RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/140  
 
21 October  2021 
(21-7967) Page: 1/92 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
8 AND 9  JULY  2021 
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR LUNDEG PUREVSUREN  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG , or the Council) was convened by  
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/1 9; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/ 795. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following modified agenda , as 
detailed below : 
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TR ADE AGREEMENTS:  ................................ ...................  4 
2   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000,  
BENEFITS PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  ................................ ................................ .........................  4 
3   EUROPEAN UNION – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER EXTENSION – APPLICATION OF 
AUTONOMOUS PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO THE WESTERN BALKANS  
(G/C/W/794)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  9 
4   PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER WTO  AGREEMENTS – ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, 
COSTA  RICA, THE E UROPEAN UNION, ISRAEL, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE 
SEPARATE  CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, THE 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES  
(JOB/GC/204/REV.5 -JOB/CTG/14/REV.5)  ................................ ................................ ...... 9 
5   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY  ..............  20 
6   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL,  
CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, HONDURAS, 
JAMAICA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY 
(G/C/W/767/REV.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 22 
7   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA, AND URUGUAY  ......................  30 
8   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA,  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ .. 33 
9   INDIA – CAUSTIC SODA QUALITY CONTROL ORDER – REQUEST FROM THE  
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU  ..............  35 
10   INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU,  
KINMEN AND MATSU  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 36 
11   SRI LANKA - IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL - REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ..................  37 G/C/M/140  
 
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  12   INDIA - INDIAN STANDARDS AND IMPORT  RESTRICTION IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR (QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS): WHEEL RIMS, SAFETY GLASS, HELMET -  
REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ...........................  39 
13   INDIA - PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 - REQUEST FROM  
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  40 
14   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULS ES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND  
THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/791)  ................................ ................................ ...............  41 
15   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  43 
16   EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE  
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  45 
17   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED 
STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  46 
18   RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION  AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ..........................  50 
19   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB  
EMIRATES, THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AN D QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON  
CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, 
SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/792)  ................................ ..............  53 
20   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM  
AUSTRALIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........  56 
21   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........................  58 
22   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE  
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ...... 58 
23   CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION  AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR)  
- REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ... 61 
24   CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY 
POINT OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND  
THE UNITED  STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 65 
25   CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/790)  ................................ ......................  67 
26   MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  68 
27   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 69 
28   EUROPEAN UNION - CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
(THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM ARMENIA, THE 
KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, CHINA, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, Q ATAR,  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA  ..............................  70 
29   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  76 
30   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION 
(EU)  2018/825 – REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ...................  79 
31   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  80 G/C/M/140  
 
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  32   INDIA – MANDATORY CERTIFICATION FOR STEEL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  81 
33   INDIA - IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM  
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................  82 
34   UNITED STATES - MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 82 
35   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST 
FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  83 
36   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 83 
37   EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS  
PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ..........  84 
38   FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS AND SUBSIDIARY 
COMMITTEES: INFORMATION FROM THE CHAIR  ................................ ............................  84 
39   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  ................................ ...................  85 
40   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 89 
40.1   Extension by the European Union and the United Kingdom of the Community Steel 
Safeguard – Request from Brazil; and United Kingdom – Safeguard Measures on Certain Steel 
Products – Request from Switzerland  ................................ ................................ ..................  89 
40.2   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ...............................  92 
 
 
The Chairperson  drew the Council's attention to the communications by Ambassador Dacio  Castillo, 
Chairperson of the General Council, concerning the election of officers of the CTG's  subsidiary bodies. 
He recalled that it had been foreseen to hold an informal meeting on this issue immediately prior to 
that day's formal meeting. However, in a communication of the previous day, dated 7  July 2021, 
Ambassador Castillo had noted that it ha d been brought to his attention that additional time would 
be required for consultations, and that, as a result, the issue of the appointment of officers would 
need to remain suspended. He indicated that this item would therefore be taken up again at the 
appropriate moment, for which reason he proposed to the Council that agenda item  40, 
"Appointment of Officers to the Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in Goods: Information 
from the Chair",  be removed from the current meeting's agenda.  
 
The Chairpe rson also observed that, given the long agenda,  it would be preferable  for Members to 
keep their interventions short, if possible . He invited those Members that were planning to submit 
longer written statements for incorporation into the meeting's minutes to expressly indicate their 
intention to do so when taking the floor . To ensure transparency in the preparation of the minutes, 
the Secretariat would only reflect what had been  said at the meeting except in those cases where a 
Member had explicitly indicat ed that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
 
The delegate of Brazil  requested that the items "United Kingdom – Safeguard Measures on Certain 
Steel Products" and " European Union – Safeguard Measures on Certain Steel Products " be included 
under "Other Business".  
 
The delegate of Switzerland  also requested  that the item "United Kingdom – Safeguard Measures on 
Certain Steel Products" be included under "Other Business".  
 
The delegate of Japan  proposed the withdrawal of agenda item  34, "China – Customs Duties on 
Certain Integrated Circuits", since Japan had confirmed that the tariff at issue had been eliminated, 
as of 1  July 2021.  
 
Finally, the Chairperson informed delegations that, under agenda item "Other Business", he would 
raise the  matter of the date of the Council's next meeting.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 G/C/M/140  
 
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  1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism1, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members' notifications of new 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). He informed the CTG that 11 RTAs had been notified to the CRTA , 
as followed:  
(i) Partnership, Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the United Kingdom and 
Serbia, Goods  (WT/REG455/N/1) ; 
 
(ii) Partnership, Trade and Cooperat ion Agreement between the United Kingdom and 
Albania, Goods  (WT/REG454/N/1) ; 
 
(iii) Association Agreement between the United Kingdom and Jordan, Goods  
(WT/REG453/N/1) ; 
 
(iv) Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and Central America, Goods  
(WT/REG452/N/1) ; 
 
(v) Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus (Pacer Plus), Goods  
(WT/REG451/N/1) ; 
 
(vi) Trade Agreement between Namibia and Zimbabwe, Goods  (WT/REG450/N/1) ; 
 
(vii) Partnership, Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the United Kin gdom and 
Kosovo2, Goods  (WT/REG411/N/1/REV.1) ; 
 
(viii) Economic Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom and the 
CARIFORUM  States, Goods  (WT/REG420/N/1/ADD.1) ; 
 
(ix) Interim Agreement establishing an Economic Partnership Agreement between the 
United Kingdom and Cameroon, Goods  (WT/REG418/N/1/ADD.1) ; 
 
(x) Economic Partnership Agreement between the United Kingdom and Kenya, Goods  
(WT/REG417/N/1/ADD.1) ; 
 
(xi) Association Agreement between the European Union and Central America, Goods  
(WT/REG332/N/ 1/ADD.1) . 
 
1.2.  The Council  took note  of the information provided.  
2  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS , WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD  ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -
G/C/W/752)  
2.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of  Chad, 
on behalf of the LDC  Group.  
2.2.  The delegate of Bangladesh , speaking on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the following:  
2.3.  The LDC  Group has been arguing that the specific need for this proposal is very clear, that is, 
to correct a technical omission and nothing else. There is no need to change any rule. If the technical 
omission is corrected, the LDCs after graduation can find an equa l policy space in the  Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ( ASCM ), like the Annex  VII(b) countries, as long as their per 
capita GNI does not reach the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms for 
three  consecutive years.  The submission contained in document  WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752 has 
 
1 Documents  WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  
2 Reference to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of the United Nations Security Council 
resolution  1244 (1999).  G/C/M/140  
 
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  already received wide support , for which the  LDC Group is grateful to all Members. Without further 
repeating the supportive arguments in detail, Bangladesh  refers to its statement delivered on this 
issue, on behalf of the LDC  Group,  at the CTG 's meeting of 31 March  2021.3 
2.4.  The LDC  Group  also appreciate s the European Union's  recent bilateral  engagement . For its part, 
the LDC Group has provided its responses to the  EU's queries. On the other hand, the L DC Group  
addressed  questions to the EU during the CTG 's meeting of 31 March  2021. The LDC Group looks 
forward to engaging further with the EU on this issue.  The LDC  Group also thanks the delegation of 
the United States for its queries , including on the justification of the present submission to correct 
a technical omission , and the availability of GNI per capita data for LDCs. At the CTG's meeting of 
31 March  2021, the  LDC Group answered these queries with explanations and examples ; it also 
provided United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs ( UNDESA ) and World Bank data 
sources. The LDC Group is open to engage further with the United States if it has any additional 
queries or concerns.  
2.5.  In conclusion, the LDC  Group requests the CTG to accept the current submission. Bangladesh, 
along with the LDC  Group itself, stands ready to engage constructively with Members  to this end . 
2.6.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
2.7.  Nepal wishes to associate itself with the statement delive red by Bangladesh,  on behalf of the 
LDC Group.  In addition, Nepal notes that the  criteria set for eligibility of graduation cover human 
development, economic development, and economic risk factor s. Meeting only two of these criteria 
allows countries to be eligible for graduation. It then  becomes possible for a country to graduate 
without meeting the per capita income threshold.  In this context, a graduated LDC may have a low 
level of GNP  per capita and meet the eligibility requirements of Annex  VII(b) of th e ASCM.  However, 
such a graduating Member may not benefit from the flexibility of export incentives as per the 
provision laid down in the Agreement because of its graduation , even if  it meets the eligibility of the 
provision.  This is an unfair situation arising from a lacuna in the WTO  law that requires an adjustment  
to be made . 
2.8.  LDC graduation is a global target , set by global leaders collectively , and a target to be achieved 
on the basis of  a common responsibility . Therefore, enabling and encou raging LDC graduation by 
extending maximum possible support to LDCs before and after their graduation , and doing so  in a 
just manner , has become an urgent need to meet the global target of timely LDC graduation.  The 
provision of the Agreement seems focused  on the level of economic development, in particular 
GNP per capita.  Therefore, this provision needs to be applied in a fair manner by allowing Members 
to enjoy the same level of benefits as others, even after their graduation, if they meet the criteria 
of incentives as per the provision and spirit of the Agreement.  
2.9.  The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
2.10.  Turkey  thank s Chad for placing  this proposal on the agenda of this meeting. Turkey' s support 
for this proposal continues as stated at previous mee tings of the CTG . 
2.11.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
2.12.  Brazil reiterates its support for the LDC proposal to amend Annex  VII of the A SCM, to allow 
graduated LDCs whose GDP  per capita remains below USD  1,000 to continue to live up to  the rules 
of Article  27.2(a).  
2.13.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
2.14.  The United States  thank s Bangladesh for its comments. The United States has  carefully 
reviewed Bangladesh' s statement from the CTG 's March meeting and would like to r espond to several 
points, most importantly on the issue of data , which the United States wishes to emphasize is not a 
minor technical matter.  
 
3 G/C/M/139, paragraphs  8.2-8.5. G/C/M/140  
 
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  2.15.  Indeed, the United States  asks Bangladesh to put aside its insistence that this proposal would 
merely correct a te chnical omission and that it would not create a new S&D  benefit for LDCs. These 
claims cannot be reconciled with the facts and do not help us to begin a constructive conversation. 
The criteria in Annex  7A and Annex  7B were deliberate choices. In addition , the proposal under 
consideration would clearly create an S&D  benefit that does not exist today.  
2.16.  Turning to the issue of data, it is important to emphasize that this is not a minor technical 
matter. Rather, it is important to the US  understanding and its th orough consideration of this 
proposal. In March, Bangladesh stated that "UNDESA regularly estimates the GNI per capita for all 
developing countries , including LDCs ", and it provided a weblink. Bangladesh also stated that the 
"World Bank also regularly upda tes GNI per capita data for all LDCs in 2010 constant USD ", and it 
again provided a weblink.  Unfortunately, neither of these sources uses the methodology called for 
in this proposal , namely  GNI per capita in constant 199 0 US dollars , as calculated in accor dance with 
the methodology set out in document  G/SCM/38.  The United States has attempted to follow those 
procedures to produce the necessary calculations and has consulted with the Secretariat  in this 
regard;  however, the United States has run into some challenges due to the missing data.  
2.17.  In light of this, the United States  would like to ask the  Secretariat of the  Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Committee ) to provide a table for Members showing 
the GNI  per capita for all WTO  Members, in accordance with the methodology  set out  in 
document  G/SCM/38. The table should appear as it does in document  G/SCM/110/Add.18, the 
annual Secretariat Note that updates GNI  per capita for Members listed in Annex VII(b) . It should 
provide GNI  per capita at constant 1990  US dollars and current dollars for each Member for the most 
recent three  years for which data is available.  The United States asks the Secretariat of the 
SCM Committee  to circulate the table t o Members once it has been prepared. And the United States  
looks forward to reviewing it.  
2.18.  Finally, the United States  would like to return to the issue of subsidy notifications. As the 
United States has  stated in the past, the fact that many of the proponents have not notified their 
subsidy program mes, as per their WTO  obligations, affects the US  view of this proposal.  Bangladesh,  
in particular , has citied capacity constraint s as the reason it has never made its required notifications.  
However, this is not persuasive.  The government  of Bangladesh  has provided detailed information 
on its subsidies to an international organization , but it was the United Nations , not the WTO. 
Bangladesh indicated to the UN that it provides cash incentives to promote exports for 35 different 
products, ranging from 2 % to 20% of f.o.b. export value. In 2019, this amounted to  USD 537 million 
as cash incentives to exporte rs. How can Bangladesh provide this information to the UN, but not to 
the WTO? What assurance can Bangladesh provide Members that it is committed to fulfilling its 
transparency obligations at the WTO, including with respect to the SCM  Agreement?  
2.19.  The delega te of the European Union  indicated the following:  
2.20.  The European Union  would like to thank the LDC  Group , and in particular Bangladesh,  for 
their presentation and informal engagement.  The European Union  supports constructive initiatives 
to better integrate L DCs into the multilateral trading system. The EU  encourage s discussing this 
proposal – and any Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) proposal – on the basis of analysis that 
shows where specific problems lie.  The European Union's  views as expressed at previous  meetings 
remain, and in particular that greater  knowledge of the facts, especially regarding the use of export 
subsidies, would help to inform these discussions.  Bearing in mind the opportunities for 
WTO technical assistance  via the WTO  Secretaria t, and irrespective of the question of appropriate 
notifications, the European Union  recall s its suggestion that the LDC  Group make a presentation on 
how LDCs make use of export subsidies and how that helps their economic development.  The 
European Union  support s the request from the United States for support from the Secretariat on the 
data side.  The European Union  stands ready to engage in informal consultations with the LDC  Group 
on this matter.  
2.21.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
2.22.  India's deleg ation thank s the delegation of Chad for the inclusion of this item  on the Council's 
agenda . India has supported this proposal in earlier meetings of the CTG. India's stan ce on this issue 
remains the same.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  2.23.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
2.24.  The LDC  Group thanks those delegations that have spoken on this issue, and particularly 
those delegations that have supported its submission.  In addition, the LDC  Group  thank s the 
European Union  and the United States for their comments , as this is a discussion that the LDC  Group 
would like to continue . Both the EU and the US have commented on the important issue of the use 
of export subsidies by LDCs  and there are two  points that should be clear . First, that it was the 
WTO Secretariat that calculates the GNI  per capita, not the UN. Second,  the use of export subsidies 
that the US and the EU have mentioned  was a different issue that should not be a precondition  for 
these discussions. This is not a subject relevant to this discussion , which  aims to correct a technical 
omission and to create equal opportunities for LDCs after graduation as long as their GNI per capita 
does not reach the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms for three  consecutive 
years.  
2.25.  The United States  has also asked about the GNI  calculation methodology issue in relation to 
the data sources provided at the CTG 's meeting of 31 March  2021. The LDC  Group clarifies that 
neither the UNDESA  nor the World Bank updates the eligibility of Members listed in Annex  VII(b) of 
the ASCM. Using the World Bank data, the WTO  Secretariat calculates the GNI according to the 
methodology set out  in Appendix  2 to document  G/SCM/38. Since the only qualificati on for inclusion 
in the Annex  VII(a) list is whether or not a Member is an LDC, the GNI  per capita data for LDCs are 
not required in this context. Nevertheless , the Secretariat is regularly updating the eligibility of the 
Annex  VII(b) countries , and the LD C Group appreciate s the Secretariat 's work in this regard . In 
addition, the LDC  Group  trusts that , when an LDC graduate s from the LDC  category, the 
WTO Secretariat can easily access the World Bank data in order to estimate the GNI  per capita of 
that LDC in  constant 1990 US dollar terms,  as per the current practice.  
2.26.  The LDC  Group looks forward to engaging further with the United States  and the European 
Union on this issue.  
2.27.  The delegate of Chad indicated the following:  
2.28.  After the intervention by the delegate o f Bangladesh, who expressed the position of the 
LDC Group, Chad wanted to reinforce what was said. The LDC  Group's  position has been on the table 
for some time now. The LDC  Group was simply seeking to stress the essence of this proposal for 
which it sought  a Decision at the General Council level. As had been noted by Bangladesh, what was 
important for the LDC  Group was to ensure that the more favourable treatment provided for 
developing  countries  in the context of Annex  VII(b) of the SCM  Agreement was also applicable to 
LDCs if their GNI  per capita did not exceed USD 1,000. Those LDCs that have graduated should be 
able to benefit from these benefits. The COVID -19 pandemic has exacerbated the already difficult 
situation in which most LDCs found themselves, making it difficult to graduate. And even those 
countries that we re able to do so should be able to benefit. The proposal is not dogmatic , but rather 
is pragmatic.  Chad hope s to be able to continue the discussions with a view to finding a solution. 
What is important to keep in mind is that graduated LDCs should not be worse off than developing 
countries in the context of the SCM  Agreement. The LDC  Group  believe s that this  issue is derived 
from an omission and agree s to update the data. The situation in the LDCs is catastrophic. The GDP 
is expected to contract by 2.6% in 2020 , and that figure is expected to be worse for 2021. 
LDC countries will know the worst economic  performance over the past 30  years, where the majority  
of LDCs will see their GDP  per capita be reduce d. The number of people hit by extreme poverty in 
LDCs will grow to 32  million in 2020 and will probably increase again  in 2021. Thus, the poverty rate 
will increase from 32.5% to 37.7% as a result of the crisis resulting from the COVID -19 pandemic. 
The LDC  share in world trade was 1% and will probably decrease as a result of the health crisis. 
LDCs are in an extremely difficult situation and do not  know w hat the future will bring. This is why 
the proposal underline s an issue that has to be correct ed. The LDC  Group  calls upon Member s to 
understand the situation in which they find themselves, especially those LDCs that will be graduating, 
and the difficulties that they will need to overcome. Chad agreed with the EU and the US and was 
ready to find the correct data on which the Secretariat could undertake the necessary work.  The 
LDC Group  calls on Members' understanding so that this pragmati c and realistic proposal can be 
considered favourably and approved by the General Council.  
2.29.  The Chairperson  asked Chad to confirm that they could agree  to a request  to the Secretariat 
to update the data , as had been proposed by the United States.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  2.30.  The delega te of Chad indicated the following:  
2.31.  It would perhaps be better to ask the delegate of Bangladesh to respond to this specific issue 
but, in principle, Chad sees no problem in asking the Secretariat to undertake this work on the basis 
of the US  proposal. Cha d has no objection. However, Chad  would prefer that Bangladesh  to respond 
to the question , it being the focal point on this issue . 
2.32.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
2.33.  The Secretariat regularly updates th ese data for eligible countries under  Annex  VII(b)  of the 
SCM Agreement , but the LDC  Group is  not sure of the objective of the US question. Earlier, 
Bangladesh had proposed two  resources to respond to the question that had been raised by the 
United States at the Council's previous meeting concerning data for LDCs. The Secretariat had its 
own way of compiling such data based on the clearly defined method contained in the relevant 
Decision. Bangladesh understood that the only qualification in order to belong to Annex  VII was 
whether the relevant Members were LDCs or not, and this is why the LDCs' GNI per capita were not 
required in this context. And this  is why the Secretariat did not  calculate it. Bangladesh understood 
that the Secretariat was doing its job and issuing the reports regularly , as provided for in the 
decisions.  
2.34.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
2.35.  First, the United States would like to respond to Ba ngladesh's comments concerning subsidy 
notifications , where the stance by the proponents would not help to move forward this proposal . A 
fundamental aspect to this proposal is trust. Trust that Members who would receive this benefit are 
transparent and wil l take advantage of that benefit. Bangladesh has cited capacity constrain ts as 
the reason why many LDCs have never submitted a subsidy notification for over 25  years at this 
point, and the US would ask whether they are working with the Secretariat to overc ome these 
challenges and provide these notifications. Second, on the US  request to have information from the 
Secretariat, Bangladesh asks why these data would be needed. The US would like to reiterate the 
request and the helpfulness towards moving forward the discussions , and thanks  Chad for their 
support in getting more information.  
2.36.  The delegate of Chad indicated the following:  
2.37.  Chad would like to thank the United States  for its reaction on the explication that was provided 
by the focal point. Chad support s the views of Bangladesh. The LDC  Group  sees no inconvenience 
with having more transparency, and the US was right that trust has to be there. It would not be 
possible to move forward without trust , and this  is why the LDC  Group sees no inconvenience  in 
having more transparency . The Secretariat already does some work in this area, but this does not 
bring too much light on the issue. If it is necessary to update the data to increase the visibility 
regarding what is happening with the q uestion, the LDC  Group has no objection. But the LDC  Group  
needs to discuss what the orientation of the data will be , and how it would be collected, analysed , 
and interpreted. So, the LDC  Group  agree s to update the data as this will help to clarify the sit uation 
and perhaps help the discussions to evolve and move forward. The LDC  Group is  open and not closed 
on this issue. Together we will be able to find a solution. The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened  the 
situation for LDCs, so even the Members that should be reclassified according to the UN calculations 
of last year  have seen their economic situation worsen. The situation is difficult for LDCs and this 
has made it difficult for them to get out of the LDC  category. Some flexibility from Members in this 
regar d, including the US and EU, will help us to reach consensus. Chad thank s Members for the 
elements that have been provided and stands  ready to keep working to find a mutually agreeable 
solution.  
2.38.  The Chairperson  encouraged Members to keep engaging on this is sue and recalled that 
notifications were an important component of the transparency function of the WTO.  He fully 
understood the challenges faced by LDCs to notify, including lack of technical capacity and 
knowledge. He encouraged the LDC  Group to continue  talking to Members.  
2.39.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  3  EUROPEAN UNION – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER EXTENSION – APPLICATION OF 
AUTONOMOUS PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO THE WESTERN BALKANS (G/C/W/794)  
3.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union.  
3.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
3.3.  On 25  June 2021, the European Union submitted a request to extend the waiver for the 
application of autonomous preferential treatment to the Western Balkans , contained in 
document  G/C/W/794.  The waiver had been  initially granted on 8  December  2000. It had been 
subsequently extended on three  occasions through decisions of the General Council adopted in 2006, 
2011, and 2016. In December  2016, the General Council adopted a decision to extend the waiver 
until 31  December  2021.  
3.4.  The request to extend the WTO  waiver permitting autonomous trade preferences to the 
Western Balkans is justified considering the persistent difficult economic situation  in the region , and 
that the preferential treatment to eligible products the European Union affords to these countries is 
intended to promote economic development in a manner consistent with the objectives of 
GATT  1994, and not to create barriers to the tr ade of other WTO  Members. More details are set out 
in the request contained in document  G/C/W/794.  In light of these elements, the European Union  
therefore requests an extension of the waiver from the provisions of Article  I:1 and Article  XIII of 
the GATT  1994 for an additional five  years, namely until 31  December  2026, as set out in 
document  G/C/W/794. The European Union  calls upon WTO  Members to support this request.  
3.5.  The Council took note  of the statement made  and agreed  to forward the draft decision to the 
General Council for adoption . 
4  PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER WTO  AGREEMENTS – ARGENTINA, AU STRALIA, CANADA, 
COSTA  RICA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, ISRAEL, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE 
SEPARATE  CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES (JOB/GC/204/REV.5 -JOB/CTG/14/REV.5)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Chinese 
Taipei , the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
4.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
4.3.  On behalf of the co -sponsors, the United States  appreciate s the opportunity to update the 
Council on their efforts to advance the proposal on Procedures to Enhance Transparency and 
Strengthen Notification Requirements, which has b een submitted to the Council as revised 
document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.5.  The Council  will recall that, at the CTG 's meeting in May of this year, 
the co -sponsors committed to undertak ing outreach to Members to learn more about their 
experiences with notifications , their needs with regard to submitting notifications, and their ideas on 
how the proposal could be improved. Since that time, the co -sponsors have worked hard to connect 
with Members and gather their input. Members have been exceptionally thoughtful and c onstructive 
in providing their feedback. The changes in this revision are aimed at being directly responsive to 
the needs and perspectives of Members and at crafting a proposal that benefits all.  
4.4.  The United States  would like to take this opportunity to ack nowledge and thank the 
co-sponsors, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Israel, Japan, 
New Zealand, Chinese Taipei, and the United Kingdom,  for the work that they have put in to improve 
upon and advocate for this proposal.  The Uni ted States thinks that the Council will agree that this 
revision is very different from the last; it is clearer, more concise, and includes a number of 
significant changes that reflect ideas shared during outreach. The co -sponsors  thank Members for 
their w illing engage ment and for sharing these good ideas.  
4.5.  The United States  would like to highlight some of the key changes incorporated into this 
version.  Significantly, financial penalties have been completely removed as an element of G/C/M/140  
 
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  administrative measures. This change is a response to the concerns the co -sponsors  heard from 
many Members regarding the punitive nature of financial penalties. To be clear, the goal of the 
proposal is not to punish Members, but rather to incentivize notification compliance for th e better 
functioning of the WTO as a whole. It is the hope of the co -sponsors that this revision better reflects 
this aim.  
4.6.  In another significant change, the role of the Working Group on Notification  Obligations  has 
been expanded to include a number of spe cific opportunities for process improvements and other 
actions that would help Members to comply with their notification obligations. For example, the 
Working Group could consider the benefits of simplified notification formats, updated reporting 
requireme nts, additional training and workshops at the committee level, the use of new digital tools, 
the creation of automatic reminder emails, having a dedicated page on the WTO  website for 
notifications -related training materials, and other areas for potential i mprovements. The changes in 
this section are aimed at furthering inclusivity and responding directly to Members ' needs.  
4.7.  The co -sponsors  have also added a multi -year transition period between the time the decision 
is adopted and when administrative measures  begin to apply. This allows the Working Group to 
move swiftly and decisively in making recommendations for changes that could be instituted before 
administrative measures would ever kick in.  The revision also suggests changes to the Trade Policy 
Reviews t o include a specific focus on Members ' compliance with notification obligations, while also 
encouraging Members to use information compiled for their Trade Policy Reviews ( TPRs) in 
submitting their own notifications.  
4.8.  The section on technical assistance and capacity -building has been reordered and simplified. 
With this revision, any Member may request assistance from the Secretariat and capacity -building 
support to meet its notification obligations, and in doing so will gain an additional year  of time in 
which to submit a notification before administrative measures would apply. This is an 
acknowledgement that there can be many reasons for a Member to be late on its notifications.  
4.9.  Beyond entirely removing the financial penalties from the proposal , the co -sponsors have  taken 
further steps to make the administrative measures more proportionate. For example, the 
co-sponsors have  moved the administrative measure regarding opportunities to preside over 
WTO bodies from Phase  1 to Phase  2. The co -sponsor s have also added a clause by which Members 
can request exemption from Phase  2 measures by appealing to the relevant committee.  As before, 
the LDC Members  continue to be fully exempt from administrative measures provided they request 
assistance and keep Me mbers informed of their status.  
4.10.  In addition, a  new footnote was added to clarify the non -retroactive nature of the proposal. 
Notifications which were due before the proposal takes effect will not be subject to administrative 
measures any sooner than one  year after the transition period ends, in line with all other 
notifications.  Significantly, the transition period would apply equally to all notifications, meaning that 
no particular notification would be carved out or granted extra time. Rather, all notific ations would 
be subject to administrative measures after the same amount of time following the relevant 
notification deadline.  
4.11.  The aim of the co -sponsors has always been to encourage the timely submission of 
notifications, which is not only critical to res toring the WTO 's negotiating  function and reaffirming 
the Organization 's core principles, but also has practical benefits for the entire WTO  Membership. 
The co -sponsors  feel strongly that the revisions that the United States has described can do just 
that. 
4.12.  The co -sponsors  believe that the updated proposal now strikes the right balance between 
incentives and administrative measures that can lead to improved compliance and greater 
transparency. And the co -sponsors  welcome Members ' reactions  to this updated pr oposal . As 
Members  advance towards the Ministerial meeting, the co -sponsors would welcome Members' 
support for this initiative to reinforce transparency as a core of principle for the effective functioning 
of the WTO.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  4.13.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.14.  The European Union  fully supports the introduction by the United States and takes from 
previous debates that views converge around the fact that transparency is crucial. However , the 
facts show that the level of compliance wi th notification requirements can be improved.  This proposal 
recognizes the difficulties that Members are facing in comply ing fully with the notification 
requirements and provides practical tools to help Members provide timely notifications. The current 
revision takes account of the comments and concerns expressed by Members and includes 
meaningful changes as laid out by the United States . 
4.15.  Admittedly , improving on notifications will require efforts from all Members. The c o-sponsors 
have shown, including thro ugh this revision, that they  too are willing to do their part ; all notifications 
are now subject to the same treatment.  The c o-sponsors are mindful that Members need time and 
appropriate flexibilities to improve. This is why the revised proposal includes t ransition periods and 
provides for various opportunities for Members facing  challenges in notifying , as well as specific 
flexibilities for LDCs . The proposal also provides for an in -depth review and possible improvement 
of the existing tools and opportunit ies at Members ' disposal to submit the relevant notifications.  
4.16.  Therefore , the European Union  believe s that this updated proposal now provides the right 
means to reach Members'  collective objective of improving transparency. The European Union  looks 
forward  to engaging with Members on that basis.  
4.17.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
4.18.  The United Kingdom  remains committed to improving transparency as part of the wider 
WTO reform debate. Working collaboratively with the Membership on the n otification proposal is key 
to this.  The United Kingdom  thank s Members for their constructive contributions during outreach in 
recent months, which co-sponsors have been careful to reflect in this new revision. The UK  hopes 
that Members can now feel encouraged to sponsor  the proposal  in recognition of the tangible benefits 
which improved notification compliance can bring to businesses and the multilateral system. The 
co-sponsors  have ensured that this revision does not disad vantage LDCs and developing countries 
with capacity constraints, and that technical assistance and capacity -building remain integral  to it. 
4.19.  The co -sponsors  do, of course , remain open to any additional feedback and engagement to 
enhance the proposal further, particularly from developing Members.  The United Kingdom  welcomes 
the positive direction in which the proposal is moving and looks forward to progressing with it  furthe r. 
4.20.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
4.21.  Argentina would like to add its voice to the statements that have been made by other 
co-sponsors  and underline a few points . Argentina  believe s that the entire Membership, without 
exception, agrees that  the upcoming WTO  Ministerial Conference should be the place where 
Members  reaffirm, at the highest level , and with specific outcomes, the principles, objectives , and 
relevance of the Organization , and the centrality of a rules-based multilateral trading s ystem . 
Argentina  consider s that the draft decision on Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen 
Notification Requirements  is a significant contribution to this end because it will allow Members  to 
reaffirm their commitment to working together to ensure the multilateral trading system's  proper 
functioning, given Members' belief that a predictable, transparent, non -discriminato ry, and open 
global trading system is essential for a broad -based, sustainable , and inclusive economic recovery.  
4.22.  Transparency with respect to Members' trade measures is critically important and allows the 
entire Membership and other Members individually , to make decisions collectively based on accurate 
and timely information.  As Members  will have seen, the draft text has taken on board virtually all 
the suggestions and concerns raised by different Members , and its balance has changed significantly. 
While ad ministrative measures remain in place against failure to submit notifications within the 
applicable deadlines, this new version recognizes the difficulties that some Members are facing in 
complying fully with the notification requirements and places emphas is on technical assistance and 
capacity -building, thus improving the system as a whole.  
4.23.  For these reasons, as well as for the reasons expressed by other co -sponsors of this proposal , 
Argentina invite s all Members to consider supporting this proposal as Members move towards MC12.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  4.24.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
4.25.  This revision reflects substantial comments and feedback received from Members to date. The 
co-sponsors  expect that the revised proposal is basically acceptable to Members that recogniz e a 
need for improving notification compliance and enhancing transparency.  The co -sponsors  especially 
hope that the future work done by the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures , 
as included in the revised proposal , will help Members ' efforts to improve  their notification 
compliance . The co -sponsors  would like to stress that it is fundamental for the functioning of the 
WTO to receive notifications properly from Members. The co -sponsors  believe that the support of all 
Members for this prop osal will help towards restoring the WTO 's functions.  Therefore, Japan, with 
other co -sponsors, is hoping to see wider support for this proposal.  
4.26.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
4.27.  As the United States has explained, Members will note that this latest version, as circulated 
in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.5 , has included significant changes in many areas that reflect 
comments heard in this Council . While the common objective remains the same, the co -sponsors  
are of the view that this updated version now strikes a better balance between the notification 
obligation s and the incentive for improving compliance in the case of genuine capacity constraints.  
4.28.  Chinese Taipei wishes  to briefly share its own perspective on t his revised version.  Firstly, 
Chinese Taipei  recognize s that capacity constraints , or any other legitimate difficulties faced by 
Members in meeting their obligations under the current notification requirements, will be addressed 
before administrative measu res begin to apply. The revised version of the proposal therefore 
instructs the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures to identify the systemic 
problems that relate to notification compliance and to come up with its recommendations in thi s 
regard within two  years. Those recommendations could lead to specific improvements, such as 
adopting simplified notification formats, rationalizing notification deadlines , or introducing new 
digital tools, all with a view to helping Members in the area o f compliance. While the Working Group 
is engaged in the process of reviewing notification challenges, no administrative measures will be 
applied before 2025 or 2026. Therefore, if this proposal is adopted by 2021, it will give Members a 
further  three  to four years to adjust before the administrative measures come into force. Chinese 
Taipei  would encourage Members in the meantime to use this period to thoroughly review the 
relevant notification requirements, and to seek the necessary technical assistance to overcome all 
the difficulties.  
4.29.  Secondly, Chinese Taipei  appreciate s the view shared among co -sponsors that any Member, 
regardless of its development level, may encounter difficulties in fulfilling specific notification 
requirements. The scope of paragraph  9 of the revised version of the proposal is thus broadened by 
replacing "developing country Member " with "a Member ". Such revision would allow any Member 
one additional year to prepare its notification before administrative measures kicked in when 
assistan ce regarding notification -related capacity -building is being requested.  
4.30.  Thirdly, in the revised proposal, the financial penalty has been removed. Chinese Taipei and 
the other co -sponsors did not want this measure to become an impediment to gaining Members'  
broader support. With this revision, therefore, Chinese Taipei and the other co -sponsors  are hoping 
that Members will view administrative measures simply as a mild reminder to reaffirm the existing 
notification commitment s to which  all Members agreed when they acceded to the WTO.  
4.31.  Finally, Chinese Taipei  remains fully committed to the work of enhancing transparency and 
improving notification compliance. Chinese Taipei  firmly believe s that Members ' collective efforts 
and constructive engagement in  relation to this proposal will pave the way to improving one of the 
WTO's  key functions.  
4.32.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
4.33.  New Zealand  welcomes the statements made by co -sponsors and continues to support and 
this proposal as a means of improving transparency and notifications as a fundamental part of the 
WTO's work.  New Zealand  would like to acknowledge the efforts of Members in engaging and 
updating the proposal , as previously laid out by the United States . As other co -sponsors have 
outlined, the revised proposal  seeks to address the concerns and comments Members have raised G/C/M/140  
 
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  in past CTG  meetings. In particular, the proposal seeks to identify areas where further guidance and 
assistance may be required to assist Members with meeting their existing notification requirements 
under respective WTO  Agreements.  New Zealand  invite s Members to consider these changes with a 
view to making constructive and meaningful progress.  
4.34.  The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
4.35.  Costa Rica considers t ransparency to be a fundamental principle and a public good for the 
proper functioning of the multilateral trading system. This is a matter of individual responsibility and 
collective commitment given that, without timely access to information, the WTO 's monitoring and 
negotiating functions are weakened, and the risk of trade conflicts and frictions grows. The WTO is 
performing a task which, performed otherwise, would be available to just a few. Hence the value of 
strengthening these mechanisms and ensuring  proper compliance.  
4.36.  The revised proposal has undergone many changes that have already been well explained by 
previous delegations. That said, Costa Rica consider s it relevant to highlight the wide recognition of 
the difficulties that Members could face in meeting their notification requirements , and the 
importance given to technical assistance, cooperation , and building national notification capacities. 
In this connection, the proposal offers appropriate incentives for enhancing the role and efficiency 
of assistance and support for building the Secretariat 's capacity, reinforced by a procedure for 
reviewing and updating notifications through the Working Group on Notifications.  
4.37.  Costa Rica  cannot overemphasize the  revised proposal's  significant changes in the area of 
administrative measures, as well as the revised treatment of notifications on agriculture. In this 
regard, t he co -sponsors have taken note of the comments and constructive feedback that they 
received on the proposal duri ng the many consultations held.  
4.38.  In conclusion, Costa Rica urges all Members to support the proposal , and to help to improve 
it further, so that it becomes a tool for effectively strengthening the WTO 's transparency pillar.  
4.39.  The delegate of Israel  indicated the following:  
4.40.  Transparency is of critical importance to the system's overall functioning and appears to be a 
matter of  common interest to practically all WTO  Members. The proposal's latest revision, which is 
substantial, considers many of the concerns rai sed by Members during previous discussions. I srael 
urges all Members to consider supporting it.  For its part, Israel stands ready to continue its close 
collaboration with the proposal's current co-sponsors and those Members interested in joining them 
as co-sponsors.  
4.41.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
4.42.  Australia remains steadfastly committed to working with other WTO  Members to achieve 
greater transparency as part of WTO  reform and to reinforce the WTO 's monitoring function. 
Fundamentally, all  WTO Members have an obligation to notify consistent with their commitments. 
Australia will continue working with the other co-sponsors of this proposal to address chronically low 
compliance rates for notifications in balanced, practical , and effective ways. Australia  welcome s the 
proposal's latest revision and urge s other WTO  Members to consider co -sponsoring it.  
4.43.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
4.44.  Canada wishes to highlight Chinese Taipei 's comments concerning paragraph  3 of the updated 
proposal . Canada has  gone through the minutes of past meetings, and one of the threads that runs 
throughout is the call to take the time to go through a comprehensive review of notification 
requirements with a view to finding ways to improve , simplify , and find new ways for Members to 
provide the information required of them under the WTO  Agreements. In addition , a number of 
delegates over the years  have mentioned the notification requirements as being a fundamental 
element or pil lar of the multilateral trading system . In Canada's view , what the co-sponsors have 
done is try to highlight this effort , including in relation to  the specific  elements in para graph  3 of the 
proposal , which  provide a forum to examine those issues, and an avenue to reach out to committees 
to see what they have done in recent years to improve their notification procedures . Members can  
then come up with recommendations that we can all support to ensure that all are able to fulfil the ir G/C/M/140  
 
- 14 - 
 
  notification  requirements , including helping Capital -based staff to understand and receive assistance 
on what is required under the agreements , as well as training for delegates here in Geneva to help 
them supply that information onward to the Secretariat.  
4.45.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
4.46.  Brazil thanked the co -sponsors for their revised version of the proposal on transparency and 
notifications, as well as for the constructive engagement in the discussions. It will continue to be 
analysed  by the Brazilian government . 
4.47.  The delegate of Singapore  indicated the following:  
4.48.  Singapore is pleased to announce that it became a co-sponsor of the fifth  revision of this 
proposal.  Singapore has long placed importance on the ro le played by notifications to the WTO to 
improve the transparency of Members ' trade regimes and facilitate trade, and Singapore believe s 
that this proposal will contribute to those aims.  The proposal's fifth  revision , which contains 
significant amendments,  strikes the right balance between providing technical assistance to help 
Members meet their notification obligations, and incentivizing them to do so.  In particular, Singapore 
welcome s the enhanced attention given to technical assistance and capacity -building, particularly in 
the enhanced and improved paragraph  3. Singapore looks forward to working with all Members to 
make progress on this proposal.  
4.49.  The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
4.50.  The Republic of Korea appreciates the propone nts' efforts to enhance transparency at the 
WTO.  Indeed, Korea shares the common belief of the WTO  Membership that transparency is vital as 
it contributes to creating and maintaining a stable and predictable environment for trade, especially 
during the COV ID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, it  is the duty of each Member to enhance transparency 
by fulfilling its notification obligation s under the various WTO  Agreements. Therefore, Korea 
welcomes this proposal and supports its main thrust.  
4.51.  The Republic of Korea  also recognizes the co -sponsors ' effort s to strike the right balance 
between the imperative need to enhance transparency through strengthened disciplines and the 
need to address the difficulties certain Members face in complying fully with the ir notificat ion 
requirements, including by removing the proposed financial measures on the assessed annual 
contribution of the Member concerned. Notification is without doubt important, but the 
administrative means to facilitate that should be proportionate. In this r egard, Korea  welcome s this 
positive move and look s forward to seeing an early consensus on this subject.  
4.52.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
4.53.  Paraguay thank s the proponents of this document 's latest revision . Paraguay also  welcome s 
the many po sitive changes that definitely improve the proposed text and move it towards a better 
and more balanced path that could lead to the consensus need ed for its adoption.  All the changes 
introduced are currently being studied in Capital but, as a preliminary c omment, Paraguay  would 
like to note a key element among those  change s, namely the equal treatment of all notifications, 
which Paraguay  has been calling for from the outset with respect to this proposed text. Paraguay  
also note s the elimination of financial  penalties as another demonstration of flexibility that is moving 
the proposal in the right direction.  Paraguay  will continue engaging  with the proponents , both within 
and outside the Council , with a view to present ing some additional ideas to improve the proposed 
text and to enable it to continue moving towards its possible adoption at the next Ministerial 
Conference.  
4.54.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
4.55.  Colombia would like to thank the proponents for upda ting this document , as well as the 
introduction by the United States and the other co -sponsors . The changes introduced are very 
positive. The new proposed text is definitely more balanced , and Colombia  believe s that it has the 
basic elements to enable Memb ers to reach the consensus need ed for its adoption.  Colombia stands 
fully ready to participate in , and contribute to , the discussions needed to reach such a consensus.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  4.56.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
4.57.  Uruguay thanks the co -sponsors for subm itting a fifth revision of this proposed text and for 
the explanations provided through bilateral channels.  Uruguay  wishes to acknowledge the 
improvements over previous versions included in the proposed text, in particular the removal of the 
unequal treatm ent for DS:1  notifications in agriculture and the monetary penalties from the list of 
Phase  2 administrative measures.  
4.58.  Uruguay has conveyed its views on some of these points to the proponents where, in its 
opinion, more work and some additional adjustments  might be required in order to have a proposed 
text with the right balance and tone to ensure its agreement at the multilateral level.  Uruguay hopes 
to continue constructive exchanges on this issue with the proponents, but also with the rest of the 
Members hip, with a view to achieving concrete and balanced results aimed at genuinely improving 
transparency in the WTO and ensuring compliance by all Members.  
4.59.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
4.60.  Switzerland thanks the co -sponsors for this substa ntially revised version. Previous iterations 
of the proposal contained a financial sanction that appeared to be counterproductive in fulfilling the 
objective of improving compliance with notification obligations.  In this fifth  revision , Switzerland 
appreciate s and thank the co -sponsors for the removal of the financial sanction s. 
4.61.  At the same time, Switzerland  wishes to reiterate the importance of transparency. Respecting 
our notification obligations is a prerequisite to an effective monito ring of each other 's trade policies, 
a key pillar of the WTO.  At present , there is room to improve the rate of compliance with notification 
obligations. Pursuant to this objective, the current  proposal offers a pragmatic and effective 
mechanism. Enhancing transparency in the broad sense would also contribute to rebuilding trust 
between Members.  Switzerland would like to express its support for this revised version and stands 
ready to co -sponsor the proposal.  
4.62.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following : 
4.63.  Indonesia thanks the proponent s for the proposal's latest revision and appreciates their efforts 
to increase transparency and notification compliance in the WTO.  Indonesia underlines the 
importance of transparency as one of the main pillars, and as one o f the fundamental norms , of the 
multilateral trading system. Transparency provides Members with equal access to information on 
prevailing laws, regulations, measures, and policies that effectively regulate our practice of 
international trade.  
4.64.  Indonesia  would like to refer to its statement from the CTG's 2020 meeting, in which 
Indonesia expressed its concern that administrative  and punitive measures would in all likelihood 
discourage the participation in the multilateral trading system of Members from develo ping countries 
and least developed countries.4 Without prejudice to the intended aim of the significant changes in 
the revised proposal, Indonesia would like to seek further clarification from the proponents regarding 
the following elements in its latest version.  
4.65.  First, how effective and relevant is it to the effort of improving a Member 's notification 
compliance  that this forum designates a Member as a "WTO  Member with Notification Delay"? And 
how effective and relevant is it to the effort of improv ing a Member 's notification compliance that 
the speaking order of a Member with a notification delay be relegated to the position  of lowest 
priority ? 
4.66.  Second, Indon esia recognizes that there is an existing and annually updated WTO factual 
report concerning the status of notification s of Members. Furthermore, there exists a mechanism,  
namely the meetings of the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB),  specifically to discuss  and review a 
Member's notification compliance . How do the initiatives in the proposal complement, or feed into, 
these existing mechanisms?  
 
4 G/C/M/137, paragraphs  7.88-7.90.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  4.67.  Third, the proposal to limit the rights of a Member with notification delay to receive responses 
to its enquiries and questions posed to Members being reviewed under the TPR  Mechanism  (TPRM)  
is inconsistent with the Rules of Procedure of the T PRB established under paragraph  C of the TPRM , 
where Members under review are obliged to respond to all written  questions as long as the questions 
have been submitted or received within the TPR M's prescribed deadlines. How then do the 
proponents foresee the implementation of the proposed initiative to discriminate the provision of 
responses?  
4.68.  Fourth, on the point of not allowing a Member with a notification delay to run for the 
chairpersonship of the various WTO  bodies, it is Indonesia' s view that all WTO  Members have similar 
rights and opportunities to nominate their representative s as chairperson s or presiding member s of 
the various WTO  bodies. With that understanding, how then do the proponents see the  proposal's  
possible threat and damage to the noble c ause of inclusiveness in Members ' participation in the 
multilateral trading system ? 
4.69.  Fifth, how has this proposal addressed the prevailing major challenges faced by developing 
countries and LDC Members in enhancing their timely fulfilment of the ir transpare ncy obligations? 
On this point, Indonesia notes that capacity  constraints have been the major root cause of delay s in 
notification s for many developing countries and LDCs, especially where there is a  limited transition 
time. 
4.70.  Nevertheless , Indonesia welcome s the previous discussions and the constructive suggestions 
that encourage Members to improve their notification compliance through increased utilization of 
technology and other meaningful resources. Indonesia considers that  such suggestions could surely 
provide possible solution s, but only once the capacity challenges faced by many Members  have been 
tackled , including through  taking advantage of the technology interface in order to simplify 
notification procedures.  
4.71.  Further discussion with related stakehold ers in Indonesia is currently taking place. Therefore, 
at present, Indonesia is  not in a position to support this proposal. Indonesia  also reserve s its right 
to provide additional  comments on the proposal once its internal consultations have been completed.  
4.72.  The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
4.73.  Chile thank s the co -sponsors , who have done something that was missing at the WTO : they 
have demonstrated a capacity to listen. And this is a prerequisite for any mu ltilateral forum. 
Members  must learn how to listen to people, to peoples, to delegations,  and to positions, and 
Members  need to find ways to accommodate those positions so that multilateralism can bear fruit. 
It took time for that listening to happen,  but they did . Chile wishes to congratulate WTO colleagues  
in this respect , especially those from Costa Rica, Argentina, and the United States, as well as those 
of all the other co -sponsors. Further to these congratulatory remarks, Chile also recalls  that this 
house is having a hard time reaching results . Therefore,  Members need to move toward s outcomes 
with flexibility . In the case of the current  proposal,  the proponents have shown great flexibility . For 
this reason , Chile is delighted to add its voice as co-sponsor to the proposal . 
4.74.  The delegate of Chad, speaking on behalf of the LDC Group , indicated the following:  
4.75.  Regarding the procedures to enhance transparency and strengthen notification requirements 
under WTO  Agree ments, Chad would like to begin by thanking the United States  and the co -sponsors 
for presenting this revised text  on matters relating, overall, to WTO  reform, and specifically to 
transparency and notification obligations.  
4.76.  Given the very nature of WTO  negotiations, the LDC  Group thinks that the aspect s of 
transparency and notification requirements  must take into account the development dimension , as 
well as the implementation capacity among developing countries, and the LDCs in particular . In 
terms of compl iance with notification obligations , the LDC  Group insists on the fact that the 
particularities of LDCs must be taken into account, especially their institutional and infrastructure  
constraints. And these difficulties are now  only worsened by the pandemic , as Members know . 
4.77.  Therefore,  LDCs are particularly concerned about  the uncertainties and risks posed in the 
context of our efforts to integrate our countries in to the world trading system , especially  given that G/C/M/140  
 
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  the additional constraints are incompatible with our level of capacity. For these reasons, Chad 
considers that  the proposal on transparency and notification  obligations should not lead to punitive 
measures for LDCs . Rather, Members  should provide further s upport to our countries in order to 
bolster our notification capacities. And the WTO  can provide additional support in terms of assisting 
LDCs to identify those notifications that are required of them so as to allow for a fuller compliance 
among LDCs with our notification obligations. And Chad does consider that , yes, it is possible to 
improve the WTO system without calling into question the balance of rights and obligations among 
Members.  
4.78.  Chad welcome s the fact that this revised text by the United States  does not include fines or 
punitive measures  but seeks rather to offer incentives . Chad considers this to be a positive 
development. Chad also sees that the role of the Working Group on Notification s is expanded , and 
also that there are other notable  changes , particularly as concerns the capacity -building proposal , 
based on Members' capacity , as well as technical  assistance . All of these are encouraging 
developments, if still insufficient.  
4.79.  Regarding the broader picture of WTO reform, Chad considers that any reform that is 
envisaged in the operation of the WTO must take into account the development dimension , as well 
as the need to grant special and differentiated treatment that is effective for LDCs, given that LDCs  
face significant in stitutional and infrastructure constraints, particularly in terms of human , financial, 
and technological  resources. During this crisis LDCs have seen , for example,  that the cost of 
IT services has grown greatly , making it difficult for LDCs  to enjoy any of  its potential trade benefits.  
4.80.  Again, for our development and our integration into global trade , LDCs need greater equity 
between our economies . For this reason,  the LDC Group will always defend the multilateral  trading 
system as well as a robust WTO. LDCs represent  only 1% of global trade and they must be in a 
position to benefit from the concrete support of WTO Members in the drafting of global trade rules, 
and also on the ground , in terms of capacity -building for exports in order to build a multilateral 
trading system that is truly inclusive and leads to positive outcomes for all.  
4.81.  LDC countries aspire to accelerate their economic and social  development through trade in 
order to overcome the poverty that affects a significant pro portion of our populations . To this end,  
the LDC Group needs a WTO that is fit for purpose . For LDCs , this means a WTO where Members 
ensure that the texts comprising its agreements help us to graduate and benefit from the  necessary  
flexibility until we are on a path to sustainable development. In this regard,  transparency , too,  is 
necessary for mutual trust. And LDCs do not want a double standard when it comes to trans parency.  
4.82.  In conclusion, M embers of the LDC  Group have already consulted with Capitals on this revised 
text and are awaiting instructions from them . We remain open to continue this discussion with the 
proponents.  
4.83.  The delegate of Norway  indicated the followi ng: 
4.84.  Norway wishes  to be added to the list of co -sponsors of this important proposal.  A rule s-based 
global trading system without transparency and openness  concerning domestic legislation and 
procedures  will quickly  become  outdated;  furthermore, it will not  create the predictability that is of 
crucial importance to cross-border trade.  In this context, Norway express es its appreciation  to the 
co-sponsors  for running an open and inclusive process leading to the proposal's current revision . In 
addition, Norway encourage s all other Members to support and join as co -sponsor s of this important 
proposal.  
4.85.  The delegate of  the Philippines  indicated the following:  
4.86.  Transparency is invaluable to the proper functioning of the rules -based multilateral trading 
system. Therefore, the Philippines  understands  the importance of improving Members' compliance 
with the basic notification obligation s under the WTO  Agreement s, and the Philippines is looking with 
interest at the revised proposal contained in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.5. In particular, the 
Philippines  notes the revisions in the proposal's latest version and  welcomes , among other  changes , 
the removal of financial penalt ies. The Philippines  also note s the flexibilities on implementation , 
those  afforded to Members that request technical assistance, and the proposed technical and 
institutional improvements to the notification exercise. The Philippines continues to study the  G/C/M/140  
 
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  evolving proposal and has transmitted its fifth  revision to Capital for further consideration. Again, 
the Philippines  thank s the proponents for their flexibility and for their continued commitment to 
engaging with  other Members  in this regard . 
4.87.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
4.88.  Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement that was delivered by Chad on behalf of the 
LDC Group . Bangladesh  thanks the United States and other co -sponsors for their submission and 
prese ntation. Bangladesh has spoken on this issue at previous CTG  meetings and has also engaged 
in an exchange of opinions during several informal meetings with Members. Bangladesh believes 
that transparency is an essential pillar of the multilateral trading sy stem and that there are many 
ways to ensure transparency , whereas the existence of  only a few notification templates cannot do 
so. 
4.89.  Bangladesh  welcomes t his submission's fifth  revision and , in particular,  thanks the proponents 
for recognizing the difficulti es of some Members , and their capacity constraints , in comply ing with 
their notification requirements. Bangladesh has  earlier pointed out that notification provisions under 
different WTO Agreements are diverse in nature , and that the capability of LDCs to notify is severely 
constrained by a lack of technical capacity and unique internal coordination challenges. The same is 
the case for the list of Agreements and Understandings that the co -sponsors mention under 
paragraph  1 of the draft decision.  
4.90.  Bangladesh  refers to the commitment made in the Marrakesh Agreement , in Article  XI:2 of 
the GATT , that LDCs "… will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the  
extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or their administrative 
and institutional capabilities ". The same has also been guaranteed in paragraph  1 of the Uruguay 
Round Ministers ' Decision on Measures in Favour of Leas t Developed Countries. The LDCs are not to 
be forced to act beyond their capacity and limitation s. 
4.91.  Bangladesh sincerely thanks  the proponents for suggesting technical assistance for those  
Members experiencing  difficulties regarding their notifications. Similarly, the  ongoing efforts of the 
WTO Secretariat to provide technical support and customized training are deeply appreciated . 
However, the reason why these initiatives cannot  already  improve the situation to an expected level  
must be investigated . In thi s regard, Bangladesh  believes  that administrative measures alone will 
not improve the situation without also practically addressing the gaps in capacity and the domestic 
coordination challenges of some Members.  Bangladesh looks forward to continuing its work with 
other Members  on this issue . 
4.92.  The delegate of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
4.93.  The Russia n Federation  would like to thank the proponents for the ir update.  The Russian 
Federation  support s the need for improving transparency at the WTO and underscore s the 
importance of timely notifications. Russia shares the opinion that arrangements on the improvement 
of notification disciplines could  significantly contribute to the efficiency of the WTO 's monitoring 
function. And Russia stands  ready to discuss this issue in a constructive manner.  
4.94.  As to the current proposal , the Russian Federation sees possibilities to find common ground 
in respect of the text. The key prerequisite for success, in Russia's  view, is to further balance out 
the proposal.  First, the Russian Federation  believe s that exclusion of the Phase  2 element of an 
additional charge to the annual contribution makes the text more agreea ble to Member s. This is 
definitely a step in the right direction.  Second , work undertaken on  enhancing the notification 
discipline s must be accompanied by collective efforts to facilitate, where possible, the work of a 
Member's authorities on preparing those notifications ; for example , the clearer the requirement as 
to notification subject, object , and format , the fewer violations of the notification disciplines there 
will be . Fewer requirements in the notification itself would also have a positive influenc e. In this 
regard, the TBT and SPS  notifications serve as good example s. The WTO  Membership should also 
further improve its assistance to developing country and LDC  Members in the area of notifications. 
There is potential for enhancing the Secretariat 's role in this regard.  
4.95.  Russia observes that some of these ideas are already incorporated in to the current draft ; 
however , Russia considers that they could be elaborated upon still further. To this end, Russia stands G/C/M/140  
 
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  ready to work on the text with the propone nts of the proposal.  In conclusion , the Russian Federation 
notes that the transparency issue in general  has become an area of work that is  even more important 
in light of the rapidly changing market access conditions against the background of the pandemic.  
There are already various proposals on the table. Russia  believe s that their consolidation could  be 
helpful in terms of shaping the scope of further work on transparency in this area in the short and 
middle  term.  
4.96.  The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the fol lowing:  
4.97.  Pakistan thanks the co -sponsors for the revised document  and emphasizes that it takes its 
own notification obligations seriously. Pakistan  believe s that transparency is a fundamental pillar of 
the WTO, which brings predictability to trade. However,  Pakistan is  still unsure about the likely 
impact of the current proposal. The problems for developing countries are compounded by severe 
capacity constraints in the form of a lack of technical training of staff, a lack of institutional capacity, 
and insuf ficient human resources. Current transparency requirements are often cumbersome, 
detailed , and not commensurate with the capacities of developing countries, which is the reason for 
the low compliance rate. Pakistan considers that many countries , including some of the developed 
countries , find it difficult to comply with their notification obligations. While all Members endeavour  
to submit all notifications in a complete and timely manner, there is no WTO Member , developed or 
developing , whose notifications are always up to date , at all times , and in all committees. This points 
to a fundamental flaw in the requirements themselves which is the root of the problem.  
4.98.  In this regard, Pakistan reiterates its view that administrative and punitive measures would 
not lead to an optimal resolution and would risk rather to be counter -productive because such an 
approach fails to address the root causes of notification non -compliance. Pakistan therefore does 
not support such an approach. Instead, Members  should look to simplify procedures, and look for 
an approach that , while recognizing the above -mentioned problems being faced by developing 
countries, provides support to su ch Members to strengthen their capacity and overcome the 
problems being faced by them.  
4.99.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
4.100.   Mexico  thank s the proponents for the revised  submission. Mexico's authorities in Capital are 
still evaluating the changes  in the revised document ; nevertheless, Mexico  would provisionally like 
to welcome the changes with respect to differentiation in notifications and the elimination of financial 
penalties. Similarly, while Mexico  agree s that there is a need to examine forma ts and other tools to 
improve Members ' notification  compliance , Mexico  still has concerns about the manner in which the 
revision of document  G/AG/2 has been presented, as the language used could prejudge the outcome 
of a possible revision.  Overall, Mexico  welcome s the changes made in this fifth revision , which Mexico 
believe s is moving in the right direction by placing more emphasis on incentives and balancing those 
against proposed penalties. Mexico  urges the proponents to continue to listen to Members'  
suggestions and concerns, as is the case in this version, so as to steer this proposal towards reaching 
a consensus among the Membership.  
4.101.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
4.102.   India appreciates the efforts made by the United States  and other co -sponsors of the 
fifth revision of this proposal  on transparency . However, India finds that the inherent principle of the 
proposal remains the same.  India finds it difficult to agree to any proposal that provides for 
administrative actions and penalties in the case of default in submitting notifications rather than 
making an effort to understand the capacity constraints and other legitimate difficulties faced by a 
large number of developing -country Members  in meeting their notification obligations under the 
WTO Agreements. What is required is not to assume a wilful default but to encourage those Members 
that are able to update their notifications despite difficulties faced, and to assist those that have not  
been able to do so because of various reasons, including capacity constraints. Although the 
fifth revision  refers to certain solution s in this direction it fails to address the problem at its root.  
Therefore, India would once again reiterate that , instead  of administrative actions and penalt ies, 
appropriate support to notify is what will encourage Members in improving their internal capacity to 
fulfil their notification obligations.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  4.103.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
4.104.   China thanks  the proponents  for providing th is updated proposal  and notes that the financial 
and punitive approach has been removed from this revision , and some transition period has been 
added in the updated proposal . In China's view, this is positive.  Nevertheless , China considers  that 
the proposal need s further discussion . China is not in a position to support punitive measures that 
would deprive a WTO  Member of its legitimate rights.  
4.105.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
4.106.   The United States recognizes those Mem bers that have announced their co -sponsorship of 
this proposal during the course of the  meeting , namely  Singapore,  Switzerland , Chile, and Norway. 
The United States is  grateful for their support and look s forward to  receiving  the support of other 
Members.  
4.107.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
TRADE CONCERNS: AGENDA ITEMS  5-37 
 
5  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATI ONS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY  
5.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Argentina and Uruguay.  
5.2.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
5.3.  As Argentina has  stated on previous occasions, its concern refers specifically to the use of the 
term "Danbo" as a protected geographical indication, but it has broader, systemic implications, 
insofar as it has a negative impact on harmonization and standardization effort s within the 
framework  of the Codex Alimentarius , undermining the predictability and consistency that  
international trade rules should have as a key factor in guiding the decision -making processes of 
Argentina's producers.  
5.4.  Indeed, the recognition and regis tration of the term Danbo as a protected geographical 
indication in favour of Denmark in the EU did not give due consideration to the Codex Alimentarius 
international reference standard for Danbo cheese , "CODEX  STAN  264 1966", which was last revised 
by tha t international body in 2008.  Under this standard, Danbo is established as the generic name 
for the product and, for labelling purposes, the name of the product is Danbo and the product's 
country of origin must be indicated. In other words, the Codex Alime ntarius clearly did not regulate 
a geographical indication, but rather regulated the generic name of a product that is produced 
globally, and not only in Denmark, under that term.  
5.5.  The protection of the name in any place other than Denmark, which the EU has done, 
constitutes an undue restriction on international trade in Danbo cheese, when it is produced in a 
place other than Denmark, as it does not take into account that the interna tional reference standard 
specifies it as the common name of the product . This is why no country should appropriate that 
name.  Therefore, given that the Codex Alimentarius is the international reference standard for the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to T rade for the identity and quality of this product, no country that 
bases its technical regulation on the Codex Alimentarius standard should encounter constraints to 
trade due to a misappropriation of the term.  
5.6.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the followin g: 
5.7.  Uruguay regrets having to include this item on the agenda again and wishes to refer to its 
previous statements5, reaffirming its concern about the European Union's decision to register the 
term "Danbo" as a protected geographical indication, despite th e objections raised by many 
Members.  Uruguay would like to provide some background on how the name emerged. Danbo cheese 
 
5 See, for example, document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  14.2-14.3. G/C/M/140  
 
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  is a semi -hard, light -coloured cheese made from cow's milk, of the so -called washed rind variety , 
which was included in the standard by  Codex . The technique for making this type of cheese was 
developed by Rasmus Nielsen, a Dane, at the end of the 19th century.  Until the middle of the 
20th century, this cheese was known as a steppe type cheese, or "Steppeost" in Danish. It was not 
until th e 1950s that the term "Danbo" came into use, when Denmark registered it under that name 
in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention (this annex allows production in other countries) and drew up 
a national standard for it.  It was Denmark itself, together with the F AO, which , from the 1960s 
onwards , promoted Danbo cheese production throughout the world through various technical 
cooperation programmes.  It was thanks to this cooperation and others that Uruguay  modernized its 
dairy industry and incorporated Danbo cheese -making techniques, becoming a net exporter of dairy 
products from the 1970s onwards.  
5.8.  In 1966, standard  264 was adopted in the Codex Alimentarius, establishing the characteristics, 
production methods , and labelling of this type of cheese. This standard has been modified several 
times, the last significant modification being in 2008, with the approval and participation of the 
European Union and its member States . For almost half a century, any  producer that complied with 
the Codex  264 standard could manufacture Danbo cheese, insofar as Article  7.2 of the standard, in 
relation to labelling, states that, "the country of origin (which means the country of manufacture, 
not the country in which the name origi nated) shall be declared".  It is therefore Uruguay's  
understanding that the term Danbo is a generic term, referring to a production process set out in a 
Codex standard, irrespective of where the term originated.  
5.9.  This is why Uruguay  consider s that the regis tration by the EU of the term Danbo as a protected 
geographical indication (which is not related to any known geographical region) constitutes the 
de facto establishment of a monopoly over a generic term, in contravention of an international 
standard that the EU  itself approved. For this reason, notwithstanding the time that has passed, 
Uruguay  maintain s its trade concern.  
5.10.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
5.11.  New Zealand sees a conflict between positions the EU has taken in standard -setting bodies 
and the actions they have taken to restrict labelling within the EU of products produced using those 
standards by producers outside of Denmark. This does not relate solely to grounds for granting or 
denying IP  protection; it also relates to the impo rtance of legal consistency, upholding internationally 
agreed standards, and not frustrating legitimate expectations of businesses operating within those 
standards.  New Zealand remains concerned that the European Commission has chosen to register 
the terms  "Danbo" and "Havarti", despite there being a Codex standard in which the European 
Commission and Denmark both acknowledged that "the country -of-origin  statement preserves its 
generic nature".  Such actions will negatively affect producers outside of Denmar k that have invested 
with the legitimate expectations that they could use the standard.  The EU's approach to registering 
cheese names for which there are existing Codex  standards disregards the integrity of the 
standards -setting system that promotes reliab ility and consistency in international trade rules, which 
New Zealand would expect the EU to support.  
5.12.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.13.  The EU  position on this issue remains as expressed in previous meetings and the EU  therefore 
refers to its previous statements.6 The EU has consistently said that the fact that a GI  name is 
subject to a specific Codex Alimentarius standard , or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa 
Convention , does not imply that the name should be considered as a common or generic term.  
Generic status in the EU can only be assessed with regard to the perception of the consumers in the 
EU territory. In the EU, the relevant public is comprised mainly of the reas onably well -informed 
members of the public and/or customers who may purchase the product or a like product.  
5.14.  Regulation (EU) No . 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 
as well as subsequent delegated and implementing acts, we re notified to the WTO under the 
TBT Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the TBT  Agreement ( for example,  provisions 
relating  to technical standards, definitions , and labelling issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual 
property rights (in par ticular, elements relating  to the substantive protection of geographical 
indications) are part of the notified measures, those are not relevant for TBT  purposes.  The EU 
 
6 See, for example, document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  14.8-14.9. G/C/M/140  
 
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  maintains that the issues under discussion belong to the very essence of the registrati on of products ' 
names as geographical indications, and that this aspect strictly concerns intellectual property rights.  
5.15.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
6  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, COLOMBIA, 
COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, HONDURAS, JAMAICA, PANAMA, 
PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agend a at the request of 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and Uruguay.  
6.2.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
6.3.  Paraguay  would like to  thank the European Union  for the recent bilateral meetings held to 
address some of Paraguay's  concerns on this matter and hopes that these can lead to constructive 
solutions in the future.  Paraguay  regret s, however, that since this item was first  placed on the 
agenda a couple years ago, no significant progress has been made to date to enable it to be removed 
from the agenda. Paraguay  also regret s that this meeting is taking place within a few days of the 
meeting of the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, where Paraguay, together with 
other Members, raised specific questions to the EU,  in document  G/SPS/GEN/1926, which was sent 
to the EU on 23  June 2021. Several of the  replies to the questions raised could help Members to 
gain a significantly better understanding of several elements in the non -tariff barriers that the 
European Union is implementing, especially regarding the proliferation of almost 2,000  emergency 
authorizations granted by EU  member States since implementation of its new regulations began in 
November  2017.  
6.4.  Some of the main arguments that have been put forward by the EU in  these discussions are  as 
follows : (i) that the prohibition of the use of certain substances and its subsequent modification of 
maximum residue levels ( MRLs) to the limit of detection are necessary to protect consumers and/or 
the environment;  and (ii) that European producers cannot be put at a disadvantage vis -à-vis 
competitors, and therefore anyone wishing to export to the E uropean Union  must adhere to 
EU standards.  Paraguay  would like to refer once again to the extensive flexibilities that are granted 
to European producers to continue using substances not permitted within the EU, via the emergency 
authorization mechanism, which are often renewed over and over again, becoming a de facto  
authorization allowing them to continue to use them. This is separate to the consideration of 
consumer health or damage to the environment, which are constantly cited as factors that cannot 
be compromised and therefore cannot be subject to flexibilities s uch as longer transition periods.  
6.5.  In addition, European producers receive billions of dollars in subsidies to adapt and comply 
with these standards. This is a luxury that several Members cannot afford, not only because they do 
not have extensive  Aggregate Measurement of Support ( AMS) rights, but also because they do not 
have the fiscal resources to allow them to do so.  Therefore, Paraguay wonders  who these producers 
are who are at a disadvantage?  Paraguay  once again stresses  the need for discussions aimed a t 
finding constructive solutions to the common challenges that Members  have been facing since 
July 2019.  
6.6.  The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
6.7.  Costa Rica is a co -sponsor of this agenda item and of the joint communication  in 
document  G/C/W/767  and its revision , as previously submitted to this Council. This item has the 
highest number of co -sponsors of all the items on this Council 's agenda. It also brings together the 
largest number of concerns raised in the TBT and SPS  Committees. It is a conc ern that has been 
supported by some 90  Members, of which the vast majority are developing and least  developed 
countries. We are talking about a matter that affects production systems and food security 
worldwide . Therefore, in Costa Rica' s view, it is a mat ter of the utmost importance.  
6.8.  Costa Rica continues to have multiple concerns regarding the scientific soundness of the EU 's 
MRL assessments , and what, in Costa Rica's  view, is a hazard -based approach, rather than one G/C/M/140  
 
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  based on risk. The reduction of MRLs wi thout sufficient scientific evidence restricts access to critical 
substances for agricultural production, particularly in countries with a tropical climate, such as Costa 
Rica. Moreover, this generates additional costs and increases the risk of pests emerg ing and having 
an impact on production and export capacity. The multiple concerns relating  to this issue have been 
raised repeatedly in the context of an ever -growing number of concerns put forward in the 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, in the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade , and since June  2019, in this Council.  
6.9.  While Costa Rica  agree s with the EU 's goal of supporting the global transition to more 
sustainable world agri -food systems, Costa Rica is of the view that the fulfilment of this goal must 
be based on building solutions designed and implemented through dialogue  mechanisms and 
multilateral cooperation frameworks. Costa Rica is concerned that forcing change, even through 
well-intentioned initiatives, further aggravates the problems that we are already facing and 
repeatedly discussing in this Council. Costa Rica is  also concerned that the costs of the adjustment 
being proposed will fall on the producers, exporters , and the most vulnerable population groups of 
developing countries , and that there will be severe consequences for global food security.  
6.10.  Aware of the crucial historical moment brought about by the COVID -19 pandemic, Costa Rica  
submitted, together with 38  other Members, a communication to the European Union 
(document  G/SPS/GEN/1778/Rev.3) requesting it, in consideration of the present exceptional  
circums tances, to interrupt its regulatory process and suspend the implementation of the reduction 
of MRLs for critical substances for agricultural production. Costa Rica is  disappointed that the EU 
communicated in the SPS  Committee that it would proceed with its  processes for reducing MRLs, 
despite the potential impact that this would have on the production systems of its most vulnerable 
trading partners.  Costa Rica  urges the EU once again to listen to the legitimate concerns of dozens 
of WTO  Members and establis h a mechanism for dialogue and evaluation of its policies on MRLs that 
takes into consideration and effectively addresses Members'  systemic and trade -related concerns.  
6.11.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
6.12.  Colombia  would like to thank the EU an d its delegates in Geneva for their continued interest 
in and willingness to discuss this issue. Colombia is  also grateful  to the EU  for the revised explanatory 
document on the procedure for setting MRLs in the European Union.  However, Colombia  regret s 
that, since this item was first placed on the agenda , no progress has been made to date on the 
substance that would be significant enough to allow  this item to be removed from the agenda.  
6.13.  Colombia has focused its previous comments on the process to determine MRLs. It has stated 
that the process is discriminatory in terms of selecting the substances to be reviewed, allowing the 
involvement of stakeholders, establishing criteria such as the form of consumption of a food product, 
and disregarding the different ge ographical and climatic conditions of countries, especially in tropical 
areas. Colombia has also questioned the scientific basis for making such determinations and, in 
particular, the precautionary application of new MRLs in the absence of any negative inf ormation on 
their effects. On this occasion , Colombia wishes to reiterate all of these arguments as well as its 
previous statements.  
6.14.  In order to move forward and make progress in the discussions, Colombia's  statement will 
focus on this occasion on the area of derogations, exceptions , or flexibilities existing in the EU to 
address the above -mentioned problems. In fact, in addition to the  problems of the procedure for 
adopting MRLs, Colombia  finds that the exceptional measures allowing producers to continue using 
certain products and substances also appear to be discriminatory.  There is a very user -friendly 
exceptional measure with a very wide scope reserved for domestic producers, known as an 
"emergency authorization ", and an increasingly limited exceptional measure available to countries 
exporting to the EU, known as "import tolerances ". And t here is a glaring difference between the 
two e xceptional measures, despite the fact that they are "emergency" or "tolerance" situations that 
basically address the same situations or problems.  In fact, the reasons for granting exceptions to 
producers inside the EU are exactly the same as those put forw ard in minute detail from our 
countries: the prevalence of an uncontrollable pest; the absence of effective alternatives; and the 
possibility of establishing mitigation measures. Yet , exceptions are always granted to domestic 
producers but almost never to foreign producers, and less and less frequently.  G/C/M/140  
 
- 24 - 
 
  6.15.  The procedure for granting an emergency authorization is quick and simple. It is based on a 
very lax review by the authorities, with many applications containing insufficient or no information 
and leaving ma ny blanks or gaps. This review is requested by the users of the plant protection 
product, and not by the producing laboratory. Colombia also notes that in many cases authorizations 
have been renewed several times, even indefinitely. Moreover, the control s ystem for such products 
appears to be circulated after the exception has been granted. It is curious that this procedure is 
also carried out separately from consideration of consumer health or damage to the environment, 
despite these being constantly cited  as factors that cannot be compromised or even subject to minor 
flexibilities , such as longer transition periods.  
6.16.  The procedure for an import tolerance, on the other hand, is extremely difficult and is 
becoming stricter over time. Despite being based on th e same factual arguments and conditions, 
the system for deciding on who can apply, and what has to be shown or proven, is radically different. 
The same is true for its time -frame and the control system that is applicable.  The numbers speak 
for themselves: in the European Union, European producers have been granted 1,934  emergency 
authorizations in the four  years since the regulation was issued. In contrast, only 61  import 
tolerances have been granted to foreign producers since 2017 during the same time-period, and  
only 16 for producers from developing countries.  Colombia reiterates that WTO  rules do not permit 
any less favourable treatment of imports from other WTO  Members than the treatment accorded to 
domestic products. Foreign producers cannot be put at a  disadvantage vis-à-vis competitors. 
Therefore, an exceptional measure should  be equivalent, which is one of Colombia's requests.  
6.17.  In summary, Colombia considers that ensuring a level playing field has several dimensions. 
On the one hand, the rules governin g the setting of MRLs for products should be equivalent, yet 
they do not appear to be. Colombia  recall s that a case in point is that of banana peel treated with 
imazalil being considered hazardous , while orange peel treated with imazalil is considered 
non-hazardous. On the other hand, the exceptional measures provide enormous scope for some 
producers and pose serious challenges for others. Lastly, some producers have a tremendous ability 
to subsidiz e to adapt, while others do not. All this is against an inherent background of geographical 
differences where the proximity to the tropics means that there is a higher prevalence of pests than 
in temperate zones.  Once again, Colombia  stress es the need for the establishment of a structured 
and comprehensive plurilateral dialogue mechanism, in parallel to bilateral discussions, in order to 
seek constructive and substantive solutions to this uneven playing field.  
6.18.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following : 
6.19.  As stated on numerous occasions, Ecuador continues to support raising this trade concern, in 
particular because the European Union has not taken into account the specific production features 
of the different regions of the world. It has also proposed ban ning the use of critical tools for pest 
control, without considering that what works in Europe may not be appropriate in other climates and 
regions.  
6.20.  Ecuador  would also emphasize that the implementation of the proposed measures includes 
inadequate transitio n periods: the EU's suggestion to seek alternative tools is difficult to implement 
because of limited access to information on replacement substances and on the implementation of 
alternative treatments. Plant protection ensures food quality. Taking unilate ral measures that restrict 
such protection without conclusive scientific evidence and with short notice amounts in practice to 
creating non -tariff barriers to trade in agricultural products , when today, more than ever, there is a 
need to encourage trade as  part of global efforts towards post -pandemic economic recovery. Based 
on the foregoing, Ecuador  refers to its previous statements on the subject7 and once again urge s 
the European Union:  (i) not to adopt restrictive measures without conclusive scientific  evidence;  
(ii) to observe the globally recognized international standards on human, plant and animal health 
protection;  (iii) to comply with the requirements established in the WTO  SPS Agreement to take a 
risk assessment approach to any measure; and  (iv) to consider suspending the ongoing 
implementation of measures to reduce MRLs and maintain the levels recommended by the Codex  
Alimentarius ; that is, to grant the necessary adjustment period – of at least 36  months – in cases 
where the reduction of MRLs is shown to be essential.  Lastly, Ecuador  associate s itself with the 
concern s raised by the delegations of Paraguay and Colombia with regard to emergency 
authorizations.  
 
7 See, for example, document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  16.28 -16.30.  G/C/M/140  
 
- 25 - 
 
  6.21.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
6.22.  Brazil's  co-sponsorship of this agenda item stems from its understanding that the EU's position 
in relation to the definition of maximum residue limits puts at risk the balance established in the 
SPS Agreement between the principle of protection of life and human and animal health and the 
guarantee that the market access conditions negotiated multilaterally are not undermined by 
unjustified non -tariff measures.  This balance rests on the scientific principle, enshrined in the 
SPS Agreement and materialized through risk analysis, which must guide the adoption of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures.  When prohibitions based on the hazard approach and/or recourse to 
Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement become the norm, despite technical advice from renowned 
institutions, the bala nce tilts towards protectionism.  This condition of imbalance cannot last.  
6.23.  This issue is not merely technical or legal, as European policy implies concrete risks to the 
maintenance of safe and efficient production systems in various regions of the world. It  prevents 
access to pest control instruments that threaten the viability of food production, and discourages 
scientific research, which would allow access to new chemical and biological technologies to combat 
these pests.  Currently, it is fashionable to dr aw attention to the risk that climate change may lead 
to the introduction of new pests, especially in areas of temperate agriculture. Without 
underestimating this risk, it is imperative to remember that tropical countries such as Brazil have 
always faced t hese SPS  risks,  and the success or failure of agricultural activity depends on access 
to these technologies.  
6.24.  In the case of Brazil, the sustainability of several crops is at risk, such as soybeans, citrus 
fruits, coffee, wheat, bananas , and papayas, which are a source of income and nutrients for a very 
significant percentage  of the Brazilian and world population.  The introduction of these technologies 
has also led to more sustainable agricultural production  in several countries , as it has made it 
possible t o use new practices, such as the no -till system.  It is undisputable that production has 
become more sustainable, since no -tillage prevents soil erosion, reduces water losses through 
evaporation, increases the level of organic matter in the soil, reduces th e use of fossil fuels with 
machinery and equipment , and provides a better balance of microbiological properties in soils.  It is 
an essential mechanism in the increase in production from increased productivity, and not from the 
expansion of the planted area , or from deforestation . 
6.25.  It is worrying that, 25  years after its adoption, the interpretation given to the SPS  Agreement 
differs from the purposes that guided the negotiations during the Uruguay Round. It is also worrying 
that Members  have to bring debates  of this nature to the CTG in a context in which Brazil has been 
following with concern legislation projects that try to create new non -tariff trade barriers under the 
guise of environmental protection measures.  
6.26.  In addition, Brazil is extremely concerned a bout the publication by the EU of more than 
2,600 emergency authorizations by its member States of substances under review since 2017.  Many 
of these requests present the same arguments as delegations from other Members on the SPS and 
TBT Committees ; others simply do not offer any justification , and yet were approved . In this context, 
Brazil believes that the EU's treatment of countries requesting longer transition periods or exceptions 
to pesticide MRL  decreases ("Import Tolerances") is clearly discr iminatory and incompatible with 
WTO rules.  
6.27.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
6.28.  Like the delegations that have already taken the floor, Panama wishes to reiterate its concern 
regarding the measures adopted by the European Union. The repeated inc lusion of this item on the 
agenda is not a mere procedural issue; the Members co -sponsoring this trade concern are reiterating 
their call because no replies have been forthcoming.  Panama  understands that Members of this 
Organization have every right to tak e whatever measures are deemed necessary to protect the 
environment and sanitary and phytosanitary health. However, the same products that are the 
subject of this concern, prohibited for imports, are permitted for European Union producers under 
emergency a uthorizations. This is at odds with the justification the EU has repeatedly given in this 
and other forums, especially those relating to the need to protect its consumers.  The European 
Union's measures are more trade restrictive than necessary. And our  farmers find it difficult to 
operate in a less than transparent regulatory environment. Therefore, Panama  urges the European 
Union to adhere to the provisions of the SPS  Agreement and to its obligations as a Member of the G/C/M/140  
 
- 26 - 
 
  WTO, and to engage with the co -sponso rs of this trade concern in an open dialogue to address our 
concerns.  
6.29.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
6.30.  As Members  all know, trade in agricultural products continues to be the most protected and 
distorted at the global level, and this is due  to different measures and policies, including in the area 
of tariffs and non -tariffs. In particular, the European Union's non -tariff policies and measures 
affecting trade in agricultural products have led to the accumulation, on the agenda of various 
WTO bodies, of a large and growing number of specific trade concerns by various Members.  In this 
regard, Uruguay wishes to reiterate its trade and systemic concern regarding the European Union's 
use of a hazard -based approach, rather than full risk assessments , in its regulatory decisions linked 
to sanitary and phytosanitary matters.  Uruguay  would like to make it clear that any determination 
of maximum residue limits, particularly when it deviates from internationally accepted standards 
and harmonization effort s in multilateral forums such as the Codex, must be based on a full scientific 
risk assessment and conclusive scientific evidence. This is essential to maintain the effective balance 
that must exist between the right of Members to pursue their legitimate o bjectives and the need to 
avoid creating unnecessary barriers to trade.  
6.31.  Uruguay  agree s with other Members that the issue of emergency authorizations to use 
unapproved active substances in general, or for certain specific uses, which are granted by 
EU membe r States to their domestic producers, should be discussed in more depth. Uruguay  notes 
that this element could lead to uncertainty regarding the consistency of the policies adopted at the 
domestic level by the member States of the European Union aimed at h ealth protection at 
Community level, as well as to unclear trade -related situations that could be discriminatory vis -à-vis 
third parties.  
6.32.  Furthermore, Uruguay wishes to reiterate its concern about persisting uncertainties over the 
approach, definition , and implementation of the new EU  regulations on veterinary drugs, particularly 
regarding the requirements that will be imposed on exporting third  countries in the future.  In this 
regard, Uruguay  would like to stress that any measures should be based on international standards, 
or on conclusive scientific evidence; that the specific circumstances of different countries, including 
the prevalence of diseases and regulations in force to address antimicrobial resistance, should be 
taken into account;  and that transition periods should be provided that are appropriate to the 
individual situations in productive sectors and product marketing requirements.  
6.33.  Uruguay  emphasize s once again that it is the special responsibility of the largest importers of 
agricultural products to consider the impact that their regulatory approaches and determinations 
might have on developing and least developed countries, whose economies are large ly based on the 
production and trade in agricultural and agro -industrial products, and through which they make an 
invaluable contribution to global food security, particularly when such approaches lack sufficient 
scientific justification.  In this regard, Uruguay  once again urge s the European Union to reconsider 
its regulatory approach in order to avoid the unjustified proliferation of barriers to international trade 
in agricultural products and the serious social and economic consequences of such an approac h on 
other Members, especially developing and least developed countries, for which the European Union 
market is of key importance.  
6.34.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
6.35.  Despite the length of time that has elapsed  since the issue was first  raised, all of the concerns, 
proposals and requests contained in document  G/C/W/767/R ev.1 very much still remain. Far from 
improving, the situation regarding the implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products 
by the European Union continues to worsen, with a growing number of Members from all regions 
expressing their concerns not only in the C TG, but also in the TBT and SPS  Committees.  Despite 
this, Members  have yet to receive satisfactory replies to questions about the measures implemented 
by the European Union that effectively prohibit the use of a number of substances required for safe 
and sustainable agricultural production, which have been assessed and authorized for use by many 
WTO Members. These measures disproportionately affect trade in agricultural products and 
undermine harmonization and standard -setting efforts at the multilateral level.  Argentina  therefore 
finds itself obliged to reiterate its request to the EU to provide additional and clear information on 
the applicable transition p eriods for MRLs and on the process and timelines for setting import G/C/M/140  
 
- 27 - 
 
  tolerances for active substances that have not been reauthorized  by the EU, as well as its request 
that this process be transparent, predictable and commercially viable and include a risk assessment, 
taking into account techniques developed for this purpose by the relevant international 
organizations.  To conclude, Argentina would like to thank Paraguay, Colombia,  and others , for having 
introduced the element concerning the emergency authori zations and the double standard that is 
being implemented.  
6.36.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
6.37.  As a co -sponsor of this paper, Australia again highlights its ongoing concerns in relation to 
the EU 's non -tariff barriers on agricultural products, including agricultural chemical regulations and 
policy and the potential negative impact on farmers and trade. This includes concerns about 
elements of the EU 's Farm -to-Fork Strategy. Australia has also previously raised its concerns , along 
with other Members , about the EU 's risk assessment and import tolerance -setting policies in this 
Council , as well as the TBT and SPS  Committees.  Australia raised or supported a number of specific 
trade concerns against the EU, in cluding at the most recent SPS and TBT  Committee meetings. This 
shows the strong level of interest in the EU 's unnecessary and unjustified measures and concerns of 
a broad cross -section of Members. It is clear that these concerns are uniformly based on the  EU's 
transparency and impediments to predictability for exporters.  While Australia recogni zes the right of 
WTO Members to regulate agricultural and other chemicals in a manner that protects animal, plant 
and human health , and the environment, Members are also bound by WTO  obligations , particularly 
in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments and ensuring that measures are no more 
trade-restrictive than necessary. Australia is a strong supporter of robust, risk and science -based 
regulations of agricultural chemicals.  
6.38.  Australia questions the EU 's approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection product 
authorizations and import tolerance limits that relies primarily on hazard -based assessment. In doing 
so, it is unclear how the EU hazard -based assessment is consistent with internationally agreed risk 
assessment standards for import tolerances.  Australia continues to seek clarification on how the EU 
determines threats to consumers of treated produce, and would welcome discussion on the risk  
assessments that underpin EU  decisions on import tolerances. Australia also seeks greater clarity 
from the EU on how hazards of a substance are differentiated in terms of the substance use in a 
production system compared with presence in consumed produce.  
6.39.  In the last decade, the EU ban of many active constituents on the basis of their hazardous 
properties, and the subsequent reduced availability of plant protection products (PPPs), has 
significantly contributed to the increasing number of emergency authori zations granted under 
Article  53 of Regulation (EC)  No. 1107/2009. Australia notes that , since 2011 , there has been a 
considerable increase in the number of these authori zations, many of which are for non -approved 
PPPs.  The use of emergency authori zations and the setting of related temporary MRLs to allow the 
supply and consumption of treated produce can lead to trade imbalances that are not in line with 
WTO standards and obligations. Australia is concerned that the establishment of MRLs under 
emerge ncy authori zation does not apply equally to imported produce. Australia would welcome more 
details on the process of emergency authori zation and establishment of temporary MRLs.  Australia 
is looking for the EU to substantially engage on these long -running issues with Australia and other 
Members.  
6.40.  The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
6.41.  The United States continues to be concerned about the EU 's implementation of non -tariff 
barriers on agricultural products. Increasingly, the EU is developin g rigid polices with extraterritorial 
implications that force third  countries to adopt European production practices to continue trade with 
the EU or to abandon trade with the EU.  The EU continues to lower many MRLs to trade -restrictive 
levels without clea r scientific justification or measurable benefit to human health. The EU 's 
hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation may lead to trade barriers that threaten the security 
of global food systems. The United States  recall s its concerns on these matters as set out in 
documents  G/SPS/N/GEN/1858, G/SPS/N/GEN/1802, G/SPS/N/GEN/1749, and 
G/SPS/N/GEN/1750 , as presented to the  SPS Committee.  
6.42.  The United States notes that pesticides are an important component in integrated pest 
management (IPM) program mes. Unneces sarily removing tools such as active ingredients and G/C/M/140  
 
- 28 - 
 
  modes of action can actually increase the development of resistance to pesticides, which adds an 
additional challenge for agricultural producers and threatens biodiversity.  The United States  also 
reitera tes its previous concerns that the EU enforces newly reduced MRLs at the point of production 
for domestic goods, but at the point of importation for imported goods. This causes trade 
inefficiencies and disruptions for products destined for the EU  market , depending on when a newly 
reduced MRL is enforced , and results in both an inconsistent application of the SPS  measure and an 
unfair advantage for EU  producers, especially for products with long shelf lives.  
6.43.  The United States  remain s concerned with the politicization of EU  pesticides polices, 
particularly as evidenced in the EU 's Farm -to-Fork Strategy, Biodiversity Strategy, and the 
Pesticide  REFIT.  Further more, it appears as though the European Union is following a similar 
approach t hrough its new veterinary drug legislation , which could prohibit producers from using , for 
growth promotion , antimicrobials that are not considered medically important. Animal species, 
pathogens causing diseases, health management practices, antimicrobial access, availability of 
alternative treatments, and antimicrobial susceptibility profiles vary by country, and the United 
States is concerned that the EU is not adequately or appropriately considering the health of animals 
within this new policy, especiall y in cases where alternative treatments are not available in an 
exporting country. In this regard, the United States  recall s its concerns , as raised in 
document  G/SPS/N/GEN/1811 , that these  prescriptive restrictions will apply to foreign producers 
shipping  animals and animal products to the EU. The EU has also not clarified how risk assessment 
will be used to inform its import polices.  
6.44.  The United States  urges the European Union to consider the needs of agricultural producers,  
and both recognize and respect the level of protection provided by national regulatory systems , 
which are at least as equivalent to the EU 's level of protection , as the EU works to implement its 
own system.  
6.45.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.46.  As it has been noted in previous  interventions on this subject, most recently at the June and 
November  2020 Council  meetings, Canada emphasizes the need for transparency and predictability 
in international trade.  In accordance with the WTO Agreements, Canada  continue s to recognize 
Members ' right to adopt measures to achieve legitimate objectives and to apply the food safety 
measures deemed necessary to protect human health. However, such measures must be 
implemented in a transparent manner that does not unjustifiably r estrict international trade.  The 
communication highlights Members ' shared need for greater transparency and predictability around 
the European Union's approach to approving and renewing plant protection product authorizations, 
as well as Members ' shared co ncerns about the impact this approach is having on trade in food.  
6.47.  Canada  acknowledge s the European Union's recent efforts to clarify the process for 
establishing import tolerances. In particular, Canada thanks the EU for hosting seminars with 
third countri es and stakeholders in January; Canada  appreciated the information shared and the 
opportunity to participate and ask questions.  Canada shares the European Union's ambitions related 
to health, safety , and environmental protection with a view of making the a griculture sector more 
sustainable and adaptable. That said, for this to work in practice, such frameworks must be 
predictable and based on thorough scientific analysis and risk assessments that reflect the specific 
realities at the national and regional l evels.  
6.48.  Canada is pleased that the European Union  intends to conduct risk assessments for all import 
tolerance requests and that such requests will be impartially reviewed in accordance with 
internationally -accepted risk assessment principles and EU  legisla tion. While Canada  recognize s that 
the European Union  has a process for import tolerances, Canada also requests that the EU consider 
maintaining MRLs for substances that do not pose unacceptable dietary risks. Along with minimizing 
disruptions to trade, th is would eliminate the need for import tolerance requests for some 
substances.  Canada also urges the European Union to take into account the timelines necessary for 
practical decision -making by farmers and producers, as well as the time and effort required  to bring 
products to market, particularly in the global trade context.  
6.49.  In addition, Canada  understand s that environmental considerations with a global reach will 
be included as a factor in future assessment s of import tolerances. However, Canada would not e 
that including environmental considerations as part of the import tolerance assessment does not G/C/M/140  
 
- 29 - 
 
  align with relevant international guidance.  Consequently, Canada looks forward to receiving further 
information from the European Union  as to the scientific j ustification for including environmental 
considerations in the import tolerance assessment process for pesticides, as they are established for 
the protection of human health from food safety risk.  In closing, Canada hopes that reiterating our 
concerns to t he CTG serves as a clear indication of the importance that Canada, and many 
WTO Members, attribute to seeking enhanced transparency and predictability for trade.  
6.50.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
6.51.  India echoes the concerns raised by other Membe rs relating to the implementation of 
non-tariff barriers on agricultural products by the European Union that effectively prohibit the use 
of a number of substances that are required for safe and sustainable agricultural production, and 
that have been asses sed and authorized for use by many WTO  Members. In this context, India would 
like to reiterate its trade and systemic concerns  on this issue . This EU hazard -based measure is 
significantly impacting trade from developing countries, including India. It also lacks transparency , 
hindering predictability for exporters.  India would urge the European Union  to avoid such 
unnecessary barriers to trade, and to find a mutually acceptable solution to this issue , through 
dialogue with Members, as soon as possible.  
6.52.  The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
6.53.  Guatemala remains concerned about this issue . Guatemala reiterate s its comments from 
previous meetings , as well as the comments just made by other Members. In this regard, Guatemala  
must establish a dialog ue with the European Union in order to find real solutions  to this issue . For a 
number of months , Guatemala has been requesting such a  dialogue but the answer from the 
European Union has always been  in the  negative. The level of Guatemala's  concern continu es to 
increase since we are being treated differently from European agricultural producers in terms of  the 
granting of emergency measures , as previously mentioned by Paraguay and Colombia.  
6.54.  The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
6.55.  Chile once again adds its voice to the concerns that , for a long time now , have been posed 
on this matter and regarding which it is clear that the European Union  has been unable to provide  a 
satisfactory answer. Chile has  always considered that multilateral standards must be applied broadly , 
by consensus , and in a manner that is justified . Once again , Chile reiterate s its concern that 
multilateral standards are not being followed . In this case , if the EU wishes to depart from the Codex 
Alimentarius , which sets limits and st andards that are observed internationally and accepted by all 
participants in the international community , the European Union can do so . However, they must be 
able to explain their rationale ; they must explain why they are going beyond an international 
standard , in particular in relation to  a matter that has been on the CTG's agenda for far too long.  
Indeed, Chile's concerns continue to multiply , and they have been reiterated  on many occasions ; 
they are not new  concerns . However,  the explanations put forwar d by the EU have remained the 
same ; Chile has  not heard any thing new. Such a situation may be understood, to a certain degree , 
as being all part of the multilateral ritual ; nevertheless, Chile would also like to receive news of some 
progress.  
6.56.  In addition, Chile takes note of the 2,600  emergency authorizations cited earlier by other 
delegations , which is a figure that we must continue to monitor. And this may mean that there is a 
different treatment applied for trading partners outside the Europ ean Union vis-à-vis the standard 
applied for producers within the EU. In other words, there is a double standard for national 
producers, which is unusual  and therefore surprising coming from the EU.  Indeed, Chile has generally 
a very high regard for the commitment to multilateralism demonstrated by the EU and its member 
States, and the EU's effectiveness in this regard, notably in terms of EU  compliance with international 
standards, including those of the WTO. In conclusion, Chile considers that it would certainly be very 
surprising and disappointing if Members were to discover that there is a clear double standard that 
applies differently for producers in the EU member States when compared to producers in other 
countries . Given that  the majority of the  trading partners of EU member  States are outside the EU 
itself, Chile wishes to hear an honest and reasoned explanation and justification  of the EU's policy 
in this regard . G/C/M/140  
 
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  6.57.  The delegate of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.58.  The European Union takes due note of the concerns expressed by WTO  Members.  The 
European Union provided a detailed reply to these concerns in previous CTG  meetings. The EU  
therefore refer s to its previous statements, notably its statement delivered at the meeting of 
November  2020.8 That statement remains unchanged and is valid in its entirety.   
6.59.  The European Union is the biggest importer of agri -food products in the world. The EU has 
developed a highly trusted, transparent , and predictable system , based on a high level of con sumer 
health protection, to which some other countries defer in the absence of their own national MRLs. 
The European Union has an open market. Its high level of consumer protection has never been an 
impediment to the import of agricultural commodities, inc luding from the Members raising this 
concern, whose large exports of agricultural products to the European Union during these five  years 
have remained stable.  The European Union provides technical assistance to developing countries 
and LDCs, directly or th rough other international organi zations, such as FAO, to support a smooth 
transition towards new products or production systems.  The EU remains committed to continuing an 
open dialogue on its policies and measures  and stands  ready to further engage with ou r trading 
partners.  
6.60.  Finally, o n the eve of the UN  Food Systems Summit, the European Union  believe s that 
Members  have a shared interest in making our food systems sustainable by tackling the issue of 
toxic active substances and by protecting our citizens ' health with appropriate measures.  
6.61.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
7  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA, AND URUGUAY  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Brazil, China, and Uruguay.  
7.2.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
7.3.  Initially, Brazil would like to register that it expects that the decreasing number of Members 
sponsoring these agenda items is a conseque nce of a review from the part of the European Union 
and the United Kingdom of their negotiating stance. Although the EU -UK trade agreement has 
resolved the concern relating to the risk of the bilateral trade occupying the quotas which are the 
object of the  "apportionment", Brazil considers that little has been made to remedy the fact that all 
Members will be worse off in terms of access to EU -27 markets due to the unilateral reduction of 
quota volumes. British quotas, established in order to maintain the pr eviously established total 
volume of EU -28 quotas, cannot be considered as a compensation by the EU -27, nor are enough by 
themselves to guarantee access to the British market.  
7.4.  As a new WTO  Member that traces the origin of its participation in the multilate ral trading 
system through the fact that it was an original contracting party of the GATT in 1947, UK  quotas 
should at least respect the Uruguay Round minimum access criteria. The reference to the Uruguay 
Round is relevant to this case, as it is on such ba sis that the United Kingdom seeks to establish its 
right to consolidate large Final Bound Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (FBTAMS ). However, 
contrary to that, the UK seeks to move away from the Uruguay Round with regard to the volume of 
its TRQs. Th e UK also seems to ignore it when it chooses the most favourable quinquennium in terms 
of exchange rate to convert euros to pounds sterling, both in relation to the FBTAMS that it claims 
and to the tariffs it seeks to consolidate.  
7.5.  Regarding only its FBTAMS , the choice of the period 2015 -2019 instead of 1986 -1988 will yield 
additional rights to grant distortive and environmentally harmful domestic support of nearly 
GBP 1 billion. Brazil would also like to register its systemic concern over the decision by th e UK and 
the EU to conclude negotiations that possibly involve Brazilian negotiating rights, despite following 
the negotiations with Brazil on these TRQs. In this sense, Brazil invites the United Kingdom and the 
European Union to rethink their negotiating posture; to recognize that there is a deterioration in the 
 
8 Document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  16.52-16.53.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  condition of access to their markets; to understand that applied tariffs are irrelevant for trade 
negotiations; and to accept that the offer of offsets, as determined by Article  XXVIII of the GATT,  
must form part of a possible agreement in this case.  
7.6.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
7.7.  Uruguay would once again like to reiterate its position and trade and systemic concerns 
expressed previously in this and other forums on the issue of mod ifications of concessions in the 
form of European Union tariff rate quotas under Article  XXVIII of the GATT. Despite existing 
fundamental disagreements, Uruguay has been a committed and constructive participant in this 
process from the outset, taking into account the relevance and sensitivity of WTO  bound market 
access conditions and concessions by important trading partners, such as the European Union, in 
key products for a small developing country whose economy is largely dependent on its agricultural 
exports. This is why Uruguay has adjusted its demands with a view to achieving the balance needed 
to ensure moderate but tangible results, taking into account the context and scope of these 
negotiations. Uruguay reaffirms its willingness to work constructivel y with the European Union to 
find appropriate solutions in this context, and recalls the importance for the multilateral trading 
system of this matter being resolved within the framework of substantive bilateral negotiations, in 
accordance with WTO  rules.  
7.8.  Uruguay recognizes that the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union 
and the United Kingdom has provided greater clarity on the form that the trade relationship between 
the two  partners will take, including with respect to the reciprocal use of WTO  bound erga omnes  
TRQs. While this commitment, together with the clarifications provided in the subsequent 
notifications of the European Union and the United Kingdom, are all positive, Uruguay reiterates that 
it would like to see this commitment reflected in the Schedules of Concessions of both Members in 
the WTO for greater legal certainty. Lastly, Uruguay would once again like to raise the issue linked 
to domestic support. In this regard, the European Union and the United Kingdom indicated in th eir 
joint letter of 11  October  2017 that the committed A MS levels for the EU -28 would be shared on the 
basis of an objective methodology. In its communication in document  G/SECRET/42/Add.3, dated 
22 December  2020, the EU stated that it would revert to Memb ers in due course on this topic. In 
this regard, Uruguay would like to receive updates on when and how the European Union plans to 
adjust downwards its final bound AMS  entitlements in its Schedule of Concessions, in line with the 
announcements made.  
7.9.  The de legate of China  indicated the following:  
7.10.  China welcomes and appreciates the recent bilateral discussion s and consultation s with the 
European Union  on the TRQ issue. China looks forward to continuing to work together with the EU 
to reach mutually satisfacto ry results  as soon as possible . 
7.11.  The delegate of New Zealand , addressing agenda items  7 and 8, indicated the following:  
7.12.  It is regrettable that New Zealand is obliged to intervene yet again under this item to raise 
the concerns that it has been consistently voicing for more than three  years now about the proposed 
treatment of the EU -UK WTO quotas following the United Kingdom's departure from the European 
Union at the start of the year. New Zealand has continued to engage actively with both the European 
Union and the United Kingdom to seek a satisfactory resolution to this issue. With the European 
Union – although New Zealand does not accept the EU's rationale for, or approach to, the 
modifications it has sought to make to its WTO  TRQ commitments – New Zealand appreciates the 
pragmatic approach that has been evident in the EU's engagement over recent months and its efforts 
to find practical solutions to address New Zealand's concerns. New Zealand can see a path ahead 
and is committed to continuing its efforts to gether to agree on practical solutions that can work for 
all. Unfortunately, this is not yet the case with the United Kingdom. In these circumstances, New 
Zealand therefore urges the UK to redouble its efforts to work together to take the kind of practical  
steps required to address the serious issues resulting from the loss of bound WTO  access that the 
UK's current proposed modifications would cause.  
7.13.  As New Zealand has indicated previously, this is not just a "technical issue". Rather, it is 
having, for New  Zealand, a real and significant commercial impact. This includes the fact that New 
Zealand exporters are not currently able to utilize their bound UK  quota access into Northern Ireland. G/C/M/140  
 
- 32 - 
 
  New Zealand appreciates the advice that it has received from the rele vant UK  agencies indicating 
that they are working strenuously to resolve this issue. With the effects of this denial of access 
growing more acute by the week, however, New Zealand calls upon the UK to confirm that this 
access will be promptly restored, and  that the current unsatisfactory situation will not be allowed to 
drag on further. New Zealand also remains concerned about several other aspects of the UK's draft 
WTO Goods Schedule. These include the UK's very substantial claim to trade -distorting AMS; a 
similarly substantial claim, on 685  products, to use of the special agricultural safeguard; and the 
proposed application of "minimum entry price" and "Meursing Table" market management systems 
not reflected in the UK's global tariff regim e. 
7.14.  New Zealand also looks forward to receiving clear indications from the United Kingdom and 
the European Union as to when they plan to submit the necessary notifications to reflect the 
understanding outlined in the EU -UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement th at each Party (UK and EU) 
is precluded from using the other's WTO  MFN TRQs. New Zealand, for its part, remains committed 
to pursuing engagement on the above issues in order to arrive at practical solutions to address its 
concerns in a way that reflects a p roper honouring of these EU/UK bound WTO  commitments.  
7.15.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.16.  Canada continues to have concerns regarding the United Kingdom  and the European Union' s 
approach to apportioning the EU -28's TRQs and has made these conce rns clear to the UK and the 
EU through multilateral and bilateral discussions.  While these concerns remain, Canada notes the 
EU and UK's willingness to discuss these issues. Canada looks forward to continuing these 
discussions with the UK and the EU during  bilateral Article  XXVIII negotiations.  
7.17.  The delegate of Paraguay , addressing agenda items  7 and 8, indicated the following:  
7.18.  Paraguay would once again like to reiterate its systemic concern regarding the approach taken 
to TRQ  distribution and the establishm ent of a broad AMS for the United Kingdom, without, so far, 
an equivalent reduction in EU  political space. Paraguay refers to its previous statement on this issue9 
and requests that it be included in the minutes in full, as follows:  
7.19.  While Paraguay welcomes the fact that the EU and the UK have reached an agreement and 
that they have mutually excluded each other from erga omnes  quotas according to their 
MA:1 notificat ions, Paraguay agrees with other colleagues that this should be reflected in their 
Schedules of Concessions. Paraguay also reiterates its concerns as expressed on previous 
occasions.10 
7.20.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
7.21.  India had already expres sed its concerns, both in writing and during formal consultations with 
the European Union under Article  XXVII. India has also made it clear how the present methodology 
and threshold years taken into account by them for the apportionment of TRQs adversely a ffect 
Members' rights. India expects that the European Union will provide reasonable opportunities to all 
WTO Members, including India, to exercise their rights under the WTO  Agreements. India also 
expects the EU to take into account the concerns that it h as raised. India looks forward to further 
fruitful negotiations with the EU.  
7.22.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
7.23.  Mexico would like to echo the concerns that were expressed today and would like to place on 
record its systemic concern in relation  to agenda items  7 and 8 concerning the TRQs and the 
methodology that was used for the ir apportionment, as well as the lack of clarity on the AMS that 
the UK is proposing to establish without an equivalent reduction by the EU -27. Therefore, Mexico 
would li ke to refer to the statements it has previously delivered in the CTG and at meetings of other 
Committees in which the se issues have been discussed.11 
 
9 Document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  18.20 -18.21.  
10 Document  G/C/M/138, paragraph  21.38.  
11 See, for example, document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  18.16 -18.17.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  7.24.  The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
7.25.  Chile would like to reiterate its well -known position on th is issue as well as its systemic 
concern.  
7.26.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.27.  The European Union is pleased to report that good progress has been achieved so far. 
Negotiations have been finalized with eight  partners, with five  agree ments formally signed and the 
others going through domestic validation procedures. Negotiations with a further two  trade partners 
are close to finalization. The EU has addressed the concerns of many WTO  Members regarding the 
UK's access to the erga omnes /MFN TRQs by putting in place the appropriate legislation, which 
precludes the UK from qualifying for imports under these quotas. The relevant legislation has now 
been fully notified to the WTO. The EU thanks a significant number of other WTO  Members for t heir 
active engagement and readiness to find practical and mutually satisfactory solutions. The EU 
remains fully committed to continuing these negotiations and consultations, and to bringing them to 
a successful close in the coming months. The EU would als o like to reassure Members that it intends 
to formally submit its revised EU-27 Schedule of commitments for certification including the 
reduced/apportioned AMS in due  course once these TRQ  negotiations are finalized.  
7.28.  The Council took note  of the statements  made.  
8  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED UK  TRQ COMMITMENTS: 
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM BRAZIL, CHINA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND 
URUGUAY  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Brazil, China, the Russian Federation, and Uruguay.  
8.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
8.3.  As a co -sponsor of this agenda item, Uruguay wishes to once again reiterate its position on the 
following points: (i)  the claim of the United Kingdom to have a  bound total AMS warrants analysis 
and discussion by Members; (ii)  it would not seem appropriate for the United Kingdom to attempt 
to replicate the rights to invoke the special agricultural safeguards ( SSG), under Article  5 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture,  for all products and under the same criteria and conditions as set out in 
the European Union's Schedule; (iii)  the proposal to introduce one  currency conversion in the draft 
Schedule of Concessions based on the average daily exchange rate in the 2015 –2019 period also 
raises concerns. First, given its ability to generate bound tariffs and particularly high levels of 
AMS entitlements, higher than those that would result from considering other representative periods 
(in particular 1986 -1988, used as a basis i n the Uruguay Round negotiations). And second, given its 
factual linkage with the ongoing Article  XXVIII process. Regarding this process, Uruguay hopes that 
this will be settled through substantive bilateral negotiations between the Members concerned and 
the United Kingdom, enabling the latter to have an independent Schedule of Concessions formally 
established in the WTO, while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the other Members 
concerned. In this regard, Uruguay hopes that the United Kingdom will , in due course, give due 
consideration to the points raised by Uruguay and provide a reply as soon as possible that is 
conducive to making progress in our negotiations and reaching a mutually satisfactory agreement, 
taking into account the specific intere sts of the two  parties involved.  
8.4.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
8.5.  China' s concern s and requests on this issue remain unchanged. China encourage s the United 
Kingdom to take full consideration of the comments and requests raised by Members both  at 
WTO meetings and in bilateral consultations. China  looks forward to working together with the UK 
to make progress on this issue.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  8.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
8.7.  The Russian Federation would like to reiterate its statemen t made during the previous meetings 
of the Committee on Market Access and the Council for Trade in Goods.12 The Russian Federation is  
still worried about the TRQ apportionment methodology  and the AMS. The Russian Federation  notes 
that Article XXVIII of the GATT, as well as the Agreement on Agriculture , does not provide the 
possibility to amend Members ' AMS commitments.  The Russian Federation also continues to be 
significantly concerned about the United Kingdom's approach to TRQ  renegotiations. The Russia n 
Federation stresses the impossibility of concluding negotiations without an agreement on 
compensation to be provided by the UK. As for the currency conversions, the Russian Federation is 
troubled by their potential impact on the general level of concessi ons, which may result in 
substantive changes to the UK's current WTO  concessions. The Russian Federation looks forward to 
further consultations with the United Kingdom to resolve these issues.  
8.8.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.9.  Australia ap preciates the constructive and pragmatic engagement from the United Kingdom  on 
the Brexit TRQ  splits before the end of the transition period in late 2020. Australia  has reached 
in-principle agreement with the UK on revised TRQ  splits and is working with th e UK to finali ze and 
implement the overall agreement.  Beyond the TRQ  splits, Australia continues to be concerned that 
the multilateral issues raised by a range of WTO  Members regarding the UK's initial rectification 
remain unaddressed. Australia considers that the UK's draft Goods Schedule, circulated on 
24 July 2018, contains substantive changes to the UK's current WTO  concessions, including the UK's 
FBTAMS  entitlement, and SSG  entitlements . Australia does not believe that the UK should have 
automatic righ ts to an AMS  entitlement without some multilateral scrutiny in the WTO and potential 
subsequent changes. Australia is concerned with the UK's inclusion of an AMS  entitlement of 
GBP 4.95 billion, and it is worth noting that the EU has still not formally pro posed any corresponding 
reductions to its AMS  entitlement. The UK needs to find a multilateral solution to this issue and 
demonstrate to other Members that its expected future domestic support programmes will not 
unduly distort global agricultural trade. A ustralia calls upon the UK to reassure Members that the UK 
is a strong advocate for domestic support reform, to help show that it will be part of the solution, 
even if it has such a large initial AMS  entitlement. Australia suggests that the UK engage in sm all 
group meetings with interested Members in Geneva to help resolve these matters to allow 
subsequent certification of the UK's Goods Schedule.  
8.10.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.11.  As noted under agenda item  7, Canada continues to have concerns  with the apportionment 
methodology used by the United Kingdom and the European Union. Canada also notes its concern 
over the new annual domestic support commitment claimed by the UK. While these concerns remain, 
Canada notes the UK's willingness to discus s its new domestic support commitment as well as its 
proposed TRQ  volumes. Canada looks forward to continuing discussions on these issues.  
8.12.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
8.13.  India echoes the concerns raised by Members today. India had already expressed its concerns, 
both in writing and during formal consultations with the United Kingdom. India has also made it 
clear to the United Kingdom how the present methodology and the thr eshold years, taken into 
account by the United Kingdom for apportionment of TRQs and some other provisions in its Schedule, 
adversely affect Members' rights. India expects that the United Kingdom will provide reasonable 
opportunities to all WTO  Members, in cluding India, to exercise its rights under the WTO  Agreements 
and to take into account the concerns raised. India looks forward to fruitful negotiations with the 
United Kingdom.  
8.14.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
8.15.  The United Kingdo m reiterates that it is strongly committed to continuing to work closely with 
WTO Members in discussions on the UK's Schedule, including through the process under 
Article  XXVIII of the GATT. It remains the UK's aim to conclude these discussions successfull y in the 
 
12 Document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  19.8-19.9.  G/C/M/140  
 
- 35 - 
 
  coming months. Since the Council's previous meeting, the United Kingdom is pleased to have made 
good progress with resolving several Members' questions and concerns relating to the UK  Goods 
Schedule. The UK thanks those who have engaged constructi vely with us to facilitate this. On the 
statements relating to AMS, SSGs, and currency conversion, in the interests of time, the UK would 
like to refer Members to its statement made at the Council's previous meeting, which describes the 
UK position and sti ll stands.13 The UK is committed to continuing bilateral dialogue towards resolution 
of the concerns voiced by Members today.  
8.16.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
9  INDIA – CAUSTIC SODA QUALITY CONTROL ORDER – REQUEST FROM THE SEPARATE 
CUSTOMS TERRI TORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Chinese Taipei.  
9.2.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
9.3.  The Indian Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers issued a Quality Control Order on Caustic Soda 
on the 3  April 2018 (notified as document  G/TBT/N/IND/69, on 7  December  2017). Chinese Taipei's  
companies applied for the compulsory certification scheme for im ported caustic soda with the Bureau 
of Indian Standards (BIS) in August  2019. BIS  officials finished the on -site factory inspection in 
December  2019. Samples of the product have also passed analysis by the authorized Indian 
laboratory. The caustic soda pro duced by Chinese Taipei's companies was in compliance with the 
technical specifications defined in the relevant Indian Standards, IS  252:2013. In August  2020, the 
BIS forwarded the application to the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers to invite further comments. 
On the 2  June of this year, Chinese Taipei's companies were informed by the BIS that it was not 
possible to further process the licence applications. This was based on a directive from the 
Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals (DOCP) under t he Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, 
which had decided not to grant any further licences for caustic soda. 
9.4.  The value of Chinese Taipei's caustic soda exports to India amounted to about USD  4 million 
in 2017. At that time, Chinese Taipei was ranked 20th among the countries importing to India, so 
these trade barriers have had a major negative effect. Chinese Taipei would appreciate it if India 
could clarify the reasons why Chinese Taipei's applications were not accepted. In fact, Chinese 
Taipei's compani es' applications are fully compliant with the provisions of India's regulations and 
Chinese Taipei's products adhere totally to the technical specifications as defined in the relevant 
Indian Standards. Thus, as far as Chinese Taipei is concerned, our appli cations should be permitted.  
9.5.  Furthermore, the BIS's decision does not comply with the relevant provisions of either the 
GATT or the TBT  Agreement. In this regard, granting licences to Indian producers while refusing the 
same treatment to foreign manufactur ers is, in Chinese Taipei's view, inconsistent with the 
provisions of the national treatment obligations under GATT  Article  III and Article  2.1 of the 
TBT Agreement. In fact, refusing to grant licences to foreign manufacturers by applying the relevant 
Indian Standards in a manner that is more trade -restrictive than necessary constitutes an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade and is inconsistent with the provisions of Article  2.2 of 
the TBT  Agreement. Moreover, prohibiting the granting of licences to  foreign manufacturers amounts 
effectively to imposing a quantitative restriction on the imports of caustic soda into India, and is also 
not compatible with Article  XI of the GATT.  
9.6.  Chinese Taipei urges India, therefore, to accelerate the procedures for gra nting approval to 
Chinese Taipei's companies. In addition, Chinese Taipei would urge the BIS not to decline any licence 
applications simply on the basis of the domestic production capacity in India or for the purpose of 
self-sufficiency. The decision to gr ant licences to Chinese Taipei's companies must be based 
exclusively on India's regulations and must comply with the provisions under GATT and the 
TBT Agreement.  
 
13 G/C/M/139, paragraphs  19.15 -19.18.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  9.7.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
9.8.  India' s delegation would like to inform Chinese  Taipei that India has taken note of the concern 
it has raised, as responded to in the TBT  Committee , and that this concern has been forwarded to 
Capital for examination.  
9.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
10  INDIA – IMPORT POLICY ON TYRES – REQUES T FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
INDONESIA, AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN 
AND MATSU  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union, Indonesia, and Chinese Taipei.  
10.2.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
10.3.  The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry announced on 12  June 2020 that a restrictive import measure had been imposed on new 
pneumatic tyres (Not ification No.  12/2015 -2020). The product list included tyres for motor cars, 
buses, lorries, motorcycles and bicycles. As a result, importers must apply to the DGFT for a licence 
or special approval before importing those items. Chinese Taipei's industry a ssociation has informed 
Chinese Taipei that several exporters have encountered difficulties in light of this new measure. In 
June 2020, the applications of Indian importers applying for import licences from the DGFT were 
delayed and not approved until Dece mber of that year. This delay in issuing import licences has 
severely affected Chinese Taipei's exports to India and resulted in a 70% decrease in 2020 compared 
to the same period in 2019.  
10.4.  Furthermore, it appears that import licences are now issued by Indi a only for certain kinds of 
pneumatic tyres that are not produced domestically. This constitutes a ban on tyre imports, which 
is not compatible with WTO  rules concerning quantitative restrictions. As a direct impact of these 
trade-restrictive policies, Chi nese Taipei's companies have suffered substantial trade losses, possibly 
adding up to hundreds of millions of US  dollars, as well as other significant adverse effects on the 
companies themselves. Given the serious effects, Chinese Taipei urges India to imp lement its policy 
in line with the regulations as set out under the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures and 
Article  XI of the GATT. In particular, non -automatic licensing procedures should be implemented in 
a transparent and predictable manner. They s hould not have either trade -restrictive or 
trade-distortive effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of restrictions.  
10.5.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
10.6.  The European Union would like to reiterate its concerns  as raised in various WTO  committees, 
namely the Committees on Import Licensing, Market Access, and Trade -Related Investment 
Measures ( TRIMs ), regarding the licensing regime for importation of pneumatic tyres for motor cars, 
buses, lorries, motor scooters and motorcycles introduced by India under Notification 
No. 12/2015 -2020 on "Amendment in Import Policy of Tyres" of 12  June 2020. To the EU's 
knowledge, India has not yet fulfilled its notification obligations under Article  1.4 and Article  5 of the 
Import Licensing Agreement. India has not indicated the measure that is implemented through the 
licensing procedure, nor the duration of the latter.  
10.7.  The EU continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure on the import of tyres, 
which has become highly restricted since June  2020. Only a limited number of licences have been 
granted to EU  tyre manufacturers and these themselves are limited in duration, quantities, and types 
of tyres. The EU would like to recall the requirements of Article  3.2 of the Import  Licensing  
Agreement according to which non -automatic import licensing shall not have trade restrictive or 
distortive effect on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the restriction. The EU 
would also urge India once again to reconsider a ny implicit or explicit quantitative or other 
restrictions on the import of replacement tyres (for example, end -user principle) that could run 
contrary to WTO  requirements, especially to ensure that its measures are not discriminating in 
favour of local ty re manufacturers.  G/C/M/140  
 
- 37 - 
 
  10.8.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
10.9.  India has imposed an import restriction on certain types of tyre. These import restriction 
provisions were issued shortly after India had banned the importation of tyre products for a per iod 
of six  months, in Notification No.  12/2015 -2020, dated 12  June 2020, regarding its Amendment in 
Import Policy of Tyres. These policies have had an impact on Indonesia's exports and disrupted the 
flow of goods to India. At the same time, India has also imposed royalty or marking fees for tyre 
products with IS  markings. Indonesia remains concerned that the imposition of marking fees is 
burdensome and has become an unnecessary obstacle to trade. In addition, the imposition of 
marking fees has no legitimate  justification, with no clear relation to the protection of human health, 
safety or the prevention of deceptive practice s. Indonesia is of the view that these policies are not 
in conformity with the principle of non -discrimination as set out in Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement. 
Indonesia is looking forward to India's response on this issue and requests India to review the policy 
to ensure its compliance with the principle of non -discrimination.  
10.10.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
10.11.   The Republic of Korea has expressed its concern in previous meetings about India's import 
policy on tyres as adopted in June  2020. According to Article  3.2 of the Agreement on Import 
Licensing Procedures, non -automatic licensing shall not have t rade-restrictive or trade -distortive 
effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the restriction. However, the policy 
is restricting trade by substantially banning the import of tyres, which is not consistent with the 
WTO rules, such  as Article  3.2 of the Agreement of Import Licensing Procedures. Once again, Korea 
urges India to operate its policy on tyres in a transparent way and in accordance with the relevant 
WTO rules so that it does not constitute a barrier to free trade.  
10.12.   The del egate of India indicated the following:  
10.13.   The non -automatic licensing requirements are administered in a manner consistent with the 
rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, including with respect to the 
time-frames for the granting of impor t licences. This is being administered in a fair and equitable 
manner and a number of licences have been granted after approval by the Exim Facilitation 
Committee (EFC). The measure has been taken keeping in view, in particular, the quality issues. In 
pursuance of non -automatic licensing, the procedure examines the applications received and grants 
licences based on the comments of the concerned administrative ministries or based on the criteria 
laid down for the purpose. In the case of tyres imports, the Co mmittee has granted licences in almost 
all cases after examination of the applications. India has notified this measure to the Committee on 
Import Licensing in document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/12.  
10.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
11  SRI LANKA - IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL - REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
11.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
11.3.  Indonesia would like to draw Members' attention to its specific trade concern regarding 
Sri Lanka's measures on palm oil import prohibition. Indonesia wishes to inform the Council that the 
Government of Sri Lanka,  through its Department of Imports and Expo rts Control, issued Operating 
Instructions  08/2021 , dated 5  April 2021, to suspend temporarily  the importation of items specified 
in Annex  A of the operating instruction , that is, certain palm oil products in 8 -digit HS  code under 
HS heading 15.11 (1511.10 .00; 1511.90.00; 1511.90.10; 1511.90.20; 1511.90.30; 1511.90.90). 
The suspension  of palm oil has had a direct and immediate impact on Indonesia's palm oil exportation 
to Sri Lanka.  
11.4.  This trade concern has previously been raised at the most recent meetings o f the Committee 
on Import Licensing and the Committee on Market Access. The response delivered orally by the 
delegation of Sri Lanka in the Committee on Market Access has not addressed Indonesia's concerns. 
As for certain explanations from the delegation o f Sri Lanka regarding its SPS, TBT, and import G/C/M/140  
 
- 38 - 
 
  licensing measures, Indonesia is of the view that Sri Lanka could not establish a correlation between 
these measures and its current import prohibition measure. In addition, Indonesia experienced 
difficulties in understanding the rationale behind the importation ban, given that no information was 
provided either in the operating instructions or in the delegation of Sri Lanka's explanation. 
Furthermore, Indonesia understands that the importation ban is being app lied temporarily, as 
indicated in the operating instruction, yet Indonesia did not find any further information that 
indicated any application time -frame. An unclear time -frame application might cause unpredictability 
for Indonesia's exporters trying to ru n their businesses. Lastly, Indonesia understands that Sri  Lanka 
has not yet notified the importation ban to the relevant committees.  
11.5.  At the outset, Indonesia observed that Sri Lanka's importation ban on palm oil might be 
contrary to its commitments under various provisions of the WTO  Agreements, including Article  XI:1 
of the GATT  1994, requiring Members to eliminate any quantitative restriction on importation and 
exportation. Indonesia is also aware that Sri Lanka imposed SPS, TBT, and import licensing 
measures, as mentioned earlier. However, Indonesia questioned the consistency of these measures 
in relation to the relevant agreements, including the SPS  measures, which should be based on 
international standards and scientific evidence, as well as on the pri nciple of non -discrimination. In 
term of import licensing measures, Indonesia's view is that non -automatic licensing should not 
create any restriction and disruption to trade. In this regard, Indonesia requests Sri Lanka to provide 
a detailed explanation o n the rationale behind the measure, including the application time -frame, 
and its potential notification submission; in addition, Indonesia seeks further information concerning 
(i) the transparency compliance of the measures (to the best of Indonesia's kno wledge, Sri Lanka 
has not submitted a WTO  QR notification of its ban on the importation of palm oil); (ii)  how the 
import prohibitions are administered (specifically on the implementation time -frame); and (iii)  the 
scientific evidence and compliance with t he non -discrimination principle as referred to in Article  2.3 
of the SPS  Agreement. Indonesia stands ready to discuss these matters with Sri Lanka with a view 
to their resolution.  
11.6.  The delegate of Malaysia  indicated the following:  
11.7.  Malaysia shares the concer ns raised by Indonesia regarding the palm oil import ban imposed 
by Sri Lanka. Malaysia has also raised similar concerns at the  April meeting of the  Committee on 
Market Access. Malaysia is  disappointed that Sri Lanka has yet to provide any satisfactory res ponses 
to its concerns, specifically on the notification and timeline for the measures imposed. In addition, 
Malaysia is  still waiting for Sri Lanka to share with Malaysia the  statement it delivered  at the 
Committee on Market Access.  Malaysia continues to maintain its concern, based on Article  XI of the 
GATT – General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions. A WTO  Member should not impose a ban or 
restriction other than duties or other charges on any product imported from, or exported to, other 
countries. Although Article  XI of the GATT does allow prohibitions or restrictions in some cases, such 
prohibitions or restrictions must be temporary and applied to prevent critical shortages of foodstuffs, 
necessary to the application of certain standards or regulat ions, or otherwise allowable under this 
provision. Malaysia is also concerned by the fact that the measure has not been notified to the WTO. 
WTO Members are bound to ensure that trade measures are administered in a non -discriminatory 
manner and any changes  must be notified in advance to the respective committees. Therefore, 
Malaysia calls upon Sri Lanka to comply with its WTO  obligations and to uphold the principle of 
transparency, which is the bedrock of this Organization. Malaysia will continue to monitor  this issue 
and hopes to work closely with Sri Lanka to find a mutually acceptable resolution to it.  
11.8.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
11.9.  Colombia wishes to express its interest in this issue and its concern regarding Sri Lanka's 
measures to r estrict imports of palm oil, which Colombia  had already raised in the Committee on 
Market Access.  Colombia is a producer and exporter of palm oil, palm oil products, and palm oil 
biofuels. The global market dynamics of these products have a direct impact o n its exports. On this 
specific matter, the " Operating Instructions" issued by the Sri Lankan Government, through which 
imports of palm oil have been suspended or restricted, are of particular concern. Colombia notes 
that Sri Lanka has not notified these m easures to the WTO, meaning that Members have a limited 
knowledge of their scope and form of implementation. In this regard, Colombia requests Sri Lanka 
to clarify the reasons for this ban on imports, the policy objectives pursued, and justification for th e 
measures, and the authorities responsible for their administration.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  11.10.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
11.11.   At the outset, Sri Lanka wishes to thank Indonesia, Malaysia, and Colombia for their 
continued interest in this issue. It also wishes t o inform the Council that the information provided 
by Sri  Lanka at various committees is still valid with regard to the concerns expressed by Indonesia. 
Sri Lanka has introduced a trade policy measure by imposing a ban on crude palm oil under 
HS subheading  1511.10.00, palm oil imported in packing of 210L and below, under 
code 1511.90.20, and the palm oil products other than refined, bleached, and deodorized 
(RBD)  palm oil, falling under code  1511.90.90. All other palm oil products, namely, palm stearin 
under code  1511.90.10, crude palm olein under code  1511.90.30, and RBD  palm oil, falling under 
code 1511.90.90, have not been banned and can be imported after obtaining a licence with a fee of 
0.4% of c.i.f.  value. The main palm oil product importe d into Sri Lanka is crude palm olein, falling 
under code  1511.90.30, and this single product accounts for about 75% of total importation of palm 
oil products into Sri Lanka. This product is not banned; it is under licence. Sri Lanka also imports 
significan t quantities of RBD  oil; this product is not banned either and can also be imported under 
licence. Therefore, Sri Lanka has not closed the import gates to these major palm oil products.  
11.12.   As per Sri Lanka's national statistics, the two  main products that are  subject to this ban, 
namely, crude palm oil under code  1511.10.00, and palm oil imported in packing of 210L and below, 
under code  1511.90.20, account for about 7% to 15% of Sri  Lanka's total imports of palm oil 
products. Therefore, the actual impact of th e ban is insignificant when the total importation of palm 
oil products is considered. That said, it is important to evaluate what prompted Sri Lanka to introduce 
a ban over a few products, with insignificant import values, while the gates remain open for t he 
major palm oil products. Sri Lanka amply justified the main reasons behind this ban during its 
previous interventions at various committees. This is purely an SPS  measure relating to aflatoxin 
and mycotoxin, which are carcinogenic materials. The Sri Lan ka Standard Institute (SLSI) has 
already adopted standards for palm oil products, which have been notified to the WTO.  
11.13.   It is important to note that crude palm oil is actually not intended for human consumption 
because it contains heavy metals and mycotoxin . The only product that is intended for human 
consumption is RBD  palm oil, which Sri Lanka has not banned. For decades, Sri Lanka has had quite 
relaxed procedures with regard to the importation of all edible oils, as a result of which the market 
was floode d with adulterated and contaminated oils, coming from various countries. Sri Lanka's 
authorities have observed that certain business entities, including importers, have engaged in 
numerous unethical practices to release cooking oils that were not fit for h uman consumption. Even 
crude oil has been adulterated and released to the market under claims that it had been refined and 
hence was fit for human consumption. Against this backdrop, Sri Lanka was compelled to adopt 
certain measures to curtail age -old unet hical practices, including adulteration. Ultimately, it is the 
responsibility of the Government to guarantee that Sri Lanka's consumers consume non -toxic food, 
including cooking oil. And Sri Lanka knows that it will not be easy to establish consumer confid ence 
in this regard. The authorities of Indonesia have already contacted the focal points in Sri Lanka, 
namely, the SLSI, and the Department of Commerce of Sri Lanka, which is the coordinating 
authority. This Sri Lanka mission is following up on this matte r with Sri Lanka's aforementioned 
authorities. Sri Lanka will update the Council on this matter once it has heard back from Capital.  
11.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
12  INDIA – INDIAN STANDARDS AND IMPORT RESTRICTION IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR (QUA LITY CONTROL ORDERS): WHEEL RIMS, SAFETY GLASS, HELMET - REQUEST 
FROM INDONESIA  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
12.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
12.3.  Indonesia thanks India f or notifying the draft of its Automobile Wheel Rims (Quality Control), 
Order  2020, on 25  May 2020, to the TBT  Committee and WTO  Members, through 
document  G/TBT/N/IND/147. Under these measures, wheel rims must conform to the IS  16192, and 
must bear India St andard Marking under the licence form of the B IS. Indonesia raised this concern 
at the previous meeting of the TBT  Committee; however, Indonesia is yet to receive substantive G/C/M/140  
 
- 40 - 
 
  responses from India.  According to India's notification, this order shall enter i nto force on 
1 October  2020, yet India has not made any addendum to the notification regarding the stipulations 
of the regulation. Indonesia seeks clarification regarding the status of the regulation's 
implementation. Indonesia is of the view that the regu lation has impacted upon and become a trade 
barrier for exporters, as there is no clarity regarding the mechanism of the regulation. Therefore, 
Indonesia requests India to postpone the regulation or to provide a sufficient transition time to allow 
industri es to comply with it.  
12.4.  Indonesia remains concerned that the conformity assessment procedure as required in the 
document is more restrictive than necessary. The procedure includes audit and certification that can 
only be carried out by the BIS, and which req uires a factory visit as part of the scheme. Indonesia 
regrets that India has not taken into account the current pandemic situation that has made factory 
visits impossible due to the travel bans and social distancing policy. Therefore, Indonesia urges Indi a 
to consider the use of remote assessment in conducting a factory visit, or any other relaxation policy, 
as a means to facilitate trade and minimize technical barriers to trade, particularly in this difficult 
time. Indonesia also encourages India to recog nize and accept conformity assessment results 
performed by accredited conformity assessment bodies outside India under the framework of the 
International Accreditation Forum (IAF) and International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation 
(ILAC) . Indonesia is also aware that, according to the mandatory implementation of IS  16192, India 
requires all manufactures of automobile wheel rims to implement the International Center for 
Automotive Technology (ICAT) Standard prior to entering India's market. Therefore, In donesia 
would like to ask clarification from India regarding the implementation of the ICAT  standards once 
this regulation comes into force. Indonesia remains concerned over this potentially duplicative 
conformity assessment procedure. Hence, Indonesia req uests India to harmonize both of these 
requirements under a single conformity assessment procedure.  
12.5.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
12.6.  India has taken note of Indonesia's concern , which has been forwarded to Capital for 
appropriate action.  
12.7.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
13  INDIA - PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER  2020 - REQUEST FROM INDONESIA  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Indonesia.  
13.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
13.3.  Indonesia seeks clarification regarding the provisions set out in the Plain Copier Paper (Quality 
Control) Order  2020. The certification shall be carrie d out only by the Bureau of Indian Standards 
(BIS), based on the Conformity Assessment Regulation  2018 through the Scheme  1 of Schedule  II, 
which shall require a factory visit, sampling and testing of the product, as well as licensing 
procedures. Indonesia  regrets that India has ignored the current pandemic situation that has made 
factory visits impossible due to the travel bans and social distancing policy. Therefore, Indonesia 
urges India to consider the use of remote assessment in conducting factory visi ts, or any other 
relaxation policy, as a means to facilitate trade and minimize technical barriers to trade, particularly 
in this difficult time.  
13.4.  Indonesia would like to reiterate that the regulation in question has had an impact upon and 
become a trade ba rrier for exporters, as there is no clarity regarding the mechanism of the 
regulation. Therefore, Indonesia requests India to postpone this regulation or to provide sufficient 
transition time to allow industries to comply with it. Indonesia also urges Indi a to adopt the available 
international standard as a basis for its testing method. Indonesia is also aware that India, through 
its Ministry of Commerce and Industry, had published the mandatory implementation of Plain Copier 
Paper (Quality Control) Order  2020 on 5  June 2020. This regulation will come into force six  months 
after the date of its publication, namely 5  December  2020. In this regard, Indonesia reminds India 
to notify this technical regulation to the TBT  Committee , and likewise to notify the adde nda of the 
notification discussed under the previous agenda item . G/C/M/140  
 
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  13.5.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
13.6.  India' s has taken note of Indonesia's  concern , which will be forwarded to Capital for 
appropriate action.  
13.7.  The Council took note  of the statemen ts made.  
14  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE 
UNITED STATES (G/C/W/791)  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United States.  
14.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
14.3.  Australia's concerns with India's restrictive measures on pulses ' imports , particularly India's 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) , are well known to all Members. While Australia welcomes India's 
temporary suspension of the renewed QRs for mung beans (Moong), pigeon peas (Tur) , and black 
gram (Urad) , until 31  October  2021, this does n ot address Australia's underlying concerns and its 
continued request that the QRs be permanently removed.  Australia has previously said in this Council 
and other WTO  committees that it believes that India is using these WTO -inconsistent measures as 
an ongo ing means to flexibly manage imports in response to changing domestic circumstances. 
Australia understands that the temporary suspension of the QRs and the imposition of domestic 
stock limits for all pulses until 31  October  2021 is to address concerns abou t inflation in pulse prices, 
which reinforces Australia's concerns about how India is using the QRs. Australia also notes that, at 
the same time, India recently continued to increase the minimum support prices for a range of 
pulses.  
14.4.  Pulses are not a "small " commodity for India, neither by tonnage nor the value produced and 
consumed, nor with respect to trade. Therefore, India's measures matter in the global pulses market. 
India's current suite of measures on pulses, including significant and increasing leve ls of market 
price support, high tariffs, and QRs, continue to negatively impact the stability and predictability of 
the global pulses market, to the detriment of all producers and consumers, including those in India. 
A well -functioning, transparent, predi ctable and stable global trading system remains fundamental 
to global economic stability for the benefit of all Members. Australia also notes that India has also 
recently signed agreements with Myanmar and Malawi and renewed an existing agreement with 
Mozambique for pulse imports for a five -year period. Australia is interested in understanding how 
these fit within India's restrictive regime for pulse imports and how they are consistent with the 
WTO's Most -Favoured -Nation  principle.  
14.5.  In addition to the formal  questions that Australia, along with a number of other Members, 
submitted to India for the previous Council meeting, the same Members submitted further questions 
for the most recent meeting of the Committee on Agriculture. Unfortunately, India did not ans wer 
all of Australia's questions or address its concerns. It is important that India provides detailed 
answers to explain the market and other conditions behind its decision and explain how they are 
WTO-consistent. While the WTO  Agreements contain exceptio ns, the onus is on the Member 
implementing the measure to explain how such exceptions may apply. Finally, Australia again asks 
India to clearly explain the status of restrictions on the importation of yellow peas for the fiscal year 
2021-2022. India did no t provide confirmation in the recent Committee on Agriculture meeting, but 
instead stated that a minimum import price requirement and port restrictions remained in place. As 
previously requested, India needs to explain how these measures are WTO -consistent  and explain 
the policy rationale for these two  specific requirements. Australia requests that India respond to 
Australia's questions and permanently remove the QRs.  
14.6.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
14.7.  The Russian Federation rei terates its long -standing concern over India's pulses import policy 
and urges India to stop applying restrictive measures on imports of yellow peas. From 2018 to 2021, 
India has been progressively restricting the access of pulses to its market through meas ures that 
India has been calling "temporary" throughout these four  years. In 2020, exports of yellow peas G/C/M/140  
 
- 42 - 
 
  from Russia into India have declined by a factor of 174 compared to the volume exported in 2017. 
The urgent problem now is the fact that, as of 7  July 2021, India has still not published an official 
notification about the rules for importation of yellow peas for the financial year 2021 -2022, as well 
as the import volumes allowed for this period. Russia urges India to notify its policy on the import 
of yellow peas for 2021 -2022 as early as possible. The absence of timely information causes 
disruptions in trade flows and a growing unpredictability in markets.  
14.8.  At the Committee on Agriculture held on 18  June 2021, India stated that its minimum import 
price r equirement and ports of entry restriction remain applicable in the current fiscal year. There 
are no clear legal grounds justifying India's measures on imports of pulses, and India's previous 
vision about the causal link between the protection of public mo rals, human, plant or animal life or 
health and import restrictions on yellow peas hardly makes sense. The Russian Federation insists 
that India should eliminate its minimum import price requirement, lift its ports of entry restrictions, 
and allow unrestri cted imports of yellow peas into its market in accordance with India's 
WTO obligations.  
14.9.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
14.10.   The United States has repeatedly stated its concerns with India's use of domestic support 
policies, multiple increases in tariff rates, and the application of quantitative import restrictions for 
pulses including pigeon peas, mung beans, black gram lentils, and peas. US  concerns remain 
unchanged. On 15  May 2021, India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued 
Notification  S.O. 1858(E), amending the import policy and temporarily removing QRs for select 
pulses until 31  October  2021. The United States requests that India explain why only those specific 
pulses were selected for the temporary removal of QRs and why th e remaining pulses are still subject 
to restrictions. Furthermore, the United States notes that India has still not responded to its written 
questions submitted on 19  March  2021. When can the United States expect to receive a response 
from India? Once agai n, the United States requests that India confirm that the allegedly "temporary" 
QRs will not be renewed once their current terms expire at the end of this Indian fiscal year.  
14.11.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
14.12.   The European Union re iterates its concerns over the lack of engagement from India on this 
question. The EU urges India to provide additional explanations as to how such a ban is necessary 
for the "protection of public morals", as India indicated at the Council's previous meeti ng. The EU 
urges India to provide written answers to the questions set out in document  G/C/W/791. The EU 
also calls upon India to provide detailed clarifications regarding how its measures comply with 
WTO rules.  
14.13.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the followi ng: 
14.14.   India's QRs on dried peas expired on 31  March  2021. However, since then, dried peas are 
effectively banned from import, as they are still listed by India as a restricted product with no quota 
publication. Canada is disappointed that India continues its  trade restrictive measures on dried peas 
and other pulses. This situation has been ongoing for more than three  years. It is difficult for Canada 
to see how India can still be claiming these measures to be temporary. As the largest supplier of 
pulses to In dia, Canada has been the WTO  Member most negatively affected by India's measures to 
limit the import of pulses. Pulses are an important source of protein for many Indian consumers and 
Canada is a high quality and reliable supplier.  
14.15.   Canada asks for India to  promptly clarify the situation as to why dried peas are still restricted 
from import, why no quota on dried peas has been available since 31  March  2021, and when 
Canadian dried peas will be again eligible to be imported into India. Canada continues to que stion 
the legal interpretation provided by India to justify its trade restrictive measures on dried peas. 
Canada is also further concerned with the establishment of stock limits on all pulses announced by 
India on 2  July. This new restrictive measure could  have a negative effect on Canadian pulse farmers. 
Canada asks for India to clarify why this measure was put in place and what effect India anticipates 
it will have on its trade in pulses. To conclude, Canada calls for India to immediately and 
expeditiousl y review its trade restrictive measures put in place on dried peas and other pulses, and 
to implement alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that promote a predictable and transparent 
import regime for pulses.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  14.16.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the foll owing:  
14.17.   Ukraine wishes to support the request from Australia, Canada, the European Union, and the 
United States, and to reaffirm its concerns over India's pulses policy. Such continuing QRs on imports 
imposed by India for about four  years, along with other trade-distorting policies in relation to various 
pulses, have created uncertainty for exporters and negatively affected the international pulse crop 
markets. As India has not provided sufficient responses to Members' questions at previous meetings 
of this Council, nor in the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Market Access, and has 
continued or renewed its QRs on imports of certain pulses, it appears that such measures violate 
the requirements of Article  XI of the GATT and Article  4 of the Agreem ent on Agriculture. Therefore, 
Ukraine calls upon India to change its unfair pulses policy and eliminate its import restrictive 
measures in order to guarantee predictable trade opportunities to access India's pulses market. 
Additionally, Ukraine would like  to receive further clarifications on the replies given by India in the 
context of the review process of the Committee on Agriculture concerning the general exceptions in 
Article  XX of the GATT  1994.  
14.18.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
14.19.   This issue has also being raised in various other forums besides the C TG, namely the 
Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Import Licensing, and the Committee on Market 
Access. India would like to refer Members to the responses given in these bodies. India would like 
to reiterate that the objective of this measure is to cater to the food and livelihood security of small 
and marginal farmers. India has been regularly reviewing this measure based on the market 
situation of pulses, owing to which the quot a of pulses has been increased from time to time. Apart 
from these increases in quotas from time to time, the Government of India, through 
DGFT  Notification S.O.  1858(E), dated 15  May 2021, has withdrawn restrictions on the import of 
Tur/Pigeon Peas (Cajan us Cajan), Moong, and Urad, by revising their import policy from "Restricted" 
to "Free", with effect from 15  May 2021, which will be in effect until 31  October  2021.  
14.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW – REQUEST FROM TH E EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union and Japan.  
15.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
15.3.  Japan continues to have concerns over China's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020.  As Japan has stated in past Council meetings, and taking into consideration the 
objective of the law to safeguard national interests, Japan  reiterate s its concerns regarding  the 
following three  points : (i) there may be the possibility that the scope of the products has been set 
out excessively broadly; (ii) there may be cases that require unnecessary disclosure of technological 
information during classification and end -user or usage investigations; and  (iii) the provisions on 
countermeasures for discriminatory export regulation by other countries are maintained in the law.  
Japan believes that the aforementioned export restrictions stipulated in this law may constitute an 
overly stringent export regulati on or be unnecessary restrictions in light of the international export 
control regime. Therefore, they may equate to export restrictions prohibited under Article  XI of the 
GATT and, in consequence, be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreements.  
15.4.  Japan wishes to r eiterate the following two  points from previous Council meetings: (i)  Japan 
is concerned by the fact that the draft regulations on rare earths, published in January  2021, mention 
a plan to set out strategic reserves; Japan believes that this plan may mean that there is a possibility 
that China may introduce controls on exports of rare earth -related products, in accordance with the 
aforementioned Export Control Law, despite the fact that natural resources should be categorized 
as products beyond the scope of  the international export control regime; and (ii)  regarding the 
"Unreliable Entities List" and export prohibition list based on the external trade law, Japan is 
concerned that the relationship between the entities list in the Export Control Law and the it ems 
covered under the law and the technology list is also unclear. Japan understands that China 
explained at the CTG's previous meeting that it is still drafting the supporting regulations and control 
lists of the Export Control Law, and also that China ex plained that it would communicate with the G/C/M/140  
 
- 44 - 
 
  relevant Members and provide updates in due course. Japan will continue to observe the details of 
the regulations on implementing the law and hopes that the above -mentioned concerns will be 
resolved accordingly in  the final draft of the regulations. In addition, Japan is of the view that 
countermeasure provisions should be removed from the law. Japan requests China to provide 
information on the detailed regulations and their timeline with full transparency and whil e providing 
ample time for their consideration.  
15.5.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
15.6.  The European Union is closely following developments regarding China's new Export Control 
Law, which took effect on 1  December  2020. While recognizi ng that the Chinese Export Control Law 
consolidates China's non -proliferation commitments and export controls, the EU still has the 
following four  major concerns regarding the law.  
15.7.  First, the EU has a major concern regarding the law's extra -territorial app lication, because 
the law contains a new provision with extraterritorial application determining consequences to 
foreign individuals and organizations outside of China violating the law and endangering the national 
security and interests of China (Article  44), which is not in line with internationally agreed export 
control standards.  
15.8.  Second, the EU has a major concern regarding the law's rules on deemed exports and 
re-exports, because the law appears to provide for controls to apply to transactions within C hina 
(Article  2.3). In this regard, the EU places great importance on the non -discriminatory treatment of 
EU companies in China (for example, their Chinese subsidiaries), and is concerned that the concept 
of deemed exports, which goes beyond the internatio nally agreed export controls standards, might 
lead to an unequal treatment that has adverse effects on the activities of EU  companies in China 
(for example, research and development activities). Furthermore, the law foresees controls on 
re-transfer or re -exports (Articles  16 and 45), but it is unclear whether the obligation not to re -export 
items without the prior consent of the Chinese authorities also applies to foreign products that 
contain controlled items obtained from China as components. The previous  draft included an explicit 
provision in this regard in case the controlled items exceeded a certain threshold, and it would be 
useful to confirm that such is not the case under the current re -export provision.  
15.9.  Third, the EU has a major concern regarding t he law's objectives and scope of controls, 
because the law names "national security and interests" as a prime objective, next to 
"non-proliferation and other international obligations"; and even though the law does not reference 
"development interests", "i ndustrial competence", or "technological development" as control 
principles anymore (as previous drafts did), the EU is concerned that Article  1 ("national security 
and interests") as well as Article  3 ("national security and coordination" of "security and  
development") contain vague language and are still reflecting objectives other than the stated 
international security obligations and commitments. The EU recalls that the objectives and scope of 
export controls should be in line with international obligat ions and multilateral commitments. The 
EU would therefore welcome a clarification in this regard, as well as on the intended application and 
specification of other related provisions that could lead to legal uncertainty for economic operators. 
That is, for  example, on: application of control parameters ("national security" and "development", 
Articles  1, 3, and 13; "terrorist purposes", Article  12); scope of controls ("temporary controls", 
Article  9) and related control lists; understanding of exporters' obl igations in this regard ("is or 
should be aware", Article  12); scope of investigations by the authorities (in case of "suspected 
violations", Article  28); and information restrictions (prohibited for reasons of national security, 
Article  32). 
15.10.   Fourth, the E U has a major concern regarding the law's retaliation clause. Article  48 provides 
for "reciprocal measures by the Chinese Governments where the abuse of export control measures 
by any country or region endangers its national security and interests". This p rovision is not in line 
with international export control standards. The EU will place great importance on any secondary 
legislation and would welcome receiving clarifications and specifications regarding the application of 
such provisions.  G/C/M/140  
 
- 45 - 
 
  15.11.   The delegate of  the United States  indicated the following:  
15.12.   The United States has been closely following this issue, including how China implements its 
new Export Control Law, which went into effect late last year. The United States is concerned that 
the law gives the Chi nese government new rationales to impose terms on transactions among firms 
and within various partnerships in China, as well as on exports and offshore transactions. It also 
allows Chinese authorities to temporarily impose export controls on goods not on a  control list. This 
law exists in the context of China's history of controlling the export of commodities, such as coke, 
fluorspar, and rare earth elements, and using ad hoc  restrictions to create commercial and political 
pressures on its major trading par tners. The United States will continue to watch this issue closely.  
15.13.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
15.14.   Australia notes the statements by Japan and the European Union in relation to China's Export 
Control Law. Australia was pleased to make a  submission to the Chinese Government in relation to 
this law in August  2020 as part of a public consultation process. Australia appreciated China's 
consultation with interested parties ahead of the adoption of this law. Australia's submission 
welcomed eff orts to codify the regulatory framework for defence export controls. Australia's concerns 
primarily relate to the broad scope of the law. Australia encourages China to provide greater clarity 
in relation to key elements of the law, including its jurisdicti on, the scope of its administrator powers, 
and confirmation that the law is consistent with China's international commitments, including under 
WTO rules and t he China –Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA). Australia urges China to take 
account of the con cerns of foreign businesses and Members in the implementation of this law and 
related measures. Australia looks forward to continuing to work closely with China.  
15.15.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
15.16.   China would like to thank Japan, the European U nion, the United States, and Australia, for 
their interest and comments on this issue. At this moment, China is  still drafting the supporting 
regulations on the Export Control Law. China  will keep the relevant Members updated on this issue 
in due course.  
15.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
16  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union.  
16.2.  The delegate of the Europ ean Union  indicated the following:  
16.3.  The European Union would like to reiterate its concerns with regard to the registration of 
companies exporting to Egypt under Decrees No.  991/2015, No.  43/2016, and No.  44/2019. The 
registration procedure at issue constit utes a considerable obstacle to trade and imposes unnecessary 
administrative burden and blocks or substantially delays EU  exports. The European Union therefore 
continues to question the measure and Egypt's justification for this mandatory registration of 
EU companies. The European Union notes with concern that most of the pending registration cases 
known to the EU have still not been successfully processed. Some sectors (like ceramic tiles) 
continue being disproportionately affected by the discretionary app lication of Decree No.  43. 
Moreover, the European Union would like to highlight the structural problems relating to Decree 
No. 43/2016, such as the lack of transparency in the registration process, the lack of clear deadlines 
for processing requests, the l ack of a clear appeal procedure, and the high level of discretion in the 
granting of registrations. The European Union calls upon Egypt to terminate the measure and looks 
forward to working with Egypt so that EU  concerns are addressed.  
16.4.  The delegate of Turkey indicated the following:  
16.5.  Turkey will refrain from repeating the points raised previously in this Council and at the 
TBT Committee; nevertheless, Turkey's concerns are still ongoing regarding Egypt's manufacturer 
registration system. Despite all the conc erns and questions from Members in previous meetings, the G/C/M/140  
 
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  structural problems relating to this Decree and its implementation still continue. The system lacks 
transparency and hence leads to unpredictability, arbitrariness, and additional costs. Turkish 
exporters continue to report long delays in the registration process and face difficulties in obtaining 
information about their pending registration requests. In this respect, Turkey wishes to reiterate 
that it could still not get clear information on the eva luation criteria for the applications to Egypt's 
General Organization of Export and Import Control (GOEIC), the steps to be taken for a smooth 
registration, and the time limits for the completion of the registration, if any. Therefore, Turkey 
wishes to rei terate its expectation that Egypt will review this measure in light of its obligations in 
the WTO  Agreements and with a view to ensuring its implementation in full transparency.  
16.6.  The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
16.7.  Egypt would like to refer to its previous statements in the CTG14 as well as the TBT and M arket 
Access Committees. As to the questions raised by the European Union in relation to the 
TBT Agreement, Egypt is following up on these with Capital in order to re ceive written replies. Finally, 
Egypt renews its call for interested delegations to reach out at the level of Geneva missions or 
Capital s regarding specific problems that companies are facing so that Egypt can revert to them with 
concrete feedback.  
16.8.  The Cou ncil took note  of the statements made.  
17  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States.  
17.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.3.  This is a long -standing agenda item, and it is of deep concern to the European Union that no 
real progress could so fa r be registered. Rather, the number and scope of Indonesia's restrictions 
seems to have further expanded over time, with a negative impact on trade flows, and this at a time 
when growth and economic integration are under major stress due to the pandemic. I ntegration in 
global value chains will be key for economic recovery. To achieve this, a country cannot rely only on 
promoting exports. It also needs to be open to increasing imports and to creating a trade and 
investment -friendly climate. The European Unio n had welcomed the adoption by Indonesia of the 
Omnibus Law on Job Creation, which could be a game -changer for facilitating investment. However, 
the European Union notes with concern that several burdensome and opaque requirements remain 
in place, preventi ng the trade and investment facilitation effects of the Omnibus Law from 
materializing.  
17.4.  The European Union is also deeply concerned about the alleged plans of Indonesia's Ministry 
of Industry to reduce imports into Indonesia by 25 -30%. In this respect, the  European Union is 
concerned by the use of a range of measures, including expanding the mandatory use of Indonesian 
national "SNI"  standards and the further promulgation of cumbersome import licensing procedures. 
In particular, the European Union reiterate s its serious preoccupation over Indonesia's burdensome 
and lengthy SPS  import authorization procedures, its complex rules on halal labelling, and its 
restrictive import licensing requirements for an increasingly broad range of goods (foodstuffs, 
textiles,  footwear, and electronics, to name just a few). These procedures, rules, and requirements 
de facto  hinder access to the Indonesian market for a variety of EU  products and hamper bilateral 
trade and investment relations.  
17.5.  The list is long, but to give just one example , Regulation No.  77 of 2019 of the Ministry of 
Trade "Regarding the Provisions on the Imports of Textiles and Textile Products" aims at preventing 
the importation of a significant number of textiles and textile  products by means of an extremely 
complex import licensing scheme. Since January  2020, those products can only be imported to meet 
the processing needs of domestic producers and small or mid -sized industries. This constitutes a 
clear de facto  ban on the i mport of finished carpets and rugs and the European Union fails to see 
any justification for it other than outright protectionism. This legislation has still not been notified, 
 
14 G/C/M/139, paragraphs  26.10 -26.11.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  despite the European Union's  repeated reminders, including at the Council's pre vious meeting, and 
affects EU  operators in the sector very negatively.  Accordingly, the European Union urges Indonesia 
to reduce the high number of trade barriers that have been affecting EU  trade flows for too long and 
to refrain from issuing new ones. Th e European Union also reiterates its call on Indonesia to ensure 
that all relevant measures are notified to the WTO in order to allow Members to comment on them.  
17.6.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
17.7.  New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by  the European Union. New Zealand believes that 
Indonesia's restrictions on agricultural imports undermine core WTO  principles. New Zealand is 
particularly concerned about the inconsistent issuance of import licences. Delays in import licences 
last year pre vented commercially meaningful access for New Zealand horticultural products to the 
Indonesian market for a significant proportion of New Zealand's export season. Delays in the 
processing of applications this year reduce the commercial certainty exporters have in this market. 
Therefore, New Zealand looks forward to the timely issuance of commercially meaningful import 
licences to allow trade to flow freely for the remainder of this season. In addition, New Zealand 
requests an update from Indonesia on how th e issues previously experienced will be addressed.  
17.8.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
17.9.  As Japan has stated in this Council and in the TRIMs  Committee, it continues to have concerns 
over Indonesia's local content requirement measures in some area s and their consistency with 
WTO Agreements. These measures include a measure for 4G  LTE mobile devices and 
TV apparatuses, as well as measures in the retail sector. Japan is carefully watching the progress of 
Indonesia's comprehensive reviews on LCR  measu res and would also like to ask Indonesia to explain 
the process and content of the reviews in a transparent manner.  
17.10.   While all the issues have unfortunately not yet been resolved, Japan would like on this 
occasion to refer only to the current situation. Ja pan has noted that, once again, trade restrictive 
measures that appear to be inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT have been increasing. For 
example, since the import registration and approval system had been adopted for imports of textile 
products in  October  2019, and air conditioners in August  2020, respectively, imports of both have 
dramatically decreased. Moreover, when the import licences for steel products were issued, in 
accordance with the Minister of Trade Regulation No.  3 of 2020, the Ministe r of Industry Regulation 
No. 4 of 2021 stipulated that the authority takes into account the national supply -demand balance 
when deciding whether or not to issue a Technical Consideration for API -U. Since then, the actual 
approved quantities of both API -U and API -P have decreased, effectively meaning that import 
restrictive measures have been implemented de facto . 
17.11.   Furthermore, on textile products, it was truly regrettable that the safeguard measure on 
carpets was introduced on 17  February  2021, even though J apan had called upon Indonesia to 
reconsider this measure during a meeting of the Safeguards Committee, as well as the consultation 
on Article  XIX:2 of GATT. Japan questions Indonesia's action of imposing a high duty amounting to  
150 to 200% without consid ering the negative impact of the introduction of its aforementioned 
import registration measures. Japan believes that this measure does not fall within the scope of "to 
the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury," as stipulated 
in Article  XIX of the GATT. Japan is concerned by Indonesia's introduction of increased trade 
restrictive measures, which are questionable in terms of their WTO  consistency. Japan is preparing 
written questions for Indonesia after receiving Indo nesia's request for Japan to do so in the TRIMs 
and Import Licensing Committees. Japan urges Indonesia to explain the background to the 
introduction of such measures as well as their legitimacy in terms of their WTO  consistency. Japan 
also urges Indonesia to withdraw these measures immediately.  
17.12.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.13.   This Council is well aware of the breadth of concerns that the United States has with 
Indonesia's trade and investment regime. In the interest of time, the U nited States will not restate 
all of them at this meeting, but the United States nevertheless notes its continued concerns with the 
items previously raised at this Council, including over Indonesia's pervasive use of local content 
requirements, and its con sideration of import duties on electronically transmitted software and 
digital goods. On this occasion, the United States would like to focus its remarks on Indonesia's G/C/M/140  
 
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  continued application of tariffs at the border on a category of ICT  products that appea r to exceed its 
WTO bound tariff commitments. For example, Indonesia has a duty -free tariff commitment for all 
products that are classified under tariff subheading  8517.62. However, US and Indonesian traders 
report that a 10% duty is being levied for certa in products in this tariff category. The United States 
has raised this issue repeatedly with Indonesia over the past year and a half, including in the Market 
Access and ITA  Committees, as well as bilaterally. Unfortunately, Indonesia has yet to provide a 
substantive response to our concerns.  
17.14.   The United States has also submitted written questions to Indonesia through the 
ITA Committee, asking for clarification of how Indonesia's treatment of these products is consistent 
with its WTO  bound commitments. The Un ited States requests that Indonesia provide written 
responses to these questions expeditiously.  The United States understands that US  companies have 
also engaged the Indonesian government directly on this issue, seeking clarification of Indonesia's 
applica tion of these tariffs. Despite their efforts, they too have yet to receive a satisfactory response 
from Indonesia. In addition to calling into question Indonesia's bound commitments, the United 
States believes that these policies are to Indonesia's own det riment as they limit access for 
Indonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech products that form the backbone of the 
digital economy. The United States is hopeful that by raising this issue again today it can help to 
pave the path for greater engag ement and move us towards its expeditious resolution. The United 
States thanks the Indonesian delegation in advance for its engagement.  
17.15.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
17.16.   Norway wishes to express its support for the concerns raised over Indone sia's system of 
import licences. As Norway has mentioned in this Council before, Norway's experience is that the 
Indonesian system of import quotas for seafood represents a restriction for exports of Norwegian 
seafood to Indonesia. And it has been the expe rience of Norway's seafood exporters, for a number 
of years, that the limited number of quotas and the lack of transparency in the process for granting 
them makes the framework for trade in Indonesia unpredictable. Norway looks forward to a 
continued dialo gue with Indonesia on this issue.  
17.17.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
17.18.   Indonesia wishes to convey to Members that provisions for the importation of animals and 
animal products are considered with a risk assessment, according to Article  5 of the SPS  Agreement.  
Indonesia has also said that a harmonization process is being carried out for meat imports and 
horticultural imports with the issuance of Minister of Agriculture Regulation No.  42/2019 concerning 
Importation of Meat and Offal Carcasses in to the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and Minister 
of Agriculture Regulation No. 39/2019 concerning Recommendations for the Import of Horticultural 
Products , which has been revised in Minister of Agriculture Regulation No. 2/2020.   
17.19.   For the import p rocess, Indonesia requires an approval procedure for the entry of imported 
goods into Indonesian territory, due to the COVID -19 pandemic; Indonesia has communicated with 
the EU  member States bilaterally concerning some delays in the approval process. Furth ermore, 
Indonesia suggests that each EU  member State report on the progress of the import approval 
procedure to the EU  representative in Geneva in order that there are no misunderstandings in this 
matter. Indonesia thanks the European Union for raising the  concern regarding the import licensing 
requirements on textile and textile products, including the import provisions on footwear, electronics, 
and bicycles/tricycles, and also the importation requirements on alcohol beverages, which have been 
submitted th rough document  G/LIC/Q/IDN/43.  Currently, Indonesia is still coordinating among 
several government agencies in preparing written replies to the European Union's questions 
regarding the aforementioned concerns.  
17.20.   Regarding certain port of destination requirem ents, according to the Regulation of the 
Minister of Trade Regulation No.  68/2020, the Government of Indonesia intends to administer a 
surveillance of incoming goods, which can be optimally carried out in accordance with the standards 
of the specified port  of destination. Regarding import verification provisions, Indonesia must ensure 
that certain incoming goods meet the requirements, both in quantity and quality. Regarding the 
import plan obligation, Indonesia requires the data in order to project the futu re utilization of import 
approvals. Regarding the importation of alcohol beverages, Indonesia found no barriers to EU  alcohol 
beverages products entering Indonesia's market. From January until April  2021, Indonesia has G/C/M/140  
 
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  issued 13  import approvals on alcohol  beverages originating from several countries, including the 
European Union. Indonesia considers that the utilization of import approvals relating to alcohol 
beverages, whether originating in the European Union or not, is based on business -to-business 
decisions from the business entities/importers concerned.  
17.21.   Regarding Japan's concerns on Minister of Trade Regulation No.  68/2020, the Government 
of Indonesia does not prohibit any imports from Japan. Indonesia has administered import permits 
on ai r conditioners to ensure the business meets the import requirement as well as consumer 
protection on after sales. Japan's import approvals were delayed because the Government of 
Indonesia needed time for issuing the said import approvals. Those aforementio ned issues have 
been solved since the import approval (PI)  was issued. Indonesia committed to implementing the 
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body ( DSB) in DS477/478. This 
commitment is demonstrated and proven by the various adjustme nts that have been made. First, 
Indonesia has enacted Law No.  11/2020 on Job Creation. All articles in the relevant laws that were 
found to be inconsistent with the WTO's rules have been amended and are no longer in place. With 
respect to the horticulture import regime, Indonesia would like to highlight that the necessary 
adjustments have also been made in the relevant regulations of the Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Ministry of Trade in order to make them consistent with WTO  rules. Indonesia is open to r eceive any 
further enquiry from New Zealand on the technicalities of the differences in market access 
horticultural products into Indonesia from New Zealand.  
17.22.   The imposition of a safeguard measure on the importation of carpets and other textile floor 
coveri ngs has come into effect with the issuance of Minister of Finance's Regulation 
No. 10/PMK.010/2021. The imposition of a safeguard measure effectively began on 
17 February  2021. The safeguard measure is valid for three  years, with the specific tariff being 
liberalized and decreasing each year. Exclusions are given to developing countries that have a de 
minimis  import share in accordance with Article  9 of the WTO  Agreement on Safeguards. Indonesia 
has notified the implementation of a safeguard measure through  notification  12.1(c), which was 
circulated by the WTO  Secretariat on 17  February  2021.  Indonesia believes that the imposition of a 
safeguard measure on the importation of carpets and other textile floor coverings has complied with 
the principles, rules, a nd procedures stipulated in the WTO  Safeguards Agreement and has been 
carried out objectively and transparently. The results of the investigation carried out by the Authority 
have found that there has been a threat of serious injury to the applicant caused  by a surge in 
imports, so that the implementation of a safeguard measure has been carried out to facilitate a 
structural adjustment to the applicant's industry to avoid deeper injury. Allegations concerning the 
imposition of import duties on textile produ cts of 150 to 200% cannot be proven by Japan. Indonesia 
had explained to Japan the safeguard measure in question in its bilateral consultations with Japan.  
17.23.   Indonesia thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the issue of the Halal 
Product Ass urance Law No.  33/2014. Indonesia is mindful of its transparency obligations as 
mandated in the TBT  Agreement. Therefore, Indonesia has notified the Government Regulation 
No. 39/2021 on the Implementation of Halal Product Assurances in 
document  G/TBT/N/IDN /131/Add.1.  Indonesia reconfirms the regulation to revoke Government 
Regulation No.  31/2019 in order to implement the mandate of the Indonesia Omnibus Law. 
Indonesia wishes  to convey that there are phases or stages to the implement ation of its  mandatory 
halal certification ; for food and beverage products , the implement ation of its  mandatory halal 
certification will be effective on 17  October  2024, while for non-food and beverage products , it will 
be effective on 17  October  2026.  Furthermore, Indonesia provi des a transition provision, as 
mentioned in Article  169 of Government Regulation No.  39/2021, to accommodate stakeholders and 
industries that had obtained halal certification based on previous mechanisms, as follows: all forms 
of cooperation with foreign h alal certification bodies and accreditation agencies in other countries 
that were carried out before this government regulation was introduced remain in effect until the 
period of cooperation ends; and foreign halal certificates recognized by the Indonesia n Ulema Council 
(MUI) before this government regulation was introduced remain valid until the expiration of the 
validity period of the foreign Halal Certificate. Indonesia would like to reiterate its openness to 
international cooperation on its Halal Assur ance System based on the principle of mutual recognition 
and mutual acceptance, in accordance with international regulations and practices.  
17.24.   Regarding localization measures, as Indonesia conveyed in the TRIMs  Committee and during 
its Trade Policy Review, the localization measures in question have been put in place only in relation 
to government procurement , or policies that involve fulfilling t he need to maintain the welfare and 
life necessities of the entire Indonesian population , or policies that involve state -managed strategic G/C/M/140  
 
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  resources.  Furthermore, Indonesia wishes to reiterate that it does not have any plan to revise the 
localization requi rements in the near future. Nevertheless, as an investment destination, Indonesia 
will always view its investment regulations from the perspective of facilitating investment and 
enhancing the business climate.  
17.25.   Indonesia is giving its most serious attention  to the imposition of import duty tariffs on 
several information technology products, as raised by the United States. Indonesia reaffirms its 
statements delivered at the ITA  Committee meetings of 31  October  2019 and 30  October  2020, and 
at the meetings of the Committee on Market Access of 11  November  2019, 8  June 2020, and 
12 November  2020, whereby the Government of Indonesia continues to be committed to complying 
with and respecting every WTO  Agreement, including Indonesia's commitment to the ITA. 
Furtherm ore, Indonesia has no intention of taking any action beyond its obligations under the ITA. 
On this issue, Indonesia is open to further communication with the European Union, Japan, the 
United States, and other WTO  Members.  
17.26.   The Government of Indonesia has c larified in the Committee on Customs Valuation that it 
does not consider the verification as a PSI activity . The verification is not only carried out in the 
country of origin of goods (exporting country), but also applies domestically in Indonesia's  Free 
Trade Zone area. Overall, the verification provisions also apply to export, import, and even domestic 
inter-island trade.  The verification applies to the documentation and technical aspects of certain 
products and is conducted to fulfil the duty and respons ibility of the Government of Indonesia 
towards its people to preserve Indonesia's health, safety, the environment, public morals, as well 
as the national security and national interest. Regarding the current legislation, the verification or 
technical surve illance activity by a surveyor does not substitute or diminish the authority of Customs 
to conduct customs inspections. The result of verification or technical surveillance submitted by the 
importer is not used by Customs in determining the classification of goods; rather, it is attached as 
supplementary documents in an import declaration. And it may serve as one reference based on 
which Customs Officers may release the consignee at the destination port. Therefore, the technical 
verification could help to e xpedite the importation process by avoiding the possibility of illegal 
importation in the context of discrepancies between the import and technical documents. Hence, 
this procedure considerably reduces dwelling time.  
17.27.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
18  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union and the United St ates. 
18.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.3.  The Russian Federation continues to openly develop and apply a policy of import substitution 
and of forced locali zation of production , which is contrary to the spirit and often to the letter  of its 
WTO commitments. Such policy is the source of numerous trade irritants affecting EU  products. At 
this Council 's previous meeting , the European Union  referred to six  specific measures. Unfortunately, 
the EU  must refer to all six  again  on this occasi on. The European Union had referred in some detail 
to the proposal to increase the so -called "recycling fee" for certain categories of vehicles, including 
by as much as a six -fold increase in the case of certain categories of vehicles (semi -trailers), and by 
up to two to three  times for road construction equipment and certain agricultural machinery. The EU 
makes the following requests to Russia: to suspend the planned increase of the recycling fee; to 
conduct a fact -based evaluation of the recycling market for vehicles so as to inform future decisions 
on the level of the recycling fee; and to ensure that measures supporting demand provide the same 
advantages to domestic and imported products. The European Union also asks Russia to inform 
Members about the st ate of play of the planned increases for the different categories of vehicles.  
18.4.  At this Council's previous meetings, the European Union had voiced its concern regarding 
Decree No.  2013, adopted on 3  December  2020, establishing quotas for foreign products in  
procurement by state-owned enterprises ( SOEs) and by some unspecified private entities. This 
decree lists 250  lines of customs nomenclature on which quotas for Russian products were 
established. These quotas reach a prohibitive 90%  level. This is manifest ly a trade -restricting G/C/M/140  
 
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  practice and its compatibility with WTO  rules is highly questionable. On 23  June 2021, 
EVP Dombrovskis sent a letter to the Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, 
asking that the situation be remedied. Should no acceptable compromise be found quickly, the 
European Union reserves its right to take all appropriate actions, including by seeking redress before 
the WTO, through dispute settlement proceedings.  
18.5.  The European Union regrets that it continues to be necessary  to refer to the blockage of 
EU exports of cement to Russia, effective since 2016. The Russian Federation announced in 2019 
that it would remedy the situation in the form an amendment to the standard, but such amendment 
has so far not materialized. As prev iously stated, the European Union considers the amendment to 
the Federal Law "on protecting consumer rights", which makes the pre -installation of Russian 
software mandatory in a number of consumer electronic devices, to be a potentially discriminatory 
meas ure. The European Union requests that this amendment be notified in accordance with the 
TBT Agreement. The measure could contravene WTO  national treatment provisions concerning 
goods, as well as Russia's WTO  commitments for certain services.  
18.6.  The European U nion repeats its request that Russia notify Federal Law No.  468, "on Viticulture 
and Winemaking". The European Union regrets that Russia refuses to do so. By way of a reminder 
to this Council, the law introduced many new requirements for the placing of win e products on the 
Russian market; therefore, it must be notified to the WTO in accordance with the TBT  Agreement. 
Furthermore, this law uses European geographical indications as definitions for certain categories of 
wine, like Champagne, Cahors, or Cognac,  and the implementation of this law is unclear. The 
European Union urges that amendments to the law, currently in preparation, eliminate its concerns. 
The European Union would welcome clarifications as to when these amendments can be expected to 
be adopted . 
18.7.  The European Union renews its concerns about the announced introduction of an export ban 
on timber, starting from 1  January  2022. The European Union once again urges Russia to explain 
how such an export ban and related measures may be compatible with the  WTO's  rules, and to notify 
any corresponding draft legislation. In conclusion, the European Union continues, overall, to call 
upon Russia to ensure that its measures fully conform to WTO  rules and to abandon its policy of 
import substitution and localizat ion. 
18.8.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
18.9.  The United States joins the European Union in again raising its concerns about Russia's 
restrictive trade practices. As the United States has noted at previous meetings of this Council, 
Russia  continues to implement policies and adopt rules that contradict the foundational principles of 
this Organization, particularly building a non -discriminatory, level playing field.  Concerning 
preferential treatment for Russian goods, and as the United State s has previously laid out in great 
detail, Russia has adopted a number of laws and subsidiary measures that dictate purchasing 
decisions for state -owned enterprises (SOEs) in favour of Russian goods. The estimates vary, but 
sources within Russia have sugge sted that the Russian State controls around 70% of the economy. 
Government mandates for certain companies to consult with a government Commission on 
purchases of certain imports, requirements that SOEs give a 15 -30% price preference to certain 
Russian good s, and requirements that certain SOEs purchase a minimum quota of 
domestically -produced products (among others), appear to be at odds with Russia's commitments 
in joining this Organization that purchases and sales would be made "in accordance with commerci al 
considerations" which "afford enterprises of other WTO  Members adequate opportunity in conformity 
with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales." The 
United States has raised this concern many times in this Co uncil and continues to wait for an 
adequate answer from the Russian Federation as to how these measures comport with its 
WTO obligations.  
18.10.   The United States is watching carefully Russia's potential expansion of its market control to 
"critical information in frastructure". There are press reports that the measure may be phased in, 
depending on the supply of Russian equipment, suggesting that this measure is yet another tool to 
limit imports. In addition, the draft Government Resolution approving the requiremen ts for software 
and equipment used in critical information infrastructure refers to "attached requirements" and 
"attached procedures", but the United States is not able to find those documents. The United States 
requests that the Russian delegate direct it to where the US might find those requirements and G/C/M/140  
 
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  procedures. The United States also asks if the Russian delegate could provide any further information 
on this measure.  
18.11.   The United States also follows the European Union in expressing concern about the soft ware 
pre-installation law that has been in force since April of this year. Here again, the Russian 
government is trying to dictate consumer choice by requiring the installation of certain Russian 
software, instead of leaving that commercial decision to the  individual consumer. The United States 
has raised concerns about this measure in the most recent meeting of the Council for Trade in 
Services, and repeats its request made at that meeting that Russia share the proposed amendments 
to the regulations govern ing the pre -installation mandate.  
18.12.   With regard to Russia's mandatory labelling or "track and trace" regime, as the United States 
has said before, it supports efforts to combat counterfeit goods. Like the European Union, the United 
States is concerned about the proportionality of this measure, and whether such a costly and 
burdensome labelling regime is really needed for all products. The United States remains concerned 
about the potential for significant supply chain disruptions at the border and about unequ al access 
to the machinery and the technological systems of the regime. The United States is also watching 
how the regime is being implemented by the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and urges all members 
of the EEU to ensure that the regime's implementation does not erect barriers to imports.  
18.13.   The United States also joins the European Union in raising a concern about Russia's recycling 
fee, in particular about its true purpose. From a practical standpoint, there appears to be little 
evidence that the law has a ctually contributed to the recycling industry or in removing old vehicles 
from the road. It has, however, contributed to increased prices for imports and protection for the 
domestic industry. The United States requests the delegate from the Russian Federat ion to provide 
updates on their government's plans. Finally, the United States reminds Russia of the importance of 
meeting its transparency obligations. As noted by the European Union, the United States urges 
Russia to notify its measures regarding wine, a long with any additional measures issued by the 
Eurasian Economic Commission. The United States also urges Russia to respond to questions 
submitted in the subsidiary committees, specifically two  sets of written questions posed in the 
TRIMs  Committee in doc uments  G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/8 and G/TRIMS/Q/RUS/10.  
18.14.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
18.15.   Australia thanks the Russian government and industry for its recent engagements on this 
issue. Australia would like to reiterate its concerns with Russia's Fede ral Law No.  468 of 
27 December  2019 on wine making and wine growing in the Russian Federation, which Australia has 
outlined at previous meetings of this Council and the TBT  Committee. This Federal Law poses several 
barriers to the importation of wine into Russia that have imposed a more onerous compliance burden, 
which, coupled with the short timelines for the law's implementation and subsequent amendments, 
are of concern to the Australian wine industry and have created ongoing uncertainty. Australia 
reques ts the Russian Federation to ensure its wine -related measures are no more trade restrictive 
than necessary and that there is a sufficient advance notice and transition period. While Australia 
notes that the value of Australian wine exports to the Russian F ederation has slightly increased since 
the implementation of the Law, Australia does not agree with Russia's argument that this means 
that Australia's wine exports to Russia have been unaffected.  
18.16.   Additionally, Australia notes several obligations within the  Federal Law that are inconsistent 
with E EU Technical Regulation No.  047/2018, "On safety of alcohol products". Australia understands 
that the implementation of the technical regulation has been postponed to allow harmonization work 
with the Russian Law. A ustralia requests the Russian Federation to provide an update on this 
harmonization work, including providing an indication of when this technical regulation is expected 
to be implemented. Australia requests that an adequate transition time be put in place  for the 
implementation of the revised technical regulations in order to provide sufficient time for businesses 
to adjust to the new requirements. Lastly, while the Federal Law entered into force on 26  June 2020, 
Russia has yet to notify the WTO of its imp lementation. Accordingly, Australia requests Russia to 
notify the Federal Law to the WTO as soon as possible.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  18.17.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
18.18.   In respect of the increase in the recycling fee for vehicles, the Russian Federation  notes that 
this fee is applied to both domestic and imported product s; the fee is the same in both cases . 
Moreover,  WTO rules do not prohibit  the establishment of fees providing that they comply  with the  
WTO principles of  national treatment and non -discrimination.  Regarding SOEs procurement, the 
Russian Federation would like to point out that this  regulation develops previous acts under Federal 
Law No.  223-FZ, "On the Procurement of Goods, Works, Services b y Certain Types of Legal Entities", 
and Federal Law No.  488-FZ, "On the Industrial Policy of the Russian Federation", which clearly 
stipulate that this regulation is to be applied in accordance with the international obligations of the 
Russian Federation. The Russian Federation would also like to note that this regulation does not 
cover private entities. As for cement certification, the Russian Federation notes that the relevant 
amendments are still being discussed among the responsible authorities. The Rus sian Federation 
will inform WTO  Members of these amendments once they have been prepared and adopted.  
18.19.   Regarding the pre -installation of software, as stated previously on numerous occasions, 
Russia maintains its position that the measure in question does no t fall under the scope of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and cannot be considered as a technical regulation.  The 
amendments to the Federal Law "On Consumer Rights Protection" do not set requirements for 
product characteristics or production m ethods. Thus, a requirement on pre -installation of certain 
Russian software products on technically complex products does not correspond to the definition of 
technical regulation set forth in Annex  1 to the Agreement on  Technical Barriers to Trade. Moreove r, 
the measure in question cannot be considered discriminatory since it does not mandate a 
replacement or de -installation of any foreign software programmes.  
18.20.   Concerning the Wine Law, the Russian Federation  took note of the statements made by the 
delegation s of the European Union , the United States , Australia,  and Argentina. The s tatements in 
question will be sent to the relevant Russian authorities for their consideration. Russia  refers to its 
previous statements on this subject in the relevant WTO working bodies. In addition, the Russian 
Federation  would like to highlight the following  points . The Federal Law on Winemaking and 
Winegrowing entered into force on 26  June 2020. The Law is intended  to develop and improve 
Russia's  internal wine market; it sets re quirements both for domestic and foreign winemakers 
irrespective of their origin. The provisions of the Federal Law are elaborated taking into account the 
obligations of the Russian Federation in the WTO and other international organizations.  And despite 
the concerns that have been raised over the Federal Law, statistics show that imports of wine into 
the territory of the Russian Federation have not substantially declined. As for the TRIPS  Agreement, 
the Russian Federation stresses that this law does not co ver intellectual property rights; nor does it 
establish a legal environment for their protection. In the Russian Federation intellectual property 
rights are registered and protected under the Civil Code of Russia that is based inter alia  on Russia's 
obligations under the TRIPS  Agreement.  
18.21.   Regarding the timber export regulation, the Russian Federation notes that the final design 
of the regulation is currently being developed but that it is intended to combat illegal exports of 
timber. As pr eviously noted, the Russian Federation is carefully studying the practice of other 
WTO Members in this area. Furthermore, the Russian Federation believes that it will be able to 
ensure the compliance of the measure with the WTO's rules.  
18.22.   The Council took no te of the statements made.  
19  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, SWITZERLAND, AND THE 
UNITED STATES (G/C/W/792)  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States.  
19.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
19.3.  The United States, the Eu ropean Union, Japan, and Switzerland circulated questions on 
17 March  2021 to each of the member State governments of the Cooperation Council for the Arab G/C/M/140  
 
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  States of the Gulf (GCC) regarding their implementation of the selective tax on carbonated soft 
drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sports drinks, and other sweetened beverages. We have not 
yet received written responses to those questions and ask these Members to indicate today when 
those responses will be provided. We look forward to their written re sponses as well as continued 
engagement with GCC  member State governments – and private sector stakeholders – regarding 
the transparency and application of this tax. Timely engagement with interested trading partner 
governments and private industry stakeho lders on the concerns noted is critical.  
19.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
19.5.  The European Union wishes to thank the GCC  countries for the constructive meeting held 
following the discussion that took place at the Council's meeting of  31 March  2021. That said, the 
European Union maintains its serious concerns, as voiced in the C TG, the Market Access Committee, 
as well as in bilateral contacts with the GCC  countries in relation to the GCC  "Treaty on Excise Tax" 
of December  2016. The Eur opean Union urgently requests, therefore, that the GCC finalize the 
reform of the "Treaty on Excise Tax" and equalize the taxation of energy drinks with other soft 
drinks. The European Union would also like to underline the call for providing immediate rel ief for 
industry until the ongoing GCC  excise taxation revision takes effect. In this regard, the European 
Union calls for the exemption of all zero  sugar beverages from the tax and harmonizing the tax rate 
at 50% for energy drinks and all other categories  of sugar -sweetened beverages subject to the tax. 
The European Union looks forward to continued engagement and further clarification from the 
GCC countries in response to the written questions that were circulated ahead of the CTG's meeting 
of 31 March  2021, and the meeting of the Committee on Market Access of 29  April 2021.  
19.6.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
19.7.  Japan has been expressing its concerns over the issue of the selective tax on carbonated soft 
drinks introduced by certain GCC  members sin ce 2019. Since the Council 's previous meeting , Japan 
notes that there have been Capital -based and Geneva -based communications between the 
GCC members and the M embers who have raised the issue. Japan appreciate s the GCC  members' 
engagement regarding the com munication  in particular . Nevertheless , Japan would like once again 
to express its concern.  Especially in the United Arab Emirates, a high tax rate is imposed on certain 
Japanese carbonated soft drinks due to their classification as energy drinks.  As we are always 
stressing, Japan does not have any intention to raise an objection to impose certain excise taxes in 
order to improve human health. However, if the objective of the excise tax is improvement of human 
health, the tax must be a specific tax  in line with the amount of ingredients such as stimulants that 
are harmful to human health. If such an approach is not taken, the tax would not act as an incentive 
to refrain from consumption of the stimulants concerned. Japan therefore requests that the selective 
tax be modified based on objective reasoning and in a transparent and constructive manner.  
19.8.  Japan noted that the Kingdom of Bahrain had provided an update on the current situation, on 
behalf of the GCC  members, at the Council's previous meeting, a s well as in the April meeting of the 
Committee on Market Access. At the time, Bahrain had mentioned that the GCC  members were 
currently undertaking a review of the selective tax. Japan requests GCC  members to share relevant 
information from this review in  advance in order to avoid any confusion in the business sector or 
countries concerned that could potentially be caused by it. In addition, Japan requests GCC  members 
to provide written answers to Members' questions.  
19.9.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated t he following:  
19.10.   Switzerland would like to thank the delegations of the GCC  member States for the 
information -sharing meeting of the previous month . Nevertheless, Switzerland's concerns with 
regard to the selective tax remain unsolved, particularly in relatio n to the state of play of the ongoing 
reform and the harmonization of the tax rate for energy drinks and other sugar -containing 
beverages. Based on the indication given by the delegation of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the future 
tax should be a volumetric tier ed tax similar to that currently applied in the United Kingdom, where 
the applicable rate is determined by a product's actual sugar content. Currently, each GCC  member 
is conducting a consultation process. Thus, in order to have more clarity on the entire process, 
Switzerland asks the GCC  member States to provide a time plan regarding the following: (a)  the 
completion of the ongoing study; (b)  the completion of the national consultation processes; (c)  the 
consolidation of these processes at the GCC  level; ( d) the adoption of a decision by the G/C/M/140  
 
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  GCC Ministerial Council; and (e)  the date of implementation. This important information will allow 
the stakeholders to contribute constructively to the process and be prepared for the new tax 
structure.  
19.11.   In addition, the  GCC is performing a review of category definitions for beverages subject to 
the tax. Switzerland is somewhat puzzled by this exercise as there is no need to define beverages 
with criteria other than their sugar content, if the revised tax will be levied o n the basis of the sugar 
content/volume only. Switzerland seeks clarification as to whether there are still plans to apply 
different rates for energy drinks and other sweetened beverages, thereby deviating from 
international best practice. Switzerland wish es would like to understand the rationale for such 
differentiation in the case of a sugar -based tax. Furthermore, Switzerland wishes to know why the 
GCC member States plan to create an additional tier for low -caloric/no -added -sugar drinks under 
the future volumetric tax, while at the same time beverages containing sugar, like milk -based 
products or juices containing added sugar, are not subject to the tax.  
19.12.   As is common practice, Switzerland reiterates its expectation to receive written answers 
from the GCC  member States to the questions it raised in document  G/MA/W/169 and 
document  G/C/W/792, as well as to the questions it has raised today. Finally, Switzerland would 
appreciate receiving the assistance of the GCC  member States in setting up a call between 
Capital-based experts and persons in charge of the tax reform in order to help clarify the issues just 
raised.  
19.13.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
19.14.   On behalf of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, th e State 
of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain thanks 
the delegations that took the floor for the interest they have expressed in the application of the 
excise tax on beverages in the GCC  member State s. With respect to the questions raised in 
document  G/C/W/792 , which constitutes the basis of this agenda item , and which was circulated 
during the last session of the Council , held on 31  March and 1 April 2021, the Kingdom of Bahrain 
wishes to recall that , during that session, it had provided,  on behalf of the GCC  member States, all 
the clarifications currently available, as recorded in the minutes of the Council's meeting circulated  
in document  G/C/M/139 on 16  June 2021.  While reaffirming the above clarifica tions, and in the 
interest of emphasizing certain details that the Kingdom of Bahrain believes would be of interest to 
Delegations and the Council, the Kingdom of Bahrain would like to recall the following few points.  
19.15.   The reform of the excise tax on bevera ges in the GCC  member States and the related studies 
and mechanisms is a lengthy and standing process of the GCC  Tax Working Group , which is 
time-consuming and requires resources and sustained efforts to develop  a tax system that will take 
into considerati on new developments, international best practices, and optimal methods. It also 
requires an aware ness of the implications of the reform on markets, industries , and consumers.  In 
this regard, the Kingdom of Bahrain assures interested delegations that the GC C Tax Group aims to 
make recommendations in an objective, efficient, and non -discriminatory manner. With regard to 
timeline to inform officials from interested WTO  Members about the study undertaken by 
GCC member States on possible revisions of the current  excise tax model and alternative excise tax 
system, the Kingdom of Bahrain feels bound to say that to give a clear and precise timeline is difficult 
if not impossible at this stage because of the complex work that the GCC  Tax Group is undertaking, 
which e ncompasses the harmonization and coordination tasks required to reach agreement among 
the representatives of the six  member States. In this regard, the Kingdom of Bahrain confirms that, 
once a decision is taken on this matter at GCC  level, there will be a formal communication issued in 
order to inform WTO  Members of the new model and its implementation timeline.  
19.16.   The Kingdom of Bahrain also wishes to recall that the GCC  member States are coordinating 
their efforts to harmonize their regulatory frameworks and  reach common agreed systems in various 
areas, including in the area of excise tax. Therefore, the implementation of any revised model will 
be applied harmoniously across all of the GCC  member States, although the programme of 
implementation may vary sligh tly depending on the status of preparedness of each individual 
GCC member State. As for consultations with private industry, the Kingdom of Bahrain wishes to 
recall that all GCC  member States are open, through their own respective mechanisms, to engaging 
in consultations aimed at obtaining feedback and comments from the private sector. In this regard, 
the GCC  member States remain committed to welcoming comments and suggestions from industry 
stakeholders. Regarding consultations with trading partner governme nts, the GCC  member States G/C/M/140  
 
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  are open to all commonly known mechanisms and these at both bilateral and WTO  levels. In this 
regard, bilateral consultations were organized on 1  June 2021 among the GCC  member States and 
the European Union, Switzerland, the Unit ed States, and Japan, on the GCC  Selective Tax. 
GCC member States stand ready to continue these consultations and are also open to any 
consultation that may be useful at Capital -level.  
19.17.   Once again, the Kingdom of Bahrain wishes to assure Members that all co mments and 
suggestions from the relevant stakeholders, including the private sector, as well as from officials 
from WTO  Members, are taken into consideration. In conclusion, the Kingdom of Bahrain wishes to 
confirm that it has provided all the information available at this stage on the issue of the excise tax 
in the GCC  member States. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of Bahrain welcomes questions and 
comments that will be received with the highest consideration in GCC  capitals.  
19.18.   The Council took note  of the stateme nts made.  
20  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA AND 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia and the European Union.  
20.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.3.  The European Union continues to have serious concerns over the broad import restrictions 
imposed by Sri Lanka, in variou s forms, since April  2020. The European Union does not dispute that 
Members can take import restrictions in the case of a critical Balance -of-Payments (BOP) situation. 
However, when doing so, a WTO  Member must comply with its WTO  obligations when invoking 
Balance -of-Payments restrictions.  The measures have already been in place for over a year now and 
the European Union needs to repeat that Sri Lanka has still not complied with its obligation to notify 
the import restriction and enter into consultations wit h other WTO  Members. Although Sri Lanka 
stated at the Council's previous meeting that it would contact the WTO  Secretariat regarding the 
preparation of a notification, Members are still waiting.  
20.4.  The European Union notes that , since the initial measure of A pril 2020, Sri Lanka has 
repeatedly modified the regulations, most recently in June  2021 via the Import and Export Control 
Regulations No. 08, 09 , and 10. The European Union  acknowledge s that this latest revision has 
reduced the list of banned imports or i mports under credit facility restrictions. The European Union 
is nevertheless disappointed to see that a significant number of goods were also again added to the 
list. This only adds to the uncertainty faced by exporters, and seems to indicate that the mea sures 
are not moving in the direction of being withdrawn. Furthermore,  on a select number of tariff lines, 
such as motor vehicles, the full import ban remains in place.  
20.5.  Regulation No.  10 explicitly states that the goods in Schedule  I of banned items have b een 
identified "with a view to strengthen and revive the national economy". This seems clearly targeted 
to protect particular domestic industries.  These measures, and the continued pressure exercised on 
the banks to reduce currency outflow, are hurting EU  interests. Several EU  member States report a 
decline of 30 -40% in their exports to Sri Lanka in 2020, and a further reduction of 10 -15% in 2021 
so far. Finally, the European Union notes that this is now the third  time that it has had to raise this 
import b an at this Council. In the absence of any notification or justification of these measures, the 
European Union calls for their full withdrawal.  
20.6.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
20.7.  Australia appreciates the difficult circumstances that Sri Lan ka is under as a result of the 
impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on its economy and trade. Nevertheless, a well -functioning, 
transparent, predictable, and stable global trading system remains fundamental to global economic 
stability and indeed to our recover y from the pandemic. Australia would like to reiterate its concerns 
raised at the Council's meetings of November  2020 and April  2021 with respect to the measures 
Sri Lanka has implemented since April  2020 restricting the imports of various products. Austra lia 
understands that Sri Lanka has subsequently implemented revised import restrictions as of 
11 June 2021. These measures appear to be overly trade -restrictive, including by continuing to G/C/M/140  
 
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  temporarily suspend a range of imports into Sri Lanka, without a cl ear end -date. In addition, Sri 
Lanka has failed to notify these measures to the WTO.  
20.8.  Australia welcomes Sri Lanka working with the Secretariat to ensure that these measures are 
adequately notified to the WTO. However, Australia reiterates its request for S ri Lanka to notify the 
WTO of these measures as soon as possible, including an explanation of their WTO  basis. Australia 
also requests Sri Lanka to update Members on when these measures will be lifted. The continuing 
lack of certainty has been trade -disrup tive and has impacted Australia's exporters' ability to provide 
staple food stuffs to Sri Lankan consumers. Australia would appreciate if Sri Lanka could reassure 
Members that: (i)  the measures have only been implemented to address the immediate impact of 
the COVID -19 pandemic; (ii)  they will not be maintained longer than necessary; and (iii)  they are 
being implemented in a manner consistent with Sri Lanka's WTO  obligations. Finally, Australia would 
welcome the opportunity to meet with the Sri Lankan delega tion, plus other interested delegations, 
to receive an update on these import measures and to discuss the questions and concerns of 
Members, including those that have been raised today.  
20.9.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
20.10.   Although wishing  to avoid repeating its statement from the Council's previous meeting, 
Japan requests Sri  Lanka to abolish this measure as soon as possible since there is a possibility that 
it could be in violation of Article  XI of the GATT.  
20.11.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
20.12.   Sri Lanka would like to recall that it made a detailed intervention on this subject during the 
meeting of the Committee on Market Access held on 29 and 30  April 2021. During that meeting, 
Sri Lanka highlighted the steps taken by its government to relax the import policy measures 
introduced to curb the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic.  Accordingly, the requirement to obtain 
import licences was removed in relation to 451  products and for these prod ucts no prior approval is 
required as the temporary suspension is no longer applied.  Close to around 1,300  items were made 
available to be imported on a credit basis, which includes certain motor vehicles, ceramic articles, 
garments, and rubber items.  In addition to the payment terms on a credit basis, where payment of 
import bills on certain items can take place on a credit basis of either 90  days or 180  days, the 
measures have been regularly liberalized, including through the introduction of two  other typ es of 
payment methods, namely advance payment and open account payments, enabling importers to 
benefit from these additional payment terms as well.  
20.13.   Many delegations question the steps that Sri Lanka has taken under its transparency 
obligations to notify th e WTO of the trade policy measures it has introduced to curb the impact of 
the COVID -19 pandemic. Sri Lanka acknowledge s that it has not yet been able to notify the se 
measures. As indicated at previous meetings, the delegation  of Sri Lanka , in consultation with the 
Secretariat, has prepared the first  draft of the notification, which is currently being finalized in 
Capital. The delegation of Sri Lanka is awaiting feedback from the authorities concerned in the 
context of the lockdowns imposed  due to  a third  wave of  the COVID -19 pandemic . 
20.14.   Indeed, Sri Lanka is currently struggling with the third  wave of the COVID -19 pandemic, 
which has posed an unprecedented threat to its economy and to the entire health sector of the 
country. Although Sri Lanka  does not wish to cite this situation as an excuse for not fulfilling its 
transparency obligations, it has nevertheless been compelled to face the pandemic's bitter reality. 
In fact, the country had to be fully closed during a long period in which only ess ential services were 
delivered on the basis of a skeleton staff. Nevertheless, Sri Lanka will continue to make its best 
efforts to secure the final draft notification as expeditiously as possible. This notification will soon be 
submitted to the Council of Trade in Services.  The Government of Sri Lanka is continuously 
examining existing restrictions on foreign exchange , which is why these measures are liberalized at 
regular intervals.  
20.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  21  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTR ICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
21.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
European Union.  
21.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.3.  The European Union regre ts that the United States has so far failed to resolve this matter, 
despite the EU raising it on multiple occasions in the SPS  Committee and this Council. The scientific 
risk assessment carried out by the United States was finalized already years ago. It d emonstrated 
that safe imports of apples and pears from the European Union can take place under a systems 
approach.  The United States continues to block the publication of its Federal Notice, which is the last 
remaining step to allowing imports of apples an d pears from the European Union under this systems 
approach, without any scientific grounds for doing so. The United States is herewith going against 
the SPS  Agreement as it maintains an approval procedure with undue delays and without providing 
a scientif ic justification to explain those delays. The European Union urges the United States to base 
its import policy on science in line with its WTO  commitments. The European Union also urges the 
United States to finalize the last purely administrative step nece ssary to allow market access to 
apples and pears from the European Union without any further delay. The European Union looks 
forward to continuing to cooperate with the United States with the aim of finding a swift solution on 
this overly long and still ou tstanding matter.  
21.4.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
21.5.  The United States thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight  EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach  to the 
United States. The US  Department of Agriculture (USDA) continues to work through its 
administrative procedures on this request. The United States would again note that the European 
Union is able to export apples and pears to the United States under  the existing pre -clearance 
programme.  
21.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
22  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia.  
22.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
22.3.  Australia and China have enjoyed a strong bilateral partnership and trading relationship, built 
over many decades, that has delivered benefits to both s ides. However, Members will recall  that 
Australia raised China's implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures at this Council's  
November  2020 and April  2021 meetings. Australia remains concerned by the broad range of trade 
restrictive measur es China has taken against Australia, particularly in the context of official Chinese 
statements linking these actions to unrelated issues in our bilateral relationship.  Australia has serious 
concerns regarding China's increasing and cumulative number of m easures targeting a wide range 
of Australian products, specifically agricultural commodities and resources, over the past 12 to 
18 months. The affected products include bottled, bulk, and sparkling wine; logs; meat; dairy; 
lobsters and other seafood; infan t formula; cotton; hay; barley and other grains; table grapes; citrus 
fruit; copper ores and concentrates; and coal.  
22.4.  The measures include a spike in testing and inspections at the border; undue delays in the 
listing and re -listing of export establishments,  including in response to the COVID -19 pandemic; 
undue delays in granting approvals for specific species and brands and the issuance of import 
licences; and the imposition of unjustified anti -dumping and countervailing duties. These 
developments have effec tively closed off areas of trade, and created significant delays, uncertainty, 
and risk, for exporters and importers of Australian products. Australia has previously outlined the 
formal actions that China has taken against Australian barley, lobster, logs and wine, which have G/C/M/140  
 
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  rendered trade in these items prohibitive. Each of these commodities shows at least a 95%  decline 
in exports to China in the first  quarter of 2021 compared to the first  quarter of 2020. Australia is 
equally concerned about China's lack  of transparency, due process, and engagement on the technical 
merits for each measure, including in response to Australian submissions.  
22.5.  Regrettably, Australia has seen no improvement in the conditions being applied to the affected 
Australian products. In addition, the range of products subject to heightened inspection and delays 
has increased, in particular for table grapes and citrus fruit, as well as other products, including oats 
and live cattle, without explanation. These developments have increased un certainty. Australia also 
continues to be concerned about credible reports that Chinese authorities have instructed importers 
not to purchase certain Australian products. Despite China's denials that any such instructions are 
in place, there have been sign ificant decreases in imports of most of these products, including the 
complete halt in trade in some of these products. For example, Australia notes that Chinese trade 
data shows zero  Chinese imports of Australian coal and copper ores and concentrates sinc e 
December  2020. Nevertheless, China continues to import these items from countries other than 
Australia.  
22.6.  Australia considers that any instruction by Chinese authorities not to purchase Australian 
products, whether issued formally or informally, would appe ar to be inconsistent with China's 
WTO obligations. The cumulative impact of these measures, their sudden increase in intensity over 
the past 18  months, the disproportionate impact of these measures on Australia, and China's public 
statements linking trade  with political issues in our relationship, takes China's actions beyond the 
realm of the technical. They give rise to concerns about China's adherence to its international trade 
obligations. Australia therefore urges China to immediately cease any discrim inatory measures being 
applied to Australian products.  
22.7.  Australia continues to seek to address its concerns with China bilaterally and through the 
relevant WTO  committees. Australia has not received satisfactory responses from China to the issues 
it has rai sed and has seen no improvement in the conditions being applied to the affected Australian 
products, causing ongoing uncertainty and economic damage to Australian exporters and Chinese 
importers of Australian products. China has consistently stated that it  is committed to open trade 
and the multilateral trading system. Australia expects all WTO  Members to conduct their trading 
relationships in a manner consistent with their WTO and free trade agreement obligations, and the 
market -oriented principles that un derpin WTO  membership.  
22.8.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
22.9.  The United Kingdom supports Australia's request for assurances that Australian exports to 
China are not, and will not be, subject to measures which unfairly stop or limit pu rchases and imports 
of Australian goods. Free and fair trade are fundamental principles and objectives of the rules -based 
multilateral system. The United Kingdom is concerned by unfair trade practices which undermine 
the integrity of the global trading sys tem and free markets to which it is committed. Such 
market -distorting practices only erode fairness and trust in the system, resulting in damaging, 
real-world consequences for citizens and businesses. The United Kingdom asks China to ensure that 
its trade measures are applied in a non -discriminatory, predictable manner, which is in line with 
WTO obligations, with the necessary transparency around decision -making and administrative 
procedures. It is also important to maintain open channels to seek redress or  explanations; to this 
end, the United Kingdom hopes that China will engage in good faith and in a timely and responsive 
manner to address these problems.  
22.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
22.11.   The multilateral rules -based trading system prov ides that all Members, regardless of their 
size or trading capacity, are subject to the same rights and obligations. This provides the 
predictability and certainty necessary to ensure that trade can take place efficiently and with the 
least friction possib le. Given the challenges all Members are facing as a result of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, the certainty provided by the multilateral trading system is more important 
than ever. If Members step away from their commitments, or adopt remedies provided for under 
the WTO  Agreements for other  purposes, this will undermine the predictability and certainty  on 
which the system rests. Therefore, New Zealand encourages Members to comply fully with their 
WTO obligations, including in the application of trade remedies.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  22.12.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
22.13.   The United States would like to register its systemic concern in relation to the information 
provided by Australia. China appears to have implemented a broad range of restrictive measures 
against certa in Australian goods, and official Chinese statements have linked these actions to 
unrelated bilateral matters. The restrictive measures include suspension of imports, increased 
inspection and testing at the border, delays in granting import permits, delays  in registration of 
export establishments, and imposition of anti -dumping and countervailing duties. The United States 
also wishes to register its systemic concern over reports that Chinese authorities have informally 
instructed importers not to purchase c ertain Australian goods. For several years, the leaders of the 
Communist Party of China have asserted that China firmly upholds the "rules -based multilateral 
trading system". But this sloganeering belies China's actions. Such actions, if ignored, would her ald 
the coming of a very different system – one based on privileges, not rights; power, not rules; and 
predation, not reciprocity.  
22.14.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.15.   The European Union is not directly involved in the issues that Australia is currently raising 
with China and, for this reason, the European Union wishes to make only a brief statement on this 
occasion. The European Union's statement is related to questions  of principle, not to the facts of the 
measures that Australia has brought to the attention of the Council. However, the European Union 
notes with concern the long list of measures adopted by China that are having a negative impact on 
Australian exports. The European Union notes and respects Australia's preference to treat these 
issues on their individual technical merits, including raising them in the various forums that the 
WTO offers for that purpose, including through technical committees and dispute se ttlement. That 
said, the length of the list of issues raised by Australia, and this discussion at the CTG, suggests that 
there is an additional dimension to this matter.  
22.16.   Taking a step back and looking at the world more generally, the European Union of cour se 
agrees that Members' compliance with WTO  obligations is key for the security and predictability of 
the international trading system. It is key for the reliability of trading opportunities in the interests 
of growth, efficiency, and welfare. And complian ce is key for a Member's reputation in this 
Organization and beyond. The European Union trusts that all Members share the commitment to 
safeguard and nurture this Organization, which is currently facing major challenges. However, there 
is a further problem  about which the European Union is concerned, namely an appearance that the 
true underlying reason for resorting to these measures, be they formal or informal, is to put pressure 
on or sanction the other country involved for a policy choice that is within the rights of that country.  
22.17.   Within the European Union, the European Parliament, member States, and the European 
Commission, have all expressed their concerns as to the practices of certain countries seeking to 
coerce others, and also the European Union, to  take or to withdraw particular policy measures. Such 
coercion raises questions about international legality that go beyond the issue of WTO -consistency. 
The European Union is grateful for this opportunity to share its concerns about a certain increasing 
trend that it has been observing over recent years.  
22.18.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
22.19.   Canada shares the systemic concerns that have been raised by Australia. Canada has also 
raised a number of specific trade concerns regarding China's applicat ion of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures that are restricting trade in food, plants and animals, and their products. In 
the case of canola, Canada has even taken the step of requesting the establishment of a dispute 
settlement panel. Canada encourages al l WTO  Members, including China, to abide by their 
WTO commitments.  
22.20.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
22.21.   Japan shares the views expressed by Australia, and other  Members , that 
anti-dumping  measures should be implemented within the framework of the WTO  Agreements, and 
that China should comply with the Anti -Dumping Agreement not only for the investigation procedures  
themselves , but also for fact -finding and analysis when  conducting an investigation. Japan also G/C/M/140  
 
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  share s the concerns expr essed by Australia that every necessary transparent measure should be 
secured.  
22.22.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
22.23.   On this issue, China has provided explanations at the Council's  previous meetings. China 
does not wish to  repeat those detailed re sponses, but rather reiterate s that the relevant measures 
have been taken to address the problems of certain Australian products exporting to China and to 
counter certain unfair trade practices of Australia. These measures are consistent with Chinese laws,  
regulations , and international practices, as well as the provisions of the China -Australia Free Trade 
Agreement.  
22.24.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS  (CSAR) - 
REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, JA PAN, AND THE UNITED STATES  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Japan, and the United States.  
23.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
23.3.  It is unfortunate that the United States must again reiterate its concerns  over this issue , as 
expressed many times previously.  Indeed, the United States brings the issue to this meeting of the 
Council because it is imperative that a resolution is found to  US concerns with China's development 
of the Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation (CSAR) and its implementing measures.  
Despite extensive multilateral and bilateral engagement from the United States, US  industry, and 
other WTO  Members and st akeholders, significant trade concerns remain.  
23.4.  First, the United States has significant concerns that the only means China provides importers 
to establish conformity with good manufacturing practices, if their respective governments do not 
issue G ood Manuf acturing Practice (GMP)  export certificates, involves animal testing. The United 
States questions China's rebuttal to the comments of several WTO  Members that its requirements 
for imports and domestic products are equivalent, as US  companies with manufactu ring in China 
report that they are not required to conduct animal tests to certify GMP when they register their 
production facility. The United States asks that China consider less trade restrictive means for its 
importers to meet its requirements, such as  third-party programmes under the ISO/IEC  17065: 
Conformity Assessment standard that align with the ISO  cosmetics GMP  standard. The United States 
also asks again that China be flexible and transparent with respect to which GMP  certificates or 
production li cences it will accept as demonstrating conformity.  
23.5.  Second, the United States remains concerned that CSAR and its implementing measures 
require overly extensive information to assess conformity and fulfil China's regulatory objectives. 
The United States is disappointed that China has not pared back these highly burdensome 
requirements. The United States asks China's National Medical Products Administration to reconsider 
the extent of the information requirements.  
23.6.  Third, the United States considers that China  has failed to address concerns that exceptions 
to the provisions protecting confidential business information (CBI) and reference to China's 
Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information may undermine protections for trade 
secrets and CBI. The Un ited States asks that China clarify whether it will develop an explicit 
mechanism for companies to indicate to  the National Medical Products Administration ( NMPA ) when 
information provided should be treated as trade secrets and CBI, to protect it from unau thorized 
disclosure. The United States requests that China provide a mechanism to ensure that the treatment 
of CBI is monitored and legally enforceable within China.  
23.7.  Fourth, the United States requests that China not require duplicative testing at laborator ies 
that have Chinese Metrological Accreditation, if companies provide test results from other 
laboratories that are in conformity with China's requirements. The United States requests that China 
consider accepting test results from laboratories certified to Good Laboratory Practices or Good G/C/M/140  
 
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  Clinical Practices, as per the International Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) Guidelines.  
23.8.  Fifth, the United States continues to have a concern about new cosmeti cs labelling 
requirements potentially creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. As explained previously, the 
United States requests that China not require companies to disclose the product manufacturer on 
the product label. The United States also asks that China not require that Chinese labelling be a 
direct translation of the foreign label, but rather, that the information on the Chinese label does not 
conflict with the product safety and effectiveness information on the foreign label.  
23.9.  The United States req uests that China delay finalization of additional measures until these 
trade concerns, as expressed by the United States and many other WTO  Members, are addressed.  
23.10.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
23.11.   Australia understands that China's new C SAR and its various implementing regulations 
entered into force on 1  May 2021. Australia would like to request an update from China on the CSAR 
and its implementing regulations, including whether any cosmetics have been imported into China 
under CSAR. If so , Australia requests that China provide details of the specific processes that met 
the requirements under the CSAR and led to successful importation.  
23.12.   Australia was initially hopeful that this new regulatory framework would moderni ze the way 
China regulated  cosmetics and provide Australian exporters with a viable pathway to access the 
Chinese cosmetics market without first  testing their products on animals. However, Australia has  
ongoing concerns with the new measures introduced by China under the CSAR  frame work and 
question s the consistency of these regulations with China's international obligations under the 
WTO Agreement. While China has now provided a pathway for imported cosmetics to be exempted 
from animal testing, this pathway is narrowly defined, requ iring imported product to have exporting 
country certification of production quality systems. Australia requests that China consider more 
flexible approaches to the provision of certification of manufacturing quality.  
23.13.   While Australia recognizes the right o f Members under the WTO  Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade to apply particular measures, including technical regulations, these should not 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade, or be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil the 
legitimate obj ective. China's CSAR includes stringent and burdensome measures that Australia 
considers are unnecessary to manage the risk posed by low -risk general -use cosmetics products. 
Australia believes that China could achieve its objective of ensuring the safety a nd quality of 
imported cosmetics products in a less trade restrictive manner.  
23.14.   A particular concern for Australia is the requirement under the CSAR for exporting Member 
governments to be involved in the certification of production quality management systems  such as 
GMP. Australia would appreciate a clear explanation from China of the justification for this 
requirement, including with regard to the following: (i)  what is the policy purpose for which 
quality/GMP  certification is being required; (ii)  why is GMP  certification or animal testing required 
for low -risk cosmetics products formulated using approved ingredients; (iii)  how does a quality 
requirement equate as an alternative to animal testing in terms of managing either safety risks or 
quality of cosmetic s products; (iv)  how does the requirement under the CSAR take account of the 
fact that different Members can organize their national regulatory systems in different ways, while 
still achieving the same overall quality and safety standards; for example, the  CSAR appears to 
discriminate in favour of domestic Chinese cosmetics products and products from WTO  Members 
with similarly structured national regulatory regimes, regardless of product safety and quality; 
(v) why are governments needed to provide GMP  certification when commercial providers with 
specialist technical expertise would likely be better qualified to certify compliance with international 
standards such as ISO, should it be needed?  
23.15.   Aside from GMP  certification, Australia's exporters have also expr essed concern about other 
measures under the CSAR  framework, including onerous testing and registration requirements and 
requirements to provide detailed information on production processes and other aspects of their 
intellectual property.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  23.16.   Australia is a c onsistent supplier of high quality and safe cosmetics products domestically, 
and to the world. Australia is disappointed that China has repeatedly not taken up its requests for 
discussions between officials on this topic. As Australia has said on previous occasions, the Australian 
Government stands ready to work with China and discuss the CSAR and our respective systems for 
cosmetics regulation.  
23.17.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
23.18.   Japan noted that China enforced the revised CSAR  in January  2021. In addition, Japan also 
noted that China has submitted TBT  notifications regarding many of its related implementing 
regulations. Japan has been expressing its concerns on the above -mentioned  regulations as well as 
the related implementing regulations in the TBT  Committee since March  2019.  
23.19.   Japan shares the same serious concerns expressed by the United States and Australia that 
China may potentially include business confidential information amo ng the information it requests 
to be disclosed. Although such language as "protection of relevant business confidential information" 
was added in the regulations, Japan noted that there are some regulations and implementing 
regulations that require disclos ure of certain information concerning the production process.  
23.20.    In addition, Japan wishes to point out that there is a problem in that China only approves 
the results verified by Chinese domestic agencies without approving international methods of 
investiga tion such as ISO, and so on. Japan would like to request China to ensure that the C SAR is 
formulated and implemented in accordance with Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement without deviating 
from the international standard.  
23.21.   The delegate of the Republic of Kore a indicated the following:  
23.22.   The Republic of Korea joins other Members in expressing its concern about China's C SAR. 
23.23.   According to the Regulation, exporters to China are required to specify the sources and 
quality data of all ingredients in the application, w hich contain critical information to businesses. 
Furthermore, the labelling requirement is excessive compared to internationally recognized practice. 
All such requirements are creating a trade barrier to Korea's exports by restricting trade more than 
is necessary to fulfil the objective of securing product safety and market norms. Korea would like to 
request China to make improvements in its Regulation in order to ensure that it does not constitute 
an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.  
23.24.   The delegat e of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
23.25.   New Zealand welcomes China's endeavours to modernize its regulatory system for cosmetics 
and also welcomes the opportunity to comment on specific elements of China's Cosmetic Supervision 
and Administration Regulati ons. 
23.26.   While New Zealand welcomes the intention to improve safety and quality assurance, New 
Zealand would like to encourage China to ensure that facilitation of trade is considered in the 
implementation of the regulations.  
23.27.   New Zealand notes that, under the measures, non -animal tested cosmetics are able to enter 
China's market only on the basis that regulator -issued GMP  certification is provided. Non -special use 
cosmetics are considered to be low -risk products in many countries, including New Zealand, and for  
this reason are not subject to regulator -issued GMP  certification. While New Zealand welcomes the 
introduction of alternatives to mandatory animal testing for imported products, like others, New 
Zealand is disappointed that the measures do not provide for  non-regulator issued GMP  certification 
or other trade facilitative mechanisms for providing product assurances. This appears to mean that 
animal testing requirements will still apply for Members who cannot offer regulator -issued 
GMP certification for cosm etics imported into China and, as such, will act as a significant and 
unnecessary barrier to trade for imported cosmetics products.  
23.28.   New Zealand would like to better understand what consideration China has accorded to less 
trade restrictive alternatives. Ne w Zealand encourages China to engage directly with New Zealand G/C/M/140  
 
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  and other affected Members to identify a trade -facilitative mechanism to demonstrate 
GMP conformity, without imposing animal -testing requirements.  
23.29.   New Zealand further requests that China also p rovide flexibility in respect of product testing 
requirements. In particular, New Zealand encourages China to accept test reports from accredited 
laboratories situated outside of China. If test reports from internationally accredited bodies outside 
of Chin a are not accepted, then this will create burdensome and unnecessary trade barriers for 
exporters as well as multiple other markets. Building in flexibility to accept test reports from 
accredited laboratories outside of China would be trade facilitative an d in accordance with 
international best practice.  
23.30.   New Zealand also holds concerns, that we note are shared by a number of Members, around 
the issue of China requiring more detailed disclosure of product formulas than is required, including 
specific sources  of each ingredient. New Zealand encourages China to limit disclosure requirements, 
particularly that of sensitive information, to that which is required to assure product safety in China's 
domestic market and so as not to compromise intellectual property.  
23.31.   New Zealand looks forward to engaging further with China on its CSAR  measures and 
welcomes China's response to the concerns raised by New Zealand and other Members.  
23.32.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.33.   The European Union supports th e interventions made by Australia, Japan, and the United 
States. China has notified to the WTO  TBT Committee the drafts containing rules for the 
implementation of the new C SAR. The European Union is of the opinion that the clear steps outlined 
in the imple menting rules for product and ingredient registration can lead to a faster and more 
efficient registration and filing mechanism. In particular, the obligation for reviewers to identify 
mistakes and applicants to answer questions at once will avoid the curr ent practice of repeated, 
time-consuming question -answer loops during applications . 
23.34.   However, the European Union would like to underline that certain requirements, such as the 
disclosure of "the source of the ingredients and their quality specifications", g o beyond the 
CSAR  principles in a way that they would create problems for the operation of cosmetic companies, 
including both domestic manufacturers and importers. The EU would like to point out that this kind 
of information, on a raw -material -by-raw-mater ial basis is commercially sensitive and touches on 
the intellectual property rights of the companies involved (suppliers and cosmetic manufacturers). 
Mandatory disclosure of this information in the registration and filing process is therefore a significant  
concern for the EU. The EU is of the opinion that including this kind of information, as part of the 
pre-market registration or filing dossier is not necessary to ensure consumer safety and traceability 
of the ingredients used in cosmetics.  
23.35.   Companies' reg istration and notification documentation may be accessible to a number of 
people including the pharmaceutical supervisory and administrative department, professional 
technical institutions and their staff, and personnel participating in the review. The Eur opean Union 
would like to underline that this diverges from international practice as this documentation is not 
required elsewhere in the world for notification and registration purposes. Preparing this amount of 
information for submission will not only co st significant time and resources, but will also increase 
the risk for and impact of eventual data breaches.  
23.36.   The European Union has noted that no specific transition periods are indicated in the notified 
draft measures, although they will be a crucial "wor kability" factor for the successful implementation 
of CSAR and its implementing legislation. Given the number of changes to industry practice that this 
implementing legislation will introduce, the EU is of the opinion that a differentiated approach is 
needed between new products and products already on the market. This would avoid a situation 
where product supply could be interrupted for an extended period due to insufficient preparation 
time for both industry and supervising authorities.  
23.37.   The delegate of China indicated the following:  
23.38.   China notes that this item has been discussed several times in the TBT  Committee, where 
China had already provided very detailed explanations of this issue at these meetings. China has G/C/M/140  
 
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  taken note of the questions today, which w ould be sent to Capital for appropriate action. China will 
not repeat those earlier detailed responses, but limits itself on this occasion to highlighting the 
following few points: (i)  strengthening the supervision of cosmetics production is a necessary me ans 
to ensuring product quality and safety, and is a common practice internationally; (ii)  China attaches 
great importance to the protection of trade secrets and the intellectual property of enterprises; the 
brief description of product process, raw materi al production process, and other registration and 
filing documents, submitted by enterprises according to Chinese laws and regulations, are not 
subject to government information disclosure; furthermore, the relevant Chinese laws clearly 
stipulate that auth orities are prohibited from disclosing information involving trade secrets and 
personal privacy that may harm the legitimate rights and interests of third  parties; therefore, this 
practice will not undermine the enterprises' trade secrets and intellectual property rights; and (iii)  in 
the process of drafting relevant technical requirements, China takes full consideration of protecting 
the trade secrets and intellectual property rights of enterprises; for example, only a summary of the 
efficacy claim basis, rather than the full text, is required in the evaluation data of a cosmetics efficacy 
claim.  
23.39.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
24  CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSIO N – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, 
CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE 
UNITED  STATES  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
24.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
24.3.  As Members are aware, the United States and many other Members over the years have 
expressed numerous serious concerns with respect to the transparency of Chi na's subsidy regime. 
After China joined the WTO, for example, it took five  years before it submitted its first  subsidy 
notification, which only covered the central government. And once China did start submitting 
notifications, they were normally late and, in the view of the United States, grossly incomplete. For 
example, it was not until 2016, 15  years after becoming a Member, that China submitted its 
first subsidy notification covering sub -central governments – entities which play a very significant 
role in China's subsidy regime.  
24.4.  In the absence of transparency, the United States is often compelled to ascertain the facts 
about China's subsidy regime for itself. When conducting this research, it is not unusual to see 
references to legal measures, normally wi th an official citation, that the United States then tries to 
locate. The United States can usually find these measures in one  place or another; but often the 
United States cannot find them, no matter how hard it looks. This can be particularly frustrating  
when these "missing measures" are repeatedly cited elsewhere and appear to be foundational to a 
particular subsidy programme.  
24.5.  In China's Protocol of Accession, China agreed to make available to WTO  Members all 
trade-related laws, regulations, and other measures prior to implementing or enforcing them, and 
to designate a single journal for the publication of all trade -related laws, regulations, and other 
measures, which China has designated as the MOFCOM  Gazette. However, in most cases, subsidy 
meas ures, especially normative measures and sub -central measures, are not published in the 
MOFCOM  Gazette. And sometimes these measures are nowhere to be found anywhere else.  
24.6.  In addition to the publication obligation, in its Protocol of Accession, China agreed  to "establish 
or designate an enquiry point where, upon request of any individual, enterprise or WTO  Member all 
information relating to the measures required to be published … may be obtained." Furthermore, 
China agreed with respect to its enquiry point t hat "Replies to requests for information shall generally 
be provided within 30  days after receipt of a request. In exceptional cases, replies may be provided 
within 45  days after receipt of a request."  
24.7.  The United States has identified references to five  legal measures, two  relating to fuel 
subsidies for fishermen, one  relating to the development of China's distant water fishing fleet, and G/C/M/140  
 
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  two relating to the semiconductor industry. Unable to find these measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette, 
or anywhere else, the U nited States submitted a request to China's WTO  enquiry point in April  2020, 
well over a year ago. The United States was then required by China to needlessly re -submit its 
request in May  2020. The United States has yet to receive a formal response to its r equest – made 
well over a year ago – despite China's obligation in its Protocol of Accession to respond no later than 
45 days.  
24.8.  This raises serious questions as to China's commitment to adhere to its WTO  obligations. What 
can be so sensitive about a fuel su bsidy programme for fishermen, for example, that it was not 
published in the MOFCOM  Gazette, or anywhere else, apparently? Why has China refused for well 
over a year to provide a copy of such measures pursuant to a properly submitted request?  
24.9.  The United St ates urges China to respond to its request by providing all the requested 
documents, as soon as possible, in accordance with its obligations under its Protocol of Accession.  
24.10.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.11.   The commitment by Chin a under its Protocol of Accession to publish all trade -related 
measures, as well as providing information through the enquiry point, are designed to improve 
transparency. However, in order for such a commitment to be effective, China must publish all its 
trade-related measures in the MOFCOM  Gazette, as well as respond to requests for information 
under the enquiry point. Again, this is in the interests of transparency, and in accordance with the 
obligations undertaken in China's Protocol of Accession. The Eu ropean Union therefore urges China 
to publish all trade -related measures and to provide the information  requested.  
24.12.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
24.13.   WTO Members have been expressing their concerns regarding the possibility of a lack of 
transpa rency and non -notification of China's subsidies in the relevant committees. Japan is 
concerned that failure to ensure transparency on subsidies expenditure might give rise to such 
problems as supply surplus by encouraging trade -distorting subsidies. As the  largest trader in the 
world, China is required to observe its notification obligations while ensuring transparency. Like the 
United States and the European Union  pointed out , Japan requests that China implement its 
transparency obligations and  ensure the effectiveness of its mechanisms to enhance transparency, 
as agreed under its WTO  Protocol of Accession.  
24.14.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
24.15.   Canada echoes the US  concerns with China's compliance with WTO  transparency 
requirements. When it accede d to the WTO in 2001, China accepted comprehensive transparency 
obligations. Through its Protocol of Accession, China agreed, among other things, to publish all laws, 
regulations, or other measures affecting trade in goods in a single official journal. Chi na also agreed 
to respond to enquiries by individuals, enterprises, and WTO  Members relating to these measures, 
within 30  days. These transparency obligations were negotiated into China's Protocol of Accession 
for a reason. Without information on subsidy m easures being made available in a timely manner, it 
is impossible for Members to assess their possible impact on trade and exercise their rights in respect 
of the implementation and enforcement of such measures. This has the effect of undermining the 
secur e and predictable rules -based system.  
24.16.   Transparency obligations in the context of the WTO  ASCM are just as important. China has 
yet to respond to an enquiry from Canada dated January  2020 regarding two  unnotified subsidy 
programmes.  
24.17.   Compliance with notifica tion requirements and response to enquiries in accordance with 
WTO rules, including transparency obligations in China's Protocol of Accession, is of great 
significance to the successful functioning of the rules -based international trading system. This is a ll 
the more important as WTO  Members gradually build back from the COVID -19 crisis.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  24.18.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
24.19.   The United Kingdom  would like to reiterate its belief that transparency is central to the 
proper functioning of the WTO. It is vital that all Members fulfil their obligations, including any 
Member -specific commitments, in a timely manner.  
24.20.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
24.21.   Australia attaches considerable importance to the WTO  notification and transpa rency 
obligations. Australia is particularly concerned about the lack of transparency in relation to subsidy 
programmes. In this regard, Australia notes the commitment made by China as part of China's 
Protocol of Accession. This mechanism was intended to i mprove transparency. In Australia's view, 
transparency remains critical to the proper functioning of the WTO. The more Members do not notify, 
the more the uncertainty for all our exporters in being able to compete fairly in international markets. 
This unde rpins the Subsidies Agreement. Australia calls on China to fully adhere to its transparency 
obligations, including those under its Protocol of Accession.  
24.22.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
24.23.   China recalls that this issue has been discussed severa l times in the Subsidies Committee 
and would like to refer Members to the statements made during those meetings. China attaches 
great importance to complying with WTO  rules and fulfilling WTO  obligations. The China Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Ga zette is an official publication that uniformly publishes Chinese 
trade policies. Eighty  issues are published every year and the general public can access them 
through the website of the Ministry of Commerce of China. Regarding China's obligation on an 
enquiry point, China has provided replies to the requests made by a certain Member last September, 
in accordance with the commitments specified in China's Protocol of Accession.  
24.24.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IM PORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STATES (G/C/W/790)  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
United States.  
25.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
25.3.  It is unfortunate that the United States must again reiterate its concerns, as expressed many 
times previously in this and other WTO  bodies, regarding the negative trade and environmental 
impacts resulting from China's import ban,  and accompanying measures, on certain recovered 
materials.  
25.4.  As the United States has indicated before, these measures seem to contradict China's own 
pro-circular economy narrative that it is promoting in the WTO, as well as internationally. The United 
States is concerned that these measures are also a detriment to our shared environment and have 
resulted in increased volumes of recyclables going to landfills and other less desirable waste 
channels, including becoming marine litter.  
25.5.  The United States circula ted a set of questions ahead of the March  2021 CTG  meeting, 
requesting that China provide written responses as soon as possible, including an explanation of the 
scientific bases that it has used to determine which categories of scrap materials it will allo w to be 
imported as "recycled raw materials". The United States has not yet received written responses to 
its questions; the United States asks China to indicate at this meeting when those responses will be 
provided. Furthermore, as it has requested many t imes previously, the United States asks that China 
immediately revise the relevant measures in a manner consistent with existing international 
standards for trade in scrap materials, which provide a global framework for transparent and 
environmentally soun d trade in recyclable commodities.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  25.6.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
25.7.  New Zealand maintains an ongoing interest in this issue. As per its past statements at 
meetings of the CTG and the TBT  Committee, New Zealand remains concerned that vanadium slag 
is included in China's catalogue of banned imports under this measure. New Ze aland does 
acknowledge and support the right of all WTO  Members to regulate and achieve legitimate health 
and environmental objectives. However, New Zealand would appreciate clarification from China on 
how it has ensured that the rules that apply to foreig n products are no less favourable than those 
accorded to domestic products. New Zealand thanks China for its recent engagement on this issue, 
including bilaterally, and at the TBT  Committee, and looks forward to further constructive 
engagement on this topi c to better understand China's approach to distinguishing between waste 
and non -waste materials.  
25.8.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
25.9.  China thanks the United States for its interest in this issue. As China has provided its 
responses on this issue  at previous meetings of the CTG and other WTO  bodies, China requests 
Members to refer to its statements delivered at those meetings.  
25.10.   China would like to reiterate that its import prohibition on solid waste aims to effectively 
protect human health and its eco-system safety. China welcomes trade in recycling materials that 
are properly treated, pose no hazard to human health and the environment, and comply with China's 
national mandatory quality standards on the relevant products. China has published its nat ional 
quality standards for recycling materials, such as brass, copper, and cast aluminium alloys.  
25.11.   China urges the major solid waste exporting Members to reduce solid waste at source, and 
to shoulder their international responsibilities to handle and dispo se of their own solid waste.  
25.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
26  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE FOR CHEESE UNDER MEXICAN 
OFFICIAL STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018 – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED 
STATES  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this ite m had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
United States.  
26.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
26.3.  The United States must raise its concerns over Mexico's NOM -223, cheese conformity 
assessment procedures, a measure that may b e finalized any day now. US concern s are three -fold. 
First and foremost, NOM -223 contains a conformity assessment scheme which includes: 
(i) third-party testing of cheese with an annual production facility inspection, traceability, and 
post-market surveill ance performed by a third -party certification body; or (ii)  batch -by-batch testing 
at the border to determine the quality of cheese products with the objective of providing better 
information to consumers. Such a scheme may be overly trade restrictive. Pro viding information to 
consumers about cheese quality is a low -risk undertaking. The United States and industry are 
concerned that Mexico's scheme is not proportional to those risks, and that Mexico does not appear 
to have seriously considered available alt ernatives to meet the consumer's needs. The United States 
requests that Mexico halt the finalization of the regulation and consider the alternatives previously 
proposed by the US  government and industry stakeholders, including the use of standards of 
identity, labelling, or suppliers' declaration of conformity to demonstrate the completion of 
third-party test procedures. Second, cheese made from animal fat will have to undergo these 
burdensome testing and certification requirements, while cheese produced fr om vegetable fat will 
not. The United States requests Mexico to please explain the reasoning for the difference in the 
treatment of these products. The third  US concern relates to whether Mexico has taken comments 
from WTO  Members and stakeholders into acc ount. Stakeholders provided input into a draft in the 
working group that concluded in September  2020, and the final draft is significantly different from 
the draft agreed to by that working group. Again, the United States asks Mexico to suspend the draft 
and reconsider the less trade -restrictive alternatives presented by industry and other 
WTO stakeholders.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  26.4.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
26.5.  The delegation of Mexico welcomes the comments shared by the delegation of the United 
States on the conf ormity assessment procedure applicable to Mexican technical regulation  223 on 
"cheese".  
26.6.  The reason for developing this measure is to address the concerns of the Mexican authorities 
over the authenticity of the products that are offered on Mexican territory  and the information that 
consumers receive about them, as well as to prevent deceptive practices.  
26.7.  As has been made known to the Members of this Council and other committees within this 
Organization, Mexico has identified various products, both of domestic  and foreign manufacture, 
that claim to be "cheese" but do not comply with the specifications of the applicable technical 
regulation. Mexico therefore considers it very important to strengthen the regulatory framework for 
the product in question.  
26.8.  The Mexic an authorities continue to analyse this procedure in a comprehensive manner so 
that the requirements envisaged, including compliance with international commitments, ensure that 
products bearing the name "cheese", and that are marketed in Mexico's national territory, comply 
fully with the applicable technical regulation.  
26.9.  The delegation of Mexico reiterates its willingness and commitment to clarifying any doubts 
that Members may have regarding this procedure, and to report on any progress made through the 
Committee and relevant contact points.  
26.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
27  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC  NO. 1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
Russian Federation.  
27.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
27.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during the previous regular meetings 
of the working bodies of the WTO on  cobalt classification adopted under the 14th adaptation to 
technical progress to the Classification, Labelling and Packaging (CLP) Regulation notified in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/629.  
27.4.  The European Union applied this classification in the absence of comprehensi ve laboratory 
and epidemiological data. Based on this classification, it is clear that the Commission will go further 
and develop industrial, product specific , and technical regulations, which will set unjustified 
restrictions or prohibit cobalt use in a w ide range of products. A n additional step in this direction is 
the chemicals strategy for sustainability that proposes imposition of a ban on the use of the most 
harmful chemicals.  
27.5.  Moreover, as a result of stigmatization, even without further restrictions,  cobalt and 
cobalt -containing products consumption will suffer due to deselection of these products by 
manufacturers of such final goods as electric vehicles' batteries, energy storage units, and similar 
equipment critical to fight climate change and achie ve green sustainability. Although the Russian 
Federation welcomes the European Commission's efforts to approve gastric bioelution, it notes that 
this methodology has not yet been approved. Could the European Union inform the Council of the 
status of the wo rk on bioelution?  
27.6.  Finally, the Cobalt Institute initiated a scientific study of the carcinogenicity of cobalt metal 
for oral routes of exposure. In this regard, the Russian Federation requests that the European Union 
inform Members if all restrictions and prohibitions of cobalt use introduced following the 
implementation of the 14th Adaptation to Technical and Scientific Progress (ATP)  and the chemicals 
strategy for sustainability will be lifted in case the carcinogenicity of cobalt for oral route of exposu re 
will not be confirmed.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  27.7.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.8.  The European Union has taken due note of the concerns expressed by the Russian Federation. 
The European Union has provided explanations in various WTO  bodies, including a t the most recent 
meetings of the TBT  Committee and this Council.  
27.9.  As explained in those meetings, titanium dioxide and cobalt were included in the 14th ATP 
amending the CLP  Regulation. Several discussions on the classification of cobalt and TiO2 and the 
classification of mixtures containing TiO2 took place in the expert group for Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals ( REACH ) and CLP  (CARACAL) and in the regulatory 
committee (the REACH  Committee).  
27.10.   After its adoption by the Comm ission on 4  October  2019, the Commission Delegated 
Regulation was sent to the Council and the European Parliament for the two -month objection period. 
As no objection was raised, the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)  2020/217 was published in 
the Officia l Journal of the European Union on 18  February  2020 and the classification of cobalt as a 
carcinogen will become applicable as of 1  October  2021.  
27.11.   The classification of cobalt as a carcinogen for all routes of exposure is based on the scientific 
opinion of the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), as well 
as on the comments received and concerns expressed by the member States and stakeholders. This 
opinion is in line with the CLP  Regulation, as well as the UN  Globally Harmonized System of 
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (UN  GHS). The opinion and the background document 
containing all the relevant scientific information on which the opinion is based are available to all 
WTO Members and stakeholders at the  ECHA  website.  
27.12.   In its scientific assessment, the ECHA's RAC  Committee took all available data into account, 
including the information submitted during the public consultation period. Review of an RAC  opinion 
is only possible if new and relevant scientific information becomes available.  
27.13.   The European Union wishes to reassure WTO  Members in the Council that all of the 
comments that they sent in the context of the EU  notification, in accordance with the 
TBT Agreement, were distributed to EU  member States and du ly taken into account by the 
Commission and member States in the decision -making process. The Commission has also sent 
written replies to the comments from WTO  Members on the TBT  notification of the measure.  
27.14.   The European Union also proposed to harmonize, a t OECD  level, the method on bioelution. 
This method could be useful to ensure that, if a metal contained in an alloy is not bioavailable (that 
is, if it remains in the matrix), then the alloys (for example, stainless steel) do not need to be 
classified. An  agreement at the OECD has been reached in May  2020 to develop and validate this 
method. The European Union would welcome any support for third  countries actively to participate 
in the development of the OECD  test method on bioelution. A special expert sub -group has also been 
recently established by the Commission in order to provide advice and exchange views on technical, 
legal, and policy issues relating to the use of the relative in  vitro bioaccessibility of a hazardous 
metal in metal compounds or alloys , for the refinement of their classification under CLP. The 
discussions are expected to focus on the applicability of the data generated with a validated test 
method.  
27.15.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
28  EUROPEAN UNION - CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT M ECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – REQUEST FROM ARMENIA, THE KINGDOM OF 
BAHRAIN, CHINA, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, QATAR, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 
AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Armenia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Qatar, the 
Russian  Federation, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  28.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
28.3.  The Russian Feder ation remains concerned by the European Union's plans to introduce a 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It is now only a few days before its planned formal 
announcement, but the concept of the mechanism by itself continues to raise the same questio ns as 
a number of months before.  
28.4.  First, one of the objectives of the CBAM, as declared by the European Union, is to address the 
risk of carbon leakage. The fight against the risk of the delocalization of the European Union's 
capacity cannot be envisaged ei ther as a climate goal or as a climate measure. Such a measure 
would, in all probability, run against agreed multilateral approaches. The Russian Federation takes 
note of the assurances from the European Union that the mechanism would be WTO -consistent. Th e 
Russian Federation expects the European Union to explain, at this meeting or upon publication of 
the draft measure, the details of their consistency evaluation.  
28.5.  Second, this mechanism would create an additional burden for exporters and importers. 
Obvious ly, it is going to significantly affect world trade in the various respective sectors. Currently 
the world economy is not in good shape due to the crisis caused by the COVID -19 pandemic. The 
European Union should have very good reason to put in place trade  restrictions at a time when all 
of the rest of us are trying to invent magic tools and means by which to save our people and our 
industries. The Russian Federation would like to hear from the European Union about such reasons, 
and to be able to comment up on the draft measure in advance.  
28.6.  Finally, it is not very clear why the European Union needs to establish such a mechanism in 
order to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. If the European Union considers that the climate 
actions of other WTO  Members ar e not sufficient, the Russian Federation believes that this issue 
should be discussed at the U nited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)  fora. 
The Russian Federation would welcome additional bilateral consultations with the EU.  
28.7.  The deleg ate of China  indicated the following:  
28.8.  China has closely followed the development of the proposed Carbon Boarder Adjustment 
Mechanism. China wishes  to reiterate that the UNFCCC is the most important international treaty 
tackling global climate change. The UNFCCC has confirmed the common but differentiated 
responsibilities as one of the core principles for international cooperation on climate change. This 
principle should be fully respected. China encourages the European Union to enhance transparency 
and ensu re the proposed CBAM is compatible with WTO  rules. China will continue to follow this issue.  
28.9.  The delegate of Kazakhstan  indicated the following:  
28.10.   Kazakhstan reiterates its position as expressed at the previous meeting of the CTG and 
continues to follow the developments around the EU  CBAM. As mentioned before, Kazakhstan urges 
the European Union to fully consider the compatibility of the CBAM with WTO  rules and regulations 
so that any such measure does not create obstacles to trade.  
28.11.   The delegate of the Kingdo m of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
28.12.   The Kingdom of Bahrain shares similar concerns to those raised by the Russian Federation, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the other proponents. The Kingdom of Bahrain thanks the 
European Union for its consultations wi th Members thus far and encourages its continued 
engagement in order to ensure the full compliance of the proposed CBAM with WTO  rules and 
agreements. Finally, the Kingdom of Bahrain looks forward to receiving further details and 
clarifications from the EU  regarding this proposed mechanism and stands ready to engage with the 
European Union and other interested Members in this matter.  
28.13.   The delegate of Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
28.14.   The issue of the European Union's CBAM has been raised more than onc e at the different 
bodies of the WTO. The Kyrgyz Republic commends the efforts of WTO  Members in establishing and 
achieving the aim of a sustainable ecological environment. Issues relating to ecology and the 
environment are important for all Members of the  WTO. At the same time, the Kyrgyz Republic G/C/M/140  
 
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  believes that all actions and measures taken with a view to achieving the above -mentioned mission 
should not affect the interests of other Members and should be implemented and maintained in full 
compliance with WTO rules and norms.  
28.15.   The delegate of Qatar  indicated the following:  
28.16.   Qatar has taken note of the European Union's Green Deal and its ambition to become the 
first climate -neutral continent by 2050. Qatar compliments the European Union for its political 
coura ge in setting these objectives. Like the European Union, Qatar has also signed and ratified the 
Paris Agreement and is equally ambitious in its climate change objectives. However, on the European 
Union's Green Deal, Qatar wishes to express some trade -related concerns over the introduction of a 
CBAM to address the so -called "carbon leakage" issue.  
28.17.   Qatar wishes to seek further clarification from the European Union regarding how the CBAM 
will applied compatibly with fundamental WTO  principles, including the most-favoured -nation 
treatment principle and the principle of national treatment. Qatar is of the view that treating "like  
products" differently based on the carbon content of the production process would go against 
decades of well -considered jurisprudence. Qatar takes this opportunity to thank the European Union 
and looks forward to continuing this discussion in a fruitful and cooperative manner.  
28.18.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
28.19.   First, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thanks th e Russian Federation and China for raising the 
subject of the CBAM and wishes to render its support to them on this very delicate and substantive 
issue.  
28.20.   Second, from Saudi Arabia's perspective, while the European Union stated that the proposed 
mechanism wi ll be in conformity with WTO  rules and  its other international obligations, it is yet to 
provide clear explanations regarding  how it aims to achieve this . Although the European Union's 
stated intention is to address the risk of investment leakage from the EU to other countries , in fact 
its main objective is to maintain the competitiveness of EU  industries. Saudi Arabia's initial review 
indicates that the proposed mechanism raises extremely serious concerns due to its potential 
long-term spill  over negative implications on global trade that will distort the full value chain of 
trade, including goods, services, and jobs.  
28.21.   Saudi Arabia urges the European Union to further engage in consultations with Members, in 
order to ensure the full compliance of the  CBAM with the WTO  rules and agreements while ensuring 
that the proposed mechanism would not create barriers to trade or be applied in a manner that 
constitutes protection to the EU  domestic industries.  
28.22.   Finally, Saudi Arabia looks forward to receiving further details and reflections from the 
European Union on this proposed mechanism. The Kingdom stands ready to engage with the EU and 
interested Members in this regard.  
28.23.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
28.24.   Argentina wishes to thank  the proponents for including this item on the Council's agenda, 
which is a cause of growing concern among Members because of the doubts that have been raised 
regarding whether a mechanism of this nature can be consistent with a number of WTO  provisions, 
in particular with the GATT  1994.  
28.25.   All Members have a duty to combat climate change. The actions that they take, and the 
instruments that they use, must be in compliance with international commitments. They must 
neither be more trade restrictive than necessa ry to fulfil legitimate objectives, nor constitute a 
disguised restriction on international trade. Against this backdrop, Argentina notes with concern the 
European Union's intention to impose the same level of ambition globally, without taking into 
conside ration the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
28.26.   Argentina wishes to stress to the European Union the importance of avoiding unilateral 
actions that lack any proper legal basis. Argentina considers that such initiatives have the potentia l G/C/M/140  
 
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  to create a major disruption to international trade by discriminating against imported products in an 
arbitrary and unjustified manner.  
28.27.   Argentina will be following the development of this initiative and hopes to receive detailed 
information on the model to be adopted, the carbon calculation system, and the scope of the 
mechanism, and hopes that this information will be provided in good time, in order to allow for 
productive exchanges on it. As requested during the meeting of the Committee on Market Access , 
Argentina also reiterates that, should this proposed initiative go ahead, it is important that it be duly 
notified to the WTO.  
28.28.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
28.29.   India believes that a thorough legal examination will be required of this mechan ism to  
ascertain its conformity with the relevant WTO  rules, including the most -favoured -nation and  
national treatment principles . India would reiterate that any such deal must take into consideration 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibili ties, and the respective capabilities of different 
countries  in light of different national circumstances. India believes that there may be 
WTO non-compliance issues relating to this mechanism that will require further deliberation.  India 
also looks forwar d to receiving details of these measures as soon as possible.  
28.30.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
28.31.   Like many Members, Turkey is closely following the developments regarding the European 
Union's Green Deal since its announcement by the European C ommission in December  2020. Within 
the context of the Green Deal, Turkey knows that the European Commission is going to unveil a 
proposal for a CBAM on 14  July 2021.  
28.32.   As expressed on previous occasions, Turkey believes that all members of the international 
community should play their part in combating climate change, taking into account the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, as indicated in the scope of 
the U NFCCC . It is also very important that any CBAM  respects WTO  rules, is applied in a manner 
that least disturbs trade, and does not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. 
Turkey wishes also to highlight that any CBAM should be designed in a transparent way and, most 
importantly, the diffe rent levels of development between countries should be considered in order to 
address trade distortions.  
28.33.   It goes without saying that the green transformation requires massive investment and 
financing, which are lacking in many developing and least develope d countries. In this regard, 
cooperation, in terms of implementing investment projects and mobilizing finance for green projects, 
is essential throughout the value chain. Last but not least, an adequate transition period should be 
provided for all relevant  parties before implementation of the CBAM. Apart from the adaptation needs 
of the business world, it would take time for countries to adapt their climate policies and fulfil the 
legislative and administrative requirements to guide the private sector. Acco rdingly, it is important 
that the transition period be designed with a view to giving sufficient time to sectors and companies, 
especially small and medium -sized enterprises ( SMEs ), to adapt to the changed circumstances and 
possible new requirements stemmi ng from a CBAM.  
28.34.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
28.35.   Brazil reiterates that it is carefully monitoring the European Union's proposal for the 
establishment of a CBAM . In addition, it expects that once specific elements of a CBAM have been 
defined , especially the modalities for its implementation and the methodologies employed to quantify 
the carbon footprint, an opportunity for a more direct dialogue between the competent authorities 
will be provided in order to ensure that the measure is not disc riminatory in character and that it is 
fully compatible with WTO  rules. Finally, as highlighted by other delegations, Brazil  must also stress 
that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, enshrined in the UNFCCC since it 
was agreed in R io in 1992, cannot be ignored.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  28.36.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
28.37.   Pakistan wishes to recall the statement made under this agenda item  at the CTG's meeting 
of 31  March  2021. While Pakistan acknowledges the European Union's stated objectives of 
preserving the environment and tackling climate change, it stress es that the European Union's CBAM 
should be consistent with its various international obligatio ns, including those at the WTO. Pakistan  
also remain s concerned about the European Union's CBAM creating unnecessary barriers to trade , 
and about the various technicalities and operations of this programme and its wider impact on trade 
flows, including potential negative implications for Pakistan's exports to the European Union.  The 
European Union's CBAM might also entail long -term negative consequences for global trade. 
Therefore , Pakistan  urges the European Union to share with the Membership further detai ls of the 
mechanism. Pakistan will continue to follow developments in this issue.  
28.38.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
28.39.   Uruguay recognizes the policy objectives identified by the European Union and reaffirms its 
strong commitment to climate chan ge matters, as reflected in its commitments undertaken in the 
various multilateral agreements in this area, including the Paris Agreement, and its policies adopted 
to comply with those agreements. Uruguay wishes to reiterate its interest in following up on  the 
process of development, adoption, and implementation of a CBAM by the European Commission, 
within the "European Green Deal".  
28.40.   While Uruguay has received some information regarding the possible scope and operation of 
this mechanism, it reiterates its in terest in continuing to receive official, updated, and detailed 
information on this initiative from the European Union, including on its current state of development 
and adoption process, how the measure will be designed, its coverage at sector and product  level, 
and its progressive implementation. Uruguay understands that the legal text should shortly be 
approved by the European Commission and seeks confirmation from the EU  delegation that its 
understanding is correct in this regard. Lastly, Uruguay wishes  to stress the importance of ensuring 
the measure's compatibility with the commitments made by the European Union in the 
WTO Agreements.  
28.41.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
28.42.   Chinese Taipei continues to register its interest in this subje ct. It appears to Chinese Taipei 
that the CBAM is part of a broader EU  industrial strategy that could have wide implications for 
international trade. As the CBAM is planned to be implemented in 2023, Chinese Taipei would urge 
the European Union to step up its engagement with international stakeholders as soon as possible, 
and in a more transparent and comprehensive manner. It should take due account of the existing 
relevant WTO  rules and widely accepted international standards, avoid undesirable trade barri ers 
arising from the mechanism and, last but not least, ensure that there is a sufficient transitional 
period for industries. Chinese Taipei will continue to follow this topic very closely, and would welcome 
any updates from the European Union as it procee ds. 
28.43.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
28.44.   The Republic of Korea appreciates the European Union's efforts to combat the climate crisis 
and its commitment to carbon neutrality by 2050. It is Korea's understanding that the European 
Union is currently in the process of elaborating a CBAM in an effort to address the issue of possible 
carbon leakage, and that it plans to announce its framework soon. However, prudence is needed in 
adopting trade -related measures, even when they are intende d for a legitimate objective, so that 
such measures do not constitute a disguised or unnecessary trade barrier.  
28.45.   The CBAM is known to be targeting carbon emissions occurring during the stage of 
manufacturing imported goods in their countries of origin; howe ver, there are concerns that the 
European Union's CBAM could cause an unnecessary trade barrier to, or arbitrary discrimination 
against, imported goods. In this regard, Korea wishes to place on record its expectation that the 
CBAM will be introduced and im plemented in a manner that is consistent with WTO  rules.  
28.46.   At the same time, any possible burden on foreign companies, financial or administrative, 
which could be caused by the CBAM should be taken into due consideration. Korea believes that it G/C/M/140  
 
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  is important to ensure transparency during the process of preparing the CBAM and to provide a 
sufficient transition period prior to the official introduction of the scheme. Korea hopes that dialogue 
will continue among the stakeholders concerned and looks forward to en gaging in such discussions.  
28.47.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
28.48.   The United States is looking forward to the European Union releasing the draft legislation on 
14 July for its CBAM. The United States strongly encourages the European Un ion to consult closely 
with trading partners to ensure that the draft CBAM, when fully designed and implemented, does 
not act as a disguised barrier to trade, particularly given the US -EU bilateral trading relationship. 
The United States is committed to ap propriately utilizing trade channels as another tool for tackling 
the potentially catastrophic impact of climate change, including through market and regulatory 
approaches to address greenhouse gas emissions and to achieve net -zero global emissions by 2050  
or before. The United States further encourages the European Union to fully consider the 
compatibility of its measure with applicable WTO  rules to ensure that there is an open system of 
trade and that any such measure will not constitute a barrier to trad e. 
28.49.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
28.50.   Japan acknowledges that interest in the European Union's CBAM has been increasing among 
WTO Members, including Japan, because it is an area that will have a significant impact on their 
trade.  As Japan has pointed out in the May  2021 meeting of the Trade and Environmental 
Sustainability Structured Discussions ( TESSD ), it is a prerequisite that the CBAM be designed to be 
consistent with WTO  rules. In addition, Japan estimates that there will be some challenges that will 
need to be addressed. For example, a CBAM should be designed to adequately take into account the 
efforts to reduce carbon emissions of each of the other countries. It should also be designed to 
achieve its objective of preventing carbon leakage with the least effect on trade. Therefore, it is 
important to consider measurement or evaluation methods for carbon emissions per product unit 
that are internationally reliable. It is also important to consider the actual verification of carbon 
costs, including any costs that, in effect, are borne by the product in proportion to the level of its 
carbon emissions. It will be necessary to continue conducting sufficient discussions on this issue 
internationally going forward.  
28.51.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
28.52.   New Zealand is a strong advocate for coherent and mutually supportive trade and climate 
policy responses. New Zealand has ac tively engaged in  the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade 
and Sustainability (ACCTS ), which seeks to bring together some of the inter -related elements of the 
climate change, trade, and sustainable development agendas. New Zealand echoes other Members 
in calling for a CBAM that must be all of the following: WTO -compatible; non -discriminatory; 
transparent; scientifically robust; not a barr ier to trade; and developed further to meaningful 
consultation with EU  trading partners.  
28.53.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
28.54.   Australia is strongly committed to addressing climate change and believes that international 
trade can and should co ntribute to this objective. Australia is confident that policies that facilitate 
increased trade in environmental goods and services, and related investment, can make a strong 
contribution in support of international climate policy. Australia notes that WT O Members, including 
those participating in the Structured Discussions on Trade and Environmental Sustainability 
(TESSD), are beginning to exchange views on approaches to strengthening the positive role of the 
WTO in relation to international climate chang e, particularly those policies that are mutually 
supportive of trade and climate.  
28.55.   Australia encourages the European Union to continue its consultative approach taken with 
respect to a CBAM. This will be particularly important once the European Union releas es more 
detailed information on its CBAM  policy. Australia also notes the European Union's commitment to 
ensure the consistency of its eventual measure with its WTO  obligations. Australia would particularly 
welcome the European Union engaging as fully as p ossible, and in detail, on those elements of the 
policy that are most likely to raise issues of WTO  consistency. This focus would be helpful for those G/C/M/140  
 
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  Members, like Australia, that have questions and concerns about any unjustifiable impact on trade 
that co uld result from the application of such a measure.  
28.56.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.57.   The European Union appreciates the interest of its partners in this important issue. The 
European Union is determined to ensure that its declared  greenhouse gas reduction targets, required 
to keep the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement within reach, are implemented in practice. 
This is why the European Union is fully translating the necessary steps into legislation. But the 
climate challenge is inherently global. This is why the European Union wants, and needs, its 
international partners to share a comparable level of ambition.  
28.58.   The CBAM is an environmental measure that aims to avoid the risk of carbon leakage as the 
European Union increases it s climate ambition. The decarbonization objectives of this EU  action 
would be sharply curtailed if EU  businesses in certain emission -intensive sectors were to transfer 
their production to other countries with less stringent emissions constraints. This coul d lead to an 
increase of total emissions globally, thus undermining the effectiveness of the EU's emissions 
mitigation policies.  
28.59.   However, the CBAM would take into account efforts by the European Union's international 
partners to adopt policies and measures  to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from industrial 
production, including through carbon pricing mechanisms. In addition, the CBAM will be designed in 
a way that is WTO -compatible. Importers will be treated in an even -handed manner and will not be 
subject to an adjustment that is higher than that applied domestically.  
28.60.   The European Union has been fully transparent throughout the CBAM  development process. 
The European Union has discussed the CBAM with a range of partners multilaterally and bilaterally. 
Follow ing the presentation of the legislative proposal on 14  July, the Commission will continue 
working with the European Union's trading partners to ensure that its adjustment measures work in 
an open and fair manner that is also fully in compliance with WTO  rules. 
28.61.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
29  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
Russian Federation.  
29.2.  The delegate  of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
29.3.  In December  2019, the European Commission announced its political vision for sustainability 
and published the European Green Deal, which aims to reduce GHG  emissions by at least by 55% 
by 2030, and to rea ch climate neutrality by 2050. The Russian Federation shares the European 
Union's view of the importance of fighting climate change.  
29.4.  However, the Russian Federation wishes to note that, whatever activities Members plan within 
the framework of the environme nt and climate change, they should be carried out in accordance 
with the fundamental principles and rules of the WTO, and should not result in any kind of 
discrimination or disguised restrictions on trade. None of the "green" measures should impede trade 
and be used as a means of "green protectionism", as implied in paragraph  32 of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.  
29.5.  The Russian Federation's dossier on the European Union's Green Deal includes about 
100 pages only enumerating EU  trade-related measures adopted under it. The Russian Federation 
wonders if such instruments of implementation under the Green Deal will be consistent with the 
European Union's obligations in the WTO.  
29.6.  Currently, WTO  Members have raised specific trade concerns regarding certain elements o f 
the Green Deal. The first  measure is the CBAM that Members discussed under the previous agenda 
item. However, the European Union's targets laid down in the European Green Deal are not limited G/C/M/140  
 
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  to the establishment of this mechanism. The European Green Dea l also provides for reductions in 
the use of chemical and more hazardous pesticides, reductions in fertilizer use, the promotion of 
EU energy standards and technologies at the global level, the diversification of energy source 
supplies, the adoption of new  technical regulations, the revision of competition rules, and so on. 
Most of the respective projects are, or will be, heavily subsidized, and their implementation would 
lead to the elimination of traditional foreign supplies from the EU  market. From a tra de point of view, 
Members are dealing here with a classic forced import substitution. The Russian Federation expects 
the European Union to explain in detail why the Russian Federation is wrong to make such a serious 
claim.  
29.7.  The Russian Federation already se es cause for concern in the implementation of certain 
elements of the European Union's Green Deal . For example, the draft EU  regulation on batteries 
notified in document  G/TBT/N/EU/775. This measure sets out product requirements for new 
batteries as a cond ition for access to the EU  market as well as material recovery targets for waste 
batteries. This regulation specifically sets requirements on the maximum level of carbon footprint 
over the life cycle of batteries , and the minimum level of recycled material s that they should contain, 
such as cobalt, lithium, copper, lead , and nickel.  Apparently, the requirements for the minimum level 
of recycled materials in batteries is aimed at reducing the use of primary metals in the European 
Union. It is no secret that the European Union does not have sufficient capacity in terms of primary 
non-ferrous metals in its territory to meet internal demand. By introducing a provision that 
discriminates against imported primary materials vis -à-vis domestically remanufactured mat erials, 
the draft regulation aims to substitute imported primary metals by like domestically recycled 
materials. This draft regulation is not based either on science or on international standards and 
guidelines that specify the content of recycled material s in batteries, the material recovery targets, 
and the levels and methodologies for calculation of the carbon footprint of this product over its life 
cycle. Another issue under the Green Deal is the chemical strategy for sustainability. This strategy 
may h ave a trade distorting effect on a wide range of economic sectors. It implies the imposition of 
new technical barriers to trade within the REACH/CLP  legislation, and new bans and restrictions in 
respect of primary non -ferrous metals that are usually unscie ntifically classified as hazardous 
materials by the European Commission, using the precautionary principle.  
29.8.  In sum, the Russian Federation draws Members' attention to the fact that environmental 
policies should not result in the imposition of unnecessary r estrictions on international trade. The 
Russian Federation expects that current trade rules will be fully respected by the EU.  
29.9.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
29.10.   Uruguay is particularly interested in learning more about the concrete implement ation on 
the ground of the broad policy objectives outlined in the European Union's Green Deal, and their 
possible impact on international trade and production beyond EU  borders.  
29.11.   Although Uruguay shares the European Union's objectives of combating climate change and 
protecting the environment, Uruguay is concerned about the attempt to impose the view that there 
is a single model of production and sustainable development that should be emulated worldwide, 
without taking into account the specific characterist ics and circumstances of different countries and 
regions, including the situation of their production systems, and their relative contributions to the 
problems to be addressed.  
29.12.   The restrictive effects that several of the strategies and policies announced i n the European 
Union's Green Deal may have on international trade are also cause for concern. In this regard, 
Uruguay reiterates to the European Union the need for its policies affecting trade to remain in full 
compliance with the EU's multilateral commitm ents made in the WTO. Uruguay reaffirms its interest 
in following up on this issue through all appropriate channels.  
29.13.   The delegate of Paraguay , addressing items  28 and 29 together,  indicated the following:  
29.14.   As Paraguay has reiterated on numerous occasions an d in the various committees of this 
Organization, Paraguay shares with the European Union the objectives of environmental protection 
and the need to take action to combat climate change. However, Paraguay holds a different view 
concerning the methods adopt ed by the European Union to achieve those objectives.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  29.15.   The adoption of unilateral measures, such as the CBAM, and other initiatives contained in 
the European Green Deal, such as the Farm -to-Fork Strategy, erode multilateral work and efforts 
being developed in existing forums and standard -setting bodies, in which the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities, as well as the specificities of each Member, are taken into account 
to achieve an appropriate balance between the three  pillars of sustain ability, namely economic, 
social, and environmental.  
29.16.   The costs of environmental protection must be shared equitably, so that the common but 
shared responsibilities of Members, according to their level of development, can be taken into 
account. This principle is being circumvented when one  Member can take unilateral trade restrictive 
actions with a view to modifying the environmental policies of another, ignoring the costs imposed 
by such restrictive measures on that Member. This is not because of an alleged pre -eminence of 
trade over the environment, but to underline the importance of multilateral cooperation in the search 
for solutions to common problems.  
29.17.   The insistence that one  Member's policies, adopted domestically, must in turn be adopted 
by all those wishing to trade with it, ignores these principles. This approach would seem to indicate 
that the Member in question assumes that it is better qualified than Members' own authorities to 
determine their environmental policies, or that it alone has the  power to decide on the overall course 
that all Members must take.  
29.18.   Paraguay reiterates that there is no single model that offers a solution applicable to and 
replicable by all 164  Members of this Organization, each with different climatic conditions, parti cular 
environmental characteristics, and levels of development. Ignoring "the other" in these debates 
leads to a biased and even radicalized vision, which does not allow for the establishment of a 
constructive dialogue that leads to knowledge and understan ding of the circumstances that Members 
face. 
29.19.   The first  few articles of Paraguay's National Constitution recognize the right to a healthy 
environment and environmental protection. Paraguay is responsible for less than 0.02% of global 
GHG emissions, has a fo rest cover of more than 40% of its territory, and has good agricultural 
practices, such as crop rotation for integrated pest management  (IPM)  and direct sowing, which also 
contribute to soil preservation, better water absorption, and carbon sequestration. Paraguay uses 
biotechnology and precision farming, seeking to increase productivity through innovation to better 
preserve natural resources. Paraguay produces 100% clean and renewable energy. Latin America 
and the Caribbean is the main region providing eco system services at the global level, with over half 
of the world's primary forest and biodiversity.  
29.20.   Paraguay  constantly hear s as arguments that domestic producers require their competitors 
to conform to the same requirements in order to compete on an equal  footing, otherwise an 
"imbalance" would be created. But what seems to be overlooked is that Members are not all equally 
responsible for the environmental damage that must be reverse d, and that those that are historically 
responsible for the current situat ion are the ones that must invest more to reverse current and future 
damage.  This should be acknowledged when developing new policies which should be based on a 
solid scientific basis so they do not become trade -distorting measures.  
29.21.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
29.22.   Brazil supports the adoption of legitimate policies with environmental objectives, but is 
concerned about the adoption of unilateral environmental measures that result in an unnecessary 
negative impact on international trade, contr ary to the commitments made by Members in other 
fora. Brazil understands that it is essential that the environmental measures adopted by the 
European Union relating to trade are fully compatible with WTO  rules, including the 
most-favoured -nation and nation al treatment principles, in order to avoid potential protectionist bias 
or the adoption of discriminatory measures. In this context, Brazil urges the European Union to take 
into due consideration its comments made in the process of drafting and implementin g the measures 
under the "Green Deal", and expresses its hope that communication channels will be established to 
allow dialogue between the competent authorities on these topics. It would also like to urge the EU 
to adopt a broader approach in the formulat ion of environmental policies and take into account the 
negative environmental impact of agricultural subsidies. Finally, it should be recalled that all 
countries have committed themselves to address the three  pillars of sustainable development G/C/M/140  
 
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  simultaneou sly. Brazil recalls that sustainability standards based on billions in subsidies , which 
cannot be matched by developing countries , cannot be considered a common reference in this global 
challenge.  
29.23.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.24.   Late in 2019, the European Union committed to becoming the world's first  climate -neutral 
continent by 2050. The European Green De al was unveiled as a comprehensive plan to ready the 
European Union's economy and society in this regard, facilitating the resetting of EU  economic policy 
to better correspond to the challenges of the global climate crisis. Its overarching objective is the  
transition towards a climate neutral, environmentally sustainable, resource efficient and resilient 
economy by 2050, with the ambition to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030.  
29.25.   On 14  July 2021, the European Union will put forward the nec essary legal framework for a 
green transition. Our "Fit for 55" package is a package of 12  initiatives, one  completely new, the 
CBAM, and 11 that are about bolstering existing legislation. These proposals will be fully in line with 
WTO rules and the Europe an Union's other international commitments.  
29.26.   Trade policy already contributes quite significantly to achieving sustainable development; 
but more can be done. The climate crisis is a global crisis and progress will depend on global partners, 
including large emitters and polluters, being ready to increase their level of ambition.  
29.27.   The Communication of February  2021, entitled "Open, Sustainable and Assertive Trade 
Policy", takes a fresh look at trade policy in light of the European Green Deal. The Communication 
aims to build a consensus around the strategic direction and objectives of the European Union's 
trade policy for the next decade. The European Union sees the green transition as an opportunity, 
not a threat. Furthermore, global climate change mitigation ef forts are necessary as part of the 
solution. Thus, cooperation at multilateral and bilateral levels is needed, as this would have the 
biggest impact in terms of shaping the rules for a fair and sustainable globalization. The European 
Union is looking forwa rd to working together with WTO  Members in that respect.  
29.28.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China and the Russian Federation.  
30.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
30.3.  The Russian Federation has raised its concerns on numerous previous occasions at this Council 
regardi ng the amendments to the European Union's basic regulation on protection against dumped 
imports introduced by Regulation (EU) No.  2017/2321 and Regulation (EU)  No. 2018/825. The 
Russian Federation will not repeat all of its concerns in detail on this occas ion but only touch on two 
of their characteristics.  
30.4.  First, the amendments are discriminatory in nature. For example, Regulation (EU) 
No. 2017/2321 envisages the issuance of reports on so -called "significant distortions" in the 
countries of export. At the m oment only two  reports have been issued and nothing suggests that 
any other reports are planned.  
30.5.  Second, the amendments imply a double punishment. The same situation can be labelled as 
a "significant distortion" under Regulation (EU) No.  2017/2321, and as a "raw material distortion" 
under Regulation (EU) No.  2018/825. This makes for a comfortable excuse for boosting the dumping 
margin and denying lesser duties to exporters.  
30.6.  The Russian Federation reiterates its principal position that such treatment of expo rters is 
WTO-inconsistent. The Russian Federation is also curious to hear any clarification or update the 
European Union may wish to provide in this regard. However, current developments do not leave us 
much hope. It appears that the European Union does no t intend to comply with its WTO  obligations G/C/M/140  
 
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  in its investigations, and the proclaimed "country -neutrality" of its methodologies appears to be an 
empty promise. The Russian Federation urges the European Union to abstain from the application of 
discriminator y and WTO -inconsistent methodologies.  
30.7.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
30.8.  China's position on this issue remains unchanged. China is of the view that the European 
Union's anti -dumping regulation and relevant practices are inconsistent with WTO  anti-dumping 
rules. China is particularly concerned by the so -called "significant market distortion" concept and 
relevant standards in the regulation, the working document on "significant distortion of China", as 
well as the use of third -party data for norm al value calculation.  
30.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
30.10.   The European Union notes the points raised both by China and by Russia. The European 
Union again refers to its previous statements on this issue that are on the record both o f this Council's 
meetings15, and of numerous meetings of the WTO  Anti-Dumping Committee, as the position 
expressed is still relevant.  
30.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of the 
Russian Federation.  
31.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
31.3.  The Russian Federation remains concerned about Angola's import restrictions on certain 
agricultural and industrial products under its Presidential Decree No.  23/19, and reiterates its 
statements made at previous meetings of the Committee on Market Access ( CMA) and the CTG. 
Since its most recent consultations with Angola, held at the beginning of the year, the Russian 
Federation has not seen any positive developments in respect of the elimination of Angola's QRs. 
The Russian Federation urges Angola to bring its measures into conformity with the 
WTO Agreements and to lift its import bans on agricultural products.  
31.4.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
31.5.  As the United States has  expressed previously in this Council and in the Committee on Mark et 
Access, the United States is committed to strengthening its trade and investment ties with Angola. 
However, the United States  remain s concerned that this decree appears aimed at restricting Angola's 
imports and could negatively impact this relationship.  The United States appreciates Angola's 
response to our questions submitted through the Committee on Agriculture. The United States urges 
Angola to continue to address this issue in this Council or its subsidiary bodies. The United States 
continues to hear  reports of confusion over how the decree is being enforced and of delays facing 
goods at the border. US  agricultural exporters remain concerned over delays that perishable goods 
face amidst all this uncertainty. The United States hopes that Angola will ta ke steps to revise this 
decree to address US  concerns and ensure that its measures with respect to imports are in 
compliance with WTO  rules.  
31.6.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
31.7.  The European Union remains supportive of Angola's inten tion to diversify its economy and to 
develop its domestic industry. However, the European Union reiterates the concerns previously 
expressed in various WTO  bodies, and for a long time now, over Decree No.  23/19. The Decree 
seems to protect domestic industr ies in a manner that is incompatible with WTO  rules and that could 
be detrimental to foreign investments in Angola. The European Union urges Angola to review the 
relevant measures in order to ensure their compliance with WTO rules. Irrespective of the issu e of 
 
15 See, for example, document  G/C/M/139, paragraphs  31.8-31.9. G/C/M/140  
 
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  the compatibility of these measures with WTO  rules, the European Union would welcome receiving 
clarification from Angola as to whether the concerns expressed have been considered, and whether 
Angola intends to introduce changes to its legislation, and  if so, how.  
31.8.  The delegate of Angola  indicated the following:  
31.9.  Angola took note of the statements made by the delegations of the Russian Federation, the 
United States, and the European Union, and their reiterated concerns around Angolan imports. 
Angola notes  that these concerns mostly focus on Decree No.  23/19, which is now to be reviewed. 
As Angola has stated previously at the C TG, the Committee on Market Access, and the Committee 
on Agriculture, Angola is engaged in bilateral consultations with the embassie s in our Capital in order 
to ensure more clarity on the specific issues relating to the concerns raised. Fortunately, Angola has 
had fruitful discussions and hopes shortly to be able to remove this item from the agendas of the 
various WTO  bodies where prev iously it  had appeared. Indeed,  Angola is close to formally sending 
its responses to the questions raised by the Russian delegation, although other ministries have been 
involved in this work at national level. Again, Angola takes note and informs the Counc il that it has 
a technical team working on a possible revision to Decree No.  23/19. Angola remains available for 
any further clarification as it strongly supports the multilateral trading system.  
31.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
32  INDIA – MANDAT ORY CERTIFICATION FOR STEEL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Japan.  
32.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
32.3.  Regarding India's mandatory certification for steel products, Japan has repeatedly been 
requesting that India ensure its proper implementation through discussions in both the 
TBT Committee and the CTG.  
32.4.  Japan wishes to touch on four  points. First, Japan would like to request India to expeditiously 
approve applications since it is still taking a long time to get approval for a conformity assessment, 
especially for new projects. Second, Japan understands that , due to the COVID -19 pandemic, the 
Government of India has not been able to proceed with on -site inspection s. Japan therefore 
requested India to implement appropriate alternative measures. In response to Japan's  request, 
India mentioned the possibility of introducing remote inspection during the most recent meeting of 
the TBT Committee . Japan would li ke to request that India provide an update on progress in 
introducing such alternatives as remote inspections. Third, if alternative appropriate measures will 
not be introduced, Japan wishes  to request that India postpone the enforcement of the introductio n 
of new compulsory standards. Finally, Japan would like to request India to improve the following 
situations that have been raised in past meetings.  
32.5.  Japan expresses its concern that, for certain products, the Government of India requested 
that Japanese co mpanies switch to local procurement from Indian companies, even though this has 
no relation to the process of applying for certification. Japan is also concerned by the Government 
of India's request that Japanese companies submit future plans for domestic production in India. 
These requirements were not included as part of the original application procedure.  
32.6.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
32.7.  India thank s Japan for its continued interest in this matter. In this context, India request s 
Japan to r efer to its statement made on this issue in the TBT  Committee. India has also taken note 
of Japan's  statement on this occasion, which will be conveyed to New Delhi for examination.  
32.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  33  INDIA - IMPORT RESTRICTION ON  AIR CONDITIONERS – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
Japan.  
33.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
33.3.  Japan continues to have deep concerns over India's import ban on air cond itioners , including 
refrigerants, introduced in October last year, which is a measure that unreasonably imposes a 
restructuring of corporate supply chains.  Indeed, Japan is deeply concerned that this measure is 
likely to be an import ban that is inconsiste nt with Article  XI.1 of the GATT. In this regard, India 
responded that the measure is consistent with its obligations under the Montreal Protocol and with 
regulations on Hydrofluorocarbons ( HCFCs ), which are ozone -depleting substances. However, this 
import ban is unnecessary and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that use 
refrigerants, which are not subject to India's reduction and elimination obligation under the Montrea l 
Protocol. Japan calls upon India to proceed with the early withdrawal of this measure. In addition, 
Japan is preparing written questions to India after receiving its request in the TRIMs  Committee. If 
India considers the measure to be justified, Japan wi shes India to be more specific in its response 
as to its reasons why.  
33.4.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
33.5.  This issue was raised previously at the CTG's meeting s held on 31  March and 1  April 2021, 
where India explained the rationale for the same.  India would like to inform Members again that the 
measure was necessary for  the application of standards and for the regulations for marketing of the 
item, besides reducing risks to human, animal and plant life and health, consistent with India 's 
commitme nt to the Montreal Protocol. Further more, as per the Ozone Depleting Substances 
(Regulation and Control) Amendment Rules, 2014, the import of air conditioners containing Group  VI 
substances (HCFCs) is prohibited since 1  July 2015.  
33.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
34  UNITED STATES - MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China.  
34.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the fol lowing:  
34.3.  China wishes to express its serious concern over US  measures prohibiting market access for 
ICT products. This is a long -standing issue on which no progress has been made. What concerns 
China further is that the United States seems to continue intensifying the relevant measures against 
Chinese communication companies. Recently, the US  Federal Communications Commission voted to 
advance a plan to ban approvals for equipment in US  telecommunication networks from Chinese 
companies. Until no w, China has not seen any evidence provided by the United States showing that 
Chinese ICT  products pose risks to its national security; nor has China received any clear clarification 
in this regard  at this Council.  
34.4.  It appears to China that national securit y is being used as a simple and effective excuse for 
the United States to serve its wide range of trade -unrelated interests. What happened to TikTok is 
a good example of this. China believes that such unfair practices undermine the integrity of the 
global trading system and the global supply chain. Such market -distorting practices only erode the 
fairness of, and trust in, the multilateral trading system. Therefore, China urges the United States 
to fully abide by the WTO  rules and to stop abusing the nationa l security exception.  
34.5.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
34.6.  As the United States has stated previously, it does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade 
in Goods  is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  34.7.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China.  
35.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
35.3.  China would like to express its serious concern over the export control measures for 
ICT products taken by the United States. Five more Chinese companies have recently be en added 
to the entity list, bringing the total number of Chinese companies on this list to almost 400. The 
companies listed in the entity list cannot conduct free trade with US  companies. What most concerns 
China, besides the sharply increasing number of listed Chinese companies in such a short time, is 
the various reasons for those companies to be listed, including "protecting the United States values" , 
"restricting the development of Chinese high -technology" , and "safeguarding the United States 
national security".  
35.4.  Earlier in the current Council's meeting, some Members made clear statements about free 
and fair trading being the fundamental principle and objective of the multilateral trading system, 
and that Members should not take market -distorting actions  or link trade measures to unrelated 
matters. China fully agrees and urges all who are saying such things to do as they say. But China 
wishes here to ask simple questions. Are the US  export control measures in line with free and fair 
trade principles? Are these measures market oriented or non -market oriented? Could the United 
States also tell China if such discriminatory measures are based on privilege or rights, on power or 
rules, and on manipulation or reciprocity?  
35.5.  The delegate of the United States  indica ted the following:  
35.6.  As the United States has stated previously, it does not believe that the WTO  Council for Trade 
in Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
35.7.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China.  
36.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
36.3.  China regrets to have to raise this issue again ; however, no substantial progress has been 
made on it to date, and m any key questions remain unanswered.  China is of the view that the issue 
of telecommunication network security should be addressed based on scientific and verifiable facts  
and data rather than the origin of suppliers. China urges Australia to review its regulatory policies 
in the telecommunications sector, to provide fair market access to Chinese companies to participate 
in its 5G  construction, and to bring its measures int o line with WTO  rules.  
36.4.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
36.5.  Australia has taken note of China's statement. China first  raised this issue in late  2018. Since 
then, Australia has engaged constructively and in good faith with China to explain th e rationale for 
its position on 5G  networks. As Australia has previously stated, its position on 5G  networks is country 
agnostic, transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory, and fully WTO  consistent.  
36.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  37  EUROPEAN UNION – SWEDEN'S DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included in the agenda at the request of 
China.  
37.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
37.3.  China regrets to have to raise this issue again, but China is deeply concerned about Sweden's 
measure prohibiting China's companies from participating in Sweden's 5G  construction. Until now, 
China has not seen any evidence provided by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority  (PTS) showing 
that Chinese companies' products pose security risks to Sweden. Therefore, China is of the view that 
Sweden's non -transparent measure is groundless, discriminatory, and inconsistent with WTO  rules. 
China requests Sweden immediately to withdr aw its discriminatory measure, and to provide a fair, 
transparent, and non -discriminatory environment for Chinese companies operating in Sweden.  
37.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
37.5.  On the previous occasion that the matter of the rec ent Swedish 5G  spectrum auction was 
raised by China, the European Union had already stressed that it was under legal proceedings in 
Sweden. These proceedings remain ongoing. For this reason, the European Union will not enter into 
the details of this issue in the context of the Council's present meeting.  
37.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS AND SUBSIDIARY 
COMMITTEES: INFORMATION FROM THE CHAIR  
38.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, at the Council's previous formal meeting, which took place on  
31 March  2021, his predecessor had suggested that, as requested by delegations, he should 
coordinate with the Chairpersons and Secretaries of the CTG's subsidiary bodies with a v iew to 
avoiding meeting overlaps and to improving the sequencing between the scheduled meeting dates 
of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies.  
38.2.  On 18  May 2021, he sent a communication to the Chairpersons and Secretaries of the 
Subsidiary Bodies of the C TG expla ining that a number of Members had expressed concerns over 
the way in which the meetings had being organized over the past years. He also asked them to try 
to avoid meeting overlaps and to improve the sequencing between the scheduled meeting dates of 
the C TG and its subsidiary bodies. Given the dates of the Ministerial and the possible meeting dates 
of the General Council, he requested them to try to meet before the first  week of November, with a 
view to ensuring that their meetings took place sufficiently in advance of the CTG's meeting, and 
that all the annual reports by the Committees could be considered at the CTG's final meeting in 
2021.  
38.3.  On 2 June 2021, the Chairpersons of the SPS and the TBT  Committees replied that, with the 
assistance of the Secretari at, they had explored the possibility of moving their meetings, which were 
currently scheduled for 2 -5 November (SPS  Committee), and 8 -11 November (TBT  Committee), and 
which had been announced to delegations in September  2020. That is, well before the date s of the 
Ministerial, General Council, and CTG  meetings had been fixed. Unfortunately, the meeting schedule 
for the autumn was already very full, and there were no alternative weeks available on which the 
SPS and TBT  Committees could meet on several consec utive days, as required by their agendas. 
Nevertheless, a solution had been found that would avoid overlaps between the formal meetings of 
the SPS and the TBT  Committees and the last CTG  meeting of the year, although the sequencing 
was not that desired by Members.  
38.4.  He was aware that this was a very important issue for Members, and he regretted that it had 
not been possible to avoid having this situation for the year 2021. However, he had requested the 
Secretariat to coordinate with all the Secretaries of the  subsidiary bodies and coordinate already the 
plan of meetings for the year 2022. The coordination also included the General Council and the 
organizers of the Public Forum, which typically took place during the last week of September or the 
first week of O ctober. He was pleased to inform the Council that the result of this planning and G/C/M/140  
 
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  consultations had been communicated in room document  RD/CTG/13, which contained the updated 
Annual Plan of Meetings, including the tentative meeting dates for 2022 and the cl osing dates of the 
agendas. He had requested the Secretariat to prepare an update for each CTG  meeting, which should 
facilitate an early identification of any potential issues and allow Members to plan accordingly.  
38.5.  He intended to continue engaging with the  new Chairpersons of the CTG  subsidiary bodies , 
as soon as they were elected, as well as with their Committee Secretaries, with a view to continuing 
to improve the coordination, thus ensuring that Members' concerns were addressed in a satisfactory 
manner.  
38.6.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
38.7.  The United States thanks the Secretariat for this information, which is very helpful to 
US authorities and should contribute to a more rational scheduling of meetings going forward. The 
United States would like to briefly make a few comments and requests. First, in 2021, there appear 
to be two CMA  meetings scheduled in October. The United States understands that the meeting is 
set for 11 -12 October, and requests that this be clarified on the schedule. Second, in 2022, the 
United States requests that the April  meeting of the CTG be pushed back to later in April. As it 
stands, the agenda for the CTG  meeting would close on the same day that the SPS  Committee is 
meeting, and before the CMA has  met. This is too close, and contributes to a large amount of 
overhang between the CMA and the CTG in particular. Third, we note that a number of meetings are 
scheduled for June and not July, like this year. The calendar seems potentially unbalanced. The 
United States wishes to know if there is a reason for the apparent shift forward.  
38.8.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
38.9.  Paraguay thanks the Secretariat for document  RD/CTG/13. Paraguay believes that this good 
practice should continue because it allows Members to have a clear overview of the meeting 
calendars, as well as with regard to the closure of agendas. Paraguay also believes that it is an 
important tool to help the Secretariat in its internal coordination, and considers that this was perhap s 
the reason why a number of Members requested that such a document be created. Paraguay notes 
with concern that, unfortunately, Members still do not have the proper sequencing of meetings  with 
some subsidiary bodies, as the Chairperson has pointed out and  Paraguay has noted in previous 
interventions. And this sequencing remained important for delegations. For example, in the item 
relating to EU  technical barriers on the importation of agricultural products,  there is a close 
connection between the work done  in the subsidiary bodies and the progress that could be made 
before it reaches this Council. This is why Paraguay insists on maintaining a proper sequencing of 
meetings. However, Paraguay understands that best efforts have been made, and that, despite tha t, 
it was simply not possible on this occasion. However, Paraguay notes that the problem seemed to 
have been addressed for next year. Paraguay once again thanks the Secretariat for its work, and 
also thanks the Chairperson for his leadership in upholding t his initiative, which came out of the real 
need of Members that this Organization improves its coordination and organization of meetings in 
general. Paraguay takes note that the circulation of this document, as the United States has pointed 
out, raises a n umber of potential issues which Paraguay hopes will be addressed in order to improve 
the functioning of this Council and its subsidiary bodies.  
38.10.   The Chairperson  recalled that the challenge had been compounded this year because of the 
COVID -19 pandemic , whic h had resulted in new constraints . He thanked delegations for their 
understanding  in this regard . He committed to do his best to improve the planning for next year and 
would take into account the comments received at the meeting.  
38.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
39  WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, at the General Council's meeting of March  2021, the 
Chairperson of the General Council had indicated that the General Council would continue holding 
periodic reviews o f the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce in its future sessions, based on 
the reports submitted by the WTO  bodies entrusted with the implementation of the Work 
Programme. For that purpose, the General Council had instructed these bodies, including the C TG, G/C/M/140  
 
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  to continue placing the issue of the Work Programme on the agenda of their meetings and to send 
updates to the General Council  in order to assist it in its preparations for MC12.  
39.2.  Since MC12 would  take place in November  2021, and in order to fulfil the renewed mandate 
of this Council to update the General Council about the discussions that have taken place on this 
issue, he invited delegations to continue expressing their opinions and to make suggestions as to 
how to work on the preparation of the period ic review to be held in the General Council in preparation 
for MC12. As was already agreed at the CTG's previous meeting when this agenda item was 
discussed, in the autumn he would submit to the General Council a factual report under his own 
responsibility  based on the CTG  meetings that had taken place in 2021.  
39.3.  The delegate of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group , indicated the following:  
39.4.  On this item, the LDC  Group considers the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce 
(E-Commerce) to be an important mechanism, p articularly given the unquestionable significance of 
E-Commerce and its accompanying opportunities today. E -Commerce is now a key issue in the wider 
context of countries' social development and economic growth.  
39.5.  Chad recalls that the LDC  Group submitted a c ommunication in November  2019, contained in 
document  WT/GC/W/787. This communication highlights a number of obstacles, barriers, and 
challenges faced by LDCs that prevent them from adequately using E -Commerce to flourish and 
boost their economies. These in clude the following: a lack of adequate and affordable information 
technology (ICT) infrastructure; limited use of online payments; weak regulatory frameworks; a lack 
of digital skills among many enterprises in LDCs; weak human and institutional capacity; and 
inadequate facilities for physical delivery of online purchases.  
39.6.  According to recent International Telecommunication Union (ITU) indicators, only 25% of 
households in urban areas in LDCs have internet access, and 35% use the internet overall, mobile 
phone usage included. In contrast, only 10% of their households in rural areas have internet access, 
with 19% of the total population using the internet, mobile phone usage included. Essentially, the 
notable lack of internet access remains a major obstacle t o the growth of E -Commerce in LDCs. In 
late 2020, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that only 
19% of people in LDCs were using the internet, compared with 87% in developed countries. This 
poses a major challenge. Clea rly, these figures contrast starkly with those of developed countries 
and many developing countries. We believe that relevant content in the Work Programme on 
E-Commerce will help LDCs with their efforts to use E -Commerce for development and economic 
growt h. 
39.7.  Certainly, as regards infrastructure, initiatives such as public -private partnerships can be 
useful and worthwhile. Governments can also play a more active role on the regulatory front, 
including by promoting E -Commerce policy frameworks. A national and  regional strategy can 
streamline initiatives in different sectors, allow for the sharing of best practices, and help achieve 
economies of scale.  
39.8.  A strategic perspective must also address the matter of fees and taxes. The LDC  Group notes 
that a number of c ountries, such as Canada and Australia, are at the forefront of systems to simplify 
the collection of taxes on micro, small, and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) and cross -border 
online trade. Members can certainly learn from such initiatives to support cr oss-border digital trade, 
especially for LDC  enterprises, which due to our nature as LDCs, are all MSMEs. The LDC  Group 
would be delighted to learn more about how the systems implemented by these pioneers (Canada, 
Australia, and other Members) can help LDC  enterprises and women entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of new opportunities and facilitate their exports.  
39.9.  The COVID -19 pandemic has forced us all to rethink the way enterprises operate, including 
in sectors that can be considered viable. E -Commerce, which is growing and evolving rapidly, has 
gradually taken hold in countless sectors. After the outbreak of the pandemic, the E -Commerce wave 
provided a major boost to established players, such as platforms and third -party marketplaces, while 
conventional enterp rises attempting to sell online did not enjoy the same success. This reflects the 
challenge of adapting business models in the short term, in respect of operational costs, the supply 
chain , and regulatory approvals.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  39.10.   As for consumers, habits and trust repre sent the other side of the coin, enabling E -Commerce 
to prosper. The LDC  Group notes at this point that a change of mindset cannot happen overnight, 
even in a specific context such as the pandemic. For example, the preference for cash on delivery 
reflects one aspect of the lack of trust in online payment solutions. The challenge is all the greater 
given the rapid development of technologies, particularly in production methods, such as the 
progressive automation of production lines, thanks to increasingly so phisticated and complex robots. 
Furthermore, it is also worth highlighting the use of technologies such as 3D  printing, which give a 
competitive edge to companies capable of using them and certainly in terms of finding a market in 
which the resulting goods  comply with safety, hygiene, and other technical standards.  
39.11.   These technologies undoubtedly open up new perspectives and opportunities. However, 
Members must be mindful that they can widen the gap between the technologically developed 
Members and the LDCs,  which are already facing a considerable digital divide. The challenge is great, 
since the automation of production lines means that jobs that could have been created in 
LDC countries may be cut or may never even be created due to the trend towards interna lizing 
production.  
39.12.   Coming back to the heart of the matter, the LDC  Group emphasizes that the main aim for 
LDCs is to ensure their capacity to reap the benefits of E -Commerce soon, without losing sovereignty 
over their domestic economic and regulatory activ ities and to really focus on bridging the digital 
divide between LDCs and developed and developing Members, or between LDCs and economies with 
a greater technological base.  
39.13.   The LDC  Group believes that conducting needs assessments at the national level can help to 
better understand where to start in rolling out a strategic E -Commerce reform programme. Such 
assessments in LDCs require technical assistance and material and financial support. The LDC  Group 
therefore calls upon its trading partners to support us  in this regard.  
39.14.   The LDC  Group believes that, for LDCs to make optimal use of E -Commerce, which is 
indispensable in today's world, LDCs still need to fulfil certain prior conditions, such as better internet 
access, solving the perennial issue of energy, im proving skills, building human and institutional 
capacity, a coherent regulatory framework, and an integrated financial and logistical system, to 
name but a few.  
39.15.   All these issues are linked to the development dimension, which underpins the Work 
Programme o n E-Commerce and is an integral part of the WTO  discussions. The LDC  Group hopes 
that these issues will be listened to, or at least given the special attention they deserve, by all 
WTO Members and the LDC  Group's technical and financial partners. E -Commerc e is transforming 
traditional trade and allowing more enterprises to participate in global trade. The LDC  Group hopes 
that this becomes a definite reality in LDCs, thereby allowing them to truly participate in global 
trade.  
39.16.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
39.17.   As the digital revolution is still unfolding, India has on a number of occasions stated that it 
is important to first understand the complex and multi -faceted dimensions of issues related to 
E-Commerce. Members still do not comprehend the full implications of the effects of E -Commerce 
on competition and market structures, issues related to transfer of technology, data storage, and 
automation, and its impact on traditional jobs and gaps in policy and regulating frameworks in 
developing countries.  
39.18.   India, therefore, has been a proponent of strengthening Members' multilateral work under 
the non -negotiating and exploratory 1998  Work Programme on E -Commerce. Under this multilateral 
Work Programme, with the intention of understanding  the implications of the moratorium on customs 
duties on electronic transmissions. India, along with South Africa, has introduced three  submissions, 
which explain our understanding on the scope and impact of the moratorium.  
39.19.   In December  2019, India joined t he consensus for a six -month extension of the moratorium, 
with an understanding that the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce will be reinvigorated with 
the specific objective of achieving clarity on issues related to the scope of the moratorium, the 
definition of electronic transmissions, identification of products which are covered under the G/C/M/140  
 
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  moratorium, as well as its impact. In this context, India would again draw the attention of the 
Membership to paragraph  3.1 of the Work Programme, which requires thi s Council to examine and 
report on aspects of electronic commerce relevant to the provisions of GATT  1994, the trade 
agreements covered under Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement, and the approved Work Programme. 
The said paragraph also provides an inclusive list  of issues to be deliberated upon here in this Council.  
39.20.   In this regard, India is finalizing a submission  on this issue, along with like -minded Members, 
for submission to this Council. India would urge the Membership to deliberate and report on these 
mandated issues  sincerely instead of prematurely jumping to rule making on such issues.  
39.21.   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
39.22.   Nepal wishes to associate itself with the statement delivered by Chad on behalf of the 
LDC Group, and to add the followin g few points. The COVID -19 pandemic has increased the urgency 
of enabling weaker economies, such as LDCs and LLDCs, to participate in E -Commerce, not to benefit 
from it but to survive in the global trading system in this critical situation. Therefore, imme diate 
interventions are essential through the Work Programme on E -Commerce. A huge digital divide and 
capacity gaps are hindering access to the just benefits from E -Commerce, and as a result, 
E-Commerce has unevenly divided the world. Access to trade infra structure, including 
ICT infrastructure, technology transfer, institutional and human capacity, and financial implications, 
among others, are some major areas to assess while designing the Work Programme. Since the 
benefits of E -Commerce would not flow aut omatically to LDCs, a comprehensive approach would be 
necessary to ensure that weaker economies benefit from E -Commerce in a just manner.  
39.23.   The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
39.24.   Pakistan would like to refer to its statement made under this agenda  item at the CTG's 
meeting of 31  March  2021.16 The digital divide is a reality, which has been further exacerbated by 
the COVID -19 pandemic. The gaps between the early starters and the late starters permeate beyond 
infrastructure and connectivity into the domain of digital skills, capabilities, and technologies. These 
issues require thorough examination and cannot be resolved overnight; it is important to understand 
and address them. Pakistan wishes to re -emphasize that any attempt at rule making, without f irst 
addressing these issues, might widen the existing digital divide and create further imbalances, which 
can have detrimental effects on the prospects of developing countries addressing existing and new 
challenges.  
39.25.   In light of the growth of E -Commerce an d the emergence of such technologies as 3D  printing 
and Artificial Intelligence, as well as the need for digital industrialization in developing countries, all 
aspects of the financial and industrial developmental and other implications must be factored in  
before extending the moratorium. Pakistan would therefore like once again to stress and support 
engagement at the correct mandated forum, including the relevant WTO  bodies, such as the 
Committee on Trade and Development ( CTD), in which multilateral discus sions on E -Commerce can 
take place with a view to finding solutions for developing countries to further their objectives of 
digital development and industrialization. Such discussions can help developing countries to better 
understand and explore avenues f or their economic growth through digital capabilities within their 
particular socio -economic context.  
39.26.   The delegate of Norway  indicated the following:  
39.27.   Norway is a strong supporter of the Work Programme  on Electronic Commerce , including the 
moratorium, and w elcome s all discussions, both in the CTG and in other relevant fora, and the 
structured discussion s under the Chairperson ship of the General Council. Like other Members that 
have intervened on this issue, namely India, Pak istan, Nepal, and Chad, Norway con siders that it is 
important that the Work Programme, including the moratorium, is extended beyond MC12. Norway 
sees many different issues that need to be discuss ed both in the CTG and in other relevant fora. 
Therefore, Norway support s an extension of the Work Programme  and moratorium.  
 
16 G/C/M/139, paragraphs  42.8-42.10.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  39.28.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
39.29.   Indonesia is aware of the current and future importance of E -Commerce in shaping global 
trade. Thus, our discussion on E -Commerce must have a certain degree of flexibility and  allow room 
for improvements in order to make today's discussion relevant to future progress. Indonesia is of 
the view that the Moratorium on the imposition of customs duties on electronic commerce should 
not be preserved permanently. This issue goes beyon d the revenue perspective; it also concerns 
other issues, such as trade statistics, creating a level playing field between digital and non -digital 
products, encouraging SMEs, providing certainty, assessing the risks posed by digital goods, and 
state sovere ignty. The current practice, through the WTO  Ministerial Decision not to impose customs 
duties on electronic transmissions, not including content transmitted electronically, is the best 
alternative for now in light of the aforementioned rationale. Therefor e, Members need to keep a 
certain degree of flexibility to facilitate future adjustments in ways that do not violate WTO  rules 
and principles or any further WTO  Ministerial Decisions in relation to the Work Programme on 
Electronic Commerce.  
39.30.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
40  OTHER BUSINESS  
40.1  Extension by the European Union and the United Kingdom of the Community Steel 
Safeguard  – Request from Brazil;  and United Kingdom – Safeguard Measures on Certain 
Steel Products  – Request from Switzerland  
40.1.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
40.2.  Switzerland requested that this item be placed on the Council's agenda because it has 
systemic and trade concerns regarding the United Kingdom's extension of its safeguard mea sures 
on certain steel products.  
40.3.  On 2 July 2021, the United Kingdom notified the Committee on Safeguards of its decision to 
extend its safeguard measures on certain steel products for three  years on ten  product categories 
and, in a new addition, for one  year on five  product categories. Concerning the latter extension, 
Switzerland is of the view that some requirements contained in the Agreement on Safeguards are 
not being met. In particular, as indicated in prior notifications made by the United Kingdom, for  four 
of the five  product categories, there was no absolute or relative increase in imports during the period 
of investigation. In these circumstances, Switzerland fails to see, in particular, how the United 
Kingdom could demonstrate that serious injury, o r threat thereof, is caused by "increased imports", 
and that the measure is applied only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury. 
In addition, the United Kingdom stated, in its notifications dated 21  May and 11  June 2021, that it 
would not extend its safeguard measures on these product categories. Switzerland also regrets that 
the extension of the United Kingdom's measures on these five  categories was notified to the 
WTO after it came into effect, making it impossible to hold consultatio ns on such an extension prior 
to its application.  
40.4.  Switzerland had already expressed certain systemic concerns about the United Kingdom's 
"transitioning" of the European Union's safeguard measures on certain steel products, as of 
1 January  2021, because suc h transitioning amounts to new safeguard measures that are subject to 
the material and procedural requirements of the Agreement on Safeguards. The present extension 
only adds to Switzerland's concerns. Therefore, Switzerland urges the United Kingdom immedi ately 
to remove the newly extended safeguard measures on the five  product categories concerned.  
40.5.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
40.6.  Under "Other Business", Brazil requests to address the extension by the European Union of 
the Community Steel Sa feguard and the extension, by the United Kingdom of this same measure 
(Documents G/SG/N/8/EU/1/Suppl.2 - G/SG/N/10/EU/1/Suppl.11 - G/SG/N/11/EU/1/Suppl.8 and 
G/SG/N/8/GBR/1/Suppl.2 - G/SG/N/10/GBR/2 -G/SG/N/11/GBR/2, respectively). Brazil would like to 
express its concern regarding both decisions and recalls that the respective revisions had already 
been raised by Brazil in the Committee on Safeguards.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  40.7.  Brazil reiterates its understanding that the measure violates multilateral regulations, which 
should lead t o its immediate extinction, rather than extension, both in the European Union and in 
the United Kingdom. In addition, Brazil expects the European Union and the United Kingdom to 
comply with the obligation, under Article  8.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, to offer compensation 
equivalent to the adverse effects of the measure. Brazil seeks to participate in the consultation 
processes opened by both Members in order to be able to address, in greater detail, the technical 
inaccuracies of the original and exten ded measures, as well as obtain adequate compensation. 
Finally, Brazil notes that it reserves its rights to use the resources provided for in the Agreement on 
Safeguards in order to rebalance the conditions of trade with the European Union and the United 
Kingdom affected by the imposition of the respective measures.  
40.8.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
40.9.  It is with regret that the Republic of Korea must express its disappointment over the European 
Union's decision to extend its safeg uard measures on certain steel products for another three  years, 
as of 1  July 2021. Given that, by their nature, safeguard measures are imposed on fair trade 
activities that are in accordance with the relevant WTO  rules, they should be introduced and 
exten ded only to the minimum extent necessary, taking into account the overall impact of those 
measures in the global context. In this sense, Korea believes that there is no reasonable evidence 
and compelling grounds for the European Union to extend its measure s. Accordingly, Korea would 
like to urge the EU to have the relevant measures terminated. At the same time, Korea encourages 
the EU to play an important role in upholding free trade and the multilateral trading system.  
40.10.   It is also regrettable that the United Kingdom has transitioned the European Union's steel 
safeguards, as of 1  January  2021, and that it has also decided to extend some of its measures for 
another three  years, as of 1  July 2021. Korea believes that the United Kingdom's imposition of stee l 
safeguard measures earlier in the current year, which was carried out without conducting any prior 
investigation, as set out in the GATT  1994 and the Safeguards Agreement, cannot be consistent with 
the WTO  rules. In addition, it is noted that the extensi on of these WTO -inconsistent measures also 
lacks legal grounds. Moreover, on 30  June 2021, the United Kingdom overturned its preliminary 
decision and decided to add five  more products to its extended measures for one  year. In fact, the 
United Kingdom had a cknowledged in its preliminary decision that it had not seen the imports of 
those products increasing or being likely to cause serious injury. Therefore, Korea urges the United 
Kingdom to promptly terminate its measures. In addition, Korea encourages the U nited Kingdom to 
play an important role in upholding free trade and the multilateral trading system.  
40.11.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
40.12.   First, in relation to the safeguard measures of the European Union on certain steel products, 
Turkey notes that it had already raised its concerns in the meetings of the Committee on Safeguards. 
Moreover, Turkey also conveyed its views regarding the expiry review process, and stated that the 
continuation of the measures was, in its view, not necessary. Neverthe less, the European Union has 
now notified, through its latest notification, its decision to extend these measures by three  years.  
40.13.   According to Article  8.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Members affected by safeguard 
measures shall be free to suspend the a pplication of substantially equivalent levels of concessions 
or other obligations. To this end, on 30  June 2021, Turkey revised its previous notifications on the 
proposed suspension of concessions and other obligations referred to in Article  8.2 of the Agr eement 
on Safeguards, taking into account the extension decision of the European Union, and notified this 
to the Committee on Safeguards through document  G/L/1359/Rev.2 –G/SG/N/12/TUR/9/Rev.2.  
40.14.   In meetings of the Committee on Safeguards, as well as in its wr itten and oral submissions 
to the European Commission, Turkey has already underlined that the measures in question are not 
in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards. Accordingly, Turkey has 
initiated dispute settlement proce edings, which are currently ongoing.  
40.15.   Turning to the United Kingdom's safeguard measures on certain steel products after Brexit, 
Turkey notes that it has been raising its concerns over their continuation in meetings of the 
Committee on Safeguards. Turkey is  of the view that the continuation of these measures is 
incompatible with the provisions of the GATT  1994, the Agreement on Safeguards, and the relevant 
WTO jurisprudence, since the United Kingdom did not individually examine whether the criteria were G/C/M/140  
 
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  being met to permit the imposition of a safeguard measure. Therefore, Turkey strongly believes that 
the United Kingdom's steel safeguard measures should have been terminated after 
31 December  2020. In contrast, on 2  July 2021, the United Kingdom notified the C ommittee on 
Safeguards of its decision to extend the measures, starting from 1  July 2021.  
40.16.   At this point, Turkey shares the concerns of Switzerland, namely that the United Kingdom's 
decision in this regard lacks certain of the legal prerequisites required u nder the Agreement on 
Safeguards. In its notifications dated 21  May and 11  June 2021, in relation to finding serious injury 
and threat, the United Kingdom proposed not to extend the measures for certain product categories 
considering that the development i n imports across the period of investigation did not meet the 
criteria of an absolute increase in imports. However, in the United Kingdom's latest notification, 
dated 2  July 2021, it has notified its decision to extend the measure for those categories by o ne year. 
Turkey is of the view that such an extension does not comply with Article  7.1 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, which requires Members to apply safeguard measures only for such period of time 
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury. In conclus ion, Turkey notes that it reserves all its 
rights stemming from Article  8 of the Agreement on Safeguards and other relevant 
WTO Agreements.  
40.17.   The delegate of the European Union  raised a point of order and indicated the following:  
40.18.   On a point of order, the Eur opean Union wishes to note that the Council is currently under 
agenda item, "Other Business". And if the European Union's understanding on this point is correct, 
the Rules of Procedure provide that discussions on substantive issues under "Other Business" s hould 
be avoided. The European Union would appreciate it if the Council could follow this rule.  
40.19.   The Secretariat  (Mrs Suja Rishikesh -Mavroidis) confirmed that, according to the Rule  25 of 
the Rules of Procedure, "representatives should avoid unduly long deb ates under 'Other Business'; 
discussions under 'Other Business' shall be avoided and the Council shall limit itself to taking note 
of the announcement by the sponsoring delegation as well as any reactions to such an announcement 
by other delegations direct ly concerned."  
40.20.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
40.21.   The Russian Federation thanks Brazil and Switzerland for raising the issue of the extension 
of safeguard measures on certain steel products by the European Union and the United Kingdom 
today. Like other WTO  Members, the Russian Federation is deeply concerned about the extension. 
As for the EU  measure, the Russian Federation has seen no grounds for its extension at the start of 
the review and also fails to see them at the end of t he review. Regulation No.  2021/10 -29 explains 
that the state of the EU  industry had deteriorated. At the same time, it can be seen from the 
Regulation that a decline in production and sales of the European Union coincide with a similar 
decline in consumpti on. This indicates that the deterioration, as stated by the European Union, if 
any, stems from developments on the EU  market other than increased imports. Remarkably, the 
deterioration appeared when the measure was in place, which can hardly be an illustra tion that the 
EU industry is adjusting. Certain developments in the EU  industry that are portrayed in the 
regulation as evidence of adjustment can hardly have relevance to an improvement in ability to 
compete with imports. The Decision of the United Kingdo m to expand the measure was also 
disappointing. Like other Members, the Russian Federation is concerned about the method used to 
determine which product categories should remain subject to the measure. The Russian Federation 
believes that no measures shoul d apply unless serious injury to the domestic industry  caused by 
increased imports, or threat thereof, is unconditionally established. The Russian Federation 
reiterates all of its previous concerns as expressed, in particular, in the Committee on Safeguard s. 
The Russian Federation reserves its rights under the Agreement on Safeguards and the GATT, and 
urges the European Union and the United Kingdom to withdraw the measure.  
40.22.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
40.23.   The United Kingdom takes note of all of the points that have been raised. As set out in its 
notification circulated to Members on 2  July, the United Kingdom invites those Members having a 
substantial interest in this issue, as exporters of products subject to the extended measure,  to 
request consultations through the UK  Mission.  G/C/M/140  
 
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  40.24.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
40.25.   The European Union received no prior notice that this item would be included on the agenda 
under "Other Business". In this regard, the European Un ion wishes to recall Rule  25 of the Rules of 
Procedure. That said, the European Union has taken due note of the intervention by Brazil under 
this item and their comments will be conveyed to Brussels.  
40.26.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
40.2  Date of Ne xt Meeting  
40.27.   The Chairperson  announced that the next CTG  meeting had been tentatively scheduled for 
1-2 November  2021. These dates would  be confirmed in due course.  
__________