WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
14 July 2023  
(23-4749) Page: 1/64 
Trade Policy Review Body   
 
REPORT OF THE TPRB FROM THE DIRECTOR -GENERAL ON  
TRADE -RELATED DEVELOPMENTS  
(MID-OCTOBER 2022 TO MID -MAY 2023)  
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 2 
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........  5 
2   RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS  ................................ ........................  8 
2.1   Merchandise trade volume and outlook  ................................ ................................ .........  8 
2.2   Trade developments in value terms  ................................ ................................ .............  10 
3   TRADE AND TRADE -RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  ................................ ..............  12 
3.1   Overview of trends identified during the review period  ................................ ...................  12 
3.1.1   Regular trade measures  ................................ ................................ ..........................  12 
3.1.2   COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures  ................................ .............................  21 
3.1.3   Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis  ...........................  23 
3.2   Trade remedies  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  27 
3.3   Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures  ................................ ................................ . 33 
3.4   Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  ................................ ................................ ................  39 
3.5   Policy developments in agriculture  ................................ ................................ ..............  42 
3.6   General economic support  ................................ ................................ .........................  44 
3.7   Other selected trade policy developments  ................................ ................................ .... 48 
4   POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES  ................................ ........................  57 
5   POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE IN INTELLECTUAL PRO PERTY  .............................  63 
 
 
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  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
1. This WTO Trade Monitoring Report on trade -related developments arrives at a time when the 
global economy continues to be affected by multiple crises. The continuing war in Ukraine, events 
related to climate change, high food and energy prices, and inflatio n, as well as the lingering 
ramifications of the COVID -19 pandemic , are having serious implications for the global economic 
environment.  
2. The overall findings of this Report, as further detailed in the Specific Findings below, reveal 
that between mid -Octobe r 2022 and mid -May 2023, WTO Members introduced more 
trade-facilitating (182) than trade -restrictive (110) measures on goods, unrelated to the pandemic. 
The number of new export restrictions has outpaced that of import restrictions for the third time 
since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise. In the area of services, 74 new measures were 
introduced by WTO Members, mostly facilitating trade. The review period saw new support measures 
by governments, including various environmental impact reduction  program mes. The 
implementation of new COVID -19 trade -related measures on goods, services, intellectual property, 
and general economic support by WTO Members declined over the past seven months.  
3. Export restrictions, whether related to the COVID -19 pandemic  or the war in Ukraine, including 
the food security crisis, continued to grab headlines, even as the pace of introduction of such 
measures slowed and several were rolled back. Globally, as of mid -May 2023, 63 export restrictions 
on food, feed and fertilize rs were still in place, in addition to 21  COVID -19-related export restrictions. 
Many of these measures were introduced in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of the 
pandemic and a similar pattern was observed following the start of the war in Ukraine. These 
developments were described in the November  2022 Trade Monitoring Report. For both crises, initial 
and often comprehensive export bans were subsequently replaced with other restrictions, such as 
quotas and licensing requirements, and many were later notified to the WTO. From a transparency 
point of view , this is important as it suggests that policy makers value the predictability of 
multilateral trade rules.  
4. The pronounced weakening of merchandise trade, which slumped during the fourth quarter of 
2022 and appeared to have remained below trend in the first quarter of 2023 , is of concern. World 
merchandise trade volume growth was expected to slow in 2022 and in early 2023, before picking 
up in 2024.  
5. The disruptions caused by the COVID -19 pandemic and the  war in Ukraine have pushed 
economic security to the forefront of policy discussions. Over the past couple of years, economies 
have consistently used the multilateral trading system to adjust to market and supply challenges, 
stressing the importance for a strong multilateral trading system based on WTO rules.  
6. The successful conclusion of the 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June  2022 secured 
a series of unprecedented multilaterally agreed outcomes and demonstrated that multilateral 
cooperation on trade can deliver. Work is already under way to build on these outcomes at MC13 in 
early 2024 and a Senior Officials meeting will take place on 23 -24 October  2023 to ensure that MC13  
produces outcomes that help all economies to build a faire r, more just and more resilient economic 
future.  
7. WTO Members must work collectively to ensure the success of the ministerial meeting and for 
reinvigorating the multilateral trading system and boosting the world economy.  
Specific findings  
8. This Report is set  against a backdrop of pronounced  weakening of merchandise trade , 
which slumped during the fourth quarter of 2022 and appears to have remained below trend in the 
first quarter of 2023. World merchandise trade volume growth was expected to slow from 2.7% in  
2022 to a subpar 1.7% in 2023, before picking up to 3.2% in 2024. Growth in 2022 was weighed 
down by the war in Ukraine, stubbornly high inflation, and tighter monetary policy. However, the 
continuing relaxation of pandemic control measures should provide  a boost to trade in 2023, 
particularly in travel -related services.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  9. Inflation is growing across the world causing further uncertainty . In 2022, inflation 
was the highest some countries have experienced in decades and was exacerbated by price spikes 
in prim ary commodities whose supplies were impacted by the war in Ukraine, the food security crisis, 
and rising energy prices.  
10. The COVID -19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine  have both caused significant disruption to  
global supply chains . With geopolitical tensions  rising, countries are increasingly looking for ways 
to develop resilience. The use of the multilateral trading system by countries to adjust to market 
and supply challenges over the past couple of years has emphasized the need for a strong 
rules-based mul tilateral trading system.  
11. The pace of implementation of new export restrictions  by WTO Members has increased since 
2020, first in the context of the pandemic and subsequently with the war in Ukraine and the food 
security crisis. Although some of these have  been rolled back, as of mid-May 2023, 63 export 
restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers were still in place, in addition to 21  COVID -19-related export 
restrictions on essential products.  
12. During the review period, WTO Members introduced 182 new trade -facilitating and 
110 trade -restrictive measures on goods, unrelated to the pandemic . Most trade -facilitating 
measures were import measures and most trade -restrictive measures were export measures. For 
the third time since the beginning of the Trade Monitorin g Exercise the number of new export 
restrictions has outpaced that of import restrictions. The trade coverage of trade -facilitating 
measures introduced during the review period was estimated at USD  703.7  billion  (down from 
USD 1,160.5  billion  in the last r eport) and that of trade -restrictive measures at  USD 110.5  billion  
(down from USD  278.0  billion).  
13. The stockpile  of import restrictions in force remained important with no sign of any 
meaningful roll -back of existing measures. By the end of 2022, 9.2% of gl obal imports were affected 
by import restrictions implemented since 2009 and which are still in force.  
14. In 2021 and 2022, initiations of trade remedy  investigations by WTO Members declined 
sharply while terminations of trade remedy actions increased.  During  the review period, the average 
number of trade remedy initiations (10.3 per month) was the second lowest since 2012 and that of 
terminations (8.1) the lowest since 2012. Trade remedy actions remained an important trade policy 
tool for many WTO Members, ac counting for 30.6% of all non -COVID -19-related trade measures on 
goods recorded in this Report. Anti -dumping continued to be the most frequent trade remedy action 
in terms of initiations and terminations.  
15. The significant decline in the number of initiations of trade remedies observed since 2021 may 
represent an important change in the landscape of trade measures. There may be several reasons 
for this recent decline. For example, in the case of both the pandemic and more recently the war in 
Ukraine , countries appear to have focused on making sure that their territories remained 
well-stocked and accessible for a wide range of products. Such policies may have impacted the use 
of the trade remedies instrument.  
16. Most of the 74 new services  measures intro duced during the review period were of a 
trade-facilitating nature. Almost half of the measures were horizontal affecting different modes of 
supply across various sectors, one third related to telecommunications or financial services trade, 
and the rest re lated to business services, health, tourism and travel , and transport services.  
17. The review period saw the introduction of numerous new economic support measures  by 
WTO Members, including environmental impact reduction program mes, renewable -energy 
production schemes or support for energy efficiency and decarbonization and for clean - and 
renewable -energy projects. Other measures included various support program mes for the 
agricultural sector.  
18. The implementation of new COVID -19 trade -related measures by WTO Members dec lined 
over the past 7 months, with 17 such measures recorded on goods. Most of these measures 
consisted of reductions of customs duties, terminations o f existing measures or amendments of 
others. Most of the 454 trade and trade -related measures in the area of goods have been 
implemented by WTO Members and Observers since the beginning of the pandemic were of a WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  trade-facilitating nature (55.3%) while the rest might be considered trade -restrictive (44.7%). 
Members continued to phase out the pandemic -related measures , and in particular the restrictive 
ones. By mid -May 2023, 83.7% of the export restrictions had been rolled back, leaving 
21 restrictions in pla ce. 
19. No new COVID -19-related services measures were reported by WTO Members, but many 
measures introduced in 2020 remain in place. Since the beginning of the pandemic, 
156 COVID -19-related services measures were identified, with 22 reported as terminated by 
mid-May 2023. The number of new COVID -19-related support measures to mitigate the social and 
economic impacts of the pandemic fell sharply.  
20. WTO Members continued to use the  SPS and TBT Committees' transparency mechanisms 
to notify their sanitary and phyto sanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and 
to discuss and often resolve specific trade concerns (STCs) non -litigiously. Human health and food 
safety were the most frequent objectives identified in the regular SPS notifications submit ted by 
WTO Members during the review period.  Members continued discussions at the SPS Committee 
meetings to advance the work programme that emerged from MC12. Most new STCs raised in the 
SPS Committee during the review period concerned animal health/animal  diseases and food safety. 
WTO Members submitted 127 SPS notifications and communications on measures taken in response 
to the pandemic. Most new regular TBT notifications submitted by WTO Members during the review 
period indicated quality requirements as their main objective. A total of 155 STCs were discussed 
during the review period. Members have submitted 226 COVID -19-related TBT notifications to the 
WTO in response to the pandemic since 2020 . 
21. The number of trade concerns raised  in WTO Committees and bo dies has been increasing 
yearly, in some cases sharply. Members continued to use WTO bodies to address their trade concerns 
and engage trading partners on real or potential areas of friction.  
22. In the  Committee on Agriculture (CoA), Members posed 225 questio ns during the review 
period on Specific Implementation Matters (SIMs), individual notifications, and overdue notifications. 
Domestic support dominated the discussions with export restrictions on foodstuffs and food security 
also addressed.  
23. WTO Members cont inued to fine -tune their intellectual property  (IP) regimes and 
phased  out many pandemic -related measures, while some formalized the utilization of online 
procedures created during lockdowns. Members continued their  discussions on the possible 
extension of the TRIPS Decision adopted at MC12 on COVID -19 diagnostics and therape utics.  
24. Discussions on global environment issues , including the circular economy and plastics 
pollution, trade and climate change, and biodiversity, intensified at the WTO. During the review 
period, an important moment for water was attained as global leade rs and key policy makers 
engaged in the UN Water Conference (UNWC). The Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and 
Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade Initiative introduced the coordinators' draft vision on the 
way forward and elements for a potential outco me at MC13.  
25. This Report also covers several other important trade -related developments and discussions 
that took place during the review period, including fisheries subsidies ; e-commerce ; Aid for 
Trade; government procurement ; trade facilitation ; trade fin ance ; micro, small and 
medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) ; and women's economic empowerment . 
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  This WTO Trade Monitoring Report1 reviews trade and trade -related developments during the 
period from 16  October  2022 to 15  May 2023.2 It is a mid -year preparatory contribution to the 
annual report by the Director -General provided for in paragraph G of the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM) mandate, which aims to assist the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB) in 
undertaking an annual ov erview of developments in the international trading environment that are 
having an impact on the multilateral trading system.  
1.2.  The Report is issued under the sole responsibility of the Director -General of the WTO. It is a 
factual transparency exercise and h as no legal effect on the rights and obligations of WTO  Members. 
It is without prejudice to the negotiating positions of Members and has no legal implication with 
respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any WTO agreement or any 
provision thereof. It does not seek to establish whether a trade measure is protectionist, and it does 
not question the right of Members to take certain trade measures (see Box 1.1 below).  
1.3.  The Trade Monitoring Reports aim to provide transparency on the very latest trends and 
developments in the implementation of a broad range of trade policy measures and offer an update 
on the main indicators of the world economy and on the state of global trade. The regular discussions 
of the Reports among Members in the TPRB provide important input and perspective to the Trade 
Monitoring Exercise, including on the coverage and analysis of trade -related issues.  
1.4.  This Report is again released in a global economic environment facing multiple challenges. 
Although the World Health  Organization recently ended the global emergency status for COVID -19 
more than three years after its original declaration3, the world continues to deal with the aftereffects 
of this health crisis, including with respect to access to vaccines in certain parts of the world. The 
updated lists of measures implemented in the context of the pandemic are available on the COVID -19 
page of the WTO website4 and cover the areas of goods, services, and intellectual property  (IP), as 
well as measures communi cated by Members on general economic support. The lists presented on 
the website are updated regularly and are not exhaustive. This information is provided for 
transparency purposes and does not question the right of WTO Members to implement any of the 
measures listed. The full list of notifications received by the WTO Secretariat in the context of the 
COVID -19 pandemic is also available on the WTO website.5 
1.5.  The war in Ukraine continues to represent an immense humanitarian crisis. Although the trade 
respon se to the war was swift, especially with respect to export restrictions, the period covered by 
this Report shows that such measures are gradually being rolled back. Yet many trade-restrictive 
measures implemented immediately after the outbreak of the war r emain in place, exacerbating the 
food security crisis in many parts of the world and creating uncertainty for the global economy and 
international trade. Under its trade monitoring mandate, the WTO Secretariat continues to monitor 
and provide transparency around the wide range of trade -related measures taken in response to 
these crises.  
1.6.  Information on measures included in this Report and its Annexes has been collated from inputs 
submitted by WTO Members and Observers and from other official and public sources. Overall, 
responses to the Director -General's request for information and to the subsequent verification 
request were received from 73 Members (counting the European  Union  and its member States 
separately) (Box 1. 2), which represents 44.5% of the membership, and covers around 90.0% of 
 
1 The previous WTO Trade Monitoring Report presented to the TPRB (WTO document WT/TPR/OV/25, 
22 November  2022) covered measures between mid -October  2021 and mid -October  2022. The WTO Trade 
Monitoring Reports have been prepared by the WTO Secretariat since 2 009. On 4 July  2023, 
the WTO Secretariat, together with the Secretariats of the OECD and UNCTAD, issued the G20 Reports on 
trade and investment measures implemented by G20 economies during the period mid -October  2022 to 
mid-May 2023 (available on the WTO w ebsite).  
2 Unless otherwise indicated in the relevant section. In addition to the trade policy measures 
implemented during the period under review and captured by this Report, other actions that impact trade flows 
may have been taken by WTO Members.  
3 Viewed at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/05/1136367  
4 WTO,  COVID -19 and World Trade . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/en glish/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm . 
5 WTO,  WTO Members' Notifications on COVID -19. Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/notifications_e.htm . WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  world imports. Three Observers also replied to the request for information. Where it has not been 
possible to confirm the information, this is noted in the Annexes.  
1.7.  In response to calls from WTO Members, most recently in the context of the 7th Appraisal of 
the TPRM, to streamline the Trade Monitoring Exercise, and in particular the information -gathering 
of trade measures, the WTO Secretariat in early 2023 introduced a digital platform for submitting 
and verifying trade measures. The principal objectives of this platform are to further participation in 
the Trade Monitoring Exercise and to facilitate the exchange of information between the Secretariat 
and delegations, particularly during the verification process. In April  2023, the Secretariat hosted 
an information meeting  on the platform for all delegations, including the presentation of  tutorials to 
guide Members and Observers through the process of submitting and verifying measures. Overall, 
the digital platform has perf ormed well during this first attempt even if, as with any introduction of 
new IT tools, some features can be modified and improved. Delegations have provided useful inputs 
to this end.  
1.8.  This mid -year Report maintains the structure of the July  2022 version. In other words, the 
coverage  of trade and trade -related measures implemented during the review period, specific 
COVID -19 related developments and, if applicable, developments in the context of the war in Ukraine 
and the food security crisis is maintained. Section  2 of the Report provides a brief account of recent 
economic and trade developments and includes the most recent forecasts for world trade growth. 
Section  3 presents selected trade and trade -related policy trends for the review period. Policy 
developments in trade in services and trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights  (TRIPS) 
are included in Sections  4 and 5, respectively.  
1.9.  A separate Addendum to this Report contains Annexes with new regular measures recorded 
during the review period. Measures implemented outside of this period are not included in these 
Annexes . Information on all regular trade measures recorded since the beginning of the Trade 
Monitoring Exercise in October  2008 with an indication of their status, as updated by 
WTO delegations, is available through the Trade Monitoring Database (TMDB).6 
1.10.  Preparations for WTO's 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) in early 2023 are already under 
way. Follow -up on the multilaterally agreed outcomes at MC12 on fisheries subsidies, the WTO 
response to the current and future pandemics, including a waiver of certain IP requirements 
concerning compulsory licensing for COVID -19 vaccines, food security, the  extension of the 
moratorium on e -commerce, and on WTO reform will require determination and commitment by all 
WTO Members. The Senior Officials meeting in Geneva on 23 -24 October will provide an important 
opportunity to take stock of preparations for MC13 . WTO Members must work collectively to ensure 
the success of MC13  and for reinvigorating the multilateral trading system and boosting the world 
economy.  
1.11.  Finally, the OECD, the International Trade Centre (ITC)  and the Global Trade Alert have 
contributed to pical boxes to this Report.  
 
6 WTO,  Trade Monitoring Database . Viewed at: http://tmdb.wto.org . WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Box 1.1 About the WTO Trade Monitoring Report  
The Trade Monitoring Report is first and foremost a transparency exercise. It is intended to be purely factual and has 
no legal effect on the rights and obligations of WTO Members. It is without prejudice to Members' negotiating positions 
and has no legal implication with respect to the conformity of any measure noted in the Report with any 
WTO Agreement  or any provision thereof.  
The Report aims to shed light on the latest trends in the implementation of a broad range of policy measures that 
facilitate as well as restrict the flow of trade and provide an update on the state of global trade. The Report neither 
seeks to pronounce itse lf on whether a trade measure is protectionist, nor does it question the right of Members to 
take certain trade measures. The Reports continue to evolve in terms of the coverage and analysis of trade -related 
issues and take into account discussions among W TO Members in the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB).  
Regarding trade remedy actions, it has been highlighted in discussions among WTO Members that some of these 
measures are taken to address what is perceived by some as a market distortion resulting from tra de practices of 
entities in another trading partner. The WTO Anti-Dumping and the Subsidies and Countervailing  Measures  
Agreements  permit WTO  Members to impose anti -dumping (AD) or countervailing (CVD) duties to offset what is 
perceived to be injurious dum ping or subsidization of products exported from one Member to another. The Reports 
are not able to establish if, where or when such perceived distortive practices have taken place. The Reports have 
never categorized the use of trade remedies as protectioni st or WTO -inconsistent or criticized governments for 
utilizing them. The main objective of monitoring these measures is to provide additional transparency and to identify 
emerging trends in the application of trade policy measures.  
With respect to Sanitary  and Phytosanitary (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures covered in the 
Report, it is important to emphasize that they are neither classified nor counted as trade -restrictive or 
trade -facilitating, and the increasing trend with respect to th e number of notifications of such measures is carefully 
linked to the transparency provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreements  only. The Reports have consistently underlined 
the basic premise that an increased number of SPS and TBT notifications does not auto matically imply greater use of 
protectionist or unnecessarily trade -restrictive measures, but rather enhanced transparency regarding these 
measures. Finally, the Reports clearly emphasize that the SPS and TBT  Agreements specifically allow Members to 
take m easures in the pursuit of a number of legitimate policy objectives.  
The WTO Secretariat strives to ensure that the Trade Monitoring Reports are factual and objective. Since 2009, the 
Reports have sought to provide a nuanced perspective to developments in i nternational trade. For example,  the 
Reports  have consistently  emphasized  that although  the number  of specific  and often long-term restrictive  trade  
measures  remain s a source  of serious  concern,  other  key factors  may influence  trade  developments.  During 
discussions of the Trade Monitoring Reports at the TPRB, Members have also drawn attention to this point and to the 
fact that, with respect to both, vigilance remains imperative.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Box 1.2 Participation in the preparation of this Report  
1. Albania  
2. Argentina  
3. Australia  
4. Azerbaijan (Observer)  
5. Brazil  
6. Cambodia  
7. Canada  
8. Chile 
9. China  
10. Colombia  
11. Costa  Rica 
12. Dominican  Republic  
13. Ecuador  
14. Egypt  
15. El Salvador  
16. Ethiopia (Observer)  
17. European  Uniona 
18. Guatemala  
19. Hong Kong, China  
20. India 
21. Indonesia  
22. Jamaica  
23. Japan  
24. Republic of Korea  
25. Macao, China  26. Mauritius  
27. Mexico  
28. Mongolia  
29. Montenegro  
30. Mozambique  
31. Myanmar  
32. New Zealand  
33. Norway  
34. Paraguay  
35. Philippines  
36. Russian  Federation  
37. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
38. Serbia (Observer)  
39. Seychelles  
40. Singapore  
41. Sri Lanka  
42. Switzerland  
43. Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese  Taipei)  
44. Thailand  
45. Türkiye  
46. Ukraine  
47. United  Kingdom  
48. United  States  
49. Uruguay  
a The European Union and its member States counted separately.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.   
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  2  RECENT ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENTS  
2.1  Merchandise trade volume and outlook  
2.1.  World merchandise trade volume slumped in the fourth quarter of 2022 and remained weak in 
the first quarter of 2023, weighed down by the war in Ukraine, stubbornly high inflation, and tighter 
monetary policy. The 2.4% quarter -on-quarter decline in Q4 dragg ed trade volume growth for 2022 
down to 2.7%, below the WTO's forecast of 3.5% from last October, but better than the more 
pessimistic  scenarios  envisaged at the start of the war. The WTO's current forecast projects subpar 
growth of 1.7% in 2023 picking up  to 3.2% in 2024, but the outlook remains clouded by downside 
risks including geopolitical tensions, food and energy insecurity, increased risk of financial instability, 
and high levels of external debt.1 
2.2.  Chart  2.1 shows merchandise trade volume through 2 022Q4 and projections through 2024Q4, 
including "error bands" to illustrate the degree of uncertainty associated with the forecast. The 
shaded area represents an approximate 85% confidence interval adjusted to reflect the 
predominance of downside risks. If  current assumptions hold, merchandise trade volume growth in 
2023 could be as low as -2.8% or as high as +4.7%.  
Chart  2.1 Volume of world merchandise trade, 2015Q1 -2024Q4  
(Seasonally adjusted volume index, 20 15=100)  
 
Note:  The shaded region represents both random variation and subjective assessment of risk.  
Source:  WTO and UNCTAD for historical data ; WTO Secretariat estimates for forecasts.  
2.3.  The slump in 2022Q4 was partly due to inflation and higher interest rates weighing on 
consumption and investment, and partly the result of the COVID -19 outbreak disrupting production 
and trade in China. The relaxation of Chinese pandemic controls is expect ed to provide a boost to 
global trade and output in 2023, particularly in travel -related services.  
2.4.  Inflation in 2022 was exacerbated by price spikes in primary commodities whose supplies were 
impacted by the war in Ukraine, notably food and energy (Chart  2.2). Energy prices had a strong 
impact on trade and output in European countries, while food prices were more keenly felt in 
Middle  Eastern and African countries.  
 
1 This Section  draws on the WTO 's Global Trade Outlook and Statistics , issued on 5  April 2023.  
8090100110120130140
2015Q1
2015Q3
2016Q1
2016Q3
2017Q1
2017Q3
2018Q1
2018Q3
2019Q1
2019Q3
2020Q1
2020Q3
2021Q1
2021Q3
2022Q1
2022Q3
2023Q1
2023Q3
2024Q1
2024Q3G20_ECO.1   World merchandise trade volume, 2015Q1 -2024Q4
(Seasonally -adjusted volume index, 2015=100)
Note: Each shaded region represents both random variation and subjective assessment of risk.
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UNCTAD for historical data ; WTO Secretariat estimates for forecasts.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Chart  2.2 Monthly average prices for primary c ommodities, January  2019-April  2023 
(Index 2019=100 and USD  per million Btu)  
 
Source:  World Bank.  
2.5.  Commodity prices have receded but  remain high by historical standards. Natural gas prices in 
April 2023 were down 78% from their peak but  were still 68% above their average level in 2019, 
before the pandemic. Similarly, global grain prices were 16% below their peak, but 60% higher than 
in 2019. Falling commodity prices have brought down headline inflation rates, but core inflation 
(excludin g food and energy) remains high in many economies. For example, year -on-year growth in 
non-energy, non -food consumer prices stood at 5.6% in the United  States  and 5.7% in the Euro  Area 
in March  2023, well above Central Bank s' targets.  
2.6.  Interest rates hikes have also revealed weaknesses in banking systems that could lead to 
broader financial contagion if left unchecked. These stresses have complicated the job of Central 
Banks trying to tame inflation, sustain economic growth, and maintain financial stability.  
2.7.  Trade -related indicators show few signs of a turnaround to date in 2023. One such indicator is 
container shipping, which was down 5.3% year -on-year in 2023Q1 according to the RWI/ISL 
Container Throughput Index.  
2.8.  Another indicator is export orders from purc hasing managers' indices (PMIs). The new export 
orders component of the J.P. Morgan Global Manufacturing PMI rose from 47.7 in March to 48.4 in 
April, but remained below the baseline value of 50, suggesting that trade continued to contract but 
at a slower rate. On a more positive note, other PMI components suggested an easing of inflationary 
pressures (input and output prices) and improved supply conditions (stocks of finished goods and 
supplier delivery times).  
2.9.  Table  2.1 shows merchandise trade volume and GDP growth by region from 2019 to 2024. The 
projected 1.7% increase in world trade in 2023 is stronger than the previous estimate of 1.0% from 
last October, partly due to a slight upward revision in GDP expectations and to changes in the 
regional distribut ion of economic activity.  
2.10.   Export growth in 2023 is expected to be strongest in North America (3.3%), followed by the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (2.8%), Asia (2.5%), Europe (1.8%), the Middle East 
(0.9%), South America (0.3%) and Africa ( -1.4%). The CIS should see a 14.9% increase in imports 
in 2023, in a rebounding from a 13.5% decline in 2022. Imports should also continue to grow in 
0100200300400500600700800
2019M01
2019M04
2019M07
2019M10
2020M01
2020M04
2020M07
2020M10
2021M01
2021M04
2021M07
2021M10
2022M01
2022M04
2022M07
2022M10
2023M01
2023M04Index, 2019=100
Energy Crude Oil Natural Gas
Food Grains Fertilizers01020304050607080
2019M01
2019M04
2019M07
2019M10
2020M01
2020M04
2020M07
2020M10
2021M01
2021M04
2021M07
2021M10
2022M01
2022M04
2022M07
2022M10
2023M01
2023M04USD per million Btu
Natural Gas, US Natural Gas, Europe
Natural Gas, JapanMonthly average prices for primary commodities, January 2019 -April 2023
(Index 2019=100 and USD per million Btu)WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 10 - 
 
  Africa (5.6%), the Middle East (5.5%) and Asia (2.6%), while small contractions are expected in 
North America (-0.1%), Europe ( -0.6%) and South America ( -1.6%).  
Table  2.1 Merchandise trade volume and GDP growth, 2019 -24a 
(Annual % change)  
  2019  2020  2021  2022  2023  2024  
World merchandise trade volumeb 0.4 -5.1 9.4 2.7 1.7 3.2 
Exports        
North America  0.4 -8.9 6.5 4.2 3.3 3.1 
South Americac -1.3 -4.9 5.8 1.9 0.3 0.6 
Europe  0.4 -7.7 8.1 2.7 1.8 2.0 
CISd -0.1 -0.9 -3.0 -4.9 2.8 2.2 
Africa  -0.3 -7.2 3.5 0.7 -1.4 1.4 
Middle East  -1.0 -6.6 -2.4 9.9 0.9 4.7 
Asia 0.8 0.6 13.1 0.6 2.5 4.7 
Imports        
North America  -0.6 -5.9 12.5 6.0 -0.1 1.4 
South Americac -1.8 -10.8 25.6 4.2 -1.6 2.3 
Europe  0.3 -7.2 8.5 5.2 -0.6 1.8 
CISd 8.3 -5.5 9.1 -13.5 14.9 0.8 
Africa  3.3 -14.8 6.4 5.6 5.6 5.5 
Middle East  11.2 -10.1 8.3 9.4 5.5 4.3 
Asia -0.5 -0.8 10.5 -0.4 2.6 5.2 
World GDP at market exchange rates  2.6 -3.3 5.9 3.0 2.4 2.6 
North America  2.1 -3.8 5.5 2.2 1.5 1.0 
South Americac 0.5 -6.5 7.4 4.0 1.4 2.0 
Europe  1.7 -5.6 5.9 3.4 0.9 1.8 
CISd 2.6 -2.5 4.9 -0.9 -0.9 0.7 
Africa  2.6 -2.4 4.7 3.4 3.5 3.9 
Middle East  1.0 -4.1 4.2 5.8 2.9 3.1 
Asia 4.0 -0.9 6.2 3.3 4.2 4.3 
Memo: Least Developed Countries (LDCs)  
Volume of merchandise exports  0.2 -1.6 -2.6 2.0 4.8 9.1 
Volume of merchandise imports  2.2 -11.0 7.4 3.6 4.8 5.4 
Real GDP at market exchange rates  4.6 4.9 0.4 2.1 4.4 4.4 
a Figures for 2023 and 2024 are projections. These projections incorporate mixed -data sampling 
(MIDAS) techniques for selected countries to take advantage of higher -frequency data such as 
container throughput and financial risk indices.  
b Average of exports and imports.  
c South and Central America and the Caribbean.  
d Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including certain associate and former member States.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat for trade and consensus estimates for GDP.  
2.2  Trade developments in value terms  
2.11.  World merchandise trade increased by 12% in 2022 to USD  25.0 trillion , an all -time high 
(Chart  2.3). The increase mostly reflected higher commodity prices. Trade in fuels and mining 
products was up 42% while fuels alone jumped 61%. Food trade grew in line with merchandise trade 
(12%) while trade in manufactures grew more slowly (7%).  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 11 - 
 
  2.12.  Merchandise tra de slowed toward s the end of 2022 and in the early months of 2023, reflecting 
both declining quantities and falling prices. Growth fell from 13% in 2022 Q3 to an estimated -1% 
in Q1 of 2023. Trade values for food and fuels were still up 6 %-7% in 2023 Q1 bu t trade in 
manufactures fell  3%. 
Chart  2.3 World merchandise trade growth by product, 2022Q3 -2023Q1  
(Year -on-year % change in USD  values)  
 
Note:  World merchandise trade refers to average of exports and import s. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
2.13.  Commercial services trade grew slightly faster than merchandise trade in 2022, rising by 15% 
to USD  6.8 trillion . All broad services categories saw growth, led by travel (79%) and transport 
(25%) as a result of the normalization  of the health situation. The appreciation of the US dollar was 
partly responsible for the modest growth of other commercial services, including financial services. 
The euro and the pound depreciated by 11% and 10%, respectively, against the dollar in 2022 , 
reducing the US dollar value of trade in Europe.  
2.14.  Commercial services trade also slowed in the fourth quarter of 2022. Year -on-year export 
growth in the United  States  dropped from 18% in 2022Q3 to 14% in Q4, while EU growth slowed 
from 6% to -2%, UK growt h fell from 14% to -4% and Chinese growth declined from 17 % to -7%. 
 
-36175-1
-12212751
76845101013
76142121112
-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Manufacturesof which: FuelsFuels and mining productsof which: FoodAgricultural productsTotal merchandise
2022 2022Q3 2022Q4 2023Q1 (estimated)World merchandise trade growth by product, 2022Q3 -2023Q1
(Year -on-year% change in USD values)
Note:  World trade refers to average of exports and imports.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 12 - 
 
  3  TRADE AND TRADE -RELATED POLICY DEVELOPMENTS  
3.1  Overview  of trends identified during the review period  
3.1.  This Section  provides analysis of selected trade and trade -related policy developments in the 
area of goods during the period from mid -October  2022 to mid -May 2023. It is divided into three 
parts. The first part looks at regular, i.e. non -COVID -19-related measures impl emented during the 
review period, including calculations on trade coverage. The second part, in Section  3.1.2, covers 
measures taken in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic. These COVID -19-related measures are 
not included in the trade coverage calculation s and are not counted towards the aggregate numbers 
in part 1. The third part, in Section  3.1.3, provides an overview of trade -related developments in 
the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis since  the beginning of the conflict.  
3.2.  A separate Add endum1 to this Report contains Annexes 1, 2 and 3 on recorded trade and 
trade-related measures taken by WTO Members and Observers from 16  October  2022 to 
15 May 2023, in the area of trade in goods. Services measures are analysed in Section  4 of this 
Repor t and are listed in Annex  4 of the Addendum.  
3.3.  This separate Addendum lists new regular (non -COVID -19-related) measures recorded during 
the review period.  
3.1.1   Regular trade measures  
3.4.  A total of 421 trade measures were recorded for WTO Members and Observers during  the 
review period (Chart  3.1).2 This figure includes measures facilitating trade, trade remedy measures 
and other trade and trade -related measures, i.e. trade -restrictive measures. Chart  3.2 illustrates 
the trade coverage3 of the measures recorded for WTO Members and Observers during t he review 
period. These figures also include measures on food, feed, and fertilizers.  
Chart  3.1 Number of measures introduced between mid -October  2022 and 
mid-May 2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
1 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/17/Add.1, 13  July 2023. 
2 These Annexes do not include SPS and TBT measures, which are covered in Sections  3.3 and 3.4.  
3 The trade coverage does not include trade for measures that have been implemented and terminated 
within the review period. Trade coverage estimates for the rev iew period were based on 2022 merchandise trade, 
when available. For several countries, 2021 merchandise trade was used as 2022 data were not available at the 
time of calculations.  
72 57 182 110 
Trade remedy initiations Trade remedy terminations
Trade-facilitating measures Trade-restrictive measures421Number of measures introduced between mid-October 2022 and mid -May 2023
Source: WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 13 - 
 
  Chart  3.2 Trade coverage of import and export measures introduced between 
mid-October  2022 and mid -May 2023 in USD  billion  
 
Note:  Values are rounded. Trade -facilitating measures cover import and export -facilitating  measures. 
Trade -restrictive measures cover import and export -restrictive measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Measures facilitating trade  
3.5.  During the review period, 182 new trade -facilitating measures were recorded for WTO Members 
and Observers.4 This repre sents 43.2% of the total number of measures recorded.  
3.6.  Most of the trade -facilitating measures were on the import side. The reduction or elimination 
of import tariffs made up the bulk of trade -facilitating measures, followed by the elimination or 
simplifica tion of export quantitative restrictions (QRs) and import QRs. The monthly average of 
26.0 facilitating measures recorded for the period was the third highest since 2012 (Table  3.1).  
Table  3.1 Measures facili tating trade (Annex  1), 2015 -22 
Type of measure  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/25)  
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-May 23 
(7 months)  
Import  205 148 113 144 100 96 137 328 329 144 
- Tariff 154 112 93 119 85 84 113 261 265 103 
- Customs procedures  30 27 17 15 2 3 6 23 21 6 
- Tax 5 4 3 6 5 8 8 6 8 2 
- QRs 5 1 0 3 1 1 8 33 29 26 
- Other  11 4 0 1 7 0 2 5 6 7 
Export  40 32 24 18 14 7 14 69 54 38 
- Duties  18 5 1 6 10 5 10 14 12 3 
- QRs 3 1 2 0 1 1 3 45 39 27 
- Other  19 26 21 12 3 1 1 10 3 8 
Other  4 3 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 
Total  249 183 137 162 115 104 153 398 384 182 
Average per month  20.8 15.3 11.4 13.5 9.6 8.7 12.8 33.2 32.0 26.0 
Note:  Revisions of the data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine-tune and update the available 
information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.7.  The trade coverage of the import -facilitating measures introduced during the review period was 
estimated at USD  675.0  billion  (down from USD  1,038.4  billion  in the last report),  i.e. 3.1% of the 
value of world merchandise imports (Table  3.2 and Chart  3.3). 
3.8.  Based on trade coverage, the HS Chapters within which most of the import -facilitating 
measures were taken include machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 8 4) (11.1%), mineral fuels 
 
4 This figure also includes measures taken in response to the war in Ukrain e and terminations of 
restrictive measures that were implemented during the review period.  
7 9 
704 111 
Trade remedy initiations Trade remedy terminations
Trade-facilitating measures Trade-restricting measures830Trade coverage of import and export measures introduced between mid -October 
2022 and mid-May 2023
(USD billion)
Source: WTO Secretariat.Note:  [see text]WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 14 - 
 
  and oils (HS 27) (10.5%), copper and articles thereof (HS 74) (9.1%), and electrical machinery and 
parts thereof (HS 85) (8.4%).  
Table  3.2 Share of trade covered by import -facilitating measures , 
mid-Oct 2014 -mid-May 2023  
(%)   
Mid-Oct 14 to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19  to 
mid-Oct 20 
Mid-Oct 20  to 
mid-Oct 21 
Mid-Oct 21  to 
mid-Oct 22 
Mid-Oct 22  to 
mid-May 23 
Share in total world 
imports  0.91 1.51 1.07 1.68 2.80 3.88 2.74 4.72 3.06 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
Chart  3.3 Trade coverage of new import -facilitating measures in each reporting period 
(not cumulative) in USD  billion  
 
Note:  These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e. annual imports 
of the prod ucts concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each 
reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.9.  The trade coverage of the export -facilitating measures introduced during the revi ew period was 
estimated at USD  28.8 billion  (down from USD  122.1  billion  in last report) , i.e. 0.1% of the value of 
world merchandise exports. The HS Chapters within which most of the export -facilitating measures 
were taken, in terms of trade coverage, inc lude iron and steel (HS 72) (43.7%), and cereals (HS  10) 
(29.1%).  
3.10.  Overall, the trade coverage of the import - and export -facilitating measures introduced during 
the review period was estimated at USD  703.7  billion  (down from USD  1,160.5  billion  in the last 
report) . 
2581,183
170249
169296545731
4821,038
675
02004006008001,0001,2001,400
mid-Oct12 -
mid-Oct13mid-Oct13 -
mid-Oct14mid-Oct14 -
mid-Oct15mid-Oct15 -
mid-Oct16mid-Oct16 -
mid-Oct17mid-Oct17 -
mid-Oct18mid-Oct18 -
mid-Oct19mid-Oct19 -
mid-Oct20mid-Oct20 -
mid-Oct21mid-Oct21 -
mid-Oct22mid-Oct22 -
mid-May23Trade coverage of new import -facilitating measures in each reporting period (not cumulative)
(USD billion)
Note:  [see original text]WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 15 - 
 
  Trade remedy actions  
3.11.  During the period under review, 129 trade remedy actions (72 initiations and 57 terminations) 
were recorded for WTO Members and Observers (Annex  2 of the Addendum), accounting for 30.6% 
of all trade -related measures covered in this Report. Anti -dumping continued to be the most frequent 
trade remedy action, accounting for 79.2 % of all initiations and 93.0 % of all terminations.  
3.12.  After reaching its highest peak so far in 2020 (36.1), the average number of trade remedy 
initiations during the review period was 10.3 per month, the second lowest since 2012. The monthly 
average of trade remedy terminations recorded during the review period was 8.1, the lowest since 
2012 (Table  3.3 and Chart  3.4). 
Table  3.3 Trade remedy actions (Annex  2), 2015 -mid-May 2023  
Type of measure  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/25)  
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-May 23 
(7 months)  
Initiations  277 343 298 273 281 433 213 112 142 72 
 - AD 229 298 249 202 215 355 186 89 113 57 
 - CVD 31 34 41 55 36 56 18 19 23 13 
 - SG 17 11 8 16 30 22 9 4 6 2 
Average per month  23.1 28.6 24.8 22.8 23.4 36.1 17.8 9.3 11.8 10.3 
Terminations  212 171 158 225 184 216 302 233 265 57 
 - AD 167 141 129 201 167 184 258 199 234 53 
 - CVD 25 15 12 24 7 13 23 23 24 2 
 - SGa 20 15 17 0 10 19 21 11 7 2 
Average per month  17.7 14.3 13.2 18.8 15.3 18 25.2 19.4 22.1 8.1 
a The figure for a specific year is the sum of the following: (i)  all ongoing investigations terminated 
during the course of that specific year, normally as of late October, without any measure; and (ii)  all 
imposed measures expired during the course of that sp ecific year, normally as of late October.  
Note:  The information on trade remedy actions for 2015 to 2022 is based on the semi -annual notifications. 
For the present review period, the information is also based on the responses and the verifications 
received directly from Members. Anti -dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on 
the number ( n) of exporting countries or customs territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one 
anti-dumping or countervailing investigat ion involving imports from (n) countries/customs territories 
is counted as (n) investigations.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.13.  Since 2021, a significant decline in the number of initiations of trade remedies has been 
observed (Table  3.3 and Chart  3.4). This repre sents an important change in the landscape of trade 
measures as traditionally trade remedies have represented an overwhelming majority of all 
measures recorded. There may be several reasons for this recent decline. In the case of both the 
pandemic and more  recently the war in Ukraine, Members have largely focused on making sure that 
their territories remained well -stocked and accessible for a relatively wide range of products. Such 
policies may have impacted the use of trade remedies instruments.  
3.14.  The trade coverage of all trade remedy investigations initiated during the review period was 
USD 6.6 billion  (down from USD  8.3 billion  in last report) , i.e. 0.03% of the value of world 
merchandise imports (Table  3.4). For terminations, the trade coverage was valued  at USD  9.3 billion  
(down from USD  14.0 billion  in the last report) , i.e. 0.04% of the value of world merchandise 
imports.  
3.15.  Trade remedy actions taken during the review period, in terms of trade coverage, included 
initiations of investigations on plastic an d articles thereof (HS 39) (37.4%), iron and steel (HS 72) 
(21.7%), machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (16.9%), and electrical machinery and parts 
thereof (HS 85) (10.2%).  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 16 - 
 
  Chart  3.4 Trade remedies initiations and terminations, average number per month  
 
Note:  Values are rounded.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Table  3.4 Share of trade covered by trade remedy initia tions , 
mid-Oct 2014 -mid-May 2023  
(%) 
 
Mid-Oct 14 to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19 to 
mid-Oct 20 
Mid-Oct 20 to 
mid-Oct 21 
Mid-Oct 21 to 
mid-Oct 22 
Mid-Oct 22 to 
mid-May 23 
Share in total 
world imports  0.17 0.55 0.48 0.53 0.24 0.36 0.15 0.04 0.03 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
Other trade and trade -related measures  
3.16.  Annex  3 of the Addendum to this Report lists measures that may be considered to have a 
trade-restrictive effect.  A total of 110 new trade -restrictive measures were recorded for 
WTO Members and Observers during the review period. Most of the trade -restrictive measures 
recorded were export measures. For the third time sinc e the beginning of the Trade Monitoring 
Exercise the number of new export restrictions (58 or 52.7% of all) outpaced that of import 
restrictions (52  or 47.3%).  
3.17.  Export restrictions mainly included the imposition of QRs and increases of export duties. 
Import  restrictions consisted of increases of import tariffs mainly , followed by the imposition of QRs. 
The average of 15.7 trade -restrictive measures per month is the third highest recorded since 2016 
(Table  3.5). 
23 29 
25 
23 23 36 
18 
9 12 
10 18 
14 
13 19 
15 18 25 
19 22 
8 
0510152025303540
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Mid-Oct21 to
mid-Oct22Mid-Oct22 to
mid-May23Trade remedies intitiations and terminations, average number per month 
Initiations avg per month Terminations avg per month
2 per Mov. Avg. (Initiations avg per month) 2 per Mov. Avg. (Terminations avg per month)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.Values are rounded.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 17 - 
 
  Table  3.5 Other trade and trade -related measures (Annex  3), 2015 - mid May 2023  
Type of measure  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
(WT/TPR/OV/25)  
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-May 23 
(7 months)  
Import  166 98 84 114 77 72 75 75 87 52 
- Tariff 106 63 47 70 46 40 36 40 52 24 
- Customs procedures  32 16 19 6 6 10 21 11 9 14 
- Tax 10 6 9 13 6 6 5 0 0 1 
- QRs 12 12 7 16 14 10 11 18 20 9 
- Other  6 1 2 9 5 6 2 6 6 4 
Export  44 20 18 18 19 27 67 139 131 58 
- Duties  13 6 4 9 7 4 14 16 16 9 
- QRs 7 10 8 4 3 11 27 107 98 39 
- Other  24 4 6 5 9 12 26 16 17 10 
Other  13 11 14 0 2 0 5 0 0 0 
- Local content  13 7 12 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 
- Other  0 4 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Total  223 129 116 132 98 99 147 214 218 110 
Average per month  18.6 10.8 9.7 11.0 8.2 8.3 12.3 17.8 18.2 15.7 
Note:  Revised data reflect changes undertaken in the TMDB to fine -tune and update the available 
information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.18.  The trade coverage of the import -restrictive measures implemented during the review period 
was estimated at USD  64.8 billion  (down from USD  163.5  billion  in last report) , i.e. 0.3% of the 
value of world merchandise imports (Table  3.6 and Chart  3.5). 
Table  3.6 Share of trade covered by import -restrictive  measures (Annex  3), 
mid-Oct 14-mid-May2023  
(%) 
 
Mid-Oct 14  to 
mid-Oct 15 
Mid-Oct 15  to 
mid-Oct 16 
Mid-Oct 16  to 
mid-Oct 17 
Mid-Oct 17  to 
mid-Oct 18 
Mid-Oct 18  to 
mid-Oct 19 
Mid-Oct 19 to  
mid-Oct 20 
Mid-Oct 20 to  
mid-Oct 21 
Mid-Oct 21 to  
mid-Oct 22 
Mid-Oct 22 to  
mid-May 23 
Share in total 
world imports  1.23 0.62 0.50 3.33 3.84 2.40 0.60 0.74 0.29 
Source:  WTO Secretariat and UN Comtrade database.  
3.19.  The import -restrictive measures recorded during the review period cover a wide range of 
products. The main sectors affected (HS  Chapters), in terms of trade coverage, vehicles, and parts 
and accessories thereof (HS 87) (22.0%), electrical machinery and parts thereof (HS 85) (16.9%), 
machinery and mechanical appliances (HS 84) (16.7%), and iro n and steel (HS 72) (12.6%).  
3.20.  The trade coverage of the export -restrictive measures implemented during the review period 
was estimated at USD  45.7 billion  (down from USD  114.5  billion  in last report) , i.e. 0.2% of the 
value of world merchandise exports. The  export -restrictive measures recorded cover a wide range 
of products. The main sectors affected (HS Chapters), in terms of trade coverage, were aluminium 
and articles thereof (HS 76) (29.2%), fertilizers (HS 31) (27.3%), cereals (HS 10) (19.8%), and 
copper  and articles thereof (HS 74) (9.3%).  
3.21.  Overall, the trade coverage of the import - and export -restrictive measures implemented 
during the review period was estimated at USD  110.5  billion  (down from USD  278.0  billion  in the 
last report) . WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 18 - 
 
  Chart  3.5 Trade coverage of new import -restrictive measures in each reporting period 
(not cumulative) in USD  billion , mid -May 2012 -mid-May 2023  
 
Note:  These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures ( i.e. annual imports 
of the products concerned from economies affected by the measures) introduced during each 
reporting period, and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Stockpile of import -restrictive measures  
3.22.  Estimating the roll -back of import -restrictive measures, and eventually the overall stockpile, 
is made complex by the fact that many temporary measures remain in place beyond the envisaged 
termination date. Moreover, the Secretariat does not always receiv e accurate information on 
changes to recorded measures. As a result, the figures below are estimates based on the information 
recorded in the TMDB since 2009. These estimates are conditioned by the availability of termination 
dates of the import -restrictiv e measures and of the HS  codes of products covered.5 
Table  3.7 Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive trade -related measures , 
2015 -22 
(USD  billion, unless otherwise indicated)   
2015 2016 2017 2018  2019  2020  2021 2022a 
Total imports (world)  16,360  15,812  17,587  19,402  18,883  17,625  22,082  25,169  
Total import restrictions in force  598 570 814 1,457  1,646  1,516  2,042  2,315  
Share in world imports (%)  3.66 3.61 4.63 7.51 8.72 8.60 9.25 9.20 
Total import restrictions  
terminated  1.51 38.09  3.88 5.45 13.12  n.a. n.a n.a 
Share in world imports (%)  0.01 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.07 n.a. n.a n.a 
n.a. Not applicable. In 2022, for two measures the date of termination is 31  December. These will be 
taken into account as terminated in 2023.  
a 2022 figures are provisional.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat calculations, based on UN Comtrade database.  
 
5 Only import measures where HS codes were available are included in the calculation.  
201 214 228 
101 
79 588 747 
441 
106 164 
65 
0100200300400500600700800
mid-Oct12 -
mid-Oct13mid-Oct13 -
mid-Oct14mid-Oct14 -
mid-Oct15mid-Oct15 -
mid-Oct16mid-Oct16 -
mid-Oct17mid-Oct17 -
mid-Oct18mid-Oct18 -
mid-Oct19mid-Oct19 -
mid-Oct20mid-Oct20 -
mid-Oct21mid-Oct21 -
mid-Oct22mid-Oct22 -
mid-May23Trade coverage of new import -restrictive measures in each reporting period (not 
cumulative)
(USD billion)
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Note:  [see text].WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 19 - 
 
  3.23.  Table  3.7 and Chart  3.6 show that the stockpile of import restrictions in force has grown  
steadily (and in fact since 2009) – in value terms and as a percentage of world imports – and that 
a significant increase in both took place from 2017 to 2018. This specific jump is largely explained 
by measures introduced on steel and aluminium, and by v arious tariff increases introduced as part 
of bilateral trade tensions. Global imports decreased substantially in 2020 compared to 2019. The 
decline was also reflected in total imports and in the value of the import restrictions in force. Global 
trade grew  again in 2021, due to rising export and import prices as inflation became a global 
phenomenon.  
3.24.  For 2022, the trade covered by import restrictions in force was estimated at USD  2,315  billion, 
representing 9.2% of world merchandise imports.6 
Chart  3.6 Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive measures on goods since 2009  
 
Note:  The cumulative trade coverage estimated by the Secretariat is based on information available in the 
TMDB on import measu res recorded since 2009 and considered to have a trade -restrictive effect. The 
estimates include import measures for which HS codes were available. The figures do not include trade 
remedy measures. The import values were sourced by the UN Comtrade database . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.25.  The following box on export restriction s on critical raw materials has been contributed by the 
OECD.  
Box 3.1 Export restrictions on critical raw materials have increased more than five -fold 
in the last decade  
Given widespread demand and concentrated supply, international trade will play a key role in satisfying the 
rapidly growing demand for critical raw materials (CRMs), such as rare earth minerals, lithium, cobalt, and 
nickel, which a re essential for renewable energy and digital technologies. This is particularly the case in the 
short to medium term, as scaling up of new mining capacities and recycling of CRMs take time to 
operationalize. Indeed, between 2007 -09 and 2017 -19, the value of trade in CRMs expanded faster than 
overall merchandise trade, growing at 38% (vs 31% for all merchandise trade). This average also hides 
significant peaks, with trade in lithium increasing by 438%, and trade in ores and minerals by 57%. Against 
this bac kground, the growing use of export restrictions on CRMs documented recently by the OECD is cause 
for concern.  
 
6 Tentative figures based on 2022 and 2021 import data and measures recorded up  to 15 May 2023. 
73126234306407467598 5708141,4571,646
1,5162,0422,315
0.60.81.31.72.22.53.7 3.64.67.58.7 8.69.39.2
012345678910
05001,0001,5002,0002,500
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Import restrictions in force (left axis) % of world imports (right axis)Cumulative trade coverage of import -restrictive measures on goods in force since 2009
(USD billion)
Source:  WTO Secretariat.(%)
Note:  [See text in report].WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 20 - 
 
  The annually updated OECD database on export restrictions on raw materials shows that export restrictions 
on CRMs have seen a five -fold increase s ince the OECD began collecting data in 2009 (Figure 1), with 10% of 
global trade in CRMs now facing at least one export restriction measure. Export restrictions on ores and 
minerals − the raw materials located upstream in CRM supply chains − grew faster th an restrictions in the 
other segments of the CRM supply chain. This correlates with the increasing concentration of upstream 
production, imports, and exports.  
Export taxes were the largest contributor to the increased global stock of export restrictions an d became the 
most frequently used type of restriction in 2020 (Figure 2). This may be related to the fact that, under WTO 
rules, quantitative restrictions on exports are generally prohibited, while export taxes are not.  
Export restrictions on raw materials  undermine the economic viability − and thus decrease output  − of 
domestic extractive industries and benefit domestic downstream users of these materials to the detriment of 
foreign users. Export taxes or quantitative export restrictions, such as export qu otas or even bans, may also 
contribute to raising world market prices for the CRMs in question, particularly if the exporter holds a large 
share of the market. Such restrictions also create incentives for other producing countries to introduce similar 
restrictions, placing even more upward pressure on international prices and in turn increasing incentives to 
restrict exports. Such spiralling increases in commodity prices have been both a reflection of, and a factor 
behind, escalating export restrictions on raw materials.  
Export restrictions on CRMs may also undermine environmental goals by hindering the production and 
diffusion of green technologies. Moreover, while some – such as export restrictions on waste and scrap – may 
be aimed at developing the circul ar economy, this may not serve global environmental ends if it hinders 
processing in the most efficient locations or undermines the economies of scale needed to develop circularity.  
While the impacts of export restrictions will depend on a range of factors , including other policies (such as 
subsidies ), the trend towards increasing export restrictions may be playing a role in key international markets, 
with potentially sizeable effects on both t he availability and prices of these materials. To explore cooperative 
options for alleviating harmful export restrictions, it will be important to continue work to better understand 
the motivations of the countries using them and the effects they have on t rading partners.  
Further information on Raw Materials Critical for the Green Transition: Production, International 
Trade and Export restrictions , including access to the OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial 
Raw Materials, is available at: https://www.oecd.org/trade/topics/trade -in-raw-materials/ . 
Figure 1 Count of export restrictions on industrial raw materials  
 
Source:  OECD Database on Industrial Raw Materials.  
02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,00016,00018,00020,000
Source:   OECD database on industrial raw materials.Count of export restrictions on industrial raw materialsWT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 21 - 
 
  Figure 2 Initial and current incidence of export restrictions by type of measure  
(Initial incidence (2009) of export restrictions by imposing country, increase factor and current stock)  
 
Source:  OECD.  
3.1.2   COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures  
3.26.  During the review period , 17 COVID -19 measures on goods – mostly facilitating measures – 
were communicated by 36 Members7 and 1 Observer.8 Most of these measures were new 
measures  (12) with several (7) being implemented during the review period. Out of the 17 
pandemic -related measures , 10 targeted imports (58.8%), 6 were export measures (35.2%) and 
1 was a more general measure. Most of these pandemic -related measures (10 out of 17) were 
temporary in nature and either have been already terminated or will be phased out.  
3.27.  Overall, since the outbreak of the pandemic, 454 trade and trade -related measures in the 
area of goods have been implemented by WTO Members and Observers (Table  3.8)9, of which 251 
(55.3%) were of a trade -facilitating nature and 203 (44.7%)  were trade -restrictive.  
3.28.  During the review period, Members continued to phase out pandemic -related measures , and 
in particular restrictive ones. According to information received by the Secretariat, as of 
mid-May 2023, 130 (51.8%) of the COVID -19 trade -facilitating and 170 (83.7%) of the 
trade-restrictive measures have been repealed.  
Table  3.8 Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures since the outbreak  of 
the pandemic  
 Facilitating  Phased out  Restrictive  Phased out  Total  
Import  207 112 20 11 227 
Export  28 12 174 152 202 
Other  16 6 9 7 25 
Total  251 130 203 170 454 
Note:  Revis ed data reflect changes to fine -tune and update available information.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
7 Australia, Brazil, Costa  Rica, European  Union  (EU27 and its member States are counted separately), 
India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Türkiye.  
8 Azerbaijan.  
9 Measures implemented in the context of the pandemic up can be viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/covid19_e.htm .  
36%
24%
17%
7%
7%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
0%0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Export tax
Licensing requirement
Other export measures
Export prohibition
Fiscal tax on exports
Export quota
Minimum export price / price reference
for exports
Restriction on customs clearance point
for exports
Domestic market obligation
Export surtax
Qualified exporters list
VAT tax rebate reduction / withdrawal
Captive miningFinal stock
27%
31%
15%
10%
9%
1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
0%
0%
0%0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Export tax
Licensing requirement
Other export measures
Export prohibition
Fiscal tax on exports
Export quota
Minimum export price / price
reference for exports
Restriction on customs
clearance point for exports
Domestic market obligation
Export surtax
Qualified exporters list
VAT tax rebate reduction /
withdrawal
Captive miningInitial stockWT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 22 - 
 
  Chart  3.7 Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by 
mid-May 2023  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.29.  About 82.5% of the trade -facilitating measures taken since the beginning of the pandemic 
were import measures aiming to reduce or eliminate import tariffs and import taxes. Certain 
WTO Members and Observers reduced their import tariffs on a variety of goods such as personal 
protective equipment (PPE), sanitizers, disinfectants, medical equipment, and medicine/drugs. In 
many cases, tariff reductions were also accompanied by exemptions from VAT and other taxes. 
Extensions, often more than once,  of some measures were implemented, while other measures have 
simply remained in force.  
3.30.  Most of the COVID -19 trade -restrictive measures (about 85.7%) were export -related. These 
measures came in the form of temporary export bans or prohibitions, export lice nce requirements 
or export authorization mechanisms targeting a variety of goods such as PPEs, drugs, vaccines, 
diagnostics, medical supplies and products, and certain food products. The roll -back of these export 
restrictions taken in the early stages of t he pandemic continued during the review period. As of 
mid-May 2023, 21 COVID -19-related export restrictions were still in place.  
3.31.  The trade coverage of the COVID -19 trade -facilitating measures implemented since the 
outbreak of the pandemic was estimated to amount to USD  383.0  billion , and that of trade -restrictive 
to USD  263.0  billion .10 Members and Observers have continued phasing out the measures 
implemented in response to the pandemic. The trade coverage of the COVID -19 trade -restrictive 
measures repealed  since the beginning of the pandemic was estimated at USD  245.0  billion  and that 
of trade -facilitating measures at USD  287.0  billion  (Chart  3.8). 
Chart  3.8 Trade coverage of COVID -19 trade and trade -related me asures on goods, by 
mid-May 2023 in USD  billion  
 
Note:  Values are rounded.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
10 Including imports and exports and based on annual 2021 trade figures.  
121 130 33 170 
Trade-facilitating measures in force Trade-facilitating measures phased out
Trade-restrictive measures in force Trade-restrictive measures phased out454Number of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by mid-May 
2023
(by number)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.
96 287 18 245 
Trade-facilitating measures in force Trade-facilitating measures phased out
Trade-restrictive measures in force Trade-restrictive measures phased out646Trade coverage of COVID -19 trade and trade -related measures on goods, by mid-May 2023
(USD billion)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 23 - 
 
  3.1.3   Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine and the food crisis  
3.32.  The war in Ukraine has continued to impact the global economy negatively, particularl y trade 
in agricultural products, but also with ramifications spreading to multiple other sectors and resulting 
in upward pressure on prices. During the review period, WTO Members and Observers extended 
existing and introduced new measures affecting the ex port and import of food, feed, and fertilizers. 
As opposed to measures introduced in the first months of the war  in Ukraine , measures introduced 
in this review period could not always and unambiguously be directly linked to the war . More 
frequently, measures were introduced in response to the ongoing food crisis, decreased agricultural 
yields, rising energy costs and inflation. All measures identified were submitted to the relevant 
delegations for verification.  
Export restrictions on food,  feed, and fertilizers  
3.33.  Since the outbreak of the war in late February  2022, the WTO Secretariat has identified 
101 export -restrictive measures introduced by 30 WTO Members and 6 Observers11 on agricultural 
commodities, of which 93 applied to food and feed (92%) and 8 targeted fertilizer exports (8%). As 
of mid -May 2023, 38 of all identified export restrictions had been rolled back, bringing the number 
of restrictions in force to 63 .12 
3.34.  Since 24  February  2022, the trade coverage of the export -restrictive meas ures introduced by 
all WTO Members and Observers was estimated at USD  121.4  billion , of which USD  13.1 billion  
referred to fertilizers. The trade coverage of the repealed export restrictions has been estimated at 
USD 96.9 billion , of which USD  7.9 billion  on fertilizers. Thus, the trade coverage of export 
restrictions that are still in place was estimated at USD  24.5 billion . 
3.35.  During the review period, export restrictions targeted a wide range of agricultural products. 
However, the beginning of 2023 saw a ri se of export restrictions on onion, garlic, and other root 
vegetables, particularly in the Central Asian region to respond to extreme climate events and 
reduced output. Wheat and other grains remained the most common products falling under export 
restricti ons during the review period.  
3.36.  The nature of export restrictions remained diverse and included export bans, quotas, duties, 
licensing requirements and other restrictions (Chart  3.9). 
 
11 Afghanistan, Algeria (Observer), Argen tina, Armenia, Azerbaijan (Observer),  Bangladesh, 
Belarus  (Observer), Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina  Faso, China, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, State of Kuwait, Kyrgyz  Republic,  Lebanon (Observer) , Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Republic of Moldova, Morocco, North  Macedonia , Pakistan,  Russian  Federation , Serbia (Observer),  Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, and  Uzbekistan (Observer).  
12 Implemented by 27 Members and 6 Observers: Afghanistan, Algeria ( Observer ), Argentina, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan ( Observer ), Bangladesh, Belarus ( Observer ), Plurinational State of Bolivia, Burkina  Faso, Egypt, 
Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Kazakhst an, State of Kuwait, Kyrgyz  Republic , Lebanon 
(Observer ), Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Russian  Federation , Serbia ( Observer ), Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine and Uzbekistan ( Observer ). WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 24 - 
 
  Chart  3.9 Number of export restrictions on food, feed, and fertili zers in force, 
January  2022-mid-May 2023 
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Import -facilitating measures on food, feed, and fertilizers  
3.37.  Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the WTO Secretariat has also identified several 
import -facilitating measures on food, feed, and fertilizers. As of mid -May 2023, 92 import -facilitating 
measures on various agricultural products were recorded for 64 Members and 3 Observers.13 During 
the reporting p eriod, 38 new  import -facilitating measures were implemented. Out of all identified 
import -facilitating measures, 25 had been phased out or expired by mid -May 2023. Currently, 67 
import -facilitating measures remain in place.14 
3.38.  Since 24  February  2022, the tr ade coverage of all import -facilitating measures introduced was 
estimated at USD  110.0  billion , out of which USD  13.8 billion  referred to fertilizers. The trade 
coverage of terminated import -facilitating measures was estimated at USD  34.0 billion , out of w hich 
USD 0.6 billion  referred to fertilizers. Therefore, the trade coverage of import -facilitating measures 
on food, feed and fertilizers that are still in place was estimated at USD  76.0 billion . 
3.39.  Import -facilitating measures targeted a wide range of agric ultural products, including 
vegetable oils, cereals, rice, meats, and poultry as well as fertilizers. These measures came in the 
form of reduction of import tariffs, increases of import quotas and introduction of tariff free quotas. 
Other measures include exemptions from value added taxes and the lifting of import permit 
requirements (Chart  3.10).  
 
13 Azerbaijan ( Observer ), Arme nia, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus ( Observer ), Brazil, Botswana, China, 
Colombia, Costa  Rica, Dominican  Republic , Egypt, El  Salvador , Eswatini, European  Union  (EU-27 and its 
member States are counted separately), Guatemala, India, Iraq ( Observer ), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz  Republic , 
Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, New  Zealand , 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian  Federation , South  Africa , Switzerland, Chinese  Taipei , Türkiye, Ukraine, 
and Viet  Nam. 
14 Implemented by 63 Members and 3 Observers: Azerbaijan (Observer), Armenia, Argentina, 
Bangladesh, Belarus (Observer), Brazil, Botswana, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, 
European Union (EU 27 and its member States are counted sep arately), Guatemala, India, Iraq (Observer), 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Switzerland, Chi nese 
Taipei, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Viet Nam.  
13372229323643454747535253545863
5960
586059616068
6362686768
66
6464646463
01020304050607080
Exports / Ban Exports / Quantitative restrictions (QRs)
Exports / Duties Exports / Other
Export measures totalExport restrictions on food, feed and fertilizers, in force by mid -May 2023
(Number)WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 25 - 
 
  Chart  3.10 Number of import -facilitating measures on food, feed, and fertili zers in force, 
January  2022 -mid-May 2023 
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Import -restrictive measures on food, feed, and fertilizers  
3.40.  During the reporting period, several measures restricting impor ts of a number of agricultural 
products, including wheat , were identified. In contrast to the previous reporting period, when 
WTO Members and Observers mainly focused on facilitating import of agricultural commodities to 
reduce price increases and stabiliz e domestic supply, some of the current import restrictions appear 
to be designed to prevent excess supply of imported agricultural commodities and to protect 
domestic producers of these products.  
3.41.  At the end of February  2023, the WTO Secretariat took stock of developments in the context 
of the war in Ukraine. Box 3. 2 below provides the main conclusions and takeaways identified in two 
Secretariat papers.  
114411131517242833364447515357626262636464656575
646568676970706970
6867
01020304050607080
Imports / Tariff Imports / Tax
Imports / Quantitative restrictions (QRs) Imports / Customs procedures
Imports / Other Import measures totalImport -facilitating measures on food, feed and fertilizers, in force by mid -May 2023
(Number)WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 26 - 
 
  Box 3.2 Taking stock on the one -year anniversary of the war i n Ukraine  
In late February -early March  2023, two WTO Secretariat papers marked the first anniversary of the war in 
Ukraine by taking stock of the war's impact on international trade and trade policy. Secretariat research 
papers do not represent the positio ns or opinions of the WTO and its Members and are without prejudice to 
Members' rights and obligations under the WTO.  
The first note titled " One year of war in Ukraine: Assessing the impact on global trade and 
development"a was released by the Economic Research and Statistics Division. It notes that despite the 
trade -distorting effect of the war in Ukraine, and previously the COVID -19 pandemic, the multilateral trading 
system has withstood this disruption relatively well. Ac cording to the note, global trade continued to increase 
in 2022, including for products greatly affected by the war, highlighting the resilience of the multilateral 
trading system.  
The positive trade performance of countries dependent on imports from the c onflict region was facilitated by 
their ability to switch their import supply to unaffected economies. For example, Ethiopia, which used to rely 
on Ukraine and the Russian  Federation for 45% of its wheat imports, reacted to the loss of most supplies from 
these two countries by increasing purchases from other producers.  
According to the note, prices rose for goods most affected by the war, but by less than expected at the 
beginning of the war. Among these products, prices increased between 4.4% for palladium  – a key input in 
the production of catalytic converters in the automotive sector – and 24.2% for maize. While these price 
increases are substantial, they remain significantly lower than the gloomiest predictions. Simulations run by 
WTO economists in a sce nario of cascading export restrictions on food suggested that wheat prices could 
increase by up to 85% in some low -income regions. However, the actual increase was 17%.  
The WTO Trade Monitoring Update on  "A year of turbulence on food and fertilizers market s"b further 
explored the fluidity of trade -restrictive measures initiated since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. According 
to the note, irrespective of existing export restrictions on food, feed, and fertilizers prior to the outbreak of 
the war, a noti ceable spike took place after 24  February  2022. It points out that immediately following the 
outbreak of the war, several export restrictions on wheat, barley, sugar and seeds from Ukraine and the 
Russian  Federation were implemented. The fear of severe dom estic shortages of basic foodstuffs appeared to 
have pushed other countries to also introduce export restrictions on these products or their close substitutes.  
The note indicates that the nature of export restrictions became more diversified over time. Whi le the first 
few months of the war saw authorities resorting to export bans and export quotas, later when global food and 
fertilizer markets began to stabilize, recourse to less restrictive measures increased. Thus, export restrictions 
started to include l icensing requirements and duties. Furthermore, the note observes that while the initial 
implementation of export restrictions was often directly attributed to the war, subsequent measures were 
introduced with reference to the need to ensure domestic supply  and to contain inflationary pressures. 
Therefore, it appears that with time the initial direct linkage between the war and the implementation of 
export restrictions became less obvious.  
Furthermore, the note points out that during the first three months f ollowing the outbreak of the war, new 
export restrictions mainly targeted a relatively limited range of agricultural products, including various grains, 
sugar, vegetable oils and fertilizers. Later, the scope of export restrictions expanded to a much wider  range 
to include rice, poultry and poultry products (eggs), meat, dairy products, fruits, and vegetables.  
The note concludes that ensuring transparency and proportionality in the context of the implementation of 
export restrictions, especially in times of crisis, is imperative to provide predictability and reduce uncertainty 
in international markets.  
a Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/oneyukr_e.pdf . 
b Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/trdev_02mar23_e.pdf . 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.42.  In the weeks and months following the start of the war in Ukraine, numer ous sanctions were 
imposed on the Russian  Federation  as well as on Belarus. Several countermeasures were also 
implemented by the Russian  Federation  and Belarus in response to these sanctions. The 
overwhelming majority of these measures were not specificall y trade -related, and applied to the 
financial, military, civil aviation, and energy sectors, as well as to specific entities and individuals. 
Most of these sanctions were generally announced and implemented with reference to security 
considerations.  
3.43.  In rec ent meetings of the T PRB to discuss the Director -General's Trade Monitoring Reports, 
delegations have stressed their right to implement sanctions as part of commercial policy, often with 
reference to the essential security interests listed in Article  XXI(a ) and  (b) of the GATT  1994. WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 27 - 
 
  3.2  Trade remedies15 
3.44.  WTO Members initiated 112 trade remedies investigations ( i.e. anti-dumping, countervailing 
duty, and safeguards investigations) in 2022, a drop of nearly 47% from the 213 initiations in 2021. 
Following a significant increase in 2021, the total number of trade remedy measures applied by 
Members in 2022 (123) fell bel ow the average total number of measures between 2008 -22 (18 5). 
3.45.  Anti-dumping actions are the most numerous among trade remedy initiations and measures 
applied. Since 2020, most anti -dumping actions have targeted products in the metals, chemicals 
and plastic s, and rubber sectors. Metals and chemical products accounted for the largest share of 
countervailing initiations.  
3.46.  Safeguard measures are subject to different rules and timelines compar ed to anti -dumping 
and countervailing actions, as they apply to all exp orting countries/customs territories. In 2022, 
initiations of safeguard investigations  also dropped significantly compared to previous years.  
Anti-dumping measures16 
3.47.  The total number of anti-dumping initiations decreased by 75% between 2020 and 2022  
(Table  3.9). While anti -dumping investigations do not necessarily lead to the imposition of measures, 
a decrease in the number of investigations initiated is an early indicator of a likely decrease in the 
number of measures imposed. Between 2020 and 2022 , a tota l of 497 anti -dumping measures were 
applied. As it can take up to 18 months for an anti -dumping investigation to be concluded, the 
measures applied in each  period may not necessarily be the result of investigations initiated in the 
same period.  
Table  3.9 Number of initiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, by 
Member , 2020 -22 
Reporting Member  2020  2021  2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Argentina  6 11 15 10 9 10 
Australia  18 0 6 8 3 1 
Bahrain, Kingdom of; 
Kuwait, State of; Oman; 
Qatar; Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of; United Arab 
Emiratesa 1 2 12 1 0 0 
Brazil  9 0 11 6 0 5 
Canada  24 5 6 20 2 4 
Chile 2 0 0 0 0 0 
China  4 9 0 22 2 2 
Colombia  4 0 0 3 0 0 
Egypt  10 2 0 11 1 1 
European  Unionb 12 8 11 11 3 8 
Ghana  0 1 0 0 0 0 
India 92 12 30 49 29 7 
Indonesia  2 0 0 0 0 2 
Japan  1 1 2 1 0 2 
Korea, Republic of  3 1 7 3 5 3 
Malaysia  11 6 1 3 0 0 
 
15 This Section  is without prejudice to Members' right to take trade remedy actions under the WTO.  
16 Anti-dumping and countervailing investigations are counted based on the number ( n) of exporting 
countries or cu stoms territories affected by an investigation. Thus, one anti -dumping or countervailing 
investigation involving imports from n countries/customs territories is counted as n investigations.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 28 - 
 
  Reporting Member  2020  2021  2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Mexico  7 4 4 6 4 1 
Morocco  3 0 0 1 1 2 
New Zealand  4 0 2 1 1 1 
Pakistan  3 4 9 7 1 10 
Paraguay  0 0 0 0 1 0 
Peru 3 0 0 2 1 0 
Philippines  0 0 1 0 0 0 
Russian  Federationc 4 2 2 5 0 2 
South  Africad 4 3 13 0 3 10 
Chinese  Taipei  5 0 0 5 3 0 
Thailand  13 1 3 12 0 5 
Türkiye  3 2 9 1 0 7 
Ukraine  6 6 12 8 0 0 
United  Kingdome,f 0 0 1 0 1 1 
United  States  89 21 24 82 19 15 
Uruguay  1 0 0 0 0 1 
Viet Nam 11 6 5 9 0 3 
Total  355 107 186 287 89 103 
a Notified by all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member States collectively, as investigations are 
initiated by the GCC regional investigating authority on behalf of all GCC member States.  
b The European  Union  is counted as one (28 member States until 31  January  2020, 27 member States 
thereafter).  
c  Notified by the Russian  Federation , but investigations are initiated by the Eurasian Economic Union 
on behalf of all of its members, i.e. Armenia, Kyrgyz  Republic , Kazakhstan, and Belarus 
(non-WTO Member) collectively.  
d Notified by South  Africa , but investigations are initiated at the lev el of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) on behalf of its member States (also for Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho and Namibia).  
e The United  Kingdom  withdrew from the European  Union  as of 1  February  2020. The European  Union  
and the United  Kingdom  commun icated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European  Union  law, with a few limited exceptions, continued to be applicable to 
and in the United  Kingdom . See WTO documents WT/LET/1462, 29  January  2020; and WT/GC/206, 
1 February  2020. 
f Member State of the European  Union  until 1  February  2020. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.48.  The number of initiations of anti -dumping investigations increased significantly in 2020 
compared with the previous years (Chart  3.11). The 355 initiations in 2020 represent the peak since 
2002 but is lower than the all -time high of 372 seen in 2001. The increase in the initiations in 2020 
also led to an increase in total number of measures applied in 2021. WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 29 - 
 
  Chart  3.11 Number of initiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, 
2008 -22 
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.49.  There was little change in terms of the products affected by anti -dumping investigations 
initiated between 2020 and 2022, with most initiations targeting products in the metals, chemicals, 
and plastics, and rubber sectors.  
3.50.  During the review period,  the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices held two meetings , 
on 26 October  2022 and 3  May 202317, where 40 trade concerns wer e raised with respect to 
anti-dumping practices. Most of these concerns (70%) were raised on AD actions by China (6), 
the European  Union  (4), the Republic of Korea (3), Viet  Nam (3), Egypt (2), India (2) , Morocco (2), 
South  Africa (2), Ukraine (2) and the United  States  (3). The remaining trade concerns were raised 
on AD actions by Australia (1), Brazil (1), Canada (1), EAEU member States (Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz  Republic , and the Russian  Federation ) (1) ), Egypt (1), Israe l (1), Malaysia (1), 
the Philippines  (1), Chinese  Taipei  (1), Thailand (1), and the United  Kingdom  (1). 
3.51.  Other additional issues and concerns were raised with respect to (i)  the continued application 
of anti-dumping  measures resulting from sunset reviews; ( ii) the length of US anti-dumping 
measures  – prolonged measures; (iii)  sunset reviews conducted by the European  Union  leading to  
the continued imposition of prolonged anti-dumping measures ; (iv) the European  Union 's Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2321 and Regulation  (EU) 2018/825; (v)  the United  States ' non-market economy (NME) 
treatment of certain countries in anti-dumping  investigations; (vi) the NME methodology in 
anti-dumping  investigations; (vii) the importance of prompt notifications for transparency purposes; 
(viii) the transitional reviews, continued application by the United  Kingdom  of the European  Union 's 
anti-dumping  measures conducted after Brexit and lengthy transitional reviews; ( ix) the 
anti-circumvention inquiries frequently initiated in recent years by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce; (x) the negative effects of the geopolitical situation on the Ukrainian economy, its 
infrastructure, vital production facilities, capacities, cost of productio n, production, export potential 
and the ability of the interested parties to defend their interests in anti-dumping  investigations; and 
(xi) the United  States ' sunset reviews attributing single country rates.  
 
17 WTO documents G/ADP/M/62, 18  January  2023 and G/ADP/M/63 (forthc oming), respectively.  
218 217
173
165208287
236229298
249
202215355
186
89143 143
134
99121161 159182
162201205
152
107287
103
050100150200250300350400
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Initiations Measures
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Number of initiations of anti -dumping investigations and measures applied, 2008 -22WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 30 - 
 
  Countervailing measures  
3.52.  While the overall number of initiations of countervailing duty (C VD) investigations  has 
decreased significantly since 2020, the number of countervailing measures fluctuated  over the 
review period  (Table 3.10) . As with anti -dumping, CVD investigations do not necessar ily lead to 
measures being applied. However, it can be concluded that the high number of initiations in 2020 
caused a significant increase in the number of measures applied in 2021.  
Table  3.10 Number of initia tions of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 
by Member , 2020 -22 
Reporting Member  2020  2021  2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Australia  7 0 1 2 0 0 
Brazil  0 0 2 0 0 2 
Canada  4 1 1 4 2 2 
China  4 2 0 1 0 0 
Colombia  0 1 0 0 0 0 
European  Uniona 3 3 3 1 1 3 
India 7 4 0 2 3 3 
United  Kingdomb,c 0 0 0 0 2 0 
United  States  30 13 11 30 11 8 
Viet Nam 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Total  56 24 18 41 19 18 
a The European  Union  is counted as one (28 member States until 31  January  2020). 
b The United  Kingdom  withdrew from the European  Union  as of 1  February  2020. The European  Union  
and the United  Kingdom  communicated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European  Union  law, with a few limited exceptions, continued to be applicable to 
and in the United  Kingdom . See WTO documents WT/LET/1462, 29  January  2020; and WT/GC/206, 
1 February  2020. 
c Member State of the European  Union  until 1  February  2020. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat . WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 31 - 
 
  Chart  3.12 Number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 
2008 -22 
 
Source : WTO Secretariat . 
3.53.  Chart  3.12 reflects annual figures on initiations of CVD investigations and measures applied 
between 2008 and 2022. It shows an upward trend in countervailing initiations from 2015 to 2020, 
notwithstanding some fluctuation in 2019. Following its peak in 2020, the nu mber of CVD initiations  
subsequently decreased significantly.  Metals and chemical products accounted for the largest share 
of the initiations reported over the review period.  
3.54.  At the regular meetings of the  Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  on 
25 October  2022 and 2  May 202318, 11 trade concerns were raised with respect to countervailing 
duty actions by Brazil (1), China (1), the European  Union  (3), India (2), the United  States  (3) and 
Viet Nam (1). 
3.55.  Additional concerns were raised with respect to (i)  the elimination of export subsidies by  
Members that received extensions under Article  27.4 of the SCM  Agreement ; (ii) the low and 
declining level of compliance with the notification and transparency obligations in the 
SCM Agreement ; (iii) the requests for information pursuant to Article s 25.8 and 25.9 (proposal on 
procedures from the United  States ); (iv)  the request for information on allegedly discriminatory 
subsidies policies and measures of the United  States ; (v) subsidies  and overcapacity; (vi) the use of 
adverse facts available by the United  States  in various CVD investigations; (vii)  the 
CVD investigations by the European  Union  regarding the so -called transnational subsidies; (viii) the 
subsidy transparency and China's p ublication and inquiry point obligations under China's protocol of 
accession; (ix) the proposed amendment to procedures for review of new and full subsidy 
notifications ; and (x) the European  Union  Foreign Subsidies Regulation.  
Safeguard measures  
3.56.  Safeguard measures are temporary measures applied in response to increased imports of 
goods that are causing serious injury, and are applied on products from all sources, i.e. all exporting 
 
18 WTO documents G/SCM/M/121, 2  February  2023 and G/SCM/M/123 (forthcoming), respectively.  
1628
925
233345
31344155
3656
1819
11
919
91013121523
182835
2441
18
0102030405060
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Initiations Measures
Source:  WTO Secretariat.Number of initiations of countervailing investigations and measures applied, 2008 -22WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 32 - 
 
  countries/customs territories.19 Safeguard measures are subject to  different rules and timelines than 
anti-dumping and countervailing measures and are, therefore, not directly comparable to these other 
types of trade remedies.  
Table  3.11 Number of initiations of safeguard in vestigations and measures applied, by 
Member , 2022 -22 
Reporting Member  2020  2021  2022  
Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  Initiations  Measures  
Bahrain, Kingdom of; 
Kuwait, State of; 
Oman; Qatar; Saudi 
Arabia, Kingdom of; 
United Arab Emiratesa 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa  Rica 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Ecuador  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt  1 0 0 1 0 0 
European  Unionb 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala  0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Indonesia  4 5 0 4 0 0 
Jordan  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Madagascar  0 1 0 0 1 0 
Malaysia  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Morocco  0 2 1 0 1 0 
Panama  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Philippines  5 0 0 0 0 1 
Russian  Federationc 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South  Africad 2 1 0 1 0 0 
Thailand  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia  0 0 1 0 1 0 
Türkiye 2 1 1 1 0 1 
Ukraine  4 1 5 2 0 0 
United  Kingdome NA1 NA1 0 0 0 0 
United  States  1 0 0 0 0 0 
Total  22 12 9 9 4 2 
a Notified by all GCC member States collectively as investigations are initiated by the GCC regional 
investigating authority on behalf of all GCC member States.  
b The European  Union  is counted as one (28 member States until 31  January  2020, 27 member States 
thereafter).  
c Notified by the Russian  Federation , but investigations are initiated by the Eurasian Economic Union 
on behalf of all of its members, i.e. Armenia, Kyrgyz  Republic , Kazakhstan (which became a WTO 
Member on 30  November  2015), and Belarus (non -WTO Member) collectively.  
d Notified by South  Africa, but investigations are initiated at the level of the Southern African Customs 
Union, i.e. also in respect of Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, and Namibia.  
 
19 Except for  exporting Members covered by the special and differential treatment provided for 
developing countr y Members  in Article  9.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.   WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 33 - 
 
  e The United  Kingdom  withdrew from the European  Union  as of 1  February  2020. The European  Union  
and the United  Kingdom  communicated that during the transition period, which ended on 
31 December  2020, European  Union  law, with a few limited exceptions, continued to be applicable to 
and in the United  Kingdom . See WTO documents WT/LET/1462, 29  January  2020; a nd WT/GC/206, 
1 February  2020. 
f Member State of the European  Union  until 1  February  2020. 
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.57.  In 2022, there were four safeguard investigations initiated and two measures applied  (Table 
3.11) . This is a significant decrease compared to previous years, especially in terms of initiations. 
The initiation figure stood at 30 in 2019, which was the second highest since 1995. Since then, a 
decline to the current level has been observed.  
Chart  3.13 Number of initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, 
2008 -22 
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat . 
3.58.  At the regular meetings of the Committee on Safeguards on 24  October  2022 and 
1 May 202320, 18 concerns were raised on safeguard investig ations by Costa  Rica (1), 
the European  Union  (1), India (2), Indonesia (3), Madagascar (3), Morocco (2), the Philippines (1), 
Tunisia (1), Türkiye (1), the United  Kingdom  (1), the United  States  (1) and Viet  Nam (1). 
3.3  Sanitary and phytosanitary  (SPS)  measures21 
3.59.  This Section  covers SPS transparency -related matters, including specific trade concerns 
(STCs) discussed in SPS Committee meetings, during the period 1  October  2022 to 31  March  2023. 
Most regular notifications related to human health and food s afety regulations, while most 
emergency notifications related to animal health/animal diseases. During the review period, 
Members met in October and November  2022 and in February and March  2023 to advance the work 
programme that emerged from the MC12 SPS D eclaration on Responding to Modern SPS Challenges. 
The outcome of these discussions will be reported to Ministers at MC13.  
 
20 WTO documents G/SG/M/61, 1 February 2023 and G/SG/M/62 (forthcoming), respectively.  
21 Information  presented in this Section  was retrieved from the ePing SPS&TBT Platform  and in the Trade 
Concern Database . See also annual reports  in WTO document G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.15 , G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.23 , 
1 March  2023. 
1025
20
1224
1823
17
11
81630
22
9
4610
411
6811 11
69
712 12
9
2
05101520253035
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Initiations MeasuresNumber of initiations of safeguard investigations and measures applied, 2008 -22
Source:    WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 34 - 
 
  3.60.  Under the SPS  Agreement, WTO Members are obliged to provide an advance notice of 
intention to introduce new or modified SPS measures22, or to notify immediately when emergency 
measures are imposed. The main objective of complying with SPS notification obligations is to inform 
other Members about new or changed regulations that may significantly affect international trade. 
Therefore, an increased number of notifications does not automatically imply greater use of 
protectionist measures, but rather enhanced transparency regarding food safety and animal and 
plant health measures, most of which are, presumably, legitimate health -protection m easures.  
3.61.  During the review period 1,106 regular and emergency notifications were submitted to the 
WTO (including revisions and addenda). Compared with the previous six -month period, regular 
notifications (including revisions and addenda) increased by appro ximately 7% while emergency 
notifications (including addenda) decreased by around 36%.  
Chart  3.14 Number of SPS notifications, including regular, emergency, revisions, and 
addenda  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.62.  During the period under review, 71% of regular and emergency notifications (including 
revisions and addenda) were submitted by developing and least -developed countries (LDCs) 
(Chart  3.14) . In October  2022, Namibia submitted its first SPS notif ication.23 In addition, four African 
LDCs (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) were among the top 10 notifiers of regular 
notifications during the review period (Chart  3.15). Notifications by these Members included draft 
East African standards, submitte d jointly.  The number of regular SPS notifications including revisions 
and addenda assigned "East African Community" increased by approximately 38% compared to the 
previous six -month period.  
 
22 Transparency obligations are contained in Article  7 and Annex  B of the SPS  Agreement.  
23 WTO document G/SPS/N/NAM/1 , 18 October  2022. 
875
578939
659260
136167
123
02004006008001,0001,2001,400
All Members Developing-country
MembersAll Members Developing-country
MembersWTO_SPS.1   Number of SPS notifications, including regular, emergency, revisions and addenda
Source: WTO Secretariat.Regular notifications Emergency notificationsApr. 2022 -Sep. 2022 Oct. 2022 -Mar. 2023WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 35 - 
 
  Chart  3.15 Top 10 notifiers from October  2022 to March  2023 (regular including 
revisions and addenda)  
 
Source:  ePing SPS&TBT Platform . 
3.63.  By keyword, most regular notifications submitted during the review period were related to 
human health and food safety regulations, followed by  measures regulating maximum residue limits 
of pesticides (pesticides MRLs) (Chart  3.16(a)). Most emergency notif ications were associated with 
animal health  and animal diseases (Chart  3.16(b)). Approximately 62% of emergency notifications 
were associated with avian influenza while less than 1% of regular notifications were related to avian 
influenza.  
3.64.  Of the regular a nd emergency notifications related to avian influenza, about 93% indicated 
that the measure was in conformity with the relevant international standard compared to 81% in 
the previous six -month period. The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH, founded  as OIE)  
has noted that "[t]his statement of conformity to the WOAH Codes  is a self -assessment made by 
the notifying Member that has not undergone any validation process by the WTO Secretariat. Still, 
it suggests that most WOAH Members reporting to the WTO  do consider the WOAH Codes  when they 
amend their legislative framework or introduce new legislation with regard to animal diseases ".24 
 
24 WOAH (2022), Implementation of WOAH S tandards: The Observatory Annual Report , p. 45. Viewed 
at: https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2022/12/annual -report -observatory -2022.pdf . 
115
94
65
55504235 34 33 32
020406080100120140
Brazil Japan Tanzania Canada Uganda European
UnionKenya Burundi Rwanda United
StatesWTO_SPS.2 -Top 10 notifiers from October 2022 to March 2023 (regular including 
revisions and addenda)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 36 - 
 
  Chart  3.16 Top 10 regular and emergency notifications by keyword (includi ng revisions 
and addenda)25 
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.65.  The SPS  Agreement  requires Members to base SPS -related trade measures on international 
standards, guidelines, and recommendations, specifically those developed by the FAO/WHO Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (Codex) for food safety, WOAH for animal health and zoonoses , and th e 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant health. The three standard -setting bodies 
and the WHO are monitoring the COVID -19 situation and, so far, have not recommended any trade 
restrictions. In the absence of relevant international stan dards, SPS measures must be based on a 
risk assessment. However, it may take some time before sufficient scientific evidence becomes 
available. Following the outbreak of the pandemic, some Members believed they had to act quickly 
to ensure appropriate heal th protection. Under the SPS  Agreement , Members have the right to adopt 
provisional measures based on available information. As more scientific evidence emerges and risk 
assessments can be carried out, these measures must be reviewed within a reasonable pe riod of 
time. 
3.66.  Between 1  February  2020 and 31  March  2023, 31 Members (counting the European  Union as 
one) notified 67 SPS measures related to the COVID -19 pandemic. The most recent SPS 
COVID -19-related documents were received on 16  January  2023, when two ad denda were notified 
lifting previous temporary restrictions.26 Twenty -eight measures were notified as regular 
notifications. Additionally, 29 addenda to regular notifications were submitted, mostly extending 
both implementation periods of temporary measure s and comment periods and dates of adoption of 
previously notified regulations. Twenty measures were notified as emergency measures. 
Additionally, 12 emergency addenda were notified, 9 lifting (or partially lifting) temporary 
restrictions previously impose d and 3 extending the validity of temporary trade -facilitating 
measures. Nine Members submitted their measures through an information communication 
(GEN document), and one additional GEN document27 was submitted by 40 Members. Overall, 27% 
of notifications on COVID -19 were SPS measures.28 
 
25 Notifications can have more than one assigned keyword.  
26 WTO documents G/SPS/N/DNK/6/Add.1  and G/SPS/N/HKG/47/Add.1. Search for information on 
notifications on the ePing SPS&TBT Platform . 
27 WTO document G/SPS/GEN/177 8/Rev.5 , 14 January  2021 (also circulated as WTO document 
G/TBT/GEN/296/Rev.5, 14 January  2021). 
28 WTO, COVID -19 and World Trade . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/c ovid19_e/covid19_e.htm . 
5569106107170196215226739771
SeedsTerritory protectionAnimal diseasesAnimal healthPlant healthAdoption/publication/entry into
force of reg.PesticidesMaximum residue limits (MRLs)Food safetyHuman health
81226414577103126149149
PestsPlant healthAfrican swine fever (ASF)Food safetyHuman healthPest- or Disease- free Regions/
RegionalizationAvian InfluenzaZoonosesAnimal diseasesAnimal healthWTO_SPS.3  Top 10 regular and emergency notifications by keyword (including revisions and addenda)2
Source:  WTO Secretariat.a. Regular b. EmergencyWT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 37 - 
 
  3.67.  No regular or emergency measures related to COVID -19 were notified during the review 
period. Two addenda were notified lifting previous temporary restrictions. 29 One previously raised 
STC30 related to COVID -19 was again discussed at the November  2022 and March  2023 
SPS Committee meetings.31 Overall, two SPS STCs related to COVID -19 have been discussed in the 
SPS Committee since the start of the pandemic.32 
3.68.  Initiall y, these measures mainly related to restrictions on animal imports and/or transit from 
affected areas (some of these measures were subsequently lifted), and increased certification 
requirements. While some restrictions were still imposed at a later stage, most notifications and 
communications submitted since the beginning of April  2020 relate to measures taken to facilitate 
trade, by allowing temporary flexibility for control authorities to use electronic versions of veterinary 
and/or phytosanitary certific ates, since the COVID -19 situation has made the transmission of original 
paper certificates challenging . Overall, about two  thirds of notifications (excluding addenda) and 
communications submitted were measures considered to be trade facilitating.  
3.69.  By the end of 2022, 98% of all notifications were submitted online through the ePing SPS&TBT 
Platform . The number of online SPS notifications has steadily increased over the past five years 
(Box 3.3). 
Box 3.3 Facilitating implementation of transparency obligations  
Accessing relevant information on SPS or TBT product requirements in export markets can represent a 
significant challenge, especially for SMEs. WTO Members are req uired to notify SPS and TBT measures, still in 
draft form, that may have a significant effect on trade and that are not in accordance with existing international 
standards. Each year, the WTO receives around 5,000  SPS and TBT notifications.  
The ePing SPS&TBT Platform  allows users (governments, economic operators, and civil society) to browse SPS 
or TBT notifications and trade concerns raised by Members in the WTO SPS and TBT committees using 
parameters such as product,  notifying Member and objective. Additionally, information on enquiry points and 
notification authorities are available on the Platform. Registered users can also sign up to receive daily or 
weekly email alerts and to follow notifications on products and/o r markets of interest and reach out to national 
and international counterparts. This facilitates dialogue among the public and private sectors to discuss and 
share information on notifications of concern, allowing stakeholders to address potential trade pr oblems at an 
early stage of the regulatory lifecycle.  
The ePing SPS&TBT Platform is also the most efficient way to submit notifications to the WTO. It integrates 
and builds upon the functionalities of the previous SPS Notification Submission System (NSS). In recent years, 
the number of online submissions of SPS notifications has been steadily increasing, with up to 98% for 2022, 
includ ing notifications submitted through the Platform.  
Online submission of SPS notifications from 2018 to 2022 (through NSS and ePing SPS&TBT 
Platform)  
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
29 WTO documents G/SPS/N/DNK/6/Add.1, 16  January  2023 and G/SPS/N/HKG/47/Add.1, 
16 January  2023. More detailed information on notifications is available at the ePing SPS&TBT Platform . 
30 More det ailed information on STCs can be retrieved from the Trade Concerns Database . 
31 STC 487: China's actions related to COVID -19 that affect trade in food and agricultural products .  
32 STCs 487 and 488. Please visit the Trade Concerns Database  for further information on STCs.  
72%81%85%91%98%
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022WTO_SPS.4 -Online submission of SPS notifications from 2018 to 2022 (through NSS and 
ePing SPS&TBT Platform)
Source:   WTO Secretariat.WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 38 - 
 
  3.70.  The WTO Secretariat prepares annual transparency reports containing detailed information 
on the implementation of the transparency provisions of the SPS  Agreement.33 
3.71.  While there is no formal provision for "counter notification", concerns regarding the failure to 
notify an SPS measure, or regarding a notified measure, can be raised as an STC at any of the 
regular meetings of the SPS Committee each year.  
3.72.  Two SPS Committee meetings were held duri ng the review period, from 9 -11 November  2022 
and 22 -24 March  2023. At these meetings, WTO Members raised 19 STCs for the first time and 
50 previously raised STCs were discussed again, including 7 of which that were first raised in the 
November  2022 meeting; 6 of these STCs addressed problems that had been raised 15 times or 
more.34 
3.73.  Of the 19  STCs raised for the first time in the two SPS Committee meetings, 7 (37%) 
concerned animal health/animal diseases, 6 (32%)  concerned food safety, 5 (26%) related to other 
types of concerns and 1 (5%) covered plant health. Regarding the 43 previously raised STCs during 
the review period,  15 (35%) covered other types of concerns, 12 (28%) concerned measures 
covering food safety , 10 (23%) concerned animal health, and 6 (14%) related to plant health. Of 
the 62 STCs raised or discussed during the review period, 18 (29%) concerned measures covering 
food safety, 17 (28%) covered animal health, 7  (11%) concerned plant health and 20 (3 2%) related 
to other types of concerns.  
3.74.  At the November  2022 SPS Committee meeting, the Secretariat informed the Committee that 
it had contacted 37 Members to seek information regarding the status (resolved, partially resolved, 
or not reported as resolved)  of STCs that had not been discussed since November  2020. As a 
follow -up to the exercise, 31 of these STCs had been reported as resolved and 14 STCs as partially 
resolved. For transparency purposes, the information provided by Members to the Secretariat wa s 
circulated in WTO document G/SPS/GEN/2062/Rev.1  in November  2022, and included the results of 
similar exercises undertaken in 2013, 2017 and 2020. It was noted that more than 57% of the STCs 
discussed in the Committee were considered as resolved or parti ally resolved.35 
3.75.  In November  2022, the Committee held a thematic session on international standards and 
best practices in pest risk identification, assessment, and management in close collaboration with 
the IPPC. Among the topics discussed were the use of technology for pest identification, addressing 
plant health hazards in different parts of the food system for food safety and food security, and the 
importance of communication, including among trading partners as well as with the private sector.36 
3.76.  In Marc h 2023, the SPS Committee adopted WTO document  G/SPS/67 , which lists existing 
tools and resources to enhance the implementation of the SPS  Agreement  relating to SPS approval 
procedures for food, animal and plant products. It also adopted WTO document  G/SPS /68, which 
provides recommendations on SPS approval procedures. Approval procedures cover any procedure 
to check and ensure the fulfilment of SPS measures.37 The documents were  the outcome of work 
from the Working Group on Approval Procedures , which had been established following a 
recommendation from the Fifth Review of the Operation and Implementation of the SPS  Agreement , 
adopted in 2020.38  
3.77.  At the November  2022 and March  2023 Committee meetings, Ukraine provided the 
Committee with informati on on its SPS situation. Several Members expressed their support and 
showed appreciation for Ukraine's efforts to fulfil its SPS WTO obligations; strongly condemned the 
 
33 Information available in the latest revision of WTO document G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.15; 
G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.23 , 1 March  2023. 
34 Information on the previously raised STCs is available in the Trade Concerns Database .  
35 See summary report of the November  2022 SPS Committee meeting in WTO document G/SPS/R/108 , 
16 December  2022. 
36 Please visit the event webpage to access the report, presentations, and recordings of the thematic 
session: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/thematic_session_nov22_e.htm .  
37 They can, for example, be used to assess products or categories of products before they are allowed 
into a market to ensure that imported products comply with SPS requirements of the importing country or to 
check that the SPS system of an exporting country provides necessary assurances before a product enters a 
market.  
38 The full report is available in WTO document s G/SPS/64, 3 August  2020; and G/SPS/64/Add.1 , 
3 August  2020.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 39 - 
 
  Russian  Federation's military action in Ukraine, noting that it constituted a violation  of international 
law and the UN  Charter; and stated that the invasion was further exacerbating  the current food 
security crisis. The Russian  Federation  underlined that the matter was not within the mandate of the 
WTO and complained that the politically mo tivated trade -restrictive actions against the 
Russian  Federation  imposed by several WTO Members were behind the possible shortages in net 
food importing countries.39 
3.78.  During the review period, meetings were held in October and November  2022 and in February 
and March  2023 to advance the work programme that emerged from the MC12 SPS Declaration on 
Responding to Modern SPS Challenges (Box 3.4).40 
Box 3.4 MC12 SPS Declaration work programme  
WTO Members and Observers a re participating in ongoing discussions as part of the SPS Declaration, which 
was adopted at MC12 in 2022 (MC12 SPS Declaration), in WTO document WT/MIN(22)/27 , 22 June  2022. The 
Declaration recognizes new opportunities and emerging challenges brought abou t by the evolution of the 
global agricultural landscape since the adoption of the SPS  Agreement in 1995 and instructed the 
SPS Committee to carry out a work programme to further enhance the implementation of the SPS  Agreement 
in an effort to  better manage issues related to international trade in food, animals and plants.  
The MC12 SPS Declaration work programme is being implemented through discussions in five thematic 
groups:  
1. How to facilitate global food security and more sustainable food systems, including through 
sustainable growth and innovation in agricultural production and international trade, and using 
international standards, guidelines, and recommendations developed b y the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the WOAH and the IPPC as the basis of harmonized SPS measures to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health.  
2. How to support basing SPS measures on scientific evidence and principles, including where 
international sta ndards, guidelines, or recommendations do not exist or are not appropriate; and 
how to promote the use by Members of principles employed by the international standard -setting 
bodies for considering scientific uncertainty in risk analysis.  
3. How to enhance th e safe international trade in food, animals and plants and products thereof through 
the adaptation of SPS measures to regional conditions, including pest - or disease -free areas and 
areas of low pest or disease prevalence which can strengthen Members' abili ty to protect plant and 
animal life or health through efforts to limit the spread of pests such as the Mediterranean fruit fly, 
diseases such as African swine fever, disease -carrying organisms, or disease -causing organisms.  
4. How to encourage cooperation wit h observer organizations that support the work of the 
SPS Committee and the international standard -setting bodies through technical exchanges and 
assistance in the context of this work programme.  
5. How to increase participation of and support for the special  needs of developing and least developed 
country Members in the development and application of SPS measures; and to increase awareness 
of and sensitivity to the impacts of SPS measures on the export possibilities of such Members.  
The outcome of the work pr ogramme, open to Members and Observers including the three international 
standard -setting bodies recognized in the SPS  Agreement (Codex, WOAH, IPPC), will be reported to Ministers 
at MC13 in 2024.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.4  Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT ) 
3.79.  WTO Members continued to use the TBT Committee's transparency mechanisms to notify their 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and to discuss and often resolve specific trade concerns 
(STCs) non -litigiously. Most of the new regular TBT notifications  submitted by WTO Members during 
the review period referred to quality requirements as their main objective. A total of 155 STCs were 
discussed during the review period. Members have submitted 226 COVID -19-related 
TBT notifications to the WTO in response t o the pandemic since 2020.  
 
39 See the summary reports of the November  2022 and March  2023 SPS Committee meetings in  
WTO documents  G/SPS/R/108 , 16 December  2022; and G/SPS/R/109, 5  May 2023, respectively.  
40 The proposed process for the work programme of the MC12 SPS Declaration is available in 
WTO document G/SPS/W/330/Rev.1 . WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Notifications submitted to the TBT Committee  
3.80.  Under the TBT  Agreement , WTO Members are required to notify their intention to introduce 
new or modified technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, or to notify adopte d 
emergency measures immediately. The principal objective of complying with the TBT notification 
obligations is to inform other Members about new or changed regulations that may  significantly 
affect trade and provide an opportunity for comments.  
3.81.  From 1  October 2022 to 1  May 2023 (the review period), WTO  Members submitted 1,325 new 
regular notifications of TBT measures.41 Members that notified the most measures during the review 
period  − 60% of all new regular notifications  – were Rwanda (160), Kenya (130), Tanzania  (125), 
Uganda (98), Burundi (87), the United  States  (59), the European  Union  (47), Brazil (32), the 
Republic of Korea (33) and Ghana (29). Most of these new regular TBT notifications indicated as 
their main objective quality requirements. Various other notifications related to protection of human 
health or safety, consumer information, labelling, prevention of deceptive practices and consumer 
protection, reducing trade barriers and facilitating trade, harmonization, and protection of the 
environmen t. 
3.82.  A total of 1,080 follow -up notifications ( i.e. addenda, corrigenda, or supplements) were 
submitted during the review  period. The continuing and frequent use by Members of follow -up 
notifications is positive as it increases transparency and predictabilit y across the measures' 
regulatory lifecycle.  
Measures discussed in the TBT Committee (STCs)42 
3.83.  WTO Members use the TBT Committee as a forum for discussing trade issues related to 
specific TBT measures proposed or maintained by other Members. Issues can range from requests 
for additional information and clarification, to questions on the consistency of measures with 
TBT Agreement  disciplines. The overall trend suggests an increasing use of the TBT Committee as a 
forum for Members to raise and resolve trad e concerns non -litigiously.  
3.84.  A total of 155 (32  new and 123  previously raised) STCs were discussed during the two 
Committee meetings that fell within the review period. Thirty -two new STCs concerned 
TBT measures by the European  Union  (9); India (6); the United States  (4); China (2); and 1  each 
by Angola, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Panama, Spain, the 
United  Kingdom  and Viet  Nam. These new STCs covered regulations on a range of products 
(e.g. washing machines ; hazardous substan ces; alcoholic beverages ; and medical, electrical and 
charging equipment), and dealt with a variety of issues (e.g. labelling and packaging, waste 
management, energy efficiency and conservation, conformity assessment procedures and technical 
regulations).  
3.85.  During the two Committee meetings covered by the review period, 10 persistent STCs were 
discussed (these STCs have each been previously raised on more than 16 occasions in Committee 
meetings).  
COVID -19-related TBT notifications and discussions at the TBT C ommittee  
3.86.  Since the beginning of the COVID -19 pandemic, 45% of all notifications submitted by 
WTO Members in response to COVID -19 were under the TBT  Agreement .43 Thirty -four WTO Members 
submitted 226 COVID -19-related TBT notifications to the WTO. These noti fications mostly dealt with 
extraordinary and temporary streamlining of certification and related procedures, and the 
introduction of new regulatory requirements for medical goods, in response to the pandemic . The 
majority (about 66%) of these notification s cover regulations on medical goods, such as PPE, 
pharmaceutical products, medical devices, other medical supplies, and other products.  
 
41 Source: ePing SPS&TBT platform . 
42 This Section  takes account of the STCs raised in t he TBT Committee meetings of 16 -18 November  2022 
and 8 -10 March  2023.  
43 TBT notifications are classified as COVID -19-related if they contain the terms "coronavirus", "COVID", 
"SARS -COV-2" or "nCoV".  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  3.87.  Since the beginning of the COVID -19 pandemic, Members have referr ed to the COVID -19 
pandemic in 55 STCs. The reference to COVID -19 in these discussions was linked to the significant 
impact of the pandemic on Members' economies.  
3.88.  There has been a recent trend of the TBT Committee receiving notifications of regulations on 
various digital technologies. Box 3.5 takes a closer look at regulatory measures on autonomous 
vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems notified to the TBT Committee.  
Box 3.5 Autonomous vehicles, unmanned aircraft sy stems and TBT  
Autonomous vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems are some of the many novel products emerging from 
the current wave of digital transformation and are becoming an integrated part of the international trade 
supply chain. By 2026, the estimated  value of the global market for drones is projected to reach 
USD 58.5 billion44, and USD  556.6  billion for autonomous vehicles.45 
International trade rules, in turn, have important implications for innovation, uptake and governance of such 
digital technolo gies. Indeed, governments have been increasingly subjecting autonomous vehicles and 
unmanned aircraft systems to various non -tariff measures, including a wide variety of regulations falling under 
the TBT  Agreement. Technical standards and regulations provi de an essential framework for the development 
of innovative digital technologies and help address a variety of legitimate public policy concerns associated 
with their deployment. For example, according to a WCO/WTO Study Report, the relevance and availabil ity of 
drone technology depend on whether the regulatory environment enables the safe use of drones and on 
developing a framework that will determine the conditions in which the technology will exist.46 
WTO Members have already started notifying to the TBT  Committee an increasing number of regulations 
addressing various issues related to autonomous vehicles and unmanned aircraft systems. This trend has 
been particularly marked in the last five years.  
To date, Members have notified at least 57 TBT measures o n autonomous vehicles and unmanned aircraft 
systems to the Committee, 74% of which during the last five years. These measures deal with, inter alia, 
policies on human health and safety, national security, performance, and quality requirements , as well as 
different conformity assessment procedures (such as testing and certification). Other policy objectives include 
prevention of deceptive practices and consumer protection and information, cost saving and productivity 
enhancement, and harmonization. Key notif ying Members in this area include China, the European  Union, 
France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the United Arab Emirates and the United  States.  
Examples of such TBT notifications include:  
• testing requirements for vehicles that do not require the  presence of a driver inside the vehicle 
(United  States).  
• technical specifications, assessment, and test requirements as well as administrative requirements 
needed for the type -approval of the automated driving system of fully automated vehicles 
(European  Union).  
• requirements concerning the installation of electronic and optical signalling devices on certain 
unmanned aircraft to allow national defence and security forces to identify airborne drones and 
distinguish them from other aircraft during f light. This measure was indicated as necessary to address 
risks stemming from an increasing number of drones illegally flying over sensitive sites on the 
territory of the notifying Member (France).  
• various safety requirements and test methods for civil unm anned aircraft products (China).  
• certain certification requirements for certain unmanned aircraft systems (United  States).  
Members have also raised at least four STCs with respect to regulations on these types of products. For 
example, such concerns relate  to regulations on unmanned aircraft systems47, procedures and technical 
 
44 WCO/WTO Study Report on Disruptive Technologies (June  2022). Viewed at: WTO | WCO/WTO Study 
Report on Disruptive Technologies . 
45 See e.g. Sharp Growth In Autonomous Car Market Value Predicted But May Be Stalled By R ise In 
Consumer Fear (forbes.com) .  
46 WCO/WTO Study Report on Disruptive Technologies (June  2022). Viewed at: WTO | WCO/WTO Study 
Report on Disruptive Technologies .  
47 Viewed at: European  Union - Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 on Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems and on Third -country Operators of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (ID 585) . WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  specifications for the type -approval of vehicles with regard to their automated driving system48 and emergency 
lane keeping system49, and s afety declaration of advanced autonomous dri ving function.50 
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine  
3.89.  At the TBT Committee meeting of 8 -10 March  2023, Ukraine and several other Members 
expressed their strong opposition to the war in Ukraine, with several Members noting that it violated 
international law. The Russian  Federation  called on Members to refrain from interventions on issues 
and events that were outside the scope of the TBT Committee and the WTO itself.51 
3.90.  At the TBT Committee meetings of 16 -18 November  2022 and 8 -10 March  2023, Ukraine 
provided an update of its TBT activities. Ukraine stated that while the work of relevant bodies in the 
field of technical regulations, standardization and metrology faced significant losses under the 
wartime conditio ns, it continued to take steps to ensure proper functioning of technical regulatory 
system. Ukraine had submitted 70 notifications and replied to 50 requests related to TBT issues 
since 2022. In addition, all accredited bodies responsible for conformity as sessment in Ukraine 
continue to carry out conformity assessment procedures. The National Standardization Program me 
for 2023 provided for the development of 1,843 draft national standards, of which 1,133 standards 
would be harmonized with international and European standards.52 In the same context, Ukraine 
also notified to the TBT Committee the postponement of entry into force of certain regulatory 
measures as a result of the martial law in Ukraine.53 
3.5  Policy developments in agriculture  
3.91.  During the period under review, the Committee on Agriculture (CoA) held two regular 
meetings, on 21 -22 November  2022 and 27 -28 March  2023.54 Domestic support dominated the 
discussions especially on measures and notifications from China, India, and the United  States . 
Discussions also focused on export restrictions on foodstuffs and food security, a key theme for a 
potential outcome at MC13.  
3.92.  The CoA provides a forum for Members to discuss matters related to agricultural trade, and 
to consult on matters related to Members' implementation of commitments under the Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA). The review work of the CoA is based on notifications t hat Members make in 
relation to their commitments and on matters raised under Article  18.6 of the AoA ( i.e. Specific 
Implementation Matters (SIMs)). During the period under review, Members posed a total of 
308 questions.55 
3.93.  As the following statistics would  demonstrate, a vast majority of issues raised in the 
Committee concerned domestic support and export -limiting measures. On notifications, a total of 
300 notifications were submitted by Members between 15  October  2022 and 15  May 2023. This 
represents an in crease in the number of notifications of close to 60% compared to the same period 
last year. This increase is due to the Committee's efforts in reducing the number of outstanding 
export subsidy notifications (Table  ES:1) as described in the Transparency se ction below. A total of 
 
48 Viewed at: European  Union - Draft Commission implementing regulation laying down rules for the 
application of Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 of the European Parliament and the  Council as regards uniform 
procedures and technical specifications for the type -approval of fully automated motor vehicles with regard to 
their automated driving system (ADS) (ID 766) . 
49 Viewed at: European  Union - Uniform procedures and technical specifications for the type -approval of 
motor vehicles with regard to their emergency lane keeping system (ELKS) (ID 700) . 
50 Viewed at: Russian  Federation - On Safety of Wheeled Vehicles (TR CU 018/2011) (ID 687) . 
51 WTO document G/TBT/M/89 (forthcoming).  
52 WTO document s G/TBT/M/88, 8 February  2023; and G/TBT/M/89 (forthcoming).  
53 WTO documents G/TBT/N/UKR/233, 27  October  2022; G/TBT/N/UKR/212/Add.1, 15  November  2022; 
G/TBT/N/UKR/234/Add.1, 23  November  2022; and G/TBT/N/UKR/124/Add.2, 25  November  2022. 
54 The reports of these meetings can be found in WTO document  G/AG/R/104 , 17 January 2023; and 
G/AG/R/105 (forthcoming) . 
55 Questions can be accessed through the compilation of questions issued for each CoA meeting under 
WTO documents G/AG/W/226 , 11 November  2022 (21 -22 November CoA meeting) ; and G/AG/W/231 , 
17 March  2023 (27 -28 March C oA meeting). All questions and answers are available in the Agriculture 
Information Management System ( AG-IMS). WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  135 questions concerned individual notifications (43% of the total number of questions). Of these 
questions, 85% related to domestic support notifications , whereas the remaining 15% related to 
notifications in market access, export subsidies and export restrictions and prohibitions.  On matters 
raised under Article  18.6 of the AoA , 23 Members raised 171 questions on 75 SIMs in the meetings 
considered in this review.56 Out of the 75 SIMs, more than half (44 SIMs)  were discussed for the 
first time. Of these, 55% related to domestic support policies, 16% concerned policies prohibiting or 
restricting exports of foodstuffs, 11% concerned market access issues, and the remaining 18% 
concerned export competition issues and other matters.  
3.94.  In the area of domestic support, significant attention was paid to reviewing support measures 
and notifications by China, India and the United  States . Several questions were posed to China on 
its latest domestic support notification covering the period 2017 -20. Most of  these questions 
concerned the evolution of market price support and the associated calculation methodology, 
recourse to Blue Box and China's compliance with its domestic support ( i.e. de minimis ) 
commitments. Through these latest notifications, China asserted that it had been compliant with its 
domestic support commitments since 2020. The Committee also continued its review of India's 
domestic support notifications , which entail the in vocation of the Bali Public Stockholding Decision 
peace clause starting 2018/19 for the breach of the de minimis  limit for rice. The focus of discussions, 
including based on detailed written questions by several Members, was on the level of annual 
minimum support prices, information on pre -determined stocks, domestic release of public stocks, 
calculation methodology of market price support and information on and accounting of 
provincial -level price bonuses.  Domestic support measures and notifications by the  United  States  
were also subject to extensive review where the United  States'  Current Total AMS in one of the 
reported years reached USD  18.1 billion , the highest level since 1995 and also close to its Total AMS 
limit of USD  19.1 billion . Increased spending during the period was attributed to two new ad hoc  
support measures, namely  the Market Facilitation program me and Coronavirus Food Assi stance 
Program me, both of which have since expired. Questions were also raised on the United  States ' 
changed reporting practice with respect to ad hoc support program mes. 
3.95.  Export -limiting measures on foodstuffs were also subject to several specific questions in the 
Committee during this period.  These questions were raised on Argentina's measures o n beef and 
some grains ; China's export prohibition on corn starch ; Egypt's export restrictions on wheat , flour, 
lentils, rice and some other products ; Hungary's measure on wheat and other grains ; India's export 
restrictions on wheat and rice ; Indonesia's e xport restrictions on palm oil ; Malaysia's export 
restrictions on chicken and eggs ; Mexico's export restriction on white corn ; and Morocco 's, 
Tajikistan 's, and Türkiye 's export restrictions on some vegetables. The main thrust of all these 
questions was on assessing the consistency of these measures with the relevant WTO rules, 
ascertaining how the interests of affected importing countries were considered  and underlining the 
importance of timely export -restricting notification to the Committee. In some cases, the concerned 
Members subject to questions informed the Committee about an adjustment in the scope of the 
measure, its complete elimination or even declined  having applied the export restriction.  
3.96.  Significant interest was al so shown by Members to review the European  Union 's deforestation 
and forest degradation strategy. A group of developing Members shared with the Committee a joint 
letter57, which they wrote to the EU Parliament, Council and Commission expressing concerns on the 
extra-territorial nature of the proposed regulation, potential negative and discriminatory effect on 
developing countries' export interests and the need for dialogue with potentially affected developing 
Members to address their concerns.  
Transparency  
3.97.  Members began  discussions on streamlining of notifications and transparency requirements 
in export competition. In view of a majority of export s ubsidy notifications stating no recourse to 
such subsidies ( "nil" statements), including in the wake of the 2015 Nairobi Export Competition 
Decis ion58, the Committee decided to allow Members to make an oral announcement in Committee 
about the absence of export subsidies in order to clear their outstanding export subsidy notifications. 
 
56 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Ecuador, European  Union , India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, New  Zealand , Nicaragua, Paraguay, Russian  Federation , Switzerland, Chinese  Taipei , 
Thailand, Ukraine, United  Kingdom , United  States , Uruguay  and Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela . 
57 WTO document G/AG/GEN/213, 29  November  2022. 
58 WTO document WT/MIN(15)/45, WT/L/980, 21  December  2015. WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  This new simplified avenue was used for the first time by six LD C Members (Guinea, Haiti, Mauritania, 
Niger, Sierra  Leone  and Uganda) at the March  2023 meeting of the Committee to announce their 
non-recourse to agricultural export subsidies, thus fulfilling their outstanding export subsidy 
obligations collectively for 125 outstanding years.  
Food security  
3.98.  Food security remained high on the agenda of the Committee especially since the onset of 
the COVID -19 pandemic. Food security is also routinely referred to by Members as a key theme for 
potential deliverables at MC13. P ursuant to the mandate in paragraph 8 of the Ministerial Declaration 
on the Emergency Response to Food Insecurity59, the Committee approved a work programme60 to 
consider food security concerns of least -developed countries and net food -importing developing  
countries  (LDCs and NFIDCs) comprising  the following four themes: access to international food 
markets; financing of food imports; agricultural and production resilience of LDCs and NFIDCs; and 
horizontal issues, including collaboration with international organizations . The Committee also 
established a Working Group to undertake thematic deliberations. The Working Group aims to 
achieve concrete solutions no later than end -November  2023. Since then, the Working Group has 
already met three times  and organized dedicated discussions on several elements forming part of 
the work programme supported by two detailed thematic workshops on agricultural financing and 
on productivity and resilience. Members also reviewed their collective responses61 to a 
Questionnaire62 on food security needs and challenges of LDCs and NFIDCs , which the Working 
Group finalized last year. A dedicated webpage  includes more details on discussions  under the work 
programme.63 
Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine  
3.99.  References to the conflict in Ukraine figured routinely in the Committee's discussions on food 
security and under specific matters dealing with trade in grains where the Russian  Federation  and 
Ukraine were , respectively, the first and fifth largest exporters of wheat globally, accounting together 
for 25% of global exports of this commodity in 2021.64 Several Members expressed concerns over 
the continuing war in Ukraine and its se rious impact on global food security. The Russian  Federation  
raised the issue of economic and trade sanctions and port restrictions, including by way of written 
questions or SIMs.  
3.6  General economic support  
3.100.   At the 6  December  2022 TPRB formal meeting dedicated to discussing the Director -General's 
Annual Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment65, WTO Members 
engaged in a constructive exchange of views. Some Members expressed strong support for the 
Secretariat's coverage on economic support measures and stressed the importance of enhanced 
transparency in this area.  Several  Members referred to the pandemic -related economic support 
measures and insisted on their potential distortive impact, especially  for developing countries a nd 
low-income economies. Others underlined the need for consensus on the scope of the exercise and 
called on WTO Members to further participate in the Reports and to engage in discussions to improve 
the exercise, including as part of the 7th TPRM Appraisal . 
3.101.   Since July  2017, the Trade Monitoring Reports have not included a separate Annex  on 
general economic support measures. This has been partly due to the low participation and response 
rate of WTO Members to the request for information on such measures, and  partly because such an 
Annex  was biased against those Members that traditionally share and publish detailed information 
on such policies. Discussions among delegations have addressed this issue with several emphasizing 
the need to preserve and strengthen transparency through the Trade M onitoring Exercise. Several 
 
59 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/28, WT/L/1139, 22  June 2022. 
60 WTO document G/AG/35, 22  November  2022. 
61 WTO document G /AG/W/233, 3  April 2023. 
62 WTO document G/AG/GEN/214, 8  December  2022. 
63 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/wrkprog -fsldcs_e.htm . 
64 WTO document G/AG/GEN/204, 6 September  2022, para. 5. 
65 WTO document WT/TPR/OV/25, 22  November  2022. WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Members welcomed the online COVID -19 support measures list66 compiled by the WTO Secretariat, 
which was put in place in the early stages of the pandemic. The list provides an informal situation 
report and is an attempt to enhance transparency around support measures taken in response to 
the pandemic. It includes only information and measures communicated by delegations directly to 
the WTO Trade Monitoring Section  and only in the original language o f the submission.  
Regular economic support measures (not related to COVID -19) 
3.102.   In response to Director -General's 10  March  2023 request for information for this Trade 
Monitoring Report, 41 WTO Members (Albania; Costa  Rica; the European  Union67; 
Hong Kong,  China; Indonesia ; Jamaica ; Mongolia ; Montenegro ; Mozambique ; the Kingdom of 
Saudi  Arabia ; Switzerland ; Thailand ; Türkiye ; and the United  Kingdom ) volunteered information on 
75 regular general economic support measures unrelated to the COVID -19 pandemic. The 
Secretariat's own research suggests that during the review period numerous other support measures 
with potentially important implications for trade were implemented by WTO Members.  
3.103.   According to the regular support measures communicated by WTO Members and those 
identified by the Secretariat, an increase was observed during the review period in the introduction 
of new support measures by governmen ts. Most measures were environmental impact reduction 
program mes, including renewable -energy production schemes through new technologies, support 
for energy efficiency and decarbonization, support for solar photovoltaic systems, investments in 
alternative energy power plants and in clean - and renewable -energy projects. Other measures 
included credits to energy firms, schemes to compensate companies for higher electricity prices and 
investments to expand productive capacities by reducing environmental impact s. 
3.104.   Several measures were introduced to support farmers and the agricultural sector, including 
support for crop prices and food production plans, and aid schemes to support the livestock sector 
and other specific agricultural sectors, such as wheat, barley,  and olive oil. Several of these measures 
were linked to the effects of the war in Ukraine. Incentives were also provided for the use of 
technologies to increase agricultural productivity, grants to support agri -food companies and general 
programmes for th e development of bio -agriculture. Other support measures implemented during 
the review period targeted tourism, aviation, and transport. Some support schemes were provided 
for the rollout of electric vehicle infrastructure. Certain measures also included s upport to cope with 
inflation, fiscal incentives, investments to promote digital development and support to high -tech 
strategic industries, including on semiconductors, secondary batteries, or biotech.  
3.105.   As in the past, several of these economic support meas ures were introduced as multi -year 
programmes, with financial disbursements staggered over the lifetime of a project and some were 
one-off grants or aid schemes. Assessing the scope and scale of government economic support 
program mes remains a difficult ta sk, as reliable, comprehensive, and comparable data are not easily 
available. The lack of reliable information has shifted the focus of analysts to firm -level data as a 
possible alternative for measuring support program mes. Recent OECD work68 has shown tha t 
although the type of support received by firms differ s greatly across sectors, the complexity of supply 
chains makes it hard to identify the ultimate beneficiaries of government support.  
3.106.   The Trade Monitoring Exercise does not make any judgement as to the  WTO-compatibility 
of any of the measures referred to in this Section. While it is possible that these measures, whether 
taken as part of an overall commercial strategy or as part of an emergency response to the COVID -19 
pandemic, may affect trade in some way, it is not always easy to conclude that they restrict or 
facilitate trade (and by how much), or that they distort competition.  
 
66 WTO, COVID -19: Support Measures . Viewed at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_support_measures_e.htm .  
67 Counting the EU -27 and its members separately.  
68 OECD Trade Policy Paper, April  2023 n°  270, Government Support in Industrial Sectors, A Synthesis 
Report.  Viewed at: https://www.oecd -ilibrary.org/docserver/1d28d 299-
en.pdf?expires=1685456054&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=AE944BAA7184BFA6F735D3E5146C1D4A .  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  COVID -19-related economic support measures  
3.107.   In response to Director -General's 10  March  2023 request for information , 10 Member s69 
volunteered information on 36 COVID -19-related support measures to the Secretariat, mainly 
related to extensions, renewals, or terminations of measures. The number of the pandemic -related 
support measures introduced by governments during th is review pe riod significantly decreased 
compared to the peak observed in the second, third and fourth quarters of 2020.  
3.108.   Since the beginning of the pandemic, at least 1,784 COVID -19-related economic support 
measures have been put in place by 113 Members and 7 Observer s.70 Of these, by mid -May 2023, 
1,139 (64%) were communicated directly to the WTO Secretariat. More than half of these measures 
(55%) were introduced by G20 economies. The number of COVID -19-related support measures put 
in place since the beginning of the pandemic far exceed ed the activity seen in the wake of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 -09. 
3.109.   Governments followed diverse approaches in introducing pandemic -related support to their 
economies. Measures came in the form of grants, loans or stimulus packag es targeting sectors of 
the economy heavily affected by the pandemic as well as fiscal and financial measures to support 
businesses and MSMEs and broader stimulus packages. Another set of support measures in response 
to the COVID -19 pandemic included vario us interventions by Central Banks. The responses of 
high-income economies have been significantly more generous than those offered by lower -income 
economies in terms of the number and variety of measures implemented and funds allocated . 
3.110.   The COVID -19-related support measures have generally appeared to be temporary in 
nature. However, information about terminations, including specific legislative acts rolling back 
support program mes entirely or partially, is often not displayed on governmental websites, 
announced in the press, or not regularly communicated to the Secretariat. Therefore, providing an 
accurate number of terminated measures is difficult.  
Developments in the context of the food crisis, the energy crisis,  and the conflict in 
Ukraine  
3.111.   The current review period saw many general economic support measures in response to the 
continuing interlinked crises in the energy and food sectors and because of surging inflation. The 
various impacts felt because of  the war in Ukraine, the food crisis a nd climate -related events 
continue d to weigh heavily on the global economy and governments respond ed with a range of 
measures that may affect trade directly or indirectly. Several WTO Members have referred to the 
importance of monitoring such measures, esp ecially in the context of a crisis.  
3.112.   The following box provides information on the new online WTO database on subsidy 
notifications submitted under the SCM  Agreement . 
Box 3.6 WTO Subsidy Database  
On 25  May 2023, the Secretariat launched the WTO Subsidy Database , which contains information from 
subsidy notifications submitted by WTO Members under the SCM  Agreement for the 2021 notific ation cycle.  
Following the structure of the notification format used by WTO Members (WTO document G/SCM/6/Rev.1, 
11 November  2011), the database contains information on the description, policy objective, duration and type 
of measure, as well as information on the eligi bility criteria, monetary amounts and statistical data on the 
potential trade effects of the measure, as notified by relevant WTO Members. By presenting the information 
in spreadsheet format, the database is intended to make the notified information more a ccessible, making it 
easier to search and analyse than in the PDF versions of Members' original documents, all of which are publicly 
available.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
3.113.   The following box on corporate subsidies has been contributed by Global Trade Alert.  
 
69 Cambodia; Chile; Hong Kong, China; Macao, China; Mongolia; Montenegro; Myanmar; 
Kingdom  of Saudi Arabia; Thailand and the United  Kingdom . 
70 Azerbaijan, Belarus, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Serbia.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Box 3.7 Corporate subsidies: A global perspective  
In recent years, certain high -profile subsidy initiatives became a source of discord between trading partners, leading to fears 
of copy -cat or tit -for-tat responses. Rather than dwell on specific episodes, this box provides evidence on worldwide subsidy 
dynamics.  
While there are differences across jurisdictions in the amounts of information made available by public authorities, it is 
remarkable how much inf ormation can be gleaned from the websites of public bodies as well as from legally mandated 
corporate statements pertaining to the award and receipt of corporate subsidies. The Global Trade Alert team has 
systematically collected information on changes in corporate subsidy policies and the award of corporate subsidies since 
1 November  2008. This evidence collection effort does not include foreign aid measures, welfare state payments, transfers 
between different levels of government, and subsidies where the transfer of state resources was less than USD  10 million. All 
corporate subsidies recorded are selective in at least one respect. Subsidies are not excluded from the Global Trade Alert 
inventory just because their stated purpose was non -economic or innovat ion-related.  
A total of 23,670 corporate subsidy awards and changes in policies towards corporate subsidies have been documented and 
are available in a downloadable inventory . This total refe rs to subsidies paid to firms competing in markets at home − excluding 
therefore state -provided export incentives of any type. In over 97% of the records assembled, information on a corporate 
subsidy initiative is backed up by an official source or a legal ly mandated corporate disclosure. Taking the European  Union as 
a single customs territory, a total of 121 customs territories are responsible for these recorded subsidy interventions.  
Many governments have awarded corporate subsidies during crises, such as  the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID -19 
pandemic. Even so, a total of 11,012 corporate subsidy awards to firms competing in home markets were documented during 
the years 2011 to 2019. During crisis years, the percentage of recorded subsidy interventi ons that involved reductions or 
removal of state support was 1.5%. Between 2011 and 2019 that percentage rose to 2.1%. Subsidy cuts are not the norm.  
When transferring resources to firms competing in markets at home, governments have chosen from 12  different types of 
subsidies. On over 9,600 occasions, governments have awarded financial grants. In another 7,121 instances, loans by state 
bodies have been provided. On 1,861 separate occasions, loan guarantees have been provided by governments. Selectiv e 
tax reductions have been given in just under 1,700  cases. A total of 969 production subsidies have been provided and 962 
capital injections or other forms of bailout have been given by public bodies.  
Subsidies to farmers and other agriculture producer in terests have long been in focus in trade policy deliberations. A total of 
4,469 such subsidy awards and policy changes have been documented. A further 5,658 corporate subsidy interventions have 
been recorded in service sectors of national economies. The ma jority of subsidies can be found, therefore, in manufacturing 
and the sectors associated with industrial production. The impact of corporate subsidies on conditions of competition are not  
confined to any one type of economic activity.  
One feature of the Gl obal Trade Alert's data collection effort is that, where they can be credibly established for goods 
producers, the HS codes of the goods are identified where the conditions of competition are affected by the award of a 
corporate subsidy. Since the focus he re is on subsidies to local firms, the markets inside a customs territory that are likely to 
be affected by a corporate subsidy award can then be identified. In what follows, the attention is only on those subsidy awar ds 
that likely tilt the commercial pla ying field in favour of local firms.  
Using the most disaggregated United Nations Comtrade data available, it is possible to identify which trading partners 
exported to a destination foreign market where a subsidy was awarded to one or more foreign import -competing firms. 
Employing accepted techniques for calculating the amount of trade covered, it is possible to estimate the share of any nation 's 
exports to a trading partner that were in product lines where subsidies have been awarded to import -competing fi rms. Such 
calculations reveal the foreign market access at risk from subsidizing local firms.  
The table below reveals the market access at risk for different groups of exporters to subsidies in effect in May  2023.  
Group of exporters  Share of exports compet ing with at least one subsidized 
import -competing firm in May  2023  
ASEAN  0.431  
EU-27 0.505  
Eurasian Economic Union  0.649  
G20 0.469  
G7 0.481  
Latin America and the Caribbean  0.660  
LDCs 0.440  
Middle East and North Africa  0.467  
Non-G20 0.518  
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.536  
Worldwide (all customs territories)  0.487  
Source:  Global Trade Alert, May  2023.  
When interpreting these market -access -at-risk statistics, it should be borne in mind that they are almost certainly 
underestimates.  
While these market -access -at-risk estimates reveal the degree to which cross -border trade in goods may be influenced by 
subsidies to import -competing firms, it is worth recalling that some subsidies can have domestic and cross -border benefits 
that go beyond the recipi ent firm. Establishing the magnitude of any such benefits can provide valuable inputs to policy 
deliberation as can estimates of the effect of corporate subsidies on cross -border movements of goods, services, and 
investment.  
Source:  Global Trade Alert.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  3.7  Other selected trade policy developments  
Council for Trade in Goods  
3.114.   At the 24 -25 November  2023 meeting71 of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG), 45 trade 
concerns were raised, the highest number of trade concerns ever raised at a single meeting of the 
CTG. This number has more than doubled since 2019. Concerns were raised on measures by 
Australia (2) ; China  (7); Egypt (2) ; the European  Union  (11); India (4) ; Indonesia (2) ; Mexico (1) ; 
Nigeria (1) ; Pakistan (1) ; Panama (1)  and  the Philippines (1) . A concern was also raised by the 
following Members as a group: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of Bahrain, United Arab 
Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar (1) ; the United  Kingdom  (2); the United  States  (7); 
Viet Nam (1); and on one measure implemented by Australia, Canada, the European  Union , Japan, 
New Zealand , Switzerland, the United  Kingdom , and the United  States . Of the 45 trade concerns, 9 
related to political tensions between China and the United States , and 7 to unilateral environmental 
measures with a trade impact.  
3.115.   At the 3 -4 April 2023 CTG meeting72, 41 trade concerns were raised, most related to 
increased political tensions and/or unilateral environmental measures. Trade concerns concerned 
measures by Australia (1), China (7), Egypt (2), the European  Union  (9), India (5), Indonesia (2), , 
Mexico (1) , Nepal (1), Pakistan (1), Panama (1), the United  Kingdom  (2), the United  States  (7) and 
on one measure implemented by the following Members: Australia, Canada, the European  Union , 
Japan, New  Zealand, Switzerland, the United  Kingdom , and the United  States . A concern was also 
raised by the following Members as a group: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, 
the United Arab Emirates, the State of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar.  
Aid for Trade  
3.116.   Launched at the 2005 Ministerial Conference, the Aid -for-Trade Initiative helps developing 
countries, and in particular the least developed among them, to build the supply -side capacity and 
trade-related infrastructure they need to benefit from WTO  Agreement s and expand their trade.  
3.117.   Since 2006, a total of USD  556 billion has been disbursed for financing Aid -for-Trade 
programmes and projects, with disbursements to LDCs amounting to USD  152 billion  (Chart  3.17). 
In 2020, an equal share of disbursements (49%) was allocated to building productive capacity and 
economic in frastructure. Africa and Asia remained  the largest beneficiaries (Chart  3.18). 
Disbursements reached a total of USD  48.7 billion  in 2020.  
 
71 WTO document G/C/M/144, 10  March  2023. 
72 WTO document G/C/M/145, 22  May 2023. WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Chart  3.17 Aid-for-Trade commitments and disbursements by income group  
(USD  billion, 2020 constant prices)  
 
Source:  OECD -CRS (Creditor Reporting System).  
Chart  3.18 Aid-for-Trade disbursements by continent  
(USD  billion, 2020 constant prices)  
 
Source:  OECD -CRS (Creditor Reporting System).  
3.118.   On 10  February  2023, Members adopted the 2023 -24 work programme under the title 
"Partnerships for Food Security, Digital Technology and Mainstreaming Trade", which also foresees  
a series of thematic workshops planned throughout the biennium. The centrepiece of the work 
programme is expected to be the ninth Global Review, to be held in mid -2024.  The Review will be 
underpinned by a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercise.  
20.722.625.828.932.035.336.639.141.243.442.246.2 46.7 47.248.7
27.130.039.7 40.142.9 42.450.754.052.959.4
54.561.1
58.2
54.664.6
5.26.17.18.49.0 9.4 9.410.6 10.211.310.512.913.9 14.3 14.0
7.09.411.212.213.2 12.811.817.9
13.918.8
15.419.821.0
17.119.7
010203040506070
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Disbursements to all countries Commitments to all countries
Disbursements to LDCs Commitments to LDCs
Source:   OECD -CRS (Creditor Reporting System).Chart AfT.1   Aid -for-trade commitments and disbursements by income group
(USD billion, 2020 constant prices)
02468101214161820
Africa America Asia Developing countries
unspecifiedEurope Oceania
2006-08 average 2009-11 average 2012-14 average 2015-17 average 2018-20 average
Source:   OECD -CRS (Creditor Reporting System).Chart AfT.2   Aid -for-trade disbursements by continent
(USD billion, 2020 constant prices)WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Committe e on Import Licensing  
3.119.   At the 23  May 2023 meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing73, nine recurring trade 
concerns were raised. Four concerns were raised regarding Indonesia's Commodity Balancing 
Mechanism , import licensing regime for certain textile p roducts , compulsory registration by importer 
of steel products , and import restriction s on air conditioners. Additionally, Members expressed 
concerns regarding Angola's import licensing requirements, Dominican  Republic 's new import 
licensing system , Egypt's import licensing requirements for certain agricultural and processed 
products , India's importation of pneumatic tyres, and Thailand's importation of wheat feed.  
Electronic commerce  
3.120.   Work under the Work Programme on e -commerce has intensified pursua nt to the 
MC12  Decision , which called for the reinvigoration of the Work Programme with particular emphasis 
on its development dimension. The Decision also requested Members to intensify discussions on the 
scope, definition, and impact of the moratorium.  In the first quarter of 2023, Members engaged 
constructively and shared national and regional experiences on several identified topics , namely 
consumer protection , digital divide , legal and regulatory frameworks , and the moratorium on the 
imposition of cust oms duties on electronic transmissions. Several delegations have circulated 
submissions as inputs to the dedicated discussions. In sharing views on what the WTO could do in 
these areas either on its own or in coordination with other organi zations, many hav e highlighted the 
need for the WTO to use its convening power to bring together relevant intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs)  working on e -commerce matters. In that regard, a workshop with IGOs is 
planned for 1 -2 June  2023 and will focus on the four them es discussed to date. In terms of the way 
forward, the facilitator has encouraged Members to start reflecting on possible outcomes and 
recommendations for Ministers at MC13 with respect to the Work Programme and the moratorium.  
3.121.   Under the Joint Statement In itiative  on E-commerce, the now 89 participants74 are 
accelerating work towards a substantial conclusion by end of 2023. In that regard, the March cluster 
of negotiations witnessed re -engagement on core issues, some of which had not been discussed for 
some  time, namely the legal architecture , data flows and data localization , source code , the 
moratorium , and development. To date, participants have reached convergence on 11 articles: open 
government data, consumer protection, spam, e -signatures and e -authent ication, e -contracts, 
transparency, cybersecurity, open Internet access, paperless trading, electronic transactions 
frameworks, and e -invoicing , on which technical discussions were exhausted in February  2023. 
Recent negotiating clusters reflect the co -conveners' objective of increasing the momentum in the 
negotiations, including by holding information sessions on specific issues with the participation of a 
variety of stakeholders.  
Fisheries subsidies  
3.122.   Work on fisheries subsidies intensified following the ado ption of the Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies at MC12. In October  2022, Members suggested at a brainstorming retreat on the 
substance and process of further negotiations (Second Wave Negotiations), to start with a 
knowledge -building exercise to inform the negotiations. On that basis, the Secretariat organized two 
workshops, on implementing the current Agreement and the evolution of the outstanding issues, 
and on data concerning the state of fisheries resources and fisheries subsidies.  
3.123.   On 27  January  2023, the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules circulated a work 
programme of four week -long clusters of meetings (Fish Weeks) to be held between March and July 
with a view to engaging on the basis of a single text by the summer. The Fish Weeks held in Ma rch 
and April involved vigorous exchanges on outstanding issues among hundreds of participating 
delegates based in Geneva and in capitals. In those discussions, Members reaffirmed their 
commitment to fulfil the MC12 mandate of achieving a comprehensive Agreement on Fisheries 
Subsidies by MC13.  
3.124.   Seven regional technical assistance and capacity -building workshops have been organi zed 
by the Secretariat to provide capital -based trade and fisheries officials from developing and LDC 
Members with a detailed underst anding of the WTO  Agreement  on Fisheries Subsidies, and to 
 
73 WTO document G/LIC/M/56 (forthcoming).  
74 Kyrgyz  Republic  joined in February  2023 and Oman in April  2023. WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  facilitate an exchange of views and experiences on entry into force and implementation of the 
Agreement and the Second Wave Negotiations. The Director -General held Minister -level 
engagements alongs ide the workshops for the Pacific, Arab, and French -speaking Africa regions.  
3.125.   As of 16  May 2023, the WTO Secretariat h as received instruments of acceptance from 
Switzerland (acceptance date of 20  January  2023), Singapore (10  February  2023), Seychelles 
(10 March 2023), the United  States  (11 April 2023), Canada (2  May 2023), Iceland (10  May 2023) 
and the  United Arab Emirates (16  May 2023). 
3.126.   The WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism was established in November  2022 to assist 
developing countries and LDCs implement the  Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. Australia, 
Germany, Iceland, Japan and Canada have contributed to the new WTO Fisheries Trust Fund.  
Government procurement  
3.127.   The plurilateral WTO  Agreement  on Government Procurement 2012 (GPA 2012) is an 
important instrumen t for keeping GPA Parties ' government procurement markets open and 
safeguarding good governance in their government procurement markets. Currently, the GPA 2012 
has 21 Parties, covering 48 WTO Members75 and there are 37 observers to the Committee on 
Government Procurement (CGP).  
3.128.   During the reporting period, the GPA Parties made further progress on the accession of 
North  Macedonia  to the GPA 2012. The conclusion of this accession, on mutually agreeable an d 
appropriate terms, would be significant for the GPA 2012 and it would send a strong signal to the 
countries in the region.  
3.129.   Albania has reiterated its commitment to accede to the GPA 2012. It indicated that a working 
group responsible for Albania's access ion to the GPA 2012 had been established.  
3.130.   The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) became an IGO observer 
to the CGP.  
Micro, small and medium -sized enterprises  
3.131.   In 2023, the Informal Working Group on Micro, Small and Medium -sized Enterprises 
(MSMEs) adopted a new program me of work based on five pillars, namely promoting MSME access 
to information, building MSME trade capacity, providing policy guidance, implementing the 
December  2020 package76, and strengthening engage ment with the private sector . 
3.132.   For the first pillar, the Group has worked to release a revamped version of theTrade4MSMEs 
platform on MSME Day 2023, including new country pages, improved search functionality, and 
updated visuals. Trade4MSMEs, which was laun ched in December  2021, is an online resource 
aggregating trade information for MSMEs and policymakers.  
3.133.   To build MSME trade capacity and promote inclusion, the MSME Group agreed to consider 
compendiums of good practices, such as on Authorized Economic Opera tors program mes, and 
decided to consolidate the Trade4MSMEs guides into handbooks.  
3.134.   Topics under discussion under the Policy Guidance pillar include MSME cyber readiness, 
encouraging adoption of UNCITRAL's model law on electronic transferable records (MLETR ), fostering 
trade digitalization and supporting wider use of standards to advance trade digitalization , low-value 
shipments , sustainability , informality , and MSME provisions in regional trade agreements. Related 
to this final point, the MSME Group issued a call for academic papers on the impact of MSME 
provisions in regional trade agreements.  
3.135.   For the fourth pillar, implementation of the December  2020 package continued. During the 
first open -ended meeting in March, four members reported on their inclusion o f, or intention to 
 
75 The European  Union  and its 27 member States are covered by the Agreement as one Party.  
76 WTO document INF/MSME/4/Rev.2, 6  October  2021. WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  include, MSME -related information in their 2023 TPRs and the Secretariat continues to update the 
database of MSME references in TPRs.  
3.136.   In line with the fifth pillar, communication with the private sector remained a priority for the 
Group.  The Group held a third annual meeting with business representatives in April  2023 and 
documents continued to be received from the private sector under the INF/MSME/P document 
symbol. The Group, together with the International Trade Centre and the Internat ional Chamber of 
Commerce, also launched their third Small Business Champions competition with the theme "helping 
smallholder farmers go global". Open to chambers of commerce, industry associations, NGOs  and 
small businesses, the initiative called for prop osals aimed at supporting smallholder farmers to 
participate in international trade.  
3.137.   Launched by 88 WTO Members at MC11 in December  2017, membership of the MSME 
Informal Working Group increased to 9877 in the first half of 2023, representing all levels of 
development and all regions of the world. The Group is open to all WTO Members. Participating 
Members account for around 90 % of world exports.  
3.138.   The following box on the use of digital technologies in francophone Africa has been 
contributed by the Internatio nal Trade Centre.  
Box 3.8 Advanced digital technologies make businesses more efficient  
The pandemic has spurred the use of digital technologies. COVID -19 highlighted how vital digital tools are for firm 
survival and resilience. But not all technologies serve the same purpose, and how they are used matters for firms' 
competitive advantage and growth.  
A survey conducted in francophone Africa by the International Trade Centre (ITC) and the Permanent Conferen ce of 
African and Francophone Consular Chambers (CPCCAF) shows that the use of digital technologies boosts profits.a 
Four in every five surveyed businesses that used digital technologies said these helped them cut costs. Eighty -five 
percent also said these  technologies helped them increase sales.b 
However, real efficiency and competitiveness gains come with integrated uses of more advanced digital tools. For 
instance, companies that adopted digital technologies such as cloud -based data storage, digital acco unting and 
computerized inventory management were almost twice as likely to report improved production efficiency than firms 
that only used digital technologies for communication purposes, such as email or social media.c Furthermore, firms 
that used e -comm erce platforms were more than 30  percentage points more likely to say they experienced an 
increase in sales compared with firms that did not use e -commerce platforms.  
Figure 1 Advanced use of digital technology and e -commerce create higher dividendsd 
 
Source:  ITC. 
Firms that trade internationally get more value out of digital technologies in improving the efficiency and timeliness 
of delivery than businesses that do not trade.e This is partially due to the fact that trading firms are larger, and 
therefore have more resources to invest in the latest technologies.f At the other end of the spectrum, youth -led and 
informal businesses reported using digital tools mostly to connect to new customers.  
Despite the advantages of advanced technologies, their adoption is still l imited in francophone Africa. Only around a 
quarter of respondents said they used digital technologies for accounting, recordkeeping, and inventory management. 
Even fewer reported using these for more advanced purposes, such as cloud -based data storage, di gital finance, and 
e-commerce platforms.g 
 
77 In 2023, the United Arab Emirates formally joined the MSME Group.  
78%42%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%AdvancedBasic
Share of respondents that reported improved production efficiencyUse of digital technology 62%29%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%YesNo
Share of respondents who reported increased salesUse of e -commerce platformsAdvanced use of digital technology and e -commerce create higher dividendsivWT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Digital deepening requires removing basic obstacles and improving digital skills  
Harnessing the potential of digital technologies requires removing persistent obstacles that hamper their use and 
adoption by busines ses in francophone Africa. Among the obstacles most reported were poor Internet or network 
connection and the high cost of Internet service subscriptions.  
Investing in better ICT infrastructure and increasing competition among network operators can play an  important 
role in lowering some barriers to digitalization. Regulations underpinning the digital economy are the subject of 
domestic and international discussions. When closing regulatory gaps, governments should align with international 
best practice – as embodied in templates such as the Model Law on Electronic Commerce.h This way they can avoid 
the kind of regulatory divergence that is so costly to small businesses.  
The availability of digitally skilled employees is also key in making full and effective  use of digital technologies. Over 
9 in 10 surveyed firms believe they will need more employees with digital skills in the next 5 years. Building digital 
competency requires integrating basic digital literacy, such as word processing, email and use of keyb oards and 
touchscreens, into education curricula.  
Nonetheless, building skills is a long -term strategy, and might not provide solutions for companies in the short term. 
For this, governments need to facilitate labour movement across borders. They can enabl e businesses to recruit 
qualified individuals from abroad. Reducing barriers to temporary movement of people in a foreign market can open 
the door to importing needed expertise.i 
In 2022, the ITC launched the Switch ON initiative, with the objective of sup porting small businesses, as well as 
women -owned and youth -led enterprises, to develop the skills they need to digitalize. This initiative aims to help 
small businesses expand their online presence and use digital trade channels to access global markets. I n parallel, 
ITC supports countries in developing and implementing supportive policy and strategies for digital readiness.  
a ITC and the CPCCAF surveyed 4,973 businesses in French -speaking Africa between May and August  2022. Data 
were gathered from companie s in Benin, Burkina  Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte  d'Ivoire , Gabon, Mali, 
Morocco, Togo, and Tunisia. For more information, see publication "SME Competitiveness in Francophone Africa 
2022, Fostering digital transformation" (Geneva, Switzerland: ITC, Nov ember  2022), available at: 
https://intracen.org/resources/publications/sme -competitiveness -in-francophone -africa -2022. 
b ITC. 
c ITC. 
d The figure on the left describes the responses of businesses to two questions: "Do you use digital technologies 
for any of the following purposes?" and "What benefits do you gain from using digital technologies?" "Basic" firms 
are those that only chose "Communicate with  customers (buyers) or suppliers through e -mail" and/or "Marketing 
and advertising through social media" to answer the first question. "Advanced" firms are those that reported 
using any other digital technologies (options included e.g. "g. Accounting, reco rdkeeping and inventory 
management"). In terms of benefits from using digital technologies, the focus is on the answer "b. Improved 
efficiency and timeliness of production". The figure on the right describes the responses of businesses to two 
questions: "D o you use digital technologies for any of the following purposes: e. Selling on e -commerce platforms 
or social marketplaces" and "What benefits do you gain from using digital technologies? g. Increased sales", for 
firms that reported using digital technolo gies. 
e ITC. 
f ITC, "SME Competitiveness Outlook 2022: Connected Services, Competitive Businesses" (Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Trade Centre, September  2022), available at:  https://intracen.org/resources/publications/sme -
competitiveness -outlook -2022-connected -services -competitive -businesses . 
g ITC. 
h UN ESCAP (2017), "Disaster risk transfer mechanisms: Issues and considerations for the Asia -Pacific region".  
i ITC, "SME Competitiveness Outlook 2022: Connected Services, Competitive Businesses" (Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Trade Centre, September  2022), available at: https://intracen.org/resources/publications/sme -
competitiveness -outlook -2022-connected -services -competitive -businesses . 
Source:  International Trade Centre.  
STEs and TRIMs  
3.139.   During the review period , six trade concerns were raised at the meeting of the Trade -Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs)78 Committee on 23  February  2023, on measures implemented by 
China (2), India (1) and Indonesia (3).  
3.140.   At the two meetings of the Working Party on State Trade Enterprises (STEs) on 
21 October  2022 and 28  April 202379 that took place during the review period, 13 trade concerns 
were raised on STEs -related policies and measures by Australia (1), China (3), Costa  Rica (1), 
India (2), New  Zealand (1), Panama (1), the Russian  Federation  (2) and Thailand (2). At both 
meetings the low level of compliance with notification obligations was also raised.  
 
78 WTO document TRIMS/M/53, 3  April 2023. 
79 WTO documents G/STR/M/41, 22  December  2022 and G/STR/M/42 (forthcoming).  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Trade and environment  
3.141.   At MC12, Ministers highlighted the importance of the Committee o n Trade and Environment 
(CTE) as a standing forum dedicated to dialogue on the relationship between trade measures and 
environmental measures. This gave new impetus to environment -related discussions in the WTO. 
During the review period, the CTE held two regular meetings and its third Trade and Environment 
Week80 and continued to focus on important global issues, including the circular economy and 
plastics pollution, trade and clima te change, and biodiversity. The March  2023 CTE meeting 
discussed how to revitalize the work of the CTE with inputs from China, Colombia, 
the European  Union,  India, and Paraguay.81 
3.142.   Some WTO Members continued their work through other platforms. For example,  in 
October  2022, the first meeting of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR82) sought to phase out 
inefficient FFS, explore ways to increase transparency and fulfil long -term sustainability objectives. 
The Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions (TESSD83) held a high -level 
event in December  2022 to take stock of progress made and to signal priorities for further work 
ahead of MC13. In May  2023 the Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable 
Plastics Trade (DPP84) introduced the coordinators' draft vision on the way forward and elements for 
a potential outcome at MC13.  
3.143.   In parallel, the WTO Secretariat also worked with various stakeholders, including the OECD 
(for the Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches (IFC MA)), the World Bank and the World 
Economic Forum (jointly launching the "Action on Climate and Trade Initiative" (ACT) aiming to 
provide technical assistance and capacity -building for developing economies, including LDCs), and 
the steel industry (for the first WTO forum on decarbonization standards85). During the review 
period , an important moment for water was attained as global leaders and key policy makers 
engaged in the UN Water Conference (UNWC).  
3.144.   The following box takes a closer look at the UN Water C onference 2023 and its main 
outcomes.  
Box 3.9 UN Water Conference 2023 and the Global Commission on the Economics of 
Water  
The UN Water Conference  (UNWC) − co-hosted by the Netherlands and Tajikistan − in March  2023 marked an 
important moment for water. It was the first time in nearly 50 years (with the only previous UNWC held in 
1977) that global leaders and key policy makers engaged on water.  
For water, SDG 6 sets the benchmark and targets of clean wa ter and sanitation for all. The 2023 UN World 
Water Development Report  highlights the tasks at hand: 26% of the world's population, approximately 
2 billion people, do not have access to s afe drinking water, and 3.6  billion lack access to safe sanitation 
services.  
One of the main outcomes from the UNWC was the Water Action Agenda  with over 700 commitments from 
member St ates, IGOs, NGOs and other stakeholders. The WTO Director -General participated at the UNWC at 
the Plenary Interactive Dialogue on Water for Sustainable Development  and in other special and high -level 
events.  
The WTO Director -General also engaged with media and other stakeholders in her capacity as a co -chair of 
the Global Commission on the Economics of Water . At the UNWC, the Commission published its preliminary 
findings with Turning the Tide: A Call to Collective Action  as a basis for its final report to be published in 
May 2024.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
 
80 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/tedweek2022_e.htm .  
81 Annual Report 2022, WTO document WT/CTE/29, 16  December  2022, and Minutes of the October  2022 
and March  2023 CTE meetings in WTO documents WT/CTE/M/76, 6 March  2023, and WT/CTE/M/77 
(forthcoming), respectively.  
82 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/fossil _fuel_e.htm .  
83 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tessd_e/tessd_e.htm .  
84 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ppesp_e/ppesp_e.htm .  
85 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/ english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_09032023_e/tbt_09032023_e.htm .  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Trade facilitation  
3.145.   The Committee on Trade Facilitation met on two occasions during the period under review – 
November  2022 and March  2023. The current global rate of implementation commitments stands at 
76%.  
3.146.   During the review  period, the Committee received 20 notifications. The Committee continued 
to focus on addressing the gaps in the provision of identified needs for technical assistance and 
capacity -building support. There were also broader discussions on the wider ongoing implementation 
support, including from a regional perspective, as well as a look at avenues for further collaboration 
and cooperation delegations. The Committee welcomed  the first experience -sharing by regional 
trade facilitation committees.  
3.147.   Discussions on  MC12 Implementation Matters took place at both meetings covering 
improved functioning of the Committee and also the WTO response to the pandemic with a view to 
submitting a written report to the CTG before 30  November  2023 describing the discussions held 
and improvements introduced.  
3.148.   At the March  2023 meeting, the United  States  raised questions about Indonesia's 
Regulation  190/PMK.04/2022 of 14  December  2022, entitled "The Transfer of Self -Consumed 
Goods".86 At the same meeting, and at the request of the United  States , an informal session on the 
topic of disaster preparedness was held highlighting the challenges faced in moving humanitarian 
aid and relief supplies across international borders during times of disaster.  
3.149.   During the review period, the work of the Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility (TFAF) 
focused on the return to in -person activities, delivering its grant program me and demonstrating 
reinforced transparency procedures set out in its updated Frame work87 for management and 
operation agreed by Members in April  2022. The external evaluation of the Facility concluded at the 
end of 2022 has been discussed with Members to identify recommendations for action.  
3.150.   TFAF's 2023 workplan88, drafted following proc edures in its new management framework, 
was agreed by the TF Committee in October  2022 and identifies priorities and activities to be 
delivered throughout the year. Grants and ad hoc activities can be requested by Members at any 
time through the TFAF websi te.89 
3.151.   Technical assistance activities included a regional trade facilitation workshop for the Pacific 
in Australia on 13 -16 December  2022 organi zed with the World Bank Group and the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat (PIFS). A national workshop was organi zed at the request of the Maldives in 
cooperation with UNCTAD, the Asian Development Bank, and the WCO in Malé on 
22-25 January  2023. An expression of interest from Malawi for a TFAF grant was matched with the 
World Bank Group , which plans to assist with the  implementation of five provisions of the TFA. A 
project proposal grant is being prepared with Madagascar, to be launched by the end of the review 
period.  
Trade financing  
3.152.   Multilateral development banks continued to receive excess demand for their trade fin ance 
facilitation programmes. For balance -of-payments -constrained countries, the increase in the value 
of imports, notably food and energy, has been stretching the capacity of local financial sectors to 
provide higher levels of trade finance. Moreover, acc ess to foreign exchange, which is indispensable 
for issuing trade finance instruments, has been also a growing problem for countries experiencing 
external sector constraints. The supply of international trade finance was also negatively affected by 
the inc rease in country risk (political or economic risk) and by recent financial turbulence, which h as 
a knock -on effect on inter -bank market conditions. As trade finance is mostly short  term, its 
availability is particularly sensitive to inter -bank market conditions.  
 
86 WTO document G/TFA/Q/IDN/1, 20  March  2023. 
87 WTO document G/TFA/3, 5  April 2022. 
88 WTO document G/TFA/TFAF/2, 8  December  2022. 
89 Viewed at: https://www.tfafacility.org/assistance -and-grants .  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Women's economic empowerment  
3.153.   Gender equality is becoming a significant component of WTO Members' trade strategies and 
policies as they increasingly recogni ze that women's economic empowerment is key for sustainable 
growth and poverty reduction. While in the past, WTO Members would simply integrate general 
objectives in support of women's economic empowerment in their trade policies, the period under 
review showed that many Members have been shifting towards affirming objectives of 
mainstreaming gender throughout their trade policies, program mes, and initiatives. Trade policies 
are also pro gressively acknowledging women's role in the economy and considering women as 
strategic economic agents that can foster trade growth and integration into the multilateral trading 
system.  
3.154.   Many Members have introduced export support programmes to help women entrepreneurs 
who are  either exporting for the first time or to further expand their presence in international 
markets. Increasingly, p olicies include dedicated programmes for entrepreneurs to have access to 
finance and credit with advantageous conditions,  for example in the form of medium - and long -term 
indirect credit lines or loan guarantees.  
3.155.   More broadly, trade policy initiatives to support MSMEs financially, although not specifically 
targeting women, can have a positive impact on them as many MSMEs are  owned or led by women. 
Some t rade policies also carve out preferences for female entrepreneurs to participate in government 
procurement bidding and some governments also support women entrepreneurs by defining their 
status using specific criteria, often i n the form a certification. This can represent an advantage for 
businesswomen in accessing trade opportunities.  
3.156.   In both agriculture and fisheries, support for women is widespread as some governments 
increase their support for female farmers using domestic support and green box subsidies . Some 
program mes include training, access to agricultural land, support in entering international markets 
and access to input subsidies and financial support. In contrast, even though most women work in 
the services sector, few policies, except for the tourism sect or, specifically have so far addressed 
gender -related issues.  
3.157.   Challenges continue to exist in policy -making when it comes to supporting gender equality 
in trade. Governments face difficulties in collecting sex -disaggregated data in trade, which is crucial 
to develop informed trade policies. Similarly, most trade policies do not include an impact evaluation 
process or a monitoring exercise to review and understand their effects.  
Developments in WTO Accessions' negotia tions  
3.158.   The accession negotiations of Comoros  and Timor -Leste , both LDCs, advanced significantl y 
over the review period and could be finali zed in 2023 − in time for adoption of the respective 
accession packages before or at MC13. The lists of outstanding issues have been narrowed down in 
recent meetings of the respective accession Working Parties, especially regarding the legislative 
actions required to a chieve WTO conformity. In the case of Comoros, the verified draft Schedule of 
Concessions and Commitments on Goods and the verified draft Schedule of Specific Commitments 
on Trade in Services were circulated to Members in early May  2023, which completed th e market 
access track of the negotiations. More information on other ongoing accessions can be found here. 
3.159.   Since its launch in 2021, the WTO's Trade for Peace (T4P) Programme  was further 
consolidated and continued to deliver various outreach , research , training  and capacity -building  
activities in the period under review. Highlights in the last quarter of 2022 include the 3rd edition of 
the T4P Week , exploring how to build peace through trade and economic integration particularly in 
fragile and conflict affected states (FCS), and the launch of the first Interdisciplinary Master's course 
on T4P , delivered in collaboration with the Geneva Graduate Institute. In 2023, the T4P Programme 
has focused on its research pillar, where work has progressed on developing the first book fully 
dedicated to examining the trade -peace nexus.  
 WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  4  POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN TRADE IN SERVICES  
Regular measures affecting trade in services  
4.1.  During the review period, 74 new measures affectin g trade in services were introduced. Half 
of these were horizontal measures targeting different modes of supply across various sectors. A 
significant number of measures relating to communications, ICT, or financial services' trade was 
recorded (11 and 13 , respectively). Other measures affected business services, health, tourism and 
travel, and transport services. Overall, most of the measures were trade facilitating (for instance, in 
commercial presence and presence of natural persons), while some new poli cies appeared to be 
trade restrictive (measures affecting communication and network -enabled services and policies 
pertaining to the screening of foreign investment).  
4.2.  Annex  4 of the Addendum provides additional information on the 74 new services measures 
introduced by 42 WTO Members and 2 Observers.1 
Measures affecting supply through multiple modes of supply across various sectors  
4.3.  Brazil  introduced a new law, effective on 30  December  2022, which notably calls for a greater 
amount of currency allowed when tr aveling abroad (USD  10,000), as well as lifting the reciprocity 
requirement for foreign banks to acquire more than 30% of shares with voting rights in Brazilian 
banks. Argentina  established a new wealth tax levy of 25% for purchases and expenses abroad tha t 
exceed a limit of USD  300 per month with credit and debit cards. This duty is separate from and on 
top of new rules and tax rates for foreign currency purchases of goods and services overseas and is 
added to the increase from 35% to 45% regarding some pu rchases made abroad recently imposed 
by authorities.  
Measures affecting supply through commercial presence across various sectors  
4.4.  Various governments introduced changes to their investment policies that affect the supply 
through commercial presence (mode 3 ) across various sectors. In Jordan , a new law published on 
16 October  2022 provides for non -discriminatory treatment, freedom of capital transfer and 
investment guarantees and incentives. It specifies that foreigners can be hired in administrative and 
technical positions that require speciali zed skills, up to 25% of the workforce. It can be increased to 
40% if skills are not available locally. The new law has not repealed the Non -Jordanian Investments 
Regulation No . 77 of 2016 , which provided for ownership  restrictions in certain activities. On 
1 January  2023, China  increased the number of sectors where foreign investment is encouraged. 
The list of sectors now covers modern services, such as recycling and processing services of retired 
wind turbine blades a nd waste photovoltaic modules, technical services (e.g. advanced system 
integration technology and service of low carbon, environmental protection, green energy saving 
and water saving), construction engineering, language services or elder care related ser vices.  
4.5.  Several EU member  States  (Estonia, Romania, Slovak  Republic , and Spain) introduced or 
revised their legislation aiming at scrutinizing direct and indirect investment by non -EU investors. In 
Estonia , the regime promulgated on 2  February  2023 will app ly to 11 specific areas such as providers 
of vital services, state -controlled undertakings and providers of national television or radio 
broadcasting services. There are no size or value thresholds, and a transaction is automatically 
covered by the FDI reg ime if a non -EU investor acquires direct or indirect control, a qualifying 
holding, or a part of the target undertaking. Starting 29  March  2023, Slovak  Republic  introduced 
three screening procedures: obligatory screening, voluntary screening, and ex offici o screening. All 
foreign investments may be screened when there is a reasonable presumption that they may 
threaten or disrupt security or public order, unlike the previous regime under which only investments 
into critical infrastructure were subject to scr eening procedures. Foreign investments falling under 
the category of critical investments should be made only after the approval of the Ministry of 
Economy. The list of critical investments is to be determined by separate legislation.  
4.6.  France 's Directorate -General of the Treasury published new guidelines on the screening of 
foreign direct investments, bringing more transparency in the process. The guidelines explain how 
 
1 The inclusion of any measure in the Annex  implies no judgement by the WTO Secretariat on whether or 
not such measure, or its intent, is protectionist in nature. Moreover, nothing in the Annex  implies any judgement, 
either direct or indirect, on the consistency of any measure referred to with the provisions of any WTO agreement.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  authorities interpret "sensitive activities", subject to review. The factors are assessed  on a 
case-by-case basis, including target customers, applications of the products/services concerned, 
dangerousness and market substitutability. New R&D activities received particular attention. The 
guidelines also clarify that an activity can be consider ed sensitive regardless of the turnover 
generated in the market.  
Measures related to communication services, e -commerce and digitally enabled services  
4.7.  A third of the measures reported affected trade in communications services, Internet - and 
other network -enabled services, or computer services. Nigeria  issued a code of practice for 
interactive computer service platforms and Internet intermediaries (effect ive on December  2022), 
requiring that large digital platforms (over 1  million  users in Nigeria) be incorporated in the country. 
The European  Union 's Digital Services Act (DSA) became effective on 16  November  2022. It applies 
to online intermediary services, which include cloud computing and webhosting services, 
intermediary services offering network infrastructure, online platforms bringing together sellers and 
consumers (e.g. app stores), and very large online platforms , as well as ver y large search engines 
reaching over 10% of the total EU population. The DSA includes new obligations on the traceability 
of business' users on online marketplaces , obligations for very large online platforms and search 
engines to prevent the misuse of sys tems, and transparency measures for all online platforms.  
4.8.  Kenya  announced that in March  2023, foreign ICT companies were no longer required to 
relinquish 30% of their ownership to Kenyans, a requirement that had been established in 2020 in 
the National Inf ormation, Communications, and Technology (ICT) Policy, with a 3-year compliance 
requirement. In March  2023, Israel  indicated that it would relax certain restrictions on ownership of 
equity in the incumbent supplier of local fixed -line services. Institution s will be allowed to own up to 
7.5% of shares, compared to 5% previously. Ethiopia  declared on 9  February  2023 that it will sell 
45% of the capital of the public telecommunications operator.  
4.9.  The Russian  Federation  amended the Federal Law on Personal Data, requiring impact 
assessments and filings with the data protection authority as pre -conditions for cross -border 
personal data transfers. The amendments apply to any entity that intends to transfer personal data 
from the Russian  Federation  to an entity based  in another jurisdiction (natural person, legal entity, 
or governmental body), whatever the nationality of data subjects. This is not required in the case of 
an adequacy decision concerning the destination country. Starting 27  March  2023, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia  made further allowance for international data transfers, which no longer require 
approval if they are in implementation of obligations under international agreements to which the 
country is a party, if the transfer is made pursuant to a contract  to which the data subject is a party.  
Financial services  
4.10.  Several policy changes by 10 Members were introduced during the review period in the 
financial services sectors. For example, in January  2023, Mauritius  introduced new rules regulating 
entities whos e main activity is to provide Global Shared Services to a related entity providing 
financial services outside Mauritius. These should be incorporated in Mauritius, not hold other 
licences, authori zation, registration, or approval except as approved by the Financial Services 
Commission, and not be engaged in the provision of any services or activities other than those 
specified in the Sixth Schedule of the Financial Services Act. On 7  February  2023, the Republic of 
Korea  liberalized the onshore inter -bank fo reign exchange market, allowing foreign financial 
institutions based abroad (with or without branches in the jurisdiction) to directly participate in this 
market, under condition of registration with Korean authorities.  
4.11.  The European  Union  adopted on 28  November  2022 the Digital Operational Resilience Act 
(DORA), which affects not only trade in financial services, but also the supply of third -party trade in 
ICT-related services to the financial sector. DORA sets rules for monitoring risks related to 
outsourc ed tasks and requires the outsourcing arrangements to comply with certain requirements 
(e.g. access to, recovery and return of data; services levels). Under DORA, the supervisory 
authorities for the financial sector can directly supervise ICT third -party s ervice providers that are 
themselves not engaged in regulated activities but deemed by the authorities to be "critical " to 
financial entities.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Other services sectors  
4.12.  New policies were also adopted with respect to transport services. Bangladesh  adopted a ne w 
ordinance on 5  February  2023 requiring that an exemption certificate be applied for the 
transportation of goods by any ship other than Bangladesh -flagged ship s and that the grant and 
revocation  of such certificate be subject to the opinion of the state-owned Shipping Corporation and 
the Bangladesh Flag Ship Owner's Association. The ordinance notably establishes requirements on 
the composition of the crew if a foreign ship licensed with an exemption certificate to transport 
exclusively commercial goods of Bangladesh in coastal areas: i f for a period of 3 months and less 
than one year, then the total manpower of the said ship shall be at least 50% recruited from among 
Bangladeshi officers and sailors; for more than one year it shall be a 100%. From 
20 November  2022, a new law came into e ffect in Egypt  establishing the River Transport Authority 
(RTA) qualified to apply the laws regulating the internal navigation, marinas and mooring in inland 
waters. The RTA can grant public utility concessions to investors to build, manage, operate, or 
maintain ports, docks, and moorings on the Nile. The concession period cannot be less than 5 years 
or exceed 15 years, and must be permitted by the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Ministry of Defence 
must approve the port's location.  
4.13.  With respect to legal serv ices, effective on 1  November  2022, a new category of incorporated 
law firms was established in Japan , namely, joint corporations, comprising both Japanese qualified 
attorneys at law and registered foreign lawyers as members. While the latter remain limite d to 
providing services related to foreign law, joint corporations can now establish branches throughout 
Japan, when it was only possible to have one office under previous foreign law joint enterprise 
arrangements. In India, new rules, effective on 10  March 2023, enable foreign lawyers and law firms 
to provide services in the country, under reciprocal conditions. The areas of practice for foreign 
lawyers/law firms are yet to be laid down by the Bar Council of India. The scope of practice will be 
limited to advisory services in foreign law, international law, international commercial arbitration, 
transactional work/corporate work such as joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, IP matters, 
drafting of contracts and other related matters. Foreign service supp liers will only be permitted to 
advise foreign persons/entities on the laws of the country in which they have qualified but will be 
allowed to represent foreign entities in international arbitrations conducted in India, regardless of 
the involvement of for eign law in such arbitration.  
4.14.  Some measures were also adopted in the tourism sector. For example, in Costa  Rica, an 
amendment to the Regulation of the Law of marinas and tourist berths, effective on 
31 October  2022, established that a foreign vessel that uses the services of a marina or tourist berth 
in Costa  Rica may remain in the country for two extendable years. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , 
as of 25  March  2023, a foreign hotel operator willing to operate in the Kingdom  is required to 
establish a licen sed legal entity, notably by obtaining a foreign investment licen ce and commercial 
registration certificate.  
Services supplied through the movement of natural persons  
4.15.  Most of the measures affecting the supply of services through the movement of natural 
persons implemented during the review period were trade -facilitating. For example, the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia  extended on 8  November  2022 the maximum duration of stay for all categories of 
single -entry visit visas from one month to three months. On 1  April 2023, Finland  expanded the 
eligibility for its D visa to those in managerial positions and their families, which will result in a faster 
entry process. Mozambique  launched on 5  December  2022 an e -Visa platform, inter alia, for crew, 
sport and culture , and business visas. The online system allows applicants to apply for visas directly 
and upload required documents, with a response provided within five business days.  
4.16.  Some measures affecting the supply of services were restrictive, such as in Paraguay , which 
requires foreign nationals working on short -term assignments to obtain a Short -term Residence 
Permit, which is valid for up to 90 days (renewable once), compared to the previous permit allowing 
work for up to 6 months. However, the duration of the temp orary residence status has been 
increased to two years (renewable for the same period), up from the previous one -year duration.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Trade concerns raised in the Council for Trade in Services  
4.17.  At the meetings of the Council for Trade in Services  (CTS)  held on 14  October  20222, 
8 December  20223 and 9  March  20234, concerns were reiterated about (i)  cybersecurity measures 
of China and Viet  Nam (raised by Japan and United  States ); (ii) 5G-related measures of Australia 
(raised by China); (iii)  measures of the United  States  regarding Chinese services and service 
suppliers (raised by China); and (iv) measures of India regarding Chinese services and service 
suppliers (raised by China ). 
Air services agreements  
4.18.  Table  4.1 presents information on air services agreemen ts (ASAs) concluded or amended 
during the period under review. These include both new ASAs and revisions of existing ones. As far 
as can be assessed from available sources, these ASAs provide for improved access conditions than 
was previously the case. All  are bilateral ASAs, with the notable exception of the ASEAN -EU 
agreement.  
Table  4.1 Air transport agreements5 concluded or amended between October  2022 and 
May 2023 
Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
Barbados  Qatar  29/09/2022 Barbados Today , "Barbados signs air services 
agreement with Government of Qatar " 
https://barbadostoday.bb/2022/09/ 29/barbados -
signs-air-services -agreement -with-government -of-
qatar/  
Belize  Qatar  01/10/2022 Breaking Belize News , "Qatar and Belize sign air 
services agreement " 
https://www.breakingbelizenews.com/2022/10/01
/qatar -and-belize -sign-air-services -agreement/  
Ethiopia  Chad 01/10/2022 2merkato.com, " Ethiopia Signs Av iation 
Agreements with Chad and Turkey " 
https://www.2merkato.com/news/alerts/6783 -
ethiopia -signs-aviation -agreements -with-chad-
and-turkey  
Singapore  Palau  03/10/2022 The Straits Times , "Singapore signs open skies 
agreement with Palau " 
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapor
e-signs-open-skies-agreement -with-palau  
Seychelles  Kazakhstan  03/10/2022 Seychelles News Agency , "Seychelles signs air 
service agreement with Kazakhstan " 
http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/1
7504/Seychelles+signs+air+service+agreement+
with+Kazakhstan  
Tonga  United Arab 
Emirates  10/10/2022 Matangi Tonga Online , "Tonga signs Air Services 
Agreement with United Arab Emirates " 
https://matangitonga.to/2022/10/10/tonga -signs-
air-services -agreement -united -arab-emirates  
Guyana  China  13/10/2022 Caribbean National Weekly , "Guyana signs air 
agreement with China" 
https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/news/c
aribbean -news/guyana -signs-air-agreement -with-
china/  
ASEAN  European  Union  17/10/2022 The Busines s Times , "Comprehensive air transport 
pact inked between Asean and European  Union, 
Government and Economy"  
https://w ww.businesstimes.com.sg/government -
economy/comprehensive -air-transport -pact-inked -
between -asean -and-european -union  
Serbia  Türkiye  19/10/2022 EX-YU Aviation News , "Serbia - Turkey reach deal 
on new routes, frequencies and capacity " 
https://www.exyuaviation.com/2022/10/serbia -
turkey -reach -deal-on-new-routes.html  
 
2 WTO document S/C/M/150, 14 November  2022. 
3 WTO document S/C/M/151, 31 January  2023. 
4 WTO document S/C/M/152, 18 April 2023. 
5 The term "Air Transport Agreements" is used here to refer to Air Services Agreements, Memoranda of 
Understanding, Exchange of Notes, and other such relevant instruments.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 61 - 
 
  Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  Finland  02/11/2022 Arabian Business , "Saudi Arabia, Finland sign pact 
to provide air services between the two countries " 
https://www.arabianbusines s.com/industries/trans
port/saudi -arabia -finland -sign-pact-to-provide -air-
services -between -the-two-countries   
Bahrain , Kingdom of  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  09/11/2022 Sarajevo Times , "Kingdom of Bahrain and BiH sign 
the Agreement on Services in Air Transport " 
https://sarajevotimes.com/kingdom -of-bahrain -
and-bih-sign-the-agreement -on-services -in-air-
transport/  
Barbados  Rwanda  11/11/2022 St Kitts Nevis Observer , "Barbados and Rwanda 
Cement Closer Ties " 
https://www.thestkittsnevisobserver.com/barbado
s-and-rwanda -cement -closer -ties/ 
Canada  India 15/11/2022 Aviation Week , "Canada, India Expand Air 
Services Agreement"  
https://aviationweek.com/air -transport/airports -
networks/canada -india-expand -air-services -
agreement -0 
United  States  Ecuador  17/11/2022 U.S. Department of State, "United  States and 
Ecuador Sign Open Skies Agreement" 
https://www.state.gov/united -states -and-
ecuador -sign-open-skies-agreement/  
Barbados  Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  29/11/2022 Loop News , "Barbados, Saudi Arabia sign air 
services agreement"  
https://barbados.loopnews.com/content/bar bados
-saudi -arabia -sign-air-services -agreement  
Nigeria  Seychelles  09/12/2022 Daily Trust , "Nigeria, Seychelles sign BASA on 
direct flights " 
https://dailytrust.com/nigeria -seychelles -sign-
basa-on-direct -flights/   
Bangladesh  Rwanda  12/01/2023 MENAFN, " BD, Rwanda Ink Bilateral Air Services 
Agreement " 
https://menafn.com/1105431666/BD -Rwanda -
Ink-Bilateral -Air-Services -Agreement  
Qatar  Saint Lucia 16/01/2023 MENAFN, " Qatar and Saint  Lucia Sign Air Services 
Agreement " 
https://menafn.com/1105435490/Qatar -And-
Saint-Lucia-Sign-Air-Services -Agreement  
Canada  Dominican  Republic  03/02/2023 Simple Flyin g, "Canada Signs Open Skies 
Agreement With Dominican  Republic"  
https://simpleflying.com/canada -open-skies-
agreement -dominican -republic/  
Montenegro  Azerbaijan  06/02/2023 See News , "Montenegro signs air service 
agreement with Azerbaijan – report " 
https://seenews.com/news/montenegro -signs-air-
service -agreement -with-azerbaijan -report -813638   
European  Union  Japan  20/02/2023 Council of the European  Union , "External aviation 
policy: EU signs agreement boosting air services 
with Japan"  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press -
releases/2023/02/20/external -aviation -policy -eu-
signs-agreement -boosting -air-services -with-
japan/  
Guyana  India 22/02/2023 Loop News , "Air Services Agreement between 
Guyana and India approved for signing"  
https://caribbean.loopnews.com/content/air -
services -agreement -between -guyana -and-india-
approved -signing  
Sri Lanka  Netherlands  22/02/2023 Ada Derana Business , "Sri Lanka  signs Air 
Services Agreement with the Netherlands " 
http://bizenglish.adaderana.lk/sri -lanka -signs-air-
services -agreement -with-the-netherlands/  
Ghana  Sao Tome and 
Principe  08/03/2023 Graphic Online , "Ghana, Sao Tome and Príncipe 
sign air traffic agreement " 
https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general -
news/ghana -news-ghana -sao-tome-and-principe -
sign-air-traffic -agreement.html  
Philippines  Türkiye  05/04/2023 Malaya Business Insight , "PH, Türkiye  improve air 
services agreement " 
https://malaya.com.ph/news_business/ph -
turkiye -improve -air-services -agreement/  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
- 62 - 
 
  Parties  Date of 
signature  Source  
Canada  United Arab 
Emirates  05/04/2023 Mirage Ne ws, "Canada -UAE Air Transport 
Agreement Expanded for More Flights " 
https://www.miragenews.com/canada -uae-air-
transport -agreement -expanded -for-981899/  
Dominican  Republic  Brazil  14/04/2023 Dominican Today , "Dominican  Republic  and Brazil 
update air transport agreement protocol " 
https://dominicantoday.com/dr/world/2023/04/14
/dominican -republic -and-brazil-update -air-
transport -agreement -protocol/  
India Guyana  20/04/2023 The Economic Times , "India, Guyana sign Air 
Services Agreement to allow easier travel between 
the nations " 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/tr
ansportation/airlines -/-aviation/india -guyana -sign-
air-services -agreement -to-allow-easier -travel -
between -the-nations/articleshow/99711161.cms  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
COVID -19-related measures affecting trade in services6 
4.19.  During the review period, no new COVID -19-related measures affecting trade in services were 
reported. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, the Secretariat has collected information on 
156 COVID -19-related measures affecting trade in services introduced by Members and Observers. 
Only one Me mber, New  Zealand , reported the termination of a COVID -19-related measure affecting 
trade in services ( i.e. conclusion of the scheme to secure regional connectivity and ensure that 
critical air services could continue through disruptions from COVID -19, and  which helped rebuild 
international reconnections and economic recovery).  
4.20.  Twenty -two measures in total were reported as terminated over the past three years. The full 
list of measures compiled since the beginning of the COVID -19 pandemic is available on th e WTO 
website.7 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The information in this Section  was compiled by the WTO Secretariat and  is an informal situation report 
and an attempt to provide transparency with respect to measures affecting trade in services taken in the context 
of the COVID -19 crisis. It does not pass judg ement  on or question the right of WTO Members to take such 
action s. The Secretariat has not sought to determine or indicate whether the measures listed in the trade in 
services COVID -19-related measures on the WTO website have trade -restrictive or trade -facilitating effects. The 
information is not exhaustive and does no t include information on general support measures relating to services. 
Further, the objective is not to list all COVID -19-related measures taken by governments around the world to 
limit movement, nor all the measures taken to ease the impact of border res trictions or other limits on movement.  
7 Viewed at: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/trade_related_services_measure_e.htm . WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  5  POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
5.1.  During the review period, WTO Members continued to refine and upgrade their intellectual 
property (IP) regimes in response to technological and economic developme nts. Namibia deposited 
its instrument of acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS  Agreement  in April  2023. 
5.2.  While many pandemic -related measures have been phased out, some Members have 
formalized the utilization of online procedures created during lock downs. Several Members continued 
to apply war -related financial measures that can have an effect on the acquisition and management 
of IP  rights. Türkiye implemented measures for IP holders in the regions affected by the 
earthquake s. 
5.3.  The MC12 TRIPS Decision on COVID -19 Vaccines1 was adopted in June  2022. Since then, 
Members have discussed the possible extension to COVID -19 diagnostics and therapeutics.  
COVID -19-related measures  
5.4.  The pace of implementation of specific measures related to COVID -19 health technologies 
slowed down. Some Members extended the duration of the availability of online procedures for 
registration and management of IP rights while others phased out such measures. Other Members, 
like Chile, incorporated the use of onl ine forms for submissions into their procedures.  
Developments in the context of the war in Ukraine  
5.5.  Several Members continue to apply a wide range of financial measures to designated nationals 
(e.g. legal or natural persons) that cover both tangible and int angible assets, like IP rights. These 
measures might indirectly affect the maintenance and licensing of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs).2 
Emergency -related measures  
5.6.  Türkiye extended the administrative deadlines for IP right holders and applicants from  the 
provinces affected by the  earthquake s.3 
National IP -related strategies  
5.7.  Albania established the interagency working group to monitor and implement its National IP 
Strategy 2022 –2025.4 Table  5.1 provides domestic legislation and administrative develop ments that 
took place during the review period.  
Table  5.1 Domestic legislation and administrative developments  
Member  Measure  
Chile The National Intellectual Property Institute updated its appraisal fees, mandated 
the use of the online form for submissions for trademark oppositions, and set the 
fees in the framework of the Madrid Protocol, between November  2022 and 
June 2023.a 
China  The National Copyright Administration issued 7 pre -warning lists of  key works for 
copyright protection, covering a total of 38 works, including 6 theatrical films 
involving overseas rights holders, as of October  2022.b 
Hong Kong, 
China  The Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2022 was passed by the Legislative Council in 
December  2022 to strengthen protection in the digital environment. It came into 
force in May  2023.c 
Montenegro  Amendments to the Law on Trademarks and to the Law on Patents entered into 
force in January  2023.d 
Myanmar  The Law on Trademarks came into force in April  2023, and the IP Central 
Committee was reorganized in February  2023. 
 
1 WTO document WT/M IN(22)/30 , 22 June  2022. 
2 Viewed at, for example: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2021C00330 . 
3 Communication by Türkiye to the Trade Monitoring Report.  
4 Communication by Albania to the Trade Monitoring Report.  WT/TPR/OV/W/17  
 
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  Member  Measure  
Nigeria  The new Copyright Act was signed into Law in March  2022.e 
Norway  The new Customs Act and Regulations on the Movement of Goods were updated 
enforcement provisions that encompass: (i)  interventions by customs authorities 
on transit shipments if the contents are protected by IP rights in Norway; and 
(ii) small consignments containing online purchases can be intercepted and 
detained by customs with a simplified procedu re for seizure and destruction .f 
Chinese  Taipei  The enforcement rules contained in the Patent Act were amended in 
October  2022.g 
Saudi Arabia, 
Kingdom of  The National Intellectual Property Strategy was launched in December  2022; the 
compulsory licensing service for copyright works was launched in 
November  2022; and implemented enforcement campaigns in March  2023.h 
Ukraine  The functions of the National Intellectual Property Authority were updated in 
November  2022; the Law on Geographical Indications for Spirits came partially 
into force in December  2022; and the Law on Copyright and Related Rights came 
into force in January  2023. 
a Communication by Chile to the Trade Monitoring Report.  
b Communication by China to the Trade Monitoring Repo rt. 
c Communication by Hong Kong, China to the Trade Monitoring Report.  
d Communication by Montenegro to the Trade Monitoring Report.  
e Viewed at: Nigeria Passes Ne w Copyright Act 2022 (wipo.int) . 
f Communication by Norway to the Trade Monitoring Report.  
g Communication by Chinese  Taipei  to the Trade Monitoring Report; and notifications to the TRIPS 
Council , WTO  document  IP/N/1/TPKM/36, IP/N/1/TPKM/P/18 , 2 December  2022. 
h Communication by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Trade Monitoring Report.  
Source:  WTO Secretariat.  
TRIPS Council  
5.8.  During the review period, the TRIPS Council met twice formally (October  2022 and 
March  2023) and several times in informal mode. Disc ussions focused on the possible extension of 
the MC12 TRIPS Decision on COVID -19 Vaccines5 to diagnostics and therapeutics. The Council's  
transparency function showed valuable progress and practical engagement, with 198 notifications 
on a diverse array of  new and revised IP laws. Members shared their national experiences and 
extensive information on their domestic experiences on "Role of IP to raise Finance for Start -Ups" 
and "Cross -border Cooperation among IP Offices". Detailed discussions on incentives for the transfer 
of technology for LDCs with a view to attaining the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
took place in a dedicated Workshop, back -to-back with the meeting in March.  
__________  
 
5 WTO document WT/MIN(22)/30 , 22 June 2022.