RESTRICTED  
  
WT/DSB/M/429  
 
30 July 2019 
(19-4915) Page: 1/24 
Dispute Settlement Body  
28 May 2019    
 
MINUTES OF MEETING  
HELD IN THE CENTRE W ILLIAM RAPPARD  
ON 28 MAY 2019  
Chairman: H.E. Dr David Walker (New Zealand)  
Table of Contents  
1   SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RE COMMENDATIONS  ADOPTED  
BY THE  DSB ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  2 
A. United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel product s from Japan: Status 
report by the United  States  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 3 
B. United  States – Section  110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the United  States  .... 3 
C. European  Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech products: 
Status report by the European  Union  ................................ ................................ .....................  4 
D. United  States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on large residential washers from 
Korea: Status report by the United  States  ................................ ................................ ..............  6 
E. United  States – Certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping proceedings 
involving China: Status report by the United  States  ................................ ................................ . 6 
F. Indonesia – Measures concerning the importation of chicken meat and chicken products: Status 
report by Indonesia  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  7 
G. United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain oil country tubular goods from Korea: Status 
report by the United  States  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 7 
H. Indonesia – Importation of horticultural products, animals and animal products: Status report 
by Indonesia  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  8 
2   IMPLEMENTATION O F THE RECOMMENDATION S OF THE DSB  ................................ ..... 9 
A. Korea – Import bans, and testing and certification requirements for radionuclides  ...................  9 
B. China – Domestic support for agricultural producers  ................................ ........................... 12 
3   UNITED  STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AN D SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT  OF 2000: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TH E RECOMMENDATIONS ADOP TED BY THE  DSB ........................  13 
A. Statement by the European  Union  ................................ ................................ .................... 13 
4   EUROPEAN  COMMUNI TIES AND CERTAIN MEM BER STATES – MEASURE S AFFECTING 
TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL  AIRCRAFT: IMPLEMENT ATION OF THE RECOMME NDATIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE DSB  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 14 
A. Statement by the United  States  ................................ ................................ ....................... 14 
5   QATAR – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING GOODS FROM THE UNITE D ARAB 
EMIRATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  15 
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by the United Arab Emirates  ................................ ..15 WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 2 - 
 
  6   UNITED STATE S – ANTI -DUMPING AND  COUNTERVAILING DUTI ES ON RIPE OLIVES 
FROM SPAIN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  16 
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by the European Union ................................ .......... 16 
7   CHINA – TARIFF R ATE QUOTAS FOR CERTA IN AGRICULTURAL PROD UCTS  ...............  17 
A. Report of the Panel ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 17 
8   APPELLATE BODY A PPOINTME NTS: PROPOSAL BY ARG ENTINA; AUSTRALIA; B ENIN; 
THE PLURINATIONAL ST ATE OF BOLIVIA; BRAZ IL; CANADA; CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC; CHILE; CHI NA; COLOMBIA; COSTA  RICA; CUBA; DOMINICA N REPUBLIC; 
ECUADOR; EGYPT; EL  SALVADOR;  THE EUROPEAN  UNION; GUAT EMALA; HONDURAS; 
HONG  KONG, CHINA; IC ELAND; INDIA; INDONE SIA; ISRAEL; KAZAKHS TAN; KOREA; 
LIECHTENSTEIN; MEXIC O; MOROCCO; NEW  ZEAL AND; NICARAGUA; NORT H MACEDONIA; 
NORWAY; PAKISTAN; PA NAMA; PARAGUAY; PERU ; THE RUSSIAN  FEDERA TION; 
RWANDA; SINGAPORE; S WITZERLAND; THE  SEPARATE CUSTOMS TE RRITORY OF 
TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINM EN AND MATSU; TURKEY ; UKRAINE; URUGUAY; THE 
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA AND VIE T NAM  ................................ .................  18 
 
1  SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RE COMMENDATIONS ADOPTE D BY THE  DSB 
A. United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from Japan: Status 
report by the United  States (WT/DS184/15/Add.195)  
B. United  States – Section  110(5) of the U S Copyright Ac t: Status report by the United  States 
(WT/DS160/24/Add.170)  
C. European  Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech products: 
Status report by the European  Union (WT/DS291/37/Add.133)  
D. United  States – Anti-dumping and counterva iling measures on large residential washers from 
Korea: Status report by the United  States (WT/DS464/17/Add.17)  
E. United  States – Certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping proceedings 
involving China: Status report by the  United  State s (WT/DS471/17/Add.9)  
F. Indonesia – Measures concerning the importation of chicken meat and chicken products: Status 
report by Indonesia (WT/DS484/18/Add.8)  
G. United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain oil country tubular goods from Korea: Status 
report by the United  States (WT/DS488/12/Add.8)  
H. Indonesia – Importation of horticultural products, animals and animal products: Status report by 
Indonesia (WT/DS477/21/Add.4 – WT/DS478/22/Add.4)  
1.1.  The Chairman  noted that there were eight sub -items under this Agenda item concerning status 
reports submitted by delegations pursuant to Article  21.6 of the DSU. He recalled that  Article  21.6 
requires that: " [u]nless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the 
recommendat ions or rulings shall be placed on the Agenda of the DSB meeting after six  months 
following the date of establishment of the reasonable period of time and shall remain on the DSB's 
Agenda until the issue is resolved".  Under this Agenda item, he invite d delegations to provide 
up-to-date information about their compliance efforts. He also  remind ed delegations that, as 
provided for in Rule  27 of the Rules of Procedure for DSB meetings: " [r]epresentatives should make 
every effort to avoid the repetition of a fu ll debate at each meeting on any issue that has already 
been fully debated in the past and on which there appears to have been no change in Members' 
positions already on record".  He then turned to the first status report under this Agenda item . WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 3 - 
 
  A. United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from 
Japan: Status report by the United  States (WT/DS184/15/Add.195)  
1.2.  The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS184/15/Add.19 5, which contain ed the status 
report by the United  States on p rogress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US  anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from Japan . 
1.3.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States had provided a status report 
in this dispute on 16 May 2019, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. The United States had 
addressed the DSB's recommendations and rulings with respect to the calculation of anti -dumping 
margins in the hot-rolled steel anti -dumping duty investigation at issue. With respect to the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings that had yet to be addressed, the US Administration would work with 
the US Congress with respect to appropriate statutory measures t hat would resolve this matter.  
1.4.  The representative of  Japan  said that his country wished to thank  the United States for its most 
recent  status report and the statement made at the present meeting . Japan, once again , called on 
the United States to fully impl ement the DSB's recommendations and rulings  so as to resolve this 
matter . 
1.5.  The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
B. United  States – Section  110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the 
United  States (WT/DS160/24/Add.170)  
1.6.  The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS160/24/Add.1 70, which contain ed the status 
report by the United  States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning Section  110(5) of the US Copyright Act . 
1.7.  The representative of the United  States  said that the  United States had provided a status report 
in this dispute on 16 May 2019, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. The US Administration 
would  continue to confer with the European Union, and to work closely with the US Congress, in 
order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of thi s matter . 
1.8.  The representative of  the European Union  said that his delegation wished to  thank the 
United  States for its status report and its statement made at the present meeting . The EU  wished to 
refer to its statements  made at previous DSB meetings under this Agenda item . The EU said that it 
wished to resolve this case as soon as possible . 
1.9.  The representative of  China  said that his country  noted that the United States had submitted 
its 17 1st status report in this dispute. Once again, this most recent  report , as was the case for the 
status reports submitted by the U nited States ahead of  previous DSB meetings , was not different 
from the very first report  submitted in this dispute . Nearly  two decades after the DSB had adopted 
the Panel R eport in DS160,  this dispute remain ed unresolved. Section  110(5) of the US Copyright 
Act, which had been  found to be inconsistent with the requirements of the Berne Convention and  
the WTO TRIPS Agreement, was still in effect. Without further implementation , the United  States 
had continu ously fail ed to provide the minimum standard of protection as required by the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement  and ha d become the only WTO Member who fail ed to implement the DSB 's 
recommendations and rulings under the TRIPS Agreement. Article 21.1 of the DSU state d that: 
"[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure 
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members ". China,  therefore , urged the 
United  States to faithfully honour its commitments under the DSU and the TRIPS Agreement by 
implementing the DSB 's recommendations and rulings in this dispute without further delay . 
1.10.   The representative of  the United States  said that as the United States  had noted at prior D SB 
meetings, b y intervening under this Agenda item, China attempt ed to give the appearance of concern 
for intellectual property rights. Yet, China had been engaging in industrial policy which had resulted 
in the transfer and theft of intellectual property and technology to the detriment of the United  States 
and its workers and businesses . In contrast, the intellectual property protection that the 
United  States provide d within its own territory equalled or surpa ssed that of any other Member . 
Indeed, none of the damaging technology transfer practices of China that had been discussed at WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 4 - 
 
  recent DSB meetings were practices that Chinese companies or innovators face d in the 
United  States . 
1.11.   The representative of China  said that, o nce again, the United States had tried to derail the 
discussion to ward other irrelevant issues. Under this Agenda item, the relevant issue was whether 
the United States ha d fully implemented the DSB 's recommendations and rulings in this dispute . 
Obviously,  the answer was negative. In its statement under this Agenda item, the United  States 
appeared to suggest the supremacy of its protection of intellectual property rights . Aside from  the 
relevance of that assertion to th e issue at hand,  that assertion contra dicted the simply fact. It was 
clear that t he United States ha d deliberately delayed the compliance in this dispute for more than 
14 years. The United States  was the only WTO Member who fail ed to implement the DSB 's rulings 
and recommendations under the TR IPS Agreement. Regarding the vague US allegations  about 
China 's intellectual property protection  and so -called forced technology transfer, China  wished to  
refer to its statements made at  prior DSB meetings, including its statement made at  the 
28 May 2018 DSB meeting.  His country took its commitments under the TRIPS Agreement seriously  
and always stood ready to engage in good faith discussions concerning any specific  intellectual 
property  issues. China welcomed and always stood ready to engage in good faith discussions with 
other Members regarding any intellectual property issue . It was fair to say that the long overdue US 
implementation in this dispute was of great concern to the Member ship and to the multilateral 
trading system, since it severely unde rmine d the effectiveness and credibility of the dispute 
settlement mechanism. China,  therefore , urged the United States to faithfully honour its duty  to 
implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute . In addition, China  invite d the 
United States to include in its next status report the specific reasons as to why implementation of 
the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute  could not take place for so long in this dispute . 
1.12.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
C. European  Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech 
products: Status report by the European  Union (WT/DS291/37/Add.133)  
1.13.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS291/37/Add.13 3, which contain ed the 
status report by the European  Union on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech 
products . 
1.14.   The rep resentative of the European  Union  said that the EU continue d to progress with the 
authori sations where the European Food Safety Authority ha d finaliz ed its scientific opinion and had 
concluded that there were no safety concerns . In general, efforts to reduce delays at all stages of 
authori zation procedures were constantly maintained at a high level . This ha d already resulted in a 
clear improvement of the situation.  It should be noted that delays in risk assessment on some 
applicat ions were mainly due to the amounts of time th at applicants need ed to respond to justified 
scientific questions . The EU wished to  note that on 30 April 2019, three draft authori zations – one 
for new genetically -modified ( GM) maize1 and two for renewing the  authori zations of a GM soybean2 
and of a GM cotton3 – had been  presented for a vote in a member States Committee , with a "no 
opinion " result. These measures w ould now be submitted for a vote in the Appeal Committee on 
5 June 2019.  The EU continue d to be committed to acting in line with its WTO obligations. More 
generally, and a s the EU had stated many times at previous DSB meetings , the EU wished to recall  
that the EU approval system was not covered by the DSB's recommendations and rulings  in this 
dispute . 
1.15.   The representative of  the United States  thanked  the European  Union (EU) for its status report 
and its statement at the present meeting , and look ed forward to the upcoming discussions with the 
EU in June. The United States continue d to be concerned with the EU 's measures affecting the 
approval of biotech products. On -going and persistent delays affect ed dozens of applications that 
had been awaiting a pproval for months or years, or that ha d already received approval. As the 
United States had highlighted at prior DSB meetings , even when the EU finally approve d a biotech 
product, EU member States continue d to impose bans on the supposedly approved produc t. The 
                                                
1 Maize MZHG0JG . 
2 Renewal of soybean MON 89788 . 
3 Renewal of LLCotton25 . WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 5 - 
 
  amendment of EU Directive 2001/18, through EU Directive 2015/413, permit ted EU member States 
to, in effect, restrict or prohibit cultivation of genetically -modified organisms (GMOs), even where 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) ha d concluded  that the product was safe. This legislation 
permit ted EU member States to restrict for non -scientific reasons certain uses of EU -authori zed 
biotech products in their territories by demanding that EU cultivation authorizations be adjusted to 
exclude portio ns of an EU member State 's territory from cultivation. At least 17  EU member States, 
as well as certain regions within EU member States, ha d submitted such requests with respect to 
MON-810 maize. This fact c ould not be squared with the EU 's representation at previous DSB 
meetings that no member State ha d taken action to ban the cultivation of such a product. The EU 
had not shown how the withho lding of products for cultivation d id not amount to a ban on those 
products. Moreover, the EU ha d provided nothing to support its suggestion at the most recent DSB 
meeting that cultivation bans d id not affect the free movement of seeds within the EU. The U nited 
States  once again emphasize d the public statement issued by the EU 's Group of Chief Scientific 
Advisors on 13  November  2018, in response to the 25  July 2018, European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
ruling that addresse d the forms of mutagenesis that qualif ied for the exemption contained in EU 
Directive 2001/18/EC. The Directive had been  a central issue in dispute in these WTO proceedings, 
and concern ed the deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, or 
GMOs. Contrary to the EU 's statement at prior DSB meetings, this ECJ ruling relate d to previously 
authorized GMOs. The EU Group of Chief Scientific Advisors ' statement sp oke to the lack of scientific 
support for the regulatory framework under EU Directive  2001/18. The EU ha d repeatedly 
maintained at previous DSB meetings that these scientific advisors were just another group of 
stakeholders. The statement clearly d id not refl ect a mere reaction from a group of stakeholders. 
Rather, the statement reflect ed scientific advice provided to the E uropean  Commission in response 
to its request for such information. The Chief Scientific Advisors ' message provided in the statement 
was clear: "in view of the Court 's ruling, it becomes evident that new scientific knowledge and recent 
technical developments have made the GMO Directive no longer fit for purpose ". The statement 
further advise d that current scientific knowledge call ed into ques tion the definition of  "GMOs " under 
the Directive and note d that mutagenesis, as well as transgenesis, occur red naturally. The United 
States urge d the EU to act in a manner that w ould bring into compliance the measures at issue in 
this dispute. The United States further urge d the EU to ensure that all of its measures affecting the 
approval of biotech products, including measures adopted by individual EU member States, were 
based on sci entific principles, and that decisions were taken without undue delay.  
1.16.   The representative of  the European Union  said that his delegation wished to  remind Members 
that the opt -out Directive was not covered by the DSB 's recommendations and rulings  in this di spute . 
The WTO Agreements d id not require full international harmoni zation and le ft some regulatory space 
or autonomy to individual WTO Members. The European Union ha d different regulatory approaches 
to non -GMOs and GMOs, but, in all cases, such regulations d id not discriminate between imported 
and domestic like products. No EU country ha d imposed any "ban". Under the terms of the Directive, 
a member State c ould adopt m easures restricting or prohibiting cultivation only when such measures 
were in line with EU law and when such measures were reasoned, proportional, non -discriminatory 
and based on compelling grounds.  The EU  also note d that the provisions of the opt -out Dir ective d id 
not affect the free trade or movement of seeds in the EU.  With regards to  MON-810, there was no 
"ban". In accordance with the provisions of the Directive, the applicants ha d reduced the 
geographical scope of their cultivation applications for sp ecific EU countries. The applicants, which 
were the only directly affected party, ha d not raised any complaints in this respect . This confirm ed 
that they were not interested in commerciali zing their products in all EU member States.  In relation 
to the statement of the Group of Chief Scientific Advisors, the EU w ished  to recall that the Group of 
Chief Scientific Advisors was an independent group of scientific experts providing scientific advice to 
the European Commission.  First, the EU w ished  to reiterat e that this statement focuse d on future 
challenges for products obtained by new mutagenesis techniques and not on the "conventional 
GMOs ". The statement d id not state or imply that Directive  2001/18 was not fit for purpose as 
regards conventional GMOs. Second, there ha d been many reactions to the ECJ judgment, bringing 
forward a wide range of different views. The statement, to which the United States had referred, fed 
into on -going discussions on new mutagenesis techniques with all stakeholders. Some stakeh olders 
agree d with that statement. However, many others consider ed that the current legislation was 
adequate to address the risks from new biotechnology developments.  The European Commission 
had a strong interest in this debate, which should go beyond the regulatory status of new 
technologies and focus on the way new products could help address societal challenges, such as 
climate change or reducing the use  of pesticides, without negative consequences on health and 
environment protection.  WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 6 - 
 
  1.17.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
D. United  States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on large residential 
washers from Korea: Status report by the United  States (WT/DS464/17/Add.17)  
1.18.   The Chairman drew attention to document WT/DS464/17/Add.1 7, which contain ed the status 
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning anti -dumping and countervailing me asures on large residential washers from  Korea . 
1.19.   The representative of the United  States  said that t he United  States provided a status report 
in this dispute on 16 May 2019, in accordance with Article  21.6 of the DSU. On 6 May 2019, the US 
Department of Com merce had published a notice in the US Federal Register announcing the 
revocation of the anti -dumping and countervailing duty orders on imports of large residential 
washers from Korea (84 Fed. Reg. 19,763 (6  May 2019)). With this action, the United States ha d 
completed implementation of the DSB 's recommendations concerning those anti -dumping and 
countervailing duty orders.  The United States continue d to consult with interested parties on options 
to address the recommendations of the DSB relating to o ther measures challenged in this dispute.  
1.20.   The representative of  Korea  said that his country  wished to thank the United States for its 
status report. Korea welcome d the revocation of the orders which were part of the measures at issue 
in this dispute. Kore a was currently evaluating if the revocation, in its effect, w ould achieve full 
compliance with the DSB's rulings and recommendations in terms of the  "as applied " measures at 
issue. At the same time, Korea , again , urged the United  States to take prompt and appropriate steps 
to implement the DSB 's recommendations for the  "as such " measure at issue in this dispute.  
1.21.   The representative of  Canada  said that his country was concerned that the United  States ha d 
not implemented the DSB 's recommendations and rulings in this dispute. In particular, Canada was  
deeply disappointed that, despite the expiry of the reasonable period of time, the United  States 
continue d to collect cash deposits from Canadian exporters based on a methodology that had been  
found to be "as such " inconsistent with WTO obligations in this dispute . 
1.22.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting. 
E. United  States – Certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping 
proceedings involving China: Status report by the United  States (WT/DS471/17/Add.9)  
1.23.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS471/17/Add. 9, which contain ed the status 
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping proceedings involving 
China . 
1.24.   The representative of the United  States  said that t he United  States had provided a status 
report in this dispute  on 16 May 2019, in accordance with Article  21.6 of the DSU. As explained in 
that report, the United  States continue d to consult with interested parties on options to address the 
DSB's recommenda tions.  
1.25.   The representative of  China  said that the Appellate Body report pertaining to this dispute had 
been circulated  on 11 May 2017.  Subsequently, o n 22 May 2017, the DSB had adopted the Appellate 
Body report and the Panel report, as modified by the App ellate Body report. The Arbitration pursuant 
to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU had determined the reasonable period of time (RPT)  for implementation  
to be 15 months . The RPT had expired on 22 August 2018. On 9 September 2018, China had 
requested authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations and the matter 
had been referred to arbitration , in accordance  with Article 22.6 of  the DSU . Thus far, the 
United States had submitted ten status reports  with nearly  identical contents . None of the se status 
reports  indicate d any substantive progress  in implementation  by the U nited States to address the 
DSB's recommendations in this dispute other than "consulting with the interested parties ". Due to 
its persistent  non-compliance, nearly t wo years after the DSB had adopted the Appellate Body report 
and the Panel report in this dispute, and  nine months  after the expiry  of the RPT, this dispute  
remained  unresolved. Unfortunately, China was not the only victim of US disrespect of WTO dispute WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 7 - 
 
  settlement . Under Item 1 of the Agenda of the present meeting , five out of eight disputes under the 
DSB's surveillance relate d to US non-compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings . Such 
behavio ur seriously undermined the effectiveness and credibility of the WTO dispute settlement 
system, which r an against the interests of the entire  Membership . With regard to  the dispute  at 
hand, China was very disappointed and deeply concerned with the progress of the United States in 
implementing the recommendations and rulings  adopted by the DSB . The WTO -inconsistent 
measures taken by the U nited States had seriously infringed China 's legitimate economic and trade 
interests, distorted the relevant international market as well as seriously  damaged the rule s-based 
multilateral trading system . The non -compliance of the United States in dispute settlement cases 
also undermine d the credibility  of the United States  in urging other WTO Members to implement 
rulings in other cases. Once again, China urged the United  States to take concrete actions, fully 
respect the WTO rules, and faithfully implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this 
dispute . 
1.26.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
F. Indonesia – Measures concerning the importation of chicken meat and chicken 
products: Status report by Indonesia (WT/DS484/18/Add.8)  
1.27.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS484/18/Add. 8, which contain ed the status 
report by Indonesia on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the case 
on measures concerning the importation of chicken meat and chicken products . 
1.28.   The representative of Indonesia  said that h is country had submi tted its status  report in 
accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. Indonesia wishe d to refer to its status reports and 
statements made at previous DSB meetings. Indonesia w ould continue its work with relevant 
stakeholders as well as Brazil with respect to the measures that w ould resolve this dispute.  
1.29.   The representative of  Brazil  said that his country  wished to thank  Indonesia for its status 
report . Brazil's concerns about Indon esia's implementation of the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in th is dispute remain ed the same, as there ha d not been any change identified in Indonesia's 
status report in th is dispute. These concerns relate d to the "positive list requirement" which was still 
in force . Indonesia  had chose n to maintain the list and include some of the HS codes of chicken meat 
and chicken products that had been  the subject of Brazil 's complaint. One HS code, however, still 
had y et to be included in Indonesia 's positive list . Brazil note d that Indonesia had eliminated the 
requirement of distribution reports with information regarding use or place of sale of imported 
chicken meat and chicken products . The requirement of distributio n plans nonetheless still exist ed 
by force of Article 22(1)(l) of Ministry of Agriculture  Regulation 34/2016 . Regarding  the possibility 
of making amendments to the terms of import licenses, to Brazil's  knowledge, the amendments still 
subject ed importers to  several sanctions in case some requirements were not strictly observed . 
Finally, Brazil highlight ed the unsatisfactory status of the analysis of Brazil's veterinary health 
certificate for the importation of chicken meat and chicken products . Brazil believ ed that  undue delay 
continue d with Indonesia 's approval of the certificate . Brazil recall ed that the reasonable period of 
time for Indonesia to comply with the DSB 's recommendations and rulings in this dispute ha d expired 
on 22 July 2018 : full implementation remain ed to be seen. Brazil  thus urge d Indonesia to fully 
comply with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in th is dispute . 
1.30.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
G. United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain oil country tubular goods from 
Korea: Status report by the United  States (WT/DS488/12/Add.8)  
1.31.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS488/12/Add. 8, which contain ed the status 
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning anti -dumping measures on certain oil country tubular goods from Korea . 
1.32.   The representative of the United  States  said that t he United States had provided a status 
report in this dispute on 16  May 2019, in accordance with Article  21.6 of the DSU. On 
23 November  2018, the US Department of Commerce had provided notice in the US Federal Register WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 8 - 
 
  that it ha d commenced a pr oceeding to gather information, analy se record evidence, and consider 
the determinations which would be necessary to bring the anti -dumping investigation at issue in this 
dispute into conformity with the DSB's recommendations and rulings . The notice was available at 
83 F.R. 59359. The United States w ould continue to consult with interested parties on options to 
address the DSB's recommendations .  
1.33.   The representative of  the Republic of Korea  said that his country wished to  thank the United 
States for its status reports and its statement  made  at the present meeting . Korea expect ed that 
the United  States would faithfully  complete the implementation of the DSB 's recommendations 
within the extended reasonable period of time which would expire on 12  July 2019.  
1.34.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
H. Indonesia – Importation of horticultural products, animals and animal products: Status 
report by Indonesia (WT/DS477/21/Add.4 – WT/DS478/22/Add.4)  
1.35.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS477/21/Add. 4 – WT/DS478/22/Add. 4, 
which contain ed the status report by Indonesia on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning impo rtation of horticultural products, animals and animal 
products . 
1.36.   The representative of Indonesia  said that his delegation had submit ted its status  report in 
accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. In order to comply with the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings, Indonesia was continuing its efforts to improve its importation system as well as to adjust 
the relevant laws and regulations. These efforts include d intensive discussions and meetings with 
relevant stakeholders aimed at gather ing inputs that contribute d to achieving  full compliance in 
these dispute s. Indonesia wished to thank New Zealand and the United  States for their bilateral 
engagement . Indonesia w ould continue its effort and engagement to wards  resolv ing these dispute s. 
1.37.   The representative of  New Zealand  said that his country  wished to thank Indonesia for its 
status report . New Zealand acknowledge d the steps that had been taken by Indonesia to bring its 
regulations into compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute.  His country 
also welcome d Indonesia 's commitment to comply fully with the se recommendations and rulings . 
New Zealand did not consi der, however, that full compliance ha d been reached in respect of a 
number of measures addressed in th is dispute . Of particular concern was the continued enforcement 
by Indonesia of limited application windows and validity periods, harvest period import ba ns, import 
realization requirements, and restrictions placed on import volumes based on storage capacity . 
These were issues that continue d to adversely affect New  Zealand exporters . New Zealand welcome d 
Indonesia's commitment to engage intensively with New  Zealand and the United States, which 
New Zealand  intend ed to continue . New Zealand remain ed very interested in progress on the further 
legislative change that was due to come into effect by June 2019  given  that, as Indonesia had noted 
in its status report, the agreed date for this measure, which was Measure  18, to be brought into 
compliance with the DSB 's recommendations and rulings was 22 June 2019. New Zealand w ould 
continue to work with Indonesia to achieve long -term, commercially m eaningful compliance with the 
DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute . 
1.38.   The representative of  the United States  said that Indonesia continue d to fail to bring its 
measures into compliance  with WTO rules. The United  States and New  Zealand agree d that 
significant concerns remain ed with the measures at issue, including the continued imposition of : 
harvest period restrictions , import realization requirements, warehouse capacity requirements, 
limited application windows, limited validity periods, and fixed licensed terms . The United  States 
was still waiting to hear from Indonesia the concrete actions it w ould take to bring its m easures into 
full compliance, including regarding the statutory changes Indonesia intend ed to make with respect 
to Measure  18. The United States remain ed willing to work with Indonesia to fully and meaningfully 
resolve this dispute but , was very concerned with Indonesia 's continued failure to come into full 
compliance with the DSB's recommendations.   
1.39.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 9 - 
 
  2  IMPLEMENTATION OF TH E RECOMMENDATIONS OF  THE DSB  
A. Korea – Import bans, and testing and certification requirements for radionuclides  
B. China – Domestic support for agricultural producers  
2.1.  The Chairman  recall ed that in accordance with the DSU, the DSB was required to keep under 
surveillance the implementation of  the DSB's recommendations and rulings in order to ensure 
effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members.  In this respect, Article  21.3 of the DSU 
provide d that the Member concerned shall inform the DSB, within 30 days afte r the date of adoption 
of the panel or Appellate Body report, of its intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB 's 
recommendations and rulings.  He then  propose d that the two sub -items be considered separately.  
A. Korea – Import bans, and testing an d certification requirements for radionuclides  
2.2.  The Chairman  recall ed that at its meeting on 26 April 2019, the DSB had adopted the Appellate  
Body Report and the Panel Report, as modified by the Appellate Body Report pertaining to the 
dispute:  "Korea – Import Bans, and Testing and Certification Requirements for Radionuclides " 
(DS495) . As Members were aware, the 30 -day time -period in this dispute had expired on 
26 May 2019. On 14  May 2019, Korea had informed the DSB in writing of its intentions with respe ct 
to implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings.  The relevant communication was 
contained in document WT/DS495/14. He then  invite d the representative of Korea to make a 
statement.  
2.3.  The representative of  Korea  said that o n 26 April 2019, the DS B had adopted the Panel and 
Appellate Body reports in  "Korea – Radionuclides " (Japan)  (DS495). Since th e present  meeting was 
being held, as the Chairman had mentioned, slightly  beyond the  30-day time -period from the date 
of adoption of the Panel and Appellate Body reports, Korea, in its written communication of 
14 May 2019 contained in document WT/DS495/14, had notified its intention to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute in a mann er consistent with its WTO obligations 
pursuant to Article  21.3 of the DSU. He said that Japan had agreed with this approach. At the present  
meeting, Korea wishe d to reiterate its intention to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in this dispute  in a manner consistent with its WTO obligations. Korea estimate d that it would 
need one week to complete implementation by re -publishing  the relevant measures. Korea would  
promptly notify the DSB and Japan in due course after completion of its implementat ion. 
2.4.  The representative of  Japan  said that his country took note of Korea 's communication contained 
in WT/DS495/ 14 and its statement made at the present meeting . At this point, Japan  wished to  
make two specific points. First, at the 26 April 2019 DSB meeting, Korea had claimed that the 
Appellate Body, by reversing the Panel 's legal findings, had also reversed the Panel 's underlying 
factual findings on the safety of Japanese food products. Japan  saw no basis for Korea 's claim . As 
Article  17.6 of the DSU stipulate d, the Appellate Body 's mandate was limited to  "issues of law 
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel". The only instance  in 
which the Appellate Body could review panels ' factual findings was when a party challenge d such 
findings under Article  11 of the DSU. Given that Korea had not invoked  Article  11 of the DSU  on its 
appeal regarding the Panel 's factual findings , except for a claim on limited technical ground s, the 
Appellate Body was simply not in a position to reverse those factual findings. Thus, as a matter of 
law, the Appellate Body 's reversal of the Panel 's legal findings d id not have any implications for the 
Panel 's fact ual findings, and the Panel 's alleged errors in applying the law ha d no bearing on the 
underlying factual findings. In fact, the Panel 's factual findings on the safety of Japanese food 
products had been  adopted by the DSB, without modification. Given this,  Japan urge d all WTO 
Members, which still maintain ed restrictive measures on Japanese food products, to remove such 
measures immediately. Second , Japan believed that this case provided  another example  of Appellate 
Body "overreach ". As Japan would explain later in detail, t he Panel had thoroughly and carefully 
analy sed the issues based on the facts, evidence and parties ' arguments , as well as the authoritative 
views of scientific experts. The Appellate Body  "interfere d lightly with " the Panel's find ings and 
criticize d the Panel simply because it ha d not analy sed or determined the issues exactly the way the 
Appellate Body had wanted the Panel to analy se or determine  these issues . WTO disputes were often 
complex and extremely technical and scientific, as in this  case which involve d the SPS Agreement. 
The Appellate Body 's reversal of the Panel's findings  on technical ground s would serve no purpose 
other than to show the Appellate Body 's misconceived institutional power. In a way, the Appellate WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 10 - 
 
  Body had put itself in the shoes of the Panel and had substituted its preferred approach to the Panel 's 
approach. The consequence was that the Appellate Body had left the dispute unresolved withou t 
ruling on the WTO -consistency of the challenged measures , thus, failing  to fulfil its function to secure 
a positive solution to a dispute. For this reason,  Japan s aw this case as another example of  
"overreach " by the Appellate Body. This should be correc ted.  
2.5.  Japan  said that , in its communication to the DSB  dated  14 May 2019  and contained in document 
WT/DS495/14 , Korea had stated that it "will need a reasonable period of time " and that it "stands 
ready to discuss this matter with Japan in due course ". The relevant DSB 's recommendations in this 
dispute concern ed Korea 's transparency obligations under Annex  B(1) and Article  7 of the SPS 
Agreement. As the Appellate Body had explained, under Article  21.3 of the DSU,  "the reasonable 
period of time is a limit ed exemption only available when it is  'impracticable ' to comply  
"immediately ".4 Korea 's notification of 14  May 2019 highlight ed how n on-transparent Korea ha d 
been throughout the dispute settlement proceedings and continue d to be so to date. To further 
illustrate this, Japan  recalled its  claim under Article  5.6 of the SPS Agreement and the discussion on 
an Appropriate Level of Protection ( ALOP). Before the Panel 's proceedings had been  initiated, Korea 
had represented to Japan that its ALOP consisted of a quantitative element, namely, an exposure 
limit of 1 mSv/year .5 Korea had then added two qualitative elements, i.e. , the so-called "As Low as 
Reasonably Ach ievable " (ALARA) principle and the level in the  "ordinary environment ", during the 
Panel proceedings without supporting evidence. Indeed, during the Panel's proce edings , Korea had 
been unable to explain how the notions of ALARA and  "the level in the ordinary environment " could 
serve as its ALOP or to provide to the Panel the basis of its assertion under its own domestic law. 
This had all been  well noted by the Panel .6 Despite Korea 's lack of transparency and inability to 
provide explan ations , the Panel had accepted that  "Korea has determined its ALOP for itself and that 
for Korea these concepts are important and inform how it formulates its SPS measures ".7 The Panel 
had done  so "in light  of the prerogative for Members to determine their own ALOP ".8 However, the 
Panel had not accept ed Korea 's description of its ALOP without qualification. With the support of its 
own scientific experts, the Panel had thoroughly examined these unexplained notions, how they 
could or could not meaningfully serve as the ALOP, and the relationship and interactions between  
the one quantitative element and the other two qualitative elements asserted by Korea .9 Following 
these analys es, the Panel had found  that: "[a]lthough the SPS Agreement does not oblige Members 
to put forth a quantitative ALOP, their ALOPs must als o not be so vague and equivocal as to evade 
their obligations ".10 The Panel had concluded  that: "if a Member is applying a particular measure 
with an express quantitative limit for contaminations, that is an indicator that products containing 
levels of cont aminants below that limit w ill satisfy its ALOP. Japan  noted  that not only for the 
challenged measures, but for food products in general, Korea has established maximum levels for 
radionuclides with a maximum upper limit of 1  mSV/year for total consumption of man -made 
radionuclides from all sources ".11  
2.6.  The Appellate  Body itself had recognized that the Panel 's analyses indicated that ALARA and 
exposure in the ordinary environment would not  "serve as a meaningful ALOP or as parts thereof ".12 
However, the Appellate Body had faulted the Panel because it had not explicitly13 examine d or 
explain ed the issue exactly the way in which the Appellate Body had wanted the Panel to follow. This 
did not constitute the proper standard to review panels ' legal analyses and conclusions, let alone a 
proper ground for the reversal of otherwise sound panel legal findings and conclusions. A panel 's 
duty was to "make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective 
assessment of the facts  of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered 
agreements ", and  to "make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the rulings ".14 In performing this duty, a panel was obliged to pr ovide  
"the basic rationale " for its findings.15 The Appellate Body 's role was, in turn, to  "uphold, modify or 
                                                
4 Appellate Body Report, "US – Zeroing " (Japan) , para.157.  
5 Panel Report, "Korea – Radionuclides", para. 7.161.  
6 Panel Report, "Korea – Radionuclides", footnote 716 to para.7.171.  
7 Panel Report, "Korea – Radionuclides", para.7.171.  
8 Panel Report, "Korea – Radionuclides", footnote 716 to para.7.717.  
9 Panel Report, "Korea – Radionuclides", paras.7.165 – 7.171.  
10 Panel Report, "Korea – Radionuclides", para.7.171.  
11 Panel Report, "Korea – Radionuclides ", para.7.172.  
12 Appellate Body Rep ort, "Korea – Radionuclides", para.5.35.  
13 Appellate Body Report, "Korea – Radionuclides ", para.5.35.  
14 Article  11 of the DSU.  
15 Article  12.7 of the DSU.  WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 11 - 
 
  reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel " pursuant to Article  17.13 of the DSU. Indeed, 
nothing in the DSU require d that a panel exa mine or analyse the matter and explain its reasoning 
exactly in the way the Appellate Body prefer red or want ed panels to follow. Furthermore, pursuant 
to Article s 3.3, 3.4 and  3.7 of the DSU, securing the  "prompt ", "satisfactory " and "positive " resolution 
of a trade dispute brought under the DSU was the objective of, and the function  that WTO Members 
had entrusted to, the WTO dispute settlement system, including the Appellate Body. The Appellate 
Body's role to  "uphold, modify  or reverse " legal f indings and conclusions of a panel under 
Article  17.13 of the DSU was informed by this very objective and had to  be exercised such that the 
dispute settlement system fulfil led this function. The DSB had established the Appellate Body not to 
condemn a panel  by reversing its findings on technical or non -substantive grounds , but to verify or 
correct legal findings and conclusions of a panel so as to secure a  "prompt ",16 "satisfactory ",17 and 
"positive "18 solution to a dispute. As Japan had explained to the Appellate Body during the appellate 
proceedings in this dispute, there were perfectly plausible ways to uphold or modify, if necessary, 
the Panel 's findings and conclusions on ALOP. Thus, the Appellate Body could have concluded, with 
certain modification s if necessary, that: (i) the Panel had actually examined the significance of the 
two qualitative elements asserted by Korea as part of its ALOP; (ii)  it had actually analysed their 
interactions with the quantitative element; and (iii) it had actually determined that, based on the 
Panel 's analysis, these two qualitative elements were too vague and equivocal to serve as a 
meaningful ALOP. However, rather than appreciating the Panel 's thorough and careful an alyses and 
findings based on the facts, evidence and parties ' arguments in pursuing the resolution of th is 
dispute , and made with the support of its own scientific experts, the Appellate Body  "interfere d 
lightly with " the Panel 's findings and disturb ed them simply because the Appellate Body might have 
wanted to analyse the issues or explain its reasoning differently. Japan  believe d this was wrong. The 
right approach  would have been  to give proper deference to sound judgements of a panel especially 
in disput es such as  this one, which were heavily  "involving scientific or technical issues "19 in which 
the Appellate Body ha d no expertise. In the end, the Appellate Body had condemned the Panel for 
showing respect to the prerogative of Korea in determin ing its ALOP and had reversed the Panel 's 
otherwise sound findings on non -reversible grounds. In doing  so, the Appellate Body had effectively 
praised Korea 's lack of transparenc y and failure to engage in dispute settlement proceedings  in good 
faith by withholding information from the Panel and keeping its ALOP as ambiguous as possible 
without any substantiation. As a result, the Appellate Body had denied Japan findings which it 
deserve d under the dispute settlement system and had instead penalized Japan for no reason. Japan 
wished  to ask each and every WTO Member whether this was the outcome that the system was 
designed for when WTO Member had established it back in 1995.  
2.7.  The rep resentative of  Korea  said that his delegation did not wish to make a second statement 
on this Agenda item but because Japan had made such a long statement, his country  had no choice 
but to respond to it.  Korea  wished  to express its concerns about Japan 's statements on the Report 
of the Appellate Body in  "Korea  – Radionuclides " (Japan)  (DS495) . As Members were aware , this 
Agenda item  related to Korea 's implementation in this dispute, not to the Appellate Body R eport 
itself. Korea recall ed that Japan had fully expressed its views on the Appellate Body Report at the 
26 April 2019  DSB meeting whe n that Report had been  adopted. Yet, Japan had decided to take 
issue with th e same Appellate Body Report again at the present  meeting. Japan 's continued protest s 
certainly harm ed Members and the system as a whole. Korea w ished  to make a few remarks 
regarding Japan 's repeated  statements made under this Agenda item . First, c ontrary to Japan 's 
continued assertion that the Ap pellate Body in this case had unduly failed to complete its analysis, 
the Appellate Body had made the proper  findings within its mandate under Article  17.6 of the DSU. 
Furthermore, i n its appeal in DS495, Japan had limited itself to arguing that the Panel 's approach 
had been  correct and that the Appellate Body should uph old the Panel 's findings. There had been  no 
request by Japan for the Appellate Body to conduct further work in the event that the Appellate Body 
would disagree with the Panel 's approac h. While Korea believe d that the ultimate outcome would 
have been the same, Japan had simply opted not to exercise that right. As the famous maxim 
provide d: "the law d id not help those who slep t on their rights ". It was regrettable  that Japan would  
seek to blame the Appellate Body  for its own decision. Second, Japan argue d that the Appellate Body 
Report had failed to resolve the dispute by failing to determine whether or not Korea 's measures 
were WTO-consistent. Japan 's position r an counter to both well -established WTO jurisprudence and 
a long-standing international principle. According to th is general  principle of the public international 
                                                
16 Article  3.3 of the DSU.  
17 Article  3.4 of the DSU.  
18 Article  3.7 of the DSU.  
19 Article  11.2 of the SP S Agreement.  WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 12 - 
 
  law, a State 's measure was presumed to be consistent with international law unless otherwise 
established. This fundamental principle also echoe d practical concerns. Indeed, Members d id not, 
and in fact c ould not, adopt  measures only after the se measures ' conformit y with WTO obligations 
was confirmed by the DSB. Thus, the presumption of compliance had to be attach ed to all Members ' 
measures unless and until established otherwise. In this particular dispute, the burden of 
establishing that Korea 's measures were inconsistent with the SPS Agreement rested on Japan as 
the complaining party, and Japan had failed to meet its burden of proof. Lastly and more importantly, 
Japan 's continued attempts at undermining the dignity and integrity of a specific Appellate Body 
report adopted by the DSB inevitably undermine d an important and long-espoused order under the  
auspice s of the WTO. Such an international order, although intangible, was an indispensable element 
of the harmonious co -existence of States. Japan 's unilateral assertion , aimed only at furthering its 
own specific interests to the detriment of the international order , did nothing but harm the collective 
interests of the international community. Members were free to disagree with rulings of panels or 
the Appellate Body. Members were also entitled to express their disagreement, and Japan in this 
case had already fully expressed its disagreement repeated ly and in many for ums. However, the 
continued expression of such disagreement, particularly when it was improperly linked to on -going 
discussion s about systemic reform, must not be tolerated by Members b ecause the likely skewed 
outcome of such an attempt c ould never be helpful to the future  of the system. For other specific 
issues, Korea wished to  refer to its statements  made at the 26 April 2019 DSB meeting.  
2.8.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States had listened closely to the 
interventions  made by the parties, including at the 26 April 2019 DSB meeting. These interventions  
had raised systemic issues on which the United States  had liked to  offer a few remarks. First, the 
DSU established that a responding party shall state its intentions in relation to the DSB's 
recommendations. There was one recommendation set out in the DSU, that in Article 19.1. Under 
this provision, the recommendation adopted by the DSB was to bring a me asure found 
WTO-inconsistent into conformity with the relevant covered agreement. Where the Appellate Body 
reversed a panel's legal conclusion that a measure was WTO -inconsistent, the consequence would 
be no DSB recommendation. That was a serious consequen ce. Reversal of a finding of inconsistency 
should occur when the legal conclusion, or interpretation on which the conclusion was based, was 
clearly erroneous. Second, Japan had raised concerns in relation to the reversal of the panel's 
findings under Artic le 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, and the United States shared those concerns. The 
appellate report stated that the panel's findings in relation to quantitative evaluation of the safety 
of Japanese imports would not "necessarily" achieve the qualitative levels of protection asserted, 
that the panel did not "explicitly integrate" its evaluation of the verbal formulations of the level of 
protection, and the panel ultimately had "failed to account clearly for all elements" of the level of 
protection. What appeared missing in this assessment was any conclusion that Japan had not made 
out the elements of its claim, or a conclusion that the quantitative evaluation of the safety of 
Japanese imports could not satisfy the qualitative levels asserted. There was no statemen t that the 
panel's legal conclusion had been, in simple terms, wrong. Third, the reversal here was also 
concerning because the panel had made factual findings relating to the safety of those products after 
having consulted with scientific experts. Under th e DSU, it was panels that were charged with making 
factual findings, including in relation to the content and effect of domestic measures. Under Article 
17.6 of the DSU, an appeal could not review facts, but was limited to issues of law and legal 
interpret ation. The appellate report here had not expressly overturned the panel's findings on the 
safety of Japanese imports. Nevertheless, it had overturned the panel's findings that the safety of 
those imports achieved another Member's level of protection, but w ithout having demonstrated how 
the panel's findings could not satisfy that level of protection. The appellate review performed in this 
dispute appeared concerned less with substance and legal error, and more with form and wording. 
The United States, theref ore, shared Japan's view that this appellate report raised concerns of 
Appellate Body overreaching, and invited Members' reflection on this important systemic issue.  
2.9.  The DSB took note of the statements and of the information provided by Korea regarding its  
intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB 's recommendations.   
B. China – Domestic support for agricultural producers  
2.10.   The Chairman  recall ed that at its meeting on 26 April 2019, the DSB had adopted the Panel 
Report in the dispute on  "China – Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers " (DS511) . As Members 
were aware,  the 30 -day time -period in this dispute had expired on 26  May 2019. On 16  May 2019, 
China had informed the DSB in writing of its intentions with respect to implementation of the of WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 13 - 
 
  the DSB's recommendations and rulings . The relevant communication was contained in document 
WT/DS511/13. He then  invite d the representative of China to make a statement.  
2.11.   The representative of China  said that a t its meeting on 26 April, the DSB had adopted  the 
recommendations  and rulings  in the dispute "China  – Domestic Support for Agricultural 
Producers " (DS511). On 16  May 2019,  pursuant to Article 21.3 of the DSU,  his country  had 
informed  the DSB of its intention  to implement  the DSB's recommendations  and rulings  in this 
dispute  through a  written communication contained in document WT/DS511/13 . At the present 
meeting, China wished to reiterate its intention to implement the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in  this dispute  in a manner  consistent with  its WTO obligations.  China  said that it would 
need a reasonable period of time to implement  the DSB's recommendations and rulings . His 
delegation st ood ready to  discuss this matter with the United  States in due course, in accordance 
with Article  21.3(b) of the  DSU.  
2.12.   The representative of  the United States  said that t he United States tha nked China for its 
communication of 16  May 2019, and its statement made at the present meeting , indicating that it 
intend ed to implement the DSB 's recommendations and rulings in this dispute, and that it w ould 
need a reasonable period of time  for implementation. China 's WTO -inconsistent domestic support 
measures were a source of significant concern to the United States and other WTO Members. The 
United States therefore look ed forward to China moving promptly to bring its measures into 
complian ce with its obligations. The United States  stood ready to agree with China, under 
Article  21.3(b) of the DSU, on the reasonable period of time to implement the DSB 's 
recommendations.  
2.13.   The DSB took note of the statements and of the information provided by Ch ina regarding its 
intentions in respect of implementation of the DSB 's recommendations.  
3  UNITED  STATES – CONT INUED DUMPING AND SU BSIDY OFFSET ACT OF  2000: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF TH E RECOMMENDATIONS AD OPTED BY THE  DSB 
A. Statement by the European  Union  
3.1.  The Chairman said that this  item was on the Agenda of the present  meeting at the reque st of 
the European  Union. He then invite d the representative of the European  Union to speak . 
3.2.  The representative of the European  Union  said that t he EU request ed, once again , that the 
United States stop transferring anti -dumping and countervailing duties to the US industry . Every 
disbursement that still t ook place was clearly an act of non -compliance with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings  in this dispute . The EU renew ed its call  on the United States to abide 
by its clear obligation under Article 21.6 of the DSU to submit status  reports in this dispute . The EU 
would continue to p lace this item on the Agenda  as long as the U nited States had not implemented 
the DSB 's recommendations and rulings  in this dispute . 
3.3.  The representative of  Brazil  said that as an original party to this dispute, his country  wished to 
thank the EU , once again , for placing this item on the DSB Agenda . Beyond the discussion about 
whether  or not t he Member concerned had an  obligation to continue submitting status reports  in this 
dispute , the reason that Members had  to return to this Agenda item at  every DSB meeting was that 
millions of dollars in anti-dumping and countervailing duties were still be ing illegally  disbursed to US 
domestic petitioners . After more than 16 years since the adoption of the DSB's recommendations  
and rulings in this dispute , and more than 13 years after the date on which  the Deficit Reduction Act 
that had repealed the Amendment, Brazil call ed on the United States to comply fully with the DSB 's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute . 
3.4.  The representative of  Canada  said that his country wished to thank the European Union  for 
placing this item on the Agenda of the present meeting.  Canada shared the EU's view that this 
dispute shall remain under surveillance of the DSB until the United States ceased to apply the 
measures at issue in this dispute . 
3.5.  The representative of  the United States  said that a s the United States ha d noted at previous 
DSB meetings, the Deficit Reduction Act  – which include d a provision repealing the  "Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 " – had been  enacted into law in February  2006. Accordingly, WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 14 - 
 
  the United  States ha d taken all actions necessary to implement the DSB 's recommendations and 
rulings in these disputes. The United States  recall ed, furthermore, that the EU ha d acknowledged 
that the Deficit Reduction Act d id not permit the distribution of duties collected on goods entered 
after 1  October  2007, more than eleven years ago. This month, the EU had notified the DSB that 
the current level of countermeasures under the Arbitrator 's formula in relatio n to goods entered 
before 2007 was US$3,355.82. Accordingly, effective 1 May 2019, the EU had announced  it would 
be applying an additional duty of 0.001% on certain imports of the United  States. The United  States  
thought  these numbers sp oke volumes about t he utility and wisdom behind this Agenda item. With 
respect to the EU 's request for status reports in this matter, as the United States  had already 
explained at previous DSB meetings, there was no obligation under the DSU to provide further status 
reports once a Member announce d that it ha d implemented the DSB 's recommendations, regardless 
of whether the complaining party disagree d about compliance. The practice of Members confirm ed 
this widespread understanding of Article  21.6 of the DSU . Respondin g party Members d id not 
continue submitting status reports where the responding Member ha d claimed compliance and the 
complaining Member disagree d, as Members  would  see under the next Agenda item concerning the  
"EC – Large Civil Aircraft" dispute  (DS316) . Accordingly, since the United States ha d informed the 
DSB that it ha d taken all steps necessary for compliance, there was nothing more for the 
United  States to provide in a status report.  
3.6.  The representative of  the European Union  said that t he United States  had referred to the value 
of the  countermeasures that ha d been applied by the EU as of May 2019 . There were two points that 
his delegation wished  to make. First, the value of this countermeasure show ed how precise  the EU 
was in making sure that it d id not apply more than the actual trade distortion that was created by 
the US measure.  Second, t he EU recall ed that the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act  had 
been found in breach of WTO rules for transferring anti -dumping and countervailing duties to the US 
industry. As long as the redistribution of collected duties continue d, the United States w ould be in 
breach of Articles  18.1 of the A nti-Dumping  Agreement and  32.1 of the SCM Agreement and full 
implementation w ould still have to be delivered. Once t he transfers of anti -dumping and 
countervailing duties cease d, so w ould the EU measures . 
3.7.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States  noted the EU 's recent 
announcement that it w ould maintain its suspension of concessions on US goods at a very low level. 
This was regrettable, especially given their close collaboration generally. The United States continue d 
to review the action by the EU and would not accept any characterization of such  continued 
countermeasures – no matter how small – as consistent with the DSB 's authorization.  
3.8.  The DSB took note of the statements.  
4  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  AND CERTAIN MEMBER STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING 
TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL  AIRCRAFT: IMPLEMENT ATION OF THE RE COMMENDATIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE DSB  
A. Statement by the United  States  
4.1.  The Chairman said that this  item was on the Agenda of the present  meeting at the req uest of 
the United  States. He then  invite d the representative of the United States to speak . 
4.2.  The representative of the United  States  said that t he United States note d that, once again , the 
European Union (EU) had not provided Members with a status report concerning the "EC – Large 
Civil Aircraft" dispute (DS316) . The United States ha d raised this same issue at recent past DSB 
meetings, where the EU had similarly chose n not to provide a status report. As the United  States  
had noted at several recent DSB meetings, the EU ha d argued that Article  21.6 of the DSU require d 
that "the issue of implementation shall remain on the DSB 's agenda until the issue is resolved ". And 
the EU ha d argued that where the EU as a complaining party d id not agree with another responding 
party Member 's "assertion that it has implemented the DSB ruling ", "the issue remains unresolved 
for the purposes of Article  21.6 DSU ". The EU d id not contest that the issue remain ed unresolved 
for purposes of Article  21.6 of the DSU. The EU 's only attempt to reconcile its stated position with 
its lack of a status report in this dispute was to argue that there was some exception to providing a 
status report if there were on-going proceedings. The only problem with this EU effort was that there 
was no such exception anywhere in the DSU. It was simply an invention by the EU to try to justify 
its acting in this dispute in a manner that was inconsistent with the legal position it ha d taken for WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 15 - 
 
  other disputes. Under the EU 's own  view, the EU should be providing a status report. Yet it ha d failed 
to do so. The only difference that the United States  could see was that, now that the EU was a 
responding  party, the EU was choosing to contradict the reading of Article  21.6 of the DSU it had 
long erroneously promoted. Under Article  21.6 of the DSU, once a responding Member provide d the 
DSB with a status report that announce d compliance, there was no further  "progress " on which it 
could report, and therefore no further obligation to provide a report. But as the EU allegedly 
disagree d with this position, it should for future meetings provide status reports in this DS316 
dispute.  
4.3.  The representative of  the European Union  said that t he United States had again implied that 
the EU was taking inconsistent positions under Article  21.6 of the DSU, depending on whether the 
EU was a complaining party or a defending party in a dispute. The US assertions remain ed without 
merit .  As his delegation  had repeatedly explained in past DSB meetings, the crucial point for the 
defending party 's obligation to provide status reports to the DSB was the stage of the dispute . In 
the "EC – Large Civil Aircraft" dispute (DS316) , the dispute was at a stage where th e defending 
party d id not have an obligation to submit status reports to the DSB. The EU wished to  recall  that in 
the "EC – Large Civil Aircraft" dispute (DS316) , the EU had notified to the WTO a new set of measures 
in a compliance communication , submitt ed at the 28  May 2018 DSB meeting . The U nited States had 
responded that the measures included in that communication d id not bring the EU in full compliance 
with the DSB 's recommendations and rulings  in that dispute . In light of  the US position, on 
29 May 2018, the EU had requested consultations with the United States pursuant to  
Articles  4 and 21.5 of the DSU . These consultations had failed to resolve the dispute. Consequently, 
the EU had then asked for the establishment of a co mpliance panel. The compliance panel had been  
established by the DSB on 27 August 2018. That compliance panel was currently reviewing "the 
existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the 
recommendations and rulings " of the DSB.  As part of that review, the compliance panel had held a 
meeting with the parties and third parties and was assessing the parties ' replies to its questions on 
compliance of the EU. He stressed that  there was a compliance proceeding still on -going  in this 
dispute . Whether or not the matter was "resolved " in the sense of Article 21.6 of the DSU wa s the 
very subject matter of this on -going litigation.  He asked how it could be said that the defending  
party should submit "status reports " to the DSB under  these circumstances . The EU would be very 
concerned with a reading of Article 21.6 of the DSU that would require the respo nding party to notify 
the purported "status of its implementation efforts " through the submission of status reports to the 
DSB, while dispute settlement proceedings on that precise issue were on-going . The view of the EU 
was further supported by Article 2 of the DSU on the administration of the dispute settlement rules 
and procedures: where, further to the disagreement between the parties on compliance, a matter 
was with the adjudicators, it was temporarily taken out of the DSB 's surveillance . 
4.4.  The DSB took note of the statements.  
5  QATAR – CERTAIN MEAS URES CONCERNING GOOD S FROM THE UNITED AR AB EMIRATES  
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by the United Arab Emirates (WT/DS576/2)  
5.1.  The Chairman  recall ed that the DSB had considered this matter at its 26  April 2019 meeting 
and had agreed to revert to it. He drew attention to the communication from the 
United  Arab Emirates contained in document WT/DS576/2 and invite d the representative of the 
United  Arab Emirates to speak . 
5.2.  The representative of the United Arab Emirates  said that his delegation had explained at the 
26 April 2019 DSB meeting that Qatar 's retaliatory a ctions against UAE products and suppliers were 
in clear contravention of the prohibition on unilateral measures in Article  23 of the DSU and also 
violate d core WTO obligations on non -discrimination and transparency. Qatar had no right to take 
unilateral retaliatory action before the panel in the "United Arab Emirates – Goods, Services and IP 
rights " dispute ( DS526 ) had even issued a decision and without hav ing first obtained the DSB's 
authorization. These were fundamental precepts underlying the DSU. By taking unilateral retaliatory 
action, Qatar ha d shown a blatant disregard for the rules -based multilateral trading system and for 
its dispute settlement mech anism. For these reasons, the UAE must reiterate its request that the 
DSB establish a panel to examine this matter with standard terms of reference.  WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 16 - 
 
  5.3.  The representative of Qatar  said that his delegation regret ted the United Arab Emirates ' (UAE) 
decision to make a second request for the establishment of a panel in  this dispute . As Qatar  had 
explained at the 26 April 2019 DSB meeting , the alleged measures mentioned by the UAE in its panel 
request either had never existed or ha d ceased to exist. Over a month ago, Qatar had informed 
the UAE that certain temporary instruments listed in the UAE 's panel request no longer exist ed. 
Qatar reg retted that the UAE had subsequently chose n, in aggressive media statements, to 
characteri ze Qatar 's rescission of the instruments as a  "confession " that the se instruments were 
WTO-inconsistent. Qatar ma de no such concession. The relevant instruments were WTO -consistent, 
but were no longer necessary. Furthermore, Qatar was  confused by the UAE 's second request for 
the establishment of a panel. Immediately after  the 26 April 2019 DSB meeting , the UAE had 
recognized that the measures no longer existed in a press note entitled  "Qatar withdraws measures 
established against the UAE ". It was contradictory for the UAE to ask  at the present meeting that  
the WTO adjudicate on the se very same measures. Qatar  did not we lcome such an impetuous 
approach to bringing disputes  to the DSB. Qatar was  also perplexed that the UAE continue d to 
maintain its scheme of coercive economic measures against Qatar, and, at the same time, 
complain ed of an alleged lack of market access to Q atar. To the extent the UAE wishe d to facilitate 
the access of its goods to the Qatari market, it should lift its own restrictions, and stop complaining 
about non -existent Qatari measures. Qatar appreciate d that the UAE exporters were suffering 
without Qat ari customers. But the UAE exporters need ed to look closer to home to find the cause. 
Indeed, it was bewildering that the UAE complain ed about an alleged lack of market access to Qatar 
while maintaining a two -year boycott on the basis of  alleged national security interests. With its 
renewed request for the establishment of a panel at the present meeting , Qatar unders tood that 
the UAE no longer consider ed restrictions on the export of goods to Qatar necessary for protecting 
those interests . The UAE should , therefore , withdraw its export restrictions without delay. Qatar 
remain ed committed to following WTO rules, and it was confident that it w ould prevail in defending 
itself against the false allegations made by the UAE. Qatar d id not restri ct economic engagement 
with the UAE. In stark contrast to the UAE 's discriminatory trade policies towards Qatar, Qatar 
continue d to export more than US$750 million worth of Qatari gas each year to the UAE. Following 
a gas pipeline outage in April, the Qata ri exporter had worked to ensure that the UAE 's supply would 
not be interrupted by sending shipments of LNG to the UAE. Through such exports, Qatar ha d 
continued to ensure a stable provision of over 30% of the UAE 's energy needs. Article  3.7 of the 
DSU adm onishe d Members to bring complaints only when they were likely to be fruitful. By insisting 
on litigation that c ould not possibly be fruitful, the UAE abuse d its privileges as a WTO Member. The 
UAE should adopt a more constructive approach to resolving its  differences with Qatar.   
5.4.  The representative of  Turkey  said that o n a number of different occasions, his country  had 
underlined that Members would all be better off to ensure there was less pressure on the dispute 
settlement system, especially at this time. Turkey had  also pointed out that resolving issues through 
dialogue would be preferable and ideal as stipulated in Article  3.7 of the DSU . This ha d become all 
the more important in the context of ongoing discussions on the f unctioning of the rules -based 
multilateral trading system. With this thought, Turkey wished to draw attention to Article  3.10 of 
the DSU, which set out good faith efforts and ask ed Members to exercise judgment when considering 
whether  a panel request would  be fruitful. This would also ensure avoiding "contentious acts ", as 
this Article specifically referred to . Turkey  believe d that this issue merit ed exactly such exercise of 
judgment . Turkey  express ed its hope that the parties  to this dispute , being partner s in the G ulf 
Cooperation Council , would resolve this matter amicably without pursuing the panel 's proceedings.   
5.5.  The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference.   
5.6.  The representatives of Afghanistan , the Kingdom of Bahrain , Brazil , Canada , China , Egypt , 
the European Union , India, Japan , Norway , the Russi an Federation , the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , 
Singapore , Chinese Taipei , Turkey , Ukraine  and the United States  reserved their third -party rights 
to participate in the Panel 's proceedings.  
6  UNITED STATES – ANTI -DUMPING AND COUNTER VAILING DUTIES ON RI PE OLIVES 
FROM SPAIN   
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by the European Union  (WT/DS577/3)  
6.1.  The Chairman  drew attention to the communication from the European Union contained in 
document WT/DS577/3 and invite d the representative of the European Union to speak.  WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 17 - 
 
  6.2.  The representative of the European  Union  said that t he EU ha d serious concerns about the 
investigations leading to the imposition by the U nited States of anti -dumping and countervailing 
duties on ripe oli ves from Spain. These relate d to the targeting of non -specific subsidies, the absence 
of a pass -through analysis, the failure to show that imports were causing injury to the US industry 
and the use of incorrect figures for one of the Spanish companies. The  EU urge d the U nited States 
to bring these duties, as well as the underlying US legislation, in line with its WTO obligations. To 
this end, the EU request ed the establishment of a panel to fully  assess the se measures.  
6.3.  The representative of the United  State s said that the United States  regret ted that the EU had 
sought the establishment of a panel in this matter. As the United States ha d explained to the E U, 
duties had been  imposed on ripe olives from Spain following thorough anti -dumping and 
countervailing duty investigations by the US Department of Commerce, and equally thorough injury 
investigations by the US International Trade Commission, fully consistent with WTO rules . 
Furthermore, the EU's request to establish a panel include d claims that had not been included in its 
request for consultations, meaning that the parties ha d yet to consult on these claims. For these 
reasons, the United States d id not agree to the establi shment of a panel at the present meeting .  
6.4.  The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter.  
7  CHINA – TARIFF RATE QUOTAS FOR CERTAIN A GRICULTURAL PRODUCTS   
A. Report of the Panel  (WT/DS517/R and WT/DS517/R/Add.1)  
7.1.  The Chairman  recall that at its meeting on 22  September  2017, the DSB had established a 
Panel to examine the complaint by the United States pertaining to this dispute. The Report of the 
Panel contained in document WT/DS517/R and  Add.1 was circulated on 18  April 2019 as an 
unrestricted document. The Panel Report was before the DSB for adoption at the present meeting 
at the request of the United  States. This adoption procedure was without prejudice to the right of 
Members to express their views on the Panel Report.  
7.2.  The re presentative of  the United States  thank ed the Panel, and the Secretariat staff that 
assist ed the Panel, for their work on this dispute. The United  States welcome d the findings of the 
Panel in this Report, which confirm ed that China had failed to administer  its tariff -rate quotas for 
wheat, corn, and rice consistently with its WTO commitments. China ha d committed to administer 
its TRQs on a transparent, predictable, and fair basis, using clearly specified administrative 
procedures and requirements that d id not inhibit the filling of each TRQ. The Panel had found that 
several aspects of China 's TRQ administration, including in particular its eligibility criteria, allocation 
principles, reallocation procedures, public comment process, all ocation of state -trading and 
non-state trading portions of each TRQ, and processing restrictions, were not transparent, 
predictable, or fair, fail ed to use clearly specified procedures or requirements, and ultimately 
inhibit ed China 's TRQs from filling. The United States also note d the Panel 's findings that the many 
disparities between what was set out in China 's legal instruments and China 's practice further 
demonstrate d that China administer ed its TRQs inconsistently with its commitments.  For example, 
the Panel had found that whereas China 's legal instruments provide d that the state -trading and 
non-state trading portions of TRQs were available for allocation to all applicants, China in practice  
allocate d the state trading portions of each TRQ exclusively to state trading enterprises (STE), and 
without applying its published rules. This mean t that, among other things, COFCO, China 's 
state-owned enterprise for grains trading, was not required to return unus ed TRQ amounts for 
reallocation to private entities. Therefore, unless COFCO import ed its full allocation amount, large 
portions of China 's TRQ would go unused every year. The Panel Report had also confirm ed what 
China 's low TRQ fill rates suggest ed: that China 's TRQ administration inhibit ed the filling of the TRQs 
inconsistent with its WTO obligations. As a result, WTO Members d id not have the access to China 's 
market that China  had agreed to when it had joined the WTO. The United States therefore 
respectf ully propose d that the DSB adopt the Report contained in WT/DS517/R  and 
WTDS517/R/Add.1 and look ed forward to China 's prompt implementation.  
7.3.  The representative of  China  said that his country  wished  to thank  the panelists , and the 
Secretariat  staff supporting them , for their hard work on this  dispute. F ollowing the dispute "China  
– Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers" (DS511) , this was the second agriculture -related 
dispute brought by the U nited States against China. Agriculture was of special significance to China 
with 1.3  billion people. Since China  had fully elaborated on that point at the 26 April 2019 DSB WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 18 - 
 
  meeting , China would refrain from repeating that prior statement at the present meeting . China  took 
note that, just 15 days after the Panel had issued its final Report to the parties, the Secretariat had 
already completed the translation of that Report and had circulated it to the whole Membership. 
While admiring the extraordinary efficiency  of the Secretariat,  China  would  also expect  that such 
efficiency  could  be maintained in future disputes , including those brought by  China. In this  dispute, 
the Panel had recognized that the public notice in connection with the allocation and reallocation of 
relevant agricultural products had been made  in conformity  with WTO rules. In practice, China ha d 
already publi shed adequate information on the allocation of TRQs, including the total TRQs amounts 
available for allocation, application time, criteria and principle , as well as the integral allocation  
process.  China regret ted that the Panel , nevertheless , had  found that flaws existed in its 
administration of TRQs. China w ished  to stress t hat it was a reserved right of China since its 
accession to the WTO to administ er imports of rice, wheat and co rn through TRQs. China  would 
continue such administration in line with WTO rules. China always respect ed WTO rules and earnestly 
fulfilled its commitments to the WTO. Though disappointed with some of the Panel ' s findings, China  
chose to let the Panel Report to be adopted at the pres ent meeting  in order to settle this dispute. 
Meanwhile, China  called on Members to maintain  an objective and impartial attitude, safeguard the 
integrity of WTO rules, respect outcomes of accession negotiations, and work together to maintain 
the authority a nd stability of the multilateral trading system.  
7.4.  The representative of  the European Union  said that his delegation wished  to thank China for 
its statement made at the present meeting and look ed forward to receiving more information 
concerning the implement ation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings  regarding  the 
administration of the TRQs and trust ed that this w ould be done in line with WTO rules and in full 
transparency for the entire Membership.  
7.5.  The DSB took note of the statements and adopt ed the Panel Report contained in WT/DS517/R 
and Add.1.  
8  APPELLATE BODY APPOI NTMENTS: PROPOSAL BY  ARGENTINA; AUSTRALIA; BENIN; 
THE PLURINATIONAL ST ATE OF BOLIVIA; BRAZ IL; CANADA; CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC; CHILE; CHI NA; COLOMBIA; COSTA  RICA; CUBA; DOMINICA N REPUBLIC; 
ECUADOR; EGYPT; EL  SALVADOR; THE EUROPEA N UNION; GUATEMALA; HONDURAS; 
HONG  KONG, CHINA; IC ELAND; I NDIA; INDONESIA; ISR AEL; KAZAKHSTAN; KOR EA; 
LIECHTENSTEIN; MEXIC O; MOROCCO; NEW  ZEAL AND; NICARAGUA; NORT H MACEDONIA; 
NORWAY; PAKISTAN; PA NAMA; PARAGUAY; PERU ; THE RUSSIAN  FEDERA TION; RWANDA; 
SINGAPORE; SWITZERLA ND; THE SEPARATE CUS TOMS TERRITORY OF TA IWAN,  PENGHU, 
KINMEN AND MATSU; TU RKEY; UKRAINE; URUGU AY; THE BOLIVARIAN R EPUBLIC OF 
VENEZUELA AND VIET  NAM (WT/DSB/W/609/REV .10) 
8.1.  The Chairman  said that t his item was on the Agenda of the present  meeting at the request of 
Mexico, on behalf of several delegation s. He drew attention to the proposal contained in document 
WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10 and invite d the representative of Mexico to speak . 
8.2.  The representative of Mexico , speaking on behalf of the co -sponsors of the proposal contained  
in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev. 10, said that the delegations in question  had agreed to submit the 
joint proposal , dated 15 April 2019 , to launch the AB selection processes .  At the present meeting, 
Mexico,  speaking on behalf of these 75 Members, wished  to make the follo wing statement. The 
considerable number of Members submitting this joint proposal expressed  a common concern with 
the current situation in the Appellate Body , which  was seriously affecting its functioning  and the 
overall functioning of the dispute settleme nt system against the best interest of its Members . 
WTO Members ha d a responsibility to safeguard and preserve the Appellate Body, the dispute 
settlement system and the multilateral trading system . Thus, it was the Members' duty  to launch 
the AB selection processes, as set out  in the joint proposal before the DSB at the present meeting . 
This proposal s ought  to: "(i) start four selection processes: one process to replace 
Mr. Ricardo  Ramírez -Hernández, whose second term expired on 30 June 2017; a se cond process to 
fill the vacancy that resulted from  the resignation of Mr. Hyun Chong Kim with effect from 
1 August  2017; a third process to replace Mr. Peter Van den Bossche, whose second term expired 
on 11 December, 2017; and a fourth process to replace Mr. Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing,  
whose four -year term of office expire d on 30 September  2018; (ii) to establish a Selection 
Committee; (iii) to set a deadline of 30  days for the submission of candida tes; and (iv) to request 
that the Selection Committee  issue its recommendation s within 60  days after the deadline for 
nominations of candidates ". The proponents were flexible with regard to  the deadlines for the AB WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 19 - 
 
  selection processes , but believed that Members  should consider  the urgency of the situation . Mexico  
continue d to urge all Members to support this proposal in the interest of the multilateral trad ing 
system and the dispute settlement system .  
8.3.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States thanked the Chair for the 
continued work on these issues. As the United States had explained in prior meetings, the United 
States was not in a position to support the proposed decision. The systemic concerns that the United 
States had identified remained unaddress ed. As the United States had explained at recent DSB 
meetings, for more than 15 years and across multiple US Administrations, the United States had 
been raising serious concerns with the Appellate Body's overreaching and disregard for the rules set 
by WTO Members. Through persistent overreaching, the WTO Appellate Body had been adding 
obligations that had never been agreed by the United States and other WTO Members. The 2018 US 
Trade Policy Agenda had outlined several long -standing US concerns.20  The United  States had raised 
repeated concerns that appellate reports had gone far beyond the text setting out WTO rules in 
varied areas, such as subsidies, anti -dumping duties, anti -subsidy duties, standards and technical 
barriers to trade, and safeguards, restrict ing the ability of the United States to regulate in the public 
interest or protect US workers and businesses against unfair trading practices. And as the United 
States had explained at recent DSB meetings, the Appellate Body had issued advisory opinions on  
issues not necessary to resolve a dispute and had reviewed panel fact -finding despite appeals being 
limited to legal issues. Furthermore, the Appellate Body had asserted that panels must follow its 
reports although Members had not agreed to a system of pr ecedent in the WTO, and had 
continuously disregarded the 90 -day mandatory deadline for appeals – all contrary to the WTO's 
agreed dispute settlement rules. And for more than a year, the United States had been calling for 
WTO Members to correct the situatio n where the Appellate Body acted as if it had the power to 
permit ex -Appellate Body members to continue to decide appeals even after their term of office – 
as set by the WTO Members – had expired. This so -called "Rule 15" was, on its face, another example 
of the Appellate Body's disregard for the WTO's rules. The concerns of the United States had not 
been addressed. When the Appellate Body overreached and abused the authority it had been given 
within the dispute settlement system, it undermined the legitima cy of the system and damaged the 
interests of all WTO Members who cared about having the agreements respected as they had been 
negotiated and agreed. The United States would continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by 
the WTO dispute settlement system , and would continue its efforts and its discussions with Members 
and with the Chair person  to seek a solution on these important issues.  
8.4.  The representative of  the European Union  said that his delegation wished to  refer to its 
statements made on this matter  at previous DSB meetings , starting in February  2017. The gravity 
and urgency of the situation was increasing as months went by. WTO Members ha d a shared 
responsibility to resolve this issue as soon as possible. The EU wished to  thank all Members tha t had 
co-sponsored the proposal to launch the AB selection  processes . The EU  invite d all other Members 
to endorse this proposal  so that new AB members c ould be appointed as soon as possible  The EU  
also wish ed to recall that concrete proposals ha d been subm itted to the General Council with a view 
to unblocking the AB selection processes . The EU  invite d all Members to engage constructively in 
these discussions so that the vacancies could be filled as soon as possible . 
8.5.  The representative of  Canada  said that his country  support ed the statement made by Mexico. 
It had now been 25  months since  the launch of t he AB selection processes had been first proposed. 
Canada deeply regret ted that the DSB ha d not been able to comply with its legal obligation under 
Article  17.2 of the DSU to appoint Appellate Body members to fill the vacancies. The text of the DSU 
was clear: "vacancies shall be filled as they arise ". This requirement d id not provide for exceptions 
or justifications not to replenish the Appellate Body. The inability to select and appoint new Appellate 
Body members c ould only increase the necessity to rely o n Rule  15 of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review , and the challenges to meet the 90 -day time -frame to issue AB reports. This 
situation was at odds with the concerns that the United  States ha d expressed regarding that practice . 
Canada share d the disappointment expressed by several other Members regarding the U S decision 
not to join the consensus to move forward with the proposal. Canada  support ed the informal process 
on Appellate Body matters  led by the DSB Chairman , as Facilitator,  under the auspices of the General 
Council to discuss the various proposals aimed at  address ing the US concerns . Canada call ed on the 
United States to meaningfully engage in constructive discussions that were aimed at  fixing the 
problems it perceive d with the system. Canada remain ed committed to working with other interested 
Members, including the United States, with a view to address ing those concerns and undertake the 
                                                
20 Office of the US Trade Representative, 2018 President's Trade Policy Agenda, at 22 -28. WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 20 - 
 
  AB selection process es expeditiously. Canada  wished to invite  those  Members that d id not yet 
sponsor this proposal to launch the AB selection process es to give it the attention it deserve d and 
support it.  
8.6.  The representative of Australia  said that her country  wished to refer to its statements made at 
previous DSB meetings on this matter and to reiterate its serious concerns regarding the DSB 's 
inability to commence the AB selection process es. Australia  welcome d the leadership provided by 
the DSB Chairman , as Facilitator of the General Council 's informal process on Appellate Body 
matters . Australia  had taken note of the Chairman's  recent status report to the General Council, 
including the frank assessment that  "discussion so far has shown that finding a solution that would  
address the key concerns raised is not going to be easy ". Australia strongly support ed continued 
work under this process and expect ed an acceleration of work ahead of the summer break. Australia  
wished to acknowledge the valuable contributions of Members to this process, and encourage d 
further constructive contributions in developing a pragmatic solution in the interests of all Members.  
8.7.  The representative of China  wished  to echo the statement made by Mexico on behalf of 
75 Members . China  regret ted that the collective efforts by these Members had been,  once again , 
frustrated by a particular Member 's illegitimate blockage which simply  exacerbate d the current 
Appellate Body crisis. China  recall ed that Members ha d a shared responsibility to promptly fill the 
vacancies in the Appellate Body , as required by Article 17.2 of the DSU. The clear text of that 
provision indicate d that such responsibility had to  be fulfilled without an y precondition . Nevertheless, 
with a view to break ing the deadlock  in AB selection processes , Members ha d made and were 
continu ing to make earnest efforts to address concerns raised by a particular Member . Various 
concrete proposals, including the joint proposals co -sponsored by the EU, China and other Members, 
had been tabled and discussed in informal meetings under the auspices of the General Council . 
Regrettably, Members  had yet to see constructive engagement from the Member concerned. If all 
Members support ed the rules -based multilateral trading system, it was time for this Member to show 
their seriousness and sincerity by meaningfully participating in relevant discussions on Appellate 
Body reform . China  noted that this Member had recently made a  statement against improv ing the 
DSU and had s tated that the current text of the DSU wa s clear enough and needed no further 
adjustment. However, th ese assertions contradict ed its own position. For instance, Article  17.12 of 
the DSU require d the Appellate Body to address each of the issues raised in an appeal. Therefore, it 
seem ed that the Appellate  Body had done nothing  wrong  and had simply  fulfilled its duty when it 
examin ed all issues raised in an appeal. If Members truly w ished  to limit the appellate review to the 
extent necessary to solve a dispute, certain clarifications or changes on this Article were needed. 
The clock was ticking. If the standstill continue d, it would inevitably lead to the dismantlement of 
the Appellate Body , which w ould cause severe damage to the effectiveness and credibility of the 
WTO dispute settlement system. To avoid unintended consequences, China call ed on all Members to 
constructively pa rticipate in informal discussions  and to try to solve the deadlock in the AB selection  
processes  as soon as possible.  
8.8.  The representative of Chile said that his country  support ed the statement made by Mexico and 
wished  to highlight the need to launch the AB selection processes  as soon as possible. Launching 
the AB process es had been Chile's priority since the beginning of the deadlock that was currently 
affecting the appointment  of Appellate Body members and therefore a lso having a negative impact 
on the dispute settlement mechanism. Furthermore, should  this situation continue , in December 
2019 the Appellate Body w ould no longer have the minimum number of members to be able to 
exercise its functions. Given this situation , Chile believe d that it was urgent to move forward in 
seeking a solution. The proposal contained in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10 had been  put 
forward as part of the necessary efforts  aimed at  support ing the engagement and participation of 
the Membership in finding a solution to this issue. Furthermore, Chile believe d that the informal 
process  on Appellate Body matters  under the auspices of the General Council, which was led by the 
DSB Chairman  as Facilitator , provided  a forum to  find solutions aimed at resolv ing the AB impasse . 
As part of this informal process , proposals such as that co -sponsored by Australia , Chile and Japan 
had been put forward regarding  the fun ctioning of the Appellate  Body and the questions that ha d 
been rais ed in this  regard. Finally, Chile w ished  to highlight that there was a need for Members to 
participate and share their views on the proposals aimed at finding potential solutions to the current 
situation.  
8.9.  The representative of Japan  said that his cou ntry expressed its thanks for the proposal  
contained in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10 , which Japan supported. Japan also support ed the 
informal process on Appellate Body matters  under the auspices of the General Council . This process WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 21 - 
 
  was well underway,  and Japan ha d been actively contributing to the work in th is process. The active 
engagement of WTO Members was essential to the prompt and successful conclusion of the process . 
8.10.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that his delegation  simply wished to refer to its 
statements made at previous DSB meetings  on th e same matter.  His delegation would  keep 
supporting the informal process under the auspices of the General Council led  by the DSB  Chairman  
as Facilitator , and hope d that all Member s would  work together to find a solution as soon as possible.   
8.11.   The representative of New Zealand  said that his country  wished to reiterate its support for 
the co -sponsored proposal contained in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10 and emphasi zed the 
importance of commencing the AB selection process es as soon as possible . New Zealand  welcome d 
discussions on the current impasse through the informal process under the auspices of the General 
Council. Like other Members, New Zealand  was focused on the urgent need to identify solutions to 
the issues  raised . 
8.12.   The representative of Turkey  said that his delegation  wished to refer to its statements made 
at previous DSB meetings . Turkey  express ed its  deep concern with the current stalemate. As one of 
75 co-sponsors of th e proposal  contained in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10 , Turkey also 
underlin ed Members ' obligation to launch the  AB selection processes without further delay as 
required by Article  17.2 of the DSU. In this respect, Turkey  support ed and welcome d the intense 
work being done in the informal process on Appellate Body matters under the auspices of the General 
Council. As pa rt of this informal  process, Members ha d had constructive discussions and several 
proposals ha d been presented by Members in order to  unblock  the current impasse. Turkey  value d 
these discussions and proposals.  However, Turkey  believe d that these  discussions should not be 
linked to the launching of  the AB selection processes and that they should be handled separately. 
Establishing a link between these discussions and the AB selection processes, Turkey  believe d, would 
benefit no one. Turkey was ready to work constructively with all Members to overcom e this deadlock 
and invite d all parties to engage in discussions with the Membership in this regard . 
8.13.   The representative of Brazil  said that his country wished to  refer to its statements made at  
previous DSB meetings regarding the urgency of launching the AB selection process es. The AB 
selection process es had bee n blocked for more than two years. In December  2019, the dispute 
settlement system w ould come to a halt. Members could not fail in their duty to maintain a standing 
Appellate Body. Members  needed to discuss proposals that had been made to overcome this 
impasse. To this end, Brazil welcome d the progress achieved in the informal process on Appellate 
Body matters under the auspices of the General Council. Brazil  remain ed ready to engage in 
pragmatic discussions to resolve these issues.  
8.14.   The representative of Uruguay  said that his country supported the statements made by Mexico 
on behalf of the 75 co -sponsors of the proposal  contained in documen t WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10, as 
well as Cuba's statement made on behalf of members of the GRULAC that were also WTO Members . 
Uruguay highlighted that WTO Members were engaged in constructive and positive discussions under 
the auspices of the General Council  thanks to the leadership of the DSB Chairman as Facilitator . 
Proposal s made by Members  were aimed at improving the functioning of the Appellate Body . As a 
result, it would be appropriate to launch the AB selection processes in order to ensure that this 
Organiz ation could continue to count on a dispute settlement mechanism . 
8.15.   The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that his delegation wished to refer to its 
statements made at previous DSB meetings. He reiterated his delegation's disappointment and 
concern that the impasse in the AB selection processes remained unresolved . His delegation 
appreciated the efforts made by various Members to address some Members' concerns with the 
Appellate  Body in the informal process under the auspices of the General  Council . Hong  Kong, China 
was committed to engaging constructively to find a solution as soon as possible . Hong Kong,  China 
urged all Members, in particular those that had raised systemic concerns, to do the same . 
Hong Kong, China emphasized that the discus sion on the systemic issues  should not be a reason to 
delay the launch of the AB selection processes . It was not justifiable to attach preconditions to the 
launch of the AB selection process. Hong Kong, China  called on Members to lift the blockage  of the 
AB selection process es without further delay.  
8.16.   The representative of Russia  said that her country  regret ted that the AB selection process es 
had not been  launched. Russia welcome d Members' collective efforts in seeking a solution to th is WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 22 - 
 
  issue through the informal process on Appellate Body matters under the auspices of the General 
Council and in particular the numerous proposals currently  on the table. Russia remain ed committed 
to such efforts and expresse d its readiness to work towards the establishment  of a well -balanced 
outcome  aimed at preserving the rule s-based multilateral trading system , including its dispute 
settlement mechanism. Engagement of all Members in a constructive dialogue was crucial. In 
particular , Russia  looked forward t o hearing the views of the U nited States who had caused the 
blockage of the AB selection process es. At this junctur e, the Membership was in a critical situation 
that warrant ed immediate action. In no case would Russia accept the ability of one single Member 
to press its interests and decide whether or not the Appellate Body should function. The 
establishment of the Appellate Body had been  the result of the collective will  of Members , to which 
Russia had agreed upon its accession. If the Appellate Body cease d to exist, this change in 
circumstances  could lead to unpredictable consequences. Russia insist ed on the immediate launch 
of the AB selection process es in order to fill the vacancies  in the Appellate Body.  Russia believe d 
that there was no legal ground s and/or adequate reasons for such a hard-line action.  
8.17.   The representative of Cuba said that his country, speaking on behalf of the members of the 
Latin American and Caribbean Group ( GRULAC) that were also WTO Members, wished to underline, 
once again, their serious concern with regard to the impasse in  the AB selection processes . There 
was no constructive and positive outcome to this important matter and the impasse continued to be 
prolonged due to a political agenda , which undermined the multilateral trading system . The GRULAC 
welcomed the informal process on Appellate Body matters under the auspices of the General Council 
that ha d been establish ed to maintain a dialogue aim ed at unblo cking the AB selection  process es. 
This show ed the urgency and importance of this  issue. A number of proposals ha d been submitted, 
which were aimed  at achiev ing this objective .  Some of th ese proposals  had been submitted by WTO 
Members from the GRULAC  region . Regrettably,  no concrete progress  had been made.  The GRULAC 
was therefore paying close attention to the concerns raised  regarding the functioning of the A ppellate 
Body. These concerns  were used to justify  the blockage to launch the Appellate Body  selection 
processes.  Once again, it was worth noting that under Article  17.2 of the DSU, vacancies shall be 
filled as they arise. This mandatory provision  had been systematically violated. GRULAC WTO 
Members were willing to  consider the proposals put forward, which may address specific concerns 
raised and look forward to any new  proposals . The search for a solution to systemic concerns should 
not be an obstacle to the functioning of the dispute settlement system. All Members should show 
good faith in t rying to find solutions.  Otherwise,  in December 2019 , the Appellate Body w ould cease 
to function. The countries in question wished to continue to  contribute to  finding a definit ive solution 
to this urgent problem  and support ed the efforts of the DSB Chair man to this end . 
8.18.   The representative of Switzerland  said that her country  wished to refer to its statements made 
at previous DSB meetings  on this matter . Switzerland deeply regret ted that the DSB continue d to 
be unable to launch the AB selection processes t owards filling the Appellate Body vacancies . 
Switzerland st ood ready to continu e the discussions in the context of the informal process on 
Appellate Body matters under the auspices of the General  Council. Switzerland  reiterate d its call on 
all Members to engage constructively in the discussions, with a view to finding concrete solutions.  
8.19.   The representative of Norway  said that his country,  again , wished  to underline its serious 
concerns  on this matter  and to refer to  Norway's statem ents made at previous DSB meetings under 
the same Agenda item. Norway noted that the United States continued to repeat the same  speaking 
points stating that their concerns remain ed unaddressed when, clearly, the Membership was 
constantly working hard to ad dress them. Norway called all Members to  engage and find a way 
forward together.  
8.20.   The representative of Korea  said that his country  also share d deep concern s and a sense of 
urgency regarding filling of the vacancies in the Appellate Body.  In this regard, Korea support ed the 
statement made by Mexico based on the joint proposal contained in document 
WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10. Korea was a co -sponsor of that proposal . Korea  looked forward to making 
good progress in the informal process on Appellate B ody matters under the auspices of the 
General  Council  carried out by the DSB Chairman  as Facilitator.   
8.21.   The representative of Singapore  said that his delegation  wished to refer to its statements 
made at previous DSB meetings and reiterate d its serious systemic concerns with the failure to 
launch the AB selection process es. In just over six months ' time, the Appellate Body w ould be down 
to one member if vacancies remain ed unfilled. Given the strain that the Appellate Body was facing, 
Singapo re called on Members to bear this in mind when considering the filing of appeals . More WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 23 - 
 
  importantly, systemic issues which had been raised c ould be discussed in a separate process. In this 
regard, even as Members continue d to engage in the informal process on Appellate Body matters  
led by the DSB Chairman as Facilitator, Singapore wishe d to emphasi ze that the AB selection 
process es should be allowed to proceed unconditionally. Singapore st ood ready to engage 
constructively and collaboratively to help resolve  this impasse . 
8.22.   The representative of Mexico  said that her country  regret ted that, despite the multiple 
attempts by different delegations, Members  continue d to have only three out of the seven members 
in the Appellate  Body. Mexico ha d serious  concerns  on this matter , which were becoming increasingly 
pressing, and , once again , called on Members to address  in a responsible manner the current 
situation in which Members  had been unable, for nearly two years, to launch the AB selection 
process es. In failing to do so, Members we re clearly disregarding the obligation  under  Article  17.2 
of the DSU, to fill such vacancies as soon as they ar ose. This situation was unacceptable and w ould 
have a serious systemic impact for the Organization . The Appellate  Body ha d found itself faced with 
many pending appeals, and this w ould only escalate  since three AB members were left to deal with 
all AB cases.  This undermine d the principle of collegiality in the Appellate  Body. There were currently 
over ten pr oposals before the General Council , which s ought  to address the concerns that ha d been 
raised . This alone should be sufficient reason for th e AB selection  process es to be agreed  by Members 
in accordance with the DSU . The selection processes must be separat ed from any systemic concern s 
so that the vacancies in the Appellate Body could be filled as quickly as possible . In this regard, 
Mexico  strongly urge d all Members, including the one that ha d raised concerns, to take part actively 
and constructively in th e informal  process  led by the DSB Chairman  as Facilitator.  
8.23.   The representative of Mexico , speaking  on behalf of the 75 co-sponsors  of the proposal  
contained in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10,  expressed  regret that for the twenty -third occasion, 
Members  still had not been able to start the AB selection processes and ha d thus continuously failed 
to fulfill their duties as Members of this Organization . The fact that a Member m ight have concerns 
about certain aspects of t he functioning of the Appellate  Body c ould not serve as pretext to impair 
and disrupt the work of the Appellate  Body. There was no legal justification for the current impasse 
in the AB selection process es, which res ulted in nullification and i mpairment for many Members . 
Article 17.2 of the DSU clearly state d: "[v]acancies shall be filled as they arise ". No systemic 
discussion s should prevent the Appellate Body from continuing to operate fully and Members had to  
compl y with their obligation under the DSU to fill the AB vacancies . By failing to act at the present 
meeting , Members  would maintain the current situation , which was seriously affecting the work of 
the Appellate Body against the best interest of all WTO Member s.  
8.24.   The representative of Chile said that his country, speaking on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and Mexico , wished to point out that exactly two years and 16  days 
had passed since  the first proposal  on AB selection processes had been circulated in document 
WT/DSB/W/596 , dated 12 May 2017 . The countries in question  remain ed convinced of the 
importance of the rule  of law and the need for a rules -based multilateral trading system  under which 
the bodies provide d for in the covered agreements, including  the Appellate Body, remain ed in 
operation. Although more than two years ha d passed, the above -mentioned countries  were still 
convinced that it would be highly beneficial to launch the AB selection process es.  
8.25.   The representative of India said that his country wished to  refer to its statements made at 
previous DSB meetings on this matter and reiterate d its serious concerns about t he current impasse 
in filling vacancies in the Appellate Body and its effect on the credibility of the WTO. As one of the  
75 co-sponsors  of the proposal  contained in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.10 , India recognize d the 
centrality  of the WTO dispute settlemen t system  in providing security and predictability to the 
rules-based trading system. By not agreeing to launch  the AB selection process es, Members we re 
moving closer to the im minent paralysis of the dispute settlement system. India welcome d reform 
proposals made  by various Members with respect to the functioning of the Appellate Body. India was 
ready to engage constructively with other WTO Members in addressing the distinct inefficiencies in 
the dispute settlement system, while strengthening  its main features and principles. However, this 
exercise c ould not serve as a pretext to i mpair  and disrupt the work of the Appellate Body . India 
reiterate d the importance of filling the vacancies in the Appellate Body as a priority.  
8.26.   The Chairman  thank ed all delegations for their statements. He said that, a s in the past, the 
DSB w ould take note of the statements expressing the respective positions, which w ould be duly 
reflected in the minutes of the meeting . As a number of delegations had stated, this matt er urgently  
require d political engagement on the part of all WTO Members . As a number of  delegations had WT/DSB/M/429  
 
- 24 - 
 
  referenced , under the auspices of the General Council, he said that he had agreed to assist the Chair 
of the General Council, in his personal capacity as Facilitator, in an  informal process of focused 
discussions on matters related to the functioning of the Appellate Body . He then  recall ed that on 
7 May 2019, he had  provided a p rogress report to the General Council on his informal consultations. 
This report had been  circulated to all Members in document JOB/GC/217.  It was his intention to 
continue the informal process of solution -focused discussions in a range of different format s with a 
view to reporting to the General Council at its meeting on 23  July 2019.  
8.27.   The DSB took note  of the statements . 
__________