RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/137  
 
9 October 2020  
(20-6949) Page: 1/93 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
10 AND 1 1 JUNE  2020 
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR JOSE LUIS CANCELA (URUGUAY)  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG , or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/1 6/Rev.1 ; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/7 81. The present document contains the record of the Council 's meeting held on 
10-11 June 2020. The meeting was convened in  virtual format and proceeded on the basis of the 
following agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  3 
2   STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  IA OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.27)  ................................ .................  4 
3   APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF  
THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ...............  4 
4   ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF  
GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ......................  5 
5   COVID -19: MEASURES RELATED TO TRADE IN GOODS – REQUEST FROM CANADA; 
COLOMBIA; COSTA RICA; HONG KONG, CHINA; NEW ZEALAND; NORWAY; SINGAPORE; 
SWITZERLAN D; AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/780)  ................................ ................................ . 6 
6   PROPOSAL FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE  
TO PROVIDE GREATER LEGAL CERTAINTY TO NON -RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES  
GRANTED BY DEVELOPING COUNTRY WTO  MEMBERS TO LEAST DEVELOPED  
COUNTRIES – REQUEST FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (G/C/W/7 75) ........................  14 
7   PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER WTO AGREEMENTS – ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, C ANADA,  
COSTA RICA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, ISRAEL, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE SEPARATE 
CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, AND THE UNITED 
STATES (JOB/GC/204/REV.3 -JOB/CTG/14/REV.3)  ................................ .......................  16 
8   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND,  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SWITZERLAND, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  ....... 26 
9   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED UK TRQ  
COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL,  
CANADA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SWITZERLAND,  
THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ .............  31 
10   ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO INCLUDE CROATIA: NEGOTIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE XXIV:6 OF THE GATT 1994 – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  34 
11   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD 1,000,  
BENEFITS PURSUANT TO ANNEX VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/752)  ................................ ................................ .......................  35 G/C/M/137  
 
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  12   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........................  37 
13   MEXICO – FRONT OF PACK NUTRITION LABELING (NOM -51) – REQUEST FROM  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 38 
14   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM  
(THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER 2019) – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  40 
15   UNITED STATES - EXECUTIVE ORDER ON SECURING THE BULK -POWER SYSTEM - 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 42 
16   EUROPEAN UNION – SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN STEEL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .............  43 
17   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL,  
CANADA, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, 
HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED  STATES, AND 
URUGUAY (G/C/W/767/REV.1)  ................................ ................................ .....................  44 
18   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB  
EMIRATES, OMAN, AND QAT AR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  ...... 54 
19   INDONES IA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  ............................  56 
20   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS  
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, THE UNITED STATES,  
AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  60 
21   EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE  
 EUROPEAN UNION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .....................  63 
22   MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .............  65 
23   CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  65 
24   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE,  
AND THE UNITED STATES ................................ ................................ ...............................  67 
25   CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF  
TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINM EN AND MATSU ................................ ................................ ........  71 
26   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS REGARDING  
PROTECTED DESIGNATIONS OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL IN DICATIONS, 
TRADITIONAL TERMS, LABELLING AND PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN WINE SECTOR 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ........................  72 
27   CHINA – NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM THE  
EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ......................  73 
28   UNITED STATES – PROHIBITIVE MEASURES ON COM MUNICATION EQUIPMENT  
OR SERVICES RELEASED BY THE FCC – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ...... 75 
29   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 75 
30   UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 76 
31   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST  
FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  77 G/C/M/137  
 
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  32   EUROP EAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) –  
REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 77 
33   THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ........................  79 
34   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU) 2017/2321 AND  
REGULATION (EU) 2018/825 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  .................  82 
35   EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM COLOMBIA AND MALAYSIA  ................................  83 
36   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .........  86 
37   BETTER FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS AND  
SUBSIDIARY COMMITTEES – REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE INFORMAL 
CONSULTATIONS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  88 
38   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  ................................ ...................  91 
39   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 92 
39.1   Date of the Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ ........................... 92 
40   ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ....................  93 
 
At the outset of the meeting, and given its virtual nature, the Chairperson  recalled to Members that , 
as indicated in the organizational and technical note that he had distributed to all delegations before 
the meeting, the virtual format of the meeting required interventions to be time -limited; however , 
delegations were invited to send their full written statements to the Se cretariat, either during the 
meeting itself or during the subsequent 10  working days, for their incorporation into the meeting's 
minutes. The Chairperson also invited Members raising specific trade concerns to share their full 
written statements with the M embers concerned so as to allow them the fullest opportunity to respond 
to them.  
 
The Chairperson  informed delegations that, under agenda item "Other Business", he would raise the 
matter of the date of the Council's next meeting.  
 
The agenda  was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA)  and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was  to be kept informed of Members' notifications of new regional 
trade agreements (RTAs).1 He informed the CTG that five  RTAs had been notified to the CRTA, as 
followed:  
(i) Free Trade Agreement between the Philippines and the EFTA States, Goods 
(WT/REG394/N/2) ; 
 
(ii) Free Trade Agreement between Hong Kong, China and Australia, Goods 
(WT/REG400/N/1) ; 
 
(iii) Interim Agreement between the EAEU a nd Iran, Goods (W T/REG401/N/1) ; 
 
(iv) Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and Singapore, Goods 
(WT/REG402/N/1) ; 
 
(v) Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Chile and Indonesia, Goods 
(WT/REG403/N/1) . 
 
 
1 See documents WT/REG/16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  1.2.  The delegate of the  Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
1.3.  The Interim Agreement leading to the formation of a free trade area between  the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU) and its member States  on the one part , and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 
the other  part, entered into force on 27  October  2019. This Agreement provides for the creation of 
a free trade area on a limited range of goods. The Agreement also establishes the basic rules of 
trade between the EAEU and Iran as close as possible to the WTO  rules, including inter alia  provisions 
on Most Favoured Nation (MFN) , national treatment, trade remedies and customs administration. 
The Russian Federation consider s this Interim Agreement to be a first  step to creation of a 
full-fledged free trade area (FTA) with Iran in the near future. In this reg ard, the Agreement provides 
for the start of negotiations on a full-fledged FTA within one  year from the date of its entry into 
force.  
1.4.  The Chairperson  proposed that  the Council take note of the statement made  and of the 
information provided . 
1.5.  The Council so agreed . 
2  STATUS OF NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENTS IN 
ANNEX  IA OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/REV.27)  
2.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to document  G/L/223/Rev.27, containing the status 
of notifications under the provisions of the  Agreements in Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement.  
2.2.  As no delegation took the floor  under this agenda item, he proposed that the Council take note 
of document  G/L/223/Rev.27.  
2.3.  The Council  so agreed . 
3  APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS TO THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE 
IN GOODS  
3.1.  The Chairperson  reminded  delegations that the Guidelines for Appointment of Officers to the 
WTO (WT/L/510) adopted by the General Council on 11  December  2002, provided that the 
Chairperson of the CTG would conduct consultations o n the appointment of the Chairpersons of the 
subsidiary bodies of this Council, including consultations with the Group Coordinators in line with the 
practical steps to be taken to improve the process of appointment of officers contained in JOB/GC/22 , 
dated  27 July 2012.  
3.2.  In this vein, he had held consultations with Group Coordinators  on 4 and 10  March  2020. A 
further round of consultations, which had been  planned for 24  March, had been  cancelled due to the 
COVID -19 pandemic.  Nevertheless, he had undertaken  bilateral consultations with all Group 
Coordinators by a number of means.  
3.3.  In line with the Guidelines for the Appointment of Chairs to WTO  Bodies, he had also 
coordinated the process with the Chair person  of the Council for Trade in Services (Ambassador Geert 
Muylle of Belgium ). 
3.4.  On 20  May 2020, he had circulated to Members a list that he had prepared on the basis of the 
candidates proposed by the Group Coordinators during his consultations . Although it had been a 
difficult task, this list had garnered the support of regional groups. However, he regretted to have 
to inform Members that one  delegation had presented a formal objection to this list. For this reason, 
despite the objective and tr ansparent manner  in which the process had been  carried out, including 
being fully in line with the principle of rotation contained in  the Guidelines , he was  obliged, 
unfortunately,  to inform the Council that , for the time being, he could not submit this li st to the 
Council for its approval.  
3.5.  Therefore, in his capacity as outgoing Chairperson, responsible for this process, he would 
continue further consultations with a view to seeing the approval of the list that he had circulated . 
In this vein, and as he had  asked from Members at the Heads of Delegation ( HoDs) meeting  in April , 
he invited Members , including the delegation that had objected to the list,  to show the necessary G/C/M/137  
 
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  flexibility in this process, and to consider the systemic interest s of Members, this being  a particularly 
significant matter at a time of crisis . Therefore, he proposed to suspend this item on the agenda  and 
to revert to it at the appropriate time . 
3.6.  The Council so agreed . 
4  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE KYRGYZ  REPUBLIC TO THE 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION  
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in  a communication dated 28 May 2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the S ecretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
4.2.  The delegat e of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.3.  Back in April  2019, the European Union  welcomed the progress achieved in our negotiations 
on tariffs for non -agricultural products, where an agreement of principle has been reached. When it 
comes to agriculture, however, neither of the Members concerned has offered genuine compensation 
yet for  the substantial reductions in market access which the EU had to face.  The EU understands 
that the current pandemic has not helped in moving these negotiations forward. Yet these 
negotiations remain important for the EU. The EU  invite s both Armenia and the Kyrgyz  Republic  to 
resume talks rapidly with a view to making substantial progress and concluding negotiations as soon 
as possible.  
4.4.  The delegat e of China  indicated the following:  
4.5.  China has also submitted claims of interest and has been working with Armeni a and the Kyrgyz 
Republic,  respectively , on the renegotiations under GATT  Article  XXVIII . Chin a is ready to engage in 
further discussion with Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic on related technical issues and looks 
forward to accelerating the renegotiation pr ocess with a view to receiving appropriate compensation 
under GATT  Articles  XXIV and XXVIII . 
4.6.  The delegate  of Armenia  indicated the following:  
4.7.  During the period following  the last Council  meeting , Armenia  continue d consultations and 
communications with interested delegations ; however, due to understandable reasons, with less 
intensity during the last months. After hopefully a gradual completion of the lockdowns, Armenia  
would be ready to intensify its efforts to com e up with the formulation of  a mutually acceptable 
position for a compensation package , and strongly believe s that its last proposal  would  lay sound 
ground s for the substantive progress and completion of negotiations.  
4.8.  The delega te of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
4.9.  The Kyrgyz Republic is  also working hard and now focusing more resources to come up with 
the formulation of mutually acceptable solution s for compensation packages on agricultural goods . 
The Kyrgyz Republic assure s the EU and other i nterested Members that it puts all possible efforts to 
intensify the consultations with its EAEU  partners to speed up the process. The negotiation process 
includes a number of players as the EAEU and WTO  Members are involved in the process. The Kyrgyz 
Republic also  regret s that ongoing work was affected by unforeseen circumstances represented by 
COVID -19. Despite these obstacles, the Kyrgyz Republic express es readiness to continue with 
interested WTO  Members the constructive dialogue and exchange to achieve  the result  and is also 
working hard and focusing more resources to come up with a mutually acceptable solution for a 
compensation package only in the Goods Council . 
4.10.   The delegate  of Brazil  indicated the following:  
4.11.   Brazil  echoes  the European Union in its concerns regarding the renegotiations on agriculture, 
since Brazil has suffered reduction in market access for agricultural products following Armenia's 
accession to the Eurasian Economic Union. Brazil recalls that, in January  2015, it sent a  Note Verbale  
to Armenia listing the products that would be affected in their bilateral trade and requesting the 
recognition of initial negotiating rights for those tariff lines. Brazil looks forward to engaging in G/C/M/137  
 
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  discussions with Armenia wit h a view to receiving appropriate compensation under 
GATT  Articles  XXIV and XXVIII.  
4.12.   The delegate  of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
4.13.   The Russian Federation recognizes its crucial role in the successful conclusion of these 
negotiations and wi ll continue to support the negotiation process.  
4.14.   The Chairperson  propose d that the Council take note of the statements made.  
4.15.   The Council  so agreed . 
5  COVID -19: MEASURES RELATED TO TRADE IN GOODS – REQUEST FROM CANADA; 
COLOMBIA; COSTA RICA; HONG KONG, CHINA; N EW ZEALAND; NORWAY; SINGAPORE; 
SWITZERLAND; AND URUGUAY (G/C/W/780)  
5.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 28  May 2020, the 
delegations of Canada;  Colombia;  Costa Rica;  Hong Kong, China;  New Zealand;  Norway; Singapore; 
and Switzerland, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda. 
After the Airgram had been issued,  the delegation of Uruguay  requested to be included among the 
list of  co-sponsor s of this agenda item.  
5.2.  The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
5.3.  There are signs that we are getting out of the pandemic crisis. Yet it is crucial that we stay 
vigilant, keep a close watch on the whole picture, and learn lessons, so that we could handle similar 
challenges in a better way in future.  Looking back, there were lots of emergency measures 
implemented during a very short period of time. Thanks to Members' efforts and commitment on 
transparency, we have much information on the measures. Much analysis and ot her information 
materials are also available regarding trade in goods under the pandemic crisis.  
5.4.  Being the WTO  body overseeing the rules -based system in respect of goods, now is the time 
for the CTG to act on this pool of knowledge in a way meaningful to t rade. 
5.5.  The communication (G/C/W/780 ) is a reminder that we possess valuable information on 
COVID -19 measures and initiatives related to trade in goods. We encourage the Secretariat to build 
on what we have ( for example,  the list on the WTO  webpage, and noti fications from Members), and 
then organize the information into a factual report to facilitate Members' tracing of the measures 
and understanding of their impact. We also hope to see relevant subsidiary committees' efforts and 
inputs in a coherent way, con tributing to the CTG's discussion through a dedicated section on the 
topic in their respective reports.  
5.6.  The COVID -19 pandemic crisis illustrates the need for resilience in the multilateral trading 
system. The CTG has a role to play, as a first  step, in ser ving as a platform to monitor the overall 
implementation of measures in a systematic manner and also to promote good practices and 
initiatives.  
5.7.  The delegate  of Colombia  indicated the following:  
5.8.  The pandemic we are experiencing has required all Members of the Organization to adopt 
various emergency measures to address the health crisis and its economic consequences, with a 
view to preserving the life, health and well -being of their citizens.  
5.9.  Colombia acknowledge s the valuable efforts made by Memb ers to notify, inform or validate the 
measures that have been adopted, even at times when their authorities were facing obvious 
difficulties. However, knowledge about the measures adopted and their implications for world trade 
may be limited or incomplete.  
5.10.   Considering the mandate and competence of this Council, Colombia and the group of 
seven  co-sponsors consider s it appropriate to include a specific item on this matter in meeting 
agendas for the coming months to have an open dialogue on the impact of the p andemic on world G/C/M/137  
 
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  trade. This would also be the forum for showcasing the work of the subsidiary committees on this 
matter.  
5.11.   The intention is to have a full and clear overview of the slate of measures, thus facilitating 
access to information, and the possibil ity of following up and analy sing documents. This proposal is 
aimed at fostering transparency, encouraging Members to submit corresponding notifications and 
thus promote cooperation, which is fundamental for effectively addressing this global crisis.  
5.12.   Colom bia also consider s that the Secretariat should produce factual documents on the 
measures adopted and their repercussions. Access to factual information is extremely useful for 
decisions to be taken in capitals, thus paving the way for reconstruction of the  global economy.  
5.13.   The delegate  of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
5.14.   Transparency is a key element in our joint efforts to mitigate the health and economic impact 
of the pandemic. It is a necessary ingredient to further develop coordinated and global resp onses 
here at the WTO in terms of trade policies.  
5.15.   It is only natural that we use a fo rmal WTO  body, namely the Council for Trade in Goods, to 
inform Members about COVID -19-related trade policies, share views on the matter and ask 
questions. A dedicated age nda item would contribute to support ing Members' efforts in their fight 
against COVID -19. 
5.16.   Switzerland is of the view that a report by the Secretariat on measures taken by Members 
would positively contribute to a fruitful exchange between Members . 
5.17.   The deleg ate of Singapore  indicated the following:  
5.18.   The communication the proponents circulated already covers what Singapore wants to say, 
but it would  like to take the chance to emphas ize that transparency is crucial to allow us to effectively 
fight the pandemic. Transparency and timely notifications are important to help importers and 
exporters cope with any disruptions to their supply chains.  
5.19.   In this regard, the CTG presents an ideal and logical platform for us to continue our work to 
track and discuss trade -related measures that have been implemented during the crisis, so that we 
may understand them better, and collectively work towards the recovery of the global economy.  
5.20.   In addition, Singapore  would also like to briefly highlight that , together with Ne w Zealand, 
Singapore has issued a Declaration on Trade in Essential Goods for Combating the 
COVID -19 Pandemic, where we both agreed to eliminate MFN  applied tariffs on a range of products, 
and also addressed import and export measures and other non -tariff barriers. Singapore  conveyed 
this in communications to this Council in documents  G/C/W/777 and G/C/W/779.  
5.21.   The delegate  of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
5.22.   Uruguay welcomes the inclusion of this item, as it recalls and strengthens the terms of 
reference of the WTO  bodies for following up the emergency measures and initiatives related to 
trade in goods taken in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. Uruguay  notes the interest in following 
these up through a more systematic analysis of information, which would lea d to better 
understanding and transparency among Members in the primary body responsible for trade in goods, 
in order to achieve the necessary balance between respect for the rights and obligations set out in 
the Agreements, in an unprecedented situation t hat is especially urgent and sensitive for Members.  
5.23.   The delegate  of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
5.24.   COVID -19 is an immense challenge currently facing all Members and has significant trade 
implications. It is vitally important that we be discussing the se issues in this Council.  
5.25.   We all benefit from transparency, information -sharing, and coordination of our respective 
trade policy responses. It was for this reason that New Zealand  and Singapore jointly communicated 
the New Zealand/Singapore Declaration on Trade in Essential Goods for Combating the G/C/M/137  
 
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  COVID -19 Pandemic to the CTG in document  G/C/W/777. New Zealand  would like to stress that the 
door is open for all Members wanting to effect meaningful change to join us, and is happy to discuss 
it with interested delegations.  
5.26.   The delegate  of Canada  indicated the following:  
5.27.   Canada  would like to echo the comments that have been made so far by the co-sponsors, in 
particular, to commend Hong Kong, China for its leadership in bringing this agenda item to the 
Council's attention and for bringing forward this suggestion of which a number of Members here are 
supportive.  
5.28.   It is extremely important in this time that the committees are able to report up to the Council 
the information that they are examining and discussing so that then we, here in the Council, can 
have a horizontal view of the disc ussions taking place and all of the notifications that have come in 
from Members in relation to measures they have taken in response to the global health pandemic.  
5.29.   At the Market Access Committee meeting that was held two  days ago there were numerous 
notifications that were presented and discussed related to the pandemic and measures taken, both 
quantitative restrictions as well as some trade -facilitative measures that a number of Members have 
taken. So just to underline the importance to us of having this h orizontal view here in the Council of 
what is being discussed in our subsidiary bodies.  
5.30.   The delegate  of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
5.31.   Costa Rica wishes to thank Hong Kong, China for its initiative and leadership. In order to avoid 
any repetition of the content of the written communication and the excellent presentation made by 
Hong Kong , China  and the other co -sponsors, Costa Rica will merely urge other Members to support 
this initiative.  
5.32.   This is a concrete proposal concerning a situati on having a worldwide impact with far -reaching 
trade and socio -economic implications. With regard to the proposal, the WTO and this Council can 
support monitoring and strengthen transparency, which are fundamental principles for the 
functioning of this Organization.  
5.33.   The delegate of Burkina Faso , speaking for Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the 
following:  
5.34.   This item is about measures taken by Members in response to the COVID -19 crisis. We have 
notified the General Council of our concerns about this in document  WT/GC/2 11. We feel that it is  
important to closely follow the consequences of this health crisis so that we can minimize the 
negative impact that it may have on our trade, particularly concerning medical and pharmaceutical 
products t hat are useful to combat the crisis and also agricultural commodities that are required to 
feed our populations. LDCs have a low level of integration in global trade and this crisis will 
exacerbate the situation that they face. It seems important to us to remove barriers to trade that 
have been created by the crisis as quickly as possible. And we will also need to look after our 
populations. The WTO can make LDCs and other Members' work easier and we welcome those 
efforts. We need to be kept informed of the  ways in which the crisis is restricting trade so that any 
unwanted limits can be removed,  and we can return to as much normality as possible.  
5.35.   The delegate  of the Republic of K orea indicated the following:  
5.36.   Korea is very supportive of the purpose of this ag enda item addressing the 
COVID -19 pandemic. Given the unexpected economic and health crisis caused by COVID -19, it is 
inevitable to ensure stable trade in goods in terms of transparency.  Korea believes that the ideas in 
the document could contribute to str engthening the relevance of the WTO.  Furthermore, Korea will 
actively participate through all relevant venues to deal with COVID -19-related measures such as 
CTG meetings as well as CTS  meetings.  
5.37.   The delegate  of Ecuador  indicated the following:  G/C/M/137  
 
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  5.38.   Ecuador is  equally grateful for the WTO's reports on Member countries' measures on goods, 
services and intellectual property, adopted in response to the COVID -19 health emergency.  Ecuador 
is continuously examining  these reports in an effort to monitor the measures tha t are of primary 
interest to it, such as export restrictions, tariff reductions, trade facilitation measures, as well as 
other measures affecting trade in food, medicines and medical inputs and devices. This is to 
determine the impact on Ecuador's  supply a nd ensure that such measures are applied temporarily.  
In this regard, such information is extremely useful to Members, particularly developing countries, 
and we consider it important for the item on COVID -19-related trade measures to remain on the 
agenda t o facilitate the examination of new measures that could eventually affect any Member 
country's imports or exports, through phytosanitary -related import restrictions, for example.  
Ecuador therefore agrees with the approach of Hong Kong, China, in that this matter of 
COVID -19-related measures remain a permanent agenda item for the C TG. 
5.39.   The delegate  of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
5.40.   In Paraguay's  view, this is an excellent initiative and one that it wishes to support. This 
exercise will help delegation s, particularly small delegations , to follow up on measures in an 
organized manner and will also facilitate the monitoring of these measures.  
5.41.   The delegate  of the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.42.   The EU welcomes this initiative to foster our collecti ve understanding of the various measures 
that Members have taken in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic.  As the EU has stated in other 
bodies, effective transparency is essential to minimize the potentially negative effects of some of 
the restrictive meas ures that have been taken, allowing for their proper scrutiny and coordination 
to keep supply chains open. It will also help us in the future econom ic recovery phase which will 
follow the first  immediate crisis response.  
5.43.   Turning to the concrete suggestions  in the communication, the EU sees value in dedicated 
discussions at CTG  level and also think s that the transparency efforts on COVID -19-related measures 
need to be centralized in the T rade Policy Review Body (TPRB) . The scope of the measures goes 
beyond g oods; it extends to services, intellectual property, and what is referred to as 'economic 
support measures' in the TPR  monitoring exercise.  
5.44.   As regards factual reports by the Secretariat, the EU  has found the reports prepared by the 
Secretariat so far to be informative and is supportive of further work to collect and summarize 
information.  The work done by individual committees is very valuable in this regard. The EU has a 
question about the reference, in the last paragraph of the communication, to the "respective reports 
of these committees to the CTG" - surely, the suggestion would not be to wait for the annual reports 
at the end of the year? If the CTG carries out a dedicated activity on goods -related 
COVID -19 measures, it should be drawing on the wor k in its subsidiary bodies more directly.  
5.45.   The delegate  of Japan  indicated the following:  
5.46.   Japan also places importance on enhancing transparency and submitting timely notifications 
and agrees that this Council has an important role and function in monitorin g COVID -19-related 
trade measures. Japan looks forward to engaging in further discussion.  
5.47.   The delegate  of Nigeria  indicated the following:  
5.48.   Nigeria wishes to thank the proponents of the paper that has been forwarded to the Capital 
for assessment. At the out set, Nigeria wishes to associate itself with the statement that will be made 
by the African Group.  As stated in previous meetings of the CTG, Nigeria believe s transparency and 
notifications are issues of critical and fundamental importance to the effective  functioning of the 
multilateral trading system. However, there are  some further comments regarding the paper before 
us. 
5.49.   First, there is need for clarity on the scope of the proposal. It would be interesting to know 
whether, by requesting Members to provid e timely information and notification of any 
COVID -19-related measures and initiatives, the proponents imply notification of trade as well as 
other physical and macro -economic policy measures and initiatives activated by Members to speed G/C/M/137  
 
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  up economic recove ry. As Members may be aware, whereas some developing countries have 
extremely tight fiscal space to provide support to their economic agents, others were able to provide 
robust support in terms of subsidies and other stimulants to their industries, includi ng tax incentives, 
which are likely to distort global trade.  
5.50.   Second, it appears the proposals seek to expand the role of the Secretariat by mandating it 
to prepare a factual report that will facilitate Members' understanding of the measures in place, 
including their impact. If this is the case, then there is need for clarity on its terms of reference of 
such impact assessment studies, as well as the methodology.  There is also the issue of whether 
Members whose measures have to be assessed would have the benefit of presenting their own 
factual report on their measures, as in the case of Trade Policy Review, or if the provisions of a 
measure be solely based on the conclusions drawn by the Secretariat.  The WTO already has existing 
mechanisms for reporting tr ade measures, including COVID -related trade measures. Members have 
obligations set out in respect to the Agreements with which they are striving to comply. It is 
imperative for Members to report their COVID -trade -restrictive measures within this framework.  
5.51.   In conclusion, Nigeria notes that most developing countries are currently struggling to cope 
with their existing notification obligations due to capacity and resource constraints. It is therefore 
unlikely that these countries would be able to cope with ad ditional notification obligations.  
5.52.   The delegate  of Botswana , speaking on behalf of the African Group,  indicated  the following:  
5.53.   The African Group appreciates the fundamental importance of transparency in the global 
trading system, especially under the curre nt circumstances we are facing, and we acknowledge that 
authoritative notification by Members is what will promote access to reliable information on the 
measures introduced  and, importantly, taking into account the capacity constraints of the Members.  
5.54.   However , the African Group holds the view that the proposal at hand should take the following 
concerns into consideration : (i) the prospect of enhancing transparency obligations without the full 
measure of the scope and intent being pursued ; (ii) the impor tance of taking into consideration the 
capacity constraints of developing and least developed countries in meeting the existing 
transparency obligations; (iii) the additional pressures on our countries owing to the 
COVID -19 crisis, resources are already ov erstretched and the focus is on containing the outbreak 
and safeguarding human health and life, and reviving our economies; (iv) the need for clarity on 
what it means to have a standing agenda item on COVID -19, and (v) the value added of a factual 
report b y the Secretariat when there are dedicated trade monitoring efforts and a dedicated webpage 
on COVID -19. For the foregoing reasons, the African Group finds it difficult at this time to 
accommodate the introduction of reforms under the guise of enhancing tr ansparency without clarity 
on the scope and impact of such reforms.  
5.55.   In addition, the African Group would like to bring up its submission on "An Inclusive Approach 
to Transparency and Notification Requirements in the WTO" , contained in 
document  JOB/CTG/15/R ev.2, which outlines well the concerns of the Group that are relevant to the 
discussions at hand.  
5.56.   Last but certainly not least, the African Group thanks the proponents for their submission, 
and the introductory statements made. Furthermore, the African Gro up finds it at this point difficult 
to accommodate the introduction of reforms under the guise of enhancing transparency without 
clarity on the scope and impact of those reforms.  
5.57.   The delegat e of Namibia  indicated the following:  
5.58.   At the outset, Namibia aligns itself with the statement that was delivered by the Republic of 
Botswana on behalf of the African Group.  The WTO is a rules -based institution that provides for 
transparency obligations across all WTO  Agreements, including those in the GATS a s well as the 
TRIPS  Agreement, in which notifications are one of the means of ensuring transparency, which plays 
a significant role in the functioning of the WTO  system.  
5.59.   However, it should be noted that LDCs and developing countries face severe challenges,  for 
example, capacity constraints in ensuring that existing transparency obligations are met. Therefore, G/C/M/137  
 
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  additional obligations as proposed by the proponents may be burdensome to LDCs and developing 
countries.  
5.60.   To conclude, Namibia acknowledges the importa nce of compliance with notification obligations 
within the WTO, in which non -compliance results in creating problems for traders without access to 
vital information which, as a result, may lead to trade distortion.  
5.61.   The delegate  of the United Kingdom  indica ted the following:  
5.62.   The United Kingdom welcomes all discussions about how WTO  Members can better 
understand and monitor the extent and impact of COVID -related trade measures  and support s the 
work that the Secretariat has already done to make information ava ilable on the WTO  webpage, 
including on measures not formally notified, and the United Kingdom has contributed actively to this. 
The United Kingdom also welcome s the steps being taken by subsidiary committees to review 
COVID -related measures relevant to th eir agreements, and look s forward to the upcoming Trade 
Monitoring Report, which should give Members an opportunity to review those and other measures 
in an accessible format, and across trade in goods and services and trade -related aspects of 
intellectual  property rights. The United Kingdom has called for a return to quarterly Trade Monitoring 
Reports during this period, as during the Global Financial Crisis.  
5.63.   The United Kingdom is content with the idea of a dedicated agenda item at the Council for 
Trade in  Goods on goods -related COVID  measures, as proposed under this agenda item. But it would 
want to ensure that such efforts were not overly duplicative of information already easily available 
or processes already underway for reviewing such measures, such as  the upcoming Trade Monitoring 
Report. The United Kingdom also feel s it would risk taking a step backwards if, for instance, any 
factual report to the CTG contained less information on goods measures taken than that already 
provided and confirmed by Member s on the WTO  COVID  webpage. The information currently 
available on the webpage should ideally be treated as a baseline, on which any factual report should 
build and add value.  
5.64.   We should also be cautious about introducing new standing items, which can somet imes 
persist long after the event that triggered them and so the UK  would welcome a way of ensuring 
such an item only remains on the agenda for the time needed – for example by committing to an 
end or review date.  
5.65.   Finally, the United Kingdom encourage s all Members to be as transparent as possible 
regarding measures they put in place in response to COVID -19, including temporary measures.  
5.66.   The delegate  of South Africa  indicated the following:  
5.67.   At the outset South Africa  wants to support the statement by Bot swana on behalf of the 
African Group and would like to thank the proponents for this proposal.  Transparency is one of the 
important principles in international trade. In recognition of this, WTO  Agreements entail notification 
obligations that Members must adhere to. These Agreements reflect the balance of rights and 
obligations of Members taking into account the capacities available in such Members. This Delegation 
supports transparency as a principle but is mindful of capacity constraints that many delegat ions 
may face and the duplicative effect that a proposal of this nature may have. The Council for Trade 
in Goods oversees the functioning of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex  1A and these entail 
notification obligations that reflect negotiated out comes. WTO  Members ' regular Goods notification 
obligations are contained in document  G/L/223/Rev.27. These obligations are already very 
substantial, and due to capacity issues, many developing countries are struggling with these 
notification requirements.  
5.68.   COVID -19 is an unprecedented crisis that is stretching the resources of Members. Developing 
countries and LDCs are facing serious constraints relating to the implementation of response 
measures and economic recovery. They do not have the deep pockets and s timulus packages that 
other Members have been able to mobilize in this current crisis. South Africa is therefore not in 
support of adding to the notification obligations of Members that are already struggling to meet their 
notification obligations  and would like to understand from the proponents the scope of the measures 
to be notified.  G/C/M/137  
 
- 12 - 
 
  5.69.   South Africa cannot agree to adding new notification obligations to Members already 
struggling to meet the ir notification obligations due to capacity constraints.  The mandat e of the 
Secretariat, provided in Article VI of the Marrakesh Agreement , must be safeguarded. South Africa  
notes the reference by the proponents to the preparation of a factual report by the Secretariat. Could 
the proponents kindly explain what would be contained in the factual reports and what the terms of 
reference would be to make "assessments of measures and the ir impact ". What kinds of trade 
measures and initiatives are going to be monitored, and would such a factual report include only 
information notified by Members or will it include unverified information researched by the 
Secretariat? Will they also include  the measures many more advanced economies are taking , for 
example, the stimulus packages for their firms and industries? None of the above is altogether clear 
and it would seem to us that such a broad capacity will go beyond the role that the Secretariat 
should play.  
5.70.   There is value in having a CTG agenda item on COVID -19 only to exchange information and 
best practices on COVID -19 for a limited time ( three  months). Such an item will encourage Members 
to share useful information and exchange views.  
5.71.   The deleg ate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
5.72.   Indonesia  noticed that the T PRB has conducted reporting and collecting data and information 
related to trade and trade -related measures in response to the COVID -19 pandemic with its sources 
from Member notification s to relevant committees and from other public sources collected by the 
Secretariat.  Indonesia is of the view that in the current difficult situation Members should avoid any 
duplication of work that might be an additional burden to Members.  
5.73.   The delegate  of the United States  indicated the following:  
5.74.   The United States continues to review the suggestions presented by Hong Kong , China  and 
the co -sponsors, and welcome s hearing views from other Members.  The US , too, agree s and value s 
the importance of transparency.  However, at this stage, the US would not be in a position to support 
another Secretariat report that , in its view, is likely duplicative of work already being done either by 
the TPRB or subsidiary bodies.  The US also questi ons the need for a standing agenda item, as has 
been noted by some of the co -sponsors and other Members. It is the US  cross-cutting view that 
agenda items can be added as needed under normal procedure.  
5.75.   The delegate  of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following : 
5.76.   Chinese Taipei's  delegation is of the view that while we continue efforts to combat the 
pandemic, we should be strengthening our collective work in the WTO, especially by together 
enhancing the transparency mechanism.  My delegation therefore is looking forward to further 
discussion on this issue.  
5.77.   The delegate  of India indicated the following:  
5.78.   The proposal seeks to have notification of measures and initiatives and a standing agenda 
item for discussion amongst the Members. None of us deny the transparency requirements and we  
must promote transparency. However, we should recogni ze the fact that there are capacity and 
resource constraints so far as any additional notification requirement is concerned. India has made 
it clear during earlier interventions that still many parts of  the world , including India,  continue to 
witness continued growth in COVID -19 infections and deaths and the primary focus of India's  
governments is to ensure the health and safety of its citizens. Most of the Members have underlined 
the need to re -calibrat e their priorities and positions at the WTO to contain the economic and social 
fallout of the crisis. The exigencies of the current crisis leave us with little bandwidth, as of now, for 
any addition to our existing notification requirements under WTO  rules. 
5.79.   Moreover, apart from other sources of information, most of such measures and initiatives get 
reflected in the WTO  Trade Monitoring Report and discussed under TPRB. A number of such 
emergency measures to tackle COVID -19 in domestic constituencies, particularly export restrictions 
on medical products, if any, are getting reviewed frequently within a short span of time and mostly 
withdrawn or relaxed to a large extent.  G/C/M/137  
 
- 13 - 
 
  5.80.   The proposal also seeks to have impact analysis of such measures an d initiatives. In the 
recent past, the WTO Secretariat has done a great job by compiling various information and bringing 
out reports. But when we get into the impact analysis, we should be mindful as to who will do such 
impact analysis , including whether left to the WTO  Secretariat who will work on the information 
available to them. There is need for clarification on the scope of the proposal.  
5.81.   Having said so, India can support information sharing. It needs to be seen as to whether we 
can explore other mean s, if any, for information sharing and to discuss them without stretching our 
resources , particularly when COVID -19 is still impacting back home. Hence,  India cannot accept 
additional notification obligation s, if any , under the present proposal.  
5.82.   The delega te of Mexico  indicated the following:  
5.83.   Mexico support s the call s for greater monitoring and transparency of measures introduced to 
combat the COVID -19 pandemic, both here and in subsidiary bodies , and believes  this to be 
pertinent given the current crisis.  Furthermore , Mexico supports the idea of having this item on the 
agenda for as long as necessary  and remain s open to discuss ion of  the details regarding the 
introduction of items for monitoring and transparency and in terms of  the duplication of work at the 
WTO.  
5.84.   The delegate  of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
5.85.   Sri Lanka  also see s transparency as a very important element in the WTO structure and 
therefore honour s that principle and also acknowledg es the capacity constraints of many developing 
countries t o live up to their obligations , particularly at times of pandemic, which have far -reaching 
implications, and for  many years to come.  Sri Lanka also concur s with the statements made by 
South Africa, India, the United States,  and the United Kingdom, because there has to be a rationale 
for introducing such an agenda item if we are to give added value to the initiative.  We already have 
certain reports that are being compiled by the WTO  Secretariat and also the very good website that 
they have introduced. It act ually disseminates a lot of information and we are benefitting from that 
exercise and would like to encourage the Secretariat to continue with the initiative . And whenever 
possible Sri Lanka has notified measures that it has taken  although , as India stated , some of the 
measures  about to be notified may already have been withdrawn. This happened in Sri Lanka's case 
on export restrictions in March , and so some of the measures are very temporary  and short-term, 
and there is a practical situation that many developing countries are now facing that has to be 
acknowledged . There is also the matter of the impartiality of the Secretariat when compiling factual 
reports . As South Africa said, this exercise increases their responsibilities as enshrined in the 
Marrakesh Agreement . Therefore , Sri Lanka does not support the permanent inclusion of this agenda 
item. If required,  we can certainly reassess and include this agenda on the request of Member s. 
5.86.   The delegate  of Australia  indicated the following:  
5.87.   Austral ia welcomes transparency on COVID -19 measures. This item provides an opportunity 
to further such discussions. Australia support s the idea of the Secretariat providing a factual report 
which would help to track what measures remain in place. The CTG could p lay a valuable role in 
helping with coherence of efforts. It can also help in providing an overall picture of goods measures 
related to COVID -19. 
5.88.   The delegate  of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
5.89.   Although the Russian Federation  believe s that transparency is crucial in the work of the WTO, 
it holds the view that the dedicated page on the WTO  website, as well as reports that are issued by 
the WTO on different occasions , bridge the gap in transparency on COVID -19-related measures. The 
WTO webpage on COVID -19-related measures is the quickest way of providing WTO  Members with 
timely information on new measures connected with COVID -19. In this regard, the Russian 
Federation  urges WTO Members to submit all the corresponding information to the dedicated 
WTO website.  
5.90.   The delegate  of Hong Kong, China  thanked Members for the very useful comments and 
clarified  the following:  G/C/M/137  
 
- 14 - 
 
  5.91.   Members ' concerns about having a "standing " item on COVID -19: it is not our intention to 
have a "standing " item, in fact we mentioned in our communication to have a dedicated agenda item 
in the CTG "in the months ahead ", as we expect a discussion at the next CTG in November. As for 
future CTG  meetings, it would be up to Members to consider whether there is a need to have an 
item on COVID -19. 
5.92.   Members ' concerns about duplication of work: our intention is exactly to avoid duplication of 
work. Noting that there is much information available in the WTO and other inter national 
organi zations, we hope to build on what we already have, for example, a consolidation of information 
useful for the CTG's work.  
5.93.   Members ' question about the Secretariat 's mandate in producing a report: our intention is 
asking the Secretariat to pro duce a report with only factual information, for example, to  use its list 
on the WTO  webpage, do some sorting and organi zation of information in a better format, to facilitate 
Members ' reference in tracking the measures; and from the facts presented, Members could have 
an understanding of the impact. The Secretariat is not expected to do an impact analysis in the 
factual report.  
5.94.   Members ' concerns on additional notification requirement: our intention is to ask the 
Secretariat to get factual information from the WTO  webpage on COVID -19, and from notifications 
submitted by Members. We expect no new notification requirement nor additional work from 
Members.  
5.95.   The delegate  of Canada  fully suppo rted Hong Kong, China 's previous statements , especially 
the point about not providing any new obligations here. This is all about sharing information and 
allowing an opportunity for Members to become aware of measures that other Members have taken 
that aff ect their trade. That is fully in the spirit with the comments that a number of delegations 
made over the past few months here, both in their submissions to the WTO but also in the statements 
that they have made and the communications that have been provid ed. 
5.96.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
5.97.   The Council  so agreed . 
6  PROPOSAL FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ENABLING CLAUSE TO 
PROVIDE GREATER LEGAL CERTAINTY TO NON -RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES GRANTED BY 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY WTO  MEMBERS TO LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES – REQUEST 
FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (G/C/W/775)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 3 March  2020, the 
delegation of the Republic of Korea had requested the Secretariat  to include this issue on the agenda.  
6.2.  The delegate of  the Republic of K orea indicated the following:  
6.3.  The COVID -19 pandemic has given rise to an unprecedented global health and economic crisis 
which has further highlighted the economic vulnerability of LDCs . In this vein, Korea hopes that this 
proposal will act as a small step towards assisting LDCs during this difficult period.  Korea  would like 
to take this opportunity to briefly introduce its proposal rather than set the stage for in -depth 
discussions. Looking ahead, Korea hopes to have in -depth discussions at a face -to-face meeting 
when social distance measures are relaxed.  
6.4.  Before dealing with the specifics of the proposal Korea would like to  provide the following 
background. In 1979, the Enabling Clause was adopted in order to integrate developing and least 
developed countries into the world trading system.  Although the Enabling Clause permitted 
developed WTO  Members to grant non -reciprocal p referential treatment to LDCs, it remained unclear 
whether developing Members also possessed this same legal basis. The WTO finally adopted a 
Decision on 15 June 1999 that secured an additional means of ensuring that developing countries 
may likewise provi de special treatment to LDCs. However, there remains an issue with the 
cumbersome extension process that takes place every 10  years. Furthermore, the three -month 
delay for a waiver extension last year resulted in much uncertainty and confusion for both dev eloping 
countries and LDCs, despite the fact that there were no restrictions on the substantial support G/C/M/137  
 
- 15 - 
 
  granted to LDCs.  It is in this light that Korea firmly believes it is high time for us to establish a stable 
and predictable legal basis on which develo ping WTO  Members can continue implementing 
preferential tariff schemes for LDCs on a non -reciprocal basis through Korea's proposal.  
6.5.  On the specific points of the proposal, Korea recalls that the General Council and the Ministerial 
Conference have the exclu sive authority to interpret the agreements of the WTO in accordance with 
Article  IX:2 of the WTO  Agreement. Korea's proposal points out that the text of the Enabling Clause 
and in particular paragraphs  1 and 2(d) are rather ambiguous in nature and understo od as allowing 
only developed Members to grant special treatment to LDCs. Korea is proposing an authoritative 
interpretation of paragraphs  1 and 2(d) of the Enabling Clause to be understood as allowing both 
developed and developing countries to provide spe cial treatment to LDCs.  Lastly, Korea made it 
clear that the purpose of this proposal is not to modify any particular agreement but to simply clarify 
the meaning of existing rights or obligations.  
6.6.  Korea' s proposal is simple, clear and effective. Its goal is to support LDCs within the 
WTO system as well as do away with the ongoing process of continuously extending the Waiver 
Decision.  Korea  very much hope s this proposal will be on the table at the General Council or 
Ministerial Conference, following constructive discussions between WTO  Members.  
6.7.  The delegate of Burkina Faso , speaking for Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the 
following:  
6.8.  The LDC  Group would like to express its interest in the submiss ion made by the Republic of 
Korea.  Our primary goal, as the LDC  Group at the WTO, is to improve and further our integration 
into global trade . Any regulatory initiative should enable that to occur and enable us to develop our 
relations with our trading par tners, so that we can achieve social progress and create jobs in our 
countries in constructive ways.  The LDC  Group welcome s the analysis that has been carried out by 
the Republic of Korea.  It is true that LDCs are often subject to specific constraints and the 
WTO Members are aware of that.  
6.9.  Concerning the waiver, the LDC  Group thinks this proposal is very sensible and better  than 
having frequent renewals and we are very happy to support it. Our group is available to discuss the 
details of this submission fur ther in future.  We would like to reiterate our heartfelt thanks to China, 
India, Brazil, Chile, Thailand, and Turkey, who have interacted with our group on this. And we hope 
that we will be able to further this line of work. We also thank those who enabled  us to renew the 
waiver in 2019.  We conclude by thanking every Member that attaches importance to this issue at 
the WTO as a means of further integrating LDCs as quickly as possible.  
6.10.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
6.11.   The Enabling Clause is an important provision in the WTO in recognition of differences in levels 
of development among WTO  Members. It allows contracting parties to accord differential and more 
favourable treatment to developing countries taking into accoun t the development, financial and 
trade needs of developing countries and LDCs.  
6.12.   The waiver on Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least -Developed Countries waives 
GATT  Article  I and provides a means for developing country Members to offer preferential tariff 
treatment to products of least -developed countries. This is in keeping with the need for positive 
efforts to be designed to ensure that LDCs secure a share in the growth in international trade 
commensurate with the needs of their economic development as en tailed in the Marrakesh 
Agreement.  
6.13.   Whereas South Africa welcome s the proposal by the Republic of Korea providing for an 
authoritative interpretation to the Enabling Clause which in essence takes away the need to renew 
the waiver every 10  years, its delegat ion is still analysing the proposal and will revert with more 
concrete views on the proposal.  
6.14.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
6.15.   China worked together with Brazil, Chile, India, Thailand and Turkey last year and extended 
the waiver for developi ng Members to grant preferential tariff access schemes to LDCs by a further G/C/M/137  
 
- 16 - 
 
  10 years, starting from 1  July 2019 until 30  June 2029. China supports exploring a permanent 
arrangement for developing Members to grant preferential treatment to LDCs. However, Ko rea's 
reinterpretation of the Enabling Clause is different from Members' previous understanding. China is 
still studying and assessing Korea's proposal, including the impact by tracing back the original 
intention and the nature of the Enabling Clause.  
6.16.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
6.17.   India's  delegation would like to thank the delegation of the Republic of Korea for this agenda 
item which has significance on the waiver being sought every 10 years for continuation of the 
unilateral preferential benefits to LDCs, provided by developing countries, under schemes such as 
Duty-Free Quota -Free ( DFQF ). This is definitely an important issue and hence needs close 
examination and consideration thereof by the Members. On the authoritative interpretation of the 
Enabling Clause, as proposed by the Republic of Korea, the issue is still being examined by Capital. 
India will discuss the matter bilaterally with the proponent as well as the LDC  Group for certain 
clarification related to the Enabling Clause.  
6.18.   The del egate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
6.19.   The delegation of Bangladesh thanks the Republic of Korea for the proposal  and fully endorse s 
the statement made by Burkina Faso on behalf of the LDC  Group. Bangladesh  also look s forward to 
constructively workin g with Members.  
6.20.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
6.21.   Turkey is among the developing countries that accord one of the most extensive preferential 
treatment schemes to the least developed countries. This is due to the belief of Turkey in the 
indisputable contribution of trade for development. Turkey  sincerely believe s that through this 
waiver, WTO  Members add meaningful input to the integration of least developed countries with the 
global economy, especially during critical times like COVID -19, as mentioned by Korea. Thus, Turkey 
definitely support s the continu ation of the non -reciprocal preferential treatment to LDCs by 
developing countries, and in fact co -sponsored the recent extension of the waiver for another 
10 years in 2019.  
6.22.   Against this background, Turkey is definitely supportive of the ultimate aim and rationale 
behind this proposal. That said, so far the Members have extended the waiver without controversy 
and rather smoothly, thus Turkey is  not certain in what ways the pro posal could really work to spur 
greater use of the preferences. Moreover, Turkey has certain questions regarding the legal 
underpinnings of this proposal, which we re already communicated to Korea bilaterally. That said, 
Turkey remains open to discuss this proposal in detail in the coming days.  
6.23.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  responded as follows:  
6.24.   Korea thanks Burkina Faso, South Africa, and China for their comments and questions on this 
proposal , which will be relayed to Capital. If Korea receives a d etailed explanation and information 
on these points, these will be bilaterally shared in due course.  
6.25.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
6.26.   The Council so agreed . 
7  PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STRENGTHEN NOTIFI CATION 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER WTO AGREEMENTS – ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, COSTA 
RICA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, ISRAEL, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS 
TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU, AND THE UNITED STATES 
(JOB/GC/204/REV.3 -JOB/CTG/14/REV. 3) 
7.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation s of Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Israel, Japan, New 
Zealand, Chinese Taipei , and the United States, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to 
include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  7.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
7.3.  On behalf of the co -sponsors, the US  appreciate s the opportunity to update the Council on its 
work since the previous CTG  meeting, to improve the joint notifications proposal, which has been 
submitted as revised document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.3. This revised proposal contains additional 
flexibilities and edits to improve its readability and operability. For this meeting, we are providing 
an upd ate and sharing the revised proposal for the purpose of giving Members time to digest and to 
consider its benefits. The United States is pleased to note Israel has joined as a co -sponsor and has 
provided a number of constructive improvements to the proposa l. Thank you, Israel. The US would 
also like to take this opportunity to thank the other co -sponsors, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa 
Rica, Chinese Taipei, the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand for their commitment, time and 
effort to improve and advocate for this proposal.  
7.4.  At its core, this proposal is about transparency, which is essential for the continued functioning 
and relevance of the WTO as an institution. The improvements in the proposal support the goal of 
greater transparency and improve d compliance by Members of respective notification obligations.  
7.5.  There are a number of substantive revisions to highlight. First, we have eliminated special 
treatment for DS:1  notifications when it comes to the provision that encourages a Member to provide 
information regarding why a notification is delayed. This is now paragraph  7; in Rev.2 this was 
paragraph  8. We acknowledge that there are tangible reasons for Member delays in 
DS:1 notifications in particular. That  is the reason why the proposal provides special treatment for 
DS:1 notifications as to the administrative measures. However, paragraph  7 is about encouraging 
transparency as to why a Member is late with its notification, and such transparency is useful across 
all of the relevant agreements in th is proposal. Another significant modification to the proposal is 
that LDCs will be exempt from all administrative measures in the proposal, provided an LDC  Member 
formally requests technical assistance to address challenges associated with submitting notif ications 
in a timely manner. This additional flexibility acknowledges that LDC  Members often have capacity 
and resource constraints that hinder timely submission of notifications and that capacity building 
assistance can demonstrably improve a Member's abi lity to notify.  
7.6.  With regard to the administrative measures, the proposal now provides greater clarity with 
respect to charges for late notifications. It includes in paragraph  12(b)(iii) a range of options, to be 
negotiated, for the assessed charge to a Mem ber's annual WTO  budget contribution for each late 
notification.  However, we have now included language in paragraph  14 to cap the charges so the 
penalties do not accumulate indefinitely. The previous version of the proposal contained no cap on 
the number  of times a Member could be charged for a late notification. The level of the cap needs 
to be looked at in conjunction with the individual charges in paragraph  12(b)(iii). The proposal is 
now clearer as to the overall approach to financial penalties. Finan cial charges would apply gradually, 
thereby providing an incentive to submit notifications and/or catch up with late ones. While 
maintaining the overall goal of reducing late notifications and improving transparency, in cases 
where a Member has multiple la te notifications the proposal ensures now a clear limit to the 
maximum financial charge.  
7.7.  The US understand s that, collectively, the changes outlined in the proposal improve the balance 
between incentives and administrative measures whose aim, as we have em phasized before, is to 
encourage the timely submission of notifications. The current crisis has amplified the importance of 
transparency and timely notifications even though the proposal was not written to specifically 
address ad hoc notifications of tempo rary measures taken in a very specific context of emergency, 
but rather to deal with the long -standing problem of year long delays in submitting regular 
notifications. The US welcome s Members'  comments on the updated proposal and stand s ready to 
discuss ho w to address any outstanding concerns. More importantly, the US would welcome 
Members' support as it continue s to find ways to reinforce the fundamental principle of transparency 
that is at the core of the WTO and its ability to reach negotiated outcomes.  
7.8.  The delegate of Israel  indicated the following:  
7.9.  At the outset, I srael would like to thank the co -sponsors of this proposal for the constructive 
and result -oriented dialogue towards improving the text, which has allowed Israel to join as a 
co-sponsor. From the first time the proposal was introduced, Israel recognized the importance of 
the underlying objective, namely, enhancing transparency by encouraging full and timely submission G/C/M/137  
 
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  of notifications. Transparency has always been important for the overall func tioning of the system, 
and this is a principle that Israel believe s is accepted and appreciated by all WTO  Members. As a 
small country with relatively a very small staff that deals with all notification obligations, it was a 
priority for Israel's  governmen t to address the transparency proposal in a way that will take into 
account, among others, these concerns as well, which are not limited only to Israel. After some 
intensive consultations and joint work, Israel now believes the proposal addresses these con cerns. 
Allow me to elaborate.  
7.10.   Israel wanted to ensure the incorporation of a more gradual approach to the administrative 
and financial measures; this is essential in Israel's view, in order to encourage Members to fulfil their 
obligations. This is now refl ected in the text. Israel also wanted to clarify the language regarding the 
administrative measures, and with the incorporation of the two  phases, Israel believes the whole 
process would be streamlined. The revised proposal establishes a cap to the financi al measures, and 
this was a priority to Israel as well, in order to limit the potential exposure of Members. Additionally, 
there is now language ensuring that each unfulfilled notification should run its individual and 
independent process under the adminis trative measures. Finally, I srael wishes to point out that for 
LDCs there is now specific language that takes their needs into account, which will  certainly  be 
viewed favourably by the wider Membership.  
7.11.   Israel is confident that the revised proposal addresses many of the concerns Israel had, as 
well as the concerns other Members have shared in the past. Israel looks forward to continu ing its 
collaborati on with the co -sponsors, as well as with any other interested Member. Transparency is of 
great syste mic importance, but also very practical; being informed about other Members' measures 
is important to the day -to-day trade and business and agreeing on this decision can and should be 
one of the deliverables for the upcoming Ministerial Conference.  
7.12.   The del egate of Japan  indicated the following:  
7.13.   Japan greatly appreciates the collective effort by all the co -sponsors, including Israel, to 
improve our proposal , and would also like to thank all Members that engaged with the proposal 
constructively. Japan, rather  than repeating the main changes that are included in this revised 
proposal , would like to highlight the important points.  
7.14.   First, enhancing transparency is the most important foundation for the effective functioning 
of the WTO, and notifications are a prer equisite for each committee discussion. The pandemic has 
clearly shown us that the world's economy is closely inter -connected and one country's measure s 
greatly affect other countries. Many Members have introduced trade -restrictive measures, including 
export bans as emergency measures. It is important that those measures be notified to the relevant 
committees and that the monitoring mechanism functions correctly so that unnecessary measures 
will be lifted as soon as possible. The current situation therefore  makes this proposal all the more 
significant.  
7.15.   Second, Members have expressed concern over the administrative measures included in the 
proposal, which Japan hopes no Member will need to face. However, to improve the level of 
compliance with existing notifi cation obligations, we believe we need such a mechanism to enhance 
transparency. Of course, Japan understand s the difficulties developing country Members, especially 
LDCs, are facing. The proposal therefore includes flexibilities and a capacity building me chanism. 
The revised proposal provides further flexibility to the LDCs.  
7.16.   Japan believes this initiative also has a symbolic meaning for the WTO  reform and  remain s 
committed to this matter in order to reach consensus at the earliest possible juncture.  
7.17.   The de legate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.18.   Compliance with notification obligations remains a priority for the EU, as the COVID  pandemic 
has accentuated the need for effective transparency. While the US has given a complete overview 
of the changes in this version, the EU would like to briefly highlight one area of change, the new 
specific special and differential treatment for LDC s. 
7.19.   In preparing this revised version, co -sponsors listened carefully as several Members set out 
their view that technical assistance and capacity building are not enough to overcome the challenges G/C/M/137  
 
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  that hamper some Members' ability to meet transparency requ irements. We also heard about the 
particular challenges that LDCs face.  
7.20.   The US agree s that technical assistance and capacity building are not a panacea. However, 
they can demonstrably improve a Member's ability to notify. The objective of the new SDT  provision 
in the proposal is to alleviate the pressure of the administrative measures from those Members that 
struggle most with meeting all their obligations on time. It also aims to create a stronger focus on 
the assistance available. In this context, the US  remind s Members that the proposal also foresees 
the opportunity to assess whether existing trade -related technical assistance is effective, as set out 
in paragraph  3(c). We look forward to deepening our conversation with Members on the basis of this 
revise d proposal.  
7.21.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
7.22.   Firstly, Chinese Taipei's  delegation is pleased to welcome that Israel has joined us as a 
co-sponsor of this proposal. Chinese Taipei also wish es to thank the United States for explaining the 
various improvements in the revised version.  
7.23.   In this revised proposal, as indicated by the United States, the proponents have recognized 
the structural challenges faced by LDC  Members to timely fulfil their tr ansparency requirements and 
have acknowledged that the existing assistance level may not be sufficient for them to alleviate the 
challenge in a short period of time. In the revised version, therefore, a new paragraph  11 has been 
added, which exempt s LDCs f rom being subject to the administrative measures as long as the 
information on the assistance and capacity -building needed in order to submit the relevant 
notification is provided. It should be noted, also, that Members may need to further assess the 
effectiveness of the existing assistance to ensure that it meets the actual needs.  Furthermore, the 
revised proposal now clarifies the implementation of the administrative measures. A cap limit on the 
financial charge has been introduced to ensure that it serve s as a modest measure, which only aims 
to remind a Member to fulfil its notification obligation.  
7.24.   Chinese Taipei  and the other proponents are looking forward to receiving Members ' comments 
at this meeting. We firmly believe that Members ' collective efforts and constructive engagement on 
this proposal will pave the way to improving one of the key functions of the WTO.  
7.25.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
7.26.   Australia would also like to welcome Israel as a co -sponsor of this proposal.  Australia also  
welcomes the further improvements to the proposal, in particular that agricultural and 
non-agricultural goods are now treated equally regarding the time for explanation of overdue 
notifications. Australia finally welcome s the important change in the treat ment of least developed 
countries. This change is very much in keeping with Australia 's view of this proposal as providing a 
pathway out of any non -compliance and into compliance, including through technical assistance 
options.  
7.27.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
7.28.   Brazil would like to reiterate its interest in the subject and willingness to further discuss the 
proposal.  
7.29.   The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
7.30.   The amendments that have been made are significant.  In Chile's  opinion, there is an obligation 
to notify and that obligation should be met, on the one hand, and on the other, we should also assist 
those Members that have objective difficulties to meet that responsibility.  So Chile congratulate s the 
co-proponents for these new amendment s that are along the right lines.  Chile is  studying this 
proposal in detail and will submit further comments in due course.  
7.31.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
7.32.   Ukraine would like to thank the co -sponsors for the updated proposal on strengthening 
notification requirements under the WTO  Agreements. Ukraine acknowledge s the essential role of G/C/M/137  
 
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  transparency in the process of implementation of the WTO  Agreements and consider s notifications 
as an importan t instrument to assess Members' compliance with their WTO  commitments. Ukraine 
welcomes the important initiative and supports an open discussion of potential options that could 
further enhance transparency compliance within the Organization.  
7.33.   The delegate o f the Republic of K orea indicated the following:  
7.34.   Korea has already expressed its support for this agenda item several times on various 
occasions. All Members are well aware of the importance of notifications as a fundamental obligation 
which plays a signif icant role in the multilateral trading system. Korea recognizes the proponents' 
efforts to reflect Members' concerns by limiting the maximum charges of administrative measures. 
On the other hand, some Members have still raised concerns on administrative me asures. Korea is 
willing to remain ready to engage in further discussions to narrow down the differences among 
Members.  
7.35.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
7.36.   Uruguay welcomes the submission of a revised version of the proposal on procedures to 
enhance transparency and strengthen compliance with notification requirements, which introduces 
some improvements from previous versions.  
7.37.   While Uruguay agrees on the importance of transparency and the goal pursued, given that 
they are key to the smooth func tioning of the Organization and its negotiating function, Uruguay 
believe s that even greater efforts must be made to find a solution that transcends the punitive 
approach and creates appropriate incentives, without losing sight of the need to ensure full 
compliance with the obligations assumed.  
7.38.   Similarly, if the intention is to enhance transparency in the Organization and have updated 
and complete information to help us in negotiations, then it is important in matters related to trade 
in goods to ensure con sistency in the treatment of the various notifications under the Agreements 
concerned, including in DS:1  notifications in agriculture. It is also important to avoid introducing 
different treatment for this notification or making such treatment contingent o n achieving a certain 
outcome in the revision of document  G/AG/2, which may or may not materialize, without a set 
time-limit. 
7.39.   At a time when we are seeing major domestic support programmes being announced in 
response to the COVID -19 pandemic and its conseq uences, Uruguay remain s in doubt as to whether 
this proposal provides the appropriate incentives to ensure the highest level of transparency and 
monitoring of the measures adopted in such a context, as a number of Members have demanded.  
7.40.   Uruguay welcomes th e openness to dialogue shown by the co -sponsors of this proposal and 
reiterates its desire to continue its constructive exchanges with them in order to achieve concrete 
and balanced outcomes aimed at enhancing transparency in the WTO, ensuring compliance b y all 
Members with their respective notification commitments.  
7.41.   The representative  of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
7.42.   The United Kingdom welcomes continued discussion on this important issue. While disputes 
and negotiations might sometimes dominate the headlines, the role of transparency in supporting 
the WTO's work is every bit as important. Transparency brings certainty and predictability to trade. 
It underpins the process of Members monitoring each other's compliance with the WT O Agreements 
and supports evidence -based negotiations. That is why the United Kingdom supports and intends to 
co-sponsor this proposal to improve compliance around transparency and notifications. We see it as 
a pragmatic response to the challenges that the  WTO is facing in this area.  
7.43.    Nevertheless, the United Kingdom is alive to the capacity constraints that some developing 
Members, in particular LDC  Members, face. That is why the UK  welcome s the changes made with 
respect to LDCs in the latest version of th e proposal, and remain s interested in further discussions 
on mechanisms to provide technical assistance, and notifications guidance, to developing countries 
who struggle to meet their notification requirements.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  7.44.   In that vein , the UK  recall s the announcement  it had  made at the General Council on 15  May, 
setting out the support the United Kingdom  is now providing to eligible developing country Members 
to notify COVID -related measures to the WTO 's monitoring exercise , through our Trade and 
Investment Advocacy Fund.  The United Kingdom looks forward to engaging further with 
WTO Members on this proposal.  
7.45.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
7.46.   Paraguay  wishes to thank the co -sponsors for submitting the third rev ision of the document. 
Paraguay  notes some improvements to it, yet one of its main concerns – the differentiated treatment 
of DS:1  notifications in agriculture – persists. This concern has been raised in this room since the 
introduction of the document, as  well as in numerous consultations with the proponents.  
7.47.   Unfortunately, this differentiation remains despite a number of revisions of the document. 
Paraguay notes with particular concern the negative repercussions that this differentiated treatment 
would ha ve on agriculture negotiations, a priority for my delegation, as well as the inconsistency 
that would result from a revision of document  G/AG/2 aimed at modifying the deadlines for 
submitting notifications in the interest of transparency.  
7.48.   Transparency is c rucial for making headway in the crafting of appropriate disciplines that 
reflect the current reality of agricultural trade. In order to develop these disciplines and thus make 
progress in negotiations, Paraguay is  of the view that the appropriate way forw ard will involve the 
promotion of initiatives that limit or eliminate lack of transparency and poor notification practices.  
7.49.   On the specific point regarding a possible revision of document  G/AG/2, Paraguay wishes to 
point out that this revision must not be taken as an opportunity to adjust the rules to the 
non-compliant practices of some Members. Paraguay is convinced that the right course of action for 
strengthening all transparency mechanisms involves Members changing their behaviour in order to 
comply wit h the rules to which we all committed. It does not entail adjusting the rules to certain 
identified poor practices, which could result in us setting a highly alarming systemic precedent.  
7.50.   Similarly, the trade impact of the non -notification of DS:1  measures,  which involve subsidies 
worth hundreds of billions of dollars, cannot be compared to the impact of the non -notification of 
other disciplines that would be subject to penalties from the first year of non -compliance. However, 
in line with this proposal, mor e time would be granted for DS:1  notifications, despite the fact that 
these measures have a greater impact.  
7.51.   In spite of Paraguay's repeated calls for this aspect to be reviewed, Paraguay has yet to see 
any progress towards the equal treatment of DS:1 and o ther notifications. A careful analysis of 
document  G/L/223/Rev.27 could perhaps provide more clarity on why this is the case. Paraguay 
once again urge s the proponents to review these aspects to ensure that the proposal does not pursue 
conflicting objective s. 
7.52.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
7.53.   The proposal remains fundamentally the same. South Africa  would therefore like to reiterate 
its concerns. The paper maintains a punitive approach to transparency and notification requirements, 
which South Africa  finds unhelpful.  
7.54.   This delegation recognizes the importance of transparency, which is one of the pillars of the 
multilateral trading system and its role for the functioning of the WTO  system. However, South Africa  
cannot agree to any proposal t hat punishes developing countries who raise legitimate concerns in 
relation to the challenges they face in meeting their transparency obligations due to limited 
capacities and resources.  
7.55.   The re -introduction of the paper at a time when many developing count ries are facing 
significant challenges related to COVID -19 shows the lack of appreciation of the proponents of the 
needs of countries who are facing serious economic collapse and are in the process of  focus ing on 
saving  the lives of their citizens as well as looking at economic recovery plans. Instead of using the 
crisis as an opportunity to foster collaborative effort, South Africa is concerned that a punitive 
approach is still put forward at a time of an unprecedented cris is. G/C/M/137  
 
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  7.56.   South Africa would like to emphasize once more that compliance with notification obligations 
is not just a matter of ticking the boxes. It is a complex process that involves such issues as collection 
and validation of data and information from various entities within countries and at times goes 
beyond the capacities of Members. In view of these challenges, a cooperative, development oriented 
and holistic approach will go a long way to promote compliance rather than a punitive approach.  
7.57.   South Africa has put forward a more pragmatic proposal in JOB/CTG/15/Rev.2, which aims to 
bridge the differences and is the best way forward. It takes a developmental and inclusive approach 
to transparency. In addition to the recognition of the importance of transparency, it elaborates on 
the capacity constraints facing developing countries such as challenges in consolidated information 
among different agencies of government.  
7.58.   South Africa is sensitive to counter -notification by any Member or the Secretariat. 
Notifications c an only be made by the concerned Member and no counter -notifications will be valid. 
The WTO is a Member -driven organization and neither the Secretariat or any other Member of the 
WTO shall have the right to notify information on behalf of another Member un less this possibility 
has been provided for in existing agreements.  
7.59.   Transparency is important to all of us and all of us are struggling to fully comply with our 
obligations for various reasons. Any work in this area must support developing countries ' ability to 
address their difficulties through inclusive and mutually agreed approaches, such as through 
simplified notification formats, longer time -frames and targeted technical assistance and capacity 
building.  My delegation remains available to discuss with the proponents possible ways to take this 
forward.  
7.60.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
7.61.   Thailand, like other Members, continues to support efforts to enhance transparency in the 
WTO. Thailand views that this revision has been made more streaml ined and shows the 
constructiveness of the proponents in order to address some of the concerns expressed by Members 
in previous meetings. Particularly, Thailand  views the exemption of LDCs from administrative 
measures, as appears in paragraph  11 of the dra ft decision, to be a substantial step forward. 
However, to build convergence, further work may need to be done to address Members' concerns 
regarding administrative measures. Thailand will continue to constructively engage and discuss with 
the proponents o n this matter with a view to achieve enhanced transparency in an effective and 
sustainable manner.  
7.62.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
7.63.   Switzerland wishes to reiterate the importance of maintaining and promoting a high level of 
transparency  in this Organization. Switzerland supports the objective of the proposal contained in 
JOB/CTG/14/R ev.3, which precisely aims at improving transparency and compliance with notification 
obligations , and thank s the proponents for a revised version of the pro posal and for the introduction 
of the document made today. Switzerland is  pleased to note a number of changes, which should 
bring the proposal closer to consensus.  
7.64.   According to past discussions in this Council, Switzerland understand s there is a broad 
recognition that the functioning of the WTO must be improved, including its monitoring function via 
an enhanced respect of notifications obligations. Recently, the Chai r of the Committee on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures issued a report on notification obligations. To quote: "Only 73  Members 
have submitted their 2019 new and full subsidy notifications. Seventy -one Members still have not 
yet made their 2017 new and  full subsidy notification, although the deadline was almost three  years 
ago. Sixty  Members still have not made their 2015  notifications, which were due almost five  years 
ago. Many of these Members either have never notified or have done so only in the dis tant past."  
7.65.   It is time for Members to reaffirm the relevance of this Organization by better complying with 
their notification obligations. There is space for efficient solutions. Switzerland looks forward to 
actively pursuing discussions with co -sponsors a nd other Members to work out and improve this 
proposal to strengthen the monitoring function of the WTO, which is in everyone's interest.  
7.66.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  G/C/M/137  
 
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  7.67.   Transparency and timely notification are issues more importa nt than ever. After more than 
two years ' discussion and the many comments expressed by Members, maybe proponents could set 
out in a document all the comments received, and how they have been/could be taken into account. 
This could be  the basis for technical discussions between CTG  meetings and c ould help focusing 
discussion on outstanding issues. Hong Kong, China  looks forward to further constructive discussion 
on this matter.  
7.68.   The delegate of Singapore  indicated the following:  
7.69.   Singapore would like to reiterate that it share s the proposal 's aim of  enhancing transparency 
and improving Members ' compliance with their WTO  notification obligations  and stand s ready to 
engage in further discussions on this.  
7.70.   The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
7.71.   Bangladesh has  spoken on this issue in the CTG  meetings in July and November of 2019 and 
exchanged opinions during numerous informal meetings with Members. Bangladesh believes that 
transparency is an essential pillar of good governance  and agree s that there are many ways to 
ensure transparency: only a few notification templates cannot fully serve the transparency purpose.  
7.72.   Sincerely, the LDCs are not unwilling to provide notification. Notification provisions under 
different Agreements are of diverse nature and the capability of the LDCs to notify is seve rely 
constrained by lack of technical capacity and unique internal coordination challenges. The same is 
the case for the list of Agreements and Understandings that the co -sponsors mentioned under 
paragraph  1 of the draft decision.  
7.73.   Members  must recall the c ommitment made in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, particularly in Article  XI:2, that says: "The least -developed countries 
recognized as such by the United Nations will only be required to undertake commitments and 
concess ions to the extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs or 
their administrative and institutional capabilities. " Further to this unequivocal guarantee, during the 
Uruguay Round Agreement, Ministers also reinforced the sam e special provisions while making the 
Decision on Measures in Favour of Least Developed Countries, and paragraph  1 of this decision 
reads: "… notwithstanding their acceptance of these instruments, the least -developed countries, and 
for so long as they rema in in that category, while complying with the general rules set out in the 
aforesaid instruments, will only be required to undertake commitments and concessions to the 
extent consistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or their  administrative 
and institutional capabilities. " The decisions of the Ministers make this evident that LDCs will be 
require d to undertake only those commitments and concessions where they recognize that they 
have capabilities. They are not to be forced to act beyond their capacity and limitation. Paragraph  12 
of the submission, which has proposed administrative measures and provision of naming and 
shaming for failure in providing notification by any Member which may also include an LDC, will be 
a clear viol ation of the commitments and agreed decisions made by the Ministers which I cited.  
7.74.   Bangladesh appreciates the proponents for suggesting technical assistance to be supported 
by WTO  Secretariat through paragraphs  8, 9, and 11 of the draft decision. The ongoi ng efforts of 
the WTO  Secretariat to provide technical support and customized trainings are deeply appreciated. 
However, the capacity constraint has not improved to the expected level in the LDCs. It must be 
investigated why the existing technical assistan ce programmes on notification enhancement cannot 
meet our expectation. Without practically addressing the capacity gaps, only administrative and 
punitive measures will not bring any productive result.  
7.75.   The delegation of Bangladesh encourages proponents to a ddress the existing difficulties in 
notification and, where required, by simplifying the templates and procedures. Bangladesh looks 
forward to working with the Members.  
7.76.   The delegate of Burkina Faso , speaking for Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the 
following:  
7.77.   Burkina Faso  would like to reassure the co -sponsors of its consultative approach. Likewise, 
we appreciate the thought that  they have given to us and our concerns.  We are ready to continue G/C/M/137  
 
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  our discussions in a range of formats so th at we can come to a consensus -based decision as part of 
the WTO  reform.  This new version will still need to have feedback from certain capitals and , in the 
meantime, we look forward to continuing our interactions to improve our understanding and to find 
results together that will lead towards a fair refor m. In this regard , we recall the communication that 
our group circulated in December  2019, JOB/GC/2 23. 
7.78.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
7.79.   Mexico considers that  the updated proposal bring s a significant contribution to the debate on 
improving transparency and strengthening respect of notification obligations by all Members.  
7.80.   Although Mexico  welcome s the improvements and explanations  and consider s that this new 
version continues to go in the right direction , Mexico  regre ts that footnote  3 on page  3 continues to 
distinguish  DS:1 notifications (agriculture)  and allows for a  much longer deadline before 
administrative measures are introduced. The relevance of this notification and the information that 
it contains are not negligible. And therefore timely presentation continues to be in our interests.  
Mexico  also continue s to feel that there is room for improvement. If it is to work for everybody, this 
exception must be subject to a specific date and not to the eventual conclusion of a discussion on 
procedures to be agreed.  Mexico  remain s convinced that what is needed in this Org anization are 
rules that are not permissive. Above all, they must be the same for everybody.  In conclusion, Mexico 
is convinced that it is important to prove monitoring and notification obligations as undertaken and 
therefore reiterate s its acknowledgement  and readiness to continue working with regard to these 
ideas.  
7.81.   The delegate of Senegal  indicated the following:  
7.82.   Senegal would like to thank the proponents for this revised proposal and for the efforts made 
to address Members' concerns, particularly those o f developing countries and the least developed 
countries (LDCs).  
7.83.   Senegal would like to reaffirm the importance of transparency and fulfilment of notification 
and transparency obligations within the operations of the multilateral trading system.  However, 
Senegal's  position on this proposal remains the same and Senegal is available to continue discussions 
with the proponents on aspects relating to technical assistance and administrative measures included 
in this proposal.  
7.84.   Certain delegations face technical an d financial constraints since they are often subject to 
administrative measures provided for under the WTO's financial regulations and are therefore 
deprived of the technical assistance foreseen in paragraphs  8 to 10 of the proposal. The delegation 
of Sene gal therefore wonders how the administrative measures contained in the WTO's financial 
regulations can be harmonized with the administrative and financial regulations provided for in this 
proposal.  Senegal would be grateful to hear the proponents' views on  this matter.  
7.85.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
7.86.   China  appreciate s the proponents for providing the updated proposal and also their efforts to 
continue consultation with other Members. China noted that the LDCs were granted more flexible 
treatment in the updated proposal. It is a meaningful progress which reflects the co nsideration on 
the difficulties faced by LDCs.  
7.87.   However, for this updated proposal, there are still some issues  that need to be further 
discussed. Regarding the coverage of this proposal, China  would like to reiterate when talking about 
transparency and not ification obligations, it should include not only goods, but also services, TRIP s 
and other relevant Agreements under the WTO  framework. Regarding the administrative measures, 
China  would like to reiterate that it is not in a position to support the puniti ve measures that would 
deprive Members of their legitimate rights as a WTO  Member, neither can China support the financial 
punitive approach.  
7.88.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  G/C/M/137  
 
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  7.89.   Indonesia will not repeat the importance of transparency as one  of the main pillars  in this 
Organization of the rules -based multilateral trading system as expressed by previous delegations.  
Indonesia is observing  that the proposal that has been discussed in this Council since the July 2019 
meeting contain s some elemen ts, including punitive administrative measures , that in Indonesia's 
view could discourage the participation of developing countries and least developed countr y 
Members in the multilateral trading system.  
7.90.   Capacity constraints are the major obstacles for dev eloping countries and LDC  Members to 
participate in the system. Hence, the Organization should focus its work on not only to improve 
transparency but also to have more effective participation of all Members by addressing the capacity 
constraints faced by d eveloping countries and LDC  Members through collaborative initiative s. 
7.91.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
7.92.   India thank s the proponents for their third  revision of their earlier proposal, wherein they 
have considered some of the concerns expressed by Members to accommodate them. However, the 
overall essence of this revised proposal remains the same. In this regard, India would like to support 
the statemen ts made by the delegation of South Africa today  and reiterate that India strongly 
believes in transparency, as it is one of the main pillars of the rule s-based multilateral trading system 
and provides Members the information and clarity on the laws and reg ulations, facts and figures as 
well as the measures, impacting international trade that are being taken by other Members. Many 
Members, including India, have significantly improved the ir notification compliance despite the 
difficulties in collecting and co llating information as per the notification requirements under various 
agreements under the WTO.  
7.93.   India had earlier expressed its concerns on specific issues in the proposal and the decision 
being sought by the proponents thereof. Most of those concerns sti ll remain. Some of the developing 
countries , including India,  have also submitted a joint proposal on transparency which needs to be 
considered by Members.  
7.94.   In a nutshell, India finds it difficult to agree to any such proposal which provides for penalties 
and administrative actions in case of default, rather than making an effort to understand the 
difficulties a large number of developing Members are facing given the breadth and length of 
notification requirements under various agreements under the WTO and t he capacity constraints of 
the Members. What is required is not to assume wilful default but to encourage those who have been 
able to update their notifications despite great difficulties and also to assist those who have not been 
able to notify because of  various reasons including capacity constraints. Understanding and empathy 
rather than sanctions that erode equity and trust is the need of the hour. Hence, India would 
advocate that instead of the administrative actions, appropriate support to notify will  encourage 
Members to improve upon their internal capacity to notify in time. Having said so, India is ready to 
discuss the matter further with the proponents on their revised proposal to find a pragmatic solution.  
7.95.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
7.96.   Strengthening and improving the WTO 's functioning, including its monitoring mechanism, is 
of utmost importance and is long overdue. The Russian Federation  consider s enhancing transparency 
and improving efficacy of the notification re quirements to be an integral part of the WTO  reform , 
and therefore support s all efforts aimed at promoting transparency in the multilateral trading 
system, including the improvement of the quality and timeliness of the information submitted by 
Members to t he WTO.  
7.97.   Russia  would like to note that the improvement of the quality and timeliness of notifications 
can be achieved not only through enforcement mechanism but also by means of clarifying the 
existing requirements, as well as adapting them to the new trad e and technological environment. 
There should also be coherence among the notifications submitted under different Committees in 
terms of both their timeliness and content. In Russia's  view, the consideration of all these issues 
together may improve complia nce with the notification requirements. Russia  believe s that the 
ongoing work on strengthening the notification obligations requires a more comprehensive approach.  
7.98.   The delegate of Côte d'Ivoire  indicated the following:  G/C/M/137  
 
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  7.99.   Côte d'Ivoire's  delegation maintains its position on this proposal. That position relates not to 
the goal of the proposal but to the way in which it suggests that we achieve that goal. Côte d'Ivoire  
does not feel comfortable with the punitive aspect of this proposal which seems excessive. Côte 
d'Ivoire  feels that there is a need to support those Members that have difficulties respecting their 
commitments on notifications and transparency , and would therefore encourage the co -proponents 
to include provisions to help not only LDCs but also developing countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, that 
experience difficulties with notifications.  
7.100.   The delegate of the United States  responded as follows:  
7.101.   The United States thanks Members for the t houghtful engagement , and the United Kingdom, 
in particular, for its supportive statement and its indication of co -sponsorship. This is very welcome 
news and the US and the other co -sponsors will look forward to working with the UK going forward. 
Regarding  the questions and comments heard today, the co -sponsors want to be able to give each 
comment and question its due consideration and a thoughtful response. In light of our virtual 
platform and the need for brevity given our long agenda, the US intend s to come back to Members 
on their comments and questions in the appropriate fora, either bilaterally, in group configurations, 
or whatever the case may be. The US will endeavour to do this promptly.  
7.102.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the sta tements made.  
7.103.   The Council so agreed . 
8  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHINA, NEW ZEALAND, THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SWITZERLAND, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  
8.1.  The Chairper son informed Members that, in communications dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegations of  Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, 
the United States, and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include t his issue on 
the agenda.  
8.2.  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
8.3.  Brazil would like to stress the importance of concluding negotiations with the European Union 
under Article  XXVIII before the end of the transition period established in the "Withdraw al 
Agreement ". Brazil's  private sector has been expressing concerns about the uncertainties they will 
face from 1 January  2021 if the European Union and the United Kingdom do not reach an agreement 
on the future of their economic and commercial relations and if the WTO 's quotas for access to the 
European Union market are not properly defined.  
8.4.  For Brazil, a clear definition of the operation and the volume of the TRQs  is of the essence. As 
for their operation, we draw attention to the fact that we will be exactly in the middle of the European 
quota year (July to June) when the transition period is over.  We should make sure that future market 
access conditions are not l ess favourable  than the ones currently in place, as provided for in 
GATT  Article  XXVIII . And the current European apportionment proposal , as well as the British one , 
will undermine access to the EU -27 and UK  market.  
8.5.  The reasons why Brazil – and many other delegations – considers that it will be in less 
favourable  conditions of access to the European market were mentioned in previous meetings of this 
Council. Those same reasons remain in view of the uncertainties raised by the negotiations between 
the United  Kingdom and the European Union and the non -recognition by the European Union that a 
successful conclusion of the negotiations under Article  XXVIII will require some degree of flexibility. 
At this point, we recall that the negotiations under Article  XXVIII  are secret, despite the fact that 
the proposal for "apportionment " was published by the European Commission on its website.  In this 
sense, Brazil hopes that the bilateral negotiations continue in this spirit of greater openness and in 
recognition that Mem bers' claims and concerns regarding a European process that impacts the 
multilateral trading system are legitimate.  Brazil also urge s the European Union to provide us with 
an overview of the developments in the negotiations with the United Kingdom.  
8.6.  The del egate of Australia  indicated the following:  G/C/M/137  
 
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  8.7.  As stated on numerous occasions, including most recently at the Committee on Market Access, 
Australia recognizes the legal rights of the EU to modify its existing schedule under 
GATT  Article  XXVIII . However, comp ensatory concessions should be provided to affected 
WTO Members for the loss of market access.  Australia cannot accept the assertion by the EU that 
no compensation is required as there has been no loss in value of the concessions. It is clear the 
proposed modifications to TRQs will lead to significant economic loss, by not only removing flexibility 
in where product is sent year -to-year, but by also rendering some TRQ  allocations too small to be 
commercially viable.  Australia  believe s the EU must proceed wit h compensatory adjustments , that 
factor in the significant commercial losses, and to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous concessions.  
8.8.  Australia has remained constructive during these negotiations and has not approached them 
to seek significant market access gains, rather we want to ensure the current quality and level of 
market access is maintained. Australia has submitted formal proposals for compensation for all 
Australia's CSQs recognized by the EU. The onus is now on the EU to respond formally to the 
proposals and move beyond its position of "no compensation".  
8.9.  It is now time for the EU to actually engage in ne gotiations to find product and Member -specific 
solutions. Otherwise, the entire process over the last few years of recognizing negotiating rights 
under Article  XXVIII  and engaging in regular bilateral meetings would appear to be have been in 
vain. Australi a stands ready to work with the EU to constructively and pragmatically resolve these 
issues well before the end of the transition period.  
8.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
8.11.   The EU is a close friend and partner. However, New Zealand  remain s concerned by its 
proposed approach to its tariff rate quota commitments in light of Brexit. The EU  believe s this raises 
important systemic issues of interest to all WTO  Members.  
8.12.   Bound WTO  market access commitments are intended to provide stability and pr edictability 
to all Members. Members seeking to modify these commitments need to respect the spirit, as well 
as the process, of the provisions covering any such modifications, including the objective of 
preserving stability in the value of mutually advanta geous concessions. An approach that unilaterally 
removes market access rights is not consistent with preserving that system.  
8.13.   The EU has said before that it considers it is entitled to reduce WTO  Members' access, because 
of Brexit, and that this will be "co mpensated" by access provided by another WTO  Member – the 
UK. The reality, though, is that the end result of this approach is reduced access to both markets. If 
this approach is applied unilaterally by the EU at the end of the current Brexit transition per iod, there 
are some products for which WTO  Members have had access under tariff rate quota into the EU from 
1 January  1995, for which they will have no access from 1  January  2021, and many other products 
for which access will have been substantially reduce d. The same applies in the case of the UK. New 
Zealand  has presented data at past meetings that clearly demonstrates this outcome.  
8.14.   New Zealand is  troubled by apparent EU  insistence that acceptance of its so -called 
"apportionment approach" should be the sta rting point for any negotiations, as this fails to recognize 
the impact on other WTO  Members of the reduced access this approach entails. It is difficult to 
understand why the EU would want to rule out alternative approaches capable of preserving the 
value  of its existing commitments before discussions have even begun.  
8.15.   A further concerning dimension of the adverse impact of the EU's proposed approach is the 
real risk that, come 1  January  2021, the EU and UK will start to compete with the rest of the 
WTO Membership for access to the smaller quotas each is offering. Neither has offered any 
reassurance that this will not be the case, at this stage, despite the data that has been presented in 
past meetings showing the extent of the "crowding out" of other WTO  Member trade this would likely 
cause.  
8.16.   Given this, New Zealand continue s to hold the deep concerns it has expressed at past 
meetings of the Committee on Market Access ( CMA), the Committee on Agriculture ( CoA), the CTG, 
and bilaterally, about the impacts of th e proposed EU  approach and urge s the EU to reconsider its G/C/M/137  
 
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  position and show readiness to engage with WTO  Members on alternative ways to resolve this issue 
in a mutually satisfactory way.  
8.17.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
8.18.   Uruguay wishes to re iterate its position and concerns already raised in this forum and in 
others, including in document  RD/CTG/5, and emphasizes the importance for the multilateral trading 
system that this matter be resolved through substantive bilateral negotiations between the parties 
concerned, and not unilaterally, in accordance with WTO  rules, and respecting market access 
commitments and the balance of previously negotiated concessions.  
8.19.   Despite what is stated in the Political Declaration on the future relationship between  the 
European Union and the United Kingdom, according to which the aim is to form a free trade area 
without tariffs or tariff rate quotas between the two  Members, a significant level of uncertainty 
remains as to the form that this relationship will take af ter 1 January  2021, and the consequences 
that this may have for trade with third  parties.  
8.20.   In this regard, there is a real risk that the United Kingdom and the European Union, which 
maintain significant levels of trade for a number of the products concerned  in the tariff rate quotas 
under negotiation under Article  XXVIII, will have access to (and make use of) their respective erga 
omnes  quotas. Given the geographical proximity and the well -oiled trade relations existing between 
operators in both Member countries, a large portion of these quotas could be exhausted, thus 
excluding the other Members that currently make use of the quotas or that might do so in the future. 
This would lead to clea r economic damage, in addition to the harm from other factors that Uruguay 
has already mentioned on several occasions.  
8.21.   As the negotiations under Article  XXVIII are taking place in parallel with the bilateral 
negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom, Uruguay again draw s attention 
to the need to take due account of these concerns in the WTO  negotiations.  
8.22.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
8.23.   As noted in this Council and other Committees, the United States supports th e UK's efforts to 
separate its WTO  rights and obligations from that of the European Union' s. However, the United 
States continues to reject the current EU -UK approach to TRQs as it is prejudicial to its WTO rights 
and trade interests.  
8.24.   The approach chosen b y the EU and the UK will reduce market access opportunities for 
US exporters into both markets. Indeed, for certain TRQ  products, the proposed split will result in 
no in-quota access to either the UK or the EU -27. For other products, the proposed split wil l likely 
result in reduced access to the EU only as the UK 's new Global Tariff will liberalize tariffs and not 
apply TRQs for certain products.  
8.25.   Furthermore, the proposals fail to clarify how bilateral EU -UK trade will be treated in the 
absence of an EU -UK bilateral agreement once the transition period ends. Currently that bilateral 
trade is not subject to the TRQs. Currently, other WTO  Members have the opportunity to export the 
full TRQ  quantity into either the UK or EU -27. But if the UK and the EU -27 are s ubject to the same 
TRQs the rest of us face, then we will be quickly crowded out and face a loss of access to both 
markets.  This is unjustifiable, and clearly an unacceptable outcome for other WTO  Members.  
8.26.   Like other Members, the United States remains read y to engage with the EU and UK in 
productive negotiations that ensure our trade interests are maintained.  
8.27.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.28.   Canada continues to have significant concerns regarding the UK and the EU 's approach to 
apportioning the EU -28's TRQs and has made these concerns clear to the UK and the EU through 
multilateral and bilateral discussions.  While these concerns remain, Canada notes the EU and UK 's 
willingness to discuss these issues.  Canada looks forward to continuing these discussions with the 
UK and the EU during bilateral Article  XXVIII negotiations.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  8.29.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
8.30.   Switzerland is taking the floor on item s 8 and 9. Switzerland  share s the concerns expressed 
under these i tems about the legal uncertainty regarding access to tariff quotas, which could arise 
specifically in the case of a hard Brexit.  Switzerland also share s the view that the deconsolidation 
and the reallocation of appropriate TRQ  quantities to the EU -27 and U K is highly relevant to many 
Members and therefore of systemic importance to the WTO as a whole. More concretely, Switzerland  
asks both the UK and the EU to come forward as soon as possible with a solution to ensure that 
existing tariff quotas are not fill ed by bilateral trade between the EU and UK and that third  country 
market access is not impaired.  
8.31.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
8.32.   China' s concerns and requests on this issue remain unchanged. China cannot accept the 
approach being taken by t he European Union and the United Kingdom to apportion the EU -28 TRQs, 
which China  believe s will impair Members ' interest s. China  encourage s the European Union to 
continue to engage and take into full consideration all of the comments and requests raised by  
Members both at WTO  meetings and in bilateral consultations.  
8.33.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
8.34.   The Russian Federation would like to reiterate its concern in respect of the EU 's approach to 
the TRQ  negotiations in the context of Brexit . The approach of  the EU-28 to the apportionment of 
TRQs cannot be considered as WTO -consistent ; neither can it provide the EU with the possibility to 
maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions.  The Russian 
Federation is  of the opinion that these negotiations cannot be concluded without a respective 
agreement on compensation with principal suppliers of the products concerned.  Thus, the Russian 
Federation urges the EU to submit its compensatory proposal.  
8.35.   The d elegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
8.36.   For reasons of time, Paraguay's  statement will address items  8 and 9 of today's agenda. As 
on previous occasions, Paraguay  wishes to express its concern regarding these agenda items and 
reiterate the main reason s behind this , namely t he lack of clarity on the future trading relationship 
between the European Union and the United Kingdom and the potentially negative impact that this 
could have on the saturation of erga omnes  quotas, and the problems linked to a los s of market 
flexibility as a result of the distribution of quotas.  
8.37.   With regard to the UK in particular, the delegation of Paraguay wishes to point out that the 
proposed Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) included in the UK's proposed schedule of 
commitment s, which was recently modified to reflect the changes from euros to pounds Sterling, is 
an additional cause for concern, since we lack information on the nature of the EU's AMS once the 
UK has withdrawn from the bloc.  
8.38.   Moreover, Paraguay  would appreciate gr eater clarity on the S anitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)  
and T echnical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  policies that would be applied by the UK from 1  January  2021, 
particularly with regard to regulatory alignment with the EU, for reasons outlined in Paraguay's 
statement on item  17 of today's agenda.  
8.39.   Paraguay  once again urge s both the UK and the EU to take the appropriate steps to avoid 
causing harm to their trading partners and to effectively fulfil the promise that this separation will 
not cause third  parties to los e their markets.  
8.40.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
8.41.   The Republic of Korea would like to reiterate its position and systemic concerns  on this item. 
Korea is very keen on the ongoing negotiations between the EU and other WTO  Membe rs, as the 
modification will bring about significant consequences for the WTO  system. In order to maintain the 
mutual benefits, the modification negotiations should be conducted in a transparent and predictable 
manner.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  8.42.   The delegate of India indicated the f ollowing:  
8.43.   India's intervention covers both agenda items  8 and 9.  India would like to thank the 
proponents of these two  items for inclusion in the agenda  and echoes the concerns raised by 
Members today.  
8.44.   India had already expressed its concerns both in writing and during the bilateral discussions 
with the delegations of the European Union and the United Kingdom on the approach they have 
taken in TRQ  apportionment. India has made it clear to them as to how the present methodology 
and the threshold years taken into account for apportionment of TRQs by the EU and the UK is 
affecting Members' rights on those specific tariff lines. Those concerns still remain.  
8.45.    India encourage s the EU and the UK to take into acc ount the concerns raised by the Members, 
including India, and work creatively to ensure the preservation of the full value of the commitments 
it has made to WTO  Members so that the current level of rights bestowed to Members for appropriate 
market access i n the EU -28 markets, both in terms of value and quality, is maintained. India looks 
forward to fruitful negotiation s with the European Union and the United Kingdom.  
8.46.   So far as the United Kingdom's recent document related to Rectifications and Modifications of 
Schedule  XIX is concerned, India's delegation would like to say that it has been received recently 
and the same is being examined by the Capital. However, as a preliminary comment, India would 
like to say that apart from concerns on the apportionment of  the domestic support value (AMS) for 
agricultural goods, India would like to hear more from the delegation of the United Kingdom on the 
basis of the number of years chosen as well as the source of such data for the exchange rate for 
euro to pound taken in to consideration by the United Kingdom in its amended Schedule  XIX 
circulated recently.  
8.47.   India will continue these discussions with the EU and the UK for further understanding and 
finding a solution.  
8.48.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
8.49.   Costa  Rica is taking the floor to refer to items  8 and 9 on the agenda  and thank s the Members 
who have placed both items on the Council 's agenda.  As on previous occasions, Costa Rica  wishes 
to make use of these agenda items to underline the importance of ensuri ng that procedures 
implemented under Article  XXVIII are transparent and inclusive and enable Members to ensure that 
guarantees established under the WTO  Agreements are not undermined; and that, if changes are 
made, this is done in such a way that all Membe rs can effectively assess any impact that such 
changes may have on international trade flows.  In this regard, Costa Rica is maintaining and will 
maintain a constructive dialogue with the EU and the U K, both at the bilateral level and in the context 
of the activities of this Council and its subsidiary bodies.  
8.50.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
8.51.   Chinese Taipei's delegation wishes to address item  8 and item  9 together. Chinese Taipei once 
again would like to reiterate its systemic concerns regarding the methodology used by the EU and 
UK for the modification of TRQs following Brexit. The delegation of Chinese Taipei shall be following 
developments on this topic very closely  and urges the EU and UK to engage continuously with 
Members in a fully transparent manner to ensure that Members' trade interests will not be affected 
and shall be maintained at the current level.  
8.52.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
8.53.   Indonesia wishes to express its gratitude to the EU for convening several meetings bilaterally 
with Indonesia to discuss future EU  TRQ commitments in the context of Brexit. Indonesia is one of 
the Members that has an interest in negotiating the EU's TRQ  commitments.  From the latest 
meeting, progress has been made with a proposal from the EU. At this meeting, Indonesia would 
only convey its hope that the EU will consider Indonesia's aspirations during the negotiations, taking 
into account the WTO  rules and a win -win m arket access approach.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  8.54.   The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
8.55.   In line with the previous statements , Chile would urge and hope s that the involved parties 
can hear these concerns with interest and listen to the objections that have been set forth to this 
agreement in the way they are trying to divide up these TRQs. Chile simply urge s them to listen and 
to show understanding.  
8.56.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.57.   Negotiations under the Article  XXVIII procedure are still ongoing wi th the partners who have 
rights under that Article. The next round is planned for July  2020. The EU welcomes that 
WTO Members generally engage in these negotiations in good faith and aims to make progress with 
as many Members as possible at the next round.  
8.58.   As stated on many previous occasions, the apportionment of the WTO  TRQs is based on an 
"EU-UK joint approach" dating back to October  2017, which ensures that the overall existing level 
of market access of other WTO  Members is maintained. The "joint approa ch" and the ongoing EU -UK 
separate but complementary negotiations with WTO  Members under GATT  Article  XXVIII are set to 
continue.  
8.59.   There will be no change to the current EU  WTO TRQ levels and management until the end of 
2020 (as agreed in the Withdrawal Agr eement between the EU and the UK, EU  law will continue to 
apply in and to the UK, including the common commercial policy and the common external tariff) . 
8.60.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
8.61.   The Council so agreed . 
9  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: 
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHINA, NEW 
ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SWITZERLAND, THE UNITED STATES, AND 
URUGUAY  
9.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, i n communications dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegations of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, 
the United States, and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on 
the agenda.  
9.2.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
9.3.  New Zealand recognize s the UK is working to establish its independent presence at the WTO, 
post-Brexit, and is ready to engage with the UK on this  and has noted with interest the 
announcement by the UK last  month of its planned new global applied tariff regime and the tariff 
simplification measures this incorporates. In that context, New Zealand wishes to note the UK's 
declared objective to use its new status as "an independent trading nation to champion fre e trade, 
fight protectionism and remove trade barriers".  
9.4.  New Zealand finds it difficult to understand proposals in the UK's new and independent draft 
WTO schedule which would establish limited and highly constrained tariff rate quota access for 
products th at the UK does not produce domestically or is not able to produce competitively at world 
market prices. Additionally, New Zealand is  curious about why the UK would preserve and utilize 
minimum access prices linked to the common market that it is leaving, o r other features of a system 
it has chosen to leave behind . 
9.5.  Moreover, as outlined under the preceding item, the "apportionment approach", with which the 
UK has also so far associated itself, not only runs counter to the intent to enable trade to flow more 
readily and smoothly signalled in the new UK  global tariff announcement. It also works to reduce 
those existing trade opportunities for other WTO  Members to which the UK has been committed for 
the past 25 years. This is very difficult to reconcile with the messages from the UK on its wish to 
use its newly independent status in the WTO to champion free trade and remove trade barriers.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  9.6.  As indicated many times, New Zealand stand s ready to work constructively with the UK to help 
it establish its independent presence in the WTO. In doing so, it is important that the UK bring a 
fresh approach to working with WTO  Members to establish a set of WTO  commitments that reflect 
both specific UK  interests and the legitimate, long -standing trading interests of other WTO  Members.  
9.7.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
9.8.  When, in July  2018, the United Kingdom submitted the original draft Schedule  XIX, under the 
1980 Procedures, its certification was contested by a number of WTO  Members. These objections 
led to the f ormal opening of a negotiation process under Article  XXVIII, which is currently underway, 
on the tariff rate quota concessions that appear in its draft Schedule.  
9.9.  Uruguay  notes that the additional amendments recently proposed by the United Kingdom in 
docume nt G/MA/TAR/RS/570/Rev.1 add another layer of complexity to the procedure for drawing 
up the Schedule by the Member in question. Uruguay is still studying these proposals and, beyond 
the issue of tariff rate quotas, shares the doubts expressed by other Mem bers about the United 
Kingdom's claim to an automatic right to have an AMS and to apply special agricultural safeguards 
for the same products as the European Union, which seems to have been taken as a given.  
9.10.   Uruguay hopes that the open procedure under Arti cle XXVIII of the GATT on tariff rate quotas 
will be settled through bilateral and confidential negotiations between the Members concerned and 
the United Kingdom, and calls on the Member in question to hold open talks with a view to securing 
market access commitments that correspond to the reality of bilateral trade and the specific interests 
of the parties involved, and do not undermine current access opportunities, complying fully with the 
provisions of the relevant multilateral rules.  
9.11.   Given the uncertain ty about the form that the future trade relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom will take, Uruguay also wish es to reiterate the need to take into 
account in the negotiations the significant existing levels of trade between the two  Members for a 
number of the products concerned in the erga omnes  quotas, and the real risk that these quotas will 
be exhausted by such trade levels under the proposed conditions, excluding other Members.  
9.12.   Uruguay will continue to engage in constructive discus sions with the United Kingdom with a 
view to reaching timely solutions that will lead to an independent Schedule of concessions being 
formally established in the WTO, while safeguarding the rights of the other Members concerned.  
9.13.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated t he following:  
9.14.   Brazil has been following closely the recent developments related to Brexit, with regard to 
both the British preparations for enjoying economic and commercial autonomy from January  2021, 
as well as the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union regarding their 
future relations. Unfortunately, despite recent developments, some uncertainties concerning 
negotiations under Article  XXVIII still remain.  
9.15.   As for the preparations for Brexit, despite some improvements in terms of reducing applied 
tariffs and simplifying some tariffs, the recently published "UK  Global Tariff" reinforces the 
importance of negotiations under Article  XXVIII in order to guarantee that Members' future market 
access conditions are not less fav ourable than the ones currently in place.  
9.16.   In agriculture, for example, attention is drawn to the lowest level of liberalization both in 
relation to the "Temporary Tariff Regime for No -Deal Brexit" and in relation to the terms proposed 
by the British govern ment to carry out the public consultation that enabled the publication of 
"UK Global Tariff". The sector therefore remains overprotected.  
9.17.   As for the UK -EU negotiation, despite the efforts of both negotiating teams in overcoming the 
hurdles imposed by the C OVID -19 pandemic, press coverage of the negotiations puts into question 
the feasibility of its conclusion by the end of this year. Brazil does not intend to minimize the 
importance for each side of the pending issues, but we would like to remember the "rip ple effect" 
on other WTO  Members in case of both the European Union and the United Kingdom not reaching a 
commercial agreement. If trade between the United Kingdom and the European Union takes place 
on MFN  terms, important erga omnes  TRQs will potentially be filled in full only by UK  exports to the G/C/M/137  
 
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  EU and by EU  exports to the UK. Hereupon, Brazil recall s the analysis made in this Council on the 
"'Netting -out' but no  'netting -in'" in the splitting proposal for British and European TRQs.  
9.18.   In this regard, Brazil invite s the United Kingdom and European Union delegations to assure 
that all the eventually established TRQs include the observation "except for the UK" and "except for 
the EU", respectively, if, at the end of the transition period, an agreement is not r eached. In Brazil's 
view, this would be an important demonstration of good faith and commitment to the multilateral 
trading  system.  
9.19.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
9.20.   As noted under the previous agenda item, the United States remains troubled with the 
approach the EU and UK have taken with respect to post -Brexit market access commitments. The 
US's primary goal is to ensure that the UK's independent goods schedule is fair and does not result 
in a loss of access to the UK or EU  markets. Therefore, the US  will examine closely the United 
Kingdom's recent proposed schedule modifications to convert all references to euros into pounds 
Sterling to ensure the changes do not adversely affect US exports. The United States  notes the 
liberal ization the UK has announced as part of its Global Tariff ; however, the US remain s concerned 
that the unfair split of TRQs with the EU could remain part of the UK's bound schedule  and remain s 
ready to engage with the United Kingdom to ensure US trading int erests are not adversely affected.  
9.21.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
9.22.   In the interest of time, Australia will not repeat its concerns regarding the splitting of the EU's 
existing tariff rate quotas, given  that they were outlined in the last  agenda item. The concerns 
Australia raised on the last agenda item equally apply to the UK, and Australia  reiterate s that it is 
now the time for the UK to actually engage in negotiations to find product and Member -specific 
solutions and move beyond their position of "no compensation".  
9.23.   Australia notes with interest that the UK has recently decided to submit a further rectification 
of its draft WTO  goods schedule in order to convert all references to euros into pounds Sterling. 
While Australia is still analy sing this latest proposed rectification, and the impact it will have on the 
UK's tariff bindings and domestic support entitlements, Australia  is still concerned that the issues it, 
and other Members, raised with the UK's initial rectification have still no t been addressed.  
9.24.   Australia considers that the UK's draft goods schedule circulated on 24  July 2018 contains 
substantive changes to the UK's current WTO  concessions, including the UK's A MS commitments, 
and Special Safeguard (SSG) entitlements. Australia do es not believe the UK should have automatic 
rights to AMS without scrutiny from the Membership. Nor should it be able to simply "copy and 
paste" SSG  rights from the EU's WTO  goods schedule – which have a distinct history and basis from 
the Uruguay Round an d could result in the perverse outcome of providing the UK  SSG rights for 
products that the UK does not produce.  
9.25.   Australia does not believe the UK 's proposed changes meet the requirement in paragraph  2 
of the "1980  Decision" that any changes "do not alter the scope of a concession" and must be "of a 
purely formal character". Australia stands ready to have constructive discussions with the UK to help 
resolve these matters.  
9.26.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
9.27.   The Russian Federation  continues to have a significant concern regarding the UK's approach 
to the TRQ  renegotiations  and stress es the impossibility of concluding negotiations without an 
agreement on compensation to be provided by the UK. The Russian Federation  also stress es the 
importance of establishing the UK's independent schedule of tariff concession s in full compliance 
with the WTO  rules and urges the UK to provide its compensatory proposal.  
9.28.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
9.29.   While China is willing to work with the UK to establish its own TRQ  commitments, China cannot 
accept the proposed apportionment approach as just expressed in agenda item  8. China  encourage s 
the UK to take full consideration of the comments and requests rai sed by Members both at G/C/M/137  
 
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  WTO meetings and in bilateral consultations. China has also noted that the UK circulated an 
amendment to its draft schedule recently. Beijing  is carefully reviewing the document and relevant 
procedure s. China would like to ask the UK  to clarify the relationship between this rectification and 
the incomplete rectification process of its draft schedule, as well as the ongoing consultations on 
TRQs. China has also noted with interest that the UK has chosen the average of the daily exchang e 
rates published by the Bank of England between 2015 and 2019, which is different to the reference 
period used for the consultations on TRQs. China looks forward to further discussion with the UK.  
9.30.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the fol lowing:  
9.31.   As Members will be aware, on 1  February  2020 the United Kingdom circulated 
document  WT/GC/206, which sets out the main implications arising from the United Kingdom's 
departure from the European Union in the WTO. The United Kingdom has undertaken it s transition 
in the WTO with the aim of maintaining the existing balance of rights and obligations between the 
United Kingdom and its trading partners. The United Kingdom has set out its goods schedule, 
circulated in document  G/MA/TAR/RS/570, on that basis . The United Kingdom has engaged 
extensively with Members on that Schedule and remain s open to discussions to ensure that 
conditions remain no less favourable to trade after the end of the transition period agreed between 
the European Union and the United Kingdom, which will end on 31  December  2020. Recognizing 
that, the United Kingdom is currently undergoing a process under Article  XXVIII to seek agreement 
with relevant WTO  Members on how to extract the United Kingdom's TRQ  commitments from those 
of the EU -28. The United Kingdom 's last round of Article  XXVIII negotiations took place in 
February  2020 in Geneva and the UK hopes to have the next round of negotiations in July  2020. 
9.32.   On AMS, the UK notes that some Members asked about whether the European Union's AMS 
will reduce proportionally in line with the commitment set out in the UK's Schedule  XIX. The United 
Kingdom cannot comment on the European Union's ongoing processes. However, the UK would recall 
that it was clear in the joint UK -EU letter of 11  October  2017 that the final bound commitment level 
for domestic agricultural support would be apportioned between the EU and the UK. This was also 
restated in the explanatory note to the United Kingdom's goods schedule in 
document  G/MA/TAR/RS/570 and is a clear c ommitment. The UK would also remind Members that 
this explanatory note contains details on how the AMS  apportionment was calculated.  
9.33.   Turning to other points raised, as some Members will be aware, the United Kingdom 
announced the "UK  Global Tariff" on 19  May 2020. This is the applied MFN tariff regime that the 
United Kingdom will apply from 1  January  2021, following the end of the transition period, and it will 
be expressed in the United Kingdom's national currency. As a consequence of this change, and to 
ensure stability and transparency between the UK's bound and applied Schedules, the United 
Kingdom has circulated document  G/MA/TAR/RS/570/Add.1, rectifying its bound goods schedule to 
redenominate all currency components in "Part  I" and "Part  IV – Section  I" of the Schedule from 
euros to pound s Sterling. This brings the United Kingdom into line with most other WTO  Members, 
who denominate their schedules in their own currency. In order to provide Members with complete 
transparency on the steps we are taking t o bring into effect this currency conversion, the UK 
introduced this matter as a standalone technical rectification of Schedule  XIX with no additional 
changes being made at this time. This currency rectification process has been submitted without 
prejudice  to already ongoing discussions on the broader certification of Schedule  XIX. 
9.34.   The United Kingdom looks forward to continuing engagement with Members on these 
important issues.  
9.35.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
9.36.   The Council so agreed . 
10  ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO INCLUDE CROATIA: NEGOTIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE XXIV:6 OF THE GATT 1994 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
10.1.   The Chairperson  informed Memb ers that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  10.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
10.3.   The Russian Federation would like t o reiterate its concerns regarding the European Union's 
negotiations under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994 within the framework of its enlargement to 
include Croatia. The Russian Federation has repeatedly raised this issue bilaterally, as well as at the 
Committee on Market Access  and during the meetings of the Council. Russia's concerns have been 
transmitted to the European Union in writing, as well as circulated among the WTO  Members. The 
Russian Federation  reminds Members that , in document  G/SECRET/35/Add .4, it has objected to the 
conclusion of these negotiations. To date, the EU has failed to enter into a constructive discussion 
with Russia on this issue. Russia once again notes that these negotiations cannot be considered as 
completed and calls upon the EU to engage into compensatory adjustment negotiations with Russia.  
10.4.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
10.5.   The EU would like to remind Members of the explanations provided at previous meetings, as 
well as in writing. The EU informed WTO  Members about the conclusion and outcome of the 
negotiations following Croatia's accession to the EU on 26  July 2018 (in 
document  G/SECRET/35/Add.2), pursuant to paragraph  5 of the Guidelines on Procedures for 
Negotiations under Article  XXVIII . The outcome of the Article  XXIV:6  process will be faithfully 
reflected in the EU -28 Schedule  CLXXV, which is currently undergoing the process of certification. 
As of today, the EU is  pleased to note that it has clarified and accommodate d the comments and  
questions of all Members, except one.  
10.6.   The EU has extensively and repeatedly explained, orally and in writing, the reasons for not 
having accepted the compensation claims of the Russian Federation in the context of the EU's last 
enlargement. For the record , the EU would like to point out that the indication of a WTO  Member as 
principal supplier in a GATT  Article  XXIV:6/XXVIII  notification does not constitute an automatic 
recognition of a right for that WTO  Member to obtain compensation. Some principal suppl iers make 
a claim, others do not. The notifying Member then enters into negotiations/consultations with those 
Members who have submitted a claim in conformity with the procedures and within the deadlines 
applicable under WTO  rules, with a view to identifyi ng if there is an entitlement for compensation.  
10.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
10.8.   The Council so agreed . 
11  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD 1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX VII(B) OF THE AGREEMEN T ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM CHAD ON BEHALF OF THE LDC GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 -
G/C/W/752)  
11.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 28  February  2020, the 
delegation of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, had requ ested the Secretariat to include this issue 
on the agenda.  
11.2.   The delegate of Burkina Faso , speaking on behalf of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, 
indicated the following:  
11.3.   The LDC  Group maintain s the importance of the proposal being made in April  2018 with regard 
to the flexibility to be granted to LDCs graduating from that status. The LDC  Group' s submission, 
under document  G/C/W/752, promotes a gentle transition of our economies in the developmen t 
dynamic once graduated from the LDC  status. As such, the proposal of the LDCs was drawn up in 
order to correct one  technical omission with regard to Annex  VII of the SCM  Agreement to ensure 
that LDCs graduating can benefit from the same conditions as tho se of non -LDCs listed in Annex  VII 
provided that the GNP  per capita remains below USD  1,000 in constant dollars. These countries 
graduating must continue to benefit from flexibilities as per Article  XXVII:2 of the SCM  Agreement.  
11.4.   On the issue of implementat ion, here this would be a simple technical issue that we are calling 
for correction in order to refer to graduating LDCs.  The LDC  Group hopes that its submission can be 
acceptable to Members and that a positive decision can be taken at the General Council.  We are G/C/M/137  
 
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  requesting that this issue remain on the agenda of the Council for Trade in Goods until we have been 
able to arrive at a decision, a constructive decision, by consensus.  
11.5.   The delegate of Bangladesh  indicted the following:  
11.6.   The delegation of Banglades h endorses the statement delivered by Burkina Faso on behalf of 
the LDC  Group. The submission is self -explanatory and aims to correct a technical omission 
regarding the use of export subsidies under the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measure s (ASCM).  
11.7.   The proposal does not envisage any new flexibility. It calls for a decision for continuation of 
the same flexibility when a graduated LDC falls within the criteria agreed by us  a long time ago. 
Article  27.2 (both subparagraphs  (a) and (b)) makes a clear distinction among the developing 
country Members on the basis of GNI  per capita. In other words, GNI  per capita below USD  1,000 is 
the threshold to allow eligible Members to use flexibilities for export subsidy. Moreover, we may also 
agree that exp ort subsidy is a policy tool that potentially can help Members in transition.  
11.8.   There is the historic example of Honduras which was not accidentally included in the original 
list of 20  developing country Members at the Annex  VII(b) in 1995 , although its GNI per capita was 
below USD  1,000. The General Council graciously allowed its inclusion in the year 2000 by correcting 
the omission. A developing country sought help 25  years ago, and Members logically responded. 
Now LDCs are seeking support from the Members with similar spirit. When the ASCM was negotiated 
in the early 1990s no one probably could visualize that in future the LDCs, that is, the Annex  VII(a) 
countries, would be graduated from the LDC  category. This is a technical omission and can be 
corrected w ithout adding any new flexibility in the original agreement. An omission cannot be 
interpreted as a deliberate intent by the Members to prevent graduating LDCs to benefit from 
Article  27.2(a) flexibilities.  
11.9.   The LDCs  thank Members for widely supporting our submission. However, a few delegations 
are of the view that if graduating LDCs need such extension they need to submit a notification first. 
Sincerely, the LDCs respect the notification obligation; however, many of them could not provide 
notifications due to capacity constraints and coordination challenges. Here, notification obligation s 
should not be made a pre -condition to our discussion that aims to correct a technical omission. 
Bangladesh therefore urge s Members to accept the LDC  submission positively  and stands ready to 
engage constructively with Members.  
11.10.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
11.11.   As is known, Turkey has already expressed its support for this proposal in previous 
CTG Meetings. In this regard, Turkey would like to refer to its previous statements on the issue and 
reiterate its belief that Members should continue their assistance to LDCs to overcome the remaining 
challenges they face and take positive actions for their full integration into the rules -based 
multilateral trading system.  In this respect, Turkey reiterate s that the graduated LDCs  with GNP 
below USD  1,000 should be given the same rights with the developing countries listed in the 
Annex  VII(b) of the A SCM. 
11.12.   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
11.13.   Nepal's  delegation would like to associate with the statement delivered by Chad i n this regard 
and add some points in the following ways. The criteria set for eligibility of graduation covers major 
aspects of socio -economic development including human development, economic development and 
economic risk factor. However, the provision al lows countries to be eligible for graduation even by 
meeting only two  criteria. It makes a possibility of country graduating without meeting the threshold 
of per capita income. In this situation, a graduating Member may not be eligible to benefit from the 
provision laid down in the ASCM regarding the flexibility of allowing export incentives just because 
of the name not mentioned once graduated in the Annex  VII(b) of the Agreement , which is not fair.  
11.14.   LDC graduation is not only the agenda of the LDCs but als o a global agenda and therefore 
enabling and encouraging for graduation by extending maximum possible support before and after 
graduation in a just manner has become urgent to meet the global target of LDC  graduation in a 
timely manner. The provision of th e agreement seems much focused on the level of economic G/C/M/137  
 
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  development particularly in the GNP per capita and therefore this provision needs to be applied in a 
fair manner by extending the facility to Members even after graduation.  
11.15.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
11.16.   Brazil would like to reiterate its support for the proposed amendment to Annex  VII of the 
SCM Agreement in order to allow graduated LDCs with GNP below USD  1,000 to continue to benefit 
from the rules under Article  27.2(a). Brazil has been expressing its support for the LDC  proposal in 
previous meetings of the SCM  Committee and this Council.  
11.17.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
11.18.   As the United States has noted each time this issue has been raised in the CTG, the speci fic 
need for this proposal remains unclear, as there does not seem to be export subsidy programs in 
place for which an extension might be needed. As such, the US continue s to question the need to 
change the rules in this area.  
11.19.   The delegate of India indicat ed the following:  
11.20.   India's delegation would also like to thank the delegation of Chad for inclusion of this agenda 
item. India has already supported this proposal in earlier meetings of the CTG. India's stand remains 
the same.  
11.21.   The delegate of the European U nion indicated the following:  
11.22.   The EU supports constructive initiatives to better integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading 
system and encourage s discussing this proposal – as any Special and Differential Treatment 
SDT proposal – on the basis of analysis that shows where specific problems lie. The EU is mindful of 
the challenges that graduating LDCs face and appreciate s the clarifications received by Members of 
the LDC  Group.  
11.23.   The EU views expressed at the last meetings remain. The EU would still need to assess the 
actual use of export subsidies by LDCs in order to establish whether a transition period is needed 
which would allow graduated LDCs to co ntinue using export subsidies. Unfortunately, the EU has 
little knowledge about whether, or to which extent, LDCs use export subsidies (or any other 
subsidies, for that matter) because LDCs hardly submit any notifications under Article  25 of the 
ASCM.  
11.24.   The EU again encourages the LDC  Group to work with the Secretariat to improve the 
situation of notifications. Possibilities of technical assistance via the WTO are available for support 
regarding notifications. Realizing that preparing first -time notifications  can take time, the EU 
suggest s that the LDC  Group could help the debate by presenting anecdotal evidence of whether 
and how LDCs  make use of export subsidies and how that helps their economic development. In 
addition, the EU suggest s that the countries concerned also seek assistance for reshaping any export 
subsidies to make them become WTO -compatible. The EU stands ready to engage  in informal 
consultations with the LDC  Group on this matter.  
11.25.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
11.26.   The Council so agreed . 
12  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS – REQUEST FROM 
THE EUROPEAN UNION  
12.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
12.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
12.3.   The EU would like t o bring a concern to the attention of the CTG which the EU has raised on 
multiple occasions as a Specific Trade Concern in the SPS  Committee.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  12.4.   Several years ago, the United States finalized its scientific risk assessment on the application 
of exports of app les and pears from eight EU  member States in a satisfactory manner under a 
so-called systems approach. Based on this risk assessment carried out by the United States, safe 
trade can start to take place under the conditions assessed. What is missing is the last remaining 
step whereby the United States publishes a Federal Notice that would allow trade to start. For several 
years now, the United States has unjustifiably blocked the publication of this Federal Notice without 
putting forward any scientific groun ds. 
12.5.   The EU is seriously concerned about this trade barrier, which goes against the provisions of 
the SPS  Agreement. Therefore, the EU urges the United States to implement approval procedures 
in line with the WTO  SPS Agreement and in a transparent manner, w ithout undue delay, and not to 
use such approval procedures as a disguised restriction to trade. As regards the EU  application for 
market access of apples and pears specifically, the EU requests the United States to grant such 
market access without any fur ther delay and publish its Federal Notice so that trade can start.  
12.6.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
12.7.   The United States thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the export of apples 
and pears under a system approach t o the United States. As previously noted, the EU has 
longstanding market access to the United States for its apples and pears under the existing 
pre-clearance program.  
12.8.   The US delegate is  pleased to report that the United States continues to work through it s 
normal regulatory process and is currently on the final step of publishing a final notice, which the 
US hopes to do soon.  The United States appreciates its bilateral work with the European Union on 
plant health and plant protection issues.  
12.9.   The Chairperso n proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
12.10.   The Council so agreed . 
13  MEXICO – FRONT OF PACK NUTRITION LABELING (NOM -51) – REQUEST FROM THE 
UNITED STATES  
13.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 2 7 May 2020, the 
delega tion of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
13.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
13.3.   The United States has provided comments on and raised concerns with Mexico's notification 
of NOM -51, "General Labeling Specifications for Pre -Packaged Foods and Non -Alcoholic Drinks – 
Commercial and Health Information" . 
13.4.   In its discussions in the TBT  Committee, the United States continues to express concerns that 
the revised regulation, intended to add ress public health, may be more trade restrictive than 
necessary to meet Mexico's legitimate health objectives, may not be based on robust scientific 
evidence, does not appear to consider the relevant international standards, and may contribute to 
consumer  confusion.  
13.5.   The US emphasize s the need for an extended transition period in light of the COVID -19 global 
pandemic, which has placed significant pressure on the food and beverage industry to maintain 
supply of safe and affordable food and manage complex glo bal supply chains. More flexibility in food 
production and labelling is needed at this time rather than diverting critical resources to comply with 
labelling rules aimed at a longer -term public health goal. A delay in the implementation of these 
rules to a llow a two -year transition period would enable the industry to remain focused on 
manufacturing during this crisis. To date, Mexico has denied the US  requests for this extension. 
Given that this measure could affect up to $3.4  billion in trade from the Unit ed States to Mexico, the 
US hopes that  Mexico continues to consider government and stakeholder input before implementing 
the regulation.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  13.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
13.7.   The EU supports the questions and concerns raised by the Un ited States. As also indicated in 
the last TBT  Committee, which took place in written form, the EU requests Mexico to postpone the 
implementation of phase  1 of the measures, as EU  industry does not have enough time to adjust.  
13.8.   The delegate of Canada  indicat ed the following:  
13.9.   Canada appreciates that Mexico has kept Members informed through each step of its process 
to amend NOM -051 in the context of the work of the WTO  TBT Committee. Mexico has demonstrated 
that it takes its transparency obligations seriously.  
13.10.   Canada also notes that Mexico has taken a phased approach to the application of the changes 
to NOM -051. The first  stage of enforcement is from 1  October  2020 to 30  September  2023. The 
1 October  2020 enforcement date provides producers six  months to comply with the amended 
measure.  While this six -month coming into force period is recognized and applied as the minimum 
reasonable interval between the final publication of a measure and its entry into force, it will be very 
difficult for Canadian producers to fu lly comply with the new labelling requirements by October  2020 
due to the significant nature of the changes. This difficulty is further exacerbated by the current 
situation as a result of COVID -19. 
13.11.   Consequently, Canada respectfully asks Mexico to consider delaying the coming into force 
period for Stage  1 of the amendments to NOM -051 by at least 12  months to provide operators 
additional time to comply with the changes.  
13.12.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
13.13.   Guatemala has  discussed this matter in the TBT  Committee  but remain s concerned.  
Guatemala recognize s Mexico's legitimate objective of protecting people's health and providing 
consumer information. However, Guatemala reiterate s the need to implement measures that are not 
more restrictive than ne cessary in terms of their impact on international trade. Having reviewed the 
new Mexican Official Standard NOM -051-SCFI/SSA1 2010, Guatemala wishes to draw attention to 
the following:  
13.14.   Nutrient content thresholds established for labelling were taken from th e thresholds 
identified by the WHO based on the overall daily diet of an individual, a parameter that was 
transferred proportionally to the specific product, when no such parameter was established in the 
Codex Alimentarius. The WHO thresholds should not de fine any characteristic of a specific food or 
beverage.  
13.15.   The new regulation on labelling refers to when a product is an "imitation" – something that, 
in Guatemala's view, is not in line with the Codex Alimentarius.  Guatemala is  concerned that the use 
of adh esive labels to comply with the requirements set forth in the Mexican Official Standard will no 
longer be permitted after the transition period. Sections  8.2.1 and 8.2.2 of the Codex standard 
CODEX -CXS-1-1985 – General Standard for the labelling of pre -packaged food – establish different 
standards and alternatives to use as benchmarks. The current Mexican standard deviates from the 
provisions of the international reference standard.  
13.16.   Guatemala reiterate s that the provisions contained in the Codex Alimentariu s must be taken 
into consideration, as well as the evidence established by the relevant scientific bodies. The object 
of the Codex Alimentarius is harmonization at the international level and the removal of barriers to 
trade. A new regulation with labellin g requirements raises concerns about the de -harmonization of  
provisions in this area at the global level, as it would create a barrier to small and medium -sized 
producers' prospects of accessing the international market, due to different labels and restric tions.  
13.17.   Guatemala request s that Mexico not put an end to the use of adhesive labels and, as 
mentioned above, comply with the Codex standard, as such a measure is more trade restrictive than 
necessary and especially as there are alternatives.  
13.18.   Guatemala also asks that Mexico take into consideration the COVID -19 crisis in Latin 
America, which has just reached its first  peak, with producers struggling to adapt to these changes. G/C/M/137  
 
- 40 - 
 
  Guatemala support s the request made by other Members that already took the floor, calling for the 
measure to be delayed.  
13.19.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
13.20.   Costa Rica wishes to thank the delegation of the United States for bringing this matter to 
the attent ion of the Council for Trade in Goods.  Costa Rica, like other delegations, has expressed its 
systemic and trade -related concern at Mexico's proposal on front of pack nutrition labelling in the 
TBT Committee.  
13.21.   In the current world situation resulting from CO VID-19, the implementation of measures of 
this kind entails a challenge that hampers efforts at worldwide economic recovery, especially in 
countries that depend on agricultural and agri -food trade.  
13.22.   Costa Rica  urges Mexico to review the implementation perio d, to ensure that it is based on 
science and on work relating to international standards, such as that being done on front of pack 
nutrition labelling in the context of the Codex Alimentarius.  
13.23.   The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
13.24.   Mexico would li ke to thank the delegation of the United States for its comments in today's 
Council meeting in respect of Mexican Official Standard NOM -051 SCFI/SSA1  2010: General 
specifications for the labelling of pre -packaged food and non -alcoholic beverages – Commerci al and 
health information, hereafter: NOM -051. As Mexico has  mentioned, the amendments to NOM -051 
aim to provide Mexican consumers with clear and accurate information on critical nutrient content 
and commercial information through the labelling of pre -packaged food and non -alcoholic beverages, 
with a view to helping consumers make more informed decisions.  
13.25.   On the basis of the regulatory impact analysis submitted to the National Regulatory 
Improvement Commission, the amendments to NOM -051 are key to the Gover nment of Mexico's 
comprehensive strategy to address health problems relating to non -communicable diseases such as 
obesity and excess weight.  The daily food guideline (GDA) system currently in use has not had the 
desired impact on the Mexican population's u nderstanding of information regarding products' critical 
nutrient content. The amendments to NOM -051 therefore seek to achieve legitimate public health 
objectives and to avoid misleading consumers.  
13.26.   Since no international standard contains the elements that  the NOM -051 amendment seeks 
to address, the Government of Mexico has developed and adopted measures it deems appropriate 
in order to meet its legitimate public health objectives.  The transitional Articles establish a phased 
entry into force of NOM -051. It  is worth noting that from 1  October  2020 to 31  March  2021, the 
requirements for front labels may be met by using adhesive labels or any other adhesive materials 
that can be stuck onto the current labels of products.  
13.27.   The use of adhesive materials is a temp orary measure in order to ease the transition required 
under the amendment to NOM -051. Given that, by 1  April 2021, labels must meet all of the 
established requirements, over one  year has been granted to fully comply with all the provisions of 
NOM-051. Once again, Mexico thanks the delegations for their comments on this agenda item today, 
and will send the comments to Capital.  
13.28.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
13.29.   The Council so agreed . 
14  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER AD JUSTMENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER 2019) – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
14.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 28  May 2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation  had requested the Secretariat to inclu de this issue on the 
agenda.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  14.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
14.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statement made during the meeting of the Committee 
on Market Access. In addition, the Russian Federation  draws the attention of the WTO  Members to 
the document circulated by the Commission's DG -TAXUD on 27  April 2020. The document highlights 
the following mechanisms on how to apply the measure at issue: (i)  new excise duty on carbon 
intensive products; (ii)  border tax or customs  duty on carbon intensive products at the level of 
internal tax; (iii)  carbon added tax (VAT  model); (iv)  surrender of ETS  allowances upon import of 
carbon intensive products; (v)  surrender of notional ETS  allowances upon import of carbon intensive 
product s. 
14.4.   The Russian Federation notes that EU  ETS applies to production sites on the territory of the 
EU. Its extension to imported products while domestic products are not subject to a like system 
appears to be inconsistent with GATT  Articles  II and III. Russia stress es that the same products with 
high and low "carbon footprint" are like products. In this regard, if the EU makes a decision to apply 
addition al fiscal measures to imported products, it will have to implement them to the domestic 
ones.  
14.5.   As for the extension of the EU  ETS to importers, it is not clear how this system may be applied 
in respect of products. How does the EU intend to surrender the ETS upon the manufacturing process 
in third  countries?  The Russian Federation will circulate a more  detailed communication on the issue 
and would like to engage in bilateral discussions on the concept of the proposed border mechanism.  
14.6.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
14.7.   China  thank s the Russian Federation for including this item on the agenda . China also noted 
that the EU is planning a carbon border adjustment mechanism and will follow this issue closely. At 
this moment, China  urges the EU to ensure that the mechanism be compliant with the WTO  rules 
and to develop and act in a transparent mann er. 
14.8.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
14.9.   The announcement of the adoption of a carbon border adjustment mechanism by the 
European Commission, within the so -called "European Green Deal", has generated interest among 
a number of WTO  Members, incl uding Uruguay.  
14.10.   In this connection, as Uruguay  stated at the most recent Committee on Market Access 
meeting, Uruguay  looks forward to learning more about this initiative, including its current state of 
development and the expected time -frame for its adoptio n, how the measure will be designed, and 
its coverage at the sector and product level.  
14.11.   Finally, Uruguay wishes to highlight the importance of ensuring the measure's compatibility 
with the commitments made by the European Union in the WTO.  
14.12.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
14.13.   Paraguay's  delegation wishes to thank the Russian Federation for placing this matter on the 
agenda. This issue has been a focus of Paraguay's attention during the question procedures at the 
93rd session of the Co A, which was suspended owing to the COVID -19 pandemic, and also at the last 
meeting of the Committee on Market Access.  
14.14.   Paraguay  wishes to take this opportunity to request the EU to respond to the following 
concerns:  To which selected sectors may a carbon tax be applied?  When does the EU plan to adopt 
this legislation?  How does the EU plan to ensure that this legislation will be consistent with its 
WTO commitments?  Does the EU plan to notify this measure to the WTO once a draft is available 
and does it plan to allow a reasonable length of time for Members to make comments?  Given that 
there are plans for an additional tax on those products with a carbon footprint greater than that of 
the EU, are European legislators also considering a "carbon credit" for products  with a carbon 
footprint lower than those produced in the EU?  G/C/M/137  
 
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  14.15.   Paraguay  has already sent these questions in writing to the EU following the meeting of the 
Committee on Market Access and hope s to receive a response as soon as possible.  
14.16.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
14.17.   The United States is monitoring the development of the proposed EU  carbon border 
adjustment mechanism with interest.  The United States is aware that the EU has stated, most 
recently under its Trade Policy Review, that t he border adjustment mechanism is not designed to 
protect European industry from competition and the mechanism is intended to reduce the risk of 
carbon leakage for certain sectors of the EU's economy.  
14.18.   While the US await s further details on this proposed ca rbon border adjustment mechanism, 
it continue s to encourage the EU to fully consider compatibility of any such measure with applicable 
WTO rules to ensure there is an open system of trade and that any such measure will not constitute 
a barrier to trade.  
14.19.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
14.20.   The EU has committed to climate neutrality by mid -century and the Commission has pledged 
to increase the EU's climate ambition for 2030. As long as the EU's trading partners do not take 
comparable c limate action, there will be a risk of carbon leakage that the EU must address.  
14.21.   In the European Green Deal, the European Commission announced that should differences 
in levels of ambition worldwide persist as the EU increases its climate ambition, the Comm ission will 
propose a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), for selected sectors, to reduce the risk of 
carbon leakage.  The European Council of 12  December  2019 has endorsed the objective of achieving 
climate neutrality by 2050 and that this should in clude "developing effective measures to tackle 
carbon leakage in a WTO  compatible way".  
14.22.   In the European Green Deal the Commission announced that it would make a proposal for a 
CBAM  for selected sectors in 2021. Before that, the Commission will first carry out an impact 
assessment to support the preparation of this initiative and to inform the Commission's proposal. 
The assessment will notably look at environmental, social and financial impacts, economic efficiency 
and legal feasibility, in particular with r espect to WTO  rules and our trade agreements, as well as in 
terms of complementarity with the EU  Emissions Trading Scheme. As part of the impact assessment, 
the Commission will actively consult citizens and stakeholders and encourage them to give their 
views on the best option to enforce ambitious policies against climate change in an open economy 
while addressing the risk of carbon leakage. The Commission is committed to transparency. The 
inputs for the consultation will be published on the Commission's ce ntral consultation page once all 
consultation activities are completed.  
14.23.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.24.   The Council so agreed . 
15  UNITED STATES - EXECUTIVE ORDER ON SECURING THE BULK -POWER SYSTEM - 
REQUEST FROM CHIN A 
15.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 28  May 2020, the 
delegation of China  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
15.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
15.3.   On 1 May 2020, the US government issued an Executive Order on Securing the United States 
Bulk-Power System, prohibiting the acquisition, importation, transfer, or installation of certain 
"bulk-power system electric equipment" where the transaction involves property in which a foreign 
adversary has any interest and poses risks to the US  national security. China would like to request 
the US to clarify how to define "foreign adversaries", and to ensure it will not be used as a tool to 
interfere with the normal business activitie s and to suppress an enterprise by the power of a nation. 
China would also like to know how the US will ensure measures taken under this Executive Order 
will not abuse the WTO  national security exception and be consistent with WTO  rules.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  15.4.   The delegate of th e United States  indicated the following:  
15.5.   The referenced Executive Order, issued by the President on 1 May, is a matter of US  national 
security and, in the view of the United States , not up for discussion in the WTO  Council for Trade in 
Goods.  
15.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
15.7.   The Council so agreed . 
16  EUROPEAN UNION – SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN STEEL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
16.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a commun ication dated 28  May 2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
16.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
16.3.   The Russian Federation has requested to discuss the EU  safeguard measures on certain steel 
products at the CTG  meeting for the first  time. For the sake of time the Russian Federation will not 
repeat all its concerns and arguments put forward at the Committee on Safeguards and wish es to 
raise only one  systemic is sue today.  
16.4.   First and foremost, it should be recalled that Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
prescribes to progressively liberalize a safeguard measure during the period of its application. This 
was further clarified by the panel in Argentina – Footwear  which stated that "the only modifications 
of safeguard measures that Article  7.4 contemplates are those that reduce its restrictiveness" . 
16.5.   Nevertheless, following the first review the measures of the EU have become more trade -
restrictive compared to t he original one. First, the liberalization rate was decreased from 5% to 3%. 
Second, the EU  authorities failed to effectively administer the measures, which exacerbated their 
restrictive effects. More specifically, when a country -specific quota for one of the product categories 
was replaced by a global quota, the authorities failed to efficiently reallocate the unused volumes of 
country -specific quota to the residual quota. As a result, the exporters had no access to those 
volumes for about a month after th e review and faced this problem subsequently at the beginning 
of new quarters. In sum, following the first review, the expectations of the exporters regarding the 
restrictiveness of the measures were deceived, and propensity of the EU  industry to adjust wa s 
blurred. The European Commission is now finalizing the second review of the measures. The EU has 
already notified  its results to the Committee on Safeguards. As it follows from the notification, 
liberalization rates will remain  at 3%. Besides, all quotas  in the next period will be administered on 
a quarterly basis.  
16.6.   Having a substantial interest as an exporter of the product concerned, the Russian Federation 
has requested consultations with the European Union under Article  12.3 of the Agreement on 
Safeguar ds. Nevertheless, the Russia n Federation  would welcome any clarification the EU may 
provide to the WTO  Membership on whether and how it is going to achieve the objective of Article  7.4 
of the Agreement on Safeguards to make the measure less trade -restricti ve following the 
second  review. In particular, how is the EU going to improve the administration of the measures so 
that the unused quota volumes are reallocated to the new quarters faster.  
16.7.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
16.8.   Korea takes note of the EU  Commission's decision to increase the level of TRQ by 3% for the 
third year of safeguard measures after listening to the Members concerned. Meanwhile, Korea would 
like to underline the necessity of maintaining and recovering the expectations for the steel industry 
and the current trade trend and practice to the level prior to implementing safeguard measures. In 
addition, Korea requests the EU to consider reducing the inconvenience caused by the change of the 
EU Commission 's plans to carry out a quarterly management of TRQ, not an annual management, 
on the third  year for safeguards. In this regard, Korea asks the EU to share the export statistics of 
exporting countries and customs statistics within EU  areas. Lastly, in terms of TRQ  modification G/C/M/137  
 
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  caused by Brexit, consultation with interested Members is necessary to proceed with the negotiation. 
Korea would like to point out the fact that the volume which the United Kingdom exported to the EU 
should be interpreted as the imported volum e of external countries, which means an increase in the 
quotas of external countries.  
16.9.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.10.   The investigation relating to the 2nd Review of the EU  steel safeguards is still ongoing. On 
29 May, the EU no tified to the WTO the changes it intends to bring about to the steel safeguard 
measures. The EU has invited all third  countries with an interest in the case to consultations, which 
will last until 11  June included. The EU looks forward to discussing the te chnical aspects of the 
proposed adjustments with the Russian Federation and any other Member in the appropriate fora, 
which are the consultations offered within the framework of the 2nd Review of the EU  safeguards ' 
investigation, as well as at the Committe e on Safeguards.  
16.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
16.12.   The Council so agreed . 
17  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA, 
COLOMBI A, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, 
NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY 
(G/C/W/767/REV.1)  
17.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 3, 4 and 5  March  2020, 
the delegation s of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, and 
Uruguay,  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
17.2.   The delegate o f the Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
17.3.   The Dominican Republic would like to reiterate its concern with regard to this item on the 
agenda  and would like to see how it can address this issue, which the Dominican Republic  consider s 
as a systemic issue.  It is greatly important , given the impact that these measures have on the trade 
in agricultural products, particularly on developing countries such as the Dominican Republic . 
17.4.    This kind of measure has a direct impact on the Dominican Republic's exports without 
underestimating the economic impact it will have on the whole region.  The Dominican Republic  
recognize s the right of all Members to take the necessary precautions in order to legitimate ly protect 
human health and safety. However,  these measures must not affect trade beyond that which is 
essentially necessary. For that reason, it  is essential that international standards are complied with, 
such as Codex Alimentarius, which has been the reference point for the majority of Members.  
17.5.    These concerns have been submitted repeatedly before the SPS and TBT  Committees.  It is 
for this reason that the Dominican Republic is  seeing an interest in the adoption of measures that 
are not trade -restrictive and are drawn up in conformity with the rule s and spirit of the WTO.  
17.6.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
17.7.   While the world finds itself in an unprecedented crisis, Colombia has  witnessed how the 
European Union is accelerating its review of Maximum Residual Limits and their entry into for ce. 
Despite the call to dialogue to identify a solution to these issues, Colombia has  not seen any concrete 
signs of a willingness to do so.  
17.8.   For some years now, the European Union has been adopting a green policy to reduce the use 
of products with a view t o plant protection. The EU is "exporting" this policy to its trading partners 
through measures such as suspending the approval of several active substances and the subsequent 
reduction of MRLs to the minimum level of detection, as well as reduction of the MRLs of active 
substances that are still approved. Moreover, recently, it appears to be accelerating its green policy 
through strategies such as Farm to Fork and Biodiversity by 2030, which risk worsening the problem.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  17.9.   Colombia appreciates the intention by the EU to adopt a public policy aimed at protecting 
human health and biodiversity. In fact, Colombia fully shares its objectives. In the case of Colombia, 
one of the richest countries in terms of biodiversity in the world, biodiversity is at the centre of its 
development policy. However, such a policy should be implemented in a manner that is 
non-discriminatory, not more restrictive than necessary, and should not subsequently become an 
unnecessary obstacle and a disguised barrier to trade. Today the EU is a dopting these measures 
without any solid scientific evidence to demonstrate that they are indeed necessary and that, in 
actual fact, these are the least  trade -restrictive measures in order to achieve an appropriate level of 
protection for its consumers.  
17.10.   Furthermore, Colombia is  concerned that the increase of these measures and strategies may 
effectively undermine international instruments such as the Codex at a time when the multilateral 
system should embrace rules -based organizations, not measures that und ermine international 
benchmarks sponsored by the FAO and the WHO and used by the WTO.  
17.11.   A year ago, in this Council Colombia expressed the same concern that it is discussing here 
today. In its statement, Colombia highlighted its concern for the effective prohibition of 
three  molecules (Buprofezin, Chlorotalonil and Imazalil) which are key to banana production, and 
which thus affect millions of persons who depend on this crop for their livelihood. Today, at least 
two more molecules are of concern to Colombia  (Chlorpyrifos and Mancozeb), which affect a higher 
number of products.  Moreover, Colombia is  concerned that the credibility and legitimacy of 
international organizations will be undermined by these measures. Compou nded by the global 
uncertainty generated by COVID -19, Colombia's products continue to suffer from lack of 
predictability vis -à-vis the rules of the largest common market in the world and the largest importer 
of fruits and vegetables.  
17.12.   Based on the foregoing , a month ago Colombia circulated a communication requesting 
suspension of the processes and entry into force of reductions to maximum residue limits (MRL s) of 
plant protection products in light of the COVID -19 situation (G/SPS/GEN/1778 -G/TBT/GEN/296). 
The request, inter alia , will allow Colombia to focus its efforts on dealing with the pandemic and its 
effects and, as Members, to ensure effective participation and full enjoyment of its rights at the 
WTO.  
17.13.   It is Colombia's hope that, on this occasion, the EU  will open a channel for frank dialogue 
with its trading partners on this difficult issue which, with each passing day, is becoming ever more 
complicated.  
17.14.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
17.15.   Ecuador continues to endorse this statement, chiefly  due to the ban on the use of an 
increasing number of plant protection tools that are key to pest eradication and food quality. Such 
measures can seriously hamper many products' entry into the market of Ecuador's  main trading 
partner.  
17.16.   Ecuador is a net expo rter of primary agricultural and fishery products which, together with 
oil, account for the largest share of public and private national income. COVID -19 has had an 
extremely serious impact throughout Ecuador's exporting production sector. According to aut horities 
at the Ministries of Agriculture and Production and Foreign Trade, in early March alone, economic 
losses in the agroexport sector stood at USD  300 million. In this regard, such measures imposed by 
the European Union could potentially heighten the economic impact on production sectors relied on 
by hundreds of thousands of low -income farming families.  
17.17.   World trade is key to Members' sustainable economic recovery. Maintaining trade restrictions 
in the middle of the pandemic jeopardizes global food supp ly and the livelihoods of small producers 
in developing countries.  
17.18.   Ecuador once again urges  the EU: not to adopt excessively restrictive measures without 
conclusive scientific evidence, without an actual increase in the level of health protection and witho ut 
taking into account the economic and social impact on its trading partners in the short, mid and long 
term; to observe the globally recognized international standards on human, plant and animal health 
protection; to comply with the requirements establis hed by the WTO's SPS  Agreement to take a risk G/C/M/137  
 
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  assessment approach to any measure, minimize the adverse effects of its trade -related measures 
and prevent them from becoming unjustified barriers to trade; and finally, to consider suspending 
the ongoing imple mentation of measures to reduce MRLs and maintain the levels recommended by 
the Codex during the pandemic and during a reasonable recovery period in order to help its trading 
partners protect their agricultural workers' health and jobs and minimize the eco nomic impact of the 
health crisis.  
17.19.   The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
17.20.   Panama  would like to ask for its previous statements to be reflected in the minutes.2 
Additionally, Panama  wants  to take this opportunity to recall that on 12  May 2020, Pan ama and a 
dozen other Members submitted document  G/TBT/GEN/296, requesting Members to suspend the 
entry into force of the new MRLs for plant protection products during the COVID -19 pandemic. 
Panama  thank s the European Union for its solidarity and for addressing this temporary request. 
Meanwhile, Panama  can continue discussions on how the EU can implement health measures in 
compliance with the SPS and TBT  Agreements, without unjustifiably preventing interna tional trade. 
Panama is  in favour of finding a solution that, as established in Article  3 of the SPS  Agreement, 
harmonizes the measures with the relevant international organizations.  
17.21.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
17.22.   Over the past five  years , around 50  specific trade concerns have been raised in the SPS and 
TBT Committees regarding measures adopted by the European Union or its member States that 
have implications for trade in agricultural products.  On this occasion, Uruguay  wishes to reiterat e its 
trade and system ic concern s regarding the use of a hazard -based approach by the European Union 
in its regulatory determinations relating to SPS matters, which has led to a number of the 
above -mentioned concerns.  
17.23.   Uruguay wishes to make it clear that a ny determination in this area, particularly when it 
departs from internationally accepted standards and the harmonization efforts made in multilateral 
areas, such as the Codex, must be based on a full scientific risk assessment and underpinned by 
validated  methodologies, in line with the provisions of the relevant Agreements, and by conclusive 
scientific evidence. This is essential to maintaining the right balance between the right s of Members 
to pursue their legitimate objectives and the need to avoid crea ting unnecessary barriers to trade in 
the process.  
17.24.   It is the special responsibility of the largest importers of agricultural products to consider 
the impact that their regulatory approaches and determinations might have on developing and least 
developed co untries, whose economies are largely based on the production and trade in agricultural 
and agro -industrial products, and through which they make an invaluable contribution to global food 
security, particularly when such approaches lack sufficient scientifi c justification.  
17.25.   In light of the above, Paraguay once again urge s the European Union to reconsider its 
regulatory approach in order to avoid the unjustified proliferation of barriers to international trade 
in agricultural products and the serious social an d economic consequences of such an approach on 
other Members, especially developing and least developed countries, for which the EU market is of 
key importance.  
17.26.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
17.27.   Guatemala wishes to reiterate its concern re garding the new measures and policies 
implemented by the European Union. In particular, it is concerned about the lack of dialogue and 
recognition of the geographical, economic and developmental differences between developing 
countries and European countri es. 
17.28.   The European Union is setting new parameters with its hazard -based approach, which will 
create considerable uncertainty as to how import tolerances will be set for authorization decisions in 
the European Union.  Despite repeated requests having been mad e in this Organization since 2017, 
 
2 The intervention made by Panama at the November  2019 CTG  meeting under this issue is contained in 
document  G/C/M/136, paragraphs  9.3-9.7. G/C/M/137  
 
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  the European Union has failed to take into consideration the comments of WTO  Members. In 
particular, it has been seeking to impose European standards in other countries, obliging producers 
and exporters in developing countries to meet the same requirements as European producers.  
17.29.   First and foremost, we must recognize that the conditions in terms of climate, time and 
distance in transportation and distribution, and especially in terms of agricultural productio n in the 
European market, are only relevant to European countries.  It is not possible to compare and demand 
that producers in tropical countries, which are currently suffering the adverse effects of climate 
change, meet the same requirements, since the con ditions are not the same. They do not have 
winters with low temperatures like in Europe, which help to control and eliminate certain pests and 
diseases naturally.  
17.30.   It is clear that agricultural producers, particularly in developing countries, do not enjoy t he 
same benefits as European producers. Moreover, they do not receive the substantial agricultural 
support that the Europeans provide to their producers to offset implemented measures, compared 
to countries like Guatemala where minimal support is provided to producers simply because 
Guatemala is  a developing country.  
17.31.   Guatemala urges the European Union to consider import tolerances for active substances 
that are not authorized in the European Union, given that we are talking about circumstances outside 
the E uropean market.  Guatemala also request s that the import tolerance process be transparent, 
predictable and commercially viable and include a risk assessment, taking into account risk 
assessment techniques developed by international organizations. Evidence o f damage to health 
caused by the presence of residues in fruit crops should be provided, particularly in fruit from 
third countries of the European Union.  
17.32.   Guatemala reiterate s the request made to the SPS and TBT  Committees to suspend, for a 
period of 12  months, the entry into force of the reductions planned for 2020. The health crisis is just 
beginning in Guatemala and time is needed to make arrangements. It is important for the European 
Union to be aware that the conditions in Europe are not the same as in  other regions of the world, 
and Guatemala  asks for its solidarity in this matter.  
17.33.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
17.34.   Australia, as a co -sponsor , again highlights its ongoing concerns in relation to the European 
Union's agricultural chemica l regulations and policy and the potential negative effect on farmers and 
trade. Australia has previously raised its concerns about the EU's risk assessment and import 
tolerance setting policies in the TBT and SPS  Committees.  
17.35.   While Australia recogni zes the  right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural and other 
chemicals in a manner that protects animal, plant and human health and the environment, Members 
are also bound by WTO  obligations , particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk 
assessmen ts and ensuring that measures are not more trade -restrictive than necessary.  
17.36.   Australia questions the EU's approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection 
product authorizations and import tolerance limits that relies primarily on hazard -based asse ssment. 
In doing so, it is unclear how the EU  hazard -based assessment is consistent with internationally 
agreed risk assessment standards for import tolerances.  
17.37.   Australia seeks clarification on how the EU determines hazards to consumers of treated 
produce, and would welcome discussion on the risk assessments that underpin EU  decisions on 
import tolerances. Australia also seeks greater clarity from the EU on how hazards of a substance 
are differentiated in terms of the substance use in a production s ystem compared with presence in 
consumed produce.  
17.38.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
17.39.   Costa Rica is a co -sponsor of this agenda item and of joint communication  G/C/W/767 and  
the revision thereof previously submitted in this Council and supp orted by some 90  Members, of 
which the vast majority are developing and least developed countries.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  17.40.   Costa Rica's technical concerns are well known, having been put forward on several 
occasions as part of many concerns raised in the SPS Committee, the TBT  Committee and, since 
June last year, in this Council.  
17.41.   Costa Rica shares the objectives of protection of the environment and human health with 
the EU. However, Costa Rica notes with concern that the EU has decided to adopt a regulatory 
approach with a major i mpact on its trading partners' production systems, without taking account 
of their climatic and geographical circumstances or the impact that this could have on food security 
at the global level or on the most vulnerable population groups of developing cou ntries.  
17.42.   The urgency and vulnerability of the situation is made worse by the current economic 
situation. Our countries were already facing an intensification of the effects of climate change, on 
top of which there is now the pandemic and its socio -economic consequences. Agricultural producers, 
especially the smallest ones, and MSMEs would be greatly affected by new measures and 
requirements that are more restrictive with regard to exports at a time when all efforts are being 
directed towards health -related c ontainment measures and economic recovery.  
17.43.   In awareness of this crucial historical moment, Costa Rica  has presented, together with 
30 other Members, a communication to the EU (document  G/SPS/GEN/1778/Rev.1) requesting it,  
in consideration of the present exceptional circumstances, to interrupt its regulatory process and 
suspend the implementation of MRLs in relation to critical substances for agricultural production.  
17.44.   Costa Rica urges the EU once again to establish a mechani sm with interested Members for 
dialogue and evaluation of its policies on MRLs that takes into consideration and effectively addresses 
our systemic and trade -related concerns. Costa Rica is  sure that, through more and better dialogue, 
we can find solutions  together, which will enable us to progress towards mutually beneficial trade.  
17.45.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
17.46.   Argentina  wishes to reiterate its concern over the proliferation of non -tariff barriers in the 
EU, which is repeatedly the top ic of discussion in the SPS and TBT  Committee s. Argentina  wishes to 
insist on Members' obligation to base their measures on a full scientific risk assessment, in 
accordance with the WTO  Agreements. Argentina  renew s its call to the EU to take the appropriat e 
steps to avoid the creation of unnecessary barriers to international trade.  
17.47.   The delegate of Honduras  indicated the following:  
17.48.   Honduras is co -sponsoring this joint statement, as the concerns expressed in it are matters 
of public interest to it. Honduras wishes to  reiterate its concern over the reduction of MRLs for a 
number of agro -chemicals and other substances that are key to agricultural production, specifically, 
those related to the management of pests of quarantine concern to Honduras . 
17.49.   Honduras also reiterate s that every decision that the European Union takes with regard to 
changing sanitary, phytosanitary or technical conditions for imports has a huge impact on the 
economic activity, employment and well -being of our people.  
17.50.   In light of the above , Honduras associate s itself with the concerns expressed by other 
Members, so that they may be taken into consideration by the European Union during its decision -
making process.  
17.51.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.52.   As conveyed at the July and November  2019 meetings of the CTG, the United States is 
deeply concerned about the European Union's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural 
products. The EU's codification and subsequent implementation of a hazard -based approach to 
pesticide regulation is profoundly and adversely impacting global agricultural production and trade, 
particularly in developing countries.  
17.53.   The EU's Farm to Fork Strategy, Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, and regulatory fitness and 
performance program (REFIT)  for pesticides released in May  2020 are the most recent examples G/C/M/137  
 
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  that raise concerns regarding the EU's commitment to its obligations under the SPS  Agreement, as 
well as to international standards.  
17.54.   In the REFIT the European Union states its commitment to "increase certainty in the use" of 
its hazard -based "cut -off criteria" , and that it no longer would conduct "full risk assessments" . The 
US asks the European Union to explain how it plans to implement these statements in a manner 
consistent with its commit ments under the SPS  Agreement, including the obligation to base such 
measures on risk assessment.  
17.55.   If the EU will no longer conduct "full risk assessments" on substances meeting the "cut -off 
criteria", the US also ask s the European Union to explain the rela tionship of the assessments it will 
undertake to the elements established by Codex guidelines.  
17.56.   The US is  interested in the EU's plans announced in the REFIT, to use all of its "diplomacy, 
trade policy, and development support instruments" to promote adopti on of its hazard -based 
approach to pesticides in third  countries, as well as to encourage support of its approach in the 
WTO SPS Committee and the Codex Alimentarius.  
17.57.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
17.58.   As noted in previous interventions on thi s subject in the July and November  2019 meetings, 
Canada emphasizes the need for transparency and predictability in international trade.  
17.59.   Canada  continue s to recognize Members' right to adopt measures to achieve legitimate 
objectives and to apply the food s afety measures deemed necessary to protect human health, in 
accordance with WTO  Agreements. However, such measures must be implemented in a transparent 
way that does not unjustifiably restrict international trade.  
17.60.   Canada hopes that reiterating the concerns  contained in this Communication to the Council 
on Trade in Goods serves as a clear indication of the importance many WTO  Members, including 
Canada, attribute to seeking enhanced transparency and predictability for trade.  
17.61.   The delegate of Chile indicated th e following:  
17.62.   Chile also join s in the concerns that have been expressed at multiple times here and at 
previous meetings at the Council of the matters related to hazard -based assessments in the Codex 
rules and also in terms of the WTO. These are all of conce rn. Chile's delegation is  also concerned 
about what it heard in this dialogue by proponents and others. This matter has been on the agenda 
for some time and has not led to specific results and so Chile just simply wish es to reiterate its 
concerns.  
17.63.   The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
17.64.   The delegation of Peru reiterates its support for the trade concern raised in 
document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 regarding the implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural  
imports implemented by the European Union through its restriction on the use of certain agricultural 
products.  Peru would like to remind all Members that their measures should be in line with 
WTO commitments, including the TBT and SPS  Agreements. All Memb ers may have a legitimate 
interest in applying consumer protection measures. However, they must also be in conformity with 
the relevant work carried out by international standard setting and harmonization bodies, based on 
scientific principles and risk -based assessments, rather than hazard -based assessments. They must 
also be applied in a manner that does not generate unnecessary restrictions on international trade.  
17.65.   At a time of a pandemic on a global scale, the measures that gave rise to this concern 
repre sent a major challenge for small and medium sized agricultural producers in developing 
countries, hampering their ability to survive this unprecedented crisis. In this context, Peru, along 
with a group of countries co -sponsoring document  G/SPS/GEN/1778 -G/TBT/GEN/296, has  
requested the EU to suspend its ongoing review of MRLs for plant protection products for one  year 
and the entry into force of any such reductions planned for the current year.  
17.66.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  G/C/M/137  
 
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  17.67.   Paraguay's  delegation regrets having once again to include this matter on this Council's 
agenda, but its concerns have not been resolved. Discussions with the EU at the technical level have 
failed to progress and Paraguay  notes with concern the increase in substances af fected by these 
policies. Such policies will have a significant economic impact on the development of Paraguay , since 
they will affect the exportation of agricultural products to its third largest trading partner.  
17.68.   In a recent report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the evaluation of 
Regulations (EC) Nos.  1107/209 and 396/2005, the EU itself indicated that another objective of the 
regulation on MRLs is to promote smooth international trade and ensure that non -EU countries are 
able to export their products to the EU. Nonetheless, the Commission recognizes in the same report 
that when MRLs are revised downwards, the duration of the import tolerance process – regarding 
which, I might add, there is still little clarity – could create barriers to trade.  
17.69.   In addition, this report recognizes that the availability of products considered by the EU to 
be low risk alternatives is deemed by relevant stakeholders to be insufficient. It also acknowledges 
that the cut off criteria for plant protection product s are a controversial issue at this Organization, 
reflected by the growing number of trade concerns relating to these policies that have been 
submitted to the EU in various forums. In this regard, Paraguay wishes to highlight that, in recent 
years, approxi mately 50  specific trade concerns (STCs) on non-tariff barriers for agricultural 
products have been submitted to the EU in the SPS and TBT  Committees. The vast majority of these 
relate to the use of plant protection products and production methods.  
17.70.   An addi tional concern today is the complex health and economic situation that we are facing 
as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic. The economic crisis that we will have to confront over the 
coming years will become even more difficult to overcome if we also face m ajor losses in trade 
caused by the continued implementation of these policies. Moreover, under current circumstances, 
these policies cannot be comprehensively reviewed and evaluated, particularly in developing 
countries where governments are focusing all e fforts on combating the pandemic.  
17.71.   In addition, Paraguay wishes to note that, despite the efforts of the Secretariat and the 
Chairs of Committees, the meetings held at this Organization, during which the technical exchanges 
addressing these policies occur, have been unable to take place as usual. The TBT  meeting was 
suspended and reduced in May to a mere exchange by written procedure, and the SPS  Committee 
meeting will be held using a hybrid system with virtual meetings. These meetings are significantly 
shorter in length, which affects Members' rights and the scrutiny of these policies.  
17.72.   In light of the above, Paraguay has  submitted, together with 14  other delegations, 
document  G/SPS/GEN/1778 –G/TBT/GEN/296 to the TBT and SPS  Committees, in which Paraguay  
request s the EU to take the above -mentioned aspects into account and suspend the review and 
implementation process for the reduction of MRLs for a period of 12  months. Paraguay hopes that 
this request will be considered favourably by the EU and that a resp onse will be received as soon as 
possible, since Paraguay notes with concern that the review processes are continuing despite the 
fact that monitoring and dialogue have been affected.  
17.73.   Lastly, Paraguay  wants to point out that European producers themselves h ave expressed 
their concern regarding the implementation of these policies within EU  territory, to which the EU has 
responded by pledging more agricultural subsidies to ensure that "nobody is left behind".  
17.74.   Paraguay wishes to highlight the fact that the EU is one of the main subsidizers of agricultural 
products, granting agricultural subsidies of approximately USD  100 billion per year, on average, 
between 2008 and 2016, including amber and blue box subsidies. Its producers will require even 
more help so that  its agricultural sector can survive the implementation of these measures.  
17.75.   The sum of all agricultural subsidies granted by Paraguay from 2008 to 2018, or, in other 
words, the amount of subsidies granted over 10  years, stands at less than USD  1 billion. Paraguay 
cannot help but question how its farmers will be able adjust to these new policies if the granting of 
subsidies is required for this adjustment to be possible. On this basis, many will unfortunately be 
left behind, primarily in small developing coun tries which rely on the exportation of agricultural 
products, as is the case for the Republic of Paraguay.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  17.76.   Paraguay once again call s on the EU to take into account the impact that these policies will 
have on the economy and development of Paraguay and on t he employment of hundreds of 
thousands of Paraguayans who rely on trade in agricultural goods for a decent standard of living. 
With these people in mind, Paraguay request s the EU to guarantee import tolerances based on 
science and conclusive risk assessmen ts so as to ensure that nobody either inside or outside the EU 
is left behind.  
17.77.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
17.78.   It is a basic right of WTO  Members under the SPS  Agreement to take SPS  measures 
necessary for the protection of human, anim al, or plant life or health. This right is qualified since 
such measures must be applied only to the extent necessary, as such must be based on scientific 
principles, and must not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except that such 
measu res may be imposed temporarily when evidence is insufficient, pending receipt of additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk. Thus, SPS  measures must not 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and must not constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade. Repeated complaints, over the years, in the SPS and 
TBT Committees regarding the overly restrictive impact of the hazard -based approach that it has 
implemented in respect of the trade in agricu ltural goods has come to naught, despite a large number 
of trade concerns raised by Members.  
17.79.   South Africa agree s with the sentiment of the co -sponsors that EU  measures 
disproportionately affect farmers in developing and least developed countries. To many LDCs and 
developing countries, technical barriers to trade, especially SPS and TBT  measures of this nature , 
are trade -restrictive because they add to the series of costs faced by their exporters. This has 
implications for developing countries' export earnin gs and incomes. In turn, it affects their quest for 
sustainable development through reducing poverty, unemployment and reliance on smallholder 
producers in the trajectory of development.  
17.80.   South Africa's exports are increasingly affected by measures that are  implemented by the 
EU. Compliance with such standards comes at significant costs and disproportionately affects South 
Africa's emerging farmers that increasingly struggle to export. South Africa therefore call s on the EU 
not to continue to introduce unnec essary obstacles to international trade and to abide by standards 
developed by international organizations, especially during this time when South Africa's producers 
and markets are affected by COVID -19. 
17.81.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
17.82.   Indonesia thanks the proponents for maintaining this agenda item and supports the trade 
concern. Indonesia and other WTO  Members had several times expressed their concerns with regard 
to the EU's policies on the application of the non -renewal and the conseq uent reduction of the MRLs 
at relevant committees, in particular SPS and TBT  Committees. Unfortunately, Indonesia has not 
received any satisfaction in the responses from the EU to address these concerns. In this regard, 
Indonesia echoes other delegations t aking the floor today to ask the EU to refer to the relevant 
agreements in developing and applying its policies so as to ensure that they do not create 
unnecessary barriers to the trade of agricultural products mainly from developing countries and 
LDC Memb ers. 
17.83.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
17.84.   India's delegation would also like to thank the proponents of this agenda item. India joins 
other Members on the concerns raised by them today on the measure by the European Union. India 
would like to reiterate its trade as well as systemic concerns on this issue. The hazard -based measure 
by the EU is significantly impacting the trade from devel oping countries, including India. It lacks 
transparency and hinders predictability for exporters. India's delegation would urge the EU to avoid 
such unnecessary barriers to trade and to find out a mutually agreed solution through dialogues with 
the Members  as early as possible.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  17.85.   The delegate of Malaysia  indicated the following:  
17.86.   Malaysia regrets having to continue raising its concern on the Directive (EU)  2018/2001 and 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)  2019/807, which have negatively affected the oil palm 
industry and Malaysia's trade interest.  
17.87.   The delegated regulation classifies palm oil as a high indirect land use change risk feedstock 
while other major oil crops are categorized as low indirect land use change risk feedstock. Such 
implementation would dis courage and be tantamount to a de facto  ban on the use of palm oil as 
feedstock for the production of biofuels and bioliquids by excluding palm oil -based biofuels and 
bioliquids from the incentives under the Directive (EU)  2018/2001.  
17.88.   It is evident that the  Directive (EU)  2018/2001 and Commission Delegated Regulation 
(EU) 2019/807 are inconsistent with the non -discrimination obligations under GATT  Article  I and 
Article  III:4, by establishing an unduly differential treatment between the "like" products.  
17.89.   The legislation has culminated in a barrier to trade that significantly distorts the market and 
pricing system which is against the principle of free trade that is unfavourable to palm oil. This 
creates the arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination disguis ed restriction on international trading of 
palm oil and its products and unnecessary obstacles which are more trade restrictive than necessary 
and more burdensome for producers of palm oil, including Malaysia.  
17.90.   Scientific evidence has proven that oil palm i s the most productive oil -bearing crop compared 
with other annual oil crops. A single hectare of cultivated oil palm land is able to supply between 
five to ten  times more oil compared to rapeseed and soybean respectively. Malaysia wishes to 
reiterate that the use of biofuels and bioliquids from other oil crops would create greater risk of 
deforestation and land use changes.  
17.91.   Malaysia wishes to emphasize that the Malaysian palm oil is produced in a sustainable 
manner following the strict and mandatory sustain able certification scheme; Malaysian Sustainable 
Palm Oil (MSPO) as well as voluntary certification schemes such as Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO) and International Sustainability and Carbon Certification (ISCC), which are in line with 
the Unite d Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN  SDG) 2030. Malaysia would also like to 
reiterate that it recognizes the importance of the protection of the environment, and conservation 
of biodiversity, and has been actively involved in activities to support c ombating climate change and 
global warming.  
17.92.   Malaysia appreciate s the European Union for their willingness for open discussion and 
dialogue in providing scientific evidence, facts and information on the sustainability of Malaysian 
palm oil. However, Malaysi a finds that such continuous engagements have not resulted in a fair 
valuation of input which resulted in unfair treatment for palm oil produced in Malaysia.  Therefore, 
Malaysia urges the European Union to be mindful and observe the principles of fairness,  justice, 
openness, transparency and non -discrimination in conducting international trade in line with the 
obligations of the WTO.  
17.93.   Nevertheless, Malaysia remains fully committed to continue to negotiate in a sincere and 
constructive manner in ensuring a no n-discriminatory treatment against palm products and to 
prevent the unnecessary barrier for market access of palm products into the European Union. 
Malaysia will also continue to monitor the development and look forward to the responses from the 
European U nion, particularly on the discrimination against palm oil, as well as its same concern 
raised during the last TBT  Committee meeting on 13 and 14  May 2020.  
17.94.   The delegate of Côte d'Ivoire  indicated the following:  
17.95.   Côte d'Ivoire is concerned by the different is sues highlighted in this document. Indeed, this 
sector is some 28% of Côte d'Ivoire's GDP, and more than 50% of its export revenues, with more 
than two -thirds of the source of employment and livelihoods of its population, including women and 
young people. These figures are not fictional. They correspond to a reality. Indeed, Côte d'Ivoire is 
the largest African producer of cacao and cashew nuts. It is the second  largest African producer of 
palm oil. It  is the fourth  largest African producer of cotton. Côte d'Ivoire shares with Cameroon the 
first place among African countries in terms of banana production. Côte d'Ivoire is therefore directly G/C/M/137  
 
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  hit by this problem highlighted in this document. And this is why Côte d'Ivoire has become a 
co-sponsor of this documen t. Indeed, the implementation of these measures will sustainably affect  
its economy. The economic and social impact of these are undeniable.  
17.96.    Côte d'Ivoire  recognizes the legitimate right of the European Union to take measures in 
order to protect their population. But these measures must be consistent with the European Union's 
commitments at the WTO and at other international organizations, particularly C odex. This is why 
Côte d'Ivoire calls on the European Union to refer to the measures referenced in C odex and, where 
necessary, the European Union must provide technical assistance to developing countries to allow 
them to respect their requirements.  
17.97.   Here the E uropean Union should extend the time -frame for implementation. Côte d'Ivoire 
calls on the European Union to kindly push back the implementation of these different measures, 
delaying them in order to allow countries to gain information surrounding the imple mentation of 
these measures. Technical assistance here is essential. Côte d'Ivoire has cited many sectors where 
this could lead to a rural exodus, where this could completely undermine the development 
programme of Côte d'Ivoire . The European Union is Côte d'Ivoire's largest destination market and it 
therefore call s on the European Union to pay particular attention to the concerns that it is raising 
with regard to this item on the agenda.  
17.98.   The delegate of El Salvador  indicated the following:  
17.99.   El Salvador once again expresses concern at the EU  regulations. The regulatory approach 
directly affects production and vulnerable population groups in tropical climates. El Salvador  
underline s the fact that all regulations must be based on international standards with com pelling 
scientific evidence. El Salvador urges the EU to open an active dialogue to find mutually beneficial 
solutions.  
17.100.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.101.   The EU has regularly provided detailed explanations in the SPS and TBT  Commi ttees and 
ultimately also in this setting about the rationale and necessity of its SPS  measures. Multiple 
seminars, workshops and bilateral meetings on risk assessment, authorization procedures and on 
specific substances have been organized in the past and  can be arranged upon request.  
17.102.   The EU is an open market and its high level of health protection has never been an 
impediment to the import of agricultural commodities. The EU measures do not discriminate against 
WTO Members: the same health and safety requ irements for food and feed apply equally to 
EU members and third  countries alike, irrespective of the origin of the product. Equally, the EU 
ensures that its import requirements for agri -food products are not more trade -restrictive than 
required to achieve  the level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection the EU considers appropriate 
for its consumers.  
17.103.   The high volume of imports of fruit and vegetables, which in 2018 amounted to 
EUR 16.8 billion, comes as an irrefutable evidence of the EU's open and transpa rent policies.  
Measures taken to protect consumers' health apply to substances that have been found to be 
mutagenic, carcinogenic, reproductive toxicants and endocrine disruptors. Consumers should not be 
deliberately exposed to these substances and no risk  can be taken. The EU has the duty to ensure 
a high level of human health protection for its citizens. In doing so, the EU always ensures that it 
respects its international commitments and that its legislation is in line with the 
WTO SPS Agreement. The EU' s approach to regulate active substances is in fact fully science -based. 
The EU follows the advice of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), as well as existing 
international standards as stipulated by its own legislation.  
17.104.   The EU has been highly transp arent about its policy objectives and the EU  Regulations on 
plant protection products have been discussed with WTO  Members on numerous occasions. Trading 
partners are informed about the possible restrictions and non -approvals of active substances via 
WTO TBT notifications, and about the proposed lowering of the MRLs for such substances via the 
WTO SPS notification system. Responding to specific requests from Members, recently the EU 
started to notify non -approval measures to both the TBT and the SPS  Committ ees. G/C/M/137  
 
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  17.105.   The EU always provides transition periods to allow operators to adapt to the new measures 
if the substance does not pose an unacceptable risk to consumers' health. Although the EU 
appreciate s the potential economic implication of measures to revoke the approval of chemical 
substances, it finds nonetheless surprising that long transition periods are requested for genotoxic 
or carcinogenic substances.  The EU also provides technical assistance to  developing countries and 
LDCs, directly or through other international organizations, such as the FAO, to support a smooth 
transition towards new products or production systems.  
17.106.   The EU  Regulation on MRLs does not impose a zero  tolerance, as some other tra ding 
partners do (for example, the US), but gives clear orientation to operators about what they must 
achieve.  In addition, the EU allows trading partners to request the establishment of import tolerances 
for all active substances, including those that are  mutagenic, carcinogenic, reproductive toxicants 
and endocrine disruptors. Such import tolerances will systematically undergo a product specific risk 
assessment and will be considered on a case -by-case basis, as foreseen by the EU  legislation on 
MRLs, and in line with WTO  requirements.  
17.107.    The EU has been supporting the activity of the Codex Alimentarius Commission since its 
establishment and participates actively in its meetings. The EU has one of the highest levels of 
uptake of Codex MRLs among major economi es. It is in fact EU  policy to systematically align its MRLs 
with Codex Alimentarius MRLs if they are supported by adequate data and information and stand up 
to the necessary scientific scrutiny applicable in the EU. Over the past years, the EU proactively  
aligned hundreds of MRLs with Codex values, without the need for third  countries to file an 
application or submit data.  
17.108.   Between 2012 and 2019, a total of 2 ,567 CXLs for food commodities were adopted by 
Codex Alimentarius. In that period, the EU has taken on board 1 ,833 MRLs out of these 2 ,567 CXLs. 
Taking into account EU  MRLs that are set at the same or higher level than the CXLs for the same 
food products, the EU is aligned with more than 70% of the CXLs established in this period. The EU 
regularly indica tes during Codex meetings when it will not align its MRLs to the proposed Codex 
MRLs, and the reasons for its decision. To increase transparency and predictability in international 
trade the EU encourages others to do likewise.  
17.109.   To conclude, the evidence sp eaks for itself: while ensuring a high level of health protection, 
the EU remains one of the largest importers of fruit and vegetables, to the benefit of farming 
communities in exporting countries.  Against this background, the EU  emphasize s its commitment to 
continue an open dialogue on its SPS  policies and measures. The EU  stands ready to further engage 
and explain its policies to its trading partners. The EU believe s that Members have a shared interest 
in tackling the issue of toxic active substances and protecting its citizens' health with appropriate 
measures.  The EU remains an open market and is committed to implement SPS  measures in the 
least trade -restrictive manner. However, the health issue at stake is of the utmost concern and 
should be properly ad dressed by all.  
17.110.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
17.111.   The Council so agreed . 
18  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST  
FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND THE UNITED STATES  
18.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 5 March and 27 and 
28 May 2020, the delegation s of the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States, had 
requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
18.2.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
18.3.   Since last November, Switzerland's  delegation has pursued its efforts here in the WTO as well 
as in the capitals of the GCC  countries. Despite all the efforts made, Switzerland's  exports of energy 
drinks still face the same discriminatory situation it has explained in detail in this Counci l for more 
than two  years.  The statement delivered by the GCC on Monday at the Committee on Market Access G/C/M/137  
 
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  has not really brought us forward as no new information has been provided to Switzerland's specific 
and longstanding questions and concerns.  
18.4.   Switzerla nd's first concern relates to the higher selective tax rate levied on energy drinks. 
Switzerland  request s all GCC  members to immediately harmonize the rate of the selective tax at 
50% on all sugar  containing beverages. This change will eliminate the discri mination against energy 
drinks, will treat all sugar containing beverages the same way, will be more transparent, will prevent 
consumers to switch to less taxed products, but not necessarily healthier products, and will raise 
revenues. The second  concern r elates to sports drinks. As only one  GCC member publishes the list 
of beverages subject to the selective tax, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to exactly know how 
sports drinks are taxed in each GCC  country. In May  2019, Switzerland  got the assuran ce that the 
different taxation of sports drinks, namely, different brands of like products subject to different tax 
rates, was a mistake and that the GCC  members will remove the discrimination. Almost a year later, 
the situation is still unclear. Switzerla nd asks the responsible authorities in each GCC  country to 
provide a clear and detailed answer regarding the tax rates applied to sports drinks. As this is an 
implementation issue, only the GCC  taxation authorities, that is, the ministries of finance who a re 
in charge of implementing the tax, and not the GCC  Secretariat, are able to provide the requested 
details. The third and very important concern relates to the second  step of the reform, which, 
according to previous indications, would take place 12  month s after the extension of the tax base, 
that is, the ad valorem  selective tax will be replaced by a volume -based tax. This would mean that 
around December  2020 the current system should change. However, a recent discussion with 
one GCC member seems to indic ate that the second  step of the reform will not take place. Could the 
GCC members in the near future precisely indicate: (i)  if the foreseen modification will still happen 
around the end of 2020 ; (ii) which elements of the reform have already been decided ; (iii) on which 
parts of the reform will the finance ministers decide and under which time -frame ; and (iv) if the 
reform is not implemented by December  2020, when will the modification take place?  
18.5.   Switzerland encourage s the GCC  States to engage and work cl osely with Switzerland and 
other interested Members as well as the private sector in order to modify the selective tax and 
related measures, so that they are applied in a transparent and non -discriminatory manner and 
meet the legitimate health policy objec tives. As experience in various countries has shown, the price 
increase of a product is not enough to change the diet habits of a population. Other policies are 
requested and, in particular, information campaigns to explain the benefits of a healthy diet. Finally, 
Switzerland request s and expect s the GCC  members to provide a detailed and swift answer to all 
the questions raised today and hope s for a solution to this issue.  
18.6.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.7.   The EU maintains its seri ous concerns, voiced in the Council for Trade in Goods, the Market 
Access Committee, as well as in bilateral contacts with the GCC  countries, in relation the GCC "Treaty 
on Excise Tax" of December  2016.  The EU welcomes the expansion of the tax base to include other 
sweetened beverages by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, thus no longer discriminating 
against soft drinks containing sugar. However, the EU is still concerned that the GCC  countries have 
not decreased the tax for energy drinks from 100% to 50% in order not to discriminate between 
energy drinks and other sugary drinks.  
18.8.   The EU also acknowledges recent positive steps by the GCC  countries to revise the excise tax, 
switching from an ad valorem  tax to a specific tax based on content, in li ne with international best 
practice linking the amount of tax to a product's actual sugar content.  However, as the 
implementation of this tax may vary between GCC  jurisdictions, the EU strongly encourages the GCC 
to engage private industry stakeholders on the process for revising the tax, as well as to provide 
immediate relief for industry until the revision takes effect, by exempting all zero  sugar beverages 
from the tax and harmonizing the tax rate at 50% for energy drinks and all other categories of 
sugar-sweetened beverages subject to the tax.  
18.9.   The EU would also like to acknowledge recent positive steps by Saudi Arabia to suspend 
requirements for a Digital Tax Stamp on beverages and commitment to working with private industry 
stakeholders to address conce rns raised regarding such a system, including the discriminatory effect 
on carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, and energy and sports drinks. The EU looks forward to 
confirmation that less trade restrictive, less costly, and more effective measures will  be used to 
ensure proper payment of the relevant taxes.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  18.10.   Finally, the EU would like to recall that it is still waiting for written replies from the 
GCC countries, with the exception of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to 
letters se nt by the EU  Trade Commissioner to their ministers in the spring of 2019.  
18.11.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
18.12.   The United States' concerns as noted in previous CTG  meetings have yet to be addressed. 
The US would like to ask the same q uestions it did in November. Those are: When can the US expect 
to receive responses that address these concerns? When will these Members provide the detail the 
US has previously requested?  
18.13.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
18.14.   Japan has  just raise d its concern over this issue during the Market Access Committee and , 
in the interest of time, will not repeat its position today in this Council. Japan would simply like to 
register its continued concerns and will closely monitor future developments.  
18.15.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
18.16.   As the focal point for the GCC  Excise Tax issue at the WTO, Bahrain  would like to 
communicate the following message . We thank the delegations that have raised concerns for their 
interest in this m atter. We would like to refer to our previous statement under this agenda item at 
the CTG and reiterate that the GCC is still in the process of reviewing the legislation, taking into 
account delegations' comments. We will endeavour to keep our trading part ners updated on any 
developments regarding this legislation.  
18.17.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
18.18.   The Council so agreed . 
19  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND NEW ZEALAND  
19.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation s of the European Union, Japan, and New Ze aland, had requested the Secretariat to 
include this issue on the agenda.  
19.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
19.3.   At the previous Council meetings and TRIMS  Committee meetings, Japan has been expressing 
its concerns over the export restrictions impo sed by the new Mining Law; local content requirements 
in the telecommunications sector, including for 4G  mobile phones; and restrictions in the retail 
sector. Japan is particularly concerned about the export restrictions imposed by the new Mining Law. 
These export restriction measures continue to be inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement and Japan 
is deeply concerned by the fact that export of nickel ore has been banned since 1  January of this 
year. This is due to the Indonesian government's decision to bring forward the ban two  years ahead 
of the originally scheduled temporary permission of export for five  years.  
19.4.   At the last Council, Indonesia explained that , because it is facing a trade deficit , it believes 
that these measures have no impact on imports from o ther Members, that there are development 
aspects to the measures, and that it has been working on upgrading its business environment. 
However, export restrictions cannot be justified by trade deficits. Japan appreciates Indonesia's 
efforts to improve its b usiness environment but remain s disappointed as it still ha s concerns over 
the WTO  consistency of the Indonesian measures,  and these have not been addressed. Japan would 
appreciate any specific details and updates on the plans Indonesia will adopt for impr ovement as 
well as on the latest situation regarding these measures.  
19.5.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
19.6.   New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by other Members.  New Zealand believes that 
Indonesia's restrictions on agricultural imports un dermine core WTO  principles.  New Zealand G/C/M/137  
 
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  welcomes Indonesia's commitment to implement the WTO  decision under DS477/478 and refers to 
its previous statements on this particular point.  
19.7.   New Zealand is particularly concerned about the inconsistent issuance of import licences. 
Delays in import licences until March prevented commercially meaningful access for New Zealand 
horticultural products to the Indonesian market for the first  quarter of 2020. To date a number of 
import licences remain unprocessed following the opening of the application window seven  months 
ago in November. These trade blockages have resulted in significant adverse effects for exporters.  
19.8.   New Zealand would like to highlight that, in response to a lack of supply and surges in the 
price of garli c and onions in March  2020, the Ministry of Trade removed the requirement of an import 
approval for these products until 31  May 2020. Prices have since stabilized following the resumption 
of imports, to the benefit of the Indonesian consumer and overseas p roducers.  
19.9.   New Zealand is also concerned about the failure to remove Measure  18; the continued 
enforcement of limited application windows and validity periods; harvest period import bans; import 
realization requirements; and restrictions placed on import volumes based on storage capacity.  New 
Zealand requests an urgent update from Indonesia on when these issues will be resolved.  
19.10.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
19.11.   This is a long -standing agenda item. The EU  welcome s an announ ced shift towards more 
trade openness and a deeper integration of Indonesia in world trade. But this cannot result solely in 
measures to improve the country's trade balance and an exclusive focus on promoting exports. To 
truly integrate in global value cha ins, a country also needs to be open to increasing imports. Creating 
a trade and investment friendly climate is necessary to achieve this result. However, as of today, 
the EU  trade and investment relations with Indonesia continue to be hampered by a long l ist of 
pervasive Non -Tariff Barriers. The list of measures is long, and the EU will only elaborate on recent 
developments.  
19.12.   As of 1  January  2020, and despite previous warnings and d émarches, the ban on nickel  
export has been brought forward by two  years, adding uncertainty to the business. Imports of 
alcoholic beverages of EU  origin continue to be de facto  denied access to the Indonesian market.  
This has been happening since April  2019– without any formal noti fication or justification. The EU 
urges again the Indonesian authorities to restore the situation and re -establish normal terms of 
trade by allowing EU  alcoholic beverages onto the Indonesian market.  
19.13.   Import licences have been rejected for export of EU  dairy products to Indonesia. More 
worryingly, Indonesian importers have been asked to find other sources of supply. Given that dairy 
products are a major export item from the EU to Indonesia, this is of great concern for the EU  dairy 
industry. The EU urges Indonesia to normalize export procedures for EU  dairy products to Indonesia 
without any additional burdens or restrictions. In general, the EU request s that exports of EU  dairy 
products to Indonesia be treated in line with Indonesia's official regulations and  WTO commitments. 
The denial of import licences to products of EU  origin, and products of EU  origin only, is in blatant 
violation of Indonesia's WTO  commitments.  
19.14.   Recently, the EU  industry also warned that a new legislation ("Regulation No.  77 of 2019 
regar ding the "Second Amendment on the Ministry of Trade Regulation No.  85/M-DAG/PER/10/2015 
Regarding the Provisions on the Imports of Textiles and Textile Products") aims at preventing 
importation of a significant number of textiles and textile products in th eir finished state and if 
imported for purposes other than to meet the processing needs of domestic producers and small - or 
mid-sized industries, by means of an extremely complex import licensing scheme. Moreover, the 
legislation has not been notified in a ccordance with WTO  terms.  
19.15.   Finally, uncertainty continues to surround the implementation of Law  33/2014 – also known 
as the Halal Law. Government Regulation No.  31 of 2019 on the Implementation of Law No.  33 of 
2014 entered into force in May  2019. An implem enting regulation setting out transition periods 
(Regulation No.  26 of 2019) was finally notified to the TBT  Committee on 14  October  2019, with 
transition periods for food and beverage products already starting as from 17  October  2019. The EU 
would request  Indonesia once again to provide clarification on the specific products covered within 
the defined categories (Halal and Haram). The EU further consider s that Indonesia's requirement for G/C/M/137  
 
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  a bilateral government -to-government Mutual Recognition Agreement as a pre -condition for the 
Indonesian Halal Product Assurance Agency (BPJPH) to start recognizing Halal -certifying agencies in 
a foreign country is complicated in practice and unnecessarily burdensome.  
19.16.   The EU invite s Indonesia to consider less cumbersome prac tical solutions to continue 
recognizing Halal -certifying institutions and to provide further information on the technical 
implementation of the cooperation between BPJPH and foreign Halal agencies. The EU also calls upon 
Indonesia to keep Halal certificati on and Halal labelling voluntary and not compulsory, as a less 
trade -restrictive measure, and not to impose non -Halal labelling for products or services not claimed 
by the producer as being Halal. The EU considers that "non -Halal" labelling is unnecessary and 
creates an excessive burden for operators. The EU refers for more detail to its comments and 
questions raised in the TBT  Committee.  
19.17.   To sum up, the EU  urges Indonesia to eliminate its high number of trade barriers, to refrain 
from issuing new ones in li ne with its commitments in the G -20, as well as to lift illegal de facto  bans 
on imports of EU  alcoholic beverages and dairy products, and to comply with its WTO  obligations.  
19.18.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
19.19.   Chinese Taipei's delegati on shares the concerns of other Members regarding Indonesia's 
trade -restricting measures on a range of products, in particular the local content requirements for 
4G mobile phones and telecommunications. Chinese Taipei would also like to register its concer ns 
over the introduction of the Halal Product Assurance Law, which stipulates that halal certification is 
required for the circulation and trade of certain products in Indonesia. Chinese Taipei thank s 
Indonesia for its update at the latest TBT  written proc edure exercise. However, its concerns remain. 
Chinese Taipei  would like to request Indonesia to provide more detailed information on the 
mechanism of mutual recognition between Indonesia's halal certification bureau (BPJPH) and foreign 
halal institutions, so that Chinese Taipei's halal products may continue to enter the Indonesian 
market without facing any trade -restrictive barriers.  
19.20.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
19.21.   The United States asks that the minutes of this meeting reflect its intervention from the  
November  2019 CTG meeting .3 The statement reads as follows:  
19.22.   This Council is well aware of the breadth of concerns the US has  with Indonesia's trade and 
investment re gime.  In previous interventions, the US  reviewed in some detail the broad range of its 
concerns including localization requirements, import licensing requirements, standards 
requirements, pre -shipment inspection requirements, and export restrictions, inclu ding taxes and 
prohibitions, among others. These types of restrictions affect a broad range of sectors.  
19.23.   The US  would like to focus its remarks on Indonesia's continuing use of localization 
requirements.  Indonesia imposes local content requirements across a  broad and expanding range 
of sectors, including telecommunications, mobile technology, energy, agriculture, retail, and 
franchising. Not only do these local content requirements raise questions about consistency with 
Indonesia's trade obligations, they al so act as barriers to trade that potentially divert investment 
from other developing countries.  
19.24.   Disappointingly, despite the US  engagement to date, Indonesian government officials at the 
highest levels have publicly touted the success of their local conten t requirements, and have called 
for their expansion to new areas, including information technology -related "Internet of Things" 
products and the pharmaceutical and medical device sectors.  
19.25.   Just last month, the US  understand s that Indonesia issued new measur es that appear to 
reinforce, and potentially expand, existing local content requirements for telecommunications tools 
and devices. The US  believe s such measures are a step in the wrong direction.  
 
3 The intervention made by the United  States at the November 2019 CTG  meeting under this issue is 
contained in document  G/C/M/136, paragraphs  11.8-11.10.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  19.26.   The US  notes that over the past year there has been some pro gress in discussions with 
Indonesia on these distortive local content requirement policies. In recent engagements in 
Washington and Jakarta, the Government of Indonesia has agreed to undertake a "comprehensive" 
review of its local content policies.  
19.27.   At a pr evious CTG  meeting the US  requested the delegation from Indonesia to come 
prepared to brief the Committee on Trade -Related Investment Measures on the status of this 
comprehensive review. Unfortunately, such a briefing has not yet occurred.  Therefore, the U S would 
like to again underscore its hope that Indonesia will conduct this review in an open and transparent 
manner and invite the delegation of Indonesia to brief Members on the status of the review at the 
next TRIM s Committee meeting.  
19.28.   The US  thank s the Indonesian delegation in advance for i ts engagement and sincerely hope s 
Indonesia will work to address the US  concerns and ensure that trade between them is free and fair.  
19.29.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
19.30.   Australia  share s Members ' concerns regarding Indonesia 's import restric ting measures, 
particularly import licensing restrictions on agricultural products. Australia notes that a number of 
Indonesia's import policies continue to unnecessarily restrict and impact Australian exports.  Australia 
encourages Indonesia to bring all i ts measures into compliance with its WTO  obligations. Australia 
thank s Indonesia for its engagement with Australia to date on this issue and request s this continues 
to ensure any delays are resolved and trade can resume.  
19.31.   The delegate of the Russian Federat ion indicated the following:  
19.32.   The Russian Federation shares the concerns of WTO  Members regarding Indonesian trade 
restricting policies and practices. The Russian Federation  urges Indonesia to bring its practices in to 
compliance with WTO  rules.  
19.33.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
19.34.   Indonesia notes that delegations were particularly interested  in Indonesia's import and 
export regulations and requirements, as well as the domestic component requirement in certain 
sectors.  To respond to the points raised in this meeting, Indonesia wishes, firstly , to draw Members ' 
attention to its current trade and business environment. As conveyed in previous meeting s and 
pointed out by Japan 's delegation just now, Indones ia's trade performance was experiencing a 
negative trend since this interest was raised for the first time in 2012 until today. Indonesia suffered 
the deepest trade deficit in 2018 due to significant increased import s during that period as a result 
of its trade openness.  
19.35.   Indonesia is committed in making a better investment climate and ensuring that Indonesia 
is the main investment destination in the region. This commitment has been made  through a series 
of continuous efforts of deregulating and improving Indonesia's  investment -related regulations and 
policies. Those efforts are beginning to bear positive results as can be seen from the UNCTAD  World 
Investment Report 2019 , which recorded that FDI  flows to Indonesia grew by 7% to USD 22 billion 
in 2018.  Indone sia's investment agency, the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board, also 
reported realization of investment in January –September  2019, which reached IDR 601.3 trillion 
(roughly equal to USD 42.7 billion) that indicates an increase of around 12 .3% from the same period 
in 2018 , which was valued at IDR 535.4 trillion (roughly equal to USD 38.1 billion).  
19.36.   Secondly, Indonesia would like to address some specific interests raised by Members.  With 
regard to importation , as reflected in open trade statistic s sources , Indonesia's trade performance 
has experienced negative growth, but at the same time Indonesia's import s have enjoyed a positive 
growth , including import s of Members who raised their interest in this agenda item. It can be inferred 
that Indonesia did not apply any measures or regulations that may significant ly impact or restrict 
importation ; rather , Indonesia continue s its effort s to simplify its import procedures and to adjust 
import regulations in order to have a better business environment. In a ddition, anyone can access 
all related import procedures and regulations anywhere and anytime because Indonesia has  made 
them publicly available on the internet.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  19.37.   On Indonesia's export regulations , its exhaustible natural resources export policy is based 
in the  spirit of raising standards of living and ensuring the full employment of Indonesia's people. 
Beside s, Indonesia sees that tariff escalation to certain agricultural products may show the 
importanc e of value added to economic development. In light of this, Indonesia believe s that its 
policy 's reasoning is legitimate under the WTO Agreement s. Regarding Halal , Indonesia wants to 
emphasize that the halal requirement is not a trade restriction. It is st andard necessity for Indonesia 
as a majority Muslim  country. Information on halal certification can be found on Indonesia's official 
halal agency website , namely, halal.go.id.  
19.38.   Lastly, with respect to the interest voiced by some Members on Indonesia's domes tic 
component requirement, Indonesia convey s the following , namely that  that those provisions are put 
in place either: (i) in relation to government procurement policy ; (ii) in relation to policies which 
involve fulfilling the need to maintain all of the Indonesian people 's welfare and life necessities ; or 
(iii) in relation to policies which involve state -managed strategic resources.  
19.39.   In addition to the domestic component requirement , Indonesia's government has started 
the comprehensive review of its localiz ation measure. The review has been started with the process 
of harmonizing a set of related regulations. According to Presidential Decree No.  24/2018, Indonesia 
has established a National Team comprising of related government authorities with one of the main 
tasks being to harmonize related regulations. This is a continuing process and a work in progress. 
Indonesia will inform interested Members about such update in due course.  
19.40.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
19.41.   The Council so agreed . 
20  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUEST FR OM ARGENTINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND URUGUAY  
20.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 3 and 5  March  2020, the 
delegation s of Argentina, the United States, and Uruguay, had requested the Secretariat to include 
this issue on the agenda.  
20.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
20.3.   Uruguay reiterates its concern and regrets having to refer to this item once again in this 
Council.  In this regard, Uruguay  would like to refer to previous statements, reaffirming the concern 
about the Euro pean Union's decision to register the term "Danbo" as a protected geographical 
indication, despite objections by a number of Members.  At the system ic level, it is worrying that an 
important Member of the WTO is disregarding recognized international standar ds and calling into 
question the value of the multilateral work undertaken in the Codex.  
20.4.   At the trade level, the creation of unnecessary barriers to the marketing of this type of cheese 
in the European Union and the impact this has when extended to third  markets is a matter of 
concern. There is also the issue of the uncertainty created by this situation as to the expectations of 
producers, many of whom were originally from Europe and who settled in Uruguay , producing and 
exporting quality cheese for generat ions. 
20.5.   Uruguay does not agree with the position that this is exclusively an intellectual property issue 
that should not be dealt with in this forum and point s out that the standard under which these rights 
were originally granted was correctly notified by t he European Union to the TBT  Committee in 
November  2013.  In this connection, Uruguay thank s the European Union delegation for the 
responses it provided to Uruguay  during its last Trade Policy Review. However, Uruguay  would like 
to repeat the following questions with regard to the practical implementation of Community 
legislation on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, which, in its view, were not 
answered at that time:  (i) has the registration of terms such as protected geographical indications 
been refused, or have some flexibilities been introduced for their use, in response to the objections 
or observations made by producers or authorities of the member States of the European Union? In 
which cas es? (ii) has the registration of terms such as protected geographical indications been G/C/M/137  
 
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  refused, or have some flexibilities been introduced for their use, in response to the objections or 
observations made by producers or authorities of other WTO  Members? I n which cases?  
20.6.   To conclude, Uruguay  urges the European Union to comply with the Codex international 
standards and to reconsider its regulatory approach in order to avoid the creation and proliferation 
of unnecessary restrictions on international trade in c heese.  
20.7.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.8.   The United States is  disappointed that it again ha s to raise this issue in this Council. In the 
interest of time, the US  request s that the minutes for this meeting also reflect its intervent ion from 
the November  2019 CTG  meeting4, as unfortunately that statement still stands.  The statement reads 
as follows:  
20.9.   The US is  disappointed that it again has to raise this issue in this Council.  Despite the United 
States and other WTO  Members having obj ected to the EU 's proposed grant of protection to havarti 
as a GI during the 2014  opposition period, and in this Council and numerous WTO  TBT Committee 
meetings -- as havarti  has been established as an international standard under the Codex 
Alimentarius -- the EU has moved forward with the process to do just that.  Havarti underwent a 
rigorous review to prove its use in the public domain and in international trade, which was 
reconfirmed by Codex members, including the EU, in 2007, 2008, and 2010.  The EU 's decision to 
move forward raises serious questions about the views of Denmark and the EU  Commission 
regarding the legal relevance of Codex and the integrity of our international  standards system, as 
well as the international trading system.  
20.10.   The US remind s the EU that no WTO  Agreement is superior to another, and just because the 
EU asserts that it is following procedures under the TRIPS  Agreement, it does not mean it can 
disregard  TBT commitments to uphold international standards. The EU must comply with both 
WTO Agreements.  The United States strongly encourage s the EU (Denmark) to uphold its 
WTO TBT obligations to follow international standards, and to consider a less trade -restrictive 
approach to protecting Danish cheese producers by linking havarti with the place of origin (Denmark 
or Vejle)  and protect only the entire compound term.  
20.11.   The EU 's decision to move forward raises serious questions about the views of Denmark and 
the EU  Commission regarding the legal relevance of Codex and the integrity of our international 
standards system, as well as the international trading system.  
20.12.   The US remind s the EU that no WTO  agreement is superior to another, and just because the 
EU asserts that  it is following procedures under the TRIPS  Agreement, it does not mean it can 
disregard TBT  commitments to uphold international standards.  The EU must comply with both 
WTO Agreements.  The US strongly encourage s the EU (Denmark) to uphold its WTO  TBT obligations 
to follow international standards, and to consider a less trade -restrictive approach to protecting 
Danish cheese producers by linking havarti with the place of origin (Denmark or Vejle)  and protect 
only the entire compound term.  
20.13.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
20.14.   New Zealand sees  a conflict in positions the EU and Denmark have taken in standard setting 
bodies and the actions they have taken ex post facto , to restrict the labelling within the EU of 
products produced using those standards by producers outside of Denmark. This does  not relate 
solely to grounds for granting or denying IP  protection, but also to the importance of legal 
consistency, upholding internationally agreed standards, and not frustrating legitimate expectations 
of business operating within those standards.  
20.15.   New Ze aland remains concerned that the European Commission has chosen to register the 
terms "Danbo " and "Havarti ", despite having previously agreed to a Codex standard in which the 
European Commission and Denmark both acknowledged  that 'the country of origin sta tement 
 
4 The intervention made by the United  States at the November  2019 CTG meeting under this issue is 
contained in document  G/C/M/136, paragraph  14.6. G/C/M/137  
 
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  preserves its generic nature '. Such actions will negatively affect producers outside Denmark who 
have invested with the legitimate expectations that they could use the standard.  
20.16.   The EU 's approach to registering cheese names for which there are exist ing Codex standards 
shows disregard for the integrity of the standards setting system that promotes reliability and 
consistency in international trade rules, which New Zealand  would expect the EU to support.  
20.17.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the followin g: 
20.18.   Australia  continue s to have concerns about decisions to grant cheese GIs that are also a 
Codex standard for cheese.  It is important to continue to support the integrity of international 
standards and to maintain access to common names when making decisi ons on GIs.  
20.19.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
20.20.   Argentina regrettably reiterates its concern over registration of the term "Danbo" as a 
protected geographical indication by Denmark. Argentina has listened to the responses provided by 
the EU in this respect but fail s to find any valid arguments.  
20.21.   On the one hand, the EU states that its regulatory system is predictable and transparent. 
What is certain is that the timely observations presented by Argentina and other countries were 
dismissed, in Argentina's view, without giving them any further consideration.  
20.22.   On the other hand, the EU maintains that the existence of a specific Codex standard or 
inclusion of the term "Danbo" in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention does not imply that said term is 
generi c. Argentina  begs to differ. What would be the point of deploying efforts to multilaterally agree 
a Codex standard on "Danbo" cheese if use of said term is the exclusive preserve of Danish 
producers?  
20.23.   The EU also states that, within its territory, the gener ic nature (or not) of a term can only 
be assessed based on the perception of European consumers. Argentina consider s this to be a 
precarious argument and sincerely doubt s whether, if they were to inverse their roles for a moment, 
the EU would accept as subjective a claim as that of consumer perception vis -à-vis an objective 
international legal instrument, such as Codex Stan  264. 
20.24.   Argentina is  aware that for the EU this is essentially a matter of intellectual property rights, 
which falls outside the purvie w of the Council for Trade in Goods. Argentina also beg s to differ on 
this point. The above -mentioned Codex standard did not regulate a geographical indication but 
rather regulated the generic name of a product that is manufactured globally (not only in De nmark).  
20.25.   In fact, registering the name "Danbo" as a geographical indication constitutes an undue 
restriction of this cheese on international trade. In any case, as Argentina has  already stated on 
previous occasions, its concerns are not purely trade -related  but also encompass systemic aspects, 
in particular impact on international standardization efforts. Argentina trusts that the EU will 
seriously review this matter.  
20.26.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.27.   The EU has always said that the  fact that a GI  name is subject to a specific Codex 
Alimentarius Standard or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention does not imply that it 
has become generic. Generic status in the EU can only be assessed with regard to the perception of 
consumers on EU  territory. In the EU, the relevant public is comprised mainly of the reasonably 
well-informed members of the public and/or customers who may purchase the product or a like 
product.  
20.28.   Regulation (EU) No.  1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultu ral products and foodstuffs, 
as well as subsequent delegated and implementing regulations, were notified to the WTO under the 
TBT Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the TBT  Agreement (for example, provisions 
related to technical standards, de finitions and labelling issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual 
property rights (in particular elements related to the substantive protection of geographical 
indications) are part of the notified measures, those are not relevant for TBT  purposes.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  20.29.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
20.30.   The Council so agreed . 
21  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
21.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation s of the European Union and the Russian Federation, respectively, had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
21.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.3.   The EU thanks the Egyptian autho rities for their efforts to enhance Egypt 's procedures related 
to the compulsory registration of foreign companies and pre -shipment inspections, established by 
three  Egyptian Ministerial Decrees (No.  991/2015, No.  43/2016 and No.  44/2019).  Egypt informed 
that, in April  2019, a special Committee was established in the Ministry of Trade to accelerate the 
processing of registrations of companies exporting to Egypt. In February  2020, the Committee 
informed that some progress in registrations has been achieved.  
21.4.   While the EU welcome s information on advancements, it maintain s its concerns on the 
registration procedures as a number of registrations are still pending creating unnecessary burden 
and administrative costs.  Also, the EU finds it very worrisome that some sectors have been 
disproportionately affected by the discretionary application of Decree  43/2016, with practically no 
registrations taking place since the introduction of the Decree in 2016.  
21.5.   Due to difficulties caused by the COVID -19 pandemic, Egypt suspended the requirement to 
stamp/authenticate import invoices at Chambers of Commerce and Egyptian Embassies abroad until 
further notice. However, documents submitted under Decrees  43/2016 and 44 /2019 still need 
authentication. The EU  would urge Egypt to reconsider the requirement of stamping documents 
under Decrees  43/2016 and 44/2019 during the pandemic.  The EU is  ready to work with the special 
Committee to finali ze the registrations of pending applications and to work on solutions, which would 
prevent delays of future registrations.  
21.6.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
21.7.   The Russian Federation remains concerned with the Egyptian manufacturer registration 
procedures under  Decree No. 43/2016 and reiterates its statements made during the previous 
meetings of the TBT Committee and the Council for Trade in Goods. The Russian Federation 
continue s to receive messages from Russian exporters that the registration procedure is 
burdensome, time -consuming, lacks transparency,  and represent s a discriminative barrier to trade.  
21.8.   A stark example of these words is the case of a Russian exporter of steel reinforcement bars. 
The company has been trying to get registered since 2016. The damage to the company due to 
denied market access is estimated at USD 100 million  annually , which makes a compound damage 
to date of up to USD 0.5 billion. 
21.9.   Given delays in the registration procedure some of the submitted documents expire d. In the 
case of the particular exporter quality management certificate, an environmental management 
certificate , as well as a trademark certificate had to be renewed . In this regard, the Russian 
Federation urges Egypt to provide Russian companies with the market access as per Egypt 's 
commitments in the WTO.  
21.10.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated the following:  
21.11.   Turkey  joins the European Union and the Russian Federation in emphasiz ing its ongoing 
concerns on Egypt 's Decree on manufacturer registration system  and appreciate s the continued 
bilateral dialogue among our delegations in Geneva. However, the system still lacks transparency 
and Turkey does not even have information re garding the processes that its firms' applications are 
going through.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  21.12.   Turkey know s that even firms whose applications are approved by the General Organization 
for Import and Export Control (GOEIC) of Egypt have to wait for the Ministerial Decrees to be 
published in order to start exports. There are no specific time -frames for any of these steps and it 
remains unclear to Turkey  what the process after the registration of GOEIC entails.  In fact, even 
Turkey's  firms which are registered cannot, at times, effectuate their exports due to coordination 
problems among the Egyptian authorities.  Turkey also still do es not have information regarding the 
Committee that was announced by Egypt to oversee the functioning o f this system.  The most recent 
information from Egypt has been the suspension of the registration of companies due to expired 
application documents. One out of every four  companies on the relevant list is a Turkish company.  
To Turkey , the expiry of the doc uments is primarily due to the failure of the GOEIC to register the 
companies within reasonable time -limits. As stated earlier, there are many companies still awaiting 
approval since the introduction of Decree  43/2016. As such, these companies are unfairly  expected 
to reapply, starting from the very first  step in the registration process.  
21.13.   It has been more than four  years now that this implementation continues to be an obstacle 
to Turkey's  exports to Egypt. It creates additional financial cost and time loss for Turkey's companies. 
With its current nature, this system is onerous, and should be lifted until full alignment with 
WTO rules is ensured.  If not lifted, Turkey asks Egypt to stipulate the registration process for Turkish 
firms whose documentation is co mplete without any further delay. Turkey also ask s Egypt to inform 
and give detailed explanation to those firms whose documents are reported to have expired.  
21.14.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
21.15.   Korea would like to reiterate its p revious position on this agenda item.  The measures taken 
by Egypt constitute a non -tariff barrier and undermine the free trade system. In particular, 
registration procedures and certificates of conformity result in serious delays for foreign 
manufacturers.  Also, the pre -shipment inspection under the current registration system has negative 
effects on trade.  
21.16.   Korea urges Egypt to take appropriate measures to improve its trade -restrictive policies and 
practices by providing information on the manufacturer regi stration system in a transparent manner.  
21.17.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
21.18.   Egypt  would like to refer to its statements from previous CTG and TBT  meetings.  Egypt 
recently took several steps to improve the transparency in the application of the registration system 
under Decrees  43/2016 and 44/2019.  The General Organization for Export and Import Control 
(GOEIC) of Egypt has published on its website full lists of the following:  the companies whose 
registration is suspended due to the expiry of their quality certificates , and these companies were 
granted a grace period to renew these certificates ; the companies whose registration process is 
suspended due to the incompletion of the required documents for registration, and these companies 
were gran ted as well a grace period to fulfil the needed documentation in order to avoid the need to 
file a new application.  
21.19.   With regard to developments of the company -specific problems conveyed to us by the 
concerned delegations in Geneva , Egypt  totally understand s that there is a delay in the registration 
process in some cases. Egypt is  currently following up with Cairo in this respect, noting that the 
lockdown in Capital , as well as the restrictive measures taken by Egypt to contain the 
COVID -19 pandemic , have ma de coordination among the different governmental authorities , as well 
as with the mission in Geneva , more challenging.  
21.20.   Therefore, Egypt  would like to thank the Members who conveyed the details of the problems 
faced by their companies ; Egypt  will do its best to provide assistance regarding any implementation 
obstacles to their companies and shall revert to them upon receipt of the feedback on these cases 
from Capital.  
21.21.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
21.22.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/137  
 
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  22  MONGOLIA – MEASURES APPLIED WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
22.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation  had requested the  Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
22.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
22.3.   In 2013 , Mongolia established a quota regime for the importation of certain agricultural 
products, including wheat flour, wheat, milk, drinking water, and beef. The Russian Federation 
repeatedly raised this issue , in several WTO  Committee meetings, as well as at the  Council for Trade 
in Goods.  In 2019 , Mongolia issued a recommendation not to establish a quota on import s of bottled 
water, liquid milk , and wheat flour , for 2020. However, Mongolia did not exclude these products 
from t he list of agricultural products subject to a quota regime.  
22.4.   The fact that Mongolia is still planning to determine quota volumes for import s of agricultural 
products, including wheat flour and milk, is not in line with WTO  rules. Thus, Mongolia 's quota regi me 
continues to be inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO  Agreements and, in particular, 
Article XI of the GATT  1994, and Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, as well as Mongolia 's 
accession commitments under para graph  20 of the Working Pa rty Report.  
22.5.   Moreover, despite the temporal removal of the quota regime for 2020, in 2019 Mongolia also 
entered  into force a new law on the enrichment of food products. According to the current standard , 
wheat flour shall be enriched with vitamins  B and D, folacin, ferrum and zin c and marked with a 
particular sign indicating the vitaminization of food products. However, there are certain indications 
demonstrating that on the M ongolian market there is  no wheat flour, either imported or domestically 
produced, with a respective label sign. The fact that Mongolian producers have the right to sell their 
unenriched flour , without enrichment  sign, while import of the same product without this sign is not 
allowed, accords less favourable treatment for imported flour and contravenes the basic provisions 
of the GATT and TBT  Agreement s. 
22.6.   The Russian Federation has raised certain issues with respect to the application of this quota 
regime and the law on the enrichment of food products at various WTO  committee meetings  and 
would like to ask Mongolia duly  to provide its feedback on th ese issues.  
22.7.   The Russian Federation call s upon Mongolia promptly to undertake all of the further steps 
necessary to bring its legislation and measures in to compliance with the relevan t WTO  provisions. 
Russia shall continue to monitor the evol ution of Mongolia 's quota policy carefully.  
22.8.   The delegate of Mongolia  indicated the following:  
22.9.   Mongolia is reiterating once again that the Food Law of Mongolia defines only a few products 
as strateg ic, including liquid milk and wheat flour. In light of this, the quota regime was implemented 
temporarily until the enrichment law came into force in December  2019.  
22.10.   Mongolia has informed the Russian Federation of the recommendations of the National Food 
Security Council of 29  November  2019 not to impose quotas on the imports of wheat flour and liquid 
milk in 2020.  No quotas are being imposed on these products following the recommendations of the 
National Food Security Council.  
22.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
22.12.   The Council so agreed . 
23  CHINA – MEASURES RESTRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STATES  
23.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of  the United States  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  23.2.   The delegation of the United States  indicated the following:  
23.3.   It is unfortunate that the United States must again reiterate its concerns, as expressed 
previously in this and many other WTO  bodies, regarding the negative trade and environmental 
impacts resulting from China 's import ban, and accompanying measures, on c ertain recovered 
materials.  
23.4.   Most recently, in April  2020, China approved a revised Law on Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes.  The United States is very concerned with the overly broad 
scope of "solid waste ", as it appears in the revised Law, which effectively results in an import ban 
on recyclable materials. Recyclable materials are saleable commodities, not trash, and should not 
be subject to a framework designed for waste.  
23.5.   The United States is also concerned with what appear  to be different requirements for foreign 
and domestic commodities.  These abrupt restrictions and bans have left US  recyclers without viable 
alternative processing capacity and the global shortfall in processing capacity has also caused the 
decline, and in  some cases, collapse, in prices for some recyclable materials.  
23.6.   Additionally, these policy measures seem to be contrary to China 's own pro -circular economy 
narrative that it is promoting in the WTO as well as internationally. As the world 's largest process or 
of scrap materials, these measures hinder China 's aspirations to transition to a more resource 
efficient, global circular economy by directly impacting global recycling networks.  
23.7.   Further, the US is concerned that these policies are a detriment to its shared environment 
and may result in an increased volume of scrap materials going into landfills or other less desirable 
waste channels, and becoming marine litter , and reiterate s its request that China immediately halt 
implementation of its ban and revise t he relevant measures in a manner consistent with existing 
international standards for trade in scrap materials, which provide a global framework for 
transparent and environmentally sound trade in recycled commodities.  
23.8.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
23.9.   New Zealand acknowledges and supports the right of all WTO  Members to regulate to achieve 
legitimate domestic health and environmental objectives. New Zealand applauds China 's stated 
proactive policy objectives in relation to sustainable dev elopment  and encourages valid actions to 
limit harmful environmental impacts from contaminated waste inside its borders.  
23.10.   New Zealand in no way seeks to question China 's right to regulate to protect its environment. 
However, New Zealand remains concerned th at vanadium slag is included in China 's catalogue of 
banned imports under this measure. New Zealand reiterate s its view that vanadium slag is a 
purposefully produced co -product with a purposeful end -use in production of specific forms of steel. 
It is not a  waste product, and so should not fall under measures for solid waste. New Zealand recalls 
that China itself is the largest global producer of vanadium slag, with approximately 500,000  tonnes 
annual production generated as a co -product from steel mills.  
23.11.   New Zealand would appreciate clarification on how China has ensured that the rules that 
apply to foreign products are no less favourable than those accorded to domestic products. New 
Zealand would be interested also to hear a further explanation from China o n how it has ensured 
that the import ban on vanadium slag is not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve China 's 
environmental and health protection objectives.  
23.12.   New Zealand thanks China for the recent discussion on this issue and looks forward to further 
constructive engagement on this topic to better understand China 's approach to distinguishing 
between waste and non -waste materials.  
23.13.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
23.14.   Canada continues to share the concerns of the US and wou ld like to reiterate its comments 
on China 's restrictions with respect to solid waste from past CTG  meetings.  Canada does not wish 
to dispute China 's goal of limiting harmful environmental impacts resulting from contaminated waste 
material.  However, Canada  notes that high quality scrap products are a valuable raw material for G/C/M/137  
 
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  Chinese customers involved in various manufacturing sectors and a key component of a strong 
circular economy which ultimately helps to reduce waste.  
23.15.   Moreover, Canada has concerns with the inclusion of wood pellets on the list of banned 
products. Canadian wood pellets are not contaminated. They are made from pure forest fibre, such 
as logging residuals (small diameter stems and branches) and residues (sawdust) from logs being 
converted i nto lumber in sawmills. Wood pellets are a renewable, low -carbon resource and switching 
from coal to wood pellets reduces GHG  emissions significantly. Wood pellets can contribute to China 's 
goal of enhancing environmental protections.  In this context, Canada asks China how it justifies 
banning imports of wood pellets, and how it has ensured that a ban on wood pellets is not more 
trade restrictive than necessary to meet China 's environmental and health protection objectives.  
23.16.   The delegate of the European Unio n indicated the following:  
23.17.   The European Union  would like to remind China again that in the bilateral framework of the 
regular EU -China Dialogues the EU submitted questions on a number of issues via a letter from the 
EU co-chair to China 's co-chair, dated 2 5 July 2018. That letter also included detailed questions on 
the recent Chinese measures on waste. As of today, China has not yet responded to the 
EU questions, on waste or on any other issue. The EU should be grateful if China would respond to 
its questio ns as soon as possible.  
23.18.   The EU looks forward to working with China (and all WTO  Members) towards addressing the 
issue of trade in waste in the most environmentally and economically efficient way and in full 
transparency.  
23.19.   The delegate of China  indicated the  following:  
23.20.   Solid waste has inherent attributes of pollution which make it different from other normal 
goods. The disposing process itself and residue generated from the disposing process of the solid 
waste could cause environment pollution and harm human s, animals , and plants.  China, as a 
developing country, has suffered the pollution of solid wastes imported from other countries for 
decades. It is imperative for China to implement measures to limit the negative effect from importing 
and processing s olid waste.  
23.21.   From the worldwide perspective, the danger of solid waste has been realized and 
acknowledged by almost all countries. According to the Basel Convention and internationally 
accepted principles, every country has the obligation to properly handle  and dispose of its 
domestically -produced solid wastes.  It is not the import restrictions that are detrimental to the 
environment, but the solid waste itself. The exporting countries should actively shoulder their 
international responsibilities to handle a nd dispose of their own solid waste, rather than reaping a  
benefit at the cost of other countries ' environment and human health.  
23.22.   Regarding transparency, China has taken full consideration of all factors , including its 
obligations under the WTO , during the adjustment process of relevant policies, and has notified 
relevant measures to the WTO. China will further notify other measures as required by 
WTO Agreements . With regard to the written questions mentioned by the EU, through bilateral 
channel s, and as  suggested before, China continue s to encourage the EU to discuss them at the 
bilateral level.  
23.23.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
23.24.   The Council so agreed . 
24  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST FROM 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, AND 
THE UNITED STATES  
24.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation s of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the 
United States, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  24.2.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
24.3.   Australia 's long -held concern s with India 's restrictive measures on pulses imports are well 
known to Members, particularly India 's quantitative restrictions (QRs) on a variety of pulses. These 
concerns are held not just by Australia, but by other Members too – including a number of de veloping 
Members.  
24.4.   Australia was disappointed by India 's recent continuation of its QRs on pulses for the 
2020-2021 fiscal year with further restrictions placed on peas. The previous 150,000  tonne QR on 
peas has now been divided with 75,000  tonnes allocated  for green peas and 75,000  tonnes for other 
peas and an effective import ban on yellow peas. India has characteri zed the QRs as being 
'temporary ' measures. This is now difficult to accept given that they have been in place for nearly 
three  years for some v arieties.  
24.5.   Australia has  continued to review the previous explanation provided by India for the 
WTO basis for the QRs during the meeting held in November  2019. That explanation has generated 
more questions and concerns with respect to these measures.  
24.6.   India claimed that the QRs on pulses are permitted under Article  XI(2)(c)(ii) of the GATT, 
which excludes from the general prohibition of quantitative restrictions those import restrictions 
imposed on agricultural products to remove a temporary surplus of the li ke domestic product, by 
making the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers free of charge or at prices 
below the current market level. Australia notes that Members cannot maintain quantitative import 
restrictions on agricultural products that satisfy the requirements of Article  XI:2(c) of the GATT  1994 
without violating Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  
24.7.   India also indicated that their QRs, even if otherwise inconsistent with their obligations, may 
nevertheless be exempted under GATT  Article  XX(a) , that is, necessary to protect public morals , and 
Article  XX(b) , that is,  necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.  
24.8.   Australia posed a series of questions at the last meeting in November and subsequently 
provided them to  India in writing  but has  still not received a response. Australia will avoid to repeat 
the questions, but note s that it was requesting India provide a detailed explanation of how India 's 
QRs satisfied the requirements of GATT  Article  XI:2(c)(ii) and Artic le XX(a) and (b), which Australia 
does not believe are appropriate or legally available in respect of India 's import restrictions on 
pulses.  
24.9.   Australia again requests India to provide prompt and fulsome responses bilaterally, and to 
table those responses in the next meeting of the relevant WTO  Committee; or otherwise , Australia 
request s India to remove the measures immediately.  
24.10.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated th e following:  
24.11.   The Russian Federation would like to express its concern regarding India 's import policy for 
the import of yellow peas.  
24.12.   Starting from April  2018, India was applying annual "temporary " quotas for import of yellow 
peas. In addition to the quota for the year 2019/2020, on 1 January  2020, India introduced a 
minimum import price requirement for yellow and green peas. From that date, ports of entry for 
yellow and green peas were also limited  to only one  seaport , Kolkata.  
24.13.   In April  2020, India introduced a new quota of 150 ,000 metric tonnes  on peas for  the fiscal 
year 2020/2021. This new quota for peas is divided into three  sub-quotas with allowed import 
volumes specified for each type of peas:  green peas – 75,000 metric tonnes , other peas – 
75,000 metric tonnes . For yellow peas a zero import volume quota has been established , which 
amounts to an import prohibition , valid until end -March  2021.  Russia notes that over the last 
two years, due to the measures applied by India, imports of yellow peas have decreased 
significantly.  
24.14.   Russia maintains its concern regarding the inconsistency with WTO  rules of India 's measures 
in respect of imports of yellow peas. The imposition of a minimum import price r equirement, import G/C/M/137  
 
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  quotas, import prohibition , and restriction on the port of entry , violate both Article XI:1 of the GATT 
and Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  The Russian Federation requests India to bring these 
measures into conformity with the  WTO rules.  
24.15.   The delegate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
24.16.   The Ukrainian delegation would like once again to reiterate its concerns regarding India 's 
restrictive measures on certain pulses.  
24.17.   India has been imposing QRs on import s, together with other trad e-distorting policies , in 
relation to various pulses for more than two years and, despite the systemic concerns expressed by 
Members during this period at almost all meetings of the Co A, the Committee  on Market Access,  and 
the CTG, India has not provided any meaningful explanations as to the nature and duration of such 
restrictive measures.  
24.18.   This year, the situation has continued to deteriorate. On 21 April, the Government of India 
issued Trade Notice No.  05/2020 -2021, which introduced quota s on imports of c ertain pulses for the 
fiscal year 2020 -2021. In particular, the permitted i mport quantity for Yellow Peas (0713 .10.10) 
became zero.  Such measures by India have a destructive effect on international pulse crop markets.  
24.19.   According to WTO  rules, QRs should be justified and applied temporarily.  India has an 
obligation to Members to guarantee appropriate and predictable trade opportunities to access India's 
pulses market.  Ukraine calls on India to bring its trade -distorting policies into conformity wit h the 
WTO rules and to eliminate its restrictive measures.  
24.20.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following : 
24.21.   The EU has raised its concerns about India 's measures for quite some time. Since the 
quantitative import restrictions have been in place for three  years, the EU would expect India to be 
in a position to provide clearer explanations about how its policies conform to WTO  rules.  Members 
have repeatedly been told that the measure was temporary. The EU consider s that a measure that 
has been in p lace for three years is not temporary. The EU urges India to quickly eliminate this 
trade -distorting measure.  
24.22.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
24.23.   As has been previously stated in this Council and in other WTO  committee meetings, the 
United States remains concerned with India 's use of domestic support policies, multiple increases in 
tariff rates, and the application of quantitative import restrictions for pulses including pigeon peas, 
mung beans, black gram lentils, and peas.  
24.24.   Despite I ndia stating several times that its quantitative restrictions on pulses were 
temporary, the US notes with disappointment that in April the Indian Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry issued Trade Notice No.  05/2020 -21 extending quantitative restrictions on pulses for the 
Indian fiscal year through 31 March  2021.  Therefore, the US repeat s its previous requests for 
information on how the measures comply with WTO  commitments and when and how the measures 
will be suspend ed. 
24.25.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
24.26.   As the largest supplier of pulses to India, Canada has been most negatively affected by 
India's measures to limit the import of pulses. Pulses are an important source of protein for many 
Indian consumers and Canada is a high quality and reliable supplier.  
24.27.   Canada is disappointed that India continues to use quantitative restriction s on the import of 
dried peas and other pulses. This situation has been going on for more than two  years now. It is 
difficult for  Canada to see how India can still be claiming these measures to be temporary.  
24.28.   On 28 March  2020, the Government of India extended certain requirements and established 
new, more stringent ones designed to further limit the importation of dried peas in the fiscal year 
2020/21. These included:  a requirement that all shipments of dried peas enter via the port of G/C/M/137  
 
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  Kolkata ; a minimum import price for dried peas set at around six  times the price imported dried 
peas have traditionally been traded ; a quantitative res triction allocation of zero metric tonnes for 
the import of yellow dried peas, which implicitly ban s all imports of yellow peas in India.  
24.29.   Canada has  previously expressed its views on the WTO -consistency of India 's QRs and is 
concerned with India 's continue d trend to establish even more stringent import restrictive measures.  
24.30.   At the last Market Access meeting, India claimed Article  XI:2(c)(ii) and Article  XX(a) and (b) 
of the GATT as the legal justification for its QRs on dried peas. Canada would be very inte rested in 
hearing more about the compliance of India 's import ban for yellow peas and the minimum import 
price for dried peas with the same Article.  
24.31.   Canada also asks that India clearly indicate how its import ban and minimum import price 
policy for yellow peas are compliant with Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture.  The elimination 
of import bans and quantitative restrictions is a fundamental principle in both the GATT and the 
WTO.  Canada reiterates its call for India to immediately and expeditiously r eview its trade -restrictive 
measures put in place on pulses and to consider alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that 
promote a predictable and transparent import regime for pulses.  
24.32.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
24.33.   Most of the issues raised today by some of the Members have also been raised in the 
meetings of other committees , most recently  the meeting of the Committee on Market Access held 
on 8 June 2020. For the sake of better utili zation of the time available for the CTG 's virtual meeting, 
India's delegation will avoid repeating what it had stated earlier.  
24.34.   In brief, as mentioned earlier on various occasions, India would like to reiterate that the 
objective of this restriction is twofold : first, to alleviate the impact of the glut in pulses on the food 
and livelihood security of small and marginal farmers; and second, to strike a balance bet ween the 
interests and livelihood security of farmers and India 's obligations under trade agreements.  
24.35.   India submits that a mere increase in import tariffs of pulses is not sufficient given the 
magnitude of the surplus in the domestic market. Accordingly, t he quotas are necessary considering 
the domestic demand and supply situation of pulses in India,  and hence the extension or removal of 
these QRs. It is aimed at alleviating the distress caused to small and marginal farmers by the influx 
of cheap imported p ulses and the consequent impact on their food and livelihood security. The 
government has been regularly reviewing these measures based on the market situation of pulses 
owing to which the quota of pulses has been increased from time to time.  
24.36.   On quota allo cation, India's delegation would like to inform the Members that:  so far as peas 
are concerned, in the financial year 2019 -2020, an import quota of 0.15  million  metric tonnes  was 
allowed , whereas in the financial year 2020 -2021, a total of 0.7  million  metric tonnes  have been 
allowed ; so far as other pulses , that is , the beans of the SPP  Vigna Mungo is concerned,  in the 
financial year 2019 -2020 and 2020 -2021, an import quota of 0.4  million  metric tonnes have been 
allowed in each of the financial years ; so far as the quota for yellow peas for the financial year 
2020-2021 is concerned, India is examining the matter internally.  
24.37.   A few Members had earlier sought to know the relevant specific WTO  provisions under which 
India imposed these measures, on which my dele gation has replied earlier that the QRs on pulses 
are necessary for the enforcement of governmental measures to remove any surplus of pulses, as 
permitted under Article  XI(2)(c)(ii) of the GATT  1994 and the protection of public morals and human, 
animal or plant life or health in India, as recognized under Ar ticle XX(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994. 
In the last meeting of the Committee on Market Access,  and the CTG 's meeting today, Members 
have sought to know the details of the legal basis and relevant reports , if any, India would like to 
provide at this stage.  
24.38.   With respect to the interplay between Article  XI of GATT and Article  4.2 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture , as per India 's understanding, the Uruguay Round negotiations did not envisage the 
tariffication  of temporary and short -term restrictions which are the t ypes of measures envisaged by 
GATT  Article  XI:2(c). Therefore, if temporary quantitative restrictions were never "required to be " G/C/M/137  
 
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  tariffied during the Uruguay Round negotiations, the prohibition in Article  4.2 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture should not ext end to Article  XI:2(c) of the GATT.  
24.39.   Apart from Article  XI:2(c)(ii), India considers that the General Exceptions under Article  XX 
allow a Member to impose measures necessary to protect its public morals, including small and 
marginal farmers ' food and liveli hood security. It also allows  Members  to introduce measures in 
pursuance of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, and the environment.  India is 
ready to discuss these issues bilaterally with the interested Members concerned.  
24.40.   So far as add itional issues , such as MIP and port restrictions mentioned recently by the 
Members as well as raised during today 's meeting, it will be communicated to Capital for their views.  
India will address any further query on this issue in the appropriate committe e. 
24.41.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
24.42.   The Council so agreed . 
25  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, 
PENGHU, KINM EN AND MATSU  
25.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 2 and 5  March  2020, the 
delegation s of the European Union,  Japan, and Chinese Taipei, respectively, had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
25.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.3.   The European Union  continues to have concerns about Chinese duties on 
MCO semiconductors. The fact that several delegations continue to raise the issue demonstrates that 
the information provided s o far by China has not alleviated our concerns.  
25.4.   As the WTO  Secretariat pointed out last year in response to GAMS, tariff lines should normally 
have been broken down to a more detailed level so that the draft HS2017  file fully reflects the same 
level of con cessions.  Therefore, China could have created additional tariff lines to continue to apply 
a zero  duty on previously duty -free products, thereby maintaining the value of concessions and 
keeping the spirit of the ITA  Expansion. This was not the case. The WT O Secretariat also pointed out 
that China should have consulted with other Members in advance.  
25.5.   The EU regret s that the issue remains unresolved and continue s to request China to rectify 
this situation at its earliest convenience by modifying the classifica tion or by eliminating the 
remaining duties.  
25.6.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
25.7.   Chinese Taipei's  delegation shares the views of the other co -sponsors on this long -standing 
issue and thank s China for its explanation ; however, Chinese Ta ipei still disagree s with the method 
used by China for the tariff transposition.  
25.8.   Since January  2017, China has raised its tariffs on multi -component integrated circuits 
(MCOs) on 10  tariff lines in its schedule above its duty -free bound rate , which in Chinese Taipei's 
view is not in line with China 's ITA commitment.  Chinese Taipei has noted that , since January  2020, 
the rate on one of the tariff lines, HS8542 .32.10, has been reduced from 1.4% to zero, which is a 
positive step , and urges China t o do the same on the other MCO  products that are at issue here, 
and to do so without further delay.  
25.9.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
25.10.   As Japan has raised its  continued concern over this issue during the Market Access 
Committee held on 8 June, it will not repeat its  position today in this Council. Japan would simply 
like to register its ongoing  concerns and will closely monitor future developments.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  25.11.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
25.12.   The United States supports the statemen ts and concerns raised by the EU, Japan,  and 
Chinese Taipei and reiterates its concern with regard to a change in China 's applied duty rates for 
certain semiconductor products.  
25.13.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
25.14.   Korea shares the concerns over this issue as expressed by the previous speakers  and 
remains concerned about the tariff rates applied by China to imports of the re -classified MCO 
(multi -component IC) products. The tariff rates imposed by China on imports of MCO  products 
undermine both the spirit and the principle of the ITA, which aim to increase the trade in IT products 
and to facilitate tariff liberalization.  In this regard, Korea encou rages China to provide further 
information on the relevant measures.  
25.15.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
25.16.   China has  responded on many occasions that it used a methodology consistent with 
WTO rules. China  also clarified different technical questio ns bilaterally.  China has always seriously 
undertaken its tariff reduction commitments and will implement the fifth tariff reduction on 
ITA expansion next month. The duty rates on MCO  products will be further reduced to 0.6%, 0.7% , 
and 1.7% , respectively. All the duties on MCO  products will be eliminated by next July as scheduled.  
25.17.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
25.18.   The Council so agreed . 
26  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS REGARDING PROTECTED 
DESIGNATIONS  OF ORIGIN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, TRADITIONAL TERMS, 
LABELLING AND PRESENTATION OF CERTAIN WINE SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
THE UNITED STATES  
26.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of the Unit ed States  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
26.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
26.3.   The US is  disappointed to have to raise this issue in this Council  again . In the interest of time, 
the US request s that the minutes for this meeting reflect its intervention from the November  2019 
CTG meeting5, as unfortunately that statement still stands.  The statement reads as follows:  
26.4.   It is very disappointing that the Unit ed States must again raise its concerns with the EU 's 
policies on geographical indications and traditional terms for wine; and specifically, the US  pending 
applications for traditional terms.  The US  has been raising concerns about these policies and the 
associated regulations for 20  years now.  
26.5.   The EU 's persistent failure to provide any information leaves the US  no choice but to raise 
these concerns once again.  At several recent TBT  Committee meetings, in this Council and in the 
EU's response to US comments,  the EU said that the pending applications for traditional terms were 
still under consideration, but that it could not provide a precise timeline for approval. The US  fails 
to understand why the EU is unable to provide an estimate of the timeline or a stat us of the 
applications.  
26.6.   The US also do es not understand – and the EU has not been able to explain – why the EU 
chose not to include timelines and greater transparency with respect to traditional terms as part of 
its review and revision of the relevant measures, even though the EU did provide som e timelines 
and transparency for geographical indications in its recent revised regulations. Why the difference? 
 
5 The intervention made by the United  States at the November  2019 CTG  meeting under this issue is 
contained in document  G/C/M/136, paragraph  21.2. G/C/M/137  
 
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  Why has the EU appeared to make no effort to ensure delays for the approval of traditional terms 
would not continue?  
26.7.   The US  also would like the  EU to clarify whether, and if so how, the processing of these 
applications will change following the recent Parliamentary elections, including whether responsibility 
for processing applications will be transitioned to a new agency within the European Comm ission?  
As noted previously, it would also be helpful if the EU could provide some transparency of the status 
of other applications so the US  can see how applications compare.  
26.8.   The US does not understand why the EU seems unable or unwilling to provide trans parency 
regarding the applications that have been lodged or to provide greater predictability through 
timelines for traditional terms.  The United States once again requests the EU to move expeditiously 
to approve its applications so that it can remove this  longstanding item from this agenda , and would 
expect that, given the EU 's proposal in "improving " the process of addressing concerns in 
WTO Committees, the EU would spend more time trying to address the concerns raised by trading 
partners or even providin g basic information related to STCs raised against the EU.  
26.9.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
26.10.   New Zealand recogni zes that Members have the right to protect their consumers from 
deceptive practices in line with their obligations under the World Trade Organization.  New Zealand 
asks that the European Union takes into consideration concerns raised by Members relating to the 
scope and application of the system of traditional terms, as well as transparency, process, and 
timelines relating to app lications by third  countries who wish to use traditional terms in the European 
Union.  
26.11.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.12.   The EU understands the continued interest of the US in this issue.  The EU has completed the 
revision of its in ternal legislation on traditional terms which was discussed in previous 
TBT Committees (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)  2019/33 and Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU)  2019/34).  
26.13.   The EU believes that its internal legislation offers a meaningful and  transparent system of 
protection to traditional terms used on wine products from the EU as well as on products from 
third countries.  In the past, the EU has demonstrated its ability to address specific Members ' 
concerns in this area either via its interna l legislation or via bilateral agreements.  
26.14.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
26.15.   The Council so agreed . 
27  CHINA – NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND JAPAN  
27.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation s of the European Union and Japan had requested the Secretariat to include this i ssue on 
the agenda.  
27.2.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
27.3.   Since the last Council meeting, Japan learned that China published the second  draft of this 
law in December last year and that there was a public comment procedure in January this year. 
Japan appreciates that some of its concerns, raised in this Council and through the public comment 
procedure, have been reflected in the second  draft. For example, Japan appreciate s the removal of 
provisions on countermeasures.  
27.4.   Japan  does not go into the deta ils of its concerns today as they are duly reflected in the 
minutes of this Council but continue s to have concerns over this draft law. China has a plan to 
establish an "Unreliable Entities List " and Japan is  concerned that this "Unreliable Entities List " may 
be used as countermeasures.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  27.5.   Japan  will continue to monitor the list of items subject to control that will be put in place in 
due course. In this connection, Japan would like to request China to provide information on the 
National Development and Reform  Commission 's export control mechanism, which is currently being 
prepared. Japan has concerns about the mechanism 's scope, inter alia  goods and technologies 
subject to control, the details of the control, and the relationship between the scope of the list under 
this mechanism and the scope of controlled items under the new export control law.  
27.6.   In the last Council meeting, China explained  that it is committed to treating all companies, 
local or foreign, fairly and to creating a non -discriminatory and transparent business environment. 
In addition, China explained that the measures are consistent with the WTO  Agreements and its aim 
is to imp lement its obligation under the international security regime and not to restrict normal trade 
activities. It further mentioned that this draft law has been submitted to the National Congress for 
review and that further steps will be dependent on the revie w outcome. Japan monitors the scope 
and specific implementation of detailed regulations. In this respect, Japan would like to request 
China to provide it with any updates and timelines, including the outcome of the review by the 
National Congress, in a tra nsparent manner while ensuring a sufficient grace period.  
27.7.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.8.   The European Union  submitted comments in writing during the public consultation in 2017 
and has been raising questions on China's draft ex port control law for more than two  years.  
27.9.   The E U acknowledge s that the draft law could consolidate China's export control system. But 
the EU recall s that strategic export controls derive from international obligations and commitments. 
Against this backgrou nd, certain provisions of the draft law require further clarification as regards 
their alignment with international security standards and their conformity with multilateral 
WTO trade rules  and would again ask China to provide the explanations that the EU  has requested 
at previous CTG  meetings. The EU  would also welcome receiving indications as to when the draft 
law will be finali zed. 
27.10.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
27.11.   Korea shares the concerns over this issue as expressed by the  previous speakers  and 
remains concerned about the tariff rates applied by China to imports of the re -classified MCO 
(multi -component IC) products. The tariff rates imposed by China on imports of MCO  products 
undermine both the spirit and the principle of the ITA, which aim to increase the trade in IT products 
and to facilitate tariff liberalization.  In this regard, Korea encourages China to provide further 
information on the relevant measures.  
27.12.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
27.13.   This issue has b een on the agenda for quite a long time and China has provided specific 
explanations at previous meetings. Today , China will not repeat its earlier responses but share some 
updated information:  
27.14.   In December  2019, the Standing Committee of National Congress reviewed the draft export 
control law.  From 28  December  2019 to 26  January  2020, the Standing Committee of National 
Congress published the draft law on the internet for public comment and received responses from 
other WTO  Members and their Chamber s of Commerce and other associations. The Standing 
Committee of National Congress is now reviewing the public comments and will give the draft law a 
second and third  reading in the near future. The following timeline will depend on the review 
outcome.  
27.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
27.16.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/137  
 
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  28  UNITED STATES – PROHIBITIVE MEASURES ON COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT OR 
SERVICES RELEASED BY THE FCC – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
28.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
28.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
28.3.   China regret s to raise this issue again as it has  never received any concrete respon ses from 
the US. 
28.4.   In November  2019, the US  Federal Communications Commission (FCC) voted to bar 
US telecommunications operators from using Universal Service Fund (USF) to purchase equipment 
from Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE and required US  companies that receive funding 
from the USF to rip out and replace relevant equipment from those Chines e companies . 
28.5.   In March  2020, the US  government issued the "Secure and Trusted Communications 
Networks Act of 2019 ", which prohibits the use of certain federal funds and subsidies to purchase 
communications equipment or services from Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE and 
requires that current equipment in use be remove d and replace d. 
28.6.   China  believe s that the restr icting measures that are being considered by the US would 
constitute a de facto  country -based market access restriction, which would violate a basic value of 
the WTO, that is , the national treatment principle. And it would also be helpless to protect 
telecommunication s security.  
28.7.   China is of the view that any security measures for commercial sectors should follow several 
principles , namely : (i) they should treat technology in a non -discriminatory manner ; (ii) they are 
not unnecessarily restrictive to limit o r prevent normal trade opportunities for foreign suppliers of 
ICT products or services ; (iii) they should be narrowly tailored and focused, taking into account 
international norms and non -discriminatory principles, and should not impose nationality -based 
conditions or restrictions.  
28.8.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
28.9.   As the US has  repeatedly stated with regard to this issue, the WTO  Council for Trade in Goods 
is not the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
28.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
28.11.   The Council so agreed . 
29  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
29.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication  dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of China  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
29.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
29.3.   China would like to continue raising its concern regarding Australia's prohibition on Chinese  
equipment suppliers from the Australian 5G  rollout in a non -transparent, closed and discriminative 
manner. It is disappointing that the scope of the measures has also been extended from 5G to 
4G network s. China  thank s Australia for its written responses to China's questions ; however, 
Australia has failed to provide substantial and direct responses to key issues.  
29.4.   Further to Australia 's response, China wants  to address specific follow -up questions to 
Australia in writing  and looks forward to receiving Australia's clear and direct responses.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  29.5.    First, China hopes that Australia could clarify whether the formal decision of excluding China 's 
5G equipment suppliers from Australian 5G  rollout has been made  because , as China reiterated 
before, no formal decisio n has yet been published. China  would also like to know whether Australia 
has excluded the telecommunication equipment suppliers from any other WTO  Members.  Second, 
China hopes that Australia could clarify on the basis of what standards it exclude s 5G equipment 
vendors? Has Australia fulfilled its obligation s under the TBT  Agreement, in particular Art icles 2.5 
and 2.11, and Art icles 5.7 and 5.8? China  would also like to point out that excluding China 's 
equipment suppliers from Australia's  5G rollout , and ex tending its relevant measures to its 
4G network , would not be helpful for Australia's cybersecurity, or its economic interests.  
29.6.   China  has always believe d that only an open, market -based , and fully competitive 
environment can make the telecommunication administrative policy achieve its security purpose.  To 
conclude, China would like to request Australia again to provide concrete answers to its questions 
as soon as possible.  
29.7.   The delegate of  Australia  indicated the following:  
29.8.   Australia notes China 's statement  and has previously substantively engaged with China on 
this issue and reiterates that its position on 5G  networks is fully WTO -consistent.  Australia will 
continue to engage constructivel y with China on this issue.  
29.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
29.10.   The Council so agreed . 
30  UNITED STATES – MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CHINA  
30.1.   The Chairperson  informed Membe rs that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
30.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
30.3.   China regret s to have to raise this issue again as it has not received  any concrete responses 
from the US.  
30.4.   On 15  May 2019, the US issued an Executive Order on Securing the Information and 
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, prohibiting US  companies from buying or 
using telecommunications equipment and services provided by foreign adversaries deemed to cause 
national security threats. Pursuant to the Executive Order, the US  Department of Commerce issued 
proposed implementation rules that would govern the process and procedures that the Secretary of 
Comme rce (Secretary) will use to identify, assess, and address certain information and 
communications technology and services transactions. On 15 May 2020, President Trump extended 
for one year the national emergency declared in the above -mentioned Executive Or der. 
30.5.   Actually, the global ICT  industry, including US  companies, is worried about the vague and 
broad wording of the above Executive Order and implementation rules. Companies are concerned 
that the US  Secretary of Commerce may be given the power to block any transactions in the 
ICT industry, which may influence many fields , such as telecommunications services, Internet, data 
storage , and equipment manufacturing, and bring unnecessary uncertainty to the ICT industry.  
30.6.   Currently, ICT  products and services play an important role in fighting against the 
COVID -19 pandemic , an area which needs all countries to strengthen cooperation. Unfortunately, at 
this time of crisis, the US has continued to restrict legiti mate competition and interfere with the 
global ICT  industry, which undermine s the stability of the global supply chain and cause s huge losses 
to the related ICT  companies in many countries.  
30.7.   Therefore, China would like to request the US to clarify how to de fine "foreign adversaries ", 
and to ensure that it will not be used as a tool to interfere with normal business activities and to 
suppress an enterprise by the power of a nation. China would also like to know how the US will G/C/M/137  
 
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  ensure that measures taken under  this Executive Order will not abuse the WTO  national security 
exception and be consistent with WTO  rules.  
30.8.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
30.9.   Again, and as noted on a previous agenda item, the WTO  Council for Trade in Goods is not 
the appropriate forum to discuss issues related to national security.  
30.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
30.11.   The Council so agreed . 
31  UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
31.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of China  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
31.2.   The deleg ate of China  indicated the following:  
31.3.   China  would like to reiterate its deep concern on this issue.  China strongly opposes the 
overgeneralization of the national security concept, the abuse of export control measures, 
suppressing compliant companies throug h national forces , and interfering with normal international 
cooperation between enterprises. China urges the US to give Chinese enterprises fair and 
non-discriminatory treatment, reconsider its relevant policies and measures, create conditions for 
normal economic and trade cooperation, and safeguard the legitimate interests of the enterprises 
from both countries.  And again, China urges the US to provide a serious and substantial response 
rather than refusing a discussion by invoking the national security e xception , as China always 
oppose s such misuse and abuse.  
31.4.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
31.5.   As with multiple other issues raised today by China, the United States does not believe that 
the WTO  Council for Trade in Goods is the appro priate forum to discuss issues related to national 
security.  
31.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
31.7.   The Council so agreed . 
32  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERAT ION 
32.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda.  
32.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
32.3.   The Russian Federation reiterates the statements made during previous meetings of the 
TBT Committee and the Council for Trade in Goods.  
32.4.   In light of recently notified draft amendments to Annex  XVII to REACH (G/TBT/N/EU/714)  
regardi ng further cobalt restrictions as well as the EU 's failure to approve bioelution , may the EU 
clarify the following questions:  
32.5.   How is the Commission planning to ensure mitigation of the negative consequences of 
unscientific cobalt classification on cobalt c ontaining alloys and compounds such as nickel, stainless 
and carbon steel?  How will the Commission apply bioelution under Article  12(b) of CLP and fulfil its 
commitments to apply it?  Could the EU inform the Members of the WTO as to the state of discussions  G/C/M/137  
 
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  on bioelution?  Could the EU inform the WTO Membership of its plans to relaunch discussions on 
bioelution at the level of the OECD?  Bearing in mind that the EU had already applied bioelution with 
regard to granulated copper and lead, could the Commission e laborate why this methodology was 
not used in the case of cobalt classification?  Could the Commission provide available scientific or 
epidemiological information allowing classification of cobalt for oral and dermal routes of exposure 
together with the rou te of inhalation?  
32.6.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
32.7.   Brazil would like to support this STC raised by the Russian Federation. In the 14th review of  
adaptation to technical progress for Regulation (EC) No . 1272/2008, the reclassification of coba lt as 
a carcinogenic level  1B was approved. The classification of cobalt as a carcinogenic product 
generates a great potential negative impact on nickel production in Brazil, since cobalt is also found 
in trace amounts within nickel production. Restriction s on the commercialization of cobalt would 
therefore negatively impact nickel production in Brazil.  
32.8.   Brazil is the primary nickel -producing country in South America, exporting around 
70 thousand ton nes of nickel, according to 2017  figures. According to industry estimates for the 
same year, the total value of nickel production reaches US D 12,350  million. Around 56% of the 
nickel mine production in Brazil is at risk with limitations on the trade of cobalt.  
32.9.   In light of this concern, Brazil kindly ask s the European Union to consider revising its 
restrictions on the use of cobalt, while relying on sound scientific analyses to support its technical 
regulations that have a significant impact on trade.  
32.10.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the foll owing:  
32.11.   Australia recogni zes the E U's right to regulate for public and occupational health and safety. 
Australia also recogni zes that appropriate classification and labelling for hazardous substances and 
mixtures can address legitimate public and occupation al health concerns.  However, Australia and 
other WTO  Members have raised concerns on multiple occasions in this and other forums that these 
measures are more trade -restrictive than necessary.  
32.12.   Australia's concerns have focused on the potential of these regu lations to create unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade in products containing titanium dioxide (TiO2) and cobalt, as well as 
the raw materials themselves.  
32.13.   While the EU has provided some information on the downstream consequences for TiO2, it 
has yet to receive a clear response to its concerns regarding products containing trace amounts of 
cobalt. Despite concerns raised by Australia and other Members, the EU has retained the 
classification of cobalt as a carcinogen through all routes of exposure, ra ther than limiting the 
classification to inhalation only. This means that a larger number of products are potentially affected 
by the regulation, and that there is therefore a greater risk of unintended downstream consequences. 
For example, stainless steel  is a common product that may contain trace amounts of cobalt in 
concentrations greater than the generic limit of 0.1 % applied in the regulation.  
32.14.   Australia continue s to urge the EU to ensure that regulations to address concerns about the 
possible hazards a ssociated with TiO2 and cobalt are no more trade restrictive than necessary.  
32.15.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
32.16.   As explained at the last meeting, titanium dioxide and cobalt were included in the 
14th Adaptation to Technical and Scientific Progress (ATP) amending the CLP  Regulation. Several 
discussions on the classification of cobalt and TiO2 and the classification of mixtures containing TiO2 
took place in the expert group for REACH and CLP (CARACAL) and in the regulatory committee ( the 
REACH  Committee).  
32.17.   After its adoption by the Commission on 4  October  2019, the Commission Delegated 
Regulation was sent to the Council and the European Parliament for the two-month  objection period. 
As no objection was raised, the Commission Delegated R egulation (EU)  2020/217 was published in G/C/M/137  
 
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  the Official Journal of the EU on 18  February  2020, and the classification of cobalt as a carcinogen 
will become applicable as of 1  October  2021.  
32.18.   The classification of cobalt as a carcinogen for all routes of exposure is based on the scientific 
opinion of the Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) as well 
as on the comments received and concerns expressed by the member States and stakeholders. This 
opinion is in line with the CL P Regulation as well as the UN  Globally Harmonized System of 
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (UN  GHS). The opinion and the background document 
containing all the relevant scientific information on which the opinion is based are available to all 
WTO Members and stakeholders at the ECHA  website.  
32.19.   In its scientific assessment, ECHA's RAC  Committee took all available data into account, 
including the information submitted during the public consultation period. Review of a n RAC opinion 
is only possible i f new and relevant scientific information becomes available.  
32.20.   The EU would like to reassure WTO  Members and the CTG that all comments which 
WTO Members sent in the context of the EU  notification , in accordance with the TBT  Agreement , 
were distributed to EU  member States and duly taken into account by the Commission and member 
States in the decision -making process. The Commission has also sent written replies to the 
comments from WTO  Members on the TBT  notification of the measure.  
32.21.   The EU also proposed to harm onize at OECD  level its method ology  on bioelution. This 
method could be useful to ensure that , if a metal contained in an alloy is not bioavailable ( that is , it 
remains in the matrix), then the alloys ( for example , stainless steel) do not need to be classi fied. 
An agreement at the OECD had been reached in May  2020 to develop and validate this method. The 
EU would welcome any support for third  countries to actively participate in the development of the 
OECD  test method on bioelution.  
32.22.   The Chairperson  proposed  that the Council take note of the statements made.  
32.23.   The Council so agreed . 
33  THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING PRACTICES – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
33.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
33.2.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.3.   The Russian Federation contin ues to apply a policy of import substitution and forced 
localization of production which is contrary to the spirit and often also the letter of the 
WTO commitments.  That said, the EU notes with satisfaction that two  export restrictions applied by 
the Russi an Federation to hides and skins and to some birch logs have lapsed and that no extension 
of these measures is planned.  
33.4.   The EU calls upon Russia to follow a similar approach in other areas of high concern for the 
EU, namely:  the currently ongoing revision of its regulation for public procurement, which needs to 
clearly distinguish between procurement for a governmental purpose, and procurement with a 
commercial purpose – where GATT and GATS  national treatment provisions shall apply;  the revision 
of the sche me of cement certification originally introduced in 2016; and  the recent amendment to 
the Federal Law "on protecting consumer rights " which makes the pre -installation of Russian 
software mandatory in a number of consumer electronic devices.  
33.5.   Turning to the wine sector , and as  noted at the previous meeting, the EU  welcomes steps 
taken by Russia to unify the level of excise duties applicable for domestic wines and for imported 
wines. Nevertheless, the EU remains vigilant as to whether concurrent parallel measu res, including 
certain subsides , do not unduly disadvantage imported wines.  
33.6.   Moreover, in December  2019 Russia adopted Federal Law  468 on 'Viticulture and 
Winemaking '. Although the law introduces many new requirements for the placing of wine products G/C/M/137  
 
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  on the  Russian market, it has not been notified to the WTO in accordance with the TBT  Agreement. 
The law is due to enter into application  already  on 26  June 2020. Such short timelines do not give 
producers sufficient time to adapt their products – where such ada ptation is possible, in the 
first place – and risks significantly restricting access of foreign wines to the Russian market. The EU 
requests Russia to notify the law on winemaking , in accordance with its WTO obligations, so that 
Members can provide their comments at a time when they can be taken into account.  
33.7.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
33.8.   In its intervention today, the EU has raised certain issues raised in past Council meetings.  For 
those issues, the United States refers Members to its statement from the November  2019 
CTG meeting.  However, the EU has raised two  new issues on which the US also echo es concerns 
raised. The United States echoes the EU 's concerns about Russia 's Federal Law No.  468-FZ "On 
Viticulture and Winemaking in the Russian Federation. " Like the EU, the US is  concerned that 
implementation of this law might create significant market disruption. Several obligations in Law 
No. 468-FZ overlap with a technical  regulation issued by the Eurasian Economic Commission "On 
Safety of Alcohol Products " and it is not clear to market participants which obligations they should 
follow when both measures are in force. In addition, this law appears to be inconsistent with 
generally accepted winemaking practices and raises concerns regarding Russia 's WTO  obligations.  
Finally, the US believe s that some of the provisions of Law No . 468-FZ will erect barriers to 
US exports.  For these reasons, it is important that Russia delay s implementation of the law to allow 
consultations between industry and government officials, to eliminate potential market access 
barriers, and to avoid significant market disruption.  
33.9.   The US also ha s concerns about Russia 's software pre -installation requireme nt established in 
Federal Law No.  425-FZ "Law on Protection of Consumer Rights. " The US has  raised its questions in 
repeated TBT  Committee meetings, but Russia has not responded to those questions.  It is now time 
to raise the issue in this Council because of the significant disruption this measure will bring to the 
market.  The US repeat s its request that Russia please explain how the requirement is not more trade 
restrictive than necessary and does not create unnecessary obstacles to trade, to expla in how this 
measure complies with the non -discrimination obligations of the WTO, and to notify the relevant 
implementing measures to the WTO.  
33.10.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
33.11.   Australia understands that Russia has adopted 'Federal Law N o. 468 of 27.12.2019 on wine 
making and wine growing in the Russian Federation' , which is intended to enter into force on 
26 June 2020.  
33.12.   The Federal Law poses a number of barriers to the importation of wine into Russia, which 
coupled with the short timelines f or the law 's implementation, are of concern to the Australian wine 
industry. A key concern is the mandatory declaration of vintage and variety required under the new 
law. This does not reflect International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) practices, of  which 
Russia is a member.  
33.13.   Article  18 of the Federal Law stipulates the start date of the wine ageing process as 1  January 
of the year following harvest, which puts Australian, and other southern hemisphere producers at a 
distinct disadvantage given that t he grape harvest for these regions relies on a different biological 
growing season and harvest. That is, 1  January in the northern hemisphere is winter, whereas 
Australian and New World grapes are harvested early in the year, after 1  January.  
33.14.   In relation t o the ageing process, Article  18 includes a category referred to as "brand " wine, 
which requires 18  months ageing following 1  January in the year following harvest. If this means 
wine cannot be given a brand unless it has been aged for 18  months, only Aust ralian wine from 2017 
and earlier would be permitted to carry a brand in Russia.  
33.15.   Article  24 prohibits the addition of water in wine, which poses a significant barrier to trade 
for New World growers. In Australia, wine producers are permitted under the Australia New Zealand 
Food Standards Code  to add water to dilute high sugar musts to aid in fermentation. The addition of 
water is done in minimal circumstances, for technical necessity, in small volumes to aid fermentation 
during periods of difficult seasonal  conditions.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  33.16.   It also appears that the Federal Law contains provisions covered by the Agreement on 
Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), including geographical indications.  
Australia invites Russia to notify the measure to the Counc il for TRIPS accordingly.  
33.17.   The short deadlines presented by the new law do not allow producers and exporters adequate 
time to ensure compliance with the new import requirements, particularly as businesses struggle to 
maintain supply chains during the COVID -19 pandemic. Therefore, Australia requests Russia to delay 
the law 's entry into for force, at least until 1  July 2021, and to allow a phase in period, which will 
provide importers and exporters the necessary time to ensure the compliance of imported wine.  
33.18.   Additionally, Australia notes several obligations within the Federal Law are inconsistent with 
the Eurasian Economic Union Technical Regulation  047/2018 "On safety of alcohol products ", which 
is expected to enter into force in January  2021. Australia seeks further clarification from Russia on 
how this regulation and Federal Law N o. 468 will be implemented once entered into force.  
33.19.   Australia hopes Russia takes into account these concerns when reconsidering the 
implementation of the new Federal Law and look s forward to Russia notifying the WTO accordingly 
as soon as possible.  
33.20.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
33.21.   The Russian Federation  would like to thank the European Union, the United States,  and 
Australia,  for the cont inued interest in Russia 's trade policy. The Russian Federation will address the 
concerns raised one by one.  
33.22.   With regard to the currently ongoing revision of Russia 's regulation for public procurement, 
the Russian Federation would like to note that in rece nt years it has made considerable efforts to 
improve its public procurement system. As a result, Russia's public procurement system meets the 
highest international standards with respect to the public procurement information system, 
transparency , and the e fficiency mechanism for protection of the rights and interests of participants 
in procurement procedures.  
33.23.   On the revision of the scheme of cement certification, the Russian Federation would like to 
note that this measure is aimed at fighting illicit trade in cement and building materials in Russia. 
Currently, the amendments to the GOST -R are being discussed internally among the relevant 
Russian authorities and the cement industry. Unfortunately, no precise timeline for the outcome of 
these discussion s can b e provided at this stage.  
33.24.   Regarding mandatory pre -installation of Russian software on a number of consumer 
electronic devices, the Russian Federation notes that amendments to the Federal Law of the Russian 
Federation "On Protecting Consumer Rights " do not contain any discriminative, trade restricting , or 
prohibitive provisions. In order to prevent a possible negative impact on trade these amendments 
have been elaborated in cooperation with foreign companies that are the Members of the Association 
of Trading Companies and Manufacturers of Electrical Household and Computer Equipment (RATEK). 
The authorities responsible for elaboration of the Federal Law took into account the position of the 
industry and its suggestions. Moreover, some of the largest tr ansnational corporations involved in 
manufacturing and exporting technically complex goods expressed a positive attitude to wards  this 
initiative and do not consider it a burden for conducting trade activity. This information can be found 
in mass media. 
33.25.   On the Federal Law "On Viticulture and Winemaking ", the Russian Federation stress es that 
the Federal Law is not aimed at setting unnecessary obstacles to international trade , but rather at 
creating the brand "Wine of Russia"  and developing winemaking in Russi a, including improving 
consumer properties and the improvement of Russian wineries. As for the entry into force of the 
Federal Law, the Russian Federation notes that the reasonable interval between the publication of 
the Law and its entry into force of not less than 180  days was provided.  
33.26.   All concerns raised today by WTO  Members will be conveyed to Capital for consideration.  
33.27.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  33.28.   The Council so agreed . 
34  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU) 20 17/2321 AND REGULATION (EU) 2018/825 
– REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
34.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation  had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda. 
34.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
34.3.   At the previous CTG  meeting , the Russian Federation raised the issue of amendments to the 
basic regulation of the European Union on protection against dumped imports introduced in 
December  2017 and in June  2018. Due to time constraints , the Russian Federation reiterate s its 
position and propose s to proceed directly to any update or clarification the EU may wish to make.  
34.4.   For instance, at the CTG  meeting in November , the EU  delegate informed Members that the 
methodology introduced by Regulation  2017/2321 was country -neutral and would ap ply to all 
WTO Members whose domestic prices and costs were significantly distorted because of State 
interference. As it further clarified, the European Commission was preparing reports on distortions 
that existed at country and sector level.  
34.5.   Russia fails to see how this methodology can be country -neutral, while the EU is searching for 
"significant distortions " in deliberately chosen countries. Since December  2017, when the report on 
so-called "significant distortions " in China was published, and a similar report concerning Russia was 
announced, the Russian Federation remain s unaware of any plans by the EU to look for "significant 
distortions " in any other country.  
34.6.   It follows that when the EU  industry applies for an investigation against Russian and Chinese 
imports, it will have an advantage of using the reports. However, it will have no such advantage 
applying for an investigation against any other imports. Having received the applications, the 
Commission will have to look for what it labels as "significant distortions " in Russia and China. 
However, a search for such "distortions " will not be triggered by applications concerning imports 
from other countries that will not include the data which the EU  industry would have to collect by 
itself. This seems to be what the EU calls a "country -neutral " methodology.  
34.7.   As another example, at the previous CTG  meeting , the Russian Federation heard from the EU 
that "together with the changes introduced by Regulation  2017/2321, [the amendments of 
December  2017] ensured that the EU's trade defence instruments would continue to be effective. 
Interestingly, some of the examples of "distortions on raw materials " in the 2018  amendment are 
similar to those  that exemplify "significant distortions " in the 2017  amendment. Should the Russian 
Federation deem it as a confirmation that in some cases the EU  investigators will both exaggerate 
the dumping margins and impose higher duties instead of the lesser ones, punishing the expor ters 
twice for one and the same thing?  
34.8.   Russia  would welcome any clarification from the EU  and also call s upon the EU to abstain from 
application of the amendments and to conduct its anti -dumping investigations in strict compliance 
with WTO  rules.  
34.9.   The deleg ate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
34.10.   Regarding  Regulation (EU)  2017/2321 , on 20 December  2017, the EU implemented changes 
to its anti -dumping and anti -subsidy legislation. The changes fully respect WTO  rules and ensure 
that the EU's trade def ence system remains strong and effective to deal with dumping from countries 
whose economies have significant distortions due to State interference.  
34.11.   The main change to the EU's anti -dumping legislation introduced an alternative anti -dumping 
calculation met hod. The new methodology is country -neutral and will apply to all WTO  countries 
where domestic prices and costs are significantly distorted owing to state interference. If it is not 
appropriate to use domestic prices or costs due to these distortions, othe r benchmarks reflecting 
undistorted costs of production and sale will be used.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  34.12.   The Commission is preparing reports on the distortions existing at country and sector level. 
These reports are technical, fact -based documents , which draw on many sources , including official 
public records in the countries concerned. Information from international organi zations is also 
included , for example, the IMF, and the OECD. The reports, which are Commission Staff Working 
Documents, are des criptive in nature and do not pass judgement on the economies in question.  
34.13.   Following the publication of the report on China in 2017, the Commission is currently 
finalizing its second  report , concerning Russia.  Depending on the frequency and extent of 
devel opments in the economies of any countries concerned, the reports may be updated. In addition, 
given that the reports will become part of the evidence on file in investigations, interested parties 
may rebut or contest the information in the reports.  
34.14.   The leg islative changes introduced by Regulation  2017/2321 are separate from the 
moderni zation changes that entered into force in June  2018 following the entry into force of 
Regulation  2018/825.  
34.15.   Regarding Regulation (EU)  2018/825 , the legislative amendments intro duced by 
Regulation  2018/825 aim at further improving the EU 's trade defence instruments and to adapting 
them to the challenges of a globali zed trading environment. The amendments improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the trade defence instruments fo r all stakeholders without changing the scope 
of the instruments, that is,  neither making them more liberal nor more protectionist.  
34.16.   The legislative changes consist of a number of elements. They ensure more transparency for 
both exporters and importers, inc luding information of the imposition or not of provisional measures 
three  weeks in advance to stakeholders. Moreover, they foresee reimbursement of duties following 
an expiry review without renewal of measures, a faster decision making, as well as support for small 
and medium -sized enterprises.  
34.17.   The amendments also allow for the adaptation of the lesser duty rule in many cases (taking 
into account raw material distortions, higher target profit s, reflection of future costs related to R&D, 
investment, and environmental agreements , such as emission trading).  
34.18.   Together with the changes introduced by Regulation  2017/2321, these amendments ensure 
the continued effectiveness of the EU's trade defence instruments. The EU pursues a free and fair -
trade agenda. This appr oach has to be accompanied by effective tools that ensure that imports into 
the EU are competing on a fair basis.  
34.19.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
34.20.   The Council so agreed . 
35  EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIRECTIV E 2009/28/EC, RENEWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM COLOMBIA AND MALAYSIA  
35.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 3 and 4  March  2020, the 
delegation s of Colombia and Malaysia, respectively,  had requested the Secretariat to include this 
issue on the agenda.  
35.2.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
35.3.   Colombia  reiterate s its concern over Directive (EU)  2018/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, which establishes that , from 2021, first  generation biofuels will count as 
renewable energy in the transport sector only up to a quota of 7%, and the Directive's delegated 
act, which states that first  generation biofuels with a high risk of causing indirect land use change 
(ILUC) shal l have their contribution to the renewable energy quota gradually reduced to 0% by 2030.  
35.4.   In Colombia's view, these provisions are inconsistent with the national treatment and 
MFN obligations set out in Articles  2.1 and 2.2 of the WTO  TBT Agreement.  
35.5.   Colombi a appreciates the intention to adopt a public policy on environmental protection 
through the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.  However, such a policy on the G/C/M/137  
 
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  environment should be implemented in a manner that is non -discriminatory, not more restrictive 
than necessary , and should not subsequently become an unnecessary obstacle and a disguised 
barrier to trade.  
35.6.   Furthermore, this measure also constitutes de facto  discrimination between like products of 
different foreign origins and like pro ducts of foreign and national origin. In this regard, it is important 
to highlight the competitive relationship and the extensive economic and technical scope for 
substitution that exists with other vegetable oils such as soya and rapeseed. Colombia especi ally 
wishes to call attention to the fact that the Directive excludes the prohibition of similar raw materials, 
many of which are produced locally in European territory.  
35.7.   Colombia therefore asks the EU to conduct a thorough review of the delegated act in 2021, 
in order to adopt an approach that includes sustainable palm oil production in the EU's goals for 
renewable energy. In this regard, Colombia request s the EU to provid e information on the status of 
review of the delegated act and how it intends to take on board the observations made by Members 
at various WTO  forums.  
35.8.   In this respect, it should be recalled that there are regional differences in the impact that the 
expansi on of oil palm cultivation has had on deforestation. For example, according to the EU's own 
assessment, Colombia is a country in which oil palm cultivation is responsible for 0.0%  deforestation.  
35.9.   Colombia tak es this opportunity to make these observations an d request s the EU to clarify 
how it intends to reconcile this discriminatory treatment towards palm oil producing countries with 
its national treatment and MFN  obligations at the WTO  and looks forward with interest to the EU's 
replies to the concerns expre ssed. 
35.10.   The delegate of Malaysia  indicated the following:  
35.11.   Malaysia regret s having to continue raising its concern s on the Directive (EU)  2018/2001 
and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU)  2019/807 which have negatively affected the oil palm 
industry and Malaysia 's trade interest s. 
35.12.   The delegated regulation classifies palm oil as a high ILUC risk feedstock while other major 
oil crops are categori zed as low ILUC risk feedstock. Such implementation would discourage and be 
tantamount to a de facto  ban on the use of palm oil as feedstock for the production of biofuels and 
bioliquids by excluding palm oil -based biofuels and bioliquids from the incentives under the Directive 
(EU) 2018/2001.  
35.13.   It is evident that the Directive (EU)  2018/2001 and Commission Delegated R egulation 
(EU) 2019/807 are inconsistent with the non -discrimination obligations under Article  I and 
Article  III: 4 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), by establishing an unduly 
differential treatment between the "like" products.  
35.14.   The legi slation has culminated in a barrier to trade that significantly distorts the market and 
pricing system , which is against the principle of free trade , and that is unfavourable to palm oil. This 
creates an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and disgui sed restriction on the international 
trading of palm oil and its products and unnecessary obstacles which are more trade restrictive than 
necessary and more burdensome for producers of palm oil , including Malaysia.  
35.15.   Scientific evidence has proven that oil p alm is the most productive oil -bearing crop compared 
with other annual oil crops. A single hectare of cultivated oil palm land is able to supply between 
five to ten  times more oil compared to rapeseed and soybean respectively. Malaysia wishes to 
reiterate that the use of biofuels and bioliquids from other oil crops would create greater risk of 
deforestation and land use changes.  
35.16.   Malaysia wishes to emphasi ze that Malaysian palm oil is produced in a sustainable manner 
following a strict and mandatory sustaina ble certification scheme , the Malaysian Sustainable Palm 
Oil (MSPO) , as well as voluntary certification scheme s, such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO) and the ISCC, which are in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(UN SDG) 2030. Malaysia would also like to reiterate that it recogni zes the importance for the G/C/M/137  
 
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  protection of the environment of conservation of biodiversity and has been actively involved in 
activities to support the combating of climate change and global warming.  
35.17.   Malaysia  appreciate s the European Union for their willingness to engage in open discussion 
and dialogue , and  in providi ng scientific evidence, facts , and information , on the sustainability of 
Malaysian palm oil. However, Malaysia finds that such continuous engagements have not resulted in 
a fair valuation of input , which has resulted in unfair treatment for palm oil produc ed in Malaysia.  
35.18.   Therefore, Malaysia urges the European Union to be mindful and to observe the principles 
of fairness, justice, openness, transparency and non -discrimination , in conducting international trade 
in line with the obligations of the WTO.  
35.19.   Neverth eless, Malaysia remains fully committed to continuing to negotiate in a sincere and 
constructive manner to ensure non-discriminatory treatment against palm oil products and to 
prevent unnecessary barrier s to market access of palm oil products into the European Union.  
Malaysia will also continue to monitor development s and look s forward to the responses from the 
European Union,  particularly on the discrimination against palm oil , as well as on Malaysia's  same 
concern raised during the last TBT  Committee Meet ing, on 13 and 14  May 2020.  
35.20.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
35.21.   Indonesia shares the view expressed in the interventions made by the delegations of 
Malaysia and Colombia that the Directive and Delegated Regulation have created unnecessary 
barriers to trade and unjustifiable discrimination on palm oil and palm oil -based products  and 
questions the compatibility of the Directive and De legated Regulation with WTO  rules and 
international standard s. Indonesia regrets any efforts that it has taken in pursuing its sustainable 
goals commitment and all its comments to the Directive and Delegated Regulation given that these 
were not considered by the EU and the EU did not provide any legitimate justification.  In this regard, 
Indonesia request s the EU to bring its measures into compliance with WTO  rules and also request s 
the Chair to record its previous statement delivered at the Council's previo us meeting in the minutes 
of today meeting.6 
35.22.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
35.23.   As Ecuador's  delegation has previously stated, by using an unsuitable methodology, the 
legislation in its current form has a dual effect: on the one hand, it lea ds to arbitrary discrimination 
between like biofuels, some of which are produced from crops such as rapeseed and sunflower that 
are less productive per hectare than oil pal m yet are not deemed to present a high risk of ILUC. This 
could be inconsistent with  obligations under Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement and Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994; on the other hand, it favours the use of raw materials of European origin, which would 
violate the principle of national treatment contained in Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement and 
Article  III:4 of the GATT  1994.  
35.24.   The EU standard automatically deems oil palm a high ILUC  risk, without recognizing that 
palm oil can pose a low ILUC  risk when produced sustainably, through the implementation of 
improved legislation and better pr actices in producing countries. The ILUC  calculation method should 
encourage, rather than penalize, countries that have gone to great pains to produce sustainable 
palm oil.  
35.25.   Ecuador has made significant progress in meeting its national targets and commitmen ts for 
mitigating the effects of climate change and is the second  country in the world to have met the 
requirements established by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) to gain access to performance -based payments for reducing emissions caused by 
deforestation and forest degradation.  
 
6 The intervention made by Indonesia at the November  2019 CTG  meeting under this is sue is contained 
in document  G/C/M/136, paragraph  31.6. G/C/M/137  
 
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  35.26.   Once again, it is worth noting the socio -economic impact that this legislation could have on 
the Ecuadorian palm growing sector, 51% of which comprises small producers in small scale family 
farming with less than 10  hectares under production.  
35.27.   Ecuador urges the EU to conduct a review of the delegated act in 2021 with a view to 
changing the methodology and the manner in which it is being used in the legislation to single out 
palm oil for exclusion or, at the very least, to give the option of exempting product s with 
internationally recognized certifications of sustainability.  
35.28.   Mitigating the effects of climate change is a legitimate goal. However, no environmental 
measures under the European Green Deal should constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustified 
discri mination, or a disguised restriction on international trade.  
35.29.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated the following:  
35.30.   In order to make good use of the time available, Costa Rica expresses its full agreement 
with the trade -related and systemic concerns expressed by the delegations that spoke before it, and 
would also like to take this opportunity to urge the EU once again to take account of the impact that 
this policy could have on world trade in biofuels, and also the impac t on population groups that 
depend on these products, especially in developing countries that have invested in sustainable 
production practices. Lastly, Costa Rica will monitor closely the concerns outlined by other Members 
with regard to this policy, both  in the TBT  Committee and in the Dispute Settlement Body.  
35.31.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
35.32.   Guatemala wishes for its interest and concern on this subject to be put on the record. It will 
therefore monitor actions taken by the European Unio n. 
35.33.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
35.34.   The European Union notes that the issue of amendments to the EU  Renewable Energy 
Directive is now subject to WTO  dispute settlement proceedings, notably under DS593 ( EU – Certain 
Measures Concerning Palm Oil and Oil Palm-Based Biofuels ). 
35.35.   In order to preserve the integrity of such proceedings the European Union will defer all 
discussions to that forum and accordingly refrain from discussing this matter in this Committee 
today.  
35.36.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
35.37.   The Council so agreed . 
36  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES  
36.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communication s dated 5 March  2020, the 
delegation s of the Russian Federation and the United States had requested the Secretariat to include 
this issue on the agenda.  
36.2.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
36.3.   As it did at  the meeting of the Committee on Market Access  of 8 June 2020, the United States 
would like to reiterate its concern with Angola 's Presidential Decree No. 23/19, issued in 
January  2019.  It is the US  understanding that this decree aims to restrict Angola 's imports with the 
goal to increase domestic econo mic development. The US understand s that this decree targets 
54 products, mainly agricultural goods, and could potentially target more in the future. The US  
further understand s that it also covers any imports that compete with goods produced in the 
Luanda -Bengo special economic zone.  
36.4.   Since the implementation of the decree, the US has  heard reports of confusion over how the 
decree is being enforced and of delays facing goods at the border. The US'  poultry and other G/C/M/137  
 
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  agricultural exporters are particularly con cerned over delays that perishable goods face amidst all 
this uncertainty.  The US is  also concerned that these actions could do a great deal to discourage 
overseas companies from doing business in Angola and may compromise Angola 's relationships with 
key t rade partners. In fact, the US  Embassy hears from local companies that the lack of import 
licences is negatively affecting Angolan businesses as they face supply shortages due to the import 
restrictions.  
36.5.   The US asks Angola to explain if it plans to revise the decree, or how it plans to implement 
the decree, in light of WTO  rules, and the potential impact on trade, investment, and businesses 
operating in Angola , and also urge s the Angolan government to request technical assistance, if 
necessary, from the WTO  Secretariat in notifying any trade measures taken under Decree  23/19 to 
the appropriate WTO  committee.  
36.6.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
36.7.   According to Presidential Decree No. 23/19 , Angola has introduced import restrictions on  
certain agricultural and industrial products. Under Article  1 of the Decree this measure prioritizes 
domestically manufactured products and promotes consumption of goods made in Angola.  
36.8.   According to the provision of this Decree, locally produced goods sha ll be given priority over 
foreign like products; only wholesalers and domestic producers are authorized to import; importers 
have to confirm the non -availability of locally produced products on the domestic market that they 
intend to import; import authori zation includes submission of contracts on the purchase of national 
products.  
36.9.   In the Russian Federation's view, the measure at issue cannot be justified under Articles  XI 
and III of the GATT.  Russia urges Angola to bring these measures into conformity with  the 
WTO Agreement s and to lift the import bans on agricultural products.  
36.10.   As of today, Angola has failed to provide us with an explanation of how these measures are 
consist ent with WTO  rules. The Russian Federation urges Angola to engage with us bilaterall y and 
in this forum.  
36.11.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
36.12.   The current challenges imposed by the COVID -19 pandemic demonstrate the importance of 
measures that favo ur the free market and therefore that consolidate international agricultural trade 
chains so that, when put to the test, they can fulfil their functions of meeting the demand for food 
and agricultural products through a more efficient allocation of resources and factors of production.  
36.13.   Agricultural supply chains have proven to be reliable  and flexible enough not to be 
dismantled by the occasional and temporary challenges faced by exporters. Its role as a tool for food 
security and socio -economic growth depends on the creation by governments of circumstances in 
which the private sector can prosper.  In this context, the procedures for granting import licen ces 
and the quantitative restrictions imposed by Angola go in the opposite direction.  So far, Angola has 
not justified how its measures comply with WTO  rules. And Brazilian exporters have, f or another 
year, been facing difficulties in maintaining traditional trade flows. The most recent are related to 
the issue of import licen ces for meat.  Brazil renews its commitment as a partner for the development 
and food security of Angola and invites th e country to review policies that may unduly impact 
international trade.  
36.14.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
36.15.   The European Union  is supportive of Angola 's intention to diversify its economy and to 
develop its domestic industry.  However, the EU shares the concerns expressed by Russia and others. 
Decree  23/19 seems to protect domestic industries in a manner that is not compatible with 
WTO rules and that could be very detrimental to foreign investments in Angola.  The EU urges Angola 
to review the relevant measures in order to ensure compliance with WTO  rules.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  36.16.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
36.17.   As noted at previous meetings, Canada encourages Angola to comply with its 
WTO notification requirements and to notify this Decree, as well as any measures taken under this 
Decree, to the appropriate WTO  Committees.  Canada also seeks to clarify the scope of the measure, 
and the HS codes  of the agricultural products covered.  Canada encourages Angola to provide 
additional in formation on when and how this Decree will be enforced, to support the predictability of 
agricultural trade.  
36.18.   The delegate of Angola  indicated the following:  
36.19.   The Angolan delegation takes note of the statements made by the delegations of the United 
States an d Russia and thanks the m for their  concern about Presidential Decree  23/19 , of which 
Angola has already sent the appropriate notification to the WTO  Secretariat (30  September  2019).  
36.20.   Angola takes note about the concerns that this Decree may not be aligned w ith the 
Organization's rules and recommended best practices.  
36.21.   As Angola has stated systematically, the Decree does not impose any restrictions on the 
importation of products from international operators.  The Decree disciplines the rules of the 
commercial ch ain of goods, that is, it defines who , among the figure s of producer, wholesaler, 
retailer , and consumer, will have the right to import , since in the past the retailer and the consumer 
were part of the chain of importers , which Angola thought not to be correct . 
36.22.   The Decree defines some restrictions, but only for public institutions, that will only resort to 
imports if it is proven that the national market does not provide that "said" product of domestic 
origin. However, Angola triggered , according to the WTO rules, the Non -Automatic Licensing  
Mechanism on the importation of some products.  
36.23.   Angola anticipate s applying the temporary measure of  the effective quantitative restriction 
only in 2022, and that , before applying the measure, it will  be preceded by an investigative study 
process and other procedures as per the rules established by the Organization . 
36.24.   Reality demonstrates how important economic diversification is in order to increase 
economic resilience as well as to enable us, LDCs, to participate meaningfully in global value chains 
and in the international trading system.  
36.25.   Finally, bearing in mind the fact that the United States,  Russia, Brazil,  and Canada,  have 
embassies in Angola, Angola would like to suggest that these countries hold bilateral meetings with 
the Angolan authorities in order to resolve this concern.  
36.26.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
36.27.   The Council so agreed . 
37  BETTER FUNCTIONING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS AND SUBSIDIARY 
COMMITT EES – REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS  
37.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that, as agreed at the November  2019 meeting of the Council, on  
5 February this year an informal meeting was convened with the aim of continuing discussions on 
the better functioning of the Council for Trade in Goods and its subsidiary committees.  
37.2.   The topics that were discussed informally were as follows: (i)  creating a plan for annual 
meetings; (ii)  preparing a CTG  annotated agenda; (iii)  the sending of meeting remi nders at least 
one month in advance of those meetings; (iv)  circulating the statements made in meetings; 
(v) creating a contacts list; (vi)  creating a general email for the Council and for each committee; 
and (vii)  introductory sessions for new delegates.  
37.3.   The note that I circulated following the meeting contains  a summary of these informal 
discussions indicating that some of those had been accepted but that in the case of others there was G/C/M/137  
 
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  no consensus among delegations, such as was the case with an annotate d agenda and the circulation 
of statements made during Council meetings.  
37.4.   Given the COVID -19 crisis, some of the ideas that had been accepted have fallen to the 
wayside given that the Secretariat has had to focus its efforts on supporting delegates with reg ard 
to certain substantive as well as technical issues that allowed them to continue the work of the 
Organization during the period of lockdown.  
37.5.   With that in mind , and with the support of Members and the Secretariat , I will communicate 
with my successor re garding the continuation of the work that was under taken  before the pandemic , 
subject to the acceptance of Members.  
37.6.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
37.7.   Last year, Hong Kong, China  raised this agenda item on the Better Functioning of the CTG 
and its subsidiary Committees  because it felt that , within the existing system, Hong Kong, China 
could take small steps to make a big difference in reducing Members' administrative burden, and to 
streamline and modernize operation s, which in turn co uld enable us to focus more on substantive 
discussion s. This agenda item was not a proposal of Hong Kong, China , but a platform for all 
Members to reflect together on small actions that it could take to work more efficiently. Hong Kong, 
China had chances t o share its views on challenges in its daily work. Hong Kong, China also heard 
some creative ideas, including  Colombia 's enhanced e -registration functionalities; Singapore 's 
promotion of good Committee practices; and Canada 's contact lists for building communication 
channels among delegates and committees. Through the hard work of Members and the Secretariat, 
some of the ideas have already been put into practice.  
37.8.   One more example of these small steps was the year plan of meetings to facilitate M embers ' 
preparation and participation at meetings. Hong Kong, China's delegation is very grateful that the 
Chair and the CTG  Secretariat had taken a new step to coordinate with subsidiary committees on 
this work. Unfortunately , after we had set the tentati ve 2020  year plan, all meetings were suspended 
under the pandemic. Yet the efforts were not wasted because what was more important was what 
was behind this year plan, namely,  the coherence of work in the organi zation, and the partnership 
among delegates an d the Secretariat, among the Council and Committees in the WTO. Such 
partnership s and a "can do " spirit are crucial to this Organi zation, and particularly at times when we 
could not easily meet and work face -to-face. Hong Kong, China encourage s Members to continue 
the good work started by the Chair in fostering this partnership, and to keep on exploring small 
steps to improve the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies . 
37.9.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
37.10.   Canada  fully support s Hong Kong, China's  comments for steering through this agenda item 
over the last few months. The consultations in February were also very helpful  also thanks to the 
delegate from Colombia who has been an active participant in the discussions we have been having.  
37.11.   Canada would like  to emphasize two  specific items. First, on the contact list under the 
e-registration system  and in my role as the Market Access Chair, the list has been extremely helpful 
in terms of getting in touch with delegates and ensuring that they  receive the appropriate documents 
directly from the Secretariat and from me , so that they have a clear understanding of the way 
forward , especially in these circumstances where delegates  cannot meet face -to-face or have small 
group consultations.  
37.12.   Moreover , 80 delegates are registered under the CTG at the moment and Canada hopes that 
there will be more who seek to have their names added to the list . 
37.13.   Lastly , Canada would like  to thank Chinese Taipei and China for circulating their statements 
through the Secr etariat. This was a voluntary measure on Canada's  part to help push forward and 
help make more efficient the meeting on Monday through these virtual means and it hopes that 
Members can continue to offer or ask the Secretariat to continue circulat ing their written statements 
to the group within the Council or within the various Committees . This would  aid our understanding 
and the information that we can share with each other in the Committees and Councils.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  37.14.   The delegate of Chile indicated the following:  
37.15.   Chile considers  that by taking small steps we will have a more rational approach to a big 
change which might otherwise never come to pass . 
37.16.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
37.17.   South Africa notes the proposals from Hong Kong , China, and Korea,  in 
documents  RD/CTG/9 and RD/CTG/10, Canada on e -contact lists , and Colombia . Issues such as 
annotated agendas are useful and proposals regarding matters that appear on the agenda for the 
first time to be more fully described or the publication of annual work plans do not require any 
substantial adjustment of current practices. It deals with information dissemination which may 
create a more transparent environment for discussion of what is placed on the agenda of the CTG 
and its subsidiary bodies. This is consistent with the Guidelines on the Arrangements for Scheduling 
of Meetings of WTO  Bodies (WT/L/106) which recogni zes the spe cial responsibility of the Secretariat  
regarding meeting documents. These measures seem efficiency -enhancing, the significance of which 
is clearly demonstrated by COVID -19. 
37.18.   However, South Africa also note s from other proposals, such as 
document  WT/GC/W/777 /Rev.5, "Procedural Guidelines for WTO  Councils and Committees Address 
Trade Concerns ", the introduction of changes that go far beyond what current rules provide  for. 
Whereas South Africa's delegation is ready to work with Members to enhance the operation of this 
Council and its subsidiary bodies, it does not see merit in proposals that amend explicit provisions 
and introduce roles and capacities that go beyond what is contained in the Annex  1A Agreements. 
The appr oach in document  WT/GC/ W/777/Rev.5 to STCs is unacceptable both in respect of the role 
designated to the Secretariat and the Chair as well as the bilateralization of trade concerns through 
informal consultations.  
37.19.   To be objective, having information regardi ng trade concerns available on a database is very 
useful and may assist in developing a better understanding of the issues ; however , this is 
substantively different from suggestions that may compromise the objective role and function of the 
Secretariat and  Chairs of various bodies. This seems to contradict the guideline s in 
document  WT/L/161 , which outlines the role and functions of various functionaries. If any Member  
may want to change these roles or any process prescribe d under an applicable agreement, 
amendment procedures under Article  IX of the WTO  Agreement should be followed. Amend ment by 
stealth cannot be accepted.  
37.20.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
37.21.   Previous discussions on this issue have been useful. The EU is pleased that s everal good 
suggestions received broad support at the Council's last meeting , on 5 February  2020,  and that they 
can be implemented without further formalities.  
37.22.   Several of these suggestions reflect some suggestions in the proposal for guidelines for 
WTO bodies dealing with trade concerns made by the EU and a group of Members.  
37.23.   Several other suggestions in that proposal aim at making meeting preparations easier. The y 
would be particularly helpful for the CTG ; for example,  earlier circulation of agendas and documents 
for meetings and clearer timelines for the circulation of minutes. In addition, the EU  has propose d 
several guidelines for making the specific work of tr ade concerns more effective.  
37.24.   On logistics , the effectiveness of the CTG would greatly benefit from leaving more time 
between its meetings and those of its subsidiary bodies, in particular those that have the same trade 
concerns on their agendas. This week is a case in point: the Market Access Committee on Monday , 
and the CTG on Wednesday , does not allow capitals to digest the exchanges of the Monday for 
Wednesday and simply leads to repetitions in the CTG. The EU acknowledge s that this particular 
situation is linked to the COVID  lockdown and rescheduling of meetings, but it has  also had similar 
issues in the past and recommend s taking this suggestion into account for future scheduling of 
meetings.  The EU looks forward to further consultations on these and ot her suggestions.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  37.25.   The delegate of Senegal  indicated the following:  
37.26.   Senegal would like to thank the Chair  for his report on the consultations under this agenda 
item. Senegal supports the proposals aiming to strengthen the Council and subsidiary bodies' 
opera tions, particularly through capacity building for delegates, the timely and annotated circulation 
of the Council and committees' agendas and sharing of Members' statements.  Senegal remains 
committed to working constructively with Members to improve the eff iciency of the Council and 
subsidiary bodies' operations.  
37.27.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
37.28.   The Council so agreed . 
38  WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
38.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that a Ministerial Decision had been adopted at MC11 
(document  WT/MIN(17)/65), in which Ministers had agreed to maintain the existing Work  
Programme on E -Commerce, and to endeavour to reinvigorate the WTO's work on E -Commerce. The 
Ministerial Dec ision had also instructed the General Council to hold periodic reviews in its sessions 
of July and December  2018, July and December  2019, and then extended to July 2020, based on 
the reports submitted by the relevant bodies, among them the Goods Council; a nd to maintain the 
current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions. Therefore, this Council 
was again tasked to discuss the E -Commerce aspects relating to trade in goods and, in order to fulfil 
its mandate, the E -Commerce issue was a standalone agenda item. The Chairperson invited 
delegations to continue to express their opinions.  
38.2.   For this reason, he invited delegations to make suggestions as to how to work on the 
preparation of the periodic review to be held in the General Council at its session of July 2020. He 
also informed delegations that , to fulfil this mandate, it was his int ention to submit to the General 
Council, once again, a factual report under his own responsibility, as his predecessors had also done.  
38.3.   The delegate of Burkina Faso , speaking for Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the 
following:  
38.4.   The LDC Group recog nizes the usefulness of E -Commerce as a very relevant aspect of 
economic and social development.  In that regard, the LDC Group supports the specific and 
accelerated work on the Work Programme on E -Commerce with a view to resolving constraints and 
finding a n outcome that will allow us to benefit more from the opportunities of E -Commerce. The 
LDC Group shared its concern in a communication shared on 21 November  2019 in 
document  WT/GC/W/78 7. 
38.5.   The Group would like Members to be able to interact with it concernin g capacity building 
related to E -Commerce and the difficulties that LDCs face to reduce the digital divide , as it had also 
mentioned in its communication.  The LDC  Group would also like its communication on E -Commerce 
to be dealt with in the relevant item o f the agenda of the Council for Trade in Goods.  
38.6.   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
38.7.   Nepal associate s itself  with the statement delivered by Chad.  The relevancy of electronic 
commerce has been acknowledged since 1998 with a work programme initiative. However, we have 
not yet been able to deliver as expected.  The area has widely emerged in the global trade regime in 
different dimensions and modes, and therefore mea ningful interventions and result -focused 
initiatives through the WTO  system have become inevitable.  The COVID -19 pandemic and its 
implication s have reminded us to expedite our work in this area in a participatory, just, and inclusive 
manner.  
38.8.   In this contex t, least developed country Members have realized the high relevancy of 
E-Commerce in the period of pandemic and post -pandemic to build forward towards a better 
recovery process.  However, there is a huge gap between developed, developing , and least develope d 
Members, and such a gap is within our own country context as well.  G/C/M/137  
 
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  38.9.   In this context, revitalization of the Work Programme on E -Commerce  is crucial and we need 
to expedite the matter so as to make the global economic development digitalized without any dig ital 
divide among the Members and within the territory of Members, particularly in LDCs.  Furthermore, 
just and equitable distribution of the benefits of E-Commerce and the digital economy has also 
become important while designing future intervention s in this area.  
38.10.   An additional package of support to enable weak Members to walk together at least in a 
visible distance has become urgent which would contribute to resulting multiplier positive impacts 
in socio -economic development including achievement of SDGs 2 030 agenda in a timely manner 
even in the situation of COVID -19 pandemic.  As indicated in the statement made by Chad on behalf 
of the LDC  Group, the delegation of Nepal re-emphasizes on the urgency of having a meaningful 
discussion on the constraints on LDCs preventing them from benefit ting from E-Commerce and 
respond ing accordingly.  
38.11.   Capacity -building, digital infrastructure development , and other issues that we are facing , 
need to be thoroughly discussed and ad dressed for an inclusive digital economy globally to make 
the future trade regime much more inclusive and just by bridging the gap.  
38.12.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
38.13.   The loss of tariff revenue due to rapidly increasing product digitaliz ation has been one of the 
main reasons South Africa has argued for the need to rethink further the extension of the moratorium 
and thoroughly examine the implications of the moratorium under the Work Programme. 
Further more, the scope of the moratorium rema ins undecided and Members have different views on 
what the moratorium is applicable to, is it to the transmission only, or is it also applicable to the 
content, and is it applicable to goods or services. This makes a conclusive analysis of the implications  
difficult.  
38.14.   MC12 is going to be important in making a decision about the E-Commerce moratorium. 
COVID -19 has highlighted the increasing importance of E-Commerce , which was successfully 
facilitated by countries without multilateral rules. However, it has al so brought to the fore the 
importance of the developmental aspects , such as the digital divide and the importance of tariffs for 
developing countries under the Work Programme. We need to enhance the capabilities of developing 
countries to benefit more conc retely from E-Commerce.  
38.15.   The CTG has specific functions that include the examination of aspects of electronic 
commerce relevant to the provisions of GATT  1994, the multilateral trade agreements covered under 
Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement, and the approved Work Programme . The issues to be examined 
are clearly stipulated in the Work Programme. It is important that we collectively and constructively 
work together to discuss the Work Programme and to provide our Ministers with enough information 
to make an infor med decision at MC12.  
38.16.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
38.17.   The Council so agreed . 
39  OTHER BUSINESS  
39.1  Date of the Next Meeting  
39.1.   The Chairperson  noted that the next meeting of the Council was scheduled to take place on 
25 and 26  November  2020. The agenda would close at 4.30pm on Thursday, 12  November  2020. 
39.2.   Regarding the closing of the agenda, he reminded delegations that, according to the Rules of  
Procedure, meetings of WTO  bodies were convened by a meeting notice issued not less than 
ten calendar days prior to the date set for the meeting. The agenda itself therefore closed one 
WTO working day prior to the circulation of the meeting notice; that i s, 11 calendar days before the 
date set for the meeting (or, if the date fell on a weekend, the previous Friday).  G/C/M/137  
 
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  40  ELECTION OF CHAIRPERSON OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
40.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the Chair of the General Council had carried out consultations 
on a slate of names for Chairpersons to the different WTO  standing bodies in accordance with the 
established Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers. These proposed nomination s had been 
approved by the General Council at its last meeting. In line with the nominations, he proposed that 
the CTG elect Ambassador Mikael Anzén of Sweden  as Chairperson of the Council by acclamation.  
40.2.   The Council  so agreed . 
40.3.   The meeting was closed . 
____ ______