G/AG/GEN/228  
 
25 September 2023  
(23-6382) Page: 1/7 
Committee on Agriculture  Original: English  
 
 
106TH MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE  
27-28 SEPTEMBER 2023  
WORK PROGRAMME PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO FOOD INSECURITY  
Submission by FAO  
The following submission, dated 25 September 2023, is being circulated at the request of the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  
 
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1  GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY SITUATION  
1.1.  The latest edition of The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World  (SOFI) r eport,1 
released in July 2023, estimates that global hunger, measured by the prevalence of 
undernourishment (PoU), remained relatively unchanged from 2021 to 2022 but is still far above 
pre-pandemic levels, affecting around 9.2 % of the world population in  2022, compared with 7.9 % 
in 2019.  
1.2.  It is estimated that chronic hunger affected between 691 million and 783 million people in the 
world in 2022. Considering the projected midrange (about 735 million in 2022), 122 million more 
people faced hunger in 2022 t han in 2019, before the pandemic.  
1.3.  The relative lack of change in hunger at the global level from 2021 to 2022 hides significant 
differences at the regional level. Progress was made towards reducing hunger in most subregions in 
Asia and in Latin America, but this is still on the rise in Western Asia, the Caribbean, and all 
subregions of Africa. The proportion of the population facing hunger is much larger in Africa 
compared with the other regions of the world – nearly 20 % compared with 8.5 % in Asi a, 6.5 % in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and 7.0 % in Oceania. According to updated forecasts, almost 
600 million people will be chronically undernourished in 2030, highlighting the immense challenge 
of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) target to eradicate hunger. This is about 
119 million more undernourished people than in a scenario in which neither the pandemic nor the 
war in Ukraine had occurred, and around 23 million more than in a scenario in which the war had 
not happened.  
1.4.  The SOFI  report also shows that, following a sharp increase from 2019 to 2020, the global 
prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity remained unchanged for the second year in a row, 
far above pre -COVID -19 pandemic levels.2 In 2022, an estimated 29.6 % of the  global population 
(2.4 billion people) were moderately or severely food insecure, meaning they did not have access to 
adequate food. This is still 391 million more people than in 2019. The prevalence of moderate or 
severe food insecurity rose slightly in Africa and in Northern America and Europe and decreased 
 
1 FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2023. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023. 
Urbanization, agrifood systems transformation and healthy diets across the rural –urban continuum. Rome, 
FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3017en . 
2 The prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity in the population, based on the Food Insecurity 
Experience Scale (FIES) is an estimate of the percent age of a country 's population that faces difficulties in 
accessing enough safe and nutritious food fo r normal growth and development and an active and healthy life. G/AG/GEN/228  
 
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  non-significantly in Asia from 2021 to 2022. The only region showing encouraging progress was in 
South America, while food security situation deteriorated in the Caribbean subregion.  
1.5.  Finally, accordin g to the Global Report on Food Crises  2023 (GRFC),3 published in May 2023, 
the number of people experiencing acute food insecurity and requiring urgent food, nutrition and 
livelihood assistance increased for the fourth consecutive year in 2022 (part of th is growth reflects 
an increase in the population analysed). The report finds that around 258 million people in 
58 countries and territories faced acute food insecurity at crisis or worse levels (Integrated Food 
Security Phase Classification (IPC)/Phase 3 o r above) in 2022,4 up from 193 million people in 
53 countries and territories in 2021. This is the highest number in the seven -year history of the 
report. Likewise, for the 48 countries with 2023 data available as of August, the 2023 Global Report 
on Food Crises Mid -Year Update  indicates that up to 238 mill ion people face high levels of acute food 
insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), representing an increase of 22 million people from the year 
before.5   
2  DRIVERS OF FOOD INSECURITY  
2.1.  As highlighted by the current and previous editions of the SOFI report, the i ntensification of 
the major drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition – conflict, climate extremes, economic 
slowdowns and downturns, and growing inequality – is hampering global efforts aimed at improving 
food security. These increasingly overlapping dr ivers are challenging the efforts to achieve the SDGs 
and impacting the quantity, quality and the choices of foods people can access within their budgets.  
2.2.  Given the importance of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in global agricultural markets, the 
outbre ak of the war in Ukraine, in February 2022, stirred a number of scenarios with regard to its 
potential global impacts. Although the worst -case scenarios - a complete cessation of exports from 
both countries and/or a complete collapse of the agricultural se ctor in one or both countries - did 
not materialize, the war's effects have had an impact on production, trade, as well as food and input 
prices. Following the cessation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023, the difficult prospects 
for Ukraine's ability to export via Black Sea ports are adding uncertainty to global markets.  
2.3.  Furthermore, the prevailing El Niño event and its impact on global weather conditions poses a 
significant downside risk to agricultural production in several regions in 2023/24 , largely related to 
the drier -than-normal conditions the phenomenon can engender.  Reductions in agricultural outputs 
have the potential to directly cut food supplies, lower rural incomes and exert upward pressure on 
food prices.  
3  TRENDS IN GLOBAL FOOD PRI CES 
3.1.  The FAO Food Price Index  (FFPI) averaged 121.4 points in August 2023, down 2.6 points 
(2.1%) from July, reversing the rebound registered last month and pushing the index as much as 
38.3 points (24.0 %) below its peak reached in March 2022 (Figure 1 – left). The drop reflected 
declines in the price indices for dairy products, vegetable oils, meat and cereals, while the sugar 
price index increased moderately.  
3.2.  Concerning individual commodities (Figure 1 – right), the FAO Cereal Price Index  averaged 
125.0 po ints in August, down 0.9 points (0.7 %) from July and standing 20.6 points (14.1 %) below 
its value a year ago. International wheat prices fell by 3.8 %, mostly reflecting higher seasonal 
availability from ongoing harvests in several leading exporters in the northern hemisphere. 
International coarse grain prices also declined in August by 3.4 %. Maize prices fell for the seventh 
consecutive month, hitting their lowest value since September 2020. Among other coarse grains, 
world prices of sorghum declined in Aug ust, while world barley prices firmed slightly. By contrast, 
the FAO All Rice Price Index in August rose by 9.8 % month -on-month to reach a 15 -year nominal 
high. The FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index  averaged 125.8 points in August, down 4.0 points 
(3.1%) month -on-month after a short -lived increase in July. The FAO Dairy Price Index  averaged 
111.3 points in August, down 4.6 points (4.0 %) from July, marking the eighth consecutive monthly 
 
3 FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2023. GRFC 2023. Rome. 
https://www.fsinplatform.org/grfc2023   
4 Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food insecurity at a specific point in time that is of a 
severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration.  
5 FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. GRFC 2023 Mid -Year Update . 2023.  G/AG/GEN/228  
 
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  decline, and as much as 32.1 points (22.4 %) below its corresponding value la st year. The FAO Meat 
Price Index  averaged 114.6 points in August, down 3.6 points (3.0 %) from July and 6.5 points 
(5.4%) from its value a year ago. The FAO Sugar Price Index  averaged 148.2 points in August, 
up 1.9 points (1.3 %) from July and as much as 37 .7 points (34.1 %) from its level in the same month 
last year.  
Figure 1. FAO Food Price Index (left) and Price Indices for commodity groups (right)  
 
Source:  FAO. 2023. Food Price Index. https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/  
4  GLOBAL CEREAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND  
4.1.  FAO's latest forecast (Table 1) for world cereal  producti on in 2023 has been revised down by 
4 million tonnes compared to the previous figure released in July. Nevertheless, despite this month 's 
downgrade, world cereal production is seen increasing by 0.9 % year on year, reaching 
2,815million  tonnes, on par with the 2021 record outturn. Most of the reduction this month relates 
to a downturn in global wheat prospects, with the world output now pegged at 781.1 million tonnes, 
2.2 million tonnes lower than expectations in July. At this level, the world output is set to decline by 
2.6% year on year but would still be the second largest outturn on record. The forecast for global 
coarse grains production in 2023 is down 1.3 million tonnes compared to July 's outlook and now 
stands at 1 511 million tonnes, still up 2.7 % on a yearly basis, with the bulk of the new cuts 
stemming from barley and oat crops. As for rice, FAO 's global production forecast for 2023/24 has 
also been lowered since July by 500 ,000 tonnes, down to 523.2 million tonnes, which is still 1.1 % 
above the 202 2/23 reduced level.   
4.2.  World cereal  utilization  in 2023/24 is forecast at 2 ,807 million tonnes, up 1.5 million tonnes 
since July and 22.1 million tonnes (0.8 %) above the 2022/23 level. Global wheat utilization forecast 
for 2023/24 is now pegged at 785 millio n tonnes, up 0.6 % above its 2022/23 level. The forecast for 
total utilization of coarse grains in 2023/24 is pegged at 1 ,501 million tonnes, down 
1.6 million  tonnes from the July forecast but still up 1.2 % from the 2022/23 estimated level. 
World  rice utili zation in 2023/24 is now pegged at 520.9 million tonnes, up 800 ,000 tonnes from 
July expectations and broadly stable year -on-year. 
4.3.  Global cereal  stocks  ending in 2023 are forecast to increase by 2.2 % from their opening levels, 
reaching 878 million tonnes, driven by expected rise in global maize, rice and wheat stocks. Global 
coarse grain stocks are estimated at 365 million tonnes, pointing to an increase of 4.3 % above their 
opening levels. FAO 's forecast of world rice stocks at the close of 2023/24 marketin g years has been 
projected at 198 million tonnes, an all -time high. At 315 million tonnes, FAO 's global wheat inventory 
forecast for 2023/24 points to a rise of 0.3 % above opening levels. Based on the latest forecasts, 
the world cereal stocks -to-use ratio in 2022/23 would stand at 30.5 %, down from 30.6 % in 2022/23 
but still indicating an overall comfortable supply level from a historical perspective.  
4.4.  Finally, world trade in cereals in 2023/24 is forecast to fall by 1.7 % below the 2023/24 level 
to 466 million tonnes, due to trade disruptions and lower import demand. At 220 million tonnes, 
G/AG/GEN/228  
 
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  FAO's coarse grains trade forecast for 2023/22 (July/June) points to a decline of  0.8% from the 
2022/23 level. International trade in rice in 2023 (January -December) is forecast at 
53 million  tonnes, 1.7 % above 2022. As for the world wheat trade in 2023/24 (July/June), it is set 
to decrease by 3.5 % above the 2022/23 level to 193 millio n tonnes.  
Table 1. Global cereal markets at a glance  
  2019/20  2020/21  2021/22  2022/23  2023/24 
(forecast)  
Production (million tonnes)  2,713.9  2,778.5  2,815.1  2,791.1  2,814.9  
Utilization (million tonnes)  2,711.3  2,760.6  2,802.6  2,784.8  2,806.8  
Trade (million tonnes)  439.9  482.2  481.9  474.1  466.2  
World stocks -to-use ratio %  30.1 30.0 30.8 30.6 30.5 
Source:  FAO. 2023. FAO Cereal Supply and Demand Brief. 8 September 2023.  
5  CROP PROSPECTS IN LOW -INCOME FOOD -DEFICIT COUNTRIES (LIFDCS) 6 
5.1.  According to the latest estimates from FAO 's "Crop Prospects and Food Situation " report 
(July 2023),7 aggregate cereal production among the low -income food -deficit countries (LIFDCs) 
in 2023 is expected to be at a level marginally down from the five -year average, on par with the 
outturn in 2022. Erratic weather conditions, persisting conflicts and agricultural input shortages are 
key factors driving this unfavourable outlook.  
5.2.  In LIFDCs i n East Africa , an erratic distribution of rainfall is impairing 2023 production 
prospects and curbing harvest expectations following two successive years of widespread drought 
that had a devastating impact on food security. In the Sudan, in addition to unf avourable rains, 
soaring prices and shortages of key inputs due to the ongoing conflict have significantly constrained 
plantings, further weighing on production prospects.  
5.3.  In Southern Africa , with the main season harvest completed by July, aggregate produc tion 
among LIFDCs in the subregion is estimated at an above -average level. However, cyclones and 
consequent flooding caused localized crop losses and damages in Madagascar, Mozambique and 
Malawi.  
5.4.  In West African LIFDCs, cereal production is forecast to be above the five -year average in 
2023. Among the Sahelian countries, harvesting will start later in the year and outputs are forecast 
at average to above -average levels, reflecting expectations of generally favourable weather 
conditions. However, the persist ing conflicts in the regions of Liptako -Gourma, Lake Chad and 
northern Nigeria continue to undermine farmers ' productive capacity and negatively affect local 
production.  
5.5.  In Near East Asian LIFDCs, an erratic temporal distribution of rainfall and low cumula tive 
amounts resulted in a below -average cereal output in Afghanistan. In the Syrian Arab Republic, 
near-average rainfall amounts since March helped crops to recover from earlier dry weather 
conditions and total cereal production is forecast at an above -average level in 2023.  
5.6.  Among the LIFDCs in Central America and the Caribbean , aggregate cereal production is 
pegged at an average level in 2023, however, there are serious concerns in Haiti where rainfall 
shortages and continued insecurity are undermining pr oduction prospects.  
 
6 The inclusion of a country in the low -income food -deficit countries (LIFDCs) group is based on three 
criteria: 1)  the level of the annual per capita Gross National Income (GNI); 2) the net food trade position; and 
3) self-exclusion (when countries that meet the first two criteria request to be excluded from the category). 
For full details see: www.fao.org/countryprofiles/lifdc    
7 FAO. 2023.  Crop Prospects and Food Situation  – Quarterly Global Report No. 2, July 2023.  Rome. 
https://doi.org/10.4060/cc6806en   G/AG/GEN/228  
 
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  6  FOOD PRICE INFLATION AND IMPORT COSTS  
6.1  Food inflation in net food importing developing countries (NFIDCs)  
6.1.  The food and beverage component of the consumer price index (FCPI), the sub -index used to 
calculate food inflation, increased amo ng the NFIDCs by an average of about 1 % per month between 
June 2020 and March 2022, before peaking at 2.43 % in April 2022. Soon after, however, the rate 
of food inflation began a downward trend up to September 2022.8 This is associated with the falling 
energy and non -energy commodity prices, the easing of supply chain bottlenecks and improvements 
in global food supplies, as well as the expected restraining impact of monetary tightening on 
commodity prices and on globa l economic activity.  
6.2.  Despite the improving trend, there are still risks associated with food inflation. Growth of FCPI 
can pick up again and remain sticky for some time due to stronger global demand than anticipated, 
a sudden surge in energy prices, an upt urn in fertilizer prices, and adverse weather shocks that 
compromise crop harvests and reduce supplies. National policy measures, such as export restrictions 
and food import subsidies, can also play a major role. Moreover, persistent geopolitical tensions can 
also fuel new rounds of inflation. Finally, a sustained real appreciation of the United States dollar 
against other currencies, including those of NFIDCs, renders food imports more expensive in local 
currency terms and contributes to domestic inflation . 
6.2  Food import bills  
6.3.  The global food import bill (FIB) is forecast to reach USD 1.98 trillion in 2023, representing a 
1.5% or USD 28.9 billion increase over the previous record, which was attained in 2022 (Figure 2). 
While marking a new absolute high, the s peed of expansion is anticipated to slow down significantly 
relative to 2022 and 2021, when growth rates reached 11 % and 18 %, respectively.  
6.4.  The anticipated increase in the 2023 bills reflects a combination of prices and volumes changes, 
with an additional  USD 18.4 billion stemming from higher international prices and USD 12.9 billion 
from higher volumes.9 In contrast to the overall trend, the least developed countries (LDCs) and the 
net food -importing developing countries (NFIDCs), will see their food imp ort bills contract by 1.5 % 
and 4.9 %, respectively. This suggests a decline in purchasing capacity, associated to the fact that 
lower international prices for several primary food items have not fully translated into lower prices 
at the domestic retail leve l. 
  
 
8 This was the last available data when the analysis was done. For more details see: FAO. 2023. 
Food Outlook – Biannual report on global food markets .  Food Outlook, June 2023. Rome. 
https://doi.org/10.4060/cc30 20en  
9 There is also a negative "mixed effect " of USD 2.4 billion in the overall change in the global FIB, which 
explains the difference between the overall increase and the sum of the price and volume effect.  G/AG/GEN/228  
 
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  Figure 2. Food import bills by country income group (current USD billion)  
 
Note:  Import bills 2023 forecasts are based on data from January 2023 to Feb 2023.  
* FAO Food Price Index 2023 data corresponds to data up to August.  
Source:  FAO. 2023. Food Outlook – Biannual report on global food markets.  
7  FAO'S WORK TO ADDRESS THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS  
7.1.  FAO plays a critical role in shaping the trade response to the global food crisis, as a provider 
of neutral and timely information on markets, through anal ysis and evidence building as well as 
targeted policy proposals, and supporting global food security governance.  
7.2.  Provision of up -to-date, neutral and timely information. FAO has intensified its market 
intelligence services by providing governments and nati onal and international stakeholders with 
up-to-date, objective, and timely data and information on market developments and outlook. 
These  include regular reporting on food commodity prices through the monthly FAO Food Price Index 
and the Food Price Monitor ing and Analysis (FPMA) Bulletin; the publication of the Agricultural Market 
Information System (AMIS) Market Monitor, prepared in cooperation with other AMIS partners, 
providing a synopsis of major market developments for wheat, maize, rice and soybeans; the 
"Crop Prospects and Food Situation " report, produced three times per year, providing a 
forward -looking analysis of the food situation and food security conditions by geographic region; and 
the biannual "Food Outlook ", presenting a comprehensive assessm ent of markets for the major food 
commodities and forecasts for the next season.  
7.3.  Analysis and evidence building.  FAO published a series of policy briefs, information notes, 
and other assessments on global agri -food markets and food security following the outbreak of the 
war in Ukraine. As part of such assessments, FAO also developed a Fertilizer Trade Tracker, available 
online, which allows countries to assess remaining import needs and/or export availabilities for the 
current crop and calendar year. Likew ise, on 14 November 2022, FAO and the WTO published a 
paper on fertilizer that highlighted the importance of keeping the fertilizer market open to meet 
global demand and to avoid a food availability crisis.  
7.4.  Policy proposals and technical initiatives. FAO s uggested in April 2022 the establishment 
of a Food Import Financing Facility (FIFF) to assist countries in shouldering the rising costs of food 
imports and improve access to food at country level. In this context, FAO welcomes the IMF 
Executive Board's dec ision to create a Food Shock Window to enable access to emergency funding 
for countries experiencing balance -of-payment challenges related to the global food crisis. 
FAO stands ready to provide any technical assistance required for the implementation of th is 
instrument.  
7.5.  Global food security governance.  FAO has been in the forefront of the efforts to address 
the global food crisis in a wide range of global governance mechanisms. In this regard, FAO has 
provided technical support and information for discussi ons in the context of UN Bodies, the G7 and 
G20, as well as the Global Forum on Food and Agriculture (GFFA). FAO Director -General joined forces 
G/AG/GEN/228  
 
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  with the Heads of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank Group, World Food Programme and 
World Trade Organi zation, issuing in February 2023 a third joint statement on the Global Food and 
Nutrition Security Crisis. The statement called on countries to balance short -term urgent 
interventions with longer -term resilience efforts as they respond to the crisis, and h ighlighted that 
urgent actions are needed to facilitate trade, improve the functioning of markets, enhance the role 
of the private sector, reform and repurpose harmful subsidies with careful targeting and efficiency. 
Additionally, at the request of the G20  Leaders, FAO, the WTO, and the World Bank produced in 
April 2023 a joint report to urge the G20 members to coordinate efforts on tackling the root causes 
of hunger and food insecurity.  
 
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