WT/DS567/R  
 
16 June 2020  
(20-4200) Page: 1/125 
  Original: English  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAUDI ARABIA – MEASU RES CONCERNING  THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERT Y RIGHTS  
REPORT  OF THE PANEL  
 
 
 
 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  14 
1.1   Complaint by Qatar  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....14 
1.2   Panel establishment and composition  ................................ ................................ ............ 14 
1.3   Panel proceeding  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 14 
1.3.1    General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 14 
1.3.2    Procedural issues arising from Saudi Arabia's refusal to interact with Qatar  ..................... 15 
1.3.3    Issues concerning certain English translations submitted by the UAE  .............................. 16 
1.3.4    The Panel's requ est for information from the International Bureau of WIPO  ..................... 16 
1.3.5    Saudi Arabia's request to confirm the authenticity of an exhibit  submitted by Qatar  ......... 17 
1.3.6    Procedural issues arising from Qatar's submission of a witness statement  ....................... 17 
2   FACTUAL ASPECTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 21 
2.1   Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 21 
2.2   Factual background ................................ ................................ ................................ .....21 
2.2.1    The broadcasting and copyright regime in Saudi Arabia  ................................ ................ 21 
2.2.2    The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it  ................................ ..25 
2.2.3    The broadcasting operations of the Qatari -based beIN Media Group  ............................... 29 
2.2.4    The emergence of beoutQ  ................................ ................................ ......................... 31 
2.3   The measures at issue  ................................ ................................ ................................ 32 
3   PARTIES' REQUEST S FOR FINDINGS AND R ECOMMENDATIONS  ................................  33 
4   ARGUMENTS OF THE  PARTIES  ................................ ................................ ...................  35 
5   ARGUMENTS OF THE THI RD PARTIES  ................................ ................................ ........  35 
6   INTERIM REVIEW  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 35 
6.1   Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 35 
6.2   General issues  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........... 35 
6.3   Factual aspects  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 39 
6.4   Prelim inary considerations  ................................ ................................ ........................... 40 
6.5   Acts and omissions claimed by Qatar to be attributable to Saudi Arabia ............................. 40 
6.6   Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement ................................ .................. 45 
6.7   Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement  ............................... 46 
6.8   Conclusions and recommendation  ................................ ................................ ................. 47 
7   FINDINGS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  47 
7.1   Preliminary considerations  ................................ ................................ ........................... 47 
7.1.1    Overview and order of analysis  ................................ ................................ .................. 47 
7.1.2    Saudi Arabia's request that the Panel decline to make any findings or  
recommendation based on Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the DSU  ................................ ................ 49 
7.1.3    The measures challenged by Qatar  ................................ ................................ ............ 54 
7.2   Acts and omissions claimed by Qatar to be attributable to Saudi Arabia ............................. 57 
7.2.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 57 
7.2.2    Arguments  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 59 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  7.2.2.1    Qatar  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 59 
7.2.2.2    Saudi Arabia  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 60 
7.2.3    Assessment by the Panel  ................................ ................................ .......................... 62 
7.2.3.1   Applicable legal standard  ................................ ................................ ....................... 62 
7.2.3.2    beIN's access to civil enforcement procedures  ................................ .......................... 63 
7.2.3.2.1    Anti-sympathy measures ................................ ................................ ..................... 63 
7.2.3.2.1.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....63 
7.2.3.2.1.2    Evidence regarding general anti -sympathy measures  ................................ ........... 63 
7.2.3.2.1.3    Evidence regarding the refusal of Saudi law firms to act in relation to the  
beoutQ matter  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 65 
7.2.3.2.1.4    Evidence regarding other actions by Saudi authorities to direct private entities  
in their arrangements with beIN  ................................ ................................ .......................... 66 
7.2.3.2.1.5    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......68 
7.2.3.2.2    The 19  June 2017 Circular, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval  
requirement  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 68 
7.2.3.3    Non-application of criminal procedures and penalties  ................................ ................. 73 
7.2.3.3.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......73 
7.2.3.3.2    Overview of correspondence  ................................ ................................ ................ 73 
7.2.3.3.3    Evidence regarding the promotion of beoutQ by prominent Saudi  nationals  ............... 77 
7.2.3.3.4    Evidence regarding the targeting of the Saudi market by beoutQ  ............................. 79 
7.2.3.3.5    Evidence regarding the transmission of beoutQ's broadcasts via Arabsat  ................... 83 
7.2.3.3.6    Evidence regarding the involvement of Selevision  ................................ .................. 88 
7.2.3.3.7    Overall assessment  ................................ ................................ ............................ 90 
7.2.3.4    Public screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts  ................................ ................................ .90 
7.2.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 92 
7.3   Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement ................................ .................. 92 
7.3.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 92 
7.3.2    Arguments  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 93 
7.3.2.1    Qatar  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 93 
7.3.2.2    Saudi Arabia  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 95 
7.3.2.3    Third parties  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 95 
7.3.3    Assessment by the Panel  ................................ ................................ .......................... 97 
7.3.3.1    Order of analysis  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...97 
7.3.3.2    Claims under Article  42 of the TRIPS  Agreement regarding civil and administrative 
procedures and remedies, and Article  41.1 on general obligations  ................................ ............ 98 
7.3.3.2.1    Applicable legal standard ................................ ................................ ..................... 98 
7.3.3.2.2    Application to the facts  ................................ ................................ ....................... 99 
7.3.3.2.3    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 101 
7.3.3.3    Claim under Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement regarding criminal procedures  ...........  101 
7.3.3.3.1    Applicable legal standard ................................ ................................ ...................  101 
7.3.3.3.2    Application to the facts  ................................ ................................ .....................  104 
7.3.3.3.3    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 106 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  7.3.3.4    Claims under Part I and Part II of the TRIPS  Agreement  ................................ ..........  106 
7.4   Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement  .............................  108 
7.4.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  108 
7.4.2    Arguments  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  109 
7.4.2.1    Saudi Arabia  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 109 
7.4.2.2    Qatar  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  109 
7.4.2.3    Third parties  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 110 
7.4.3    Assessment by the Panel  ................................ ................................ ........................  112 
7.4.3.1    Applicable legal standard  ................................ ................................ .....................  112 
7.4.3.2    "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations"  ..........................  116 
7.4.3.3    "action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security  
interest"  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........................  119 
7.4.3.3.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 119 
7.4.3.3.2    The "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article  73(b)(iii)  ....................  119 
7.4.3.3.3    Saudi Arabia's articulation of its "essential security interests"  ................................  120 
7.4.3.3.4    The connection between the measures and the essential security interests  ..............  121 
7.4.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  124 
8   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  ................................ ................................ . 124  
 
 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  LIST OF ANNEXES  
ANNEX A  
WORKING PROCEDURES O F THE PANEL  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel  4 
ANNEX B  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES 
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Qatar  12 
Annex  B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia  29 
ANNEX C  
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Australia  48 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Kingdom of Bahrain  51 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil  53 
Annex C -4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada  57 
Annex C -5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China  60 
Annex C -6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European  Union  62 
Annex C -7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  67 
Annex C -8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway  71 
Annex C -9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian Federation  74 
Annex C -10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Singapore  76 
Annex C -11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine  80 
Annex C -12 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United Arab Emirates  83 
Annex C -13 Integrated executive  summary of the arguments of the United  States  89 
 
 
  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  WTO CASE S CITED IN THIS REPO RT 
Short title  Full case title and citation  
Argentina – Financial Services  Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods 
and Services , WT/DS453/AB/R  and Add.1,  adopted 9  May 2016, DSR 
2016:II, p.  431 
Argentina – Financial Services  Panel  Report , Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and 
Services , WT/DS453/R and Add.1, adopted 9 May 2016, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/D S453/AB/R, DSR 2016:II, p.  599 
Australia – Salmon 
(Article  21.5 – Canada)  Panel  Report , Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – 
Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS18/RW, adopted 
20 March  2000 March 2000, DSR 2000:IV, p.  2031 
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres  Panel  Report , Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres , 
WT/DS332/R, adopted 17  December  2007, as modified by Appellate  Body 
Report WT/DS332/AB/R, DSR 2007:V, p.  1649 
Canada – Autos  Panel  Report , Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry , WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted 19  June 2000, as modified 
by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, DSR 
2000:VII, p.  3043 
Canada – Renewable Energy / 
Canada – Feed-in Tariff 
Program  Panel  Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy 
Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed -in Tariff 
Program , WT/DS412/R and Add.1 / WT/DS426/R and Add.1, adopted 
24 May 2013, as modified by Appellate  Body Reports WT/DS412/A B/R / 
WT/DS426/AB/R, DSR 2013:I, p.  237 
Canada – Wheat Exports and 
Grain Imports  Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat 
and Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 
27 September  2004, DSR 2004:VI, p.  2739 
China – Intellectual Property 
Rights  Panel  Report , China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights , WT/DS362/R, adopted 20  March  2009, DSR 
2009:V, p.  2097 
China – Raw Materials  Appellate  Body Reports, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials , WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / 
WT/DS398/AB/R, adopted 22  February  2012, DSR 2012:VII, p.  3295 
China – Raw Materials  Panel  Report s, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials , WT/DS394/R , Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R , Add.1 and 
Corr.1 / WT/DS398/R , Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22  February  2012, as 
modified by Appellate  Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / 
WT/DS398/AB/R, DSR 2012:VII, p.  3501 
China – TRQs Panel  Report , China – Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products , 
WT/DS517/R and Add.1, adopted 28  May 2019 
Colombia – Textiles  Panel  Report , Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, 
Apparel and Footwear , WT/DS461/R and Add.1, adopted 22  June 2016, as 
modified by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS461/AB/R, DSR 2016:III, 
p. 1227 
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Colombia) / 
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Panama ) Panel  Report , Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, 
Apparel and Footwear – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Colombia  / 
Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and 
Footwear – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Panama , WT/DS461/RW 
and Add.1, circ ulated to WTO Members 5  October  2018 [appealed by 
Panama 20  November  2018 – the Division suspended its work on 
10 December  2019]  
EC – Bananas III  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities  – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/AB/R , adopted 
25 September  1997, DSR 1997:II, p.  591 
EC – Bananas III (US) 
(Article  22.6 – EC) Decision by the Arbitrator, European  Communities  – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by 
the European  Communities  under Article  22.6 of the DSU , WT/DS27/ARB, 
9 April 1999, DSR 1999:II, p.  725 
EC – Commercial Vessels  Panel  Report , European  Communities  – Measures Affecting Trade in 
Commercial Vessels , WT/DS301/R, adopted 20  June 2005, DSR 2005:XV, 
p. 7713 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  Short title  Full case title and citation  
EC – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities  – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar , WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted 
19 May 2005, DSR 2005:XIII, p.  6365 
EC – Selected Customs 
Matters  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities  – Selected Customs 
Matters , WT/DS315/AB/R , adopted 11  December  2006, DSR 2006:IX, 
p. 3791 
Guatemala – Cement II  Panel  Report , Guatemala – Definitive Anti -Dumping Measures on Grey 
Portland Cement from Mexico , WT/DS156/R, adopted 17  November  2000, 
DSR 2000:XI, p.  5295 
India – Additional Import 
Duties  Panel  Report , India – Additional and Extra -Additional Duties on Imports 
from the United  States , WT/DS360/R, adopted 17  November  2008, as 
reversed by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS360/AB/R, DSR 2008:XX, 
p. 8317 
India – Agricultural Products  Appellate  Body Report, India – Measures Concerning the Importation of 
Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS430/AB/R, adopted 19  June 2015, 
DSR 2015:V, p.  2459 
India – Solar Cells  Appellate  Body Report, India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells 
and Solar Modules , WT/DS456/AB/R and Add.1, adopted 14  October  2016, 
DSR 2016:IV, p.  1827 
India – Autos  Panel  Report , India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector , 
WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, and Corr.1, adopted 5  April 2002, DSR 
2002:V, p.  1827 
Indonesia – Import Licensing 
Regimes  Panel  Report , Indonesia – Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals 
and Animal Products , WT/DS477/R, WT/DS478/R, Add.1 and Corr.1, 
adopted 22  November  2017, as modified by Appellate  Body Report 
WT/DS477/AB/R, WT/DS478/AB/R, DSR 2017:VII, p.  3131 
Korea – Various Measures on 
Beef Appellate  Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen Beef , WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 
10 January  2001, DSR 2001:I, p.  5 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks  Appellate  Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages , WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 24  March  2006, DSR 2006:I, p.  3 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks  Panel  Report , Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages , 
WT/DS308/R, adopted 24  March  2006, as modified by Appellate  Body 
Report WT/DS308/AB/R, DSR 2006:I, p.  43 
Russia – Pigs (EU)  Panel  Report , Russian Federation – Measures on the Importation of Live 
Pigs, Pork and Other Pig Products from the European  Union , WT/DS475/R 
and Add.1, adopted 21  March  2017, as modified by Appellate  Body Report 
WT/DS475/AB/R, DSR 2017:II, p.  361 
Russia – Tariff Treatment  Panel  Report , Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and 
Manufacturing Products , WT/DS485/R , Add.1, Corr.1, and Corr.2, adopted 
26 September  2016, DSR 2016:IV, p.  1547 
Russia – Traffic in Transit  Panel  Report , Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit , 
WT/DS512/R and Add.1, adopted 26  April 2019 
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)  Appellate  Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on 
Cigarettes from the Philippines , WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 15  July 2011, 
DSR 2011:IV, p.  2203 
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)  Panel  Report , Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from 
the Philippines , WT/DS371/R , adopted 15  July 2011, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS371/AB/R , DSR 2011:IV, p.  2299 
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines) (Article  21.5 – 
Philippines)  Panel  Report , Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from 
the Philippines  – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by the Philippines , 
WT/DS371/RW  and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 12  November  2018 
[appealed by Thailand 9  January  2019]  
US – 1916 Act  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 , 
WT/DS136/AB/R , WT/DS162/AB/R , adopted 26  September  2000, DSR 
2000:X, p.  4793 
US – 1916 Act (Japan)  Panel Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, Complaint by 
Japan , WT/DS162/R  and Add.1, adopted 26 September 2000, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, DSR 2000:X, p. 
4831 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  Short title  Full case title and citation  
US – Carbon Steel (India) 
(Article  21.5 – India)  Panel  Report , United  States  – Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot -
Rolled Carbon Steel Flat Products from India – Recourse to Article  21.5 of 
the DSU by India , WT/DS436/RW  and Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 
15 November  2019 [adoption/appeal pending]  
US – Clove Cigarettes  Appell ate Body Report, United  States  – Measures Affecting the Production 
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes , WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24  April 2012, 
DSR 2012:XI, p.  5751 
US – Coated Paper 
(Indonesia)  Panel  Report , United  States  – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures 
on Certain Coated Paper from Indonesia , WT/DS491/R and Add.1, adopted 
22 January  2018 
US – COOL (Article  21.5 – 
Canada and Mexico)  Appellate  Body Reports, United  States  – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COO L) Requirements – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Canada 
and Mexico , WT/DS384/AB/RW / WT/DS386/AB/RW, adopted 
29 May 2015, DSR 2015:IV, p.  1725 
US – Corrosion -Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Sunset Review of Anti -Dumping 
Duties on Corrosion -Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan , 
WT/DS244/AB/R, adopted 9  January  2004, DSR 2004:I, p.  3 
US – Gambling  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Measures Affecting the Cross -
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services , WT/DS285/AB/R, 
adopted 20  April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p.  5663 (and Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, 
p. 5475)  
US – Gasoline  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20  May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 
p. 3 
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd 
complaint)  Panel  Report , United  States  – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint) , WT/DS353/R, adopted 23  March  2012, as 
modified by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS353/AB/R, DSR 2012:II, p.  649 
US – Nicaraguan Trade  GATT Panel  Report , United  States  – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua , 
L/6053, 13  October  1986, unadopted  
US – Oil Country Tubular 
Goods Sunset Reviews  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Sunset Reviews of Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina , WT/DS268/AB/R, 
adopted 17  December  2004, DSR 2004:VII, p.  3257 
US – Poultry (China)  Panel  Report , United  States  – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of 
Poultry from Ch ina, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25  October  2010, DSR 2010:V, 
p. 1909 
US – Section 211 
Appropriations Act  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Section 211 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998 , WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1  February  2002, 
DSR 2002:II, p.  589 
US – Section 211 
Appropriations Act  Panel  Report , United  States  – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998, WT/DS176/R , adopted 1  February  2002, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS176/AB/R, DSR 2002:II, p.  683 
US – Shrimp  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products , WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6  November  1998, 
DSR 1998:VII, p.  2755 
US – Shrimp (Article  21.5 – 
Malaysia)  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by 
Malaysia , WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21  November  2001, DSR 2001:XIII, 
p. 6481 
US – Shrimp (Article  21.5 – 
Malaysia)  Panel  Report , United  States  – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia , 
WT/DS58/RW, adopted 21  November  2001, upheld by Appellate  Body 
Report WT/DS58/AB/RW, DSR 2001:XIII, p.  6529 
US – Shrimp (Ecuador)  Panel  Report , United  States  – Anti-Dumping Measure on Shrimp from 
Ecuador , WT/DS335/R, adopted on 20  February  2007, DSR 2007:II, p.  425 
US – Tuna II (Mexico)  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna  and Tuna Products , 
WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13  June 2012, DSR 2012:IV, p.  1837 
US – Upland Cotton  Panel  Report , United  States  – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , WT/DS267/R, 
Add.1 to Add.3 and Corr.1, adopted 21  March  2005, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS267/AB/R, DSR 2005:II, p.  299 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  Short title  Full case title and citation  
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses  Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Measure Affecting Imports of 
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India , WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted 
23 May 1997, and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p.  323 
US – Zeroing (EC) 
(Article  21.5 – EC) Appellate  Body Report, United  States  – Laws, Regulations and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article  21.5 of 
the DSU by the European  Communities , WT/DS294/AB/RW and Corr.1, 
adopted 11  June 2009, DSR 2009:VII, p.  2911 
 
  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  EXHIBITS CITED IN TH IS REPORT  
Exhibit 
Number  Full Title  
QAT-1 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, 
19 June 2017 
QAT-2 Saudi Press Agency Website, " Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular relations 
with Qatar ", 5 June 2017 
QAT-3 Announcement on the Saudi Embassy to the United  States  website, " Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts 
Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of Qatar ", 5 June 2017 
QAT-7 @Saudi News 50, Tweet, 6  June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation)  
QAT-8 XE Currency Converter, Saudi riyals to US dollar conversion, last accessed 8  April 2019 
QAT-10 Al-Youm Al -Sabea, '' Hashtag 'Cutting Ties with Qatar' tops the world list of trend on Twitter '' (Arabic 
original and English translation)  
QAT-11 Saudi Al -Marsd Online Newspaper, " Legal figure: Anyone showing sympathy with Qatar on social 
media platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment a nd fined 3 million riyals " (Arabic 
original and English translation), 8  June 2017 
QAT-12 Amal Ruslan, "Saudi Newspaper Okaz: Punishments include imprisonment for those who sympathize 
with Qatar on social media" , 7 June 2017 (Arabic original and English tr anslation)  
QAT-13 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Anti -Cyber Crime Law, 26  March  2007 (English translation)  
QAT-15 Amnesty International, " Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Saudi Arabia ", 22 February  2018 
QAT-21 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of 
Qatar 17 -24 November  2017, Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 
2017 
QAT-37 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15  April 2019 
QAT-38 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 15  June 2017 (Arabic original and 
English translation)  
QAT-39 Saudi Monetary Authority, Confidential Circular, 11  July 2017 (Arabic original and English 
translation)  
QAT-41 Promotion of beoutQ  through Social Media  
QAT-42 Images of beoutQ promotional material  
QAT-43 beoutQ -pirated broadcast of Champions League, Video  
QAT-44 beoutQ -pirated broadcast of Europa League, Video  
QAT-45 beoutQ -pirated broadcast of FIFA World Cup game between Croatia and England of 2018, Video  
QAT-46 beoutQ -pirated broadcast of Formula 1, Video  
QAT-47 beoutQ -pirated broadcast of NBA final games between the Cleveland Cavaliers and the Golden State 
Warriors of 2018, Video  
QAT-48 2017-2019 Sampling of Live and Replayed Content Broadcast on beoutQ  
QAT-49 beoutQ Promotional, as shown on beoutQ, Video, 21  September  2018 
QAT-50 SportsPro, "Saudi Arabia, cartoon pirates and great TV sports rights robbery" , 6 March 2019  
QAT-51 Tweets about the sale of beoutQ STBs, 12  August  2017 
QAT-52 Public statements from world sports organizations condemning beoutQ Piracy, as collected on beIN 
Media Group's Website Exposing beoutQ, 16  January 2019  
QAT-53 SportsPro, " ATP and ITF pile in on BeoutQ over pirate broadcasts ", 6 July 2018 
QAT-54 FIFA, " Joint Public Statement on behalf of FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League, LaLiga and 
Bundesliga on beoutQ ", 22 January  2019 
QAT-55 UEFA, " Joint Statement on behalf of FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League, LaLiga and Bundesliga 
on beoutQ ", 22 January  2019 
QAT-56 Reuters, " Soccer: Leagues and governing bodies condemn beoutQ TV piracy ", 22 January  2019 
QAT-57 Asian Football Confederation Statement on beoutQ, 9  January  2019 
QAT-58 Motion Picture Association of America, 2018 Notorious Markets Comments, 1  October  2018 
QAT-59 The Guardian, " BBC and Sky call for EU crackdown on Saudi pirate TV service ", 31 October  2018 
QAT-60 Bloomberg, " Telemundo Says Its World Cup Broadcasts Were Illegally Distributed ", 19 June 2018 
QAT-62 Reuters " NBA, U.S. Tennis, Sky, urge U.S. action on alleged Saudi TV piracy ", 16 February  2019 WT/DS567/R  
 
- 11 - 
 
  Exhibit 
Number  Full Title  
QAT-63 Submission by Audiovisual  Anti-Piracy Alliance for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 4  February 2019  
QAT-64 Submission by Canal+ Group for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7  February  2019 
QAT-65 Submission by the International Intellectual Property Alliance for the 2019 Special 301 Revie w, 
7 February  2019 
QAT-66 Submission by the National Basketball Association and the United  States  Tennis Association for the 
2019 Special 301 Review, 7  February  2019 
QAT-67 Submission by beIN Media Group, LLC and Miramax, LLC for the 2019 Special 301 Rev iew, 
7 February  2019 
QAT-68 Submission by Sky Limited for the 2019 Special Review, 7 February 2019  
QAT-69 Submission by the Sport Coalition for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019  
QAT-70 Submission by U.S. Chamber of Commerce for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7  February  2019 
QAT-71 Photographs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to 
September 2018  
QAT-72 beoutQ -pirated broadcast of NFL Super Bowl LIII game between New England Patriots and 
Philadelphia Eagles, Video, 4  February  2018  
QAT-73 Images of beoutQ -pirated broadcast of 4  February  2018 NFL Super Bowl Half -Time Show  
QAT-74 Country -by-Country Examples of beoutQ -Pirated Content (2018)  
QAT-75 beoutQ  advertisements pricing rate cards Saudi riyals 
QAT-76 beoutQ advertisements for Saudi brands  
QAT-77 Bloomberg, " Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as Soccer Rights' Spat Escalates ", 22 June 2018 
QAT-78 Photographic Evidence of Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal P irate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World 
Cup at Cafés in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 11  July 2018 
QAT-79 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " IPTV Piracy on BeoutQ STBs ", 25 November  2018 
QAT-80 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ  Broadcast Piracy Further Update ", 15 August  2018 
QAT-81 NAGRA Kudelski Group Website, " The Group at a Glance " 
QAT-83 Social Media Evidence of Saudi Municipalities Organizing Public Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Pirate 
Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup, June 2018  
QAT-84 Tweet from Margherita Stancati, Wall  Street Journal reporter, 22  June 2018 
QAT-85 Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs Announcement of 294 screens to broadcast 
World Cup (Arabic original and English translation), 13  June 2018  
QAT-86 Arabsat, About, last accessed 16  April 2019  
QAT-87 Arabsat, " League of Arab States Secretary -Genera l honors Arabsat CEO ", 29 January  2018 
QAT-89 Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February  2019 
QAT-90 NAGRA, Kudelski Report,  "beoutQ Piracy Overview ", 24 June 2018 
QAT-91 Various Letters from beIN  to Arabsat, dated 16  August  2017 through 13  July 2018 
QAT-92 UEFA Letter to Arabsat, 12  March  2018 
QAT-93 Arabsat Letter to UEFA, 14  March  2018 
QAT-94 UEFA Letter to Squire Patton Boggs LLP, 17  April 2018 
QAT-96 LaLiga  Letter to Arabsat, 4  April 2018 
QAT-97 Arabsat Letter to LaLiga, 19  April 2018 
QAT-98 Squire Patton Boggs LLP Letter to LaLiga, 13  June 2018 
QAT-99 Premier League Letter to Arabsat, 11  April 2018 
QAT-100 Squire Patton Boggs LLP Letter to FIFA, 5  June 2018 
QAT-101 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 29  August  2017 
QAT-102 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 14  December  2017 
QAT-103 Cartesian website, " Our Story " 
QAT-104 Nextv News, "Selevision launches in MENA ", 18 March  2014 
QAT-105 Videonet, " Selevision uses Verimatrix to protect its new Seevi service, which combines IPTV and 
OTT", 3 March  2016 WT/DS567/R  
 
- 12 - 
 
  Exhibit 
Number  Full Title  
QAT-106 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual 
Media, 3  September  2018 
QAT-107 Declaration of Adam Jacob Muller, Beluga CDN LLC, 20  June 2018 
QAT-112 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30  August  2003 
QAT-113 Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. 
(1688/1), 2 9 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22  June 2005 
QAT-116 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 15  August  2017 
QAT-117 Letter from Saudi General Commission for Audiovisual Media to beIN (Arabic original and English 
translation), 2  September  2017 
QAT-118 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14  September  2017 
QAT-119 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16  January  2018 
QAT-120 Letter from beIN  to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 6  March  2018 
QAT-121 Tweets about beIN and beoutQ STBs (Arabic original and English translation), 25  and 26 May 2018 
QAT-122 UEFA Letter to KSA Ministry of Culture & Information, 8 June 2018  
QAT-123 UEFA Le tter to GCAM, 8 June 2018  
QAT-124 BBC Letter to KSA Ministry of Culture & Information, 26  June 2018 
QAT-125 BBC Letter to GCAM , 26 June 2018  
QAT-175 The New York Times , "The Brazen Bootlegging of a Multibillion -Dollar Sport Network ", 9 May 2018 
QAT-184 United  States  2019 Special 301 Report, Office of the United  States  Trade Representative 
(April  2019) (Excerpts)  
QAT-187 Excerpts of United  States  2018 Out -of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets, Office of the 
United  States  Trade Representative (Apri l 2019) (Excerpts)  
QAT-188 SportsPro Media, " UK government to investigate BeoutQ Premier League IP theft ", 25 April 2019 
QAT-189 Broadband TV News, " MPs call for 'robust attack' on pirate beoutQ ", 10 May 2019 
QAT-190 Inside World Football, " AFC streamin g of ACL reaches 1m in Saudi Arabia but now Saudi 24 channel 
joins piracy ", 13 March  2019 
QAT-191 Washington Post, " FIFA wants Saudis to stop pirated Women's World Cup TV feeds ", 16 June 2019 
QAT-217 Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24  July 2019 
QAT-220 Email from GCAM to right holders, 13  July 2017 
QAT-223 Second Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Gervais, 19  August  2019 
QAT-224 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " Response to IGP Testing  of 28 January and 1  February  2019 and beoutQ 
Frequency Changes ", 8 February  2019 
QAT-226 Synamedia Report, "' beoutQ' Service Analysis ", 6 June 2019  
QAT-227 Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA, the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie 
A regarding the activities of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia, 31  July 2019 
QAT-238 MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019 as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemen tal Declaration 
by Football Right Holders, 19  September  2019 
QAT-248 Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24  October  2019 
QAT-257 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC Programming Director, dated 27  October  2019 
SAU-1 Saudi Press Agenc y (SPA), Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular 
relations with Qatar, 5  June 2019; and Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., 
Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relation s with the State 
of Qatar, 5  June 2017 
SAU-2 First Riyadh Agreement  
SAU-3 Implementing Mechanism  
SAU-4 Supplementary Riyadh Agreement  
SAU-5 Joint Statement of 5  March  2014 
SAU-6 Saudi Arabia and Regional Security, Qatar's History of Funding Terrorism and Extremism, 
27 June 2017 
SAU-7 Qatar's Al Jazeera, Counter Extremism Project, visited 7  July 2019; Al Jazeera faces criticism in 
Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood , The Washington Post, 5  January  2014 WT/DS567/R  
 
- 13 - 
 
  Exhibit 
Number  Full Title  
SAU-19 General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Translation of Executive Regulations for Licensing Pay 
TV Service, Summary of Legal Requirements for Broadcasters  
SAU-27 "Press Release, Arabsat", dated 15  June 2019 
SAU-28 S.A.R.L. beIN  Media Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication Organization , Summary 
Proceedings Order, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, RG number 18/59094 – Portalis number 
352J-W-B7C-CNOK, rendered 13  June 2019 (English translation available at 
https://www. degaullefleurance.com/wp -content/uploads/2019/06/20190613 -Ordonnance -de-
r%C3%A9f%C3%A9r%C3%A9 -English -version.pdf accessed 21  July 2019)  
SAU-32 Copyright Law  
SAU-39 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24  June 2019  
SAU-40 FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26  June 2019 
SAU-41 Statement Regarding Saudi Law as Expressed in the "17  June 2017 Circular", 3  October  2019 
SAU-42 Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 536 in 2018 (19/10/1439 H)  
SAU-43 Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 496 in 2018 (14/09/1439 H)  
SAU-44 Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 410 in 2017 (28/06/1438 H)  
SAU-45 Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision 
No. (1688/1), 29  May 2004 as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22  June 2005 and Resolution of 
the Board of Directors of the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority No. (4/8/2019) dated 4/9/1440 
AH 
ARE-3 Letter from H.E. Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al -Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, to H.E. 
Dr. Abdullatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, Secretary -Gener al of the GCC, 19  February  2017 
ARE-6 United Arab Emirates' 5 June Declaration  
 
 
  WT/DS567/R  
 
- 14 - 
 
  1  INTRODUCTION   
1.1  Complaint by Qatar  
1.1.  On 1 October 2018, Qatar requested consultations with Saudi Arabia pursuant to Article 4 of 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and 
Article  64.1 of the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS  Agreement) with respect to the measures and claims set out below.1 
1.2.  On 11 October 2018, Qatar received a communication from the Chairman of the 
Dispute  Settlement Body (DSB) covering a communication from Saudi Arabia, stating that 
Saudi  Arabia would not engage in consultations with Qatar.2 
1.2  Panel establishment and composition  
1.3.  On 9 November 2018, Qatar requeste d the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article  6 of 
the DSU with standard terms of reference.3 At its meeting on 18 December 2018, the DSB 
established a panel pursuant to the request of Qatar in document WT/DS567/3, in accordance with 
Article  6 of the DSU.4 
1.4.  The Panel's terms of reference, as set forth in WT/DS567/4, are the following:  
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by 
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Qatar in document 
WT/D S567/3 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.5 
1.5.  On 6 February 2019, Qatar requested the Director -General to determine the composition of 
the panel, pursuant t o Article 8.7 of the DSU. On 18 February 2019, the Director -General accordingly 
composed the Panel as follows:  
 Chairperson:  Mr Donald McRae  
 
 Members:   Ms Annabelle Bennett  
    Ms Beverley Pereira  
 
1.6.  Australia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, 
Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States and Yem en notified their interest in 
participating in the Panel proceeding as third parties.  
1.3  Panel proceeding  
1.3.1   General  
1.7.  After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures6 and 
partial  Timetable on 27 March 2019.  
1.8.  The Panel held a first s ubstantive meeting with the parties on 9 -10 July 2019, and a session 
with the third parties took place on 10 July 2019. Following the first substantive meeting, the Panel 
sent a first set of written questions to the parties and third parties on 12 July 201 9. The Panel then 
held a second substantive meeting with the parties on 3 October 2019, and sent a second set of 
written questions to the parties on 8 October 2019. After consultation with the parties, on 
15 October  2019 the Panel adopted its Timetable for  the rest of the proceeding. On 
 
1 See Request for consultations by Qatar, WT/DS567/1.  
2 See Request for the establishment of a panel by Qatar, WT/DS567/3 (Qatar's panel request), para. 2.  
3 See Qatar's panel request.  
4 See Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 18 December 2018, WT/DSB/M/423, para. 7.10.  
5 See Note by the Secretariat, Constituti on of the Panel established at the request of Qatar, 
WT/DS567/4.  
6 See the Panel's Working Procedures in Annex A -1. WT/DS567/R  
 
- 15 - 
 
  6 December  2019, the Panel issued the descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel then 
issued its Interim Report to the parties on 16  March 2020, and issued its Final Report to the parties 
on 27  April 2020.  
1.9.  The remainder of this section provides an overview of the specific procedural issues that arose 
during this proceeding, which include: ( a)  issues arising from Saudi Arabia's refusal to interact with 
Qatar; ( b) issues concerning certain English translations su bmitted by the UAE; ( c) the Panel's 
request for information from the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO); ( d) Saudi  Arabia's  request that the Panel confirm the authenticity of an exhibit submitted 
by Qatar; and ( e)  issues arising from Qatar's submission of a witness statement.  
1.3.2   Procedural issues arising from Saudi Arabia's refusal to interact with Qatar  
1.10.   Throughout the proceeding, Saudi Arabia took the position that, consistent with its severance 
of all relations wit h Qatar (including diplomatic and consular relations), and the essential security 
interests that motivated it to take that action, it would not interact , or have any direct or indirect 
engagement , with Qatar in any way in this dispute. Saudi Arabia took th is position in the context of 
consultations7, at the DSB meeting where the request for the establishment of this Panel was first 
considered8, and in its comments on the Panel's draft Working Procedures and Timetable during the 
organizational phase.9 Saudi Arabia reiterated , in all of its subsequent submissions in this 
proceeding, its refusal to interact  in any way , or have any direct or indirect engagement , with Qatar 
in this dispute.10 
1.11.   Saudi Arabia's refusal to engage with Qatar in the manner described abov e raised the question 
of how the Panel ought to conduct the proceeding. In the light of the parties' comments on the draft 
Working Procedures and Timetable made at the organizational phase of the proceeding, the Panel 
did not consider it necessary to devel op any special or additional working procedures in the 
circumstances of this case. However, the Panel did adjust certain aspects of the normal panel 
process, as well as certain aspects of the standard Working Procedures, to address this special 
circumstanc e. The Panel has been guided at all times by the prohibition against any ex parte 
communications between the Panel and either party.11  
1.12.   Regarding the organizational meeting, Articles 12.1 and 12.3 of the DSU provide for the 
adoption of the Panel's Working Procedures and Timetable for the panel process following 
consultation with the parties. While the normal practice is for a panel to hold  an organizational 
meeting with the disputing parties to receive their comments on the draft Working Procedures and 
Timetable sent in advance, this particular means of consultation is not mandated by the text of 
Article  12 of the DSU. In the special circum stances of this case, and taking into account the views 
of the parties, the Panel decided to consult with the parties exclusively through a written procedure.  
1.13.   In addition to dispensing with an organizational meeting, the Panel also modified the standard 
Working Procedures in several respects to reflect the special circumstances of this case. In particular, 
the Panel:  
a. modified the normal requirement of direct service of documents by the parties on one 
another, so as to provide instead that "[e]ach party shal l send all communications and 
 
7 See Qatar's panel request, para. 2.  
8 Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 4 December 2018, WT/DSB/M/422, para. 5.3 (stating that 
"[b]ecause  rejecting formal State interaction was the defining element of severed diplomatic relations, the 
Saudi Government would not engage with the complaining party in connection with the referenced matter"). 
See also Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 18 Decemb er 2018, WT/DSB/M/423, para. 7.10.  
9 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel commenting on the draft Working Procedures and 
Timetable, dated 14 March 2019, p. 2 (stating that "the severance of relations means that any direct meetings 
and communications w ith the complainant are unacceptable").  
10 See, e.g. Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 7; opening statement at the first meeting of 
the Panel, para. 37; response to Panel question No. 28, paras. 22 -23; second written submission, para. 19; 
oral statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 4; and response to Panel question No. 37, para. 1.  
11 Article 18.1 of the DSU provides that "[t]here shall be no  ex parte communications with the panel or 
Appellate Body concerning matters under considerati on by the panel or Appellate Body." This prohibition is 
reiterated in similar terms in paragraph VII:2 of the Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.  
 WT/DS567/R  
 
- 16 - 
 
  documents directly to the Secretariat, which the Secretariat will then proceed 
to transmit promptly to the other party"12; and  
b. adjusted its Working Procedures to clarify that the purpose of the first and second 
substantive meetings with the Panel was to allow each party to address the Panel 
directly, and to provide that neither party was under any obligation to respond to 
questions posed by the other party at or following those meetings.13  
1.14.   Neither party requested  any separate or additional procedures to govern the conduct of the 
meetings with the Panel, which otherwise proceeded in the usual manner.  
1.3.3   Issues concerning certain English translations submitted by the UAE   
1.15.   In its third -party submission, the UAE provide d the Panel with several exhibits. 
On 2 July 2019, Qatar sent a letter to the Panel raising issues with the English translations of two of 
the exhibits that the UAE had provided with its third -party submission. First, Qatar maintained that 
the UAE's transl ation of a letter by Qatar's Foreign Minister created the "deeply misleading 
impression" that Qatar unilaterally renounced, and did not attempt to comply with, the 
Riyadh  Agreements, which were concluded between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and other 
count ries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in respect of regional security matters.14 
Second, Qatar stated that the UAE translation of another exhibit that it had submitted contained 
several paragraphs omitted in the Arabic original.15 In its let ter, Qatar indicated that it had raised 
these same issues with the panel in another parallel proceeding between Qatar and the UAE, and 
was forwarding its objections "for the information of this Panel".16  
1.16.   The Panel invited the UAE to respond to Qatar's comm ents by 10 July 2019. In its response, 
the UAE expressed its disagreement with Qatar on some of the translation issues, but indicated that 
most of the issues raised by Qatar were immaterial.17  
1.17.   The Panel did not consider it necessary to take any further ste ps in relation to these translation 
issues.  
1.3.4   The Panel's request for information from the International Bureau of WIPO  
1.18.   On 12 July 2019, the Panel sent a letter to the International Bureau of WIPO, which is 
responsible for the administration of the Berne Co nvention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works. In that letter, the Panel requested the assistance of the International Bureau of WIPO in the 
form of any factual information available to it that would be relevant to the interpretation of the 
provisions of the Paris Act of that Convention (Berne Convention (1971)) referenced by the parties. 
The Panel sought, in particular, any information reflected in the materials of diplomatic conferences 
and subsequent developments in the framework of the Bern e Union.18  
1.19.   On 2 August 2019, the International Bureau of WIPO provided the requested information in a 
letter to the Panel.19 In respect of the information provided, t he parties were invited to provide any 
comments they wished to make in the context of their  second written submissions due on 30 August 
 
12 Working Procedures, paragraph 30(e).  
13 Ibid. paragraph 15.  
14 For more information about the scope and content of the Riyadh Agreements, see paragraphs 2.20 to 
2.26 of this Report.  
15 Qatar's communication to the Panel in DS526  United Arab Emirates – Measures Relating to Trade in 
Goods and Services, and Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights , dated 1 July 2019, p. 3. For 
more information concerning the differences in translation of the letter in question, see foot note 117 of this 
Report.  
16 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 2 July 2019.  
17 United Arab Emirates' communication to the Panel, dated 10 July 2019, p. 1.  
18 Panel's communication to the International Bureau of WIPO, dated 12 July 2019. The "Berne Unio n" 
refers to the Union established under Article 1 of the Berne Convention by "[t]he countries to which [the 
Berne] Convention applies".  
19 International Bureau of WIPO's communication to the Panel, dated 2 August 2019.  
 WT/DS567/R  
 
- 17 - 
 
  2019.20 Neither party made any comments on the letter from the International Bureau of WIPO to 
the Panel.  
1.3.5   Saudi Arabia's request to confirm the authenticity of an exhibit submitted by Qatar  
1.20.   On 30 August 2019, th e same day that the parties' second written submissions were to be 
filed, Saudi Arabia sent a separate letter to the Panel asking it to "certify the authenticity of the 
document" presented as Exhibit QAT -1, "Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and Ge neral 
Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, 19 June 2017". In its letter, Saudi Arabia recalled that 
it had previously indicated, in its responses to the questions from the Panel following the first 
substantive meeting, that the Ministry had conducte d a full search for an "officially issued version" 
of the Circular.21 Saudi Arabia also suggested that the Panel should be aware of the "dubious 
provenance" of the Circular, and "should not attribute the alleged 'Circular' to Saudi Arabia without 
authentica tion". While Saudi Arabia requested that the Panel "assure itself of the authenticity of the 
document in order to preserve the integrity of the proceedings", it did not specify any particular 
steps that the Panel should take to do so.22 
1.21.   Upon receipt of this letter, the Panel invited Qatar to provide its comments on this request by 
13 September 2019.23 In its comments, Qatar recalled that it had already refuted, in its second 
written submission filed on 30 August 2019, Saudi Arabia's claims that the Circul ar was "not issued", 
and that it had already demonstrated the authenticity of the Circular.24 Additionally, Qatar submitted 
statements by four right holders who had attest ed to having received an email from the Ministry of 
Culture and Information of Saudi A rabia on 13 July 2017, to which the Circular was attached. The 
four right holders are Bundesliga, the International Tennis Federation, the Union of European 
Football Associations and Italia Film.25  
1.22.   On 16 September 2019, the Panel informed the parties that insofar as either party wished to 
make any further submissions on this matter, it could do so at the second substantive meeting in 
the context of its oral statement, in its oral responses to any questions from the Panel pertaining to 
the Circular, or on bo th occasions. The Panel stated its intention to reach a decision on this issue by 
the end of the second substantive meeting with the parties.26 
1.23.   In its opening oral statement at the second substantive meeting, Saudi Arabia confirmed "that 
there is no need fo r the Panel to certify the authenticity of the Circular".27 In doing so, Saudi Arabia 
explained that "the Circular represents an accurate description of Saudi law".28 
1.3.6   Procedural issues arising from Qatar's submission of a witness statement  
1.24.   On the afternoon of 30 August 2019, the same day that the parties' second written 
submissions were due to be filed, Qatar filed an "urgent request" for additional confidentiality 
procedures pursuant to paragraph 2(4) of the Working Procedures.29 Qatar's stated purpose for 
requesting these additional procedures was to ensure the safety of an individual whose testimony 
would be filed as an exhibit to its second written submission later that same day.30 Qatar requested, 
 
20 Panel's communication to the partie s, dated 12 August 2019.  
21 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019, p. 1.  
22 Ibid. p. 2.  
23 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 2 September 2019.  
24 See Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 13 September 2019, pp. 1 -4. 
25 Ibid. pp. 7, 14, 21 and 27.  
26 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 16 September 2019.  
27 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second substantive meeting, para. 16.  
28 Ibid. para. 11. At the second meeting with the Panel, Saudi Arabia provided a state ment indicating 
that it "intends to be bound by the statements concerning its legal position as regards its domestic law" as 
described in its opening statement, adding that its delegation "confirms formally and for the record that 
representatives of the Ki ngdom of Saudi Arabia have full powers to make legal representations concerning the 
application of Saudi law and that they are acting within the authority bestowed on them". (Statement 
Regarding Saudi Law as Expressed in the "17 June 2017 Circular", 3 Octo ber 2019, Exhibit SAU -41.)   
29 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019.  
30 Ibid. p. 1. According to Qatar, the individual previously worked for beoutQ (the entity described in 
section 2.2.4 below) and provided his signed testimony "at what he believes to be great risk to his personal 
safety and that of his family, on the condition that he would be provided safety under Qatar's witness 
protection program"; and Qatar considered that "it would be necessary to keep the name of the Witness and al l 
 WT/DS567/R  
 
- 18 - 
 
  inter alia , that the identity of the witness be designated as confidential information, that it be 
redacted from the Report, and that it only be shared with a limited group of approved persons. Qatar 
did not offer any views on how the information contained in the exhibit or in its second written 
submission should be handled pending the resolution of this last -minute request for additional 
confidentiality procedures.31  
1.25.   The Panel informed the parties that they should each proceed to file their second written 
submissions with the Secretariat as scheduled for later tha t same day, and that the Secretariat 
would transmit each party's submission and accompanying exhibits to the other party only after the 
Panel had resolved Qatar's request for the adoption of additional confidentiality procedures.  The 
Panel invited Saudi Ar abia to provide its comments on Qatar's request by 3  September 2019.32  
1.26.   In its comments, Saudi Arabia objected to the adoption of any additional confidentiality 
procedures on the basis that the witness statement in question appeared to constitute new factua l 
information that did not comply with the timing requirements of paragraph 5(1) of the 
Working  Procedures or the principle of due process.33 Saudi Arabia further submitted that, in any 
event, additional confidentiality procedures would be unnecessary in th e light of the existing 
confidentiality requirements that apply under Article  18.2 of the DSU. Finally, Saudi Arabia 
emphasized that "[t]he premise of [Qatar's request], that a person's safety would be threatened by 
disclosing information of illegal activi ty in Saudi Arabia, is wholly unacceptable " and stated that "[n]o 
WTO Member should be expected to participate in dispute settlement proceeding where evidence is 
accepted based on such a false and malicious premise."34  
1.27.   Following the receipt of Saudi Arabia 's objection on 3 September 2019, and pending the 
Panel's resolution of Qatar's request, the Panel requested Qatar to submit a version of its second 
written submission the following day, on 4 September 2019,  without the witness statement attached 
as an exhibit, and with any references to the witness statement redacted from the body of 
Qatar's  second written submission.35 Qatar did so, and the Secretariat transmitted each 
party's  second written submission and a ccompanying exhibits to the other party on 
4 September  2019.  
1.28.   The Panel invited Qatar to provide its comments on Saudi Arabia's objections of 
3 September  201936, and Qatar did so on 6 September 2019.37 In its comments, Qatar argued that 
the new evidence in E xhibit QAT -222 was submitted as rebuttal evidence "in full accordance" with 
paragraph  5(1) of the Working Procedures.38 Qatar also contended that Saudi Arabia's arguments 
failed to refute the need for, or the appropriateness of, the additional confidentiali ty requirements 
requested by Qatar. Among other things, Qatar argued that the adoption of such additional 
procedures requested in the present dispute "is based not on any 'premise' regarding the conduct 
of the responding Member, but instead on the level of  sensitivity of the information and the risks 
that could arise from its public disclosure". Qatar noted that it refrained from asking for the full 
protections typically extended in cases involving Highly Sensitive Business Information to ensure 
that Saudi  Arabia would have a full opportunity to review and engage with the evidence at issue.39  
1.29.   In a communication to the parties on 13 September 2019, the Panel attached a draft set of 
additional procedures for the protection of strictly confidential information (SCI) for additional 
comments from the parties. In this communication, the Panel observed that it is common practice 
in WTO dispute settlement proceedings for additional procedures for the protection of business 
confidential information (BCI) or SCI to be adopted if either of the parties so requests. The Panel 
also stressed "that the decision to adopt these SCI procedures does not imply any view of the Panel 
on whether certain information merits being designated as confidential information, and does not 
 
identifying information confidential to help ensure his safety, and the safety of his family members." 
(Qatar's  communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019, p.  1.) 
31 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 30 August 2019, pp. 1 -2. 
32 Panel's commun ication to the parties, dated 30 August 2019.  
33 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 3 September 2019, paras. 3 -11. 
34 Ibid. paras. 12 -14. (emphasis original)  
35 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 3 September 2019.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Qatar's comm unication to the Panel, dated 6 September 2019.  
38 Ibid. p. 1.  
39 Ibid. pp. 3 -4. 
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  imply any view on the probative value, relevance or credibility of any evidence that a party 
designates as confidential".40  
1.30.   In the same communication, the Panel also noted that it was:  
mindful of the fact that the timing of Qatar's request for additional conf identiality 
procedures has resulted in an unavoidable delay in the transmission of the witness 
statement to Saudi Arabia, which may in turn limit Saudi  Arabia's  ability to conduct, in 
time for the second substantive meeting, an adequate review of the submi tted 
information or its source, including but not limited to establishing the veracity of the 
information, vetting the source of the information, and assessing motivation and 
credibility through the application of appropriate resources.41  
1.31.   Accordingly, the Panel stated that:  
to ensure that Saudi  Arabia's due process rights are fully respected, in the event that 
the Panel rules that the witness statement referenced by Qatar in the context of its 
request meets the timing requirements in paragraph 5(1) of the Working Procedures, 
the Panel will give sympathetic consideration to any subsequent request, from Saudi 
Arabia, to file a supplementary written submission specifically addressing this evidence 
if it so wishes.42 
1.32.   Qatar offered no further comments. However, o n 16 September 2019, Saudi Arabia responded 
by strongly objecting to the proposed SCI procedures.43 Saudi Arabia indicated that it could not 
accept these procedures for a number of reasons:  
a. the proposal to have a list of "approved persons" was deemed unacc eptable because 
the Saudi government officials, staff and contractors who may need access to 
information designated as SCI include persons located in Saudi Arabia's agencies 
responsible for matters such as national security and law enforcement, and the ide ntity 
of many persons in the relevant agencies cannot be disclosed without violating its 
essential security interests44;  
b. the premise of the SCI procedures —that a person's safety would be threatened by 
disclosing information of illegal activity in Saudi Arabia —was regarded as wholly 
unacceptable45;  
c. the proposed definition of SCI, as information "the disclosure of which could,  in the 
submitting party's view , cause harm to the originators of the information" reflected that 
premise, and was also incons istent with Appellate Body guidance that procedures for 
granting enhanced protection for confidential or sensitive information must set out 
objective criteria that panels must apply46;  
d. while most requests to adopt procedures for additional protection are g ranted by 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body, if a party opposes the application of 
proposed  BCI/SCI  procedures, as in this case, a panel must exercise its control as 
adjudicator and require sound justification for the procedures47;  
 
40 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 13 September 2019.  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 16 September 2019.  
44 Ibid. para. 5.  
45 Ibid. para. 8.  
46 Ibid. para. 12. (emphasis original)  
47 Ibid. para. 15.  
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  e. any decision to open the  door to sensitive witness evidence of this kind, and the 
establishment of related procedures and safeguards, should be based on input from the 
broader WTO Membership, at least including the third parties to the dispute48; and  
f. the proposed SCI procedures w ould violate Saudi Arabia's due process rights, because 
the complaining party's last -minute request to submit unprecedented witness 
information under SCI procedures in the circumstances of this dispute would effectively 
deprive Saudi  Arabia of its right to  present arguments at the second substantive 
meeting concerning the veracity of the information and the source of the information 
based on an adequate review of the submitted information.49 
1.33.   The Panel invited Qatar to respond to Saudi Arabia's objections to the proposed 
SCI procedures by 20 September 2019, with a view to determining the next steps in the light of 
Qatar's response.50 On 19 September 2019, Qatar responded that Saudi Arabia's objections went 
beyond the scope of the Panel's request to comment on the specific procedures proposed by the 
Panel on 13  September 2019, and that it was "inappropriate and inefficient for the part ies to continue 
exchanging views on matters that the Panel has already decided". As such, Qatar stated that it would 
refrain from commenting further on the need for SCI procedures in this dispute, and offered no 
further comments on the SCI procedures propo sed by the Panel.51  
1.34.   Qatar enclosed with its letter a copy of the relevant exhibit (i.e. Exhibit QAT -222) with certain 
confidential information blacked out and redacted, as well as Qatar's complete second written 
submission, also with certain confidential i nformation blacked out and redacted. Qatar requested 
that these documents be made available promptly to Saudi Arabia, noting that it trusted that 
reviewing this document would convince Saudi Arabia to withdraw its objections regarding the 
timeliness and re levance of the exhibit. Qatar also indicated that, upon issuance of SCI procedures, 
it was prepared to submit to the Panel, for transmission to Saudi Arabia, the complete SCI versions 
of these documents. These versions would include the previously blacked -out text in its entirety, in 
unredacted form within square brackets.52  
1.35.   Following receipt of Qatar's comments, along with the redacted version of Exhibit QAT -222 
and the revised version of Qatar's second written submission, the Panel informed the parties th at it 
had instructed the Secretariat to hold these documents, without passing them on to Saudi Arabia, 
until the Panel had determined how it would proceed. The Panel indicated that it would finalize the 
issue of additional confidentiality procedures which it expected to do in the course of the second 
substantive meeting. The Panel also informed the parties that it had not seen any version of the 
material in question, redacted or unredacted.53 
1.36.   At the second substantive meeting with the parties held on 3 Octob er 2019, the Panel 
informed the parties that, following further deliberations on this matter, it would not adopt the 
SCI procedures as requested by Qatar, and that it did not consider that there were alternative 
procedures that would be effective to achiev e Qatar's stated objective. The Panel concluded, 
therefore, that it would not adopt any additional SCI procedures. The Panel then informed the parties 
that it had declined Saudi Arabia's request to declare the witness statement as inadmissible on the 
basis that it was not submitted in a timely manner in accordance with paragraph 5(1) of the 
Working  Procedures. The Panel informed the parties that Qatar was free to submit the witness 
statement, but that if it elected to do so, Qatar must rely on the general c onfidentiality provisions 
set forth in the DSU and reflected in paragraph 2(1) of the Working Procedures. The Panel recalled 
that, according to Article 18.2 of the DSU, and paragraph 2(1) of the Working Procedures, " Members 
shall treat as confidential info rmation submitted to the Panel which the submitting Member has 
designated as confidential".  
1.37.   In response, Qatar indicated that it would submit the witness statement pursuant to the 
general confidentiality provisions of Article 18.2 of the DSU. Qatar further  indicated that its original, 
unredacted second written submission as filed on 30 August 2019, which referred to and quoted 
 
48 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 16 September 2019, paras. 17 -18. 
49 Ibid. paras. 21 -22. 
50 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 17 September 2019.  
51 Qatar's communication to the Panel, dated 19 September 2019, p. 1.  
52 Ibid. p. 2.  
53 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 23 September 2019.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  from Exhibit QAT -222, should be treated as the relevant version of the submission for purposes of 
the Panel record. However, upon Qa tar's indication that it planned to re -file its second written 
submission and Exhibit  QAT-222 in unredacted form relying on the general confidentiality provisions 
of Article 18.2 of the DSU, Saudi Arabia informed the Panel that it did not wish to receive t his exhibit.  
1.38.   The Panel informed the parties that in accordance with Article 18.2 of the DSU, 
Qatar's  designation of the name and identifying information of the witness as confidential meant 
that such information would be treated as strictly confidential a s far as the Panel was concerned, 
and as far as both parties were concerned. In response to Saudi Arabia's statement that it did not 
wish to receive the submission or witness statement, the Panel stated that, because the documents 
would be submitted to the  Panel and would form part of the record, the Panel had no choice but to 
send the documents to Saudi Arabia. The Panel noted subsequently that whether Saudi Arabia would 
wish to consider, review, comment on, or treat the documents as not having been receiv ed was a 
matter for Saudi Arabia.  
1.39.   In response to the Panel's statements, Saudi Arabia stated that, as a matter of sovereignty, 
it had the right to accept or reject the submission of any document to it, and reiterated that it did 
not wish to receive the su bmissions containing the information designated as confidential by Qatar. 
Saudi Arabia explained that it was refusing to receive the submissions because the designation of 
the witness' name as confidential information was premised on the "totally unaccepta ble" allegation 
that Saudi Arabia potentially represented a risk to the individual or his family. Saudi Arabia stated 
that it would never accept such an allegation and  that it would never accept receiving such 
information designated as confidential.  
1.40.   On 4 October 2019, the Panel informed the parties that Qatar had re -filed the unredacted 
version of its second written submission and Exhibit QAT -222, including its annexes. The Panel 
recalled that Saudi Arabia had stated at the second substantive meeting that it did not wish to 
receive a copy of this exhibit and informed the parties, notwithstanding what it had said earlier, that 
"[o]ut of respect for Saudi Arabia's position, the Panel will not forward this exhibit and its annexes 
to Saudi Arabia."54 
1.41.   On the even ing of 20 December 2019, which was the date by which the parties were to submit 
their comments on the draft descriptive part of the Report, Saudi Arabia sent the Panel a 
communication that developed the assertion that the witness statement should not be gi ven any 
weight because of the individual's employment relationship with Qatar.  On 9 January 2020, the Panel 
received Qatar's comments. On 14 January 2020, the Panel acknowledged receipt of the parties' 
respective communications and indicated that it had  no need for further submissions on the matter 
which would  be addressed in the Panel Report.  
2  FACTUAL ASPECTS  
2.1  Introduction  
2.1.  This section provides an overview of the factual background to the case, and then briefly sets 
out the measures at issue. A more detaile d review of the facts, and the Panel's findings on any 
disputed factual issues, will be set forth as necessary in the context of the Findings in Section 7 of 
this Report.  
2.2  Factual background  
2.2.1   The broadcasting and copyright regime in Saudi Arabia  
2.2.  The Saudi Ministry of Media (formerly the Ministry of Culture and Information) and the General 
Commission  of Audio and Visual Media (GCAM ) are the governmental entities "in charge of any 
broadcast, publication, and distribution of written, visual, or audio media content". This includes "the 
granting of media licences in … Saudi Arabia and [matters relating to] broadcast, publication, and 
 
54 Panel's communication to the parties, dated 4 October 2019.  
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  distribution using media channels and multiplatform, which encompass broadcast signals via 
satellites".55 
2.3.  All television and media channels that are interested in operating in Saudi Arabia "must obtain 
all required licen ces from the relevant regulatory author ities which may permit operation in the 
media field and more specifically in relation to publishing and distributing media content or sale and 
importation of all required reception equipment for the provision thereof".56 To be licensed as a 
broadcaster, an entity must satisfy certain objective criteria specific to the broadcasting business, 
and then generally applicable Saudi law must be observed, including, but not limited to, copyright 
law, publications law, competition law and criminal law.57 Broadcasting approval requirements are 
set out in the regulations of GCAM.58 These provide, among other things, that a Pay TV service shall 
not be operated in Saudi Arabia without a licence from GCAM.59 A broadcasting licence may not be 
renewed or can be cancelled if its  holder does not comply with broadcasting laws and regulations or 
with any other generally applicable Saudi law.   
2.4.  Saudi Arabia's domestic copyright regime is established through its Copyright Law60 and 
Implementing Regulations.61 These instruments are also administered by the Ministry of Media. 
Article 1 of the Copyright Law defines a "work" as "[a]ny literary, scientific or artistic work". 
Furthermore, it defines "audio -visual work" as "[a]ny work produced for simultaneous audio and 
visual use, consisting o f a series of related images, accompanied by sound and recorded on an 
appropriate means and shown by suitable devices". Article 1 of the Copyright Law defines 
"broadcasting" to include transmissions via satellite.62  
2.5.  The list of various types of protected w orks in Article  2 of the Copyright Law includes, inter alia, 
"[w]orks which are especially prepared for broadcasting or are presented through broadcasting", 
and "audiovisual works".63 Article 9 of the Copyright Law provides the author, or whoever she or he 
delegates, the right to, inter alia , "[c]ommunicat[e] the work to the public via any possible means, 
such as displaying, acting, broadcasting or data transmission networks".64  
2.6.  Both parties agree d with the premise that professional sports broadcasts constit ute protected 
"works" under the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the 
TRIPS  Agreement65, and are covered by the definition of "Audio -Visual Work" under Article 1 of 
Saudi  Arabia's Copyright Law, or otherwise protected under the Copyright Law.66 
2.7.  Article 13 of the Implementing Regulations provides that "[a]ny  use beyond that specified by 
the owner of audio, visual and broadcasting works shall be deemed an infringement of copyright", 
including "communication [of] the work to the public without obtaining a prior license from the 
owners of the copyright" and "[b] reaking of protective barriers for the purpose of presenting 
 
55 See Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
Circular, Exhibit QAT -1, p. 1.  
56 Ibid. para. 2.  
57 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 28.  
58 Ibid. (referring to General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Translation of Executive Regulations for 
Licensing Pay TV Service, Summary of Legal Requirements for Broadcasters, Exhib it SAU -19). 
59 General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Translation of Executive Regulations for Licensing Pay TV 
Service, Summary of Legal Requirements for Broadcasters, Exhibit SAU -19, Article 5.1.  
60 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424,  30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT -112. See also 
Qatar's first written submission, para. 113.  
61 Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. 
(1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113. See also Qatar's 
first written submission, para. 113.  
62 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT -112, Article 1. 
See also Qatar's first written submission, para. 114.  
63 Copyright Law, Royal Decree  No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT -112, Article 2.  
64 Ibid. Article 9.  
65 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 47(a), para. 31; and Qatar's responses to Panel 
question No. 6(b)(iii), para. 48, and Panel question No. 9(a), para. 69. 
66 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 47(b), para. 32; and Qatar's response to Panel 
question No. 47(b), paras. 122 -127. 
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  broadcasting materials through illegal means".67 The latter is understood to cover the sale and 
making available of illegal decoders, a prohibition that is reinforced by Articles 15 and 17 of the 
Implementing Regulations.68 Article 11 of the Implementing Regulations on "Infringement Liability" 
extends to secondary liability by providing, inter alia , that "[a]ny person who obtains an original 
copy of any intellectual work and exploits it by means of renting, adaptation or permitting others to 
copy or reproduce it or any other acts which affect or obstruct the author from exercising his rights 
shall be deemed to have infringed the Copyright".69 
2.8.  With respect to broadcasting organizations, Article 18 of t he Copyright Law provides that the 
scope of the Copyright Law shall cover "[w]orks of broadcasting organisations".70 Article 7 of the 
Implementing Regulations provides broadcasting organizations with "the right to prohibit any of the 
following acts if under taken without their authorisation: (1) [f]ixation and reproduction of 
broadcasts[;] (2) [r]etransmission by wireless means and communication of materials to the 
public[;] (3) [d]etermining the means of direct broadcast and reception or through receivers or  by 
cable[; and] (4) [t]ransmission to the public of radio broadcast in public places or through internal 
wire broadcasts of closed compounds".71   
2.9.  Pursuant to Saudi law, several entities are involved in the initiation, investigation and 
adjudication  of allegations of infringement of the above -mentioned copyrights and related rights. In 
certain cases, the initiation of such procedures and investigatio ns could ultimately lead to the 
application by the Saudi government of criminal penalties. Under Article 20 of the Implementing 
Regulations, entitled "Detection  Tasks", "officials of the General  Department of Copyright in Riyadh 
and its branches in the Kin gdom's provinces" are "responsible for the task of detecting violations 
and securing the evidence proving the existence of an infringement of copyright, such as equipment, 
works or commodities".72 Article  21 of the Implementing Regulations then explains tha t, "upon 
receiving the evidence" resulting from the "detection tasks", the "General Department of Copyright 
or the competent branch shall" move forward with a number of procedures including "analyzing the 
content of evidence", after which it must then prep are a report (pursuant to Article 22).73 Article 23 
of the Implementing Regulations, entitled "Investigation of Violations", refers to a "competent 
investigating officer", and sets out procedures for the task of investigating.74 After the Saudi 
government pe rforms its investigation, and in accordance with Article 23(11) of the Implementing 
Regulations, the "General Department of Copyright shall refer the cases and violations along with 
all relevant documents to the Committee".75 
2.10.   The "Committee" referred to in Article 23(11) of the Implementing Regulations  is established 
pursuant to Article 25 thereof, entitled "Violation Review Committee". Referred to as the 
"Copyright  Committee" by Qatar, it is established to adjudicate any allegations of 
 
67 Qatar's first written submission, para. 116 (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, 
Minister of Cultur e and Information's Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. 
(1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, Article  13).  
68 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's 
Decision No. (168 8/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, 
Articles 15 and 17).  
69 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's 
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004 and amended by decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, 
Article 11).   
70 Ibid. para. 117 (referring to Copyr ight Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 
30 August  2003, Exhibit QAT -112,  Article  18).    
71 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's 
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Dec ision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, 
Article 7).   
72 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 28 (referring to Implementing Regulations of 
Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amende d by 
Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, Article 20 (First)).  
73 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's 
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, 
Articles 21 and 22).  
74 Ibid. (referring to Implement ing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's 
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, 
Article 23).  
75 Ibid. (referring to Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Mini ster of Culture and Information's 
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, 
Article 23(11)).  
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  copyright  infringemen t referred to it. Once the Copyright Committee takes a decision by majority 
vote with respect to any such allegations, its decision is subject to a subsequent layer of approval 
before it is made final.76 
2.11.   The elements of the operation of the Copyright Commit tee, insofar as they have been 
described generally above, do not appear to be contested by either party. Following the first 
substantive meeting with the Panel, however, Saudi Arabia indicated that three resolutions by the 
Council of Ministers had amended the Copyright Law or affected the manner in which the Copyright 
Committee would operate.77 More specifically, these amendments concern the question of which 
governmental actor is tasked with approving the decisions taken by the Copyright  Committee.  
2.12.   In its u namended form, Article 25(1) of the Copyright Law states that "[a] Committee to 
review the violation shall be formed by the Minister [of Culture and Information]'s decision" to review 
allegations of copyright infringement.78 Then, under the unamended versio ns of Article 25(2) of the 
Copyright Law and Article 25(6) of the Implementing Regulations, the decisions taken by the 
Copyright Committee as to the allegations of copyright infringement referred to it:   
a. "shall be endorsed by the Minister" (Article 25(2) o f the Copyright Law)79; and, more 
specifically,  
b. "shall be referred by the chairman of the committee to the Minister, and said decisions 
shall not be effective unless approved by the Minister" ( Article 25(6) of the Implementing 
Regulations ).80  
Qatar thus re ad the unamended Copyright Law and Implementing Regulations as having required 
that the Minister approve or endorse the decisions taken by the Copyright Committee before such 
decisions are to have any legal effect.81 
2.13.   According to Saudi Arabia82, however, the  Copyright Law and Implementing Regulations were 
amended, such that, under Article 25(2) of the Copyright Law and Article 25(6) of the Implementing 
Regulations, the Board of Directors of the Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (SAIP), not the 
Ministe r, would have the responsibility for endorsing or approving the decisions of the Copyright 
Committee.83 The Board of Directors would be composed of 12 government representatives and 
 
76 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT -112, 
Article  25; a nd Copyright Law, Exhibit SAU -32, Article 25.  
77 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 26 -28. See footnote 82 below for more 
information about the amending resolutions. Saudi Arabia addressed this and other factual aspects of the 
measures raised by Qatar for the purpose of demonstrating its "good faith conduct in  connection with the 
invocation of the security exception" in Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement, and asks that this be clearly 
reflected in the Report. (Saudi Arabia's comments on the draft descriptive part of the Report, p. 2.)  
78 Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT -112, 
Article  25(1).  
79 Qatar's second written submission, para. 105 (quoting Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 
Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT -112, Article  25(2)). (emphasis omitted)  
80 Qatar's second written submission, para. 105 (quoting Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, 
Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. 
(1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, Article 25(6)). (emphasis omitted)  
81 See, e.g. Qatar's first written submission, paras . 119, 121, 140, 152, 350, 381 and 401 -402; and 
Qatar's second written submission, paras. 93 -94, 104 -105, 109, 191, 200 and 218.  
82 Saudi Arabia submitted the amended versions of its Copyright Law and its Implementing Regulations, 
as well as the three resol utions that either amended the text of the Copyright Law or defined the composition 
of the Board of Directors. (See Copyright Law, Exhibit  SAU-32, Article 25(2); and Saudi  Arabia's  response to 
Panel question No. 48, paras. 33 -36 (referring to Council of Mi nisters' Resolution No. 536 in 2018 
(19/10/1439  H), Exhibit SAU -42; Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 496 in 2018 (14/09/1439 H), 
Exhibit  SAU-43; Council of Ministers' Resolution No. 410 in 2017 (28/06/1438 H), Exhibit SAU -44; and 
Implementing Regulatio ns of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No.  (1688/1), 
29 May 2004 as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005 and Resolution of the Board of Directors of 
the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority No. (4/8/2019) dated 4/9/144 0 AH, Exhibit SAU -45)). 
83 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras. 26 and 27 (referring to Copyright Law, 
Exhibit  SAU-32, Article 25(2)); and Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and 
Information's Decision No. (168 8/1), 29 May 2004 as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005 and 
Resolution of the Board of Directors of the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority No. (4/8/2019) dated 
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  three non -governmental stakeholders, appointed by a decision of the Council  of Ministers on the 
proposal of the President of the Council.84 The amendments to the Copyright Law and the 
Implementing Regulations would also replace, in Articles 1 and 24 of the Copyright Law and Article 
1 of the Implementing Regulations, the terms "Min istry" (referring to the Ministry of Culture and 
Information) and "Minister" (referring to the Minister of Culture and Information), with the terms 
"Authority" (referring to the SAIP) and "Board of Directors" (referring to the SAIP's Board of 
Directors), r espectively. The replacement of both sets of terms also appears to have taken place in 
Articles 16(1), 16(3), 22 and 26 of the Copyright Law.85  
2.14.   Qatar note d that the amended versions of the Copyright Law86 and Implementing 
Regulations87 do not appear to be publicly available, and thus it question ed whether these versions 
have entered into force. In particular, Qatar note d that the amended Implementing Regulations were 
not issued until 9 May 2019, approximate ly six months after the establishment of the Panel. Qatar 
request ed the Panel to consider the Implementing Regulations at the time of the Panel's 
establishment (i.e. 18 December 2018)88, but also note d that "[r]egardless of the precise identity of 
the gate keeper —the Ministry or a Board of Directors consisting mostly of high -ranking government 
officials  … — Saudi  Arabia's copyright regime requires mandatory political approval to make any 
enforcement of copyright effective for both civil and criminal remedies ".89 
2.15.   Finally, Qatar stated that it underst ood that the Copyright Committee "is the sole entity 
responsible for copyright infringement"90 and "has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence 
of criminal piracy and to determine the resulting penalties".91 However , Saudi Arabia submit ted that 
the SAIP also has responsibilities relating to copyright enforcement.92  
2.2.2   The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it  
2.16.   The issues that arise in this dispute must be understood in the context of the s erious 
deterioration of relations between Saudi Arabia, Qatar and certain other countries from the MENA 
 
4/9/1440  AH, Exhibit SAU -45, Article 20). See also Council of Ministers' Resolution  No. 536 in 2018 
(19/10/1439 H), Exhibit SAU -42, p. 5 of PDF file.  
84 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 27 (referring to Council of Ministers' 
Resolution No. 496 in 2018 (14/09/1439 H), Exhibit SAU -43, p. 13 of PDF file; and Council of  Ministers' 
Resolution No. 410 in 2017 (28/06/1438 H), Exhibit SAU -44, p. 10 of PDF file).  
85 Compare Copyright Law, Royal Decree No. M -41 of 2 Rajab, 1424, 30 August 2003, Exhibit QAT -112, 
Articles 1, 16(1), 16 (3) 22, 24 and 26, with Copyright Law, Exhibi t SAU -32, Articles 1, 16(1), 16 (3) 22, 24 
and 26; and compare Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's 
Decision No. (1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005, Exhibit QAT -113, 
Article 1,  with Implementing Regulations of Copyright Law, Minister of Culture and Information's Decision No. 
(1688/1), 29 May 2004, as amended by Decision No. (1640), 22 June 2005 and Resolution of the Board of 
Directors of the Saudi Intellectual Property Authority  No. (4/8/2019) dated 4/9/1440 AH, Exhibit SAU -45, 
Article 1.  
86 Qatar indicated that the Arabic version of the Copyright Law available on the homepage of the 
website of the SAIP and the website of the Saudi Embassy to the United States reflects the Copyrig ht Law prior 
to its amendment. The link to the English version of the Copyright Law on the SAIP website directed the user 
to a page from the "Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers" entitled "Page not found 404". (Qatar's 
second written submission, para. 111. See also Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question 
No. 49, para. 110.) Qatar also expressed concerns that the amended Copyright Law has not been notified to 
the TRIPS Council pursuant to Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. ( Ibid. paras. 101 and 111.)  
87 Qatar noted that the publicly available version of the Implementing Regulations does not reflect the 
amendment made thereto, and that, presumably, the publicly available version remains in force. 
(Qatar's  second written submiss ion, paras.  106-108. See also Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to 
Panel question No. 49, para. 110.) Qatar also expressed concerns that the amended Implementing Regulations 
have not been notified to the TRIPS Council pursuant to Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. (Ibid. para. 111.)  
88 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 49, para. 108; and Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's 
response to Panel question No. 49, para. 108.  
89 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 93 -94. See also, ibid. paras. 1 04-109, 191, 200 and 218.  
90 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 120, 152, 350, 381 and 401.  
91 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 30. As described in paragraph 2.9 above, Qatar noted 
that, in addition to the adjudicative role of the Copyri ght Committee, "other elements of the Saudi government 
are, pursuant to Saudi law, allocated the role of initiating criminal procedures that would ultimately lead to 
criminal penalties". (See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 26 -31.) 
92 Saudi  Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 34.  
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  region.93 On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other nations severed all relations with Qatar.94 
In their respective submissions to the Panel, t he disputing parties (and the UAE as a third party) 
each referred to the 5  June 2017 severance and/or the events leading up to the severance and, as 
noted below, the disputing parties characterized the severance of relations as constituting relevant 
"background " to the measures at issue in this dispute.  
2.17.   Saudi Arabia characterized the events leading up to its severance of relations with Qatar as 
"relevant background information".95 However, Saudi Arabia went further, submitting also that the 
"severance of relatio ns between the two countries and the publicly -stated reasons for the measures 
of Saudi Arabia constitute the only relevant facts in this dispute".96  
2.18.   For its part, Qatar explained in its first written submission that the "rampant piracy at issue 
in this dispute has occurred against the background of Saudi Arabia having imposed, since 5 June 
2017, a scheme of coercive economic measures against Qatar".97 In its panel request, Qatar stated 
also that:  
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia imposed a scheme of diplomatic, political, and economic 
measures against Qatar. Such measures impacted, inter alia , the ability of Qatari 
nationals to protect intellectual property rights in Saudi Arabia. … The multiple Qatari 
companies severely impacted by these measures include beIN Me dia Group LLC and 
affiliates ("beIN").98 
2.19.   According to Saudi Arabia, especially since 2011, "the security situation in many countries in 
the [MENA] region has been unstable, with wars, terrorism, and instability prevailing in many places 
for many different r easons, causing a devastating effect on human life and on the stability of national 
governments and multiple crises in international relations".99 Saudi Arabia provided the following 
summary of and perspective on the events leading up to the 5 June 2017 sev erance. The Panel 
expresses or implies no position concerning any of these allegations . The Panel further recalls that 
Qatar , while maintaining that many of Saudi Arabia's assertions about the events leading up to the 
severance of relations are irrelevant to the specific measures at issue, strongly denied certain 
accusations made by Saudi Arabia.  Among other things, Qatar maintains that the period leading up 
to that date was characterized by cordial and cooperative relations between Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia.100 
2.20.   In the context of its discussion of the security situation, Saudi Arabia submit ted that "years 
of active diplomacy at the highest national levels" took place within the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC),101 a regional council established by Saudi Arabia, Bahra in, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the 
 
93 See Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 2 ("There is no question 
that a significant dispute has arisen among the complaining Party, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt,  and the 
United Arab Emirates.")  
94 See, e.g. Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 1 -2; and United Arab Emirates' third -party 
submission, para. 24 (referring to the United Arab Emirates' 5 June Declaration, Exhibit ARE -6). See also 
Saudi  Arabia's  opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 46 (referring to United Arab Emirates' 
5 June Declaration, Exhibit ARE -6; and Kingdom of Bahrain Ministry Foreign Affairs News Details, Statement of 
the Kingdom of Bahrain on the severance of dipl omatic relations with the State of Qatar, 5 June 2017). 
Saudi  Arabia states that the Panel "may also take judicial notice of the fact that other Members of the WTO 
have taken similar measures in response to the actions of the complaining Member". (Saudi Ar abia's first 
written submission, para.  2.)   
95 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting, para. 23.  
96 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 2. In keeping with its view that these are the only 
relevant facts in this dispute, Saudi Arab ia states that:  
Saudi Arabia's only comment regarding the substance of the complaint in this dispute, and 
regarding references to the relevant company of the complaining Party, is that issues with the 
company began in 2016, and there never was a relationship between the c ompany, on the one 
hand, and any measures taken by Saudi Arabia in connection with the break in diplomatic and 
consular relations, on the other hand. Any issue that the company may have is unrelated to the 
real dispute between Saudi Arabia and the complain ing Party. (Saudi Arabia's opening statement 
at the first meeting, para. 3.)  
97 Qatar's first written submission, para. 14.  
98 Qatar's panel request, paras. 6 -7. 
99 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 24.  
100 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 96-103. 
101 Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 17.  
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  UAE.102 According to Saudi Arabia, it and other GCC Countries "have acted, individually where 
necessary and collectively wherever possible, to uproot the sources of instability in our region".103 
Saudi Arabia state d that "[c]ons istent with this commitment", in November 2013, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar and the UAE signed the "First Riyadh Agreement", which established a collective understanding 
of the causes for, and solutions to, instability and violence in the region.104   
2.21.   The First R iyadh Agreement included a collective commitment by signatories to refrain from 
taking certain actions that were identified as the cause of instability, and which are set out in the 
three paragraphs of the First Riyadh Agreement.105 The First Riyadh Agreemen t set forth the 
following obligations:  
1.  No interference in the internal affairs of the Council's states, whether directly or 
indirectly. Not to give harbor or naturalize any citizen of the Council states that has an activity 
which opposes his country's regimes, except with the approval of his country; no support to 
deviant groups that oppose their states; and no support for antagonistic media.  
2.  No support to the Muslim Brotherhood or any of the organizations, groups or individuals 
that threaten the se curity and stability of the Council States through direct security work or 
through political influence.  
3.  Not to present any support to any faction in Yemen that could pose a threat to countries 
neighboring Yemen.106 
2.22.   On 5 March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain issued a statement withdrawing their 
ambassadors from Qatar. In the statement, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain took the position 
that Qatar had not taken necessary actions to put into effect the commitments contained in the First 
Riyadh Agree ment of 23 and 24 November 2013.107 The statement referred, among other things, to 
the principle "not to support all of the actions that threaten the security and stability of the GCC 
Countries by organisations or individuals, either through direct security work or by attempting 
political i nfluence as well as not supporting hostile media".108   
2.23.   The Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement was signed by all GCC Countries on 
17 April 2014 and set forth implementation procedures regarding the obligations contained in the 
Riyadh Agreement.  It identified certain agreed threats to the security and stability of GCC Countries, 
reaffirmed the obligations undertaken in the First Riyadh Agreement, and established specific 
procedures to ensure compliance with commitments undertaken.  It also reiterated a nd expanded 
upon the obligations listed in the First Agreement relating to the "Internal Security" of GCC 
Countries, their "Foreign Policy" and their "Internal Affairs". The Implementing Mechanism further 
clarified that "[i]f any country of the GCC Countri es failed to comply with this mechanism, the other 
GCC Countries shall have the right to take an[y] appropriate action to protect their security and 
stability".109 
2.24.   On 16 November 2014, the GCC Countries found it necessary to enter into the 
"Supplementary Riy adh Agreement".110 Under the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, GCC Countries 
undertook, among other things, "not to give refuge, employ, or support whether directly or 
indirectly, whether domestically or abroad, to any person or media apparatus that harbors 
inclinations harmful to any [GCC] state".111 It further stated that all signatories were committed to 
"ceasing all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of Egypt in all media platforms, whether 
 
102 Saudi Arabia's op ening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 5. See also Implementing 
Mechanism, Exhibit SAU -3, p. 11.  
103 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 25.  
104 Ibid. para. 26. See First Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit SAU -2. 
105 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 26. See First Riyadh 
Agreement, Exhibit SAU -2. 
106 First Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit SAU -2, p. 5.  
107 Joint Statement of 5 March 2014, Exhibit SAU -5, p. 2 of PDF file.  
108 Ibid. 
109 Implemen ting Mechanism, Exhibit SAU -3, p. 11.  
110 Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit SAU -4. 
111 Ibid. para. 3(c).  
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  directly or indirectly, including all the offenses bro adcasted on Al Jazeera , Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, 
and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media ".112  
2.25.   In connection with the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE 
returned their ambassadors to Qatar in November 2014.113 However, Saudi Arabia assert ed that, 
between November 2014 and June 2017, Qatar continued to violate the explicitly agreed terms of 
the Riyadh Agreements by supporting and harbouring extremist individuals and organizations, many 
of whom had been designate d as terrorists by the United Nations and by individual countries114; 
supporting and allowing terrorist and extremist groups to use Qatar -based and Qatar -sponsored 
media platforms to spread their messages115; and  "[e]ngaging in activities that threatened the 
security and stability of GCC Countries as detailed in reports by intelligence chiefs, including as 
mandated under the Riyadh Agreements, the details of which will not be presented in the context of 
this WTO dispute".116  
2.26.   On 19 February 2017, Qatar's Foreign Minister sent a letter to the Secretary General of the 
GCC calling upon the GCC Countries to "agree to terminate the Riyadh Agreement which has been 
overtaken by events at the international and regional levels."117  Saudi Arabia said that it considered 
this letter to amount to "a repudiation by Qatar of its obligations under the Riyadh Agreements"118 
(to which Qatar responded that the letter could not reasonably be read in that manner119). 
2.27.   Saudi Arabia assert ed that, between 19 February 2017 and 5 June 2017, Qatar continued to 
act against Saudi Arabia's essential security interests, in violation of the terms of the 
Riyadh  Agreements.  Saudi Arabia assert ed that, in addition to continuing to harbour and support 
extremists and terrorists, Qatar ha d purported ly made  ransom payments to secure the release of 
kidnapped members of the Qatari royal family.120 (Qatar responded  that these assertions should be 
rejected as having no basis in fact.121) 
2.28.   According to Saudi Arabia, it was in the light of the above developments, and following 
Saudi  Arabia's further consideration of remaining viable options to protect its essential security 
interests in view of Qatar's failure to abide by its commitments under the Riyadh Agreement, tha t 
Saudi Arabia determined that severing all diplomatic and consular relations would be the only way 
to protect effectively its sovereign interests.122   
2.29.   On 5 June 2017, Saudi Arabia severed relations with Qatar, including diplomatic and consular 
relations, t he closure of all ports , the prevention of Qatari nationals from crossing into Saudi 
territory , and the expulsion within 14 days of Qatari residents and visitors in Saudi territories .  On 
the same day, Saudi Arabia publicly articulated the rationale behind  the measures in the following 
terms:  
 
112 Ibid. para. 3(d). 
113 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 32.  
114 Ibid. para. 33, first bullet (referring to Saud i Arabia and Regional Security, Qatar's History of Funding 
Terrorism and Extremism, 27 June 2017, Exhibit SAU -6)). 
115 Ibid. para. 33, second bullet (referring to Qatar's Al Jazeera, Counter Extremism Project , visited 
7 July 2019; Al Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood , The Washington Post, 
5 January 2014, Exhibit SAU -7). 
116 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 33, third bullet.  
117 Letter from H.E. Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al -Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, to H.E.  
Dr.  Abdullatif Bin Rashid Al Zayani, Secretary -General of the GCC, 19 February 2017, Exhibit ARE -3. According 
to the United Arab Emirates, the text should be translated as saying that "the subject  of this agreement has 
been exhausted", that "this agreement must be terminated since the purpose of it has been completed ", and 
that "the reliance on the Riyadh Agreement and the abandonment of the Charter and its other mechanisms do 
not serve the interests and objectives of the GCC"; according to Qatar, it should be translated as "the subject  
matter  of this Agreement has been exhausted" and "this agreement should  be terminated due to the 
exhaustion of its purpose ", and "relying on the Riyadh Agreement and abando ning the GCC Charter and its 
other mechanisms do not achieve the interests or goals of the GCC". (See Qatar's communication to the Panel, 
dated 2 July 2019, and the United Arab Emirates' response, dated 10 July 2019. (emphasis added))  
118 Saudi Arabia's open ing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 34.  
119 Qatar's second written submission, paras. 301 -305. 
120 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 35 -37. 
121 Qatar's second written submission, para. 298.  
122 Ibid. para. 37.  
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  [T]he Government of … Saudi Arabia emanating from exercising its sovereign rights 
guaranteed by [] international law and protecting its national security from the dangers 
of terrorism and extremism has decided to sever  diplomatic and consular relations with 
the State of Qatar, close all land, sea and air ports, prevent crossing into Saudi 
territories, airspace and territorial waters.123 
2.2.3   The broadcasting operations of the Qatari -based beIN Media Group  
2.30.   beIN Media Group LLC (beIN) is a global sports and entertainment company headquartered 
in Qatar.124  
2.31.   To build its business, beIN has made substantial investments in acquiring licences to 
broadcast content produced by major international right holders. To this end, it has obtaine d the 
exclusive rights to broadcast, and to authorize others to broadcast, prime sporting competitions in 
the MENA region, including in Saudi Arabia.125 beIN's content includes, but is not limited to, 
broadcasts of: the major European football leagues, Major  League Baseball, the National Basketball 
Association, the National Football League, the US Open Tennis Championships, the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup, the Union of European Football Associations 
(UEFA) Champions Leag ue and many others.126  
2.32.   The rights to broadcast this content have been licensed on a territorial basis, and beIN holds 
exclusive rights to broadcast in the territory of Saudi Arabia.127 As a licensor and commercial 
broadcaster of sports and entertainment content, beIN's revenues are largely generated from 
subscriptions to beIN's television packages. Saudi Arabia is the largest and most important market 
in the MENA region, and is strategi cally important to beIN and its right holders.128 
2.33.   beIN generally owns the copyright in: ( a) any match/event commentary produced by beIN 
(for example, Arabic match commentary) on particular matches/events; ( b) any studio programming 
produced in and around the  relevant live matches/events (excluding any match/event footage 
included within such studio programming but including any beIN filmed player/manager interviews, 
and other beIN produced non -match footage); ( c) beIN logos (including on -screen channel bugs) 
included within the relevant transmission; and ( d) any beIN commissioned/owned musical works 
included within the relevant transmissions.129 
2.34.   In addition, beIN owns the related rights130 conferred on broadcasting organizations131, 
including the right to prohibit u nauthorized fixations, reproductions of fixations and rebroadcasting 
by wireless means of broadcasts, as well as communications to the public of television broadcasts 
of the same.132  
 
123 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular 
relations with Qatar, 5 June 2019; and Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., Press 
Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of Qatar, 
5 June 2017, Exhibit SAU -1. See also Saudi Press Agency Website, " Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic 
and consular relations with Qatar ", 5 June 2017, Exhibit QAT -2. 
124 Qatar's first writt en submission, para. 29 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para. 2).  
125 Ibid. paras. 29 and 30 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-37, para.  6). 
126 Ibid. para. 31 (refer ring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15  April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 7).  
127 Ibid. para. 32 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 7).  
128 Ibid. para. 34 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Grou p LLC, 15  April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 8).  
129 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i), para. 34 (quoting Supplemental Declaration by 
beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217, para. 7). See also Supplemental Declaration,  para. 16.  
130 Article 14 of the TRIPS Agreement covers three categories of "related rights", or rights related to 
copyright. These are the rights of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations.  
131 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i), p ara. 34 (quoting Supplemental Declaration by beIN 
Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217, paras. 10 and 16).  
132 See Qatar's first written submission, paras. 340 -352; and Qatar's response to Panel question 
No. 6(b)(i), paras. 34 -36. beIN provided exa mples from its contracts with various right holders demonstrating 
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  2.35.   In some instances, beIN had the right to take action under the Saudi Copyr ight Law in respect 
of an infringed copyright work or related right where beIN is not the owner of that right.133 For 
example, pursuant to beIN’s media rights agreement with UEFA National Team Football, beIN may 
commence legal proceedings for infringement of  the underlying copyright work belonging to UEFA, 
with UEFA’s prior written consent. In general, given that beIN typically owns the copyright for 
multiple aspects of the works that it broadcasts, it would be expected that beIN and the relevant 
sports leagu e (e.g., UEFA) would ordinarily bring a copyright infringement action together, as co -
plaintiffs.134 
2.36.   Following Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with Qatar on 5 June 2017, the Saudi Ministry 
of Culture and Information blocked access to beIN's website in Saudi Arabia since early June 2017.135 
Since that time, customers connecting from a Saudi internet protocol address have been redirected 
to a page stating that beIN websites violate Saudi law.136  
2.37.   On 19 June 2017, the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and GCAM issued a Circular, 
which stated that beIN was not licensed to distribute media content, and did not have the right to 
operate, in Saudi Arabia.137 The Circular also provided that any distribution of media content either 
via satellites or through oth er means and platforms, and the charging and collection of related fees 
in Saudi Arabia without obtaining the necessary licences from the appropriate authorities:  
shall subject the distributors of such media content and content licensors, hardware 
supplier s, and their owners in their individual capacity to criminal prosecution and 
personal litigation and shall result in the imposition of penalties and fines and the loss 
of the legal right to protect any related intellectual property rights.138 
2.38.   On 11 July 2017 , the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority issued a Decision suspending and 
prohibiting "all monetary operations in all methods of payment either through credit cards, payment 
cards, transfers or any other method to the said company either for new subscription s or any 
renewals in its channels or services".139 The Decision referred directly to the Saudi Ministry of Culture 
and Information and GCAM's Circular of 19 June 2017, which Qatar says was to prohibit beIN sports 
channels in Saudi  Arabia and to severely limi t beIN's ability to operate in Saudi Arabia.140 
2.39.   The parties h eld different views as to the time periods during which beIN had a licence to 
operate in Saudi Arabia. According to Saudi Arabia, beIN was not licensed and did not have the right 
to operate in Saud i Arabia between December 2016 and June 2017 (or thereafter).141 According to 
 
that beIN retains copyright in its own works and the related rights in its broadcasts.  (See Qatar's  response to 
Panel question No. 45, para. 105 (referring to the Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217, paras. 7 -16).) 
133 beIN has to date not initiated civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ before Saudi  tribunals, 
and neither has any other foreign right holder. See paragraph 7.37 of this Report.  
134 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(ii), pa ras. 37 -38, and 6(b)(iii), para. 50 (referring to the 
Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217, para. 14).  
135 Qatar's first written submission, para. 39 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
15 April 2019,  Exhibit QAT -37, para. 12; and Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 
15 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation), Exhibit QAT -38). 
136 Ibid. (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para. 12).  
137 Qatar's first written submission, para. 40 (referring to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and 
General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, Exhibit QAT -1). Saudi Arabia confirmed that although the 
Circular was not "officially r eflected" in the records of the Ministry of Media, or "officially issued" by the 
Government of Saudi Arabia, the text of the Circular accurately reflects Saudi law. Saudi Arabia added, inter 
alia, that the Circular was informative in nature only and did no t change the status of or revoke the legal rights 
of any entity. (Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras. 10 -12 and 33.) 
In response to a Panel question, Saudi Arabia stated that "[t]here is no specific 'applicable law' that penalizes 
an unlicensed entity with the loss of the legal right to protect any related intellectual property rights." (Saudi 
Arabia's response to Panel question Nos. 11(b) and 29, paras. 2 and 29.)  
138 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and Gene ral Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, 
Exhibit QAT -1, p. 2.  
139 Qatar's first written submission, para. 42 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para. 15; and Saudi Monetary Authority, Confidential Circula r, 11 July 2017 
(Arabic original and English translation), Exhibit QAT -39). 
140 Ibid. (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para. 15).  
141 Letter from GCAM to beIN, Exhibit SAU -29; and Saudi Arabia's response to Pane l question No. 41, 
para. 26 (referring to Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 12).  
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  Qatar, beIN understood at all times until early June 2017 that it was operating with the approval of 
GCAM under a valid licence, pending the formal renewal of its pre -existing Pay TV Licence.142 
2.2.4   The emergence of beoutQ  
2.40.   Qatar provided the following summary of and perspective on the emergence of the 
broadcasting entity known as beoutQ, and the following facts do not appear to be contested. In 
August 2017, beoutQ began the unauthorized d istribution and streaming of media content that is 
created by or licensed to beIN, and  beIN continues to broadcast in the MENA region.143 The name 
"beoutQ", i.e. "be out Qatar", is a play on the name beIN Sports.144 beoutQ illegally streams and 
broadcasts the  contents of beIN's sports channels, replacing beIN's logo with that of beoutQ.145 It 
provides access to 10 beIN sports channels (both live and pre -recorded by beoutQ).146 In addition 
to pirated versions of live broadcasts147, beoutQ  also creates unauthorized reproductions of those 
broadcasts for later replay as reruns.148 
2.41.   While beoutQ initially limited its activities to streaming pirated content online, it expanded to 
the retail sale of beoutQ -branded set -top boxes (STBs) throughout Sa udi Arabia and other 
countries.149 These STBs receive satellite broadcasts of pirated content and, as discussed further 
below, they also provide access to Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) applications offering thousands 
of pirated movies, TV shows and TV channels around the globe.150 Web streaming appears to have 
been terminated in favour of beoutQ's satellite -based broadcasting to STBs.151   
2.42.   There are reports that beoutQ STBs and subscriptions have been widely available in Saudi 
retail outlets since the autum n of 2017.152  The beoutQ STBs available in the above -referenced stores 
in November 2017 allegedly ranged in price from between Saudi Arabian Riyals (SAR) 360 – SAR 
400 (approximately USD  95 – 110).153 In September 2018, investigators reportedly found beoutQ 
STBs for sale in 16 electronics shops visited in Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam.154 These beoutQ STBs 
allegedly ranged in price from between SAR 330 – SAR 370 (approximately USD 89 – 99).155    
2.43.   In addition to generating revenue through sales of STBs and subscription s, beoutQ allegedly 
sells advertising slots on its 10 pirated channels, and publishes its advertising rates in Saudi Riyals 
on its website (e.g., Premier League "gold packages" for advertising priced at SAR 2,500,000 or 
 
142 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 42, para. 43.  
143 Qatar's first written submission, para. 47 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para. 17).  
144 Ibid. para. 35.  
145 Ibid. para. 48. See, e.g. beoutQ pirated broadcast of Champions League, Video, Exhibit QAT -43; 
beoutQ pirated broadcast of Europa League, Video, Exhibit QAT -44; beoutQ pirated b roadcast of FIFA World 
Cup game between Croatia and England of 2018, Video, Exhibit QAT -45; beoutQ pirated broadcast of 
Formula  1, Video, Exhibit QAT -46; and beoutQ pirated broadcast of NBA final games between the Cleveland 
Cavaliers and the Golden State W arriors of 2018, Video, Exhibit QAT -47. 
146 Qatar's first written submission, para. 36.  
147 See, e.g. beoutQ -pirated broadcast of NFL Super Bowl LIII game between New England Patriots and 
Philadelphia Eagles, Video, 4 February 2018, Exhibit QAT -72; Images of b eoutQ pirated broadcast of 
4 February 2018 NFL Super Bowl Half -Time Show, Exhibit QAT -73; and  Country -by-Country Examples of 
beoutQ Pirated Content (2018), Exhibit QAT -74.   
148 Qatar's first written submission. para. 48. See, e.g. 2017 -2019 Sampling of Live  and Replayed 
Content Broadcast on beoutQ, Exhibit QAT -48. 
149 Qatar's first written submission, para. 37. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. para. 78.  
152 Ibid. para. 61 (referring to Photographs of beoutQ  Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in 
Saudi  Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT -71). 
153 Ibid. para. 62 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 39).  
154 Ibid. para. 63 (referring to Photograp hs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in 
Saudi  Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT -71). 
155 Ibid. para. 64 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 37).  
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  approximately USD 666,638).156 Moreove r, many of the advertisements shown on beoutQ channels 
are reportedly for Saudi products.157 
2.44.   beoutQ has promoted its pirated streams on a variety of social media platforms, including 
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter.158 Additionally, beoutQ has circulated an an ti-beIN cartoon 
encouraging Saudi citizens and beIN's licensors to replace beIN with beoutQ.159 beoutQ packaging 
and promotional material in Saudi retail outlets explicitly advertises the availability of sports content 
exclusively licensed to beIN.160   
2.45.   While the focus of beoutQ's broadcasting activities was initially on sports content, it has 
expanded to cover the most popular movies and television programming in the world.161  In addition 
to illegally providing access to beIN channels 1 -10, the beoutQ STBs come  pre-loaded with IPTV 
applications and portals that lead to other pirated content.  Allegedly, the beoutQ custom app store, 
which comes pre -loaded on the device, contains 25 applications (apps), including 12 IPTV apps, 
which are used to watch live televisi on and video -on-demand (VOD) content over the Internet.  Some 
of these apps allegedly offer between 2,300 and 4,000 live or recorded television channels from all 
over the world with thousands of movies available in different languages, and up to 35,000 TV show 
episodes.162 The Show Box application, which has come to be known as the "Netflix of piracy", 
provides free access to more than 4,700 movies, 700 TV -shows and 35,000 TV -show episodes via 
streaming or direct download to the STB . The other five IPTV appli cations tested by beIN offer 
thousands of live television channels in addition to VOD content and require activation codes 
(subscriptions) that can be purchased online. These applications offer all major US and European 
television channels, live US sports events and movies and TV shows in English and other  languages. 
Some of these IPTV applications also broadcast the pirate beoutQ sports channels.163   
2.3  The measures at issue  
2.46.   According to Qatar, the measures at issue "include the following specific acts and/or 
omissions:  
(i) Saudi Arabia's acts and omissions that result in Qatari nationals being unable to protect 
their intellectual property rights, including copyrights, broadcasting rights, trademarks 
and other forms of intellectual property;  
(ii) Saudi Arabia's acts and omissions that result in failure to accord Qatari nationals 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to Saudi Arabia's own nationals or 
nationals of other countries, with regard to the protection of intellectual property rights, 
including copyrights, broadcasting rights, trademarks and other forms of intellectual 
property;  
(iii) Saudi Arabia's acts and omissions that make it unduly difficult, for Qatari nationals to 
access civil judicial remedies, or to seek remedies, in respect of enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, including copyrights, broadcasting rights, trademarks and 
other forms of intellectual property rights; and,  
 
156 Ibid. para. 67 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15  April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 47; beoutQ advertisements pricing rate cards Saudi Riyals, Exhibit  QAT-75). 
157 Ibid. para. 67 (referring to beoutQ advertisements for Saudi brands, Exhibit QAT -76). 
158 Ibid. para. 4 9 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 21; and Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT -41). 
159 Ibid. para. 50 (referring to beoutQ Promotional, as shown on beoutQ, Video, 21 September 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -49). 
160 Qatar's first written submission, para. 71 (referring to Images of beoutQ promotional material, 
Exhibit QAT -42). 
161 Ibid. paras. 72 -77. 
162 Ibid. (referring to NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " IPTV Piracy on BeoutQ STBs ", 25 November 2018, 
Exhibit QA T-79). 
163 Ibid. 
 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  (iv) Saudi Arabia's omission to prosecute, as a criminal violation, piracy on a commercial 
scale, of ma terial in which copyright is owned by, or licensed to, Qatari nationals."164 
2.47.   Qatar submit ted that the above "acts and omissions" are "reflected" in the following 
"evidence", which may also be analy sed as specific "measures" at issue in this proceeding165: 
a. the 19 June 2017 Circular  allegedly issued by the Ministry of Culture and Information 
and GCAM which, according to Qatar, served effectively to strip beIN of the legal right 
to protect any intellectual property rights related to the beIN channels ;  
b. so-called " anti-sympathy measures " allegedly imposed shortly after the severance of 
relations on 5  June 2017, and which allegedly subject lawyers based in Saudi Arabia to 
legal jeopardy if they express support for and/or provide assistance to Qatar and Qatari 
nationa ls, and thereby prevent beIN from securing legal representation  needed to 
access civil enforcement procedures against the infringement of its intellectual property 
rights;  
c. the travel restrictions , imposed on or shortly after 5 June 2017, to the extent tha t they, 
in combination with the anti -sympathy measures and other measures, allegedly prevent 
beIN from being able to  access civil enforcement procedures against the infringement 
of its intellectual property rights by initiating procedures or testifying in person;  
d. the Ministerial approval requirement  of Copyright Committee decisions which, as applied 
to beIN, allegedly p revents beIN from being able to  access civil and criminal166 
enforcement procedures against the infringement of its intellectual property rights;  
e. Saudi Arabia's alleged failure to apply criminal procedures and penalties  against 
beoutQ167, despite the evidence  that beoutQ's activities constitute copyright piracy on 
a commercial scale and the evidence that it is directed and controlled by persons and 
entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia ; and  
f. Saudi Arabia's alleged promotion of public ga therings  with screenings of 
beoutQ's  unauthorized broadcasts.  
2.48.   Qatar assert ed that certain of these measures "work together"168 to prevent beIN from 
accessing Saudi courts and tribunals to protect its intellectual property rights, and stresses that it 
challen ges their "combined operation".169 
3  PARTIES' REQUESTS FO R FINDINGS AND RECOM MENDATIONS  
3.1.  Qatar claim s that these measures, in different combinations, violate multiple obligations in 
Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement, as follows:  
a. Part I of the TRIPS Agr eement:  
 
164 Qatar's panel request, para. 13; and Qatar's first written submission, para. 141.  
165 Qatar's first written submission, para. 142; and Qatar's response to Panel question No. 2(a), 
para. 18. 
166 The Panel understands Qatar to argue that this me asure prevents beIN from accessing criminal 
enforcement procedures insofar as access to the Copyright Committee could result in the application of criminal 
procedure s and penalties. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 30.)  
167 The Panel understa nds this measure to extend beyond the effect of the Ministerial approval 
requirement of Copyright Committee decisions, as confirmed by Qatar's explanation to that effect. According to 
Qatar, this measure "goes beyond the omissions (and gatekeeping function ) of the Copyright Committee to 
encompass omissions by all Saudi government agencies and authorities that have the authority to initiate 
criminal procedures and penalties that would ensure that Saudi Arabia complies with its obligation to 'provide 
for crim inal procedures and penalties to be applied' against the beoutQ piracy." Thus, it is Qatar's view that 
"[b]eyond the Copyright Committee, however, other elements of the Saudi government are, pursuant to Saudi 
law, allocated the role of initiating criminal procedures that would ultimately lead to application of criminal 
penalties." (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, paras. 28 -29.)  
168 Qatar's second written submission, para. 290.  
169 Ibid. para. 276.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  i. Article 3.1 of the TRIPS Agreement (national treatment), because they accord to 
Qatari nationals treatment that is less favourable than that accorded to Saudi 
nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property; and  
ii. Article 4 of the T RIPS Agreement (most -favoured -nation treatment), because, 
with regard to the protection of intellectual property, they fail to extend 
immediately and unconditionally to Qatari nationals advantages granted to 
nationals of other countries.  
b. Part II of the TRI PS Agreement:  
i. Articles 9(1); 11; 11 bis(1)(i), (ii) and (iii); and 11 ter of the Berne  Convention 
(1971), as incorporated into Article 9 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail 
to provide authors of works with the exclusive rights mandated therein; and  
ii. Article 14(3) of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to provide broadcasting 
organizations with the requisite exclusive rights specified therein.  
c. Part III of the TRIPS Agreement:  
i. Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to make available to  
Qatari  nationals enforcement procedures, as specified in Part III of the TRIPS 
Agreement;  
ii. Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to make available to 
Qatari  nationals civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, including inter alia the right to be represented by 
independent legal counsel; and  
iii. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, because they fail to provide for the application 
of criminal procedures and penalties to the wilful commercial scale piracy of 
beIN's copyrighted material .170 
3.2.  Qatar request s that, pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU, t he Panel recommend that 
Saudi  Arabia bring its measures into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement.171 
3.3.  Saudi Arabia request s that the Panel reject Qatar's claims in this dispute in their entirety, and 
stated that "the Panel has multiple avenues to end its work  without addressing the substantive 
claims that have been raised in this case, including by:  
• recognizing that Security Exceptions  have been invoked;  
• confirming that Saudi Arabia's actions are justified under Article 73 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement;  
• referencing Article 3.4 of the DSU and the impossibility of issuing a recommendation or 
ruling 'aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter' or Article 3.7 of the DSU 
and the impossibility of securing a positive solution to the dispute; and/or  
• barring t he claim because it has not been brought in good faith with the intention of 
addressing substantive WTO rules."172 
3.4.  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia submit s that " the information that Saudi Arabia has provided to 
support the Panel's 'objective assessment' of [its] good faith conduct in connection with the 
 
170 Qatar's first written submission, para. 443; and Qa tar's second written submission, para. 310.  
171 Qatar's first written submission, para. 444; and Qatar's second written submission, para. 311.  
172 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 70.  
 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  invocation of the Security Exception  in Article 73 establishes the absence of any substantive violation 
of the TRIPS Agreement".173 
4  ARGUMENTS OF THE PAR TIES  
4.1.  The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel 
in accordance with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annexes B -1 and B -2). 
5  ARGUMENTS OF THE THI RD PARTIES  
5.1.  The arguments of Australia, Bahrain, Brazil,  Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, 
Norway, Russia, Singapore, Ukraine, the UAE and the United States are reflected in their executive 
summaries, provided in accordance with the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annex 
C). India, Korea, Me xico, Chinese Taipei, Turkey and Yemen did not submit written or oral arguments 
to the Panel.  
6  INTERIM REVIEW  
6.1  Introduction  
6.1.  On 16 March 2020, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 30 March 2020, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia each submitted written requests for the Panel to review aspects of the 
Interim  Report. On 14 April 2020, Qatar submitted comments on Saudi Arabia's requests for review. 
Saudi Arabia did not submit any comments on Qatar's requests for review. Neither party requested 
an interim re view meeting.  
6.2.  In accordance with Article 15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Report sets out the 
Panel's   response to the parties' requests made at the interim review stage. The Panel  generally 
addresses the parties' requests in dividually and in  sequence according to the sections and 
paragraphs to which such requests pertain.  To avoid repetition, the Panel addresses related requests 
together where possible.  
6.3.  In addition to the requests for substantive modifications that are discussed below, various 
correct ions or improvements of a typographical or minor editorial nature were made to the Report, 
including but not limited to those suggested by the parties in their interim review comments.  
The discussion below refers to the paragraph numbering in the Final Rep ort. 
6.2  General issues  
Saudi Arabia's non -engagement with facts or arguments presented by Qatar  
 
6.4.  Saudi Arabia  suggests that the Panel seems to attribute the establishment of certain facts and 
positions on arguments in both section 7.2 and section 7.3 of the Report to the lack of engagement 
by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia requests that , in all instances  where the Pa nel suggests that its 
findings are based in part on "uncontested ", "unrebutted ", or "unrefuted " facts, for example , the 
Panel add a sentence stating that: "The Panel recalls that Saudi Arabia did not engage with facts or 
arguments presented by Qatar  in the  dispute settlement proceedings consistent with its position 
under Article  73 of the TRIPS Agreement. " Saudi Arabia specifically requests the addition of this 
sentence to  body text or footnotes accompanying  paragraphs 7.6, 7.37, 7.40, 7.59, 7.64, 7.115, 
7.154, 7.159, 7.160 and 7.174 . In its comments on some of these paragraphs, Saudi Arabia also 
requests that "the Panel confirm how it ensured an objective assessment of evidence given that 
Saudi Arabia did not address any claims or respond to any evidence su bmitted by [Qatar]" . 
6.5.  Qatar offers several reasons why the Panel should reject these requests:  
a. First, paragraph 1.10 of the Report already recognizes that "[t]hroughout the 
proceeding, Saudi Arabia took the position that , … it would not interact, or have any 
direct or indirect engagement, with Qatar in any way in this dispute".174 Qatar considers 
 
173 Ibid. para. 72.  
174 Emphasis added by Qatar.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  that paragraphs 1.10  to 1.14 of the Report accurately summarize 
Saudi  Arabia 's position and its consequences, and that no modifications are required to 
any por tion of the Report to reiterate these points.  
b. Second, Qatar submits that although Saudi Arabia asserted  throughout the proceedings 
that it was "not engaging " with Qatar, Saudi Arabia availed itself of all the available 
opportunities to present its case to  the Panel . Specifically, Saudi Arabia responded to 
the facts and legal arguments presented by Qatar in multiple submissions and through 
presenting its own factual evidence and arguments concerning each of the six measures 
that Qatar challenged. Saudi Arab ia submitted 44 exhibits in these proceedings, and 
participated actively in each of the two substantive meetings with the Panel. Qatar lists 
multiple  key factual and legal assertions that Saudi Arabia placed on the record, as often 
highlighted in the Panel 's own summary of Saudi Arabia 's arguments in the Report . 
Even in Saudi Arabia 's comments on the Interim Report, Saudi Arabia calls the 
Panel 's attention to specific arguments that it made (and evidence that it submitted) to 
the Panel, and Saudi Arabia asks that the Panel reflect these  argument s and evidence 
in its Report.  
c. Third, Qatar notes that , in paragraph 7.40 of the Report, the Panel already explained 
how it ensured an objective assessment insofar as Saudi Arabia did not contest one or 
more claims . The Panel recalled  that, in those WTO  cases where a responding party did 
not contest one or more claims raised by the complainant, panels have consistently 
proceeded on the basis that they were nonetheless required to satisfy themselves that 
the complainant had established a prima facie case of violation in order to rule in the 
complainant 's favour.  Accordingly, the Panel considered it important to confirm that, 
before considering any exceptions or lines of defence invoked by Saudi Arabia, the Panel 
must first satisfy itself that Qatar has established a prima facie  case in relation to each 
of the mea sures and claims at issue, including through Qatar's written and oral 
submissions.  
d. Finally, insofar  as Saudi Arabia is challenging the merits of the Panel 's analysis and 
findings, and asking the Panel to defend its analysis, Qatar contends that such a request 
would fall outside of the limited scope of interim review.  Qatar states that the Panel 
should reject Saudi  Arabia 's proposed revisions to the Interim Report to the extent they 
seek to challenge the merits of the Panel 's analysis and findings and to rea rgue the facts 
and law.  
6.6.  The Panel has revised paragraphs 7.2 and 7.40 in the light of the parties' comments.  
6.7.  In the context of making the above -mentioned requests, Saudi Arabia  reiterates its argument 
that, in paragraphs 7.40, 7.59, 7.160 and 7.174 of the Interim Report,  the Panel should take special 
care to ensure that it discharges its obligation to make an objective assessment of the matter, and 
"to consider how the real dispute taints the arguments and evidence presented by the complaining 
Party".175  
6.8.  Qatar responds that this is nothing but a repetition of a substantive argument which the Panel 
has fully considered and rejected. In paragraph 7.15 of the Interim Report, the Panel accurately 
summarized Qatar's position on Saudi Arabia's argument. I n footnote 221 to the Interim Report, the 
Panel recognized that the "dispute " referred to in Article  3.7 of the DSU and the "matter " referred 
to in Article  11 of the DSU , like the "matter " referred to in Article  3.4 of the DSU , is the narrow one 
currently before the Panel, and not what Saudi Arabia referred to as the "real dispute ". Qatar recalls 
that the Panel concluded that it had jurisdiction over the matter referred to it by the DSB, and that 
it could not refrain from exercising that jurisdiction on acc ount of what Saudi Arabia characterized 
as the "real dispute ". Qatar states that it fully agrees with the Panel 's findings on this issue.   
6.9.  The Panel does not consider that there is any need to modify these paragraphs.  
 
175 Saudi Arabia 's second written submission, para. 3.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  The absence of any evidence regarding  beoutQ's operations before the Saudi 
authorities with exclusive jurisdiction for copyright enforcement at the time of the 
establishment of the Panel  
 
6.10.    Saudi Arabia  makes a series of related requests, in connection with multiple paragraphs 
spanning section s 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 of the Report, that are aimed at having the Panel reach  the 
conclusion that , as of the time of the Panel's establishment,  there was no evidence regarding 
beoutQ 's operations before the Saudi authorities with exclusive jurisdiction f or copyright 
enforcement.  Specifically, Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel add new text throughout its findings 
to establish the propositions that:  
a. the Saudi authorities with exclusive jurisdiction for copyright enforcement are the 
Copyright Committee an d, as reflected in Saudi Arabia 's submissions, the SAI P;  
b. a complaint or information can be filed with the SAIP directly by right holders by email , 
and hundreds of Saudi and foreign companies (including digital content providers) have 
initiated procedures through the SAIP and to the Copyright Committee, including by 
email and without legal representation;  
c. at the time of the establishment of the Panel, no  evidence or claim was filed with SAIP 
or the Copyright Committee by any right holder regarding copyright infringement by 
beoutQ  to initiate civil or criminal enforcement procedures ;  
d. much of the "evidence " on which the Panel relied in its assessment did n ot exist at the 
time the Panel was established; and  
e. therefore, the Panel should find that, as of the date of its establishment, the Saudi 
authorities that have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the existence of criminal piracy 
and to determine the resu lting penalties "never received any evidence regarding beoutQ 
operations ". 
6.11.   Saudi Arabia  requests the insertion of six paragraphs of new text, in six different places in 
the Report  (following paragraphs 7.155 , 7.175 , 7.218 , 7.219 , 7.221  and 7.291 ), which wo uld 
capture all of the propositions  in bullet points (a) through (e) above . In its comments on 
paragraphs  7.227  and 7.293 , Saudi Arabia refers back to these proposed insertions .  
6.12.   In addition to these insertions, Saudi Arabia proposes that additional text b e added to a range 
of other paragraphs to reflect or establish one or more of the propositions listed in bullet points (a) 
through (e) above. Specifically, Saudi Arabia requests that the propositions reflected in bullet points 
(a), (b) and/or (c) above be reflected through additions to paragraphs 7.37 , 7.45, 7.46, 7.52, 
7.86, 7.92, 7.164 , 7.213  and 7.224 . In connection with the proposition reflected in bullet point 
(d) above, Saudi Arabia requests that, where certain evidence was not available to the Saudi officials 
responsible for copyright enforcement as of the date of establishment of the Panel, the Panel add a 
sentence stating that: " The Panel acknowledges that the evidence at issue here was not available to 
the Saudi officials responsible for copyright enforcement as of the date of establishment of the 
Panel." Saudi Arabia raises this issue primarily in connection with the evidentiary basis for the 
Panel's  finding that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to the criminal jurisdiction 
of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia requests the addition of the sentence above in a number of places 
in that part of the Report, including in the body text or footnotes accompanying paragraphs 7.97, 
7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.123, 7.125, 7.126, 7.128, 7.129, 7.130 , 7.136 and 7.149 . 
However,  Saudi Arabia reiterates the same point in the context of commenting on the Panels' review 
of the evidence relating to the anti -sympathy measures ( paragraphs 7.64, 7.65 and 7.66) and 
the 19 June 2017 Circular, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement 
(paragraphs  7.74 and 7.80). 
6.13.   Qatar  responds generally that Saudi Arabia seeks to misuse this interim review process by 
re-arguing significant aspects of the dispute, and by effectively asking to draft for it self new, lengthy 
portions of the findings section of the Interim Report. Saudi Arabia 's approach is inconsistent with 
the purpose of the interim review stage as set out in Article 15.2 of the DSU, which is for the Panel 
to consider "precise aspects " of the Interim Report raised by the parties. WTO panels have often 
explained that it is not appropriate to request a panel to revisit the merits of its analysis and findings WT/DS567/R  
 
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  at the interim review stage. According to Qatar, t he purpose of the interim review stag e is not to 
provide the parties with an opportunity to enter into a debate with the Panel.  
6.14.   Qatar requests that the Panel make no modifications to reflect any the propositions listed 
above as (a) through (e) . Qatar's comments may be summarized as follows:  
a. The statement about SAIP having "responsibilities relating to copyright enforcement " is 
a Saudi assertion that Qatar has explained is erroneous, and irrelevant to the current 
dispute. Qatar explained at length in its submissions  that SAIP was not operationa l and 
did not "effectively launch its activities " until 2019 —after the establishment of the Panel 
in this proceeding on 18  December 2018. While beIN and the third -party right holders 
have sent multiple letters to various Saudi government agencies informing  them of the 
beoutQ piracy, beIN and the third -party right holders  received no indication in response 
that SAIP would be the proper authority to evaluate the beoutQ piracy. Thus, the 
proposed references to SAIP would conflict with the facts established by extensive 
evidence on record. If the Panel were to include these additional references to 
Saudi  Arabia 's evidence and argument on SAIP, then Qatar respectfully requests that 
the Panel likewise refer to additional SAIP -related evidence and arguments that Qa tar 
submitted.  
b. Saudi Arabia 's request that the Panel refer to its assertion that "hundreds of other 
copyright holders " have initiated procedures through SAIP and to the Copyright 
Committee would not add anything of relevance to the paragraph, which is focu sed on 
the beoutQ piracy. The evidence to which Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel refer is 
not necessary for the Panel to resolve any particular claim in this proceeding, nor is it 
relevant to the paragraphs at issue. Prior panels have rejected requests  for the insertion 
of lengthy recitations of arguments and evidence on the basis that panels need not refer 
explicitly to every argument made, or each piece of evidence adduced, by the parties.  
c. Paragraph 7.37 of the Report already states the undisputed fac t that beIN and 
third-party right holders have not initiated civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ 
before Saudi tribunals. It is not necessary for the Panel to repeat this fact throughout 
the findings, as requested by Saudi Arabia. As the Panel found , beIN and third -party 
right holders were not able to initiate civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ 
because of the anti -sympathy measures and other measures taken by Saudi Arabia. 
Furthermore, criminal enforcement procedures are initiated by a gover nment, not by 
private parties, such that a reference to beIN or other right holders not having "initiated 
. . . criminal enforcement procedures " would be "nonsensical ". 
d. Qatar recalls that Saudi authorities were, in fact, on notice of the inability of third-party 
right holders to engage Saudi counsel to represent them in proceedings against beoutQ, 
as the Panel detailed earlier in the Interim Report. Saudi Arabia 's suggested revisions 
would contradict the factual record of this dispute. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia fails to 
provide any explanation as to why the availability of the evidence to Saudi copyright 
enforcement officials is legally relevant here.  It appears that Saudi Arabia may be 
conflating the concepts of measures within the scop e of a panel 's terms of reference, 
on the one hand, with evidence that can be used to support a claim regarding specific 
measures, on the other  hand. Panels and the Appellate Body have endorsed the 
assessment of post-establishment facts in examining whethe r the maintenance of a 
measure violates a continuing obligation, including  in disputes involving claims under 
the TRIPS Agreement. The evidence in question helps to confirm the 
right holders ' claims of an ongoing problem that began well before panel establ ishment 
and continued throughout the course of the proceedings in this dispute. In this context, 
evidence available after panel establishment is particularly important for the Panel to 
examine Saudi Arabia 's omission to take criminal actions against beoutQ , because such 
evidence demonstrates that this omission, having begun before the establishment of 
the Panel, also continued throughout the course of the panel proceedings.   
e. While Saudi Arabia effectively asks the Panel to reconsider its finding regarding the 
attribution of certain acts and omissions to Saudi Arabia, it is not appropriate for 
Saudi  Arabia to reargue the facts in the interim review stage.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  6.15.   The Panel considers that these requests by Saudi Arabia generally amount to rearguing the 
case, and the Panel does not consider it necessary to revisit the merits of its analysis and findings 
at the interim review stage. The Panel notes that while certain pieces of evidence referred to in the 
Panel's findings post -date the establishment of the Panel, it is clear from the Report that the Panel 
based its factual findings on information that was provided to the Saudi authorities prior to the 
establishment of t he Panel. As already indicated in paragraph 7.155, the Panel considered that post-
establishment evidence served to  "corroborate"  and "supplement"  the information already provided 
to the Saudi authorities.  
6.3  Factual aspects  
The June 2017 severance of relation s and events leading up to it  
 
6.16.   Qatar  states that although it  understands that the Panel 's intention in section 2.2.2  is to 
present a balanced account of the events leading up to Saudi Arabia 's severance of relations with 
Qatar on 5 June 2017 (as reflected in the Panel 's reference to Qatar 's explanation of one point in 
paragraph 2.18), Qatar observes that this section is  drafted almost entirely according to the account 
provided by Saudi Arabia.176 Although Qatar notes that the Panel states in paragraph  2.19 that it 
would recount Saudi Arabia 's "perspective on the events leading up to the 5 June severance ", the 
Panel does no t set forth Qatar 's perspective, which is markedly different from that of Saudi Arabia. 
Indeed, Qatar rejects a number of the factual assertions recounted by the Panel in this section. 
Qatar  requests that the Panel seek to introduce greater balance into it s telling of the circumstances 
leading up to 5 June 2017, in particular, by :  
a. stating that Qatar contests many of the factual assertions that form part of the 
Panel 's presentation of the factual background  in section 2.2.2 ;  
b. providing a fuller account of t he positions of the parties in respect of the 
19 February  2017 letter referenced in paragraph 2.26  (i.e. Qatar reiterates  that 
although Saudi Arabia said that it considered this letter to amount to "a repudiation by 
Qatar of its obligations under the Riyad h Agreements "177, Qatar argued  that the letter 
could not reasonably be read in that manner178); and  
c. reflecting in the Report that Qatar rejects the Saudi assertions recounted in  
paragraph  2.27 as having no basis in fact .  
6.17.   The Panel revised  paragraphs 2.19, 2.26 and 2.27 in the light of the parties' comments.  
6.18.   Qatar  makes two requests pertaining to its submissions that Qatar and Saudi Arabia 
cooperated extensively on, inter alia , counter -terrorism and related matters:  
a. with reference to sectio n 2.2.2 , Qatar requests that the Panel seek to introduce greater 
balance into its account  of the circumstances leading up to 5 June 2017, in particular, 
by referring in this section to Qatar 's explanation that the period leading up to that date 
was charact erized by cordial and cooperative relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
with deep economic integration within the GCC and other fora and, in particular , in the 
area of counter -terrorism (as highlighted by both countries ' attendance at the 
Riyadh  Summit  of 20 -21 May 2017 at which the GCC countries and the United States 
established the joint Terrorist Financing Targeting Center179); 
b. in paragraph 7.235 , first sentence, Qatar requests that the Panel reflect Qatar 's view 
that no emergency prevailed when the me asures at issue were taken, including because 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively on, inter alia , counter -terrorism and 
related matters. Cooperation on such matters is detailed in paragraphs 101 -102 of 
Qatar 's opening oral statement at the first meeting  of the Panel; and   
 
176 Qatar refers, as examples, to the introductory clauses of paras. 2.17, 2.19, 2.20, 2.27 and 2.28.  
177 Saudi Arabia 's opening statement at the first meeting  of the Panel , para. 34.  
178 Qatar 's second written submission, paras. 301 -305. 
179 Qatar 's opening statement at the first meeting  of the Panel , paras. 96-100. WT/DS567/R  
 
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  c. in paragraph 7.235 , final sentence,  Qatar requests that the words "including 
cooperation on counter -terrorism and related matters " be included at the end of the 
sentence. Qatar states that cooperation on such matters is det ailed in paragraph 103 
of Qatar 's opening oral statement at the first meeting of the Panel and paragraph 88 of 
Qatar 's opening oral statement at the second meeting  of the Panel . In the accompanying 
footnote  to the final sentence of paragraph 7.235 , Qatar r equests that, in addition to 
citing Qatar 's opening oral statement at the first meeting  of the Panel , Qatar requests 
that the Panel also reference paragraph 88 of Qatar 's opening oral statement at the 
second meeting  of the Panel , which further substantiate s the existence of ongoing 
security -related cooperation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  
6.19.   The Panel revised paragraph 2.19 in the light of Qatar's comments. The Panel does not 
consider it necessary to revise the text of paragraph 7.235.  
6.20.   Qatar  requests that t he Panel revise  paragraph 2.24 , third  sentence , by including the 
remaining , underlined  part of the existing quote from the Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, such 
that it would read  as follows : "ceasing all media activity directed against the Arab Republic of  Egypt 
in all media platforms, whether directly or indirectly, including all the offenses broadcasted on 
Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera Mubashir Masr, and to work to stop all offenses in Egyptian media ." 
Qatar  observes that this additional language is found in Exh ibit SAU -4, para graph  3(d), which is 
currently cited in the accompanying footnote to paragraph 2.24.  Qatar considers that the full quote 
would provide a more accurate impression of the concerns with respect to Egyptian media, which 
went beyond Al -Jazeera.  
6.21.   The Panel revised paragraph 2.24 in the light of Qatar's comment.  
6.4  Preliminary considerations  
Overview and order of analysis  
 
6.22.   Qatar  notes, with reference to paragraph 7.3 , that it agrees with the Panel that , in general , 
panels have discretion in choosing the order of analysis  to follow. Qatar also states that it agrees 
with the Panel 's choice of order of analysis. However, Qatar recalls the Appellate Body 's guidance 
that an order of analysis contrary to "the fundamental structure and logic " of a covered agreement 
would be an error of law, notwithstanding panels ' general discretion regarding the order of 
analysis.180 Qatar  recalls that it argued that the structure and logic of the TRIPS Agreement require  
examination of the complainant 's claims before a panel turns to consider whether any violations are 
justified by the defen ce in Article 73(b)  thereof181, and that several third parties agreed with that 
view.182 Qatar  requests that the Panel address the parties ' and third parties ' arguments on this point, 
as well as the relevant Appellate Body guidance, as it sets out its approach on this issue.  
6.23.   The Panel does not consider it necessary to modify or expand on the discussion in paragraph 
7.3. 
6.5  Acts and omissions claimed by Qatar to be attributable to Saudi Arabia  
Introduction  
 
6.24.    Each party requests additions to paragraph 7.37  to reflect what are, in their respective 
views, additional "undisputed factual circumstance s". 
6.25.   Saudi Arabia requests that the second and third sentences of this paragraph be revised so as 
to add the underlined text: " First, beIN has not initiated civil or criminal  enforcement procedures 
against beoutQ before Saudi tribunals, and neither has any other foreign rig ht holder . Second, the 
 
180 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos , para. 151. 
181 Qatar 's response to Panel question No. 1, paras. 1 -14; and second written submission, 
paras.  232-239.  
182 Brazil 's third -party statement, para. 5; Canada 's third -party submission, paras. 8 -19; 
Canada 's third-party statement, paras. 2 -5; China 's third -party statement, paras. 10 -13; 
European  Union 's third-party submission, paras. 36 -39; Norway 's third -party submission, paras. 4 -5; 
Norway 's third-party statement, paras. 3 -4; and Ukraine 's third -party submission, para. 19.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  Saudi authorities with exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement proceedings under Saudi 
law have not received any claim or information from beIN or any other right holder regarding beoutQ 
and have not applied criminal proce dures or penalties against what Qatar has characterized as 
beoutQ 's commercial -scale piracy. " 
6.26.   Qatar  responds that by requesting that the Panel insert the word "criminal " in the second 
sentence of paragraph 7.37, Saudi Arabia reveals an apparent misundersta nding of the fundamental 
difference between civil and criminal enforcement procedures: criminal enforcement procedures, 
unlike civil procedures, are initiated by the government, not by private parties. Qatar states that the 
Report already reflects the shar ed understanding that criminal procedures are to be initiated by a 
government, and not by private parties; for example, in finding that Saudi Arabia violates its 
obligations under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement, the Panel states in paragraph 7.209 of 
its Report that "[w]hile IP rights are 'private rights' that generally require right holders themselves 
to assert their rights, only States are entitled to enforce criminal law procedures and penalties ". 
Furthermore, pursuant to Saudi law, several elements o f the Saudi government are allocated the 
role of initiating criminal procedures. For example, Articles 20 to 23 of the Saudi Copyright 
Regulations make clear that the authority to initiate criminal procedures falls on Saudi government 
agencies, rather than  private individuals.183 
6.27.   Qatar adds that, contrary to what Saudi Arabia appears to suggest with its proposed changes 
to the third sentence  of paragraph 7.37 , Qatar has placed extensive evidence on the record 
demonstrating that various Saudi authorities received ample notice of beoutQ piracy, and its 
Saudi  connections.184 With respect to the proposed reference to the Saudi authority with "exclusive 
jurisdiction over copyright infringement proceedings under Saudi law ", Qatar states that such a 
reference would be irrelevant in this context. Qatar notes that this paragraph provides a summary 
of the undisputed  factual circumstances underlying Qatar 's claims, as state d in the first sentence of  
paragraph  7.37, and Qatar submits that the Panel should reject the proposed language because 
Qatar disputes its veracity.  
6.28.   For its part, Qatar  requests that the Panel add the following sentence and accompanying 
footnote at the end  of the fourth sentence  of paragraph 7.37 : "Fourth, the pirate beoutQ has been 
operated by Saudi -based persons and promoted by prominent Saudi nationals.  (Qatar 's first written 
submission , paras. 51  and 106-111.)" According to Qatar, these facts have not b een disputed by 
Saudi Arabia in this proceeding, as the Panel confirms in paragraphs 7.115 and 7.154  of its Report . 
Qatar states that, with this addition, this paragraph would provide a more complete account of the 
undisputed "factual circumstances underly ing Qatar 's claims ". 
6.29.   The Panel does not consider it necessary or appropriate to revise paragraph 7.37 in the 
manner set forth in the parties' respective requests, as that would involve presenting as "undisputed 
circumstances" either contested positions or conclusions based on the review of evidence that 
follows.  
Anti-sympathy measures  
 
6.30.   Qatar  makes two related requests in connection with the Panel's statement, in the 
third sentence of paragraph 7.58 , that the anti -sympathy measures appear to be directed at 
expressions of support for the State of Qatar, not necessarily to any and all Qatari nationals.  
a. Qatar requests the addition of the following sentence after the third sentence in 
paragraph  7.58: "Nevertheless, in practice, the anti -sympathy meas ures appear to 
have a chilling effect that also discourages the expression of sympathy towards 
Qatari  nationals, generally. " In Qatar 's view, this suggested addition is consistent with 
paragraph 7.287  of the Report , where the Panel recalls the connection b etween the 
anti-sympathy measures and the refusal of Saudi law firms to represent beIN (i.e. a 
Qatari national) against beoutQ piracy, and with paragraph 7.284  of the Report , where 
the Panel explains that the Saudi measures at issue, which sought to end "direct or 
indirect interaction between Saudi Arabia and Qatar ", "extend[] to their respective 
populations and institutions ", i.e. Qatari nationals.  
 
183 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 5, para. 28.  
184 See Qatar's second written submission, paras. 88 -91. WT/DS567/R  
 
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  b. Qatar requests that the Panel add "and Qatari nationals " at the end of the first sentence 
in paragraph 7.59 . Qatar states that , for the reasons previously stated in its comment 
on paragraph 7.58 immediately above, this addition would make the Panel 's findings 
consistent with its subsequent analysis in paragraphs 7.284 through 7.288  of its Report . 
Further,  Qatar c onsiders that this addition would also be supported by the evidence on 
the record, including the report  from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights which states: "[t]he Mission was informed by all interlocutors that the 
Quartet 's unilatera l measures have been accompanied by a widespread defamation and 
hatred campaign against Qatar and Qataris in various media linked to the four countries 
as well as on social media, and by the introduction of criminal sanctions in KSA, UAE 
and Bahrain agains t people expressing sympathy for Qatar and Qataris ."185 
6.31.   The Panel is not persuaded that it is necessary or appropriate to revise the text of paragraph 
7.58. The Panel has revised paragraph 7.59 in the light of Qatar's comment.  
6.32.   In addition to the foregoing, Saudi Arabia requests that the second sentence of paragraph 
7.59 be revised by making the following deletions and additions in that sentence: "It is uncontested 
that multiple Saudi news outlets announced  published reports on  the existence of general anti -
sympathy measures on nearly the same  three successive  days." Saudi Arabia comments that, in its 
objective assessment of the facts, the Panel should have considered Saudi Arabia's confirmation that 
it "does not maintain any 'ant i sympathy measures'" when assessing whether private news reports 
can be characterized as announcements of Saudi Government measures.  
6.33.   Qatar  responds that, despite Saudi Arabia 's assertion to the contrary, the Panel 's statement 
that "[i]t is uncontested tha t multiple Saudi news outlets announced the existence of general 
anti-sympathy measures " is fully consistent with the evidentiary record. Qatar states that the fact 
is that Saudi Arabia never contested that the three Saudi news outlet reports cited  by, and exhibited 
by, Qatar announced the existence of the anti -sympathy measures.186 Qatar submits that the 
unsupported general assertions to which Saudi Arabia points do not qualify as rebuttals to specific 
pieces of evidence that Qatar provided. Furthermore, Qat ar observes that the Interim Report already 
discusses Saudi Arabia 's general assertion that it did not maintain any anti -sympathy measures, in 
paragraphs 7.45 and 7.58, and that there is no need for the Panel to discuss such an assertion here 
again.   
6.34.   The Panel has revised the second sentence of paragraph 7.59 in the manner proposed by 
Saudi Arabia.  
6.35.   Saudi Arabia notes that paragraph 7.66  states that: "Saudi Arabia stated, inter alia , that 
the reason that no law firm would be able to proceed with a case aga inst beoutQ in Saudi courts 
might be that the company does not have a location in Saudi Arabia. However, there has been no 
evidence to support this." Saudi Arabia makes two related requests:  
a. that the Panel quote the entirety of paragraph 14 of Saudi Arabia 's response to 
Panel  question No. 39 in the footnote accompanying the first sentence quoted above; 
and  
b. that the Panel  clarify the evidence that it considers to be outstanding, and in particular , 
whether what is lacking is evidence that lawyers do not enga ge in matters that do not 
relate to their jurisdiction, or whether what is lacking is evidence that beoutQ does not 
exist in the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia.  
 
185 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of 
Qatar 17 -24 November 2017, Report on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, December 2017, 
(Exhibit QAT -21), para. 14 (emphasis added).  
186 @Saudi New s 50, Tweet, 6  June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation), (Exhibit  QAT-7); 
Saudi Al -Marsd Online Newspaper, "Legal figure: Anyone showing sympathy with Qatar on social media 
platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined 3 million riyals " (Arabic original and English 
translation), 8  June 2017, (Exhibit QAT -11); and Amal Ruslan, "Saudi Newspaper Okaz: Punishments include 
imprisonment for those who sympathize with Qatar on social media ", 7 June 2017 (Arabic original and English 
transl ation), (Exhibit QAT -12). WT/DS567/R  
 
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  6.36.   Qatar  responds that when summarizing arguments put forward by Saudi Arabia, 
paragraph  7.45 of the Report previously referenced the quote that Saudi Arabia requests to be 
inserted , and that there is no need for the Panel to expand its reference to include the quote. 
Furthermore, Qatar states that what Saudi Arabia considers to be "outstanding eviden ce" is, in fact, 
a purely speculative assertion.  The Panel has already addressed such assertions in this paragraph 
and concluded that "there has been no evidence to support [these assertions] ". In Qatar's view, 
interim review is not an appropriate stage t o reargue the facts.  
6.37.   The Panel declines to make any change to paragraph 7.66 for the reasons stated by Qatar.  
6.38.   Saudi Arabia  repeats a series of comments and requests, in connection with the 
Panel's findings on the anti -sympathy measures, that are aimed at having the Panel reach the 
conclusion that, as of the time of the Panel 's establishment, there was no evidence that Saudi Arabia 
took such measures. Specifically, Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel: 
(a) reflect  Saudi  Arabia's  insistence that no measures exist in Saudi Arabia to limit the engagement 
of independent counsel in any way to support the enforcement of intellectual property rights; 
(b) reflect that beIN has signed Powers of Attorney for several Saudi national lawyers to represent 
its interests in  a wide variety of legal and administrative proceedings in Saudi Arabia; and 
(c) conclude that, in light of the open, electronic line of communication for all Saudi and foreign right 
holders to submit complaints to SAIP, the Panel must conclude that it wou ld not make any sense for 
Saudi Arabia to limit access to lawyers in Saudi Arabia, and that the only reason that a complaint is 
not submitted to SAIP is because a company chooses not to submit a complaint.  Without proposing 
any specific textual changes, Sa udi Arabia reiterates the requests reflected in subparagraphs (a), 
(b) and/or (c) above in relation to paragraphs  7.60, 7.64, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.95, 7.194, 
7.197 and 7.199.  
6.39.   Qatar  responds that Saudi Arabia is rearguing a factual point that the Panel  has ruled on in 
its Interim Report, and is effectively asking for a different result. Such a request goes beyond the 
proper scope of the interim review and constitutes an attempt to re -argue the case. Further, the 
Panel has already summarized elsewhere in  the Interim Report most of the arguments and evidence 
Saudi  Arabia enumerated here, and need not reference such arguments and evidence every single 
time it discusses relevant claims. The only evidence that the Panel did not address in the 
Interim  Report i s that related to beIN 's signing of powers of attorney for Saudi lawyers to represent 
its interests in the competition proceedings. However, WTO panels need not refer explicitly to every 
argument made, or each piece of evidence adduced, by the parties, and  the evidence Saudi Arabia 
submitted on the powers of attorney is not necessary for the Panel to resolve Qatar 's claims because 
it does not add anything of relevance about the IP -related actions and omissions underlying 
Qatar 's claims. Qatar recalls that i t has responded, in its previous submissions, to each of the 
arguments and evidence that Saudi Arabia enumerated in its request, including the assertions 
regarding the power of attorney. If the Panel opts to reference any of Saudi Arabia 's additional 
argum ents or evidence, Qatar respectfully requests that the Panel reference Qatar 's corresponding 
rebuttals as well.  
6.40.   The Panel does not consider it necessary or appropriate to make any changes to these 
paragraphs.  
The 19 June 2017 Circular, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement  
 
6.41.   Saudi Arabia  asks the Panel to explain  how the Circular is relevant to Qatar' s claim in light of 
Saudi Arabia's  "Statement Regarding Saudi Law as Expressed in the '17 June 2017 Circular ', 
3 October 2019 ", submitted as Exhibit SAU -41. Saudi Arabia reiterates this comment in relation to 
different paragraphs referencing the Circular, including paragraphs 7.67, 7.76  and 7.226 . 
6.42.   Qatar  responds that Exhibit SAU -41—which states that Saudi Arabia intends to be bound by 
statements made by Saudi representatives concerning the application of Saudi law —is "completely 
irrelevant " to the point being made in these paragraphs of the Report . Qatar  contends that these  
paragraphs have nothing to do with Saudi representatives ' interpretation of the text of the 
19 June 2017 Circular. Qatar notes that the Panel has already summarized Exhibit SAU -41 in 
footnote 28  of its Report , and understands that the Panel 's silence on this exhibit reflects an 
understanding, consistent with Qatar 's arguments, that this exhibit is irrelevant, and would add 
nothing to the Panel 's analysis.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  6.43.   The Panel does not consider Exhibit SAU -41 to be relevant to the discussion in the se 
paragraphs, and has therefore made no revisions.  
6.44.   With reference to  paragraph 7.89 , Qatar  requests that the Panel consider referencing 
paragraph 22 of the  Second Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Gervais, 19  August  2019, 
(Exhibit QAT -223) in this discussion, which provides further evidence that witnesses must appear in 
person in judicial proceedings in Saudi Arabia.  
6.45.   The Panel does not consider it necessary to include a reference to or discussion of QAT -223 
in the context of this paragraph.  
6.46.   Qatar  notes that , in paragraph 7.95 , the Panel refers to Saudi Arabia having taken 
"'anti-sympathy measures ' that directly or indirectly have had the result of preventing beIN from 
securing legal representation to enforce its IP rights ". Qatar understands that , by "anti--sympathy 
measures " in this paragraph, the Panel may intend to refer to the "measures that, directly or 
indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its 
IP rights " referred to in paragraph 7.73.  Given that Qatar understand s that the "measures " 
addressed in paragraph 7.73 are not limited solely to the "anti-sympathy measures " described 
elsewhere in the Panel 's factual analysis, Qatar requests the Panel to clarify the relationship between 
the measu res covered in paragraph 7.73 and the scope of the finding in paragraph 7.95.  
6.47.   The Panel has revised paragraph 7.73.  
Non-application of criminal procedures and penalties  
 
6.48.   Saudi Arabia  requests that the Panel revise paragraph 7.149  to read  as follows:  
"Saudi  Arabia did not itself, nor through Arabsat,  provide sufficient evidence or argument to rebut 
the above mentioned technical reports. " Saudi Arabia notes that the Panel has not suggested or 
established that Saudi Arabia communicates "through Arabsat ". 
6.49.   Qatar  responds that Saudi Arabia 's request contradicts its own submissions in these 
proceedings. In its responses to Panel questions following the second substantive meeting, 
Saudi  Arabia confirmed that Arabsat was sharing information with the Saudi government,  and it 
submitted to the Panel a letter from Arabsat to FIFA as an exhibit.187 Based on this fact alone, the 
Panel 's phrase should remain, as Saudi Arabia was indeed providing evidence "through Arabsat ". 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has acknowledged that Arabsa t should effectively be viewed as an 
instrument of the Saudi government, at least with respect to beoutQ piracy.188 In particular, 
Saudi  Arabia has stated that "[m]oreover, FIFA 's confirmation that it 'is in no way implying that 
Arabsat  is involved in, or co mplicit with, the illegal beoutQ operation ' directly undermines claims by 
the complaining Party that Saudi Arabia  is involved in and complicit with beoutQ operations ".189 
The only logical way to read this sentence is to understand that: if Arabsat is involve d in or complicit 
with beoutQ, then this necessarily implies that Saudi Arabia is involved in or complicit with beoutQ. 
Qatar suggests that the Panel consider referring to this statement from Saudi Arabia in 
its Final Report so as to help clarify Saudi Ara bia's position on its relationship with Arabsat.  
6.50.   The Panel has revised paragraph 7.149 in the light of Saudi Arabia's request.  
6.51.   Qatar  observes that , in paragraph 7.156 , the Panel states that "[i]n the light of the 
conclusion stated above on the basis of the evidence canvassed above, the Panel considers it 
unnecessary to review the witness statement submitted by Qatar ". Qatar understands that the Panel 
does not wish to express, or imply, any views on Saudi Arabia 's assertions regarding the credibility 
of the witness statement and its contents. In order to make that position clear, Qatar requests that 
the Panel expressly clarify that its treatment of the witness statement does not reflect agreement 
with Saudi  Arabia 's allegations about the reliability of the  statement.  
 
187 Letter from Arabsat to FIFA, dated 24 June 2019, (Exhibit SAU -39).   
188 Qatar 's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No.39, para. 59.  
189 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39 , para. 19.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  6.52.   In the light of Qatar's stated understanding that this paragraph is drafted in a manner that 
avoids expressing or implying any views on Saudi Arabia's assertions, the Panel considers it 
unnecessary to make the addition proposed by Qatar.  
Public  screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts  
 
6.53.   Saudi Arabia requests that the Panel reference, in both paragraphs 7.161 and 7.163, its 
statement that: 
Saudi Arabia maintains a vigilant watch over the enforcement of broadcast copyright 
violations at public gatherings.  On 14 April 2019, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and 
Rural Affairs issued Circular No. 41898 which forwarded Royal Court Circular No. 40752 
to the Secretariats, the Agencies and the Public Administrations of the Ministry, 
including to all Saudi municipal  administrations. Circular No. 41898 emphasized that 
the Royal Order must be followed and reminded all administrations "to provide the 
maximum possible protection of intellectual property rights, " including copyright 
protection. (Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs Circular No. 41898, 9/8/1440H / 14 
April 2019G. (Exhibit SAU -35)). 
6.54.   Qatar  recalls that the Panel has previously referenced Circular No. 41898, at paragraph 7.47 
of the Interim Report, which pertains to the Saudi government 's prior use of "non-genuine copies of 
computer software ". This Circular has no relevance for paragraphs 7.161 or 7.163, which discuss 
evidence of beoutQ -related tweets originating from Saudi governmental accounts, as well as 
Saudi  government promotions of public gathering s of beoutQ screenings. If the Panel were to opt to 
reference Circular No. 41898 in this paragraph, Qatar requests that the Panel recall Qatar 's own 
discussion of this Circular, namely, that it provides additional evidence of the Saudi government 's 
own his tory of active violation of copyright law.190 In particular, by submitting this Circular, the 
Saudi  government indicates that, at least through April 2019, its own government offices have been 
using counterfeit or pirated computer software.  
6.55.   The Panel does no t consider Saudi Arabia's statement concerning Exhibit SAU -35 to be 
relevant to the discussion in these paragraphs, and has therefore made no revisions.  
6.6  Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement  
Introduction  
 
6.56.   Qatar  suggests that the second se ntence in the footnote to  paragraph 7.167  be deleted, as 
it is unclear to what Qatar ostensibly agrees. Qatar notes that the point appears to have been added 
in error.  
6.57.   The Panel has revised the footnote to paragraph 7.167 in the light of Qatar's request.  
6.58.   Saudi  Arabia  requests that the Panel add a longer quotation of the European Union's 
submission to the text of paragraph 7.179  when summarizing the third parties' arguments on the 
interpretation of Article 61 of the TRIPS  Agreement .  
6.59.   Qatar  requests that if the Panel were to include the additional language from the 
European  Union 's submissions as proposed by Saudi Arabia, the Panel also include a more complete 
and balanced summary of the European Union 's position on Article 61 of the TRIPS A greement. 
In particular, Qatar requests that the Panel also recall the European Union 's position that "[i]f … it 
is proven that the Saudi government supported, facilitated and even participated in the alleged 
piracy, it could be argued that de facto Saudi Arabia does not provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties in the case of the piracy of beIN 's content. "191 
6.60.   The Panel has added a new footnote to paragraph 7.179 in the light of the parties' comments.  
 
190 Qatar's openin g statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 27.  
191 European Union 's third-party submission, para. 34.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  6.7  Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement  
The "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article 73(b)(iii)  
 
6.61.   Qatar  notes that , in paragraph 7.273 , the Panel states that "Saudi  Arabia 's arguments under 
Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement focus on its 'comprehensive measures ', taken on 
5 June 2017" and that "[t]his led Qatar to repeatedly state that these 'actions ' are not the measures 
that it is challenging, and to argue that Saudi Arabia has therefore not actually invoked any defence 
under Article  73(b) with respect to the specific measures at issue in this dispute ". Qatar considers 
that these sentences do not fully reflect either Saudi  Arabia 's or Qatar 's arguments on the matter. 
Qatar states that, for its part, Saudi Arabia expressly clarified, inclu ding at the two substantive 
meetings with the Panel, that it "is not asserting that any of the [six measures described at 
paragraph 2.47 of the Panel 's Interim Report] are 'action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security in terests '". Indeed,  Saudi  Arabia underscored that such measures 
were "unrelated " to the "real dispute ".192 Faced with such a clear position by the respondent that it 
was not invoking the defen ce in respect of the measures at issue challenged by Qatar, 
Qatar 's position was, and continues to be, that the defen ce must be invoked with respect to 
measures challenged by the complainant  and that Saudi  Arabia conceded that at least five of the six 
measures at issue did not meet one of the critical requirements for jus tification under Article 73(b)  
of the TRIPS Agreement . Qatar requests the Panel to reflect this argument more accurately and fully 
in its Report. Qatar also requests that the Panel reproduce or paraphrase paragraph 283 of 
Qatar 's second written submission for this purpose. Moreover, in footnote 374 to its second written 
submission, Qatar identified several specific instances where Saudi Arabia 's submissions stated that 
the specific actions of which Qatar complains were unrelated to considerations of securit y.193 
Qatar  requests that the Panel reproduce footnote 374, along with the portions of the 
Saudi   submissions to which Qatar cites, in a footnote  in the Report . 
6.62.   The Panel notes paragraph 7.273 introduces the discussion that follows and is not meant to 
fully reflect either of Saudi Arabia's or Qatar's arguments on this matter. The Panel does not consider 
it necessary to provide a n exhaustive recitation of either party's arguments insofar as they are 
already reflected in the paragraph s that follow, but has added additional references to the parties' 
submissions in footnotes, as suggested by Qatar's comment.  
Saudi Arabia's articulation of its "essential security interests"  
 
6.63.   With reference to  paragraph 7. 281, Qatar  recalls that, at paragr aph 7.236, the Panel 
recounts Qatar 's argument as to why Saudi Arabia 's articulation of its essential security interests 
lacks veracity, specifically because Saudi Arabia is, in fact, motivated by ulterior considerations, such 
as promoting development of i ts own media industry in connection with sports broadcasting. 
In paragraph 7.281, the Panel recounts Qatar 's argument that Saudi  Arabia 's articulation of its 
security interest was vague and general; however, the Panel does not engage with Qatar 's argument 
that the stated security interests lacked veracity as motivations for the measures at issue in these 
proceedings. Qatar requests that the Panel address this element of Qatar 's argument.  
6.64.   The Panel does not consider it necessary to expand on its discussion o f Qatar's arguments 
relating to Saudi Arabia's articulation of its essential security interests.  
The connection between the measures and the essential security interests  
 
6.65.   Qatar  makes two related requests in connection with paragraph 2.29  and paragraph 7.286  
concerning the expulsion of Qatari nationals from Saudi territories .  
6.66.   First, Qatar requests that the Panel include an additional phrase (as underlined) to paragraph 
2.29, first  sentence, so that it would read as follows: " On 5 June 2017, Sa udi Arabia severed 
relations with Qatar, including diplomatic and consular relations, the closure of all ports, the 
prevention of Qatari nationals from crossing into Saudi  territory, and the expulsion within 14 days 
of Qatari residents and visitors in Saud i territories ." Qatar states that, with this addition, the 
 
192 Saudi Arabia 's opening statement at the first meeting  of the Panel , paras. 3, 49.  
193 Saudi Arabia 's opening statement at the first meeting  of the Panel , paras. 3, 49; and response to 
Panel question No. 30(a), para. 53.  
 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  summary would better reflect the full scale of Saudi Arabia 's order of 5 June 2017. Qatar notes that 
the press release from the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which the Panel cites in the 
accompanying footnote, reflects this additional element of the comprehensive measures.194 Second, 
Qatar requests that the Panel revise paragraph 7.286 , second sentence, to include the following 
language as underlined : 
 "Given that Saudi Arabia imposed a trav el ban on all Qatari  nationals from entering the 
territory of Saudi Arabia and an expulsion order for all Qatari nationals in the territory 
of Saudi  Arabia  as part of the comprehensive measures taken on 5  June 2017, it is not 
implausible that Saudi Arabia might take other measures to prevent Qatari nationals 
from having access to courts, tribunals and other institutions in Saudi Arabia. " 
6.67.   The Panel has made the revisions proposed by Qatar.  
6.8  Conclusions and recommendation  
6.68.   With respect to  paragraph 8.1(b)(ii) , Qatar  requests that the Panel insert an additional 
phrase , as underlined,  so that the sentence would read as follows:  
Qatar has established that Saudi Arabia has not provided for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied to beoutQ despite the evidence establishing prima facie  that 
beoutQ, which has committed wilful copyright piracy on a commercial scale,  is operated  
by individuals or entities under the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, and thus Saudi Arabia 
has acted inconsistently with Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement.  
6.69.   In Qatar's view, t his would provide a more fulsome description of Saudi Arabia 's violation of 
Article  61 of the TRIPS Agreement, and is consistent with the Panel 's findings in paragraphs  7.214  
to 7.217 and paragraph 7.221.  
6.70.   The Panel does not consider it necessary to revise paragraph 8.1(b)(ii) in the manner 
proposed by Qatar.  
7  FINDINGS  
7.1  Preliminary consider ations  
7.1.1   Overview  and order of analysis  
7.1.  In this dispute , Qatar challenge d six different measures relating to beoutQ's piracy of 
beIN's  proprietary content . Qatar claim s that these measures, in different combinations, violate 
multiple distinct obligations of the TRIPS  Agreement  relating to non -discrimination, the availability 
of IP rights in Saudi Arabia, and the availability of civil and criminal IP enforcement procedure s.195 
Qatar structure d its first written submission by first seeking to establish the main facts underlying 
its claims, in relation to each of these six measures.196 Qatar then present ed each claim under the 
relevant provision of the TRIPS  Agreement  (and the B erne Convention (1971), as incorporated by 
reference into the TRIPS  Agreement) in the sequence reflected in that agreement.197 In response to 
Saudi  Arabia's invocation of Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement , Qatar submit ted that the 
Panel should first make findings on whether the measures at issue violate the obligations of the 
TRIPS  Agreement, and only then consider whether the affirmative  defence under Article  73(b)(iii) 
applies and justifies any such violations.198 Qatar also argued that the Panel should reject  
 
194 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Press Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular 
relations with Qatar, 5 June 2019; and Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi  Arabia, Washington, D.C., Press 
Release, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of Qatar, 
5 June 2017, Exhibit SAU -1 (emphasis added).  
195 For a listing of the challenged measures and the legal claims, see Sections  2.3 and 3 above.  
196 See Qatar's first written submission, part III ("Factual Background").  
197 See ibid. part IV ("Saudi Arabia Violates its Obligations under the TRIPS  Agreement"). Most of 
Qatar's claims under the various TRIPS and Berne Convention (1971)  provisions invoked by Qatar involve the 
same combination of measures and factual premises, giving rise to a certain amount of repetition.  
198 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 1, para.  1; and second written submission, para.  234. 
 WT/DS567/R  
 
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  Saudi  Arabia's  invocation of Article  73(b)(iii)199 and its request that the Panel decline to make any 
findings or a recommendation.200 
7.2.  In its first written submission, Saudi Arabia focuse d on its severance of all relations with Qatar  
on 5 June 20 17, which it refers to as its "comprehensive measures".201 Saudi Arabia submit ted that 
its comprehensive measures of 5 June 2017, constitute action justified by the security exception in 
Article  73 of the TRIPS  Agreement .202 Saudi Arabia also present ed the sep arate and additional 
argument that the Panel should exercise its discretion to decline to make any findings or a 
recommendation in this dispute.203 In subsequent submissions, Saudi  Arabia address ed the six 
measures challenged by Qatar more specifically  (and some of the other facts underlying Qatar's 
claims), for the purposes of demonstrating  its "good faith conduct in connection with the invocation" 
of the exception in Article  73.204 Saudi Arabia, at the same time, stated that it would "not engage 
with facts or arguments presented by Qatar".205 
7.3.  In considering the most appropriate order of analysis in which to address these issues, the 
Panel has a wide margin of discretion to order and structure its analysis as it sees fit.206 A panel may 
be guided by the man ner in which the complainant has presented its claims, and equally, by the 
manner in which the respondent has presented its defences.207 Furthermore, panel  findings  are often 
structure d to avoid repetition and improves the readability of the Report.208 A panel 's choice on how 
to order and structure its analysis will often reflect, expressly or implicitly, one or more particular 
circumstances of the case at hand.209 
7.4.  The Panel will first address Saudi Arabia's request that the Panel decline to make any findings 
or a recommendation in this dispute. The Panel will then briefly address another set of preliminary 
questions concern ing the scope of the measures challenged by Qatar.  
7.5.  After having addressed those preliminary questions , the Panel will consider the specific 
measures  and legal claims raised by Qatar. The Panel structures that subsequent part of its  analysis 
by first examining the six measures at issue as defined by Qatar and the facts asserted to support 
 
199 Qatar's opening stat ement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 41 -121. 
200 Ibid. paras. 122 -124. 
201 In its first written submission, Saudi Arabia stated that "[o]n 5 June 2017, the Kingdom of 
Saudi  Arabia … severed diplomatic and consular relations with the complaining Member, and imposed 
comprehensive measures putting an end to all economic and trade r elations between the two countries", and 
that "from the outset, Saudi Arabia has clearly articulated its determination that the application of 
comprehensive measures is necessary protect 'its national security from the dangers of terrorism and 
extremism'".  (Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras. 1 and 6(c).)  
202 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, part II ("Essential Security Interests").  
203 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, part III ("No Satisfactory Settlement Possible at the WTO"). 
In its opening statement at the first meeting, Saudi Arabia reiterated these two lines of argument but presents 
them in reverse order. (See Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  16-17.) 
204 See Saudi Arabia's first written s ubmission, para.  1; response to Panel question No. 29; and second 
written submission, section 4.2.4 ("Respect for the Obligation of Good Faith").  
205 See e.g. Saudi Arabia's request for review of the Interim Report.  
206 Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Wheat E xports and Grain Imports , para.  126. 
207 See Appellate  Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC) (Article  21.5 – EC), para.  277; and Panel  Report, US – 
Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) , fn 1005 to para.  7.9. 
208 See, e.g. Panel  Reports, Guatemala – Cement II , para.  7.5; Argentina – Financial Services , 
para. 7.66; Russia – Traffic in Transit , para.  7.106; and China – TRQs, para.  7.13. 
209 See, e.g. Panel  Reports, Russia – Pigs (EU) , para.  7.30; and Russia – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.24-
7.26. In the context of  discussing the scope of a panel's discretion to structure its analysis within the 
examination of a given claim, the Appellate  Body has stressed that the particular manner of sequencing the 
steps of an analysis is "adaptable", and "may be tailored to the s pecific claims, measures, facts, and 
arguments at issue in a given case". While stressing the importance of "the particular circumstances of a given 
case", the Appellate  Body has stated that "an appellant challenging the sequence and order of analysis adop ted 
by a panel in a given case must demonstrate why, by following a particular sequence, the panel committed an 
error in the specific circumstances of the case at hand. It is not sufficient for an appellant merely to claim that 
a panel erred by deviating f rom a certain sequence and order of analysis in the abstract." (Appellate  Body 
Reports, US – COOL (Article  21.5 – Canada and Mexico) , para.  5.229. See also Appellate  Body Report, India – 
Agricultural Products , para.  5.26.)  
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  Qatar's  claims210, and then turning to Qatar' s multiple legal claims under Parts  I, II and III of the 
TRIPS  Agreement.211  
7.6.  The Panel will next examine Saudi Arabia's invocation of the security exception in Article  73 of 
the TRIPS  Agreement. In WTO dispute settlement proceedings, it is " common practice"212 for panels 
to begin with an examination of the claims of inconsistency  with the relevant covered agreement , to 
be followed, if any such inconsistency were found to exist, with an assessment of whether the 
aspect(s) of the measure(s) at issue would be cov ered by one or more exceptions.  Qatar argue d 
that the Panel should follow the traditional approach in this case213, and Saudi Arabia expressed no 
disagreement .214 In these circumstances215, the Panel considers it unnecessary to address the 
arguments of the third parties any further, most of which take the position that a panel should follow 
the traditional order of analysis in cases involving security exceptions.216 
7.1.2   Saudi Arabia's request that the Panel decline to make any findings or 
recommendation based on A rticles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the DSU  
7.7.  Article 3.4 of the DSU provides that "[r]ecommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be 
aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter". Article 3.7 of the DSU provides, in a 
similar manner, that "[t]he ai m of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution 
to a dispute." Article 11 of the DSU  provides that "a panel should … make such other findings as will 
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements".  
7.8.  Saudi Arabia request ed that the Panel decline to make any findings or recommendation in the 
present case.217 Saudi  Arabia ma de that request on the basis that: (a) the current dispute is "not a 
trade dispute at all"218, but a "politi cal, geopolitical  and essential security dispute"219; (b) certain 
DSU provisions —including, in particular, Article  3.4 of the DSU —raise a "legal impediment" 
 
210 See section 7.2 of this Report ("Acts and omissions attributable to Saudi Arabia").  
211 See section 7.3 of this Report ("Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS Agreement"). The Panel 
begins with the claims under Part III, for reasons that are elaborated in section 7.3.3.1 of this Report.  
212 Panel  Report, Colombia – Textiles , para.  7.16 (referring to Appellate  Body Report, Thailand – 
Cigarettes (Philippines) , para.  173). In the referenced passage from Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) , the 
Appellate  Body stated, in a different cont ext, that "an analysis of whether a measure infringes an obligation 
necessarily precedes, and is distinct from, the 'further and separate' assessment of whether such measure is 
otherwise justified".  
213 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 1, paras.  1-14; and second written submission, 
paras.  234-239. 
214 Saudi Arabia did not respond to Panel question No. 1, which invited the parties and third parties to 
provide their views on the proper order of analysis in this case.  
215 The different order of analysis f ollowed by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit appears to have 
been influenced by circumstances that are distinguishable from the present dispute, most notably "the specific 
way Russia presented its arguments with regard to the jurisdiction of the panel". ( European  Union's third -party 
submission, para.  39.) In this case, neither Saudi Arabia nor any third party argued that its invocation of 
Article  73 deprives the Panel of jurisdiction.  
216 Brazil, Canada, China, the European  Union , Japan, Norway and Singapore urged the Panel to follow 
the same order of analysis as that proposed by Qatar. (See Brazil's third -party statement, paras.  2-6; 
Canada's response to Panel question No. 1, para.  1 (referring to Canada's third -party submission,  paras.  8-19; 
and Canada's third -party statement, paras.  2-5); European  Union's third -party submission, paras.  37-39; 
European  Union's response to Panel question No. 1, para.  2; Japan's response to Panel question No. 1, 
paras.  1-5; Norway's third -party sub mission, paras.  4-5; Norway's third -party statement, paras.  3-5; and 
Singapore's response to Panel question No. 1.) In contrast, the United  States argued that the Panel should 
begin and end its analysis by taking note of a respondent's invocation of a secu rity exception. (United  States' 
response to Panel question No. 1 to third parties, paras.  1 and 7.)  
217 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras.  4, 9-13 and 15; opening statement at the first 
meeting of the Panel, paras.  10-16; closing statement at th e first meeting of the Panel, paras.  3-5; response to 
Panel question No. 36, paras.  77-85; second written submission, paras.  1-13 and 69 -70; opening statement at 
the second meeting of the Panel, paras.  2-8 and 49 -50; and closing statement at the second mee ting of the 
Panel, paras.  2-5 and 8 -10. 
218 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.  
219 Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 1. See also opening 
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 7 and 14; clos ing statement at the first meeting of the 
Panel, para. 3; and second written submission, paras. 69 -70. 
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  precluding the Panel from ruling on the merits of the claims before it220; and (c) any Panel findings 
would be inconsequential, or a "meaningless step", in resolving this dispute because of the severance 
of economic relations between the parties, as was the case in the GATT dispute US – Nicaraguan 
Trade .221 
7.9.  While  Saudi Arabia did not present the Panel with any arguments formulated in terms of the 
Panel's "jurisdiction" or the "justiciability" of the dispute222, several third parties, including 
Australia223 and the European  Union224, construed Saudi Arabia's arguments as implying that 
Saudi  Arabia regard ed the matter as "non -justiciable". Furthermore, the United States argued that 
Saudi  Arabia's invocation of the security exception in Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement is not 
reviewable, and therefore , the matter is not "justiciable".225 There is a deg ree of overlap between 
the third parties' arguments presented in terms of  "justiciability", on the one hand, and the 
arguments presented by the parties and third parties in relation to Saudi  Arabia's  argument that the 
Panel should decline to make any findi ngs or recommendation based on Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of 
the DSU, on the other hand.  
7.10.   The Panel recalls that the issue of whether a panel has the discretion to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction that has been validly established, in circumstances where the  WTO dispute forms only 
one element in a wider dispute between the parties, was directly addressed by the panel and 
Appellate  Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks . In that dispute, Mexico argued that the 
United  States' WTO claims were inextricably linked to a larger dispute concerning compliance with 
its obligations under the North  American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and argued that although 
the WTO panel did have jurisdiction over the dispute, the panel also had the jurisdiction to decide 
whether or no t to exercise its substantive jurisdiction.226 Mexico argued that the panel should have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction, as the dispute involved predominant elements derived from rules 
of international law that were incapable of settlement at the WTO, name ly, NAFTA rules.227  
7.11.   Examining its duty under Article  11 of the DSU to make an objective assessment of the 
matter, the panel in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks found that, under the DSU, it had no discretion 
to decide whether or not to exercise its jurisdictio n in a case properly before it.228 The Appellate  Body 
upheld the panel's finding229, stating that it saw "no reason … to disagree with the Panel's statement 
that a WTO panel 'would seem … not to be in a position to choose freely whether or not to exercise 
its jurisdiction.'"230 Regarding the duty in Article  11 of the DSU to "make such other findings as will 
assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements", the Appellate  Body stated that it "[i]s difficult to see how a panel would fulfil that 
obligation if it declined to exercise validly established jurisdiction and abstained from making any 
finding on the matter before it".231 The Appellate  Body stated that "we express no view as to whether 
there may be other circumstances in which legal impediments could exist that would preclude a 
panel from ruling on the merits of the claims that are before it."232  
 
220 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 36(a), para. 79. See Saudi Arabia's first written 
submission, paras.  4, 9-13 and 15; opening statement at  the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  7-8 and 11 -15; 
closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  3-4; response to Panel question No. 36(a), 
paras.  78-80; and second written submission, paras.  2-3 and 70.  
221 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel  question No. 36(a) and (b), paras.  77-81.  
222 The Panel notes that Saudi Arabia's integrated executive summary presented its arguments 
concerning "The Matter Before the Panel", "Limited Jurisdiction to Assess Essential Security Interests", and 
"Impossibili ty of Satisfactory Settlement" under the heading of "Jurisdictional Issues". (See Saudi Arabia's 
integrated executive summary, p. 3.) According to Paragraph 22 of the Panel's Working Procedures, "executive 
summaries shall not in any way serve as a substitu te for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the 
Panel's examination of the case".  
223 Australia's third -party oral statement, para.  5. 
224 European  Union's third -party submission, para.  45.  
225 United  States' response to Panel question No. 8 to t hird parties, paras.  25-28.  
226 Panel  Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , para. 4.102.  
227 Ibid. para. 4.104.  
228 Ibid. para. 7.8. See ibid. para. 7.9.  
229 Appellate  Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , para. 57.  
230 Ibid. para. 53 (quoting Panel  Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , para. 7.8).  
231 Appellate  Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , para. 51.  
232 Ibid. paras.  44 and 54.  
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  7.12.   The panel in  Russia – Traffic in Transit  summarized some of the foregoing points when it 
observ ed that:  
The ICJ has rejected the "political question" argument, concluding that, as long as the 
case before it or the request for an advisory opinion turns on a legal question capable 
of a legal answer, it is duty -bound to take jurisdiction over it, regar dless of the political 
background or the other political facets of the issue.233 … Moreover, the Panel notes 
that in Mexico  – Taxes on  Soft Drinks , the Appellate  Body expressed the view that a 
panel's decision to decline to exercise validly established juris diction would not be 
consistent with its obligations under Articles  3.2 and 19.2 of the DSU, or the right of a 
Member to seek redress of a violation of obligations within the meaning of Article  23 of 
the DSU.234 
7.13.   With these general considerations in mind, the  Panel will now turn to the specific arguments 
presented by Saudi Arabia, beginning with its argument that the current dispute is "not a trade 
dispute at all"235, but a "political , geopolitical,  and essential security dispute".236 
7.14.   Saudi Arabia state d that it h ad severed all diplomatic and economic ties with the complaining 
Member, and emphasize d that the "only relevant issue" in this dispute is that "this is not a 'trade 
dispute' at all".237Saudi Arabia contends that t he underlying dispute concerns only non -trade 
interests that must be addressed following changes in behaviour, and only then in the context of 
bilateral and regional political discussions. For Saudi Arabia, political and essential security disputes 
of this kind cannot be resolv ed at the WTO, and should not be brought to the WTO disguised as 
trade disputes.  If complainants bring political and security questions to the WTO inappropriately, 
panels should protect the integrity of the dispute settlement system and refuse to proceed w ith 
disputes that arise from non -trade-related political and security issues that cannot be resolved at 
the WTO.238 According to Saudi Arabia, in the light of the total severance of diplomatic and consular 
relations between the parties, the Panel should cons ider whether any potential finding or ruling of 
the DSB could in any way address the underlying causes of the comprehensive rupture in diplomatic 
and consular relations between the parties.239 
7.15.   Qatar disagree d with Saudi Arabia's position that there is no "tr ade dispute", and that the 
"real dispute" lies elsewhere.240 Qatar recall ed that the Panel's  terms of reference are to "examine, 
in light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the 
matter referred to the DSB  by Qatar in document WT/DS567/3 ", i.e. Qatar's panel request, which 
identifies the measures at issue and Qatar's claims.241 Qatar submit ted that Saudi  Arabia ha d 
violated several provisions of the TRIPS  Agreement, that it (Qatar) ha d framed its claims in it s panel 
request accordingly, and that such claims circumscribe the Panel's terms of reference. Qatar 
contend ed that the matter referred to the Panel , as defined by Qatar's panel request,  is, "by 
definition, a 'trade dispute' over which the Panel ha d validl y been conferred jurisdiction" and , in 
Qatar's view, "[t]he Panel must exercise that jurisdiction".242 
 
233 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , fn 183 to para. 7.103  (referring to International Co urt of 
Justice, Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations , (United Nations) (1962) I.C.J. Reports, 
p. 155; International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadi ć (1995), Case No. IT -94-1-A, paras.  23-25). 
234 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , fn 183 to para. 7.103  (referring to Appellate  Body Report, 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , para. 53).  
235 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.  
236 Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 1. See also opening 
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras. 7 and 14; closing statement at the first meeting of the  
Panel, para. 3; and second written submission, paras. 69 -70. 
237 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.  
238 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, paras.  69-70. See also first written submission, para. 12; 
opening statement at the first meeting  of the Panel, para. 14; and closing statement at the first meeting of the 
Panel, para. 3.  
239 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 13.  
240 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 219 (quoting Saudi Arabia's first written 
submission, para. 11; and closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 6).  
241 Qatar's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  3-4. (emphasis omitted)  
242 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, para. 219. (emphasis  omitted)  
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  7.16.   The Panel is not persuaded that it can decline to make any findings or a recommendation, 
i.e. "decline to exercise its jurisdiction" on the basis of Saudi  Arabia's argument that the 
"real dispute"243 between the parties is not a "trade dispute".244 The Panel considers that it is evident 
from its terms of reference that it has not been asked by Qatar or the DSB to make any findings or 
recommendation on any wider dispute between the parties. The matter raised by Qatar in its panel 
request, which now forms the Panel's  terms of reference, concerns alleged violations of the 
TRIPS  Agreement. Accordingly, the matter before the Panel falls within the legal subject -matter 
jurisdiction of a WTO dispute settlement panel.  
7.17.   For similar reasons , the Panel is not persuaded that it can decline to exercise jurisdiction on 
the basis of Saudi  Arabia's argument that it is impossible for any findings or recommendation to 
secure a  positive solution to "the matter" and/or achieve a satisfactory settlement of "the dispute" 
under the DSU. The Panel considers that this argument, like Saudi Arabia's argument concerning 
the "real dispute" not being a "trade dispute", is directed at the w ider political dispute between the 
parties that is not at issue before the Panel.245 The Panel recalls that  Article 3.4 of the DSU provides 
that recommendations or rulings made by the DSB are to be aimed at achieving a "satisfactory 
settlement of the matter  in accordance with the rights and obligations under [the DSU] and under 
the covered agreements". The Panel considers that the "matter" referred to in Article  3.4 is the 
"matter referred to the DSB" by a complainant in its panel request, as provided under A rticle 7.1 of 
the DSU.246 Thus, in this dispute, the matter for which a satisfactory settlement is to be achieved is 
the "matter referred to the DSB" by Qatar in its panel request, which, in turn, circumscribes the 
Panel's terms of reference. The Panel is therefore not persuaded by Saudi  Arabia's arguments under 
Articles 3.7 and 11 of the DSU.247 
7.18.   In respons e to a question from the Panel inviting the parties and third parties to comment on 
the relevance of the Appellat e Body's analysis in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks  to Saudi Arabia's 
request that the Panel decline to make any findings or recommendation248, Saudi Arabia argued that 
"in the present dispute there exist stark legal impediments not present or considered in Mexico – 
Taxes on Soft Drinks ". Specifically,  Saudi Arabia stated that the implications of Article  3.4 of the 
DSU (which provides that "recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving 
a satisfactory settlement of the matter") were not considered in that case and that, in its vi ew, the 
provisions of Article  3.4 would amount to such a "legal impediment" that would  preclude a panel 
from ruling on the merits of the claims before it.249 However, the Panel notes that Saudi Arabia has 
identified no case in which a panel or the Appellate  Body has found that the fairly general wording 
of Article  3.4 of the DSU can constitute a "legal impediment" that would preclude a panel from ruling 
on a particular measure or claim.  
7.19.   The Panel notes that Saudi Arabia further argues that, given the compreh ensiveness of the 
diplomatic and economic measures imposed by Saudi Arabia and other Members in the region, and 
the underlying rationale for those measures, it is clear that Qatar has not exercised sound judgement 
 
243 See paragraph 7.13 of this Report.  
244 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.  
245 For instance, in its first written submission, Saudi Arabia stated that "no finding of the Panel and no 
ruling of the DSB will in any way address the underlying causes of the comprehensive rupture in relations 
between the complaining Member and Saudi Arabia". ( Saudi Arabia's first written submission, p ara. 15.)  
246 Article  7.1 of the DSU establishes the following standard terms of reference: "To examine, in the 
light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the 
matter referred to the DSB by (na me of party) in document ...  and to make such findings as will assist the DSB 
in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s)." (emphasis 
added)  
247 The Panel considers that the "dispute" referred to in Article  3.7 and the "matter" referred to in 
Article  11, like the "matter" referred to in Article  3.4, is the narrow one currently before the Panel, and not 
what Saudi Arabia referred to as the "real dispute".  
248 In its first written submission, Saudi Arabia referr ed to Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the DSU in support 
of its request that the Panel decline to make any findings or a recommendation. Saudi Arabia did not refer to 
any panel or Appellate Body reports interpreting or applying those provisions. However, the i ssues raised by 
Saudi Arabia's request, and the DSU provisions that it refers to, were addressed by the panel and the Appellate 
Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks. Furthermore, without referring to any WTO cases dealing with these 
provisions, Saudi Arab ia apparently sought to distinguish that case by arguing that "[t]his case does not 
concern whether the WTO or some other forum is more appropriate for the settlement of a trade dispute". 
(Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 11.)  
249 Saudi Arabia' s response to Panel question No. 36(a), para. 79.  
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  in taking action under Article  3.7 of the DSU.250 The Panel recalls the Appellate  Body's statement in 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks  that Article  3.3 of the DSU provides that the "prompt settlement of 
situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under  
the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to 
the effective functioning of the WTO".251 Thus, the Appellate  Body stated that there is "little in the 
DSU that explicitly limits the rights of WTO Members to brin g an action".252 The Appellate  Body then 
added that Article  3.7 of the DSU states that "[b]efore bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its 
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful", and that Article  3.10 
thereof stipulates t hat "if a dispute arises, all Members will engage in these procedures in good faith 
in an effort to resolve the dispute ."253 Given the discretion granted to complainants in deciding 
whether to bring a dispute under the DSU, the Panel does not consider that Qatar failed to exercise 
its judgement within the meaning of Article  3.7 in bringing this case.  
7.20.   The present dispute involves claims of violation. Where a WTO panel finds a measure 
inconsistent with a covered agreement, Article  19.1 of the DSU  mandates the panel to recommend 
that the Member concerned "bring the measure into conformity" with the covered agreement.254 
Once the DSB adopts the panel report, the panel's recommendation becomes part of the 
"recommendations and rulings of the DSB"255, with  which the respondent has a legal obligation to 
comply.  
7.21.   The Panel thus considers the present dispute distinguishable from US – Nicaraguan Trade , a 
GATT dispute in which the panel declined to make findings or a recommendation in the context of 
the invocati on of Article  XXI of the GATT 1947.256 That panel did so in respect of a non-violation 
claim , in respect of which the  GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES could only make a non -binding 
recommendation that the United  States withdraw its embargo, or authorize Nicaragua to  suspend 
the application of obligations toward the United  States.257 Given the two -way trade embargo 
between the United  States and Nicaragua, the panel considered that any authorization permitting 
Nicaragua to suspend obligations to the United  States "could not alter the balance of advantages 
 
250 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras.  9 and 13; and response to Panel question No. 36(b), 
para. 82.  
251 Appellate  Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , para. 52.  (emphasis original) The 
Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III  has made a similar observation with respect to Article  XXIII:1 of the 
GATT  1994 and Article  3.7 of the DSU, stating that:  
a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member 
under the DSU.  The language of Article  XXIII:1 of the GATT  1994 and of Article  3.7 of the DSU 
suggests, furthermore, that a Member is expected to be largely self -regulating in deciding 
whether any such action would be "fruitful ". (Appellate  Body Report, EC – Bananas III,  para. 
135. See Japan's response to Panel question No. 8, para. 36.)  
252 Appellate  Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks , fn 101 to para. 52 (quoting Appellate  Body 
Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar , para. 312).  
253 Ibid. (emphasis original)  
254 In contrast, Article  26.1( b) of the DSU provides that in a non -violation case, the panel or the 
Appellate  Body shall recommend that the Member concerned "make a mutually satisfactory adjustment".  
255 See, e.g. Panel Report, US – Carbon Steel (India) (Article 21.5 – India) , para. 7.299 (stating that 
"once the Appellate Body's findings are adopted by the DSB, they become the 'recommendations or rulings of 
the DSB' "). (emphasis original)  
256 As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia's first writt en submission referred to Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the 
DSU in support of its request that the Panel decline to make any findings or a recommendation, and did not 
refer to any panel or Appellate Body reports interpreting or applying those provisions. How ever, its arguments 
broadly paralleled the arguments that the United States presented, and which the panel ultimately accepted, in 
US – Nicaraguan Trade . In response to a question from the Panel, Saudi Arabia stated that it concurs with the 
panel's approac h in US – Nicaraguan Trade . (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 36(b).) In response 
to a question from the Panel inviting the parties' and third parties' views on the relevance of the GATT panel's 
findings  in US – Nicaraguan Trade , the United St ates submitted that the panel's findings makes clear that " the 
question of whether an essential security action is inconsistent with a covered agreement is not justiciable", 
and that the GATT panel did not have the competence to address national security m atters. ( United  States' 
response to Panel question No. 8, paras.  17 and 31.) The UAE commented that the GATT panel's special terms 
of reference could be read as implying that the parties recognized that the GATT  CONTRACTING PARTIES could 
not play a useful role in the resolution of the dispute on matters of security between the parties. ( United Arab 
Emirates' response to Panel question No. 8, para. 40.)  
257 GATT Panel  Report, US – Nicaraguan Trade, para. 5.7. The panel was established with special terms  
of reference that precluded it from examining the validity of the invocation of Article  XXI of the GATT  1947. 
(Ibid. para s. 1.4 and 5 .3.) 
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  accruing to the two contracting  parties under the General Agreement in Nicaragua's favour" .258 In 
the present dispute , Qatar and Sau di Arabia have no t imposed a  two-way embargo on trade or 
mutually suspended IP rights , and Qatar indicate d that the DSB's authorization of a complainant to 
suspend obligations would be valuable given the remedies outlined in the DSU.259  
7.22.   Before concluding  its examination of this issue , the Panel observes that Saudi Arabia did not 
argue that the TRIPS  Agreement did not apply, and the Panel sees no issue regarding the 
applicability of the TRIPS  Agreement and the DSU to Saudi Arabia's relations with  Qatar . Article  63 
of the Vienna  Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[t] he severance of diplomatic or 
consular relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations established between 
them by the treaty except in so far as  the existence of diplomatic or consular relations is 
indispensable for the application of the treaty." Likewise, Article  XIII:1 of the WTO  Agreement does 
not recognize the severance of relations between two Members as a circumstance resulting in the 
non-application of  the multilateral agreements on trade in goods, the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, or the TRIPS  Agreement.260 Saudi  Arabia argue d that the circumstances underlying and 
evidenced by its severance of relations with Qatar should be taken i nto account for purposes of 
applying the two sets of WTO provisions that it refers to, namely : (a) for purposes of establishing 
that the conditions of the security exception in Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement are satisfied, 
and (b) for purposes o f establishing that the conditions for a panel making findings and 
recommendations, as reflected in Articles 3.4, 3.7 and 11 of the DSU are not satisfied.  
7.23.   For all of these reasons, the Panel concludes that it cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction 
over the claims of WTO -inconsistency that fall within its terms of reference  and that the matter is 
justiciable . 
7.1.3   The measures challenged by Qatar   
7.24.   The second set of preliminary questions  concerns the scope of the matter before the Panel, 
and more precisely t he scope of the measures that are properly before the Panel.   
7.25.   The specific measures at issue identified by Qatar are the six measures reflected in 
paragraph  2.47 of this Report . Qatar's submissions are directed to those measures individually and 
the extent to which they "work together"261, in various combinations, to create the results  
enumerated in paragraph 2.46. These six specific measures are: (a)  the 19 June 2017 Circular, 
(b) the anti-sympathy measures, (c) the travel restrictions, (d)  the Ministerial approval 
requirement, (e) the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties, and (f) the promotion of 
public gatherings with screenings of beoutQ's  unauthorized broadcast s. Qatar assert s that it is the 
"combined operation"262 of the first four of these six measures that "make it unduly difficult for 
Qatari nationals to access civil judicial remedies" (in the sense of the third bullet in paragraph 
2.46).263 Thus, the Panel's  findings are directed at the six specific measures as defined in paragraph 
2.47 of this Report.  
7.26.   The Panel notes that  Qatar's submissions referred  to some of the six measures in more than 
one way. In its first written submission, Qatar repeatedly refer red to the "targeted restrictions of 
intellectual property protections".264 In response to a Panel question, Qatar clarified that it was 
correct to read any references to "targeted restrictions of intellectual property protections" in its 
 
258 Ibid. para. 5.11. In this connection, the panel observed that Nicaragua accepted that it would be 
"a meaningless st ep". ( Ibid.)  
259 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, paras. 213 -214. Among other things, Qatar considered 
that the suspension of the protections of Saudi nationals' IP rights may provide some level of redress to Qatar 
for Saudi Arabia's TRIPS violatio ns. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 36, paras.  211-214.)  
260 Article  XIII of the WTO  Agreement is entitled "Non -Application of Multilateral Trade Agreements 
between Particular Members", and paragraph 1 thereof states that " [t]his Agreement and the Mu ltilateral Trade 
Agreements in Annexes 1 and 2 shall not apply as between any Member and any other Member if either of the 
Members, at the time either becomes a Member, does not consent to such application."  
261 Qatar's second written submission, para.  290. See Qatar's responses to Panel question No. 2(a), 
para. 15, and Panel question No. 5, para. 25.  
262 Qatar's second written submission, para.  276. 
263 See paragraph 2.46, third bullet, of this Report.  
264 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  156, 157 and 187 , heading IV.A.2(c), paras.  205, 206, 207, 
224, 225, 233, 234, 240, 326, 327, 328, 345, 352, 374 and 396.  
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  first written submissi on to mean  the 19 June 2017 Circular  and not some broader category of 
measures.265 As regards the requirement for Ministerial approval of Copyright Committee decisions 
as applied to beIN, Qatar variously referred to the Ministry's "denial of access to admini strative 
tribunals and courts"266, to the Ministry's having acted to close the "gates " with respect to 
adjudicating infringement of copyrights held by Qatari nationals267, to the Ministry having barred 
beIN from accessing Saudi Arabia's administrative tribunal s or courts to launch a copyright 
infringement case268, or more simply to the "gatekeeping function".269 In response to a Panel 
question, Qatar clarified that these various formulations are different ways of referring to the same 
measure.270 
7.27.   The Panel further notes that Qatar included extremely broad language in paragraph 5 of its 
panel request which may have introduced a further element of ambiguity with respect to the 
measures that it is challenging. The Panel recalls that Article  6.2 of the DSU  requires a complain ant 
to identify "the specific measures at issue" in its panel request. However, paragraph 5 of Qatar's 
panel request states that "[t]he measures at issue in this request include all written and unwritten, 
published and unpublished, meas ures (including omissions) that have resulted in Saudi Arabia's 
failure to protect IP rights, including with respect to IP rights held (or applied for) by, inter alia , 
Qatari entities and Qatari individuals".  In response to a question from the Panel, Qatar  clarified that 
it is not challenging any measures other than those set out in paragraphs 2.46 and 2.47 above.271 
7.28.   Saudi Arabia observe d that, in paragraph 6 of Qatar's panel request, Qatar note d that 
Saudi  Arabia ha d "imposed a scheme of diplomatic, politica l, and economic measures against Qatar", 
and that "[s]uch measures impacted, inter alia , the ability of Qatari nationals to protect intellectual 
property rights in Saudi Arabia".272 Saudi Arabia consider ed that this reference to the "scheme" of 
such measures , in paragraph 6 of Qatar's panel request, "refers to the comprehensive ' measures ' 
as the basis for [the application of the] additional, related measures identified by the complaining 
Party that allegedly impact the protection of intellectual property".273 As a result, Saudi Arabia 
emphasize d that the comprehensive "measures" are "a measure  affirmatively included in the 
Panel's  terms of reference", and that "the complaining Party cannot deny Saudi Arabia the 
opportunity to raise defenses, especially based on Security Exceptions , with reference to [such a 
measure]".274 According to Saudi Arabia, "the extension to and coverage of the very same 
comprehensive measures  within the Panel's terms of reference has been asserted by the complaining 
Party since at least 19  November 2018 and cannot be disputed at this stage".275  
7.29.   Notwithstanding its reference to these "comprehensive measures" in its panel request, 
Qatar  stated on several occasions that its claims do not pertain to such measures. In its opening 
statement at the first substantive meeting, Qatar stressed that it "does not challenge, in this dispute, 
Saudi  Arabia's decision to sever diplomatic and economic ties".276 In its closing statement at the 
same meeting, Qatar reiterated that "[t]his dispute does not include a challenge to 
Saudi  Arabia's  decision to cut off diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar".277 In its 
second  written submission, Qatar add ed that while it "recalls the scheme of coercive economic 
measures imposed by Saudi  Arabia on 5  June 2017 as 'background' in Section III.A of its 
First Written Submission, Qatar pursue [d] no claims against that scheme"278 and reiterate d that it 
"has never pursued claims agai nst Saudi  Arabia's  imposition of 'comprehensive measures' in this 
 
265 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 3, para.  22. 
266 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  252, 269, 322, 327, 328, 345, 352, 374 and 396.  
267 Ibid. paras.  148, 350, 381 and 401.  
268 Ibid. paras.  123, 350 and 381.  
269 Ibid. paras.  194 and 227.  
270 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 4, para.  23. 
271 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 2(b), para.  21. 
272 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No . 32(a), para.  68; and second written submission, 
para. 24 (referring to WT/DS567/3, para.  6). 
273 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  25. (italics added, underlining original)  
274 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  26; and response to  Panel question No. 32(a), 
paras.  65 and 69 -71. (underlining original)  
275 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  26; and response to Panel question No. 32(a), 
paras.  65 and 69 -71. (underlining original)  
276 Qatar's opening statement at the first meet ing of the Panel, para.  84. (emphasis original)  
277 Qatar's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  4. (emphasis original)  
278 Qatar's second written submission, para.  279. (fn omitted)  
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  dispute".279 Qatar consider ed that whether Saudi Arabia can justify other  measures at issue —either 
individually or by grouping them into a "comprehensive measure" or "overall scheme" —is entire ly 
irrelevant for the present dispute.280 This leaves open whether the measures which are challenged 
individually and collectively fall within, or are a necessary consequence of, the comprehensive 
measures . 
7.30.   Qatar made certain statements in its submissions th at might be construed as constituting 
"as such" claims in respect of two aspects of Saudi law. The Panel recalls that in WTO law, there is 
an important distinction between "as such" claims and "as applied" claims.281 It is well established 
that any "as such"  claim must be clearly stated in the panel request, and that certain thresholds 
must be satisfied to uphold any such claim (e.g. the law must mandate, not merely allow for, 
WTO-inconsistent conduct). Regarding the need to ensure that any "as  such"  claim is  clearly stated 
in the panel request, the Appellate  Body has stated that:  
We would therefore urge complaining parties to be especially diligent  in setting out "as 
such" claims in their panel requests as clearly as possible. In particular, we would expect 
that "as such" claims state unambiguously the specific measures of municipal law 
challenged by the complaining party and the legal basis for the allegation that those 
measures are not consistent with particular provisions of the covered agreements. 
Through such straightforward presentations of "as such" claims, panel requests should 
leave respondent parties in little doubt that, notwithstanding their own considered views 
on the WTO -consistency of their measures, another Member intends to challenge th ose 
measures, as such, in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.282 
7.31.   With the foregoing in mind, the Panel recalls that in its first written submission, Qatar 
repeatedly state d that the nature of the Ministerial approval requirement in the Copyright Law 
"highlig hts a fundamental flaw in Saudi  Arabia's copyright regime"283, namely, the lack of access to 
civil judicial procedures for copyright owners that the Minister disfavours, in his capacity as a political 
actor working under the direction of the King dom of Saudi  Arabia.  
7.32.   However, Qatar's panel request and first written submission did not present any "as such" 
claim regarding the requirement for Ministerial approval of Copyright  Committee decisions. In 
response to a question from the Panel, Qatar confirmed that it is not making a n "as such" claim, and 
that its  claim is that the requirement for Ministerial approval of Copyright  Committee decisions "as 
applied" to beIN gives rise to violations of the specific provisions of the TRIPS  Agreement  and the 
Berne Convention (1971).284 In the absen ce of an "as such" claim relating to the Ministerial approval 
requirement, the relevant question before the Panel is whether that requirement ha s, through its 
application or existence, worked alone or together with other measures to de ny beIN access to civil 
and criminal enforcement procedures. The burden of proof rests on Qatar to provide sufficient 
evidence to substantiate its assertions to that effect.  
7.33.   A second aspect of Saudi law that Qatar discussed in terms that might be construe d as 
constituting an "as such" claim relates to the 19  June 2017 Circular. In its first written submission, 
Qatar assert ed that the 19  June 2017 Circular "served to effectively strip beIN  of the legal right to 
protect any intellectual property rights related to the beIN channels"285, and "precluded beIN's ability 
to operate in Saudi Arabia or enforce its intellectual property rights by stripping its legal right to 
protect its intellectual pr operty rights".286 Saudi Arabia counter ed that beIN ha d not lost the right to 
protect any related IP rights in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the 19  June 2017 Circular because, while it 
 
279 Ibid. para.  280. 
280 Ibid. para.  281. 
281 "As such" claims are directed at a provision of a law or regulation that mandates WTO -inconsistent 
conduct as such, independent of any instances of its application. "As applied" claims are directed at the 
application of a law, regulation or other measure in certain instances, without claiming that any provision 
thereof is necessarily WTO -inconsistent in and of itself. (See generally Appellate  Body Report, US – 1916 Act , 
paras.  60-61.) 
282 Appellate  Body Report, US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para. 173. (emphasis 
original)  
283 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  140, 195, 228 and 409.  
284 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 7, para.  56. 
285 Qatar's first written submission, para.  41.  
286 Ibid. para.  144. 
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  is true that, under Saudi law, "unlicensed distributors of illegally distribu ted content do not have a 
right to protect copyright in such illegally distributed content"287, Saudi Arabia made no 
determination that beIN continued to distribute its content after 19  June 2017.288  
7.34.   Qatar responded that this "admission" by Saudi Arabia about  its law, namely, that "beIN —or 
any other entity which Saudi Arabia considers is broadcasting illegally ( i.e., without a license or for 
other reasons) —could not protect copyright or related rights in its own content"289, establishes 
another "deficiency" in S audi Arabia's domestic "copyright regime".290 In developing this argument, 
Qatar refer red to "the violations of the TRIPS  Agreement  evident from Saudi law and practice".291 
Qatar also refer red to the finding of the panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights  that, although 
international copyright rules allow WTO Members to censor content, a WTO Member is not allowed 
to deny copyright protection to unlicensed content.292 
7.35.   The Panel recalls the findings of the panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights  that 
Article 4(1) of China's Copyright Law —which denied copyright protection to works whose publication 
and/or dissemination was prohibited by law —was inconsistent "as such" with Article  5(1) of the 
Berne Convention.293 However, s ince Qatar's panel request did not include an "as such" claim against 
this alleged deficiency in Saudi law, Qatar cannot challenge this law independently of any instances 
of its application to beIN or any other entity. The Circular is mentioned by name in 
Qatar's  panel  request, wher e it is characterized in terms that focus on the " distribution of beIN media 
content".294 Likewise, in Qatar's first written submission, all references to the effect of the 
19 June 2017 Circular focus on "Qatari nationals" or "beIN" having been stripped of t heir right to 
protect their IP rights.295 This narrow focus on how the Circular affected "Qatari nationals" (i.e.  beIN) 
also aligns to the way in which Qatar formulated the measures , as set out in paragraph 2.46 of this 
Report.  
7.36.   Accordingly, since Qatar's cla im in relation to the Circular is an "as applied" claim, Qatar bears 
the burden of substantiating its assertion that the 19  June 2017 Circular "served to effectively strip 
beIN of the legal right to protect any intellectual property rights related to the b eIN channels" .296 To 
do so, Qatar would have to adduce evidence to show that beIN had actually taken action to protect 
its IP rights and that such action was barred or in some way hampered by the Saudi authorities.  
7.2  Acts and omissions claimed by Qatar to be attributable to Saudi Arabia  
7.2.1   Introduction  
7.37.   The following factual circumstances underlying Qatar's claims are undisputed. First, beIN has 
not initiated civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ before Saudi tribunals, and neither has 
 
287 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  13. 
288 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para.  47; and opening statement at the second 
meeting of the Panel, para.  14. Saudi Arabia clarified that "it affords copyright protection to all entities even i f 
they are not licensed to broadcast in Saudi Arabia, with the exception of entities found to have distributed 
content illegally ( i.e., without a broadcasting license) in Saudi Arabia". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel 
question No. 41, para.  24.) 
289 Qatar' s second written submission, para.  172 (referring to Second Supplemental Expert Report of 
Professor Gervais, 19  August  2019, Exhibit QAT -223, para.  3). 
290 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 41, para.  20 (referring to Qatar's second written submission, 
paras. 169-173); and para. 24.  
291 Second Supplemental Expert Report of Professor Gervais, 19  August  2019, Exhibit QAT -223, para.  2. 
292 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 41, para.  20 (referring to Second Supplemental Expert Report 
of Professor Gervais, 19  August  2019, Exhibit QAT -223, para.  4 (referring, in turn, to Panel  Report, China – 
Intellectual Property Rights , paras.  7.120 -7.139)). The right to censor content is recognized in Article  17 of the 
Berne Convention (1971), which, in turn, is incorporated  into the TRIPS  Agreement by Article  9.1. 
293 Panel  Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights , paras.  7.28-7.143. That panel noted that "this 
claim challenges China's Copyright Law, in particular Article  4(1), not as it has been applied in any particular 
instance but 'as such'." (Ibid, para.  7.28.)  
294 Qatar's panel request, para.  8.  
295 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  202, 230, 251, 268, 300 -301, 321, 347, 379 and 399.  
296 Ibid. para.  41.  
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  any other foreign righ t holder.297 Second, Saudi authorities have not applied criminal procedures or 
penalties against what Qatar has characterized as beoutQ's commercial -scale piracy.298 Third, 
beoutQ's  illegal broadcasts of some 2018 World Cup matches were publicly screened in 
Saudi  Arabia.299 However, the parties disagree about the extent to which any of these circumstances 
is the result of acts and omissions attributable to Saudi Arabia.  
7.38.   While Qatar as serted that Saudi Arabia ha d taken a number of measures (i.e. the 19 June 
2017 Circular, anti -sympathy measures, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement) 
whose "combined operation … deprive[s] Qatari nationals of access to civil judicial p rocedures and 
remedies in respect of intellectual property rights"300, Saudi Arabia submit ted that these alleged 
measures either do not exist or do not have the effects alleged by Qatar.301 Similarly, Saudi Arabia 
stated that the reason for the absence of crim inal procedures and penalties being applied against 
beoutQ is that beIN and other foreign right holders have not provided Saudi authorities with sufficient 
supporting evidence and cooperation.302 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia suggest ed that any public 
screenings  of beoutQ's illegal broadcasts were not endorsed by, and are not a measure attributable 
to, the Government of Saudi Arabia.303 
7.39.   It is for the complain ant to make a prima facie  case, which involves establishing the existence 
of the challenged measures and the other factual premises underlying its claims, as well as the 
breach of the legal provisions invoked by the complain ant.304 While  WTO-inconsistent conduct may 
not be lightly p resumed, and must always be supported by sufficient evidence, the applicable 
evidentiary standard of proof in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is closer to that of the balance 
of probabilities, and is not a standard of certainty or proof beyond a reasona ble doubt.305 As a 
consequence of the applicable evidentiary standard being closer to that of a balance of probabilities, 
panels may make findings of fact based on inferences and circumstantial evidence.306  
7.40.   In the light of Saudi Arabia's stated position that it would  "not engage with the facts or 
arguments presented by Qatar", t he Panel considers it important to confirm that, before considering 
any exceptions or lines of defence invoked by Saudi Arabia, it must first satisfy itself that Qatar has 
established a  prima  facie case in relation to each of the measures and claims at issue. In those 
WTO cases where a responding party did not contest one or more claims raised by the complainant, 
panels have consistently proceeded on the basis that they were nonetheless required to satisfy 
themselves that the complainant had established a prima facie case of violation in order to rule in 
the complainant's  favour.307 In this case, the Panel has sought to satisfy itself that Qatar's claims 
are well -founded in fact and in law through various means, including written and oral questions  and 
undertaking a careful review of the evidentiary basis underlying Qatar's various factual assertions .308 
The Panel has not made any material factual findings merely on the basis that some of Qata r's 
assertions are uncontested by Saudi Arabia. If the Panel determines that a prima facie case has 
 
297 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 43, paras. 47 and 60 ; Saudi Arabia's response to Panel 
question No. 29, para.  35; Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  61; and Saudi Arabia's response to 
Panel question No. 39, para.  13. 
298 Qatar's first written submission, para.  131; and Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, 
para. 45.  
299 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  86-94; Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No.  30(a), 
paras.  61-62; and Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 67.  
300 Qatar's second written submission, para.  276. See also ibid. para.  290.  
301 See generally Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras.  26-27, 35 -36, and 47 -50; 
and second written submission, paras.  53-58.  
302 See generally Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras.  41-46; and s econd written 
submission, paras.  59-66. 
303 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a), paras.  61-62; and second written submission, 
paras.  67-68. 
304 Appellate  Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , p. 14, DSR 1997:I, 323, at p.  335. 
305 Panel  Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) (Article  21.5 – Philippines) , para.  7.777. 
306 Ibid. para. 7.778.  
307 See, e.g. Panel  Reports, US – Shrimp  (Ecuador) , paras.  7.9 and 7.11; and US – Poultry (China) , 
paras.  7.445 -7.446.  
308 For example, the Panel put questions to Qatar on a series o f factual and legal issues relating to its 
claims, including but not limited to detailed questions to clarify the extent to which beIN holds copyright and 
related rights over the alleged pirated content and broadcasts. (See, e.g. Panel question Nos. 6(b)(i ), (ii), (iii) 
and (iv); 6(c); 6(d); and 45 to the parties.)  
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  been established by Qatar in relation to any of the measures, it will then turn to consider the defences 
and arguments made by Saudi Arabia.   
7.41.   The Panel will address these disputed factual issues  and consider the evidence in support  
before turning to Qatar's claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement . The Panel will 
refer back to these factual findings later in the context of its analysis of Qatar's specific claims under 
the TRIPS  Agreement .  
7.2.2   Arguments  
7.2.2.1   Qatar  
7.42.   Qatar argue d that beIN "has faced numerous obstacles preventing it from initiating civil action 
in Saudi courts in order to enforce its IP rights".309 First, it stated that the 19 June 2017 Circular 
stripped beIN of the right to protect its IP rights before Saudi courts and tribunals.310 Qatar argue d 
that it does not matter whether the Circular was " officially issued".311 Second, it assert ed that beIN 
has been unable to obtain legal representatio n from Saudi lawyers to enforce its IP rights , partly 
due to Saudi  Arabia's  anti-sympathy measures.312 In Qatar's view, Saudi Arabia's "raw assertion" to 
the contrary "does not even attempt to refute the evidence on record".313 Third, it submit ted that 
the tra vel ban imposed on Qatari nationals makes it impossible for Qatari right holders to initiate, 
conduct or testify in proceedings for the enforcement of IP rights in Saudi Arabia.314 Qatar contend ed 
that Saudi  Arabia's  "remarkable assertion" that foreign natio nals may commence and participate in 
proceedings by email is unsubstantiated.315 Fourth, there is a requirement for Ministerial approval 
of any decision of the Copyright Committee316 and, Qatar stated, the Minister has not approved the 
initiation of proceeding s before the Committee317, and would never approve any decision in favour 
of beIN or its licensors (even if a case could be initiated).318 According to Qatar, the alleged 
amendment to the Copyright Law replacing the Minister with a Board of Directors changes n othing 
in this regard319, and it remains "utterly implausible" that a Board of Directors comprised of Saudi 
government officials and private citizens would permit a successful challenge before the 
Committee.320  
7.43.   Regarding the "total lack of criminal enforcement" or other action by Saudi authorities, Qatar 
submit ted that beIN has repeatedly requested, along with other foreign right holders, that 
Saudi  authorities take immediate action against beoutQ. Qatar assert ed that it has provided ample 
evidence o f beoutQ's illegal broadcast piracy in Saudi Arabia to these authorities.321 
Nevertheless,  despite the extensive evidence of beoutQ's widespread, commercial -scale copyright 
piracy in Saudi Arabia, to date, Saudi authorities have taken no criminal action agai nst beoutQ, 
 
309 Qatar's first written submission, para.  132.  
310 Ibid. paras.  38-43. 
311 Qatar's second written submission, paras.  23-30. 
312 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  133-139. 
313 Qatar's second writ ten submission para.  78. See ibid. paras. 77 -82. 
314 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  15, 145 and 193.  
315 Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 40, paras. 65 -71. 
316 Qatar's first written submission, paras. 119 -121 and 140.  
317 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 18(a), paras.  114-115.  
318 Ibid. para.  116.  
319 Qatar's second written submission, para. 114. See ibid. paras.  106-114. 
320 Ibid. para.  114. In response to Saudi Arabia's assertion that beIN or other relevant right holde rs can 
directly access remedies for copyright infringement in Saudi Arabia through the SAIP, Qatar maintained that 
the SAIP is not the proper forum to adjudicate claims of copyright infringement, GCAM and the Ministry never 
provided any indication otherwis e to beIN or other foreign holders, and the SAIP was not operational at the 
time of the establishment of the Panel. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 43, paras.  56-77.) 
321 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  126-131 and 197 -201; and second writte n submission, 
para. 85 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15  April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, paras.  58-61; 
Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 15  August  2017, Exhibit QAT -116; Letter from 
Saudi General Commission for Audiovisual Media to beIN (Arabic original and English translation), 
2 September  2017, Exhibit QAT -117; Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 
14 September  2017, Exhibit  QAT-118; Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Inf ormation, 
16 January  2018, Exhibit  QAT-119; Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 
6 March  2018, Exhibit  QAT-120; and Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General 
Commission for Audiovisual Media, 3  September  2018, Exhibit QAT -106).  
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  Arabsat, or other Saudi facilitators.322 In Qatar's view, Saudi Arabia's suggestion that the allegations 
that beIN and other right holders have brought before Saudi authorities are "unfounded" and 
"unsupported" is directly contradicted by the ext ensive evidence before the Panel —including 
evidence that was previously shared with or otherwise made available to Saudi authorities, and it is 
"hard to imagine what 'relevant and credible information' Saudi Arabia still needs".323 Qatar assert ed 
that "it co uld not be for lack of sufficient evidence" that Saudi Arabia has failed to initiate procedures 
and penalties against the beoutQ piracy.324 For Qatar, the reason that criminal procedures and 
penalties have not been applied against beoutQ is that the Saudi go vernment itself has supported, 
facilitated and participated in the beoutQ piracy.325  
7.44.   Regarding the alleged promotion of public gatherings with screenings of 
beoutQ's  unauthorized broadcasts,  Qatar refer red to "government -sponsored beoutQ piracy 
events"326 during the 2018 FIFA World Cup, when beoutQ broadcasts were the only way for Saudi 
nationals to watch their own national team play.327 Qatar refer red to tweets by international 
journalists revealing that, on 22  June 2018, a government -sponsored event was broadc asting the 
beoutQ -pirated World Cup match between Saudi Arabia and Uruguay on a large public screen in 
Riyadh's main boulevard.328 Qatar also assert ed that the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs of 
Saudi Arabia published flyers ahead of the 2018 FIFA Wo rld Cup, advertising 294 display screens 
allocated across the 13 regions of Saudi Arabia – all broadcasting beoutQ.329 Qatar provide d further 
evidence in the form of tweets posted by various Saudi municipal governments that promoted 
various public screenings  of beoutQ's  broadcasts of the 2018 FIFA World Cup.330 Qatar submit ted 
that Saudi Arabia does not engage with or dispute any of this evidence, and invite d the Panel to 
make an objective assessment of the facts based on the ample evidence provided by Qatar.331 Qatar 
added that "public statements made by government officials in their official capacity via social media 
platforms can be attributed to a government, in the same way that such statements by officials to 
the press can be attributed to the government for which they  work".332 As regards 
Saudi  Arabia's  reference to an April 2019 Circular that was allegedly sent to various government 
offices, Qatar submit ted that this Circular concerns pirated or counterfeit computer software and has 
"nothing whatsoever to do with pirate d sports broadcasting".333 
7.2.2.2   Saudi Arabia  
7.45.   As regards beIN's access to civil enforcement procedures, Saudi Arabia submit ted that the 
alleged measures either do not exist or do not have the legal or practical effects asserted. First, beIN 
has not lost the right to protect any related IP rights in Saudi Arabia by virtue of the 19  June 2017 
Circular or the rules of Saudi law that  it reflects because, while it is true that "unlicensed distributors 
of illegally distributed content do not have a right to protect copyright in such illegally distributed 
content"334, and while it is also true that certain "entities have been distributing unlicensed media 
content in Saudi Arabia after 19  June 2017", "no credible evidence exists to link such distribution to 
the wilful conduct of companies of the complaining Party or related entities".335 Second, Saudi Arabia 
did not maintain any "anti -sympathy  measures" or any other measures that restrict ed access to 
 
322 Qatar's first written submission, para.  131; and second written submission, para.  86. 
323 Qatar's second written submission, paras.  88-92.  
324 Ibid. para.  214.  
325 Qatar's first written submission, para.  437; and second written submissi on, paras.  215-217. Qatar 
also suggests that such procedures have not been applied to the beoutQ piracy "because such piracy 
predominantly affects a Qatari national, beIN, and its licensors". (Qatar's first written submission, para.  200.)  
326 Qatar's first w ritten submission, section III.B.4(b).  
327 Ibid. para.  86.  
328 Ibid. para.  87.  
329 Ibid. para.  88.  
330 Ibid. paras.  89-94.  
331 Qatar's second written submission, paras.  38-39.  
332 Ibid. para.  39.  
333 Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  27. 
334 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  13. 
335 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para.  47; and opening statement at the second 
meeting of the Panel, para.  14. Saudi Arabia clarified that "it affords copyright protection to all entities even if 
they are not licensed to broadcast in Saudi Arabia, with the exception of entities found to have distributed 
content illegally ( i.e., without a  broadcasting license) in Saudi Arabia". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel 
question No. 41, para.  24.) 
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  lawyers in Saudi Arabia for assistance in IP matters336, and in any event companies may directly 
provide information and evidence to the SAIP or to the Government without retaining counsel or 
other l ocal support in Saudi Arabia.337 Furthermore, in Saudi Arabia's view, no law firm would be 
able to proceed with a case against beoutQ in Saudi courts "because the company does not have a 
location in Saudi Arabia , and its location outside Saudi Arabia cannot be ascertained" .338 Saudi Arabia 
states that "[t] his could explain why law firms in Saudi Arabia appear to be substantively and 
procedurally unable to establish a case against beoutQ , rather than unwilling to work with 
complainants to file cases against beoutQ."339 Third, Saudi Arabia submit ted that foreign nationals 
may avail themselves of all rights in Saudi Arabia without physically travelling to or being present in 
Saudi Arabia, and  may commence and participate in proceedings or complaints before the Copyright 
Committee or SAIP by email from outside Saudi Arabia.340 Fourth, regarding the Ministerial approval 
requirement, the Copyright Law was amended to replace the Minister with a Boar d of Directors.341  
7.46.   Regarding the non -application of criminal procedures or penalties to 
beoutQ's  commercial -scale piracy, Saudi Arabia submit ted that "in order to take action under 
Saudi  criminal law and procedure, authorities require a reasonable level of evidence to facilitate 
follow up and prosecution".342 However, the various communications it has received from original 
right holders outside of Saudi Arabia "follow a pattern of relaying unfounded and unsupported 
allegations that beoutQ is distributing cont ent in Saudi Arabia in violation of their copyright".343 It 
submit ted that "no relevant and credible information has been provided by such companies to 
Saudi  authorities in order to support action against alleged infringing activity and companies".344 
Saudi  Arabia stated that it will "continue its efforts to identify the source and stop the copyright 
piracy of beoutQ but requires cooperation from entities in the market to achieve this goal".345 It 
submit ted that Arabsat ha d established that it did not distribute beoutQ content on its satellite 
frequencies.346 Saudi Arabia maintain ed that Members "cannot  be expected to act on criminal 
allegations without evidence and without cooperation of concerned right holders "347, and submit ted 
that "[w]here concerned right holders c ome forward with evidence and cooperate with the 
Government, Saudi Arabia effectively addresse s copyright infringement issues ".348 
7.47.   Regarding the alleged promotion of public gatherings with screenings of 
beoutQ's  unauthorized broadcasts, Saudi Arabia  submit ted that "[t]he Government of Saudi Arabia 
does not promote or authorize screenings of beoutQ broadcasts, and has no relationship at all with 
beoutQ."349 It also "note [d] that unofficial, non -government tweets are not usually recognized by 
legal adjud icators or attributed to a government without explicit approval".350 Saudi Arabia add ed 
that it "maintain s a vigilant watch over the enforcement of broadcast copyright violations at public 
gatherings.351 It explain ed that, on 14  April 2019, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
issued Circular No. 41898, which forwarded Royal Court Circular No. 40752 to the Secretariats, the 
Agencies and the Public Administrations of the Ministry, including to all Saudi municipal 
administrations. Circular No. 41898 emphasized that the Royal Order "must be followed and 
reminded all administrations 'to provide the maximum possible protection of intellectual property 
rights, ' including copyright protection ".352 
 
336 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras.  48-49. 
337 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  55. 
338 Saudi Arabia's response to Pane l question No. 39, para.  14.  
339 Ibid. 
340 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 40, paras.  20-21. 
341 See paragraph 2.13 of this Report.  
342 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para.  45.  
343 Ibid. para.  41.  
344 Ibid.  
345 Ibid. para.  42.  
346 Ibid. para.  43.  
347 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  59.  
348 Ibid. para.  61.  
349 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a), para.  61.  
350 Ibid. para.  62.  
351 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  68. 
352 Ibid. 
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  7.2.3   Assessment by the Panel  
7.2.3.1   Applicable legal standard  
7.48.   Article  3.3 of the DSU refers to "measures taken by another Member", without limitation as 
to the government agencies involved, and "[i]n principle, any act or omission attributable to a WTO 
Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings".353 The 
Panel is guided by the following legal considerations in its assessment of the existence of the 
measures at issue, and in its assessment of the other disputed factual issues underlying all of Qatar's 
various claims under Parts  I, II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement . 
7.49.   For the purposes of the DSU, t he notion of "measures" is not restricted by requirements as 
to form. Although measures challenged in the WTO are often reflected  in legal instruments such as 
enacted legislation, measures enacted or applied through other instruments that are legally binding 
in a Member's domestic legal framework (decrees, directives, regulations, notifications, judicial 
decisions354, etc.) have also been subject to challenge. A determination of whether an instrument is 
a "measure" "must be based on [its] content and substance … and not merely on its form or 
nomenclature."355 The legal status of an instrument within the domestic legal system of the Membe r 
concerned is not dispositive of whether that instrument is a measure for purposes of WTO dispute 
settlement .356 
7.50.   Only those acts or omissions attributable to a WTO Member are subject to WTO obligations. 
However, under Article 4(1) of the ILC Articles on Res ponsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (2001) (ILC Articles on State Responsibility), "[t]he conduct of any State organ shall 
be considered an act of that Member under international law , whether the organ exercises legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, 
and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the 
State."  As a consequence, a Member is responsible for actions at all levels of government (local, 
municipal, federal) and for all actions taken by any agency within any level of government.357 Thus, 
the responsibility of Members under international law applies irrespective of the branch of 
government at the origin of the action having international repercussions.358  
7.51.   Additionally, Article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility provides tha t the conduct of 
a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law "if the 
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control 
of, that State in carrying out the co nduct". As one panel observed, " what appear on their face to be 
private actions may nonetheless be attributable to a government because of some governmental 
connection to or endorsement of those actions".359 While there must be a sufficient nexus between 
the action of private entities and the action of a government (or other organ of the Member) for that 
government to be held responsible for that action, "it is necessary to take into account that there is 
a broad variety of forms of government of action that can be effective in influencing the conduct of 
private parties".360 The fact that acts or omissions of private parties "may involve some element of 
private choice" does not negate the possibility of those acts or omissions being attributable to a 
Member inso far as they reflect decisions that are not independent of one or more measures taken 
by a government (or other organ of the Member).361 
 
353 Appellate  Body Rep ort, US – Corrosion -Resistant Steel Sunset Revie w, para.  81. 
354 See, e.g. Appellate  Body Report, US – Shrimp , para.  173 (citing Appellate  Body Report, US – 
Gasoline , page 28; Jennings and Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law , 9th ed., Vol. I (Longman's 
1992), p.  545; and I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law , 4th ed. (Clarendon Press, 1990), p.  450).  
355 Appellate  Body Report, US – Corrosion -Resistant Steel Sunset Review , fn 87 to para.  87. 
356 Appellate  Body Report , US – Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews , para.  187.  
357 See, e.g. Panel  Reports, Australia – Salmon (Article  21.5 – Canada) , para.  7.12; Brazil – Retreaded 
Tyres , para.  7.400; and Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-In Tariff Program , fn 37 to para. 7.6. 
358 Panel  Report, US – 1916 Act (Japan) , para.  5.10. 
359 Panel  Report, Japan  – Film, para.  10.52.  
360 Panel  Report, Canada – Autos , para.  10.107.  
361 Appellate  Body Report, US – Tuna II ( Mexico ), para.  239 (referring to Appellate  Body Report, Korea 
– Various Measures on Beef , para.  146.) See also Panel  Reports, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) , 
paras.  7.636 -7.637; Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.5 – Colombia) / Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.5 – 
Panama) , paras.  7.197 -7.198; and Indonesia – Import Licensing Regimes , para.  7.11. 
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  7.2.3.2   beIN's access to civil enforcement procedures  
7.52.   Qatar assert ed that Saudi  Arabia has taken a series of measures (i.e. the 19  June 2017 
Circular, anti -sympathy  measures, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval requirement) whose 
"combined operation … deprive[s] Qatari nationals of access to civil judicial procedures and remedies 
in respect of intellectual property rights".362 Saudi Arabia submit ted that these alleged measures 
either do not exist or do not have the legal or practical effects alleged by Qatar.363 The Panel now 
turns to the question of whether sufficient evidence has been provided to establish that Qatari 
nationals  have been unable to initiate  civil enforcement procedures against beoutQ and that this is 
the result of acts and omissions attributable to Saudi  Arabia.  
7.2.3.2.1   Anti-sympathy measures  
7.2.3.2.1.1   Introduction  
7.53.   According to Qatar, beIN's difficulty in securing legal represent ation in Saudi Arabia is partially 
attributable to the general ''anti -sympathy measures" announced the day after the severance of 
relations on 5  June 2017.364 Qatar also argue d that the Government of Saudi Arabia has "instructed 
lawyers in [Saudi Arabia] to refrain from representing beIN" in connection with the beoutQ matter.365 
In response to a question from the Panel regarding the relationship between these ways of 
characterizing the measure, Qatar explained that "[t]he instruction to lawyers in Saudi  Arabia to 
refrain from representing beIN is closely related to the general anti -sympathy  measures, and indeed 
would appear to be a natural application of that measure".366 Qatar added that "the anti -sympathy 
measures provide useful context to understand why such in structions are being provided  ".367  
7.54.   In the light of Qatar's clarification that the "instruction" to lawyers in Saudi Arabia to refrain 
from representing beIN is "a natural application of" the general anti -sympathy measures, the Panel 
approaches the "general " anti -sympathy measures announced on 6  June 2017 as relevant 
context.368 The Panel will begin by addressing the evidence concerning the general anti -sympathy 
measures. Then, the Panel will review the evidence regarding the alleged refusal of Saudi law firms 
to act in relation to the beoutQ matter  and, thereafter, will review t he evidence regarding Saudi 
authorities seeking to instruct or influence private entities in their arrangements with beIN. Finally, 
the Panel will state its overall conclusion as derived from examining the above -mentioned evidence 
in its totality.  
7.2.3.2.1.2   Evidenc e regarding general anti -sympathy measures  
7.55.   Qatar assert ed that, on 6  June 2017—the day after Saudi  Arabia severed relations with 
Qatar —a Saudi news agency stated, via Twitter, that expressions of sympathy for Qatar could face 
certain penalties. The tweet,  which Qatar submitted to the Panel369, states that "[t]he person who 
sympathizes with #Doha on social networking sites after #cutting off_ relations_with_ Qatar shall 
be subject to imprisonment for 5  years and a fine of up to 3 million riyals". Qatar furthe r observe d 
that the tweet included the hashtag "Cut_ties_with_Qatar", or "BoycottQatar", and that, at around 
 
362 Qatar's second written submission, para.  276. See also ibid. para.  290.  
363 See generally Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras.  26-27, 35 -36 and 47 -50; and 
second written submission, paras.  53-58.  
364 See, e.g. Qatar's first written submission, paras.  17-27, 143 and 188 -192. 
365 See, e.g. ibid. para.  136 (quoting Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 
6 March 2018, Exhi bit QAT -120; and Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, 
para. 62). 
366 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 13, para.  98. 
367 Ibid. para.  100. 
368 See Qatar's first written submission, para.  17. The Panel does not consider it neces sary to enter into 
a discussion of all of the evidence submitted by Qatar in relation to what it terms ''a repressive climate in which 
mere expressions of support for Qatar, and Qatari nationals and companies, are harshly punished".  
369 Qatar's first written  submission, para.  18 (referring to @Saudi News 50, Tweet, 6  June 2017 
(Arabic  original and English translation), Exhibit QAT -7). SAR 3 million is equivalent to approximately USD 
800,000. (XE Currency Converter, Saudi riyals to US dollar conversion, last a ccessed 8  April 2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-8.) 
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  this time, the first hashtag was the most widely retweeted hashtag on Twitter worldwide.370 Qatar 
stated that, concurrently with the issuance of the 6 June 2017 tweet, Saudi news outlets began 
widely reporting that the Saudi  authorities would sanction expressions of sympathy for Qatar with 
five years' jail time, or a SAR  3 million fine, and has provided evidence of the same. Qatar provided 
the text of these news reports as exhibits.371  
7.56.   Qatar explain ed that this penalty corresponds to one that exists under Saudi law. 
Specifically,  Qatar observe d that the same penalties reported by these news outlets are provided for 
in the text of Article  6(1) of the 2007  Anti-Cyber Crime Law. Qatar provided the Panel with the text 
of this law, which refers to the "[p]roduction, preparation, transmission, or storage of material 
impinging on public order, religious values, public morals and privacy, through the information 
network or computers".372 
7.57.   In addition, Qatar provided evidence of international entities and organizations commenting 
on the existence of these general anti -sympathy measures. First, Qatar provide d the Panel with a 
copy of a 2017/2018 report on Saudi Arabia by Amnesty International, which found that "[f]ollowing 
the announced decision to sever ties with Qatar, the Saudi authorities warned people against 
expressing sympathy towards Qatar or criticizing government actions, stating that this would be 
considered an offence punishable under Article 6 of the Anti -Cyber Crime [L]aw".373 Second,  Qatar 
provided the Panel with a copy of a report published by the UN Office of the High  Commissioner for 
Human Rights ( OHCHR ), which comments on  Saudi  Arabia's  anti-sympathy  measures. According to 
that report, which reflects information provided by Qatari nationals who have property in 
Saudi  Arabia, particularly commercial entities, "lawyers in these countries [(i.e. the UAE, Bahrain 
and Saudi Arabia)] are unlikely to  defend Qataris as this would likely be interpreted as an expression 
of sympathy towards Qatar".374  
7.58.   With respect to Saudi Arabia's assertion that it "does not maintain any 
'anti-sympathy  measures'"375, the Panel is aware that the evidence Qatar provided has s everal 
limitations  in establishing that such measures would , in and of themselves, operate to  prevent Saudi 
law firms from agreeing to represent beIN or other Qatari nationals. The scope of the general 
anti-sympathy measures, as described above, is limited  to expressions of support on "social media" 
or online, as suggested by the very name of the law (i.e. the Anti -Cyber Crime Law) that, according 
to Qatar, serves as the basis for the penalties. Furthermore, the anti -sympathy measures appear to 
be directed at expressions of support for the State of Qatar, not necessarily to any and all Qatari 
nationals. Additionally, the Panel notes that Saudi Arabia did not enact any specific law or regulation 
establishing the general anti -sympathy measures, and the evident iary basis for their existence is 
primarily statements by Saudi news outlets. Finally, the Panel is mindful that the OHCHR  Report in 
question reflects information that Qatari nationals provided to the OHCHR  team.  
7.59.   Despite  the foregoing, and having carefully  reviewed and considered the evidence provided 
by Qatar, the Panel concludes that the evidence establishes the existence of the general 
anti-sympathy measures  that directly or indirectly fostered a climate of anti -sympathy against Qatar  
and Qatari nationals . It is uncontested that  multiple Saudi news outlets published reports on the 
existence of general anti -sympathy measures on three successive days . Specifically, each of the 
three Saudi news outlets identified  in the exhibits provided by Qatar reported the existence of the 
 
370 Qatar's first written submission, para.  18 (referring to Al -Youm Al -Sabea, '' Hashtag 'Cutting Ties with 
Qatar' tops the world list of trend on Twitter '' (Arabic original and English translation), 5  June 2017, 
Exhibit  QAT-10). 
371 Ibid. para.  19 (referring to Saudi Al -Marsd Online Newspaper, " Legal figure: Anyone showing 
sympathy with Qatar on social media platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined 3 million 
riyals " (Arabic original and English transla tion), 8  June 2017, Exhibit QAT -11; and Amal Ruslan, "Saudi 
Newspaper Okaz: Punishments include imprisonment for those who sympathize with Qatar on social media" , 
7 June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation), Exhibit QAT -12). 
372 Ibid. para.  20 (ref erring to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Anti -Cyber Crime Law, 26  March  2007 
(English  translation), Exhibit QAT -13, p.  9). 
373 Ibid. para.  21 (referring to Amnesty International, " Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – Saudi 
Arabia ", 22 February  2018, Exhibit QAT -15, p.  3). 
374 Qatar's first written submission, para.  22 (referring to Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Mission to the State of Qatar 17 -24 November  2017, Report on the 
Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, Dec ember 2017, Exhibit QAT -21). 
375 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para.  48.  
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  general anti -sympathy measures on 6, 7 and 8  June 2017, respectively.376 Indeed, Saudi  Arabia did 
not contest the authenticity of any of  the evide nce referred to above or challenged 
Qatar's  characterization of this evidence.  
7.2.3.2.1.3   Evidence regarding the refusal of Saudi law firms to act in relation to the 
beoutQ matter  
7.60.   Qatar assert ed that, following the severance of relations and the emergence of beoutQ,  beIN 
sought to engage legal counsel in Saudi Arabia to commence civil actions before the Saudi courts to 
seek injunctions, damages, or other legal remedies against the individuals and/or entities behind 
beoutQ. Qatar also assert ed that, despite requests t o several law firms based in Saudi Arabia, beIN 
has been unable to secure legal representation.377 Qatar provided evidence to substantiate its 
account, including a Declaration provided by the CEO of the beIN Media Group LLC, dated 
15 April 2019, and earlier correspondence between beIN and the Saudi  authorities.  
7.61.   The Declaration by beIN states in relevant part:  
After the piracy became evident in Saudi Arabia, we reached out to various Saudi law 
firms to represent beIN in a potential copyright infringement case in Saudi Arabia. Those 
law firms, including but not limited to Al Fahad & Partners, Al Tamimi, the Qasir  Al 
Motawee Law Firm, and TAG Legal, all declined to do so. Although the law firms did not 
explicitly indicate why they refused to take on the engagement against beoutQ, my 
colleagues and I understand that it was due to Saudi Arabia 's measures (both writte n 
and unwritten) against supporting Qatari interests, as well as the statement in the 
19 June 2017 Circular, which indicated that beIN would lose "the legal right to protect 
any related intellectual property rights".378 
7.62.   In a letter to the Ministry dated 16  January  2018, beIN explained the difficulties it was 
encountering in attempting to secure legal representation to initiate copyright infringement ca ses in 
Saudi courts. beIN asked the Ministry to detail any governmental restrictions in place that may be 
affecting beIN's ability to commence civil proceedings.379 More specifically, beIN stated, in relevant 
part: 
Over the past weeks, beIN has contacted sev eral KSA law firms to seek representation 
for such legal action before the KSA courts. None of these KSA law firms has been willing 
to represent either beIN or the Rights Holders in connection with beoutQ's broadcast 
piracy. Moreover, we have been advised that the KSA National Information Center has 
taken the position that it will not authorize any legal action to enforce beIN's rights in 
the KSA.  
We therefore request that the Ministry of Culture and Information please advise: 
(i) whether lawyers in the KS A are under any legal obligation or governmental 
instruction preventing them from representing beIN and/or the Rights Holders in civil 
legal actions before the KSA courts, including in matters relating to the piracy of 
beIN's  media content; and (ii) whethe r beIN and/or the Rights Holders are required to 
seek any government authorizations or permissions in order to commence civil legal 
 
376 See, e.g. @Saudi News 50, Tweet, 6  June 2017 (Arabic original and English translation), 
Exhibit  QAT-7; Saudi Al -Marsd Online Newspaper, " Legal figure: Anyone show ing sympathy with Qatar on 
social media platforms will be sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and fined 3 million riyals " (Arabic original 
and English translation), 8  June 2017, Exhibit QAT -11; and Amal Ruslan, "Saudi Newspaper Okaz: Punishments 
include impr isonment for those who sympathize with Qatar on social media" , 7 June 2017 (Arabic original and 
English translation), Exhibit QAT -12. 
377 Qatar's first written submission, para.  133. 
378 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15  April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para.  56 (referring to Saudi 
Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, dated 
19 June 2017, Exhibit QAT -1, p. 2).  
379 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16  January  2018, Exhibit  QAT-119, 
pp. 1-2.  
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  actions before the KSA courts, including in matters relating to the piracy of beIN's media 
content.380 
7.63.   In a 6  March  2018 lette r to the Ministry, beIN set out its understanding of why it was unable 
to hire counsel to bring a copyright infringement case in Saudi courts. beIN stated that "the Saudi 
Government has instructed lawyers in the KSA to refrain from representing beIN … and that it is the 
position of the Saudi government that beIN … cannot bring civil legal actions relating to beoutQ 
broadcast piracy before the KSA courts."381 beIN's letter indicated that "we will proceed on the basis" 
of this understanding "[i]n the event that  the Ministry of Culture and Information fails to respond by 
14 March  2018".382 In its Declaration, beIN state d that it had received no response to either of the 
letters above.383  
7.64.   The Panel notes that, in response to Qatar's evidence about beIN's  inability to secure legal 
representation, Saudi Arabia state d that the Lawyers' Guide issued by the Saudi Bar Association 
"gives lawyers the freedom to accept or not to accept the case of a client and the power of 
attorney".384 In the Panel's view, the exis tence of such a freedom in the Lawyer's Guide, which was 
not provided as an exhibit, is not sufficient, in and of itself, to establish that beIN's inability to secure 
legal representation as described above is the result of a purely private choice by Saudi  law firms. 
Among other things, Saudi Arabia did not address whether —and, if so, how —the freedom to accept 
the case of a client as expressed in the Lawyer's Guide would supersede any anti -sympathy 
measures that it ha d taken. As discussed in the next subsec tion, Qatar provided evidence that a 
Saudi law firm was not given this freedom in connection with its representation of beIN in the context 
of a criminal matter.385 
7.65.   With its second written submission, Qatar provide d the Panel with a copy of a public joint 
statement made on 31  July 2019 by seven major football right holders (including FIFA, UEFA, AFC, 
the Premier League, Bundesliga, LaLiga and Lega Serie A). According to the joint statement, these 
right holders have also been unable to engage Saudi counsel or access Saudi courts and 
administrative tribunals in connection with the beoutQ piracy.386 The statement reads, in relevant 
part: 
Over the past 15 months, we spoke to nine law firms in KSA, each of which either simply 
refused to act on our behalf or initially  accepted the instruction, only later to recuse 
themselves.  
As copyright holders we have reached the conclusion, regrettably, that it is now not 
possible to retain legal counsel in KSA which is willing or able to act on our behalf in 
filing a copyright co mplaint against beoutQ.387 
7.66.   In response to a Panel  question asking Saudi Arabia to comment on the joint statement quoted 
above, Saudi Arabia stated, inter alia , that the reason that no law firm would be able to proceed 
with a case against beoutQ in Saudi cour ts might be that the company does not have a location in 
Saudi Arabia.388 However, there has been no evidence to support this.  
7.2.3.2.1.4   Evidence regarding other actions by Saudi authorities to direct private entities 
in their arrangements with beIN  
7.67.   Qatar provided evidence to support its submission that Saudi  authorities have actively sought 
to direct private entities as to their arrangements with beIN through informal communications. As 
 
380 Ibid. p. 2.  
381 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 6  March  2018, Exhibit QAT -120, p.  1. 
382 Ibid.  
383 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para.  62. 
384 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29(a), para.  49. 
385 See paragraph 7.70 of this Report.  
386 Qatar's second written submission, para.  81 (referring to Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA, 
the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie A regarding the a ctivities of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia, 
31 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -227). 
387 Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA, the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie 
A regarding the activities of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia, 31 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -227. 
388 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39, para.  14.  
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  discussed below, this include d evidence relating to the transmis sion of the 19  June 2017 Circular to 
39 foreign right holders, and evidence that a Saudi  law firm was pressured to act on behalf of beIN 
in relation to a criminal law matter.  
7.68.   On 19  June 2017, the Ministry and GCAM issued a Circular prohibiting the distrib ution of beIN 
media content.389 The Circular states that all television and media channels that are interested in 
operating in Saudi Arabia "must obtain all required licences " and that "[a] ll beIN channels and 
Al-Jazeera channels are not licensed and [do] not have the legal right to operate in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and its presence and provision of entertainment and Sports programs and television 
services in the Kingdom violates the applicable laws in the Kingdom as of the date thereof."390 
This Circular further provides that:  
Any distribution of media content either via satellites or through other means and 
platforms and the charging and collection of related fees in the Kingdom without 
obtaining the necessary licenses from the appropriate authorities, i ncluding the Ministry 
of Culture and Information and the General Commission of Audio and Visual Media, shall 
subject the distributors of such media content and content licensors, hardware 
suppliers, and their owners in their individual capacity to criminal  prosecution and 
personal litigation and shall result in the imposition of penalties and fines and the loss 
of the legal right to protect any related intellectual property rights in accordance with 
the applicable laws in the Kingdom.391 
7.69.   By itself, the conten t of the Circular  does not purport to direct any private parties in their 
arrangements with beIN. However, t he Panel considers that the transmission of the Circular alluding 
to the potential loss of "related intellectual property rights" to these foreign r ight holders was an 
action aimed at influencing these private entities in their arrangements with beIN. Qatar explain ed 
that it was transmitted as an email attachment from GCAM's  official account directly to 39 right 
holders, including FIFA, UEFA, LaLiga, the Premier League and many others.392 According to 
Saudi  Arabia, this Circular was never "officially issued".393 In the Panel's view, the "unofficial" status 
of this document , sent to these 39 right holders who hold valuable IP rights related to beIN's 
broadcasts, in no way diminishes its impact.  
7.70.   Separately from the Circular, Qatar also provided evidence, in the form of additional email 
messages, in support of its assertion  that a S audi law firm was pressured to act on behalf of beIN 
in relation to a criminal law matter.394 As explained in beIN's Second Supplemental Declaration, 
which was submitted together  with Qatar's responses to the second set of questions in this 
proceeding, Qatar  provided the Panel with several email messages from a Saudi law firm to beIN 
that document the following. On  1 July 2018, a Saudi law firm , representing beIN in relation to a 
competition law matter that had arisen prior to the severance of relations and t he closing down of 
beIN's operations in Saudi Arabia , informed beIN via email that the Saudi Council of Competition 
(CCP) had called. The CCP had requested the law firm to "collect notice of a new 'criminal' case they 
are launching against Bein", "probably  for imposing new penalties and/or administrative 
remedies".395 The law firm told beIN that, '"[b]ecause of the sensitivities of these cases, if you ask 
us to decline accepting notice, we may be unable  to accept representation on your behalf for the 
new case  and you may have to find another lawyer'".396 When beIN did not immediately instruct the 
law firm to accept service of the new criminal complaint, the law firm sent another email message 
to beIN two days later, on 3 July 2018. This email message, which Qata r provide d as an exhibit, 
states:  
 
389 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular,  
Exhibit QAT -1. 
390 Ibid. para. 1. 
391 Ibid. para.  3. 
392 Email from GCAM to right holders, 13 July 20 17, Exhibit QAT -220. 
393 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29(a), fn  28 to para.  47 and fn  34 to para.  54. 
394 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 38, paras.  1-15.  
395 Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 October 2019, Exhibit QAT -248, 
para. 10 (referring to  Email from Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad (Al Fahad & Partners) to beIN, dated 1 July 2018, 
Annex 3 to Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 October 2019, Exhibit QAT -248).  
396 Ibid. (emphasis omitted ) 
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  We received a call from CCP that we must accept service on your behalf. We explained 
we have no authority. They threatened to stop the services of our office unless we 
accede to their demand. We do not believe that this co urse of action is correct but if 
they do go ahead and stop our services (that would paralyze our office) we will have no 
choice but to do so. Please take note.397 
7.71.   The Panel considers these email exchanges to be relevant  to the inability of beIN and foreign 
right holders to retain Saudi counsel to commence actions against beoutQ. This exchange reflects 
the influence that the Government of Saudi Arabia has over the decisions of lawyers based in 
Saudi  Arabia to accept particular cases for particular clients. Given that the Government  of 
Saudi  Arabia appears to have instructed a law firm in Saudi Arabia to act for beIN in respect of a 
particular matter, the Panel does not consider it implausible that the Government of Saudi Arabia 
would instruct, direct, or guide one or more law firms in Saudi Arabia not to act for beIN in a 
particular matter.  
7.2.3.2.1.5   Conclusion  
7.72.   The Panel considers that the e vidence before it sustains the conclusions that: 
(a) Saudi  Arabia  imposed general anti -sympathy measures banning expressions of support toward 
Qatar, at least on social media, on 6  June 2017; (b) all Saudi law firms that have been approached 
by beIN, and b y seven major football right holders, have declined to act in relation to the beoutQ 
matter, and it is difficult to conceive of any plausible explanation of why beIN and foreign right 
holders would be unable to obtain any legal representation in Saudi Arab ia in relation to beoutQ —
an entity engaged in high -profile piracy that has been the subject of global condemnation —if not for 
some form of government instruction, direction or guidance; and (c) Qatar provided two other 
examples of Saudi authorities activel y seeking to influence right holders or a law firm in their 
arrangements with beIN.  
7.73.   Examining the above -referenced evidence in its totality, and recalling the applicable standard 
of proof and evidentiary principles in WTO dispute settlement398, the Panel con siders that Qatar has 
demonstrated that Saudi Arabia has taken "anti-sympathy measures " that, directly or indirectly, 
have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights 
through civil enforcement procedures be fore Saudi courts and tribunals . 
7.2.3.2.2   The 19  June  2017 Circular, travel restrictions and Ministerial approval 
requirement  
7.74.   The Panel will now consider the evidence provided by Qatar to establish that the non -initiation 
of civil enforcement procedures against beo utQ is the result of other acts or omissions attributable 
to Saudi Arabia, including, in particular, the 19  June 2017 Circular, the  travel  restrictions or the 
Ministerial approval requirement.  
7.75.   Qatar provided a copy of the 19 June C ircular  to the Panel as an exhibit.399 By its terms, it 
prohibits the distribution of beIN (and Al Jazeera's) content in Saudi Arabia, and states that the 
penalty for contravening this prohibition includes "the loss of the legal right to protect any related 
intelle ctual property rights" . The Panel notes that it was issued on an official Ministry letterhead, and 
signed by a Saudi government official.400 Furthermore, it is undisputed that a copy of this document 
was circulated broadly by the "Office of the General Direc tor of the President " of GCAM to 39 
individual right holders.401 Finally, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority Decision issued on 
11 July 2017 directly referred to the 19  June 2017 Circular .402  
 
397 Ibid. para.  11 (referring to  Email from Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad (Al Fahad & Partners) to beIN, dated 3 
July 2018, Annex 4 to Second Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 October 2019, Exhibit 
QAT-248).  
398 See paragraphs 7.39 and 7.40 of this Report.  
399 Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular, 
19 June 2017, Exhibit QAT -1. 
400 Qatar's second written submission, paras.  24 and 27.  
401 Ibid. (referring to Email from GCAM to right holders, 13 July 2017, Exhibit QAT -220).   
402 See paragraph 2. 38 of this Report.  
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  7.76.   The Panel therefore considers that the 19  June 2017 Circular exis ts, and that it is a 
government measure for purposes of WTO law regardless of whether it was "officially issued".403 
Furthermore, the Panel accepts that  the Circular could also potentially impact on beIN's ability to 
access civil enforcement procedures.  
7.77.   Turning to the  second of the three measures referred to above, i.e. the travel  restrictions, 
there is no disagreement between the parties about this measure's existence.  Both parties refer to 
press releases  that Saudi Arabia  issued on 5  June 2017, indicating t hat, as part of the severance of 
relations, Saudi Arabia was among other things "clos[ing] all land, sea and air ports, prevent [ing] 
crossing into Saudi territories, airspace and territorial waters".404 According to an official statement 
by Saudi Arabia, this travel ban was intended to "prevent[] Qatari  citizens' entry to or transit through 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia".405 In response to a question from the Panel, Saudi Arabia confirm ed 
that, as of the dat e of the establishment of the Panel, the travel restrictions on citizens of the 
complaining party referred to in the 5  June 2017 announcement still existed (but note d that certain 
limited exceptions apply as necessary, including for citizens of the complai ning party to perform the 
Hajj and Umrah).406 
7.78.   The Panel is therefore satisfied that the travel restrictions exist, and that these constitute  a 
government measure for purposes of WTO law. Furthermore, the Panel accepts that, by their nature, 
the travel restrictions could also impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures.  
7.79.   Turning to the third measure, the Ministerial approval req uirement, the Panel observes that 
Qatar has provided the text of the relevant provisions of the Copyright Law and Implementing 
Regulations, which expressly refer to the role of the Minister in approving any Copyright Committee 
decisions regarding cases of copyright infringement and state that they "shall not be effective unless 
approved by the Minister".407 The Panel recalls that Saudi Arabia asserts that the Copyright Law and 
Implementing Regulations were amended, such that the Board of Directors of the SAIP, not the 
Minister, would have the responsibility for endorsing or approving the decisions of the Copyright 
Committee.408 However, as noted by Qatar, the amended Implementing Regulations were not issued 
until 9  May 2019, approximately six months after the es tablishment of the Panel.409 Furthermore, it 
is undisputed that once the Copyright Committee takes a decision by majority vote with respect to 
any such allegations, its decision is subject to a subsequent layer of approval before it is made 
final.410 
7.80.   The Panel  is therefore satisfied that the Ministerial approval requirement was provided for in 
Saudi law as of the date of the Panel's establishment.411 Furthermore, the Panel accepts that, by its 
nature, the Ministerial approval requirement could, in the circumstanc es prevailing in Saudi Arabia 
since 5  June 2017, also impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures.  
 
403 See paragraph 1.20 and footnote 137 of this Report. In this connection, the Panel recalls that the 
notion of "measure s" for the purposes  of the DSU is not restricted by any requirement as to form, and that the 
legal status of an instrument within the domestic legal system of the Member concerned is not dispositive of 
whether it is a measure for purposes of WTO dispute se ttlement.  (See paragraph 7.49 of this Report.)  
404 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para.  1 (referring to a report by the Saudi Press Agency).  
405 Qatar's first written submission, para.  15 (referring to Announcement on the Saudi Embassy to the 
United  States website, " Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consular Relations with the State of 
Qatar ", 5 June 2017, Exhibit QAT -3). 
406 See Saud i Arabia's response to Panel question No. 16. The Panel notes that this is consistent with 
Qatar's own responses to Panel question Nos. 15(a) and (b).  
407 See paragraph 2.12 of this Report.  
408 See paragraph 2.13 of this Report.  
409 See paragraph 2.14 of this Report.  
410 See paragraphs 2.10 and 2.11 of this Report.  
411 A panel's terms of reference require it to assess the WTO -consistency of a challenged measure as it 
existed on the date of the Panel's establishment. (See Appellate  Body R eports, US – Clove Cigarettes,  
para. 205; China – Raw Materials , para. 260; and EC – Selected Customs Matters , para.  187.) Several panels 
have rejected requests from a respondent  to make findings on the changed situation, on the basis that the 
complainant had not requested such findings. ( See, e.g. Panel Reports, Russia – Tariff Treatment , para.  7.84; 
China – Raw Materials , paras.  7.22-7.24; India – Additional Import Duties , paras.  7.58-7.60; and India – 
Autos , para.  8.27.)  
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  7.81.   Thus, the Panel finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish the existence of each of 
these measures, and the Panel further accepts that each of these formal legal restrictions could 
impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures.  
7.82.   However, there is no evidence that any of these measures has yet been applied to beIN to 
prevent it from accessing civil enforcement procedures  and the Panel considers that 
Qatar's  arguments about how these measures would operate if beIN were able to retain counsel in 
Saudi Arabia involves speculation about future and hypothetical events.  It is well established that a 
WTO dispute settlement panel should not make findings that would involve speculation either about 
future or hypothetical measures412 and panels s hould refrain from making speculative findings on 
future measures .  Panels must also refrain from making findings about existing measures in a 
manner that turns on speculation about future events, or events triggering the operation of a 
measure that have n ot yet arisen.413 Such speculation would be contrary to the duty of the Panel 
under Article  11 of the DSU to make "an objective assessment of the facts of the case".  
7.83.   First, from the wording of the Circular414, it is not clear  that any loss of the right to enfo rce IP 
rights is automatic upon the conditions precedent being triggered. Those conditions precedent are 
stated  to be "[a]ny distribution of media content" and "the charging and collection of related fees in 
the Kingdom without obtaining the necessary lice nces". Once triggered, according to the 
Circular's  text, these two conditions precedent "shall subject" the certain entities prescribed in the 
Circular that fulfil these conditions "to criminal prosecution and personal litigation", "and shall result" 
in a penalty, namely, "the imposition of penalties and fines and the loss of the legal right to protect 
any related intellectual property rights in accordance with the applicable laws in the Kingdom".415 
7.84.   No evidence has been presented to the Panel to show that th e Circular has been applied in 
the relevant circumstances. Specifically, Qatar provided no evidence to demonstrate that 
any Saudi  tribunal or other Saudi  authority has applied the penalty provision of the Circular to deny 
beIN standing to protect any IP ri ghts. Additionally, there has been no indication that the 
Saudi  authorities have applied any of the other penalties stated in the Circular, i.e. "criminal 
prosecution", "personal litigation", or "the imposition of penalties and fines".  
7.85.   Furthermore, the Pa nel notes that Saudi Arabia maintains that beIN has not actually taken 
the actions that would trigger the application of the penalty provisions in the Circular.416 In the 
Panel's view, this highlights a lack of clarity regarding whether beIN continued to "di stribute" its 
media content without having obtained a license after the Circular was sent to beIN via email on 
13 July 2017, and/or charge and collect fees after that time.417 The Panel also recalls that Qatar 
made no "as such" claim in connection with the aspect of Saudi law that is reflected in the Circular .418 
Without evidence relating to or demonstrating the application of the Circular, the Panel is unable to 
accept Qatar's assertion as to how the Circular would operate.  
7.86.   The Panel also notes that beIN has not yet initiated any civil enforcement proceeding with 
respect to its IP rights. The Panel has found  that Saudi Arabia has taken measures  that, directly or 
indirectly,  have had the result of prevent ing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforc e its 
IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals. Thus, whether a 
Saudi tribunal or authority would apply the terms of the Circular to prevent beIN from enforcing its 
 
412 Panel  Report, EC – Commercial Vessels , para.  7.30; Panel  Report, US – Upland Cotton,  para. 7.158; 
Panel  Report, India – Autos , para.  7.34. 
413 Panel  Report, US – Shrimp (Article  21.5 – Malaysia) , para.  5.109; Appellate  Body Report, US – 
Shrimp (Article  21.5 – Malaysia) , para.  95; Panel  Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) (Article  21.5 – 
Philippines) , paras.  7.602 -7.603.  
414 See paragraph 7.68 of this Report.  
415 Saudi  Ministry of Culture and Information and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, Circular,  
Exhibit  QAT-1, para.  3. 
416 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 11(a), para. 1, and Panel question No. 29, para.  47; 
and opening statement at the second me eting, para.  14. Saudi Arabia clarified that "it affords copyright 
protection to all entities even if they are not licensed to broadcast in Saudi Arabia, with the exception of 
entities found to have distributed content illegally ( i.e., without a broadcasti ng license) in Saudi Arabia". (Saudi 
Arabia's response to Panel question No. 41, para.  24.) 
417 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 51, paras.  129-131. 
418 See paragraphs 7.33 to 7.36 of this Report.  
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  IP rights if beIN were able to secure legal represe ntation to initiate civil proceedings is, for the Panel, 
a matter of speculation.  
7.87.   Second, turning to the travel restrictions, Qatar's arguments  concern the manner in which 
such restrictions would operate in the hypothetical situation in which beIN was able to retain legal 
counsel. For example, Qatar argue d that "even if Qatari nationals were somehow able to obtain legal 
representation, they would nevertheless have undue difficulties when attempting to meet with their 
lawyers to discuss any proceedings".419 The extent to which the travel restrictions would obstruct 
Qatari nationals from accessing civil enforcement procedures, were they able to obtain legal 
representation, has been debated by the parties and third parties.420  
7.88.   The Panel emphasizes  that Qatar's cha llenge in relation to the travel restrictions is directed 
at their practical consequences for beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures. Qatar 
clarified that, "[t]o be clear, in these proceedings, Qatar does not challenge, per se , Saudi Arabia' s 
decision to close its borders, or to prevent Qatari nationals from entering its territory."421 Qatar did 
not challeng e the travel restrictions per se, but only the manner in which they might operat e in 
combination with the anti -sympathy measures and other measures to deny beIN access to civil 
enforcement procedures . The Panel cannot  make a determination about the consequences of 
retaining the travel restrictions while removing the anti -sympathy measures , as this would be 
speculative .  
7.89.   In the Panel's view, w hether the travel restrictions would operate to prevent beIN from 
accessing civil enforcement procedures if beIN were able to secure legal representation to initiate 
civil proceedings is also a matter of speculation. The actions taken to prevent Saudi lega l counsel 
from representing beIN in an action  to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures 
before Saudi courts and tribunals require the Panel to speculate about how the travel restrictions 
would impact on beIN if it were able to secure le gal representation. As Qatar put it:  
Qatar has not asserted that Saudi Arabia requires  Qatari nationals to initiate or conduct 
proceedings in person, or to testify or otherwise participate in these proceedings in 
person. Due to Saudi Arabia 's anti-sympathy measures, and the resulting restrictions 
on the ability of Saudi attorneys to assist the Government of Qatar or Qatari nationals 
in this WTO dispute, Qatar is unable at this time to answer the Panel 's specific question 
about what Saudi law requires  with respect to in -person participation.422 
7.90.   Indeed, the Panel notes that Qatar contemplates that, if Saudi Arabia were to offer alternative 
means ( e.g., video testimony among other possibilities) that adequately provided for the rights of 
parties to "substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence " within the meaning of 
Article  42 of the TRIPS  Agreement , together with the right to be represented by counsel (also in line 
with Article  42), then "its travel ban could potentially have little , if any, impact on the ability of 
Qatari nationals to access civil judicial procedures".423 
7.91.   Third, with respect to the Ministerial approval requirement, Qatar assert ed that, were beIN 
able to secure legal representation, it "would nevertheless be blocked" f rom ultimately prevailing.424 
 
419 Qatar's first written submission, para.  226.  
420 In its third -party submission, the European  Union suggested, with respect to the effect of the travel 
restrictions, that "Qata ri nationals could be represented in legal proceedings by their representatives, provide 
testimonies and discuss their cases with their lawyers via different means of communications" and thus "could 
exercise the rights … remotely". (European  Union's third -party submission, paras.  14 and 22). 
See Qatar's  response to Panel question No. 17, paras. 109 -113 (alleging that the travel ban and the other 
measures at issue foreclosed the ability of Qatari nationals to do so, whether in person or "remotely"); 
Saudi  Arabia's response to Panel question No.  40, paras.  20-22 (asserting that foreign nationals may avail 
themselves of all rights in Saudi Arabia without physically travelling to or being present in Saudi Arabia, 
including by email or by visiting SAIP's public w ebpage); and Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to 
Panel question No. 40, paras.  61-71 (alleging that the travel ban, together with the other measures at issue, 
make it impossible for Qatari right holders to initiate, conduct, or testify in procee dings for the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in Saudi Arabia, in violation of Articles 41.1 and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement).  
421 Qatar's second written submission, para.  290.  
422 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 17, para.  111. (emphasis orig inal) 
423 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 23, para.  152. 
424 Qatar's first written submission, para.  140.  
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  Qatar also refer red to beIN's understanding that the Ministry "will not authorise" any legal action to 
enforce beIN's rights.425 Qatar argue d that beIN "has been barred"  from initiating copyright 
proceedings as a consequence of th e anti -sympathy measures, and that beIN "would be barred" 
from accessing the Copyright Committee by virtue of the Ministerial  approval requirement.426 Thus, 
by its terms, Qatar's argument s are directed at what the Minister would or would not do if beIN were 
able to secure legal representation and brought a case before the Copyright Committee.  
7.92.   However, to date, neither beIN nor any other foreign right holder has initiated civil 
enforcement proc edures against beoutQ before Saudi tribunals.427 In the Panel's view, the question 
of whether —and, if so, how —the Ministerial approval requirement (or replacement measures 
establishing a different layer of approval428) would be applied to beIN, were beIN able to retain legal 
counsel in Saudi Arabia and bring a case before the Copyright Committee, would also be an exercise 
in speculation. Again, it should be noted  that Qatar did not make any "as such" claim in connection 
with the Ministerial approval requirement  at issue .429 In the absence of  evidence of how these 
requirements have been applied , the Panel is unable to conclude that the Ministerial approval 
requirements would operate in the manner described by Qatar.  
7.93.   The Panel notes that Qatar also argued that "the absence of any copyright infringement 
actions being brought against beoutQ is, in and of itself, evidence that the 'gatekeeping function' 
has been applied to prevent beIN and other right holders from obtaining civil remedies for copyright 
infringement in S audi Arabia".430 However, this argument assumes that, in addition to the explicit 
Ministerial approval requirement regarding decisions issued by the Copyright Committee as set forth 
in the text of the Copyright Law and Implementing Regulations, there is an a dditional unwritten 
requirement for Ministerial approval of the initiation  of proceedings before the 
Copyright  Committee.431 However, this additional alleged unwritten measure may simply be a 
different way of characterizing another measure that the Panel has  already ruled upon, namely the 
measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi 
legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and 
tribunals . If it is a distinct measure, then Qatar has not provided sufficient evidence of the existence 
of such an unwritten measure.  
7.94.   For these reasons, the Panel finds that Saudi Arabia has imposed certain restrictions that 
could impact beIN's ability to access civil enforcement procedures . These include  the 19  June 2017 
Circular, the travel restrictions and the Ministerial approval req uirement . However , there is no 
evidence that any of these measures has yet been applied to beIN to prevent it from accessing civil 
enforcement procedures. The Panel considers that it would be an exercise in speculation to predict 
how those requirements mig ht be applied to restrict beIN's access to civil enforcement procedures.  
7.95.   The Panel concludes  that Qatar has not discharged  its burden of proving that the 19  June 2017 
Circular, the travel restrictions and the Ministerial approval requirement , taken individ ually or 
collectively,  have prevented, or would prevent, beIN from accessing civil enforcement procedures 
before Saudi courts and tribunals. However, the Panel concludes that Qatar has established that 
Saudi Arabia has taken "anti-sympathy measures " that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of 
preventing beIN from securing legal representation to enforce its IP rights .   
 
425 Ibid. paras.  194 and 227. See ibid. paras. 229, 350, 381 and 401.  
426 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 18(b), paras.  117-118. 
427 Qatar's resp onse to Panel question No. 43; Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, 
para. 35; Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  61; and Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question 
No. 39, para.  13. Furthermore, Qatar indicated that it does not hav e any example of Ministerial approval 
having been withheld in cases of advancing claims against copyright infringement. Qatar suggested that 
Saudi  Arabia "is not a country where such information is easily available". (Qatar's response to Panel question 
No. 18(c), para.  121.)  
428 See paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 of this Report.  
429 See paragraphs 7.31 to 7.32 of this Report.  
430 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 44, para.  103. 
431 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 18(a), para.  114. See also Qatar's response to Panel question 
No. 44, paras.  78-103. 
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  7.2.3.3   Non-application of criminal procedures and penalties  
7.2.3.3.1   Introduction  
7.96.   The Panel now turns to the question of whether sufficient eviden ce has been provided to 
establish that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to  the criminal jurisdiction of 
Saudi  Arabia. This issue is central to Qatar's claim under Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement , and it 
is disputed between the partie s. Saudi Arabia maintain ed that Members cannot be expected to act 
on criminal allegations without evidence and without the cooperation of concerned right holders .432 
Saudi Arabia reiterate d that criminal procedures and penalties were not applied against beoutQ 
because beIN and other foreign right holders have not provided sufficient supporting evidence and 
cooperation.433 Qatar assert ed that "it could not be for lack of sufficient evidence that  Saudi Arabia 
has failed to initiate procedures and penalties against the beoutQ piracy ".434 
7.97.   The Panel will begin with an overview of the relevant correspondence between beIN and 
certain third -party right holders, on the one hand, and the Saudi Ministry of C ulture and Information 
(Ministry), GCAM and Arabsat, on the other hand. The Panel will then examine the evidence 
presented by beIN and other right holders in detail, along with the additional corroborating evidence 
submitted to the Panel by Qatar. After  reviewing the evidence in detail, the Panel will state its overall 
conclusion.  
7.2.3.3.2   Overview of correspondence  
7.98.   The Panel begin s by summarizing the correspondence between beIN and third -party right 
holders —particularly UEFA and BBC Studios —and the Ministry and GC AM. The Panel then 
summarize s the correspondence between beIN and third -party right holders —particular ly UEFA, 
LaLiga, the Premier League and FIFA—and Arabsat.  
7.99.   In a letter to the Ministry dated 15  August  2017, beIN state d that it "recently learned that an 
entity operating under the name 'beoutQ' is currently broadcasting beIN's proprietary media content, 
without [beIN's] authorization, in … Saudi Arabia". beIN enclose d with its letter video recordings of 
beoutQ's pirated b roadcasts of beIN's proprietary content in Saudi Arabia435, and request ed that the 
Ministry and GCAM "take immediate action to investigate and prevent the unauthorized use of 
beIN's  media content by 'beoutQ' and/or any other unauthorized channels or means in  … Saudi 
Arabia".436 In a response to beIN dated 31  August  2017, GCAM state d that "it has not been proven 
to us that there are any unlicensed devices at all the regular sales outlets". GCAM  added that it ha d 
not granted any licen ce for the broadcast of satel lite channels in contravention of Saudi law, and 
that it would "take the appropriate measures in the event that it becomes aware of any violation of 
the laws in this regard and the sanctions stipulated in the law in respect of the violators are 
applied."437 
7.100.   Two weeks after receiving this response from GCAM, beIN submit ted a second letter to the 
Ministry, dated 14  September  2017, in which it state d that it ha d become aware of "further evidence 
indicating that persons in Saudi Arabia are actively promoting and/ or involved in these illegal and 
unauthorized broadcasts". This evidence, enclosed with beIN's letter to the Ministry, consist ed of: 
(a) tweets sent from the Twitter accounts of prominent Saudi persons and institutions endors ing or 
advertis ing beoutQ's pir ated broadcasts, (b) beIN's assertion  that the website of the beoutQ  channel 
was originally geo -blocked to Saudi Arabia during the initial period of its operation, and (c) posts on 
social media, including Facebook, that advertise d beoutQ STBs and indicate d that these STBs would 
be on sale in Saudi Arabia. Considering that this evidence link ed the piracy of beIN's  proprietary 
 
432 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  59.  
433 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras.  41-46; and second written submission, 
paras.  59-66. 
434 Qatar's second written submission, para.  214.  
435 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Cultu re and Information, 15 August 2017, Exhibit QAT -116, 
p. 1. 
436 Ibid. p. 2.  
437 Letter from Saudi General Commission for Audiovisual Media to beIN (Arabic original and 
English  translation), 2 September 2017, Exhibit QAT -117. 
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  content to persons subject to the Ministry's jurisdiction, beIN renew ed its request that the Ministry 
and/or GCAM take action to investigate and prevent the illegal piracy by beoutQ.438 
7.101.   In a third letter to the Ministry, dated 16  January  2018, beIN assert ed that 
beoutQ's  broadcasts were available since August 2017 and had significantly expanded to include 
web streaming and satellite transmission. beIN note d that, since October 2017, beoutQ offers beIN 
channels, overlaid with the beoutQ logo, via satellite transmission to persons purchasin g 
subscriptions and STBs from retail outlets in Saudi Arabia.439 beIN enclose d images of such STBs on 
sale. beIN conclude d that it "believe[s] that Saudi persons or entities own or control beoutQ, and/or 
are facilitating beoutQ's unauthorized and illegal tra nsmission of beIN's proprietary media 
content".440 
7.102.   On 8 June 2018 and 26  June 2018, respectively, UEFA and BBC Studios also each sen t letters 
to the Ministry and to GCAM concerning beoutQ's piracy. Both UEFA and BBC Studios state d that "a 
pirate operator usi ng the name 'beoutQ' had been engaged in the unauthorised distribution of 
programming and channels licensed to and/or operated by beIN and by other authorised third parties 
operating in and outside of the MENA region." UEFA and BBC Studios each indicate d that beoutQ 
was operating from Saudi  Arabia, with UEFA further alleging that beoutQ was engaged in both illegal 
web streaming and satellite broadcasting using the Badr -4/Arabsat 4 -B satellite and frequencies 
operated by Arabsat. UEFA and BBC Studios submit ted that beoutQ was selling STBs and 
subscriptions for its satellite broadcasting in retail outlets across Saudi  Arabia, that beoutQ's activity 
was spreading, and that beoutQ STBs became available for sale in countries in the MENA region 
other than Saudi Ar abia.441 
7.103.   Finally, in a letter from beIN's legal representative to both the Ministry of Media (previously 
known as the Ministry of Culture and Information) and GCAM, dated 3  September  2018, beIN 
provide d additional evidence of beoutQ's operations in Saudi Ara bia and its expansion to other 
countries in the Middle East. Specifically, beIN state d that it had uncovered the sale —in other 
countries in the MENA region, including Morocco, Oman and Bahrain —of beoutQ STBs imported from 
Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, beIN co nsider ed that there was compelling evidence demonstrating that 
beoutQ is operated from and controlled by persons in Saudi Arabia, given that: (a) beoutQ's pirate 
operations are focused on the Saudi market; (b) beoutQ's pirate channels and related data are 
transmitted via Arabsat satellites and have moved at different times across different Arabsat 
frequencies; and (c)  beoutQ is wholly, or in part, operated and/or controlled and directed by 
Saudi -based persons. beIN submit ted extensive evidence, including newspaper articles describing 
beoutQ's piracy, photographic evidence advertising rate cards and subscriptions priced in Saudi 
Riyals, social media posts in support of beoutQ's piracy, declarations concerning the relationship 
between beoutQ and a Saudi content distributor, technical reports demonstrating the transmission 
of beoutQ's pirated content on Arabsat satellite frequencies and social media posts and photographic 
evidence referring to public screenings of beoutQ's pirate d content organized by municipalities across 
Saudi  Arabia.442 
7.104.   In addition to correspond ing with the Ministry and GCAM, beIN and third -party right holders 
wrote to Arabsat to convey their concerns about the transmission of beoutQ's  pirated broadcasts  
using Ar absat satellite frequencies . In a letter to Arabsat dated 16  August 2017, beIN request ed 
Arabsat to remove or disable access to any unauthorized broadcast of beIN's  proprietary content on 
its satellite infrastructure.443 In a response to beIN dated 29  August  2017, Arabsat state d that it 
would "forward[] any complaint of infringement received from beIN to the channel infringing its 
 
438 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit  QAT-118, 
pp. 1-2. 
439 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16 January 2018, Exhibit  QAT-119, 
p. 2. 
440 Ibid. pp.  1-2.  
441 For UEFA's letters to the Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information and to GCAM, see UEFA Letter to 
KSA Ministry of Culture & Information, 8 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -122, and UEFA Letter to GCAM, 8 June 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -123. For BBC Studios' letters, see B BC Letter to KSA Ministry of Culture & Information, 
26 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -124; and BBC Letter to GCAM, 26 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -125. 
442 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018 , Exhibit QAT -106. 
443 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, 
pp. 1-2. 
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  rights", and would "ask[] the channel to stop such infringement immediately". Arabsat state d that 
it refuse d to accept or bear any  liability if this action does not stop the broadcast of such infringed 
content.444 
7.105.   In a subsequent letter to beIN dated 14  December  2017445, Arabsat state d that it "ha [d] no 
legal & contractual relationship with the entity of beoutQ, and ha [d] no insights [or ] information on 
the content broadcast [] on the said frequency since it is [an] encrypted signal". Arabsat allege d that 
the signal " [was]  transmitted directly from the client's premises", and that, "[r]eferring to the 
mechanism agreed upon by beIN and Arab sat, and as the broadcast [] signal [was]  encrypted, 
Arabsat ha [d] contacted the client operating the mentioned frequency to clarify [beIN's ] claim." 
According to Arabsat, the client responded that it "ha[d] no relationship or cooperation with [the] 
beoutQ channel and its content" and was "fully complying with the laws relating to intellectual 
property, copy rights and [its] contract with Arab sat". Accordingly, Arabsat state d,  it "[was]  not in 
a position to deactivate the carrier as no solid evidence [was]  furnished to Arabsat that 
beoutQ's  content is transmitted on the said frequency". Arabsat "urge [d] beIN to provide tangible 
evidence provin g technically that beoutQ is transmitted on the said frequency to enable Arabsat to 
take the required action".446 
7.106.   beIN's legal representative respond ed to Arabsat's legal representative in a letter dated 
26 December 2017. With respect to Arabsat's request fo r tangible evidence, beIN attache d a report 
prepared by its technical team finding that beoutQ was initially using Arabsat frequency 12207  MHz 
to broadcast beIN's content through beoutQ  STBs and later used Arabsat frequency 11919  MHz.447 
beIN renew ed its req uest that Arabsat, by no later than 30  December  2017: (a) identify its client(s) 
using frequencies 12207  MHz and 11919  MHz to broadcast beIN's proprietary content under the 
name beoutQ, (b)  provide details of the uplinks used by Arabsat's client(s) using t he name beoutQ 
for the transmission of signals to Arabsat's satellites, and (c) confirm that Arabsat would prevent 
access to frequencies 12207  MHz, 11919  MHz and any other Arabsat frequencies used by beoutQ.448 
7.107.   From mid -March 2018 to early June 2018 , four th ird-party right holders —UEFA, LaLiga, the 
Premier League and FIFA —also engage d in correspondence with Arabsat  concerning beoutQ's  piracy . 
According to the Panel record, UEFA, LaLiga and the Premier League  each issued letters to Arabsat , 
alleging that beoutQ ha d made unauthorized transmissions of their programming via Arabsat 
satellite frequencies. The Premier League identifie d the frequencies as 12207  MHz and 11919  MHz, 
carried on the Arabsat satellite located at the orbital position 26OE. The right holders ask ed Arabsat 
to take steps available to it to prevent beoutQ's transmissions on Arabsat satellite frequencies  and 
to cease any collaboration with any clients or customers broadcasting beoutQ -pirated content using 
Arabsat satellites or services.449  
7.108.   Arabsat respond ed to the letters issued by UEFA and LaLiga, advising each to direct its 
correspondence  to beIN's legal representative , which had already been engaging with Arabsat, or to 
Arabsat's  legal representative.450 UEFA subse quently  wrote to Arabsat's legal representative  to 
confirm beoutQ's  unauthorized transmissions via Arabsat frequencies.451 According to the Panel 
record, Arabsat's legal representative  then issue d two letters , one to LaLiga and one to FIFA . 
The legal representative inform ed LaLiga and FIFA  that Arabsat was conducting an investigation 
concerning the use of Arabsat's sate llite frequencies and would consider their input in the 
investigation. Arabsat's  legal representative added that, once it complet ed its investigation, Arabs at 
 
444 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 29 August 2017, Exhibit QAT -101. 
445 Arabsat states that it is responding to a letter from beIN dated 6 D ecember 2017. While the 
6 December 2017 letter has not been filed with the Panel, beIN's 26 December 2017 letter to Arabsat noted 
that the 6 December 2017 letter contains a request "that Arabsat take immediate action to stop the 
unauthorized and illegal tr ansmission of beIN's proprietary media content via Arabsat's satellites by pirate 
entity 'beoutQ'". (Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, 
Exhibit  QAT-91, p.  3.) 
446 Arabsat Letter to beIN, 14 December 2017, Exhibit  QAT-102. 
447 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, 
p. 3. 
448 Ibid. p. 4.  
449 UEFA Letter to Arabsat, 12 March 2018, Exhibit QAT -92; LaLiga Letter to Arabsat, 4 April 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -96; and Premier Le ague Letter to Arabsat, 11 April 2018, Exhibit QAT -99. 
450 Arabsat Letter to UEFA, 14 March 2018, Exhibit QAT -93; and Arabsat Letter to LaLiga, 19 April 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -97. 
451 UEFA Letter to Squire Patton Boggs LLP, 17 April 2018, Exhibit QAT -94. 
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  would "carefully consider the findings and then weigh what action is appropriate under the 
circumstances".452 Arabsat's legal representative also emphasize d to FIFA453 that Arabsat is not 
"collaborating" with any person or entity to commit IP piracy , and that Arabsat  is not a Saudi entity 
and is not controlled by the Saudi government or by private Saudi entities .454 
7.109.   In a follow -up letter dated 13  July 2018 to Arabsat's legal representative, beIN allege d that 
beoutQ's commercia l-scale piracy via Arabsat satellites ha d intensified.455 beIN submit ted evidence 
of a Saudi content distributor's active assistance of beoutQ's piracy and a technical report produced 
by anti -piracy expert Nagra asserting that beoutQ's pirated broadcasts are  transmitted on Arabsat 
satellite frequencies.456 beIN then "demands [ed] as a matter of urgency" that Arabsat: (a) disable 
and/or block the transmission of beoutQ's expected pirate transmission of the FIFA World Cup 2018 
final game on 15  July 2018 on Arabsat  satellite frequencies, including those listed in the present 
letter; (b) disable and/or block any further access by beoutQ, and affiliated entities, to Arabsat 
satellites and frequencies; (c) cancel any contracts that facilitate beoutQ broadcasts on Arabs at 
satellite frequencies; and (d) disclose the identities of any and all persons or entities paying for, 
contracting for, or using the Arabsat satellite frequencies used by beoutQ, and any other frequency 
on which beoutQ transmissions are broadcast on Arab sat's satellites.457 beIN conclude d that "it is 
plain that Arabsat has more than enough evidence to finally take 'the problem of piracy seriously'".458 
7.110.   In a letter from Arabsat to FIFA, dated 24  June 2019, Arabsat stated that it was respond ing 
to a 28  May 2019 letter from FIFA459, as well as  the "daily notices" it ha d received from FIFA . 
Specifically , Arabsat contend ed that FIFA was ignoring two issues.460 First, FIFA neglect ed to discuss 
the conclusion of Arabsat's prior investigations performed by six experts , reflected in 
Arabsat's  15 July 2018 letter, that Arabsat frequencies are not being used by beoutQ. Arabsat also 
noted that the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris , France (TGI) fully vindicated Arabsat, rejected 
all claims and awarded Arabsat substantia l costs. Arabsat ask ed FIFA to provide Arabsat with the 
written results of the "third party on -site testing", and in the meantime, consider ed that FIFA ha d 
provided no proof that beoutQ was using Arabsat frequencies to transmit pirate broadcasts.461 
Second,  Arabsat state d that "disabling" frequencies is a permanent, radical action that it could not 
undertake "absent an incontrovertible showing that a frequency has been hijacked or otherwise 
misused by a third party", and that "no other means exist for preclud ing such activity". 
Disabling  such frequencies , in Arabsat's  view,  would only terminate legitimate programming and 
interfere with the contractual rights of Arabsat customers, and would not affect beoutQ's broadcasts. 
Moreover, satellites involve "very sensitive technology, to which no human technician has physical 
access  to correct malfunctions". Unlike "'flipping' a switch on land", Arabsat note d, doing so on a 
satellite involves a substantial risk that the frequency might not be re -enabled. Accordingly, Arabsat 
stated that it cannot "disable any frequencies used to tran smit beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts".462 
 
452 Squire P atton Boggs LLP Letter to LaLiga, 13 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -98; and Squire Patton Boggs 
LLP Letter to FIFA, 5 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -100. 
453 The Panel has not been provided with a copy of FIFA's 28 May 2018 letter to Arabsat, to which 
Arabsat's legal repres entative responds, but the key points in the letter are reproduced in the response of 
Arabsat's legal representative to FIFA.  
454 Squire Patton Boggs LLP Letter to FIFA, 5 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -100. Arabsat's legal representative 
submitted that Arabsat is " a quasi -governmental entity of the Arab League, established by 22 of its members". 
The General Assembly is Arabsat's main organ, and its membership consists of the communication ministers in 
the Arab member states or their duly authorized representatives. (Ibid.)  
455 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, 
p. 5. In this letter to Arabsat, beIN referred to previous letters from 1 May 2018, 1 June 2018 and 
12 July 2018, and laments that, "[d]espite numero us notices … Arabsat has failed to take any action to stop 
the transmission of beoutQ's illegally pirated content, which constitutes direct infringement of beIN's copyrights 
and trademarks." (Ibid.)  
456 Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2 017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, 
p. 6. 
457 Ibid. p.  8. 
458 Ibid. 
459 While FIFA's 28 May 2019 letter has not been submitted to the Panel, Arabsat noted that this letter 
"claims to have 'procured third party on -site testing' and to 'have received indepen dent confirmation that 
beoutQ is engage[d] in illegal satellite broadcasting' through Arabsat satellites". (Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 
24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -39, p.  3.) 
460 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -39, pp.  1-2. 
461 Ibid. p.  2. 
462 Ibid. pp. 2-3. 
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  7.111.   In its response to Arabsat, dated 26  June 2019, FIFA state d that it was simply request ing 
the support of Arabsat in addressing the unauthori zed transmissions of beoutQ, and was not 
"implying that Arabsat is involved  in, or complicit with, the illegal beoutQ operation". In the absence 
of Arabsat being in a position to disable its satellite frequencies, FIFA request ed that Arabsat employ 
any means necessary to investigate the use of its frequencies, notably 11270 MHz Horizontal 
polarization (11270 MHz H) (on the Arabsat Badr -6 satellite) during the live transmissions of the 
remaining matches of the FIFA Women's World Cup 2019. FIFA encourage d Arabsat to help identify 
the source of the signals being uplinked and to provi de feedback on such investigations. FIFA 
reiterate d its request for a copy of the test results referred to in Arabsat's letter dated 15  July 2018, 
and note d that the TGI did not find that beoutQ was not carried by Arabsat's satellite frequencies. 
Rather, in FIFA's view , the TGI simply dismissed the case on the basis that beoutQ's transmissions 
were not widely available in France.463 
7.112.   The Panel will now examine , in greater detail,  the evidence presented to Saudi authorities 
by beIN and other right holders, together with certain additional corroborating evidence submitted 
to the Panel by Qatar.  
7.2.3.3.3   Evidence regarding the promotion of beoutQ by prominent Saudi  nationals  
7.113.   In its 14  September  2017 and 3  September  2018 letters to the Ministry and GCAM, beIN 
provided evidence of tweets sent from the Twitter accounts of prominent Saudi nationals.464 These 
Twitter accounts belong to Mr Saoud Al -Qahtani, counsel for the Saudi Royal Courts465; Mr Abdulaziz 
al-Mriseul, genera l manager of the Al Riyadh Newspaper; and the Al Riyadh newspaper itself. 
beIN allege d that the tweets from these accounts "provide reason to believe that the conspiracy to 
pirate beIN's proprietary media content has occurred within or has connections to t he territorial 
jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia".  
7.114.   beIN provided copies of these tweets to the Ministry466, which Qatar subsequently submitted 
to the Panel .467 These tweets are reproduce d below.  
No. Time and 
date of tweet  Author of tweet  Content of tweet  
1 12 June 2017 Mr Saoud Al -Qahtani, 
counsel for the Saudi 
Royal Courts  "The alternative solutions are coming soon and they are 
going to be free or for a low price. 
#Blocking_Qatari_beIN_Sport 
#Oh_Dulim_Greet_them_back  
It was their plan after buying the broadcas ting rights five 
times the real value to insert political bulletins and 
programmes to damage international stability.  
There is a big hole in the law in their monopoly to 
broadcast in the region. Revise the situation in Britain and 
France, for example…that is enough indication."468 
2 6 August 2017  
 Mr Abdulaziz al -Mriseul, 
general manager of the 
Al Riyadh Newspaper  "Saudi heroes will entirely pirate beIN  sport channel [sic] 
and satellite -broadcast the full content on beoutQ channel 
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"469 
 
463 FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -40. 
464 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit  QAT-118, 
pp. 1-2; and Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual 
Media, 3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, p.  5. See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para.  22. 
465 According to Qatar, as early as 12 June 2017, Saud Al -Qahtani was a consultant to the Saudi Royal 
Court  holding the rank of Minister, and Chairman of the Board of the Saudi Union for Cyber and Programming 
Security. (Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para.  22.) 
466 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit  QAT-118, 
pp. 1-2. 
467 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT -41. 
468 Ibid. pp. 15-16; and SportsPro, "Saudi Arabia, cartoon pirates and great TV sports ri ghts robbery" , 
6 March 2019, Exhibit QAT -50. See also Qatar's first written submission, para.  46; opening statement at the 
first meeting of the Panel, para.  26; and second written submission, para. 36.  
469 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QA T-41, p.  1. See also Qatar's first written 
submission, para.  51. 
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  No. Time and 
date of tweet  Author of tweet  Content of tweet  
3 6 August 2017  Mr Abdulaziz al -Mriseul, 
general manager of the 
Al Riyadh Newspaper  "This streaming will be through the channel's special 
receiver and the subscription will be for a very low price 
because it does not mainly aim at getting profits 
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"470 
4 6 August 2017  Mr Abdulaziz al -Mriseul, 
general manager of the 
Al Riyadh Newspaper  "After two weeks from now, beoutQ receivers will be 
available in the market. It will be satellite broadcasting, 
not a streaming via internet 
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"471 
5 6 August 2017  Mr Abdulaziz al -Mriseul, 
general manager of the 
Al Riyadh News paper  "As for me, I will strongly support beoutQ channels, and I 
will never feel satisfied until the full piracy of beIN sport 
channels. Let's wait and see who is the strongest. 
#Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"472  
[This tweet was accompanied by a cartoon showing beoutQ 
"kicking" beIN out of the market. ]473 
6 N/A Al Riyadh Newspaper  "Launching 10 sport channels broadcasting European 
Leagues, for low prices…Soon…marking the end of 'beIN 
sport' era."  
[This tweet contains the logos of various sports leagues, 
including Barclays Premier League, Ind Liga, Serie A, and 
LFP.]474 
 
7.115.   All of t he tweets above foreshadow that a substitute for beIN's operations  would enter the 
Saudi market , and some of the tweets support the establishment of a pirate channel, beoutQ , to 
circumvent beIN's exclusive licences from third -party right holders . Saudi Arabia did not contest the 
content of these tweets.   
7.116.   In addition to the se tweets , Qatar provided the Panel with other social media evidence, 
including a cartoon commercial produced by beoutQ, show ing strong support for beoutQ and 
antipathy toward beIN.  Specifically, Qatar submitted tweets that were posted in August 2017 from 
the Twitter  account of the general  manager of the Al Riyadh newspaper, the same Twitter account 
that authored tweets 2 to 5 above.475 These additional tweets further clarify the rationale of 
beoutQ's  piracy and the apparent origins of beoutQ in Saudi Arabia. In these t weets, the author: 
(a) conducts lotteries or giveaways offering beoutQ STBs to viewers476, which, based on the text of 
the tweets, appear to have drawn complaints from beIN itself477; (b) states that beoutQ  STBs will 
be available in two weeks478; (c) stresses th at "[t]he main purpose is to give a serious blow to the 
Qatari media, invalidate their scheme, and make content available to the followers, away from their 
channels … #Launching_beoutQ_Sport_Channels2"; and (d) invites readers to "spoil their scheme 
and qu ickly subscribe in beoutQ for a very low price, and trust what the national heroes are doing".479 
Qatar also submit ted an anti -beIN cartoon, circulated by beoutQ, encouraging Saudi citizens and 
beIN's licensors to replace beIN with beoutQ.480 
 
470 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT -41, p.  3. See also Qatar's first written 
submission, para.  51. 
471 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT -41, p.  7.  
472 Ibid. p. 9. See also Qatar's first written submission, para.  51. 
473 Qatar's first written submission, para.  51. 
474 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT -41, p.  13. 
475 See tweets 2 to 5 in the table following paragraph 7.114  of this Report.  
476 Promotion of beoutQ through Social Media, Exhibit QAT -41, pp. 17 -18. 
477 Ibid. p. 21. 
478 Ibid. p. 19. 
479 Ibid. p. 11. 
480 Qatar's first written submission, para.  50 (referring to beoutQ Promotional, as shown on beoutQ, 
Video, 21 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -49 and SportsPro, "Saudi Arabia, cartoon pirates and great TV sports 
rights rob bery" , 6 March 2019, Exhibit QAT -50). In this cartoon, Saudi citizens protest outside of what appears 
to be beIN's headquarters, which is adorned by a dollar sign and has a control room in which the CEO of beIN 
is surrounded by piles of US dollars. The CEO  of beIN appears to become enraged at the sight of the protests, 
and visits the headquarters of numerous football leagues. He leaves the headquarters of each football league, 
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  7.117.   The Panel recalls  that, in the context of denying its promotion of public gatherings with 
screenings of beoutQ 's unauthorized broadcasts, Saudi Arabia note d "that unofficial, 
non-government tweets are not usually recognized by legal adjudicators or attributed to a 
governme nt without explicit approval".481 The Panel discusses these tweets , not because they are 
attributable to the Government of Saudi Arabia , but because they are evidence  that beoutQ  was 
promoted by prominent individuals and  newspapers  within Saudi Arabia , which is relevant to the 
question of whether beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to  the criminal jurisdiction 
of Saudi Arabia.  
7.2.3.3.4   Evidence regarding the targeting of the Saudi market by beoutQ  
7.118.   Qatar indicate d that beIN has provided evidence to the Saudi authorities demonstrating that 
beoutQ targets the Saudi market by: (a) allowing only persons in Saudi Arabia to access its websites, 
(b) making its STBs widely availabl e for sale at retail stores in Saudi Arabia, and (c) advertising its 
subscriptions and rate cards to viewers using prices in Saudi riyals. 
7.119.   First, beIN assert ed, in a letter to the Ministry and GCAM, that only web users in Saudi Arabia 
can access beoutQ's w ebsites, or that such websites are "geo -blocked" to Saudi  Arabia.482 In support 
of this assertion, beIN refer red to a technical report by Nagra483 indicating that, as of the date of its 
report, beoutQ channels could be watched for free on two websites, http:// beoutq.se and 
http://beoutq.sx, accessible only to web users in Saudi Arabia. Nagra confirm ed that it could only 
access these websites with an IP address from Saudi Arabia.484 beIN consider ed that this finding 
"provides [a] strong reason to believe that this act of piracy was mainly targeted to the Saudi 
market".485  
7.120.   Second , in a letter to the Ministry, beIN submit ted extensive photographic evidence showing 
beoutQ STBs on sale at retail stores i n Saudi Arabia.486 beIN submit ted this evidence  to the Ministry  
under the file name "Images of the beoutQ set -top boxes on sale in retail stores in the KSA". A 
similarly titled exhibit, "Photographs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi 
Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018" has been submitted to the Panel.487 An examination of 
the photographs in this exhibit from November 2017, for example, reveals that beoutQ STBs were 
available for sale, and were ultimately purchased by investigators in Saudi Arabia, at multiple 
electronics retail stores in Jeddah, Riyadh and Al Dammam. The photographic evidence shows the 
store front at which each beoutQ STB was purchased; the receipt and business card from each store 
detailing the cost and date of the pu rchase of each beoutQ STB, as well as the name and address of 
each store; and, for certain STBs, the card containing an activation code and instructions for 
activation. As demonstrated by beIN's photographic evidence , in November 2017, investigators 
purcha sed beoutQ STBs from seven  stores in Riyadh, nine stores in Jeddah and eight stores in Al 
Dammam.488 
7.121.   beIN also pointed out that international journalists had reported on the wide availability of 
beoutQ STBs in Saudi retail stores. On 22  June 2018, Bloomberg' s managing editor for the 
MENA  region reported that:  
 
appearing to be disappointed, and walks home. At the end of the commercial, he en ters the TV room of his 
home with his family and sits down to a match televised by beoutQ. (Ibid.)  
481 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29(a), para. 62.  
482 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisu al Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106. 
483 Ibid. p.  4 (referring to Appendix 9 : Nagra Report, "beoutQ Piracy Overview," dated 24 June 2018, 
section 3.1, p.  4). See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit  QAT-37, para.  26. 
484 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Piracy Overview ", dated 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -90, section 
3.1, p.  4. 
485 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 14 September 2017, Exhibit  QAT-118, 
pp. 1-2. 
486 Letter from beIN to Saudi Ministry of Culture and Information, 16  January  2018, Exhibit  QAT-119. 
487 Ibid. p. 5 (referring to Appendix 7 : Images of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in 
Saudi  Arabia). See Photographs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi Arabia, 
October 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT -71. 
488 Photographs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to 
September 2018, Exhibit QAT -71, pp.  51-63. 
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  Many Saudis say it was easy to buy the devices in shops across the kingdom in the lead 
up to the World Cup, generally for as much as 400 [R]iyals ($107), including a year -long 
subscription. It's now comm on to see BeoutQ playing in homes, restaurants and cafes 
that purchased receivers. The channel was playing on big screens at a 
government -sponsored event in the Saudi capital on Wednesday showing the national 
team's game against Uruguay. It was also playin g on a large public screen on the side 
of a building on Tahlia Street, the city's main commercial boulevard.489 
7.122.   Third, beIN also submit ted additional photographic and social media evidence, in its 
3 September  2018 letter to the Ministry and GCAM, showing the extent to which beoutQ targets the 
Saudi market. beIN submit ted photographic evidence in which beoutQ appears to advertise and 
price, in Saudi riyals, subscriptions490 to its pirated content, rate cards  that list the prices for 
advertising spots in various football matches and at various points in those matches491, and Saudi 
brands and products.492  
7.123.   In addition to the evidence above, submitted by beIN to the Ministry and GCAM, Qatar 
provided the Panel with additio nal evidence supporting the conclusion that beoutQ appears to target 
the Saudi market. This evidence consists of: (a) a declaration made by the CEO of beIN concerning 
beoutQ's  operations and the predominant use of beoutQ's websites by persons in Saudi Arab ia; 
(b) photographic evidence demonstrating that beoutQ STBs were "visibly displayed, promoted, and 
sold" at electronics stores in at least three major Saudi cities as recently as May 2019; 
(c) photographic evidence that numerous  restaurants and cafés , as well as a Saudi television 
channel,  openly showed beoutQ channels as recently as June  2019; and (d) statements , reports  and 
submissions  made by governmental authorities in the United  States and the United Kingdom , as well 
as third -party right holders,  expressing concern about beoutQ's piracy in Saudi Arabia. The Panel 
will discuss each of these categories of evidence in turn.  
7.124.   First, a ccording to a 15 April 2019 D eclaration made by beIN's  CEO, between January 2018 
and August  2018, the beoutq.sx website was a ccessed primarily and overwhelmingly by users in 
Saudi  Arabia (71.99%), followed by users in Egypt (5.68%), Morocco (3.68%), Algeria (3.06%), 
the United  States  (2.04%), Tunisia (1.81%), the United Kingdom (1.19%), the UAE (1.04%) and 
Germany (0.93%).493 This information support s the finding made by Nagra above that 
beoutQ's  websites are geo -blocked  and cannot be accessed  by web users physically located outside 
Saudi Arabia unless such users subscribed to a virtual private network that registers the user ’s 
location as being in Saudi Arabia .494  
7.125.   Second, Qatar provided the Panel with additional photographic evidence demonstrating that 
beoutQ STBs were "visibly displayed , promoted, and sold" at multiple Saudi electronics stores in 
November 2017, September 2018, October 2018, April 2019 and May  2019.  This photographic 
evidence further supports the similar evidence submitted by beIN that beoutQ STBs were available 
for sale in retail stores in November 2017.495 In November 2017, investigators found that, in 
Jeddah's Sahary Centre, 20 of the approximately 25 electronics stores had posted leaflets for beoutQ 
or had beoutQ STBs visibly on display. Similarly, in Jeddah's  Nazir Center, at least 20 of 
 
489 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Com mission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, p.  8 (referring to Appendix 15 : Bloomberg, "Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim 
as Soccer Rights' Spat Escalates," dated 22 June 2018). See also Qatar's first written submission, para.  69 
(quoting B loomberg, " Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as Soccer Rights' Spat Escalates ", 22 June 2018, 
Exhibit  QAT-77). 
490 Ibid. p. 5 (referring to Appendix 4 : Evidence of beoutQ Subscriptions Priced in Saudi Riyals).  
491 Ibid. p.5 (referring to Appendix 5: Evidence of beou tQ Advertising Rate Cards Priced in Saudi  Riyals ). 
Qatar submitted evidence to the Panel showing, for example, that beoutQ has advertised Premier League "gold 
packages" for SAR 2,500,000 (or approximately USD 666,638). (See also Qatar's first written submi ssion, 
para. 67 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit  QAT-37, para.  47; and 
beoutQ advertisements pricing rate cards Saudi Riyals, Exhibit QAT -75).) 
492 Ibid. p. 5 (referring to Appendix 6 : Evidence of beoutQ Carrying Adve rtising for Saudi Brands).  
493 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para. 27; and Qatar's first 
written submission, para.  80 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit  QAT-37, 
para. 27). 
494 See para graph  7.119  of this Report.  
495 See paragraphs 7.120  to 7.122  of this Report.  
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  40 electronics stores offered beoutQ STBs for sale.496 The beoutQ STBs available in stores in 
November  2017 ranged in price from SAR 360 to 400 (approximately USD 95-110). In September 
2018, beoutQ STBs available for sale in 26  electronics  stores in the above -mentioned cities ranged 
in price from SAR 330 and 370 (approximately USD 89 -99).497 Investigators were able to purchase 
beoutQ STBs in September  2018 and October  2018 at multiple stores.498 Finally, beoutQ  STBs were 
also available for purchase in 15 Saudi electronics stores in late April 2019 and May 2019  at prices 
ranging from SAR 600 to 720 (approximately USD 160 -192). Qatar provide d a picture of the store 
front and a business card for "beout Q 2", one su ch store in the Al  Fakhriyah District of Al  Dammam 
that distributed beoutQ in May 2019.499 Saudi retail stores appear to have regularly exchanged 
tweets with customers regarding the sale of beoutQ STBs.500 
7.126.   Third, Qatar submitted evidence to the Panel showing that numerous  restaurants and caf es, 
as well as Saudi television channels, have broadcast beoutQ's pirated content to the public.  
Photographic evidence from  July 2018, April  2019, May 2019 and June 2019 reflects that restaurants  
and caf es openly showed beou tQ channels on televisions on their premises.501 This evidence 
supplement s and expand s upon beIN's  earlier evidence showing that Saudi municipalities had posted 
tweets to organize public screenings of 2018 World Cup matches on beoutQ channels in many cities 
in Saudi  Arabia.502 The prominent Saudi -owned and Saudi -based channel Saudi 24 has also 
broadcast beoutQ 's pirated content  on occasion , including the Al Hilal v Al Duhail AFC Champions 
League match on 12  March  2019. Saudi 24 added graphics to the screen, including its own logo and 
an image of Saudi Arabia's leaders apparently watching the game or other wise overseeing the 
broadcast.503 
7.127.   Fourth, and f inally, Qatar provided the Panel with reports , statements, or submissions 
produced by the United  States , the United Kingdom  and third -party right holders  expressing concern 
about beoutQ's piracy in Saudi Arabia.   
7.128.   For example, i n its 2019 Special 301 Report, the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative ( USTR ) placed Saudi  Arabia on its Priority Watch List, citing "[r]ampant satellite and 
online piracy" propagated by beoutQ. The USTR explain ed that the beou tQ STBs "continue to be 
 
496 Qatar's second written submission, para.  49 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, paras.  34-40; Photographs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on Sale in Retail Stores in 
Saudi Arabia, October 2017 to September 2018, Exhib it QAT -71; Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media 
Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217, paras.  24-25; and Photographic Evidence of Screenings of 
beoutQ's  Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup at Cafes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 11 July 201 8, 
Exhibit  QAT-78). See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, pp.  125-188. 
The beoutQ packaging and promotional material in such stores explicitly advertises the availability of sports 
content exclusively licensed to beIN . (Qatar's first written submission, para.  71 (referring to Images of beoutQ 
promotional material, Exhibit QAT -42).) 
497 Qatar's second written submission, para. 63 (referring to Photographs of beoutQ Set -Top Boxes on 
Sale in Retail Stores in Saudi  Arabia, O ctober 2017 to September 2018, Exhibit QAT -71). See also Declaration 
by beIN Media Group LLC, 15  April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, paras.  34 and 37.  
498 Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, paras.  36 and 38.  
499 Qatar's response to Pan el question No. 21(a), para.  134; and Qatar's opening statement at the 
second meeting of the Panel, para.  45 (referring to Photographic Evidence and Documentation of beoutQ 
Set-Top Boxes on Sale in Saudi Arabia, April -May 2019, attached as Annex 1 to Suppl emental Declaration by 
beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217, pp.  22-23). 
500 Qatar's first written submission, para.  52 (referring to Tweets about the sale of beoutQ STBs, 
12 August 2017, Exhibit QAT -51). A New York Times article also quoted f rom an employee at an electronics 
shop in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in May 2018. The employee stated that a one -year subscription to a beoutQ STB 
costs USD 100, and that his shop had been selling beoutQ STBs since February 2018. (The New York Times, 
"The Brazen  Bootlegging of a Multibillion -Dollar Sport Network ", 9 May 2018, Exhibit QAT -175.)  
501 Qatar's second written submission, para.  49 (referring to Photographic Evidence of Screenings of 
beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup at Cafes i n Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 11 July 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -78; and Photographic Evidence of Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Broadcasts at Restaurants and 
Cafés in Saudi Arabia, April -June 2019, attached as Annex 2 to Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group 
LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217); and Qatar's response to Panel question No. 21(a), para.  134. 
502 See section 7.2.3.4 ("Public screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts") of this Report.  
503 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  20 (refer ring to Inside World 
Football, " AFC streaming of ACL reaches 1m in Saudi Arabia but now Saudi 24 channel joins piracy ", 
13 March  2019, Exhibit QAT -190).  
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  widely available and are generally unregulated in Saudi Arabia"504 and that Saudi Arabia "has not 
taken sufficient steps to address the purported role of Arabsat in facilitating [b]eoutQ's piracy 
activities".505 In a series of submissio ns to the US Government under the 2019 Special 301 process 
in February 2019, multiple right holders and coalitions from around the world detail ed the harm that 
the beoutQ piracy has caused to their business.506 The USTR's  2018 Notorious Markets List, which 
"highlights prominent and illustrative examples of online and physical marketplaces that reportedly 
engage in and facilitate substantial piracy and counterfeiting", cite d beoutQ as "an illicit pirate 
operation that has been widely available in Saudi  Arabia and throughout the Middle East region and 
Europe".507  
7.129.   The UK Government similarly  indicated that it is investigating beoutQ's IP theft of the 
English  Premier League's content.508 In testimony before the UK's Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Select Com mittee in mid -May 2019, "secretary of state [for Culture, Media and Sport] Jeremy  Wright 
QC, confirmed that UK Government departments are 'pursuing this matter' and 'the [UK] embassy 
in Riyadh is speaking to the Saudis on this subject'".509 Secretary Wright went on to highlight the 
threat that this piracy causes to the future of sports and sports broadcasting, including in the UK.510  
7.130.   Qatar also provide d the Panel with a copy of a public joint statement by seven major football 
right holders (including FIFA, UEF A, AFC, the Premier League, Bundesliga, LaLiga and Lega Serie 
A).511 The statement provides that : 
We, the rights holders of various football competitions, collectively condemn in the 
strongest possible terms the ongoing theft of our intellectual property by the pirate 
broadcaster known as 'beoutQ' and call on the authorities in Saudi Arabia (KSA) to 
 
504 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 21(a), para.  136 (quoting United States 2019 Special 301 
Repor t, Office of the United States Trade Representative (April 2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit QAT -184). 
505 Ibid. para.  11 (quoting United States 2019 Special 301 Report, Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (April 2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit QAT -184, p. 57 ); and Qatar's second written submission, 
para. 59 (quoting United  States 2019 Special 301 Report, Office of the United  States Trade Representative 
(April 2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit  QAT-184, p.  57).  
506 See, e.g. Reuters " NBA, U.S. Tennis, Sky, urge U.S. act ion on alleged Saudi TV piracy ", 
16 February  2019, Exhibit QAT -62; Submission by Audiovisual Anti -Piracy Alliance for the 2019 Special 301 
Review, 4  February 2019, Exhibit QAT -63; Submission by Canal+ Group for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 
7 February  2019,  Exhibit QAT -64; Submission by the International Intellectual Property Alliance for the 2019 
Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -65, p.  14; Submission by the National Basketball 
Association and the United  States Tennis Association for the 2019  Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019, 
Exhibit QAT -66; Submission by beIN Media Group, LLC and Miramax, LLC for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 
7 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -67; Submission by Sky Limited for the 2019 Special Review, 7 February 2019, 
Exhibit QAT -68; Submission by the Sport Coalition for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7 February 2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-69; Submission by U.S. Chamber of Commerce for the 2019 Special 301 Review, 7  February  2019, 
Exhibit QAT -70, p.  27; and Reuters " NBA, U.S. Tennis, Sky, urg e U.S. action on alleged Saudi TV piracy ", 
16 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -62.  
507 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  11 (quoting Excerpts of 
United  States 2018 Out -of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets, Office of the United  States Trade Representative 
(April  2019) (Excerpts), Exhibit QAT -187, pp.  2 and 15).  
508 Ibid. para.  13 (referring to SportsPro Media, " UK government to investigate BeoutQ Premier League 
IP theft ", 25 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -188).  
509 Ibid. (referring to Broadba nd TV News, " MPs call for 'robust attack' on pirate beoutQ ", 10 May 2019, 
Exhibit QAT -189).  
510 Ibid. 
511 Qatar's second written submission, para.  88 (referring to Public statements from world sports 
organizations condemning beoutQ Piracy, as collected on beIN Media Group's Website Exposing beoutQ, 
16 January 2019, Exhibit QAT -52; SportsPro, " ATP and ITF pile  in on BeoutQ over pirate broadcasts ", 
6 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -53; FIFA, " Joint Public Statement on behalf of FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League, 
LaLiga and Bundesliga on beoutQ ", 22 January 2019, Exhibit QAT -54; UEFA, " Joint Statement on behalf of 
FIFA, UEFA, AFC, The Premier League, LaLiga and Bundesliga on beoutQ ", 22 January 2019, Exhibit  QAT-55; 
Reuters, " Soccer: Leagues and governing bodies condemn beoutQ TV piracy ", 22 January  2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-56; Asian Football Confederation Statement on beoutQ, 9 January 2019, Exhibit QAT -57; 
Motion  Picture Association of America, 2018 Notorious Markets Comments, 1 October 2018, Exhibit QAT -58, 
p. 10; The Guardian, " BBC and Sky call for EU crackdown on Saudi pirate TV service ", 31 October 2018, 
Exhibit  QAT-59; an d Bloomberg, " Telemundo Says Its World Cup Broadcasts Were Illegally Distributed ", 
19 June 2018, Exhibit  QAT-60). 
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  support us in ending the widespread and flagrant breaches of our intellectual property 
rights taking place in the country.512 
7.2.3.3.5   Evidence regarding the transmission of  beoutQ's broadcasts via Arabsat  
7.131.   Headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Arabsat is an intergovernmental organization and 
satellite operator whose largest shareholder is the Government of Saudi Arabia (with a stake of 
36.6%)513 and whose CEO is a Saudi national .514 beIN allege d that the frequencies of this satellite 
operator transmit beoutQ's pirate channels and related data (firmware updates, decryption keys and 
signaling data) to beoutQ STBs in Saudi Arabia, according to technic al reports that it has submitted 
to the Ministry, GCAM and Arabsat. Two of the four technical reports submitted to the Ministry, GCAM 
and Arabsat were also submitted to the Panel515, and will be discussed below.  
7.132.   Cybersecurity expert Nagra516 determined that be outQ's pirate transmissions have moved 
at different times across four Arabsat frequencies: 12207  MHz Vertical  polarization (12207 MHz V) , 
11919  MHz Horizontal  polarization ( 11919  MHz H ), 12380  MHz Horizontal  polarization  
(12380  MHz H) and 12341  MHz Horizon tal polarization ( 12341  MHz H ). These frequencies operate 
on Arabsat  satellites Badr -4 and Badr -6, directed at the orbital location 26OEast, which covers the 
MENA  region and parts of Europe.517 According to Nagra, beoutQ channels can be moved at will 
across these frequencies without upgrades to a beoutQ STB's firmware and without interruption of 
beoutQ's  pirate service for end -users.518 
7.133.   Following initial tests conducted by Nagra leading to the findings above, Arabsat instructed 
its outside experts to test "cert ain specific Arabsat frequencies at certain specific times" to detect 
whether beoutQ pirate broadcasts were being transmitted on these frequencies. Arabsat's outside 
experts found no such broadcasts on these Arabsat frequencies as tested at specific times.  
In Nagra's  view, however, the findings of Arabsat's outside experts establish only that beoutQ 
repeatedly switches between the four Arabsat frequencies. Nagra note d that none of 
Arabsat's  outside experts was asked to conduct simultaneous or systematic testing of all four Arabsat 
frequencies, and that "systematic testing would be the most obvious and straightforward way to 
determine whether … beoutQ was … transmitting on any Arabsat frequenc y."519 Based on its 
experience in combating piracy, Nagra consider ed it "no surprise whatsoever that a pirate operation 
would seek to arrange its activities in such a way", and note d that Arabsat had "no legitimate 
technical or practical reason to instruct i ts outside experts to engage in such selective testing". 
Nagra  emphasize d that it is "a simple exercise to turn on a beoutQ STB and determine which 
frequency is transmitting the beoutQ pirate channels", and that any satellite operator has the 
technical cap ability to determine exactly which customers are broadcasting on its frequencies.520 
7.134.   Noting the regularity with which beoutQ's frequency switches  occur , Nagra report ed that 
beoutQ made three such switches in 10 days, between 9 June 2018 and 19  June 2018, and that all 
 
512 Joint statement by FIFA, the AFC, UEFA, the Bundesliga, LaLiga, the Premier League and Lega Serie 
A regarding the activities of beoutQ in Sa udi Arabia, 31 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -227. 
513 Arabsat, About, last accessed 16 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -86. 
514 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, p.  5 (referri ng to Appendix 10 : Nagra Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy – 
Further Update," dated 15 August 2018). See also Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-37, para.  29; and Arabsat, " League of Arab States Secretary -General honors Arabsat CEO", 
29 January 2018, Exhibit QAT -87.  
515 See NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Piracy Overview ", 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -90; NAGRA, 
Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update ", 15 August 2018, Exhibit QAT -80; and Letter from 
beIN's counsel t o Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 3 September 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -106. The other two reports were submitted to Arabsat. (See Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, 
dated 16 August 2017 through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, p. 4.) 
516 See NAGRA Kudelski Group Website, " The Group at a Glance ", Exhibit QAT -81. 
517 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, p.  5 (referring to Appendix 10 : Nagra Report, "beoutQ Broadcast Piracy – 
Further Update," dated 15 August 2018); and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Piracy Overview ", 
24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -90, pp.  4 and 6 -8. 
518 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update ", 15 August  2018, 
Exhibit  QAT-80, p. 6. 
519 Ibid. pp.  6-9. 
520 Ibid. p.  5. 
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  such switches occurred immediately before or after Arabsat's outside experts tested a particular 
Arabsat frequency . For example, on 20  June 2018, Arabsat's outside experts tested Arabsat 
frequencies 11919  MHz H and 12207  MHz V. During the night of 19  June 2018 to 20  June 2018, 
however, beoutQ's  pirate channels had switched off of these frequencies and on to Arabsat 
frequencies 12341  MHz H and 12380  MHz H. Once Arabsat's outside experts  complet ed their tests 
of frequency 11919  MHz H, beoutQ's  pirate channels moved back to that frequency. Then, w hile 
beoutQ continued to broadcast on Arabsat  frequency 11919  MHz H, Arabsat mandated two other 
experts to test Arabsat frequency 12341  MHz H.521 Arabsat's outside experts did not find any beoutQ 
transmissions on frequency 12341  MHz H, but on 26 June 2018, Nagra found that beoutQ's pirate 
channels, signaling data and STB firmware updates were all being transmitted on frequency 
11919  MHz H.522 The spec ific frequencies used frequently change d, often before or after testing 
conducted by Arabsat's outside experts , but Nagra consistently found beoutQ's pirated broadcasts 
to be carried on Arabsat satellite frequencies.523 
7.135.   Nagra also refer red to "two unusual te chnical features" concerning the four Arabsat satellite 
frequencies that should have attracted Arabsat's attention and prompted further enquiries.524 
First, the four Arabsat frequencies contain "unusual custom obfuscated data", encoded in the Time 
Offset Table (TOT), which is used by the beoutQ STB to discover where and how the beoutQ 
channels, decryption keys and firmware updates are broadcast. Nagra emphasiz es that 
"[n]o legitimate broadcaster would include this information in the TOT, which is intended to carry 
the [Coordinated Universal Time] and local date and time information". Second, the Arabsat 
frequencies carrying beoutQ audio and video signals are mi ssing the standard Digital Video 
Broadcasting (DVB) / Moving Picture Experts Group tables that are commonly used in satellite 
television broadcasts, such as the names of the television channels, the available audio languages, 
the television operator, the s pecific satellite frequency being used to transmit the television signal 
in question, the audio and video compression methods, or the electronic program me guide describing 
current and future events.  
7.136.   In addition to the two Nagra technical reports discussed above, Qatar provided the Panel 
with four other technical reports and statements noting that beou tQ's pirated content is broadcast 
on Arabsat satellite frequencies. Specifically, Qatar submitted: (a) a report from anti -piracy expert 
Cartesian dated 8  Febru ary 2019525, (b) an additional report from Nagra dated 8  February  2019526, 
(c) a report from cybersecurity expert Synamedia dated 6 June 2019527, and (d) a report produced 
by MarkMonitor dated April 2019.528 Qatar also submitted statements made by the European Uni on 
and references to a report commissioned by third -party right holders whose content has been 
affected by beoutQ's piracy.  
7.137.   In its 8  February  2019 technical report, anti-piracy expert Cartesian529 agree d with 
Nagra's  conclusion530 that Arabsat had "no legitimate technical or practical reason" to instruct its 
outside experts to test specific Arabsat frequencies on specific dates, as opposed to engaging in 
systematic or sequential testing of all Arabsat frequencies. The fact that beo utQ's changes in 
frequencies occur immediately before and after Arabsat's outside experts' "selective testing" is, for 
Cartesian, "a strong indication that Arabsat is seeking to conceal the broadcast of beoutQ's illegal 
content on its satellites, if not ac tively colluding with the originator of beoutQ's illegal content".531 
Cartesian arrive d at a similar conclusion when noting Arabsat's failure to take any decisive action 
 
521 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update ", 15 August 2018, 
Exhibit  QAT-80, p. 5. See also ibid. pp.  16-17; and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " Response to IGP Testing of 28 
January and 1 February 2019 and beoutQ Frequency Changes ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -224, p.  16.  
522 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Broadcast Piracy Further Update ", 15 August 2018, 
Exhibit  QAT-80, p. 5. 
523 Ibid. p.  9. 
524 Ibid. p.  13. 
525 Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -89. 
526 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " Response to IGP Testing of 28 January and 1 February 2019 and beoutQ 
Frequency Changes ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -224. 
527 Synam edia Report, "' beoutQ' Service Analysis ", 6 June 2019, Exhibit QAT -226. 
528 MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019 as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration 
by Football Right Holders, 19 September 2019, Exhibit QAT -238. 
529 Cartesian website, "Our Story ", Exhibit QAT -103.  
530 See paragraph 7.133  of this Report.  
531 Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February 20 19, Exhibit QAT -89, 
pp. 8-9 and 18.  
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  concerning beoutQ's piracy. Cartesian consider ed that Arabsat is able to determine wheth er an 
allegedly illegal signal is transmitted over one of its frequencies, and has the technical and 
contractual means to stop any such transmission. For Cartesian, Arabsat's inaction thus "provides a 
strong indication that Arabsat either is directly invol ved in this piracy or, at a minimum, is colluding 
with beoutQ".532 
7.138.   According to Cartesian, changes of frequencies may happen over the lifetime of a TV channel, 
but typically only once every few years, and "always for very good reasons".533 Numerous frequency 
changes of the kind occurring on Arabsat satellite frequencies and the implementation of "advanced 
and unusual signaling mechanisms" necessary to do so are, in Cartesian's view, "certainly … difficult, 
costly and time -consuming". The on ly plausible explanation for such conduct is "an intention to 
conceal the transmission of illegal content", which "should have alerted Arabsat, as the satellite 
operator, to the need to carry out a full independent investigation of the suspected illegal us e of its 
satellites" and to take "immediate action … to stop such illegal conduct".534 Cartesian note d that 
shutting down a frequency535 is "extremely easy for a satellite operator", "is not an unusual action 
for a satellite operator", is part of the "very bas ic supervision operations" that a satellite operator 
can perform remotely on its satellite, is "very straightforward to do" and can be done at "virtually 
no cost". Satellite operators conduct this action "on a regular basis for various reasons".536 
According  to Cartesian, each frequency may be transmitting several TV channels, meaning that 
shutting down a frequency will interrupt the broadcast of each TV channel carried on the frequency. 
Nevertheless, if all channels on a particular frequency are part of the illegal service, the satellite 
operator can shut down the frequency without impairing a legitimate service.537 
7.139.   The Panel considers that Cartesian 's statements  in the previous paragraph  address two 
concerns presented by Arabsat in its 24  June 2019 letter to F IFA. Arabsat contend ed that disabling 
one of its satellite frequencies would only terminate legitimate programming and interfere with the 
contractual rights of Arabsat customers, and would not affect beoutQ's broadcasts. Arabsat also 
contend ed that unlike "'flipping' a switch on land", doing so on a satellite involves a substantial risk 
that the frequency might not be re -enabled.538 Cartesian agree d that shutting down a frequency will 
have the effect of interrupting the broadcast of any legitimate TV channels  on that frequency. 
However, Cartesian also note d that if all channels on a particular frequency are part of the illegal 
service and are not mixed with legitimate channels, the satellite operator can shut down the whole 
 
532 Ibid. pp.  18-19. 
533 Ibid. pp.  9-10. These reasons include a technical issue with a frequency, the decommissioning of a 
frequency or a satellite, a migration to a newer (more cost -effective) technology, the addition of n ew channels, 
or material changes in channels' encoding bit rates, which would cause channels to be re -distributed among 
available frequencies. Furthermore, STBs do not have the capability to dynamically follow channels across 
changes of frequencies, which significantly inconvenience end -users. (Ibid.)  
534 Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -89, 
pp. 10-11. See also ibid. p.  18. Cartesian also noted Nagra's findings that the Network Information Table, 
Program Map Table and the Service Description Table are missing from beoutQ's signals. Broadcasting 
channels without this mandatory information therefore constitutes "major non -compliance" with DVB/MPEG 
regulations. Such a violation can easily be observed wi th any stream analyser available on the market, and a 
satellite operator would immediately recognize this violation to be abnormal and extremely suspicious 
behavior. (Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit  QAT-89, 
pp. 11 -12.) Cartesian considered it "very unusual —possibly unknown —in the TV satellite broadcast industry to 
observe TV channels repeatedly changing from one … frequency to another on numerous occasions over a 
period of only several months". (Ibid . p. 10.) 
535 Cartesian used the term "transponder", rather than the term "frequency", in its technical report. 
Nevertheless, based on Cartesian's discussion of these terms, these two terms appear to be nearly 
synonymous. Cartesian explained that each satell ite has a set of transponders, and that each transponder 
corresponds to a single frequency. Thus, when Cartesian referred to a particular "transponder" in use on an 
Arabsat satellite and the conclusions to be drawn from beoutQ's switches to other transpond ers, in line with 
other technical reports, Cartesian was actually referring to the frequency carried on each transponder. 
(Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -89, p. 4.) For 
this reason, the Panel h as used the terms "frequency" or "frequencies", rather than "transponder" or 
"transponders", when summarizing Cartesian's report.  
536 Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -89, 
p. 17. The two examples pr ovided by Cartesian for switching off a customer's satellite service are: (a) when 
the customer fails to pay its bills to the satellite operator, and (b) for ethical or legal reasons. (Ibid.)  
537 Ibid. 
538 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -39, pp. 2-3. 
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  frequency, without any risk of impai ring a legitimate service.539 Above all, Cartesian emphasize d 
that shutting down a frequency is an easy, basic, straightforward, common action taken by satellite 
operators , which appears to address Arabsat's statements about the technical difficulties that o ne 
might encounter in deactivating a satellite frequency . 
7.140.   In its third technical report, dated 8  February  2019, Nagra document ed additional suspicious 
frequency changes that took place between 27 and 28  January 2019. On these dates, beoutQ 
channels were broadcast: (a) first, on Arabsat frequency 12341  MHz H, accessible in Europe and 
North  Africa on various non -beoutQ STBs; (b) next, on Arabsat frequency 11270  MHz H; (c) then, 
on Arabsat frequency 12341  MHz H once more; and (d) finally, on Arabsat frequency 11270  MHz H, 
but no longer available in North Africa or in Southern Europe.540 These switches in frequencies 
occurred two days before Arabsat's  outside expert tested frequency 12341  MHz H in connection wit h 
the litigation before the TGI in France . Arabsat's outside experts did not find beoutQ channels to be 
transmitted on frequency 12341  MHz H, and i n Nagra 's view , the frequency switches catalogued 
above  explain why the outside experts arrived at such findi ngs.541 A technical report subsequently 
produced by Synamedia found that, as of mid -April 2019, the 10  beoutQ channels tested by Nagra 
continued to be broadcast on the Arabsat frequency 11270  MHz H via the Arabsat Badr -4/5/6/7 
satellite constellation.542 For the duration of Synamedia's tests, the beoutQ content was transmitted 
via one of the four Badr satellites at orbital position 26OE.543 
7.141.   In a video on its official Facebook page, beoutQ confirm ed that the change to 
Arabsat  frequency 11270  MHz H occurred due to "problems related to … the coverage area". 
beoutQ  stated that the new frequency could only be received from the Middle East, Egypt and 
Eastern Libya and would be broadcast from "Badr26", which likely refers to the Arabsat Badr satellit e 
constellation at 26OEast. beoutQ also posted a message to its users in North Africa to assure them 
that the loss of coverage was only temporary, and that beoutQ would either return to a previous 
Arabsat frequency or use new frequencies providing coverage  in North Africa. A separate posting 
confirmed this plan, announcing "good surprises soon" for beoutQ customers in North Africa. 
On 30 January  2019, the "BeoutQsports" Facebook page confirmed that: (a) other frequency 
changes had taken place as a result of  "Qatari attacks" ; and (b) the frequency changes and resulting 
loss of coverage in North Africa and Southern Europe were only temporary and would be reversed 
after the end of the 2019 Asian Cup; and beoutQ would "return to the whole Arab world with better 
quality" .544 A technical report from Cartesian dated 10  September  2019 confirm ed that, on 
3 and 4 July 2019 in Southeast Europe, beoutQ channels returned to frequency 11270  MHz H on 
Arabsat's Badr -7 satellite.545 
7.142.   An additional technical report that was publicly released with a Supplemental Declaration by 
football right holders dated 16  September  2019, known as the MarkMonitor Report, confirms the 
findings above .546 This report, which Qatar asserts only became availab le to it upon its public release 
in mid -September 2019, is the report that Arabsat requested from FIFA in its 24  June 2019 letter.547 
Since this report was published, it has not been contested by Saudi  Arabia or Arabsat.  
 
539 Cartesian Report, " Broadcast Piracy via Satellite Transmission ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -89, 
p. 17. 
540 Ibid. pp.  10-14. 
541 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " Response to IGP Testing of 28 January and 1 February 2019 and beoutQ 
Frequency Changes ", 8 February 2019, Exhibit QAT -224, pp.  16-17. 
542 Synamedia Report, "' beoutQ' Service Analysis ", 6 June 2019, Exhibit QAT -226, pp.  4-6. See also ibid. 
pp. 9-10. 
543 Ibid. p. 6.  
544 Ibid. pp. 18 -21. 
545 Cartesian Report, " Technical Investigation of beoutQ Broadcasts ", 10 September 2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-89, paras.  6-17, 21 -26, 51 -53 and 56. Using broadcast analysis tools, Cartesian also determined 
that certain mandatory metadata tables were missing from the broadcast. Cartesian considered the missing 
mandatory information " highly suspicious", noting that any satellite operator transmitting it can observe this 
fact and suspect that it is used for unusual or illegal purposes. (Ibid. paras.  58-61. See also Qatar's opening 
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  30.) 
546 Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  55 (referring to MarkMonitor 
beoutQ Investigation, April 2019, p.  3, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Football Right 
Holders, 19 September 2019, Exhibit QAT -238). 
547 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 39, para.  17 (referring to Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 
24 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -39); Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No.  39, 
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  7.143.   According to this report, several sports leagues or federations (claimants)548 asked the 
anti-piracy and cybersecurity firm MarkMonitor to conduct an independent technical investigation 
into beoutQ. MarkMonitor's investigation concluded that: (a) beoutQ re -streams the claimants' 
copyrighted content without their authorization; and (b) the beoutQ "Live Sports" satellite service is 
transmitted on Arabsat's Badr constellation satellites (Badr -4, 5 and 6) at 26°East over frequency 
11270  MHz H (video component) and frequency 11919  MHz H (signalization for the STB to decode 
the video channel); and (c) the hardware and software in the beoutQ STBs "has been designed and 
operates in such a way so as to make the beoutQ channels available primarily in Saudi Arabia through 
sophisticated geo -fencin g and virtual private networks technology". MarkMonitor found the 
beoutQ  pirate service to be a highly technically sophisticated and organized operation, regionally 
targeted to the Middle East, and in particular, Saudi Arabia.549 
7.144.   As noted above, FIFA is one of at least four entities550 that has received reports that 
beoutQ's  pirated content is broadcast on Arabsat satellite frequencies. Specifically, FIFA stated that 
"[b]eoutQ's unauthorised transmissions of the FIFA  Women's World Cup 2019 are made available 
by way of Arabsat satellite frequencies".551 The European  Union  also indicated that, according to 
complaints received from EU right holders, "the satellite services of BeoutQ are being transmitted 
by satellite (Badr -4/Arabsat -4b) of the Arab Satellite Communic ations Organization."552 
7.145.   In its 24  June 2019 letter to FIFA, Arabsat stated that the TGI fully vindicated Arabsat, 
rejected all claims and awarded Arabsat substantial costs.553 Saudi Arabia add ed that the TGI  
rendered a summary judgment order in favour of Arabsat, stating that "the tests carried out at 
ARABSAT's request … contradict the results of [Nagra 's] tests produced by the claimants and show 
that … beoutQ's  programs at issue cannot be broadcast [] in Fran ce over the ARABSAT frequencies 
referred to in [Nagra's]  tests via the Badr -4 satellite".554 FIFA respond ed, and Qatar agree d, that 
the TGI did not find beoutQ was not carried by Arabsat's satellite frequencies, but simply dismissed 
the case on the basis tha t beoutQ's transmissions were not widely available in France.555 
7.146.   The Panel notes that the TGI explained in its decision that testing by Nagra in January 2019, 
in two cities in southern France,  demonstrated that beoutQ channels were available in France. 
For purposes of assessing territorial jurisdiction, the TGI determined that the results of Nagra's tests 
 
para. 55 (referring FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26 June 201 9, Exhibit SAU -40); and Qatar's opening statement at 
the second meeting of the Panel, para.  55 (referring to MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April  2019, p.  3, as 
attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Football Right Holders, 19  September  2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-238). 
548 These sports leagues or confederations are the Asian Football Confederation ( AFC); DFL Deutsche 
Fußball Liga e.V. ( DFL); Fédération Internationale de Football Association ( FIFA); Football Association Premier 
League Limited ( PL); Leg a Nazionale Professionisti Serie A ( Serie A ); Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional 
(LaLiga ); and Union of European Football Associations ( UEFA). (MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019, 
p. 3, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Foo tball Right Holders, 19 September 2019, 
Exhibit QAT -238.)  
549 MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, April 2019, pp.  4-5, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental 
Declaration by Football Right Holders, 19 September 2019, Exhibit QAT -238. See also Qatar's opening 
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  55 (ref erring to MarkMonitor beoutQ Investigation, 
April 2019, p.  3, as attached as Exhibit 1 to Supplemental Declaration by Football Right Holders, 
19 September  2019, Exhibit QAT -238). 
550 The other three entities are UEFA, LaLiga and the Premier League. (See para graphs 7.102 , 7.107  and 
7.108  of this Report.)  
551 Synamedia Report, "' beoutQ' Service Analysis ", 6 June 2019, Exhibit QAT -226, para.  24 (referring to 
Washington Post, " FIFA wa nts Saudis to stop pirated Women's World Cup TV feeds ", 16 June 2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-191).  
552 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  22 (referring to 
European  Union's  third-party submission, para.  4). 
553 Arabsat Letter to FIFA, 24 Ju ne 2019, Exhibit SAU -39, p.  2. 
554 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, paras.  43 and 44 (referring to S.A.R.L. beIN Media 
Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication Organization , Summary Proceedings Order, Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Pa ris, RG number 18/59094 – Portalis number 352J -W-B7C-CNOK, rendered 13 June 2019 
(English translation available at https://www.degaullefleurance.com/wp -content/uploads/2019/06/20190613 -
Ordonnance -de-r%C3%A9f%C3%A9r%C3%A9 -English -version.pdf accessed 21 Jul y 2019), Exhibit SAU -28, at 
p. 11); and Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  63. 
555 FIFA Letter to Arabsat, 26 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -40; Qatar's opening statement at the second 
meeting of the Panel, para.  28; and Qatar's second written submissio n, paras.  61-63 and 67.  
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  were sufficient to establish that the TGI had jurisdiction.556 The TGI also found that, in June 2018, 
beoutQ channels were available on Arabsat frequencies 11 919 MHz H and 12207  MHz V on the 
Arabsat Badr -4 satellite. Furthermore, the TGI noted that Arabsat's own website states that its 
Badr-4 satellite covers the MENA region, and that this satellite's coverage also "extends to parts of 
Europe, including the ext reme south of France". For the TGI, this was sufficient to establish that 
Arabsat has the legal capacity to be a defendant.557 
7.147.   Nevertheless, the TGI also relied on tests conducted by Arabsat's outside experts, which 
contradicted the results of Nagra's test, showing that: (a) the beoutQ programs at issue cannot be 
broadcast in France over the Arabsat frequencies via the Badr -4 satellite ; and (b) in June 2018, only 
the Badr -5 and Badr -6 satellites actually covered the French territory. The Badr -4 satellite only  
resulted in "theoretically slight spillovers in the extreme southern part of France", which would have 
no practical impact for the public, as only a professional antenna and professional technical resources 
would be able to capture beoutQ's signal.558 Accor dingly, the TGI did not find that beIN demonstrated 
"the existence of a 'manifestly unlawful disturbance' or evidence of imminent harm" under 
French  law, and it thus dismissed beIN's suit.559  
7.148.   The Panel thus considers the TGI  to have found that beoutQ's pirated broadcasts had very 
limited coverage in southern France because they were transmitted on the Arabsat Badr -4 satellite. 
This meant that transmissions of beoutQ channels on Arabsat frequencies were unlikely to reach 
Frenc h viewers, but that such transmissions had nevertheless occurred. Qatar contend ed that, 
according to Nagra technical reports, beoutQ moved its pirated content off of the Arabsat frequencies 
with wider coverage in France prior to scheduled testing conducted  by Arabsat's outside experts.560 
7.149.   In the light of the expert technical reports prepared by Nagra, Cartesian, Synamedia and 
MarkMonitor, and the complaints that Arabsat received from other entities, the Panel does not accept 
Saudi  Arabia's statement that, "[b]ased on information that it has collected, Arabsat has established 
that it does not distribute beoutQ content on its satellite frequencies ".561 The technical reports 
demonstrate that beoutQ's  pirated broadcasts are transmitted via Arabsat's satellite freque ncies, 
and the tests performed by Arabsat's outside experts do not throw doubt on this finding , particularly 
given that they examine only certain frequencies at certain times. The selective, isolated testing of 
one frequency at a pre -determined time, as co nducted by Arabsat's outside experts, would not detect 
the operations of a sophisticated broadcast pirate known to move across multiple satellite 
frequencies without creating any interruptions in its broadcast services.  The Panel also notes 
Nagra's  findings that beoutQ switched off of certain Arabsat frequencies shortly before or after they 
were tested by Arabsat's  outside experts, that Arabsat has not undertake n simultaneous or 
systematic testing when this appears to have been within its capacity to  do so, and that the Arabsat 
frequencies carry unusual data or are missing particular information.  Saudi  Arabia did not, nor did 
Arabsat, provide sufficient evidence or argument to rebut the above -mentioned technical reports.   
7.2.3.3.6   Evidence regarding the involv ement of Selevision  
7.150.   According to additional evidence that beIN  provided in its 13  July 2018 letter to Arabsat and 
in its 3  September  2018 letter to the Ministry and GCAM, beoutQ appears to be "wholly, or in part, 
operated by Saudi -based persons", includin g the Saudi Selevision Company LLC (Selevision), 
 
556 S.A.R.L. beIN Media Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication Organization, Summary 
Proceedings Order, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, RG number 18/59094 – Portalis number 352J -W-
B7C-CNOK, rendered 13 June 2019, Exhibi t SAU -28, p.  8. 
557 Ibid. p. 9.  
558 Ibid. p. 11.  
559 Ibid. The TGI stated that it needed a showing of "the existence of a 'manifestly unlawful disturbance' 
or evidence of imminent harm" to justify "granting its order against ARABSAT to disclose the material rela ting 
to the broadcasting of the beoutQ programs at issue in France or the injunctions to enjoin it from broadcasting 
in France the beoutQ satellite signal". (S.A.R.L. beIN Media Group LLC et al v. Arab Satellite Communication 
Organization, Summary Proceedi ngs Order, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, RG number 18/59094 – 
Portalis number 352J -W-B7C-CNOK, rendered 13 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -28, p. 11.)  
560 See paragraphs 7.134  and 7.140  of this Report.  
561 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para.  43 (referring to " Press Release, Arabsat ", 
dated 15 June 2019, Exhibit SAU -27). 
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  a Saudi -based entity and beIN's former content distributor in Saudi Arabia.562 beIN refer red 
specifically to several pieces of evidence in support of this allegation.563 
7.151.   Until June 2018, beoutQ used a portion of  the bandwidth of the Arabsat  frequency 
12380  MHz H to broadcast signaling data and software updates for beoutQ STBs. The rest of the 
bandwidth on that frequency was used to broadcast 11 TV channels from the Seevii/Selevision 
television service.564 Nagra con sidered it likely that Seevii/Selevision was renting the entire 
Arabsat  frequency during this time.565 Nagra also note d that the software for the beoutQ STBs 
contains strings of code expressly referencing Selevision.566 For Nagra, "[i ]t is unlikely to be a 
coincidence that beoutQ and Selevision shared the use of Arabsat Badr -6 frequency 12380 MHz H 
and that the beoutQ STB software contains references to Selevision".567 After these findings by Nagra 
were made public, evidence of Selevisio n's link to beoutQ vanished. Selevision  channels were no 
longer broadcast on Arabsat frequency 12380  MHz H, and Arabsat ceased transmission on that 
frequency as of 24  June 2018. The same frequency and all references to Seevii/Selevision were 
removed from A rabsat 's website as of 20  July 2018, and beoutQ firmware updates were encrypted 
to hinder further software analysis.568 
7.152.   In addition, a ccording to beIN, an individual involved in the beoutQ piracy subscribed to 
beIN's services using a Selevision corporate ema il address, gained access to beIN's  proprietary 
media content, and rebroadcast this content on beoutQ's pirate transmissions.569 Such a practice 
has been corroborated by a New York Times article describing the manner in which beoutQ pirates  
beIN's signal. Ac cording to the article, a single subscriber to beIN's content is able to re -air this 
content , and even though each such  subscriber has a unique identification number that beIN is 
normally able to trace and use to identify the subscriber , those subscribers that are rebroadcasting 
beIN's proprietary content on beoutQ 's channels have been able to hide their identification numbers  
from detection . beIN's executive director of technology note s that he "[has] never seen this 
anywhere else", referring t o the level of technical sophistication of beoutQ's operation.570 
7.153.   Since Selevision was likely renting the entire frequency, it would follow that Selevision would 
have been aware of how the bandwidth on that frequency was being used . Such an awareness by 
 
562 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, pp.  5-6; Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 
through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, pp.  2-3; and Q atar's second written submission, para.  71. See also 
Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, paras.  43-47. Selevision is a digital 
entertainment services provider based in Saudi Arabia. (Nextv News, " Selevision launches in MENA ", 
18 March  2014, Exhibit QAT -104; and Videonet, " Selevision uses Verimatrix to protect its new Seevi service, 
which combines IPTV and OTT ", 3 March 2016, Exhibit QAT -105.)  
563 beIN also presented evidence from US civil proceedings showing that Mr Raed Khushe im, the CEO of 
the Khusheim Holdings Company, which, in turn, is the parent company of Selevision, used a credit card to pay 
US company BelugaCDN LLC for the content delivery network service that would be used for the beoutQ pirate 
website. (Letter from be IN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, pp.  5-6 (referring to Appendix 11: Declaration of Adam Jacob Muller of 
BelugaCDN LLC, dated 20 June 2018).) See also Various Letters fr om beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 
through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, pp.  2-3; and Qatar's second written submission, para.  71 (referring to 
Declaration of Adam Jacob Muller, Beluga CDN LLC, 20 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -107).  
564 Letter from beIN's cou nsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, pp.  5-6 (referring to Appendix 9 : Nagra Report, "beoutQ Piracy 
Overview," dated 24 June 2018); Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 A ugust 2017 through 
13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, pp.  2-3; and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Piracy Overview ", 24 June 2018, 
Exhibit  QAT-90, pp. 12-14. 
565 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Piracy Overview ", 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -90, pp. 13-14. 
566 Letter f rom beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, pp.  5-6 (referring to Appendix 9 : Nagra Report, "beoutQ Piracy 
Overview," dated 24 June 2018); and NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beout Q Piracy Overview ", 24 June 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -90, p. 14. See also Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 through 
13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, pp.  2-3. 
567 NAGRA, Kudelski Report, " beoutQ Piracy Overview ", 24 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -90, p. 14. 
568 Ibid. p.  10. 
569 Letter from beIN's counsel to Saudi Ministry of Media and General Commission for Audiovisual Media, 
3 September 2018, Exhibit QAT -106, pp.  5-6 (referring to Appendix 12: Declaration of Walid Abdelhalim of 
beIN, dated 27 June 2018).  
570 The New York Times , "The Brazen Bootlegging of a Multibillion -Dollar Sport Network", 9 May 2018, 
Exhibit QAT -175. 
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  Selevision would have been required for it to ensure that all of its channels were being transmitted 
successfully  to viewers . If Selevision was renting the entire frequency, it is also possible that beoutQ 
needed to secure Selevision's permission to broadcast its pirated content on the same frequency. In 
the Panel's view, the evidence above leads to the conclusion that Selevision allowed or assisted 
beoutQ to broadcast its pirated content on Arabsat frequency 12380  MHz H.  
7.154.   The Panel notes that the evidence regarding the involvement of Selevision has not been 
disputed by Saudi Arabia.  
7.2.3.3.7   Overall assessment  
7.155.   The Panel considers that the evidence which was provided to Saudi authorities by beIN and 
other third -party right holders, and which has now been corroborated and  supplemented by further 
evidence submitted to the Panel, supports Qatar's assertions that: (a) beoutQ's piracy was promoted 
by prominent Saudi nationals, (b)  beoutQ targets the Saudi market, (c) beoutQ's  pirate broadcasts 
are transmitted via Arabsat satellite frequencies, and (d) beoutQ has received assistance from a 
Saudi content distributor in delivering its pirated broadcasts to Saudi consumers. Taking these 
conclusions together, and recalling the appl icable standard of proof and evidentiary principles in 
WTO dispute settlement571, the Panel considers that Qatar has established a prima facie case that 
beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to  the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia.  
7.156.   The Panel recalls that Qatar submitted a statement from a n individual alleged to have specific 
knowledge of beoutQ's operations in Saudi  Arabia. As discussed in section 1.3.6 above, the parties 
were unable to agree on additional confidentiality procedures for handling the witness statement, 
and the Panel declined to adopt any such procedures . Saudi Arabia also objected to the submission 
of the evidence.572 In the light of the  conclusion stated above on the basis of the evidence canvassed 
above, the Panel consider s it unnecessary to review the witness statement submitted by Qatar.573 
7.2.3.4   Public screenings of beoutQ's broadcasts  
7.157.   The Panel now turns to Saudi Arabia's alleged promotion of public gatherings with screenings 
of beoutQ's  unauthorized broadcasts  of some 2018 World Cup matches . The Panel will structure its 
analysis by reviewing the evidence provided by Qatar, and then considering Saudi Arabia's 
arguments  in response to such evidence .  
7.158.   With its first written submission, Qatar provided the following  categories of evidence as 
exhibits:  
a. a report published by Bloomberg, and the image of and hyperlink to a tweet by a 
Wall Street Journal  reporter, both dated 22  June 2018, stating that a 
government -sponsored event was broadcasting beoutQ's pirated broadcas t of the 
Saudi  Arabia/Uruguay match on large public screens in Riyadh, including on the city's 
main commercial boulevard574; 
b. an image of an announcement by the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 
dated 13  June 2018, stating "294 screens in Municip al gardens and squares to 
 
571 See paragraphs 7.39 and 7.40 of this Report.  
572 See section 1.3.6 of this Report.  
573 The Panel notes a similarity with a situation that arose in EC – Bananas III (US) (Article  22.6 – EC). 
In that case, the European  Communities indicated that it could not accept the Business Confidential 
Information (BCI) procedures adopted by the Arbitrat or, and as a consequence "could not receive" the 
information submitted by the other party pursuant to those procedures. The Arbitrator reasoned that the 
European  Communities' refusal to receive the information did not bar the complainant from submitting it , and 
would not bar the Arbitrator from considering it. However, the Arbitrator ultimately assessed that it did not find 
it necessary to rely on the BCI at issue to resolve the particular issue before it. (Decision by the Arbitrator, 
EC – Bananas III (US) (Article  22.6 – EC), paras.  2.6-2.7.) 
574 See Qatar's first written submission, para.  87 (referring to Tweet from Margherita Stancati, 
Wall Street Journal reporter, 22 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -84; and Bloomberg, " Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as 
Soccer Rights' S pat Escalates ", 22 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -77). 
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  broadcast World Cup Games", with a breakdown of how many screens there would be 
in each of the 13  regions of Saudi Arabia575; 
c. images of , and hyperlinks to , tweets by eight different Saudi municipalities promoting 
public  screenings of broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches, several of which included 
images of beoutQ's pirated broadcasts576; and  
d. photographs showing screenings of beoutQ's pirated broadcasts of the 2018 World Cup 
Croatia/England match on 11  July 2018 on large public screens at seven different caf es 
in Riyadh.577 
7.159.   The Panel considers that, in the absence of effective refutation, the above evidence would 
suffice to substantiate Qatar's assertion that Saudi Arabia promoted public gatherings with 
screenings of beoutQ's  unauthorized broadcasts  of certain 2018 World Cup matches .  
7.160.   The Panel regards Saudi Arabia's assertion that "[t]he Government of Saudi Arabia does not 
promote or authorize screenings of beoutQ  broadcasts"578 as insufficient to rebut the evidence 
provided by Qatar. Saudi Arabia has not contested the authenticity of this evidence or challenged 
any aspect of Qatar's characterization of it. Insofar  as Saudi Arabia's assertion is meant to 
distinguish the central "Government of Saudi Arabia" from the municipalities, it suffices to refer to 
the applicable principles of state responsibility that apply in WTO dispute settlement.579  
7.161.   The Panel considers that Saudi Arabia's statement that "unofficial, non -government tweets 
are not usually recognized by legal adjudicators or attributed to a government without explicit 
approval"580 is beside the point, because most of the tweets in question are in fact governmental  
tweets. Article  11 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, entitled "Conduct acknowledged and 
adopted by a State as its own", provides that "[c]onduct which is not attributable to a State … shall 
nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the 
State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own." By  its terms, the principle only 
applies to conduct that is not otherwise attributable to a state. However, as already noted above , 
under gen eral international law principles of state responsibility, actions at all levels of government 
(local, municipal, federal), or by any agency within any level of government, are attributable to the 
State.581  
7.162.   The Panel recalls  Saudi Arabia's assurance that it  maintains a "vigilant watch" over the 
enforcement of broadcast copyright violations at public gatherings582, and its explanation that on 
14 April 2019, the Saudi Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs forwarded Royal Court Circular 
No. 40752 to the Secreta riats, the Agencies and the Public Administrations of the Ministry, including 
to all Saudi municipal administrations.583 The Panel notes, however,  that Qatar's assertion and 
supporting evidence is directed at the promotion of public screenings of 2018 World Cup matches  
and not at ongoing conduct.  
7.163.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel concludes that  Saudi Arabia promoted public gatherings 
with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.  
 
575 See ibid. para.  88 (referring to Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs Announcement of 
294 screens to broadcast World Cup (Arabic original and English translation), 13  June 2018, Exhibit QAT -85). 
576 See Qatar's first written submission, paras.  89-94 (referring to Social Media Evidence of Saudi 
Municipalities Organizing Public Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup, 
June 2018, Exhibit QAT -83). 
577 See Qatar's first written submission, paras.  70 and 86 (referring to Photographic Evidence of 
Screenings of beoutQ's Illegal Pirate Broadcasts of the FIFA 2018 World Cup at Cafés in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 
11 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -78). 
578 Saudi Arabia's res ponse to Panel question No. 30(a), para.  61.  
579 See paragraph 7.50 of this Report.  
580 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 30(a), para.  62.  
581 See paragraph 7.50 of this Report.  
582 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  68. 
583 Ibid. WT/DS567/R  
 
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  7.2.4   Conclusion  
7.164.   The Panel concludes that although Qatar did not demonstrate the existence of formal legal 
restrictions being applied to prevent beIN from accessing civil enforcement procedures, Qatar 
otherwise established that the non -initiation of civil enforcement proced ures against beoutQ before 
Saudi tribunals by beIN, the non -application of criminal procedures or penalties against beoutQ by 
the Government of Saudi Arabia and the public screening of beoutQ's illegal broadcasts of 2018 
World Cup matches in Saudi Arabia a re all the result of acts and omissions attributable to Saudi 
Arabia.  
7.3  Claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement  
7.3.1   Introduction  
7.165.   Having addressed the existence of the challenged measures and made findings on the 
disputed factual questions in th is dispute, the Panel now proceeds to address the applicable 
provisions in Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement  in connection with the following measures: 
(a) the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obta ining 
Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts 
and tribunals (anti-sympathy measures); (b) the non -application of criminal procedures and 
penalties to beoutQ; and (c)  the promotion of public gath erings with screenings of beoutQ's 
unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.  
7.166.   Qatar raise s multiple legal claims in relation to these three measures. First, Qatar claim s 
that the anti -sympathy measures are inconsistent with: (a) the non -discriminat ion obligations in 
Article  3.1584 and Article  4585 of the TRIPS  Agreement , contained in Part I thereof; (b) the obligations 
to provide authors of works with the exclusive rights mandated in Articles 9586, 11587, 11bis588 and 
11ter589 of the Berne Convention (1971), as incorporated by reference in Part II of the 
TRIPS  Agreement590, as well as the obligation to provide broadcasting organi zations with the 
exclusive rights provided for in Article  14.3591 of the TRIPS  Agreement , also contained  in Part II 
thereof; and (c) the obligations in Article  41.1592 and Article  42593 of the TRIPS  Agreement , which 
relate to civil enforcement procedures and are included in Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement . Second, 
Qatar claim s that the non -application of crimina l procedures and penalties to beoutQ is also 
inconsistent with most of the above -referenced obligations in Parts I and II of the 
TRIPS  Agreement594, but its claim under Part III concerns Article  61595, as opposed to Articles 41.1 
and 42 , of the TRIPS  Agreement . Third, Qatar claims that the promotion of public gatherings with 
 
584 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  156-157, 187-192 and 205; and second written submission, 
paras.  141, 143 and 148.  
585 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  206-207, 225 -226 and 233; and second written submission, 
paras.  151, 153 and 158.  
586 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  249 and 252; and second written submission, paras.  164 and 
168. 
587 Qatar's first written submission, para.  269; and second written submission, para.  165 and 168.  
588 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  302-305; and second written submission, paras.  166 and 
168. In response to a question from the Panel, Qatar clarifies that its claims regarding the anti -sympathy 
measures extend to subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii)  of Article  11bis(1). (See Qatar's response to Panel question 
No. 9(b).)  
589 Qatar's first written submission, para.  322; and second written submission, paras.  167-168. 
590 Article  9 of the TRIPS  Agreement is entitled "Relation to the Berne Convention", and pa ragraph 1 
thereof states: "Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the 
Appendix thereto."  
591 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  341 and 346; and second written submission, paras.  179 and 
184. 
592 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  375-376 and 382 -383; and second written submission, 
paras.  189-190 and 194.  
593 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  396-397; and second written submission, paras. 198 -199 and 
202. 
594 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  197-201 and 229 (Articles 3.1 and 4 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement), and paras.  251-252, 269, 302 -303 and 322 (Articles 9(1), 11, 11bis(1)(ii) and 11ter of the 
Berne  Convention (1971)); and second written submission, paras.  141, 148, 151, 153 and 158 (Articles 3.1 
and 4 of the TRIPS  Agreement), and paras.  164-168 (Articles 9(1), 11, 11bis and 11ter of the 
Berne  Convention (1971)).  
595 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  411-442; and second written submission, paras.  205-219. 
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  screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018  World Cup matches is also a measure that 
is itself inconsistent with Articles 11 and 11bis596 of the Berne Convention (1971), and also a rgued 
that it serves as evidence of the violation of Article  61.597 
7.167.   Saudi Arabia state d that, consistent with its previous position  before the Panel, it is not 
engaging with the substance of any claims raised by the complaining party.598 
Saudi  Arabia's  submissions did not reference any of the above -cited provisions of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  or Berne  Convention (1971). However, Saudi Arabia did make arguments, and 
quote d from third -party arguments, relating to the obligation under  Article  61 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement .599 
7.168.   In this dispute, the third parties focus ed their submissions and oral statements almost 
exclusively on systemic issues pertaining to the interpretation and application of the security 
exception in Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement . The European  Union  is the only third party 
that, in its wr itten submission, addressed the interpretation and application of the TRIPS obligations 
invoked by Qatar.600 However, in response to questions from the Panel, several third parties provided 
their views on issues concerning the relationship between the obliga tions in Parts  I, II and III of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  and the scope of the obligations in Articles 41.1, 42 and 61.  
7.169.   The next subsection provides an overview of Qatar's main arguments on the interpretation 
of the obligations that it invokes, and on how the ob ligations in Parts I, II and III relate to one 
another. The next two subsections reflect Saudi Arabia's arguments concerning Article  61 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement, as well as the views expressed by the third parties.  
7.3.2   Arguments  
7.3.2.1   Qatar  
7.170.   With respect to its claim s under Part I of the TRIPS  Agreement , Qatar note d the 
Appellate  Body's statements that the most -favoured -nation treatment and national treatment 
provisions are "fundamental" and "cornerstone" provisions of the TRIPS  Agreement .601 Qatar 
explain ed that while its claims under Articles 3.1 and 4 focus on the discriminatory treatment with 
respect to civil and criminal enforcement, "because the restrictions on the ability of Qatari nationals 
to enforce intellectual property rights are so extreme, they also implica te the substantive protections 
that must be accorded pursuant to Part II of the TRIPS  Agreement" and, therefore, Qatar's claims 
of discrimination also extend to matters covered by Part II of the TRIPS  Agreement . Qatar argue d 
that findings of violation unde r Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement would not render any additional 
findings in respect of the claims under Part  I duplicative602, and state d that "it is important that the 
Panel consider not only the claims under Parts II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement , but a lso the 
distinct claims under Part I of the TRIPS  Agreement".603 Qatar note d that this view has largely been 
shared by third parties, including Canada, the European  Union  and Japan.604 
7.171.   Regarding the obligations in Articles 9, 11, 11 bis and 11 ter of the Berne C onvention (1971) 
and Article  14.3 of the TRIPS  Agreement , Qatar argue d that a WTO Member must do more than 
merely provide such rights in name or on paper only, and that for such rights to be meaningful, they 
must be "enjoyed".605 Qatar's  claims under Part II of the TRIPS  Agreement  rest on the premise that 
 
596 Qatar's first written submission, para s. 271 and 304; response to Panel question No. 9(a); and 
second written submission, paras.  165 and 168.  
597 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  431 and 437 -438; and response to Panel question No. 9(a).  
598 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 22 (a), para.  9; and second written submission, 
para. 59. 
599 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para.  46.  
600 European  Union's third -party submission, paras.  6-35. 
601 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  160 and 209 (referring to Appellate  Body Report, US – 
Section 211 Appropriations Act , paras.  241 and 297, respectively).  
602 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(b), paras.  143-151. 
603 Ibid. para.  151. 
604 Qatar's second written submission, paras.  131-133. 
605 Ibid. para.  161. Qatar also quotes the European Union's response to Panel question No. 5, which 
stated that "criminal procedures and penalties should not be provided only on paper, but should be effecti ve in 
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  although Saudi Arabia  "provides certain rights on paper (i.e. in the text of their copyright law and 
regulations), those rights effectively have been stripped"606 from beIN through the measures at 
issue. Qatar argue d that "[w]here the loss of enforcement is so drastic, the entir ety of the rights is 
eliminated"607, in the sense that Saudi Arabia's violations of the obligations of Part III of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  "are so extreme that they render effectively worthless the substantive rights under 
Part II of the TRIPS  Agreement ".608 Qatar  submit ted that its interpretation of the obligations in 
Part II does not render the enforcement obligations in Part III redundant, because "there are many 
situations where a measure would violate Part III, but not violate any obligations under Part II".609 
Qatar state d that "it is only in the extreme (and, frankly, unusual) situation where right holders are 
effectively completely blocked from accessing civil judicial procedures ( and where criminal 
procedures are not applied) that an inability to enforce IP r ights would also violate the core 
substantive obligations under Part II".610 
7.172.   Turning to the relationship among the obligations in Part III that it invokes, Qatar submit ted 
that Article  42 and Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement  are two distinct provisions cove ring different 
aspects of the IP enforcement (i.e. civil/administrative enforcement vs. criminal enforcement) that 
Members are required to provide.611 Qatar note d that it has challenged a different group of measures 
under Article  42 and under Article  61, and  different compliance obligations may result from this 
dispute.612 In Qatar's view, Article  41.1 of the TRIPS  Agreement  is also distinct from both Article  42 
and Article  61. While Article  42 sets out specific requirements for "fair and equitable procedures" 
that must be available in a Member —e.g. requiring that parties be allowed "independent legal 
counsel" and be "duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence" —
Article  41.1 is more focused on the potential results of these p rocedures (i.e. permitting "effective 
action" and "expeditious remedies" including those that "constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements").613 Similarly, while Article  41.1 focuses on the nature and content of the procedures 
that must be made "available", Article  61 requires that criminal procedures are "to be applied", at 
least in situations of egregious commercial -scale piracy such as that occurring with the beoutQ 
piracy.614 Given the significant differences between the standards under each of  the three provisions, 
a finding of violation under one would not be duplicative of a finding under either of the other two , 
Qatar argues .615 
7.173.   With respect to the obligation under  Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement , Qatar submit ted 
that it follows from the phr ase "to be applied" that Members "must do more than simply write down 
criminal procedures and penalties in their criminal laws ".616 In its view, Members " have an obligation 
to actually apply  those procedures and penalties, particularly in egregious cases of conduct that 
qualifies as a crime".617 As contextual support for its position, Qatar refer red to the requirement in 
the second sentence of Article  61 that "[r]emedies available shall include imprisonment and/or 
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterren t …", and argues that "[t]o provide such [a] deterren t 
to wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale, those acts must be 
actively prosecuted and punished".618 It further submit ted that the objective of Article  61 would be 
frustrated without a WTO  Member actually applying those criminal procedures and penalties in 
 
practice, otherwise the obligation would be deprived of its meaning". (Ibid. paras. 209 -210 (quoting European 
Union's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para. 25).)  
606 Qatar's second written submission, para.  161.  
607 Qatar's response t o Panel question No. 24(b), para.  161.  
608 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(a), para.  64; and response to Panel question No.  24(a), 
para. 159. See also Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(a), para. 66.  
609 Qatar's response to Panel question No.  24(c), para.  166. 
610 Ibid. para.  164. (emphasis original)  
611 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 25, para.  168. 
612 Ibid. paras.  169-172. 
613 Ibid. para.  174. 
614 Ibid. para.  175. See ibid. paras. 176-177. 
615 Ibid. para.  177. 
616 See Qatar's first written submiss ion, para. 419. See generally ibid. paras.  413-430; response to 
Panel question Nos.  26(a) and (b); and second written submission, paras.  205-211. 
617 Qatar's first written submission, para.  419. (emphasis original) In Qatar's view, the phrase "to be 
applied" in Article  61 can be contrasted with the use of the phrases, e.g., "are available" (in Article  41.1), 
"shall make available" (in Article  42), and "shall have the authority" (in Articles 44, 45 and 46) in other 
enforcement -related provisions in Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement, in a manner that clarifies the special nature 
of the obligation under Article  61. (Qatar's second written submission, para.  207.) 
618 Qatar's first written submission, para.  421. (emphasis original)  
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  practice —particularly in situations of egregious, open, widespread piracy —by actively prosecuting 
and punishing (at least) the two types of infringements identified in Article  61.619 Qatar add ed that 
"such an interpretation of Article  61 does not imply that Members are under an obligation to actively 
prosecute all cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale".620 
Rather, in  Qatar's  view, "Article  61 mandates that Members prosecute such counterfeiting or piracy 
at least in some situations, particularly in egregious cases of conduct that qualifies as a crime."621 
In response to Saudi  Arabia's  indication that it "does not conside r that the TRIPS  Agreement  obliges 
Members to prosecute every alleged criminal activity" and that a Member may enforce "intellectual 
property law when justified by the available evidence and circumstances", Qatar state d that "[i]n 
principle, Qatar agrees ."622 
7.3.2.2   Saudi Arabia  
7.174.   In the light of its invocation of Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement, Saudi Arabia did not 
address the claims made by Qatar  under Parts I, II and III , with the exception of Qatar's claim under 
Article  61.  
7.175.   Saudi Arabia submit ted that it "doe s not consider that the TRIPS Agreement obliges Members 
to prosecute every alleged criminal activity".623 Rather, Saudi Arabia state d that it "enforces 
intellectual property law when justified by the available evidence and circumstances."624 In its second 
written submission, Saudi Arabia state d that " even in cases where the TRIPS  Agreement  provides 
for criminal procedures and penalties, Members are not required to apply these remedies in all 
cases." Rather, in Saudi Arabia's view, "Members should provide legal fora and procedures to apply 
such remedies where warranted and where supported by  evidence", and "[i]n particular, Members 
cannot be expected to act on criminal allegations without evidence and without cooperation of 
concerned rights holders."625 Saudi Arabia add ed that it is prepared to investigate and prosecute 
violations of IP laws, c onsistent with the TRIPS  Agreement  and under Saudi law. However, to take 
action under Saudi criminal law and procedure, authorities require a reasonable level of evidence to 
facilitate follow up and prosecution.626 
7.3.2.3   Third parties  
7.176.   With respect to the obligations in Part I of the TRIPS  Agreement , Canada, the 
European  Union  and Japan argue d that a finding of violation under Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement  
would not render a finding of violation under Part I duplicative, as the obligations in Parts I and III 
are distinct. Among other things, Canada observe d that "a panel's finding that a Respondent does 
not permit parties to a domestic civil judicial IP enforcement procedure to be represented by 
independent legal counsel, as required by TRIPS Article  42 (u nder Part III), does not also mean that 
the Respondent has failed to do so on a non -discriminatory basis, as required under TRIPS Article  3.1 
(under Part I)". The European  Union  noted that different measures "can infringe different provisions 
of the TRIPS  Agreement and the same measure can simultaneously violate provisions in Part I and 
III". Japan suggest ed that because "Articles 3 and 4 are not subsumed in Parts II or III", in "a 
situation of discriminatory denial of criminal procedures and penalties , the Panel must therefore also 
rule concerning the application of Articles 3 and 4 [in addition to ruling under Article  61]".627 The 
UAE disagree d with Qatar and these third parties, and submit ted that, given the overlap in Qatar's 
claims under Parts I and III, the UAE d id not see how additional findings under Part I would be 
necessary to resolve the dispute. The UAE maintain ed that were the Panel to find that Qatari 
nationals do not have access to civil and criminal remedies and that this constitutes a violation  of 
 
619 Ibid. paras.  422-424. 
620 Qatar's second written submission, para.  206 (referring to Qatar's response to Panel question 
No. 26(b), para. 181).  
621 Ibid. 
622 Ibid. para.  211. (emphasis ori ginal)  
623 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para.  46.  
624 Ibid. 
625 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  59 (referring to the European  Union's integrated 
executive summary, para.  6; and Singapore's integrated executive summary, para.  19). 
626 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 29, para. 45.  
627 Canada's response to Panel question No. 2(b) to third parties, para.  5; European  Union's response to 
Panel question No. 2 to third parties, para.  5; and Japan's response to Panel questio n No. 2 to third  parties, 
para. 15.  
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  Part III, the rectification of this violation would necessarily rectify any potential discrimination under 
Articles 3 and 4.628 
7.177.   Regarding the scope of the obligations in Part II, Canada, the European  Union  and Japan 
also suggest ed that the same aspects of the same measures violate copyright obligations in Part II 
of the TRIPS  Agreement  and the enforcement obligation s in Part  III of the TRIPS  Agreement .629 
Canada state d that, "without prejudice to our position as to whether Articles 9 , 11, 11 bis and 11 ter 
of the Berne Convention include a requirement that the rights contemplated are able to be 'enjoyed'", 
a claim regarding the rights under those provisions is different from a claim under Articles 41.1, 42 
and 61 of the TRIPS  Agreement .630 The European  Union  submit ted that the 19  June 2017 Circular 
seems to pertain to the obligations in Parts II and III equally, as it contains some elements that 
appear to pre -empt the enjoyment of the exclusive right of the right holders, while others appe ar to 
make enforcement against infringements practically impossible (and some elements may violate 
both Parts  II and III). The European  Union  nevertheless consider ed that the other measures, 
including the alleged significant difficulties in securing legal representation, may violate the relevant 
obligations included in Part III rather than Part II, as these measures appear to concern the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights.631 The European  Union  added that accepting 
Qatar's  claims under the Berne Conv ention"  would by no means render the claims related to the 
enforcement obligations in Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement  redundant".632 Japan agree d that 
"Qatar's  interpretation of the Berne  Convention would not render Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement  
redundant".633 In contrast, the UAE submit ted that the very fact that the drafters placed the 
obligations in different Parts with different titles makes clear that the obligations within each Part 
seek to regulate distinct matters, and thus the very structu re of the TRIPS  Agreement  undermines 
Qatar's  argument that the same aspects of the same measure can violate both sets of obligations 
simultaneously for the same reasons.634 For the UAE, Qatar's argument pertains more to the 
availability of rights as opposed to the enforcement of such rights, as it is submitting that the 
substantive right is, in fact, not available.635 
7.178.   Regarding the relationship among the obligations in Part III that Qatar invokes, Canada, the 
European  Union , Japan and Ukraine all consider ed that Articles 41.1, 42 and 61 contain sets of 
distinct obligations, and therefore, a finding under one of these provisions would not render a finding 
under another duplicative.636 The European  Union , Japan and Ukraine, in particular, all consider ed 
that Article  41.1 sets out general principles or general obligations that are further elaborated in more 
detail in Articles 42 and 61, and that Article  41.1 is distinct from Articles 42 and 61.637 Japan note d 
Articles 42 and 61 develop the general principles in Article  41.1, but do not entirely duplicate them, 
and as such, the Panel can exercise judicial economy with respect to a finding under Article  41.1 
only if there would be no impact on the manner of compliance in the case at issue, in the light of 
the factual circu mstances and claims in that case.638 The UAE maintain ed that, as Article  41.1 refers 
to "enforcement procedures as specified in this Part", there appears to be overlap between 
Article  41.1 and the other provisions in Part III. To the extent that the Panel co nsiders that its 
findings under various provisions would be duplicative, and therefore unnecessary, the UAE 
suggest ed that the Panel consider exercising judicial economy.639 
7.179.   With respect to the interpretation of Article  61, the third parties present ed diverse views. 
Several  third parties, including Brazil, Canada and Ukraine, ma de arguments consistent with 
 
628 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 2(b) to third parties, para.  16. 
629 Canada's response to Panel question No. 3 to third parties, para.  7; European  Union's response to 
Panel question No. 3 to third p arties, paras.  6-14; and Japan's response to Panel question No. 3(a) to 
third parties, paras.  16-18. 
630 Canada's response to Panel question No. 3(c) to third parties, para.  8. 
631 European  Union's response to Panel question No. 3 to third parties, paras.  9-10. 
632 Ibid. para.  13. 
633 Japan's response to Panel question No. 3 to third parties, para.  20. 
634 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 3(a) to third parties, para.  18. 
635 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 3(b) to third parties, para.  19. 
636 Canada's response to Panel question No. 4 to third parties, paras.  9-10; European  Union's response 
to Panel question No. 4 to third parties, paras.  15-19; Japan's response to Panel question No. 4 to 
third parties, paras.  24-25; and Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 4 to third parties, paras.  10-15. 
637 European  Union's response to Panel question No. 4, paras.  15-19; Japan's response to Panel 
question No. 4, par as. 24-25; and Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 4, paras.  10-15. 
638 Japan's response to Panel question No. 4, paras.  24-25. 
639 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 4, para.  21. 
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  Qatar's  interpretation of this provision and submit ted that this obligation requires more than merely 
"writing down" certain criminal procedures and  penalties in a Member 's domestic law.640 
Several  other third parties, including China, Singapore and the UAE , advance d a more restrictive 
interpretation, arguing that the obligation under  Article  61 is fully discharged by the "writing down" 
of criminal proc edures and penalties in a Member's domestic law.641 The European  Union  consider ed 
that Article  61 merely requires that Members provide for criminal procedures and penalties, and, in 
principle, the absence of initiation of investigations and the punishment of  the alleged perpetrators 
alone cannot show a violation of Article  61.642 However , the European  Union  contemplate d that "a 
constant non -enforcement may amount to facilitating IP rights infringement, against the spirit of 
Article  61". The European  Union  added that "[i]ndeed, criminal procedures and penalties should not 
be provided only on paper, but should be effective in practice, otherwise the obligation under  
Article  61 would be deprived of its meaning."643 Japan similarly submit ted that the first sentence of  
Article  61 requires Members to have relevant criminal procedures available for application but does 
not provide an obligation to prosecute all cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting and copyright 
piracy on a commercial scale; but similarly add ed that if a Member "systematically suspends the 
application" of criminal procedures and penalties, it is reasonable to conclude that it does not provide 
for such criminal procedures and penalties "to be applied".644 
7.3.3   Assessment by the Panel  
7.3.3.1   Order of analysis  
7.180.   The parties do not dispute  that the text of the Saudi  Copyright Law and Implementing 
Regulations provide for all of the exclusive rights set forth in Part II of the TRIPS Agreement that 
are relevant to the dispute .645 The Panel therefore considers  Qatar's cl aims fall more squarely under 
the enforcement obligations in Part  III of the TRIPS  Agreement rather than the obligations in 
 
640 See Brazil's response to Panel question No. 5(a) to thi rd parties; Canada's response to Panel 
question No.  5 to third parties, paras.  11-12; and Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, 
paras.  16-19. Brazil understood Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement to require not only the "writing down" of the 
criminal procedures and penalties, but also their "application", and states that this threshold would be met by a 
Member "criminalizing these conducts and prosecuting instances of these conducts" according to its legal 
system. ( Brazil's response to Panel question No. 5(a) to third parties.) Canada considered that Article  61 
"should be interpreted as requiring Members not only to have criminal procedures and penalties in place, but to 
apply them in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright  piracy on a commercial scale". 
(Canada's  response to Panel question No.  5 to third parties, para.  11.) Ukraine stated that it will not comment 
specifically on the interpretation of Article  61 or the views of Qatar or the European  Union, but submits that 
"the nature of a legal norm that stipulates, in particular, criminal procedures and penalties, entails a possibility 
of this norm to be applied and/or enforced" and that, "[o]therwise, non -applicability of such norm undermines 
the relevance of its existence  overall." (Ukraine's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para.  19.) 
641 See China's response to Panel question No. 5(a) to third parties, paras.  3-4; Singapore's response to 
Panel question No. 5 to third parties; and United Arab Emirates' res ponse to Panel question No. 5(a) to 
third parties, para.  22. According to China, Article  61 "has not imposed any direct obligation for Members to 
initiate the investigation and eventually, impose penalties against the specific criminal activities. The phra se 'to 
be applied' in the first sentence of Article 61 "merely sets the scope of those criminal actions, and should not, 
under any circumstance, be interpreted as to impose [an] additional obligation [on] Members." 
(China's  response to Panel question No.  5(a), para.  3.) Singapore argued that the text of Article  61 "does not 
support that argument" of Qatar, and observes that i n China – Intellectual Property Rights , "the panel did not 
find a duty to prosecute". ( Singapore's response to Panel question No. 5 to  third parties (quoting Panel  Report, 
China – Intellectual Property Rights , paras.  7.596 -7.597).)  According to the United Arab Emirates, " [c]reating a 
legal pathway for prosecution is not an obligation to actually prosecute" and "[i]n other words … the tex t of 
Article  61 imposes an obligation of procedure, and not an obligation of result." (United Arab Emirates' response 
to Panel question No. 5(a) to third parties, para.  22.) 
642 The European Union also stated that "[t]he wording 'to be applied' does not add an obligation to 
investigate and punish all cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. 
There are certain objective criteria which can justify if a WTO member does not investigate or prosecute in a 
given case (i.e. lack of evidence). In principle, the absence of initiation of investigations and the punishment of 
the alleged perpetrators alone cannot show a violation of Article 61." ( Europ ean Union's response to Panel 
question No. 5 to third parties, paras. 20 -21.) 
643 European  Union's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para.   25. (emphasis omitted) 
See also ibid. paras. 20 -24; and third -party submission, paras.  31-35. 
644 Japan 's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, paras.  26-28. 
645 Qatar's first written submission, section III.C and paras.  238, 253, 272, 305, 324 and 326.  
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  Part II.646 In response to a Panel question, Qatar indicate d that, while the "fundamental structure 
and logic" of certain provisions o f the covered  agreements would require a panel to follow a particular 
order of analysis, Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement do not constitute such provisions.647 
The Panel considers it appropriate to begin with the claims under Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement, 
and then address the claims under Parts I and II in the light of its findings under Part III.  
7.181.   Regarding the order of analysis of the three distinct claims that Qatar brings under Part III, 
the Panel proceeds as follows. While the Panel does not question that Articles 41.1, 42 and 61 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  set forth distinct obligations, the Panel addresses the claims under Articles 41.1 
and 42 together because both are directed at the same measures said to prevent beIN from 
accessing civil enforc ement procedures. Next, the Panel will then address the claim under Article  61 
relating to the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties for wilful copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale. The Panel notes that, in principle, the general obligatio n under  Article  41.1 applies 
equally to civil and criminal enforcement procedures provided for in Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement . 
The reason that the Panel does not also rule on the obligation under  Article  41.1 in relation to the 
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties is that the scope of Qatar's claim under 
Article  41.1 is expressly limited to restrictions imposed on IP  right holders from pursuing civil actions 
before Saudi courts.648 
7.3.3.2   Claims under Article  42 of the TRI PS Agreement  regarding civil and 
administrative procedures and remedies, and Article  41.1 on general obligations  
7.3.3.2.1   Applicable legal standard  
7.182.   Article  41 constitutes Section 1, entitled "General Obligations", of Part  III of the 
TRIPS  Agreement . Article  41.1 reads as follows:  
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available 
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of 
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including e xpeditious remedies 
to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the 
creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards again st their abuse.  
7.183.   As the Appellate  Body has noted, "[t]hese enforcement procedures … provide for an 
internationally -agreed minimum standard which Members are bound to implement in their domestic 
legislation".649 
7.184.   Article  42, entitled "Fair and Equitable Procedu res", is part of Section 2, entitled "Civil and 
Administrative Procedures and Remedies", of Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement . Article  42 reads as 
follows:  
Members shall make available to right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the 
enforcement of any intellectual property right covered by this Agreement. Defendants 
shall have the right to written notice which is timely and contains sufficient detail, 
including the basis of the claims. Parties shall be allowed to be represented by 
independent legal counsel, and procedures shall not impose overly burdensome 
requirements concerning mandatory personal appearances. All parties to such 
 
646 When panels are confronted with claims under multiple WTO provisions that apply cumulatively  to 
the same measure, they often select the order of analysis on the basis of which provision "deals specifically, 
and in detail" with the types of measures at issue. (See, e.g. Appellate  Body Report, EC – Bananas III , 
paras.  155 and 204.)  
647 Qatar's respon se to Panel question No. 22(a), paras.  139-142. In response to the same question, 
Saudi Arabia stated that, consistent with its previous conduct before the Panel, it is not engaging with the 
substance of any claims raised by the complaining party and has n o comment on the Panel's proposed analysis 
of these claims. (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 22(a), para.  9.) 
648 Qatar's panel request stated that Saudi Arabia has acted inconsistently with Article  41.1 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement "… by restricting  intellectual property right holders (including Qatari rights holders) from 
pursuing civil actions before Saudi courts (or otherwise frustrating their ability to do so) …". (Qatar's panel 
request, paragraph 15(f). (emphasis added))  
649 Appellate  Body Report,  US – Section 211 Appropriations Act , para.  206. 
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  procedures shall be duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all relevant 
evidence. The procedure shall provide a means to identify and protect confidential 
information, unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements.  
7.185.   Article  42 is part of Section 2, which deals with civil and administrative procedures and 
remedies. Article  42 details specific requirements in respect of "civil judicial procedures" concerning 
the enforcement of any IP rights to ensure that such procedures are "fair and equitable". 
The Appellate  Body has noted that, "[l]ike Section 1 of Part III, Section 2 introduces an i nternational 
minimum standard which Members are bound to implement in their domestic legislation".650 
7.186.   Footnote 11 to Article  42 clarifies that, for the purpose of Part III, the term "right holder" 
includes federations and associations having legal standing t o assert such rights. The Appellate  Body 
has noted that the term "right holders" within the meaning of Article  42 "includes persons who claim 
to have legal standing to assert rights".651 
7.187.   The basic obligation in the first sentence of Article  42 is that Members shall "make available" 
to "right holders" "civil judicial procedures" concerning the enforcement of any IP right covered by 
the TRIPS  Agreement . The Appellate  Body has elaborated that "[m]aking something available  means 
making it 'obtainable', putt ing it 'within one's reach' and 'at one's disposal' in a way that has sufficient 
force or efficacy"652; therefore, "the ordinary meaning of the term 'make available' suggests that 
'right holders' are entitled under Article  42 to have access  to civil judicial  procedures that are 
effective in bringing about the enforcement of their rights covered by the Agreement".653 
7.188.   The Appellate  Body has further note d that:  
Article  42, first sentence, does not define what the term 'civil judicial procedures' in that 
sentence encompasses. The TRIPS  Agreement  thus reserves, subject to the procedural 
minimum standards set out in that Agreement, a degree of discretion to Members on 
this, taking into account 'differences in national legal systems'.654 Indeed, no Member's 
national sys tem of civil judicial procedures will be identical to that of another Member.655 
7.189.   Section 2 of Part III of the TRIPS Agreement also contains Article  49, entitled "Administrative 
Procedures". Article  49 provides that, to the extent that any civil remedy can be  ordered as a result 
of "administrative procedures" on the merits of a case, such procedures shall conform to the 
principles equivalent in substance to those set forth in Section 2.  
7.3.3.2.2   Application to the facts  
7.190.   The Panel considers that beIN is undoubtedly a "r ight holder" for purposes of Articles 41.1 
and 42 of the TRIPS  Agreement . As elaborated in section 2.2.3 of this Report, beIN has made 
substantial investments in acquiring licences to broadcast content produced by major international 
right holders, and has  obtained the exclusive rights to broadcast, and to authorize others to 
broadcast, prime sporting competitions in the MENA region, including in Saudi Arabia. The rights to 
broadcast this content have been licensed on a territorial basis, and beIN holds exc lusive rights to 
broadcast in the territory of Saudi Arabia.656  
7.191.   The Panel considers that it is also clear that sports broadcasts of the type that beIN has been 
licensed to distribute constitute protected "works" under the provisions of the Berne Convention 
 
650 Ibid. para.  207. 
651 Ibid. para.  217. 
652 Ibid. para.  215 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , L. Brown (ed.), (Clarendon 
Press, 1993), Vol. I, p.  154).  
653 Ibid. para.  215 (referring to Pan el Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act , para.  8.95). 
(emphasis added)  
654 (footnote original ) Recital 2(c) of the Preamble to the TRIPS  Agreement.   
655 Appellate  Body Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act , para.  216. 
656 Qatar's first written submission, para.  32 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group LLC, 
15 April 2019, Exhibit QAT -37, para.  7). See also Various Letters from beIN to Arabsat, dated 16 August 2017 
through 13 July 2018, Exhibit QAT -91, p.  5 (stating that beIN "holds exclusive rights to broadcast the 2018 
FIFA World Cup in the MENA region, including the World Cup Final game … as well as any rebroadcasts and 
recaps of that game" and owns "copyrights, trademarks, and other types of intellectual property" ). 
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  (1971) as incorporated into the TRIPS  Agreement , and are covered by the definition of "Audio -Visual 
Work" under Article  1 of Saudi  Arabia's Copyright Law, or otherwise protected under the 
Copyright  Law. The Panel notes that there is no disagreement between  the parties on this issue.657  
7.192.   In addition, beIN generally owns the copyright in any match/event commentary produced 
by beIN, as well as studio programming such as interviews, beIN logos and musical works. beIN  also 
owns the related rights conferred on broadcasting organizations, including the right to prohibit 
unauthorized fixations, reproductions of fixations and rebroadcasting by wireless means of 
broadcasts, as well as communications to the public of televisi on broadcasts of the same.658 In some 
instances, beIN had the right to take action under the Saudi Copyright Law in respect of an infringed 
copyright work or related right where beIN is not the owner of that right.659  
7.193.   The Panel notes Saudi Arabia's observation, made in the context of commenting on 
paragraph 2.31 of the draft descriptive part of the Report, that "mere assertions" by Qatar that it 
has broadcast rights for certain content  cannot  "establish the fact of such rights".660 The Panel recalls 
that it put several  questions to Qatar aimed at further clarifying and confirming, on the basis of  
evidence, the nature and extent of beIN's copyright and related rights in connection with beoutQ's 
broadcasts. The relevant evidence that accompanied Qatar's  first written submission has been 
supplemented with additional evidence, including, among other things : (a) examples of protected 
works or subject matter of related rights of which beIN is the right owner661; (b) examples of licence 
agreements that enable beI N to take action under the Saudi Copyright Law in respect of the allegedly 
infringed work or related right s licensed to it662; (c) an explanation of the categories of protected 
works or subject matter of related rights that were infringed in relation to specific broadcasts, such 
as the beoutQ's  screenings of the 2018 World Cup matches663; and (d) side-by-side screen captures 
of a small sampling of sports events or episodes of television shows that were initially broadcast by 
beIN and then immediately pirated and rebroadcast by beoutQ within a time delay of mere 
seconds.664 
7.194.   The Panel has found that Saudi Arabia has taken measures that, dire ctly or indirectly, have 
had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through 
civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals .665 Given that beIN is a right holder 
for purposes of Article  42 of the TRIPS  Agreement , it follows that Saudi Arabia has acted 
inconsistently with the specific requirement, in the third sentence of Article  42, that parties "shall be 
allowed to be represented by independent legal counsel".  
7.195.   The Panel notes that Qatar has a lso argued that, because of the travel restrictions at issue, 
Qatari nationals are generally not permitted to enter the territory of Saudi Arabia, including to 
initiate, conduct, or testify in proceedings for the enforcement of IP rights. According to Qata r, the 
inability to personally attend legal proceedings in Saudi Arabia, particularly when considered 
together with the inability to hire legal counsel, "precludes Qatari nationals from presenting evidence 
in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enfor cement of intellectual property rights".666 
According  to Qatar, this violates the specific requirement, in the fourth sentence of Article  42, that 
litigants "shall be duly entitled to substantiate their claims and to present all relevant evidence".667 
As elabo rated earlier, the Panel considers that whether or not the travel  restrictions would operate 
to prevent beIN from accessing civil enforcement procedures, if beIN were able to secure legal 
representation to initiate civil proceedings, is a matter of specula tion.668 In the Panel's view, it is 
 
657 See paragraph 2.6 of this Report.  
658 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i), paras.  34-35 (referring to Supplemental Declaration 
by beIN Media Group LLC, 24 July 2019, Exhibit QAT -217, paras.  7, 10 and 16).  
659 Ibid. para.  37 (referring to Supplemental Declaration by beIN Media Group L LC, 24 July 2019, 
Exhibit  QAT-217, para.  14). 
660 Saudi Arabia's comments on the draft descriptive part of the Report, p. 3.  
661 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(i).  
662 See Qatar's response to Panel question No. 6(b)(ii).  
663 See Qatar's respons e to Panel question No. 6(d).  
664 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 45, para. 113 (referring to Declaration by beIN Media Group 
LLC Programming Director, dated 27 October 2019, Exhibit  QAT-257).  
665 See section 7.2.3.2. 1 ("Anti -sympathy measures") of thi s Report.  
666 Qatar's first written submission, para.  398.  
667 Ibid. 
668 See paragraphs 7.87 to 7.89 of this Report.  
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  unnecessary to rule on Qatar's  argument concerning the fourth sentence of Article 42 in the light of 
its earlier finding regarding the travel restrictions.  
7.196.   The Panel has also considered Qatar's argument, made in the contex t of challenging the 
Ministerial approval requirement as applied to beIN, that the effect of such a "political" element is 
that Copyright Committee proceedings are not "civil judicial procedures" within the meaning of 
Article  42, first sentence, of the TRI PS Agreement .669 The Panel considers it unnecessary to express 
any view on the interpretation of the term "civil judicial procedures" in the context of the 
first sentence of Article  42, in the light of its earlier finding regarding the Ministerial approval 
requirement. As elaborated earlier, Qatar did not ma ke any "as such" claim in respect of this aspect 
of Saudi law, and the Panel has concluded that the question of whether —and, if so, how —the 
Ministerial approval requirement (or replacement measures establi shing a different layer of 
approval670) would be applied to beIN, if beIN was able to retain legal counsel in Saudi  Arabia and 
bring a case before the Copyright Committee, would be an exercise in speculation.  
7.197.   For these reasons, the Panel concludes that Saudi Arabia has acted in a manner inconsistent 
with Article  42 of the TRIP S Agreement  by taking measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the 
result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil 
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals . 
7.198.   The Panel recalls that Q atar has made an additional claim under Article 41.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreemen t. The Panel considers that the violation of the obligation under  Article  42 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  to allow parties to be " represented by independent legal counsel" gives rise to a 
consequential violation of the obligation under  Article  41.1 to "ensure that enforcement procedures 
as specified in this Part are available under their law". As the Panel has found that enforcement 
procedures as specified in Part III are to that extent not  "available", the question of whether they 
permit "effective action against any act of infringement" of IP rights covered by the TRIPS  Agreement  
within the meaning of Article  41.1 does not arise.  
7.3.3.2.3   Conclusion  
7.199.   The Panel concludes that Saudi Arabia has acted i n a manner inconsistent with Article  42 
and Article  41.1 of the TRIPS  Agreement  by taking measures that, directly or indirectly, have had 
the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil 
enforcement pr ocedures before Saudi courts and tribunals . 
7.3.3.3   Claim under Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement  regarding criminal procedures  
7.3.3.3.1   Applicable legal standard  
7.200.   Article  61, which constitutes Section 5, entitled "Criminal Procedures", of Part  III of the 
TRIPS  Agreement, reads as follows:  
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in 
cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial scale. 
Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/o r monetary fines sufficient to 
provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a 
corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the 
seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringin g goods and of any materials and 
implements the predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. 
Members may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases 
of infringement of intellectual property rights, in p articular where they are committed 
wilfully and on a commercial scale.  
7.201.   Qatar's claim is directed at the obligation in the first sentence of Article  61 that Members 
"shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilf ul … 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale." This obligation was invoked as the basis for a claim in one 
 
669 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  391-395 and 401 -409.  
670 See paragraphs 2.11 to 2.14 of this Report.  
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  prior case, China – Intellectual Property Rights , and that panel's findings provide guidance on the 
interpretation and application of this provision.671 
7.202.   The scope of the obligation to "provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied" 
is limited by the phrase "at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale".672 As the panel in China – Intellectual P roperty Rights  noted:  
Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement  distinguishes between the treatment of wilful 
trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy on a commercial scale, on the one hand, 
and all other infringements of intellectual property rights, on the ot her hand, in that 
only the former are subject to an obligation regarding criminal procedures and penalties. 
This indicates the shared view of the negotiators that the former are the most blatant 
and egregious acts of infringement. This view must inform the  interpretation of 
Article  61.673 
7.203.   As regards the term "wilful", the panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights  explained that 
it "functions as a qualifier indicating that trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy is not subject 
to the obligation in the  first sentence of Article  61 unless it is 'wilful'." This word, in the panel's view, 
"[which] focus[es] on the infringer's intent, reflects the criminal nature of the enforcement 
procedures at issue."674 
7.204.   As regards the terms "trademark counterfeiting" and " copyright piracy", the panel in 
China  – Intellectual Property Rights  considered that the definitions of the similar terms "counterfeit 
trademark goods" and "pirated copyright goods" provided in footnote  14 to Article  51 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement  are relevant to understanding the meaning of these terms in the context of 
Article  61.675 Footnote 14 (b) provides that, for purposes of the TRIPS  Agreement , the term "pirated 
copyright goods" shall mean : 
[A]ny goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder or person 
duly authorized by the right holder in the country of production and which are made 
directly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have 
constituted a n infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of the country 
of importation.  
7.205.   The panel in China – Intellectual Property Rights , furthermore, clarified the meaning of the 
term "on a commercial scale" as follows:  
[A] "commercial scale" is th e magnitude or extent of typical or usual commercial 
activity. Therefore, counterfeiting or piracy "on a commercial scale" refers to 
counterfeiting or piracy carried on at the magnitude or extent of typical or usual 
commercial activity with respect to a gi ven product in a given market. The magnitude 
or extent of typical or usual commercial activity with respect to a given product in a 
given market forms a benchmark by which to assess the obligation in the first sentence 
of Article  61. It follows that what c onstitutes a commercial scale for counterfeiting or 
piracy of a particular product in a particular market will depend on the magnitude or 
extent that is typical or usual with respect to such a product in such a market, which 
may be small or large. The magn itude or extent of typical or usual commercial activity 
relates, in the longer term, to profitability.676  
 
671 Panel  Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights , paras.  7.494 -7.669. That panel was also 
confronted with a related claim under the second sentence of Article  61, which turned on the outcome of the 
claim made under the first sentence. This panel report was not appealed.  
672 Article  61 sets out a minimum standard. The last sentence of Article  61 provides that Members may 
provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of IP rights, in 
particular where they are committed wilfully and on a commercial scale.  
673 Panel  Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras.  7.514 and 7.528.  
674 Ibid. paras.  7.518 -7.524.  
675 Ibid. paras.  7.520 -7.521 and 7.572.  
676 (footnote original ) This finding is without prejudice to the qualitative aspect of "commercial scale" 
considered with respect t o the second limb of this claim.  
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  The Panel observes that what is typical or usual in commerce is a flexible concept. The 
immediate context in the second sentence of Article  61, which i s closely related to the 
first, refers to the similarly flexible concepts of "deterrent" and "corresponding gravity". 
Neither these terms nor "commercial scale" are precise but all depend on circumstances, 
which vary according to the differing forms of com merce and of counterfeiting and piracy 
to which these obligations apply.677 
7.206.   The first sentence of Article  61 states that Members "shall provide for criminal procedures 
and penalties to be applied". The meaning of the phrase "to be applied" in this provision has arisen 
as a general interpretative issue in this case, one not addressed in prior WTO jurisprudence.  
7.207.   In the Panel's view, the obligation in the first sentence of Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement  
is not automatically discharged through the creation of  a formal written law that provides for the 
criminalization of wilful commercial -scale piracy without regard to whether and, if so, how the written 
law is applied in practice. In cases where a Member has not  taken actions that could lead to the 
applicatio n of criminal procedures and penalties against  wilful commercial -scale piracy, an 
assessment of compliance with Article  61 must consider the evidence available to the authorities 
and other relevant circumstances. Naturally, the onus would rest on the compl aining Member to 
establish that, notwithstanding that another Member's written law provides for criminal penalties 
and procedures to be applied to cases of wilful copyright piracy, that Member has acted inconsistently 
with Article  61 in relation to the man ner in which its authorities have applied the law.  
7.208.   The Panel considers this interpretation to be consistent with the ordinary meaning of the 
relevant terms of Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement . In particular, t he verb to "apply" is defined as 
"[t]o bring ( a rule, a test, a principle, etc.) into contact with facts; to bring to bear practically; to 
put into practical operation".678 This would suggest that Members have an obligation to put criminal 
procedures and penalties in to practical operation.  
7.209.   It is important to consider Article  61 in the context of the whole of the TRIPS Agreement and 
the distinctions that it draws.  The Panel agrees with Qatar that the phrase "to be applied" in 
Article  61 can be contrasted with the use of the phrase "shall make avail able" in Article  42.679 The 
phrase can also be contrasted with the phrase "shall have the authority" in Articles 44, 45 and 46 of 
the TRIPS  Agreement, and with the more general phrase , in Article  41.1, that requires Memb ers to 
ensure that enforcement procedu res as specified in Part III "are available".  This difference in 
terminology, including in particular the difference in terminology between Article  61 ("shall provide 
for … to be applied") and Article  42 ("shall make available") reflects and is explained b y an important 
structural difference between civil and criminal procedures. While  IP rights are "private rights"680 
that generally require right holders themselves to assert their rights, only States are entitled to 
enforce criminal law procedures and penalt ies.681 
7.210.   Certain o ther elements of the context of Article 61 are difficult to reconc ile with the view 
that the obligation in the first sentence of Article  61 require s nothing more of Members than that 
they formally "write down criminal procedures and penalties in their criminal laws" without regard 
to whether and, if so, how they are applied.  Article  1.1, first sentence,  speaks in broader and more 
general terms of each  Member being required to "give effect" to TRIPS provisions ; and, in its third 
sentence,  refers more widely to the implementation of obligations in a Member's "legal system and 
practice". Likewise, the general obligation under Article  41.1 is that Members shall ensure that 
 
677 Panel  Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras.  7.577 -7.578. The Panel emphasized that 
its findings regarding the first sentence of Article  61 were confined to the issue of what acts of infringement 
must be cri minalized and not those which must be prosecuted. (See ibid.  para. 7.596.)  
678 Oxford English Dictionary online, definition of "apply", available at: 
< https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9724?rskey=pQF380&result=2#eid>, accessed 21 January 2020.  
679 Furthermore, i n the context of discussing Article  42, the Appellate  Body has explained that "the 
ordinary meaning of the term 'make available' suggests that 'right holders' are entitled under Article  42 to have 
access  to civil judicial procedures that are effective in b ringing about the enforcement of their rights covered by 
the Agreement". (Appellate  Body Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act , para.  215 (referring to 
Panel  Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act , para.  8.95). (emphasis added))  
680 See Preamble t o the TRIPS  Agreement, fourth recital.  
681 European  Union's response to Panel question No. 5 to third parties, para.  25. 
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  enforcement procedures as specified in Part III are available under their law "so as to permit effective 
action" against any act of infringement of IP rights covered by the TRIPS  Agreement .  
7.211.   The Panel considers that  a restrictive interpretation of the terms "shall provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied" would also be at odds with the object and purpose of 
Article  61. The object and purpose of Article  61 includes singling out what negotiators  of the TRIPS 
Agreement understood to be the two "most blatant and egregious acts of infringement" and "[t]his 
view must inform the interpretation of Article  61."682 A restrictive interpretation of the obligation in 
the first sentence of Article  61 would also be difficult to reconcile with  the TRIPS  Agreement 's overall 
object and purpose of  "provid[ing] effective and appropriate means for the enforcement" of trade -
related IP rights , as reflected in subparagraph (c) of the second recital of the preamble . 
7.212.   The parties and a number of third parties provided views on the scope of the obligation in 
Article 61 to provide for criminal procedures and penalties "to be applied".683 The Panel notes that 
both parties , and third parties that expressed a view, agree with the vie w that Article  61 does not 
contain an obligation on Members to investigate and prosecute all suspected cases of wilful 
"trademark counterfeiting " and "copyright piracy " on a commercial scale . The Panel accepts that 
view. However, the parties and third part ies held diverging views about the implications of accepting 
that premise. Some third parties reason ed that, if there is no obligation to investigate and prosecute 
all suspected cases of "trademark counterfeiting" and "copyright piracy " on a commercial scale, the n 
it follows that the absence of any express guidance or criteria in the text of Article  61 as to whi ch 
kinds of circumstances would compel a Member's  authorities to investigate and prosecute a 
particular set of allegations is an indication that no such obligation exists.684 Certain other third 
parties present ed arguments that eschew an all -or-nothing appro ach, referring for instance to 
situations  of "constant" or "systematic" non -enforcement  potentially giving rise to a violation of the 
obligation in the first sentence of Article  61.685 
7.213.   The Panel does not consider it necessary to determine further, in the abs tract, the scope of 
the obligation to "provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied". Having found that 
Qatar has established a prima facie  case that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject 
to the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia686, the Panel turn s to the textual elements of Article  61 
of the TRIPS  Agreement  to assess whether: (a)  the conduct identified of beoutQ amounts to "wilful 
… copyright piracy on a commercial scale" , and (b) Saudi Ar abia has implemented its obligation to 
"provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied" in the circumstances of this case . 
7.3.3.3.2   Application to the facts  
7.214.   In the Panel's view, the conduct of beoutQ amounts to "wilful … copyright piracy on a 
commercia l scale".  
7.215.   As elaborated in Section 2.2.4 of this Report, beoutQ has engaged in "copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale". It initially streamed pirated content online, and then expanded to the retail sale 
of beoutQ -branded STBs throughout Saudi Arabia and other countries. These STBs receive satellite 
broadcasts of pirated content and, as discussed further below, they also provide access to 
IPTV applications offering thousands of pirated movies, TV shows and TV channels around the globe. 
There are reports th at beoutQ STBs and subscriptions have been widely available in Saudi retail 
outlets since the autumn of 2017. In addition to generating revenue through sales of STBs and 
subscriptions, beoutQ allegedly sells advertising slots on its 10 pirated channels, an d publishes its 
advertising rates in Saudi riyals on its website (e.g., Premier League "gold packages" for advertising 
priced at SAR 2,500,000 or approximately USD 666,638). beoutQ has promoted its pirated streams 
 
682 Panel  Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, para. 7.528.  
683 See paragraphs 7.173 , 7.175  and 7.179  of this Report.  
684 The UAE observed that:  
Members use different factors in determining priorities, such as the extent of prosecutorial 
resources, the availability of evidence, cooperation of witnesses and the accused, the impact of 
prosecution on other ongoing cases or matters, and the presence or absence of remedial efforts. 
It would be just as impractical to expect all Members to uniformly apply such factors to their 
decision -making processes. (United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 5(b), 
para. 23.) 
685 See paragraph 7.179  of this Repo rt.  
686 See section 7.2.3.3 ("Non -application of criminal procedures and penalties") of this Report.  
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  on a variety of social media platforms, in cluding Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. While the focus 
of beoutQ's broadcasting activities was initially on sports content, it has expanded to cover the most 
popular movies and television programming in the world.  
7.216.   A figure reflecting  the commercial scale of this piracy was provided in a Declaration produced 
by beIN and submitted by Qatar to the Panel. This Declaration states  that, since 12 March  2018, 
beoutQ has pirated and rebroadcast 33,488 sporting events and 3,447 episodes of tele vision shows 
that were initially broadcast by beIN.687 The Declaration also provides side -by-side screen captures 
of 15 sporting events or episodes of television shows that were initially broadcast by beIN and then 
immediately pirated and rebroadcast by beou tQ within a time delay of mere seconds. In each of the 
15 examples, the screen capture on the left -hand side shows the beoutQ -pirated broadcast, and the 
screen capture on the right -hand side shows the feed from beIN prior to its broadcast . The screen 
captu res and video clips of beoutQ's pirated content feature a beoutQ logo that is superimposed 
over the beIN logo . The beIN watermark remains in the background in some of the video clips.688 
7.217.   The Panel considers that beoutQ's conduct is properly characterized as "wilful", taking into 
account "the infringer's intent".689 An entity such as beoutQ, whose sole operation consists of 
providing illegally pirated content and does so on a commercial scale, is not infringing on third -party 
copyright in a mann er that could be characterized as unintentional, accidental, or inadvertent.  
7.218.   Turning next to the question of whether Saudi Arabia has "provide [d] for criminal procedures 
and penalties to be applied" to beoutQ's commercial -scale piracy, Saudi Arabia has not  identified 
any such action. Rather, Saudi Arabia argued that its authorities have taken no such action because 
they have received "no credible evidence".  
7.219.   The Panel has found that Qatar has established a prima facie  case that beoutQ is operated 
by individ uals or entities subject to  the criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia.690 The Panel has also 
found that beIN and other foreign right holders repeatedly sent detailed information to the Saudi 
authorities to inform them of beoutQ's alleged piracy, and the exte nsive evidentiary basis for 
concluding that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to  the criminal jurisdiction of 
Saudi Arabia.691 Additionally, the Panel has found that, while taking no action to apply criminal 
procedures and penalties to be outQ, Saudi authorities engaged in t he promotion of public gatherings 
with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.  
7.220.   The Panel notes Saudi Arabia's assertions, as reflected in certain media reports, that its 
authorities hav e taken actions to seize beoutQ's STBs , thus acknowledging that beoutQ is engaging 
in illegal activities .692 Leaving aside Qatar's submissions about  the lack of any evidence to sustain 
Saudi Arabia's assertions in this regard693, Saudi Arabia did not suggest that any such seizures are 
"criminal procedures and penalties" in the sense of Article  61, or that they relate to beoutQ's 
copyright piracy. Rather , Saudi Arabia state d that the basis for its authorities' seizures of beoutQ's 
STBs is the same basis upon which its authorities have seized beIN's  STBs – namely, that they are 
 
687 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 45, paras. 110, 111 and 113 (referring to Declaration by beIN 
Media Group LLC Programming Director, dated 27 Octob er 2019, Exhibit  QAT-257).  
688 Ibid. 
689 Panel  Report, China – Intellectual Property Rights, paras.  7.518 -7.524.  
690 See section 7.2.3.3 ("Non -application of criminal procedures and penalties") of this Report.  
691 Ibid.  
692 The media report submitted as Exhibit Q AT-77 states:  
Saudi Arabia has strongly denied accusations it was behind a television service pirating multi -
billion -dollar content, with a senior official saying that authorities have confiscated thousands of 
pieces of equipment being used to illegally wa tch premium soccer events like the World Cup … 
Al-Qahtani, in rare public remarks to international news organizations, said Saudi authorities 
have confiscated 12,000 devices used for illegal streaming. 'I believe that the actual number of 
confiscated devic es will prove much higher,' he said. Authorities will continue 'to conduct 
inspection campaigns in coordination with all relevant bodies to prevent any attempt to 
broadcast any illegal content,' he said. (Bloomberg, " Saudis Dismiss Piracy Claim as Soccer 
Rights' Spat Escalates ", 22 June 2018, Exhibit QAT -77.) 
693 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 21(b), para.  138; and second written submission, 
para. 52-56. Video footage posted on Twitter suggests that, in late May 2018, the Government of Saudi Arabia 
has seized beIN  STBs from coffee shops and stores, and based on an eyewitness account, at least one coffee 
shop subsequently purchased a beoutQ STB to replace the beIN STB. (Tweets about beIN and beoutQ STBs 
(Arabic original and English translation), 25 and 26 May 2018, Exhibit QAT -121.)  
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  not licensed.694 Accordingly, such seizures could not, in the Panel's view, have discharged Saudi 
Arabia's obligation under Article  61 to provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied 
against beoutQ for its copyright piracy on a commercial scale.  
7.3.3.3.3   Conclusion  
7.221.   Having considered all of the evidence before it, the Panel concl udes that Qatar has 
discharged its burden of establishing that, notwithstanding that Saudi Arabia's written law may 
provide for criminal penalties and procedures to be applied to cases of wilful copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale, its authorities have acted inconsistently with the obligation in the first sentence 
of Article  61 to "provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied" to the operations of 
beoutQ. The Panel therefore concludes that Saudi Arabia has acted inconsistently with Article  61 of 
the TRIPS  Agreement . 
7.3.3.4   Claims under Part I and Part II of the TRIPS  Agreement  
7.222.   In its first written submission, Qatar set forth its interpretation of the language "treatment 
no less favourable"695, "nationals of other Members"696, and "with regard to the p rotection of 
intellectual property"697 in the context of Article  3.1, as well as the corresponding textual elements 
of the legal standard in Article  4.698 Qatar also presented a detailed discussion and analysis of each 
of the obligations in Articles 9, 11, 11 bis and 11 ter of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article  14.3 
of the TRIPS  Agreement.699 
7.223.   However, t he Panel recalls that the WTO dispute settlement system is not meant "to 
encourage either panels or the Appellate  Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of the 
WTO Agreement  outside the context of resolving a particular dispute", and that a panel "need only 
address those claims which must be addressed to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute".700 For 
the reasons that follow, the Panel considers it appropriate to exercise judicial economy in respect of 
Qatar's  remaining claims concerning the anti -sympathy measures, the non -application of 
criminal  procedures and penalties and the promotion of public gatherin gs with screenings of beoutQ's 
unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches.  
7.224.   In the light of its finding that the anti -sympathy measures (in particular the measures that, 
directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Sa udi legal counsel to 
enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals ) violate 
Articles 41.1 and 42 of the TRIPS  Agreement  and its finding that the non -application of criminal 
procedures or penalties to beoutQ vi olates Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement , the Panel considers 
it unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additional claims that these same measures violate 
Articles 3.1 and 4 of the TRIPS  Agreement . In the Panel's view, these additional claims under Part I  
are premised on the alleged inability of Qatari nationals to access civil and criminal remedies to 
enforce their IP rights. Specifically, Qatar argue d that the treatment/advantages allegedly accorded 
to Saudi  nationals (or  non-Qatari foreign nationals) is  the treatment reflected in the provisions of 
Chapter  Six of the Saudi Copyright Law.701 These provisions provide for civil and criminal remedies 
 
694 In response to Panel question No. 49, Saudi Arabia stated that it "would like to confirm that it seizes 
STBs of the relevant company of the Complaining Party and beoutQ on the basis that they are not licensed to 
distribute content by the appropriate Saudi authorities". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 49, 
para. 37.)  
695 See Qatar's first written submission, paras.  164-169. 
696 See ibid. paras.  170-173. 
697 See Qatar's first written submission, paras.  174-183. 
698 Ibid. paras.  212-218. 
699 Ibid. paras.  242-247 (Article  9), 255 -264 (Article  11), 274 -293 (Article  11bis(1)(i), (ii) and (iii)), 
308-317 (Article  11ter), and 329 -340 (Article  14.3).  
700 Appellate  Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , pp. 18-19, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 339 -340. 
701 Having said this, Qatar also submitted that third -country nationals have also been frustrated in their 
attempts to initiate civil proceedings in relation to the beoutQ matter, and that it has no knowledge of any such 
proceedings being initiated by third -country nationals. (Qatar's response to Panel question No. 20(a), (b) and 
(c), paras.  128-131.) The Panel recalls that with its second written submission, Qatar provides the Panel with a 
copy of a public joint statement made on 31 July 2019 by seven major football right holders (including FIFA, 
UEFA, AFC, the Premier League, Bundesliga, LaLiga and Lega Serie A). According to the joint statement, these 
right holders have also been unable to engage Saudi counsel or access Saudi courts  and administrative 
tribunals in connection with the beoutQ piracy. (See paragraph 7.65 of this Report.)  
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  against the infringement of copyrights that seem to correspond to those required by Part III of the 
TRIPS  Agreem ent.702 While the Panel agrees with Qatar, Canada, the European  Union  and Japan 
that the obligations in Articles 3.1 and 4 are distinct from the obligations contained in Part  III703, 
Qatar and these third parties did not explain how, in the facts of this case,  any potential 
discrimination under Articles 3 and 4 would persist if Saudi Arabia brought its anti -sympathy 
measures and non -application of criminal procedures and penalties into conformity with its 
obligations under Part  III of the TRIPS  Agreement .  
7.225.   In the light of its findings under Articles 41.1 , 42 and 61 of the TRIPS  Agreement , the Panel 
also considers it unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additional claims relating to the 
anti-sympathy  measures and non -application of criminal procedures and pena lties under Part II of 
the TRIPS  Agreement . In the Panel's view, these additional claims under Part II are also premised, 
insofar as the anti -sympathy measures and the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties 
are concerned, on the alleged inabi lity of beIN to access civil and criminal remedies to enforce their 
rights. Qatar made this clear when it characterize d Saudi Arabia's violations of the obligations in 
Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement as being "so extreme that they render effectively worthless the 
substantive rights under Part II of the TRIPS  Agreement ".704 Thus, if Qatar is correct in arguing that 
Articles 9, 11, 11 bis and 11 ter of the Berne Convention (1971) and Article  14.3 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement require that WTO Members d o more than merely provide such rights in name or 
on paper only, and that for such rights to be meaningful they must be "enjoyed"705, in this case, 
beIN's inability to "enjoy" those rights stems from the submission  that its IP rights cannot be 
"enforced" und er Articles 41.1, 42 and 61 of the TRIPS  Agreement . Even if it were correct that the 
same aspects of the same measures may violate copyright obligations in Part  II of the 
TRIPS  Agreement and the enforcement obligation s in Part  III thereof706, no explanation has been 
given as to how , on the facts of this case, any violations of Articles 9, 11, 11 bis and 11 ter of the 
Berne  Convention (1971) and Article  14.3 of the TRIPS  Agreement  would persist if Saudi Arabia 
were to bring its anti -sympathy measures and the non -application of criminal procedures and 
penalties into conformity with its obligations under Part III of the TRIPS  Agreement . 
7.226.   The Panel notes that certain aspects of Saudi law would persist despite the withdrawal of 
the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi 
legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcemen t procedures before Saudi courts and 
tribunals , and despite the application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ. Specifically, 
based on Saudi Arabia's description of its legal regime, it would still be the case that, as reflected in 
the 19  June 2017 Circular, "unlicensed distributors of illegally distributed content do not have a right 
to protect copyright in such illegally distributed content".707 Thus, any violations of Articles 9, 11, 
11bis and 11 ter of the Berne  Convention (1971) and Article  14.3 of the TRIPS  Agreement  arising 
from this measure would persist regardless of the Panel's findings on the anti -sympathy measures 
and the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties. However,  the Panel is not declining to 
rule on these alleged vi olations of Part II because it involves speculation . As already explained708, it 
is the limited scope of the claims Qatar raised, including its refraining from making any "as such" 
claim in relation to this measure, that prevents  the Panel from ruling on it. 
7.227.   In the light of its findings under Articles 41.1 and 42 of the TRIPS  Agreement  regarding the 
anti-sympathy measures and the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties, the Panel 
also considers it unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additiona l claims that t he promotion of 
public gatherings with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches 
is itself inconsistent with Articles 11 and 11bis709 of the Berne Convention (1971).  First, the Panel 
 
702 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  184-187 and 219. While Qatar stated that its claims under 
Article  3.1 and 4 also extend to discrimination in respect of matters covered by Part II of the 
TRIPS  Agreement, Qatar at the same time clarified that its claims under Part II are also premised on the  same 
aspects of the same measures that give rise to the violations of Articles 41.1, 42 and 61. (Qatar's response to 
Panel question No. 8, paras. 57 -59; and second written submission, para.  136.)  
703 See paragraphs 7.170 and 7.176  of this Report.  
704 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 22(a), paras.  64 and 66; and response to Panel question 
No. 24(a), para.  159.  
705 Qatar's first written submission, para.  238. (emphasis omitted)  
706 See paragraphs 7.171  and 7.177  of this Report.  
707 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the second meeting of the P anel, para.  13. 
708 See paragraphs 7.33 to 7.36 of this Report.  
709 See Qatar's first written submission, paras.  271 and 304; r esponse to Panel question No. 9(a), 
paras.  69-72; and second written submission, paras.  165 and 168.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  has already fully taken this measure into account as a relevant factual circumstance in the course 
of finding that Saudi Arabia does not "provide for" criminal procedures and penalties to "be applied" 
in the sense of Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement . Second, the promotion of public gatherings with 
screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts of 2018 World Cup matches occurred nearly 
two years ago in the context of the World Cup, and in the absence of any claim or evidence of a 
continuing act by Saudi Arabia, it is not clear how an additional ruling under Articles 11 and 11bis 
of the Berne Convention (1971) would have any implications for implementation.  
7.228.   The Panel concludes that, in the light of these findings upholding Qatar's claims under Part  III 
of the TRIPS  Agreement , it is unnecessary to make findings on Qatar's additional claims under Parts  I 
and II of the TRIPS  Agreement . 
7.4  Saudi Arabia's invocation of Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement  
7.4.1   Introduction  
7.229.   Saudi Arabia has invoked the security exception in A rticle 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement . 
In the light of its findings in sections 7.2 and 7.3 above, the Panel will determine whether the 
measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi 
legal counsel to e nforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and 
tribunals (i.e. the anti-sympathy measures) , and/or Saudi Arabia's refusal to provide for criminal 
procedures and penalties to be applied to beoutQ , constitute "action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests … taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations".  
7.230.   Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, which is identical to Article  73(b)(iii) of the 
TRIPS  Agreement , was recently addressed by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit.710 It held that 
a panel must determine for itself whether the invoking Member's actions were "taken in time of war 
or other emergency in international relations" in subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT 
1994. It further found that a panel's review  of whether the invoking Member's actions are ones 
"which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" under the chapeau 
of Article  XXI(b)  of the GATT 1994 requires an assessment of whether the invoking Member has 
articula ted the "essential security interests" that it considers the measures at issue are necessary to 
protect, along with a further assessment of whether the measures are so remote from, or unrelated 
to, the "emergency in international relations" as to make it i mplausible that the invoking Member 
implemented the measures for the protection of its "essential security interests" arising out of the 
emergency.  According to the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit , the obligation of a Member to 
interpret and apply Art icle XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 in "good faith " requires " that the measures 
at issue meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security 
interests , i.e. that they are not implausible as measures protective of these interests ".711 
7.231.   In this dispute, both parties interpret ed Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement  by 
reference to , and consistently with , the interpretation of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994 
developed by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit .712 Howe ver, the parties' arguments reveal 
divergent views on three fundamental issues pertaining to the applicability of the security exception 
in Article  73(b)(iii) to the facts and measures at issue: (a) whether there is an "emergency in 
international relations" in the sense of subparagraph (iii) of Article  73(b); (b) whether Saudi Arabia 
has articulated its "essential security interests" with sufficient clarity and precision; and 
(c) whether —and, if so, how —the measures that Saudi Arabia characterizes as the "action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" under the chapeau of 
Article  73(b) relate to any of the specific measures challenged by Qatar in this dispute.  
 
710 See generally Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.27-7.149.  
711 Ibid. para. 7.138.  
712 See section 7. 4.3.1 ("Applicable legal standard") of this Report.  
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  7.4.2   Arguments  
7.4.2.1   Saudi Arabia  
7.232.   Saudi Arabia submit ted that the Panel should find that an "emergency in international 
relations" exists in the sense of Article  73(b)(iii) on the basis that it has "severed all diplomatic and 
economic ties with the complaining Member, which is the ultimate  State expression of the existence 
of an emergency in international relations".713 Saudi Arabia also submit ted that "[t]he existence of 
an emergency in international relations has been recognized by other countries wh ich have applied 
similar measures against  the complaining Party" .714 It reference d Qatar's alleged repudiation of the 
Riyadh  Agreements concluded between the GCC members715 and alleged interference in other 
countries in the region .716 Saudi Arabia assert ed that its action was taken "in time of" the eme rgency 
because it severed all diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar on 5  June 2017, following 
Qatar's  repudiation of the Riyadh Agreements and Qatar's continued actions that those agreements 
identified as threats to the security and stability of GCC  members.717 According to Saudi Arabia, the 
emergency in international relations "has persisted since June  2017".718 
7.233.   In its submissions, Saudi Arabia articulated its "essential security interests" generally in 
terms of protecting its elf "from the dangers of terrorism and extremism".719 Thus, it stated that "one 
of its principal essential security interests" is "the elimina tion of the extremism and terrorism that 
have led to instability and conflict in [their] region"720 and that the  "essential security interest" in 
question is "the protection of Saudi citizens, territory, and government from terrorism and 
extremism".721 In summ arizing its earlier submissions, Saudi Arabia reiterate d that it "has always 
defined its 'essential security interest' as carrying out its central sovereign duty of protecting 
Saudi  citizens and population, government institutions, and territory from the t hreats of terrorism 
and extremism, which have led to war, instability, and general unrest in our region".722  
7.234.   In the context of its invocation of Article 73(b)(iii) Saudi Arabia focuse d on its  
"comprehensive measures" taken on 5  June 2017, and on its consequ ent refusal to engage directly 
or indirectly with Qatar in this dispute .723 
7.4.2.2   Qatar  
7.235.   Qatar disagree d with the arguments raised by Saudi Arabia concerning the existence of an 
"emergency in international relations" in this case, submitting that: Saudi Arabia's al legations 
regarding the events leading up to the severance of relations in June 2017 are unsupported, and 
also point ed to a "mere political or economic" dispute, which is not sufficient to constitute an 
emergency724; to the extent that Saudi Arabia argue d that the severance of all diplomatic and 
economic ties in June 2017 itself precipitated an "emergency" that justifies the same severance of 
all diplomatic and economic ties, the argument is illogical and would render the condition set forth 
 
713 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para.  6(a).  
714 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel,  para. 46. (fn  omitted)  
715 Ibid. paras.  21-22 and 44 -45; Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, 
paras.  18-20; and second written submission, paras.  14-18 and 41.  
716 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  47. 
717 Ibid. para.  48 (referring to Supplementary Riyadh Agreement, Exhibit  SAU-4). 
718 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  41; opening statement at the second meeting of the 
Panel, para.  21. 
719 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras.  1, 6(c) and 14.  
720 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  21.  
721 Saudi Arabia' s response to Panel question No. 30(b), para.  63. 
722 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para.  42. (fn omitted)  
723 See, e.g. Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para.  7; opening statement at the first meeting of 
the Panel, paras.  6 and 43; closing  statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  5, 8 and 10; response to 
Panel question No. 28, para.  23; second written submission, paras.  6, 10, 11, 19 and 43 -45; opening 
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras.  2 and 4; and closing stat ement at the second meeting of 
the Panel, paras.  3-8. 
724 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  65-66 and 96; and second written 
submission, paras.  271, 294 -295 and 299 -300. 
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  in Article  73(b)(iii) redundant .725 In Qatar's view no "emergency" in international relations prevails 
today, and the two countries cooperate in various fora.726  
7.236.   Qatar submit ted that Saudi Arabia has not identified its "essential security interests" with 
sufficient clar ity or precision, and that its articulation of its essential security interests 
"lacks  veracity".727 In its view, Saudi Arabia 's apparent interests "are communicated in the most 
abstract of terms".728 That is problematic , Qatar asserts,  because the present dis pute is distant from 
the "hard core" of war, and therefore the Member invoking Article  73(b) "must articulate its interest 
with an appropriate degree of clarity and precision to demonstrate their veracity, so as to 
demonstrate that they are true and not a disguise for pursuit of other objectives".729 Qatar doubt ed 
the veracity of any security interests in connection with the measures at issue, because in its view 
those measures bear no relation to such interests.730 Qatar assert ed that Saudi Arabia's actions ar e 
in fact motivated by the objective of promoting the growth of its own media industry, and submit ted 
that a Member is not permitted to invoke the security defen ce merely by labelling commercial 
interests as security interests.731 
7.237.   Qatar further submit ted that the measures at issue are not plausibly connected to 
Saudi  Arabia 's essential security interests.732 In response to Saudi Arabia's submissions about what 
constitutes the "action" that it considers "necessary to protect its essential security interests" in the 
sense of the chapeau of Article  73(b)  of the TRIPS  Agreement , Qatar set out its understanding that 
Saudi Arabia has not actually invoked Article  73(b) with respect to the measures at issue.733 In the 
light of Saudi  Arabia's  statements that it is not invoking Article  73 in respect of any of the six 
measures challenged by Qatar other than the travel restrictions, Qatar submit ted that the Panel 
"cannot uphold the defense in respect of the measures that the respondent affirmativ ely asserts 
were not considered necessary for protecting its essential security interests" and that "[d]oing so 
would amount to impermissibly making the case for the respondent and legal error."734 Qatar 
submit ted that the argument presented by the UAE (and adopted by Saudi Arabia) about the 
impermissibility of "parsing out individual measures" taken as part of an "overall action" is irrelevant 
to the present dispute, because it is irrelevant "whether or not Saudi  Arabia can justify measures 
other  than the me asures at issue —either individually or by grouping them into a 'comprehensive 
measure' or 'overall scheme'".735 
7.4.2.3   Third parties  
7.238.   Brazil, Canada, the European  Union , Japan and Russia agree d with the panel's finding in 
Russia – Traffic in Transit  that the existen ce of an "emergency in international relations" is a factual 
circumstance subject to an objective determination by a panel.736 The UAE also agree d with the 
panel's finding in this respect, noting that an "emergency in international relations" refers to a 
serious, unexpected and possibly dangerous situation involving the interactions of two or more 
 
725 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  95; and second written 
submission, para.  265.  
726 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  101-103; and  opening statement 
at the second meeting of the Panel, para . 88.  
727 Ibid. paras.  107-115. 
728 Ibid. para.  108. 
729 Ibid. 
730 Ibid. para.  110. 
731 Ibid. para. 112. See ibid. paras.  111-115. 
732 Ibid. paras.  116-121; and Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, 
paras.  81-83. 
733 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  81-85; and second written 
submission, paras.  272-281. 
734 Qatar's second written subm ission, para.  259. (emphasis original)  
735 Ibid. para.  281. (emphasis original)  
736 Brazil's third -party submission, paras.  12-13; Canada's third -party submission, paras.  21-22; 
Canada's third -party statement, paras.  6-7; European  Union's third -party submissio n, paras.  81 and 86 -87; 
Japan's third -party statement, paras.  13 and 19; and Russia's third -party statement, paras.  18-19. 
Both Canada and the European  Union considered that, under Article  73(b)(iii), a panel must determine whether 
there is a "sufficient n exus" between the respondent's measure and the circumstances set out in 
subparagraph  (iii). (Canada's third -party submission, para.  23; Canada's third -party statement, paras.  8-9; 
and European  Union's third -party submission, para.  90.) 
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  countries or in how they regard each other, which is related to essential security interests .737 
By contrast, both Bahrain and the United  States  consider ed that Article  73(b) is a self -judging 
provision, in part, because the words "which it considers necessary" in the chapeau apply to 
subparagraphs (i) to (iii).738 As regards whether an "emergency in international relations" exists in 
this dispute, Japan submi tted that the assertion that the severance of economic and diplomatic ties 
constitutes in itself such an emergency under Article  73(b)(iii) is "circular reasoning" and should be 
rejected.739 The European  Union  and Singapore consider ed that the severance of d iplomatic and 
consular relations is not necessarily dispositive of the existence of such an emergency, but facts 
underlying or leading to such a severance could qualify as an "emergency in international 
relations".740 The UAE conclude d that its and other cou ntries' termination of relations with Qatar "in 
and of itself" reflects the existence of an "emergency in international relations", and agree d with 
Saudi Arabia that the severance of diplomatic and economic ties is the "ultimate State expression" 
of the ex istence of an emergency in international relations .741 
7.239.   Most of the third parties refrain ed from commenting on the manner in which Saudi Arabia 
has identified its "essential security interests". The European  Union  stated that, without taking a 
position on the  facts of this case, Saudi Arabia should have better explained several elements of its 
defen ce, including the "essential security interests" that it claims to be at issue.742 However,  several 
third parties commented on the issue of whether —and, if so, how—the measures at issue are 
plausibly connected to Saudi Arabia's essential security interests. Brazil "fail [ed] to see how the 
respondent's proffered essential security interests, or any country's essential security interests for 
that matter, could be protected by allowing the operation of a copyright pirate whose broadcasts 
have spread beyond the respondent's borders and encompass not only the copyrights held by the 
claimant's nationals but by other countries' nationals as well, including Brazil's".743 
The European  Union  stated that, without taking a position on the fact s of this case, it would 
"welcome a detailed explanation clarifying why, in order to protect its essential security interests, 
Saudi Arabia considers necessary to breach the rights of thir d party right -holders".744  
7.240.   The UAE submit ted that a panel "cannot parse out the individual measures taken as part of 
the overall action of severing diplomatic and economic relations, and seek to apply the plausibility 
test to each element separately and out  of context".745 The UAE add ed that, if the Panel applies the 
test to individual "measures" (e.g. limiting access to a port), as opposed to the overall "action" 
(e.g. termination of relations), this can only be to consider a plausible connection between the overall 
"action" and "measures" —i.e. if limiting access to a port is plausibly connected to the termination of 
relations (which itself must be plausibly connected to the emergency).746 Brazil respond ed that the 
text of Article  73(b) of the TRIPS  Agreement  refers to "action", not "overall action", and "[n] othing 
in the text of Article  73(b) limits the scope of this provision to only one action."747 Canada state d 
that if "individual measures are included as part of an 'overall action' or comprehensive response to 
a security threat, the relationship between the comprehensive response and the security interest is 
relevant to determining whether the individual measur es are sufficiently linked to the circumstances 
set out in subparagraph", but add ed that a panel should still consider whether each of the individual 
measures has a sufficient nexus to the circumstances set out in subparagraph (iii).748 
The European  Union  submitted that it "does not see any basis for the proposition that the required 
 
737 United Arab Emirat es' third -party submission, para.  9. For this reason, the UAE considered that a 
panel should not apply a rigid, unbending standard in examining whether an "emergency in international 
relations" exists. Rather, a panel must take into account the perspective  and position of one Member in light of 
its relationship with another, and must conduct its examination from the vantage point of the Member claiming 
the existence of an emergency and the essential security interests. (Ibid.)  
738 Bahrain's third -party submis sion, paras.  5-6; Bahrain's third -party statement, paras.  7-13; 
United  States' third -party submission, para.  5; and United  States' third -party statement, paras.  5 and 7.  
739 Japan's third -party submission, para.  12; and third -party statement, para.  16. 
740 European  Union's third -party statement, para.  3; and Singapore's third -party statement, para.  6. 
741 United Arab Emirates' third -party submission, para.  25. 
742 European  Union's third -party submission, para.  67. 
743 Brazil's third -party submission, para.  37. The Pa nel notes that Saudi Arabia, when invited to address 
this point, stated that it "has not taken copyright works of any right -holders in connection with the protection 
of Saudi Arabia's essential security interests". (Saudi Arabia's response to Panel questio n No. 35, para. 76.)  
744 European  Union's third -party submission, para. 67.  
745 United Arab Emirates' oral statement, para. 23.  
746 United Arab Emirates' response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, paras.  36-37. 
747 Brazil's response to Panel question No. 7  to third parties.  
748 Canada's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, paras.  17-18. 
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  connection should be linked to a nebulous overall 'action', while the concrete measures would escape 
scrutiny".749 According to Japan, if an "overall action consisting of individua l measures has its own 
unique effect through synergy between its component measures, the connection with these 
emergency and security interests should be examined in relation to the overall action, rather than 
each component measure".750 Singapore did not ag ree that the "overall action" to be assessed is the 
action of "severing diplomatic and economic relations", and stated that what is required in the 
present case "is an articulation of how the various measures alleged to be substantive violations of 
the TRI PS Agreement, seen in totality, bear a connection with the 'emergency in international 
relations'".751  
7.4.3   Assessment by the Panel  
7.4.3.1   Applicable legal standard  
7.241.   As previously stated, t he wording of Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement  is identical to 
that of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, which was first interpreted by the panel in Russia – 
Traffic in Transit .752 The panel's interpretation of Article  XXI(b)(iii) in that dispute gave rise to an 
analytical framework that can guide t he assessment of whether a respondent has properly invoked 
Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, or, for the purposes of this dispute, Article  73(b)(iii) of the 
TRIPS  Agreement .  
7.242.   Specifically, a panel may proceed by assessing :  
a. whether the existence of a " war or other emergency in international relations" has been 
established in the sense of subparagraph (iii) to Article  73(b); 
b. whether the relevant action s were "taken in time of" th at war or other emergency  in 
international relations ; 
c. whether the invoking Member has articulated its relevant "essential security interests" 
sufficiently to enable an assessment of whether there is any link between those actions 
and the protection of its essential security interests ; and  
d. whether the relevan t actions  are so remote from, or unrelated to, the "emergency in 
international relations" as to make it implausible that the invoking Member considers 
those actions to be necessary  for the protection of its essential security interests arising 
out of the e mergency . 
7.243.   The parties in this dispute and multiple third parties each express agreement with the 
general interpretation and analytical framework enunciated by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit . 
These parties and third parties therefore consider ed that both can be transposed to Article  73(b)(iii)  
of the TRIPS  Agreement .753 
 
749 European  Union's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, para. 29.  
750 Japan's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties, para. 34. On the other hand, Japan 
considered that " to the extent the relevant individual measures are independent and distinct, each of these 
measures may need to be justified by finding a connec tion with the emergency and security interests at issue". 
(Ibid. para. 33.)  
751 Singapore's response to Panel question No. 7 to third parties.  
752 Where two sets of exceptions from obligations use similar language and requirements and set out 
their provisions  in the same manner, the Appellate  Body has considered prior panel and Appellate  Body reports 
concerning the first set of exceptions to be relevant for its analysis under a second set of exceptions. 
(See Appellate  Body Reports, US – Gambling , para. 291 (fi nding previous decisions under Article  XX of the 
GATT  1994 relevant for its analysis under Article  XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)); 
and Argentina – Financial Services , para. 6.202 (referring to the Appellate  Body's interpretation of Article  XX(d) 
of the GATT  1994 in Korea – Various Measures on Beef  to set out its analytical framework for Article  XIV(c) of 
the GATS).)  
753 See Qatar's opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras.  72-73; Qatar's opening 
statement at the f irst meeting of the Panel, paras.  43-49 and 65 -67; Qatar's second written submission, 
paras.  265-271; Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  43-49; 
Saudi  Arabia's second written submission, para. 33; Saudi Arabia's openi ng statement at the second meeting 
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  7.244.   The first step in the analytical framework outlined above requires a panel to assess whether 
the existence of a "war or other emergency in international relations" has been establishe d in the 
sense of subparagraph (iii) of Article  73(b). The panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit  concluded  that 
the circumstance in subparagraph  (iii) is "an objective fact" that is "amenable to objective 
determination".754 In other words, the  panel concluded that the adjectival clause "which it considers" 
in the chapeau of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994 "does  not qualify the determination of the 
circumstance[]" in subparagraph  (iii).755 In th at panel's view, the evaluation of whether the 
respondent has satisfied the circumstance in subparagraph (iii) must "be made objectively rather 
than by the invoking Member itself".756  
7.245.   The panel also concluded that the term "emergency in international relations" refers 
generally "to a situation of armed c onflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of heightened tension or 
crisis, or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state". Such situations, in the panel's view, 
"give rise to particular types of interests for the Member in question, i.e. defenc e or military interests, 
or maintenance of law and public order interests". For the panel, while "political" and "economic" 
conflicts could sometimes be considered "urgent" and "serious" in a political sense, such conflicts 
will not be "emergenc[ies] in in ternational relations" within the meaning of subparagraph (iii) "unless 
they give rise to defence and military interests, or maintenance of law and public order interests".757 
7.246.   Saudi Arabia and Qatar each appear ed to generally agree with the interpretation of  
subparagraph (iii) provided above , as both refer red to the interpretations of the panel in Russia – 
Traffic in Transit . Neither party stated any disagreement with any aspect of that panel's reasoning.758 
Notably, Saudi  Arabia agree d that the phrase "emergen cy in international relations" should be 
understood to mean "a situation of armed conflict, or of latent armed conflict, or of heightened 
tension or crisis, or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state."759 The Panel notes that 
the opinion of t he majority of the third parties that expressed a view on this issue is consistent with 
that panel's interpretation.760 
7.247.   Turning to the second step of the analytical framework, the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit 
examined the introductory phrase "taken in time of" in subparagraph (iii). This phrase connects the 
"action" referred to in the chapeau of paragraph (b) to the phrase "emergency in international 
relations" in subparagraph (iii). In the panel's view, this i ntroductory phrase "require[s] that the 
action be taken during the war or other emergency in international relations". The connection 
 
of the Panel, paras.  19-48; Saudi Arabia's closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para. 7; 
Australia's third -party statement, paras.  10-14; Brazil's third -party submission, paras.  11-17; 
Canada's  third-party submission, paras.  21-22; Canada's third -party statement, paras.  6-7; 
European  Union's  third-party submission, paras.  81-97; Japan's third -party submission, para. 9; 
Japan's  third-party statement, paras.  13 and 19; Russia's third -party statement, paras.  17-21; 
Singapore's  third-party statement, paras.  3-5; Ukraine's third -party submission, paras.  25-26; and 
Ukraine's  third-party statement, paras.  9-13. 
754 Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.71. See also ibid. paras.  7.66, 7.72 -7.74, 7.77, 7. 79 
and 7.82. In its interpretation of this phrase in Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, the panel in Russia – Traffic 
in Transit took into account several elements, including: (a) the operation of subparagraphs (i) to (iii) as 
clauses that "qualify and limit the exercise of the discretion accorded to Members under the chapeau " 
(Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.65); (b) the "substantially different" nature of the subject 
matter in subparagraphs (i) to (iii), each of which establishes an "alternative " requirement 
(ibid. paras.  7.67-7.68); (c) the ordinary meaning of the term "war" and the use of the term "or" to indicate 
that war is but one example of a larger category of "emergency in international relations" (ibid. para. 7.72 
(emphasis o mitted)); and (d)  the negotiating history of Article  XXI of the GATT 1947, which revealed, inter 
alia, that the potential abuse of the exceptions would be curtailed by limiting the circumstances in which the 
exceptions could be invoked to those circumstanc es specified in subparagraphs (i) to (iii) (ibid. para. 7.98(b)).  
755 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.82. See also ibid. para. 7.101.  
756 Ibid. para. 7.100.  
757 Ibid. paras.  7.75-7.76. (fn  omitted)  
758 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, p ara. 33 (quoting Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , 
paras.  7.76 and 7.111); and Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  61-62, 65 -67 
and 74 -75 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.65, 7.75, 7. 76, 7.82, 7.100).  
759 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33 (quoting Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , 
paras.  7.76 and 7.111).  
760 See paragraph 7.238  of this Report.  
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  between these two elements constitutes a "chronological concurrence [that] is also an objective fact, 
amenable to objectiv e determination".761 
7.248.   Saudi Arabia and Qatar both appear ed to generally agree , implicitly or expressly, with the 
panel's interpretation of the phrase "taken in time of".762 Notably, Saudi Arabia also refer red to the 
"temporal relation" that should exist between  qualifying emergencies and related "actions".763 
None of the third parties expressed any disagreement with this aspect of the panel's 
interpretation.764  
7.249.   Proceeding to the third step in the analytical framework, the panel in Russia – Traffic in 
Transit  conclu ded that a panel would be required to assess whether a respondent has sufficiently 
articulated its "essential security interests" in the sense of the chapeau of paragraph (b) . The panel 
noted that  "essential security interests" is evidently  a narrower concept than "security interests", 
with the former generally concerning "those interests relating to the quintessential functions of the 
state, namely, the protection of its territory and its populati on from external threats, and the 
maintenance of law and public order internally".765 For the panel, "[t]he specific interests that are 
considered directly relevant to the protection of a state from such external or internal threats will 
depend on the partic ular situation and perceptions of the state in question, and can be expected to 
vary with changing circumstances". For these reasons, the panel considered that "it is left, in general, 
to every Member to define what it considers to be its essential securit y interests".766 
7.250.   The panel noted, however, that a Member is not "free to elevate any concern to that of an 
'essential security interest'"; rather, "the discretion of a Member to designate particular concerns as 
'essential security interests' is limited by it s obligation to interpret and apply Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the 
GATT  1994 in good faith".767 For the panel, th is "obligation of good faith " requires that Members not 
use the security  exception  as a means to circumvent their WTO obligations .768 The panel conclud ed 
that "[i]t is therefore incumbent on the invoking Member to articulate the essential security interests 
 
761 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.70. (emphasis original) See also ibid. para. 7.77.  
762 Saudi Arabia argued that the "measures at issue were 'taken in time of ' an emergency in 
international relations in June 2017 … and continued to be applied within the meaning of 
TRIPS  Article  73(b)(iii)". Saudi Arabia also referred to the "temporal relation" that should exist between 
qualifying emergencies and related "action s". (Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 6(b); and 
second  written submission, para. 33.) For its part, Qatar noted that this phrase connects the defended action 
to the emergency and requires that the action "be adopted during  the existence of an  emergency, which came 
into being before their adoption and continues to exist thereafter". (Qatar's opening statement at the first 
meeting of the Panel, para. 64 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.70). (emphasis 
original) See also Qatar's second written submission, para. 269 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in 
Transit , para.  7.70).)  
763 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33.  
764 Canada and the European  Union submitted that subparagraph  (iii) requires at least that the action be 
taken during a period of time in which the "war" or "other emergency" exists. (Canada's third -party 
submission, paras.  23-24; and European  Union's third -party submission, paras.  90-92.) Both Cana da and the 
European  Union considered that, under Article  73(b)(iii), a panel must also determine whether there is a 
"sufficient nexus" between the respondent's measure and one of the circumstances set out in 
subparagraph  (iii). (Canada's third -party submis sion, para. 23; Canada's third -party statement, paras.  8-9; 
and European  Union's third -party submission, para. 90.) Russia and the UAE agreed that the terms "taken in 
time of" require that the action be taken during the war or other emergency in internatio nal relations. 
Russia  referred to the connection between these two elements as "a chronological concurrence that is also an 
objective fact, amenable to objective determination". (Russia's third -party statement, para. 19 (quoting 
Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para.  7.70.)) In  the UAE's view, this temporal requirement " must be 
distinguished from the narrower 'relationship of ends and means' required by the terms 'relating to' used in 
subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of Article  73(b)". ( United Arab Em irates' third -party submission, para. 10.)  
765 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.130.  
766 Ibid. para. 7.131.  
767 Ibid. para. 7.132.  
768 In what it deemed a "glaring example" of a respondent's circumvention of its WTO obligations, the 
panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit  stated that a respondent could seek, hypothetically, to release itself from 
the structure of "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements" that constitutes the multilateral trading 
system. The respondent would do so "simply by  re-labelling trade interests that it had agreed to protect and 
promote within the system, as 'essential security interests', falling outside the reach of that system". (Ibid. 
para. 7.133.)  
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  said to arise from the emergency in international relations sufficiently enough to demonstrate their 
veracity."769 
7.251.   Qatar and Saudi Arabia each advance d arguments consistent with the Russia – Traffic in 
Transit  panel's interpretation of the phrase "essential security interests".770 Notably, Saudi Arabia 
maintain ed that it "has clearly articulated its determination that the application of comprehensive 
measu res is necessary [to] protect 'its national security from the dangers of terrorism and 
extremism', and … are [not] applied to circumvent its WTO obligations".771 Most if not all of the third 
parties that addressed this element of the security exception expressed their agreement with one or 
more elements of the panel's interpretation reviewed above.772 
7.252.   Moving to the fourth and final step of the analytical framework  set out above , the panel in 
Russia – Traffic in Transit  considered the "obligation of good faith " to apply  not only to the 
respondent's articulation of "its essential security interests", but also to the connection between the 
measures at issue and those interests. This obligation, for the panel, is "crystallized in demanding 
that the me asures at issue meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered 
essential security interests".773 Specifically, a  panel must determine "whether the measures are so 
remote from, or unrelated to, the … emergency that it is implausible t hat [the respondent] 
implemented the measures for the protection of its essential security interests arising out of the 
emergency".774 
7.253.   Saudi Arabia and Qatar each express ed basic agreement with the interpretation of the 
chapeau of paragraph (b) as expressed above. Saudi Arabia stated that a panel could examine the 
relationship between the measures for which the security exception was invoked, and the essential 
security interests, where such an examination would support the panel's assessment of the bona fide 
invocation of the security exception.775 Saudi  Arabia also sought to demonstrate its "respect for the 
obligation of good faith" with reference to "the relationship between the measures and the essential 
security interests at issue".776 
7.254.   Qatar agree d that the ph rase "which it considers" in the chapeau of Article  73(b) "confer[s] 
… discretion on the Member taking the actions at issue"; in addition, such discretion is not 
unfettered.777 For Qatar, this is because a panel must ensure that the invoking  Member  acts in good 
faith and does not exercise its discretion "in pursuit of different or ulterior objectives".778 
Qatar  submit ted that the word "necessary" "denotes an action that contribute s to the attainment of 
the relevant objective"; however, should a measure, in the light of the facts, be "manifestly incapable 
of making a contribution to the stated security interests, or actually undermine[] those interests", 
Qatar assert ed that the invo king Member could not, in good faith, "consider[]" the measure 
"necessary for the protection of its essential security interests".779  
7.255.   Australia, Brazil, the European  Union , Russia and Ukraine consider ed that the language 
"which it considers" in the chapeau of Article  73(b) confers discretion on an invoking Member to 
 
769 Ibid. para. 7.134.  
770 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, pa ras. 6(c) and 14; opening statement at the first meeting of 
the Panel, paras.  18-22; second written submission, para. 34 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in 
Transit , para. 7.130); Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, par as. 74-75, second 
written submission, paras.  257-258 and 262 -264; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, 
para. 69 (quoting Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.71 and 7.133 -7.135).  
771 Saudi Arabia's first written submission , para. 6(c). See also ibid. para. 14; and opening statement at 
the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  18-22. 
772 See Australia's third -party statement, para. 10 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , 
paras.  7.130 -7.131); European  Union's t hird-party submission, paras.  62, 94 and 96 (referring to 
Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.130, 7.132 -7.133 and 7.138); Singapore's third -party 
statement, para. 5; Ukraine's third -party submission, paras.  20-24; and United Arab Emirates'  third-party 
submission, para. 6 (referring to Panel Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.131).  
773 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.138.  
774 Ibid. para. 7.139. See also ibid. para. 7.145.  
775 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, p ara. 37 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in 
Transit , para. 7.133).  
776 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 46.  
777 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 70. (emphasis omitted)  
778 Ibid. para. 71 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.132).  
779 Ibid. para. 78. (emphasis omitted)  
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  determine the necessity of the measure, but that this discretion is not unfettered. Though  these 
third parties express ed slightly different formulations of the "minimum requirement of plausibilit y", 
they all agree with this requirement and the role of the obligation of good faith in the application  of 
Article 73(b)(iii) .780 For example, the European  Union  consider ed that if a threshold analysis of the 
"design" of the measure reveals that it is "inca pable" of addressing the purported objective of 
protecting essential security interests, (e.g. because it is designed to circumvent WTO obligations or 
compliance obligations or promote protectionist interests), then the measure cannot be justified 
under th is exception.781 Nevertheless, t he UAE consider ed that, to give the clause "which it 
considers" legal effect in the chapeau of Article  73(b), a panel must leave it to the implementing 
Member to determine whether the action was "necessary".782 The UAE also cons idered that the 
"minimum requirement of plausibility"783 enunciated by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit might 
have been appropriate in  that dispute, but should not be applied "too mechanically"  and that this 
Panel should proceed with "caution" in adopting a test that is not grounded in the text of the security 
exception .784 Regardless,  in its view, the "plausibility formulation" sets "a very low bar".785 
7.4.3.2   "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations"  
7.256.   The Panel will no w proceed with the first prong of the test under Article  73(b)(iii) of the 
TRIPS  Agreement , which entails consideration of two issues: (a) whether an "emergency in 
international relations"786 exists between the disputing parties; and (b) whether the anti -sympathy 
measures and non -application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ were "taken in time 
of" this emergency. The Panel will address these two elements of Article  73(b)(iii) in turn.  
7.257.   For the reasons that follow, the Panel considers that "a situ ation … of heightened tension or 
crisis"787 exists in the circumstances in this dispute, and is related to Saudi Arabia's "defence or 
military interests , or maintenance of law and public order interests " (i.e. essential security interests), 
sufficient to est ablish the existence of an "emergency in international relations" that has persisted 
since at least 5  June 2017. The Panel notes at the outset that it is the combination of the 
considerations that follow which sustains this conclusion, rather than any one of them being 
necessarily decisive in its own right.  
7.258.   First, the Panel recalls that, on 5  June 2017, Saudi Arabia "severed diplomatic and consular 
relations with [Qatar], and imposed comprehensive measures putting an end to all economic and 
trade relations  between [itself and Qatar]".788 On the same day, the Saudi Press Agency reported 
the actions and their underlying rationale as follows:  
An official source stated that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia emanating 
from exercising its sovereign rights guaranteed by the international law and protecting 
its national security from the dangers of terrorism and extremism has decided to sever 
 
780 Australia's third -party statement, para. 10 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , 
paras.  7.146 -7.147), paras.  11-12 (referring to Panel  Repor t, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.138) and 
paras.  15-16; Brazil's third -party submission, paras.  18 and 27 -29; European  Union's third -party submission, 
paras.  44, 96 -97, 100 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.138) and pa ra. 101; 
Russia's third -party statement, para. 21; Ukraine's third -party submission, paras.  20-26 and 28 (referring to 
Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.132, 7.135 and 7.138); and Ukraine's third -party statement, 
paras.  11-13. 
781 European  Union's third -party submission, para. 100 (referring to Appellate  Body Report, India – 
Solar Cells , para. 5.58).  
782 United Arab Emirates' third -party submission, para. 5 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in 
Transit , para. 7.146). See also third-party statement, para. 11.  
783 United Arab Emirates' third -party statement, para. 19 (quoting Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in 
Transit , para. 7.138).  
784 Ibid. para. 20.  
785 Ibid. para.  21. 
786 The Panel notes that neither party has claimed that there was, at any point, a state of "war" in the 
sense of paragraph 73(b)(iii).  
787 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.76. (fn  omitted)  
788 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 1.  
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  diplomatic and consular relations with the State of Qatar, close all land, sea and air 
ports, prevent crossing into Saudi territories, airspace and territorial waters.789 
7.259.   The Panel agrees with Saudi Arabia that one Member's severance of "all diplomatic  and 
economic ties" with another Member could be regarded as " the ultimate State expression of the 
existence of an emergency in international relations".790 The UAE observed  that 
Saudi  Arabia's  severance of relations with Qatar, "in and of itself, indicates the gravity of the 
situation"791, and "there are few circumstances in international relations short of war that constitute 
a more serious state of affairs".792  
7.260.   The Panel notes that the severance of diplomatic or consular relations has been characterized 
as "a unilateral and discretionary act usually decided upon only as a last resort when a severe crisis 
occurs in the relations between" a sending state and a receiving state.793 The severance of such 
relations typically brings about "the termination of all direct  official communication between" the two 
states.794 The severance of diplomatic relations is an "exceptional" act795, and it has been observed 
that "[b]reaking off diplomatic relations has become rarer and they are nowadays sometimes even 
maintained in times o f armed conflict. … The temporary or permanent recall of a mission is used 
more frequently and is resorted to in case of security issues or serious crises in diplomatic 
relations."796 It has also been observed that the breaking off of diplomatic and consular  relations 
"was usually accompanied by rising tension in public opinion and by hostility".797 
7.261.   In this connection, the Panel further notes that Article  41 of the UN Charter —located in 
Chapter VII thereof, entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,  Breaches of the Peace, 
and Acts of Aggression" —provides that the UN  Security  Council may decide what measures, short of 
the use of armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions. Article  41 states that these 
measures "may include complete  or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations".798  
7.262.   Saudi Arabia's severance of all diplomatic , consular  and economic ties  with Qatar, viewed in 
the context of  similar action s taken by several other nations  and the relevant history recounted in 
this Report, falls into the category of cases in which such action can be characterized in terms of an 
exceptional and serious crisis in the relations between two or more States.  
7.263.   Second, the Panel recalls the context in which Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with  
Qatar occurred. Saudi Arabia repeatedly allege d799 that Qatar had, inter alia , repudiated the 
Riyadh  Agreements designed to address regional concerns of security and stability800, supported 
terrorism and extremism801, and interfered in the internal affairs of o ther countries.802 The Panel 
expresses or implies no position concerning any of these allegations, and recalls that Qatar strongly 
 
789 Ibid. (quoting "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar", 
Saudi  Press Agency, https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1637298).  
790 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 6(a).  
791 United Arab Emirate s' third -party statement, para. 16.  
792 Ibid. 
793 Commentary on the 1969 Vienna  Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article  63: Severance of 
diplomatic or consular relations, (Brill, Nijhoff 2009), pp.  786-787, paras.  4-5. 
794 Ibid.  
795 John P. Grant and J. Craig Barker, Parry & Grant, Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, 3rd 
Edition  (Oxford University Press, 2009), p.  554. 
796 Holger P Hestermeyer, Vienna  Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), Max Planck Encyclopedia 
of International Law , Oxford Univer sity Press, 2015, para. 40.  
797 Working paper prepared by Mr. Abdullah El -Erian, Special Rapporteur, Volume II(2), UN Document 
A/CN.4/L.166 (July 1971) p.  103, para. 12.  
798 Charter of the United Nations, done at San Francisco, 26 June 1945, 1 UN Treaty Series  XVI, 
Article  41, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/Part/un_charter.pdf.  
799 See paragraphs 2.22 to 2.28 of this Report.  
800 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  21-22 and 44 -45; closin g 
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  18-20; and second written submission, paras.  14-18 and 
41. 
801 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  26-37; closing statement 
at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  17-20; and second written submission, paras.  14-15. 
802 Saudi Arabia's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para. 47.  
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  denied the various accusations made by Saudi Arabia. It suffices to observe that the nature of the 
allegations constitutes furt her evidence of the grave and serious nature of the deterioration and 
rupture in relations between these Members, and is also explicitly related to Saudi  Arabia's  security 
interests . In the Panel's view, when a group of State s repeatedly accuse s another of  supporting 
terrorism and extremism, as described in greater detail earlier803, that in and of itself reflects and 
contributes to a "situation … of heightened tension or crisis"804 between them that relates to their 
security interests.805 Thus, in the light of the reasons  advanced  by Saudi Arabia for its actions , the 
Panel does not accept  Qatar's view that the events culminating in the severance of relations can be 
characterized as a "mere political or economic" dispute.806 
7.264.   Third, the Panel notes the argument of  Qatar and Japan that it might involve circular 
reasoning, and/or render one of the two main elements of Article  73(b)(iii) redundant, if 
Saudi  Arabia's severance of all diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar on 5  June 2017 were 
deemed to constitute both the "emergency in international relations" under subparagraph (iii), and 
also the "action which [Saudi  Arabia] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests" under the chapeau of Article  73(b). It is not necessary for the Panel to determine whether, 
and if so, to what extent one and the same action or factual circumstance may constitute both an 
"emergency in international relations" and the "action" the Member concerned considers "necessary 
for the prot ection of its essential security interests" and "taken in time of" that emergency . In this 
case the "action" that the Panel must examine under the chapeau  of Article  73(b) is not the 
severance of diplomatic and economic relations that took place on 5  June 2017.  
7.265.   The Panel recalls that t he "action[s]" that it must examine under the chapeau are the specific 
acts and omissions attributable to Saudi Arabia that it has found to be inconsistent with the 
TRIPS  Agreement . In this case, these are: ( a) the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the 
result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil 
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals; and ( b) Saudi Arabia's non -application 
of criminal procedures and penalties to be applied to beoutQ. Qatar itself stressed that the severance 
of relations is distinct from the measures it is challenging.807 
7.266.   Finally, the Panel does not consider that various forms of cooperation between the disputing 
parties in the fora highlighted by Qatar808 call into question that the "emergency in international 
relations" between Saudi Arabia and Qatar persists. It is not in dispute that the complete severance 
of diplomatic , consular  and economic  relations has remain ed essentially unchanged between June 
2017 and the present.  
7.267.   Both parties , and most third parties in their submissions, agree d that the determination of 
whether there exists "a war or other emergency in international relations" is to be made "objectively" 
by a panel .809 The parties and several third parties  advance d divergent views as to whether a panel 
must grant any margin of "deference" to a respondent's characterization of a situation as an 
emergency.810 
 
803 See section 2.2.2 ("The June 2017 severance of relations and events leading up to it") of this Report.  
804 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.76. (fn  omitted)  
805 The Panel elaborates further on the nature of these interests in the context of its examination of the 
measures under the chapeau  of Article  73, which entails consideration of the "essential security interests" 
articulated by Saudi Arabia. (See section 7.4.3.3.3 ("Saudi Arabia's articulation of its 'essential security 
interests'") of this Report.)  
806 Qatar's opening statement at the  first meeting of the Panel, paras.  65-66 and 96; and second written 
submission, paras.  294-295 and 299 -300. 
807 See paragraph 7.29 of this Report.  
808 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  101-103. 
809 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33 (referring to Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in 
Transit , paras.  7.76 and 7.111); and Qatar's opening statement at the second me eting of the Panel, para. 73 
(referring to Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  65-67; and Qatar's second 
written submission, paras.  265-271). Bahrain and the United  States considered that Article  73(b) is entirely 
"self-judging" and that the words "which it considers necessary" in the chapeau apply to subparagraphs (i) to 
(iii). (Bahrain's third -party submission, paras.  5-6; Bahrain's third -party statement, paras.  7-13; United  States' 
third-party submission, para.  5; and Unit ed States' third -party statement, paras.  5 and 7.)  
810 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 33; Qatar's opening statement at the second 
meeting of the Panel, paras.  72 and 75; European  Union's third -party submission, para. 89; 
European  Union's  third-party statement, para. 3; and United Arab Emirates' third -party submission, para. 9.  
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  7.268.   The Panel recalls that the WTO dispute settlement system is not meant "to encourage either 
panels or the Appellate  Body to 'make law' by clarifying existing provisions of the WTO  Agreement  
outside the context of resolving a particular dispute".811 In the lig ht of its findings above, the Panel 
does not consider it necessary to rule on certain issues discussed by the parties or third parties 
about how a panel should proceed in a case where it is not persuaded that an "emergency in 
international relations" exist s, or is presented with an insufficient basis upon which to make any 
determination of that issue. The Panel has found, on the basis of the facts in this dispute, that an 
"emergency in international relations" exists in this case.  
7.269.   As to the second element of subparagraph (iii) of Article  73(b) of the TRIPS  Agreement , it 
follows from the foregoing assessment, and in particular the Panel's conclusion that an "emergency 
in international relations" has persisted since at least 5  June 2017, that the two actions that the 
Panel must examine under the chapeau of Article  73(b) were "taken in time of" the "emergency in 
international relations". The measures at issue are of a continuing nature, as opposed to acts or 
omissions that occurred or were completed on a partic ular date, and neither party has suggested 
that the Panel must assign any dates to them for the purposes of examining the claims and defences 
before the Panel. In the Panel's view, it suffices to note that beoutQ did not commence operations 
until August 20 17, and hence the actions to be examined under the chapeau were "taken in time of" 
the "emergency in international relations" that has persisted since at least 5  June 2017.  
7.270.   The Panel thus concludes that the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result 
of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil 
enforcement procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals (i.e. anti -sympathy measures),  and 
Saudi  Arabia's non-application of criminal procedures and pe nalties to be applied to beoutQ,  were 
"taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations".  
7.4.3.3   "action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interest s" 
7.4.3.3.1   Introduction  
7.271.   The Panel will now proceed with the second prong of the test under Article  73(b)(iii) of the 
TRIPS  Agreement , which entails the consideration of two further issues: (a) whether Saudi Arabia 
has sufficiently articulated the "essential security interests" that it considers the measures at issu e 
are necessary to protect; and (b) whether the anti -sympathy measures and/or the non -application 
of criminal procedures or penalties are so remote from, or unrelated to, the "emergency in 
international relations" as to make it implausible that the invokin g Member implemented the 
measures for the protection of its "essential security interests" arising out of the emergency.  
7.272.   Before turning to those issues, the Panel will first address a fundamental issue regarding the 
scope of Saudi Arabia's invocation of A rticle 73(b)(iii).  
7.4.3.3.2   The "a ctions"  covered by Saudi Arabia' s invocation of Article  73(b)(iii)  
7.273.   As explained earlier, Saudi Arabia's arguments under Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS 
Agreement focus on its "comprehensive measures" taken on 5  June 2017. This led  Qatar to 
repeatedly state  that these "actions" are not the measures that it is challenging, and to argue that 
Saudi Arabia has  therefore  not actually invoked any defen ce under Article  73(b) with respect to the 
specific measures at issue in this dispute.812 
7.274.   In its first written submission , Saudi Arabia stated that it has "properly invoked the Security 
Exception in Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement "813 and the consequence of that, according to 
Saudi Arabia,  is that the Panel "should decline to proceed further in this dispute because a 
WTO dispute settlement panel is not capable of resolving the national security matter at issue ".814 
In its second written submission , Saudi Arabia stated that it " has established that its invocation of 
 
811 Appellate  Body Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses , pp. 18-19, DSR 1997:I, 323, at 339 -340. 
812 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  81-85; second written 
submission, paras.  272-281. 
813 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, para. 3.  
814 Ibid. para. 4.  
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  the Security E xceptions  under Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement is justified and that no additional 
findings be made in this dispute ".815 In short, according to Saudi Arabia, the effect of its invocation 
of Article 73 was that no further findings can be made in this dispu te and thus Article 73 operated 
to end the case. On that basis, the invocation of Article 73 was an invocation of the security exception 
in respect of, and which applied to, the entire matter before the Panel.  
7.275.   To clarify the relationship of the "measures a t issue " identified by Qatar and the 
"comprehensive measures " taken by Saudi Arabia on 5 June 2017, the Panel asked Saudi Arabia 
"whether Saudi Arabia is asserting that any of the acts or omissions raised by Qatar as the measures 
at issue are 'action which  it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests ' 
for purposes of Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement ". Saudi Arabia responded that , with the potential 
exception of the travel restrictions, it was not asserting that any of the alleged acts or omissions is 
an "action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests " for 
purposes of Article 73 of the TRI PS Agreement.816 This statement was relied upon by Qatar as a 
concession by Saudi Arabia that Article 73 was not being  invoked in respect of the measures at issue 
in this case.817 Thus, Qatar contended, the invocation of Article 73 must fail.  
7.276.   However, a close r analysis of Saudi Arabia's position shows that Saudi Arabia was not resiling 
from what it had set forth in its written pleadings. Rather, Saudi Arabia invok ed Article 73 in respect 
of, and as applied to, the entire matter before the Panel, and was not di recting its invocation at the 
specific measures identified by Qatar. The Panel notes that, given that Saudi Arabia  denied that 
some of the measures identified by Qatar existed in fact, it would have been contradictory for Saudi 
Arabia to say that it had in voked Article 73 specifically in respect of measures whose existence it 
denied.   
7.277.   Saudi Arabia  affirmed that its invocation of Article 73 covered the measures at issue 
identified by Qatar. Saudi  Arabia argued that Qatar's panel request asserts  the existence of a "direct 
relationship"  between the comprehensive measures and the related measures referenced by 
Qatar.818 Saudi Arabia also adopted the view  that "a panel cannot parse out the individual measures 
taken as part of the overall action of sev ering diplomatic and economic relations, and seek to apply 
the plausibility test to each element separately and out of context".819 In response to a question by 
the Panel, Saudi Arabia stated that it considers that the "comprehensive measures … extend to and  
encompass the measures referenced by the complaining party in this dispute".820 
Saudi  Arabia's  position was that the comprehensive measures were taken precisely for the purpose 
of protecting the essential security interests for which it invokes the security  exception in Article 73.  
7.278.   For these reasons, the Panel concludes that the "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia 's 
invocation of Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement  include the anti -sympathy  measures and the 
non-application of criminal procedures and pen alties to beoutQ.  
7.4.3.3.3   Saudi Arabia 's articulation of its "essential security interests"  
7.279.   Having addressed the scope of the "actions" covered by Saudi Arabia 's invocation of 
Article  73(b)(iii), the Panel will next examine whether Saudi Arabia  has sufficiently articulated the 
"essential security interests" that it considers the measures at issue are necessary to protect.  
7.280.   First, Saudi  Arabia  has expressly articulated its "essential security interests", in terms of 
protecting it self "from the dan gers of terrorism and extremism" .821 Thus, the situation in this case 
contrasts to the situation that arose in Russia – Traffic in Transit , in which the respondent appeared 
not to expressly articulate its essential security interests  at all.822 Second, the int erests identified by 
Saudi  Arabia are ones that clearly "relat[e] to the quintessential functions of the state, namely, the 
 
815 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 73.  
816 Saudi Arabia 's responses to Panel question Nos. 30 and 31.  
817 See, e.g. Qatar's second written submission, para. 283.  
818 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 32(a), para . 68; second written submission, para.  24. 
819 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 33(a), para. 74.  
820 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 32(a), para.  65 (emphasis omitted); response to Panel 
question No. 33(a), para.  74. 
821 Saudi Arabia's first written submission, paras.  1, 6(c) an d 14. See paragraph 7.233  of this Report.  
822 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.136.  
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  protection of its territory and its population from external threats, and the maintenance of law and 
public order internally" .823 
7.281.   Although Qatar argu ed that Saudi  Arabia's  formulations of its essential security interests are 
"vague" or "imprecise"824, the Panel sees no basis in the text of Article  73(b)(iii), or otherwise, for 
demanding greater precision than that which has been presented by Saudi Arabia. The Panel recalls 
that, in Russia – Traffic in Transit , the standard applied to the invoking Member was whether its 
articulation of its essential security interests was "minimally satisfactory" in the circumstances.825 
The requirement that an invoking Member articulate its "essential security interests " sufficient ly to 
enable an assessment of whether the challenged measures are related to those intere sts is not a 
particular ly onerous one, and is appropriately subject to limited review by a panel.826 The reason is 
that this analytical step serv es primarily to provide  a benchmark  against which to examine the 
"action" under the chapeau of Article  73(b). Tha t is, this analytical step  enabl es an assessment by 
the Panel of whether either of the challenged measures found to be inconsistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement is plausibly connected to the protection of those essential security interests .    
7.282.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel concludes that Saudi Arabia's articulation of its relevant 
"essential security interests"  is sufficient to enable an assessment of whether there is any link 
between the relevant  actions and the protection of its essential security interests .  
7.4.3.3.4   The connection between the measures and the essential security interests  
7.283.   The Panel notes that both parties have suggested that the Panel may and should assess the 
relationship (if any) between the relevant measures and the "emergency i n international relations" . 
Saudi Arabia stated that it has "no problem with the good faith test" in respect of the invocation of 
Article  73(b)(iii)827, and that " the Panel may assess compliance with Saudi Arabia 's obligation of 
good faith".828 Saudi Arabia stated more generally that "consistent with Saudi Arabia's approach to 
this dispute, [it] will not address the facts presented by the complaining Party, and leave the 
assessment of the evidence to the Panel".829 For its part, Qatar stressed that 
Saudi  Arabia 's purported non -engagement with parts of the matter before the Panel does not 
prevent the Panel from fulfilling its function under the DSU and its terms of reference, and that there 
is "no reason whatsoever for Saudi Arabia 's purported 'refusal to engage' with Qatar to frustrate the 
ability of the Panel to make findings and recommendations based on its terms of reference and the 
material on the record".830  
7.284.   The Panel notes that Saudi Arabia's position in this dispute is that it seeks to protect Saudi 
citizens and the Saudi population, Saudi  government institutions, and the territory of Saudi Arabia 
from the threats of terrorism and extremism . One of the means through which Saudi Arabia seeks 
to protect these essential security interests is by ending any direct or indirect interaction between 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, extending to  their respective populations and institutions. An action that 
Saudi Arabia has taken for this purpose is to ref use to interact with Qatar in the context of WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings. Another is to end or prevent any direct or indirect interaction or 
contact between Saudi  Arabia n and Qatar i nationals.  
7.285.   The Panel turns to the measures that, directly or indire ctly, have had the result of preventing 
beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures 
before Saudi courts and tribunals (anti-sympathy measures ). The relevant question is whether the 
anti-sympathy measures "meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered 
essential security interests, i.e. that they are not implausible as measures protective of these 
 
823 Qatar's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  74-75 (quoting Panel  Report, 
Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.71); Qatar's second written submission, paras.  262-264 (quoting 
Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.71); and Saudi Arabia's second written submission, par a. 34 
(quoting Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.130).  
824 See paragraph 7.236  of this Report.  
825 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Tra nsit, para. 7.137.  
826 Among other things, it may be noted that an assessment of whether or not certain security interests 
are "essential" or not is not one that a WTO dispute settlement panel is well positioned to make.  
827 Saudi Arabia's response to Panel qu estion No. 28, paras. 20 -23.  
828 Saudi Arabia's second written submission, para. 46.  
829 Saudi Arabia's communication to the Panel, dated 20 December 2019, para. 7.  
830 Qatar's comments on Saudi Arabia's response to Panel question No. 37, para. 19.  
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  interests".831 The panel mus t therefore review whether the anti -sympathy measures "are so remote 
from, or unrelated to, the ["emergency in international relations" ] as to make it implausible that 
[Saudi  Arabia] implemented the measures for the protection of its essential security int erests arising 
out of the emergency ".832 
7.286.   The measures aimed at denying Qatari nationals access to civil remedies through 
Saudi  courts may be viewed as an aspect of Saudi Arabia's umbrella policy of ending or preventing 
any form of interaction with Qatari nat ionals.  Given that Saudi Arabia imposed a travel ban on all 
Qatari nationals from entering the territory of Saudi Arabia and an expulsion order for all Qatari 
nationals in the territory of Saudi Arabia as part of the comprehensive measures taken on 
5 June 2017, it is not implausible that Saudi Arabia might take other measures to prevent Qatari 
nationals from having access to courts, tribunals and other institutions in Saudi Arabia. Indeed , it is 
not implausible that , as part  of its umbrella policy of ending  or preventing any form of interaction 
with Qatari nationals , as reflected through , inter alia , its 5 June 2017 travel ban intended to 
"prevent[] Qatari  citizens' entry to or transit through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia"833, which forms 
part of Saudi Arabia's "comprehensive measures" , Saudi Arabia might take various formal and 
informal measures to deny Saudi law firms from representing or interacting with Qatari nationals for 
almost any purpose.  
7.287.   As an ancillary consideration, the Panel also notes  the direct link made by Qatar itself 
between the anti -sympathy measures preventing law firms from representing beIN , on the one hand , 
and the "comprehensive measures" taken on 5  June 2017, on the other hand . Saudi Arabia 
maintain ed that the "comprehensive measures" are an "action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests" , a point that Qatar does not dispute . Specifically, as 
elaborated earlier834, Qatar explained that "[t]he instruction to law yers in Saudi Arabia to refrain 
from representing beIN is closely related to the general anti -sympathy measures, and indeed , would 
appear to be a natural application of that measure".835 The Panel recalls that the general 
anti-sympathy measures were announce d by Saudi news outlets on 6  June 2017, i.e. the day after 
Saudi Arabia's severance of relations with Qatar. The Panel also finds it significant  that 
Qatar's  argument has focused on the manner in which the anti -sympathy measures "work together" 
with the tr avel restrictions that were announced on 5  June 2017, and which undoubtedly constitute 
an integral part of the "comprehensive measures" taken by Saudi Arabia.  
Indeed,  Qatar's  submissions consistently refer to these two measures in tandem, using the 
formula tion "anti -sympathy and related measures (e.g. travel restrictions)".836  
7.288.   For these reasons, the Panel considers that the anti -sympathy measures "meet a minimum 
requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security interests, i.e. that they are 
not implausible as measures protective of these interests".837  
7.289.   In the Panel's view, however, the same conclusion cannot be reached regarding the  
connection between Saudi Arabia's stated essential security interests and its authorities'  
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ. In contrast to the anti -sympathy 
measures, which might be viewed as an aspect of Saudi Arabia's umbrella policy of ending or 
preventing any form of interaction with Qatari nationals, the Panel is una ble to discern any basis for 
concluding that the application of criminal procedures or penalties to beoutQ would require any entity 
in Saudi Arabia to engage in any form of interaction with beIN or any other Qatari  national.   
 
831 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.138.  
832 Ibid. para. 7.139.  
833 Qatar's first written submission, para.  15 (referring to Announcement on the Saudi Embassy to the 
United  States website, " Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Diplomatic and Consula r Relations with the State of 
Qatar ", 5 June 2017, Exhibit QAT -3). 
834 See paragraph 7.53 of this Report.  
835 Qatar's response to Panel question No. 13, para. 98. See the Panel's findings at section 7.2.3.2. 1 
("Anti -sympathy measures") of this Report.  
836 Qatar's first written submission, paras.  8. 156, 157, 187, 205, 206, 207, 225, 233, 269, 322, 327, 
328, 345, 346, 352, 374 and 396; and Qatar's responses to Panel question No. 4, para. 24, Panel question 
No. 8, paras. 58, 61, and 65, and Panel question No. 17, para. 112.  
837 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.138.  
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  7.290.   Multiple third -party right hol ders submitted evidence directly to the Saudi authorities  and 
have made such evidence available to these authorities in the course of this dispute . This third-party 
corroborating evidence includes, for example:  
a. letters issued by UEFA and BBC Studios to the Ministry and GCAM containing evidence 
concerning beoutQ's operations and efforts to target the Saudi market , its use of 
Arabsat satellites and its sale of STBs  and subscriptions  in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere 
in the MENA region838;  
b. letters from UEFA, LaLiga and the Premier League to Arabsat  reporting beoutQ's use of 
particular Arabsat satellite frequencies  to transmit its pirated content839, which 
Arabsat's  legal representative stated in letters to third -party right holders that Arabsat 
would take into account in its ongoing investigation840;  
c. FIFA's letter to Arabsat concerning the scope of its satellite coverage and its 
transmission of beoutQ's pirated conten t841;  
d. submissions made to the USTR concerning beoutQ's piracy, which were summarized in 
the USTR's 2019 Special 301 Report  and have been submitted to the Panel and 
Saudi  Arabia in this dispute842;  
e. a public joint statement made by seven major football right holders condemning beoutQ 
and requesting enforcement action by Saudi Arabia against beoutQ843; and  
f. a technical report produced by the anti -piracy and cybersecurity firm MarkMonitor, at 
the request of the seven football right holders,  making specific findings concerning 
beoutQ's unauthorized re -streaming of copyrighted content, the transmission of 
beoutQ's  pirated content on specific Arabsat satellites and frequencies,  the design and 
operation of the hardware and software of beoutQ STBs to target Saudi  Arabia, and the 
technically sophisticated and organized  nature of beoutQ's  operation .844 
7.291.   The Panel recalls  that the non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ, a 
commercial -scale broadcast pirate , affects not only Qatar or Qatari nationals , but also a range of 
third-party right holders . The Panel recalls that several third parties commented on the question of 
whether —and, if so, how —the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ could 
plausibly be connected to Saudi Arabia's essential security interests. Brazil state d that it "fails to see 
how the respondent's pr offered essential security interests, or any country's essential security 
interests for that matter, could be protected by allowing the operation of a copyright pirate whose 
broadcasts have spread beyond the respondent's borders and encompass not only the copyrights 
held by the claimant's nationals but by other countries' nationals as well, including Brazil's".845 
Similarly, the European  Union  stated that, without taking a position on the facts of this case, it would 
"welcome a detailed explanation clarifying  why, in order to protect its essential security interests, 
Saudi Arabia considers it necessary to breach the rights of third party right -holders".846 In its third -
party oral statement, the European  Union  reiterate d that it " would appreciate it if Saudi Arab ia could 
provide a plausible explanation of the reasons why 'it considers necessary' to allow the systematic 
infringement of the intellectual property rights of EU right holders in order to protect its essential 
security interests".847 
7.292.   The Panel observes tha t, in further contrast to the anti -sympathy measures, neither party 
has suggested that there is any direct link between the non -application of criminal procedures and 
penalties , on the one hand,  and any action taken on , or consequential to , the 5 June 2017  
 
838 See paragraph 7.102  of this Report.  
839 See paragraph 7.107  of this Report.  
840 See paragraph 7.108  of this Report.  
841 See paragraphs 7.110  to 7.111 of this Report.  
842 See paragraph 7.128  of this Report.  
843 See paragraph 7.130  of this Report.  
844 See paragraph 7.142  of this Re port. 
845 Brazil's third -party submission, para. 37.  
846 European  Union's third -party submission, para. 67.  
847 European  Union's third -party oral statement, para. 7. (emphasis omitted)  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  "comprehensive measures" severing relations with Qatar, on the other hand . Whereas the 
anti-sympathy measures were announced on 6  June 2017, there is no such temporal connection 
between the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties and the 5  June 2017 
"comprehensive measures". For the reasons given above, there is also no rational or logical 
connection between the comprehensive measures aimed at ending interaction with Qatar and 
Qatari  nationals, and the non -application of Saudi criminal proce dures and penalties to beoutQ.  
7.293.   The Panel concludes that the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ 
does not have any relationship to Saudi Arabia's policy of ending or preventing any form of 
interaction with Qatari nationals.  There fore, the Saudi authorities' non-application of criminal 
procedures and penalties to beoutQ  is so remote from, or unrelated to, the "emergency in 
international relations" as to make it implausible that Saudi Arabia implemented these measures for 
the protec tion of its "essential security interests".848 As a consequence, the Panel concludes that the 
non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ does not "meet a minimum 
requirement of plausibility in relation to the proffered essential security interests, i.e. that they are 
not implausible as measures protective of these interests".849 
7.4.4   Conclusion  
7.294.   For these reasons , the Panel finds that the requirements for invoking Article  73(b)(iii) are 
met in relation to the inconsistency with Article  42 and Arti cle 41.1 of the TRIPS  Agreement850 arising 
from the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining 
Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts 
and tribuna ls. The Panel also finds that the requirements for invoking Article  73(b)(iii) are not met 
in relation to the inconsistency with Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement  arising from 
Saudi  Arabia's  non-application of criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ.  
8  CONCLUSIONS AND RECO MMENDATION  
8.1.  For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:  
a. The Panel has no discretion to decline to make any findings or recommendation in the 
case t hat has been brought before it;  
b. With respect to Qatar's claims under Parts I, II and III of the TRIPS  Agreement : 
i. Qatar has established that Saudi Arabia has taken measures that, directly or 
indirectly, have had the result of preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal 
counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement procedures before Saudi 
courts and tribunals , and thus Saudi Arabia has acted in a manner inconsistent 
with Article  42 and Article  41.1 of the TRIPS  Agreement ; 
ii. Qatar has established tha t Saudi Arabia has not provided for criminal procedures 
and penalties to be applied to beoutQ despite the evidence establishing prima 
facie that beoutQ  is operated by individuals or entities under the jurisdiction of 
Saudi Arabia, and thus Saudi Arabia has acted inconsistently with Article  61 of 
the TRIPS  Agreement ; 
iii. in the light of these findings, it is unnecessary to make findings on 
Qatar's  additional claims under Parts I and II of the TRIPS  Agreement . 
c. With respect to Saudi Arabia's invocation of the security exception in Article  73(b)(iii) 
of the TRIPS  Agreement : 
i. the requirements for invoking Article  73(b)(iii) are met in relation to the 
inconsistency with Article  42 and Article  41.1 of the TRIPS  Agreement  arising 
 
848 See paragraph 7.285  of this Report.  
849 Panel  Report, Russia – Traffic in Transit , para. 7.138.  
850 The Panel notes that its analysis under Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement would apply equally 
to any violati ons of Parts I and II of the TRIPS  Agreement arising from the anti -sympathy measures, and 
therefore sees no reason to disturb its decision to exercise judicial economy over those claims.  WT/DS567/R  
 
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  from the measures that, directly or indirectly, have had the result of preventing 
beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil 
enforcement procedures before S audi courts and tribunals ; and  
ii. the requirements for invoking Article  73(b)(iii) are not met in relation to the 
inconsistency with Article  61 of the TRIPS  Agreement  arising from Saudi Arabia's 
non-application of  criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ .  
8.2.  Under Article  3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations 
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie  to constitute a case of 
nullification or impairme nt. The Panel concludes that, to the extent that the measures at issue are 
inconsistent with the TRIPS  Agreement , they have nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Qatar 
under that Agreement.  
8.3.  Pursuant to Article  19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommends tha t Saudi Arabia bring its 
measures into conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS  Agreement . 
 
__________