RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/147  
 
30 January  2024 
(24-0699) Page: 1/121 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
30 NOVEMBER – 1 DECEMBER  2023  
CHAIRPERSON: H.E.  DR ADAMU MOHAMMED ABDULHAMID  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened in 
documents  WTO/AIR/CTG/26  and WTO/AIR/CTG/26/Rev.1 ; the proposed agenda for the meeting 
was circulated in document  G/C/W/840  and an annotated agenda was ci rculated in 
document  JOB/CTG/44 . Following the conclusion of this meeting, a follow -up note by the 
Chairperson collating agreed next steps, deadlines, and actions to be taken by delegations in 
preparation for the next formal meeting was circulated in documen t G/C/W/841 . 
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  ................................ ....................  5 
2   MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  ................................ ................................ .............................  5 
2.1   Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Concessions 
– Extension of Collective Waiver Decisions  ................................ ................................ ............  5 
3   MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS  ................................ ................................ .............  6 
3.1   Consideration of the Draft Report on the WTO  Response to the COVID -19 Pandemic 
and Preparedness for Future Pandemics (JOB/CTG/35/Rev.2 and JOB/CTG/35/Rev.2/Add.1)  ....... 6 
3.2   Consideration of the Draft Report on Improvements in the Functioning of the Council 
for Trade in Goods and it s Subsidiary Bodies (JOB/CTG/39/Rev.2 and JOB/CTG/39/Rev.3);  
Additional Proposals by the United Kingdom (JOB/CTG/41 and JOB/CTG/42)  .............................  7 
3.3   Enhancing Clarity and Accessibility of Information (JOB/CTG/43) – Request from 
Paraguay and the United Kingdom  ................................ ................................ ......................  12 
4   PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE 
RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES – COMMUNICATION FROM  
THE AFRICAN GROUP (G/C/W/830)  ................................ ................................ ..............  14 
5   MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, 
BENEFITS PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES – REQUEST FROM DJIBOUTI ON BEHALF OF  
THE L DC GROUP (G/C/W/752)  ................................ ................................ ......................  17 
6   ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC 
UNION: PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION 
FROM ARMENIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  19 
7   ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM 
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC (G/L/1137/ADD.8)  ................................ ................................ ... 19 
8   MEMBERS' NON -RESPONSIVENESS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY OTHER MEMBERS – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  20 
9   MEMBERS' NON -NOTIFICATIONS OF ITEMS PURSUANT TO CERTAIN 
WTO  AGREEMENTS  – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ............  22 
10   G20 TRADE AND INVESTMENT MINISTERS' MEETING – UPDATE INCLUDING 
JAIPUR CALL ON ACTION FOR MSMES – REQUEST FROM INDIA  ................................ ..... 23 G/C/M/147  
 
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  11   INDIA – IMPORT LICENSING MEASURES ON PCS, TABLETS, AND OTHER 
ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS – STATE MENT BY CHINA  ................................ ..........................  25 
12   EUROPEAN UNION – THE ANTI -SUBSIDY INVESTIGATION AGAINST THE 
IMPORTS OF BAT TERY ELECTRIC VEHICLES FROM CHINA – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ....... 26 
13   INDIA – QUALITY CONTROL ORDER FOR CHEMICAL AND PETROCHEMICAL 
SUBSTANCES – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ..... 27 
14   FRANCE – REVISED ELECT RIC VEHICLE (EV) SUBSIDY SCHEME – STATEMENT 
BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  ................................ ................................ ..........................  28 
15   PERU – TAX TREATMENT  OF PISCO – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM  .........  29 
16   CHINA; HONG KONG, CHINA; MACAO, CHINA; AND T HE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
– RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS OF AQUATIC PRODUCTS FROM JAPAN AFTER 
DISCHARGE OF ALPS TREATED WATER INTO THE SEA – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ............  30 
17   INDIA – VISCOSE STAPLE FIBER (VSF) IMPORT – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  ...... 34 
18   EUROPEAN UNION – ANTI -DUMPING ON FATTY ACID – STATEMENT BY 
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  34 
19   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (ID  137) – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, 
COLOMBIA, COSTA  RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBL IC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, 
PARAGUAY, THE UNITED STATES AND URUGUAY  ................................ ...........................  35 
20   CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS (ID  174) – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA AND 
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 42 
21   CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS 
(CSAR) (ID  169) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 45 
22   EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE PRODUCTS (ID  191) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 48 
23   INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE 
CERTIFICATE ACCOMPANIED WITH IMPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT (ID  175) – 
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............  50 
24   PANA MA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING (ID  177) – 
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............  52 
25   MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE UNDER MEXICAN OFFICIAL 
STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018, "CHEESE NAMES, SPECIFICATIONS, 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, AND TEST METHODS," PUBLISHED ON 
31 JANUARY  2019 (ID  162) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  ...............................  53 
26   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES, THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON 
CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS (ID  120) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ..........................  54 
27   INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES (ID  125) – 
STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 55 
28   UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS (ID  146) – 
STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ..........  57 
29   INDIA – IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT POLICY THROUGH 
QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS (QCOS) IN VARIOUS SECTORS (ID  206) –  
STATEMENTS BY CANADA A ND THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ..................  57 
30   INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
(ID 51) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN AND N EW ZEALAND  ............  58 G/C/M/147  
 
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  31   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS  
AND FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS 
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (ID  119) – STATEMENTS BY NEW ZEALAND  
AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  62 
32   INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM (ID  173) – STATEMENTS BY 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ .............  63 
33   UNITED STATES, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS 
AGREEMENT ON CHIP EXPORT RESTRICTIONS (ID  204) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  .........  66 
34   CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY 
POINT OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION (ID  170) – 
STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 67 
35   EUROPEAN UNION – COMMISSION REGULATION (EU)  2023/334 REGARDING 
MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND THIAMETHOXAM IN OR ON  
CERTAIN PRODUCTS (ID  200) – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 69 
36   AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, 
SWITZERLAND, UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL  
TRADE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA (ID  189) – STATEMENT B Y  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  74 
37   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES (ID  165) – STATEMENTS BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, 
PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU AND THAILAND  ................................ ..............................  80 
38   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (ID  148) – 
STATEMENTS BY CHINA, INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  .........................  82 
39   EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION -FREE COMMODITIES (ID  203) – 
STATEMENTS BY COLOMBIA, INDONESIA, PARAGUAY AND  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  90 
40   EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (ID  171) – STATEMENT BY 
THE RUSSIAN F EDERATION ................................ ................................ ............................  98 
41   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS (ID  161) – 
STATEMENTS BY JAPAN AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ...... 100 
42   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS (ID  181) – STATEMENT  
BY THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  101 
43   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS (ID  157) – STATEMENT  
BY THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  102 
44   UNITED STATES – SECTIO N 301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA 
(ID 117) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................  103 
45   UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES 
MEASURES OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 (ID  194) – STATEMENT  
BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  103 
46   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION 
(EU)  2018/825 (ID  144) – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ......................  105 
47   CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES (ID  152) – STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIA  ................................ ......................  105 
48   UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE 
GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN (ID 195) – 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 108 
49   UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE   
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (ID  205) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ..............................  109 
50   CHINA – DRAFT REVISION OF CHIN ESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT  
LAW (ID  202) – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ........  109 G/C/M/147  
 
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  51   CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY 
SPECIFICATION FOR OFFICE DEVICES) (ID  201) – STATEMENT BY JAP AN ..................  111 
52   CHINA – EXPORT CONTROL LAW AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE IN STRATEGIC 
PRODUCTS (ID  112) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  ...............  112 
53   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ COMMITMENTS: 
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS (ID  127) – STATEMENT BY URUGUAY  ................................ ........  115 
54   UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS (ID  145) – STATEMENT  
BY URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  117 
55   REPORTS TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL  ................................ ................................ .... 118 
55.1   Consideration of Annual Reports of the Subsidiary Bodies of  
the Council for Trade in Goods  ................................ ................................ .........................  118 
55.2   Adoption of the Annual Report of the Council for Trade in Goods to  
the General Council (G/C/W/837 and G/C/W/837/Rev.1)  ................................ .....................  119 
56   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 119 
56.1   Tentative Annual Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of  
the Council for Trade in Goods (JOB/CTG/40)  ................................ ................................ ..... 119 
56.2   eAgenda  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  120 
56.3   Date of Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ .............................  121 
 
 
The Chairperson  welcomed Deputy Director -General (DDG) Angela Ellard and noted that she was 
now in charge of the Market Access Division.  
DDG Angela Ellard  indicated the following:  
Thank you , Ambassador Abdulhamid , for the introduction. It is a pleasure for me to be able to join 
this meeting of the Council for Trade Goods. As noted by the Ambassador, I will be the DDG 
responsible f or overseeing the work of the Market Access Division, which serves this Council, among 
other matters. As you know, the CTG plays a key role at the WTO by overseeing the operation of all 
WTO Agreements relating to trade goods, and its 14  subsidiary bodies i nclude many of the key 
technical bodies and represent the bulk of the deliberative function of the WTO. I am delighted to 
see that the CTG  has taken a leadership role in improving the functioning of this body through 
"reform by doing", which has become an example for the WTO as a whole. I  am eager to work with 
you to continue to implement these reforms. The Secretariat has built in funds to implement 
IT-related reform -by-doing into its updated budget request released on Monday, which we hope 
Members will ap prove shortly.  I look forward to contributing to and learning from the work of this 
Council, and I stand ready to work with you and help any way I can.  
The Chairperson  observed that, given the long agenda, it would be preferable for Members to keep 
their i nterventions short, if possible. He invited those Members that were planning to submit longer 
written statements for incorporation into the meeting 's minutes to expressly indicate their intention 
to do so when taking the floor. To ensure transparency in th e preparation of the minutes, the 
Secretariat would only reflect what had been said at the meeting, except in those cases where a 
Member had explicitly indicated that it was their intention to submit a longer statement in writing.  
He added that t he deadlin e for uploading written statements on eAgenda, or for sending written 
statements to the Secretariat, was 8  December  2023. Finally, he asked if any delegation wished to 
add any other issue under the agenda item, "Other Business".  G/C/M/147  
 
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  The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
Regarding agenda item  111, on new trade concerns, " Mexico – Sunset Review of the  Anti-Dumping 
Duty on Brazilian Exports of Bond Paper, Cut ", Brazil requests for it to be remove d from the agenda. 
It was not our intention to raise it as  a new trade concern. We take this opportunity to clarify that 
the matter has already been addressed at the last meeting of the Committee on Anti -Dumping 
Practices, and that Mexico has engaged constructively in seeking a bilateral solution.  
 
The Chairperson  informed Members that he would like to share information under "Other Business" 
with respect to the following three  issues: (i)  functioning of the Tentative Annual Plan of Meetings; 
(ii) the Secretariat will share information on the changes to the eAgenda ; and (iii) on the date of the 
next meeting.  
The agenda was agreed  with these modifications . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
1.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
1.2.  Under this agenda item, the Council is requested to take note of reg ional trade agreements 
(RTAs) notified under Article  XXIV:7(a) of the GATT  1994 and listed in the agenda. Pursuant to the 
Transparency Mechanism for RTAs2, they will be considered in the Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements.  
1.3.  The delegate  of Chinese Taip ei indicated  the following : 
1.4.  With regard to the communication from El Salvador in WT/REG283/N/3 , my delegation would 
like to clarify that according to paragraph  2 of Article  18.05 of the Free Trade Agreement between 
El Salvador and Chinese Taipei, "A withdrawal shall become effective one hundred eighty (180)  days 
after the Party provi des written notice to the other Party, unless the Parties agree on a different 
period." On this matter, we have not received any written notice from El  Salvador. El  Salvador's 
unilateral declaration to terminat e the said FTA is apparently inconsistent with  the required 
procedure provided in the above -mentioned Article and, accordingly, does not have any effect 
contemplated by paragraph  1 of Article  18.05. The lack of written notification and the legal 
ineffectiveness are not changed by El  Salvador's unilate ral decision to circulate the aforementioned 
Communication. Our position on this matter had been circulated in WT/REG283/N/2  on 
13 April 2023.  
1.5.  The Council took note  of the statement and information provided.  
2  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES  
2.1.  The Chairperson  indicate d the following:  
2.2.  As indicated in the Airgram, the Committee on Market Access has forwarded five  items for the  
consideration of this Council.  
2.1  Introduction of Harmonized System Changes into the WTO  Schedules of Concessions 
– Extension of Collective Waiver Decisions  
2.3.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
2.4.  At its meeting on 16  October  2023, the Committee on Market Access agreed to forward for the 
consideration of this Council five  draft collective requests for waiver extensions concerning the 
introduc tion of Harmonized System Changes into WTO  Schedules of concessions. Since the 
document symbols of the notifications are indicated in the Airgram and in the Agenda, I will limit 
myself to noting that they concern one -year extensions of draft collective wai ver decisions 
 
1 Agenda Item  11 as indicated in the following documents: WTO/AIR/CTG/26  and 
WTO/AIR/CTG/26/Rev.1 ; G/C/W/840 ; and JOB/CTG/44 . 
2 Decision of 14  December  2006, document  WT/L/671 . G/C/M/147  
 
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  concerning HS2002, HS2007, HS2012, HS20017, and HS2022, all of which will expire on 
31 December  2023. In addition, I have been informed by the Secretariat that a revision to the 
HS2022  draft waiver was circulated in document  G/C/W/835/Rev.1  to include an additional Member 
in the list. I propose that the Council agree to forward the draft collective waiver decisions contained 
in documents  G/C/W/831 , G/C/W/832 , G/C/W/833 , G/C/W/834  and G/C/W/835/Rev.1  to the 
General Cou ncil for adoption, unless there is any comment. Would any Members wish to comment? 
This does not seem to be the case.  
2.5.  The Council so agreed . 
3  MC12  IMPLEMENTATION MATTERS  
3.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.2.  I would like to begin this agenda item by repo rting on the informal meeting of the Council that 
took place on 19  September  2023, and which was convened through document  ICN/CTG/12 . At that 
meeting, the Council discussed how to proceed with the reports to the General Council on the 
WTO response to the pandemic and the improvement to the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary 
bodies. I had informed Members of these discussion s in a report that was circulated in 
document  JOB/CTG/37 , which also described the manner in which Members could provide feedback 
and comments on the two  draft reports that are being considered by the Council at today's meeting.  
3.1  Consideration of the Draft Rep ort on the WTO  Response to the COVID -19 Pandemic 
and Preparedness for Future Pandemics ( JOB/CTG/35/Rev.2  and 
JOB/CTG/35/Rev.2/Add.1 ) 
3.3.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.4.  The first  draft report to be considered by the Counc il is that on the WTO  Response to the 
COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics. As you may recall, we had a 
first discussion of this report in September, but Section  3 on "lessons learned" remained empty. This 
second  revision, which was circ ulated on 10  October  2023, incorporates inputs from an informal joint 
submission by Ecuador, the European Union, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay, for Section  3 
of the report on lessons learned and challenges experienced in the goods area. I understa nd that 
these Members also tried to reach out to other Members in preparing these inputs, which I 
understand are largely based on the "Ministerial Declaration on the WTO  Response to the 
COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics" ( WT/MIN(22)/31 ) and the Committee 
on Market Access Lessons Learned from the Experience –Sharing Sessions on Trade in 
COVID -19-Related Goods ( G/MA/409 ). Members were kindly requested to provide comments on the 
report by 17  October  2023. No comments were received, and therefore no new revision was issued. 
Let me now begin by opening the floor to the Members that provided these inputs.  
3.5.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
3.6.  My delegation would  like, first of all , to thank the Secretariat for the preparation of this draft 
report and to express our support for it. Ecuador has actively participated in these discussions given  
the importance it attaches to this issue . Therefore,  I would also like to thank all Members for their 
contributions and for working together w ith Ecuador.  
3.7.  The delegate of India indicated  the following : 
3.8.  India thank s the Secretariat for preparing this draft report on the WTO  response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic. Many of these discussions happened under the Committee on Market Access, 
where India part icipated constructively. We made two  presentations on India's trade facilitation 
measures and the use of technology to address the pandemic -related challenges. India also 
presented a detailed paper on pandemic response, which carries the CTG symbol JOB/CTG/36 . We 
hope that these discussions and papers submitted by Members can form a basis for any rapid 
response discussions if required in the future.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  3.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated  the following : 
3.10.  The European Union welcomes the work undertaken in the subsidiary bodies of the CTG on 
experience -sharing relating to the trade challenges that emerged from the COVID -19 pandemic. We 
believe that this kind of technical work was not only useful to help identify solutions and best 
practices during the pandem ic itself, but can serve as a model for future pandemics and similar 
trade-disruptive events. We especially welcome the outcome document agreed in the CMA , which 
attempted to draw conclusions and provide a useful summary of the work done. We believe that the 
report by the CTG should endorse and highlight these conclusions.  
3.11.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.12.  I would like to thank all Members for their c onstructive engagement on this draft report. Can 
the Council agree to adopt this report so it can be submitted to the General Council?  
3.13.  The Council so agreed . 
3.2  Consideration of the Draft Report on Improvements in the Functioning of the Council 
for Trade in G oods and its Subsidiary Bodies ( JOB/CTG/39/Rev.2  and 
JOB/CTG/39/Rev.3 ); Additional Proposals by the United Kingdom ( JOB/CTG/41  and 
JOB/CTG/42 ) 
3.14.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.15.  As you may recall, the first  version of this report was circ ulated on 28  September  2023 and 
included a request for inputs from Members. A first  revision was circulated on 16  October, followed 
by a second  revision on 31  October. This third  revision provides information on the discussions that 
have been held to impro ve the functioning of the CTG and its 14  subsidiary bodies, which collectively 
implement all the agreements for trade in goods included in Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement, and 
represent the majority of the WTO's regular bodies. The report also reflects all the improvements 
introduced in these bodies since the conclusion of MC12, and is based on the reports by the 
subsidiary bodies, all of which are included in the Annex of the CTG  report. In the case of the 
CTG itself, we have a total of 22  improvements that have been introduced. I am delighted to report 
that a total of 121  improvements have already been introduced in the functioning of the CTG and its 
subsidiary bodies. Allow me to emphasize that the effective functioning of the regular bodies i s a 
necessary condition for a successful implementation of the functions of the WTO, including its 
deliberative function and the implementation of the existing WTO  Agreements. Members may also 
wish to continue any relevant discussions in the future, of cou rse, as improving the functioning of 
regular bodies is an incremental and ongoing process. The report also describes the process followed 
by the CTG in implementing this mandate, and the proposals adopted or recommended by the 
Council, as well as the role it has played vis-à-vis its 14  subsidiary bodies; finally, it reproduces, by 
area or category, the main outcomes of these discussions. In addition to this draft report, the 
United  Kingdom has submitted two  additional proposals for action at this meeting bu t, if the UK will 
allow me, I would first like to see if there are comments on the draft report as it stands. We will 
then revert back to the UK  proposals after these reactions. Would any Member like to take the floor 
on the draft report in JOB/CTG/39/Rev.3 ? 
3.16.  The delegate of the United States  indicated  the following : 
3.17.  For those of you who were around last year , or at the beginning of this year, you may recall 
my quote from Oscar Romero, who said that while "we cannot do everything, but it is a step along 
the way. " We should all take a moment and appreciate the document before us. Without each and 
every one of us, we could not have accomplished this. Even though we may not have done everything 
as planned and, in some cases, better than where we starte d, we should all be proud of what we 
have done here. We proved today , with this document,  that we are better when we act together and 
our efforts in areas such as these are what will keep the WTO going.  
3.18.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated  the following : 
3.19.  My delegation would also like to thank the Secretariat for the preparation of this report and 
for all its work supporting the discussions held on this subject. Ecuador considers that the G/C/M/147  
 
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  adjustments made both in this Council and in its subs idiary bodies have contributed very positively 
to the work of delegates in Geneva and in our respective Capitals. Ecuador agrees with the comments 
by the United States and supports the adoption of the draft report, and would like to thank all 
Members for t heir proactive participation in these discussions, in particular the co -sponsors of 
document  JOB/CTG/21 : Argentina;  Brazil;  Colombia;  Paraguay; Peru;  and Uruguay.  
3.20.  The delegate of India indicated  the following : 
3.21.  India thank s the CTG  Chair, Ambassador Abdulhamid, for the initiative taken on the work on 
improvements in the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. We also thank the previous 
CTG Chair, Ambassador Etienne Oudot de Dainville, for his leadership in shaping this discourse on 
operational efficiency improvements. We support the adoption of this report, such that it can be 
presented to the General Council and also be showcase d at the Abu Dhabi Ministerial Conference. 
India's paper WT/GC/W/874 , presented in the Ge neral Council , had conceptualized the idea of 
30-for-30, that is, the WTO  undertaking 30  operational efficiency improvements before completing 
30 years of its existence by the end of 2024. We are glad to see that the CTG and its subsidiary 
bodies themselve s have contributed to 62  improvements through formal decisions and 59  other 
improvements to make an inspiring total of 121  improvements. We request that our Ministers be 
updated on these concrete results achieved, which have been  a direct result of the MC1 2 mandate. 
Additionally, we welcome the two  proposals put forward by the United Kingdom  in 
documents  JOB/GC/41  and JOB/CTG/42 . We support the ideas laid out in both the proposals. We 
thank the delegation of the UK for their engagement in developing these proposals . In fact, since 
these ideas are very pertinent, we encourage Members to agree on these ideas in this meeting itself. 
This will allow the Secretariat to add these changes to the JOB/CTG/39  document before it is sent 
to the General Council.  
3.22.  The delegate of China  indicated  the following : 
3.23.  China  would like to thank the Chairs and the Secretariat of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies 
for drafting this report. Since July  2022, the CTG and its subsidiary bodies have undertaken 
numerous discussions to improve the functioning of relevant bodies , taking  into account the different 
nature and mandates of those  bodies. We appreciate the se efforts and are very pleased to see that 
a total of 121  improvements have been introduced in the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary 
bodies. WTO  Members agreed at MC 12 to "work towards necessary reform of the WTO" and to 
"improve all its functions". In light of the significant institutional improvements made by the CTG 
and its subsidiary bodies, we believe that it is important to incorporate this work into the 
MC13  deliverables package , and to get it acknowledged and blessed by Ministers at MC13. Finally, 
as pointed out in this draft report, improving the functioning of regular bodies is an incremental 
process. We welcome the United Kingdom's  new proposals and look for ward to further engaging with 
Members  on this issue.  
3.24.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated  the following : 
3.25.  I would like to echo the words of those who have taken the floor  before me. We should 
collectively congratulate ourselves on this important progress and achievement. It is not every day 
that we in the WTO can celebrate  that we have implemented not 121, but 122  improvements, 
because yesterday we agreed one  more in the Committee on Agriculture as part of these collective 
efforts and harmoni zation of Committe e practices. We ask the Secretariat to include this in a revised 
version. We are aware that we did it late, but it would be good if it could be presented to the General 
Council. We will refer more specifically to the United Kingdom's documents when we get to them, 
but we would also like to support the Indian Mission to be able to include these two  improvements , 
and have them included in a further revision. Finally, I would like to take a moment to congratulate 
the delegations of the United Kingdom, India, and our Latin American colleagues for their hard work 
in developing these improvements, as well as the enormous effort of some delegations that are not 
so active today but that did begin this process a few years ago, and in particular the delegations of 
Hong Kong, China and Canada.  
3.26.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated  the following : 
3.27.  Let me thank the Secretariat for producing this draft report on improvement s in the 
functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. The report highlights a large variety of measures G/C/M/147  
 
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  that aim at improving the functioning of the WTO  deliberative function, our main objective. We are 
encouraged to see that many measures have been su ccessfully adopted by the CTG and its 
subsidiary bodies. The reform by doing process is well under  way. However, we note that very few 
reforms have  been implemented to improve transparency or facilitate the resolution of specific trade 
concerns. This is wh ere lies the greatest potential to improve the deliberative function. For our 
traders, improving transparency and facilitating the resolution of trade concerns  would significantly 
enhance predictability. It is crucial nowadays to work in that direction given that exporters 
increasingly face consecutive shocks that enhance global demand volatility, which in turn affect 
market predictability. Likewise, this would enhance the resilience of supply chains, a shared objective 
of all WTO  Members.  
3.28.  The delegate of Djibouti , speaking on behalf of the LDC  Group, indicated the following:  
3.29.  We take the floor to put on record at the CTG that we have been asked to bring to the attention 
of the CTG our views on reform of the functioning of the committees and councils. The LDC  Group 
supports such improvements , particularly those that had their genesis in the LDC  Group submission 
in document  JOB/GC/223/Rev.1 . These include the use of annotated agendas, expediting the 
production of minutes, mechanisms to avoid overlappi ng of key meetings, summary notes on the 
same day of the meeting  itself, and translation provided for all informal meetings.  
3.30.  To complement the work done, we suggest that some improvements in the reform process 
could be considered. For example, future propo sals requiring adoption that are of a cross -cutting 
nature that impact LDC  participation in WTO  bodies should be sent to the General Council for 
discussion and decision. LDCs and small delegations all participate  at the General Council , so this is 
the best  place to evaluate the impact of reform -by-doing proposals on their participation in the WTO.  
3.31.  On the adoption of some changes , for example the change of the 10 -day rule to 15  days, (in 
the CTG, the Committee on Market Access , the Council for Trade in Services , and so on), we 
understand that there are two  sides: (i) to receive documents earlier , which is important for specific 
trade concerns; and (ii) in those bodies where most LDCs bring their agenda items and documents , 
we need more time to prepare. Indeed, s ome of our Members thought that the change meant more 
time to prepare. However, t his is not the case. We did not reverse these adoptions to avoid  stand ing 
in the way of changes . However, we request the CTG to recommend to the General Council that t he 
change of the 10 -day rule to 15  days be implemented on a trial basis  in order to determine the 
impact on our Group. This is similar to what was already agreed in certain bodies concerning the 
introduction of the eAgenda on a trial basis. This is a good idea that came from the process.  
3.32.  We also feel that , while some steps may have been taken, more effort must be made to avoid 
overlapping meetings. For example, t here have been a number of clashes in the last three  months 
that have posed serious challenges f or LDCs.  Finally, while useful in some cases, the "written 
procedure " and circulating proposals for adoption during summer recess should be avoided.  We 
reiterate our applause to the Secretariat, and the CTG , for all of the great work done on several 
areas of reform of the functioning of the various committees and the CTG.  
3.33.  The Chairperson  indicated  the following : 
3.34.  Thank you, Djibouti. Before I call the next speaker, I would like to remind you that the 
proposal on the 15  days has already been agreed by the Council. In case you have other 
improvements beyond the 122  improvements that have already been implemented, we can of course 
come back to them next year.  
3.35.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated  the following : 
3.36.  Just to echo colleagues in the room. We would like to express our gratitude to you and your 
predecessor, and also for the efforts of Roy and the Secretariat team in coordinating this work, as 
well as to my fellow colleagues for putting forward fairly useful proposals to improve the functioning 
of this Council and its subsidiary bodies. This has included the online tools, the website, and 
eAgenda, and I think that they may seem minor, but these have really resulted in significant 
enhancements to our ability to  engage in the WTO  committees as delegates. And, as you indicated, 
Chair, we hope that the CTG is going to charter us a way forward in setting a good benchmark for G/C/M/147  
 
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  reform by doing. Equally, I would like to thank the United Kingdom for their proposal, and w e will 
come to that, but we would like to express our support for the suggested ideas in the report.  
3.37.  The delegate of Colombia indicated  the following : 
3.38.  Let me thank and welcome your report, and echo the interventions that have mentioned the 
importance of in cluding also the new and more recent points. I would also like to thank the 
delegations that have sponsored this process, both now and before, as well as the United Kingdom, 
India, the Latin American Members , as well as Hong Kong, China and Canada for thei r earlier efforts. 
In conclusion, I would also like to give special thanks to the Paraguayan Mission, as they have been 
a permanent leader throughout this process, which has had important under -the-radar and 
constructive effects on the Organization, and th ese efforts are worth highlighting.  
3.39.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated  the following : 
3.40.  Let me start by thanking DDG  Ellard for her presence in this meeting today, and I would like 
to wish her the best of luck in her new portfolio. Members recogni zed the need to improve the daily 
operation of WTO  bodies as an important means to enhance the Organization's capacity and 
efficiency. To this effect, the European Union  welcomes the substantive work carried out by the CTG 
and its subsidiary  bodies in facilitating and reporting the "Reform by Doing " work. We would like to 
express our appreciation to all involved for the work done , and we encourage further work in this 
area. 
3.41.  The Chairperson  indicated  the following : 
3.42.  I would like to thank delegations for their comments. Do I take it correctly that Members 
would be willing to adopt the report as it stands? This seems to be the case but, before we formally 
adopt it, let's now m ove to discuss the two  additional proposals from the United Kingdom to see if 
more can be added to the report. As you may recall, my report from the informal meeting of 
19 September  2023, JOB/CTG/30 , indicated that Members may be able to further develop and a gree 
on some of the proposals that remain unresolved. For this reason, I urged Members to continue 
working with others on those proposals with a view to bridging the differences and finding mutually 
agreeable solutions at this formal meeting. In this regar d, the UK has submitted two  proposals in 
writing that are directly linked to those issues discussed by the Council in September. May I now 
give the floor to the UK so that they can introduce the  additional proposals . 
3.43.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated  the following : 
3.44.  First let me open with some remarks on the last item, welcoming the 122 changes  that have 
been agreed . I would echo my colleague from the U nited States: we should be proud of this. There 
are 122  individual  proposal s in that report , which have been  made over many years and months. 
We reiterate our thanks to  all delegations, including  the LDC  Group , for their valuable proposals, 
including that from April 2022.  
3.45.  It has been amazing to be part of these discussions, which have been driven by delegates, 
using their expertise in how this place works , demonstrating their deep pursuit of ways to make our 
own work more efficient and inclusive, including through brainstorming practical ideas to support 
the participation of smalle r delegations. We thank DDG  Ellard for her remarks on the importance of 
the CTG's work, and the point that our CTG  endeavours are a model for the rest of the WTO and, as 
such, we hope our ideas percolate out of this body to inspire changes also in other ar eas, where 
appropriate.  
3.46.  We must make sure that these ideas do not get  stuck in a silo given that some are so simple 
and pragmatic, and could immediately help participation. We look forward to welcoming this Report 
at the General Council  and, as others have said, to forwarding them to Ministers and welcoming 
them at MC13.  
3.47.  Before wrapping up  on this broader point of reform , let me praise our excellent Chair person s 
who have guided this process. And, additionally, the outstanding, pragmatic, innovat ive Secretariat 
team that we have been blessed with in this Council. They are the machinery putting this into action, 
to drive the change that we have envisioned.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  3.48.  Turning now to these two  loose ends, let me introduce these two  very different proposals 
which are in two  very different formats. The proposal in JOB/CTG/41  relates to an issue we have 
previously discussed at length in this Council. It is about scheduling of meetings, and transparency 
on any rescheduling of meetings. This paper is not a request for a Decision. Instead, it relates to 
existing text, that already appl ies de facto to the CTG, which was adopted back in 1995. So it 's not 
about creating something new ; rather , it's an aide-mémoire  about implementing what we already 
have. And this existing 1995  text helpfully encourages both the fixing of the WTO  meetings calendar, 
and provides for the circulation of a written explanatory notice for any meetings that are 
rescheduled. We think both a re excellent practices to be encouraged. So, in effect, this UK  proposal 
– if the Council is amenable – would be for the Chair and Secretariat to please circulate these notices, 
in line with these guidelines, from this day forth in case of meetings being r escheduled . And of  
course, we take note of the efforts of the Chair and Secretariat to set the calendar in the CTG and 
its subsidiary bodies, which is so helpful, and look forward to discussing that.  
3.49.  Turning now to the proposal contained in document  JOB/CTG/42 , which  also relates to an 
issue that we have spoken about at length in this Council, but on which  we have  not had a text to 
guide us until now. At the last meeting, I said that the UK would provide a draft text. This proposal 
would provide for the Chair,  under their own responsibility, to circulate a concise neutral overview 
of CTG  Informal meetings within two  days after the meeting. This would replicate the current helpful 
practice of other bodies, including the CMA and SPS  Committees. The objective of p roviding more 
information on informal meetings would be to help increase their transparency, including for those 
delegations that cannot attend them. We hope this extra information would support the inclusion 
and participation of all Members in the work of  this Council generally, including in the preparation 
for the formal agenda items that are linked to discussions in informal meetings. On that basis, this 
text provides a range of parameters to help guide the Chair's preparation of a factual and neutral 
overview of the main elements discussed by Members, as linked to the agenda of the meeting as 
circulated in the informal convening notice. Unlike the previous proposal, this proposal  is a request 
for a Decision by this Council. Therefore, if the Council is a menable, and can accept this Decision, 
then going forth we would welcome the circulation of a note from the Chair in line with the 
parameters set out in this document.  
3.50.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
3.51.  Paraguay  would like to support and welcome these two  initiatives. As our colleague from the 
United Kingdom  rightly pointed out in introducing them, they are practices that have in fact already 
been adopted by some of the subsidiary bodies of the Goods Council. In this regard, the Market 
Access Committee has already adopted the practice of giving a written explanation when there is a 
change in meeting dates and, in fact, we have already had to implement it a couple of times. We 
will probably have to implement it aga in, and it is definitely a transparency practice that is very 
useful in helping delegations understand the reasons lead ing to these changes in the planning of our 
work. It is a practice that should be extended not only to this Council, but also to the othe r bodies , 
including the General Council , where we notice that there are the most changes that affect also all 
the other councils and committees. Also, the circulation of an informal meeting report under the 
responsibility of the Chair, without attributing positions to specific delegations , and in a neutral 
manner , is a good practice that we see in several committees, including the Market Access 
Committee, the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures , the Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, and also the Committee  on Agriculture . As the US  delegation pointed out, these 
are practices that allow delegations that cannot be present at an informal meeting to know what 
was discussed and, in that sense, we note that, as the LDCs said, smaller delegation s have problems 
being in the room , including in formal meetings. The situation worsens when it comes to informal 
meetings, so we think it is a very useful contribution in terms of transparency. In general, in some 
committees the report of informal meetings  is usually circulated for comments before the 
Chairperson reads it out at the next formal meeting. It is a practice that we could discuss, but the 
important thing is that the reports are produced , and that we have information about what has 
occurred in me etings that we cannot attend. Despite our best efforts, duplication and overlapping of 
meetings continues to happen.  
3.52.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
3.53.  Ecuador  would first like to thank the United Kingdom for the submission of both documents,  
which Ecuador fully supports. The first  document  serves as a reminder of a decision already taken  G/C/M/147  
 
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  in 1995 , if I am not mistaken ; and the second  document  is a decision to produce a report after 
informal meetings.  
3.54.  The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
3.55.  Hong Kong, China would like to thank the United Kingdom for their proposals. We think their 
suggestions are very useful and we support them.  
3.56.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated  the following : 
3.57.  Uruguay is grateful for the two  proposals  by the United Kingdom. We echo what has already 
been said by Paraguay, Ecuador,  and Hong Kong, China. We believe that the reports of the 
chairpersons after an informal meeting, on their own responsibility, are extremely important.  
3.58.  The delegate of Djibouti , speaking on behalf of the LDC Group , indicated  the following : 
3.59.  We would just like to thank the United Kingdom for their great effort s in helping us advance 
on the reform issues. The UK has frequently met with the LDC  Group, and has taken into account 
our concerns with their proposals. We also met to discuss these issues, and our Group is favourable 
to the UK's proposals.  
3.60.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.61.  I thank all the Members for their comments. With this, can the Council agree to adopt these 
two new proposals by the United Kingdom  on a trial basis? I see no objection. So, I understand  that 
Members are ready to adopt the two  proposals by the UK. We will now ask the Secretariat to circulate 
them as a Decision by the Council. In addition, I propose t hat the Secretariat modify the draft report 
to reflect these two  new issues, for a total of 124  improvements overall. The modified version of the 
report will be circulated and submitted as soon as possible to the General Council. Can Members 
agree to this way of proceeding?  
3.62.  The Council so agreed . 
3.63.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.64.  I would like to echo the statements made by DDG  Ellard and Members on the importance of 
what has been achieved in this Council . It is commendable. We have heard in several m eetings of 
this Council, and even in meetings of the General Council, about  the achievements realized by this 
Council , and particularly now with the report that has just been adopted. We should all be happy 
and try to continue and keep up the momentum.  
3.3  Enhancing Clarity and Accessibility of Information ( JOB/CTG/43 ) – Request from 
Paraguay and the United Kingdom  
3.65.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.66.  This item has been included on the agenda at the request of Paraguay and the United 
Kingdom. I  understand that this is a new submission containing three new proposals that have not 
yet been discussed by the Council, so I would like to invite Paraguay and the United Kingdom to 
present them.  
3.67.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
3.68.  The main pur pose of this document is to highlight the challenges that we are currently facing 
and to propose specific suggestions that could be implemented on a trial basis by this Council. The 
document circulated by Paraguay and the United Kingdom, with a revised ver sion to be circulated 
shortly that will include Colombia and Uruguay as co -sponsors, aims at improving the clarity and 
accessibility of information and draws on previous submissions, including those contained in 
documents  JOB/CTG/21/Rev.3 , JOB/CTG/26/Rev.1  which makes reference to JOB/GC/223/Rev.1  
and WT/GC/W/874 . G/C/M/147  
 
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  3.69.  I do not intend to read the introductory paragraphs of the document but would like  to mention 
in broad terms that the motivation for these proposals is to facilitate the follow -up and participation 
of all delegations , especially small delegation s with limited human resources , including through the 
improvement of the format of certain documents.  The intention is by no means to reduce the amount 
of information, but on the contrary to moderni ze the format and facilitate access to it through 
addition al information that is considered useful , such as the inclusion of hyperlinks to existing 
documents , for example . The CTG is already a well -functioning example  of this,  which we should 
acknowledge, while also congratulat ing and thank ing the Secretariat for  their excellent work.  
However,  the reform of the WTO in general , and of the functioning of the WTO in particular , is not 
yet complete.  
3.70.  We all find it difficult to keep track of the wide variety of deadlines from different bodies. This 
is why the first  part of the proposal seeks to build on a useful practice that is already implemented 
by the Rules Committees, where a concise "deadlines document" is published immediately after the 
meeting with all the key information on dates and actions in one  place. This would create a quick 
access summary of dates and processes that are important to keep in mind, which would be 
particularly useful for smaller delegations, which have less capacity to attend and follow up on 
meetings. As I mentioned earlier, CTG  delegates a lready have a wide range of resources, thanks to 
the Secretariat, so it is ultimately a matter of bringing them together in one  place for ease of access.  
3.71.  With regard to the CTG's Information Centre, the new CTG  portal , in which the Secretariat 
has once aga in put so much effort, is an excellent example of improvements that facilitate access to 
information. I would like to encourage all delegates to use this excellent tool which, at least in the 
case of Paraguay, facilitates the work of preparing for CTG  meetings. Our proposal now requests the 
addition of two  additional boxes with hyperlinks to the latest minutes, deadlines , and dates of 
CTG meetings,  as well as when the agenda will close, to make this information even more accessible.  
3.72.  Regarding the convening notice (Airgram), the proposal is quite long, but in reality,  it reflects 
current practice. The main point is actually to update the current format, which , as we all know,  is 
rather outdated. We note that the annotated agenda is much easier to read, so we wanted to apply 
the same to the convening notice. We would like to keep the information already contained in the 
convening notices, but laid out in a format and typeface t hat can be copied and pasted into an email 
without losing the formatting or capitals when changing the typeface. Therefore, this part of our 
submission accommodates the contents that are in the CTG  convening notices  already , but requests 
the inclusion of o ther information that is already available in other tools, but that would be useful 
also to have in this document. I would like to stress that this is not intended to create anything 
substantially new , or to remove things beyond the old font and difficult formatting, and to continue 
with the inclusion of hyperlinks. It is simply to allow the Secretariat to make the existing information 
more readable (with a font like the annotated agenda, and more digitally integrated) and to add 
some additional useful info rmation, such as a link to the CTG's Rules of Procedure.  
3.73.  Let me conclude by again thanking you for giving me the floor to present this submission , 
and to thank again the Secretariat for the excellent work that ultimately makes it easier for us to 
focus on these additional small improvements to further contribute to the reform process based on 
actions. With your permission , we ask if Members would agree to implement the proposals on a trial 
basis for the next meeting. In the affirmative, this would lead to: (i) a timeline document being 
distributed after this meeting; (ii)  boxes being added to the already existing CTG  section in the 
WTO webpage; and (iii)  the next convening notice being issued in a more user -friendly format. We 
could then come back to the nex t Council meeting, as necessary, to see if this has been useful.  
3.74.  The delegate of India indicated  the following : 
3.75.  We welcome document  JOB/CTG/43  submitted by the United Kingdom and Paraguay. The 
ideas presented in this paper are very pertinent. Implementing the proposals contained in this 
document will help Members get a quick and accurate understanding of what transpired in a formal 
meeting , including action items, if any. The idea of setting up a CTG  Hub is also in line with India's 
proposals o f using technology to better serve both Geneva and capital -based delegates. This 
intervention will help in easy access to CTG  documents, while also enriching the CTG  webpage, which 
can become a one -stop destination for all information on the Council. My de legation will urge 
Members to consider supporting these ideas on a trial basis so that they can be taken up for formal 
adoption. Such a decision can be taken up as per the process being followed by the CTG for 
improvements in its functioning.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  3.76.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated  the following : 
3.77.  New Zealand  would like to support the proposal put forward by Paraguay and the United 
Kingdom, and echo India's remarks that it is a very useful, practical way of improving some of the 
accessibility to information, p articularly having links online to meeting information and the CTG  hub, 
as we  have also supported in the past, to have a very consolidated, one -stop-shop for the 
information of the CTG. And we would welcome improvements to the format of the Airgram, or the  
convening notice as it will be, to give us a better way of organizing our information as delegates.  
3.78.  The delegate of Norway  indicated  the following : 
3.79.  I thank Paraguay and the United Kingdom for presenting this proposal today , and as 
underlined by Paraguay, Norway likewise considers that enhancing the clarity and accessibility of 
information is especially important to small delegations. The Council and its subsidiary bodies have 
made great improvements already in this respect, and I also want to thank Roy and  the Secretariat 
for all the work that you have done in improving the website, making it more of a one -stop-shop, 
as New Zealand said. Norway very much supports the proposal on a trial basis for the next meeting, 
and supposing that the Secretariat would be  able to execute it, we think that it could be a good idea.  
3.80.  The delegate of Pakistan  indicated  the following : 
3.81.  Thank you for your leadership, and I would also like to thank the WTO  Secretariat for all the 
support. We support the proposal in document  JOB/CTG/43 , presented by Paraguay and the United 
Kingdom . It is an excellent proposal, particularly so because it will help smaller delegations to be in 
the picture and in the loop. It will improve the clarity, accessibility , and transparency of the 
proceedings of the Council. So we support the views that have been expressed before us, and thank 
Paraguay and the UK for presenting this proposal.  
3.82.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
3.83.  The European Union would like to thank Paraguay and the United Kingdom  for the proposal. 
The EU is open for further discussions in the area of reform by doing. Indeed, improvements to the 
clarity and accessibility of online information can lead to important efficiency gains.  
3.84.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated  the following : 
3.85.  I wish to thank Paraguay and the United Kingdom  for their communication contained in 
JOB/CTG/43 . The paper encompasses a number of proposals that aim to improve the functioning of 
the CTG. In our view, the proposed good practices can be implemented without further discussions , 
and following the principle of reform by doing.  
3.86.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
3.87.  I understand that Members are ready to adopt the proposal on these three  points on a trial 
basis. Can Members agree to this ? I see no objection. We will now ask the Secretariat to circulate 
the document with the three  points as a Decision by the Council. In addition, I propose that the 
Secretariat modify the draft report in Rev.3 to reflect these three  new issues, for a total of 
127 improvements. The modified version of the report will be circulated and submitted as soon as 
possible to the General Council. Can Members agree to this way of proceeding?  
3.88.  The Council so agreed . 
4  PRINCIPLES GUIDING THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION O F TRADE RELATED 
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES – COMMUNICATION FROM THE AFRICAN GROUP 
(G/C/W/830 ) 
4.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
African Group. He also noted that t his document had been  submitted to several bodies, and that it 
had first  been discussed at the General Council 's meeting of 24 -25 July 2023.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  4.2.  The delegate  of Djibouti, speaking on behalf of the LDC  Group,  indicated  the following : 
4.3.  The LDC  Group has the pleasure to intervene in s upport of the principles found in the 
submission by the African Group. LDCs also export products that can be impacted by unilateral 
environment al measures , while our countries contribute only marginally to the emissions that 
generate the greenhouse effect.  We are also not responsible for the climate crisis. We note that the 
paper has indicated that WTO rules allow complementary trade measures that are conducive to 
effective implementation of domestic environmental policies but seek to prevent such measures from 
creating disguised restrictions  to trade.  Therefore, climate measures that restrict our market acces s 
should indeed be avoided. The African Group paper sets out important principles that should be 
recogni zed in the WTO with a view to ensuring that eff orts to implement measures for trade and the 
environment do not result in adverse consequences, especially for LDCs and developing countries.  
4.4.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated  the following : 
4.5.  Paraguay thank s the African Group for their document. In general , Paraguay agrees with the 
orientation and principles set out in the document. We will be approaching the African Group for 
further discussion and to try to have joint initiatives along these lines.  
4.6.  The delegate of India indicated  the following : 
4.7.  We thank the Africa n Group for their submission of document  G/C/W/830 , and for bringing it 
to the attention of the Council for Trade in Goods. Like the African Group, India also believes that 
the environment -related trade measures being taken b y several Members negatively impact market 
access for developing countries. In fact, our own concerns on this issue are well documented in 
document  JOB/CTE/78/Rev.1 , presented to the Committee on Trade and Environment. This paper 
was jointly prese nted by India and South Africa. The ideas presented by the African Group and those 
contained in our Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE) submission have great commonality. 
We believe that the principles enshrined in international environmental law, lik e Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC), and the concept of nationally 
determined contributions  (NDCs) , to name just two, should be reflect ed in international trade law 
as well when designing trade measures rooted  in environmental outcomes. We welcome further 
discussion on this issue in all relevant WTO  bodies.  
4.8.  The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following : 
4.9.  We also thank the African Group for their document on the Principles Guiding the Development 
and Implementation of Trade -Related Environmental Measures. As we have also indicated in 
previous meetings, including meetings of the General Council, we support the main ideas underlying 
the arguments in this paper with regard to the need to respect the multilaterally agreed mandate of 
nationally determined contributions ( NDCs ) and the principles arising from both multilateral trade  
and environment agreements. We also believe that  the development dimension has to be an integral 
part of such measures, together with consideration for access to financing and technology with the 
aim of levelling the playing field. We very much support multilateral discussions on the nexus of 
trade and the environment , and we would like to continue deeper engagement with other Members 
on these matters.  
4.10.  The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
4.11.  Colombia expresses its appreciation to the African Group for its valuable contribution through 
today's submi ssion and presentation, which sets out the guiding principles that should be applied 
for the development  and implementation of trade -related environmental measures. This effort 
highlights the importance of a collaborative and coherent approach to trade and  environment. 
Likewise, we would like to recall that Colombia has presented a similar proposal in the Committee 
on Trade and Environment in document RD/CTE/221 , which addresses  the importance of coherence 
between the worlds of trade and international environ mental law. Our proposal does not mention 
specific principles yet, but it does draw attention to the need to have this discussion. This proposal 
complements and reinforces the efforts of the African Group, underlining the need for a coherent 
common framewo rk between both fora of public international law.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  4.12.  The delegate of China  indicated  the following : 
4.13.  China  share s similar views to those of the African Group on many of the guiding principles 
suggested in the proposal, such as Common but Differentiated Respons ibilities and Respective 
Capabilities  (CBDR -RC), Historical Responsibility, and Environmental Impact Assessment. We look 
forward to in -depth studies and discussions to explore how such principles could be integrated into 
the WTO. We also encourage Members to carry out more discussions in the Committee on Trade and 
Environment ( CTE) on various environmental issues.  
4.14.  The delegate of Switzerl and indicated  the following : 
4.15.  Switzerland thanks the African Group for its paper,  and we welcome its engagement on this 
important topic. As we all know, the whole planet is facing climate change, pollution , and biodiversity 
loss, and some Members may face b igger consequences. These issues require international 
collaboration and an approach that includes all policy fields, including trade. In other words, trade 
has to contribute to the solution,  and we believe that these global issues need a global answer, 
which means all hands  on deck.  
4.16.  In principle, we believe that some of the concepts that are being put forward by the African 
Group have not been agreed in other international fora, and remain controversial. We would 
therefore be cautious when using the term "guiding principles ". Importing political polarization from 
other fora would not help our discussions in the WTO. In our view, this communication requires 
discussions in the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE) as the relevant body to have  
substantial d iscussions on trade and environment issues , and we note that it was presented for the 
first time at the CTE 's November  meeting . However, we are not sure of the added value of presenting 
this paper to all committees, including in the CTG.  
4.17.  To conclude, we en courage further in -depth discussions on the trade and environment nexus 
on issues  that present both challenges and opportunities for all Members , especially LDCs at the 
CTE. 
4.18.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
4.19.  The European Union would also like to thank  the African Group for the paper. The EU supports 
more transparency and dialogue on trade -related environmental policies that Members are 
implementing to fulfil their international commitments. The EU sees the WTO, and particu larly the 
CTE, as a valuable forum for engagement on trade -related environmental measures, both during the 
design stage and once the measures are implemented. This includes discussions on how to minimi ze 
the impact of such measures on trade while also iden tifying means to support developing countries 
in complying with such measures and facilitating trade.  
4.20.  The European Union has engaged with WTO  Members without the WTO needing to change 
the rules. We do not believe that prescriptive principles for engagement  are necessary in the WTO.  
Moreover, the principles referred to in the African Group 's paper belong to different legal regimes 
and do not necessarily apply to every environmental policy being implemented. Yet, we fully agree 
that, in national policymaking,  compliance with relevant international commitments must be 
ensured, even if they stem from different legal regimes. This is why the EU has made sure that its 
European Green Deal policies comply with  the Multilateral Environmental Agreements  (MEAs) , 
includ ing the UNFCCC and the WTO  rules.  
4.21.  The European Union  has walked the talk of transparency and engagement. We invite other 
WTO Members, including developing Members , to do the same with their measures. We would also 
encourage Members to move on from ideologi cal discussions to engagement in practical action.  
4.22.  The delegate of Pakistan  indicated the following:  
4.23.  Pakistan  welcome s and support s the 12  guiding principles. I will not list them individually, but 
all the 12  guiding principles are provided in the paper . I would also like to thank the African Group 
for putting together this proposal. Trade and Environment is being discussed in various fora within 
the WTO, in different committees, and trade measures are being used in the name of  the 
environment to increase a nd raise trade barriers . Therefore , it is critical that this be discussed in all G/C/M/147  
 
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  the committees. We would urge the Council to consider this paper and these guiding principles. 
Thank you.  
4.24.  The Chairperson  proposed  that the Council take  note of the statements  made.  
4.25.  The Council so agreed . 
5  MEASURES TO ALLOW GRADUATED LDCS, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST FROM DJIBOUTI ON BEHALF OF THE LDC  GROUP ( G/C/W/752 ) 
5.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of 
Djibouti on behalf of the LDC  Group. He also noted that the issue had been last discussed by the 
CTG at its meeting of 6 and 7  July 2023.  
5.2.  The delegate of Djibout i, speaking on behalf of the LDC  Group,  indicated the following:  
5.3.  The LDC  Group in this case is only seeking a clarification , namely  that an LDC after graduation 
from the LDC  category would be able to avail itself of the flexibility under Article 27.2(a) of  the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  (ASCM), in a manner to be included in 
Annex  VII(b), if its GNP  per capita  remain ed below the USD 1,000 threshold in constant 
1990 US dollar  terms. We do not want to change the rules ; nor do we want to create any additional 
flexibility for us. Our only objective is to bring uniformity in the treatment under the provisions of 
the ASCM , which already exist in the WTO, under Annex  VII(b) , for those Members listed therein . 
Those Members,  having graduated from the LDC  category , should be deemed to be listed among 
developing countri es identified pursuant to Annex  VII(b) to the  ASCM , if their GNP  per capita is 
below US D 1,000 in constant 1990  dollars at the time of graduation , and they will re main in the list 
until their GNP  per capita reaches USD  1,000 in constant 1990  dollar s for three  consecutive years. 
If any such graduated LDC  Member is excluded from the list of Annex  VII(b) to the ASCM  because  
its GNP  per capita reached USD  1,000 for thre e consecut ive years, that graduated LDC shall be 
re-included when its GNP  per capita falls below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  dollars.  
5.4.  The delegate of Bangladesh  indicated the following:  
5.5.  The delegation of Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement made by Djibouti on behalf of the 
LDC Group. The proposal in document  G/C/W/752  aims to correct a technical omission regarding 
the use of export subsidies under the WTO  Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM). It is widely accepted that export subsid y is a policy tool that potentially can help Members 
in transition.  
5.6.  According to Article  27.2(a) of the ASCM, some Members are eligible to enjoy flexibilities under 
this Agreement. Th ese Members are specified in Annex  VII in two  separate categories: (a)  the LDCs; 
and (b)  some developing countries , as long as their GNI  per capita remains below USD  1,000 in 
constant 1990  US dollar terms. Paragraph  10.4 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on 
Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns ( WT/MIN(01)/17 ) confirms that, if a Member has been 
excluded from the Annex  VII(b) list, it shall be re-included in the list when its GNI  per capita falls 
back below USD  1,000. However, it is not clear  whether an LDC after graduation from the 
LDC category that still remains below the threshold ( that is, USD 1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar 
terms) will be able to avail itself of the flexibility contained in Article  27(a)  of the ASCM . 
5.7.  We thank the Secretariat for its notes in G/SCM/W/585 , dated 22  November  2021, with the 
title "GNP  per capita calculations for all WTO  Members using the methodology in G/SCM/382 . The 
GNI trend in that document shows that many LDCs, that is, Members listed in Annex  VII(a), may 
graduate from the LDC  category with GNI  per capita below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar 
terms. For example, Nepal is scheduled to graduate from the LDC  category in 2026 with a GNI per 
capita below USD  1,000 in cons tant 1990  US dollar terms. It is unclear whether Nepal will be able 
to avail itself of the flexibility under Article  27.2(a)  of the ASCM . This is a practical problem , and how 
can we solve it? Therefore, the LDC  Group proposes that an LDC after graduation, as long as its 
GNI remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms, should be allowed 
to use the flexibility under Article  27.2(a) of the ASCM. This request is also consistent with the G/C/M/147  
 
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  2001 Ministerial Decision that considered the  GNI threshold USD  1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar 
terms as the only criterion for the re -inclusion to, and re -exclusion from, the Annex  VII(b)  list. 
5.8.  We are grateful to all those Members that have been supporting this proposal since its 
submission in 2018 . The LDC Group also thanks the European Union and the United States  for 
opportunities to discuss their concerns bilaterally. Concerns were raised about data availability and 
information on export subsid ies. The LDC  Group values the importance of data , but considers  that it 
cannot be the pre -condition for the current discussion that aims to correct a technical omission 
without adding any new flexibility to the original agreement. An omission cannot be interpreted as 
a deliberate intent by Members to prevent  graduating LDCs from benefit ing from 
Article 27.2(a)  flexibilities.  
5.9.  Before we conclude, we should like to make a clarification. The current communication on  
Annex  VII of the ASCM has also been referred to as a component in Annex  II to the LDC  Group's 
proposal on Graduation at the General Council  (WT/GC/W/807/Rev.2 ). This means  that deliberation s 
on this item at the CTG will compl ement those on the LDC  Graduation proposal. We trust this 
clarification is helpful to avoid any confusion in this rega rd. Bangladesh, along with the LDC  Group, 
will continue working with the delegations of the European Union and the United States , and 
welcomes further suggestions from Members to get a positive result in this regard.  
5.10.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
5.11.  The European Union  thanks Djibouti and Bangladesh for their statements. The EU supports 
constructive initiatives to better integrate LDCs into the multilateral trading system and we 
encourage disc ussing this proposal. The EU is mindful of the challenges that graduating LDCs face. 
The EU is willing to explore a solution in the context of the discussions in the Committee on Trade 
and Development ( CTD) on LDC  graduation.  
5.12.  The delegate of the United Sta tes indicated the following:  
5.13.  As we have mentioned in previous meetings, we are reviewing the information that was put 
together by the Secretariat and, unfortunately, the calculations confirm our concerns that gaps 
remain in the information that is needed f or this proposal to be workable from a technical 
perspective. We remain ready to discuss ideas and proposals on how to address those gaps or 
otherwise address the issues addressed by this proposal.  
5.14.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
5.15.  My delegati on aligns itself with the statement delivered by Djibouti on behalf of the LDC  Group 
and would like to add few points. It is our pleasure to note that , as per the tentative plan, seven  LDCs 
will be graduating by 2026 : the graduation of Bhutan will be very soon, and others are also making 
progress in this regard. Meeting the GNP criteria does not necessarily mean that graduated countries 
will be able to overcome all the ir trade-related challenges. On the contrary, graduated countries may 
face enormous challe nges to cope in a new trade and economic environment. In the case of today's 
agenda, it is not clear whether a graduated Member  will be able to enjoy the said flexibilities if their 
GNI is below USD 1,000 in constant 1990  US dollar terms . In this regard, the decision in the proposal 
submitted by the LDC Group is necessary for greater clarity and predictability , such  that an LDC, 
after its graduation, and as long as its GNI  remains below the threshold of USD  1,000 in constant 
1990 US dollar terms, should be allowed the possibility to use the flexibility under Article 27.2 of the 
ASCM as are the developing countries listed in Annex  VII(b). LDCs are not demanding anything new 
but only requesting clarity concerning graduated countries automatically falling under the list of 
Annex  VII(b). The proposed decision is important to us from the perspective of justice, inclusiveness, 
equity , and equality.  
5.16.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
5.17.  The Council so agreed . G/C/M/147  
 
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  6  ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM 
ARMENIA  
6.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that the delegation of Armenia  had requested the 
Secretariat to circulate document  G/L/1110/Add.9 , relating to the extension of the time -period for 
the withdrawal of concessions, in connection with Armenia's accession to the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU), until 2  January  2025.  
6.2.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
6.3.  Despite positive achievements recorded on the NAMA  substance and our efforts to come up 
with the Agriculture package, we have to state that , due to well -known circumstances , and along 
with a significant number of the Members involved, the compensatory negotiations have move d 
much slower than was originally expected. Thus, it is obvious that additional time is required to 
finalize the process.  In view of this, to properly organize the course of the negotiations pursuant to 
document  G/L/1110/Add.4 , Armenia has indicated the following:  "In connection with the Treaty of 
Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)  [ … ]; and in view of 
ensuring that Members reserve their rights pending the communication to the WTO  Secretariat of 
the agreements reached in the context of Article  XXIV:6 (GATT), Armenia believes that it is desirable 
to provide for an extension of 12  months (that is, until 2  January  2025) ."3 
6.4.  It means that we express our readiness to provide for an extension of an additional 12 -month 
period , until 2 January  2025, to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions under 
Article  XXVIII:3 of the GATT  1994. Me anwhile, we stand ready to continue the negotiations with the 
interested WTO  Members  in a pragmatic and constructive way with a view to finaliz ing them in the 
foreseeable future. Considering the above, we request the Council to agree on the proposed 
extens ion. 
6.5.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated  the following : 
6.6.  The European Union welcomes the progress achieved in our negotiations on tariffs for 
non-agricultural products, where an agreement of principle has been reached. When it comes to 
agriculture, however, following the exchanges held in March  2022, the EU would welcome a sound 
commitment from Armenia to pursue these negotiations with a view to mak ing progress and 
potentially concluding them within the extended time -frame.  
6.7.  The delegate of Armenia  indicated the following:  
6.8.  We have taken note of the statement made by the representative of the European Union and 
will convey it to Capital in due course. We confirm our readiness to continue our negotiations with 
WTO Members in a pragmatic way with a view to finalizing them in the foreseeable future. 
Meanwhile, we will continue to inform the Council and interested Members of the ongoing 
compensatory adjustm ent negotiations.  
6.9.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the communication by Armenia and 
the statements made, and to agree on the extension of the deadline until 2  January  2025, as set 
out in communication G/L/1110/Add.9 . 
6.10.  The Council  so agreed . 
7  ACCESSION OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC TO THE EURASIAN ECONOMIC UNION: 
PROCEDURES UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 OF GATT  1994 – COMMUNICATION FROM THE 
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC ( G/L/1137/ADD.8 ) 
7.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that the delegation of the Kyrgyz Re public had requested 
the Secretariat to circulate document  G/L/1137/Add.8 , relating to the extension of the time -period 
 
3 Document  G/L/1110/Add.9 . G/C/M/147  
 
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  for the withdrawal of concessions, in connection with the Kyrgyz Republic's accession to the EAEU, 
until 12 February  2025.  
7.2.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
7.3.  The Kyrgyz Republic is still in the process of analysing the qualifications and other relevant 
data analysis based on the initial claims of interested Members. The Kyrgyz Republ ic is in discussions 
with one of the interested Members and stands open to cooperation with others. The Kyrgyz Republic 
would like to recall that the term provided for withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions 
expires on 12  February  2024. Consider ing that an additional time would be required in order to move 
these negotiations forward, and to ensure that Members reserve their rights pending the 
communication to the WTO  Secretariat of the agreement reached in the context of Article  XXIV:6 of 
the GAT T, the Kyrgyz Republic requests a further extension of Members' rights to withdraw 
concessions pending the conclusion of Article  XXVIII:3  negotiations , until 12  February  2025, as 
reflected in document  G/L/1137/Add.8 . Thus, "the Kyrgyz Republic will n ot assert that 
WTO Members that have submitted a claim pursuant to Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994 are 
precluded from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions because this withdrawal occurs 
later than six  months after the Kyrgyz Republic's withdraw al of concessions".  
7.4.  On the basis of the above -mentioned, the Kyrgyz Republic expresses its gratitude for the 
understanding of the interested WTO  Members, and for their support in demonstrating no objections 
on the issue of the extension of rights. The Kyrg yz Republic will continue communicating and 
exchanging information with the relevant parties to this process in due course.  
7.5.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated  the following : 
7.6.  The European Union welcomes the progress achieved in our negotiations on  tariffs for 
non-agricultural products, where an agreement of principle has been reached. When it comes to 
agriculture, however, following the exchanges in November  2022, the EU would like to invite the 
Kyrgyz Republic to submit a complete offer for compen sation on agricultural products, with a view 
to making progress and potentially concluding the negotiations within the extended time -frame.  
7.7.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following:  
7.8.  We would like to thank the European Union for their valuable comments, which will be conveyed 
to Capital in due course.  
7.9.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the communication by the 
Kyrgyz  Republic and the statements made, and to agree on  the extension of the deadline until 
12 February  2025, as set out in communication  G/L/1137/Add.8 . 
7.10.  The Council so agreed . 
8  MEMBERS' NON -RESPONSIVENESS TO QUESTIONS POSED BY OTHER MEMBERS – 
REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
United States. He also noted that the Members concerned had been  listed in Annex  1 of the agenda . 
8.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated  the following : 
8.3.  The United States is  once again raising this issue before the Council to identify certain Members ' 
non-responsiveness to questions posed by other Members. These have been outstanding issues on 
the agendas of the identified bodies for some time, and we are raising them up to t he Council as a 
normal administrative matter. As indicated in Annex  1, there are a series of questions that have 
been outstanding in the identified subsidiary bodies for some time, without response.  
8.4.  To be clear, this is not about the quality of a response or any other substantive issue in the 
questions themselves, but simply there being no response at all to the questions being posed. The 
United States stands willing to consult and/or work with all of the other Members identified in the 
Annex, so that those  Members can provide the necessary responses. As the United States has G/C/M/147  
 
- 21 - 
 
  demonstrated many times over in the various subsidiary bodies, we are happy to work with Members 
with such routine committee business and in exploring ways to improve the question -and-answer 
process going forward.  
8.5.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following : 
8.6.  The Russia n Federation  shares the view that questions posed by the WTO  Members have to be 
answered. The right to ask question s entails the obligation to respond. U nfortunately, some Members 
prefer to keep asking questions without providing any answers themselves. Our view on this issue 
is well -known to this Council , as well as to other relevant WTO  working bodies. At previous 
CTG meetings we set forth our considerat ions in detail, hence we will not  go into the detail s this 
time. However, w e will highlight  instances of selective transparency compliance that a number of 
WTO Members employ. Cases of non -responsiveness from the United States to the questions posed 
by the Russian Federation involve instances in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices, the Committee on Agriculture , and the Trade 
Policy Review Body. Unfortunately, certain WTO  Members  have decided to follow suit. Having pointed 
out that it would not engage in business -as-usual activity in the WTO, during its last TPR , Japan 
decided not to respond to written questions submitted by Russia. S everal days ago , in the Committee 
on Agriculture ( CoA), Japan reconfirmed its position that it would not engage in business -as-usual 
activity and refused to answer written questions posed by Russia in the Committee. Such a stance 
surprisingly did not preve nt Japan from raising questions on Russia 's trade policy under Agenda 
Item 16 of the current CTG  meeting regarding restrictions on import s of aquatic products from  
Japan. Written questions to the European Union  on the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanis m 
circulated two  years ago in the CMA and CTG still remain unanswered. Similarly, questions to the 
EU posed during meetings of the Committee on Market Access and the Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade on elements of the EU's Green Deal were likewise left unaddressed. Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom consistently 
leave unanswered written questions in the Committee on Agriculture regarding their unilateral 
measures that affect trade in agriculture. Selective transparency compliance undermines the 
WTO transparency mechanism. Russia calls on the said  Members to increase the overall 
transparency compliance rate in the WTO by improving their own transparency track record.  
8.7.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated  the following : 
8.8.  Switzerland  thank s the United States  for putting this item on the agenda. Although there are 
technical and organizational ways to improve the functioning of the committees, it is first and 
foremost Members ' responsibility to foster constructive deliberations. It is expected that Members  
engage in good faith in the discussions during and between committee meetings. This requires 
Members to answer questions that are posed to them. This is part of what we could label "good 
deliberative practices ". The process of questions and answers contribute s to creating common 
understanding about each and every Member's  trade policy measures and is conducive to rebuilding 
trust amongst Members . We therefore encourage all Members to improve their responsiveness as a 
way to improve the deliberati ve function of this Organization.  
8.9.  The delegate of India indicated  the following : 
8.10.  India had presented its comments on this agenda item raised by the United States in the 
previous meeting of the CTG. We request that our remarks made in the previous meeting  also be 
taken on record for this meeting.4 
 
4 G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  5.5-5.8: "5.5.  The delegate of India, addressing Agenda Items  5 and 6, 
indicated the following:  
5.6.  India remains engaged with the delegation of the United States on the issue raised on the Working Party 
on State Trading Enterprises. As mentioned in our statement in the previous CTG  meeting, to respond to the 
concerned questions, we have been awaiting the release of our updated National Trade Policy, w hich has been 
introduced a few weeks ago.  
5.7.  Our belief is that the WTO  Members act as per their best capacities to comply with the various notification 
obligations of this Organization. More broadly, transparency brought about by complying to the notif ication 
obligations must permeate all parts of this Organization. For example, we recently highlighted a situation in the 
Committee on Agriculture, where there has been a situation where counter -notifications were issued against 
our delegation, including b y Members who have not submitted their own domestic support notification. The 
 G/C/M/147  
 
- 22 - 
 
  8.11.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated  the following : 
8.12.  The United Kingdom  will be speaking to Agenda I tems 8 and 9. The United Kingdom is grateful 
to the  United States for raising the issue. Members know well that the UK , like so many others , 
shares the US'  passion for the underlying principles of transparency and resolution of trade concerns. 
We would also be keen to hear from the Members listed on what would most help them to fulfil their 
notification or response requirements. The UK stands ready to provide technical assistance and 
capacity -building to help its partners meet their obligations, and we look forward to continuing this 
conversation on t ransparency.  
8.13.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
8.14.  The Council so agreed . 
9  MEMBERS' NON -NOTIFICATIONS OF ITEMS PURSUANT TO CERTAIN WTO  AGREEMENTS  
– REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  the 
United States. He also noted that the Members concerned had been  listed in Annex  2 of the agenda . 
9.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
9.3.  Similarly to the previous agenda item, the Un ited States is bringing this agenda item to the 
Council again to identify certain Members ' non-notifications of items pursuant to certain 
WTO Agreements. This non -notification issue has been raised in the identified subsidiary bodies for 
several years now,  and we are now raising this up to the Council as a normal administrative matter. 
As the United States has stated in past meetings, we appreciate the Chairs ' and Secretariat 's 
attempts in the relevant subsidiary bodies to get Members to make their respecti ve notifications, 
and we have noticed that an increasing number of Members have done so. However, as indicated in 
Annex  2, there remain a number of Members  that have not yet made their respective notifications.  
9.4.  In reviewing the list, the United States note s that, for nearly every Member, information has 
been reported to the WTO through the TPR  process whether the Member does or does not have the 
requisite obligation item in place. In other words, most WTO  Members have been made aware of 
their status, albeit  in another forum.  
9.5.  As other Members have demonstrated in the past, the notification is not overly burdensome 
and, for most Members, will likely result in a nil  notification. Therefore, we continue to encourage 
all of the outstanding Members who have yet to make their respective notifications to review their 
individual situations and make the applicable notification.  
9.6.  As many of these notifications have been outstanding for over 25  years, if Members have 
questions about their notification obligations, they should approach the Secretariat for guidance 
about how to meet the requirements under the applicable WTO  Agreements. Alternatively, if for 
some reason a Member is unable to reach out to the Secretariat, Members can reach out to other 
Members for guidance a nd/or assistance. We have all been in a position of having to do a 
WTO notification for the first  time at one time or another, so we should all be sympathetic to the 
challenges certain obligations may face . As many Members in the referenced subsidiary bodi es can 
attest to, including LDCs and those with small delegations, we stand ready to help in any way we 
can and have indeed already helped many Members with their applicable notifications.  
9.7.  We are pleased to report that , since this list was created, Lesotho  has made a notification to 
the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises; Mauritania has made the requisite notifications to 
the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, and the Committee on Safeguards;  and Tanzania and Vanuatu have separately made the 
 
delegation of the US has also been involved in this discussion. However, this anomaly is not captured in the 
agenda item raised today by the US for the CTG.  
5.8.  If the intent h ere is to highlight discrepancies and anomalies, we would request the delegation of the US 
not to cherry -pick what would constitute transparency in the working of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. And 
we would also request the delegation of the US not to co-sponsor papers on certain subjects along with 
defaulters on the same subject ." G/C/M/147  
 
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  requisite notifications to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. We sincerely 
appreciate the efforts made by our LDC  friends in making these notifications, and encourage other 
Members to follow their example.  
9.8.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated  the following : 
9.9.  Nepal  would like to thank the United States for raising its concerns regarding the notification 
under paragraph  25.2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and paragraph  1 
of the understanding of Working Party on State Trading Enterprises and replies to the checklist of 
issues (G/VAL/5 ). The messages hav e been communicated to Capital. And I will update the Council 
as soon as I receive the relevant information from Capital.  
9.10.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
9.11.  The Council so agreed . 
10  G20 TRADE AND INVESTMENT MINISTERS' MEETING – UPDATE INCLUDING JAIPUR 
CALL ON ACTION FOR MSMES – REQUEST FROM INDIA  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
India.  
10.2.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
10.3.  Under the ongoing G20  presidency of India, the G20  Trade and Investment Ministerial Meeting 
(TIMM) was held in August  2023. This meeting focused on easing barriers to international trade and 
investment; helping boost productivity and output and fostering e conomic growth and prosperity for 
all. This agenda item has been added for an update on the meeting. While addressing the opening 
session of TIMM in Jaipur, Rajasthan, Hono urable  Minister of Commerce and Industry Shri Piyush 
Goyal encouraged the Ministers from the G20 and other invitee countries to work collectively to 
achieve concrete, decisive and action -oriented outcomes. This session resulted in a 
TIMM  declaration, which also included the Jaipur Call for Action for enhancing access to information 
for MS MEs. This agenda item has been added to share an update with the WTO  delegates from this 
declaration, with the outcomes being relevant to our ongoing work in this Organization. We will urge 
the Members to refer to documents  RD/MA/120  and RD/MA/121 , which were the two presentations 
circulated after the meeting of the Committee on Market Access. Coincidentally, today is 
30 November, the last day of India's G20  presidency. We wish Brazil the best as they take over the 
G20 presidency , starting tomorrow , for the upcomin g year. We hope that the contributions made by 
the Indian presidency on trade can be integrated into and shaped further in the G20  agenda.  
10.4.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated  the following : 
10.5.  Switzerland  wishes to thank India for their update on the Jaipur call on action for MSMEs. 
Given  that Switzerland fosters innovation, entrepreneurship , and trade openness, the topic of how 
to foster a greater participation of MSME s in world trade is dear to us. Facilitating  trade for MSMEs, 
and thus better integrating them in to global value chains, will contribute to creating jobs and 
addressing income gaps. This will be to the benefit of all, particular ly developing countries. Every 
day the trading environment becomes more complex. In comparison to large firms, MSMEs face 
unequal difficulties in navigat ing the global economy.  
10.6.  Facilitating the participation of MSMEs in world trade calls for improved access to information, 
ways to promote a more predictable regulatory environm ent, and reduction of trade costs. Let me 
quote , in particular , the declaration on access to information, initiated by Switzerland, that requires 
participating Members  to submit a variety of information to the Global Trade Helpdesk. It is also 
relevant to mention the launch of the trade4MSMEs ( "trade for MSMEs ") platform that contain s a 
wealth of useful information for MSMEs and trade policy makers. Maximizing the impact of our 
actions requires the solutions to be designed and implemented in the WTO.  
10.7.  While we welcome the G20  initiative on the matter, in the spirit of joining efforts, we 
encourage India and all G20  Members to contribute to the current work being carried out in the 
WTO informal Working Group on MSMEs.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  10.8.  The delegate of the United States  indicate d the following:  
10.9.  The United States appreciate s India's leadership in the G20 this year, including its focus on 
making trade - and market -related information available to MSMEs. We look forward to hearing from 
the ITC on its plans to upgrade the Global Trade  Help Desk to help bridge such information gaps. 
We recall that the ITC will work on a detailed plan, in consultation with UNCTAD and the WTO. Those 
consultations will be done in accordance with the relevant Memorandum of Understanding among 
the ITC, UNCTA D, and the WTO.  
10.10.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated  the following : 
10.11.   The European Union attaches great importance to the internationali zation of MSMEs. They 
represent 99% of all EU  companies and 94% of EU  exporting companies. In contrast to larger 
businesses, MSMEs face particular challenges when engaging in international markets. Notably, they 
have limited capacity to deal with complex administrative and regulatory procedures. They also have 
asymmetrical a ccess to information which is necessary to conduct business abroad. This is why 
access to reliable information is key for MSMEs to increase their participation in international trade. 
Therefore, the EU welcomes the "Jaipur Call for Action " to enhance acces s to information for MSMEs.  
10.12.   The European Union would like to report on several EU  tools to help MSMEs trade abroad. 
First, since October  2020, the online EU  Access2Markets portal provides MSMEs with all the 
information they may need to export and import to  third countries. The Access2Markets platform 
has been very successful with the EU  SME community and beyond with more than six  million visitors 
since its launch. Second, through dedicated SME  chapters in the EU 's more recent trade agreements, 
the EU  reques ts its trade partners to make available on one  single website all information European 
SMEs may need when trading and doing business with that respective market. Third, in the margins 
of the work of the WTO  Informal Working Group on MSME s, the EU cooperate s towards 
improvements of the existing Global Trade Helpdesk (GTH). In this regard, the EU notes the regular 
data submissions to the GTH, feedback on GTH  recent upgrades , and bilateral meetings with the 
International Trade Centre to exchange on future coll aboration.  
10.13.   The European Union  encourages all Members to develop information portals that would 
complement the GTH with more detailed information about their markets. The EU will continue to 
support the implementation of the "WTO MSMEs Package " with its rec ommendations to enhance 
access to information, reduce red tape, facilitate access to trade finance, and explore synergies with 
the Global Trade Helpdesk.  
10.14.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
10.15.   The Council  so agreed . 
TRADE CONCERNS  
10.16.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
10.17.   We will now start addressing the trade concerns, which constitute the bulk of our discussions. 
For information, we have 44  trade concerns , which ties with the previous record number from 
November of last year. Of these trade concerns, eight are new and 36 were previously raised. As 
agreed by the Council at its meeting of 3 -4 April 2023, we will begin by considering the new trade 
concerns bef ore turning to look at those previously raised.  
10.18.   Before we begin , I would like to remind you that the annex to the Annotated Agenda contains 
links and cross -references to discussions in other bodies, most of which were kindly provided by the 
Members request ing the inclusion of the agenda items and complemented, where possible, by the 
Secretariat. Where available, the Secretariat also added direct links to the trade concerns database.  
10.19.   In light of the increasing number of trade concerns that remain on our agen da over extended 
periods, with some issues remaining over several years, I would like to remind you that I am at your 
disposal should you wish to request the good offices of the Council's Chairperson.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  NEW TRADE CONCERNS  
11  INDIA – IMPORT LICENSING MEASURES ON PCS, TABLETS, AND OTHER ELECTRONIC 
PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
11.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
11.3.  China  would like to refer to its statements made at the Committee on Market Access on 
16 October and the Committee on Import Licensing Procedures on 31  October. On 3  August  2023, 
the Directorate General of Foreign Trade  (DGFT), Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India issued 
the Notificat ion No.  23/2023 and abruptly announced that a licensing requirement for importing 
laptops, tablets, all -in-one personal computers and ultra-small form factor computers and servers 
would be imposed immediately. On 4  August  2023, India decided to delay the i mplementation of the 
licensing requirement until 1  November  2023, in Notification No.  26/2023 , issued by the DGFT.  
11.4.  We also take note that , on 19  October, some changes and exemptions were made to the 
import licensing requirement , in Notification No.  38/2023 . On the same day, the DGFT issued the 
Policy Circular No.  06/2023 -24, which provided some information on implementation of Import 
Management Systems for IT  hardware. According to the said Policy Circular, the importers still need 
to apply for import autho rizations in order to import relevant products.  
11.5.  We would like to receive a clarification from India concerning  this measure, in particular, the 
import authorizations in the Policy Circular No.  06/2023 -24, including the purpose of these import 
authorizations and the process of applying for and granting the authorizations.  
11.6.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
11.7.  The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by others regarding India's import 
management system for electronics such as PCs, tablets, and other electronic products. We are 
closely monitoring the ramifications of the system impl emented by India since 1  November, and 
hope that India will refrain from introducing trade -restrictive measures.  
11.8.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
11.9.  My delegation notes that India has commenced the implementation of an import management  
system for personal computers, laptops, tablets and other electronic items falling under 
HS Code 84.71, starting from 1  November  2023. We also note that the import management system, 
which requires importers to register and apply for authorization before exporting products into India, 
will remain in force until September  2024. While we will closely monitor the effects of the 
implementation of the management system, we urge India to strictly follow WTO  rules when 
implementing the current rules or enacting a ny new rules. In particular, we urge India to ensure 
that it does not create any trade -restrictive or distorting effects , and that it strictly adhere to the 
transparency requirement. We reiterate the importance of India providing sufficient opportunities 
and an appropriate time -period for traders and other interested parties to comment on any proposed 
regulations , and that they receive a reasonable amount of time to adapt to any new requirements.  
11.10.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
11.11.   The United States notes that we have raised this concern in the Committee on Market Access 
and the Committee on Import Licensing. We have also submitted a number of questions to India on 
this item. We look forward to receiving India's responses.  
11.12.   The delegate  of India indicated the following:  
11.13.   We have taken good note of the statements made by the delegations of China, the United 
States, Chinese Taipei, and the Republic of Korea today. We are also in receipt of the questions 
contained in document  G/LIC/Q/IND/29 . This document was received on 18  October. Our 
New Delhi-based authorities are currently looking at the comments made in the previous meetings G/C/M/147  
 
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  of the Committee on Market Access, the Committee on Import Licensing, and the Council for Trade 
in Goods , as well as the questions raised in the questionnaire. We would like to draw the attention 
of Members to Notification  No. 38/2023 of 19  October  2023, available on the Directorate General of 
Foreign Trade 's website, which further clarifies the measure. We also draw the attention of Members 
to the WTO  notification G/LIC/N/2/IND/23 , which was circulated yesterday , in the Committee on 
Import Licensing , concerning  this particular measure. We will remai n engaged bilaterally with all 
Members raising this issue.  
11.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
12  EUROPEAN UNION – THE ANTI -SUBSIDY INVESTIGATION AGAINST THE IMPORTS OF 
BATTERY ELECTRIC VEHICLES FROM CHINA – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recall ed that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
12.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
12.3.  On 4  October, the European Commission initiated an anti -subsidy investigation against 
imports of new battery electric vehicles from Ch ina. China is seriously concerned with th e initiation  
of this investigation . 
12.4.  First, with regard to the pre -initiation consultations, the European Union  refused to provide 
China with the evidence and factual basis for initiating the investigation, which pre vented China from 
engaging with the EU in a meaningful and substantial pre -initiation consultation. We believe that the 
EU's practice is inconsistent with its obligation to afford a reasonable opportunity for consultation , 
and seriously jeopardize s China's  right to consultation. It violates Articles  13.1 and 13.3 of the 
SCM Agreement.  
12.5.  Second, regarding the initiation  of the investigation , the European Union neither provided 
evidence of the existence of "special circumstances" to justify the initiation, nor indicate sufficient 
evidence of the existence of subsidies, injury threat, and causation. We believe that this violates 
Article  11.6 and Article  11.2 of the SCM  Agreement.  
12.6.  Third, the sampling methodology of exporting producers is not transparent, objective , and 
impartial. The European Union requested the relevant Chinese firms to provide a large amount of 
irrelevant information in the questionnaire and to prove the existence of subsidies by themselves. 
This is a violation of the impartiality of the investigation. In the sampling, the EU excluded the largest 
EV exporter of China and chose only three  Chinese native brand companies, which do not account 
for th e largest percentage of China's EV  exports. This is contrary to the criteria of representation 
based on the highest volume of exports. In the EU  industry sampling, the EU excluded its enterprises 
with the highest production and sales volumes. In addition, the EU has not substantially responded 
to China's questions regarding the composition of the EU's EV  industry and the sampling of EU's 
EV producers, and keep s the relevant information undisclosed. This makes it impossible for China to 
comment on the sampli ng of the EU  industry and the determination of the EU  industry, and seriously 
affects China's right to defend itself.  
12.7.  Fourth, the European Union  abuses its investigative power by arbitrarily expanding the scope 
of companies responding to its questionnaire.  Some sampling companies have to ask more than 
100 affiliated companies to respond to the questionnaire. With only  a four-day extension to answer 
the questionnaire, this practice has created a huge burden for the sampling companies to respond  
to the questi onnaire.  
12.8.  We believe that the European Union's  investigation seriously violates the WTO  rules and 
obligation s. This is a practice of  EU "protectionism" aiming to protect the EU's own industry in the 
name of "fair competition". We urge the EU to comply with the WTO rules, to correct its wrong 
practice immediately , and to ensure that the investigation be carried out in a transparent, fair, 
impartial , and WTO -consistent manner  that will  fully protect China's legitimate rights and interests.  
12.9.  Finally, it is worth highlighting that the key driver of the rapid development of the Chinese 
EV industry is not government intervention and subsidies, but the large scale of the Chinese G/C/M/147  
 
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  domestic market, China's unremitting efforts in technology upgrade an d innovation , and its complete 
and competitive industrial and supply chains. China's efficient EV  industry has made , and will 
continue to make, great contributions not only to China's carbon emissions reduction, but also to 
the global response to climate c hange and the green transformation, including in the European 
Union.  
12.10.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
12.11.   The European Union thanks China for its remarks concerning the initiation of the 
investigation into battery electric vehicles f rom China, which began on 4  October  2023. The 
investigation is in its early stages and is being conducted in accordance with strict legal procedures 
in compliance with EU and WTO  rules. The EU would like to recall that ex officio  initiations of trade 
defence investigations under special circumstances are in line with EU and WTO  rules. The European 
Commission had sufficient evidence that the recent surge in low -priced and subsidized imports from 
China posed an economic threat to th e EU industry. Pre -initiation consultations were offered in line 
with WTO  rules, with ample time for them to take place, which they did, before initiation. As regards 
sampling, the European Commission analysed a wide range of information. On this basis , a sample 
of companies was selected that ensures representativity for the electric car industry operating in 
China.  
12.12.   I would like to note that the initiation of the investigation does not indicate any presumption 
of its outcome. The investigation will determin e whether countervailable subsidi zation benefiting 
battery electric vehicle production in China exists and if it is causing or threatening to cause injury 
to the competing electric vehicle producers in the European Union. In such case, the EU will also 
examine whether it is in its interest to remedy the effects of any such unfair trade practices by 
imposing anti -subsidy duties on the imports.  
12.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
13  INDIA – QUALITY CONTROL ORDER FOR CHEMICAL AND PETROCHEMICAL 
SUBSTANCE S – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Thailand.  
13.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
13.3.  Thailand wishes to express its ongoing concern about India's Quality Control Ord er for 
Chemical and Petrochemical Substances, a matter previously raised in multiple sessions of the 
Committee on Market Access and Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. Given the substantial 
delay in issuing IS  mark certificates to eligible Thai manuf acturers of this product, adversely affecting 
their operations, Thailand finds it necessary to raise this concern for the first  time in the Council for 
Trade in Goods. Despite India attributing the delay to manpower and testing facility constraints, 
certificates have been issued to domestic and other foreign suppliers. The delay in providing IS  mark 
certificates to the Thai manufacturers raises concerns about potential discrimination by India, 
questioning the fair and non -discriminatory treatment of manufac turers, regardless of their origin. 
In view of these concerns, Thailand requests India to postpone the implementation of the IS  Mark 
Certification based on the Quality Control Orders for Polyethylene Material for Moulding  and 
Extrusion. This delay should p ersist until India can efficiently issue certificates to all eligible 
manufacturers in a timely and non -discriminatory manner.  
13.4.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
13.5.  India thank s the delegation of Thailand for its continued interest in this issue. The Bureau of 
Indian Standards (BIS) is carrying out physical inspections for applications received from foreign 
manufacturers, where the country to be visited is facilitating the visit of BIS  officers. The process of 
standards development of BIS is aligne d with accepted international best practices that are based 
on the core principles of openness, transparency, impartiality , and consensus. While formulating 
Indian standards, analysing the relevance of international standards – ISO, IEC , and others – to the 
Indian situation is an integral part of the process. This process is in accordance with the Code of 
Good Practice of  the WTO TBT Agreement , and as a policy. The BIS seeks to align Indian standards G/C/M/147  
 
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  with the International Standards of ISO and IEC, where av ailable , and to the extent possible, keeping 
in consideration the specific climatic/environmental conditions and technological development in the 
country. Around 88% of Indian Standards, for which corresponding ISO and IEC  standards are 
available, are harm onized with their ISO/IEC  counterparts.  
13.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
14  FRANCE – REVISED ELECTRIC VEHICLE (EV) SUBSIDY SCHEME – STATEMENT BY THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the Republic of Korea.  
14.2.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
14.3.  The Republic of Korea has significant concerns over France's revision to its "green bonus", 
which was enacted on 10  October  2023. Korea acknowledges the French government's commitment 
to promoting electric vehicles (EVs) as part of its strategy to actively address climate change. 
However, Korea is concerned that the recent amendments to its EV  subsidy regime appear to be 
inconsistent with WTO rules and principles, including Articles  I and III  of the GATT , as they are 
designed in a manner that could disadvantage imported EVs based on the carbon emissions 
generated during their production. Such an approach could unduly burden businesses and p otentially 
hamper fair and free economic activities.  
14.4.  In this context, the Republic of Korea would like the French government to consider the 
following . First, Korea requests that France clarify the methodology used to determine carbon 
emission factors and the criteria behind these determinations, and adjust them to reflect justifiable 
figures. We understand that , at present, there are no established standards for carbon emissions for 
each component in the EV  manufacturing process.  
14.5.  Second, the Republic of Ko rea believes that the consideration of transportation distance and 
carbon emission factors by each transport could significantly disadvantage foreign 
EV manufacturers, particularly those with assembly sites located far from France and reliant on 
maritime t ransport. This approach will substantially reduce the likelihood of foreign -produced cars 
qualifying for French subsidies. Therefore, Korea suggests that this consideration be revisited and 
adjusted.  
14.6.  Lastly, the Republic of Korea proposes that France consi der postponing the implementation 
of these changes until there are established international standards on carbon emission factors.  
14.7.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
14.8.  China t hanks the Republic of Korea for adding this item to the agenda. We also  have concerns 
on this matter. One of our concerns is on the default values for carbon emissions of imported electric 
vehicles. As we pointed out in the "Policy Issues for Dedicated Multilateral Discussions on Border 
Carbon Adjustment" ( WT/CTE/W/258 ), we  believe that default values for carbon emissions of 
imported goods is a critical element in the policy design of environment -related trade measures. 
Members must ensure the reliability of and minimize the time -lag in the database through effective 
coopera tion with the Members having appropriate jurisdiction, so as not to constitute arbitrary or 
disguised trade restrictions. We will closely monitor the development of this issue.  
14.9.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
14.10.   Regard ing the revised EV  subsidy  scheme, Japan would like to request that France 
implement and exercise such subsidies in accordance with the WTO.  
14.11.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
14.12.   The European Union takes note of the concerns expressed by the Republic of Korea,  China,  
and Japan, and recalls the information provided in the context of the regular meeting of the 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in October. The revision of the subsidy scheme G/C/M/147  
 
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  aims to direct subsidies for purchasing electric vehicles  towards the most environmentally friendly 
vehicles, considering the growing demand for these vehicles in the coming years.  
14.13.   The French measure aims to prioritize the acquisition of environmentally friendly vehicles 
throughout their entire life cycle. The p revious bonus system only considered CO2 emissions during 
vehicle use. Conditioning the Auto Bonus on environmental criteria that would take into account the 
entire life cycle of the vehicle would reduce France's carbon footprint by an average of 
800,000  tonnes of greenhouse gases per year between 2024 and 2027.  
14.14.   As regards the application process for the bonus scheme, please note that manufacturers 
have submitted 452  applications since 10  October  2023; 345 of these have already been examined 
by the French E nvironment and Energy Management Agency , ADEME.  
14.15.   The French authorities remain at the disposal of manufacturers. They also maintain ongoing 
technical exchanges with manufacturers to help them submit their applications. The first  list of 
eligible vehicles is  expected to be published on 15  December.  
14.16.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
14.17.   Considering the differential carbon emission factors applied to EU -produced EVs and those 
manufactured outside the EU  respectively, it is challenging to see the revision as purely 
environmentally motivated. Even if it is intended  as such , the measure may constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade, which wou ld be in violation of the WTO Agreements.  
14.18.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
15  PERU – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United Kingdom.  
15.2.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
15.3.  As a major producer of world -class spirits, the United Kingdom has significant interest in 
making sure that these receive fair and equ al treatment in markets around the world. All Members 
in this room, including Peru, have signed up to the GATT, including Article  III, under which it is 
prohibited to apply internal taxes or charges to imported goods in excess of those applied to like 
dome stic products. This principle has been consistently reiterated by WTO  panels. It is disappointing 
therefore that, for over a decade, the UK has had to raise Peru's discriminatory tax measures on 
imported spirits in this and other fora. These exemptions cle arly favour and protect Pisco over other 
competing products in the Peruvian Spirits market, including Scotch and gin. The economic impact 
of this discriminatory tax is significant. Our industry estimates that this measure has cost the UK 
more than G BP 70 million over the past five  years. Our exporters continue to lose millions a year  
when compared with our sales to Peru before this discriminatory law was introduced.  
15.4.  Turning to the context of this item, following years of bilateral outreach, Members may reca ll 
that we have raised our concerns in the Committee on Market Access  (CMA)  for almost two  years. 
However, we have not seen the progress that we would expect, and have yet to receive answers to 
our written questions submitted nearly 18  months ago.  
15.5.  Reluctan tly – not least given how important a partner we consider Peru to be on WTO  affairs 
– we therefore felt that it was necessary to take the significant step of escalating this STC from the 
CMA to the Council for Trade in Goods, which is an unprecedented step  for the UK. We hope that by 
bringing this to the Council's attention, we will encourage Peru to answer the questions raised of 
their policies. And we also hope that we can sit down as partners and look at practical next steps for 
removing this barrier.  
15.6.  We believe that there is a way forward that works for Peru, for the United Kingdom , and within 
the spirit of the WTO, but we need Peru, across different ministries and specialisms, to engage 
substantively with us. We hope that they will do so now.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  15.7.  The delega te of the European Union  indicated the following:  
15.8.  As at meetings of the Committee on Market Access, where this issue has been raised several 
times, the European Union once again wishes to join the United Kingdom in raising concerns 
regarding Peru's tax dis crimination in favour of Pisco. The EU continues to be seriously concerned 
that the existing tax regime undermines the ability of EU  spirits to compete on a level playing field 
on the Peruvian market. The EU insists that Peru clarify  how this measure is co nsistent with its 
existing WTO  obligations, in particular the obligation not to discriminate against imported spirits. We 
regret that despite this matter being raised several times in the CMA and in bilateral fora, so far, no 
progress can be reported. The EU looks forward to Peru's suggestions as to how to resolve this issue 
promptly.  
15.9.  The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
15.10.   Peru takes note of the interventions made by the United Kingdom and the European Union, 
and their concerns expressed in the Marke t Access Committee and now in this Council. In this regard, 
it is worth mentioning that we have been meeting bilaterally and discussing the UK's concerns. In 
this regard, we reiterate our willingness to continue to do so and to bring the technical issues o f this 
matter to the bilateral mechanisms available to us. I reiterate, however, that Peru has taken note 
of the approaches and concerns, and that, should we make changes to the tax measures, these 
changes would be evaluated in coordination with the sector s concerned, as well as with our trading 
partners. In addition, it is relevant to underline that any tax changes on our part require legislative 
amendments involving multiple stakeholders from the public, private , and civil society sectors , which 
is naturally  a burdensome process in substantive and temporal terms.  
15.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
16  CHINA; HONG KONG, CHINA; MACAO, CHINA; AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION – 
RESTRICTION ON IMPORTS OF AQUATIC PRODUCTS FROM JAPAN AFTER DISCHARGE OF 
ALPS TREATED WATER INTO THE SEA – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
16.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
16.3.  On 24  August, China;  Hong Kong, China;  and Macao, China;  and o n 16 October, the Russian 
Federation,  respectively , imposed an import restriction measure on Japanese aquatic products, and 
on other foodstuffs in Macao, China, following the discharge of Japan's Advanced Liquid Processing 
System (ALPS) treated water. Japa n's position is as set out in the communications circulated by the 
Secretariat on 4 and 27  September, 12  October , and 8  November , respectively, and we will not go 
into the details of our position again today. However, Japan would like to stress that the di scharge 
of ALPS -treated water into the sea has been carried out in accordance with international safety 
standards and practices  and after taking all possible safety precautions. Furthermore, as the IAEA's 
comprehensive report indicates, the discharge of AL PS-treated water into the sea has negligible 
impact on human health and the environment.  
16.4.  In addition, following the discharge of the ALPS -treated water, the Government of Japan, with 
the support of independent international experts from the IAEA  Task Force , and with the continuous 
involvement of the IAEA, including IAEA -led reviews, has carried out monitoring relating to the 
concentration of radioactive substances , and has also published the results in a timely and 
transparent manner. Japan has consistently  provided information to the SPS  Committee on the 
safety of discharging ALPS -treated water into the sea. In addition, the Government of Japan is fully 
committed to taking all possible measures to ensure the safety of the discharge of ALPS -treated 
water by implementing reliable monitoring and publishing the results of such monitoring in a timely 
and transparent manner.  
16.5.  The Government of Japan once again expresses its strong regret  of the fact that, despite 
these measures taken by Japan, these four  Members have imposed import suspension measures on 
Japanese aquatic products and on other foodstuffs in Macao, China without any scientific grounds. 
These measures are totally unacceptable to Japan. In fact, in September this year, the value of G/C/M/147  
 
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  Japan's seaf ood exports to China decreased by approximately 90% compared to the same month 
last year. Thus, access to markets for Japanese fishery products and foodstuffs has been significantly 
hampered, causing significant economic damage to domestic fishermen and ot her stakeholders. 
These measures are clearly contrary to Article  XI:1 of the GATT concerning the g eneral elimination 
of quantitative restrictions , and Japan strongly urges China;  Hong Kong, China;  Macao, China;  and 
the Russia n Federation  to immediately cea se such measures. We continue to call on China;  Hong 
Kong, China;  Macao, China;  and the Russia n Federation  to promptly respond to discussions with 
Japan, in view of our request for discussions under paragraph  6(c) of Annex  B of the SPS  Agreement.  
16.6.  The deleg ate of the United States  indicated the following:  
16.7.  The United States takes note of Japan's intervention, and its concern that China;  Hong Kong, 
China;  Macao, China;  and the Russian Federation continue to apply a trade restrictive measure to 
suspend imports of Japan's aquatic products without justification. The US reiterates that it shares 
Japan's concerns. The US agrees with the position of the IAEA and other international bodies, after 
rigorous safety reviews, that the discharge of ALPS -treated water from t he Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Station does not pose a concern to public safety, and that the discharge will have a 
negligible impact on any concentrations of elements in international waters. The four  Members' 
implementation of the measure cannot be r egarded as being based on scientific principles.  
16.8.  The United States notes reports that China's own active nuclear power plants annually release 
several times more of certain radioactive compounds, such as tritium, than will be released by the 
Fukushima Daii chi Nuclear Power Station. This undermines claims from China about their concern 
about the same compounds for safety reasons. The United States further notes evidence of 
numerous Chinese -flagged vessels fishing in the same waters China has banned Japanese imports 
from, and subsequently selling their seafood in China as domestic products. These reports further 
corroborate the position of Japan that there is no legitimate scien ce-based concern underlying this 
measure. Therefore, we urge China;  Hong Kong, Chin a; Macao, China;  and the Russian Federation 
to immediately repeal their measure.  
16.9.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.10.   Canada acknowledges the conclusions of the IAEA's Comprehensive Report on the Safety 
Review of the ALPS -Treated Water at the Fu kushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Canada's 
veterinary and public health authorities have concluded that the release of this treated water by 
Japan does not constitute a food safety concern. Canada believes that SPS -related trade measures 
should rely o n science -based evidence in accordance with the obligations of the 
WTO SPS Agreement.  
16.11.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
16.12.   The United Kingdom would like to reiterate its full support to the Government of Japan's 
decision to discharge Advanced Liquid Processing System ( ALPS) treated water from the Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station into the ocean. We would also like to reiterate our concern over new 
import restrictions on all aquatic produ cts from Japan by China, as well as partial import restrictions 
by Hong Kong, China;  and Macao, China despite the fact that this practice is scientifically robust and 
compliant with international regulations. It fully meets the requirements of the IAEA and  is consistent 
with international nuclear safety standards. The UK would therefore ask China to reconsider these 
measures. We hope that China will engage constructively and transparently with these concerns in 
this Council and other committees.  
16.13.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
16.14.   China  refers to its statements made at the Committee on Market Access on 16  October and 
the SPS  Committee meeting on 15  November. On 24  August  2023, Japan unilaterally started the 
discharge of the Fukushima nu clear contaminated water into the ocean, disregarding the strong 
questioning and opposition from the international community.  
16.15.   First, we want to stress that there is no precedent for such a discharge since the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy by mankind. The quantity, time span, and geographical scope of Japan's G/C/M/147  
 
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  planned ocean discharge are unprecedented. There are no internationally recognized disposal 
standards on such a discharge, and its hazards have been difficult to assess to this day.  
16.16.   Second, the measure s China has taken against aquatic products originating from Japan are 
emergency precaution ary trade measures. They are totally justified, reasonable , and necessary. 
China has made relevant notifications to Japan and the WTO. China is highly concerned about  the 
radioactive pollution risks posed to the imported food and agricultural products as a result of Japan's 
decision to discharge the nuclear -contaminated water into the ocean. The Chinese people are highly 
concerned about the marine ecological environmen t and food safety, and express strong worries 
about the potential hazards arising from Japan's discharge of nuclear -contaminated water into the 
ocean. As we pointed out in the Position Paper of China regarding Japan's discharge of 
nuclear -contaminated water into the ocean ( G/SPS/GEN/21 53), after Japan's release of 
nuclear -contaminated water into the ocean, Japanese aquatic products will pose widespread and 
long-term threats to people's life and health , and huge risks to food safety because of the influ ence 
of marine food chain accumulation and bio -concentration. China has taken emergency precaution ary 
trade measures against aquatic products originating from Japan, in accordance with China's relevant 
laws and regulations and the SPS  Agreement of the WTO,  in order to fully prevent the risks of 
radioactive contamination on food safety caused by Japan's discharge of nuclear -contaminated water 
into the ocean, to protect the life and health of Chinese consumers , and to ensure the safety of 
imported foods.  
16.17.   Third, we request Japan to promptly provide comprehensive monitoring data and report s to 
China. We have taken note of the recent release of monitoring data on radioactive contamination in 
seawater and aquatic products by the Japanese side. However, based on th e data released by Japan, 
there are prominent issues , such as insufficient types of monitored nuclear isotopes, limited variety 
and scarcity of monitored samples, and inadequate detection sensitivity. As a result, the monitoring 
data released by Japan is insufficient to support relevant assessments and to el iminate the concerns 
of the Chinese consumers regarding food safety risks and public health impacts. China urges Japan, 
with a scientific, responsible, sincere, and transparent attitude, to scientifically assess the huge 
potential risks posed to global foo d safety by the discharge of contaminated water from the 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean. Japan should comprehensively collect relevant data, 
conduct risk assessments, and provide timely relevant assessment reports to China in order to earn 
the trust of Chinese consumers. Based on the relevant monitoring data and assessment reports, 
China will make decisions on the next steps in a scientific and responsible manner.  
16.18.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
16.19.   The Russian Fede ration shares the concern of other Members regard ing the safety of all 
aquatic products, including edible aquatic animals, originating from Japan after Tokyo started the 
process of radioactive water discharge from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant into the  sea. The 
SPS measure in question was imposed in accordance with Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement as a 
precautionary emergency measure in order to protect Russian citizens against the risks arising from 
the introduction of radioactively contaminated food into the Russian market. It is known that 
nuclear -contaminated water has now been released by Japan at least twice. These actions pose risk s 
to environmental safety, food safety and public health, especially given its cumulative effect. Despite 
bilateral co nsultations with the Russian competent authorities that were held in October this year, 
Japan has not yet provided us with any evidence of the safety of fish and seafood caught in the zone 
of water discharge from the "Fukushima -1" nuclear plant. Moreover, Japan has not supplied us with 
the necessary data on monitoring of the content of radioactive isotopes of caesium  and strontium in 
fish products exported from Japan to Russia. The concentration of these isotopes is regulated in 
accordance with the requirem ents of the legislation of the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia also 
requested information on the radioactive isotope of hydrogen also referred to as tritium. The Russian 
Federation urges Japan to be more transparent and to provide comprehensive scienc e-based 
information necessary to confirm the safety of aquatic products, including the possibility of sampling 
at the water dumping site.  
16.20.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following:  
16.21.   Despite our repeated ly raised  concerns, the Japanese Government h as decided to discharge 
nuclear -contaminated water from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (FNPS). Unlike ordinary 
cooling water generated during normal operation of nuclear plants, the nuclear -contaminated water 
had direct contact with nuclear fuels and contained at least 30  radionuclides, including some with G/C/M/147  
 
- 33 - 
 
  long half -life. The discharge of nuclear -contaminated water on such a large scale (130  million cubic 
metres) and for such a long period of time (30  years) is unprecedented. In addition, there is no 
guarantee that the purification system would operate effectively in the long term. There is also no 
guarantee that the plan would not pose any risks to food safety and marine ecology. More 
importantly, while tritium can be diluted, it cannot be entirely rem oved from the water.  
16.22.   Food safety and public health are the primary concerns of Hong Kong, China. Considering 
the aforementioned risks, Hong Kong, China must take precautionary measures to prevent and 
reduce the danger to public health. As a result, we have  to make the decision to suspend the import 
of aquatic products, sea salt, and seaweeds originating from Fukushima and nine  nearby 
metropolises or prefectures. This would also allow us to further observe whether the dilution and 
discharge system would oper ate as planned and to have a more accurate assessment of the impact 
when more data is available.  
16.23.   Hong Kong, China has recently received questions from Japan through our SPS  Enquiry 
Point. While a formal response is being prepared, we have been engaging in ongoing bilateral 
discussions with Japan. We remain committed to exchanging options with Japan in any form. We 
will continue to closely monitor and assess the latest situation in order to safeguard  the food safety 
and public health of citizens in Hong Kong , China . 
16.24.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
16.25.   Japan  would like to thank the United States, the United Kingdom,  and Canada for their 
supportive statements. We would also like to thank China;  Russia;  and Hong Kong, China for their 
responses . Regarding the answers that were provided, we would like to stress that the water being 
discharged is not contaminated water ; it is ALPS -treated water. As mentioned in our statement, this 
is water with a very low concentration of radioactive mate rials that is  far below the regulatory 
standards. This is achieved by further diluting the ALPS -treated water , which has already been 
sufficiently  purified . It is really very regrettable that the phrase "discharge of contaminated water 
into the sea" contin ues to be used without any scientific basis. We urge for the phrase to be 
corrected . The only criterion  is whether the final concentration release of the released radio nuclides  
is below the regulatory threshold, regardless of whether it originates from a conventional reaction 
or a reactor in which a nuclear accident has taken place. Regarding the scientific rationale, even in 
the case of emergency situations, imposing such measures , which are not based on science or risk 
assessment , is unacceptable and not  justified. It is a violation of Article  XI:1 of the GATT . The only 
exception is in those cases where there is insufficient scientific evidence. The Tokyo Electric Power 
Company has comprehensively undertaken and disclosed the relevant information, and it does not 
fall into the category of cases where there is insufficient scientific evidence. If some Members  deem 
that there is an insufficient scientific basis, they should explain on what basis. The Government of 
Japan has been sharing information regarding  the ALPS -treated water with the international 
community in a transparent manner, which has included briefing sessions for the diplomatic missions 
in Tokyo,  and holding sessions in international meetings, including those organized by the IAEA. The 
Governme nt of Japan  has also published information on line and provided individual briefing sessions 
to interested countries.  
16.26.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
16.27.   China  would like to remind Members that a total of 1.3  million tonnes of contaminated water 
from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant will be discharged over 30 years. This creates huge 
uncertainty in terms of risks to food safety. As a neighbouring Member and an important importe r 
of Japanese aquatic products, it is totally justified , reasonable  and necessary  for China to take 
emergency precaution ary trade measures. China  would also like to point out  that, regard ing the 
wastewater discharged by Chinese  nuclear plants, there are fun damental differences between the 
nuclear -contaminated water that came into direct contact with the melted nuclear reactor core in 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and the water released by nuclear power plants during the course 
of their normal operation.  
16.28.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  17  INDIA – VISCOSE STAPLE FIBER (VSF) IMPORT – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
17.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the foll owing:  
17.3.  Indonesia wishes to express its dissatisfaction with India's implementation of the Viscose 
Staple Fibers Order, 2022. India's regulation on VSF  products creates uncertainty in the trade 
process and also leads to a decline in Indonesian VSF  product e xports entering the Indian market. 
Since the implementation of the VSF  regulation, Indonesian companies have not been able to export 
to India at all because certification has not yet been completed. This situation not only generates a 
deprivation in bilate ral trade between Indonesia and India but also compromises the Indonesian 
industry's rights and company interests. Indonesia further expressed its concern about the different 
treatment of Indonesian companies in terms of the factory inspection schedule. Ac cording to 
information received by Indonesian companies, India has performed factory inspections for 
companies residing outside of India. Indonesia hopes that India will be able to provide 
non-discriminatory treatment to all companies that are certified. W e urge India to implement the 
QCO system in a manner that complies with Articles  2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.  
17.4.  Furthermore, in terms of market access, Indonesia is interested in seeking clarification and 
transparency from India on the import regulation s for VSF  products, including requirements for 
obtaining import approval, import recommendations, and other items, so that Indonesian companies 
can be assured of access to  the Indian market. Addressing India's regulation of VSF  products, 
Indonesia believes  that India's position toward VSF  products from Indonesia has impeded exports 
and has the potential to breach Article  3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement (ILA) and Article  XI:1 
of the GATT  1994. Indonesia once again urges the Indian government to consider the option of 
international recognition based on the MRA/MLA  framework of the results of the conformity 
assessment and/or conformity assessment body from the country of origin , and to reconsider the 
VSF import restriction policy. This will speed u p the certification process, avoid duplication of testing 
and certification procedures, could reduce conformity assessment costs, and ensure India's  
compliance with the WTO  Import Licensing Agreement , as well as the WTO  principles of MFN, 
non-discriminatio n, and the elimination of unnecessary trade barriers. Lastly, Indonesia sincerely 
hopes that India could response to the enquir y that we sent on 11  August  2023 relat ing to this issue, 
as was conveyed at the TBT  meeting in November  2023.  
17.5.  The delegate of India indicated the following:  
17.6.  India would like to thank the delegation of Indonesia for their interest in this issue. The issue 
is related to quality control procedures and is already being discussed in the TBT  Committee. As 
such, we would request the delega tion of Indonesia to refer to the responses provided in the 
TBT Committee.  
17.7.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
18  EUROPEAN UNION – ANTI -DUMPING ON FATTY ACID – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the a genda at the request of  
Indonesia.  
18.2.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
18.3.  Indonesia would like to bring to Members'  attention the definitive anti -dumping measure 
imposed by the European Union on imports of fatty acids from Indonesia. The measure was adopted 
and implemented through the Commission Implementing Regulation  2023/111 of 18  January  2023. 
Indonesia wishes to highlight once again the fact th at the relevant investigation of the measure was 
not supported by more than 50% of the production output of the like product produced by the 
EU domestic industry , and not even by 25% of the total EU producers of the like product, following 
the withdrawal o f the complaint on 24  August  2022 and the producers' opposition to the measures. 
Although the complaint was withdrawn and the parallel anti -subsidy investigation terminated based 
on the withdrawal of the complaint, Indonesia regrets that the relevant inves tigation continued and G/C/M/147  
 
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  concluded with the imposition of high anti -dumping duties on Indonesian fatty acids ranging from 
15.2% to 46.4%. The decision to initiate the anti -dumping investigation ex officio , without the 
support of the EU industry and proper ju stification, raises concerns regarding the European Union's 
compliance with its obligations under the Anti -dumping Agreement. Furthermore, the evidence of  
positive trends indicating no material injury to the domestic industry questions the Commission's 
objectivity as an investigating authority. Indonesia hopes for a resolution with the EU regarding its 
concerns.  
18.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
18.5.  The European Union takes note of Indone sia's comments concerning  the EU's anti-dumping 
investigation on fatty acids. The EU would like to recall that the regulation imposing definitive 
measures sets out the position regarding the withdrawal of a complaint. Given that the case is 
currently subje ct to litigation , it is not appropriate for the EU to give detailed comments. However, 
the EU would like briefly to recall its comments made in the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices  
(ADP Committee) , as follows : 
18.6.  Article  9 of the EU  Basic AD  Regulation sta tes that: "where the complaint is withdrawn, 
proceedings may be terminated, unless such termination would not be in the Union's interest". In 
this instance , the European Commission determined that it was not in the Union 's interest to 
terminate the investi gation. As regards the comments on "legal standing" , the EU would like to recall 
that the requirement of Article  5.4 of the Anti -dumping Agreement refers to the initiation of the  
investigation. The EU considers that its  anti-dumping investigation and measu res on fatty acid are 
in line with WTO  rules.  
18.7.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
PREVIOUSLY RAISED TRADE CONCERNS  
 
19  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS  (ID 137)  – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, COLOMB IA, 
COSTA  RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, PARAGUAY, THE UNITED 
STATES AND URUGUAY  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa  Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, 
the United States , and Uruguay . 
19.2.  The delegate of Costa  Rica indicated the following:  
19.3.  Costa  Rica shares the concerns raised by other Members today and on previous occasions in 
this Council  concerning the meas ures by the European Union , and continues to co -sponsor and 
support this agenda item and document  G/C/W/767/Rev.1 . We consider that the concerns raised 
about the European Union's regulatory approach remain relevant , and that the resolution of these  
concerns remains urgent, especially for developing countries with tropical climates , as is the case of 
Costa  Rica. 
19.4.  Regarding  maximum residue limits (MRLs) , Costa  Rica maintains  systemic and trade concerns 
about the European Union's  hazard -based approach. In practice, this approach has led to the 
elimination of dozens of substances that are essential for the control of pests and diseases in 
agricultural production in tropical climates. Added to  this is the implementation of measures based, 
according to the EU itself, on "environmental concerns of a global nature". Beyond the eminently 
extraterritorial character of this type of measure s, we are concerned that this justification does not 
appear to be consistent with the principles of the SPS  Agreement or the TBT  Agreement.  
19.5.  We also note that the European Union is implementing measures to control deforestation and 
forest degradation outside its territory, through policies that affect the importation of certain 
agricultural products, including tropical produc ts exported by Costa  Rica. In this regard, many 
methodological doubts arise about the design and implementation of a trade mechanism such as the 
one proposed by the EU. We urge the EU to ensure that its measures are consistent with the 
WTO Agreements and t heir fundamental principles, that they are not discriminatory , and that they G/C/M/147  
 
- 36 - 
 
  do not constitute disguised barriers to trade. Costa  Rica once again urges the European Union to 
continue its dialogue with interested parties in order to overcome the concerns of  Members 
expressed in this Council and its subsidiary bodies.  
19.6.  The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
19.7.  Ecuador wishes to recall on this occasion the previous statements that it has made on this 
matter both in this Council and in the Committees on S anitary and Phytosanitary Measures and 
Technical Barriers to Trade. Ecuador regrets that the discussion on this subject has been confined 
to the presentation of positions and concerns, but has not led to any progress. Therefore, the 
constant calls to consi der the impact of the E uropean Union's non -tariff barriers, which mainly affect 
small and medium -sized farmers of Members that export to Europe, are still pending response . We 
would like to recall the five objections and arguments on which our concern is b ased under  this point 
of the agenda: (i) the adoption of measures without scientific evidence; (ii) the non -observance of 
international standards; (iii) the non -observance of the obligations of the WTO  SPS Agreement; 
(iv) the suspension of MRLs that go bey ond the Codex Alimentarius; and (v) the lack of reasonable 
adjustment periods in cases that prove to be necessary. These five  points have not been adequately 
substantiated by the E uropean Union. The fifth  point is particularly crucial: trading partners need at 
least five years to adapt their agricultural practices and put processes in place to allow the use of 
substitutes . 
19.8.  On the other hand, and with a constructive approach, Ecuador and other Members have r aised 
consultations on  the impact assessments of these measures in tropical developing countries, as well 
as on small and medium farmers in these countries. The lack of authori zed substances has a direct 
impact on market access for typically Andean and tro pical fruits, which as minor crops have few 
defined residue limits for approved substances. Finally, Ecuador renews its willingness to maintain 
a constructive exchange in order to find a definitive solution to this issue. Only a frank and committed 
dialogu e will allow us to achieve this objective and to consolidate the benefits of a rules -based 
multilateral trading system for all its Members.  
19.9.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
19.10.   We thank the European Union for the talks in various formats, plur ilateral and bilateral, as 
well as the responses received under G/SPS/GEN/2171 , but it is difficult to resolve a trade concern 
if dialogue does not lead to change. This trade concern has been on the agenda for five years, and 
the situation , far from i mproving , has worsened. We see that what we have been announcing for 
some time is now materiali zing. The reduction of MRLs to the detection limit is now affecting exports. 
Import tolerances are not being approved, despite having sufficient scientific basis  for approval, 
simply for political reasons. This is the case of the import tolerance for tricyclazole in rice, which, as 
we have mentioned in previous interventions, represents the main source of rejections of our exports 
to the EU.  
19.11.   Despite the scientific  opinion of EFSA, the European agency itself, that the MRL should be 
raised to 0.09  mg/kg of the detection limit, the Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and 
Feed did not issue an opinion  on 11  May 2023, did not have the support of a qualified majo rity of 
the member States for its approval, and the Council vote on 20  September  2023 did not have a 
majority either.  
19.12.   Against this background, only yesterday, the European Parliament's Committee on 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety adopted a motio n calling for the rejection of the import 
tolerance for tricyclazole . In said document , we find it interesting to note the following: the 
Parliament in the said motion insists that tricyclazole in imported rice should be kept at 0.01  mg/kg, 
as well as for European producers in view of the creation of a "situation of complete lack of reciprocity 
to the detriment of EU  rice producers" , and that "this situation could lead in the long term to unfair 
competition for EU  rice producers". The same motion recogn izes that tricyclazole is "the only plant 
protection product to reliably control rice blast in rice -growing areas of the world", that "imports 
from countries that allow the use of tricyclazole amounted to a total volume of almost 
194,000 tonnes, which corr esponds to approximately 12% of total imports " and that ' "the proposed 
Council Regulation, according to the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), would have 
reduced notifications by 76% in 2021 and 73% in 2022 ". A quick search of the RASFF  system s hows 
that there are 74  notifications, affecting exports from countries such as Bangladesh, Brazil, India, G/C/M/147  
 
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  Lebanon, Pakistan, Sri Lanka,  and Viet  Nam.5 In the case of exports from Paraguay,  had the Codex 
standard been maintained or an MRL as proposed by EF SA been adopted, most of these rejections 
would not have happened.  
19.13.   When we say that the situation has worsened, we refer to the fact that this trade concern 
started with EFSA's application of the precautionary principle in a manner inconsistent with the 
SPS Agreement, and even in cases where international standards exist. Today, it turns out that even 
in cases where EFSA  itself considers the substance to be safe, according to its own risk analysis, 
EU member States are ignoring their regulatory agency. This  puts in check the principles and 
obligations that are the basis of the SPS  Agreement, principles and scientific evidence for 
decision -making that affect s plant, animal and human health, and puts everyone in this Council in a 
particular situation, where th e "passing of responsibilities" between the Commission and the member 
States means that there is no accountability, and no answers in many cases, in particular with regard 
to emergency authori zations. The Commission indicates that this is the responsibilit y of the member 
States, and member States, although present in this room, and WTO  Members in their own right, 
cannot answer us.  
19.14.   We are still awaiting an answer as to why emergency authori zations were granted after the 
ECJ's ruling on their illegality. The Commission said it would take action, and we hope it will. The 
Commission says it monitors emergency authori zations, but out of the thousands, we have seen 
only 18  cases of reviews, and we can count on one hand the cases where EFSA has indicated that 
they were not justified, and not by applying the same yardstick that we are required to apply, but 
only in the absence of chemical alternatives, even though there are equally viable non -chemical 
alternatives. We do not have answers on the costs of import tolera nces vis-à-vis emergency 
authori zations, but we do have the certainty that emergency authori zations are approved, while 
import tolerances are not. We are witnessing a replacement of science by politics in decision -making 
that should have the health of cons umers at its centre.  
19.15.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
19.16.   Canada wishes to again express its concern that the European Union  is increasingly 
establishing non -tariff barriers to trade based on domestic EU  regulations related to environmental 
sustainability which are more trade restrictive than necessary and will likely result in increased 
uncertainty and higher compliance costs and burdens for importers and exporters, further 
complicating international supply chains. While Canada  shares the EU's priority for enhancing 
agricultural sustainability, it is critical that the EU recognize and respect the measures being taken 
by third  countries to support environmental sustainability, which reflect the unique growing 
conditions of a part icular region. The EU's approach to ensure that all imports entering the EU have 
been produced according to EU  standards will only increase the costs and burden associated with 
agricultural production and trade during a time of high food prices and food in security. For example, 
while Canada shares the EU  objective of preventing global deforestation, the compliance 
mechanisms that have been proposed within the legislation will result in barriers to trade for 
Canadian exports on several important products, ev en though they are at a low risk of having 
stemmed from deforestation. Based on information provided thus far by the European Commission, 
it seems clear that the geo -location requirement provided for in the Regulation will be difficult or 
impossible to mee t by many Canadian exporters. It is imperative that the EU  carry out 
comprehensive engagement sessions, and take into account the concerns of trading partners while 
ensuring the regulation does not unnecessarily impact trade.  
19.17.   The delegate of Uruguay  indica ted the following:  
19.18.   Uruguay continues to maintain its trade and systemic concerns regarding the general 
approach followed by the European Union in its regulatory decisions relat ing to sanitary and 
phytosanitary matters, and the way in which this approach interacts with other instruments of 
European Agricultural Policy – such as subsidies and tariffs – to restrict access to the European 
market, preventing third -country producers from  competing with their European counterparts on 
equal terms, in line with the views expressed by other delegations. In particular, we are concerned 
about the implementation of an approach whereby the EU  has decided to reduce the MRLs of a 
growing list of ac tive substances, used at different stages of the production process of various 
agricultural products, to levels below those agreed in CODEX, and even to the level of detection, 
 
5 RASFF W indow - Results (europa.eu)  G/C/M/147  
 
- 38 - 
 
  without necessarily carrying out a full risk assessment to justify such a depar ture on the basis of 
conclusive scientific evidence.  
19.19.   In our view, any such determination, particularly where it departs from internationally 
accepted standards and harmoni zation efforts in multilateral settings such as CODEX, must 
necessarily be based on a  full scientific risk assessment and conclusive scientific evidence, in 
accordance with the SPS  Agreement. This is essential to maintain the effective balance that must 
exist between the right of Members to pursue their legitimate objectives and the need t o avoid 
creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. Uruguay agrees with other Members that the issue of 
derogation regimes, including the existence and implementation in practice of emergency 
authori zations, appears to reveal tensions between the domestic pol icies of member States of the 
European Union and the objective of health protection pursued at Community level, as well as 
situations in the trade sphere which are potentially discriminatory vis-à-vis third parties. Uruguay is 
also concerned that insuffici ent transition periods are being provided to make the necessary 
adjustments in production and to ensure compliance of the products concerned with the modified 
MRLs.  
19.20.   Finally, Uruguay once again urges the European Union to reconsider the direction of its 
regulatory approach with a view to avoiding the unjustified proliferation of barriers to international 
trade in agricultural products, taking into account its WTO  obligations, as well as the socio -economic 
consequences that these policies may have on its trad ing partners, in particular developing and least 
developed countries.  
19.21.   The delegate of Colombia  indicated the following:  
19.22.   On this particular issue, Colombia is concerned that , since the first  time this topic was placed 
on the agenda to date, and despite mech anisms for dialogue and formal and informal discussions, 
progress has been marginal or non -existent. In the interest s of time, we make full reference to our 
previous interventions and in different scenarios, in the sense of our concern for the regulatory 
approach of the European Union, and for the discriminatory nuances of its policy. Finally, we would 
like to mention that , without prejudice to the above, Colombia is also willing to engage in a 
constructive dialogue to seek a balance between the objectives of the measures adopted and trade 
needs. This will be based on a detailed and objective review of the regulations to ensure consistency 
with WTO  principles and obligations.  
19.23.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
19.24.   The United States joins Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa  Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Uruguay in again raising concerns regarding the European 
Union's implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products. Unfortunately, this is  the 
thirteenth  consecutive meeting that this item is on the CTG  agenda , and the fifth year that this issue 
has been raised in the Council. As we have noted in the past, the EU continues to lower many 
pesticides ' Maximum Residue Levels, or MRLs, to trade -restrictive levels without clear scientific 
justification or measurable benefit to human health. This hazard -based approach to pesticide 
regulation may lead to trade barriers that threaten the security of global food systems.  
19.25.   Further, the European Union  enforces newly reduced pesticide MRLs at the point of 
production for domestic goods, while enforcing these MRLs at the point of importation for imported 
goods. This difference in the treatment of domestic and imported goods causes trade inefficiencies 
and dis ruptions for products destined for the EU  market and results in an unfair advantage for 
EU producers, especially for those that produce products with long shelf lives.  
19.26.   The United States  reiterate s our concerns that the European Union appears to be followin g 
a similar approach with its new veterinary drug legislation through prohibitions on the use of 
antimicrobials that are not considered medically important for human health. Like other Members, 
we have shared our concerns in the SPS  Committee that these pr escriptive restrictions, which do 
not appear to be based on completed risk assessments, will apply to foreign producers exporting 
animals and animal products to the EU.  
19.27.   The United States again requests that any EU  measure allow s flexibility to trading part ners 
to meet the EU  level of protection in a manner that is appropriate to the needs of farmers and G/C/M/147  
 
- 39 - 
 
  producers within the exporting countries' own domestic context. The international community should 
be working together to support science -based measures tha t promote a safe and sustainable food 
supply, and we call on the EU to join with its trading partners in identifying such mutually beneficial 
approaches.  
19.28.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
19.29.   Australia continues to raise or support several spe cific trade concerns relating to the 
European Union's  implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products in relevant 
WTO Committees. Australia remains concerned that the EU's application of its health and 
environmental standards to imported agr iculture and agri -food products – in many aspects – does 
not facilitate trade and is not conducive to achieving productive and sustainable outcomes in the 
agriculture sector. For imported agricultural products, the EU's regulatory approach to agricultural 
inputs, production requirements, and specific measures targeted at protecting the environment has 
impacted third -country producers' ability to access the EU  market. These concerns include the EU's 
recent attempts to set maximum residue limits (MRLs) for ce rtain pesticides in order to achieve 
environmental outcomes in third  countries. Australia does not consider that the existing MRL  system 
is an appropriate or efficient tool to achieve environmental outcomes. Third  country national 
competent authorities are  the best decision maker to ensure that pesticide application is undertaken 
in a safe, responsible, and sustainable manner in each country, in accordance with their unique 
environment. Australia has a robust regulatory framework for agricultural and veteri nary chemicals, 
providing Australian farmers with safe access to the pesticides they need to maintain productivity 
and profitability while looking after Australia's unique environment. This approach aligns with the 
principles set out in the recent statemen t by Cairns Group Members on the contribution of the 
multilateral trading system to support ing sustainable and resilient agriculture and food systems 
(G/AG/GEN/222/Rev.1 ). The statement highlights the crucial role of a resilient agriculture s ector in 
feeding a growing population and a science -based and inclusive approach to collectively address ing 
environmental challenges. Australia also maintains concerns over the unfair competitive advantage 
provided to EU  producers in applying EU  domestic p roduction requirements to imports, without 
allowing for the recognition of third -country systems that achieve equivalent outcomes. 
EU producers are subsidized to implement EU  production requirements , and if they are unable to 
maintain productivity and prof itability, then only EU  producers can access EU  exemptions from 
certain regulatory requirements, such as emergency authorizations for the use of plant protection 
products (PPPs). This creates a two -tiered system, with imported products subject to more stri ngent 
regulatory conditions than domestically produced products. Australia recognizes the right of 
WTO Members to regulate agricultural imports in a manner that protects animal, plant and human 
health and the environment. However, Members are also bound by  WTO obligations, particularly in 
relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments and ensuring that measures are no more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve legitimate objectives. To ensure the free flow of 
agricultural trade without unneces sary regulatory burden, Australia maintains its request that the 
EU apply international standards and best practice for regulating imported agricultural products. We 
thank the EU for its ongoing engagement with Australia on these long -running issues.  
19.30.   The d elegate of the Dominican Republic  indicated the following:  
19.31.   The Dominican Republic wishes to reiterate its statement from the formal meeting s of the 
CTG, held on 3 -4 April 2023 and 6 -7 July 2023. We share the European Union's concern for the 
protection of h uman and animal health, as well as measures to protect the environment. However, 
we are concerned about the systemic and commercial impact that the measures on the reduction of 
maximum residue limits (MRLs) may have on exports from our country, considering  that this type 
of regulation has a direct socioeconomic impact in the Dominican Republic, particularly affecting 
agricultural producers, who generally constitute the most vulnerable populations in LDCs and 
developing countries, and who suffer directly the  socioeconomic consequences of these restrictions 
to international trade.  
19.32.   The Dominican Republic considers that any measure applied by the European Union should 
be developed in accordance with the rules agreed upon in the WTO. The regulatory project presen ted 
by the EU on MRLs should take into consideration the scientific evidence. We therefore invite the EU 
to adhere to the Codex Alimentarius when reconsidering the implementation of these measures.  
19.33.   We have a specific  concern about the possible modification of M RLs of "imazalil", which is a 
fundamental product for fruits such as bananas and mangoes . We express the concern of the G/C/M/147  
 
- 40 - 
 
  Dominican Republic over the European Union's  notification in document  G/SPS/N/EU/319 , of 
5 April 2019, which informed Members of a proposal for a preliminary draft Commission Regulation 
amending Annexes  II and III of Regulation (EC)  No. 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council as regards the revision of the M RLs of imazalil i n certain foodstuffs.  
19.34.   The Dominican Republic recognizes the right of the European Union to adopt the sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures it deems necessary to achieve the level of health protection of its 
citizens, in accordance with Article  2 of the SPS Agreement. However, this right to adopt sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures to achieve an adequate level of protection entails basic obligations. In 
general, Members  may adopt sanitary and phytosanitary measures provided that: (i)  they are only 
applied to t he extent necessary to protect life or health; (ii)  they are based on scientific principles 
and are not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence; and (iii)  they do not unjustifiably 
discriminate between domestic and foreign origin or between exter nal sources of supply.  
19.35.   Imazalil is a key post -harvest fungicide which is of great economic and agricultural 
importance, widely used for the cultivation of fruits such as bananas, mangoes , and avocados, being 
an essential tool in the post -harvest treatment of these foods, as they are prone to experience 
different diseases caused by fungal pathogens that can only be prevented by the use of imazalil as 
part of an effective control program me. Exports of banana, mango , and avocado represent about 
20% of the Dominican Republic 's total annual food exports, and the main destination of these fruits 
is the European Union, in particular for bananas.  
19.36.   The reduction of MRLs for the active ingredient imazalil would cause serious problems for 
our industry. It is practically  a zero -tolerance measure. At this time, there is no effective substitute 
among plant protection products with the efficacy of imazalil, especially with respect to fungal 
pathogen control.  
19.37.   In April  2015, through notification  G/SPS/W/284  of April  2015, India  noted the frequent 
practice of adopting the limit of determination as the MRL for pesticides not registered or not used 
in the territory of the importing Member , and the ensuing disruptions in international trade. As a 
consequence of this notification, th e SPS  Committee has held several technical workshops with the 
aim of reducing or eliminating this practice by some Members.  
19.38.   The Dominican Republic regrets that the European Union's  authorities have not taken into 
account the recommendations of the workshop s on the establishment of MRLs carried out by the 
SPS Committee, and made the proposal to amend Regulation  396/2005 to modify the MRLs of 
imazalil based on the Limit of Quantification without taking into consideration the impact on 
international trade.  
19.39.   The Joint Statements on SPS  issues at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12); the statement 
on Trade in Food and Agricultural Products at the 11th Ministerial Conference (MC11); and the 
Declaration of the G20  Agriculture Ministers Meeting in July  2018 reinfor ce the European Union's 
commitment as a Member to the SPS  Agreement and refrain from adopting unnecessary barriers to 
international trade.  
19.40.   We encourage the European Union to find an alternative solution on MRLs for imazalil , and 
that we address our concerns without unnecessarily undermining our economies  and agriculture. 
The Dominican Republic notes that  the E FSA risk assessment of 5  September  2017, annexed to 
notification  G/SPS/N/EU/319 , states that the MRLs for banana s, derived from good agricultural 
practices (GAP) , are tentative and that the toxicity of the metabolite R014821 formed in post -harvest 
applications is still inconclusive.  
19.41.   In view of the above, the Dominican Republic, as a WTO  Member, expresses its concern ; 
furthermore, it does not agree with the European Union's  policy on the establishment of MRLs based 
on Limit of Quantification because it is not a policy that contribute s to guaranteeing the health of 
consumers , and because it creates unnecessary obstacle s in the trade of agricultural products 
exported from Members , in violation of Articles  2 and 5 of the SPS  Agreement, respectively. 
Therefore, we request that the establishment of MRLs for imazalil be supported by scientific 
evidence.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  19.42.   The delegate of Brazil indicated the following:  
19.43.   Brazil regrets that the European Union has continued to adopt NTBs that lack scientific 
evidence and further imbalance the trade in agricultural goods. The scientific principle from the 
SPS Agreement establishes a balance between  the protection of life and health, on one  side, and the 
access to markets, on the other side. The EU constantly imposes prohibitions based on the hazard 
approach and/or recourse to Article  5.7 of the SPS  Agreement, in disregard of the position of 
renowned  institutions. Brazil is concerned that measures creating new non -tariff trade barriers, 
under the justification of environmental protection, are increasing. It is regretful that we need to 
bring such a debate to the CTG, as the interpretation given to the  SPS Agreement is moving away 
from the purposes that guided the negotiations during the Uruguay Round.  
19.44.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
19.45.   This is a long -standing trade concern on the agenda of this Council. We share the concerns 
raised by various Members who spoke before us on the European Union's imposition of non -tariff 
measures on agricultural products. We request that our statement made in the previous 
CTG meeting be placed on record for this meeting as well.6 
19.46.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
19.47.   Argentina thank s the delegations that included this item on the agenda. Argentina once 
again reiterates its concern and stresses the importance of ensuring that all Members apply 
measures based on science -based risk analysis. As we have expressed on previous occasions whe n 
this concern was discussed in this Council , while Argentina shares the European Union's  concern to 
strengthen the protection of human health and to protect the environment, we wish to stress once 
again the importance of complying with the provisions of t he WTO  Agreements in such a way that 
measures are no more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve a legitimate objective. We are 
particularly concerned about the number of substances banned by the EU, which is increasing day 
by day.  
19.48.   This situation may have serious consequences for a number of WTO  Members, especially 
developing countries, whose populations and economies are highly dependent on agricultural 
exports, as already highlighted by several previous interventions. We also consider that the approa ch 
adopted by the European Union  to establish ing transitional periods on MRLs does not take into 
account the needs and capacities of third  countries to be able to adapt  to them . Finally, we agree 
with several other delegations on the need to take into acco unt the concerns raised and that it is 
essential for the EU to use the risk assessment approach in the analysis of regulatory changes , and 
to have conclusive scientific studies to determine the different aspects that may affect human health 
and the environ ment.  
19.49.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
19.50.   We acknowledge that the European Union  is working to ensure that the EU  health and 
environmental standards are applied to imported agricultural, livestock and fishery products within 
the framework of a m irror clause with a view to establishing a sustainable food system. In order to 
build a sustainable food system, it is necessary not only to address agricultural products imported 
into the EU but also agricultural products produced around the world. To tha t end, it is important for 
each country to work on building a sustainable food system that takes into account its own climate 
and other factors. We are of the view that the EU health and environmental standards should not be 
uniformly applied to imported g oods, but the efforts of each country should be respected. For 
example, the EU is lowering MRLs for the protection of pollinator insects, which is different from the 
way MRLs have been set for the protection of human life or health in the past. This deviat es from 
 
6 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  8.73-8.74: "8.73.   The delegate of India indicated the following: 
8.74.   India shares the concerns raised by other Members on the European Union's application of non -tariff 
barriers on agricultural products. The EU's unilateral measures are  increasingly undermining regulatory 
principles and are not founded on internationally agreed risk analysis principles. They do not take into account 
alternative approaches to meeting regulatory objectives. In implementing its SPS  measures, as well as in i ts 
new approach to using TBT  measures for environmental reasons, the European Union seems to impose its own 
domestic regulatory approach onto its trading partners. India observes with concern that this is becoming a 
wider trend, as also seen under the Euro pean Green Deal -related regulations ." G/C/M/147  
 
- 42 - 
 
  international harmonization surrounding MRLs. The EU should not make judg ements  on the merits 
of third  countries' pesticide use methods, as these are set by national authorities, taking into account 
the environmental conditions in each Member. The European Commission's report on the 
"Application of EU  health and environmental standards to imported agricultural and agri -food 
products" has stated that the EU will continue to make efforts at the multilateral level to obtain a 
global consensus on intern ationally agreed standards. If the EU introduces such a new approach, we 
would like to request that the EU ensure that the measures are consistent with WTO  Agreements 
and that it hold international discussions on this matter.  
19.51.   The delegate of the European U nion indicated the following:  
19.52.   The European Union takes note of the comments by WTO  Members. The EU provided detailed 
replies at previous CTG  meetings. Our statements remain valid in their entirety. The EU has engaged 
extensively, including on the basis of the questions raised in this Council , as well as at the SPS and 
TBT Committees.  
19.53.   The European Union has also engaged bilaterally both here in Geneva and in respective 
capitals. A plurilateral meeting took place in Geneva on 17  March which allowed for a fran k technical 
discussion. The EU has organi zed information sessions and provided detailed information. We have 
circulated no less than 10 communications since 2019 in relation to our pesticides policy. We refer 
in particular to document  G/SPS/GEN/1494/Rev.2 , circulated in July  2022. The document provides 
an overview of the ongoing review of maximum residue levels of pesticides in the EU. Importantly, 
it describes the review process as well as how non -EU countries can active ly contribute to it. The EU 
remains open to engage in further discussions on how we can work together in order to facilitate the 
trade of agricultural products treated with plant protection products.  
19.54.   The European Union also continues to provide technical a ssistance to developing countries 
and LDCs in improving SPS  capacity and market access, directly or through other international 
organi zations and partnerships, such as the WTO -hosted Standards and Trade Development Facility 
(STDF). The EU shared detailed i nformation on the SPS -related technical assistance it provided in 
the period 2019 -20 to the SPS  Committee ( G/SPS/GEN/1139/Add.6 ) and continues to provide 
technical assistance to developing countries and LDCs in improving SPS  capacity and market access. 
This is being done directly or through other international organizations and partnerships, such as 
the WTO -hosted STDF.  
19.55.   The European Union  remains convinced of our common interest in ensuring that pesticide 
residues are not present at levels  presenting an unacceptable risk to human health. Last but not 
least, we believe that we have a shared interest in making our food systems sustainable by tackling 
the issue of toxic active substances and protecting our citizens' health.  
19.56.   The Council took no te of the statements made.  
20  CHINA – ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES FOR REGISTRATION OF OVERSEAS 
PRODUCERS OF IMPORTED FOODS (ID 174) – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the requ est of  
Australia and the United States.  
20.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
20.3.  As part of China's Regulation on Registration and Administration of Overseas Manufacturers 
of Imported Food, promulgated as Decree  248, Australia appreciates the ong oing cooperation 
between the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) and the General 
Administration of Customs of China (GACC) to work through the implementation of the China Import 
Food Enterprise Registration (CIFER) system. We welcome c hanges GACC has made to CIFER over 
the past 12  months, which have improved the interaction of DAFF and Australian exporters with the 
system. Australia looks forward to further technical engagement with GACC and appreciates the 
opportunity to work cooperati vely with China on changes that promote food safety in a science -based 
manner that is no more trade restrictive than necessary. Australian food exporters are ready and 
willing to comply with China's food safety requirements, but businesses – particularly n ew G/C/M/147  
 
- 43 - 
 
  establishment listings for the China market – and competent authorities need clarity and a 
reasonable time -frame to make changes to comply with registration requirements in the 
CIFER  system. The system remains challenging to Australian exporters require d to self -register in 
CIFER. As China is aware, Australia has previously raised these concerns on several occasions in 
both the SPS and TBT  Committees, and bilaterally via the recent meeting of the ChAFTA  Committee 
on Trade in Goods. In light of the above,  Australia requests that China's customs authorities continue 
to work constructively with Australia's businesses and competent authority, and considers Australian 
applications in a consistent and timely manner. Australia is happy to provide case studies re garding 
challenges in order to support further technical engagement. Finally, it was pleasing to see the 
productive meetings between the leaders of our two  countries – Prime Minister Albanese with 
President  Xi and Premier  Li in Beijing recently.  
20.4.  The delega te of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.5.  As with previous trade concerns, the United States notes that this is the seventh  consecutive 
meeting that this item is on the CTG  agenda and the third  year that this issue has been raised before 
the Council . We are extremely disappointed that China finalized and implemented this measure as 
proposed, despite extensive efforts at constructive engagement by the United States and the 
international community, including in TBT, SPS, and CTG  meetings, in bilateral engagements, and 
through joint letters from nine  WTO Members.  
20.6.  China did not meet the requests of trading partners to meaningfully engage in the explanation 
of the new requirements, provide a scientific or technical justification, or publish changes that re duce 
unnecessary trade burdens for the billions of dollars' worth of safe food exported to China under 
these requirements.  
20.7.  Despite being in effect for nearly two  years, Decree  248 continues to create new challenges 
for global food producers and competent a uthorities as China regularly alters the scope of the 
measure without notification of the changes, implements new requirements without advance notice, 
and applies inconsistent criteria for review of applications for registration.  
20.8.  We ask once more that Chin a meet its international and bilateral obligations, and we maintain 
our commitment to seek ing solutions to these outstanding concerns and welcome meaningful 
dialogue with China to reduce barriers to trade in safe food products. We acknowledge that the 
discussion in this Council has led China to implement this measure in a manner that is less restrictive 
than the measure itself appears to require, including by appearing to informally waive certain 
documentation requirements that would have imposed an immense  burden on the US  competent 
authority.  
20.9.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
20.10.   We note that there are many uncertainties in the registration procedures relat ing to China's 
"Regulations for Management of Registration of Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Foods", which 
impose a significant burden on overseas authorities and business operators. For example, delays in 
examination happen as well as in cases where the Chinese authorities do not provide sufficient 
explanation of the reasons for the rejection of applications. We request that China improve the 
operations and the transparency of procedures relat ing to the implementation of these regulations 
so that the proc edures do not become an excessive burden on business operators.  
20.11.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.12.   The European Union  would like to support concerns raised about the implementation of 
Decree  248 of the General Administration of Cus toms of the People's Republic of China (GACC). 
Almost two  years after its entry into force, the EU considers that the whole implementation process 
of Decree  248 is still burdensome, both for authorities and operators. The registration process, 
notably the electronic submission of documents through the CIFER  system , is cumbersome and 
time-consuming, be it to apply for new registrations, or to amend or correct existing registrations. 
The EU requests that China guarantees continuity of trade while Decree  248 is being implemented. 
In this context, new requirements should not be implemented without advance notice , and China 
should regularly publish updated guidance on the implementation of Decree  248. G/C/M/147  
 
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  20.13.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
20.14.   The Republic of Korea would like to reiterate our concerns with China's administrative 
measures for registration of overseas producers of imported foods, and refer to our statement s at 
previous meetings.7 Korea recognizes China's efforts to ensure food s afety and its right to take 
measures necessary for protecting its citizens from related risks. However, Korea remains 
particularly concerned about the lengthy process for registration and the unclear rationale for 
disapproval, which have negatively impacte d upon our exporting businesses. Korea requests that 
China resolve the issues in a timely manner. We stand ready to further engage with China.  
20.15.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
20.16.   Canada welcomes China's efforts to facilitate the registration and renewal process of foreign 
establishments in the China Import Food Enterprise Registration (CIFER)  system. While Canada 
appreciates China's cooperation on this matter, greater consistency i n the registration and renewal 
process as well as efforts to reduce administrative burden would help ensure that the CIFER  system 
does not cause delays.  
20.17.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
20.18.   As Chinese Taipei has already stated  at previou s CTG  meetings, we remain deeply concerned 
about these measures, as uncertainties and a lack of transparency persist even after they have been 
implemented for more than one and a half years. China has not taken useful steps to ease Members'  
legitimate conc erns. 
20.19.   First, a lack of sufficient information remains a major obstacle, particularly for those facilities 
that must register directly with the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC). While China 
has indicated that technical guidance, regulatory interpretations, and supporting documentation 
have already been provided, we would urge that these materials be regularly updated and placed 
on a publicly available website so that they can be accessed by overseas facilities.  
20.20.   Second, the standard or antici pated processing time for the review and approval procedures 
has yet to be disclosed. Little is known about the individual stages of the application process. Also, 
our facilities have reported that their applications have been rejected by the GACC without 
explanation. We would therefore once again urge the GACC to comply with its obligations under the 
SPS and TBT  Agreements so as to ensure that its review and approval procedures are efficient and 
transparent.  
20.21.   Finally, despite seeking clarification from Chin a several times through both bilateral channels 
and this forum, we have not received any sufficient and detailed response. We therefore urge China 
to engage in a constructive dialogue to resolve the above -mentioned difficulties.  
20.22.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
20.23.   The Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Overseas Producers of Imported 
Foods (Decree  248) came into force on 1  January  2022. We have notified the measures to the WTO 
and some reasonable comments have already been consi dered and incorporated into the regulations. 
The transitional period of the regulation is in line with the requirements of the TBT and 
SPS Agreement s. 
 
7 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  11.14 -11.15 : "11.14.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  
indicated the following:  
11.15.   The Republic of Korea would like to reiterate its concerns with China's administrative measures 
for registration of overseas producers of imported foods, and refer to our statement delivered at previous 
meetings. Korea recognizes China's efforts to ensure food safety and its right to take measures necessary for 
protecting its citizens from related risks. However, Korea remains concerned about the expansion of products 
to be managed by the authorities of exporting Members. Accordingly, Korea once again urges China to improve 
the registration process for overseas producers and to  provide scientific evidence for its measures introduced in 
accordance with the SPS  Agreement. The Republic of Korea stands ready to further engage with China to 
resolve these issues constructively ." G/C/M/147  
 
- 45 - 
 
  20.24.   With the strong cooperation of the food safety authorities of all Members, more than 
80,000  overseas prod ucers from 165  economies have been registered in China. Among them, the 
United States has registered 6 ,434 enterprises, 6 ,030 in Japan, 2 ,999 in the Republic of Korea, 
2,193 in Australia,  and 1 ,162 in Canada. In 2022, which is the first  year of the impleme ntation of 
the CIFER  system, the value of the imported food reached CNY 1.39 trillion, an increase of 10.4%  
year-on-year. This increase shows that the import registration implemented by China is effective in 
ensuring the safety of imported food and promoting food trade to China.  
20.25.   The GACC has made great efforts to support the implementation of the regulation. It has 
issued the explanatory documents for the regulation, the guideline s and supporting documents and 
forms for registration application. A re gistration information system has been launched for overseas 
enterprises. The GACC has also held briefings and training sessions with more than 100  Members. 
A video regarding the CIFER  system operation is published on the official website of the GACC.  
20.26.   At the WTO, we organized an information session during the 91st TBT Committee meeting in 
June 2023, and responded to some common questions raised by Members on the registration 
procedures. Should Members have further enquiries about the regulation and the regi stration 
system, please communicate with the GACC bilaterally , and the GACC will respond in a timely 
manner and provide technical support.  
20.27.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
21  CHINA – COSMETICS SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS (CSAR) 
(ID 169) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES  
21.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Japan, and the United States.  
21.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated t he following:  
21.3.  The European Union would like to thank the Chinese authorities for extending the deadline 
for registration of cosmetics' raw materials and finished products until 1  January  2024. We also 
welcome the announced changes , which will provide more flexibility for producers when registering 
raw materials ' safety information.  
21.4.  At the same time, the European Union  would like to reiterate the concerns it already shared 
in previous meetings of this Council (July and November  2021, April, July and November  2022, and 
April 2023).8 These relate to the Cosmetic Supervision and Administration Regulation in force since 
1 May 2021. Our concerns are well  known and remain as expressed at the Council's previous 
meeting .9 
21.5.  The mandatory disclosure of commercially se nsitive information touch es on the intellectual 
property rights ( IPR) of the companies involved in the registration process. The European Union  
requests China to consider the possibility to require continuous access to inspect the sensitive 
information at the companies' files, including the amount of information required for the notification 
of new ingredients, as well as potential issues over th e disclosure of such information after a certain 
period of time , but without imposing the obligation to submit it to an external database.  In particular, 
the Chinese legislation requires both the specification issued by the raw materials manufacturer and 
the ingredient composition reported by the cosmetic companies in their product application to be 
exact matching figures – any mismatch between the information provided by the raw material 
producer and the cosmetic companies would make the application of the  latter invalid. Given that 
the exact composition of raw materials is never completely stable but may vary/evolve over time 
within certain limits, it is almost impossible to guarantee a complete consistency between the figures. 
Furthermore, access to this database would reveal cosmetics' formulation. The EU encourages China 
to accept a range of values instead of exact matching figures. In addition, the  need to publish a 
detailed summary of efficacy substantiation evaluation s may damage business secrets as t his 
 
8 G/C/M/140  paragraphs  23.32 -23.36 ; G/C/M/141  paragraphs  17.28 -17.30 ; G/C/M/142  
paragraphs  8.12-8.15; G/C/M/143  paragraphs  8.21-8.22; G/C/M/144  paragraphs  33.16 -33.22 ; and  
G/C/M/145  paragraphs  25.14 -25.18.  
9 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  12.6-12.7.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 46 - 
 
  information is disclosed to the public even before products are made available to consumers, 
providing commercial advantage to competitors.  
21.6.  The European Union  believes that these requirements are unnecessarily stringent to ensure 
consumer safety and tr aceability of the ingredients used in cosmetics, diverging from international 
practice. This extensive level of information is not required elsewhere in the world for notification 
and registration purposes, and the safety of consumers is always ensured.  
21.7.  Besides, the European Union  would like to reiterate its comment that a differentiated approach 
is needed between new products and products on the market. This would avoid a situation whe re 
product supply could be interrupted for an extended period of time du e to insufficient preparation 
time for both industry and supervision authorities.  
21.8.  In addition, the European Union  would like to remark that, since the new requirements to 
register high -risk New Cosmetic Ingredients (NCI) entered into force in May  2021, and  at least until 
January  2023, no high -risk NCIs have been successfully registered in China, according to 
EU stakeholders. This is deemed to be due to the excessively detailed technical information required, 
which go es beyond what is necessary to evaluate t he safety of ingredients, for example requiring 
R&D reports, how the ingredient was invented , or a description of the manufacturing process.  
21.9.  Finally, the European Union would like to recall that no laboratories have been accredited in 
EU member States , and so even if the CSAR  rules do not impose local testing upon arrival in Chinese 
territory, de facto importers of cosmetics are forced to test their products in China. This requires 
sending samples only for these purposes, then undergoing the approval proced ure and only later 
importing cosmetics for sale. The EU would encourage China to facilitate the accreditation of 
laboratories in other countries, notably in those of the European Union . 
21.10.   The European Union  urges China to address these concerns expeditiously . 
21.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
21.12.   Japan has continued to express its concerns over China's Cosmetics Supervision and 
Administration Regulations , as well as over the related implementing regulations. We call for the 
following measures to be t aken to ensure that China's CSAR  regulations and operations are in 
accordance with Articles  2 and 5 of the TBT  Agreement: (i) as for tests required for the registration 
and notification of cosmetic products and evaluation tests on toothpaste, we call for t he acceptance 
of test results of overseas inspection institutions that have the same qualifications and capabilities 
as the domestic cosmetics registration inspection institutions in China; and (ii) we call for China to 
recognize the test methods that are internationally recognized by OECD, ISO, and so on, as 
equivalent test methods for those already accepted in China's National Standard and related 
regulations. We request that the basis for efficacy claims evaluation be determined by cosmetics 
registrants/ notifiers based on the specific wording of claims and scientific validity, that the scope of 
application of the "Guiding Principles for Evaluating Equivalent Efficacy" be expanded, and that the 
concept of read -across be introduced. We request that , in the future, when implementing relevant 
laws and regulations, an appropriate period of time be allowed between the publication to the 
implementation of each relevant law and regulation , in accordance with Articles  2.12 and 5.9 of the 
TBT Agreement , so that cosmetics registrants and notifiers can bring their products into compliance 
with the new relevant laws and regulations.  
21.13.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
21.14.   It is unfortunate that this is the eighth  consecutive meeting that this item is on the 
CTG agenda and the third  year that this issue has been raised in the Council. The United States and 
other WTO  Members have consistently been raising significant concerns with the Cosmetics 
Supervision and Admini stration Regulation (CSAR) and its implementing measures in the past 
13 TBT Committee meetings as well. Unsurprisingly, China has not sought to work with the United 
States and other WTO  Members to reach resolution.  
21.15.   The United States maintains its serious c oncerns with CSAR and its implementing measures, 
and requests that China specifically address the concerns raised in previous meetings at both the 
CTG and the sub -body levels. We find it very concerning that China, in its floor statements for the G/C/M/147  
 
- 47 - 
 
  CTG and W TO TBT Committee, continues to assert that the many long -standing concerns with CSAR 
raised by WTO  Members are due to a misunderstanding of the requirements. As CSAR progresses 
into implementation, it is increasingly clear that China's requirements are bur densome, treat imports 
unequally, and do not address WTO  Members' concerns as to the protection of companies' 
intellectual property. The United States asks that China discontinue its practice of reiterating CSAR's 
requirements and instead acknowledge and r esolve concerns.  
21.16.   Finally, we refer China to the previous statements of the United States and many other 
WTO Members for our unresolved concerns, and suggestions as to how these concerns could be 
addressed.  
21.17.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated th e following:  
21.18.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by other Members regarding China's 
Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulations and its implementing measures, and refers 
to our statement s at previous meetings.10 Given our mutual in terest in the cosmetics industry, Korea 
once again urges China to resolve this issue promptly, while underlining the importance of continuing 
our dialogues and exchanges regarding cosmetic regulations via both bilateral and multilateral 
channels. Korea sta nds ready to further engage with China to resolve these issues constructively.  
21.19.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
21.20.   New Zealand has taken into account the response given by China at the previous Council for 
Trade in Goods. We reiterate our well-documented concerns from previous meetings, as well as 
during our recent Joint Trade and Economic Commission meeting, regarding China's regulatory 
system for cosmetics. We continue to urge China to consider additional measures to allow for (i) the 
exem ption of animal testing requirements through non -government regulatory authority -issued 
GMP certification or other trade facilitative mechanisms for providing product assurances;  
(ii) providing flexibility in respect of product testing requirements. In par ticular, we encourage China 
to accept test reports from accredited laboratories situated outside of China; and  (iii) further 
limitations on product disclosure requirements, particularly in relation to sensitive information – that 
is, limited to that which is required to assure product safety in China's domestic market, so as not 
to compromise intellectual property.  New Zealand looks forward to engaging further with China on 
its Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulations (CSAR) to address these iss ues. 
21.21.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
21.22.   First, regarding the inspection required for cosmetics registration and notification, requiring 
the inspection for cosmetics ' registration and notification to be carried out by professional institutions 
aims to protect consumers' rights and ensure the accuracy of the inspection results. Inspection 
institutions shall obtain the certification of inspection and testing qualification (CMA) in the field of 
cosmetics. However, China does not prohibit foreign ins pection institutions from getting the 
certification, and China's Administrative Measures for the Accreditation of Inspection and Testing 
Institutions does not restrict foreign inspection institutions from getting such certificates either.  
21.23.   Second, regarding  the evaluation of cosmetic s' efficacy claims. The formulation of the 
specification for the Evaluation of Cosmetic Efficacy Claims is to further ensure the scientific basis , 
accuracy and reliability of those claims, and to safeguard the rights and interest s of consumers. 
Based on the principle of equivalence, the efficacy claim evaluation test method does not limit the 
selection of internationally recognized foreign regulations or technical standards, such as OECD or 
ISO. 
 
10 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  12.18 -12.19 : "12.18.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  
indicated the following:  
12.19.   The Republic of Korea shares concerns expressed by other Members regarding China's CSARs and its 
implementing measures, and refers to our statement  delivered at previous meetings. Given our mutual interest 
in the cosmetics industry, Korea once again urges China to resolve this issue promptly, while underlining the 
importance of continuing our dialogues and exchanges regarding cosmetic regulations via  both bilateral and 
multilateral channels. The Republic of Korea stands ready to further engage with China to resolve these issues 
constructively."  G/C/M/147  
 
- 48 - 
 
  21.24.   Third, regarding the cosmetics ' labelling -related issues. In order to protect consumers' 
rights, it is important to include manufacturers' relevant information, their locations, and so on,  in 
the information of cosmetics ' manufacturers. When marking enterprise information, the 
corresponding  guiding words should be used to not confuse consumers. With regard to the 
ingredients with weight percentage not exceeding 0.1% (w/w), the indicating words "other trace 
ingredients" should be labelled. The measure does not require a descending order of in gredient 
content or any other specific order.  
21.25.   Lastly, regarding the protection of trade secrets and intellectual property rights, China  
believe s that requiring registrants to submit safety -related materials is a common practice in various 
Members. We have taken various measures to protect the intellectual property rights and trade 
secrets of enterprises. For example, rather than submitting the full text, we only request that 
relevant enterprises submit the summary of the supporting material of the efficacy claims. The 
required technical materials of new raw materials only cover the basic aspects, such as the name, 
registration number, composition , and so on , rather than the complete information. The Chinese 
authorities and administrative staff will strictly protect trade secrets in handling the registration  of 
cosmetics , in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations.  
21.26.   The Council took note  of the state ments made.  
22  EGYPT – HALAL CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPORTED FOOD AND 
BEVERAGE PRODUCTS (ID 191) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Eur opean Union and the United States.  
22.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
22.3.  The United States acknowledges that Egypt has delayed implementation of its new Halal 
requirements for dairy products; we understand the most recent delay is now in effect until 
1 January  2024. However, the United States notes that continued delays in implementation are not 
sufficient to address our underlying concerns. We ask that Egypt publish a technical regulation that 
describes the implementing procedures for all products that require Halal certification as a condition 
of import. The United States also welcomes Egypt's recent approval of a new Halal certifying body. 
We ask that Egypt publish the criteria and process it will use to approve additional Halal certification 
bodies. The United States requests that Egypt suspend any new Halal requirements until the 
requested information has been made available and certifier issues have been resolved. These efforts 
will provide the assurance that US and other exporters need in order to confidently ship 
Halal-compliant dairy products to Egypt.  
22.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
22.5.  The European Union reiterates its concerns with regard to Egypt's requirements on Halal 
certification. The EU is concerne d about the negative impact of this measure on imports of food and 
beverages into Egypt. The EU invites Egypt to notify the Halal standard  4249/2014 to the WTO 
before its finalization, as well as the comprehensive list of products that should be Halal-certified. 
Once the Halal standard is finalized and adopted, the EU would recommend introducing a transition 
period of at least six  months to enable operators to adjust to new conditions.  
22.6.  The European Union  has noted that the requirement for dairy products was  suspended until 
the end of 2023, by the latest Addendum of 8  August. We very much appreciate the flexibility of 
Egypt's authorities, which is very helpful to economic operators.  
22.7.  The European Union  would also like to invite Egypt to reconsider the decision  to grant the 
right to certify the compliance with Halal requirements to a single company and to provide for a 
Halal certification system that would allow multiple, well -established certification entities, in 
accordance with international best practices. R e-certification of products from establishments 
already certified by other companies is an unnecessary duplication and would lead to a longer time 
to market and higher costs for consumers.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 49 - 
 
  22.8.  The European Union would like to request  Egypt to consider keeping the Halal certification 
and labelling voluntary for dairy products, to pursue the legitimate objective of ensuring reliable 
information without unduly hindering trade flows. Consumers should be able to decide whether to 
buy Halal-certified food or not, based on cle ar labelling.  
22.9.  Finally, the European Union would like to ask Egypt about the concrete steps envisaged to 
provide comprehensive information about the new measures and clear written and publicly available 
guidance to stakeholders, including a detailed descrip tion of the certification procedure, its duration, 
costs, and required documents, as well as the process for registration of suppliers. The EU is ready 
to work with Egypt on solutions that would prevent the negative impact this measure is likely to 
have on  food and beverages imports to Egypt.  
22.10.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
22.11.   My delegation would like to thank the EU and US  delegations for putting this issue back on 
the agenda and for registering our trade and systemic concern under this item . Paraguay requests 
an update from the Egyptian delegation today, as Egypt has not provided an update at the last 
TBT Committee meeting earlier this month on this concern.  
22.12.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
22.13.   Canada continues to be concerned with Egypt's Halal certification requirements for all 
imported food and beverage products. Canada understands Egypt's objective to ensure that Egyptian 
consumers are confident that they are buying and consuming Halal-certified products. However, 
such measures should not create unnecessary barriers to international trade or be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil that objective. Canada welcomes Egypt's delayed 
implementation of the Halal certification for dairy pro ducts to 31  December  2023. However, Canada 
requests that this measure be suspended until more information is provided. In particular, Canada 
requests further information on procedures to receive certification, fee structures, details on audits, 
products co vered, documentation requirements, and specificity on how these requirements will be 
implemented. In light of these concerns, Canada refers to our previous statements made at the 
CTG.11 In particular, Canada invites Egypt to consider a Halal certification system that would allow 
multiple, well -established certification entities from exporting countries, in accordance with 
international best practices. Until further clarity on the measure and procedures is provided, we 
respectfully request that Egypt suspend  the implementation of the measure.  
22.14.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
22.15.   Switzerland shares the concerns expressed by other Members regarding the requirements 
for Halal certification and refer s to its previous statements in this Council and  the TBT  Committee. 
To prevent ambiguities, Switzerland asks for a further extension of exemptions until the final scope 
and clear guidelines for the implementation of Halal requirements have been published. We reiterate 
the importance of recognizing forei gn Halal certification bodies , in accordance with international best 
practices, and to clarify ing the criteria for the acceptance of foreign Halal certificates.  
 
11 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  16.11 -16.14: "16.11.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.12.   Canada continues to be concerned with Egypt's Halal certification requirements for all imported food 
and beverage products. Canada understands Egypt's objective to ensure that Egyptian consumers are 
confident that they are buying and consuming Halal -certified products. However, such measures should not 
create unnecessary barriers to international trade or be more trade -restrictive than necessary to fulfil that 
objective.  
16.13.   Canada welcomes Egypt's delayed implementation of the Halal certification for d airy products to 
30 September  2023. However, Canada requests that this measure be suspended until the following questions 
are answered. Canada requests further information on procedures to receive certification, fee structures, 
details on audits, and speci ficity on how these requirements will be implemented.  
16.14.   In light of these concerns, Canada refers to our previous statements made at this Council and urges 
Egypt to reconsider the implementation of this measure. In particular, Canada invites Egypt to  consider a Halal 
certification system that would allow multiple, well -established certification entities, in accordance with 
international best practices. Canada is open to meeting with Egypt bilaterally to have an open and transparent 
discussion, further  clarify the requirements under this new measure, and consider the impact it may have on 
trade. Until then, we respectfully request that Egypt suspend the implementation of the measure.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  22.16.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
22.17.   New Zealand has taken into account Egypt's  comments on this issue at the previous Council 
for Trade in Goods meeting in July, and the recent meeting of the TBT  Committee. We thank Egypt 
for providing an explanation of the implementation practice for the new Halal standard, ES 4249. 
However, we rem ain concerned about some ongoing uncertainty in the implementation of the 
measure , and the consequent uncertainty that this is generating for exporters.  
22.18.   New Zealand requests that Egypt provide further written clarification on the implementation 
of the ES42 49 standard. We request that this set out clearly:  (i) the responsibility of the respective 
Egyptian government agencies for the different steps of the Halal certification process, and their 
relevant contact points; and  (ii) the specific steps that domestic and foreign suppliers of Halal 
products must follow to comply with the Standard, including publication of issues such as 
time-frames, registration/audit requirements, fee schedules , and labelling requirements.  
22.19.   Once it has be en notified to the WTO and been consulted on as a final set of requirements 
for Halal imports into Egypt, New Zealand requests that a reasonable transition period, of at least 
6-12 months is provided. This transitional period will allow exporters time to u nderstand and comply 
with any new requirements.  
22.20.   New Zealand  invite s Egypt to further consider the approval of multiple Halal certification 
bodies for certification of Halal food products into the Egyptian market, in accordance with 
international best pract ice. Allowing multiple, well -established, certification bodies to certify products 
as Halal will make Egypt's Halal regulations less trade restrictive, reduce the impact of duplication 
and other unnecessary costs on consumers, help resolve supply chain iss ues, and promote Egypt's 
overall food security.  
22.21.   The delegate of Egypt  indicated the following:  
22.22.   Egypt would like to thank the European Union, the United States, Canada, Switzerland, 
New Zealand, and Paraguay for their comments. In this respect, I would like  to make several points. 
First, Egypt is in the process of preparing the necessary technical regulation with respect to Halal 
requirements for dairy products that comprise s the product coverage  (which will be confined to dairy 
products , as stipulated in ES 4249/2023 (as per their label) ), and  the role of the relevant entities 
involved , including the Halal certification bodies to be approved by the relevant authority.  Second, 
it is important also to stress that the referred to technical regulation shall allow  for a transitional 
period between the issuance of the regulation and its entry into force to allow producers in exporting 
countries to duly adapt  to it, as per the provisions of the TBT  Agreement. Third, in the meantime, it 
is important to note that the r equirement for a Halal certificate to accompany imports of dairy 
products has been further postponed until 31  December  2024 (this will be duly notified in the 
TBT Committee). This decision has been taken in order to ensure the predictability and the smooth  
flow of trade.  Fourth, the General Organization for Veterinary Services (GOVS) will also publish the 
criteria for approving Halal certification bodies , including the requirement for registration at the 
relevant authority. Finally, the relevant technical r egulation , together with the criteria for approving 
other Halal certification bodies , will be duly notified once issued.  
22.23.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
23  INDIA – ORDER RELATED TO REQUIREMENT OF NON -GM CUM GM FREE CERTIFICATE 
ACCOMPANIED WITH I MPORTED FOOD CONSIGNMENT (ID 175) – STATEMENT BY THE 
UNITED STATES  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this  item had been included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States.  
23.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
23.3.  Unfortunately, this i s the seventh  consecutive meeting that this item is on the CTG  agenda 
and the third  year that this issue has been raised in the Council. The United States continues to 
reiterate serious concerns with India's measure mandating "non -GM (genetically modified) origin 
and GM  free certificates" for certain agricultural imports into India, notified on 2  September  2020, G/C/M/147  
 
- 51 - 
 
  as G/TBT/N/IND/168 , and a later notified entry -into-force date of 1  March  2021. To date, India has 
not responded to  our questions regarding its rationale for requiring a non -GM certificate on a 
consignment basis. The United States requests that India immediately revoke this trade restrictive 
Order and engage in further dialogue with the United States to find mutually a greeable alternatives 
that do not unnecessarily impact trade.  
23.4.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
23.5.  Japan expresses its concern that there might be a possibility that this would constitute a 
trade-restrictive measure that is not based on scientifi c evidence. We request that agricultural 
products exported from exporting countries that exercise proper control of their genetically modified 
agricultural products be excluded from this requirement.  
23.6.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
23.7.  Canada t hanks the United States for placing this item on the agenda. Canada reiterates its 
concerns raised at the July  2023 CTG  meeting , as well as at recent SPS and TBT  Committee 
meetings. Canada refers to its previous intervention on this item, and asks that it be included in the 
meeting record as the situation has not changed.12 It still remains unclear to Canada how India's 
non-GM certification requirement will fulfil its intended objective. Therefore, we continue to call on 
India to share the scientific and te chnical information on which it has based its approach to support 
a transparent, predictable, risk - and science -based trading environment. Once again, Canada urges 
India to engage with Members to discuss and consider alternate, less trade -restrictive appro aches 
that would meet India's objectives and minimize impacts on trade.  
23.8.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
23.9.  Argentina thanks the United States for placing this concern on the agenda of this meeting. 
We again reiterate our concern and stress that this measure has no scientific explanation to support 
it. As we have expressed on previous occasions in this Council and in the TBT  Committee, Argentina 
has strong  concerns that this requirement will set a precedent, that in the future other products or 
even their derivatives will be included, and that this requirement will become  a barrier to trade. We 
hope that India can reconsider this measure.  
23.10.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
23.11.   As we have recently stated at meetings of the TBT and SP S Committees, we are particularly 
concerned that this measure could lead to the unjustified assumption that GM  food products 
evaluated and authorized on the basis of sound regulatory processes are less safe than non -GM food 
products. These GM  products have  undergone rigorous scientific safety assessments in accordance 
with international standards, guidelines and recommendations to ensure that they are considered 
as safe as their conventional counterparts. We call on India: ( i) to provide answers to the ques tions 
that have been withdrawn on numerous occasions , especially with regard to the notification 
submitted by India to the SPS  Committee on 5  January  2023 under document  symbol 
G/SPS/N/IND/290 ; and (ii) to notify the SPS  Committee of the measure con sidering the intended 
objective of ensuring the safety and wholesomeness of imported food , and for India  to reconsider 
this policy as  being inconsistent with its obligations to this Organization.  
 
12 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  14.4-14.5: "14.4.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
14.5.   Canada thanks the United States for placing this item on the agenda. Canada wishes to reiterate its 
concerns raised at previous meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods, as well as the recent SPS and 
TBT Committees, regard ing India's non -GM Order, which mandates that a non -genetically modified (non -GM) 
or GM  free certificate accompany imported consignments of 24  imported food products. We are concerned with 
the lack of scientific support for India's measure given the broad scientific consensus that GM  products are as 
safe as their conventional counterparts. It remains unclear to Canada how India's non -GM certification 
requirement will fulfil its intended objective. We are equally concerned with the undue burden and neg ative 
commercial impact the measure creates on exporting countries through unjustified certification requirements. 
Canada requests once again that India suspend the implementation of this measure and permit trade to 
continue without a GM -free certificate r equirement. This would enable India to engage with Members to discuss 
and consider alternate, less trade -restrictive approaches that would meet India's objectives and minimize 
impacts on trade."  G/C/M/147  
 
- 52 - 
 
  23.12.   The delegate of Uruguay indicated the following:  
23.13.   Uruguay is  looking forward to the responses from India. Clearly, the question of a labelling 
for the production of food products that have been produced with biotechnology, a system that has 
been prove n over many years , and has pr oven that there are no risks to human health, generates 
doubts , and we wonder whether this is more a political rather than a technical issue. For example , 
in Uruguay there is no differentiation for products that have an ingredient that has been genetically  
modified because it is considered that both products fulfil the same role.  
23.14.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
23.15.   India thanks Member s for their  interest in India's non-GM cum GM  free certificate 
requirement. The import of GM  foods is not allowed in India (as per the Environment Protection 
Act, 1986 and FSSAI  Act, 2006). Therefore, to ensure that only non-GM food crops are imported 
into India, FSSAI has notified the requi rement of a non-GM certificate to accompany imported food 
consignment s, which is an assurance provided by the competent authority of the exporting country 
that the food crops that are not approved by GEAC (Genetic Engineering Approval Committee) are 
not im ported in to India,  and the importer has to provide the certificate as per the format notified by 
FSSAI. On similar lines, India has been issuing such certificates for its exports to other countries. 
Noting the restriction of GM  foods in India, the toleranc e limit for adventitious presence of GMOs at 
1% is permissible in imported food crops , and the same was notified vide the FSSAI  order dated 
8 February  2021. Accordingly, import is permissible if the adventitious presence of GM  content is 
less than  the notified tolerance limit. Further, the GEAC has so far not approved any of the crop 
varieties of genetically modified/ engineered origin listed on the Order mentioned above. The 
requirement of a non-GM certificate for import of 24  food crops is an assurance req uired from the 
competent authorities of exporting countries that the food crops exported to India are of 
non-GM origin and GM -free. To date, our several trade partners are already providing  the requisite 
certificate and trade is going on smoothly. The FSSAI is open to interact ing with trading partners to 
discuss the said matter in order to facilitate trade. However, with respect to the specific query raised 
by Members , India would like to state that the TBT  Agreement recognizes the right of a Party to 
adopt international standards as per the appropriateness or effectiveness for the Party. The 
precautionary measures have been taken by the FSSAI since GM  food is not allowed in India. Further, 
on similar lines, India also issues more than 7 ,000 GM free certificates yearly as per the requirement 
of the exporting countries.  
23.16.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
24  PANAMA – ONIONS AND POTATOES HARVEST LIFE AND SPROUTING (ID 177) – 
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED  STATES  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of 
the United States.  
24.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
24.3.  Regrettably, this is the seventh  consecutive meeting that this item is on the CT G agenda and 
the third  year that this issue has been raised in the Council. The United States continues to raise its 
concerns on Panama's technical regulations for onions and potatoes. Despite continued attempts to 
constructively engage with Panama on this  issue, Panama continues to be unresponsive and has yet 
to provide the scientific justification for these measures. We maintain our availability and 
commitment to work with Panama to refine the measures so that they meet Panama's legitimate 
objectives, whi le not being unnecessarily restrictive. In the interim, we reiterate our request that 
Panama provide the scientific justification for its measures or suspend implementation of both the 
potato and onion regulations until technical discussions have concluded . 
24.4.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
24.5.  Canada continues to be concerned with Panama's quality requirements for fresh potatoes, 
implemented in February  2020, which are having a direct impact on Canada's ability to export 
potatoes to Panama. Canad a is supportive of the US  intervention regarding this issue. Canada would 
like to refer to its previous intervention at the July  2023 CTG  meeting on this item and ask for it to G/C/M/147  
 
- 53 - 
 
  be included in the meeting record as the situation has not changed.13 Canada re spectfully requests 
again that Panama pause the enforcement of these requirements to allow for additional technical 
dialogue to occur and ensure that Panama's quality standards do not continue to create unintended 
barriers to our mutually beneficial bilate ral trade in agriculture.  
24.6.  The delegate of Panama  indicated the following:  
24.7.  Panama thanks the delegations of the United States and Canada  for their comments. We have 
taken note of their concerns. Panama continues to analyse the comments received by our tradi ng 
partners, and we are open to consider their concerns, as evidenced by the extension of the entry 
into force of the measure last year. Panama reaffirms its commitment to transparency, and notes 
that the Panamanian authorities continue to discuss the issu e with all relevant governmental bodies, 
including the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Panamanian Food 
Authority. We recall that any decision will be duly notified and shared with the Council.  
24.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
25  MEXICO – CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE UNDER MEXICAN OFFICIAL 
STANDARD NOM -223-SCFI/SAGARPA -2018, "CHEESE NAMES, SPECIFICATIONS, 
COMMERCIAL INFORMATION, AND TEST METHODS," PUBLISHED ON 31  JANUARY  2019 
(ID 162) – STATEMENT BY THE UNITE D STATES  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the United States.  
25.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
25.3.  Unfortunately, this is the ninth consecutive meeting that this item is on the CTG  agenda and 
the third  year that this issue has been raised at the Council. The United States remains highly 
concerned with the revised measure. Could Mexico provide a timeline for when it will respond to 
WTO Member comments? Could Mexico also please  provide an update on the status of this measure 
and an estimated time -frame of when the revised measure will be notified to the WTO?  
25.4.  The United States is concerned that this measure may conflict with the ongoing redrafting of 
the corresponding cheese stan dard. How will Mexico harmonize its update to the NOM -223 cheese 
standard with the NOM -223 cheese CAP notified to the WTO on 8  February  2022? Has Mexico 
considered extending its eventual timeline for implementation of the measure to a period of 
12 months o r more? If Mexico proceeds with implementation of the current measure, at least 
one year will be needed to launch systems to comply.  
25.5.  The United States, therefore, urges Mexico to indefinitely delay implementation of the 
measure and consider less trade -restrictive alternatives as previously proposed by the 
US Government, other WTO  Members, and industry stakeholders.  
25.6.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
25.7.  New Zealand has considered Mexico's response on this matter at the previous Council for 
Trade in Goods in April and at the recent TBT  Committee. However, we remain concerned that the 
conformity assessment procedures that Mexico has set out for cheese under NOM -223 are more 
trade restrictive than necessary, with some aspects of the Conformity Assessment Procedure (CAP) 
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade and likely to cause difficulties for 
New Zealand's  exporters. We support the request for Mexico to consider less trade -restrictive 
 
13 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  17.4-17.5: "17.4.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
17.5.   Canada continues to be concerned with Panama's quality requirements for fresh potatoes, implemented 
in February  2020, which are having a direct impact on Canada's ability to export potatoes to Panama. Canada 
would like to refer to its previous intervention at the April  2023 CTG  meeting on this item and ask it to be 
included in the meeting record as the situation has not changed. Canada respectfully requests again that 
Panama pause the enforcement of these requiremen ts to allow for additional technical dialogue to occur and 
ensure that Panama's quality standards do not continue to create unintended barriers to our mutually 
beneficial bilateral trade in agriculture."  G/C/M/147  
 
- 54 - 
 
  alternatives to the measures.  We look forward t o receiving a response from Mexico to the concerns 
raised, and an update on the status of any revised version of the Conformity Assessment Procedure.  
25.8.  The delegate of Mexico  indicated the following:  
25.9.  Mexico appreciates the interest of Member s in this matter , and reiterates that the competent 
authorities of the Ministry of the Economy and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
continue to evaluate the comments received from national and foreign interested parties during the 
public consultation perio d on the draft Conformity Assessment Procedure (C AP) of the Standard. 
Once the analysis period has concluded, the Government of Mexico will be in a position to notify the 
appropriate responses to the delegations that expressed their concerns, as well as to  all 
WTO Members. Having said the above, Mexico reiterate s that the process of elaboration of the  CAP 
is still open, so that the modifications to the document will be made taking into consideration the 
observations and comments received in due time and for m during the public consultation period, 
always ensuring that its provisions are harmoni zed with those established in the amendment of the 
Standard.  
25.10.   It is also important to note that the implementation of the CAP will be in accordance with 
the provisions o f the Law on Quality Infrastructure and in strict compliance with Mexico's obligations 
under the TBT  Agreement and the related chapters of the Free Trade Agreements to which it is a 
party. On the other hand, with regard to the verification, surveillance an d compliance activities of 
the draft measure, the provisions of the Quality Infrastructure Law will be considered within the 
scope of the powers of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development and the Federal Consumer Prote ction Agency individually or jointly under the terms of 
the Collaboration Agreements that may be signed. Finally, the competent authorities have 
determined that it is feasible to resume activities to amend the Standard itself, as well as the Draft  
CAP of said standard, once the Systematic Review is carried out in the first  quarter of 2024, when  
the results will be notified.  
25.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
26  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, THE 
STATE OF KUWAIT, O MAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (ID 120) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Switzerland,  and the United States . 
26.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
26.3.  The United States, along with Switzerland, the European Union,  and Japan, circulated 
questions in M arch 2021 to Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) member State governments regarding 
the status of the selective tax on beverages. While we appreciate the information provided during 
the last Council meeting, as well as separate discussions with member State off icials since then, we 
sadly note that this is the 17th consecutive meeting that this topic is on the agenda and the sixth year 
that this issue has been raised in the Council, and, we still have yet to receive written responses to 
those initial questions an d follow -up questions. We ask these Members to update us as to when such 
responses to those questions will be provided. As we have conveyed before, we request a substantive 
update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax model and its implementation plan under t he GCC  unified 
excise tax agreement, and note the importance of timely engagement with interested parties 
regarding this issue.  
26.4.  The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
26.5.  Switzerland wishes  to refer to its past statements in the CTG where it has raised this issue, 
together with the United States  and the European Union , and voiced its concerns in detail for many 
years, as well as its efforts undertaken in the WTO and bilaterally. Referring to the meeting of the 
Committee on Market Access  (CMA) of October  2023, my delegation would like to thank the 
delegation of Oman for having indicated that the study on the selective tax reform was in an 
advanced stage , and that a comprehensive report would be published very soon.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 55 - 
 
  26.6.  However, once again the informatio n, although a welcome development, is rather vague. We 
would request that Oman,  in the name of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member States , 
provide more specific details as to how we should understand "that a comprehensive report would 
be published very soon". Does this mean in a couple of weeks , or a couple of months , or more? We 
would appreciate more specificity and transparency as to when the comprehensive report will be 
published , and what next steps are foreseen to implement the reform without any further delay.  
26.7.  For health reasons, s everal WTO  Members have introduced an excise duty on food products 
in order to incentivize the consumers to  revert to less harmful alternatives. The taxation systems 
adopted are well documented as regards their pros and cons. Choosing an efficient tax system that 
meets legitimate health objectives does not require complex and time -consuming studies. Moreover, 
according to their statements made at previous meetings in this Council and the CMA, the 
GCC Members have repeatedly confirmed that they will revert to a tiered volumetric selective tax 
similar to the model in place in the UK. In our view, the GCC  member St ates only need to agree on 
the value of the different tiers and the rates of the tax.  
26.8.  We highly encourage the GCC to speed up the final decision -making and share the draft with 
interested Members. Switzerland hopes that this trade concern will be resolved in the near future.  
26.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.10.   The European Union would appreciate an update on the review of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council's "Treaty on Excise Tax" of December  2016. The EU would like to reiterate the import ance 
of basing the review on scientific elements and international best practices. In this regard, the EU 
welcomes information that , as a result of the " tax reform study" , a volumetric tax model based on 
international best practice is being considered. We also consider it important that the reform will 
equalize the tax rates for energy drinks with the tax rates applied on other soft drinks. The EU would 
like to recall the importance of harmonizing the implementation of the Excise Tax Law and the need 
for a close engagement with private industry stakeholders on the process for revising the tax. The 
EU is ready to continue engaging with the GCC on this important issue.  
26.11.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , speaking on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC)  member States , indicated the following:  
26.12.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the State of Qatar, the State of Kuwait, and Oman, I would like to thank the del egation s of the 
United States , Switzerland, and the European Union for their continu ing interest in the GCC  select ive 
tax on carbon ated soft drinks, energy drinks , and other sweetened beverages. I should like to inform 
Members  that, as per the latest update from the GCC  Secretariat, the st udy reviewing selective tax 
regime s has reached an advance d stage. We anticipate that a comprehensive report will be issued 
soon. The delay is attributed to certain technical challenges that the GCC  member States are actively 
working to resolve in order to  expedite completion of this study.  
26.13.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
27  INDIA – RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES (ID 125) – STATEMENTS 
BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, Canada, the European Union , and the  United States . 
27.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
27.3.  This trade concern is the longest raised by the United State s, as this is the 17th consecutive 
meeting that this item is on the CTG  agenda and the sixth year that this issue has been raised before 
the CTG. The US shares the concerns regarding India's quantitative restrictions for select varieties 
of pulses. As we h ave stated previously in the Committee on Import Licensing ( CIL), the Committee 
on Agriculture ( COA), and the Committee on Market Access ( CMA), we repeat our requests for 
information on how the measures reflect India's WTO  commitments, and when and how the  
measures will be ended. We continue to urge India to consider less trade restrictive requirements 
and to notify future relevant measures and regulations in a timely manner.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 56 - 
 
  27.4.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
27.5.  Canada remains deeply concerned by  India's continued efforts to restrict imports of pulses 
through several trade -restrictive and domestic support measures and import restrictions on dried 
peas. These measures have significant negative impacts on exports of pulses to India. Once again, 
Canada continues to call for India to immediately and expeditiously remove its trade restrictive 
measures, and to implement alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that promote a predictable 
and transparent import regime for pulses. Canada continues to ques tion the legal interpretation 
provided by India to justify trade restrictive measures on dried peas, especially its "temporary 
nature" when the quantitative restrictions were established on 25  April 2018 and have been applied 
since then. Canada will contin ue to closely monitor India's unjustified import restrictions and trade 
distorting measures.  
27.6.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
27.7.  Australia joins Canada, the European Union, and the United States in raising our concerns 
with India's continued  use of quantitative restrictions on imports of certain pulses. Recalling 
Australia's statement made during the October  2023 meeting of  the Committee on Market Access 
(CMA) , by the time this latest extension of India's free import policy for urad and tur o r pigeon peas 
is scheduled to expire, India will have maintained a "temporary" suspension on its WTO -inconsistent 
quantitative restrictions policies for almost three  years , from May  2021 to 31  March  2024.  
27.8.  While Australia appreciated the advance announcemen t of this extension at the time, we 
cannot ignore the fact that this is still an extension to a temporary exemption. For that reason, 
Australia once again encourages India to consider the longer -term benefits to its own food security 
of permanently removin g the quantitative restrictions on all pulses.  
27.9.  Such a response by India would signal to markets that India acknowledges the serious 
challenges to global food security currently and the negative impacts on global food markets from 
snap changes to import pol icies. The permanent removal of the quantitative restrictions would 
provide pulse producers with the certainty they need to make rational, market -oriented planting 
decisions without fear of their exported product becoming stranded should the Indian governm ent 
make a snap decision to impose or extend import restrictions.  
27.10.   We will continue to monitor India's policy settings closely and look to raise this issue again 
in both the CMA and this forum.  
27.11.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.12.   The European Union fully shares the concerns raised by the United States, Canada, and 
Australia. India continues to state that the trade measures applicable to certain pulses are constantly 
reviewed for the purpose of maintaining food and nutritional security . Unfortunately, this does not 
allow a predictable and transparent import regime for the varieties of pulses concerned by the trade 
restrictive measures. We support the calls made today on India to review the measures and to 
ensure  that they are WTO -consis tent. 
27.13.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
27.14.   Argentina again wishes to record its support for this trade concern and thanks the 
delegations that placed it on the agenda. As we have expressed on previous occasions in this Council, 
this measure a ffects two of the main pulses exported from Argentina to India: yellow peas and mung 
beans. As in previous interventions, Argentina reiterates its concern about the uncertainty that this 
measure entails for our exporters and requests its review by the Indi an authorities.  
27.15.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
27.16.   India would like to thank the intervening delegations for their continued interest in this issue. 
As previously stated, the measures adopted by India are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining 
food and nutritional security. This is an area of great impo rtance to our economy and the policies on 
imports are regularly reviewed and updated. The trade measures applicable to pulses are in 
compliance with relevant WTO  agreements and the specified procedures of th ose agreements.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 57 - 
 
  27.17.   The Council took note  of the stat ements made.  
28  UNITED STATES – IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON APPLES AND PEARS (ID 146) – 
STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of 
the European Union.  
28.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
28.3.  The European Union wishes to reiterate its well -known concerns about this long -standing and 
what we consider to be an unjustified barrier. All the necessary scientific groundwork has been 
carried out. The US  scientific assessment concluded more than five  years ago that apples and pears 
from the EU are safe for import into the United States under the so -called "accepted systems" 
approach. Yet the US refrains from proceeding with the next purely administrative step to unblock 
the sit uation, namely the publication of a final notice.  
28.4.  To date, these exports to the United States can only take place under a so -called 
pre-clearance procedure, which is overly costly and not economically viable for exporters. Only very  
limited exports are tak ing place  under this procedure . This means that , in reality , the United States 
market is closed for apples and pears from the European Union.  
28.5.  The European Union reiterates its request and urges the United States to respect its 
obligations under the WTO  SPS Agreement. We urge the US to base its import conditions on science 
and to solve this important matter without further delay. The EU looks forward to continuing working 
together with the United States with a view to solving this issue expeditiously.  
28.6.  The de legate of the United States  indicated the following:  
28.7.  The United States thanks the European Union for its continued interest in the status of the 
request from eight  EU member States to export apples and pears under a systems approach to the 
United States. T he US  Department of Agriculture continues to work through its administrative 
procedures on this request. We would again note that the EU is able to export apples and pears to 
the United States under the existing pre -clearance program.  
28.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
29  INDIA – IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT POLICY THROUGH 
QUALITY CONTROL ORDERS (QCOS) IN VARIOUS SECTORS (ID 206) – STATEMENTS BY 
CANADA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Canada and the European Union.  
29.2.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
29.3.  Canada remains concerned by the Quality Control Orders (QCOs) issued by India across a 
variety of sectors. As expressed in other fora, such as the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade  
(TBT Committee) , Canada is concerned by the QCO  objectives, notification processes , and systemic 
issues in the framework. We hope India meaningfully engages with these concerns, and answers the 
questions  posed by many Members, including Canada. We urge India to ensure that 
QCO implementation is consistent with its WTO  obligations.  
29.4.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
29.5.  The European Union is deeply concerned by the increasing number of  Quality Control Orders 
(QCOs) issued by India. Since 2019, almost 200  QCOs have been notified by India to the Committee 
on Technical Barriers to Trade ( TBT Committee ), and almost a third of these have been the subject 
of specific trade concerns raised by WTO Members. The EU has been consistently raising the issue 
of QCOs, in particular in relation to toys, and more recently  also viscose staple fibres and footwear , 
among others.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 58 - 
 
  29.6.  The majority of QCOs introduced appear to have a protectionist orientation and consequently 
raise questions regarding their compliance with India's obligations under the WTO  TBT Agreement. 
The European Union  is particularly concerned by the visible trend of QCOs prescribing India -specific 
standards where international standards alrea dy exist. Furthermore, QCOs prescribe mandatory 
conformity assessment procedures that are more restrictive than necessary to fulfil their legitimate 
objective. They cause extra burden and economic cost to European stakeholders as a result of 
unnecessarily cumbersome procedures, including mandatory factory inspections by officials of the 
Bureau of Indian Standards  (BIS) , and sample testing in Indian laboratories to obtain necessary 
permissions or licences for products already tested and certified under estab lished international 
standards and schemes. There is no provision for a streamlined process on the basis of existing 
certification from any international body.  
29.7.  The European Union would also like to recall the importance of duly notifying all of these 
measu res as required, notably under Articles  2.9. and 5.6. of the TBT  Agreement.  
29.8.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
29.9.  The United Kingdom  thank s the European Union and Canada for tabling this item. The United 
Kingdom shares their concerns over the number of Quality Control Orders  (QCOs)  being introduced 
by India on a number of goods which seem to be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil 
India's legitimate objectives. In particular, we have raised concerns on Indian footwear regula tions 
in the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade ( TBT Committee ). We thank India for the 
constructive bilateral conversations and the recently shared guidance through which we hope to 
resolve the outstanding uncertainty around how manufacturers can me et the new requirements. We 
would, however, encourage India to ensure that existing and incoming regulations are in accordance 
with international standards where they exist in order to prevent adverse impacts for foreign 
businesses and trade. We would remi nd India of the importance of notifying these measures as 
required in the appropriate Committees and consider implementation timelines when introducing 
these measures. We look forward to continued engagement with India on this issue across WTO  fora. 
29.10.   The de legate of Japan  indicated the following:  
29.11.   Japan supports the European Union and Canada's comments on India's Quality Control 
Orders (QCOs). Although QCOs provide for overseas factory inspections by the Bureau of Indian 
Standards (BIS), Japan requests that Q COs not be more trade restrictive than necessary, in 
accordance with Articles  2 and 5 of the TBT  Agreement. In addition, we request that QCOs be 
consistent with the TBT  Agreement, for example, that international standards be used as the basis 
for QCOs in a ccordance with Articles  2.4 and 5.4 of the TBT  Agreement, and that an appropriate 
period be allowed before implementing QCOs in accordance with Article s 2 and 5 of the 
TBT Agreement. Japan requests India to ensure that the orders comply with the TBT  Agreem ent. 
29.12.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
29.13.   India thank s the delegations of Canada, the European Union , the United Kingdom, and 
Japan,  for their continued interest in India's implementation of conformity assessment policy through 
Quality Control Orders (QCOs) . Please note that a detailed response on this issue has been released 
in document  G/TBT/N/778 , circulated on 15  November. We urge the interested Members to refer to 
this document. On the sidelines of the recent meeting  of the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT  Committee) , we had very productive bilateral conversations with both the UK and the 
EU. Since the QCO on footwear has been mentioned, let me add that detailed explanations were 
provided on this QCO in th ose bilateral meetings.  
29.14.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
30  INDONESIA – IMPORT AND EXPORT RESTRICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES (ID 51) 
– STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN AND NEW ZEALAND  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Japan, and New Zealand.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 59 - 
 
  30.2.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
30.3.  The European Union regrets that once again the Council for Trade in Goods needs to address 
Indonesia's import and export restrictive policies and practices. This item has been on the agen da 
of this Council for several years now, and despite the deep concerns repeatedly expressed by the 
EU – as well as by many other WTO  Members – it is worrisome that no real progress could be 
registered in this respect. Rather, the number and scope of Indon esian restrictions seems to have 
further expanded over time, with a shift towards managed trade and negative impacts on trade 
flows.  
30.4.  We took due note of Indonesia's  comments in the previous meetings of this Council about its 
commitment to uphold its WTO  obligations, including , in particular , the principles of transparency 
and non -discrimination. We also raised this issue in bilateral contacts over the last months. However, 
we have unfortunately not yet seen changes in this direction in Indonesia's policies or practices, and 
our operators continue to face an increasingly restrictive business environment. In particular, the 
EU reiterates its serious preoccupation over the many issues that we have already raised multiple 
times , namely : Indonesia's burdensome an d lengthy SPS  import authori zation procedures ; its 
complex rules and lack of pragmatic certification procedures for Halal labelling ; its mandatory use 
of domestic SNI  standards (Indonesian National Standard) diverging from international standards  
for an increasing number of products ; its wider use of local content requirements ; its restrictive 
import licensing requirements or other import c ontrol measures ; and its export bans and duties.  
30.5.  Accordingly, the European Union  once more urges Indonesia to address the many trade 
barriers of concern to its trading partners, and, as a first  step, to notify all relevant measures to the 
WTO.  
30.6.  The delegate  of the United States  indicated the following:  
30.7.  Like we have for the last three  years, the United States  would like to take this opportunity to 
again underscore our concerns with Indonesia's import and export restricting policies and practices. 
The US has raised concerns with specific Indonesian policies in past meetings of the Council, as well 
as in the  Committee on Trade -Related Investment Measures  (TRIMs  Committee) , the Committee on  
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT  Committee) , the Committee of Participant s on the Expansion of 
Trade in Information Technology Products ( ITA Committee) , and the Committee on Market Access 
(CMA) . First, we again ask Indonesia to provide the Council with an update on its review of its local 
content policies which have been ongoin g for some time. We underscore the importance of ensuring 
that its consultations allow for broad public input.  
30.8.  Second, we continue to have concerns regarding Indonesia's continued application of tariffs 
on multiple ICT  products that appear to exceed its WT O bound tariff commitments. We have raised 
this issue with Indonesia bilaterally and across multiple WTO  committees over the past four  years, 
without a substantive response to our concerns. We have unfortunately seen a similar issue occur 
in multiple other  countries. Earlier this year, several dispute panels found that India's tariff treatment 
of a number of ICT  products is inconsistent with its WTO  commitments. We urge Indonesia to engage 
constructively on this issue with Members, and finally address these  long-standing concerns to 
ensure the integrity of its market access commitments.  
30.9.  Third, we are concerned by Indonesia's continued practice of finalizing trade -related measures 
without sufficient opportunities for stakeholder input. Indonesia has demonstra ted a pattern of 
issuing final measures connected to its Halal product assurance law without sufficient notification 
and with little, if any, opportunities for public input. These measures have the potential to impact a 
significant proportion of global goo ds trade with Indonesia, including US  exports. By finalizing 
measures in this manner, Indonesia misses an opportunity to receive valuable feedback from 
stakeholders regarding the trade impact of its measures.  
30.10.   Additionally, we remain concerned that Indonesi a has yet to respond to important questions 
on its Halal measures that we have circulated at the WTO  TBT Committee. Going forward, we 
strongly encourage Indonesia to adopt a more transparent and consultative policymaking process, 
as well as reconsider its trade -restrictive policies which will support its broader economic goals as 
well as the interest of Indonesian consumers, workers, and businesses.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  30.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
30.12.   In past meetings of the CTG and the Committee on Trade -Related  Investment Measures 
(TRIMs  Committee) , Japan has continuously expressed its concerns about the various Local Content 
Requirement (LCR)  measures implemented by Indonesia related to 4G LTE  equipment, 
TV equipment, and the retail industry , and so on , and the  consistency of these measures with the 
WTO Agreement. The Indonesian government has been implementing import and export restrictions 
on steel products, textile products , and air conditioner equipment, among other products . However, 
in May  2022, the Indone sian government announced that it would introduce the "Neraca Komoditas" 
(Commodity Balance System) for textile products and air conditioner equipment from 2023, based 
on Ministerial Decree No.  25 of 2022 of the Minister of Commerce. Japan's concerns about  the 
commodity balance system, as we will address in Agenda Item 32, are that it violates Article  XI:1 
of the GATT (prohibition of quantitative restrictions), Article  X (publication of trade rules), and the 
provisions of the Import Licensing Agreement, among others, and we call for a remedy for the 
situation to be found as soon as possible.  
30.13.   In particular, as for imports of steel products, Japan recognizes that it has been announced 
that they are temporarily out of the scope of the Commodity Ba lance Mechanism, but imports under 
API-U licences are currently suspended, which has a serious impact on Japan as well as operators in 
Indonesia. The prospects for the issuance of licen ces from next year onwards are also uncertain 
under API-P licences. The extremely serious and unusual situation wherein imports themselves are 
impossible for a long period of time continues, and an immediate and drastic solution is required. 
Furthermore, with regard to textile products, it is regrettable that safeguard measur es on carpets 
were extended on 9  November this year, despite the fact that the Government of Japan made 
comments in a public hearing session on 12  September, and that we expressed concerns at the 
meeting of the Committee on Safeguards ( SG Committee ) in Oct ober. The Government of Japan has 
also requested that compensation talks be held. There are two  main problems with these measures: 
one is that the tariff is as high as 150 -200% in terms of ad  valorem tax conversion ; and the other 
is that the tariff has bee n introduced in a situation in which carpet imports have dropped sharply.  
30.14.   Japan requests that these measures be eliminated as soon as possible. Japan is concerned 
about the increasing number of trade restrictive measures in Indonesia, which are thought to be 
inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement s, and we would like to request a concrete explanation 
regarding the background of the introduction of these systems and their consistency with the 
WTO Agreement s. In particular, Japan has submitted written questions t o the Committee on  Import 
Licens ing (CIL) and TRIMs  Committee on the following three  measures: (i) the import regulation on 
air conditioners ; (ii) the import licen ce for steel ; and (iii) the import regulation for textiles. We expect 
a prompt response from Indonesia. We do hope that import regulations on air conditioners will be 
operated so as not to fall under import restrictions, and that licensing standards and procedures will 
be stipulated with more transparency, and that other measures  will be corrected  or eliminated as 
soon as possible.  
30.15.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
30.16.   New Zealand echoes the concerns raised by the European Union, Japan, and others, in 
previous CTG  meetings. We have considered Indonesia's response on this matter and a ppreciate 
Indonesia's ongoing engagement with New Zealand on these policies and practices. However, 
New Zealand continues to raise this issue in the Council for Trade in Goods because we believe that 
Indonesia's restrictions on imports continue to undermin e core WTO  principles. The frequent 
changes to import requirements reduce commercial certainty, which in turn hampers returns for 
businesses and can lead to increased costs. Moreover, in the food and beverage sector, this 
uncertainty also contributes to th e ongoing increasing cost of food, which can have a particularly 
negative effect on people on low incomes.  
30.17.   New Zealand  notes and welcome s the Indonesian delegate's statement at the 
July CTG meeting, that "Indonesia is dedicated to enhancing the business climate through 
streamlining rules and procedures as a destination for investment and exports". To this end, we 
reiterate the importance of  WTO alignment of policies, and also echo concerns of other delegations 
made in previous meetings regarding local content requirements  across many sectors.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 61 - 
 
  30.18.   New Zealand would like to reiterate the following concerns and requests to Indonesia. 
New Zealand re mains concerned about the inconsistent time -frames and issuance of import licences 
and import permits. Uncertainty around import licences and delay s in issuing import permits are 
leading to commercially significant market access issues for trading partners . In some cases this 
year, licen ces have been issued after our growing seasons, meaning there was no realistic possibility 
of using the permit or allocation provided. We request that Indonesia provide greater clarity on the 
time-frames for the issuance of import recommendations for commodities not currently under the 
SNANK  system, and how import volumes are calculated and allocated to importers.  
30.19.   New Zealand welcomes Indonesia's stated objective that the commodity balance is intended 
to enhance trade in good s and Indonesia's response in July  2023 that it "never meant to obstruct 
international trade flows through its import and export regulations". However, we note that the 
Regulation appears likely to add further complexity, as it allows for import restrictio ns to be applied 
where domestic supply is calculated to be sufficient to meet projected demand. Specific 
implementation details of the Commodity Balance/import licensing system are yet to be provided, 
which is adding to the uncertain environment for import s. 
30.20.   Finally, New Zealand appreciates Indonesia's ongoing engagement on this issue, including 
via the WTO  Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), where Indonesia has committed to "following the 
recommendations and decisions of the DSB by repealing relevant procedures ". We join others in 
asking Indonesia to make renewed efforts to address these long -standing concerns about 
Indonesia's import restricting policies and their impact on trade.  
30.21.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
30.22.   Canada's concerns related to Indo nesia's tariffs on ICT  products, which have already been 
expressed in the past, continue to be of concern. In particular, Canada continues to have systemic 
concerns with Indonesia's application of tariffs above its bound rates on ICT  products. Canada calls  
upon Indonesia to implement import measures in a transparent and predictable manner, in 
accordance with the relevant WTO  provisions.  
30.23.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
30.24.   Indonesia express es its appreciation to the European Union, Japan,  New Zealand, the United 
States,  and Canada for their interest in Indonesia's import and export policies and practices. 
Indonesia intends to reiterate its position from the previous meetings of the CTG and the Committee 
on Trade -Related Investment Measures (TRI Ms Committee)  regarding concerns raised by the 
European Union and Japan regarding the Domestic Component Level (TKDN), according to which 
TKDN is intended for policies relating to government procurement, policies relating to meeting needs 
to maintain welfa re, life necessities for Indonesians, and policies relating to strategic resources 
managed by the State. Indonesia is currently conducting multiple reviews of the intended policy, 
and these studies are still in progress. Increasing local products for gover nment purchases, 
especially those made by central and provincial governments, is a current priority for the Indonesian 
government. Indonesia is dedicated to enhancing the business climate through streamlining rules 
and procedures as a destination for inves tment and exports.  
30.25.   Regarding concerns over the textile import licensing regime by the European Union and 
Japan, Indonesia intends to repeat its statement from the previous CTG meeting , that applications 
for import licensing are currently being carried out electronically and after all the licensing documents 
submitted are complete and appropriate, import permits will be processed within a relatively short 
period of time , in accordance with the Import Licensing Agreement. In order to comply with 
Indonesia's o bligations under the TRIMs  Agreement and other WTO  rules, this goal is pursued in 
order to assist investors and strengthen the Indonesian economy.  
30.26.   In response to queries about the licensing system for Japanese imports of electronic goods 
and air conditione rs (AC), Indonesia stated that the regulation's primary goals were to enhance the 
licensing system and assure the administration of product import supervision. Applications for import 
approval are made electronically , in accordance with current requirement s. Following the completion 
and accuracy of the paperwork, the import approval will be performed quickly and in compliance 
with the Import Licensing Agreement. Indonesia therefore believes that there are no restrictions on 
the import of the aforementioned air conditioner goods.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  30.27.   As Indonesia stated at the previous meetings of the Committee on Import Licensing ( CIL) 
and CTG, it intends to ensure that all steel products entering the Indonesian market meet standards, 
specifications, and requirements related to health aspects and safety in the use of imported steel 
products. This is in response to concerns regarding the licensing regime for imports of steel products 
by Japan. Additionally, Indonesia believes that the aforementioned policy is in keeping  with the 
WTO's principles of transparency and non -discrimination, as well as the terms of the WTO  Import 
Licens ing Agreement, and is not meant to restrict imports through the import licensing system for 
steel products.  
30.28.   As required by Articles  7 and 8 of the SPS  Agreement , to take EU  interests  into account , 
Indonesia updated the policy in a transparent way, giving just ifications and policy developments, 
details of modifications, and progress of implementing policies for each EU  member State. Indonesia 
added that the purported unjustified delay by the EU was no longer relevant because it had been 
two years. Indonesia has  demonstrated its dedication to development, enhancement, and 
transparency in its approval processes. Indonesia has demonstrated its dedication to advancement, 
reform, and openness in its approval processes. Each EU  member State has received a copy of the 
policy's development in preparation for the next step in the approval process.  
30.29.   Indonesia plans to bring up the earlier concern raised by Japan at both the CTG  meeting and 
the meeting of the Committee on  Safeguard s (SG Committee ) regarding carpet product sa feguards . 
Before enacting security measures, Indonesia always follows protocol, which includes 
announcements and consultations. Before making a decision, Indonesia carefully reviewed all the 
issues raised by the interested parties. This course of action is  required to repair the substantial 
harm done to the domestic sector. According to Indonesia, the entire process was conducted 
objectively, measurably, transparently, and in conformity with WTO  regulations. In essence, 
Indonesia wants to reaffirm its commi tment to upholding all of its obligations under all agreements, 
rules, and WTO  principles, particularly the principles of transparency and non -discrimination. 
Additionally, Indonesia has never meant to obstruct international trade flows through its import and 
export regulations, particularly those that are connected to government procurement regulations 
that are focused on ensuring the welfare and basic necessities of the Indonesian population.  
30.30.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
31  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS (ID 119) – STATEMENTS BY NEW ZEALAND AND URUGUAY  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at t he request of  
New Zealand and Uruguay.  
31.2.  The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
31.3.  New Zealand has considered the European Union's previous statements on this matter. 
However, New  Zealand continues to raise this item in the Council for Trade in Go ods because we 
still see a conflict in the European Commission's approach to protecting the cheese names "Danbo" 
and "Havarti", for which there are existing CODEX  standards. In our view, the EU's approach 
undermines the integrity of the standards setting s ystem that promotes reliability and consistency 
in international trade rules, which we would expect the EU to support.  
31.4.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
31.5.  Uruguay regret s including this item on the agenda again and wishe s to refer to its previ ous 
interventions, while reaffirming its systemic and trade concerns about the decision of the European 
Union to register the term Danbo as a protected geographical indication, despite the objections 
raised by several Members. In systemic terms, Uruguay is concern ed that recogni zed international 
standards are being disregarded, raising doubts about their integrity and the value of the 
international harmoni zation efforts made in CODEX. The meaning and relevance of multilaterally 
agreeing on a CODEX  standard  is unclear  if the use of such a term will then be a limited exclusive 
privilege of certain producers. As Uruguay has long pointed out, Danbo cheese is a cheese -making 
technique covered by CODEX  Standard 264, which sets out the characteristics, pro duction method , 
and labelling of this type of cheese. This standard establishes that Danbo is the name that may be G/C/M/147  
 
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  applied to this foodstuff in accordance with this standard , and that the country of origin of the 
product must be declared, clarifying that i t is the country where the cheese was made.  
31.6.  The general interpretation of this CODEX  standard is that Members recogni ze Danbo as a 
generic term that can be produced in various locations, as long as the requirements set out in the 
standard are met. In terms  of trade, Uruguay is concern ed about the creation of unnecessary barriers 
to the marketing of this type of cheese in the EU  market , and the extension of its effects to 
third markets through the conclusion of trade agreements. This situation generates unce rtainty 
about the legitimate expectations of small -scale producers to access international cheese markets, 
who received rich cultural knowledge, including knowledge about cheese production through Danish 
cooperation programmes. Uruguay considers that the r egistration of the term Danbo as a protected 
geographical indication is not only contradictory to this historical policy of cooperation, but also 
constitutes a precedent of establishing a de facto monopolistic use of a CODEX  standard. Despite 
the time that  has elapsed without  the EU  taking into account these legitimate systemic and trade 
concerns, Uruguay will continue to keep this item on the agenda.  
31.7.  The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
31.8.  Argentina thanks Uruguay and New Zealand for including t his item on the agenda. Argentina 
wishes to reiterate that the Codex standard for Danbo cheese is the international reference standard 
for the identity and quality of this product in the context of the TBT  Agreement. As this is the 
international reference standard for the identity and quality of "Danbo" cheese, no country basing 
its technical regulations on this standard should face trade restrictions due to misappropriation of 
the term. For Argentina, it is not understandable that efforts should be made to  agree at multilateral 
level on a Codex standard for "Danbo" cheese if the use of the term is then to be the exclusive 
privilege of Danish producers. In essence, registering the term "Danbo" as a geographical indication 
constitutes an undue restriction on international trade in such cheese. In any event, as Argentina 
has stated on previous occasions, its concerns are not purely commercial , but also encompass 
systemic aspects, in particular the impact on international harmoni zation efforts.  
31.9.  The delegate of t he European Union  indicated the following:  
31.10.   The European Union takes note of the concerns expressed by New Zealand, Uruguay, and 
Argentina. The EU has provided detailed replies to these concerns at previous CTG  meetings. Without 
repeating its previous state ments in full, the EU would like to underline that its previous statements 
remain unchanged. Notably, the EU has consistently said that the fact that a GI  name is subject to 
a specific Codex Alimentarius standard , or that it is listed in Annex  B to the Str esa Convention , does 
not imply that the name should be considered as a common or generic term.  Rather, g eneric status 
in the EU can only be assessed with regard to the perception of the consumers on the EU  territory. 
In the EU, the relevant public is compr ised mainly of the reasonably well -informed  members of the 
public and/or customers who may purchase the product or a like product.  
31.11.   Regulation (EU)  No. 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, 
as well as subsequent delegated an d implementing acts, were notified to the WTO under the 
TBT Agreement as they contain provisions relevant to the TBT  Agreement (e.g.  provisions related to 
technical standards, definitions and labelling issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual property 
rights (in particular, elements related to the substantive protection of geographical indications) are 
part of the notified measures, th ese are not relevant for TBT  purposes.  
31.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
32  INDONESIA – COMMODITY BALANCE MECHANISM (ID 173) – STATEMENTS BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Japan, and the United States.  
32.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
32.3.  Under the "Commodity Balance System", an SPI (Import Permit) is required for the import of 
subject products, and the issuance of export and import permits to businesses is to be conducted G/C/M/147  
 
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  through the "National Co mmodity Balance System (SNAS -NK)" based on the 
government -determined commodity supply and demand balance, thus put ting the existing import 
application and permit system out of operation in December  2022. However, in January  2023, there 
were delays and glit ches in the operation of SNAS -NK, which is compliant with the system, resulting 
in major disruptions, such as import permits being delayed in the case of steel products. In the case 
of iron and steel products, it has been announced that they are temporaril y out of the scope of the 
Commodity Balance Mechanism.  
32.4.  In this regard, Japan asked for clarification of Indonesia's Laws and Regulations at the Import 
Licensing Committee in October of this year, but we have not received any clear responses. Japan 
again ca lls for Indonesia's explanation. The system has been severely impacted, with import 
applications for API -U licences for general operators themselves being blocked for a period of time  
since last December. Japan also recognizes that, although the decree was  promulgated in September 
this year, relevant laws and regulations also need to be developed. Japan would like to request that 
the legislation is put in place as soon as possible and that the situation is improved. In addition, with 
respect to licen ces for  manufacturers that allow imports, Japan would also like to point out that 
problems still exist as approvals are given to only a small portion of the applied volume. Furthermore, 
there is uncertainty about import approvals from next year onwards, and we re quest that immediate 
improvements be made . 
32.5.  Japan  understand s that "textile products" are included in the scope of this system, but 
question s whether carpets and rugs have been covered by this system in duplicate. If so, we would 
like to know what requireme nts are in place, and we would be grateful to obtain further details on 
the timetable and arrangements for the application of the commodity balancing system to textile 
products. Indonesia explained in the previous CTG that the system "is not intended to im pede 
imports by WTO  Members, but to improve the business environment for free trade."  
32.6.  However, as seen in its actual operation , as already described, the commodity balancing 
system is highly likely to violate Article  XI:1 of the GATT, among other  provision s, as a measure that 
has a trade -restrictive effect on imports. In addition, the specific formula for calculating the 
commodity balance and the specific method for determining the volume of imports allowed are not 
specified in the law, which is inconsisten t with the obligation to publish trade rules under Article  X 
of the GATT , and in light of the significant obstacles to import licensing that have arisen in actual 
operation, we are concerned that the Import Licensing Agreement may also be violated. Japan i s 
concerned about this and request s that the situation be remedied as soon as possible.  
32.7.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
32.8.  Indonesia's commodity balance system continues to raise concerns, including because its 
scope of application  keeps expanding. At the CTG 's previous meeting , Indonesia commented that 
the commodity balance is aimed at increasing the ease of doing business  and business  environment, 
enhancing transparency , and facilitating planning for economic operators. We welcome efforts to 
ensure a coordinated and streamlined approach on the management of import and export licences. 
However, the EU regrets that the design of the mechanism and its implementation so far l ack clarity 
for business es and may lead to further restrictions to trade flows – in turn raising questions on the 
WTO-compatibility of the scheme.  
32.9.  The European Union  again asks Indonesia to clarify the measures that it intends to take for 
the implementatio n of the commodity balance system as the basis for issuing import (and export) 
approvals. We also encourage Indonesia to clarify how it will ensure that this mechanism will be 
compliant with Indonesia's WTO  obligations and deliver on the stated objective o f facilitating free 
trade flows rather than creating a more restrictive business environment. Finally, the EU reiterates 
that imports remain necessary as a part of Indonesia's ambition to develop its domestic industry, 
and that raising barriers to trade wo uld hamper its economic growth, which cannot be achieved 
through export promotion alone.  
32.10.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
32.11.   As with previous specific trade concerns ( STCs), the United States notes that this is the 
fourth  consecutive meeting that this issue is on the CTG 's agenda. The commodity balance policy 
originally appeared to apply to certain agricultural commodities. The policy has since been expanded G/C/M/147  
 
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  to include non -agricultural products, in particular consumer goods such as cell phones. Since the 
policy was implemented, importers have reported experiencing significant delays in obtaining import 
licences, especially for certain agricultural products, and that some impo rt licences issued by the 
Indonesian authorities covered lower volumes than requested by the importer.  
32.12.   Please explain what steps Indonesia is taking to avoid these administrative delays in the 
future. Also, please explain whether importers obtain a licence  covering the volume they request. If 
not, please explain how the volume is decided. Finally, please explain how the Government of 
Indonesia determines to which products the policy will apply.  
32.13.   While Indonesia has previously explained that this policy was d esigned to build better trade 
governance and transparency in furtherance of its goal of import substitution, we strongly urge 
Indonesia not to expand its policy to other products, and to rethink this counter -productive and 
trade-disruptive policy.  
32.14.   The dele gate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
32.15.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by others regarding Indonesia's 
Commodity Balance Mechanism. It has been reported that our businesses still encounter challenges 
such as undue delays  in the issuance of the recommendations and limited quantity of import quotas, 
stemming from the implementation of the Commodity Balance Mechanism. Korea requests that 
Indonesia improve the functioning of the mechanism, particularly by providing clarificat ions on the 
timeline for import recommendation issuance and the approval of import quotas, to ensure that the 
system does not act as a means to restrict import quantities. The Republic of Korea stands ready to 
deepen our engagement with Indonesia to fully resolve this matter.  
32.16.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
32.17.   The United Kingdom shares the concerns raised by Japan, the European Union, the United 
States,  and the Republic of Korea. Although we support Indonesia's effort to be more tra nsparent, 
it appears that Indonesian regulations related to commodity balance could be trade restrictive. As 
previously raised in this Council, the UK remains concerned about businesses already experiencing 
procedural delays in entering the Indonesian mark et, particularly in agricultural and food and drink 
sectors. The UK also continues to request that Indonesia share a full list of products subject to the 
Commodity Balance Mechanism. The UK would welcome further information from Indonesia on any  
future dev elopments regarding this policy and looks forward to future engagement on this subject.  
32.18.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
32.19.   As indicated in the Council's previous meetings, Switzerland shares the concerns raised by 
Japan, the European Unio n, the United States, the Republic of Korea,  and the United Kingdom, 
regarding Indonesia's  Commodity Balance Mechanism. We are disappointed to note that this issue 
is not progressing. We strongly encourage Indonesia to provide more detailed answers to the 
concerns and questions raised by interested Members, in particular regarding the consistency of the 
Commodity Balance Mechanism with WTO  rules.  
32.20.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
32.21.   Indonesia thanks Members for their interest in the issue of t he Commodity Balance 
Mechanism. The goal of commodity balances is to serve as a vehicle for providing complete, 
accurate, and trustworthy information through an integrated national database system, Indonesia 
plans to restate its position from the CTG's previous meeting . Additionally, a better business climate, 
corporate certainty, and the free flow of goods are goals of the commodit y balance.  
32.22.   The commodity balance will not be an additional burden for Indonesia's import regime, but 
it will accelerate Indo nesia's import licensing procedures. This is primarily due to the emphasis on 
the principles of simplification and transparency in the commodity accounts. The Commodity Balance 
Mechanism will provide complete, detailed, transparent and accurate data, which  will be 
implemented by the relevant ministries  and institutions.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  32.23.   Indonesia continues to believe that the commodity balance will streamline import approval 
procedures, increase the ease of doing business, and facilitate transparent trade and forecasting fo r 
business development.  
32.24.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
33  UNITED STATES, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS – US-JAPAN -NETHERLANDS AGREEMENT ON 
CHIP EXPORT RESTRICTIONS (ID 204) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of 
China.  
33.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
33.3.  China  noted that both the United States and the European Union stated in previous meetings 
that they took issue with the agenda item description as put forward by China, but  the fact s speak 
for themselves . Within a short period of time, the three  Members all introduced new export controls 
on the semiconductor industry against China,  on 7 October  2022, on 23  July 2023, and on 
1 September  2023, respectively . If no such agreemen t exists among the three  Members, how could 
the three  Members take similar actions in such a synchronized manner? With regard to the United 
States' export control on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, we will elaborate on it under 
Agenda I tem 48. 
33.4.  With regard to Japan's export control on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, China's  
concern remains. We are concerned that the scope of products subject to the new export control is 
clearly excessive, as it covers the products that have long been removed fr om the Wassenaar 
Arrangement. In addition, the classification of export licensing and groupings of country or region 
under this export control reflect that the measures are discriminatory and targeted against China.  
33.5.  With regard to the new export controls o n semiconductor manufacturing equipment issued by 
the Dutch government, we note that the relevant semiconductor manufacturing equipment can be 
exported to China until the end of this year. We are concerned that the new export controls go 
beyond the scope of the control list of items of the Wassenaar Arrangement and include products 
that are no t covered by the EU  dual-use export control list.  
33.6.  Finally, China  urges the United States, Japan,  and the Netherlands to notify the respective 
measures in accordance with their WTO commitments.  
33.7.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
33.8.  The United States continues to take issue with the agenda item description as put forward by 
China. Also, as we have stated previously, the United States does not believe that the WTO  Council 
for Trade in Goods is the appropriate forum to discuss issues relate d to national security, including 
export controls.  
33.9.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
33.10.   Japan has long been implementing strict export controls based on the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Act, which Japan considers necessary from the perspect ive of maintaining 
international peace and security, in a manner consistent with  the WTO Agreements. We will continue 
to act in accordance with this policy.  
33.11.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
33.12.   The European Union recalls its statemen t made in previous meetings of the Council for Trade 
in Goods. Like the United States , the EU continues to take issue with the description of this agenda 
item by China, as a factual matter. Moreover, the type of measures regulated by the GATT are those 
adopted by individual Members. The EU's statement therefore relates to the latter only.  G/C/M/147  
 
- 67 - 
 
  33.13.   The matter raised by China concerns national export control measures by the Netherlands 
relating to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. The Dutch government published its 
national regulation on 30  June14, which entered into force on 1  September  2023.  
33.14.   The measure was adopted, in the same way as all existing restrictions of this type, in 
conformity with the applicable WTO  rules. Most notably, the exce ptions of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade permit Members to take action which they consider necessary for the protection 
of their essential security interests relating to traffic in goods carried on directly or indirectly for 
supplying military forces.  
33.15.   The Dutch measure was published in a ministerial order under specific provisions of the 
EU Dual-Use Regulation that governs the export of dual -use goods and technology to destinations 
outside the European Union , allowing EU  member States to take ad ditional national export control 
measures for reasons of public security (Article  9). The Dutch ministerial order imposes an 
authorization requirement, allowing transactions that do not raise security concerns to proceed 
unimpeded.  
33.16.   As mandated under the European Union's Dual -Use Regulation, the EU published the Dutch 
controls on 20  October  2023 to ensure the transparency and legal clarity of the measures.  
33.17.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
34  CHINA – SUBSIDY TRANSPARENCY AND CHINA'S PUBLICATION AND INQUIRY POINT 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER CHINA'S PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION  (ID 170)  – STATEMENTS BY 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, JAPAN, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia, C anada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  
34.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
34.3.  As Members are well aware, this is the third  consecutive year that the United States and other 
Members have raised concerns with respect to the transparency of China's industrial subsidy regime. 
In China's Protocol of Accession, China agreed to publish all trade -related measures in a single 
journal. However, China rarely does so for its subsidy measures. In its Protocol of Accession, China 
also agreed to "establish or designate an enquiry point where, upon request of any individual, 
enterprise or WTO  Member all information relating to the measures required to be published … may 
be obtained."  
34.4.  As we have stated in past Council meetings, we tested out China's commitment on the enquiry 
point and came away with nothing. China simply refused to provide a written response to our 
request, telling us specifically that it would not respond to our reques t, even though China's Protocol 
of Accession enquiry point commitment covers "laws, regulations and other measures".  
34.5.  It is not about the specific measures we requested, but about any WTO  Member's ability to 
understand the actions that China is taking. We s hould all uphold the principle that measures 
establishing and implementing subsidy program mes should be transparent. It is imperative to the 
fairness of the international trading system that Members are transparent in their measures 
impacting trade and inv estment.  
34.6.  This is not just unfair to the United States and our co -sponsors of this agenda item who can 
try to uncover these measures on our own, but is especially unfair to the developing and least 
developed Members who may wish to rely on these mechanisms to understand China's actions, but 
who may not have the capabilities to research these measures themselves.  
 
14 https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2023/06/30/government -publishes -additional -export -
measures -for-advanced -semiconductor -manufacturing -equipm ent  G/C/M/147  
 
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  34.7.  The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
34.8.  Canada has repeatedly echoed the concerns of other Members regarding China's compliance 
with WTO  transparency obligations. When it acceded to the WTO in 2001, China accepted 
comprehensive transparency obligations, and Canada is disappointed that China continues to not 
fulfil these obligations. The proper functioning of the multilateral trading system dep ends on 
Members upholding their notification and transparency requirements, and it is imperative that all 
Members comply with notification obligations and responses to enquiries in accordance with 
WTO rules.  
34.9.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the  following:  
34.10.   The United Kingdom continues to support the concerns raised by other co -sponsors around 
China's compliance with its transparency obligations under its Accession Protocol. We note that this 
item has been on the agenda for many years, both at thi s Council and in the Committee on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM  Committee ). We would refer Members to previous statements 
that we have given on this item across both bodies . In particular, we recall the UK's suggestion 
during the 27  October re gular meeting of the SCM Committee, in the spirit of progressing discussions 
and building greater understanding among Members, that China share its experiences on how it 
fulfils its transparency obligations under its Accession Protocol. We would like to th ank China for its 
constructive engagement on this suggestion at that Committee, and for its willingness to share its 
experiences with Members on complying with its transparency obligations, including on the 
difficulties it faces. While we recognize that th e SCM  Committee only met recently, we would be 
interested in knowing whether China could provide an update to Members on whether it has 
considered when it plans to go ahead with this.  
34.11.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
34.12.   Japan has repeatedly poin ted out in the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM  Committee) that if transparency in subsidy disbursement is not ensured, distortions 
in subsidy disbursement will be encouraged, which may lead to problems such as excess production 
capacity. In particular, various Members have expressed concerns about the transparency of Chinese 
subsidies and the possibility that they may not be notified, but it is difficult to say that China is 
taking sufficient action in response to the points raised. Japan request s that China also fulfil its 
notification obligations under the Subsidy Agreement and its transparency obligations agreed to in 
its Accession Protocol  to ensure the effectiveness of the mechanisms that contribute to improving 
transparency.  
34.13.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
34.14.   Australia attaches considerable importance to the WTO  notification and transparency 
obligations, particularly relating to subsidies, which stem from both the Agreements and the 
obligations made by Members und er their Protocols of Accession. Transparency remains critical to  
the proper functioning of the WTO and underpins the Subsidies Agreement. It creates certainty for 
all our exporters in being able to compete fairly in international markets. It is for the su bsidizing 
Member to notify its measures promptly and comprehensively , and not a burden of discovery placed 
on other WTO  Members. Australia therefore urges China to fulfil the transparency commitments 
made as part of its Protocol of Accession.  
34.15.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
34.16.   As noted in the July  meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods, New Zealand considers 
transparency as critical to the proper functioning of the WTO, and attaches considerable importance 
to adherence by all Members, including China, to WTO  notification and transparency obligations, 
particularly in relation to subsidies, including under their Protocols of Accession. New Zealand 
therefore urges that all Members, including China, fulfil these obligations in a timely mann er, 
including any Member -specific commitments. Adhering to these obligations helps build certainty for 
exporters and makes an important contribution to the successful functioning of the rules -based 
international trading system.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  34.17.   The delegate of the European  Union  indicated the following:  
34.18.   The European Union wishes to reiterate its support to the concerns raised by other Members 
regarding China's compliance with its transparency obligations under its Accession Protocol. The EU 
refers to its past statement on t he matter. We urge China to comply fully with its Member -specific 
commitments by publishing all trade -related measures as it agreed to do , and by respond ing to 
requests for information under the enquiry point without undue delay.  
34.19.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
34.20.   China  regret s that this issue has been raised again despite us having already provided 
explanations to the United States through the US  Embassy in Beijing, and in this Council. In July's 
CTG meeting China clar ified this matter  further . We would like to include China's  statement made at 
July's CTG meeting in the record  of this meeting.15 
34.21.   China  reiterate s that Members can obtain its fishery development policies on the official 
website of the State Council. The other policies that the US enquired about are neither laws, 
regulations  or other measures affecting trade, nor the information which falls within the scope of the 
information di sclosure of relevant Chinese laws and regulations.  
34.22.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
35  EUROPEAN UNION – COMMISSION REGULATION (EU)  2023/334 REGARDING 
MAXIMUM RESIDUE LEVELS FOR CLOTHIANIDIN AND THIAMETHOXAM IN OR ON CERTAIN 
PRODUCTS (ID  200) – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia and the United States.  
35.2.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
35.3.  The United States reiterates i ts concerns that this measure lacks sufficient technical 
justification to fulfil its environmental objective, challenges the expertise of national competent 
authorities, undermines good agricultural practices, and introduces a dangerous precedent for an 
unsubstantiated use of a food safety metric to achieve supposed environmental aims. Given the 
critical importance of these pesticides for the production of crops that are exported to the European 
Union  from the United States and other WTO  Members, we are con cerned that the reduction of these 
MRLs to the limit of determination (LOD) may pose a significant obstacle to trade. As the EU has 
previously recognized, global environmental challenges cannot be achieved by one -size-fits-all 
approaches that are narrowly tailored to the conditions in one country or region. Once again, the US 
 
15 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  13.27 -13.31  "13.27.   The delegate of China  indicated the 
following:  
13.28.   We take note of the statements made by relevant Members. We regret that this issue has been added 
to the agenda multiple times despite China having already provided  its explanations to the US through the 
US embassy in Beijing, and in this Council. China attaches great importance to compliance with the WTO  rules, 
and its fulfilment of its WTO  obligations. We would like to make a few further points on this matter.  
13.29.  First, China's commitment on establishing an enquiry point reflects the importance China attaches to 
transparency. When China joined the WTO in 2001, it was not convenient to get relevant information in China 
at that time due to the limited ways and ch annels to access information. Within this context, China made a 
commitment to establish an enquiry point. The commitment we made is above the general level of 
WTO Members' commitments in this regard, reflecting China's willingness to provide relevant infor mation to 
stakeholders, including WTO  Members, with the greatest sincerity and to the greatest extent possible.  
13.30.   Second, the Chinese government has been continuously enhancing the transparency of our policies 
over the years. For example, China's Gov ernment Information Openness Regulations, formulated in 2007 and 
revised in 2019, has stipulated the scope of government information disclosure, which includes trade policies. 
In recent years, with the rapid development of internet and telecommunication te chnology, it has become 
more convenient to access relevant information in China.  
13.31.   Third, with regard to the policy documents that the United States enquired about, and as we said in 
previous meetings, the fishery development policies have been publi shed on the official website of the State 
Council of China. The other policies are neither laws, regulations and other measures affecting trade, nor the 
information which falls within the scope of information disclosure of relevant Chinese laws and regulat ions. My 
colleagues who work in the enquiry point have explained this to their US  colleagues in Beijing, and we have 
also clarified this matter multiple times in this Council."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  urges the EU to pursue a collaborative approach to protecting pollinators, using appropriate 
international venues to advance a shared understanding of this global challenge.  
35.4.  The delega te of Australia  indicated the following:  
35.5.  Australia joins other Members in expressing concern over amendments to 
Regulation  396/2005 arising from Commission Regulation  2023/334 regarding maximum residue 
levels for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in or on certain products, consistent with our concern s 
previously expressed in relation to Agenda Item 19 (Implementation of Non-Tariff Barriers on  
Agricultural Products) at this and previous CTG  meetings. The amendments consider environmental 
impacts in exporting countries when setting import MRLs and asses sing requests for import 
tolerances. Australia has also expressed these concerns in the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade ( TBT Committee)  and the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Committee ). 
35.6.  Australia recogni zes the right of WTO  Members to regulate agricultural imports in a manner 
that protects animal, plant and human health and the environment. However, Members are also 
bound by WTO  obligations, particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments 
and ensuring that measures are no more trade -restrictive than necessary. Australia does not support 
using MRLs on imported products to achieve environmental outcomes outside the European Union's 
borders. This extraterritorial approach impacts the ability of third  count ries to implement 
environmental policies consistent with their unique environmental circumstances. National 
authorities of third  countries are best placed to ensure that pesticide application is undertaken in a 
responsible and sustainable manner in each co untry, and in accordance with their unique 
environment. Australia is concerned about the limitations of the 2018  European Food Safety 
Authority risk assessments cited by the EU in the regulation. These studies have been used to 
support a link between the l owering of MRLs to the limit of determination and pollinator health. We 
request the EU to provide robust scientific evidence in support of this conclusion. We look forward 
to continuing to engage with the EU on this important topic.  
35.7.  The delegate of Paragua y indicated the following:  
35.8.  Paraguay reiterates its trade and systemic concern, as we have recently done in the  
Committees on  Market Access  (CMA) , Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT  Committee),  and Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS  Committee) , about th e European Union's attempt to use the MRLs 
for clothianidin and thiamethoxam not to protect European consumers, but as a means to regulate  
the use of neonicotinoids in production processes and methods in third  countries. The 
extraterritoriality of the meas ure ignores the ability of national authorities to establish regulatory 
frameworks based on sound scientific evidence, applied to registration processes in order to assess 
the risks of pesticides and their uses, which includes the assessment of risks to th e environment and 
pollinators, and we would like to ask the EU how this is compatible with its obligations under 
WTO law, and even under its founding agreements. The imposition of the restrictions on international 
trade established in this regulation will make farmers in Paraguay and the region less competitive 
than farmers in Europe, who do not have to face the same pests and climatic conditions to produce 
food, and can benefit from emergency authori zations to continue using these substances, as we 
pointed  out earlier, as they continue to benefit from authori zations issued even after the ruling of 
the European Court of Justice, which prohibits the continued granting of such authori zations.  
35.9.  Similarly, as noted in our intervention under  ID 137 ( Agenda Item 19), we continue to receive  
no answers to the questions of how long it takes to approve an emergency authori zation and what 
the average cost of the emergency authori zation approval process is in order to understand how 
emergency authori zations are compatib le with the non -discrimination obligation. The European 
Union  insists that this is up to Members , and while we welcome the confirmation that action will be 
taken on authori zations approved after the ECJ  ruling in the recently circulated responses, we canno t 
help but note that authori zation was granted by the Czech Republic on 4 April 2023 for the period 
20 April 2023 to 16 July 2023, well after the ruling, and again, we cannot get that Member to 
respond directly today.  
35.10.   Regard ing promises concerning the poss ibility of applying for import tolerances, if in cases 
of MRLs set with the objective of protecting human health member States are not giving a favourable 
vote for import tolerances, and we will not dwell again on the case of tricyclazole and rice, how can  G/C/M/147  
 
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  the Commission argue that applying for import tolerances is a feasible avenue for MRLs set with 
environmental objectives , including those covered by this Regulation?  
35.11.   Paraguay has submitted written comments to the notification within the deadline , and so 
have several other Members, and the EU indicates that this is an important mechanism for third  party 
participation in their regulatory processes. H owever , to date they have not been able to clarify how 
comments submitted by Members are taken into account, e specially given the short time between 
the end of the comment period and the decision taken by  the EU  Standing Committee on Plants, 
Animals, Food and Feed (ScoPAFF ), which approved the proposed reduction of the MRLs for these 
substances , without modificati ons. 
35.12.   Finally, regarding the erroneous  mention of my country in the final version of 
Regulation  2023/334 , although we appreciate the publication of a corrigendum, we wish to point out 
that, to date, the official EU  website still does not have an updated version , such that, when 
consulting the Regulation,  the erroneous reference to Paraguay in footnote  19 remains . We request 
the European Union  to amend the documentation available on its offic ial website as a matter of 
urgency .16 
35.13.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
35.14.   Ecuador thanks Australia and the United States  for their interest in including this issue again 
on the agenda of this meeting. My delegation would also like to reiterate  its concern on this matter, 
in line with what we have already stated in this same Council and the Committees on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, Market Access, and Technical Barriers to Trade . Ecuador wishes to stress 
that pesticides are one of the mo st important inputs in global agro -industrial development, which 
have enabled a significant increase in agricultural productivity to meet the growing demand for food. 
We insist that this regulation changes the focus of protection of the "European consumer" , adding 
the unilateral consideration of "environmental factors" from countries outside the territory and 
jurisdiction of the European authorities. This approach disregards and disqualifies the adequacy of 
the regulatory policies of other countries, which sovereignly set the conditions of food production 
and agricultural activity in their jurisdictions. Moreover, they do not seem to conform to WTO  rules, 
and do not take into account the particular climatic conditions and economic and social development 
considerations of their various trading partners. With these arguments, we once again urge the 
European Union  to reconsider its current policy on ceilings on third -country products, such as import 
tolerances, also taking into consideration the great efforts ma de by our productive sectors, many of 
them small and medium -scale, to adapt to an adverse international scenario.  
35.15.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
35.16.   Brazil is concerned that if the Regulation for restricting the use of thiamethoxan and 
clothia nidin becomes the basis for other similar restrictions, farmers in Brazil and worldwide can face 
serious problems that will affect productivity and their capacity to contribute to global food security 
Trade restrictions need to consider the variety of loca l conditions, including climate and soil. Different 
needs and challenges from producers must be taken into account in the design and application of 
the restrictions. A Member should not expect that its own trade restrictions have to be applied by 
other Mem bers. Given its extraterritorial effects, the European Union's regulation raises concern s in 
relation to the multilateral trading s ystem. Brazil remains interested in meaningful dialogue with the 
EU on the subject and hopes that the EU can take measures to  avoid the creation of unnecessary 
barriers to trade. Brazil calls on the European Commission to consider a more balanced approach 
that harmonizes with the Codex Alimentarius recommendations for clothianidin and thiamethoxan 
MRLs.  
35.17.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
35.18.   Argentina thanks the delegations that presented this concern, which we share. While 
Argentina shares the concern about the environmental challenges that the international community 
must resolve, Argentina expresses its concern abo ut the approach, and the related trade measures, 
that the European Union is implementing. Argentina questions the unilateralism and 
extraterritoriality of the measures, not only in political terms, as it ignores our own authorities, our 
 
16 https://eur -lex.europa.eu/legal -content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2023.047.01.0029.01.ENG  G/C/M/147  
 
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  own regulatory syst ems, our good practices implemented to conserve and make a sustainable use 
of our biodiversity, but also because of the doubtful consistency with WTO  rules and with the 
principles of international law, as the basis of multilateralism.  
35.19.   Argentina notes that this measure departs from the science -based approach required by 
current regulations. Moreover, the available scientific evidence shows that the decline in the number 
of pollinators is multi -causal and that, using good agricultural practices, the use of neocotinoids, 
clothianidin and thethiamethoxam is safe. Regarding the purpose of the measure, if it were an 
environmental measure, it should also comply with the principles of general international law , and 
of international environmental law in particular.  However, this is not the case , since the principle of 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources is disregarded, insofar as the measure limits the right 
of Members to manage their resources in accordance with national regulation. Moreover, the 
measure d isregards the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective 
Capabilities  (CBDR -RC), and the obligation to grant special and differential treatment, in that there 
is no differentiation of responsibilities in accordance with internat ional law, and no consideration of 
the different needs of Members according to their level of development.  
35.20.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
35.21.   Uruguay reiterates its concern at the approval, without substantive amendments, of 
Regulation  2023/3 34 modifying the MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam, despite the numerous 
comments submitted by some twenty  trading partners in the aforementioned consultation process,  
and by numerous WTO  Members at recent meetings of the Goods Council and the Committ ee on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ( SPS Committee) , the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade ( TBT Committee),  and the Committee on Market Access (CMA) . Uruguay understands that the 
establishment of MRLs is a tool designed to protect the health o f consumers from the risks arising 
from ingestion and  that it is , therefore, a type of measure that falls naturally within the scope of the 
SPS Agreement.  
35.22.   For these issues, the international reference body is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
where health  issues are comprehensively considered for the adoption of MRLs. Without prejudice to 
other rules in the vast and complex European regulatory framework, in the European Union, the 
main and specific rule on MRLs for pesticides in food and feed is Regulation  No. 396/2005, 
Article  3(d) of which also defines MRLs as: "the upper legal limit of concentration of a pesticide 
residue in food or feed established in accordance with this Regulation, based on good agricultural 
practice and the lowest consumer exposure n ecessary to protect all vulnerable consumers".  
35.23.   Uruguay shares the interest in promoting the protection of pollinators, in line with the 
protection of the environment and biodiversity, and supports the existence of regulatory 
environments based on scientifi c criteria, so as not to jeopardize food security or constitute barriers 
to trade. In this regard, Uruguay reiterates its willingness to work cooperatively with other Members, 
including the European Union, to find mechanisms to achieve these objectives wit hout unnecessarily 
restricting trade, while ensuring the conservation of the environment and the protection of human, 
animal and plant health.  
35.24.   However, Uruguay maintains its doubts as to both the relevance and the legal basis, in 
European  and WTO  law, for establishing  reductions of  MRLs to the level of determination on the 
grounds of "environmental issues of global concern" or issues other than h uman health. As far as 
environmental aspects are concerned, while their importance is not unknown, we understand that 
they are not part of the MRL -setting process, but are , and should be , addressed by each country in 
its territory using the appropriate too ls, taking into account its production and regulatory system, 
and its environmental and political conditions.  This has been confirmed by the Codex Secretariat, 
which confirmed that environmental aspects are currently not considered in risk analysis for plant 
protection products under Codex.  
35.25.   In sum, Uruguay considers that MRLs should be established on the basis of a risk 
assessment, with the objective of protecting the health of consumers, and not for environmental 
protection purposes. Uruguay also wishes  to stress that sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
adopted or applied by WTO  Members, such as the European Union, must conform to the objectives 
set out in paragraph  1 of Annex  A of the SPS  Agreement, and to the other substantive obligations 
of that Agree ment, such as those relating to international harmonization, avoidance of unnecessarily G/C/M/147  
 
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  trade restrictive approaches, and transparency, as well as to the obligations under GATT  1994. 
Finally, we reiterate our interest in following up on the future consider ation of requests for 
emergency authori zations for these and other substances subject to restrictions under 
Community -level regulations.  
35.26.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
35.27.   India reiterates its concerns regarding the European Union's  lowering of  existing MRLs for 
clothianidin and thiamethoxam. In its response to this agenda item in the meetings of various 
WTO bodies, the EU acknowledges that non -EU countries may face production conditions and pest 
pressures different from those in Europe. However , the EU has not granted exemption to those 
countries where the use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam cannot be avoided due to ( i) different soil 
and other production conditions and including pest pressures and environmental conditions; and 
(ii) non-availab ility of efficacious alternative pest control products. A blanket universal prohibition 
without taking into account the differences in the conditions prevailing in different countries is highly 
inappropriate. India request s the European Union to develop a methodology whereby difference in 
the conditions of the production and pest pressures are taken into account and appropriate 
derogations are granted.  
35.28.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
35.29.   New Zealand refers to statements previously made on t his matter and again shares and 
supports the concerns raised by other Members. New  Zealand recognizes that Commission 
Regulation (EU)  2023/334 amending Annexes  II and V to Regulation (EC)  No. 396/2005 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regard s maximum residue levels for clothianidin and 
thiamethoxam in or on certain products is now in effect and will apply from March  2026. New Zealand 
maintains previously raised concerns about the European Union's approach to this matter, including 
the propose d mechanism of implementation. New  Zealand maintains that addressing global 
environmental themes, such as pollinator decline, is a challenge best dealt with by Members working 
with trade partners in the appropriate multilateral fora.  
35.30.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
35.31.   Canada, like Australia and the United States, is disappointed with the European Union's  
decision to adopt regulation EC  No. 396/2005 to lower the MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam 
to the Limit of Quantification. We would like  to note that this decision is not based on dietary risks,  
but on perceived environmental concerns for the global pollinator population, which does not take 
into account risk mitigation measures in exporting countries. This approach is unnecessarily trade 
restrictive and does not take into consideration the unique circumstances, such as climate and 
growing conditions, and risk management measures of exporting countries.  
35.32.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
35.33.   The European Union takes not e of the interest by several Members on this issue. As 
previously communicated, the EU takes into account environmental objectives when setting 
maximum residue levels for substances no longer approved in the EU due to environmental concerns 
of a global nat ure, while respecting WTO  standards and other international obligations. The EU 
addresses this matter on an incremental basis, considering and reviewing the position of each 
particular active substance on a case -by-case basis, founded on the best available  scientific evidence 
and ensuring that its measures are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their 
objective.  
35.34.   The European Union informed WTO  Members about  its new rules  already two  years ago , in 
November  2020 ( G/SPS/GEN/1868 ). The EU  has regularly updated the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures ( SPS Committee)  and the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Committee)  on progress since then. The draft Regulation on lowering the maximum reside 
levels for the two  neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam was notified to the 
TBT Committee on 6  July 2022 ( G/TBT/N/EU/908 ). The EU has carefully studied and  replied to all 
comments received from WTO  Members during the notification process.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  35.35.   Last February, the new rules were adopted through Commission Regulation (EU)  2023/334. 
This Regulation is the first such regulation  implementing the new policy announced in  the European 
Green Deal , and – more specifically – the Farm to Fork Strategy on imported food in relation to 
pesticides residues.  
35.36.   The European Union has explained in previous meetings the rationale for the measures and 
refers Members back  to these explana tions. The environmental objectives of global concern that this 
Regulation targets are those relat ing to the protection of pollinators. This is an issue of global 
concern, which goes beyond national boundaries and cannot be solved through actions at EU  level 
alone. These two  neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam are known to contribute 
significantly to the decline of pollinator populations because of their intrinsic properties that lead to 
adverse effects on pollinators independent of where  they are used geographically.  
35.37.   The European Union  would like to clarify that the Regulation does not require third  countries 
to prohibit the use of the neonicotinoids clothianidin and thiamethoxam in their own territory. The 
EU's objective is to ensure tha t food and feed consumed in the EU do not contribute to the global 
decline of pollinators, independently of whether the product is produced in the EU or imported from 
third countries. Therefore, if the harvested crop is destined to be placed on the EU  market, it will 
have to comply with the maximum residue levels in place in the EU.  
35.38.   Regarding  possible trade impacts, the Regulation defers the application date of the 
Regulation to 36  months after entry into force (instead of six  months, which is the standard period 
given in the European Union ). It allows products placed on the market before the application date 
to remain on the market until the end of their shelf life. The Regulation will therefore become 
applicable only at the beginning of 2026.  
35.39.   The European Union  considers that currently there is no alternative to the lowering of the 
MRLs of clothianidin and thiamethoxam which would be less trade restrictive and equally contribute 
to the objective of protecting pollinators. Based on the best available current  knowledge, reducing 
the use of neonicotinoids is an effective corrective action to tackle pollinators decline. The EU is 
acting in full compliance with WTO  rules, which allow Members to adopt measures if they are 
necessary to achieve a legitimate objectiv e. 
35.40.   On emergency authori zations in the European Union , the Commission is still considering the 
implications of the recent judg ement  of the European Court of Justice for the granting of other 
emergency authorizations.  
35.41.   The European Union  acknowledges that thi rd countries may face production conditions and 
pest pressures different from those in mainland Europe. Therefore, import tolerances can be granted 
to active substances not authorized in the European Union provided that the submitted information 
demonstrat es that the use is safe to pollinators.  
35.42.   Finally, let me highlight that the European Union  has several programmes to assist 
third countries, in particular developing countries, to comply with EU  legislation and to build capacity 
and knowledge in the SPS  field. Countries interested in receiving SPS -related technical assistance 
from the EU are invited to approach the EU  Delegation based in their country or the relevant 
directorates of the European Commission.  
35.43.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36  AUSTR ALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA (ID  189) – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
36.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
36.3.  The Russian Federation would like to draw Members' attention once again to the destructive 
impact of unilateral trade restrictive measures of a coercive nature with extraterritorial effect  G/C/M/147  
 
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  introduced by the WTO  Members indicated in the title of this agenda item on international trade, 
supply chains , and the world economy. In our previous interve ntions throughout 2022 and 2023, we 
explained that given that Russia is one of the largest suppliers of energy products on the global 
market, the restrictions on its energy sector lead to global disruptions in this sector and higher 
energy prices. High ene rgy prices result in higher consumer prices across the full board of products, 
including food. In fact, any restrictions, including on shipping companies, insurance companies, and 
the banking sector in international transfers, generate additional costs, wh ich are passed on to global 
consumers resulting in higher global prices across various sectors, including food prices. Some of 
the aforementioned factors were particularly prominent in 2022 ; however, they continue to play 
their role in 2023.  
36.4.  The European U nion and the United States keep claiming that their restrictions do not target 
food and fertilizer export s from Russia. However, in reality Russian exporters of these product 
categories face numerous difficulties with financial transactions, logistics , and insurance , among 
others. In this context , despite all the coercive restrictive measures, Russia continues to supply the 
Global South with food and fertilizers. Among the countries that receive Russia's fertilizers free of 
charge are Malawi (20,000  tonnes) , Kenya (34,000  tonnes), Zimbabwe (23,000  tonnes), Nigeria 
(34,000  tonnes), and Sri Lanka (55,000  tonnes). Until end -2023, it is planned to ship 
200,000  tonnes of wheat free of charge to Somali, the Central African Republic, Burkina  Faso, 
Zimbabwe, Mali, and Eritrea.  
36.5.  On a different note, the recently issued 2023 World Trade Report by the WTO  Secretariat is 
devoted to the topics of fragmentation in the world economy and re -globalization. Unilateral trade 
restrictive measures discussed under the present agend a item are definitely a contributing factor to 
such fragmentation. The report highlights some of the consequences of such measures. According 
to the report, fragmentation would leave economies less prosperous, less innovative, less resilient, 
and less will ing and well -equipped to cooperate on the social, environmental, and security challenges 
they face. As one of a number of possible scenarios , the WTO  Secretariat consider s splitting the 
world trade system into separate trade blocks. In this case , it is est imated that the cost of such a 
split would be about 5 % of real income at the global level, with some developing economies facing 
double -digit losses. The following are a mong other key findings in the report:  (i) fragmentation 
would reduce global welfare as economies would forego gains from trade based on comparative 
advantage, increased product variety, the sharing of fixed costs, and the diffusion of ideas and 
technologies ; (ii) fragmentation can lead to diminished production efficiency, decrease d investor 
confidence, hindered innovation and higher prices ; (iii) fragmentation can ultimately lead to reduced 
incomes for both the poor and the rich globally, resulting in increased poverty and exacerbated 
inequality between economies ; and (iv)  fragment ation risks reducing global welfare and promoting 
economic divergence. LDCs are likely to suffer the most.  The firm conclusion of the report is that 
today's world needs more trade and more cooperation, not less.  
36.6.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated  the following:  
36.7.  Since Russia has accused us in the past of carrying out an "active disinformation campaign" 
against them, we want to – yet again – set the record straight in front of all Members of this Council. 
In the minutes, we would refer back to all previous UK  statements under this item.17 Frankly, we  
 
17 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  44.21 -44.28 : "44.21.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  
indicated the following:  
44.22.   The United Kingdom continues to reject the lies that Russia keeps recycling in the CTG and other 
bodies. Indeed, Russia's transparent attempts to dive rt, disinform, and blame others for the impacts of their 
own, illegal, unprovoked, and barbaric invasion of Ukraine – a sovereign country – are farcical. Because let us 
be clear, Russia and only Russia continues to be responsible for the global food shorta ges, rising inflation, and 
supply chain disruptions that they have caused through invading another country. Russia's fictional narrative is 
as unconvincing as it is implausible; the facts speak for themselves.  
44.23.   Turning to the facts on the consequenc es of Russia's invasion: Since our last CTG  statement, the global 
consequences of Russia's chosen war have continued to come into increasingly sharpening focus. Their actions 
are having catastrophic worldwide impacts on food prices. The impact of Russian t anks preventing Ukrainian 
farmers sowing hundreds of square miles of wheat – and we are talking about an area the size of Belgium – 
continues to be felt.  
44.24.   Russia has also kept disrupting vital operations like the Black Sea Grain Initiative by delayi ng ships and 
blocking inspections, this has resulted in a 29% decrease in food exports by weight compared to March  2023, 
and a 66% decrease in May. Russian obstructions of these operations harm global food security by restricting 
 G/C/M/147  
 
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  think it's entirely self -evident how much Russia's aggression against Ukraine is harming global food 
security. The global trading system cannot and will not turn a blind eye until Russia ceases this 
aggression. Until th at time, the United Kingdom  is committed  to standing in support of Ukrainian 
sovereignty and the Ukrainian people.  
36.8.  Russia's decision to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative has reduced global grain 
supply at a critical time for vulnerable people ar ound the world, and contributed to further market 
volatility. Russia has also systematically attacked Ukrainian civilian grain and port infrastructure, 
clearly intending to degrade Ukraine's ability to export food to the world. Ukrainian grain has been 
a lifeline for countries on the cusp of famine, supplying 80% of the World Food Programme's global 
wheat grain delivered to Somalia, Sudan,  and Yemen, among others. Since July, Russia has 
destroyed enough grain to feed one million people for a year. To be cle ar, since leaving the Black 
Sea Grain Initiative, Russia has destroyed more grain than all the grain it has promised to donate 
to African countries. This is unacceptable. The United Kingdom  will keep condemning Russia's illegal 
and unprovoked assault on Uk raine, as it seeks to use violence to rewrite the rules, redraw borders , 
and impose its will on the Ukrainian people.  
36.9.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
36.10.   Russia's statement does not deserve a substantive response. We note again that Russia is 
complaining about a situation that it has created. Russia continues to try to shift blame for the 
suffering, death, and destruction that Russia has perpetrated on Ukraine, and for the disruption and 
deprivation being felt around the world.  
36.11.   Russia  started and perpetuates this war; Russia illegally tried to annex parts of Ukraine; 
Russia continues to destroy Ukraine's agricultural and energy infrastructure; and Russia continues 
to spread disinformation that sanctions are causing food insecurity. How ever, we have made it very 
clear, by providing exceptions and guidance, that banks, insurers, shippers, and other actors can 
continue to bring Russian food and fertilizer to the world.  
36.12.   The United States  again condemn s Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked, an d illegal aggression 
against independent and sovereign Ukraine. We will spare no efforts to hold President Putin and the 
architects and supporters of this aggression accountable for their actions. We underline our resolve 
to impose severe economic and fina ncial consequences on Russia.  
36.13.   The United States will continue to support Ukraine's courageous efforts to defend itself, 
uphold its territorial integrity, and protect its population.  
36.14.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
36.15.   The European U nion reiterates its resolute condemnation of the Russian Federation's war of 
aggression against Ukraine, which deliberately violates the UN  Charter and disregards the 
 
supplies and keeping price s high around the world. This makes it even harder for people in developing 
countries to afford the food they need.  
44.25.   The explosion of the Kakhovka Dam, another catastrophe exacerbated by this war, will also have far 
reaching consequences on food sec urity, putting at risk the production of vital grain, causing a knock on effect 
on grain supply and inflation.  
44.26.   Russia's Domestic Policies: Against these supply chain implications of their war, we have already 
outlined that Russia is taking an activ e choice to make a bad situation worse by continuing to take unilateral 
steps that further increase global prices of agri -food. Russia's own autonomous export restriction measures 
have covered numerous agricultural goods – including fertilizer, white sugar , raw cane sugar, wheat, rye, 
meslin, barley, corn, rice, sunflower oil and seeds, and rapeseed oil and seeds.  
44.27.   The actions we just outlined are clear proof that Russia is continuing to weaponize food and making the 
situation even worse by unilatera lly cutting global supply and stimulating price hikes in global food prices.  
44.28.   Turning to our own sanctions and next steps more broadly: On the other hand, the United Kingdom has 
specifically not targeted food or fertilizer exports from Russia to thi rd countries. We have only introduced 
sanctions as a way of targeting Putin's war machine. The UK will continue to shine a light on the far -reaching 
consequences of this war, and we will continue to support those across the world who are on the sharp end o f 
the consequences of Russia's illegal and unprovoked attack on Ukraine. The UK will continue to stand with 
Ukraine, against this attack on their sovereignty and territorial integrity, for as long as it takes."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  rules-based international order , and reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine's sover eignty, 
territorial integrity , and right of self -defence.  
36.16.   The European Union remains committed to maintaining collective pressure on Russia's ability 
to wage its war of aggression, including by further strengthening sanctions, and through their full 
and ef fective implementation and the prevention of their circumvention, especially for high -risk 
goods, in close cooperation with its allies and partners.  
36.17.   The European Union  strongly condemn s Russia's disinformation attempts , which blame 
international sanctions for rising food insecurity. We must repeat again that EU  sanctions do not 
target trade in agricultural, food , or medical products, nor the trade of Russia with third  countries.  
36.18.   Russia's unilateral decision to terminate the implementation of the Black Sea G rain Initiative 
and its deliberate attacks on Ukraine's grain storage and export facilities, as well as its actions to 
hinder the freedom of navigation in the Black Sea, show that Russia continues to weaponize food 
and undermine global food security. The E uropean Union will continue to support efforts to facilitate 
exports of Ukraine's grain and other agricultural products to the countries most in need, notably in 
Africa and the Middle East.  
36.19.   The European Union  has taken all its measures in a fully transpare nt manner. The relevant 
EU measures are publicly available on its website. The EU calls on Russia to stop its acts of 
aggression and fully respect Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence within its 
internationally recogni zed borders.  
36.20.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
36.21.   Canada continues not to engage with Russia's delegation to the WTO in a business -as-usual 
fashion given Russia's unprovoked, unjustified , and illegal war of aggression in Ukraine. Canada 
strongly condemns Ru ssia's use of food as a weapon of war and is deeply concerned by Russian 
disinformation over the causes of global food insecurity and the false narrative that Canada does 
not care about the potential indirect effects of sanctions or that sanctions cause fo od and energy 
insecurity.  
36.22.   Canada and its partners designed the sanctions in a targeted way to minimize harm for 
third countries and the global economy. Canadian sanctions do not target Russian agricultural 
commodities, fertilizer, food, medicine, or humani tarian assistance. Sanctions against Russia are not 
the cause of growing food or energy insecurity. Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine and deliberate 
weaponization of hunger and energy are to blame. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a major 
shock to an already strained food system, resulting in record -setting food, fuel, and fertilizer prices.  
36.23.   Global food prices remain historically high and domestic food prices continue to rise sharply 
in most countries. High prices disproportionately affect the poor, wh o spend most of their income 
on food and other basic needs. High fertilizer and energy prices are likely to result in a decline in 
agricultural productivity, reducing future food availability, undermining farmer livelihoods , and 
impacting economies of the Global South.  
36.24.   The evolving food crisis remains a top priority for Canada and other donors, as demonstrated 
by its continued prioritization within G7 and G20  agendas in 2023. Canada will continue to support 
humanitarian partners, such as the World Food Programme, to help meet the emergency food and 
nutrition needs of the growing number of acutely food insecure people. Canada is supportive of 
efforts to mitigate export shortfalls from the invasion of Ukraine and reduce global food prices and 
condemns the termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as the use of food as weapon of 
war. We will continue to take actions that we consider necessary to protect our essential security 
interests, and we will work closely with like -minded partners to promo te peace and security for all 
states and their citizens.  
36.25.   Canada's support for Ukraine and its people is unwavering, and we will work to find ways to 
use trade to support Ukraine in rebuilding its economy and its society. We once again call for Russia 
to immediately cease all hostile actions against Ukraine.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  36.26.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
36.27.   Switzerland condemns Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in the strongest possible 
terms and calls on Russia to take military de -escalation m easures, cease hostilities , and immediately 
withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory. In response to Russia's military aggression, Switzerland 
has taken a number of economic measures. These measures are of an exceptional nature. They have 
been taken be cause of Russia's violation of international law. The measures taken by Switzerland 
are in accordance with international law, including WTO  law. 
36.28.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
36.29.   New Zealand continues to condemn, unequivocally, Russia's ongoing war of aggression 
against Ukraine. Russia's actions have already caused thousands of deaths, a massive humanitarian 
crisis, and untold suffering. Russia's egregious disregard for the principles that underpin global peace 
and prosperity have serious  implications for global order, security, and economic stability.  Let us be 
clear. It is Russia's invasion of Ukraine that has created uncertainty and volatility in world food 
pricing and supply.  
36.30.   New Zealand has joined the international community in applyi ng sanctions in a transparent 
manner. Information on the Russia Sanctions Act that was passed by the New Zealand Government 
on 8 March  2022 and all subsequent regulations that implement sanctions are publicly available on 
the New Zealand Ministry of Foreig n Affairs and Trade website.  
36.31.   Sanctions under the Act are a direct response to Russia's illegal war of aggression, and are 
not intended to disrupt trade in essential goods such as food, agricultural or medical products. They 
include prohibitions on dealing with assets and services, travel bans on individuals from entering 
New Zealand, tariff increases on imports of Russian origin, a luxury goods import and export ban 
from/to Russia, and a prohibition of strategic goods intended for use by military or securit y forces 
from being exported to Russia and Belarus. New Zealand also supports G7+  energy measures.  
36.32.   New Zealand remains united with the international community to hold those responsible for 
violations of humanitarian and international law to account. Imposi ng sanctions on Russia is a means 
to bring an end to this war. We continue to stand in full solidarity with Ukraine and its people and 
reaffirm our unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.  
36.33.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
36.34.   Alongside other Members who have already spoken, Australia again condemns, in the 
strongest possible terms, Russia's illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine. This invasion is a gross 
violation of international law. Australia strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Australia has imposed a comprehensive suite of measures against Russia in response to 
its invasion of Ukraine. Australia has notified these trade measures to th e WTO to ensure 
transparency, which is an important obligation on all Members that Australia takes seriously. These 
measures are justified given Russia's unprecedented invasion, and are justified under WTO  rules, in 
particular Article  XXI of the GATT  1994.  Food and agricultural commodities (aside from a limited 
number of luxury goods, such as lobster and caviar) are not sanctioned by Australia. Rather, it is 
Russia's own decisions that are constraining its contribution to global food stocks, including throu gh 
the imposition of restrictions on its own exports. Australia is committed to strengthening the global 
rules-based order and is a ready and able partner for all countries that seek a peaceful and 
prosperous world, where sovereignty is respected.  
36.35.   The dele gate of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
36.36.   The intervention by the representative of the Russian Federation is nothing more than 
another attempt at trying to conduct business as usual in this body as if nothing is happening outside 
these walls, while Russia continues its blunt disregard of the rule s-based international order , 
including the rules of this Organization. Since the beginning of the full -scale military invasion of 
Ukraine,  in February  2022, the UN  General Assembly has adopted at least four  resoluti ons 
condemning , in the strongest possible terms , the Russian armed aggression against Ukraine in 
blatant violation of Article  2(4) of the UN  Charter, unequivocally condemning the attempted illegal G/C/M/147  
 
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  annexation by Russia of the occupied territories of Ukraine , calling on the states, international 
organi zations and UN  agencies not to recogni ze any changes in the status of Ukraine's regions , and 
demanding that Russia immediately, completely , and unconditionally withdraw all of its military 
forces from the territ ory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.  
36.37.   Russia intentionally destroys the critical civilian infrastructure of Ukraine, thus endangering 
the international trade for my country, including in agricultural products. The Russian representa tive 
elaborated a lot about how many goods Russia supplies to some African states for free. I can add 
one more – the stolen Ukrainian grain. At least six  million tonnes of Ukrainian grain was stolen by 
the Russian Federation during the invasion and given t o some African states for free to buy their 
loyalty. The use by Russia of food as a blackmailing tool should be condemned.  
36.38.   The a rmed aggression of the Russian Federation deprives Ukraine of its rights within the 
WTO and does not allow us to implement prope rly our obligations before the WTO. Our trade partners 
also suffer from Russia's  reckless actions , being unable to enjoy benefits from our bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. Ukraine is grateful to our partners for their strong and unwavering 
support in light of the Russian armed invasion. We call upon WTO  Members to deprive the Russian 
aggressor state of its tools to commit the crime of aggression against Ukraine and to undermine the 
rules-based multilateral trading system and the work of this Organiz ation. Thank you.  
36.39.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
36.40.   Russia's aggression of Ukraine clearly infringes upon Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, and constitutes a grave breach of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of  
force. Japan will never accept the unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force and it is an 
extremely serious situation that shakes the very foundation s of the international order. Japan 
condemns Russia's actions in the strongest terms. In respon se to Russia's aggression, Japan is 
implementing strict sanctions , in close cooperation with the international community, including the 
G7. We continue to work with our partners, including international organizations, to proactively 
address the impact of R ussia's aggression on Ukraine on areas such as energy and food, among 
others, across many countries. Japan and other countries have been carefully addressing the 
situation by imposing sanctions in a manner that does not hinder the provision of humanitarian  
assistance or the operation of global agricultural trade.  
36.41.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
36.42.   The Republic of Korea has been strongly condemning Russia's armed invasion against 
Ukraine. Korea believes that it is essential to foc us on the very origin of the sharply aggravating 
situation on the global supply chain in many areas, posing a significant threat to rules -based global 
trade order under the WTO. The way to end all this is to stop Russia's military action in Ukraine.  
36.43.   The de legate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
36.44.   Article  IV of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization provides 
that the Council for Trade in Goods oversee the functioning of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in 
Annex  I. Hence, the substantial part of the interventions that we heard  a few minutes ago are clearly 
irrelevant to the mandate of the CTG. As underlined many times  in this house , discussions on the 
regional or global security situation, UN  Charter enforcement or compliance , evidently go beyond 
the mandate of WTO  working bodies, including this one. These discussions belong to the specialized 
UN bodies and agencies. I t is in these bodies and agencies that Russia share s its position in detail 
concerning  the roots and reasons for its special military operation in Ukraine , as well as on the issues 
that arise during its conduct. In addition, we would like to comment on some of the unfounded 
allegations made just now by some delegations.  
36.45.   Some delegations mentioned that Russia introduced export restrictions on agricultural 
products. In this regard, we reiterate that these export restrictions are in line with Russia's 
WTO obligations. Russia tries to supply as many customers as we can in the context of  the economic 
aggression that we face. On the termination of the Grain Deal , if we are worried about global food 
security , we should tackle the whole food supply side rather than focus only on Ukrainian supplies. 
That is why unilateral trade restrictions prevent the Grain Deal from resuming. Russia reaffirms its 
position and is ready to explore opportunities for reviving the Black Sea Grain Initiative. However, G/C/M/147  
 
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  this can only happen  once all the requirements are met to lift the restrictions imposed on the Russian 
companies dealing with agricultural products and fertilizers in deeds rather than in words. To name 
a few, such requirements are: (i) reconnecting Rosselkhozbank to the SWIF T system 
(Rosselkhozbank is the specialized bank servicing Russian agricultural production and export) ; 
(ii) unblocking transport logistics and insurance ; and (iii)  unfreezing the Russian companies' assets , 
as well as some others that have been explained i n more detail during meetings of the Committee 
on Agriculture,  as well as in the UN  dedicated platforms.  
36.46.   We also note that Ukrainian sea exports of grain are not blocked. Existing sea routes allowed 
four million  tonnes of grain to be sent overseas in Octob er alone. Regarding attacks on Ukraine's 
port infrastructure, Russia reiterates that Russian military attacks exclusively target military 
resources and means of military attack hidden under their cover.  
36.47.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
37  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES (ID  165) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, INDONESIA, THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN 
AND MATSU AND THAILAND  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on t he agenda at the request of  
the European Union, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei , and Thailand . 
37.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
37.3.  Thailand emphasizes its serious ongoing concern s about India's restrictive import policy on 
tyres, a matter consisten tly raised in various WTO  bodies. Unfortunately, there has been limited 
progress in addressing these concerns. Moreover, we are deeply troubled by the substantial decline 
in Thailand's tyre exports to India during the first nine  months of 2023, experiencin g a 21.5%  drop 
compared to the same period the previous year , and a 65.1%  decline compared to the same period 
in 2019. This decline raises significant alarms about the persisting adverse effects of India's import 
policy on our exports.  
37.4.  Additionally, there is a profound apprehension that India may have implemented import 
quotas on tyres, coupled with a lack of transparency in its import policy, potentially distorting trade 
to the disadvantage of international suppliers. In addition to the information on impo rt licen ces 
granted to Thailand that India provided to us earlier, we urgently request India to furnish additional 
information to address our concerns, including details of the administration of restrictions and the 
time-frame for processing applications r elating to tyre imports. We also seek information on the 
distribution of these licen ces among supplying countries.  
37.5.  Thailand calls upon India promptly to provide the requested information and take a proactive 
step toward resolving these concerns.  
37.6.  The delega te of the European Union  indicated the following:  
37.7.  The European Union reiterates its concerns relating to the long -standing issue of India's 
import policy on tyres. We have explained our position on multiple occasions in various bodies of 
the WTO, including  in this Council, in the Market Access Committee  (CMA) , in the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade ( TBT Committee ), in the Import Licensing Committee  (CIL), and in the 
Committee on Trade -Related Investment Measures ( TRIMs  Committee ). Stakeholders in t he EU 
continue to be negatively impacted by this measure. The EU recalls the questions it had submitted 
to India in November  2020 in the CIL, to which it has not received a response. The EU remains  
concerned by India's measure and would like to repeat its request for further information from India.  
37.8.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
37.9.  Indonesia seeks to reiterate its concerns to India due to the absence of a satisfactory response 
from the Indian government regarding the matter of the prohibition of  tyre imports. The 
impediments faced by Indonesian tyre exports to India persist. Notably, t yres imported from India 
have recently entered the Indonesian market.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  37.10.   Indonesia plans to ask India for more information on three  issues, including the  restriction 
on importing t yres that can be made domestically in India, the charging of a fee for the use of the 
Indian Standard Mark (IS  Mark) on tyre products exported to third  countries, and the sampling of 
imported t yre containers and packaging . As con tained in the Notification by the Directorate General 
of Foreign Trade of India' s Ministry of Trade and E -Commerce in Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 on 
12 June 2020, the Government of India has made amendments to the tyre import policy from "free" 
to "restr icted". Indonesia has learned that India has required importers to make separate statements 
via email regarding import restrictions for specific types and size categories of tyres that can be 
produced domestically in India. Any violation of these provision s will be subject to criminal penalties 
under the FTDR  Act 1992.  
37.11.   Furthermore, India's import policy has now become even more stringent, where every 
container containing imported t yres must be sampled for Indian customs purposes. Next, importers 
are also re quired to fulfil the registration requirements of the warehouse where imported t yres are 
stored. The ban on t yre imports, according to Indonesia, is discriminatory because it only applies to 
a small number of WTO  Members that could pose a threat to India's  domestic t yre industry. As a 
result, the policy may be in conflict with one of the core WTO  principles, namely the principle of 
non-discrimination. In addition, because India is one of the world's major t yre producers and can 
create a variety of t yre kind s and sizes, the regulation restricting imports of Indian tyres has de facto 
made it more difficult for Indonesian t yre goods to access the Indian market.  
37.12.   Indonesia also intends to ask India for further clarification regarding the imposition of a 
marking f ee on tyre products marked with the Indian Standard (IS)  Mark. The imposition of IS  Mark 
marking fees on tyre products that will be exported to third  countries can burden business actors 
and create unnecessary trade barriers in international trade.  
37.13.   Indones ia also requested India to review its import restrictions on t yre products right away 
to ensure their compliance with the WTO  principles of transparency and non -discrimination, as well 
as with Articles  2.1 and 2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, Articles  3.2 and 3.3  of the Import Licensing 
Agreement, and Article  XI of the GATT  1994 regarding the general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions. Indonesia is also willing to continue talking with India in order to resolve this issue in 
any number of potential internati onal fora, including bilaterally.  
37.14.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
37.15.   Chinese Taipei  remain s disappointed that Members' concerns regarding India's import 
licensing regime on new pneumatic tyres ha ve not been appropriately addressed. According to 
statistics from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry of India, the quantity of our tyre exports to 
India from 2020 to August  2023 sharply decreased , by over 50% compared to the exports in 2019. 
At the same time, according to the Indian Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association (ATMA), 
India's tyre exports in 2022 went up by 70%. These figures demonstrate that India's tyres have 
benefited from the unrestr icted markets of other Members, whereas tyre producers in other 
WTO Members have to face increased trade barriers to enter the Indian market. Article  3.2 of the 
Import Licensing Agreement stipulates that "non -automatic import licensing shall not have trade  
restrictive or distortive effects on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the 
restriction". However, in this case, the trade restrictive effect of India's tyre licensing policy is 
evident. We request India to address the problematic mea sures that result in quantitative restrictions 
and to ensure that its licensing regime is administered in a manner consistent with  WTO rules.  
37.16.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
37.17.   Canada would like to express its continued concerns, which have be en raised on a number 
of occasions in various WTO  bodies, including the CTG, about India's non -automatic import licensing 
system for t yres. Canada urges India to eliminate this quantitative import restriction in accordance 
with its WTO  obligations.  
37.18.   The del egate of India indicated the following:  
37.19.   India would like to thank the various Members for their continued interest in this issue. We 
would also like to refer to our response provided in the previous meetings of the Council for Trade 
in Goods, the Committee  on Market Access , and the Committee on Import Licensing. My delegation G/C/M/147  
 
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  would like to reiterate that the non -automatic  licensing requirements for tyres are administered in 
a manner consistent with the rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing Procedur es, including 
with respect to the time -frames for the grant ing of import licen ces. We are open to engaging 
bilaterally with the Members  concerned . 
37.20.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
38  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (ID  148) – 
STATEMENTS BY CHINA, INDONESIA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
38.1.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
38.2.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during the previous meetings of the 
Committee on Market Access ( CMA), CTG , and the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE). The 
transitional phase of the CBAM was launched on 1  October  2023. As of that date, the European 
Union  started to apply additional reporting requirements on imports in respect of products covered 
by this mechani sm. Now importers have to collect and provide the EU with the fourth  quarter data 
on the imported goods and emissions embedded in their production. Specifically, the information to 
be submitted is the following:  (i) the quantity of the goods imported;  (ii) the installation where the 
goods were produced, identified by  the applicable United Nations Code for Trade and Transport 
Location (UN/LOCODE) of the location;  (iii) the company name of the installation, the address of the 
installation and its English tran script;  (iv) geographical coordinates of the main emission source of 
the installation;  (v) the production routes used, which shall reflect the technology used for the 
production of the goods, and information on specific parameters qualifying the indicated production 
route for determining the embedded direct emissions;  and (vi)  other information.  
38.3.  We find that such requirements constitute additional barriers to trade and in certain cases 
may significantly restrict or even prohibit imports. We would like to dr aw Members ' attention to the 
fact that the supplier is not the manufacturer of the products in every case. In addition, not all 
manufacturers may be able to provide the requested information. In case of non -compliance, imports 
will be subject to a penalty regime  from 10 to 50  euros per tonne of unreported emissions.  Thus, 
even during the transitional phase, the CBAM not only establishes a substantial administrative 
burden and import restrictions but also places an additional financial burden on the importation of 
products.  
38.4.  The Russian Federation has repeatedly noted the protectionist nature of the CBAM. The 
European Union's  desire to use this mechanism in order to protect its domestic industry is evident 
from the CBAM's text and the EU  Commission 's statements. In particular, according to the 
Commission , "the CBAM is the EU's landmark tool to fight carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs 
when companies based in the EU move carbon -intensive production abroad to tak e advantage of 
lower standards, or when the EU's products are replaced by more carbon -intensive imports".  
38.5.  The Russian Federation would like to remind the European Union that the UNFCCC and the 
Paris Agreement provide countries with the freedom to choose th ose measures for combating climate 
change that would be most effective for each of them. At the same time, the introduction of unilateral 
trade restrictive measures contradicts the UNFCCC. The Convention does not allow for the use of 
climate change -related  measures to restrict international trade.  Thus, we urge the European Union  
to bring its measure s into consistency with both the WTO  rules and the international climate 
agreements.  
38.6.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
38.7.  China  refers to its previous  statements made in this Council18 and the Committee on Market  
Access. We reiterate that climate change is a common challenge for all humanity and an important 
 
18 G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  22.2-22.7: "22.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
22.3.   China believes that to effectively respond to climate change, realize global sustainable development, and 
build a community with a shared future for humankind, Members need to earnestly implement the goals, 
principles and requirements of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris 
Agreement, reduce barriers, and promote trade and investment liberalization.  
 G/C/M/147  
 
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  area of global governance. All Members should uphold multilateralism and work together to addres s 
climate change through greater international cooperation. Since the European Union  put forward its 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ), many WTO  Members , including China, have raised 
concerns and questions about  it. Members stress that CBAM should adhere to the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC), comply with the 
basic principles and rules of the WTO, and avoid constituting protectionist measures and green trade 
barriers. We noted that , on 1 October  2023, the CBAM began to be applied in its transitional phase. 
We are closely monitoring the implementation of the EU's CBAM. In addition, China circulated a 
communication, namely Policy Issues for Dedicated Multilateral Discussions on Border Carbon 
Adjustment  (WT/CTE/W/258 ), in the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE) in November. We 
encourage all Members, including the European Union , to actively participate in the relevant 
discussions.  
38.8.  The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
38.9.  Indonesia once again convey s its objections to the European Union regarding the adoption of 
the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)  regulation. According to Indonesia, any trade 
policy pertaining to the environment and climate change, including the EU's CBAM, must be 
implemented with extreme caution in order to prevent it from becoming an unnecessary non -tariff 
trade barrier that breeds protectionism. While we acknowledge the EU 's commitment to addressing 
climate change and achieving carbon neutralit y with the implementation of the CBAM, Indonesia 
believes that certain aspects of it raise significant concerns that the EU might wish to reconsider.  
38.10.   Firstly, Indonesia would like to elucidate the fact that the lack of clarity and transparency in 
the CBAM is a major source of contention. The absence of detailed guidelines and specific 
methodologies for calculating carbon content and price differences may lead to ambiguity and a 
potential adverse impact on the industry, while noting that Members are allowed to determine their 
own carbon price calculation methodology. Furthermore, Indonesia urges and encourages the 
European Union to provide clear and comprehensive information on how the CBAM will be 
implemented, monitored, and evaluated to ensure that the industries affected can adequately 
prepare for the forthcoming changes.  
38.11.   We recognize that the European Union's  policy objective is to combat climate change. 
However, the CBAM requires a rigorous assessment of how such a policy upholds both environmental 
goals and international trade principles, as well as the extent to which it complies with the rules and 
provisions of the WTO. In this context, Indonesia looks forward to engaging in a positive and 
constructive dialogue with the EU to address its concerns relat ing to these issues.  
 
22.4.   We believe that the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) is a unilateral 
measure that deviates from the basic principles of "common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities" and "Nationally Determined Contribution Arrangem ents" of the UNFCC and the Paris Agreement. It 
may not comply with the basic principle of non -discrimination of the WTO.  
22.5.   Numerous studies have shown that the CBAM may have a much greater negative impact on developing 
than developed Members. First, d ue to different stages of development, developing Members often lack 
financial resources and green technology to support energy transition. This is why the energy transition 
process of developing Members is relatively slow and emission intensity is relativ ely high. Second, the 
economies of developing Members are more vulnerable to carbon price increases. In particular, developing 
Members do not have good systems and capacity to collect, calculate and verify emission data, including the 
specific emission dat a for individual enterprises. To establish and improve such data collecting systems, the 
cost will be huge for developing Members. Third, if some Members set up an exclusive carbon club based on 
CBAM, it would cause greater losses to developing Members' ou tput and welfare, lead to a decline in global 
trade, distort the market, and widen development inequality.  
22.6.   We thank the European Union for publishing for public comment the draft implementation regulations on 
reporting obligations during the transit ional period of the CBAM in June, but we believe that the four -week 
consulting time is not enough to conduct a detailed analysis of the CBAM and submit comments on it. We hope 
that the EU will further improve inclusiveness and transparency in the subsequen t process of 
CBAM  implementation, and ensure the CBAM's consistency with WTO  rules.  
22.7.   China made two  proposals at the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)  meetings in March and 
June respectively. We proposed to carry out dedicated discussions on e nvironmental measures that could 
significantly impact trade from five perspectives, namely the basic operating mechanism, various elements of 
policy design, environmental contribution, trade impact, and the inclusiveness of the measures. We hope that 
the discussions will enhance the WTO's role in trade and environment based on the MC12  Ministerial 
Declaration and the WTO's mandate, provide opportunities to consider different Members' needs and concerns, 
and contribute to the UN  2030 Agenda for sustainable d evelopment."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  38.12.   Indonesia is aware that the European Union's  CBAM will impose import taxes on a variety of 
goods, such as iron and steel, cement, aluminium, chemical base materials, fertilisers, refineries, 
and energy, depending on the amount of carbon  emissions generated during the manufacturing 
process. Furthermore, it has been  suggested that the scope of these products be expanded to include 
a variety of additional goods, such as plastics, hydrogen, organic compounds, and ammonia. The 
Emission Tradin g System (ETS) of the European Union will then be utilized to adjust the carbon tax 
price.  
38.13.   Regarding this CBAM  issue, Indonesia wishes to inform the European Union that, as a 
developing nation, Indonesia has taken a number of significant actions as part of  its commitment to 
combating climate change, including: (i)  Presidential Decree No.  98 of 2021 concerning Carbon 
Economic Value (NEK) , which includes  efforts to achieve Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) 
targets, reporting, validation and verificatio n as well as certification of emission reductions followed 
by the derivative regulations of the Minister of Environment and Forestry Number  21 of 2022 
concerning Procedures for Implementing Carbon Economic Values; (ii)  Permen of ESDM No.  16/2022 
concerning  Procedures for Implementing the NEK in the Power Generation Subsection; 
(iii) formulation of Minister of Environment and Forestry concerning Implementation of Nationally 
Determined Contribution (NDC) and Draft Regulation of Minister of Environment and For estry 
concerning Procedures for Carbon Trading in the Forestry Sector and Draft Regulation of Minister of 
Home Affairs concerning the Role of Regional Governments in Implementing Carbon Economic Value 
in the Context of achieving NDC  Targets and Preparation  RPOJK regarding the Establishment and 
Technical Arrangement of Carbon Exchange by KLHK and OJK; (iv)  Green Industry Standard System 
(SIH) set by the Ministry of Industry; and (v)  several industrial sectors have started calculating 
carbon emissions and KAD IN has formed the KADIN Net Zero Hub to mobilize the private sector to 
achieve net zero  emission or engage with the Global Carbon Council (GCC)  Protocol.  
38.14.   Furthermore, Indonesia has also learned that in paragraph  70 of the CBAM  Regulation 
preamble, it is stated that: "A dialogue with third  countries should continue and there should be 
space for cooperation and solutions that could inform the specific choices to be made on the details 
of the CBAM during its  implementation, in particular during the transitional period. " In this regard, 
Indonesia intends to question the form of cooperation that will be carried out by the European Union 
with third  countries in the implementation of its CBAM.  
38.15.   Indonesia believes that the CBAM  policy is discriminatory because it violates the WTO's 
most-favoured -nation (MFN) and national treatment standards. According to EU  Regulation 
No. 2023/956 , Article  2, point 6, letters  A and B, the European Union signals that a third  country 
may be excluded from adopting CBAM if it has implemented ETS and imposes a carbon tariff that is 
higher than the EU's carbon tariff. The MFN  principle of the WTO, according to which each 
WTO Member is expected to treat imported goods from all other WTO  Members equally and without 
difference, may be broken by the European Union in this regard.  
38.16.   By paying attention to the WTO principle of national treatment, the European Union should 
provide equal treatment between imported goods that are subject to additional  tariffs based on 
CBAM, with local goods produced domestically in the EU. Indonesia observes that, in the ETS, 
operators or industries that have carbon emissions below a certain "cap" or limit are not required to 
purchase certificates or allowances. Howeve r, the said arrangement does not apply to industries in 
other WTO  Members that export their products to the EU. In relation to Article  II of the GATT  1994, 
Indonesia believes that the EU's CBAM has the potential to impose additional costs on producers of 
commodities outside of the EU, with additional levies beyond the tariffs in accordance with the 
EU Schedule of Concession (SoC)  Agreements.  
38.17.   Indonesia requests that the European Union quickly evaluate the CBAM  laws to ensure that 
they adhere to WTO  rules, in cluding Article  XI of the GATT  1994, as well as the 
most-favoured -nation  (MFN) and national treatment principles of the WTO. Indonesia further 
request s that the EU take into account the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement's Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilitie s and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC) principles when creating and 
implementing its CBAM  regulations.  
38.18.   Indonesia believes that any trade policy relating to the environment and climate change 
must be supported by factual data and scientific research or it risks devolving into unilateral and 
covert protectionism.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  38.19.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
38.20.   The European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ) appears to pose 
challenges to a broad array of WTO  rules, in disciplines related to tariffs, as well as in the 
fundamental principles of non -discrimination and national treatment. The EU's CBAM appears to 
adopt selective gaps in its coverage, for instance  in accounting for indirect emissions, that could 
exacerbate its discriminatory nature. Many stakeholders have highlighted the hybrid legal nature of 
trade-related environmental measures and the need for those measures to comply with both trade 
and environ mental multilateral rules. Historical responsibilities mean that countries that 
industrialized first, benefiting from cheap and more polluting energy sources, should bear a larger 
brunt of the costs of emission s reduction s. In both the UNFCCC and the Paris  Agreement, the EU 
has agreed to take into account the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and 
Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC). This principle should, therefore, be correctly reflected in 
European trade -related climate measures, such as the CBAM. The CBAM apparently attempts to 
impose on other Members a European model that ignores other modalities of climate action besides 
direct carbon pricing and addresses only specific sectors unilaterally determined by the EU. This is 
contrary to t he Paris Agreement, where each country establishes their Nationally Determined 
Contribution and the means to achieve them, particularly with regard to the distribution of the 
burdens between economic sectors. Brazil urges the EU to observe the need for its  trade-related 
climate measures to comply with both trade and environmental multilateral rules. We remain 
committed to work ing together with the EU to shape a fair and effective multilateral treatment for 
the nexus between trade and sustainability that aligns with and supports the commitments made by 
Members in environmental fora.  
38.21.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
38.22.   India has  expressed its concerns about the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism (CBAM ) on numerous occasions in various WTO  bodies , including the CTG, the 
Committee on Market Access (CMA), and the Committee on Trade and Environment  (CTE) . We h ave 
also been engaged with the EU bilaterally, where these concerns have been explained in significant 
detail to our EU  counterparts. While the EU's CBAM is now in force, we would like to reiterate our 
views raised in various forums. We remain concerned wi th the use of the concept of leakage. This 
concept is today being applied to carbon leakage, but we risk global trade fragmentation if the 
concept is extended horizontally or vertically. The EU's CBAM is a trade and environment hybrid, 
going even by the EU's own explanation. Hence, well -established principles and rules of both 
international trade law and international environment al law should have been followed in designing 
the CBAM. In not doing so , and in ignoring the principle of Common but Differentiate d 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC), this measure upends the hard -built 
consensus in the multilateral environment al agreements over the last 50  years.  
38.23.   The European Union's CBAM forces an emissions reduction path on the EU's trading par tners. 
It disregards the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) made by the EU's trading partners and 
effectively impinges upon their sovereign decisions. The worst effects of the EU's CBAM will be felt 
by MSMEs, who will not be able to meet the comple xities of emissions tracking, measuring, and 
reporting. Overtime, MSMEs may be replaced by big firms in the EU's trading profile, thus having a 
negative impact on the sustainable development objective of the WTO enshrined in the Marrakesh 
Agreement. We rem ain concerned about the CBAM  reporting and implementation which has kicked 
in now. Given the realities of trade, we may encounter situations where businesses have to share 
their trade secrets or sensitive information with intermediaries and EU  authorities or choose not to 
operate in the EU  market. Our businesses remain concerned about such second -order problems. 
Given so many design and implementation issues, we are compelled to believe that the EU's CBAM 
is effectively a trade protectionist measure rather an environmental intervention. Finally, we request 
the European Union  to notify its CBAM to the relevant WTO  bodies , such as  the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade  (TBT Committee) . G/C/M/147  
 
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  38.24.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
38.25.   Türkiye  thank s China, Indonesia,  and the Russian Federation for keeping this item on the 
agenda. We would like to  refer to our previous statements in this Council19, as well as those delivered  
in the Committee on Market Access ( CMA) and the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE) with 
regard to this issue. We continue to closely follow the ongoing legislative and im plementation 
processes under the European Green Deal, including the CBAM. Although we appreciate the fairly 
open process followed by the European Union , our concerns remain with regard to the compatibility  
of the EU's CBAM with international environmental and trade law, and many of the concerns that we 
have raised are shared by other major EU trading partners.  
38.26.   Türkiye  would like to reiterate that trade -related measures for tackling climate change 
should pass the necessity test, prioritize international coop eration and collective action, take into 
account different circumstances and historical responsibilities of countries, respect social and 
economic development needs of others , and not constitute arbitrary or disguised restriction s and 
unjustifiable discrim ination in international trade.  
38.27.   Specifically, with regard to the implementation of the transitional reporting phase of the 
European Union's CBAM , which started in October of this year, we are sure that the EU  Commission 
is facing an enormous number of ques tions and concerns also from the private sector, as do we. 
There are many practical issues around calculating the emission values, difficulty including in 
obtaining emission values for input materials  and concerns on sharing commercially sensitive 
production process data, to mention a few. In our view, fundamental concerns regard ing the 
 
19 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  22.41 -22.46 : "22.41.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the 
following:  
22.42.   Türkiye always indicated our support to global efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change while 
ensuring cooperation so as to achieve a strong global response to these challenges. We also continuously 
emphasize that each country contributes to this effort in accordance with its own national responsibilities and 
capabilities, as based on international environmental law. We are pur suing our own objectives to transform the 
Turkish economy into a sustainable, resource -efficient, and low -carbon production structure.  
22.43.   In our view, the WTO could help facilitate the transformation to environmentally sustainable economic 
growth glob ally, in an inclusive and just manner. With this in mind, we have been closely following the ongoing 
legislative processes under the European Green Deal, including the CBAM. We thank the EU for its transparent 
approach in devising the regulatory rules, and  for its openness to inputs from trade partners in the process. 
However, our concerns with regard to the compatibility of the CBAM with international environmental and trade 
law, as we have explained on multiple occasions from the beginning, still persist.  
22.44.   First of all, the lack of a development dimension and disregard for national responsibilities and 
capabilities is a general criticism with regard to this process. Furthermore, we believe that there are several 
discriminative aspects of the CBAM, w hich result in placing importers and imported goods at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to their counterparts in the EU. For example, there are differences between the scope 
of the EU  ETS and that of the CBAM. As we have also mentioned in previous meeti ngs, while CBAM applies to 
products identified by CN  codes, the ETS applies to installations identified in terms of their activity/production 
process, subject to minimum capacity or total rated thermal input thresholds. Therefore, while CBAM would 
capture all producers of CBAM  goods in third  countries, EU  producers of the same goods that are below the set 
thresholds are exempted from the EU  ETS. Nor will this divergence be addressed with the initiation of the 
ETS 2, which will be a separate carbon pricing r egime for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings, as 
this system will impose a much lower carbon cost than the current ETS, and will not subject industrial 
installations that would be affected by it to any GHG  monitoring, reporting, and verific ation obligation. 
Therefore, we believe it is necessary that exemptions be provided under the CBAM to third  country operators in 
line with the EU  ETS scope thresholds.  
22.45.   A second  issue relates to the treatment of precursors, as also explained before.  The CBAM, due to its 
focus on embedded emissions in products, brings an additional burden on producers in third  countries to 
account for the embedded emissions in input materials they use in the production process. The burden 
increases as the good becomes  more complex. In our internal consultations, especially end -user product 
producers at SME  status, inform us of the difficulty and burden of tracking input emissions, and indicate that 
their EU  counterparts do not have similar obligations under the EU  ETS. Furthermore, in the EU  ETS, 
applications such as over -allocation of free allowances and ability to trade allowances, state aid provided by 
member States with regard to CO 2 costs related to electricity use, and funding opportunities, provide 
EU producers w ith a competitive advantage over third  country producers with fewer resources. Hence, 
remedies to address these imbalances should be sought.  
22.46.   In this regard, we believe that the allocation of CBAM  revenues to the financing of the green 
transformatio n projects of developing countries and LDCs could at least help alleviate such imbalances, and 
would also be more in line with the climate change mitigation objectives underlying the CBAM  Regulation. In 
this process, ensuring that developing countries and LDCs have access to critical technologies will also be key 
to the CBAM's inclusivity and overall success."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  non-discriminatory application of the mechanism and the ongoing questions as to the environmental 
soundness of the CBAM, as well as its compatibility with the WTO  rules and environmental law , need 
to be addressed before the CBAM becomes definitive. In this regard, Türkiye  looks forward to further 
engagement and update s from the European Union . 
38.28.   The delegate of Paraguay  indica ted the following:  
38.29.   Our intervention relates to concerns in Agenda Items 38 (ID 148) and 4 0 (ID 171) Paraguay  
thanks the European Union for the briefing held during the Environment Week, for 
documents  WT/CTE/GEN/31  and WT/CTE/GEN/32  circulated in this regard, and for the new  briefing 
organized in the framework of the last meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment.  
However, Paraguay's systemic concerns presented repeatedly have not been duly taken into account 
and I wish to repeat them again in this Council . 
38.30.   When we asked  the European Union  how the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC) in the light of national circumstances and 
nationally determined contributions  (NDCs)  is taken into account in this measure for environmental 
purposes , and how the historically low emissions of some countries are recogni zed as opposed to 
those of the European Union,  whose Members developed with highly polluting methods, we received 
as an answ er that we all must contribute to the global crisis, with which we agree.  But when we ask 
how Members'  efforts to contribute that are different from carbon pricing are taken into account, we 
receive the answer that they are not taken into account but that eventual payments under the CBAM 
will be calculated on the basis of emissions.  When we ask whether products with lower emissions 
than the EU or neutral products will receive preferential market access, the answer is no, at most 
they will not have to pay th e additional tariff resulting from the CBAM.  Since this and other unilateral 
EU measures disproportionately affect countries with much lower historical emissions than the EU, 
one would at least expect the EU to provide a means of implementation and assista nce for a just 
green transition and to redirect the revenues generated by CBAM to that effect.  And f rom these  
elements we can only assume that the EU's intention has nothing to do with the environmental 
objective it claims to pursue.  
38.31.   We reiterate that , for Paraguay,  this is not a measure with a direct impact in the short term 
given our generally low industriali zation, similar to that of so many other developing countries  like 
Paraguay , but a systemic concern about the application of unilateral measures with supposed 
environmental objectives, but clear negative implications for the trade and development of 
third countries. Without market or other incentives and restrictions alone, measu res such as these 
will not drive green industriali zation; rather, in countries like my own, they will impede it.  
38.32.   Linked to this, I would like to refer to measures under the European Green Deal in general. 
The concerns are the same, namely that environmenta l measures with a trade impact must comply 
not only with the principles of international environmental law or the rules of the World Trade 
Organi zation, but because of their duality , with both . They must also take into account the 
particularities of third  countries and their development needs by providing assistance, sufficient 
means of implementation, sufficient time to adapt , and other special considerations. We take this 
opportunity to draw attention to another regulation in the framework of the "Directi ve on Corporate 
Sustainability Due Diligence" which is currently under inter -institutional negotiations between the 
Council and the European Parliament given again the possible implications and excessive burden to 
demonstrate compliance , which unfailingly ends up being passed on by European operators to 
producers in third  countries. We urge the European Union to ensure , from the initial stage of this 
initiative , that it does not unnecessarily affect trade and also that it takes into account the concerns 
of its trading partners.  
38.33.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
38.34.   Uruguay shares several of the concerns  raised in the statements made by various 
delegations on different agenda items relating to policies in the framework of the European Green 
Deal. Although Uruguay shares the objectives of combating climate change and protecting the 
environment, as demonstrated by the commitments made in the framework of multilateral 
agreements on the subject, including the Paris Agreement and the policies adopted to comply with 
them, Uruguay nevertheless remains concerned that the European Union is seeking to impose a view 
that there is a single model of production and sustainable development that should be emulated G/C/M/147  
 
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  worldwide, without taking into account the local cha racteristics and specific conditions of the different 
countries and regions, the realities of their production systems, or their contributions to the problems 
to be combated.  
38.35.   There are also concerns about the excessively restrictive effects of the practica l 
implementation of several of the strategies and policies announced in the European Green Deal, 
such as those referred to under  other agenda items, which may have a negative impact on 
international trade and production beyond the borders of the European U nion, as well as their 
possible incompatibilities with WTO  rules. For these reasons , Uruguay urges the European Union to 
ensure the compatibility of its trade and environment -related measures with both its commitments 
and obligations under the WTO  Agreemen ts and the Multilateral Environmental Agreements  (MEAs) . 
38.36.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
38.37.   The Republic of Korea understands the European Union's objective in introducing the Carbon 
Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which includes tackling carbon leakage. However, Korea is 
concerned that this measure might significantly diminish EU market acce ssibility for foreign 
businesses. Specifically, under the CBAM, external companies face stringent obligations relat ing to 
information disclosure. Additionally, EU  importers are confronted with an increased administrative 
load and potential penalties in rel ation to reporting obligations, making them more likely to forego 
the importation of external products. Therefore, Korea requests that the EU's CBAM  implementing 
regulations be designed to ensure equal treatment for both EU  internal and external businesses  so 
as not to violate WTO  rules, including the principle of national treatment . Furthermore, to ensure a 
level playing field, Korea requests that the EU thoroughly consider the systems of other Members in 
its detailed design of the regulation. The Republic  of Korea stands ready to further engage with the 
European Union  to resolve these issues constructively.  
38.38.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
38.39.   Chinese Taipei appreciates the efforts that the European Union  has made in updating 
Members on the latest developments regarding the CBAM at the recent meeting , in mid -November , 
of the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) . We also thank the EU for having a bilateral 
meeting with us at the margins of that CTE meeting. Ensuring the compliance of C BAM with 
WTO rules, and preventing the measures from being discriminatory or becoming a disguised 
restriction on international trade , are the fundamental obligations of all WTO  Members, regardless 
of the underlying purpose or nature of the measures. With r espect to the issue of discriminatory 
treatment, we would like to point out that CBAM applies to several downstream products in the iron 
and steel industry. In the EU, carbon emissions of such downstream products were neither subject 
to the EU  ETS scheme, nor subject to the obligations to report and verify their emissions. However, 
CBAM imposes obligations on foreign manufacturers of such downstream products to report, and, 
after 2026, to verify the embedded emissions for such products. There is a genuine c oncern about 
the measure incorporating discriminatory elements against imported like products. Moreover, with 
respect to disguised restrictions on international trade, CBAM involves perplexing implementing 
procedures. EU  importers are required to obtain an  array of information from foreign exporters which 
could potentially involve trade secrets. Substantial fines for submitting incorrect information could 
be imposed. And there is a critical lack of EU -accredited verifiers to implement the mechanism. 
Collect ively, these complicated procedures substantially and disproportionately increase compliance 
costs and create undue burdens to foreign exporters, especially small and medium -sized enterprises. 
They could give rise to a significant barrier and constitute a disguised restriction on international 
trade, hampering the rights of exporters seeking access to the EU  market. To ensure the 
effectiveness of CBAM in combating climate change , while preserving the principle of fairness and 
non-discrimination enshrined in  the WTO  rules, we urge the European Union  to continue engaging 
in comprehensive consultations with Members concerning the requirements and implementation of 
its CBAM.  
38.40.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
38.41.   The Kingdom of Saud i Arabia would like to reiterate its concerns over the European Union's 
Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ). This issue has also been addressed under the agenda 
of the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE) and the Committee on Market Access ( CMA), 
where Members discussed and will continue to discuss , in depth , their views and concerns in this G/C/M/147  
 
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  regard. The consistency of the EU's CBAM with the fundamental rules of the WTO is questionable. 
Therefore, the burden of proof to confirm that this mechanism is consistent with the EU  obligations 
and commitments regarding most-favoured -nation  (MFN) , national treatment, rules of origin , and 
non-tariff barriers ( NTBs) lies the EU. Furthermore, monitoring and calculating the carbon emissions 
embedded in the products covered by the CBAM is not a straightforward task and many details of 
the calculation methodology are not yet  clear. As far as we understand, the EU  ETS implies effective 
financial contribution measures, while the EU  State Aid Guidelines provide c ompensations for the 
reduction of indirect GHG  emissions. This scheme looks like a specific import -substitution subsidy 
that is prohibited by the WTO  Agreement s. Therefore, we would appreciate if  the EU could  provide  
further clarification on this matter. T he Kingdom of Saudi Arabia kindly requests the EU to specify 
articles in the WTO  Agreements that allow it to adopt this unnecessar ily complicated mechanism. 
We also urge the EU to further engage in consultations with Members in order to ensure the full 
compliance of the CBAM with WTO  rules and Agreements , and to ensure that the proposed 
mechanism will not create unnecessary barriers to trade, or be used as a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination , or be a disguised restriction on international t rade, or be applied in a 
manner that constitutes protection to the EU  domestic industries. Finally, unilateral trade measures 
must not be accommodated. We support the concerns raised by a number of Members about the 
effects of such measures, let alone the ir incons istency with WTO  rules.  
38.42.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
38.43.   With regard to the European Union's  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which 
requires the reporting of information on emissions per unit of product and carbon price paid  in the 
country of origin, which came into force in October this year , in a transition period, we are aware 
that the EU has explained it as being part of its climate change measures. With this in mind, we 
continue to stress that it should be an initiative that contributes to reducing emissions not only within 
the EU  region, but also globally. In addition, as we have repeatedly stated, it is important that the 
mechanism does not discriminate between foreign and domestic products, and that it is carried out 
in conjunction with policy coordination  efforts  with other countries. The key is to reduce the "carbon 
intensity " as a "result " of the reduction efforts that each country has made according to its own 
circumstances. These policies should therefore be taken into account broadly. We believe that this 
point has not yet been adequately reflected in the mechanism. We are also concerned that the 
implementing regulations on the application during the transition period were published on 
17 August , and that, despite new reporting obligations on operators, there has not been sufficient 
time for them to come into force by 1  October. The information required must be reported on a 
quarterly basis and on a product -by-product basis, which is more burdensome than for companies 
in the EU, and it also require s companies to submit their trade secrets, such as the ratios of steel 
scrap, which EU  companies are not required to report. Furthermore, it is unclear whether there is 
adequate legal protection of the trade secrets of the production operator when the production 
operator and the import operator are different. We would like to request the European Union  to 
continue to fully discuss the issue with each country, taking into account the actual response of 
companies , and o ther factors, so as not to impose excessive burdens that impede trade.  
38.44.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
38.45.   South Africa will be making this statement in support of the trade concern raised under 
Agenda Item 38 on the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and Item  40, on 
the EU  Regulations on Deforestation -Free Commodities. South Africa thanks tho se Members that put 
and kept these items on the agenda. Like other Members that spoke before us on Item  38 and 39,  
South Africa is concerned that the CBAM and deforestation policies of the EU amount to prioritizing 
EU policy over those exporting countries and imposing a unilateral vision of how to address climate 
change. South Africa is concerned that the genuine and necessary climate change agenda is being 
undermined through the use of unilateral protectionist measures that create competitive 
disadvantages  and eliminate foreign competition in the EU  market. We have consistently raised this 
and other concerns in various WTO  fora, including in engagements with the EU. There is no 
conclusive evidence that these unilateral measures of the EU will achieve their intended objective, 
yet the economic costs on South Africa and other economies like ourselves will be real in various 
sectors. It is estimated, in a hypothesis covering all imports into the EU from Africa, that the CBAM 
may reduce certain exports by as muc h as 5%, while reducing Africa's GDP by as much as 1.1%. 
South Africa, as one of the most exposed countries on the continent, is, like other Members,  also 
concerned about the potential WTO -inconsistency  of all CBAM and deforestation measures, 
particularly as they relate to the principles of national treatment and most -favoured -nation (MFN). G/C/M/147  
 
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  The effect of unilateral measures such as the EU's CBAM, and import restriction measures expressly, 
are that they undermine the multilaterally agreed mandates of nationa lly determined contributions 
(NDCs) of countries of exports. Second, they conflict with the CBDR  principles. Third, they create a 
preferential treatment and restrict the market access of imported goods of developing countries and 
LDCs in particular, creati ng a distortive effect on international trade. Fourth, they diminish the 
development prospects of developing countries and LDCs. And lastly, they lead to changes in trade 
patterns. Beyond trade, all the policies are likely to have implications for investme nt, development , 
and job creation . The impact on the agricultural sector, including the livelihoods of farmers on the  
African continent, will be immeasurable and long -lasting unless more sensible measures that take 
account the limited capacity and resource  constraints of developing countries like ourselves are 
taken into account. The administrative and compliance measures and costs for exporting will require 
adequate systems, controls, and procedures, which will be difficult and prohibitive for most if not all 
countries on the African continent, including South Africa. Sustainable development is important and 
includes environmental protections, but this must be achieved in a multilateral manner that is 
consistent with the respective needs and concerns of cou ntries at different levels of economic 
development. It also requires respect and adherence to multilaterally agreed commitments and 
principles under relevant multilateral and environmental agreements, principles that the African 
Group has advocated in the submission in document  G/C/W/830 . 
38.46.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
38.47.   The European Union has engaged with partners during the design stage of its Carbon Border 
Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ) and the EU remains committed to continuing this e ngagement now 
that the CBAM has entered into force with a transition period. The EU has been engaging here in the 
WTO, in Brussels , and in partner countries , through online seminars, physical events, distribution of 
guidance documents, and direct assistanc e. The objective is to assist third -country operators, 
exporters to and importers in to the EU in performing all the new obligations required by the 
CBAM  Regulation and its secondary legislation. The transition period will involve extensive 
consultation of stakeholders, including international partners to increase our mutual understanding 
of the instrument. One of the objectives of the transition period is to collect data on emission s 
reporting so it can be taken into account when designing the definitive  CBAM methodologies. We 
encourage all interested parties to engage in this process. I would also like to use this opportunity 
to inform you that Mr  Gerassimos Thomas, Director -General of Taxation and Customs of the 
European Commission, in charge of the European Union's CBAM , will be coming to Geneva on 
18 December  2023. We will be delighted to welcome your Ambassadors to join this discussion.  
38.48.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
39  EUROPEAN UNION – DEFORESTATION -FREE COMMODITIES (ID  203) – STATEMEN TS 
BY COLOMBIA, INDONESIA, PARAGUAY AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Colombia, Indonesia, Paraguay, and the Russian Federation.  
39.2.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the follo wing:  
39.3.  The concerns we have about this measure are various and well -known to the European Union 
since we have raised them in various WTO  bodies, as well as bilaterally and in other configurations. 
In response to your request, Chair, I will shorten my interv ention by making special reference to the 
questions that Paraguay, together with other Members, submitted in the framework of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) under the symbol  WT/CTE/GEN/33 , to which we expect 
a written reply as proof of th e transparency and true spirit of dialogue and cooperation of the 
European Union, considering that the same regulation includes the WTO among the fora for 
Cooperation with Third  Countries. If we do not receive written answers in the forum in which we 
submi t them, we will be obliged to reply to them in other bodies, including this Council. With regard 
to the specific concerns and respecting the announcement made about the brevity of my 
intervention, I will limit myself to requesting that the intervention mad e by Paraguay at the previous G/C/M/147  
 
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  Council meeting be reflected in its entirety in the minutes20 and to reiterate some elements regarding 
the implementation of this measure.  
39.4.  The European Union  insists that this measure provides for 18  months of transition befor e 
implementation, yet there is little more than a year to go before the measure is implemented and 
third countries are still unclear about to what producers and operators must adapt. There is no clarity 
on whether the EU will accept national or other certi fication schemes as sufficient, nor clarity on the 
implementation of the measure , as it will largely depend on the national authorities of EU  member  
States , which will also create even more uncertainty. We reaffirm our commitments to environmental 
objectiv es and principles and are convinced that international trade can and should contribute 
positively to their achievement ; however , unilateral measures such as this one , with dubious 
environmental results but a clear trade impact , do not effectively contribut e to these objectives and 
affect the development of other countries. To conclude, Paraguay again urge s the European Union  
"to cooperate effectively and establish a productive dialogue with its trade and sustainable 
development partners to jointly address the impact of EU  legislation and its implementing 
instruments, including trade facilitation support".  
39.5.  The delegate of Colombia indicated the following:  
39.6.  Firstly, Colombia would like to express that it shares the objectives of reducing deforestation 
and forest degradation at the global level as part of efforts to promote sustainability and combat 
climate change. Notwithstanding  the above, we have concerns that the implementation of the 
 
20 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  39.44 -39.51: "39.44.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
39.45.   Allow me to thank the delegations of Brazil, Indonesia, and the Russian Federation for including this 
topic on today's agenda. Paraguay thanks the European Union for the briefing held during the Trade and 
Environment Week, the recent publication of a document with frequently asked questions, and the bilateral 
discussions. However, Members' concerns and queries persist, as evidenced by the trade concerns and 
discussions on the European Regulation for deforestation -free commodities in the various WTO  committees.  
39.46.   The issue was addressed a t the last meeting of the Committee on Agriculture held last June. On that 
occasion, the delegations of Brazil and China presented questions under AG  IMS ID 105034. The European 
Union responded that farmers receiving CAP  payments under environmental progra mmes must set aside at 
least 4% of their arable land as nonproductive areas and conditions that benefit biodiversity. In this regard, we 
note that under Annex  II, Item  10 of the AoA, "Structural readjustment assistance provided through drawdown 
programs," the EU has notified EUR  152.3  million in subsidies for afforestation of agricultural land. We deeply 
regret the lack of equivalence measures in the European Regulation. Chair, allow me to remind you that in 
Paraguay, in the lands where land use change is s till allowed, our farmers must maintain 40%, not 4%, of 
forests, and this they must do by legal obligation, not because they receive subsidies.  
39.47.   Additionally, Chair, on that occasion, the European Union indicated that it maintained two  cooperation 
programmes for the five -year period 2021 -2024 in order to facilitate the just transition of developing countries, 
for a combined amount of EUR  3.5 billion. This would be equivalent to about EUR  700 million per year for all 
developing countries. Let me conte xtualize the numbers to put them in perspective. In one  year, the EU 
provided voluntary coupled aid and transitional national aid to the milk and dairy sector of EUR  919.1  million, 
while reporting a current total AMS for butter alone of almost EUR  3 billion. However, EUR  700 million per year 
is expected to be sufficient to finance the transition for all developing countries.  
39.48.   In addition to these shortfalls, there are also some questions about the restoration obligations included, 
for example, in the Kunming Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. The Framework established the objective 
of protecting 30% of the planet's surface, which to some extent could imply an additional obligation to 
developing countries, as they are home to the re maining ecosystems, but at the same time it sets the 
objective of restoring 30% of degraded ecosystems, which implies a relative burden on developed countries, as 
their development processes involved massive deforestation processes that we can still observ e today. 
However, we see that in the European Parliament the proposal to restore damaged ecosystems and recover 
nature throughout Europe does not even have the required majority in the Committee on the Environment. 
With this it would seem that the EU is en listed to fulfil its restoration obligations but at the same time demands 
greater conservation commitments from its trading partners than those agreed internationally and assumed 
autonomously by them.  
39.49.   How is this consistent with the objective pursu ed by the European Union with this measure? And how is 
it consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective responsibilities in 
light of national circumstances and nationally determined contributions?  
39.50.   The Eu ropean Union has previously responded that the obligation and requirements are not 
discriminatory as they apply equally to products originating in the EU. However, most of the products covered 
are not produced in the EU, and most of the deforestation in th e EU was prior to the selected cut -off date, so 
we again request clarification as to how it avoids discrimination in its application.  
39.51.   This, added to the resistance to restore ecosystems, would seem to indicate at least a great 
inconsistency between  the stated objectives of the measure and the European Union's actions, if not a 
disguised restriction on trade, especially for products that are produced in the EU, or those not produced in the 
EU (e.g.  palm oil), but for which there are similar domestic products (rapeseed oil).  G/C/M/147  
 
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  measures and their enforcement may become barriers to trade for certain exports, even though they 
have little or no relationship to deforestation. In this regard, we express our concern about the 
implications of this regulation on the multilateral trading system.  
39.7.  The application of measures that are more restrictive than necessary, and potentially 
discriminate between Member s, runs counter to the spirit of fair and equitable trade promoted by 
the W TO. It is crucial that the measures adopted not only pursue a legitimate environmental 
purpose, but that they are also proportionate and with differentiated implementation mechanisms. 
In this context, I reiterate that Colombia values environmental objectiv es and is committed to efforts 
to combat deforestation and to uphold multilateral commitments, but under the principle , of course , 
of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC). I conclude by 
indicating our willingness  to have a constructive dialogue to achieve a balance between conservation 
objectives and respect for trade needs.  
39.8.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
39.9.  The Russian Federation reiterates its position regarding this issue , as stated during the 
previous meetings of the Committee on Trade and Environment ( CTE), the Committee on Market 
Access ( CMA), and the CTG. The Regulation constitutes another example of the protectionist policy 
conducted by the European Union under the cloak of fig hting climate change. Currently , the 
Regulation covers trade in live cattle, meat and meat products, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, soya, 
and wood. However, this list can be expanded in the future. The covered products may be imported 
into the EU only if  they comply with the EU  Commission -established  criteria concerning legislation 
compliance in the country of their production, including  in relation to the following : (i) the presence 
of indigenous peoples in the country of production or parts thereof;  (ii) the consultation and 
cooperation in good faith with indigenous peoples in the country of production or parts thereof;  and 
(iii) concerns in relation to the country of production and origin or parts thereof, such as level of 
corruption, prevalence of docu ment and data falsification, lack of law enforcement, violations of 
international human rights, armed conflict or presence of sanctions imposed by the UN  Security 
Council or the Council of the European Union.  It is not clear how these criteria are consiste nt with 
the WTO  rules or the international climate agreements. Therefore , we urge the European Union to 
provide us with the clarification of this measure's compliance with the WTO  rules.  
39.10.   The delegate of Peru indicated the following:  
39.11.   First, we thank the delegations that have raised this agenda item. As in other areas of this 
Organization, we wish to express our concern with the EU  Regulation, due to its potential to generate 
significant disruptions in the trade flows of the products th at fall under its scope of application. In 
our opinion, this unilateral measure ignores the different realities and efforts that countries like mine 
have been making in terms of deforestation. We are sincerely concerned that there are still so many 
unclear  aspects regarding the implementation of the Regulation, or that require complementary 
regulations despite the fact that the entry into force of the regulation is so close. We are also 
sincerely concerned about the unilateral rating of the level of defores tation risk, whose specific 
criteria and methodology have not been properly communicated and coordinated with the countries  
potentially affected by it. In this regard, if this classification is based on general indices  and does 
not take into account the pa rticular situations that may arise within each of the countries, it could 
negatively affect producers and exporters in low -risk areas, putting them at a disadvantage 
compared to exporters of similar products in other countries.  
39.12.   We believe that there are mu ltiple ways to tackle deforestation, and we regret that the 
EU standard has chosen the least appropriate one, removing the opportunity for small producers to 
continue to develop their economic activity in order to lift themselves out of poverty. Not to men tion 
how this could also affect the programmes that countries such as my own have undertaken to replace 
illicit crops with crops such as coffee and cocoa. I will conclude by reiterating that the implementation 
of this regulation should be carried out only once it has undergone a thorough debate at the 
multilateral level, when  there is complete clarity regarding the requirements and deadlines that have 
been established, and when  there is certainty that the European Union will have the necessary tools 
to solv e any problems that may arise in its implementation. As mentioned by Paraguay, we are very 
interested in the responses to the questions  posed  in document  WT/CTE/GEN/33 . G/C/M/147  
 
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  39.13.   The delegate of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
39.14.   Indonesia intends to again conve y its concern regarding the European Union 's 
DFC regulation. Indonesia has noted that the DFC  regulation will prohibit the import and sale of 
seven  commodities, namely cattle products, cocoa, coffee, rubber, soybeans, wood, palm oil, and 
their derivative p roducts, which have the potential to have an impact upon, and originate from , 
deforestation and degradation land -forest.  In addition, the intended DFC  regulation will also impose 
mandatory due diligence on the seven  products. Importers are required to carry out due diligence 
to show that their products are legal and free from deforestation and forest degradation.  
39.15.   In essence, this DFC  law imposes stringent traceability standards, links the in -issue 
commodity with the agricultural land where the commodity  was produced, and will be challenging 
for SMEs, particularly small farmers, and have a significant impact. Although MSMEs and large 
industries have been given a grace period to implement the EUDR (European Union 
Deforestation -Free Commodities Regulation),  Indonesia understands that this will still make it 
challenging for Indonesian farmers, who make up the majority and are smallholders, to comply with 
the rules and be free from deforestation and forest degradation.  
39.16.   Indonesia thus hopes that the European Un ion will adopt EUDR  indicators that are more 
sensible and favoured by developing countries,  like Indonesia,  as well as least developed countries 
(LDCs). In this instance, Indonesia also wishes to inform the European Union that it has made 
significant progr ess in terms of sustainability, both through laws and  through  corporate practices 
that support sustainable agriculture and industry. This is true for both the government and business 
players in Indonesia.  
39.17.   There are several Indonesian government policies th at have been support ing sustainability , 
includ ing: (i) Sustainable Jurisdiction Indicators compiled by the Ministry of National Development 
Planning/Bappenas ( the Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Agency) 
which can accommodate sustainability principles; (ii)  Minister of Agriculture No.  98/2013 , 
concerning Guidelines for Plantation Business Licensing; (iii)  Minister of Agriculture No.  38/2020 , 
concerning the Implementation of Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil Plantation Certificati on 
Articles  28 and 29 , which regulate traceability; and (iv)  activities to strengthen the governance of 
smallholder oil palm plantations and the formation of a Task Force (Satgas) to  improve  governance 
of the palm oil industry with a focus on smallholders,  carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture . 
39.18.   Indonesia plans to ask the European Union for clarification as to  the existence of a 
high/standard/ low risk assessment of WTO  Members based on an assessment completed by the 
European Union under Article  29 of the EUDR regarding  assessment of countries. Indonesia 
understands that i nformation provided by non -governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as other 
stakeholders , including indigenous peoples and civil society organizations, as well as WTO  Members  
and corporate actors (operators), will also be used in the intended assessment.  Indonesia wishes  to 
seek clarification in this instance regarding the standards for third  parties permitted to submit the 
assessment , as well as the format of the assessment metho dology to be applied, given the vast 
array of assessment sources the European Union is permitted to employ.  
39.19.   Indonesia also believes that the intended DFC  regulation has the potential to provide 
different treatment between European Union domestic products a nd imported products, creat ing 
unnecessary barriers to international trade, and having  the potential to threaten the livelihoods of 
small farmers, so that it can disrupt product market access  and agriculture in developing countries 
and LDCs that are not co mpliant with Article  4.2 of the WTO  Agreement on Agriculture . 
39.20.   Indonesia also believes that the EUDR's Article  1 definition of the "7  (seven)  products and 
their derivatives" is not supported by sufficient scientific evidence , and that the majority of the goods 
it covers are imports that are not produced  domestically by the European Union. The 
most-favoured -nation ( MFN) and national treatment principles, as well as the less favourable 
treatment outlined in Article  2.1 of the TB T Agreement, may be violated, as well as other WTO  norms 
and principles.  
39.21.   In relation to this issue, Indonesia emphasizes that the European Union needs to consider 
the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC) principl es in 
the process of formulating and implementing trade policies relat ing to the environment and climate G/C/M/147  
 
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  change, including DFC  regulations, as contained in discussions at the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement.  
39.22.   Indonesia believes that country classification criteria and methodologies for assessing 
deforestation risks must be rigorous and fair, taking into account the complexities of global supply 
chains. In addition, Indonesia emphasizes that any policy relat ing to trade and environment must 
not be discriminat ory or a disguised restriction on international trade.  
39.23.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated the following:  
39.24.   On 7 September, a joint letter was sent from 17  developing countries regarding the entry 
into force, on 29 June, of the European Union's so -called "anti -deforestation law" ("EU  Deforestation 
Regulation") to the main EU authorities. The letter was signed by a significant group of countries 
from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa,  and Asia. In addition to Brazil, Argentina, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Côte d 'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, and Thailand signed 
the document.  
39.25.   The objective of the initia tive is to reiterate concerns about the punitive and discriminatory 
nature of this particular European regulation, as well as to highlight the importance of the European 
Union maintaining an effective dialogue with producing countries, with a view to avoid ing disruptions 
in trade and excessive burdens on producers of agricultural goods and derivatives covered by the 
measure. Since this is a trade measure that hinders access to the EU  market, we firmly believe it is 
in the interest s of the Membership to be a ware of it.  
39.26.   Brazil remains firmly committed to combating deforestation and has strengthened inspection 
and preservation activities in Brazilian forests, particularly in the Amazon. However, in Brazil's  view, 
European law, in addition to conflicting with th e principles that govern international trade and the 
multilateral understandings on climate and biodiversity, imposes imbalances in the economic, social 
and environmental aspects of the problem it aims to address , as well as jeopardiz ing sustainable 
develo pment.  
39.27.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
39.28.   India has raised its concerns on the proposed European Union measures under the Carbon 
Border Adjustment Mechanism  (CBAM) , Deforestation -Free Commodities and other Green Deal  
proposals in various forums . Most recently, India submitted a paper , document  JOB/TE/78 , to the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) in March  2023, which pointed out that we are 
witnessing potential trade fragmentation if Members continue to take unilateral trade measures 
which apply  extraterritorially. We also urged the need to act in accordance with the principles of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR -RC), as well as  
honouring the nationally determined contributions (NDCs).  
39.29.   It is not clear how the European Union will undertake the country -risk classification, and if 
there would be a nuanced approach of using a combination of product and subnational classification , 
or if the classification would remain a standard national labe l irrespective of the product concerned 
or regional variations. Our businesses have also expressed concerns that there may be situations 
where business -critical information would have to be shared with EU  importers and authorities. The 
EU suggestion that t he importing entities look at geo -spatial imagery and satellite data is also 
concerning. Such intrusive measures do not respect the sovereignty of the EU's trading partners. 
The measure as proposed right now will hurt agriculture exports in the chosen comm odities to the 
EU. Its worst effects will be felt by small and marginal farmers in developing countries. The 
agriculture sector in developing countries , including India,  is a key driver for employment as well as 
the economic well -being of a large part of t he population, especially women and those associated 
with MSMEs. It is unfortunate that the EU is making policy choices which directly harm the economic 
interests of these socio -economic groups. Finally, we request the European Union to notify its 
Deforest ation-Free Commodities measure to the relevant WTO  bodies , such as the Committee on  
Technical Barriers to Trade  (TBT Committee) . G/C/M/147  
 
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  39.30.   The delegate of Argentina  indicated the following:  
39.31.   Argentina  thank s the delegations that registered this agenda item. Argentina  reiterates its 
commitment to the 2030  Agenda for Sustainable Development, its goals and environmental 
objectives at the multilateral level. In this context, we consider that our efforts and achievements 
in the sustainability of national agri -food systems deserve fair recognition. Given our role as partners 
of the European Union in multilateral environmental fora and in the WTO, we expect that the 
elaboration of the directives for the implementation of regulations and risk assessment by the 
European Commiss ion will be done in a cooperative and consultative manner. In particular, we 
believe that , in this process, the European Commission has the opportunity to consider the 
challenges that a unilateral regulation such as the EUDR poses to developing countries, especially to 
their small producers, which is an issue that was not taken into account in the drafting of the 
regulation. In the same vein, Argentina has a firm belief  in the sustainability of its cattle, soybean 
and timber production. We value instances o f dialogue as a means for the recognition of the 
environmental achievements of our agri -food system, backed by national regulations and 
certification systems that deserve adequate consideration.  
39.32.   Argentina is convinced that there is room for improvement of the European regulations to 
adequately reflect local circumstances, national legislations , and certification mechanisms in 
developing countries. We strongly believe that an equitable and collaborative approach is always 
more constructive than the impositio n of "one -size-fits-all" solutions. Indeed, we advocate a 
collaborative approach to tackling global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity loss , and 
pollution, recogni zing the particularities of both our country and those of developing countries.  
39.33.   The delegate of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
39.34.   Türkiye would like to thank Colombia, Indonesia, Paraguay,  and the Russian Federation for 
keeping this item on the agenda. Again, we would like to refer to our previous statements in this 
Council and in the Committee on Market Access ( CMA) regarding this item. Once again, we would 
like to emphasize the importance of cooperation with partner countries in making risk classifications 
and using solid scientific data. This is also valid for any possible  extension in the scope of this 
legislation. In addition,  burdens imposed on small producers that discourage them from participating 
in supply chains have to be separately revaluated. We would appreciate further update s from the 
European Union on this item . 
39.35.   The delegate of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
39.36.   Ecuador takes note and appreciates the interest of Members in including this trade concern 
on the agenda of this meeting of the Goods Council. Ecuador once again wishes to express its concern 
over the deve lopment of policies within the framework of the Green Deal and deforestation -free 
products. My delegation reaffirms its commitment to environmental objectives and principles, but 
regrets that the particularities of each trading partner are not taken into c onsideration. On the other 
hand, and in line with our intervention in the Committee on Market Access  (CMA) , I would also like 
to refer to the letter of 7  September, which was signed by several Ambassadors to the European 
Union – including Ecuador – and add ressed to the Parliament, the Council , and the Commission of 
the European Union, in which the main elements underpinning this concern were detailed, among 
them:  (i) the Deforestation -Free Commodities Regulation does not take into account local capacities 
and practices, as well as their national legislations;  (ii) the unilateral assessment system is 
inherently discriminatory and punitive, which could be incompatible with the EU's WTO  obligations;  
(iii) small producers are particularly vulnerable to these reg ulations, who may end up being excluded 
from international value chains not because they deforest their land, but because they lack the 
capacity and resources to demonstrate compliance;  and (iv)  the implementation of these guidelines 
will entail high costs  for exporters and importers, as well as for producers and consumers.  
39.37.   Therefore, Ecuador joins other Members in urging the European Union to maintain a more 
proactive dialogue than has thus far been the case, in which the practices developed in the differe nt 
producing countries are properly evaluated in order to achieve the common and shared objective of 
environmental protection and sustainability. Ecuador renews its commitment to continu ing a 
constructive dialogue on this issue.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  39.38.   The delegate of Guatemala  indicated the following:  
39.39.   Guatemala thanks the delegations of Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador, the Russian Federation,  
and Indonesia for including this item on today's agenda. As other delegations have indicated, we 
wish to reiterate our concerns that have been expressed in different fora regarding the 
EU Deforestation -Free Commodities Regulation. This new regulation includes a comparative  
assessment of countries in which the EU will assign a risk level to countries. It means that this 
encompasses challenges that go beyond environmental ones, such as the geolocation of plantations, 
which is a complicated issue in particular for small produc ers. In our view, this regulation does not 
take into account the specific circumstances and characteristics of our developing countries. This 
one-size-fits-all approach does not seek to solve the legitimate environmental interest, but will 
rather produce o ther adverse effects. Depending on the risk, certain requirements will be imposed 
on operators that imply new procedures for our producers and exporters. This regulation will enter 
into force in 2025, allowing  approximately 13  months to make the necessary internal preparations. 
This is why the time-period  must take into account the different conditions in each of our countries.  
We reiterate Paraguay's comment  regarding the questions that were sent in 
document  WT/CTE/GEN/33 , which seeks to provide more c larity on the implementation of this 
measure. We urge the European Union  to engage in dialogue with affected producer countries to 
mitigate the harmful impacts of this new policy, taking into account the implementation of 
compliance support. We reiterate o ur commitment to address ing global challenges, always taking 
into account the multilateral agreements of the WTO.  
39.40.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
39.41.   The United States shares the European Union's  objective in combating deforestation.  
However, we are concerned about the EU's prescriptive approach to addressing global deforestation 
connected to agricultural commodity production. The US emphasizes that deforestation is a global 
issue that requires cooperative approaches by national compe tent authorities and civil society 
organizations. For this reason, the US has strong concerns with the EU's approach in this space.  
39.42.   Specifically, the United States is deeply concerned that the European Union's  approach may 
not be well -calibrated to effecti vely address root causes of deforestation and that may adversely 
impact trade by imposing significant costs and burdens to global supply chains without providing 
measurable benefits to curb global deforestation.  
39.43.   The United States  request s that the European  Union engage in two -way consultations 
between our technical experts to discuss ways this regulation can be better calibrated to address 
global deforestation and avoid imposing undue burdens on producers that do not contribute to global 
deforestation. Furt her, the US respectfully requests that the EU delay implementation of this 
regulation, notify the regulation to the WTO  TBT Committee, provide adequate time for stakeholder 
comment, and take those comments into account before implementing the final regulat ion. 
39.44.   The delegate of South Africa  indicated the following:  
39.45.   South Africa  will be making this statement in support of the trade concern raised under 
Agenda Item 38 on the E uropean Union 's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and Item  40, on 
the EU  Regulations on Deforestation -Free Commodities. South Africa thanks those Members that put 
and kept these items on the agenda. Like other Members that spoke before us on Item  38 and 39, 
South Africa is concerned that the CBAM and deforestation policies of th e EU amount to prioritizing 
EU policy over those exporting countries and imposing a unilateral vision of how to address climate 
change. South Africa is concerned that the genuine and necessary climate change agenda is being 
undermined through the use of un ilateral protectionist measures that create competitive 
disadvantages and eliminate foreign competition in the EU  market. We have consistently raised this 
and other concerns in various WTO  fora, including in engagements with the EU. There is no 
conclusive evidence that these unilateral measures of the EU will achieve their intended objective, 
yet the economic costs on South Africa and other economies like ourselves will be real in various 
sectors. It is estimated, in a hypothesis covering all imports into t he EU from Africa,  that the CBAM 
may reduce certain exports by as much as 5% , while reducing Africa's GDP by as much as 1.1%. 
South Africa, as one of the most exposed countries on the continent,  is, like other Members,  also 
concerned  about the potential WT O-inconsistency  of all CBAM and deforestation measures, 
particularly as they relate to the principles of national treatment and most-favoured -nation ( MFN). G/C/M/147  
 
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  The effect of unilateral measures such as the EU's CBAM , and import restriction measures expressly , 
are that they undermine the multilaterally agreed mandates of nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) of countries of exports. Second, they conflict with the CBDR  principles. Third, they create a 
preferential treatment and restrict the market access of imported goods of developing countries and 
LDCs in particular , creating a distortive effect on international trade. Four th, they diminish the 
development prospects of developing countries and LDCs. And lastly, they lead to changes in trade 
patterns. Beyond  trade, all the policies are likely to have implications for investment , development , 
and job creation . The impact on the agricultural sector, including the livelihoods of farmers on the  
African continent, will be immeasurable and long -lasting unless more sensible measures that take 
account the limited capacity and resource constraints of developing countries like ourselves are 
taken into account. The administrative and compliance measure s and costs for exporting will require 
adequate systems, controls, and procedures, which will be difficult and prohibitive for most if not all 
countries on the African continent, including South Africa. Sustainable development is important and 
includes env ironmental protections, but this must be achieved in a multilateral manner that is 
consistent with the respective needs and concerns of countries at different levels of economic 
development. It also requires respect and adherence to multilaterally agreed c ommitments and 
principles under relevant multilateral and environmental agreements, principles that the African 
Group has advocated in the submission in document  G/C/W/830 . 
39.46.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
39.47.   The EU  Regulation on defore station -free supply chains entered into force on 29  June 2023. 
It will enter into application on 29  December  2024 with an additional six -month flexibility for SMEs. 
The European Union  has been engaging on the Deforestation regulation, here in the WTO and 
bilaterally during the design stage of the Regulation and will continue to do so during its 
implementation. The last information session was held on 15  November here in the WTO , where 
many of your questions have been answered. The Commission has a Frequentl y Asked Questions 
document to support the compliance of operators and traders, in particular SMEs, with the 
requirements of this Regulation. We will be updating this FAQ to reflect the practical implementation 
issues raised during these sessions.  
39.48.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
39.49.   Just to express our disappointment with the European Union's response. Although it is a 
measure that generates concern from a large number of Members, as can be seen from the 
interventions and support for t hese concerns in the Council and other WTO  bodies, we still do not 
receive substantive answers to our questions. And we do not agree with the statement  that the 
questions were answered in the briefing. While such briefings are useful, they are generally no t of 
sufficient length ; this is why we submitted written questions , along with other Members. So, thank 
you, but no, the questions were not properly answered in these sessions.  
39.50.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
39.51.   The United States ap preciates that the European Union  has organized multiple sessions to 
inform WTO  Members  about this regulation. However, the US notes that one -way 
information -sharing sessions are not sufficient for all relevant stakeholders to review and comment 
on this re gulation. The US requests that the EU suspend implementation of this regulation until it 
has been notified to the WTO  TBT Committee , and to provide adequate time for stakeholder 
comment and take those comments into account before implementing the final reg ulation.  
39.52.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
39.53.   The European Union has taken due note of the concerns which have been expressed by 
several Members, which will be conveyed to Capital.  
39.54.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  40  EUROPEAN UNION – THE EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (ID  171) – STATEMENT BY THE 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
40.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
40.2.  The delegate of the Russian F ederation  indicated the following:  
40.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its statements made during previous meetings of the CTG.21 
Under the umbrella of the Green Deal, the European Union  is implementing many measures aimed 
at restricting trade , including its  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism ( CBAM ), its regulation on 
deforestation, its chemical strategy, its additional requirements for new batteries, and its new 
proposal on packaging and packaging waste. Under the Green Deal, the EU introduces new charges, 
quantitative restrictions that include import and export prohibitions, and new technical requirements 
in the absence of international standards. All these measures are subject to discussions in the 
relevant WTO  working bodies.  
40.4.  The consequences associated wi th the full operation of the policies such as the CBAM or due 
diligences directive , as well as other regulations implementing the European Green Deal , appear to 
be distorting traditional trade flows and supply chains, which undermines Members' rights to ap ply 
appropriate policies in the field of decarbonization, as well as decreas ing the global prosperity, 
especially of developing countries. The measures that the EU tries to justify by "sustainability" are 
 
21 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  22.8-22.15: "22.8.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated the 
following:  
22.9.   The Russian Federation reiterates its statements on this issue that were made during the previous 
meetings of the CMA, the  CTG, and the CTE. The Regulation on the establishment of the CBAM was published 
on 16  May 2023. Our analysis shows that the European Union has failed to make it compatible with the 
WTO rules.  
22.10.   By using this mechanism, the European Union seeks to en sure cross -border application of its emission 
trading system or carbon pricing methodology, to protect its domestic industry from fair foreign competition, 
as well as to resolve the problem of relocation of its production facilities to third  countries. The  CBAM will be 
applicable only to goods originating in the WTO  Members which will not establish an emission trading system 
fully linked with the EU  Emissions Trading System (ETS) or apply a carbon price without any rebates beyond 
those also applied in accor dance with the EU  ETS. 
22.11.   In this regard, we would like to point out that there is no evidence that the emission trading system is 
effective or that it is the only correct solution to address the problem of climate change. It should be kept in 
mind th at agreements at the international level provide for the possibility for countries to be able to choose 
measures to combat climate change in the most effective way for each of them. Even at the EU  level, 
industries continue to receive a significant share o f their emission allowances for free – for many industries this 
free share constitutes 100%. Thus, the EU also cannot fully assess the effectiveness of its ETS in terms of its 
impact on addressing climate change.  
22.12.   The next issue that we would like t o draw attention to is that the CBAM covers the most sensitive 
sectors of the EU  economy, namely cement, fertilizers, iron and steel, and aluminium, which are those sectors 
where the EU usually applies anti -dumping or safeguard measures to protect its prod ucers. It is equally 
interesting that the CBAM also covers hydrogen energy, which is still in development. By including hydrogen 
into the scope of the CBAM the EU makes it clear that this regulation has nothing to do with the problem of 
combating climate c hange. We would like to note that hydrogen is a key technology for the low carbon 
transition, as it does not emit any greenhouse gas at the point of use. Thus, there is no doubt that the 
inclusion of hydrogen in the regulation aims to secure foreign invest ment for EU  companies in renewable 
hydrogen, and to decrease the competitiveness of other kinds of energy sources, in particular those derived 
from natural gas, methane, and others.  
22.13.   With this regulation the European Union establishes not only additional charges on the importation of 
products, but also substantial administrative burden and import restrictions. According to the CBAM  Regulation, 
"goods shall be imported into the customs territory of the Union only by an authorised CBAM  declarant".  It will 
also be prohibited to import goods without CBAM  certificates. The European Union introduces the system of 
verification of embedded emissions. The Regulation provides for the principles of verification, content of 
verification report, and requireme nts for an accredited verifier.  
22.14.   The European Union constantly argues that the CBAM will mirror the EU  ETS. However, according to 
the Regulation "the CBAM  system has some specific features when compared to the EU  ETS, including with 
respect to the c alculation of the price of CBAM  certificates, the possibilities to trade CBAM  certificates and their 
period of validity. Those features are due to the need to preserve the effectiveness of the CBAM as a measure 
to prevent carbon leakage over time".  
22.15.   For the sake of time, we will not outline all the elements of the CBAM that are questionable from the 
point of view of WTO  norms and international climate agreements. However, our preliminary analysis shows 
that the CBAM is incompatible with Articles  I, II, III, and IX of the GATT  1994. We urge the European Union to 
bring the Regulation into line with the WTO  rules."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  based neither on the rules and principles of the multilateral trading system nor on global agreements  
in the field of combating climate change. The EU merely aims to protect its domestic industries from 
imports while improving its competitive advantages in the global market. Furthermore, from the 
systemic point of view, the EU seeks to replace the concept of a "product" as an object of 
consumption , as implied in the GATT , with the idea that a product is the "result of a production 
process", while completely ignoring the current understanding of a " like product" , which is the result 
of a long -standing consensus. Along with that, I wish to recall that the reasons why this Organization 
was founded in the first  place were to enhance trade and increase prosperity , rather than create 
new restriction s. 
40.5.  Bearing all this in mind, I would like to point out that Brussels neglects attempts to find a 
common solution at multilateral level to  the existing challenges, preferring a unilateral agenda and 
trying to establish a friend shoring  approach that leads to the fragmentation and destruction of the  
MTS. To conclude, the Russian Federation would like to urge the European Union  once more to 
respect the WTO  rules and international agreements in the field of environmental protection.  
40.6.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated  the following:  
40.7.  Our intervention relates to concerns in Agenda Items 38 (ID  148) and 40 (ID  171) Paraguay  
thanks the European Union for the briefing held during the Environment Week, for 
documents  WT/CTE/GEN/31  and WT/CTE/GEN/32  circulated in this r egard, and for the new  briefing 
organized in the framework of the last meeting of the Committee on Trade and Environment.  
However, Paraguay's systemic concerns presented repeatedly have not been duly taken into account 
and I wish to repeat them again in this Council . 
40.8.  When we asked the European Union how the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities  (CBDR -RC) in the light of national circumstances and 
nationally determined contributions  (NDCs)  is taken into account  in this measure for environmental 
purposes, and how the historically low emissions of some countries are recognized as opposed to 
those of the European Union, whose Members developed with highly polluting methods, we received 
as an answer that we all must  contribute to the global crisis, with which we agree.  But when we ask 
how Members'  efforts to contribute that are different from carbon pricing are taken into account, we 
receive the answer that they are not taken into account but that eventual payments u nder the CBAM 
will be calculated on the basis of emissions.  When we ask whether products with lower emissions 
than the EU or neutral products will receive preferential market access, the answer is no, at most 
they will not have to pay the additional tariff  resulting from the CBAM.  Since this and other unilateral 
EU measures disproportionately affect countries with much lower historical emissions than the EU, 
one would at least expect the EU to provide a means of implementation and assistance for a just 
green transition and to redirect the revenues generated by CBAM to that effect. And from these  
elements we can only assume that the EU's intention has nothing to do with the environmental 
objective it claims to pursue.  
40.9.  We reiterate that, for Paraguay, this is not a measure with a direct impact in the short term 
given our generally low industrialization, similar to that of so many other developing countries like 
Paraguay, but a systemic concern about the application of unilateral measures with supposed 
environme ntal objectives, but clear negative implications for the trade and development of 
third countries. Without market or other incentives and restrictions alone, measures such as these 
will not drive green industrialization; rather, in countries like my own, t hey will impede it.  
40.10.   Linked to this, I would like to refer to measures under the European Green Deal in general. 
The concerns are the same, namely that environmental measures with a trade impact must comply 
not only with the principles of international envi ronmental law or the rules of the World Trade 
Organi zation, but because of their duality , with both . They must also take into account the 
particularities of third  countries and their development needs by providing assistance, sufficient 
means of implementa tion, sufficient time to adapt , and other special considerations. We take this 
opportunity to draw attention to another regulation in the framework of the "Directive on Corporate 
Sustainability Due Diligence" which is currently under inter -institutional ne gotiations between the 
Council and the European Parliament given again the possible implications and excessive burden to 
demonstrate compliance , which unfailingly ends up being passed on by European operators to 
producers in third  countries. We urge the Eu ropean Union to ensure , from the initial stage of this 
initiative , that it does not unnecessarily affect trade and also that it takes into account the concerns 
of its trading partners.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  40.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
41  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS (ID  161) – STATEMENTS BY 
JAPAN AND THAILAND  
41.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan and Thailand.  
41.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
41.3.  Thailand would like to express its serious concerns about India's import prohibition on air 
conditioners containing refrigerants, an issue that we have persistently raised in various WTO  bodies 
to date without any progress. We believe that this prohibition is inconsistent wit h the GATT  1994, 
specifically Article s XI:1 and XX, as these measures represent a de facto trade restriction . And we 
urge India to ensure that its policies comply with the principles and obligations enshrined in the 
GATT.  
41.4.  Moreover, we draw attention to Ind ia's notification  G/LIC/N/ 2/IND/21 , which, in our view, 
violates the principle of national treatment. This is because the importation of hydrofluorocarbons 
into India is still permitted if a non -automatic import licence is granted, while the impor tation of the 
same substance is banned when it is contained within an air conditioner. This inconsistency raises 
concerns about the discriminatory nature of India's import prohibition and the adverse impact it may 
have on international trade. For these rea sons, Thailand therefore reiterate s that India shall amend 
or discontinue the measure as soon as possible to ensure that it is in compliance with India's 
commitments under the WTO.  
41.5.  Moreover, Thailand has noted a significant delay in the implementation of I ndia's IS  Mark 
Certification, which is based on the Quality Control Orders for air conditioners and their associated 
components. Specifically, the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) has stopped issuing certificates to 
all Thai manufacturers since June  2023, while continuing to issue them to all domestic Indian 
producers. We stress the importance of India ensuring that the implementation of the IS  Mark 
Certification does not unfairly discriminate against foreign suppliers, especially those meeting the 
standard  requirements. Such actions could run counter to the principles of non -discrimination.  
41.6.  Consequently, we urge India to provide information on certificate holders and processing 
times, including details of certificates that have not yet been processed. Additionally, we request 
India to expedite the issuance of certificates at the earliest oppo rtunity or consider delaying the 
implementation of the IS  Mark Certification based on the Quality Control Orders for air conditioners 
and their related parts until it can issue certificates to all qualified manufacturers in a timely and 
non-discriminatory manner.  
41.7.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
41.8.  As we have stated in past CTG  meetings, Japan remains very concerned about India's import 
ban on air conditioners containing refrigerants , introduced in October  2020, which is highly likely to 
be contr ary to Article  XI:1 of the GATT and Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement. Although India 
stated at the CTG's previous meeting that "India has updated in the relevant Committees ", no 
clarification of this measure has been given in a WTO committee. The notification in the Import 
Licensing Committee relates to the import of refrigerants themselves, which is a different notification 
from the refrigerants enclosed in air -conditioning equipment, which is the subject of this agenda 
item, and is not related to  this measure.  
41.9.  In addition, India referred to the share of Japan's air conditioners and said that raising this 
issue in the Committee was inappropriate . However, the share of Japanese products has nothing to 
do with the consistency with the WTO  Agreement s of the measures, and it is difficult to understand 
the intention behind this. Rather, it is possible that the share has not increased due to the trade 
restrictive effects of the import restrictions. We look forward to a sincere and prompt response from 
India, including in response to the written questions we submitted in September  2020.  
41.10.   Third, while we are aware of India's response to the review by the Bureau of Indian 
Standards (BIS) at the TBT  Committee, we again request that the significant delays in the  G/C/M/147  
 
- 101 - 
 
  certification process for real imports are resolved. With regard to the certification system for 
IS standards based on Quality Control Orders for air  conditioners and their components, it is highly 
regrettable that the certification system came into force  on 1 October, despite the fact that Japan 
had requested, via a letter from its Ambassador, that the date of enforcement be once again  
postponed . Nevertheless, we would like to request the smooth implementation of overseas factory 
audits by the BIS and mea sures to ensure that the certification procedures are not delayed, so that 
import restrictions are not caused by delays in the certification procedures by BIS.  
41.11.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
41.12.   The Republic of Korea shares the concerns expressed by Thailand and Japan regarding 
India's import restriction on air conditioners. Korea believes that the measure appears to be 
inconsistent with WTO  rules, particularly Article  XI.1 of the GATT  1994, thereby creating an 
unnecessary obstac le to trade. The Republic of Korea requests that India resolve the issue in a timely 
manner. We stand ready to further engage with India.  
41.13.   The delegate of India indicated the following:  
41.14.   India wishes  to reiterate our previous responses on this issue provided  in various 
WTO bodies. The measure in question was necessary to apply standards in reducing risks to human, 
animal and plant life and health. The measure is consistent with India's commitment to the Montreal 
Protocol. Further, as per the Ozone -Depleting S ubstances (Regulation and Control) Amendment 
Rules  2014, the import of air conditioners containing Group  VI substances (HCFCs) has been 
prohibited since 1  July 2015. We have shared the details of these measures, including their intention 
and the ongoing de velopments, with the delegations  concerned . It is also pertinent to mention that 
this measure was adopted based on consultations with the relevant industry groups comprising of 
representatives from all sectors of the air conditioning industry. These discus sions with industry led 
to policy reforms aimed at meeting the cooling requirements of the country in a responsible manner. 
The measures were designed after several rounds of discussions with the industry groups, which 
included industry players from domest ic and international markets, including firms representing at 
least one  Member raising the trade concern. The additional comments made today on the QCO by 
various Members will be communicated to Capital for its consideration.  
41.15.   The Council took note  of the s tatements made.  
42  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS (ID  181) – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  
42.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Thailand.  
42.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
42.3.  Thailand expresses its understanding and empathy for the economic challenges and 
balance -of-payment difficulties faced by the people of Nepal. While acknowledging these hardships, 
we feel compelled to reiterate our concerns about Nepal's ongoing import ban on caffeinated mixed 
energy drinks and flavoured synthetic drinks from Thailand, which has been in effect since 2019. 
Despite the passage of time, Thai exporters continue to suffer from this measure, and we observe 
that Nepal has not initiated consultations w ith the Committee on Balance -of-Payments Restrictions, 
as stipulated by Article  6 of the Understanding on the Balance -of-Payments Provisions, as well as 
Article  XII, paragraph  4(a), and Article  XVIII, paragraph  12(a) of the GATT  1994.  
42.4.  Thailand urges Nepal to promptly adhere to and abide by these provisions. They constitute 
vital elements of the international trade framework, and compliance is essential for fostering a fair 
and equitable trading environment. Consultations through the Committee on Balance -of-Payments 
Restrictions are designed to facilitate constructive dialogue and provide an opportunity to address 
concerns, leading to mutually beneficial resolutions.  
42.5.  The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
42.6.  Nepal would like to thank Thailand for its sta tement and continued interest in Nepal's trade 
policy measures, and notes that this concern has also been raised in the Committee on Market G/C/M/147  
 
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  Access ( CMA). In response to the concern raised today, my delegation wishes to refer to its previous 
statement deliv ered at the CTG's meeting of July 2023.22 Furthermore, my delegation would like to 
inform you that the reviewing process has already begun, and we are of the view that it requires the 
engagement of several agencies. It may take a longer time to come with s ome conclusion.  
42.7.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
43  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS (ID  157) – STATEMENT BY 
THAILAND  
43.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Thailand.  
43.2.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following:  
43.3.  Thailand would like to express our concern about Sri  Lanka's import ban  on various products , 
which has had a significant impact on Thailand's exports to Sri  Lanka, particularly as concerns small 
passenger vehicles. The expor t of such vehicles from Thailand to Sri  Lanka has practically come to 
a standstill since 2021. Nevertheless, Thailand appreciates the positive steps taken by Sri  Lanka to 
gradually eliminate its restrictive import policies. As per Sri  Lanka's statement dur ing the last 
meeting  of the Committee on Market Access (CMA) , as of 10  October  2023, all HS  codes except for 
304 items under Chapter  87 have been removed from the Schedule of Temporary Suspension. 
However, this indicates that import restrictions on vehicles still persist. We seek further clarification 
and updates from Sri  Lanka regarding the timeline for lifting the remaining restrictions and urge 
Sri Lanka to notify the WTO about these measures.  
43.4.  The delegate of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
43.5.  Sri Lanka would like to thank Thailand for its continued interest in Sri  Lanka's import trade 
policy measures. At the last CTG  meeting, held in July  2023, my delegation mentioned that Sri  Lanka 
would remove its restrictiv e import policy measures in a progressive manner. Accordingly, since the 
CTG's previous meeting, Sri  Lanka has arranged to relax its temporary suspension on 327  HS codes 
on 20  July, and 14  HS codes on 14  August. Finally, through Import and Export Control R egulation 
No. 14 of 2023, published in the Gazette Notification No.  2353/16, dated 9  October  2023, Sri  Lanka 
arranged to relax temporary suspension on all remaining HS  codes except some items under 
Chapter  87. Accordingly, as of 10  October  2023, Sri  Lanka has removed all the HS  codes from the 
Schedule of Temporary Suspension, except 304  HS codes under Chapter  87. Sri  Lanka will also 
arrange to progressively remove temporary suspension on all these remaining few items, and to 
update this Council accordingly.  My delegation has taken note of new non-topic concerns expressed 
by Thailand today, which will be conveyed to Capital.  
 
22 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  42.5-42.6: "42.5.   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
42.6.   Nepal would like to thank Thailand for its statement and continued interest in Nepal's trade policy 
measures, and notes that this concern has also been raised in the CM A. In response to the concern raised 
today, Nepal wishes to refer to its statement delivered at the previous meeting of the CTG, in April  2023. 
Furthermore, I would also like to assure you that my delegation will update the Council as soon as possible 
once we receive further communication from Capital.  
G/C/M/145  paragraphs  14.7-14.9: "14.7   The delegate of Nepal  indicated the following:  
14.8  Nepal would like to thank Thailand for its statement and continued interest in its trade policy measures 
and notes that this concern has also been raised in the Committee on Market Access (CMA). Accordingly, Nepal 
wishes to refer to its earlier statements delivered at the meetings of the CMA held in October  2022, and at the 
Council's meeting held in July  2022, in response t o the concern raised today, while noting that Nepal is still 
facing challenges in its balance of payments.  
14.9  Nepal's export -import ratio of trade in goods was 1:2.5 in 2004/2005, when Nepal became a 
WTO Member; it has widened and reached 1:15.3 in 2017/2018; and the export -import ratio was more than 
1:10 in the year 2022, which has been placing huge pressure on its balance of payments. The Government of 
Nepal is assessing the measure periodically in view of the pressure on its balance of payments. I n this regard, 
Nepal has made some progress, which has been notified through document  G/MA/QR/N/NPL/1 , on 
11 October  2022. Once again, Nepal would like to inform Members that the measure was not intended to 
impact any area in particular. I would al so like to assure Members that I will update them as soon as I receive 
a further progress report from Capital. Finally, Nepal wishes to resolve this matter at the bilateral level."  
 G/C/M/147  
 
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  43.6.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
44  UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA (ID  117) 
– STATEMENT BY CH INA 
44.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
44.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
44.3.  China  wishes to express our serious concern that the United States continue s imposing 
Section  301 tariffs on some of China's exports to the US, even if it is a measure manifestly 
inconsistent with WTO  rules. The Section  301 tariffs do not serve the interests of either the Chinese 
or American enterprises and people. The cost of Sec tion 301 tariffs is almost entirely borne by 
US importers, driving up the price of US  enterprises inputs. We urge the United States to 
immediately remove all Section  301 tariffs imposed on Chinese products.  
44.4.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the f ollowing:  
44.5.  China's decision to continue to raise this matter in this and other WTO  committees has been 
a pointless waste of WTO  resources, given that China has already unilaterally imposed the only 
remedy that the WTO  Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) could pot entially authorize: the suspension of 
WTO concessions.  
44.6.  China has already applied tariff measures to imports from the United States in excess of its 
WTO commitments for the explicit purpose of retaliating against the measures for which it now seeks 
legal fi ndings. We understand that , from July  2018 to September  2019, China imposed four  rounds 
of tariffs , ranging from 2.5% to 30% , in retaliation against US  Section  301 tariffs, which covered 
approximately 71% (USD  109 billion) of 2017  imports into China from t he United States.  
44.7.  China, of course, did so without obtaining the authorization from the DSB pursuant to the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding. China does not dispute the fact that it has already imposed 
retaliatory tariff measures in response to the US  meas ures at issue. Nor does China dispute that 
these retaliatory measures remain in effect.  
44.8.  The United States urges China to be mindful of the Council's and Members' time and resources 
when raising matters in Council meetings in the future.  
44.9.  The delegate of China indicated the following:  
44.10.   China must respond to the statement made by the United States that it considers China's 
decision to be a waste of this Council's time and resources.  As Members are aware, the mandate of 
this Council is to oversee the functioning  of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex  1A of the 
WTO Agreement. Section  301 tariffs imposed by the United States clearly fall within the mandate of 
this Council, so it is justified and necessary for China to raise this ongoing and WTO -inconsistent 
measure in this Council. We believe that the best way to save this Council's time and resources is 
for the United States  immediately to remove the WTO-inconsistent Section  301 tariffs. This will not 
only save time and resources, but also save the multilate ral trading system.  
44.11.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
45  UNITED STATES – TRADE DISTORTING AND DISCRIMINATORY SUBSIDIES MEASURES 
OF THE INFLATION REDUCTION ACT OF 2022 (ID  194) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
45.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  45.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
45.3.  China wishes to refer to the statements made in previous meetings in this Council.23 We take 
note that the proposed guidance on the new clean vehicle provisions o f the Inflation Reduction Act 
("Guidance") took effect on 18  April 2023. The Guidance sets forth various local content 
requirement s to qualify for electric vehicles (EV)  tax credit s. For example, to obtain the EV  tax credit, 
the new clean vehicle's final a ssembly should occur within North America. The Guidance also 
introduces various discriminative measures, for example, an eligible clean vehicle may not contain 
any battery components that are manufactured by a foreign entity of concern. These measures 
violate the WTO  rules, in particular, the most -favoured -nation  (MFN)  and national treatment  
principles and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
45.4.  In addition, the United States  intends to provide the bilateral arrangements on critical 
minerals with some Members the status of free trade agreements , and make their products eligible 
for the tax credit. We believe that treating bilateral arrangements , which only cover a limited numb er 
of products, such as critical minerals, as free trade agreements is an arbitrary interpretation of the 
concept of  a free trade agreement. It is inconsistent with the understanding of the free trade area 
under the WTO  framework , which requests the partie s to a free trade agreement to eliminate the  
duties and other restrictive regulations on substantially all the trade  in question . It is also worth while 
highlighting that a free trade agreement concluded by certain Members should not raise any barriers 
to other Members.  
45.5.  Finally, China  reiterate s that measures introduced by Members to address climate change 
must be consistent with WTO  rules. We urge the United States to eliminate the WTO -inconsistent 
subsidies and measures in the Inflation Reduction Act.  
45.6.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
45.7.  On this issue, rather than repeating our previous statements, the United States  refers China 
to our previous statements from earlier meetings.24 
 
23 G/C/M/146  paragra phs 19.2-19.6: "19.2.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
19.3.   We would like to refer to the statements we made in previous meetings in this Council. Since the IRA 
came into effect on 1  January  2023, it has caused significant disruptions to the industry chain and supply chain 
of the Electric Vehicles  industry. In order to obtain the subsidies provided by IRA, a large amount of 
investment related to the EV  industry has been allocated to Northern America, resulting in a shift of industry 
and technology outflows from other Members, and has triggered a tr ansatlantic subsidy race. For example, 
when the European Union recently released the Net Zero Industry Act and Critical Raw Materials Act in 
response to the IRA.  
19.4.   We believe that the "siphon effect" caused by the subsidy race will lead to distortion and a mismatch of 
resources in the global electric vehicle market. It would significantly reduce developing Members' opportunity 
and capacity to access clean energy products and relevant investment and technologies, which will not be 
conducive to achieving  the global emission reduction targets. The subsidy race may also weaken developing 
Members' capacity to address global challenges and wider the gap between rich and poor.  
19.5.   We take note that the United States believes that the IRA is an important bil l to address climate change, 
and that the relevant subsidies are naturally justified. We are happy to see the US increase its public 
investment with a view to promoting green transformation, but subsidies to address climate change should be 
non-discriminat ory, consistent with WTO  rules, and should not lead to a "race to the bottom competition", 
which will disrupt the supply chain and negatively impact developing Members' green development.  
19.6.   Finally, we call on the United States to eliminate discrimina tory, distorting, and WTO -inconsistent 
subsidies in its IRA. We also call on the WTO to strengthen its role in monitoring this matter."  
24 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  19.11 -19.12: "19.11.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the 
following:  
19.12.   On this issue, rather than repeat our previous statements, we would simply like to refer Members back 
to our statements from previous meetings."  
G/C/M/145  paragraphs  15.12 -15.17: "15.12.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
15.13.   We all share an urgent need to increase investments in clean energy technologies to seriously combat 
the climate crisis, as well as to address supply chain is sues. The Inflation Reduction Act signed by President 
Biden is a key tool for the United States to meet these critical objectives.  
15.14.   The transportation sector is the highest source of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States, and 
we will not mee t our Paris commitments and other climate goals without bold action to promote major new 
investments in clean energy technology, especially incentives for electric vehicle production and their adoption. 
The Act provides clean vehicle tax incentives to enco urage a rapid transition to clean transport. It ensures we 
 G/C/M/147  
 
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  45.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
46  EUROPEAN U NION – REGULATION (EU)  2017/2321 AND REGULATION (EU)  2018/825 
(ID 144) – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
46.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
the Russian Federation.  
46.2.  The delegate of the Russian Feder ation indicated the following:  
46.3.  The Russian Federation reiterates its concerns regarding the amendments to the European 
Union's basic regulation on protection against dumped imports introduced by Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation (EU)  2018/825. Once again, we would like to point out the 
discriminatory nature of these amendments , which can be illustrated by the following : (i) the 
European Commission can punish the exporters twice for the same situation labelled by the 
amendments as "significant distort ions" and "raw material distortions" ; and (ii)  the European 
Commission has issued only two  "reports" on so -called "significant distortions" in two  particular 
exporting countries. This clearly shows the discriminatory nature of the EU's approach regarding the 
application of anti -dumping measures. Without going into further detail, we would like once again 
to reiterate our systemic concern about the WTO -inconsistency of the amendments. We urge the 
European Union  to refrain from their application an d not to violate its WTO  obligations.  
46.4.  The Council took note  of the statement made.  
47  CHINA – IMPLEMENTATION OF TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES 
(ID 152) – STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIA  
47.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been included on the agenda at the request of  
Australia.  
47.2.  The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
47.3.  Australia appreciates the opportunity to update Members on developments on this agenda 
item since the previous meeting of this Council in July. Australi a welcomes our increased engagement 
and dialogue with China this year, which has led to the resolution of a number of trade disruptive 
and restrictive measures and helped revitali ze our China -Australia Free Trade Agreement 
(ChAFTA)  architecture. Australia looks forward to continuing to share a mutually beneficial trading 
relationship through ChAFTA and also the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Australia 
and China share the benefits, as do all WTO  Members, of a stable, predictable, and open globa l 
trading system. We will continue to work constructively with China, in this and other WTO  bodies 
and under our Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, to resolve remaining concerns in a timely way, 
 
can create more diverse and robust supply chains and promote the domestic adoption of clean vehicles. In 
addition to the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit for new clean vehicles purchased, the Inflation Red uction Act also 
provides for a Commercial Clean Vehicle Credit and a Previously Owned Clean Vehicle Credit. These provisions 
create tax credits for certain eligible light, medium and heavy -duty clean vehicles purchased by businesses, 
and, for used clean ve hicles. Final assembly, battery and critical mineral requirements do not apply to these 
credits. We believe these vehicles will account for a significant share of the total clean vehicle purchases in the 
future and our Congressional Budget Office estimates  these vehicles will receive roughly 40% of overall Clean 
Vehicle Tax Credit funding.  
15.15.   We are in the early stages of developing the regulations for this program. We are considering input 
from all stakeholders as the Department of Treasury moves forw ard with its public process in implementing 
these credits as required by the legislation. We note that several of our trading partners already have taken 
advantage of the opportunity to participate in our transparent process, and that there will be future 
opportunities to engage in this process.  
15.16.   We would note that many of our trading partners, including China, have also prioritized investment in 
EV technologies, and taken a range of domestic measures to support zero  emission vehicles.  
15.17.   In dis cussions regarding electric vehicle measures, the starting point should be the importance of 
working to achieve our overall climate, supply chain, and related goals in parallel – and to do so in a way that 
we can maintain support from our stakeholders. Thi s includes, for example, our shared goal in ensuring we 
achieve the Paris commitments."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  including those impacting wine, live rock lobster , and red meat, in the interests of both China and 
Australia.  
47.4.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
47.5.  The United States takes note of Australia's intervention, including its report of recent bilateral 
developments. We reiterate our concern that Ch ina continues to apply trade restrictive measures on 
a number of products without adequate transparency or justification. We remain deeply troubled by 
the information provided by Australia and from other credible sources since the beginning of this 
episode . 
47.6.  As the United States has noted previously, China's actions are not isolated to Australia. There 
are many instances of China using economic coercion against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation 
for unconnected bilateral issues. It is clear that there is a broader pattern of similarly coercive actions 
taken by China against other Members. We are all aware of many instances where China uses, or 
threatens to use, abusive, arbitrary, or pretextual trade actions to pressure or influence the 
legitimate decision -making of sovereign governments.  
47.7.  China claims to uphold the "rules -based multilateral trading system," but its actions speak for 
themselves. China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or breaking 
rules and norms in order to  inflict harm on others to advance its geopolitical and economic ends. 
China's actions threaten and undermine the rules -based multilateral trading system and harm 
relations between its Members.  
47.8.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
47.9.  The United Kingdom continues to support Australia's concerns about trade restrictive 
measures taken by China. Since this is a long -standing item on which we have intervened many 
times, we will keep this short and would like to refer Members to previous state ments that we have 
given on this concern, both at this Council25 and at the Committee on Market Access  (CMA) . We 
continue to note progress on measures being lifted by China and welcome a full resolution to follow.  
47.10.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the follo wing:  
47.11.   Canada shares Australia's concerns with the ongoing challenges caused by China's continued 
adoption of trade disruptive and restrictive measures. We note that some of China's trade measures 
against Australia have been lifted, welcome this as a step i n the right direction , and hope full 
resolution will follow. As previously noted, Canada's agricultural market access in China continues 
to be negatively impacted by the  following: (i)  a lack of transparency and scientific justification for 
China's measure s; (ii) long delays in China's approval process for Canada's market access requests; 
and (iii) discriminatory treatment compared to that provided to the same products from other 
Members. Canada hopes that the recent engagement at the official's level will lead to the resolution 
of the outstanding issues. We encourage all WTO  Members, including China, to abide by their 
WTO commitments.  
47.12.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
47.13.   Japan shares Australia's concerns regarding China's trade measures, including  trade 
remedies. If China is operating its trade measures in an arbitrary manner, as reported, it is contrary 
to a free and fair rules -based international trading system. We call on China to respond to Australia's 
concerns in good faith and in a timely man ner. We are cognizant that progress has been made 
 
25 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  9.16-9.17: "9.16.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the 
following:  
9.17.   The United Kingdom would like to support Australia's concerns about trade restrictive measures taken by 
China. We appreciate that some measures have been lifted and we welcome this. It is vital that all 
WTO Members adhere to the fundamental principles and objectives of free and fair trade that underpin the 
rules-based multilateral trading system. Actions that deliberately target against goods of certain Members for 
political reasons risk undermining the integrity of this system and lead to harmful consequences for business 
and citizens worldwide. The United K ingdom welcomes further lifting of these measures and encourages China 
to engage constructively and transparently on these measures to help address the concerns raised by 
Members."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  bilaterally towards resolving the wine case, but we will continue to monitor developments closely. 
Japan has repeatedly expressed concern about economic coercion that undermines the function and 
credibility  of the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
47.14.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
47.15.   As stated in previous meetings of this Council and the Committee  on Market Access (CMA) , 
the European Union shares the concerns of Australia and ot hers. Australia has reported on progress 
concerning  some measures, while others remain unresolved, now for an ever longer period of time. 
There seems to be no technical justification that would make these measures permissible  under the 
WTO Agreement. Many Chinese measures are informal and unpublished, agai n in violation of 
WTO rules. Also, the measures were implemented as measures of economic coercion, in an attempt 
to force the Australian government to change policies that were fully within Australia's rights 
internationally. As the European Union has also  experienced, China and several other countries are 
occasionally adopting such measures of economic coercion, which general international law also 
prohibits because of their illegal interference in the affairs of another State.  
47.16.   The delegate of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
47.17.   New Zealand continues to hold a systemic interest in the concerns that have been expressed 
on this topic by Australia and other WTO  Members. As New Zealand has repeatedly noted in a 
number of fora, the multilateral rules -based trad ing system provides that all Members, regardless 
of their size or trading capacity, are subject to the same rights and obligations. We wholeheartedly 
endorse the view that through the WTO we share the benefits, as do all WTO  Members, of a stable, 
predictab le, and open global trading system. This provides the predictability and certainty necessary 
to ensure that trade can take place efficiently and with the least friction possible.  
47.18.   If Members step away from their commitments, or adopt remedies or other measu res 
provided for under the WTO  Agreements for unassociated  purposes, this will undermine the 
predictability and certainty on which the system rests. The adoption of measures by WTO  Members 
that cause widespread disruption to trade and lack transparency hav e caused serious concern to 
New Zealand, including the actions taken by China against a range of exports from Australia,  some 
of which remain in place.  
47.19.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
47.20.   Chinese Taipei thanks Australia for providing up dates on this agenda item. We continue to 
share Australia's concerns about some of  China's trade measures, which apparently have adverse 
implications on the rule s-based multilateral trading system. We would like to emphasi ze that 
Members' trade measures, w hether formal or informal, published or unpublished, should be 
implemented in a WTO -consistent manner and should never be based on unrelated issues. My 
delegation will continue closely to follow the development of this subject from a systemic 
perspective.  
47.21.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
47.22.   China wishes to refer to its statements made in previous meetings.26 As pointed out by 
Australia just now, there is some positive progress on this issue. We hope both sides can continue 
working together to imp rove, maintain , and strengthen bilateral economic and trade cooperation.  
47.23.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
 
26 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  9.22-9.23: "9.22.   The delegate of China  indicated the fo llowing:  
9.23.   China would like to refer to its statements made at previous meetings of this Council and the Committee 
on Market Access. China has taken normal inspection and quarantine measures on some products imported 
from Australia with a view to prot ecting the health and safety of Chinese consumers. These measures are in 
line with Chinese laws and regulations, international practices, and the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
We also informed Australia of the measures in a timely manner. At presen t, as some Australia imported 
products concerned have met China's inspection and quarantine requirements, we have resumed the imports 
of these products. We hope that China and Australia will continue working together to strengthen the bilateral 
economic co operation."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  48  UNITED STATES – A SERIES OF DISRUPTIVE POLICY MEASURES ON THE GLOBAL 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY CHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN (ID  195) – STATEMENT BY 
CHINA  
48.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
China.  
48.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
48.3.  China wishes  to continue expressing our serious concerns on the disruptive and discriminatory  
measures taken by the United States against China with regard to the semiconductor industry. We 
have serious concerns on the latest measures taken by the US in October to further tight en the 
export control s against China on advanced computing semiconducto rs, semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment , and supercomputer s. 
48.4.  Regard ing the notice of Funding Opportunity CHIPS  incentive Program, issued by the 
US Department of Commerce , our concern remains. The notice requests the applicants for 
CHIPS  funds to demonstrate whether and how they intend to utilize domestically produced iron, 
steel, and construction materials as part of their projects. This may not comply with WTO  rules, in 
particular those in the SCM  Agreement and TRIMs  Agreement.  We also note that the notice requests  
the applicant to demonstrate why the investments would not occur without the CHIPS  incentives. It 
seems to us that the applicant's investment decisions are not ba sed on market orientation and 
commercial logic.  
48.5.  In addition, the Final National Security Guardrails for CHIPS for America Incentives Program , 
issued on 22  September  2023, prevents the recipients of CHIPS  funds from expanding both 
advanced facilities and Le gacy Facilities in China. This is a typical example of "Cold War mentality", 
"zero-sum game" and "trade bullying".  
48.6.  The "small yard, high fence" approach the United States  is taking is detrimental not only to 
China's interests, but also to the interests of the US itself , and other Members. It severely 
undermines the global semiconductor industry chain, violates market principles, disrupts the normal 
order of international trade and investment, and negatively affects the rules -based multilateral 
trading syste m. We call on the WTO to strengthen the monitoring of the relevant measures.  
48.7.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
48.8.  On this issue, rather than repeating our previous statements, the United States refers China 
to our previous statements from earlier meetings.27 
48.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
 
27 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  20.13 -20.15: "20.13.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the 
following:  
20.14.   In the interest of time, I will not give an overview of the CHIPS  Acts and the transparency that the 
United States has undertaken to dat e, but we are going to refer Members back to our previous statements 
from earlier meetings. With regard to China's comments on the subsidies and market distortions, the United 
States believes that its contemplated support is consistent with US  law and its international commitments. 
Contrary to China's speculation, the evaluation criteria do not contain a requirement to use domestically 
produced inputs, the Subsidies Agreement does not have obligations with regards to restrictions of entities 
receiving gover nment support, and the US  Department of Commerce will implement certain restrictions to 
ensure that those who receive CHIPS  funds cannot compromise national security.  
20.15.   Those national security -based restrictions are described in more detail in the Ac t and in a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking published in the Federal Register on 23  March, which also solicited comments on the 
proposed rule. Entities can choose whether or not to apply for incentives through the CHIPS  program and thus 
be subject to the nati onal security limitations. And, for reasons that have been made multiple times in various 
WTO bodies, we are not providing a substantive response to Russia's intervention."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  49  UNITED STATES – DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES IN THE NAME OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY (ID  205) – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
49.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agend a at the request of  
China.  
49.2.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
49.3.  As the Council is aware, the United States has implemented a series of trade -restrictive 
measures since 2018, in the name of national security , against some Members, including China.  The 
measures can be placed into eight  categories:  (i) tariff measures, such as Section  232 tariff 
measures against imported steel and aluminium products;  (ii) rule of origin measures, such as 
discriminatory application of origin marking;  (iii) direct expo rt restrictions, including extensive 
export controls on commercial products exported to China;  (iv) extraterritorial application of export 
restrictions, which restrict third  countries from exporting products to China even if the products do 
not contain any  "US content";  (v) procurement prohibition – for example, the US prohibits federal 
government agencies from procuring or using telecommunications products and services from 
certain Chinese companies;  (vi) discriminatory subsidies policies – such as restricting semiconductor 
companies receiving US  government subsidies from expanding their relevant investment in China;  
(vii) market authorization prohibitions, which prohibit some Chinese telecommunication equipment 
from obtaining certificates necessary for market access;  and (viii)  ICTS transaction reviews – such 
as the US  review of commercial transactions for a very broad range of ICT  products and services.  
49.4.  In addition, in August  2023, the United States issued an executive order to restrict its 
investme nts into Chinese semiconductor, quantum computing , and artificial intelligence companies , 
in the name of national security. This will affect the normal commercial decisions of enterprises.  
49.5.  China  believe s that the broad scope and growing number of the measu res taken by the United 
States in the name of national security reflects how the US is abusing national security. We are all 
aware of how the United States raised tariffs on imported steel and aluminium products in the name 
of so-called "national security"  , and then lowered tariffs only for certain Members , and put in place 
quotas, which are explicitly prohibited by the WTO  rules. We also note that the US even considers 
battery components of electric vehicles made by China as a potential threat to US  national security, 
therefore requiring discriminatory treatment in its subsidies policy.  
49.6.  The United States  believes that the application of the "security exemption" provisions is solely 
"self-judging" and is not subject to review by WTO  dispute settlement panel s. However, as indicated 
by several dispute settlement panels, neither the negotiating history of the GATT, the text of the 
GATT, nor the interpretation of the relevant provisions by many other Members agree with the 
US claim. By abusing "national security ", the US has broken one  window after another of the 
mansion of the multilateral trading regime, and would give rise to the "broken window theory", 
where exemptions become the rule and put the rules -based multilateral trading regime in danger. 
Finally, Chi na believes that it is necessary to enhance reviewing and monitoring of the abusing 
security exemptions under the WTO  framework.  
49.7.  The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
49.8.  As we have previously indicated, the United States does not consider  that the Council for 
Trade in Goods is the appropriate venue to discuss issues relating to national security.  
49.9.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
50  CHINA – DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW (ID  202) 
– STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
50.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  50.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
50.3.  In July of last year, China published a draft for revision of the Government Procurement Law 
(a public hearing draft). W ith regard to the scope of the revised law, in addition to "state agencies, 
business units and organizations" in the current Article  2, "other procurement entities" has been 
added in Article  2 and Article  12. If the scope of application of the Government P rocurement Law 
expands to include even procurement beyond "procurement by governmental agencies", as 
stipulated in Article  III:8(a) of the GATT, and Local Content Requirement (LCR) is made based on 
the revised law, foreign products may be treated in a disc riminatory manner and violate Article  III:4 
of the GATT . At the same time, it may also violate Article  2.3 of the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership ( RCEP) Agreement. In addition, if China were to join the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA)  at a later stage,  it could violate Articles  4.1 and 4.2 of the GPA, 
which  stipulate non -discriminatory treatment as a general principle. Therefore, when the State 
Council determines "other procurement entities" in accordance with Article  12 of the draft 
amendment to the Law, it should be ensured that discriminatory treatment is not extended without 
limitation.  
50.4.  If "other procurement entities " are also subject to the GPA after joining it, this should be 
clarified. In addition to the issue on the local content requirements regulation , as just mentioned, 
Article  23 of the revised bill, which clearly includes "support for domestic industries", adds a new 
local content requirement that gives preferential treatment in government procurement for products 
with a high added value ratio within China. Japan would like to point out that this cannot be permitted 
under the government procurement exception of Article  III:8(a)  of the GATT either , unless it truly 
falls under government procurement, and this local content requirement may also violate 
Article  III:4 of the GATT , Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement , and Article  2.3 of the 
RCEP Agreement . If China were to join the GPA at a later stage, this coul d violate Articles  4.1 and 
4.2 of the GPA.  
50.5.  In addition, local governments such as Shaanxi, Hangzhou in Zhejiang, and Anhui have issued 
notices stating that they give preference to domestic products in government procurement , and that 
expert argumentation, the submission of an application, and approval of the finance department are 
required when purchasing imported products, which may violate Article  III:4 of the GATT , unless if 
it truly falls under government procurement in the sense of Article  III:8(a)  of the GATT . If China 
joins the GPA, this may also be in violation of Article  4.1 and 4.2  of the GPA. 
50.6.  At the CTG 's meeting of last November, China stated that it treat ed foreign companies and 
domestic Chinese companies equally in government procurement, except in matters relat ing to 
security, but it continues to discriminate in the treatment of a wide range of goods. In addition, at 
the CTG 's meeting in July, China stated  that it would like to discuss the issue within the process of 
the negotiations on its accession to the GPA, but as previously mentioned, the issue should be 
addressed by the CTG , as the revised law would leave room for LCR  measures to be applied to the 
procurement beyond "procurement by governmental agencies" , as defined in Article  III:8(a) of the 
GATT.  
50.7.  Regarding these issues, no convincing explanation was provided by China at the Committee 
on Government Procurement meeting held this month (November). Thes e new provisions in the 
proposed amendments represent a move backwards, rather than to meet the standards required by 
the GPA, to which China has already been negotiating for accession for many years. We would like 
to reiterate that China's application to join the GPA and other high standard agreements cannot help 
but raise questions as to whether it intends to meet the standards.  
50.8.  On the other hand, as we mentioned at the Committee on Government Procurement meeting 
this month, we are aware that the Chinese government enacted and published the "Opinions of the 
State Council on Further Optimi zing the Foreign Investment Environment and Increasing Efforts to 
Attract Foreign Investment" in August this year. The premise that there is a difference in treatment 
between domestic goods and services provided by Chinese companies and those provided by foreign 
companies seems problematic from the perspective of national treatment, but the State Council's 
Opinions include statements such as ensuring equal participation of foreign companies in 
government procurement and other fields, which is noteworthy , in that it may improve the 
unfavourable treatment of products and services provided by foreign companies.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  50.9.  Together with the related "Notice on Improving Unreasonable Discrim inatory Treatment 
between Domestic and Foreign Investors" issued in November this year, we will closely monitor the 
future operation of the system. What we would like to clarify here is that the State Council's Opinion 
seems to cover only "foreign companie s with a registered office in China" , and does not cover 
"foreign companies with an office abroad", but if this is the case, the discrimination between 
domestic and foreign products will not be resolved in the end, which may cause problems in terms 
of nati onal treatment. We would also like to confirm the scope of the relevant notice published by 
the Ministry of Commerce in November this year, from a similar perspective.  
50.10.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
50.11.   China  regret s that Japan has again raised this issue in this Council. We believe that this 
Council is not an appropriate place to discuss this issue, as the mandate of this Council is to oversee 
the functioning of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex  1A of the WT O Agreement, to which 
the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) does not belong. We request Japan to raise this 
issue in an appropriate body. Meanwhile, we note that China and Japan had an opportunity to discuss 
this issue bilaterally during the Commit tee on Government Procurement (CGP)  meeting in 
November, and we provided detailed responses to Japan's concerns in that meeting. We are willing 
to continue engaging with Japan on this issue under the framework of China's accession negotiation 
to the GPA.  
50.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
51  CHINA – DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES) (ID  201) – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
51.1.  The Chairperson  recalled  that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Japan.  
51.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
51.3.  Japan  understand s that the amendment of the Recommended National Standards of China 
(GB/T) has recently been submitted for public commen t and opinions have been sought on it. 
Regarding this Draft National Standard, Japan has previously raised concerns in various bodies, 
including at the CTG, that provisions requiring multifunctional peripherals and printers, including 
their components to b e designed, developed , and manufactured in China may be inconsistent with 
various WTO  Agreements, including Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement, Articles  2.1, 2.3 and 5.1.2 
of the TBT  Agreement, Article  III:4 of the GATT, and Article  7.3 of China's Protocol  of Accession.  
51.4.  However, Japan has noted that no such provisions are included in the current Draft National 
Standards. We understand that studies and procedures will be conducted in the future to establish 
this National Standard, but we request that it does  not include content that will treat foreign products 
in a discriminatory manner or that could lead to de facto technology transfer requirements. At the  
same time, the provisions of this Draft National Standard still raise concerns about the leakage of 
trade secrets or technology leakage, depending on the content of the information provided by the 
provider of office equipment for the security testing of office equipment. For example, the Draft 
National Standard requires the provision of materials on the sup ply chain, materials on third -party 
technology , and materials on the manufacturing process of office equipment, which contain 
information on trade secrets and sensitive technology. This may violate Article  5.1.2 of the 
TBT Agreement.  
51.5.  Japan request s that the design and operation of the security test, including these previously 
mentioned points, be consistent with China's existing international commitments, including under 
the WTO Agreements. Japan has submitted its comments on this Draft National Sta ndard in 
accordance with the public comment procedure, and we would like to request that these comments 
be taken into account.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  51.6.  The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
51.7.  As Japan pointed out just now, we published the draft Security Specification for Office Devices 
for public comment on 25  August  2023. The current draft does not have provisions requiring the 
development and production of multi -function devices and printers within China. During the 
comment period , from 25  August to 24  October, we receive d 234  comments. We thank the relevant 
associations, enterprises , and other entities from Japan and the United States for submitting their 
comments. We are currently working on these comments.  
51.8.  The Council took note  of the statements made.  
52  CHINA – EXPORT CON TROL LAW AND RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE IN STRATEGIC 
PRODUCTS (ID  112) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND JAPAN  
52.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
the European Union and Japan.  
52.2.  The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
52.3.  Japan continues to have concerns over China's Export Control Law, which entered into force 
in December  2020. The details of export -controlled items and the details of regulations and 
operations are still unclear. In this regard , in April 2022, a draft ordinance for the Dual -Use Item 
Export Control (draft of public consultations) was published regarding the operation of the law 
concerning dual -use products.  
52.4.  The opacity of the legal operation has not been resolved at all in relation to t he scope of items 
subject to regulation and disclosure requirements of techniques, and we will continue to request 
explanations on the details of the regulations related to the law. In this regard, China stated in the 
CTG's previous meeting  that "we are cu rrently conducting a comprehensive review based on the 
said comments and will continue to work with Japan and interested countries." We would like to 
know the schedule for future enactment and specific details based on the comments. As we have 
stated in pa st CTG  meetings, taking into consideration the objective of the law to safeguard national 
interests, we would like to reiterate our concerns on the following points in particular.  
52.5.  First, we are concerned there might be a possibility that the scope of produ cts subject to 
export control is excessive. Second, we are concerned there might be cases that require unnecessary 
disclosure of technical information during classification and end -user or usage investigations. Third, 
we are also concerned that the provisi ons on countermeasures against export regulations by other 
countries have been maintained in the law. We are concerned that the aforementioned export 
restrictions stipulated in this law may constitute an overly stringent export regulation.  They may 
therefo re fall under the export restrictions that are not justified under the GATT , making them 
inconsistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
52.6.  In addition, we continue to have concerns about the Unreliable Entities List (UEL)  measure 
and the Export Prohibited and Restricte d Technology List under the Foreign Trade Act, including the 
unclear relationship between the UEL and the Export Administration Act Entity List and Item and 
Technology Lists. In particular, the "Unreliable Entity List" is not clear. In particular, there ar e 
concerns about whether fairness and transparency in application can be ensured with respect to the 
identification of foreign entities to be included in the "List of Unreliable Entities" and the content of 
measures to be taken against foreign entities, as  well as the possibility of non -conformity with 
Article  X of the GATT , and so on, because the predictability of its operation is extremely low.  
52.7.  In addition, since the predictability of the operation of the measures is extremely low, the 
possibility that th e measures will be inconsistent with Article  X of the GATT , and so on , is noted. In 
relation to this, we would like to reiterate that we have concerns with regard to the fact that the 
draft regulations on rare earth s published in January  2021 mentioned a p lan to set out strategic 
reserves. We believe that this plan could mean that there is a possibility that China might introduce 
controls on exports of rare earth s-related products in accordance with the aforementioned Export 
Control Law. G/C/M/147  
 
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  52.8.  Japan wishes to ask about the status of consideration within the Chinese government 
regarding the proposed revisions to the "Inventory of Export Prohibited and Export Controlled 
Technologies in China" , enacted in accordance with the Foreign Trade Law and the Regulations on 
the Management of Export and Import of Technology, which were published in December  2022. In 
addition, we would like to express our concern about the fact that the  proposed revisions include 
items such as silicon manufacturing technology for solar panels, which are subject to restrictions, 
and that exports with little risk of military diversion are excessively restricted. On 1  August, the 
Ministry of Commerce of the  People's Republic of China enforced a measure to impose a permit 
system for the export of gallium and germanium -related items on the grounds of protecting national 
security and interests, and Japan is concerned about the intention of this measure.  
52.9.  While C hina mentioned that a number of export applications have been approved since the 
implementation of the export control, Japanese companies have expressed concerns that it is taking 
a very long time to obtain export licences. We request an explanation of the  status of the 
examination from China and request that the permit procedure is carried out fairly and promptly. 
On 20  October, the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China issued a public notice on 
the export control of graphite -related items  on the grounds of protecting national security and 
interests, which is scheduled to come into effect on 1  December, and this measure changes the 
description of the scope of artificial graphite from "other artificial graphite" , and so on,  to "artificial 
graphite materials and their products". We understand that natural graphite has been newly added 
to the scope of the regulation. Japan is closely monitoring the situation. If China's export control 
measures are being applied to Japan in an unfair manner in l ight of international rules such as the 
WTO, we will take appropriate action based on those  rules.  
52.10.   The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
52.11.   At previous meetings, the European Union took note that China is conducting a 
comprehensive review of public comments to the "Draft Regulation on the Export Control of Dual -Use 
Items", published in May  2022. The EU would like to ask China when the review will be completed 
and when the Regulation will be published. The EU reiterates the concerns expressed in previous 
meetings of this Council over certain aspects of China's export control regime, notably as regards 
its extraterritorial application to foreign individuals and organi zations, its broad objectives , and the 
broad scope of co ntrols, particularly with respect to the notion of "national interests". We also 
continue to be concerned by China's criteria for risk assessment with regard to destination countries 
or regions, and control lists. Recently, China has announced several expo rt controls on the alleged 
basis of "national security and interests".  
52.12.   First, China's Ministry of Commerce announced on 3  July 2023 new controls on exports of 
items containing gallium and germanium. As noted in the July  meeting, the scope of the announced 
export restrictions is very broad, and China appears not to have defined technical parameters that 
would circumscribe controls to items with military applications. There is thus a risk that this could 
negatively impact trade in broadly commercially availab le items.  
52.13.   Second, on 31  July 2023, China announced controls on advanced unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), which address exports with clearer security implications, considering the use of drones in 
the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.  
52.14.   Third, on 20  October  2023, China announced the modification of its control on graphite and 
graphite products, which raise s similar concerns to those targeting gallium and germanium. Namely, 
they have a broad scope and China appears not to have defined techn ical parameters that would 
limit controls to items with military applications, which creates a risk that they could negatively 
impact trade in broadly commercially available items.  
52.15.   Therefore, the  European Union  is concerned that these export restrictions a ppear at least in 
part unrelated to the need to protect international peace and stability under China's non -proliferation 
obligations arising from international treaties , and that they may not be justified on the grounds of 
protect ing "essential security i nterests". The EU urges China to provide more information on the 
security -related rationale of the measures, particularly with respect to items such as natural 
graphite, which is widely used in normal commercial applications, and the control of which there fore 
poses a particular threat of disrupt ing trade and civilian value chains.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  52.16.   The delegate of the United States  indicated the following:  
52.17.   The United States shares similar concerns with the imposition of this export measure on 
gallium and germanium. We are c oncerned with the lack of transparency around this restriction and 
the uncertainty it is causing for traders. We urge China to notify this measure in accordance with its 
WTO commitments and we will continue to monitor this situation closely.  
52.18.   The delegate o f the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
52.19.   The United Kingdom thanks Japan and the European Union for tabling this item on the 
agenda today and would again reiterate the concerns regarding China's Export Control Law measure. 
We have noted that , in addit ion to the expansion to export controls on gallium and germanium  that 
were announced in July, China has announced new expanded controls on exports of graphite from 
1 December. We do understand that licences have been granted for gallium and germanium , which 
is a welcome step, and something the UK hopes will continue into the future. However, we would 
like China to clarify the rationale for these measures, especially on what China would define as its 
"national interest" for the purposes of this law. More spe cifically, how this law would relate to any 
export restrictions arising from it; as well as further information on how China would decide which 
"other goods, technologies, services" would come within the scope of this law , and what the 
limitations are. We call on China to provide a justification for these controls with regards to its 
WTO commitments, for example, through notification to appropriate Committees. Export restrictions 
without clear justification and transparent administration disrupt global supp ly chains, and the UK 
joins the calls for further transparency from China around their Export Control Law's implementation.  
52.20.   The delegate of Canada  indicated the following:  
52.21.   Canada notes China's announcement to impose export controls on graphite products as of 
1 December, which are in addition to China's imposition of export controls on gallium and germanium 
on 1 August. Given that China is the largest global supplier of these minerals, Canada is requesting 
clarification on China's objectives and rationale fo r the application of export controls on these 
minerals. Canada will continue to closely monitor China's application of export controls on these 
minerals.  
52.22.   The delegate of Australia  indicated the following:  
52.23.   Australia notes the statements by Japan and the European Union  in relation to China's Export 
Control Law. As we set out in Australia's submissions to China's consultations on these then proposed 
laws and regulations, we welcomed efforts to codify the regulatory framework for defence export 
controls. Howeve r, Australia still has concerns about the broad scope of the Export Control Law, 
including China's recent announcements on the implementation of export controls on certain 
graphite, gallium and germanium -related items on the basis of "national security ". Australia is closely 
monitoring this latest measure in regard to its WTO -consistency and its impact on global supply 
chains. We encourage China to continue to provide greater clarity in relation to key ele ments of the 
law, including jurisdiction, the scope of administrator powers, how these measures safeguard China's 
national security, and confirmation that the law is consistent with China's international 
commitments. We continue to urge China to take accou nt of the concerns of foreign businesses and 
Members in the implementation of this law and development of any associated measures.  
52.24.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
52.25.   The Republic of Korea is closely monitoring the potential rami fications of China's recent 
export control measure on certain products, particularly regarding their impact on global supply 
chains and the multilateral trading system. Korea expresses its desire for the measure to be 
implemented in a fair and transparent manner , in accordance with WTO  principles.  
52.26.   The delegate of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
52.27.   Switzerland would also like to refer to the recent announcement made by the Chinese 
authorities with regard to the export control of gallium and germanium for r easons of national 
security. This measure is likely to have a strong impact on the global supply chains and the G/C/M/147  
 
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  multilateral trad ing system. Switzerland will therefore analyse the measure and its implementation 
and welcomes further clarifications, especial ly with regard to its WTO  compatibility.  
52.28.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
52.29.   China wishes to refer Members to its previous statements on this issue.28 Concerning the 
gallium and germanium -related items, we would like to note that they can be use d for both military 
and civilian purposes. Imposing export control s on gallium and germanium -related items is an 
international common practice. Since 1996, some gallium and germanium -related items have been 
gradually included in the Wassenaar Arrangement o n Export Controls for Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Good and Technologies. Forty-two member States of The Wassenaar Arrangement have 
implemented it. 
52.30.   China imposes export control s on some gallium and germanium -related items in a justified, 
reasonable , and non-discriminatory manner under the framework of  the WTO, with the aim to better 
fulfil its international non-proliferation obligations. It should be noted that the export control does 
not prohibit exports, and exports that are used for lawful purposes and  meet the relevant regulations 
will be allowed. We have already approved a number of export applications since the implementation 
of the export control. We will continue reviewing the export applications and make proper decisions 
in accordance with the rel evant regulations in an open, transparent , and non -discriminatory manner.  
52.31.   Regard ing the export control on some graphite items, we would like to point out that China 
has long been imposing temporary export control s on some graphite items in accordance with the 
relevant laws and regulations to fulfil its international non-proliferation obligations. Recently, we 
conducted comprehensive assessments of the temporary export controls on some graphite items 
and decided to adjust these export control measures. Start ing from 1  December  2023, China will 
impose formal export controls on three  highly sensitive graphite items , which  were previously 
subject to temporary export control , and remove the temporary export controls on five  less sensitive 
graphite items. We belie ve that , with this adjustment, we can better fulfil our non-proliferation 
obligations and support the security and stability of global industry and supply chains. It should be 
noted as well that the new export control on some graphite items does not target  any specific 
Members. Exports that meet the relevant regulations will be allowed.  
52.32.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
53  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC 
CONCERNS (ID  127) – STATEMENT BY URUGUAY  
53.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Uruguay.  
53.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
53.3.  Uruguay wishes to refer to its interventions at previous meetings of this Council29 and 
reiterates its systemic concern about the unilateral modifications of concessions in the form of tariff 
 
28 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  32.27 -32.30:"32.27.   The delegate of China  indicated the following:  
32.28.   We refer to the statements made at previous meetings in this Council and would like to update the 
Members concerned that the Daft Regulation on the Export Control of Dual -Use Items has been included in the 
Legislative Work  Plan of the State Council for 2023.  
32.29.   With regard to China's latest export control on gallium and germanium, we stress that China is always 
committed to keeping the global industrial and supply chains secure and stable. China's export control 
measures have always adhered to the principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non -discrimination. Industrial 
products and materials containing gallium and germanium can apparently be used for both military and civilian 
purposes. China's export control on  the relevant items is a common international practice. Some Members 
have also imposed export controls on the relevant products and materials.  
32.30.   China's export controls on the relevant items do not target any specific Member. It is not a ban on 
relevant exports. Permits will be granted if exports comply with China's relevant laws and regulations."  
29 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  34.2-34.4: "34.2  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
34.3  First, Uruguay wishes to reiterate once again its position and c oncerns with respect to the United 
Kingdom's claim to have a significant Total Consolidated  AMS of GBP  4,949.3  million, the proposed currency 
conversion in that Member's draft Schedule of Concessions and its implications for the proposed levels of 
 G/C/M/147  
 
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  rate quotas by the European Union under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 after Brexit, in particular 
with regard to the lack of necessity and legal basis under the WTO  Agreements to proceed in this 
regard. Likewise, Uruguay reiterates its disagreement, given that, so far, we do not see substantial 
willingness to consider even the most modest and reasonable requests, despite the damage studies 
presente d in due course , and the special relevance and sensitivity for our country of the conditions 
and concessions of access to the markets under discussion. Once again, Uruguay reaffirms its 
willingness to seek a mutually agreed solution, for which it will be n ecessary for the European Union 
to recogni ze Uruguay's specific conditions and needs , and to demonstrate the political will required 
to reach an agreement.  
53.4.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
53.5.  Paraguay reiterate s our trade and systemic concern s, and once again call s on the European 
Union to report on when they plan to circulate their AMS  reduction , as reported to Members , as a 
result of their apportionment methodology with the United Kingdom . 
53.6.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the fol lowing:  
53.7.  The European Union  has negotiated with its WTO  partners in full respect of the provisions laid 
down in Article  XXVIII of  the GATT  1994 as regards the modification of its Schedule. The EU has 
been open to discuss with the WTO  partners concerned the proposed TRQ  apportionment. Whenever 
the WTO  partners presented valid data and arguments justifying a modification of the proposed 
TRQ volumes, the EU has been open to meet such requests.  
53.8.  WTO partners have also asked the European Union  to exclude the Unite d Kingdom from the 
access to its WTO  erga omnes  TRQs (and vice versa). The EU has fully met this request , as it could 
at the given stage of the proceedings , and together with the UK, by laying down this exclusion in 
Article  33 of the EU -UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement.  
53.9.  As far as the Aggregate Measurement of Support is concerned, for technical reasons it will be 
possible to address this only when the Articl e XXVIII process is concluded and new schedules are 
certified, but the European Union  can assure Members that it is respecting a proportionally reduced 
ceiling already now. The EU therefore cannot share the view that it did not have a sound legal basis 
for these actions or that it was not willing to take into consideration valid proposals and requests by 
other Members.  
53.10.   Indeed, the efforts of the European Union to seek mutually agreed solutions with its 
WTO partners have given very good results. The EU is pl eased to report excellent progress achieved 
so far with the majority of our partners. Agreements have been formally signed with fifteen  partners , 
and are close to being signed or otherwise concluded with three  more partners.  
53.11.   The European Union  welcomes the  increased engagement of many WTO  Members and 
remains fully committed to bringing the pending negotiations to a successful conclusion in the 
coming weeks. The EU will use the just promulgated six -month prolongation (until end of June  2024) 
to implement int ernally any agreement that may still be concluded in the next weeks.  
53.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
 
domestic  support and market access commitments, and the UK's intention to replicate the rights to invoke the 
special agricultural safeguard in Article  5 of the Agreement on Agriculture for all products and under the same 
criteria and conditions as those set out in  the European Union's Schedule.  
34.4  Secondly, with respect to the ongoing Article  XXVIII process, my delegation takes advantage of the 
submission of communication  G/L/1386/Add.4 , by which the United Kingdom extends the deadline for 
concluding the r elevant negotiations until 1  January  2024, to reaffirm Uruguay's openness and willingness to 
continue working with the United Kingdom with a view to reaching a mutually advantageous agreement, which 
would allow that Member to have an independent Schedule o f Concessions formally established in the WTO, 
while safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of our country. " G/C/M/147  
 
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  54  UNITED KINGDOM – DRAFT GOODS SCHEDULE AND PROPOSED 
UK TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMIC CONCERNS (ID  145) – STATEMENT BY URUGUAY  
54.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this item had been  included on the agenda at the request of  
Uruguay.  
54.2.  The delegate of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
54.3.  Uruguay wishes to reiterate once again its position and concerns with respect to the United 
Kingdom's claim to a large Total Bou nd AMS of GBP  4,949.3  million; the proposed currency 
conversion in the draft Schedule of concessions of that Member and its implications for the proposed 
levels of domestic support and market access commitments; and the United Kingdom's intention to 
replic ate the rights to invoke the agricultural special safeguard for all products and under the same 
criteria and conditions as set out in the European Union's  Schedule. Regard ing the ongoing 
Article  XXVIII process, Uruguay reaffirms its willingness to continue  working with the United 
Kingdom with a view to reaching a mutually advantageous agreement, which would allow that 
Member to have an independent Schedule of concessions formally established in the WTO, while 
safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests  of our country.  
54.4.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
54.5.  My delegation would like to reiterate its systemic concern on this item and request s that our 
earlier statements be reflected in the minutes.30 We would simply like to point out two  element s that 
we believe are central to our concerns: (i) until the effective reduction of the EU  AMS, the existence 
of an AMS by the United Kingdom is, in fact, generating a new duty and not a simple 
"apportionment "; we understand that this is out of the UK's hands , but we urge the UK to push the 
European Union  to make the corresponding rectifications as soon as possible ; and  (ii) we also 
question the UK's maintenance of SSG  duties for tariff lines for which it has no t retained the 
corresponding tariff quotas.  
54.6.  The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
54.7.  The United Kingdom would like to thank Uruguay and Paraguay for their continued interest in 
this Article  XXVIII process regarding the obligations within  the UK's Schedule of concessions and 
commitments on goods. We further thank those Members with whom we have formally concluded 
discussions in recent months. The UK has now been operating on the basis of its own Goods Schedule 
since January  2021, and since  that time we have been engaging with partners to protect existing 
rights, obligations, and the continuity of trade. Members will be aware that the UK's negotiations 
and consultations are now largely completed.  
54.8.  The United Kingdom refers to document  G/L/1386/Add.5 , which was circulated by the 
Secretariat on 30  November. The document outlines that the UK has extended the timelines under 
Article  XXVIII:3 of the GATT by six  months, until 1  July 2024. This recent extension to timelines 
under the Article  XXVIII process will provide sufficient time for those Members working through 
internal processes to conclude formally.  
54.9.  Regarding the statement made on Aggregate Measurement of Support ( AMS) and special 
safeguards ( SSG) by the delegate  from Paraguay,  we would  like to refer Members to the  UK's 
 
30 Document  G/C/M/146 , paragraphs  34.5-34.7: "34.5.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the 
following:  
34.6.   Paraguay would like to thank the delegation of Uruguay for including this item on the agenda. In the 
interest of time, I will refer to Agenda Items  33 and 34 in this same intervention.  
34.7.   I would like to highlight the following points of interest to my delegation. In the cas e of the European 
Union, we wish to know when we will see an equivalent reduction in its list of AMS  commitments that has been 
reflected in the United Kingdom's list of commitments as a result of its exit from the EU. In the case of the UK, 
we reiterate ou r systemic concerns about the approach taken with respect to a number of entitlements that 
belonged to the EU. This includes the allocation of an AMS without a corresponding reduction in the EU's 
Schedule of commitments, quota partitioning, and the allocat ion of SSG  duties without minimum access 
commitments to justify them."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  previous statements made in this Council31, and at the Committee on Market Access, which set out 
our position on these issues. We would also like to note that , following technical level engagement, 
many Members who once i nitially held similar concerns, have since received sufficient reassurances 
to enable them to remove their objections. The United Kingdom  will further update Members and 
this forum following the conclusion of Article  XXVIII negotiations, in line with WTO  practice.  
54.10.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
55  REPORTS TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL  
55.1  Consideration of Annual Reports of the Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in 
Goods  
55.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
55.2.  Pursuant to the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of WTO  Activities and for Reporting under 
the WTO" ( WT/L/105 ), which were adopted by the General Council on 15  November  1995, all bodies 
constituted under the Agreements in Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement are required to submit a 
factual report to t he Council for Trade in Goods annually, and the Council is to take note of these 
reports. Such factual reports were adopted at the last meeting of each subsidiary body and are now 
submitted to the CTG for consideration. These reports are contained in the f ollowing documents:  
CTG Subsidiary Body  Report (Document Symbol)  
Committee on Agriculture (COA)  G/L/1520  
Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices (ADP)  G/L/1501  
Committee on Customs Valuation (CV)  G/L/1516 
Committee on Import Licensing (IL)  G/L/1512  
Committee on Market Access (CMA)  G/L/1507  
Committee on Rules of Origin (ROO)  G/L/1499  
Committee on Safeguards (SG)  G/L/1503  
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)  G/L/1519  
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)  G/L/1506  
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  G/L/1518  
Committee on Trade Facilitation (TF)  G/L/1514  
Committee on Trade -Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)  G/L/1492  
Committee of Participants on the Expansion of Trade in Information 
Technology Products (ITA)  
 G/L/1510  
Preshipment Inspection and Independent Entity  G/L/1517  
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises (STEs)  G/L/1496  
 
55.3.  Unless there are any comments from delegations, can the Council take note of the submitted 
factual reports?  
 
31 G/C/M/146  paragraphs  34.8-34.9: "34.8.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the 
following:  
34.9.   The United Kingdom would like to thank Uruguay and Paraguay for their continued interest in this 
process and indeed to thank those Members who have concluded discussions with the UK in recent months. As 
set out under Agenda Item  3, the new deadline ensures that those Members who have agreed to conclude 
these talks have suffi cient time to progress through their internal procedures. The UK has now been operating 
on the basis of its own Goods Schedule since January  2021, and since that time we have worked with partners 
to protect existing rights, obligations, and the continuity of trade. We are pleased with the overarching 
successes this approach and our discussions have achieved."  G/C/M/147  
 
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  55.4.  The Council  so agreed . 
55.2  Adoption of the Ann ual Report of the Council for Trade in Goods to the General 
Council ( G/C/W/837  and G/C/W/837/Rev.1 ) 
55.5.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
55.6.  I would like to draw your attention to the Draft Report of this Council to the General Council, 
circulated in document  G/C/W/804 . In accordance with the "Procedures for an Annual Overview of 
WTO Activities and for Reporting under the WTO" ( WT/L/105 ), it was agreed that "[t]he respective 
sectoral Councils should report in November each year to the General Council on the activities in t he 
Council as well as in the subsidiary bodies" , and that the reports of the sectoral Councils should be 
"factual in nature, containing an indication of actions and decisions taken, with cross -references to 
reports of subordinate bodies and could follow th e model of the GATT  1947 Council reports to the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES". I would like to remind delegations that all sections of the Draft Report 
before you will be updated in light of today's meeting and will be circulated to Members for 
comments.  
55.7.  In additio n, please note that the Secretariat has adjusted the way in which the information 
on trade concerns is presented, which is now summarized in table format in the annexes. With this 
in mind, would any delegation wish to comment on, or propose a change to, th e Draft Report? The 
floor is open.  
55.8.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
55.9.  Just to note that in the revision of the document, in the presentation of the Annex on trade 
concerns, we have found some inconsistencies that we have already sent to the Secretariat to be 
taken into account in a correction of the document.  
55.10.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
55.11.   Thank you, Paraguay. I see no further comments. Therefore , the Secretariat will circulate 
by email a revised version of the Annual Report by clos e of business on Monday, 4  December , at the 
latest, and will track all of the changes. If no objection is received by the Secretariat by 1pm CET of 
Wednesday, 6  December, this revised draft will be considered to be approved and the Annual Report 
will be circulated under the G/L document  series for presentation to the General Council. Is this 
agreeable? I see no objections.  
55.12.   The Council  so agreed . 
56  OTHER BUSINESS  
56.1  Tentative Annual Plan of Meetings – Subsidiary Bodies of the Council for Trade in 
Goods ( JOB/CTG/40 ) 
56.1.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
56.2.  I would like to draw your attention to document  JOB/CTG/40  containing the latest version of 
the Tentative  Annual Plan of Meetings for the CTG and its subsidiary bodies for the year 2024. This 
document was prepared in close coordination between the Secretary of the Goods Council and the 
Secretaries of the CTG  subsidiary bodies with the aim of avoid ing overlaps and to ensure a n optimal 
scheduling of meetings. Please note that the dates are tentative and some of the meetings may 
need to be rescheduled. Would any Member like to comment on the Tentative Annual Plan of 
Meetings or raise any other issue relat ing to the functioning o f the CTG and its subsidiary bodies?  
56.3.  The Council took note  of the statement  by the Chairperson . G/C/M/147  
 
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  56.2  eAgenda  
56.4.  The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
56.5.  Under this agenda item, I would like to request the Secretariat to inform us briefly about the 
implementation of some improvements in the eAgenda. Secretariat, you have the floor.  
56.6.  A representative of the Secretariat  (Mr Roy Santana) indicated the following:  
56.7.  We are pleased to report that we have successfully included practically all the comments and 
additional functions that were requested at the last meeting. We are constantly working to try to 
improve it. You may even have noticed that, during the meeting, some changes were introduced, 
and some errors were fixed, so please let us know if there are a ny other issues that you notice and 
you think should be fixed. You will also notice that there is going to be a countdown in terms of the 
time you will have to upload your statements. We noticed that about 80% or 90% of the statements 
have already been inc luded, so thank you very much for this. We believe that it's going to be quite 
useful for you once all of these statements and reports become available. Finally, I would also like 
to note that we have introduced some changes to the function "download all t he statements", where 
we have aligned with the format and the way in which the information is presented in the Committee 
on Market Access.  
56.8.  The delegate of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
56.9.  Just to thank the Secretariat for all the work done both on the cha nges to the eAgenda and 
the tireless work of the Goods Council Secretariat to ensure that we have today what we see on the 
e-Delegates portal. Few in this room will remember when there was no mailing list and we had to 
search one by one by phone for delega tes to find out who covered what. This is an example of how 
we have evolved slowly but surely in this Council. We also thank the Secretariat for the website.  
56.10.   The delegate of Japan  indicated the following:  
56.11.   We just wish to extend our appreciation for the Secretariat efforts on the eAgenda. It is very 
useful – thank you very much. And j ust a clarification for today's interventions : do we have any 
deadline for the system , as we need to check the delivered statement , by way of final scrutiny ? So 
please clarify if there is any deadline for the uploading of statements.  
56.12.   The delegate of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
56.13.   Just to quickly underline firstly our massive thanks to the Secretariat and IT  colleagues for 
the introduction and management of the eAgenda and the proactive desire to make it better, easier, 
more practical, and more useful, along with the other digital t ools. It has made such a difference to 
the way we work and made our lives so much easier. And I would also like to take the opportunity  
to thank Renata from Paraguay,  bearing in mind that this is her last CTG after being here for nearly 
six years , and to thank her for being such an active member of the Council and the whole WTO. In 
particular, she has done so much on this broader work , including on the digital side , using her 
experience to help make everyone's lives easier, so thank you , and good luck, Rena ta. Cheers!  
56.14.   The delegate of India indicated  the following : 
56.15.   We commend the Secretariat for their work on this system and all Members  for adopting the 
system very openly. I see a lot of statements available on eAgenda already. This makes a huge 
difference to our collective productivity.  
56.16.   A representative of the Secretariat  (Mr Roy Santana) indicated the following:  
56.17.   On Japan's question, I would like to confirm that delegations have until next Friday, 
8 December, to upload their statements on eAgenda.  
56.18.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  G/C/M/147  
 
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  56.3  Date of Next Meeting  
56.19.   The Chairperson  indicated the following:  
56.20.   The next CTG  meeting is scheduled to take place on  30 April and 1  May 2024. However, 
since the Council agreed to hold an annual information session on the WTO  digital tools, which 
should, to the extent possible, take place back -to-back with the Council's first  formal m eeting, please 
note that the Secretariat may need to slightly adjust these dates. In addition, please note that the 
first information session for CTG  delegates is scheduled to take place on 18  April 2024. The dates 
will be confirmed in due course.  
56.21.   As a fin al note, the Chairperson thanked those delegates leaving Geneva for their important, 
valuable, and much appreciated contributions.  
56.22.   The meeting was closed . 
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