WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
17 January 2022  
(22-0362) Page: 1/572 
Trade Policy Review Body  
20 and 22 October 2021  Original: English/Spanish  
anglais/espagnol  
inglés/español  
 
  
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
CHINA 
MINUTES  OF THE MEETING  
Revision  
Chairperson: H.E. Mrs. Athaliah Lesiba MOLOKOMME (Botswana)  
This document contains the advance written questions  and additional questions by 
WTO Members , and replies provided by  China .1 
 
 
Organe d 'examen des politiques commerciales  
20 et 22 octobre 2021  
EXAMEN DES POLITIQUES COMMERCIALES  
LA CHINE 
COMPTE RENDU DE LA RÉUNION  
Revision  
Présidente : S.E.  Mme Athaliah Lesiba MOLOKOMME (Botswana)  
Le présent document contient les questions écrites communiquées à l 'avance par les 
Membres de l 'OMC, leurs questions additionnelles, et les réponses  fournies par  la Chine .1 
 
 
Órgano de Examen de las Políticas Comerciale s 
20 y 22 de octubre de 2021  
EXAMEN DE LAS POLÍTICAS COMERCIALES  
CHINA 
ACTA DE LA REUNIÓN  
Revisi ón 
Presidenta: Excma.  Sra. Athaliah Lesiba MOLOKOMME (Botswana)  
En el presente documento figuran las preguntas presentadas anticipadamente por escrito  y 
las preguntas adicionales de los Miembros de la OMC,  así como las respues tas facilitadas por  China .1 
  
 
1 In English and Spanish only ./En anglais et espagnol seulement./En inglés y español solamente.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Contents  
VIET NAM  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  4 
AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  6 
AUSTRALIA - ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ..... 12 
PAKISTAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  20 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ ...............................  24 
SWITZERLAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  27 
NORTH MACEDONIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 35 
ISRAEL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  37 
THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  39 
HONG KONG, CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 47 
BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  50 
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................  66 
JAPAN – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ..........  111  
ARGENTINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  121  
ARGENTINA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ .. 126  
SINGAPORE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  131  
BRAZIL  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  145  
COSTA RICA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  160  
OMAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  166  
NORWAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  167  
UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 172  
UNITED STATES – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS  ................................ .............................  219  
MEXICO  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  247  
COLOMBIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  252  
UKRAINE  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  261  
EL SALVADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  272  
CANADA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  273  
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  ................................ ................................ ............................  315  
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ .................  317  
PHILIPPINES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  319  
CHILE  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......................  338  
NEW ZEALAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  348  
UNITED KINGDOM  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 361  
UNITED KINGDOM – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS  ................................ .........................  402  
CHINESE TAIPEI  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 403  
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 410  
EUROPEAN UNION - FOLLOW UP QUESTIO NS ................................ ..........................  463  
ICELAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..................  478  
SAUDI ARABIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  480  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  BRUNEI DARUSSALAM  ................................ ................................ .............................  482  
MALAYSIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................  484  
BANGLADESH  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........  488  
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  490  
INDONESIA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ .. 499  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA  ................................ ................................ ................................  504  
INDIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  519  
INDIA - ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ...........  551  
TURKEY  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....................  565  
ECUADOR  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  568  
URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  572  
 
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  VIET NAM  
I. Relating to Section 3.3.3.2 (SPS Measures) of WTO Document No. WT/TPR/S/415 
(in general)  
 
Background:   
In March 2021, China 's General Administration of Customs approved of 2 following regulations, both 
of which will be effective from 1 Jan 2022:   
- Order No. 248 (Decree on the issuance of the Regulations on the Registration and 
Administration of Imported Food Overseas Production Enterprise s)  
- Order No. 249 (Decree on the issuance of the Measures for the Administration of Import and 
Export Food Safety of the People 's Republic of China).  
 
Order No. 248 has expanded the scope of application of business registration regulations and 
classified e nterprises based on risk levels. Meanwhile, Order No. 249 introduces a number of 
outstanding changes, such as changes in import management principles for foods that do not have 
China 's national standards and foods produced with new food ingredients, change s in labeling 
requirements, and changes in business registration information. Such major changes will increase 
procedures and costs for businesses. It also requires businesses to study carefully and take time to 
adjust accordingly.   
 
Question:  
Please prov ide specific resources/links to obtain detailed instructions, documents, procedures, and 
remarks for such new regulations, especially:   
 
o Registration of foreign food production enterprises;   
o Contents of the provisional set of standards issued by the Health  Administration of 
the State Council (Government) of China related to foods that do not have China 's 
national standards and foods produced by new food ingredients;  
o Detailed instructions, including visual images on the new labeling requirements for 
imported  products; and   
o Detailed instructions on procedures when there are changes in the enterprise 's 
registration documents.  
 
Reply:  In order to standardize the review of relevant standards for imported foods without national 
food safety standards (hereinafter referred to as imported food without national standards), through 
consultation with relevant departments, the National Health C ommission (formerly known as the 
National Health and Family Planning Commission) issued the Notice for Regulating the Standard 
Review of Imported Foods without National Food Safety Standard (Guo Wei Ban Shi Pin Fa [2017] 
No. 14) in April 2017. The Notice s tipulates the scope of imported food without national standards 
and duties and procedures for the review of relevant standards for imported food without national 
standards. For details, please refer to:  
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/sps/s3593/201704/15031a65db34492eab8fb5819e9cb466.shtml   
 
Article 93 of the Food Safety Law stipulates that the importation of food made of new food raw 
materials does not belong to imported fo od without national standards. In order to standardize the 
safety review and licensing of new food raw materials, in accordance with the Food Safety Law of 
the People 's Republic of China and the Administrative Measures for the Safety Review of New Food 
Raw Materials, the National Health Commission (formerly known as the National Health and Family 
Planning Commission) formulated the Provisions on Application and Acceptance of New Food Raw 
Materials and the  Directive Rules for the Safety Review of New Food Ra w Materials. For details, 
please refer to:  
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/cms -
search/xxgk/getManuscriptXxgk.htm?id=e8dc7f4ec58444f8bbf32ec079d7e905  
 
According to relevant laws and regulations including the Food Safety Law, labeling and nutrition 
labeling for imported pre -packaging food shall meet the National Food Safety Standard: General 
Rules for the Labeling of Prepackaged Foods (GB 7718 -2011) and t he National Food Safety Standard: 
Nutrition Labeling of Prepackaged Foods (GB 28050 -2011). The original texts of the above 
two standards can be accessed on the Platform of Data Retrieval for National Standards on Food 
Safety: https://sppt.cfsa.net.cn:8086/db   WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  The Decree on the Issuance of the Measures for the Administration of Import and Export Food Safety 
of the People 's Republic of China (Order No. 249) highlights the requirements for the labeling of 
import ed dietary supplements and food for special dietary uses. Labeling the product in Chinese is 
conducive to gaining recognition among Chinese consumers.  Efforts are made on a coordinated basis 
to study and discuss some issues regarding the measures for the supervision and administration of 
food labeling. The legislation procedure will be sped up when an agreement is reached.  
 
Overseas manufacturers of imported food in validity period whose registration information have 
changed shall handle the situation according the Article 19 of Decree on the Issuance of the 
Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Imported Food Overseas Production 
Enterprises (Order No. 248).  
 
II. Relating to Section 3.3.3.2 (SPS Measures), Para 3.165 of WTO Document 
No. WT/TPR/S/415  
 
Background: On 21 September 2020, China sent a notification to the WTO (Document 
G/SPS/N/CHN/1173) on measures with respect to imported cold -chain food to prevent the 
transmission of COVID -19. The notification was based on Notice No. 103(2020)  issued by the China 's 
General Administration of Customs on 11 September 2020.  
 
According to this measure, after two positive results from SARS -CoV-2 virus test samples on 
products or packages of imported frozen products, the Chinese Customs will suspend the import of 
products of that enterprise for a week. After one week, customs cle arance will automatically be 
granted. In case the virus is detected for the third time, the Chinese Customs will suspend receiving 
the enterprise 's product import dossiers within 04 (four) weeks. After 04 (four) weeks, customs 
clearance will automatically be granted.   
 
Issue at stake:  
Since 18 July 2021 until now, however, Yunnan province of China has been suspending imports for 
all dragon fruit products of Viet Nam, regardless of production enterprises. In addition, 
Yunnan  Province authorities have suspen ded imports of many other Vietnamese fruits, which have 
been neither tested nor reported positive results for SARS -CoV-2 virus.  
 
In the notification sent to the WTO, China did not provide any basis for relevant international 
standards. Currently, there ar e no scientific studies in the world confirming that the SARS -CoV-2 
virus can be transmitted from food to humans.   
 
Question:  
Please provide specific scientific basis for the above -mentioned measure China is imposing on 
Vietnamese foods and agricultural export products, especially dragon fruits.   
Reply:  Viet Nam is one of the important exporters of dragon fruit to China.  According to statistics, 
in 2020, China imported about 618 million kilograms of fresh dragon fruit from Viet  Nam, worth 
about RMB 3.8 billion yuan.  The measure China has taken in response to the pandemic is based on 
scientific evidence and risk assessment, and is in alignment with relevant provisions of the WTO 
SPS Agreement, as well as relevant requirements of the WHO/FAO. It has been proved that the 
measure has achieved good results. China looks forward to working together with Viet  Nam and 
other WTO members to win the fight against the pandemic.  
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  AUSTRALIA  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
2.1 GENERAL FRAMEWORK   
Page 31 (Para 2.6)   
The Secretariat 's report states that: In principle, all trade -related rules formulated by the authorities 
at all levels must comply with international trade agreements to which China is a party, including 
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and its follow -up agreements, 
China 's accession protocol and China 's Working Party Report.  
 
Question 1   
a) Article 6.1 of China 's Protocol of Accession provides that: China shall ens ure that import 
purchasing procedures of state trading enterprises are fully transparent, and in compliance with the 
WTO Agreement, and shall refrain from taking any measures to influence or direct state trade 
enterprises as to the quantity, value, or coun try of origin of goods purchased or sold, except in 
accordance with the WTO Agreement.  
 
b) Paragraph 46 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China provides that: 
China would ensure that all state -owned and state -invested enterprises would make purchases and 
sales based solely on commercial considerations, e.g. price, quality, m arketability, and availability, 
and that the enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate opportunity to compete for 
sales to and purchases from these enterprises on non -discriminatory terms and conditions. In 
addition, the Government of China w ould not influence, directly or indirectly, commercial decisions 
on the part of state -owned or state -invested enterprises, including on the quantity, value or country 
of origin of any goods purchased or sold, except in a manner consistent with the WTO Agre ement.  
 
Since the second half of 2020 there have been consistent media reports that Chinese authorities 
"unofficially " directed state trading enterprises to cease or limit purchases and imports of Australian 
coal, cotton and other products. Australia has drawn these reports to China 's attention on multiple 
occasions since they first appeared. In line with China 's commitment under Article 6.1 of China 's 
Protocol of Accession and Paragraph 46 of the Report of the Working Party, what controls does China 
have in place to ensure no such "unofficial " directions are given, and what steps has it taken to 
investigate these allegations?  
 
Reply:  It is normal for Chinese importers to make decisions on whether and where to purchase 
based on market conditions and their own needs, with various factors being taken into consideration. 
This is of common business practices and conform to laws of the market.  
 
c) Australia notes Paragraph 75 of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China 
provides that: All individual s and entities could bring to the attention of central government 
authorities cases of non -uniform application of China 's trade regime, including its commitments 
under the WTO Agreement and the Draft Protocol. Such cases would be referred promptly to the 
responsible government agency, and when non -application was established, the authorities would 
act promptly to address the situation utilizing the remedies available under China 's laws, taking into 
consideration China 's international obligations and the nee d to provide a meaningful remedy.  
In relation to notifications and enquiries made by Australia into reported trade actions against 
Australian imports, can China outline the steps it took to comply with its commitments under 
Paragraph 75?   
 
Reply:  China has always kept and actively fulfilled its WTO commitments. Recently, in response to 
Australia 's concerns on parts of exports to China, the relevant measures taken by the Chinese 
authorities conform to the international practices of law and WTO rules , and China has informed 
Australia in due course.  
 
2.1 GENERAL FRAMEWORK  
Page 31 -32 (Para 2.6)  
The Secretariat 's report states that China publishes all "trade -related laws, regulations, and rules " 
on MOFCOM 's website.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question 2   
a) How does China determine which laws, regulations, and rules are trade -related? What overall 
percentage of China 's laws, regulations, and rules get published on MOFCOM 's website?   
b) Does China also publicly report administrative guidance issued by the Chinese Government to 
SOEs and private importers? If so, where?  
 
Reply to a), b) and c):  China publicly reports laws, regulations and other measures relating to or 
affecting trade in goods and services, TRIPS or foreign exchange control in accordance with the 
commitments releva nt to its accession to the WTO in due course.  
 
2.3.1 WTO  
Page 34 (Para 2.22)  
The Secretariat 's report states that "During the review period, China submitted various notifications 
to the WTO. Nevertheless, some notifications, including those on state trading enterprises and 
domestic support, remain outstanding. "  
 
3.3.1 INCENTIVES   
Page 76 (Para 3.120, 3.122 and 3.131)   
The Secretariat 's report states that: The authorities indicate that a notification on subsidies covering 
the years 2019 and 2020 will be submitted to the WTO in due course. It also states that: The 
notifications submitted to the WTO and the replies provided by China to questions asked by other 
Members do not enable the Secretariat to have a clear overall picture of China 's support 
programmes. In particular, the notifications do not contain information on expenditure levels in 
certain sectors such as aluminium, electric vehicles, glass, shipbuilding, semiconductors, or steel. It 
also states that: No notification on domestic support ha s been submitted to the WTO since the 
previous Review in 2019. The authorities indicate that a new notification would be submitted before 
mid-July 2021.  
 
3.3.5 STATE TRADING, STATE -OWNED ENTERPRISES, AND PRIVATIZATION   
Page 97 (Para 3.196)   
The Secretaria t's report states that: China provided its last full notification on state trading 
enterprises (STEs) in 2018. The authorities indicate that a new notification would be submitted 
before mid -July 2021.  
In reviewing these sections of the Secretariat Report,  Australia also gave consideration to the 
following section of the Chinese Government report (WT/TPR/G/415):  
 
4.2.2 DEEPLY AND FULLY PARTICIPATING IN MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND 
DISCUSSIONS, AND EARNESTLY FULFILLING THE OBLIGATIONS AS A WTO MEMBER   
Page 15 (Para 4.24)   
China 's report states that: China has fully fulfilled its obligations of notification under all 
WTO agreements.  
 
Question 3   
a) When does China propose to submit its outstanding notifications, including those outlined in 
G/AG/GEN/86/Rev.43?  
 
Reply:  China has submitted its latest notifications on state trading enterprises (STEs) and STEs 
quantity limitation, and will soon submit a notification on domestic support to the agriculture sector.  
 
b) Can China explain why it believes  it is "fully fulfilling " its transparency commitments, if the 
WTO Secretariat is unable to "have a clear overall picture " of China 's support programmes?  
c) Can China advise how it intends to improve its adherence to its WTO notification and 
transparency obligations and address the information shortfalls and concerns expressed by Members 
and the Secretariat?  
 
Reply to b) and c):  China believes that it has ful ly fulfilled its obligations of notification under all 
WTO agreements. In recent years, China has been committed to enhancing the transparency of its 
subsidy policies and has submitted notifications in due course on subsidies at the central and local 
gover nment levels, covering all provincial -level administrative regions and also containing many 
subsidy policies to counties, with a special chapter on fishery subsidies being notified. China 's latest 
notification on subsidies for 2019 -2020 includes 71 subsidy  policies at the central level, and 
374 subsidies at the local level in 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, as well as WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  five cities with separate state plans. China 's efforts and achievements in the transparency of its 
subsidy policies have  received positive comments from many members  
 
3.1.1.3 TRADE FACILITATION   
Page 49 (Box 3.1 GACC trade facilitation measures, 3. Import facilitation of food and 
agricultural product imports)   
The Secretariat 's report states that China has introduced an "Expedited process to grant market 
access to more categories of agri -food products from more countries and to register more 
establishments. Shortening of quarantine approval process. Green lanes to be established at key 
ports to provide around -the-clock cle arance for foreign agri -food products on a reservation basis. 
Priority inspection of imported food and agricultural products over other goods and priority testing 
of products suspected to contain pests or disease. "  
 
Question 4  
a) Could China explain why impo rts from Australia across a range of sectors (including coal, hay, 
wine and lobsters) are, unlike exporters of like products from other Members, experiencing sudden 
lengthy inspection and processing delays, without providing any prior notification or justi fication, 
and increased costs associated with storage and spoilage of perishable products (in contrast to the 
apparent intended effects of the trade facilitative measures highlighted in the report), noting these 
goods do not face discriminatory treatment i n any other market and trade is underpinned by 
Australia 's strong biosecurity systems?  
 
b) Could China explain why it has not responded to Australia 's efforts to facilitate the 
reinstatement of trade, noting that China has not provided evidence that the suspensions are 
proportionate to the risk and that Australia has already provided China with proposals for enhanced 
measures and details of investigations as requested by China?  
 
Reply to a) and b):  Regarding coal: In recent years, the Chinese Customs has conducted risk 
testing and analysis on the safety and quality of imported coal, and found that there are many cases 
concerning unqualified imported coal. Therefore, the Chinese Customs has strengthened quality and 
safety inspection of imported coal and tes ting of environmental protection items in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations for better protection on the environmental safety as well as legitimate 
rights and interests of Chinese enterprises.  
As for lobsters: Chinese Customs carries out inspec tion and quarantine on lobsters imported from 
Australia at import ports in accordance with the law, and release them after passing the inspection. 
This is not only to implement the requirements of relevant national laws and regulations, but also to 
ensure the imported food safety of Chinese consumers.  
As for wine: Based on the reflections from this industry, from 2015 to 2019, the volume of wine 
imported by China from Australia increased from 57 million liters to 121 million liters, a cumulative 
increase of  113%, while the prices dropped significantly. In addition, the Australian Federal 
government and state governments provide a large number of subsidies to the Australian wine 
industry, causing a huge impact on the Chinese wine market and enterprises. Under  this 
circumstance, the wine industry in China filed an application for "Anti-dumping and anti -subsidy " in 
accordance with the law, and the authorities accepted and investigated the application in accordance 
with the WTO rules and relevant provisions of Ch inese law.  
 
3.1.5 IMPORT PROHIBITIONS, RESTRICTIONS AND LICENSING   
Page 58 (Para 3.43)   
The Secretariat 's report notes that licenses and import quotas on restricted goods were "not applied 
during the review period ".  
 
Question 5   
Could China explain its delay in renewing import licenses for Australian exporters of various 
agricultural goods (e.g. hay, lobsters and table grapes), despite Australian traders having submitted 
renewal requests to China in accordance with China 's requirements well ahead of time ?  
 
Reply: On the issue of hay. According to that requirements of relevant law and regulations on 
imported plant -derived feed in China, all enterprises exported to China can engage in relevant trade 
within the validity period after being registered by the Chinese side. Before the expiration of the 
validity period, if the relevant enterprises apply for extension of registration, the official competent 
department of the exporting country shall check and confirm to ensure that they meet the 
requirements of the  Protocol and China 's entry animal and plant quarantine, and recommend WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  extension of registration to the Chinese side. China will conduct a retrospective inspection to decide 
whether to accept the application for registration extension submitted by enterpri ses. This measure 
shall be applicable to all plant -derived feeds exported to China, and there is no differential treatment 
or discriminatory treatment.  
As for lobsters: Chinese Customs carries out inspection and quarantine on lobsters imported from 
Austral ia at import ports in accordance with the law, and release them after passing the inspection. 
This is not only to implement the requirements of relevant national laws and regulations, but also to 
ensure the imported food safety of Chinese consumers.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
4.2 FIRMLY SUPPORTING THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM WITH THE WTO AT ITS 
CORE  
Page 14 (Para 4.14)   
China 's report states that: China has always been a staunch supporter, active participant and major 
contributor to the multilateral trading system. China calls on the WTO members to maintain a rules -
based, transparent, non -discriminatory, open and inclusive multilateral trading system, and to 
oppose unilateralism and protectionism. China also calls on th e WTO members to discard 
discriminatory or exclusionary standards, rules or regimes, and to take down barriers to trade, 
investment and technological exchanges. China has fully participated in the various work of the 
WTO, actively participated in reform of  the WTO, and committed itself to supporting the WTO 's 
greater role in further opening up and enhancing development, and strengthening the authority and 
efficacy of the multilateral trading system.   
 
4.2.1 ACTIVELY PARTICIPATING IN REFORM OF THE WTO, AND O PPOSING 
UNILATERALISM AND PROTECTIONISM   
Page 15 (Para 4.19)   
China 's report states that: China expressed its serious concern and strong opposition to the unilateral 
and protectionist actions that specific members have taken, which are in serious violation of the 
fundamental rules and spirit of the WTO … China calls on all  members to maintain open markets, 
and promote trade liberalization and facilitation. Trade frictions between members should be 
resolved in the framework of the WTO according to multilateral trade rules, and based on mutual 
respect.  
 
Question 6   
On 6 July 2021, China News Service asked a spokesperson for China 's Foreign Ministry a question 
on Australia 's loss of agricultural product market share in China. In response, China 's Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian, said: We will not allow any count ry to reap benefits from doing 
business with China while groundlessly accusing and smearing China and undermining China 's core 
interests based on ideology. When a certain country acts as a cat 's paw for others, it is the people 
that pay for misguided gover nment policies. From what you mention in your questions, we can see 
how such a practice has served the country concerned.  
 
a) Can China explain how its recent trade actions against Australia are consistent with its 
commitment to conduct trade in a "transpare nt" and "non-discriminatory " manner?  
b) Does China agree that predictability of trade is a central tenet of the multilateral trading system?  
c) Can China explain how its recent trade actions against Australia are consistent with its "serious 
concern and strong  opposition to the unilateral and protectionist actions " which are "in serious 
violation of the fundamental rules and spirit of the WTO "?  
d) Can China explain how its failure to provide detailed responses to Australia 's concerns is 
consistent with its belief  that "trade frictions between members should be resolved in the 
framework of the WTO "?  
e) Can China explain why it has not provided substantive responses to Australia 's concerns? Does 
China believe WTO Members should respond to specific trade concerns raise d by other 
WTO Members and seek to resolve through direct dialogue?  
f) Does China consider a WTO member 's assessment of the state of a bilateral relationship should 
have an impact on its obligation to comply with its WTO commitments? Does China consider the 
WTO Agreements permit the state of a bilateral relationship with another member can allow it 
to amend or not comply with its WTO commitments?  
 
Reply to questions from a) to f):  China has repeatedly stated its position on China -Australia trade 
cases. The measures taken by Chinese authorities against Australian exports to China in accordance WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  with laws and regulations are aimed at protecting the legitimate rights and interests of d omestic 
industries and the safety of consumers, which conform to Chinese laws and regulations as well as 
WTO rules rather than take Australia as a target deliberately.  
China firmly upholds the rules -based multilateral trading system, respects WTO rules an d handles 
foreign trade -related issues in a manner consistent with WTO rules. The Australia 's claim that "China 
has not provided substantive responses to Australia 's concerns " is not comport with the facts. The 
communication between the competent authoriti es of China and Australia has been open and 
smooth.  
 
The 50 years of diplomatic relations between China and Australia shows that economic and trade 
cooperation has always been the most dynamic driving force for China -Australia relations. China has 
been Au stralia 's largest trading partner in goods, largest export market and largest source of imports 
for 12 consecutive years. Australia enjoys a surplus in bilateral trade in goods and services as well 
as two -way investment, making huge profits. According to A ustralian statistics, due to the impact of 
the epidemic, Australia 's foreign trade decreased by nearly 7% year on year in 2020. However, 
Australia -China trade is on the rise against all odds, up 0.7% year on year. Australia 's exports to 
the world dropped b y 7.4%, but only a 1.8% decrease in its exports to China. In particular, 
Australia 's trade surplus with the world was 38.8 billion US dollars, all of which came from China. 
In 2021, China -Australia trade continued to maintain strong growth, and from Januar y to August, 
China -Australia trade in goods reached USD 151.13 billion, up 38.4% year on year.  
 
The hard -won achievements in China -Australia economic and trade cooperation need to be cherished 
by both sides and upheld for mutual benefit. Regrettably, for a  period of time, Australia has 
politicized trade and investment issues, violated the principles of market economy, China -Australia 
Free Trade Agreement and the spirit of WTO rules, and continuously discriminated against Chinese 
companies. Since 2018, more than a dozen Chinese investment projects in Australia have been 
rejected by the Australian side on the grounds of "national security ". Without any concrete evidence, 
Australia has banned Chinese companies from participating in the construction of Australia 's 5G 
network on the grounds of "national security ". Australia has continuously revised its foreign 
investment law and significantly tightened its so -called "national security review " on foreign 
investment. Australia has initiated 106 anti -dumping and anti -subsidy investigations against Chinese 
products, which is 26 times the number of investigations initiated by China in Australia. This not 
only interferes with the sound development momentum of China -Australia pragmatic cooperation, 
undermines Australia 's own image and credibility, but also runs counter to the fundamental interests 
of the two peoples.  
 
China urges Australian to fully implement the principle of open market and fair competition, provide 
a fair, transparent and non -discriminatory business envi ronment for companies from Chinese and 
other countries, and take concrete actions to create favorable conditions for practical cooperation 
between the two sides in various fields. It is hoped that the Australian side will demonstrate sincerity 
and take con crete actions to create favorable conditions for the sound and steady development of 
bilateral economic and trade relations and bring more benefits to the two peoples.  
 
5. DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD MARKET 
SYSTEM  
Page 20 (Para 5.1)   
China 's report states that: China firmly commits itself to comprehensively deepening reform, fully 
leverages the decisive role of the market in allocating resources and gives better play to the role of 
government to ensure better alignm ent between an efficient market and a well -functioning 
government.  
In reviewing this section of the Chinese Government Report, Australia also gave consideration to the 
following sections of the WTO Secretariat 's report (WT/TPR/S/415):  
 
3.3.1 INCENTIVES  
Page 76 (Para 3.123)   
The Secretariat 's report states that: According to the authorities, the Government does not intervene 
in SOEs ' financing, operation, and management  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.3.1 INCENTIVES   
Page 78 (Para 3.127)   
The Secretariat 's report states that: Given the importance of the Chinese economy and the size of 
government support accorded to individual companies, China 's support measures are reported to be 
susceptible to affect global markets, downstream industries, and individual val ue chains.  
 
3.3.5 STATE TRADING, STATE -OWNED ENTERPRISES, AND PRIVATIZATION   
Page 97 (Para 3.206)   
The Secretariat 's report states that: The importance of SOEs in China 's economy, coupled with high 
amounts of financial support, may affect the functioning of market -oriented policies and practices.   
 
Question 7  
Given the importance of SOEs in China 's economy, can China explain how it is ensuring "the decisive 
role of the market in allocating resources " and explain how its SOEs  are not in fact distorting "global 
markets, downstream industries, and individual value chains "?  
 
Reply:  Since the reform and opening up, China has made historic achievements and undergone 
historic changes in building a market economy. The Chinese govern ment has committed to giving 
full play to the decisive role of the market in resource allocation, give better play to the role of the 
government. For detailed information in respect of China 's opening and reform measures, please 
refer to our government rep ort.  
The Chinese Government attaches great importance to the fair and just participation of SOEs in 
market competition. SOEs have been integrated with the market economy, become the main entities 
participating in market competition independently, and purc hase and sell according to commercial 
considerations. They are subject to the same laws and rules as other enterprises in terms of access 
to funds, bankruptcy and competition legislation, and do not any enjoy privilege.  
China has fully implemented the negative list mechanism for market access, and no additional access 
restrictions will be taken outside the list. We will fully implement the fair competition review system, 
and remove and abolish various regulations and prac tices that hinder the unified market and fair 
competition, strengthen anti -monopoly and anti -unfair competition law enforcement, promote the 
market -oriented allocation reform of land, labor, capital, technology, data and other factors, and 
give full play t o the decisive role of the market in resource allocation, implement the three -year 
action plan for SOE reform, and promote the market -oriented reform of competitive links in key 
industries such as energy and railways. All these will create a fair competiti on environment for all 
kinds of market entities . 
 
PART III: OTHER QUESTIONS  
 
Question 8  
On 24 February 2021, Bloomberg News asked the following question at a State Council Information 
Office press conference: What has to happen for China to end the ban or the block on the importation 
of Australian coal, and for the removal of other impediment s to exports from Australia to China?  
In response, China 's Vice Minister of Commerce and Deputy China International Trade 
Representative, Wang Shouwen, said: We hope that Australia can take more actions that are 
conducive to increasing trust and cooperati on and that are more in line with the spirit of the 
comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. This in turn will promote the healthy 
and stable development of bilateral economic and trade relations.  
While Australia supplied around 50 % of China 's coal imports  by value in 2020, China 's imports of 
coal from Australia fell to zero in January 2021, and have remained at zero since. In the meantime, 
China increasingly sourced coal from Russia, Indonesia, South Africa, the US, Colomb ia and Canada. 
Is there any basis in the WTO Agreements that China can point to for a cessation of imports of 
Australian coal, or any other measure that would cause only Australian exports of coal to China to 
fall to zero?  
 
Reply (to the above two questio ns): In recent years, the Chinese Customs has conducted risk 
testing and analysis on the safety and quality of imported coal, and found that there are many cases 
concerning unqualified imported coal. Therefore, the Chinese Customs has strengthened quality and 
safety inspection of imported coal and testing of environmental protection items in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations for better protection on the environmental safety as well as legitimate 
rights and interests of Chinese enterprises.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  AUSTRALIA - ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
2.4.1 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND MARKET ACCESS  
Page 37 (Para 2.45)  
The Secretariat 's report states that:  On 23 June 2020, the current version of the National Negative 
List was issued by the NDRC and MOFCOM to replace the 2019 version.  
 
Question 1  
Can China confirm what activities remain restricted or prohibited under the 2020 version of the 
National Negative  List? 
 
Reply:  For the 2020 version of the National Negative List , please refer to :  
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020 -12/16/content_5569975.htm .  
On 8 October 2021, the NDRC issued the 2021 version of the National Negative List  (Draft) to solicit 
public opinions. For the draft 2021 version, please refer to :  
https://hd.ndrc.gov.cn/yjzx/yjzx_add.jsp?SiteId=371  
 
3.1.6.1 ANTI -DUMPING MEASURES  
Page 62 (Paras 3.53 -3.54)  
The Secretariat 's report states that: The legal framework for the conduct of anti -dumping 
investigations and the application of anti -dumping measures remains the Foreign Trade Law, the 
Regulations on Anti -Dumping, and a number of published Rules, some of them provisional. During 
the review period, three of these Rules were amended (see below); there have been no other 
changes to the anti -dumping procedures that are covered in detail in China 's previous Reviews. The 
authorities indicate that China is preparing notification to the WTO regarding these amended rules. 
In 2018, China notified to the W TO its Interim Rules on Implementation of the 
World  Trade  Organization Ruling in Disputes Concerning Trade Remedy Measures, which entered 
into force on 29  July 2013.  
The Secretariat 's report states that : On 4 April 2018, MOFCOM promulgated the Rules on 
Interim Review of Dumping and Dumping Margins (Interim Review Rules), which replace the 
Interim  Rules for the Mid -Term Review of Dumping and Dumping Margins that have been in place 
since 2002. They introduced various changes. First, they refined and clarified  provisions relating to 
the rights and obligations of the investigating agency and interested parties, including in relation to: 
(i) clarifying the timing for filing a periodical review application to provide an opportunity for a 
periodical review applicat ion under special circumstances; (ii) clarifying that exporters and 
manufacturers must submit evidence that proves the necessity of a review; (iii) clarifying the period 
for domestic industry to request evidence materials to be submitted during the review;  (iv) clarifying 
that the exporter/producer can submit an application for an interim review; and (v) cancelling the 
provision that the periodical review is not completed as an automatic end -of-term review. Second, 
they adopted clearer and stricter periodic al review procedures and time requirements to ensure 
investigation efficiency. Third, they incorporated provisions to be consistent with WTO rules 
(e.g. improving the description of the sampling survey and the disclosure before final ruling).  
 
Question 2  
a) How does China ensure its investigating authority conducts investigations consistently with 
WTO Rules ?  
 
Reply:  When drawing up  and implementing investigation -related rules, China strictly follows 
WTO rules to ensure fairness, justice and transparency.  
 
b) Can China clarify which of its amended rules referenced in paragraph 3.53 of the Report by 
the Secretariat relating to its anti -dumping system remain provisional, and clarify why they are 
provisional ? Paragraph 3.54 states inter alia  that the Rules on Interim Review of Dumping and 
Dumping Margins (Interim Review Rules)  promulgated on 4 April 2018 (and replacing provisional 
measures  from 2002) incorporated provisions to be consistent with WTO rules . Are further 
changes required to ensure China 's measures more fully conform with WTO rules ?  
 
Reply:  Amended rules referenced in paragraph 3.53 of the Report by the Secretariat relating to 
anti-dumping system are no longer provisional rules. The anti -dumping investigation legislation and 
amendments that China has already made  or will make in the future a re conducted in accordance 
with the WTO rules, aiming to continuously improve relevant rules.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  c) Given the previous 5 -year delay in China 's notifications of changes to its laws and regulations 
affecting the conduct of anti -dumping investigations and the appl ication of anti -dumping  measures 
identified in the report, when can Members expect China to make notifications to the WTO regarding 
these amended rules ? 
 
Reply : China is making preparations for related notifications.  
 
3.3.3.2 SPS MEASURES  
Page 86 (Para 3.168)  
The Secretariat 's report states that: "In order to prevent the reintroduction of the COVID -19 virus 
through imported cold -chain food and to protect the health and safety of consumers, the GACC 
implemented emergency preventive measures  for foreign manufacturers of imported cold -chain 
foods with positive novel coronavirus nucleic acid results . In response to the pandemic, China has 
also taken measures to facilitate the imports of food and agricultural products ". 
The SPS Agreement states that Members must base their measures on an assessment of the risks, 
taking into account the available scientific evidence. I n cases where relevant scientific evidence is 
insufficient (as was the case with COVID -19), a Member may provisionally adopt sanita ry or 
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information. Further, in such 
circumstances, the SPS obliges Members to seek to obtain the additional information necessary for 
a more objective assessment of risk and to review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
accordingly, within a reasonable period of time.  
 
Question 3  
a) How has China taken into account the information in the updated Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations and World Health Organisation 's (WHO) publication: 
COVID -19 and Food Safety: guidance for food businesses  that indicates that it "is highly unlikely 
that people can contract COVID -19 from food or food packaging " and that "There is no evidence to 
date of viruses that cause respiratory i llnesses being transmitted via food or food packaging. 
Coronaviruses cannot multiply in food; they need an animal or human host to multiply ."? 
b) Could China indicate when it will notify the SPS Committee with an update ?  
c) Could China provide details of the cr iteria, approval procedures and time frames for 
assessing  and lifting voluntary suspensions of export establishments following the resolution of on -
site COVID -19 cases among workers ? 
 
Reply to a -c: In order to prevent the risk of the COVID -19 being imported through imported cold -
chain food, effectively guarantee food safety and people 's lives and health, and maintain the safety 
of international trade supply chains, China has implemented measures for imported cold -chain food 
under the premise of following international standards and rules - risk monitoring, suspension of the 
import of pr oducts from companies that have a cluster of infections, and implementation of 
emergency preventive measures for overseas manufacturers of imported cold chain foods that have 
detected positive nucleic acid for the COVID -19. In this regard, some WTO members  have expressed 
their concerns to China through several channels, and China is willing to share and exchange relevant 
information with the members concerned.  
 
The Covid -19 pandemic has seriously jeopardized the safety and health of human lives, and has had  
a grave impact on the economic and social order and production of countries around the world. China 
has made great efforts to effectively control the pandemic in its territory, but still is exposed to 
significant risk of reintroduction of Covid -19 through  importation. Since last year, some countries 
have lifted the lockdown despite the increased new cases, and people started working while still 
suffering from illness. As a result, many overseas manufacturing companies have reported clusters 
of infections a mong their employees. Chinese customs and local authorities have repeatedly detected 
positive nucleic acid for Covid -19 virus on the inner and outer packaging of imported cold -chain food 
products or on the product itself, which indicates deficiencies in th e food safety management 
systems of some overseas food companies that export to China. In this context, the General 
Administration of Customs (GAC), in order to protect food safety and consumer health, has deployed 
emergency preventive measures to monitor the risk of imported cold chain foods, suspend the import 
of products from companies reported with clusters of infections, and apply a 1 -week or 4 -week 
suspension to overseas producers of imported cold chain foods that have tested positive for nucleic 
acid of the Covid -19. These measures have received proactive support and cooperation from many 
countries and establishments, and many of the exporters that experienced clusters of infections 
have suspended their exports to China voluntarily. Certainly, the est ablishments involved can 
resume their exports to China after taking measures to effectively eliminate the relevant risks and WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  ensure food safety for their exports to China. China has notified the WTO of the above circumstances 
in an appropriate form.  
 
COVID -19 is a new virus, and many of its epidemiological characteristics remain uncertain. 
Considering the global prevalence, high contagiousness, and high pathogenicity of Covide -19, China 
has taken corresponding emergency responses, which are important to pre vent the risk of 
importation of Covide -19 virus through imported cold chain foods. On 17 October 2020, the Chinese 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) announced to the public that the live virus 
was detected on the outer packaging of impo rted cold -chain foods, which is the first time to confirm 
out of laboratory that COVID -19 can survive for a longer period of time on the outer packaging of 
items under special conditions of cold -chain transportation, suggesting that the virus has the 
possibility of cross -border importation over long distances with cold -chain items as the carrier. Given 
this situation, China has tightened the regulation of cold chain foods based on risk assessment, and 
the relevant practices conform to the WTO rules. As a ne cessary measure to protect people 's health, 
it does not undermine the normal operations of international trade.  
 
China welcomes the entry of high -quality and safe food from all members and strictly abides by the 
rules of the World Trade Organization. At pr esent, the global pandemic prevention and control is still 
in a critical period. China calls on relevant members to follow the guidelines issued by the FAO and 
the WHO to establish an effective food safety management system and take various preventive 
meas ures to prevent exported food from being infected by COVID -19. China is willing to maintain 
communication with members on related matters to ensure food safety from the source and enhance 
consumer confidence, and ensure the safety of the international food  supply chain together with 
other members.  
 
3.3.6 GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT  
3.3.6.4 OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT  
Page 104 (Paras 3.221 -3.222)  
The Secretariat 's report states that:  China maintains buy -national policies in government 
procurement…. It is also noted that the buy -national requirement does not apply to procurements 
by SOEs, as they are not considered as government procurement in China and are not bound by the 
Government Procurement Law. Therefore, the authorities state that  there is no differential treatment 
of foreign goods, services, and suppliers in SOEs ' procurements, including those in the areas of 
infrastructure and public utilities.  
 
Question 4  
a) Can China confirm whether there are any buy -national style domestic procurement or local 
content targets set for certain SOEs, government entities and/or product categories that have not 
been made publicly available, including to China 's trading partners ?  
b) If so, noting China 's ongoing accession process to the WTO GPA, how would such 
targets/requirements align with the WTO GPA 's core principles and obligations around transparency, 
national treatment and non -discrimination ? Does China intend to make any such  
targets/requirements public ? 
c) Can China explain how its buy -national requirements, including those in its draft revised 
Government Procurement Law, are consistent with (or will be made consistent with) the WTO  GPA's 
core principles and obligations around n ational treatment and non -discrimination against foreign 
goods, services and suppliers – noting China 's ongoing accession process to the WTO GPA ?  
 
Reply to a -c: China fulfills its commitments when it accessed  the WTO to ensure that government 
procurement only complies with published and publicly available laws, regulations, generally 
applicable judicial decisions, administrative decisions and procedures (standard contract clauses). 
After completes the negotiation of joining the GPA, China will amend the Go vernment Procurement 
Law to provide GPA participants non -discriminatory treatment for goods, services and suppliers.  
 
3.3.7 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS  
3.3.7.5.8 UNDISCLOSED INFORMATION AND TRADE SECRETS  
Pages 115 -116 (Paras 3.284 -3.289)  
3.3.7.6 ENFORCEMENT  
Pages 116 -117 (Para 3.290 and Table 3.32)  
The Secretariat 's report provides an overview of developments in China 's laws protecting undisclosed 
information and trade secrets, including adding new types of trade secrets infringements to the 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law. The report also provides an overview of China 's enforcement actions WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  against trademark infringements, counterfeit patents and other illegal activities during the review 
period.  
 
Question 5  
a) Can China provide an overview of the types o f trade secrets infringements its authorities have 
taken action against during the review period ? 
b) Can China provide further information on any trends in intellectual property infringement its 
authorities have observed through its enforcement actions during  the review period ? 
 
Reply to a and b:  Administrative law enforcement against unfair competition was intensified  during 
the review period . Special  enforcement actions were carried out to combat unfair competition in key 
fields such as those involving people 's livelihoods. Regulatory and law enforcement efforts were 
strengthened against unfair competition conducts such as counterfeiting, market confu sion, false 
advertising and infringement of trade secrets in the Internet and other key fields so as to safeguard 
the market order marked by fair competition and protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
business operators and consumers according to t he relevant laws and regulations. During the special 
action period in 2020, a total of 7,371 unfair competition cases were investigated, involving a total 
value of 2.76 billion RMB and fines in the amount of 416 million RMB.  
 
The IPR protection department s of Chinese government  performed their duties in accordance with 
relevant laws and regulations, intensified judicial protection of IPR and administrative law 
enforcement, continued to promote the special governance in key fields, and improved working 
mecha nisms, comprehensively stepped  up IPR protection.  
 
For more info rmation, please refer to  2020 Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China. 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021 -04/25/cont ent_5602104.htm  
 
4.1.2 AGRICULTURE  
Page 126 (Para 4.14 -4.16)  
The Secretariat 's report states that:  the fill rates for China 's tariff rate quotas (TRQ) have fluctuated 
over the review period, with fill rates for wheat, corn, rice and wool tops relatively low in 2018 
and 2019. A number of these TRQs were the subject of WTO dispute settlement action under DS517, 
which resulted in adverse findings against China. Australia acknowledges that China has notified 
TRQ fill rates for calendar year 2020, w hich includes significant improvements for wheat and corn 
(a fill rate of 84.6% and 100% respectively). Australia also notes that the report states: China 's 
NDRC and MOFCOM are responsible for TRQ allocations and the importation of grain (wheat, maize, 
and rice), sugar, tobacco, and cotton is subject to state trading, whereby one part of the quota is 
allocated to state trade enterprises and the other part to other enterprises.  
 
Question 6  
a) What measures has China implemented to increase the TRQ fill rates s ince the last review, 
including efforts to address underfill and reach a fill rate of at least 65%, in line with the 
WTO Bali Decision on Tariff Quota Administration ?  
b) Can China explain what resulted in the significant improvement in fill -rates for wheat a nd corn 
in calendar year 2020 ? Will China commit to maintaining these changes to ensure on -going high fill 
rates in future years ? 
c) What reforms has China made to TRQ administration in response to the outcomes of DS517 
and how have fill rates subsequently im proved, including preliminary year -to date fill rates for 2021 ? 
d) Can China confirm that the NRDC and MOFCOM have been and will continue to administer the 
TRQs in a fair, transparent and non -discriminatory manner, including not discriminating against a 
particular Member and allocating import licences on the same basis for all Members ?  
e) Given the roles of state trading enterprises (STE) in China 's TRQs, including  specific quota 
allocations for particular commodities, how is China ensuring STEs are importing products under the 
TRQs in line with market -based principles that underpin the WTO ?  
 
Reply to a) -e): In accordance with China 's WTO commitments and the Foreign Trade Law, China 
has formulated the Interim Measures for the Administration of Import Tariff Quotas for Agricultural 
Products (Order No. 4 of 2003 of the Ministry of Commerce and the Development and 
Reform  Commission) to implement import tariff quo ta management for wheat, corn, rice, cotton, 
sugar, wool and woolen bars. China has established a unified, fair, just, transparent, predictable and 
non-discriminatory agricultural import tariff quota management system, and releases the annual 
tariff quota implementation rules accordingly. China allocates tariff quotas in accordance with WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 16 - 
 
  the WTO rules and fulfill its accession commitments. After obtaining the quotas, enterprises 
independently decide whether to import in accordance with market conditions. Chi na's agricultural 
product tariff quota management measures are made to the public and transparent.  Members can 
check these measures on the websites of the Ministry of Commerce and the National Development 
and Reform Commission. As for state trading, please  refer to China 's latest notification.  
 
4.1.2 AGRICULTURE  
Page 129 (Para 4.25); Page 130 (Para 4.29)  
The Secretariat 's report states that: China implements a minimum purchase price policy for rice and 
wheat,  including minimum procurement prices and a limited total purchase volume set each year by 
the NRDC. These commodities were the subject of WTO dispute settlement action under DS511, 
which resulted in adverse findings against China. The report further noted  that China 's last domestic 
support notification was in December 2018 covering years 2011 to 2016, which saw the introduction 
of Blue Box spending in 2016, and pending China 's new notification, information on China 's new 
agriculture support programmes intr oduced during the review period was not available. Australia 
notes that as part of the 2016 notification, China notified domestic support in excess of de minimis 
entitlements for corn, cotton and soybeans.  
Australia also notes that China now has the larges t domestic support entitlement due to its growing 
value of agricultural production, providing China with the greatest potential to impact the global 
agricultural market through the cumulative volume of its agricultural support measures. Of particular 
conce rn is China 's lack of transparency around these measures with outstanding notifications for 
calendar year 2017 onwards.  
 
Question 7  
a) What steps has China taken to ensure its minimum purchase price policy for rice and wheat 
is within China 's de minimis  dome stic support entitlement of 8.5% of the value of production under 
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture ? 
 
Reply : By setting reasonable minimum purchase price levels for rice and wheat and limiting the 
total amount of purchases, the "Amber Box " support provided by the minimum purchase price policy 
has fallen far below the de minimis domestic support entitlement for Chinese agriculture.  
 
b) What domestic reforms has China undertaken for domestic support provided to corn, cotton 
and soybeans to recti fy the breach of China 's de minimis  domestic support entitlement of 8.5% of 
the value of production for each commodity under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture ? 
 
Reply : China has been improving its cotton target price policy, and the existing policy falls in to the 
category of "Blue Box ". Relevant policies regarding corn and soybeans are not "Amber Box ". 
 
c) Can China provide an update on the domestic reforms it has undertaken in response to the 
outcomes of DS511 and how these will be notified in the future ? 
 
Reply:  In accordance with the DS511 ruling , China has further improved the minimum purchase 
price policy for wheat and rice by setting and announcing the total purchase quantity in advance. 
The relevant measures are in full compliance with the WTO rules an d released on time. Reform 
measures of the minimum purchase price policy for wheat and rice include setting the reasonable 
minimum purchase price levels for rice and wheat and limiting the total purchasing amount, which 
has been notified as Amber Box.  
 
d) Has China continued to move agricultural support measure expenditure towards the Blue Box 
(production limiting schemes) and away from the Amber Box (trade and production distorting 
support) ? If so, how ? 
 
Reply : China 's domestic agricultural support policies a re mainly "Green Box " policies. In recent 
years, the level of "Blue Box " support ha s increased , while the level of "Amber Box " support has 
decreased significantly. For example, China ha s improved the minimum purchase price policy for 
rice and wheat, which has greatly reduced the "Amber Box " support.  
 
e) Why has China not met its domestic support notification obligations for calendar years 2017 
and onwards, and when will it submit these over due notifications ? 
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 17 - 
 
  Reply : In recent years, China has gradually established a green and ecologically oriented agricultural 
subsidy system based on the "Green Box " to ensure national food security and accelerate the 
structural reform of the agricultural supply side, which has laid a solid foundation for ensuring 
national food security and promoting sustainable agricultural development. China has not only 
ensured dom estic food security, but also increased imports of land -intensive products such as 
soybeans, making substantial contribution to global food security and the development of  
agricultural trade.  
 
f) What steps has China taken to minimise the possible harmful imp acts on global agricultural 
markets from its agricultural support, including for developing Members ? 
 
Reply:  According to  the principles of the WTO Agriculture Agreement, China draws up relevant 
policies in consideration of minimizing distorting effects on  production and prices.  
 
g) Does China believe it has a responsibility, given the size of its agricultural production and 
domestic support entitlements, to take a greater leadership role in agricultural trade reform in 
the WTO? If so, how ? 
 
Reply:  China has repeatedly stated in recent agricultural negotiations that per capita support for 
farmers reflects the inherent differences in agricultural development conditions between developed 
members with commercial -oriented agriculture and developing memb ers with subsistence -oriented 
agriculture. China insists that priority shall be given to address the deficit in domestic support rules 
and correct the unfair and unbalanced agricultural trade rules developed in the Uruguay Round.  
 
4.4.1.3.2.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN LICENSING OF FOREIGN BANKS  
Page 158 (Paras 4.146 -4.148)  
The Secretariat 's report describes several measures to open the banking sector to foreign 
participation.  These measures included lifting caps on foreign ownership of Chinese commercial 
banks, abol ishing requirements for obliged foreign shareholders to hold a minimum level of assets, 
allowing foreign investors to establish and operate more freely in the sector.  
 
Question 8  
a) Since the reforms were introduced, has there been an increase in foreign participation in the 
banking sector as shareholders in Chinese banks ?  
 
Reply:  Since the reforms were introduced , several foreign investors have taken stakes in 
Chinese  banks. For example, Singapore 's United Overseas Bank invested in China 's Hengfeng Bank 
and Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) held stakes in Aibank, an Internet bank set up 
by CITIC Bank and Baidu.  
 
b) Have any foreign -owned banks established in China since the reforms ? 
 
Reply:  After the announcement of the measures, a n umber of foreign banks have opened businesses 
in China, including Cathay United Bank (China) Limited,  Arab Bank Shanghai Representative Office, 
First Abu Dhabi Bank (FAB)  Shanghai Branch, Morocco Bank  of Foreign Trade  Shanghai Branch, 
HBL Beijing Branch, S PD Silicon Valley Bank Shenzhen Branch, BNK Busan Bank, Nanjing Branch, 
etc. 
 
c) What further reforms are authorities considering to encourage greater foreign participation in 
the banking sector ? 
 
Reply:  China will optimize the business environment for foreign investors, encourage fair 
competition and innovation, create a market -oriented, rule -based, and international business 
environment, and continuously stimulate market vitality , so as to  encourage further pa rticipation of 
foreign investors in China 's financial market.  
 
4.4.1.3.4.3 FOREIGN ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE COMPANIES  
Page 164 (Para 4.181)  
The Secretariat 's report explains that in September 2018, the CSRC issued the Administrative 
Measures for the Overseas Establishment, Acquisition, and Shareholding of Financial Institutions of 
Securities Companies and Securities Investment Fund Management Companies  to further clarify the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 18 - 
 
  conditions for Chinese companies going abroad and to strengthen the parent company 's control over 
its overseas subsidiaries.  
 
Question 9  
a) Can China outline the intent of the measure ?  
b) What conditions apply to Chinese companies going abroad ? 
 
Reply to a and b : To effectively strengthen the management of overseas institutions by securities 
and fund operating institutions, the China Securities Regulatory Commission officially issued the 
Administrative Measures for the Overseas Establishment, Acquisition, and Share holding of Financial 
Institutions of Securities Companies and Securities Investment Fund Management Companie s. For 
detailed conditions and requirements on  overseas establishment , acquisition  and shareholding of 
financial institutions , please refer to Article 8 of the Measures. For the whole text of the Measures, 
please refer to :  
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/zjh/201809/t20180928_344730.htm . 
 
4.4.2.2.6 CYBERSECU RITY  
Pages 170 -172 (Paras 4.214 -4.219)  
The Secretariat 's report states that the Cybersecurity Law, which entered into force on 1 June 2017, 
remains in force. During the review period, in order to implement the Law, several regulations, 
administrative measu res, and technical specifications were adopted or published for public comment. 
The report states that on the specific legislation concerning personal information protection, on 
21 October 2020, China published for comment the first draft of the Personal I nformation Protection 
Law, the country 's first comprehensive law regulating the processing of personal information.  
 
Question 10  
a) On 28 May 2021 Australia made a submission to the consultation of the second draft of the 
Personal Information Protection Law welcoming a number of revisions to the draft law. However, it 
also raised concerns with the draft law particularly around extra -territoriality, trade retaliation 
measures, compliance costs for firms and the overall scope of the legislation. How were the co ncerns 
raised by Australia addressed in the final legislation passed on 20 August 2021 ? 
 
Reply : The Personal Information Protection Law draws on the practices of relevant countries and 
regions, and the Law clarifies the necessary extraterritorial effects to fully protect the rights and 
interests of individuals in China. Article 3( ii) of the Law is mainly applicable to cross -border 
transactions targeting individuals in China, and personal information processing behavior in activitie s 
such as recording and tracking personal information of natural persons in China so as to analyze and 
evaluate the behavior of such natural persons. China has the right to take measures to safeguard 
the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterpris es and maintain the normal international 
economic and trade order. The provisions of the Law are consistent with the Foreign Investment Law 
and the Foreign Trade Law.  
 
b) On 28 May 2021 Australia also made a submission to the consultation of the second draft of 
the Data Security Law welcoming a number of revisions to the draft law. However, it also raised 
concerns with the draft law particularly around extra -territoriality, trade retaliation measures, 
compliance costs for firms and the overall scope of the leg islation. How were the concerns raised by 
Australia addressed in the final legislation passed on 10 June 2021 ? 
 
Reply:  The second paragraph of Article 2 of the Data Security Law stipulates that "When data 
handling activities outside the territory of the PR C harm the national security, the public interest, or 
the lawful rights and interests of citizens or organizations of the PRC, legal liability is to be pursued 
according to the Law ". The above -mentioned provision of the Law is formulated in accordance with  
the internationally accepted principle of protective jurisdiction. Anyone who commits the above acts 
shall be punished in accordance with China 's Criminal Law, the Law of the Application of Law for 
Foreign -related Civil Relations,  etc. China has the right  to take measures to safeguard the legitimate 
rights and interests of Chinese enterprises and maintain the normal international economic and trade 
order. The provisions of the Law are consistent with the Foreign Investment Law and the Foreign 
Trade Law.  
 
c) In its submission of 28 May 2021, Australia sought further clarification on the application of 
specific Articles in the Personal Information Protection Law and the Data Security Law. When will 
China provide a response to these requests for further clarifica tion?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 19 - 
 
  Reply : In the process of formulating the Personal Information Protection Law and the Data Security 
Law, the Chinese legislature authority has extensively solicited opinions in accordance with 
legislative procedures by publishing drafts on the China National People 's Congress website, and 
explained and gave feedback to the opinions and amendments through various methods such as the 
reports of the Constitution and Law Committee of the National People 's Congress and other statutory 
documents, as w ell as the press conferences of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the 
Standing  Committee of the National People 's Congress.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 20 - 
 
  PAKISTAN  
Document - WT/TPR/S/415  
 
SUMMARY  
2. The outbreak of the COVID ‑19 pandemic in early 2020 had a major impact on output and 
employment. Virtually all sectors were severely hit by the pandemic, with the notable exceptions of 
financial services and information technology. Starting in mid -2020, the economy began to recover, 
mainly driven by public investment and interna tional trade. Swift fiscal and monetary policy reactions 
helped mitigate the economic impact of the COVID ‑19 pandemic, but as a result of the Government 's 
stabilizing measures, financial stability risks may have increased.   
 
1. Pakistan would appreciate if  China would elaborate what has been China 's experience 
in overcoming the COVID -19 pandemic since its outbreak in early 2020; and what 
contributions has China made to global cooperation on combating COVID -19?  
 
Reply:  During the COVID -19 outbreak when people 's safety and health were seriously endangered, 
China mobilized maximum efforts and resources within the shortest period of time to contain the 
spreading of the pandemic. With arduous efforts, China made major strategic achievements in 
fighting again st the pandemic and took the lead in resuming work and production. The complete 
industrial chains and strong support systems in China play a positive role in boosting the recovery 
of the world economy. As combating the pandemic is the most urgent task faci ng the international 
community, President Xi Jinping is promoting international cooperation and calling for building a 
global health community for mankind, strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and 
jointly addressing the challenges posed by  the pandemic. China has been actively fulfilling its 
international obligations and made significant contribution to the global cooperation on combating 
COVID -19.  
 
China is sharing information and experience in fighting against the pandemic with the 
inter national community. After the outbreak, China immediately took the initiative to share the 
information on pandemic with the WHO, as well as other countries and regional organizations 
including the whole coronavirus genome sequence and the specific primers and probes for detecting 
the coronavirus. China regularly notified the WHO and relevant countries of information of the 
pandemic. China compiled the documents of COVID -19 prevention and control plans and treatments, 
which were translated into three languag es, and shared with more than 180 countries, as well as 
over 10 international and regional organizations.  
 
China is providing humanitarian assistance to the international community. China launched 
the largest global emergency humanitarian operation since the founding of the People 's Republic of 
China. China has been actively sending medical assistance overseas, donating medical supplies 
to 150 countries and regions and 12 international organizations, and sending 36 medical teams 
to 34 countries. China prov ided the WHO with two donations totaling USD 50 million in cash for 
fighting the pandemic. In May 2020, President Xi Jinping announced at the opening ceremony of the 
73rd World Health On -line Assembly that China would donate USD 2 billion in the coming two years 
supporting the international community to combat COVID -19.  
 
China is making every effort to improve the accessibility of vaccines. China firmly believes 
that COVI D-19 vaccines are first and foremost a global public good, and has taken the lead in 
committing that all vaccines developed shall be considered as public goods. China has been working 
hard to improve the accessibility and affordability of vaccines to devel oping members. China is 
working with over 10 countries in vaccine R&D and production. China has participated in the WHO -
initiated COVAX and committed to donating a first batch of 10 million vaccine doses to developing 
countries in urgent need. China is now  donating vaccines to 85 developing members and 
4 international organizations, and exporting vaccines to more than 40 countries. In May 2021, 
President Xi Jinping announced at the Global Health Summit that China would provide an additional 
USD 3 billion in  international aid over the next three years to support combating COVID -19 as well 
as economic and social recovery in other developing countries. Up to now, China has supplied 
350 million doses of vaccines to the whole world. And China supports for waiving  intellectual property 
rights on COVID -19 vaccines, and hopes to see a consensus on this issue be reached in the WTO 
and other international organizations soonest possible.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  China is promoting the export of pandemic control supplies in an orderly manner. As the 
largest manufacturer of anti -pandemic supplies, China spares no effort in providing supplies to the 
rest of the world, while meeting the domestic needs. By May 2021, China had provided over 
280 billion masks, over 3 billion protective suits and 4 bi llion testing kits to more than 200 countries 
and regions, providing strong support to other countries in their fight against COVID -19. 
 
China is taking trade facilitation measures during the pandemic. In order to facilitate the 
compulsory product certific ation process, China encourages and advises certification bodies to 
provide online training for enterprises, carries out virtual inspections on manufacturers, opens fast 
tracks and green lanes, and issues electronic certificates. In 2020, a total number of  142,000 expired 
CCC certificates at home and abroad were renewed. In so doing, China recognized and accepted the 
conformity assessment results of the mutual recognition systems established through multilateral or 
bilateral channels.  
 
14. China has taken various trade -facilitating measures with respect to import registration, 
documentation, and inspection requirements, as well as in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. Its 
national single window for international trade was extended and, reportedly, the overa ll customs 
clearance time for imports nationwide was reduced.  
 
2. Pakistan appreciates if China can specify the trade -facilitating measures taken during 
the review period and their effectiveness.   
 
Reply:  In January 2020, China notified measures implementing the Trade Facilitation 
Agreement  (TFA) to the WTO ahead of schedule, including measures like "Exchange of Information ", 
"Provision of Information " and "Establishment and Publication of Average Release Times ". So far, 
China has fully implemente d the measures stipulated in the TFA.  
 
Since the last review, China has continued vigorously promoting paperless application for import 
and export licences and customs clearance. Since 15 October 2018, paperless application for import 
licences and customs  clearance has been implemented nationwide for goods subject to automatic 
import licence administration and goods subject to import licence administration (except for ozone -
depleting substances). Since 1 January 2020, paperless application for export licen ces and customs 
clearance has been implemented nationwide for goods under export restriction administration 
nationwide.  
 
Since 2018, China Customs has integrated the enterprises ' qualifications for customs declaration 
and inspection, and removed the validity period of the registration of customs declaration enterprises 
and their branches. Meanwhile, the inspection and quarantine operations have been integrated into 
the overall fra mework and procedures of national customs clearance integration, realizing the 
"five unifications " (namely, unified declaration documents, unified operation system, unified risk 
assessment, unified issuing of instructions, and unified on -site law enforcement). By the end of 2018, 
China Customs had successfully completed full integration of national cus toms declaration and 
inspection. In March 2021, the overall customs clearance time for imports nationwide was 
37.12  hours, reduced by 61.9% compared with that of 2017; and the overall customs clearance time 
for exports nationwide was 1.67 hours, reduced by  86.4% compared with that of 2017.  
 
In addition, China has continuously deepened the reform of China Compulsory Certificate (CCC) 
scheme. 62 products with relatively standardized industry development and lower risks were 
removed from the CCC catalogue. En terprises self -declaration assessment mechanism was 
introduced to the CCC scheme, applying to 19 products. Certification process was optimized and the 
certification period was reduced by more than 30%.  
 
33. China continues to reduce its proportion of coal  consumption, in line with objectives set for green 
and low -carbon energy development in the 13th Five -Year Plan for Energy Development. Other 
measures regarding the promotion of clean energy included the authorities ' efforts to fully 
operationalize China 's carbon emission trading framework, set renewable electricity consumption 
quotas as a share of total power consumption in each province, and implement a new environmental 
tax policy. The energy sector was further opened to foreign investments during the r eview period, 
through several liberalization measures, such as the removal of the restrictions on the exploration 
and development of oil and natural gas (except for oil shale, oil sands, and shale gas).  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3. Pakistan appreciates if China can provide further details and specify its carbon emission 
trading market system: its functioning and how China sees it fit into its objective to 
address climate change . 
 
Reply: In December 2020, China released Measures for the Administration of Carbon Emissions 
Trading (for Trial Implementation) and Implementation Plan for the 2019 -2020 national carbon 
emission trading quota setting and allocation (power generation industry). The Plan provided a list 
of key emission units that were included in the quota management of  the power generation industry 
and clarified the specific requirements for quota allocation and fulfilment. In addition, it officially 
started the first quota fulfillment cycle of the carbon market in China.  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1 Main Features of th e Economy  
1.8. Poverty rates fell during the review period. According to the authorities, the incidence of poverty 
dropped from 3.1% in 2017 to 1.7% in 2018 and to 0.6% in 2019, using the 2011 poverty line.12 At 
the same time, income levels of those over the poverty line or living in poor regions rose significantly. 
The authorities also underline the results that were achieved regarding access to basic education, 
electricity, healthcare, and improved infrastructure. The authorities further indicate China 's aim to 
completely eradicate poverty by 2020.   
 
4. Pakistan notices that China has made tremendous progress on eliminating absolute 
poverty across the country in a relatively short time; and has achieved the building of a 
society with moderate prosperity in all aspects. Pakistan appreciates if China could outline 
its progress in poverty alleviation during the review period and share its experience on 
how it managed this significant achievement.   
 
Reply:  China has won a complete victory in the fight against  poverty. By the end of 2020, 
98.99  million rural residents living below the current poverty line had all been lifted out of poverty, 
and 832 registered poor counties and 128,000 villages had been removed from the poverty list. 
China has eliminated regiona l poverty and completed the arduous task of eradicating extreme 
poverty. According to the World Bank 's poverty standard, the number of Chinese population lifted 
out of poverty accounted for more than 70% of that of the world 's total for the same period. China 
has met the target of eradicating poverty set by the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
10 years ahead of schedule, which highlights China 's contribution to the community with a shared 
future for mankind. Guided by the strategy of tar geted poverty alleviation, China has taken 
development as the fundamental way of poverty alleviation, and changed its approach from "blood 
transfusion " to "blood regeneration ".  
 
2. Trade and Investment Regimes  
2.2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
2.12. China 's trade policy objectives have remained largely unchanged since the previous Review; 
China seeks to further liberalize its trade and investment regime to reshape its economy. The 
13thFive-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2016 -20), which was issued in 
December  2016, lays out objectives to expand trade and increase outbound and inbound 
investment.11 Reflecting China 's broader industrial and economic goals, the Plan aims to widen 
market access for foreign investment by, inter alia, loosening foreign investment restrictions in 
various sectors such as manufacturing and finance, as recently reflected in the negative lists  for 
foreign investments (Section 2.4). The 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 
(2021 -25) was adopted by the National People 's Congress on 11 March 2021.  
 
5. Pakistan appreciates if China can indicate the measures China is taking to wi den the 
market access for Foreign Investment.   
 
Reply:  China unswervingly promotes opening up, improves the legal system for foreign investment, 
continuously liberalizes foreign investment market access, and expands the encouraged categories 
for foreign investment. It improves the service system of foreign inv estment, steps up to protect 
the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investment, and constantly optimizes the foreign 
investment environment. Since the last review, China has promulgated the Foreign Investment Law 
and its implementing regulations. C hina has also issued the Circular on Certain Measures for Actively 
and Effectively Utilizing Foreign Investment to Promote Quality Economic Development, the Opinions 
of the State Council on Further Effectively Utilizing Foreign Investment and the Opinions of the 
General Office of the State Council on Further Stabilizing Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 23 - 
 
  building a policy system for foreign investment in the new era and effectively improving quality and 
level of foreign investment in China.  
 
2.19. Durin g the review period, as reflected in several measures, China attached great importance 
to addressing climate change issues. The authorities indicate that the country implements an active 
national strategy on climate change and has achieved positive results  through a series of measures, 
such as industrial restructuring, energy structure optimization, energy conservation and efficiency 
improvement, the establishment of a carbon emissions trading market, and expanding the forest 
carbon sink. They also expect t hat China will reach a peak in carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 
and carbon neutrality before 2060.  
 
6. Pakistan appreciates if China can provide further details on its national strategy to 
address climate change, what are the measures taken and implemented and what are the 
results.   
 
Reply:  In the review, China highlights the importance of addressing climate change issues. It 
actively implemented its national strategy in response to climate change, which had yielded fruits 
by adjusting industrial  structure, optimizing resource structure, saving energy and improving 
efficiency, establishing carbon emission trading market and promoting carbon sink of forests. China 
has taken active measures to implement United Nations Framework Convention on Climate  Change  
and Paris Agreement , and is doing its best to reduce its carbon dioxide emission so that the carbon 
dioxide emission of China will reach its peak before 2030. China also strives to achieve carbon 
neutrality before 2060 in order to promote sustainable development.  
 
3 TRADE P OLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1.4.4 Port construction fees  
3.42. Until 1 March 2020, China levied port construction fees on imported and exported goods.52 For 
domestic export containers and inland containers, the fees were CNY 32 per 20 -foot container  and 
CNY 48 per 40 -foot container. For foreign import and export containers, the fees were CNY  64 per 
20-foot container and CNY 96 per 40 -foot container. The fee for other non -standard containers, 
except 20 -foot and 40 -foot containers, was levied according  to that of similar types of containers 
(for non -standard containers less than 30 feet, the fee was levied according to that of 20 -foot 
containers; for non -standard containers of 30 feet and above, the fee was levied according to that 
of 40 -foot containers ). The authorities indicate that a temporary decision was taken not to collect 
these fees from 1 March to 31 December 2020, followed by a permanent decision to abolish fees 
from 1 January 2021.  
 
7. Pakistan appreciates if China can indicate whether the port construction fees were 
abolished permanently since January 2021?   
 
Reply:  Yes. 
 
3.3.4 Competition policy and price controls  
3.3.4.1 Competition policy  
3.3.4.1.1 Legislative and institutional framework  
3.175. The AML is currently under amendment. The main purpose of the amendment is to further 
improve the anti -monopoly system and rules and enhance the enforcement of the Law. The SAMR 
published a draft of  the amended Law for public comments on 2 January 2020.158 According to the 
authorities, 265 comments were received from 75 organizations and citizens. These comments 
concern almost all aspects of competition policy, including monopoly agreements, abuse of  dominant 
market position, abuse of administrative power, notification of concentration of undertakings, 
investigation, and legal liability. The draft of the Law was completed and submitted to the 
State  Council in December 2020.  
 
8. Pakistan appreciates i f China could indicate whether the comments received were taken 
into account and when the AML will be finalized.   
 
Reply:  The AML is currently under amendments and has now been submitted to the 
Standing  Committee of the National People 's Congress for review. The 31st Session of the 
Standing  Committee of the 13th National People 's Congress will review the State Council 's prop osal 
for reviewing the draft amendment to the AML.  
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core  
4.2.3. Supporting a bigger role of the WTO  
 
Page 16, para 4.28  
China actively participates in the WTO 's "Aid for Trade " initiative, fully supports the integration of 
developing Members into the multilateral trading system, and advocates a bigger role of the WTO. 
China 's LDCs and Accessions Programme (the "China Programme ") was set up to help the LDCs join 
the WTO. By the e nd of 2020, China had contributed a total of USD 4.2 million to the "China 
Programme ". This Programme provides technical assistance and capacity -building to the acceding 
parties, supports the accession work of the WTO, and enhances the representativeness o f 
WTO membership, contributing to strengthening the multilateral trading system. In September 2018 
and December 2019, the 7th and 8th China Round Table meetings took place in Kazakhstan and 
Russian Federation respectively. In December 2020, the 9th China R ound Table meeting was held 
virtually as one of the events to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the WTO. In March 2021, China 
shared its experience in joining the WTO with other acceding parties online.  
 
Question № 1:  
Could China please provide informati on, if possible, on the perspective areas of future work under 
the "China Programme ", in particular in respect to the possible new elements of respective work?  
 
Reply : The "China Programme " aims to help the LDCs  join the WTO and integrate into the 
multilateral trading system, focusing on supporting activities under the five pillars, including Annual 
China Round Table on WTO Accessions (CRTs), China WTO Accession Internship Programme, 
Increasing participation of L DCs in WTO meetings, South -South dialogue on LDCs and development, 
and LDCs ' Trade Policy Review follow -up workshops. In the future, the "China programme " will 
continue to explore the innovative activity patterns and contents around the new problems and ne w 
needs encountered by the LDCs in the process of accession to the WTO, to better meet the actual 
needs of the LDCs.  
 
REPORT BY THE SECRETARIAT  
 
SUMMARY  
Page 11, para 11  
A new Foreign Investment Law was adopted, with the aim of, inter alia, improving Chin a's business 
environment for foreign investors and ensuring that they participate in market competition on an 
equal basis. The legislation stipulates that investors are protected against expropriation, restrictions 
on cross -border remittances, IPR infringe ment, and forced transfer of technology.  
 
Question № 2:  
Could China, please, further elaborate on the provisions aimed to protect investors against 
expropriation, restrictions on cross -border remittances, IPR infringement, and forced transfer of 
technolog y? Could China please further elaborate on the future plans for further investment 
liberalization (please, specify sectors, if possible).  
 
Reply: Articles 20 -22 of the Foreign Investment Law  and Articles 21 -24 of the Regulations on the 
Implementation of the Foreign Investment Law  have made provisions on expropriation, restrictions 
on cross -border remittances, IPR infringement, and forced transfer of technology. See 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019 -03/20/content_5375360.htm  for details.  
In June 2021, the amended Patent Law  came into effect, strengthening the protection of the lawful 
rights and interests of patentees including foreign investors. For examples, it introduces  punitive 
damages for willful infringements, increases statutory damages, increases the amount of penalty 
against counterfeiting patents, and further regulates the burden of proof.  
China will implement the "14th Five-Year Plan ", further shorten the negativ e list for foreign 
investment, relax controls over foreign investment, and promote investment liberalization.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.1 Growth and impact of COVID -19  
Page 18, para 1.6  
The COVID -19 pandemic has posed an unprecedented shock to China 's economy. Besides inflicting 
human costs, it has had a major impact on output, trade, and employment. At the beginning of  2020, 
economic growth fell to its lowest level in 40 years: between the last quarter of 2019 an d the 
first quarter of 2020, growth fell by almost 13 percentage points, from 5.8% to -6.8%. Apart from 
financial services and information technology, all sectors were severely hit. Over 100 million workers 
were directly affected by the pandemic, by being put on unpaid leave in retention schemes or 
reduced -work programmes, exiting the labour market, or becoming unemployed. In May  2020, the 
Government abandoned the announcement of the annual GDP target for the first time in more than 
25 years due to factors that are difficult to predict, such as the coronavirus pandemic and 
uncertainties around trade.  
 
Question №3:  
Could China please clarify what is the GDP target for 2022, 2023 and 2024 years?  
 
Reply: During the "14th Five -Year Plan " period (2021 -2025), China will adopt a new vision for 
development, focus on enhancing the quality and returns of development, maintai n sustained and 
sound economic development, and give full play to its growth potential. China will strive to ensure 
that its economic performance stays within the proper range, put forward appropriate annual target 
growth rate, and achieve development that  has higher quality and efficiency and is fairer, safer and 
more sustainable.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1.3 Tariffs  
3.1.3.1 Applied MFN tariffs  
Page 51, para 3.25  
The simple average applied MFN rate in 2021 was 7.1%, compared with 9. 3% in 2017, with tariff -
rate reductions in nearly all product categories. The tariff was higher for agricultural products 
(WTO  definition), at 12.7%, showing a notable decrease compared with 2017 and 2015 (Table 3.2). 
The average applied tariff on non -agricultural products fell to 6.2% (from 8.5% in 2017 and 8.6% 
in 2015). The percentage of tariffs that exceeded 15% (international tariff peaks) was 4.5% 
(significantly lower than the 13.9% in 2017). The percentage of tariffs subject to domestic tariff 
peaks was 1.9% (compared with 1.8% in 2017).  
 
Question №4: Could China, please, elaborate on the publication of changes in applied tariff rates? 
Is there any specific mechanism of early announcement of the import tariff changes?  
 
Reply : China issues its plan on provisional import tariff rates every year to adjust the MFN tariff 
rate and provisional tariff rate for some import goods. The above specific plans on the adjustment 
of tariff rates are available at the "policy release " module of the official website of the Tariff 
Department of Ministry of Finance of China.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Mining and Energy  
4.2.2 Energy  
4.2.2.5 Electricity  
Page 148, para 4.87  
Private investment, including foreign investment, is encouraged in th e development of the renewable 
energy sector. In the new 36 -Clause on Private Investment (State Council Circular 2010/13), 
domestic private capital is "encouraged " to build new energy sectors such as wind, solar, geothermal, 
and biomass power. Electricity generation from wind, solar, or biomass power is also listed in the 
"encouraged " section of the Catalogue of Encouraged Industries for Foreign Investment 
(2020  edition). China also promotes electricity generation with nuclear energy; as in the case of 
renewable energy, FDI is encouraged.  
 
Question №5:  
Could China, please, describe the specific requirements in respect to the establishment and 
operations of forei gn business entities in wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass power sectors?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 26 - 
 
  Reply: China has lifted restrictions on market access to wind, solar, geothermal and biomass energy 
development. Market regulators will create a level playing field for domestic a nd foreign businesses.  
Investment in fixed assets, industry license, etc. shall comply with relevant laws, regulations and 
rules.  
 
4.4 Services  
Question №6:  
Could China, please, provide information on the key laws and regulations regulating pre - and post -
establishment of entities (including foreign ones) in advertising services, as well as translation 
services sectors?  
 
Reply:  Foreign investors in China shall  observe relevant provisions in the Foreign Investment Law 
and the Regulations on the Implementation of the Foreign Investment Law . In accordance with the 
current negative list for foreign investment, advertising services and translation services sectors do 
not belong to the field of investments that are prohibited or restricted, that is, foreign investors 
investing in the above sect ors enjoy the same treatment as that of domestic enterprises. It involves 
fixed asset investments and business license, and shall comply with relevant laws, regulations, and 
rules. Entities in advertising services and translation services sectors shall be incorporated in 
accordance with relevant laws and regulations such as the Company Law and the Partnership Law 
and comply with relevant laws and regulations of the advertising and translation services sectors.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SWITZERLAND  
Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/415 ) 
Chapter 1 Economic Environment   
1. Para. 1.9 of the secretariat report states that the contribution of agriculture to GDP climbed 
slightly during the pandemic after continuously falling. What are the reasons for this increase during 
the pandemic?   
 
Reply : This can be attributed to changes in market demand and the overall development of different 
sectors of the national economy. It should not understood simply as a change in the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP.  
 
Chapter 2.1 General Framework   
2. Para. 2.3: T he judicial specialization for issues related to e -commerce has been modernized. 
Three Internet Courts have been established. They handle different types of Internet -related cases. 
Are they also competent for cross -border cases? Are decisions of these cour ts published online?   
 
Reply:  Internet courts are grass -roots people 's courts with centralized jurisdiction over specific 
types of Internet -related cases within their jurisdiction. They have jurisdiction over cross -border 
Internet -related cases in accordance with the Civil Procedure Law of the People 's Republic of China, 
the Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases by 
Internet Courts (Fa Shi [2018] No. 16), the Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on Some 
Issues Concerning the Jurisdiction of Civil and Commercial Cases Involving Foreign Elements 
(Fa Shi [2020] No. 20), and the Notice of the Supreme People 's Court on Clarifying Relevant Matters 
Concerning the Standards for Hierarchical Jurisdiction o ver and Centralized Handling of Foreign -
related Civil and Commercial Cases of First Instance (Fa [2017] No. 359).Decisions and judgments 
of Internet courts are made public on the Internet in accordance with the Provisions of the 
Supreme  People 's Court on t he Issuance of Judgments on the Internet by the People 's Courts 
(Fa Shi [2016]  No. 19).  
 
3. Para. 2.5: On 1 June 2016, China established a review system to restrain regional authorities 
from adopting policies and practices that may impede competition. Accordi ng to the authorities, 
since the establishment of the system, all regions and departments have reviewed new policy 
measures concerning the economic activities of market entities in accordance with the requirements. 
Which sort of economic activities have be en reviewed and what are the results of the review?   
 
Reply: In June 2016, China established and implemented a fair competition review system, which 
made it clear that administrative organs and organizations legally authorized with the function of 
managing  public affairs should conduct a fair competition review when formulating regulations and 
normative documents concerning the economic activities of market entities, assess the impact on 
market competition, and prevent exclusion or restriction of market com petition. The establishment 
and implementation of fair competition review system has effectively maintained the fair competition 
order in the market and effectively improved the market -oriented and legalized international 
business environment.  
 
Chapter 3.1 .2 Rules of origin   
4. Para 3.21: According to para 3.21 "Non-preferential rules of origin are used to apply the most -
favoured  nation (MFN) tariff rate; ensure the origin of goods subject to anti -dumping, countervailing, 
and safeguard measures; ensure that import quotas and tariff quota limits are imposed on specific 
countries; and determine the origin of imported goods purchased  by the Government. " Is there a 
single set of non -preferential rules of origin (NPRO) that apply to all trade policy instruments 
(MFN tariff rate, anti -dumping, safeguard, etc.) or are there different sets of NPRO that apply to 
different trade policy instr uments?   
 
Reply: China has a unified set of non -preferential rules of origin. At present, there are no special 
rules of origin applicable to trade remedies.  
 
5. Para 3.21: Do certificates of non -preferential origin apply on imports or on exports? Are 
certificates of non -preferential origin voluntary or mandatory?  
 
Reply:  The non -preferential certificate of origin is applicable to import and export and is voluntarily 
applied for by enterprises.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Chapter 3.1.3 Tariffs   
6. Para. 3.23. What is the difference between MFN tariff rates and general tariff rates? In which 
cases do either of these tariff rates apply?   
 
Reply:  According to the Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on Import and Export Duties, 
the most -favoured -nation tariff rate sh all be applicable to the imported goods whose place of origin 
is a member of the WTO, to whom the clause of the most -favoured -nation is commonly applicable, 
and the imported goods whose place of origin is a country or region that has concluded with the 
People's Republic of China a bilateral trade agreement that contains clauses of reciprocal most -
favoured -nation treatment, and the imported goods whose place of origin is within the 
People 's Republic of China. For imported goods originating from countries or regions other than those 
subject to MFN tariff rate, conventional tariff rate or preferential tariff rate, as well as imported goods 
of unknown origin, the general tariff rate shall apply. So, there is no case where two tariff rates are 
applied at the same  time. 
 
Chapter 3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports  
7. Para 3.39: According to paragraph 3.39 China has preferential VAT policies for several sectors. 
As the new WTO notification on subsidies and countervailing measures is still outstanding, could 
China indicate whether all or only some of the preferential VAT policies remain in place and which 
ones?   
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification of central and local subsidies for 2019 -2020 submitted 
by the Chinese side (G/SCM/N/372/CHN).  
 
8. Para 3. 40: Paragraph 3.40 indicates that China levies a consumption tax on a range of 
products.  As the new WTO notification on subsidies and countervailing measures is still outstanding, 
could China indicate updated information regarding new preferential consumpt ion tax rates or 
exemptions introduced since 2019?   
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification of central and local subsidies for 2019 -2020 submitted 
by the Chinese side (G/SCM/N/372/CHN).  
 
Chapter 3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensin g 
9. Para 3.80: According to paragraph 3.80 and footnote 96, China 's latest WTO notification on 
quantitative restrictions dates back to 15 February 2019 and covers the period 2018 -2020. As the 
Decision on notification procedures for quantitative restrictions (G/L/59/Rev.1) requires 
WTO members to make complete notifications of all their quantitative restrictions at two yearly 
intervals, could China indicate when it intends to comply with this obligation?  
 
Reply:  China has submitted an updated notification of quantitative restrictions.  
 
Chapter 3.2.5, "Export finance, insurance and garantees " 
10. What are the reasons, from the Chinese point of view, that the International Working Group 
on Export Credits (IWG ) was suspended? Would China agree that a resumption of the 
IWG negotiations would be desirable?  
 
Reply:  China has been actively participating in the consultation process of the IWG since its 
establishment in 2012. At the vice -ministerial meeting held in July 2020, China put forward 
constructive proposals on important issues such as transparency and sustainable financing proposed 
by other members, and made it clear that consultations on related issues could continue. Regrettably, 
some members have suspende d the IWG 's technical consultations with a "take it or leave it " attitude, 
ignoring the fact that consultations are a mutually supportive process. China has always firmly 
supported and practiced multilateralism and believes that differences between parties  can be 
properly resolved through multilateral consultations.  
 
"What is Chinas stance with regard to transparency into the terms offered in export finance 
transactions, a scope of coverage that would apply to both goods and services and the question of 
international standards for debt sustainability? "  
 
Reply:  For the three issues of transparency, the applicable scope of the rules, and debt sustainability, 
our stance was made clear at the vice ministerial -level meeting of the IWG convened on 10  July 2020.  
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  In absence of a solution within the IWG, how does China  intend to comply with WTO regulations in 
this field (the current OECD arrangement provides a safe harbor and WTO protection)?  
 
Reply:  As a WTO member, China complies with WTO rules in its export financing business, and the 
Export -Import Bank of China ref ers to the relevant provisions of the OECD "Gentlemen 's Agreement " 
in pricing its loans.  
 
11. Para 3.110: Quote "The authorities note that all projects operate according to market 
principles ": what are the benchmarks used to assure that all projects operate according to market 
principles (e.g. benchmarking of market conditions)?  
 
Reply : (1) The Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Export -Import Bank of China 
(Order No. 3 of 2017 by CBRC) stipulates that the Export -Import Bank of China is obliged to establish 
market -driven operation and disciplinary mechanisms, and is set to develop into a policy financial 
institution with specific positioning, explicit business, conspicuous f unctionality, sufficient capital, 
standardized governance, strict internal control, secure operation, and good services. In practice, 
the Export -Import Bank of China implements the development requirements of modernized finance, 
and its operation, manageme nt and types of business are all carried out pursuant to the bank 
operational regularity. (2) The loan conditions will be determined for specific projects based on the 
market benchmark: on the basis of cost actuarial and risk quantification, with the goal of sustainable 
business development, linked to the market interest rate level, by comprehensively considering the 
comprehensive contribution of customers and various costs such as capital, risks, taxation and 
management expenses, etc. and predicting the tr end of the interest rate and market competition, it 
shall be determined according to the principle of risk -return matching. (3) A loan contract is a legal 
document signed between a bank and its client, and it can be disclosed only with mutual consent by 
the two parties under the contract. For the business performance of the Export -Import Bank of China, 
it is advisable to refer to the annual report published on its official website.  
 
Chapter 3.3.4.1 Competition Policy   
12. Para 3.173: In 2018, the SAMR (State Ad ministration for Market Regulation) was established 
as the national administrative body for regulating market -related issues, including competition. The 
previous functions and personnel of the NDRC, the SAIC, and MOFCOM in their respective fields of 
compet ition policy merged into the SAMR. Thus, the fragmentation of the administrative 
enforcement of competition policy came to an end. An Anti -Monopoly Committee was also created 
to organize, coordinate, and guide the anti -monopoly work across the country. The  SAMR now serves 
as the General Office of the Committee and is responsible for its day -to-day work. What is the role 
of the Anti -Monopoly Committee in the daily activity of the SAMR? Does it participate to the 
elaboration of the SARM 's decisions? Can the d ecisions of the SARM be appealed to independent 
administrative or judicial authorities?   
 
Reply:  According to China 's Anti -monopoly Law, the Anti -Monopoly Committee of the State Council 
(AMCSC ) is responsible for organizing, coordinating and guiding anti -monopoly work. The main 
duties of the AMCSC are: first, to study and formulate relevant competition policies; second, to 
organize investigations and assessments of the overall market competitio n situation and issue 
assessment reports; third, to formulate and issue anti -monopoly guidelines; fourth, to coordinate 
anti-monopoly administrative enforcement; and fifth, to perform other duties as prescribed by the 
State Council. The AMCSC office is set  up at the State Administration for Market Regulation. 
According to China 's Anti -monopoly Law, Administrative Litigation Law and Administrative 
Punishment Law, administrative counterparties who are dissatisfied with the administrative 
punishment imposed by  the anti -monopoly enforcement agency may file administrative lawsuits 
against the anti -monopoly enforcement agency in court, and the AMCSC has no duty to file lawsuits.  
 
Para 3.188: China has been active in international cooperation in the area of competition policy. 
Since 2018, the SAMR has signed bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on anti -monopoly 
cooperation with foreign competition authorities. What is the sco pe of these MOUs?  
 
Reply: Since its establishment in 2018, SAMR has signed 14 cooperation documents with the EU, 
Russia, Belarus, Japan, Korea, Serbia and the Philippines to establish bilateral antimonopoly 
cooperation mechanisms. The cooperation document s mainly include: content of cooperation, 
method of cooperation and exchange of information. Case exchange and cooperation procedures are 
also specified in the special case enforcement cooperation documents.  
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  Chapter 3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterp rises, and privatization   
Para 3.123: Switzerland regrets the lack of information on subsidies and other support provided to 
state-owned enterprises. Due to the size of the Chinese market and the presence of large SOEs in 
various sectors, even small suppor t to SOEs may have distortive effects on markets. How does China 
intend to improve the transparency of SOEs and potential support to SOEs?   
 
Reply:  China has no subsidy specifically for SOEs. Please refer to the subsidy notification submitted 
by China for its subsidy policy.  
 
Para 3.124: We note incomplete information on so -called Government Guidance Funds. More than 
a dozen such funds were set up in the last few years. What is the purpose of these funds? What sort 
of incentives do they provide? How does Ch ina ensure these funds do not provide market -distorting 
subsidies?  
 
Reply: The investment management and decision making of Government Guidance Funds (GGFs) 
is completely market -oriented. The government does not interfere or participate in the decision 
making of any investment projects of GGFs. They are established in accordance with China 's 
Company Law and other laws, and have their own governance structure for market -oriented 
operation. The Chinese government does not provide subsidies to any industry th rough GGFs.  
 
Para 3.196: Para 3.196 of the Secretariat 's Report, indicates that China provided its last full 
notification on state trading enterprises in 2018, and that a new notification would be submitted 
before mid -July 2021. Since the new notification has not been submitted yet, could China indicate 
when it plans to submit it?  
 
Reply:  China has submitted the latest notification on state trading enterprises.  
 
Para 3.196: The Chinese authorities mention that SOEs in China operate under market conditions,  
with no privileges granted by the government. How does China ensure that this is indeed the case? 
What sort of corporate governance are SOEs required to follow? How does China ensure competitive 
neutrality?   
 
Reply: China has always insisted on the market -oriented reform of SOEs. The goal of the reform is 
to make SOEs independent market entities that operate independently, bear their own profits and 
losses, bear their own risks, exercise self -restraint and develop themselves. In accordance with the 
Company  Law and other laws and regulations, SOEs have established a sound corporate governance 
mechanism with statutory powers and responsibilities, transparent powers and responsibilities, 
coordinated operation and effective checks and balances. China has fully implemented the negative 
list system for market access, and no additional access restrictions will be taken outside the list. The 
Chinese government has fully implemented the fair competition review system and cleaned up and 
abolished various regulations a nd practices that hinder the unified market and fair competition. 
Efforts have been made to strengthen anti -monopoly and anti -unfair competition enforcement, 
promote market -based allocation of land, labor, capital, technology, data and other factors, and g ive 
full play to the decisive role of the market in resource allocation. The country has implemented the 
three -year action plan for SOEs reform, and promoted the market -oriented reform of competitive 
links in key industries such as energy and railways. All  these will create a fair competition 
environment for all types of market players.  
 
Para. 3.200 of the Secretariat 's Report: Could China provide more details on the progress that has 
been achieved in mixed -ownership reform?   
 
Reply: In recent years, China has actively and steadily promoted mixed -ownership reform, carried 
out pilot mixed -ownership reform in important areas, and encouraged relevant enterprises to 
introduce private capital to optimize their shareholding structure and cor porate governance structure, 
establish flexible, efficient, market -oriented operation mechanisms and effective incentive and 
restraint mechanisms, through which state capital and private capital complement each other and 
develop together. Up to now, more t han 70% of the central SOEs have completed the mixed -
ownership reform.  
 
Para 3.200: According to the Report of the Secretariat, the Central Commission for Comprehensive 
Reforms approved a new proposal for "a structural plan of China 's SOEs ". What is the sc ope of and 
results available based on this measure?   WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  The Opinions on Optimizing the Layout and Restructuring of the State -owned Economy in 
the New Era  (hereinafter referred to as "Opinions ") were issued mainly to enable the state -owned 
economy to be tter serve the national strategic goals and better adapt to the requirements of high -
quality development and the new development pattern. The content of the Opinions mainly includes 
overall requirements, specific directions, system construction, organizati on and implementation of 
the layout optimization and restructuring of the state -owned economy. Guided by the Opinions, we 
have focused on promoting the strategic restructuring and integration of central SOEs and other 
related work. In recent years, we have  completed a number of restructuring projects with large 
assets and far -reaching impact, involving a total of 12 central SOEs in 6 groups, such as CSSC and 
CSIC, Sinochem and ChemChina, etc. At the same time, China has taken the industry system reform 
in related fields as an opportunity to promote professional integration through asset reorganization 
and equity cooperation, and has reorganized large central SOEs such as PipeChina and 
China  Satellite Communications Co. Ltd.  
 
Para 3.201: Where do you see the reasons for the strong decrease of industrial SOEs ' profits in 2019 
(as stated in para. 3.201), whereas private enterprises ' profits increased (as seen in Table 2.23)?   
 
Reply: Due to weak market demand, falling prices of i ndustrial products, rising costs and other 
factors, the profits of industrial enterprises declined. On the other hand, in recent years, China has 
gradually increased various policy preferences for small and medium -sized private enterprises, 
actively solved  their difficulties and problems, and created a better environment for their 
development, so the profits of private enterprises have increased significantly.  
 
Para 3.204: Para. 3.204 of the secretariat report states that 3 out of the 10 largest SOEs are un der 
SASAC 's supervision. What are the criteria to be supervised by SASAC? Is there any other body 
supervising the other 7 largest SOEs?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with the Law of the People 's Republic of China on the State -Owned Assets of 
Enterprises, the state -owned assets supervision and administration body under the State Council 
and the state -owned assets supervision and administration bodies established by the local people 's 
governments according to the provisions of the State Council shall perform the contributor 's 
functions for state -invested enterprises on behalf of and upon the authorization of the corresponding 
people 's government. The State Council and the local people 's governments may, when necessary, 
authorize other departments or bodies to perf orm the contributor 's functions for state -invested 
enterprises on behalf of the corresponding people 's government.  
 
3.3.6 Government Procurement  
Para. 3.221: Par 3.221 states that China maintains buy -national policies according to Article 10 of 
the Governm ent Procurement Law. At the same time, paragraph 3.212 indicates that the 
Government Procurement Law is currently under amendment and paragraph 3.229 that China and 
GPA Parties are engaged in the GPA accession process. Switzerland would appreciate if China  could 
clarify how the revision of the Government Procurement Law intends to address the question of buy -
national policies to make sure that the government procurement legal framework is fully aligned 
with the WTO GPA standards.   
 
Reply:  China will amend i ts government procurement law to grant non -discriminatory treatment to 
goods, services and suppliers of GPA participants after it completes negotiations on legal 
adjustments for joining the GPA.  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual Property Rights   
Switzerland wishes to co ngratulate China for the substantive reforms undertaken regarding 
intellectual property during the reporting period. We welcome in particular the strengthening of 
patent protection and enforcement through the introduction of instruments such as patent term  
extension and patent linkage, amendments of the legal framework to enhance the protection of 
trade secrets, as well as the revision regarding trademarks in an effort to curb bad -faith 
registrations, just to mention a few.   
 
Paras 3.264 and 3.271: Paragrap h 3.264 of the Secretariat report states that the amended 
Patent  Law was expected to enter into force on 1 June 2021. Paragraph 3.271 of the same report 
refers to the new mechanism for the early resolution of potential pharmaceutical patent disputes. 
We welcome that China has decided to introduce such a linkage system, which we understand is 
now operational. In this context, we would kindly ask China to confirm whether the linkage system WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  contained in article  76 of the revised Patent Law applies from the date of entry into force of the 
revised Patent  Law, that is, from 1 June 2021.   
 
Reply: According to the patent law, from 1 June 2021, when a dispute arises during the process of 
drug market review, the parties concerned may file a lawsuit in the people 's court or request an 
administrative ruling from the patent administra tion department of the State Council.  
 
Chapter 4. Trade policies by sector   
Chapter 4.1.2 Agriculture   
Para 4.20: According to paragraph 4.20 and China 's notification to the Market Access Committee on 
Quantitative Restrictions (G/MA/QR/N/CHN/5/Rev.1), a ra nge of agricultural products, such as rice, 
maize, and wheat are subject to export quotas and exports of some of these products are also 
subject to state trading. How does China ensure that those measures do not affect the food security 
of importing countr ies?  
 
Reply: China is a net importer of food, so the adoption of export restrictions on some agricultural 
products will not affect the food security of other countries.  
 
Table 4.7: Table 4.7 shows a significant decrease in export quotas for maize, rise, and wheat flour 
from 2018 to 2019. What are the reasons behind this decrease and how does China ensure that this 
decrease does not have a negative impact on the food security of importing countries?   
 
Reply:  China is a net importer of food, so the ad option of export restrictions on some agricultural 
products will not affect the food security of other countries.  
 
Chapter 4.2.2 Energy  
13. Para 4.62: According to para. 4.62 China is committed to reaching the proportion of non -fossil 
energy consumption about 25% by 2060. In light of the August 2021 report of the Intergovernmental 
panel on climate change, and given China is the world 's largest energy producer and consumer 
(para  4.56), will China review its targets and accelerate the path of th e transition to renewable 
energy sources?   
 
Reply:  China is the largest developing member in the world, with obviously unbalanced and 
insufficient development. For example, its energy structure is biased towards coal, its industrial 
structure is biased tow ard heavy industries, and its level of science and technology needs to be 
improved. China 's carbon peak and carbon neutral targets are nationally determined contributions 
put forward in accordance with the Paris Agreement. The targets are set after thoroug h research 
and demonstration, reflecting great ambition and requiring strenuous efforts to achieve. China will 
undertake extensive and profound economic and social changes to fulfill its commitments in a 
gradual and determined manner.  
 
China has committed to a highly ambitious renewable energy development goal of developing more 
than 1.2 billion kilowatts of wind and photovoltaic power generation capacity by 2030, a figure that 
already exceeds the present total installed generating capacity in some countrie s. Currently, China 
ranks first in the world in total installed wind power and PV capacity, and in new installations. At the 
same time, China 's new energy industry chain is the biggest contributor to the world 's clean energy 
transformation. In 2020, for ex ample, China provided more than 76% of the world 's solar cells and 
modules, and produced 41% of the world 's wind turbines.  
 
4.3.2 Selected sectors   
4.3.2.3. Iron and steel   
14. Para 4.119: Paragraph 4.119 indicates that the NDRC, the MIIT and the National Bureau of 
Statistics have jointly asked the steel companies to submit a report on their capacity status and 
production changes in their facilities over the last three years. Cou ld China indicate whether the 
steel industry has provided the requested information? Could China provide some information 
regarding the conclusions of the analysis conducted based on the data provided by the steel 
industry? What are the main conclusions?  
 
Reply:  The NDRC has not issued a notice requiring steel companies to provide reports on their 
production capacity.  
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  According to reports of the OECD, the nominal crude steelmaking capacity of China has been 
increasing in the recent year. How does this cap acity increase relate to China 's efforts to address 
excess capacity in the steel industry?   
 
Reply:  During the "Thirteenth Five -Year Plan " period, China cut crude steelmaking capacity by more 
than 150 million tons. The capacity of new smelting projects in the steel industry must be less than 
or equal to that of the old facilities, and the crude steelmaking capacity in the steel industry has 
been effectively controlled.  
 
Chapter 4.4.2.2.6 Cybersecurity  
15. Para 4.215: "There are five levels of network security protection, escalating from Level 1 to 
Level 5. A network at Level 2 or above shall be filed with a public security authority at or above t he 
prefectural level. " Can any data be provided on a) the number of networks deemed to be classified 
on the different levels of protection, in particular level 1 as compared to levels 2 -5?, and b) could 
some examples be provided for networks classified on different levels?   
 
Reply:  Regarding the graded information security protection system, I would like to make the 
following points: As information technology develops, cybersecurity situations have become more 
challenging and complex, so the graded informat ion security protection system will be improved 
accordingly. The Cybersecurity Law of the People 's Republic of China stipulates that "the state shall 
implement the rules for graded protection of cybersecurity. " This was proposed on the basis of years 
of ex perience in graded information security protection work and in accordance with the new 
cybersecurity situations today. Graded protection of cybersecurity represents an improvement of 
graded information security protection and the former is a continuation o f the latter. To implement 
the Cybersecurity Law of the People 's Republic of China, the Ministry of Public Se curity, together 
with other relevant authorities, are now working on the Regulation of Graded Cybersecurity 
Protection, with a draft for comment al ready released. This Regulation will replace the 
Administrative  Measures for the Graded Protection of Information Security.  
 
Para 4.218:  According to the report, "it would appear that companies in China can still apply to the 
Government to offer VPNs for commercial purposes. " Does this possibility include the use of foreign 
VPN-clients or is the use of VPN limited to Chinese , government -issued VPN -clients? What 
"commercial purposes " are deemed eligible for the use of such VPN -clients? Does the prohibit ion of 
VPN-clients extend to private users?   
 
Reply:  Virtual private network (VPN) is a generic network communication technology. To ensure 
fairness and a sound market order and promote healthy development of the relevant industry, China 
has formulated rul es for cross -border telecommunication operations mainly based on Regulation on 
Telecommunications of the People 's Republic of China (Decree of the State Council of the 
People 's Republic of China No. 291) and Measures on the Administration of International 
Communications Gateway Exchanges Procedures (Decree of the former Ministry of Information 
Technology No. 22). It is mainly targeted at enterprises or individuals that rent international 
dedicated cables or VPNs without approval from the telecommunication a uthorities or qualification 
for international communication business operation to carry out cross -border telecommunication 
businesses against relevant laws and regulations. Rules in this regard will not have any impact on 
the normal cross -border internet a ccess of Chinese and foreign enterprises or other users for various 
kinds of lawful business activities. Foreign trade enterprises and transnational companies, when 
finding it necessary to use a dedicated cable or any other means to gain cross -border netwo rk access, 
shall, after obtaining approval from telecommunication authorities, rent such connections from 
telecommunication operators qualified for international business operation.  
 
Report by the Chinese authorities (WT/TPR/G/415):   
 
Para 5.11: Regarding paragraph 5.11 of the Government report, specifically patent term extension, 
we understand that draft documents currently under consideration envisage that imported 
pharmaceutical products would not be eligible to benefit from an exten sion of the patent term. We 
are aware that the framework for patent term extension has not been finalised yet, but wish to 
enquire how such a criterion would be compatible with TRIPS article 27 paragraph 1 that stipulates 
that patent rights shall be enjoya ble without discrimination as to whether products are imported or 
locally produced. We would also kindly invite China to consider this aspect in the finalisation of this 
very welcome reform.   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  The Patent Law provides that patents for inventions rela ted to new drugs may request a 
patent term extension. Since this provision is mainly to compensate for the time occupied by the 
marketing review and approval of new drugs, the definition of new drugs is consistent with the 
system of laws and regulations on  drug supervision and with the practice of drug supervision and 
administration departments, so as to maintain the harmonization between the patent law and the 
drug supervision law.  
 
Para 5.35: Para 5.35 mentions that "in 2020, China officially launched thr ee-year action plan of SOE 
reform, starting a new boom in SOE reform ". Could China provide some more details on the priorities 
set out in the three -year action plan?   
 
Reply: The three -year action of SOE reform focuses on several key tasks: first, to impro ve the 
modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics and form a scientific and effective corporate 
governance mechanism; second, to promote the optimization of the layout and restructuring of 
state-owned capital and improve the efficiency of state -owned capital allocation; third, to actively 
and steadily promote the mixed -ownership reform, and enable enterprises of all types of ownership 
complement each other and develop together; fourth, to stimulate the vitality of SOEs, improve their 
market -oriented operating mechanism and thus efficiency; fifth, to form a state -owned assets 
supervision system focusing on capital management, and make state -owned assets supervision 
more systemic, targeted and effective.  
 
 
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  NORTH MACEDONIA  
WT/TPR/S/415 – WTO Secretariat 's Report WT/TPR/S/415  
 
2. Trade and Investment regime  
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements   
Page 34, point 2.20:  
The report provides:  "China has been a WTO Member since 11 December 2001. At the Trade Policy 
Review Body, its trade policies have been reviewed seven times; the previous Review took place in 
July 2018. China is an observer to the Committee on Government Procurement and has been 
negotiating its accession to the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
since 2007. On 21 October 2019, China introduced to the parties to the Agreement its sixth revised 
market access offer in the context of its negotiations to join the GPA (Section 3.3.6). China is an 
observer to the Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircr aft. China is also a participant in the 
Information Technology Agreement. "  
 
North Macedonia Question 1 : What are the plans of China to apply for signatory to the Plurilateral 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft?  
 
Reply:  China supports the process of multilateral trade liberalization and is willing to conduct 
dialogues and discussions with interested WTO members under the WTO framework.  
 
Page 34, point 2.22:   
The report provides:  "During the review period, China submitted  various notifications to the WTO 
(Table A2.1). Nevertheless, some notifications, including those on state trading enterprises and 
domestic support, remain outstanding. According to the authorities, China is preparing new 
notifications. "  
 
North Macedonia Question 2 : What were the main reasons for the outstanding and what is the 
time plan to submit the remaining and new notifications?  
 
Reply: China has already submitted the notification on state trading. We are now trying our best to 
prepare for the notification on agricultural domestic support, and will submit it as soon as possible.  
 
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1 Incentives  
Page 75, point 3.115.   
The report provides: "During the review period, China continued to provide incentives and financial 
support to different sectors and industries. The authorities indicate that these measures are in place 
to accelerate transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, foster infant industries, 
stimulate innovation, promote de velopment in remote areas, enhance competitiveness of SMEs, and 
attract FDI. Furthermore, support was also granted with a view to protecting the environment, 
reducing emissions, and conserving energy. Generally, support is granted by the Central 
Government  or local governments in the form of direct transfers and tax preferences. The authorities 
indicate that no incentives are granted in the form of access to credit. "  
 
North Macedonia Question 3 : Is there any quantitative analysis that calculates the impact of 
provided incentives in different sectors and industries, especially to attract FDI? If yes, could China 
kindly provide further information about these analyses?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, Chi na has made such efforts as actively promoting the policy of high -level 
investment liberalization and facilitation, implementing across the board the Foreign Investment Law  
and its implementation regulations, continuously lowering the threshold for foreign  investors to 
access the market, extending the coverage of encouraged foreign investment, establishing special 
task forces to provide services for foreign -invested enterprises and major foreign -invested 
programmes, and improving the reporting mechanism for  foreign -invested enterprises. In the 
first eight months of 2021, the foreign investment in actual use in China was USD 113.78 billion, a 
year-on-year increase of 27.8%. Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN 
submitted by China.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.3.6 Government Procurement  
3.3.6.1 Overview  
Page 99, point 3.210.  
The report provides  "According to data provided by the authorities, the total value of government 
procurement in China was CNY 3.3 trillion in 2019 (the latest year for which data were made 
available), accounting for 3.3% of GDP (Table 3.25). The majority of procurement takes place at the 
sub-Central Government level. Procurement by local entities accounted for 91.9% of China 's total 
value of government procurement in 2019; in the same y ear, procurement by the Central 
Government accounted for 8.1%. "  
 
North Macedonia Question 4:  Does data provided by the authorities on the total value of 
government procurement in China cover procurement conducted by SOEs under the Tendering Law?  
 
Reply:  Article 2 of the Government Procurement Law stipulates that: The term  "government 
procurement " as mentioned in the present law refers to the procurement of goods, projects and 
services within the lawfully made centralized procurement lists or above the pro curement limits by 
the state organs, public institutions and bodies with public fiscal funds. At present, SOEs are not 
subject to the Government Procurement Law. The data on the total value of government 
procurement in China does not cover procurement cond ucted by SOEs under the Tendering Law.  
 
3.3.6.2 Legal and institutional framework  
 
Page 100, point 3.211.  
The report provides  "There have been no major changes to China 's legislative and regulatory regime 
concerning government procurement since the previ ous Review. The Government Procurement Law 
remains the primary legislation regulating government procurement activities.171 It applies to 
procurements of goods, services, and construction works by state organs, public institutions, and 
social organizations.172 The Government Procurement Law does not apply to SOEs; a large number 
of infrastructure projects and public utility wo rks carried out by SOEs are therefore excluded from 
the scope of application of the Government Procurement Law. Furthermore, Article 4 of the 
Government Procurement Law provides that the construction works that fall within its definition of 
government proc urement, i.e. those works procured by state organs, public institutions, and social 
organizations (and not SOEs), must follow the tendering procedures set out by the Tendering Law 
when tendering is used as the procurement method. In all events, such constr uction works must 
still follow other policy requirements set out by the Government Procurement Law. The Tendering 
Law regulates tendering procedures regardless of whether the tendering concerns a project of a 
government agency or an SOE. Furthermore, accor ding to the Government Procurement Law, the 
Central Military Commission issues separate regulations concerning military procurement and 
administrates their enforcement. "  
 
North Macedonia Question 5:  Does China plan to integrate procurement rules in a sing le 
Procurement Law that would cover both contracting entities now covered by the Government 
Procurement Law and SOEs covered by the Tendering Law?  
 
Reply:  China is working to amend the Government Procurement Law  and the Tendering Law , during 
which the coordination between the two laws will be taken into consideration according to opinions 
from all parties.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  ISRAEL  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.2 Import licensing requirements  
3.1.5.2.2 Non -automatic import licensing requirements  
3.51.  
"In 2020, the Catalogue of Import Goods Subject to Licensing listed 118 tariff lines at the HS 10 -digit 
level that were subject to non -automatic import licensing (compared with 139 tariff lines at the 
HS 10-digit level in 2017). During the review period, some used mechanical and electrical products, 
such as engineering machinery, electric power and ele ctrical equipment, and textile machinery, were 
deleted from the Catalogue. As noted in previous Reviews, imports subject to non -automatic licences 
mainly include used mechanical and electronic equipment, and substances that deplete the ozone 
layer. The pur pose of non -automatic import licensing for ozone -depleting substances is to fulfil 
China 's obligations under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and 
the licensing requirements with respect to used machinery are to serve social  interests and to protect 
the environment and consumer health and security. The procedures to obtain a non -automatic 
import licence have remained unchanged since the previous Review.  
 
Question 1: Please provide a list of the products which are subject to n on-automatic import license 
requirement in order to be imported to China or provide a link to any publication in English of the 
abovementioned list on an official website. Reply: Please refer to the latest circular of quantitative 
restrictions submitted by  China.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
3.3.2.1 Overview  
3.135.  
"The Plan for Deepening Standardization Reform issued by the State Council proposes that the 
current mandatory national, sector, and local standards will be gradually integrated into mandatory 
national standards; the three -level system of mandatory national, sector, and local standards 
concerning environmental protection, enginee ring, construction, and medicine and healthcare will 
be retained. "  
 
Question 2:  it would be appreciated if China could elaborate regarding the China Standards 2035 
Plan:  
a) What are the main elements of the plan?  
b) Are there any short -term measures which will be implemented prior to the launch of the plan?  
c) Will the plan include any standards which will be canceled or replaced by international 
standards / new set of domestic standards?  
d) When is China expected to report the measures included in the plan to the WTO 
TBT Committee?  
 
Reply for a) –d): The China St andards 2035 Plan is a research programme on standardization 
carried out by the Chinese Academy of Engineering. It aims to evaluate the effectiveness of China 's 
recent efforts in building the system and structure of standards, enhancing the efficacy of 
standardization administration, and facilitating the alignment with international standards; analyze 
existing deficiencies and issues; and provide, from the perspective of a research institute, comments 
and suggestions for informing future standardized develo pment in China. Building on the experience 
of international and foreign standardization institutes, the programme strengthened communication 
and exchange throughout the research. The State Administration for Market Regulation 
(Standardization Administratio n) will follow WTO requirements when developing standardization 
policies based on relevant research results.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE   
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade   
3.3.6 Government procurement  
3.3.6.5 COVID -19-related government procurement measures  
3.227.   
"To address the COVID -19 pandemic, China established "green channels " for government 
procurement in relation to the prevention and control of the pandemic. On 26 January 2020, the 
MOF circulated the Notic e on Facilitating Procurement for Pandemic Prevention and Control (Cai Ban 
Ku No. 23, 2020) which requires that state organs, public institutions, and social groups at all levels 
should open "green channels " for the procurement of goods, services, and cons truction works for 
pandemic prevention and control.189 The Notice also requires that sound internal control 
mechanisms be established and maintained for emergency procurement. On 6 February 2020, the 
MOF circulated the Notice on Government Procurement -related Matters during the Period of 
Pandemic Prevention and Control (Cai Ban Ku No. 29, 2020).190 This Notice focuses on the 
protection of the health and safety of procurement professionals and suppliers during the pandemic 
and encourages the use of electroni c means in government procurement.  
 
Question 3:  
a) Israel would appreciate if China could elaborate more regarding the "green channels " for 
government procurement which were established to address the COVID -19 pandemic outbreak, 
i.e. does these channels allow for a different process of procurement? In which way? Does this apply 
to both domestic and imported products?  
b) Is there a list of p roducts to which the "green channels " apply? Was the list published?  
c) Are these measures still in force?  
 
Reply for a) –c): To address the COVID -19 pandemic, the Ministry of Finance issued the Notice on 
Facilitating Procurement for Pandemic Prevention and Control , establishing the "green channels " for 
government procurement in relation to the prevention and control of the pandemic . State institutions, 
public institutions, and social organizations at all levels that apply government budgetary funds to 
procure commodities, engineering projects, and services for pandemic prevention and control are 
allowed to be free from the methods a nd procedures stipulated in the Government Procurement Law 
and procure imported supplies without government approval. There is no list of products to which 
the "green channels " apply. The Notice on Facilitating Procurement for Pandemic Prevention and 
Contr ol is still in force. Buyers who are conducting procurement activities in response to emergency 
needs of pandemic prevention and control shall implement the provisions of the Notice.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  THAILAND  
Documents Questions  
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 1.42  
Page 26  
 Does China have any plans to spur growth in its declining services exports, such as 
manufacturing services and travel? If so, please elaborate those plans.   
 
Reply: China has always supported the development of service trade. The decline in exports of 
traditional services such as tourism is caused by the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic and structural 
factors. China has formulated a series of plans to stimulate the gro wth of service exports. For 
example, it has rolled out the Asian Tourism Promotion Plan, and launched 50 best tourist city brands 
and 20 international tourism cooperation demonstration zone brands. It has been strengthening 
brand building in the tourism se ctor and increase market participation in the "Beautiful China " 
campaign.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 2.41  
Page 37  
 Does China have technology transfer requirements for the receiving of investment incentives?  
 
Reply:  China 's current laws and regulations do not req uire mandatory technology transfer for the 
receiving of investment incentives. We encourage Chinese companies to strengthen technological 
cooperation with foreign companies. It 's normal for the foreign and Chinese parties to negotiate 
terms and conditions for cooperation. It should not be confused with mandatory technology transfer 
requirements.  
 
WT/ TPR/S/415  
Para 3.73  
Page 68  
 Please provide further details on the relevant procedures and criteria used in the 
implementation of China 's risk management syste m, including how enterprise 's ratings are 
calculated, to ensure that the system works in a transparent and fair manner.  
 
Reply: According to the risk management requirements in the Revised Kyoto Convention and 
the WCO Risk Management Compendium, the risk management center is the platform through which 
the risk management requirements of functional departments are implemented on the scene. It 
supports functional managements by issuing parameters, rules, and instructions to personnel on the 
site. It is respo nsible for implementing decision -making and directing on -site operations through 
parameters, rules, and instructions within the selection -investigation -punishment framework, and 
improving the integrated rapid response and emergency management mechanism of the customs. 
A closed -loop risk management model with information collection, risk analysis, early warning, risk 
disposal, and instruction evaluation as the main functions have taken shape. The model starts from 
collecting and integrating internal and exte rnal risk information, utilizes big data analytics, timely 
issues early warning based on the results of data analysis, handles risks (by issuing risk instructions 
and adopting differentiated disposal methods such as inspection by the on -site unit, initiati on of 
inspection, and handing over to the anti -smuggling authority), evaluates instructions based on 
feedbacks from law enforcement agencies, and incorporates feedbacks and evaluation results into 
the risk information system to continuously improve the eff iciency of risk management.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.74  
Page 68  
 As stated in one of the GACC 's measures to facilitate the import of food and agricultural 
products by setting up green lanes at key ports in China to provide around -the-clock clearance for 
foreign agri -food products on the reservation basis, please explain in detail whether there are a ny 
differences in the process and the cost between green lanes and regular lanes. In addition, please 
provide details of the ports in which green lanes have been set up and the procedures required to 
make a reservation for around -the-clock clearance.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 40 - 
 
  Reply: China has opened agricultural product green lanes after consulting with relevant countries. 
Fresh and perishable agricultural products of which the customs requires higher levels of clearance 
can use the green lane. The customs (including the inspectio n and quarantine departments) of the 
two countries jointly confirm the list of commodities (HS code) eligible for green lanes. The 
two countries will paste the "Agricultural Product Green Lane " logo in the languages of the 
two countries on vehicles transpo rting agricultural products cross the border in accordance with the 
relevant requirements.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.82  
Page 69  
 China is one of the most important countries in the global supply chain and the restrictions of 
export of important raw materials such as rare earth can impact the world 's economy. In this regard, 
please provide details regarding procedures and quantitative criteria used in consideration of 
imposing export quotas.  
 
Reply: Since 2015, China has cancelled the export quota of  raw materials such as rare earths. We 
recommend Thailand further verify the relevant issues.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.150  
Page 83  
 Will China be introducing more products eligible for the self -declaration assessment 
mechanism? If so, what are some of the pro ducts being considered?  
 
Reply:  China 's latest compulsory product certification (CCC) catalogue contains a total of 
17 categories and 103 products, 19 of which are eligible for self -declaration assessment mechanism. 
China will continue to evaluate the eff ectiveness of the self -declaration assessment mechanism, and 
adjust the scope of self -declaration assessment based on product risks.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.3.3.1  
Page 84  
 Concerning China 's SPS -related laws and regulations, specifically on the Decree 248 reg arding 
the regulation on the registration and administration of overseas producers of Imported food: 1)  May 
China clarify the detail of the Decree? 2) Has China notified the Decree to the WTO? And 3) When 
the Decree will enter into force? Thailand is conce rned that the adjustment of our domestic 
procedures may be required to comply with China 's new Decree and we also need to ensure that the 
obligations would be adequately communicated to all private sectors so that they could prepare in 
advance. Therefore, Thailand would like to know if China is considering to provide a sufficient 
transitional period for exporting countries to prepare properly.  
 
Reply:  The safety of imported food concerns the health and life safety of citizens and is a major 
livelihood issu e. In accordance with laws and administrative regulations, such as, the Food Safety 
Law of the People 's Republic of China  and the Regulation on the Implementation of the Food Safety 
Law of the People 's Republic of China , China has organized the revision of regulations on the 
administration of safety of imported and exported food and the administration of registration of 
overseas imported food production enterprises. the Measures for the Administration of Import and 
Expor t Food Safety of the People 's Republic of China (Decree 249 of the General Administration of 
Customs)  and the Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Overseas Producers of 
Imported Food (Degree 248 of the General Administration of Customs)  promulgated on 
12 April 2021 will come into force on 1 January 2022. Before the promulgation, China notified the 
WTO in accordance with the relevant rules, accepted comments of WTO members and adopted 
reasonable opinions and suggestions, so it conform to rel evant WTO rules. General Administration 
of Customs No. 248 and No.249 have been published on the official website of General 
Administration of Customs. Enquiries are welcome. In the near future, China will publish 
interpretations of the Measures for the Ad ministration of Import and Export Food Safety of the 
People 's Republic of China (Decree 249 of the General Administration of Customs)  and the 
Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Overseas Producers of Imported Food 
(Degree  248 of the Gener al Administration of Customs) in appropriate forms. Please keep track of 
our information. Decree 248 of the General Administration of Customs will not affect the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 41 - 
 
  implementation of the bilateral protocol. If the relevant country (region) and China have agre ed 
otherwise on the registration method and application materials, the agreement shall prevail.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.167  
Page 86  
 When GACC  which is responsible for inspection and quarantine as well as supervision and 
administration of food and cosmetics imports issued the announcement on adjusting the supervision 
requirements for certain imports and exports, would there be advanced notice an d/or transitional 
period for exporting countries to go through their domestic administrative procedures?  
 
Reply: For information on the Announcement on Adjusting the Supervision Requirements for Certain 
Imports and Exports, please refer to the website of the General Administration of Customs of the 
People 's Republic of China. Thailand may access updates by visiting the website of the General 
Administration of Customs and following the official Weibo account  "Customs Release ". 
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.169  
Page 87  
 Regarding China 's SPS measures, notified to the SPS Committee, eight new STCs were raised 
in the Committee, including the STC on administrative measures for registration of overseas 
manufacturers of imported food. How did China respond on those ST Cs? Did China commit to 
terminate or postpone entry into force date of those measures?  
 
Reply:  The safety of imported food concerns the health and life safety of citizens and is a major 
livelihood issue.  In accordance with laws and administrative regulati ons, such as, the Food Safety 
Law of the People 's Republic of China  and the Regulation on the Implementation of the Food Safety 
Law of the People 's Republic of China , China has organized the revision of regulations on the 
administration of safety of import ed and exported food and the administration of registration of 
overseas imported food production enterprises. the Measures for the Administration of Import and 
Export Food Safety of the People 's Republic of China (Decree 249 of the General Administration o f 
Customs)  and the Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Overseas Producers of 
Imported Food (Degree 248 of the General Administration of Customs)  promulgated on 
12 April 2021 will come into force on 1 January 2022. Before the promulgation,  China notified the 
WTO in accordance with the relevant rules, accepted comments of WTO members and adopted 
reasonable opinions and suggestions, so it conform to relevant WTO rules. General Administration 
of Customs No. 248 and No.249 have been published o n the official website of General 
Administration of Customs. Enquiries are welcome. In the near future, China will publish 
interpretations of the Measures for the Administration of Import and Export Food Safety of the 
People 's Republic of China (Decree 249  of the General Administration of Customs)  and the 
Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Overseas Producers of Imported Food 
(Degree  248 of the General Administration of Customs) in appropriate forms. Please keep track of 
our information. D ecree 248 of the General Administration of Customs will not affect the 
implementation of the bilateral protocol. If the relevant country (region) and China have agreed 
otherwise on the registration method and application materials, the agreement shall prev ail. 
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.181  
Page 92  
 According to the information provided that the mergers which have higher value than the 
threshold standard need to ask for permission from SAMR, please clarify if the AML laws mention 
specific timeframe for considering the approval of the mergers, and how much time the laws allow 
for consideration.  
 
Reply:  According to the provisions of China 's Anti -Monopoly Law, the anti -monopoly law 
enforcement agency shall conduct a preliminary review of the declared market concentration within 
30 days from the date of r eceipt of the relevant documents and materials submitted by the parties 
in compliance with the law, and notify the parties in writing of its decision regarding whether to 
further review them. If the law enforcement agency decides the concentration merits a  further 
review, it shall, within 90 days from the date of the decision, complete the review and notify the 
merging companies in writing of its decision on whether to approval the concentration. Under any 
of the following circumstances, the law enforcement  agency may extend the review period upon WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 42 - 
 
  written notification to the parties, but the maximum period shall not exceed 60 days: (i) where the 
parties agree to extend the review period; (ii) where any information submitted by the parties are 
inaccurate and need to be further verified; or (iii) significant changes have occurred to the parties 
after the declaration. If the law enforcement agency fails to make a decision within the time limit, 
the parties may carry out the concentration.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.1 83 
Page 92 -93 
 According to the information provided that once the "simple cases " have completed the 
approval process, they would be published on SAMR 's website for 10 days for public comment. Please 
clarify if the public opinions will affect the commissio n's consideration for the mergers.  
 
Reply:  According to the provisions of China 's Interim Provisions on the Standards That Apply to 
Simplified Cases of Concentrations of Undertakings and Guiding Opinions on the Declaration of 
Concentration of Undertakings  in Simple Cases, the parities can apply for a simple case for a 
concentration that meets the relevant criteria. The parties shall fill in the Public Disclosure of Simple 
Case of Undertaking Concentration ( "Public Disclosure "). After the simple case is fil ed, the anti -
monopoly law enforcement agency will publish the Public Disclosure on the website of the SAMR for 
a period of 10 days. During the public disclosure period, any entity or individual (third party) can 
submit a written opinion to the anti -monopol y authority on whether the case should be deemed a 
simple case. The anti -monopoly authority shall verify the opinion and evidence of third parties. If 
the anti -monopoly authority decides that it should not be considered as a simple case, it shall revoke 
the simple case identification and require the parties to re -declare the case as a non -simple case.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.185  
Page 93  
 Please elaborate and give some illustrative examples on anti -competitive measures aiming to 
protect locally manufactured pro ducts and other preferential measures inconsistent with the 
competition law.  
 
Reply:  The fair competition review system aims to maintain a unified, competitive market where 
economic entities of different ownership structure use production factors in accordance with the law 
and participate in competition on an equal footing, and are equall y protected by law, and to prevent 
excessive and inappropriate government intervention in market such as introducing unreasonable 
market access restrictions. Since the implementation of the system, a total of 1.89 million policies 
have been abolished. Near ly 30,000 policies that violated the review standards have been revised 
and abolished. 857,000 new policies have been reviewed, and 4,100 policies that violated the review 
standards have been revised or abolished in a timely manner. These efforts have effe ctively 
promoted the development of a unified, open, effectively regulated market where market players 
participate in competition on an equal footing, laying a solid foundation for higher -level opening up.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.185  
Page 93  
 Could you please  provide specific examples of exceptions as prescribed by the State Council 
Opinions on Administrative Monopoly?  
 
Reply:  The regulations and normative documents related to economic activities of market entities 
formulated by administrative agencies authorized by Chinese laws and regulations to manage public 
affairs shall be subject to fair competition review in accordance wi th the principle of "prohibitions + 
exceptions ". Currently, no policies that violate the exceptions have been found.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.206  
Page 97  
 China objects to the statement contained in the Secretariat 's report, stating that State -owned 
Enterprise s (SOEs) in China operate under market conditions, with no privileges granted by the 
Government. Please elaborate more on this point i.e., how SOEs in China operate under market 
conditions and receive no privileges from the Government?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 43 - 
 
  Reply:  The Constit ution of the PRC stipulates that SOEs have the right to operate independently 
within the scope provided by the law; the Company Law and the Law on the State -Owned Assets of 
Enterprises also stipulate that SOEs have independent legal personality and enjoy p roperty rights as 
legal person. As independent market entities, Chinese SOEs follow the same legal system and have 
the same legal status as other enterprises. In practice, establishing the legal status of SOEs as 
independent market entities is an important  part of China 's SOE reform. After nearly 40 years of 
reform, Chinese SOEs have become qualified market entities that manage themselves independently 
and assume responsibility for their own profitability.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.203 Table 3.23  
Page 98  
 Table 3.23 contains information such as the number of enterprises, the number of SOEs and 
the total assets of SOEs in industrial and construction sectors, could China kindly provide this kind 
of information for SOEs in financial and telecommunications services s ectors?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the official websites of the relevant enterprises.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.252  
Page 109  
 What is the result of not filing a request for trademark renewal within the 12 -months period 
before the date of expiration?  
 
Reply: According to Article 40 of the Trademark Law, if the owner of a mark intends to continue to 
use the mark after the expiration of registration, it shall go through the renewal procedure in 
accordance with the law within twelve months before the expir ation; if it fails to complete the 
procedure in time, a six -month grace period can be given. The validity period for each renewal of 
registration is ten years, calculated from the day after the expiration of the previous validity period 
of the trademark. I f the 6 -month grace period expires and the renewal procedure has not been 
completed, the trademark shall become invalid.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 3.295  
Page 118  
 Could China share the results after the implementation of the said IPR enforcement measures, 
campaigns and action plans? Do they result in the decrease of IPR infringement? If so, please provide 
the statistical data (if any).  
 
Reply : In June 2020, the Nat ional Copyright Administration, the Cyberspace Administration, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, and the Ministry of Public Security of China jointly 
launched "Jianwang 2020 ' Campaign to step up crackdown on infringement and piracy on on line 
audiovisual, e -commerce, social media, education and other platforms, and strengthen IPR 
enforcement on online literature, games, music, knowledge sharing, and other platforms. During the 
"Jianwang 2020 " Campaign, a total of 3,329,400 infringing links  were deleted, 2,884 infringing 
websites (APP) were closed, 724 online infringement and piracy cases were investigated, including 
177 criminal cases, the amount involved of which reached 301 million yuan, and 925 online 
IP disputes were settled. The campai gn has effectively strengthened IPR protection and enforcement 
on the Internet. The campaign was launched in June this year, and relevant data will be released by 
the end of the year.  
 
In the "Iron Fist " Campaign in 2020, the market supervision authorities  at all levels investigated 
39,000 IP infringement cases. On the whole, the effectiveness of China 's IP protection has been 
widely recognized by innovation entities across the world and the international community. In 2020, 
social satisfaction with IP prot ection continued to increase, with the satisfaction score exceeding 
80 points for the first time, reaching 80.05 points. According to the 2020 Business Climate Survey 
released by AmCham China, 69% of the interviewed US companies in China believed that Chin a's IP 
protection had improved, which was a record high. According to the Business Confidence 
Survey  2020 published by European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 67% of the surveyed 
EU companies in China rated the effectiveness of China 's IP protection l aws and regulations as 
"excellent " or "sufficient ". WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 44 - 
 
  China has always attached importance to intellectual property cooperation with relevant countries  
(regions ) and international organizations, and established and expanded intellectual property 
information sharing mechanisms with relevant countries(regions) and international organizations. 
Strengthening intellectual property cooperation and exchanges is of positive significance for 
enhancing understanding, expanding consensus, and learning from each other.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 4.14  
Page 125 -126 
 According to information provided in Table 4.5, China bound rice flour as a Tariff Rate Quota 
under the WTO by sharing the annual in -quota quantity of this product with the short and medium 
grain rice and long grain ric e products at 5,320,000 Tonnes. Does China have a plan to consider 
separating amount of rice flour quota quantities from the other rice products?  
 
Reply:  China will continue to reform and improve its tariff rate quota management measures in 
accordance wit h the relevant commitments made by China when it joined the WTO. It will also take 
the needs of domestic and foreign enterprises into consideration.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 4.209  
Page 169  
 What are the five public service platforms? Please clarify.  
 
Reply:  According to the "5G+Industrial Internet " 512 Project Promotion Plan, relevant 
Chinese  authorities will grasp the opportunity provided by the industrial Internet innovation and 
development projects to build 5G network transformation and promotion platforms wi thin 5 industrial 
Internet companies, and build a 5G network test environment that meets the needs of industrial 
enterprises. They will provide SMEs with "5G+Industrial Internet " intranet templates, application 
consulting services, and R&D skill training p rograms, and improve their own public service 
capabilities.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 4.210  
Page 169 -170 
 What are the requirements for operators who would like to share basic telecommunications 
facilities? Please clarify.  
 
Reply:  Please refer to related stipulations in the Implementation Opinions on Advancing joint 
construction and sharing of telecommunicati on infrastructure 2019, issued by the Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology and the State -owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (correspondence between the MIIT and China Unicom [2019] 
No. 123).  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 4.213  
Page 170  
 Is there any restriction of foreign ownership in a joint venture with Chinese counterparts in 
China 's market for cloud services. If so, please elaborate.  
 
Reply:  To provide cloud computing services requires an internet data center license, which is not 
yet made available to foreign companies.  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 4.225  
Page 173  
 Are there any different requirements between foreign e -commerce operators and Chinese 
e-commerce operators in order to obtain a business license?  
 
Reply: China welcomes overseas cross -border e -commerce companies and domestic companies to 
take advantage of the opportunities brought by the development of the Chinese market. According 
to the Announcement on Matters Concerning the Supervision of Retail Impo rts and Exports in 
Cross -Border E -commerce (GACC Announcement No. 194, 2018), cross -border e -commerce WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 45 - 
 
  platform companies, logistics companies, payment companies, etc. who engage in cross -border 
e-commerce retail import shall register with the local customs  in accordance with the relevant 
regulations of customs declaration authorities on the registration and management; and overseas 
cross-border e -commerce enterprises shall entrust a domestic agent to register with the customs of 
the agent 's locality. For mo re information, please visit: 
http://www.customs.gov.cn/customs/302249/302266/302267/2141321/index.html  
 
WT/TPR/S/415  
Para 4.230  
Page 173  
 Please elaborate if the same List of Goods under Cross -Border E -Commerce (CBEC) Retail 
Importation is applied to all 105 CBEC pilot zones. If not, please provide specific examples. In 
addition, please provide details regarding criteria for the consideration of including products to the 
List of Goods under CBEC Retail Importation and the procedures to register for additional items to 
be delivered to Chinese consumers through the CBEC Retail Importation Programme.  
 
Reply: In 2021, China extends the pilot project of CBEC retail impo rts to all CBEC pilot zones. 
According to the Notice on Cross -border E -commerce Retail Import Tax Policy, the cross -border 
e-commerce retail import tax policy applies to the following products imported from other countries 
or regions and within the scope o f the List of Goods under Cross -border E -commerce Retail 
Importation: (i) All cross -border e -commerce retail imports that are traded on the e -commerce 
transaction platforms connected to the customs and whose electronic information of transaction, 
payment, and logistics are accessible; (ii) Cross -border e -commerce retail imports that are not 
traded on the e -commerce transaction platforms connected to the customs, but whose electronic 
information of transaction, payment, and logistics can be provided by expre ss and postal companies, 
promising to bear corresponding legal responsibilities for entering the country.  
 
WT/TPR/G/415  
Para 3.8  
Page 7  
 Regards to China Compulsory Certificate (CCC), please elaborate on the approximate approval 
time per 1 request, the len gth of validity of the certificate and the average cost per 1 inspection. 
Please also explain in detail whether there are any differences in the process and cost between 
enterprises self -declaration and normal process.  
 
Reply: 1. At present, according to the relevant regulations, the CCC certification agency is required 
to, with the active cooperation of the client, issue a certificate within 90 days of accepting the 
application (not including the time for rectification after a problem in the product or the manufacturer 
is discovered during the certification process). 2. The validity period of the certificate is five years. 
If it needs to be renewed, the client should submit a certification application within 90 days before 
the expiration of the certificate. If the last inspection result within the validity period of the certificate 
is "Qualified ", the certification agency will directly reissue a new certificate without re -testing or 
inspection. 3. The inspection fee arising in th e certification process is based on the number of 
certified products and production scale of the enterprise. Generally, the average fee for each 
inspection is 5,000 yuan. 4. In the case of products in the CCC catalog that are eligible for the self -
declarat ion process, an enterprise will receive a self -declaration certificate after submitting relevant 
information to China 's self-declaration information reporting system. There is no need to go through 
the CCC certification process with the designated certific ation agency, which means the enterprise 
won't have to pay the relevant inspection and evaluation fees.  
 
WT/TPR/G/415  
Para 3.26  
Page 11  
 What is China 's expectation for joining CPTPP? What elements or provisions of the agreement 
does China view as significant obstacles or required substantial domestic adjustments in 
joining  CPTPP?  
 
Reply: China has always been an advocate for the construction of open, transparent, and mutually 
beneficial regional free trade arrangements, and is actively building a network of high -standard free 
trade zones open to the world. Applying to join the CPTPP shows China 's willingness and 
determination to further deepen reform and open up its markets. In order to actively promote its 
accession to the CPTPP, China has conduct ed a full, in -depth and comprehensive study and WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 46 - 
 
  evaluation of the rules of the CPTPP, collated reform measures and revising work of laws and 
regulations that may be required to join the CPTPP, and made relevant technological preparations 
for joining the CP TPP. China is willing to make unswerving efforts to fully meet the rules and 
standards of the CPTPP through active reform.  
 
WT/TPR/G/415  
Para 4.12  
Page 14  
 In light of COVID  19 pandemic, the facilitation of China 's compulsory product certification 
process is a great benefit to help international trade ongoing. However, after the COVID -19 
pandemic, does China plan to continue using the facilitative measure on compulsory product 
certification process?  
 
Reply:  China will actively evaluate the CCC certificatio n facilitative measure during the COVID -19 
pandemic, and consider promoting the facilitative measure on the basis of ensuring the validity of 
the certification.  
 
WT/TPR/G/415  
Para 5.3  
Page 21  
 Are foreign start -up entrepreneurs eligible for the benefits an d supportive initiatives under the 
innovation and platform research and development scheme? If so, what are the criteria and 
conditions for applying to the program?  
 
Reply: Foreign entrepreneurs and foreign -funded enterprises in China are eligible for the  benefits 
and supportive initiatives under the innovation and platform research and development scheme.  
 
WT/TPR/G/415  
Para 6.2  
Page 22  
 Given that the Trade Policy Review of China presents macro -economic development policy, in 
this regard, Thailand would like to ask if there are any additional specific information on policy at 
the provincial level such as prioritized areas, targeted indust ries, and international trade and 
investment policy?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the official website of local governments. We also welcome specific appeals 
made by Thailand through bilateral channels.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  HONG KONG, CHINA  
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT AND GOVERNMENT  REPORTS  
 
Trade Policies and Practices by Measure  
 
Export finance, insurance, and guarantees  
(WT/TPR/S/415: Page 74, para 3.112 -3.113)  
China 's official export credit insurance agency is SINOSURE. It offers short -, medium -, and long -term 
export credit insurance, bond and guarantee facilities, and overseas investment insurance and credit 
information services. One of the available insurance products is small and micro enterprise easy 
credit insurance, which is tailor -made to meet the specific need of small and micro businesses.  
 
Quest ion: 
1.  Could China provide more details on the small and micro enterprise easy credit insurance, 
such as its coverage, credit limit and utilisation?  
 
Reply:  This product insures small and micro enterprises incorporated in the People 's Republic of 
China a gainst the commercial risks and political risks in exports. The policy sets limit of liability for 
a single buyer or issuing bank, which is determined by the premium rate.  
 
Trade Policies by Sector  
Financial Services  
(WT/TPR/S/415: Pages 165 -166, para 4.189)  
The authorities encourage financial institutions to adopt new information technologies, as a way to 
improve the accessibility of financial services and reduce risk through the application of big data 
and artificial intelligence. In 2019, the People 's Bank of China (PBOC) issued the Fintech 
Development Plan, which lays out the basic principles, development goals, and supportive measures 
from 2019 -21. The PBOC conducted a pilot programme in 10 different places.  
 
Question:  
2. Could China share with us more details about the key strategies or supportive measures of 
the Fintech Development Plan, in particular those affecting foreign -invested entities? What is the 
current status of the implementation of the pilot programme?  
 
Reply: Up to now, 27 key tasks in the Plan have delivered positive results. China 's financial 
technology is displaying vigor and vitality, and plays an important role in serving the real economy, 
practicing inclusive finance, and preventing and mitigating risks.  
 
(WT/TPR/S/415: Pa ge 166, paras 4.191 -4.192)  
Tech companies are required to obtain the corresponding financial licences to conduct financial 
services business.  
 
There is no single comprehensive regulation that governs fintech activities. Various administrative 
measures on f inancial services apply to fintech business operators. Additionally, China has not set 
up a single supervisory authority for the regulation of the fintech industry. As indicated in Table 4.21, 
the relevant businesses of the fintech industry are subject to the supervision of the traditional 
regulatory authorities, depending on the characteristics of the services provided. The authorities 
indicated that in the fintech industry, financial innovation must be carried out on the premise of 
prudential supervision;  supervision must be strictly implemented. All financial activities must be 
licensed and fully regulated in accordance with the law to avoid regulatory arbitrage. According to 
the authorities, all types of entities, domestic or foreign, are treated equally .  
 
Question:  
3. What factors have been taken into account when issuing financial licen ses to tech companies 
to conduct financial services or fintech business? In view that there is neither single regulation nor 
single supervisory authority for the regulat ion of the fintech industry, we would like to know whether 
there is any plan to set up such regulation or supervisory authority given the growing importance of 
fintech activities.  
 
Reply: First of all, the finance sector is subject to licen sing management, and all financial businesses 
must be licensed before operation. Second, we strictly follow access rules in terms of capital WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  requirements, shareholder qualifications, internal control syst em, etc. Third, if the standards for 
establishing a financial holding company are met, a financial holding company shall be established 
in accordance with the Trial Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Financial Holding 
Companies . 
 
Telecommun ications  
(WT/TPR/S/415: Page 169, paras 4.208 -4.209)  
In March 2020, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) issued the Notice on 
Promoting the Accelerated Development of 5G. It provides guidance for the industry to fully promote 
5G netwo rk construction, application popularization, technological development, and security 
assurance.  
 
In November 2019, the MIIT  issued the Plan for Advancing the 512 Program on 5G Plus Industrial 
Internet, a policy document to facilitate the integrated development of 5G and industrial Internet. 
It aims to promote the use of 5G technologies to upgrade five public service platforms by 2022.  
 
Question:  
4. Please share with us more details regarding the guidance provided under the Notice on 
Promoting the Accelerated Development of 5G, and the current status of the Plan for Advancing 
the 512 Program on 5G Plus Industrial Internet.  
 
Reply: The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology continues to promote the 
implementation of industrial Internet and 5G innovative development. First, we consolidate the 
network foundation, and promote industrial enterprises to upgrade and transform industrial 
production networks using new technologies such as 5G and time -sensitive networks. Second, we 
improve the industrial ecology, and promote the integration and innovation of "5G + Industrial 
Internet " and new technologies such as artificial intell igence, edge computing, and blockchain. 
Third,  we deepen integrated applications, and accelerate the popularization of typical applications of 
"5G + Industrial Internet ". 
 
E-commerce  
(WT/TPR/S/415: Page 173, para 4.230)  
Regarding foreign business, the E-commerce Law provides that China shall encourage cross -border 
e-commerce (CBEC) development. In practice, the authorities have been promoting CBEC (activities 
of purchasing or selling products via online shopping across national borders). On 27 April 202 0, the 
State Council issued the Approval of the Establishment of Integrated Pilot Areas for Cross -border 
E-commerce in 46 Cities and Areas (Guo Han No. 47, 2020). This brought the total number of CBEC 
pilot zones to 105.  
 
Question:  
5. We appreciate the inc rease in the number of the CBEC pilot zones. What criteria would be 
taken into account when considering the approval for the establishment of new CBEC pilot zones? 
In addition to CBEC pilot zones, are there any other measures to encourage CBEC development?  
 
Reply: Since 2015, China has approved 105 cross -border e -commerce (CBEC) pilot zones in five 
batches successively. In general, CBEC  pilot zones have taken on increased importance, becoming 
a new highlight in foreign trade growth, a new channel for entrepreneurship and innovation, and a 
new drive for transformation and upgrading.  
To encourage and support CBEC, the Ministry of Commerce has worked with relevant departments 
to explore innovative options, improve supporting policies, foster enabling environment, and achieve 
high-quality development of CBEC. The Ministry of Commerce has guided the pilot zones in 
establishing a policy framewo rk centered on "six systems and two platforms. " The six systems refer 
to information sharing, financial services, intelligent logistics, e -commerce integrity, statistics 
monitoring, and risk prevention and control. The two platforms include the online comp rehensive 
service platform and the offline industrial parks. This has produced 36 mature practices of experience 
in 12 aspects that have been replicated and promoted nationwide.  
 
On July 5, 2021, the General Office of the State Council released the Opinio ns of the State Council 's 
General Office on Speeding Up the Development of New Business Forms and New Models of Foreign 
Trade, making it clear that China will improve support policies for CBEC, expand the integrated pilot 
zones, enhance refined service pla tforms such as independent CBEC sites and CBEC software, 
streamline the management of payment and settlement, strengthen the organization and building WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  of the industry and talent training, and promote the development of new forms and new models of 
foreign t rade on a healthy, sustainable, and innovative basis.  
 
According to the Notice on Improving the Supervision over Cross -Border E -Commerce Retail Imports 
(No. 486, 2018, Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the 
Ministry o f Finance) issued by the Ministry of Commerce and other five departments, imported 
commodities in CBEC retail are subject to the List of the Imported Commodities in Cross -Border 
E-Commerce Retail and shall comply with relevant supervision requirements. In 2021, China extends 
the pilot project of CBEC retail imports to all the cities (regions) that are home to pilot free trade 
zones, CBEC pilot zones, integrated bonded zones, demonstration zones for creative promotion of 
import trade, and bonded logistics ce nter (Type B). CBEC retail imports have been assigned with 
tax-free quota. The tax -free limit on single transactions is 5,000 yuan, while the annual trading limit 
is 26,000 yuan. The temporary tariff rate on any imported commodities in CBEC retail is levie d at 0%. 
The import value added tax and consumption tax are temporarily fixed at 70% of the statutory tax. 
Tariffs levied on other CBEC imported commodities are the same as that of the general trade. For 
details, please refer to the Import and Export Tarif f. 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  BRAZIL  
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE Secretariat Report  
 
Page 169 (Para 4.207)  
- On 6 June 2019, the MIIT  issued the Basic Telecommunication Business Operation License to three 
state-owned carriers (China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom) and a state -owned 
broadcasting company (China Broadcasting Network) to approve their operation of "fifth generation  
digital cellular mobile communication services ". As a consequence, the MIIT revised the 
Telecommunication Services Classification Catalogue (2015) to accommodate the new item. The 
2019 revised Catalogue adds "A12-4 Fifth generation digital cellular mobile  communication services " 
to "A12 Cellular mobile communication services " under Category A "Basic telecommunication 
services ". The new item refers to voice, data, multimedia, and other services provided through fifth -
generation (5G) digital cellular mobile communication networks. According to the authorities, by 
end-June 2020, more than 400,000 5G base stations had been built.  
 
Question :  
1. Can China give more information regarding its licensing framework? Can any of the licenses 
mentioned or any other lic enses encourage the development, on the telecom market, of supply of 
the Open -RAN model and of the 5G standalone service architecture? If yes, how so.  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the relevant provisions of the Regulations on Telecommunication  for 
information regarding the licensing framework. The openRAN technology currently receives 
considerable attention of the world although it is still in its infancy. China has been adhering to the 
principle of technology neutrality and keeping a close wat ch on its latest developments.  
 
Page 169 (Paragraphs 4.208 and 4.209)  
- In March 2020, the MIIT  issued the Notice on Promoting the Accelerated Development of 5G. It 
provides guidance for the industry to fully promote 5G network construction, application 
popularization, technological development, and security assurance.  
- In November 2019, the MIIT is sued the Plan for Advancing the 512 Program on 5G Plus 
Industrial Internet, a policy document to facilitate the integrated development of 5G and 
industrial Internet. It aims to promote the use of 5G technologies to upgrade five public service 
platforms by 2022.  
 
Questions :  
2. Could China elaborate on the developments and results of 5G operations in the counrty?  
 
Reply:  Since the commercialization of 5G, Chinese regulatory authorities have guided 
telecommunications companies to actively carry out 5G network construction, promote the co -
construction and sharing of 5G networks, and expand 5G network coverage in urban areas , counties, 
and towns. As of the end of August 2021, China has opened a total of more than 1.03 million 5G 
base stations, and has built and shared more than 500,000 5G base stations, covering all cities, over 
97% of counties, and 40% of towns. The number o f 5G terminal links exceeded 400 million. 
China 's 5G application is active in innovation, which is reflected in a variety of activities such as the 
establishment of a 5G application industry phalanx and the "Bloom Cup " innovative 5G application 
competition . At present, there are more than 10,000 cases of innovative 5G application, and 5G has 
exerted an enabling effect in industry, medical care, education, transportation, etc.  
 
3. Which are the five public service plataforms mentioned as targets for the deve lopment policy in 
place?  
 
Reply:  According to the Plan for Advancing the 512 Program on 5G Plus Industrial Internet, the five 
public service platforms refer to the five service platforms for transforming and promoting the 
internal 5G network of industrial  Internet enterprises by relying on the industrial Internet innovation 
and development program to build a network test environment that meets the needs of industrial 
enterprises to carry out 5G network application R&D and verification, provide small and me dium-
sized enterprises with a "5G+Industrial Internet " intranet construction and transformation template, 
carry out application consulting and R&D training, and improve public service capabilities.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 169 (Para 4.210)  
- On facility sharing, the MIIT cont inues to require basic telecommunications enterprises to carry 
out infrastructure construction in accordance with the requirements of sharing basic 
telecommunications facilities or co -construction. In addition, Internet access service providers 
in China ca n provide Internet access services to users by leasing the network resources from 
basic telecommunications companies and wired access facilities service providers. In June 2020, 
China issued the Implementation Opinions on Supporting the Accelerated Develop ment of 5G 
Networks Through the Co -construction and Sharing of Telecommunication Infrastructure. 
According to the authorities, as at end -June 2020, the sharing rate of newly built towers in 
China stood at 90%, which is equivalent to sharing the constructio n of 780,000 towers and 
saving a total of CNY 140 billion. As at end -2020, China 's telecom operators had opened more 
than 330,000 shared 5G base stations.  
 
Questions :  
4. Are all companies subject to mandatory infrastructure sharing? If not, how does China define 
which companies are subjected to such obligations?  
 
Reply:  At present, the Chinese government does not force all companies to share 
telecommunications infrastr ucture, but only requires basic telecommunications companies to 
achieve joint construction and sharing through friendly consultations on the premise that they have 
the conditions for joint construction and sharing.  
 
5. Infrastructure sharing is critical fo r the deployment of service in certain areas. Given that, can 
China supply aditional information regarding infrastructure and spectrum sharing in their regulatory 
regime? How these measures can promote the deployment of 5G?  
 
Reply:  In terms of telecommuni cations infrastructure, while continuing to promote the co -
construction and sharing of telecommunications infrastructure among basic telecommunications 
companies, the Chinese government actively promotes the sharing of telecommunications 
infrastructure and  infrastructure resources such as transportation, power, and municipal services to 
support the large -scale deployment of 5G. Regarding spectrum sharing, first, the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology issued 5G frequency licenses (limited to ind oor use) for shared use of 
the 3300 -3400MHz frequency band to China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Radio and Television 
in 2019. Second, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is studying and formulating 
relevant radio management policies fo r basic telecom operators to carry out 5G public mobile 
communication network sharing and frequency sharing, and further guide basic telecom operators 
to improve the efficiency and comprehensive benefits of 5G frequency resources.  
 
Page 170 (Para 4.211)  
- In November 2019, in order to further improve the service quality of the telecommunications 
industry, China officially rolled out a mobile number portability programme, which allows mobile 
users to keep their phone numbers when switching to a new mobile pr ovider.  
 
Question :  
6. Are there any plans for expanding number portability to other services, for instance to fixed 
telephony?  
 
Reply:  According to the Measures for Administration of Number Portability Services , cellular mobile 
communication users (excl uding Internet of Things users) of basic telecom operators have been able 
to use number portability services since November 27, 2019. Number portability is currently 
unavailable for other services as the corresponding technology, market, service, etc. are not 
prepared for this. In the later stage, efforts will be made to actively study the feasibility of providing 
number portability for corporate services by comprehensively considering the market, technology, 
service, and other factors.  
 
Page 170 (Para 4.21 2)  
- There were also new developments in the framework of spectrum management. In 2019, the MIIT 
promulgated provisions on the management of the use of the frequencies of enhanced Machine -
Type Communication (eMTC) systems, specifying the usage frequency o f eMTC systems, the 
management requirements of base station terminals, and other content. The Ministry also issued 
Announcement No. 52, 2019, which defines the catalogue, radio frequency specifications, and WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 52 - 
 
  management requirements of micro -power short -range radio transmitting equipment, with a view 
to further standardizing the management of such equipment.  
 
Question :  
7. In the context of 5G, are there coverage obligations related to spectrum auctions in place or 
planned in the auction proceedings or any other means of granting spectrum for those services?  
 
Reply:  Currently, China allocates 5G spectrum by means of admi nistrative license, and is studying 
and formulating relevant plans for implementing 5G frequency license by means of bidding. 
According to the Radio Frequency Utilization Requirements and Verification Administration  issued by 
the Ministry of Industry and I nformation Technology in 2017, 5G and other public mobile 
communications services should meet the following frequency utilization requirements: frequency 
band occupancy is not less than 70%, regional coverage is not less than 60%, and the user load 
rate is  not less than 60%.  
 
Page 172 (Para 4.221)  
- The Measures establish an interagency cybersecurity review body, which consists of members 
from 12 government agencies – the CAC, the NDRC, the MIIT, the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Ministry of National Se curity, MOFCOM, the Ministry of Finance, the PBOC, the SAMR, the National 
Radio and Television Administration, the National Administration of State Secrets Protection, and 
the State Cryptography Administration – and is led by the CAC. The Office of Cyberse curity Review 
is established in the CAC.  
 
Question :  
8. Can China elaborate more on the coordination of its several bodies in the context of cybersecurity 
policies and regulations? What each of the referred Agencies is responsible for in the context of 
cybersecurity, data protection and other security related policies? Please specify which areas they 
are involved in, and if they have a complementary role in that matter.  
 
Reply:  Article 4 of the Measures on Cybersecurity Review stipulates that the Cyberspace 
Administration of China (CAC) shall establish a national network security review mechanism in 
conjunction with relevant departments. The Office of Cybersecurity Review is est ablished in the CAC 
and is responsible for formulating regulations and rules related to cybersecurity review and 
organizing cybersecurity reviews.  
 
QUESTION REGARDING BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
We noted the absence, in both the Secre tariat 's and the Chinese reports, of information on support 
to develop, launch and produce civil aircraft. China has, however, notified two programs that 
explicitly benefit the aeronautical sector by the means of its most recent NFNs (G/SCM/N/372/CHN 
and G /SCM/N/343/CHN).  
 
Question :  
9. We would like to know the Chinese opinion on the role that subsidies play in China 's aircraft 
manufacturing sector, particularly bearing in mind that China is a new entrant to this market. 
Furthermore, we would like to know the Chinese opinion on the adequacy of the current WTO rules 
on subsidies to effectively address the distortions of  the global aeronautical sector.  
 
Reply:  Subsidy policies for the development of the civil aviation industry shall comply with the 
current WTO subsidy rules.  
 
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE Secretariat Report  
Page 18 (Para 1.6)   
• The COVID 19 pandemic has posed an unprecedented shock to China 's economy. Besides 
inflicting human costs, it has had a major impact on output, trade, and employment. At the 
beginning of 2020, economic growth fell to its lowest level in 40 years: between the last quarter 
of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, growth fell by almost 13 percentage points, from 5.8% 
to -6.8%. Apart from financial services and information technology, all sec tors were severely 
hit. Over 100 million workers were directly affected by the pandemic, by being put on unpaid 
leave in retention schemes or reduced -work programmes, exiting the labour market, or 
becoming unemployed. In May 2020, the Government abandoned the announcement of the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 53 - 
 
  annual GDP target for the first time in more than 25 years due to factors that are difficult to 
predict, such as the coronavirus pandemic and uncertainties around trade.  
 
Question:   
1. According to Chinese authorities, what are the ma in factors that best explain the distinctive 
performance of the financial services sector, compared to other sectors of the economy, 
during the pandemic?  
 
Reply:  First, China has always regarded the services of bancassurance institutions and the support 
of the real economy as the starting point and goal.  
Second, we paid attention to preventing and addressing stock risks, increased efforts to dispose of 
non-performing assets through various forms such as liquidation, write -off, and transfer, and 
conducted more stringent investigations on high -risk institutions to address the risks.  
Third, we took forward -looking measures to prevent risks.  
 
Page 20 (Para 1.13)   
• With a view to safeguarding financial market stability and providing liquidity to the banking 
system during the pandemic, the PBOC expanded its relending facilities to provide targeted 
support to manufacturers of medical supplies and daily necessities. Furthermore, the authorities 
tolerated rising levels of non -performing loans in heavily i mpacted regions and sectors, and 
introduced a payment moratorium for most micro, small, and medium -sized enterprises 
(MSMEs) and other eligible firms until end -2021. Furthermore, the PBOC lowered various policy 
rates. Non -interest rate instruments deployed  by the PBOC aimed to provide additional support 
especially to smaller firms. They included expanding relending facilities, reducing targeted 
reserve requirement ratios, increasing bank lending targets, expanding credit support by policy 
banks, subsidizing  local banks ' repayment moratoria, and introducing a zero -interest scheme 
for uncollateralized lending to MSMEs. The various measures led to a rapid increase in bank 
lending and had a significant positive measure on corporate bond issuance.  
 
Questions :  
2. Considering the higher tolerance level of non -performing loans in heavily impacted sectors, 
does the PBOC envision any program to rebalance the risks related to these loans?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government quickly responded to the COVID -19 strikes and imple mented 
targeted policies. Remarkable results in controlling the epidemic and stabilizing the economy have 
been achieved, and the quality of credit assets in the banking industry was basically stable. 
Considering the time lag in the reflection of non -perfor ming loans, the financial authorities support 
and encourage banks to increase provision for losses on non -performing loans as well as write -off 
and disposal of non -performing loans in order to cope with the possible downward pressure of bank 
credit asset q uality under the impact of the COVID -19. 
 
3. In which sectors of the economy did the PBOC apply the policy of higher tolerance of non -
performance loans?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese regulatory rules do not provide different non -performing loan ratios by economic 
sector.  
 
Page 20 (Para 1.18)   
China continued its efforts during the review period to further internationalize the CNY; for example, 
it took measures including bi lateral swap agreements, the pursuit of alternatives to the SWIFT inter -
bank payments system, and investment in credit rating agencies for sovereign debt. According to 
the authorities, China promotes the two -way opening of the capital market, facilitates f oreign 
investors to invest in CNY assets, optimizes policies on cross -border CNY business, promotes trade 
and investment facilitation, and further improves the CNY internationalization infrastructure. About 
70 countries now also use the CNY as reserve curr ency. Yet as at mid -2020, only about 2% of global 
payments were conducted through the CNY. It would appear that regulations on capital movements 
(see below) constitute a major obstacle for the further internationalization of the CNY.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 54 - 
 
  Question :  
4. What are, if any, the foreign partners with which the Chinese authorities are negotiating or 
envisioning future negotiations regarding trade in local currencies?  
 
Reply:  The People 's Bank of China has signed local currency cooperation/settlement agreement s 
with the central banks of 10 countries including Laos and Cambodia, and launched a local currency 
settlement (LCS) cooperation framework with the Central Bank of Indonesia. There is no negotiation 
or plan to start negotiations with the central banks of o ther countries on local currency settlement.  
 
Page 21 (Para 1.19)   
Since 2014, the PBOC has been developing a central bank digital currency, the e -CNY or e -renminbi. 
It is designed to be a legal tender combining digital currency and electronic payment char acteristics, 
thus serving as cash (M0). The e -CNY is currently being tested across several regions, selected 
banks, and electronic payment platforms. It is expected to offer a higher degree of anonymity and 
lower handling charges than those of existing pay ment providers, higher compatibility across 
platforms, and, by broadening the reach of people with limited access to finance, to lead to more 
financial inclusion. The PBOC plans to use the e -CNY for domestic transactions initially.  
 
Questions :  
5. What is th e PBOC 's current assessment of the development and operation of e -CNY?  
 
Reply:  The e -CNY mainly serves as cash (M0), which will coexist with physical CNY for a long time, 
and is subject to centralized management and two -tier operation. The e -CNY issuance right belongs 
to the state. The People 's Bank of China is responsible for e -CNY issuance, cancellation, inter -
institutional interconnection, and wallet ecological management. At the same time, commercial 
banks meeting the capital and technology requirement s will be selected as designated operating 
institutions, which work together with relevant commercial institutions to provide e -CNY exchange 
and circulation services to the public. These institutions currently include commercial banks, telecom 
operators an d Internet companies.  
 
6. What are the main challenges faced by the PBOC during the development process of e -CNY?  
 
Reply:  With the deepening development of e -CNY and financial technology, regulatory rules and 
laws related to legal e -CNY and e -CNY-related business rules and systems need to be improved. In 
addition, the e -CNY acceptance environment needs to be further optimize d and requires the 
engagement of all sectors of society.  
 
7. Has the project of developing a central bank digital currency (e -CNY or e -renminbi) been 
conceived of as an element of currency statecraft to foster the renminbi as an international 
currency?  
 
Reply: Cross -border payment involves many complex issues such as monetary sovereignty, foreign 
exchange management policies, exchange system arrangements, and regulatory compliance 
requirements, and remains to be a tricky problem to be addressed by the interna tional community. 
Currency internationalization is a natural market selection process. The status of international 
currencies is fundamentally determined by economic fundamentals and the depth, efficiency, and 
openness of the currency and financial markets . Digital RMB has the technical conditions for cross -
border use, but it is currently mainly used for domestic retail payment.  
 
In the future, the People 's Bank of China will actively respond to the Group of Twenty (G20) and 
other initiatives to improve cross -border payments, and study the applicability of central bank digital 
currencies in cross -border fields. Based on the domestic pilot results and the needs of the 
international community, the People 's Bank of China will explore cross -border pay ment pilots on the 
premise of fully respecting the monetary sovereignty of both parties and complying with laws and 
regulations, will establish legal digital currency exchange arrangements and regulatory cooperation 
mechanisms with relevant monetary author ities and central banks following the three requirements 
of "lossless ", "compliance " and "interoperability ", and will  adhere to the two -tier operation, risk -
based management requirements and modular design principles to meet the regulatory and 
compliance r equirements of various countries.  
 
The People 's Bank of China will also continue to advance the R&D pilot work in a steady and orderly 
manner; further expand the coverage of pilot test application scenarios in combination with the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 55 - 
 
  development plans and loc al characteristics of the pilot test areas; study and improve relevant 
systems and rules; study and formulate administrative methods related to e -CNY; strengthen the 
protection of personal information of e -CNY; deepen the research and evaluation of the in -depth 
influence of legal digital currency on monetary policy, financial system, and financial stability; and 
actively engage in the international exchange on legal digital currency.  
 
Page 21 (Para 1.23)   
Against the background of dampening of domestic demand and weaker exports, partly resulting 
from trade tensions, the authorities resorted to various stimulus measures during the review period, 
involving taxes, access to credit, and infrastructure investment; however, according to an OECD 
study,  the stimulus may increase corporate sector indebtedness and, more generally, reverse 
progress in the deleveraging of state -owned enterprises (SOEs).  
 
Questions :  
8. What were the main consequences to the Chinese economy from the increased trade 
tensions wit h the US under the Trump administration?  
 
Reply:  Some changes have taken place in China -US relations in the past, which affected the 
economic and trade relations between the two countries. However, it must be noted that China and 
the United States share e xtensive common interests and continue to maintain close economic and 
trade ties. The impact of changes in China -US economic and trade relations on China 's economic 
growth is generally limited. For example, in 2020, while China 's total imports fell by 0.8% , imports 
from the United States achieved a relatively rapid growth of 9.8%; while global cross -border direct 
investment has fallen sharply by approximately 40%, US non -financial direct investment in China 
reached US D 2.3 billion, a decrease of 14.2% over the previous year and China 's non -financial direct 
investment in the US registered US D 6.21 billion, an increase of 56.4 %.  
 
9. As a result of the escalation of trade tensions with the US has it been seen the emergence 
of any different pattern of trade and FD I of China and its major foreign partners?  
 
Reply:  Direct investment by Chinese companies follows commercial and market principles and global 
practice and is negotiated with foreign partners on an equal footing. There 's not really much of a 
difference in the pattern of trade and FDI of China.  
 
Page 22 (Pa ra 1.31)   
Under the One Belt and One Road Initiative, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, 
the Government seeks to connect nearly 140 countries and regions through rail lines, pipelines, 
highways, ports, and other infrastructure. As at March 2021, total expenditure under the BRI 
amounted to USD 640 billion. According an OECD study, infrastructure projects of the BRI may have 
an impact on the debt burden on recipient countries. Nonetheless, the authorities do not agree with 
the conclusion  of the study. The authorities also underline the trade -enhancing and mutually 
beneficiary nature of the projects.  
 
Questions :  
10. As it has been originally conceived of, does the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) contemplate 
the integration of South America un der its wide trade and investment connections?  
 
Reply:  China 's "Belt and Road " Initiative (BRI) aims to continuously strengthen economic 
development cooperation with BRI countries through policy communication, facility connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, finan cial integration, and people -to-people bonds, promote the facilitation and 
liberalization of global trade and investment, and build together with BRI countries a community of 
shared interests, future, and responsibility featuring political mutual trust, ec onomic integration, and 
cultural inclusiveness.  
 
11. If so, what are the main areas of cooperation with South America seen as strategically 
important for the BRI?  
 
Reply:  The BRI  is an economic cooperation initiative, not a geostrategic concept. It always adheres 
to the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, upholds the concept 
of openness, greenness, and integrity, follows international rules a nd national laws, pursues 
environmental protection and sustainability, and is committed to jointly building high -quality, high -
standard projects.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  12. More specifically, does MERCOSUR play any important role under the strategic alliance of 
the BRI with South Am erica?  
 
Reply:  As developing countries, China and MERCOSUR member states go through similar 
development stages, and face similar development challenges and governance dilemmas. In recent 
years, some MERCOSUR member states including Chile, Peru, Ecuador, a nd Uruguay have signed 
the "Belt and Road " cooperation documents with China. It is believed that in the future, the 
MERCOSUR will help promote in -depth cooperation between member states and China in 
infrastructure, logistics and transportation, and economi c and trade under the framework of the 
"Belt and Road Initiative ", and play a significant role in achieving mutual benefit and win -win results 
for the Chinese and Latin American people.  
 
Page 35 (Para 2.29)   
On 15 November 2020, China and 14 other countri es signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) Agreement. The Agreement has provisions on trade in goods; rules of origin; 
customs procedures and trade facilitation; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards, 
technical regulations, a nd conformity assessment procedures; trade remedies; trade in services; 
temporary movement of natural persons; investment; intellectual property; e -commerce; 
competition; small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs); economic and technical cooperation; 
govern ment procurement; institutional provisions; and dispute settlement. It has four market access 
annexes (schedules of tariff commitments, schedules of specific commitments for services, 
schedules of reservations and non -conforming measures for services and i nvestment, and schedules 
of specific commitments on temporary movement of natural persons). In general, tariffs on 90% of 
tariff lines will be eliminated; regarding trade in services, some participating signatories made 
commitments in over 100 sectors/subs ectors. In addition, participating countries adopt a negative 
list approach to make commitments on investment in non -services sectors. The RCEP Agreement 
will take effect 60 days after its ratification by at least six Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
(ASEAN) and three non -ASEAN signatories.  
 
Questions :  
13. What are the main results expected to the Chinese economy from is participation in the RCEP 
Agreement?  
14. Which Chinese economic sectors/products are likely to gain/lose consequent upon its entry 
into t he RCEP Agreement?  
 
Reply to Question13 and 14:  The RCEP Agreement will significantly improve the overall business 
environment in the region, further enhance the trade creation effect, strengthen the division of labor 
and cooperation between the members, propel the expansion and upgrading of the consumer 
market, and promote the in -depth integration of the industry chains, supply chains and value chains 
in the region. After the RCEP Agreement takes effect, more than 90% of the goods trade in the 
region will  eventually achieve zero tariffs, and the regional cumulation rule will greatly lower the 
threshold for tariff preferences. The high -level trade in service and investment opening -up 
commitments made by the members will further unleash the potential of coop eration.  
 
Page 36 (Para 2.33)   
On 15 January 2020, China and the United States signed the China -United States Phase 1 Economic 
and Trade Agreement. It contains provisions related to, inter alia, intellectual property, technology 
transfer, trade in food and agricultural products, and fin ancial services.  
 
Questions :  
15. What are the main results so far from the Phase 1 agreement with the US to the 
Chinese  economy?  
 
Reply:  The China -US economic and trade agreement on the basis of equality and mutual respect is 
beneficial to both countries an d the whole world. Since the agreement came into effect, the two 
sides have communicated smoothly at all levels, jointly and steadily promoted the implementation 
of the agreement, and maintained a good working relationship. In terms of optimizing the busin ess 
environment, China has made positive progress in intellectual property protection, expanding access 
to agricultural products and food, and opening up financial markets in accordance with the needs of 
domestic reform and opening up. In terms of expandin g procurement from the United States, China 
has carried out exclusions for market -based procurement with additional duties to facilitate 
enterprises ' trade. Chinese companies have carried out procurement from the United States in WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  accordance with WTO rules and principles of marketization and commercialization, and 
achieved  good results. In 2020, China 's imports from the United States totaled approximately 
USD 134.9 billion. Since 2021, China 's procurement from the United States has shown rapid growth.  
 
16. Overa ll, is this agreement seen as beneficial or detrimental to the bilateral trade relationship 
with the US both in a short -term and a long -term perspective?  
 
Reply:  After the China -U.S. economic and trade agreement was reached, China and the U.S. settled 
the conflicts and maintained a relatively stable relationship for a certain period of time. Global 
investment, trade, and financial markets continue to recover. International organizations have raised 
their economic growth expectations. Multilateral platforms  such as the Group of Twenty have 
positively evaluated that the agreement has injected positive energy into the stable growth of the 
global economy. After the unexpected COVID -19 outbreak, the political atmosphere and market 
conditions have changed signifi cantly, which brought difficulties and challenges to the 
implementation of the agreement. Despite the challenges, China persisted in promoting reform and 
opening up, steadily promoted the implementation of the agreement, advanced bilateral economic 
and tra de cooperation, stabilized market expectations, enhanced corporate confidence, and 
maintained the relative stability of the China -US economic and trade field. The U.S. has given 
positive comments on the progress of the agreement on many public occasions. T he U.S. business 
community has repeatedly sent letters to the leaders of China and the United States to express their 
affirmation and support for the agreement.The economic and trade teams of both sides maintained 
good exchanges, making the agreement one o f the few communication platforms to maintain China -
US relations. It can be said that the China -US economic and trade agreement is conducive to 
stabilizing China -US economic and trade relations and injecting stability into global economic and 
trade develop ment.  
 
Page 94 (Para 3.188)   
China has been active in international cooperation in the area of competition policy. By mid -2020, 
China signed 53 international anti -monopoly cooperation documents with 32 countries and regions 
and established bilateral and multilateral anti -monopoly coop eration mechanisms. Since its 
establishment in 2018, the SAMR has signed bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on anti -
monopoly cooperation with the competition authorities of the European Union, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, Serbia, Belarus, the Phi lippines, and Morocco. China and the Russian Federation renewed 
their MOU on the Implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation and Exchanges in Anti -monopoly 
and Anti -Unfair Competition (2020 -21). The SAMR extended the MOU on Cooperation with BRICS 
Countr ies in the Field of Competition Laws and Policies. China actively participated in the BRICS 
Competition Conference and furthered cooperation with BRICS countries in competition policy. China 
also carried out cooperation and coordination in many merger and monopoly agreement cases with 
its trade partners such as Canada, the European Union, Germany, India, the United States, the 
Russian Federation, and South Africa. China also participated in the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) act ivities in the area of competition and consumer protection.  
 
Questions :  
17. What are the main goals envisaged by the Chinese authorities under the strategic 
cooperation with the BRICS countries?  
 
Reply:  Over the past more than ten years, the trade and inves tment cooperation among the BRICS 
countries has been continuously deepened, and their economic and trade ties have developed 
rapidly. First, the BRICS countries have seen closer economic and trade ties. In 2020, the combined 
GDP of the BRICS economies acco unted for 23% of the world total, compared with 12% when the 
BRIC was formalized in 2006, and their share in global trade in goods increased from 12% to 18%. 
Second, the BRICS countries have seen productive outcomes of their cooperation. In 2013, President  
Xi Jinping proposed the vision of "integrated market " for the BRICS, pointing the way for cooperation 
and development of developing countries. In 2017, China hosted the Ninth BRICS Leaders ' Summit 
in Xiamen, and the leaders of the five countries witnessed  the signing of the BRICS Action Agenda 
on Economic and Trade Cooperation, ushering in a new era of BRICS economic cooperation and 
trade. At the 12th BRICS Leaders ' Summit in November 2020, the Strategy for BRICS Economic 
Partnership 2025 was adopted, whic h maps out the roadmap for BRICS cooperation in the next 
five years.  
 
18. What are the main economic and financial projects being currently undertaken by means of 
the cooperation with the BRICS countries, within and beyond member countries territories?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Reply:  First, Great Wall Motor Company Limited signed an investment agreement with the Russian 
side in May 2014. The Tula project was started in September 2015, and the factory was put into 
operation in June 2019. The construction of the engine plant was s tarted in April 2021 and is 
expected to be completed in 2022. Second, the Haier Russia Industrial Park project was launched 
by Haier Smart Home in January 2019, with a total capacity of more than three million home 
appliances such as refrigerators, freezer s, washing machines, TVs, water heaters and kitchen 
appliances. Up to date, the refrigerator and washing machine plants have been in operation.  
 
Page 149 (Para 4.101)   
China is the largest automobile market worldwide, both in terms of demand and supply. Ac cording 
to the results of the national survey of industries above a certain scale, the production volume of 
automobiles in 2018 and 2019 was around 27.8 million and 25.7 million, respectively.  
 
Questions :  
19. Has the heavy blow inflicted to the Chinese car i ndustry during the COVID -19 pandemic been 
at least in part the result of a shortage of semiconductors worldwide along its value chain?  
 
Reply:  From January to August this year, China 's automobile production and sales showed a growth 
trend year -on-year, an d the overall development of the automobile industry was sound.  
 
20. If so, how have the Chinese authorities reacted to this seemingly inherent fragility of its 
automotive industry in terms of industrial policy measures?  
 
Reply:  China established a working group for the promotion and application of automotive 
semiconductors, organized a number of work coordination meetings, gave full play to the strength 
of local governments, vehicle companies and chip companies, strengthened sup ply and demand 
matching and work coordination, promoted the improvement of automotive chip supply capabilities, 
and strived to minimize the impact. In the next step, we will continue to play the role of special 
classes, strengthen operation monitoring, ana lysis, and judgment, coordinate and solve related 
problems in a timely manner, and support enterprises to find alternative solutions through the 
enterprise measures implemented by C hina. We will guide enterprises to optimize the layout of the 
supply chain,  improve the supply capacity of automotive chips, and fundamentally improve the 
stability of the supply chain.  
 
Page 153 (Para 4.123)   
The 2014 Guidelines for Promoting the Development of the National Integrated Circuit Industry set 
specific targets to develop China 's IC and semiconductor industry. It identified the goals of raising 
the industry 's revenue to over CNY 350 billion by 2015, and achieving an annual rate of revenue 
growth of over 20% by 2020. Priority tasks include the establishment of the Na tional Leading Group 
for the Development of Integrated Circuit Industry, the initiation of the National Integrated Circuit 
Industry Investment Fund, and the promotion of safe and reliable hardware and software.  
 
Questions :  
21. What are the main fragilities o f the Chinese semiconductor industry, if any, in terms of 
production shortages and technology gaps?  
22. Has China suffered from any significant disruption in the supply chain of semiconductors 
during and in the aftermath of the COVID -19 pandemic?  
23. If so, which policies have been implemented to counter this problem?  
 
Reply to Questions 21 -23: There is a certain technological gap between China 's integrated circuit 
industry and other countries. At the beginning of 2020, the COVID -19 epidemic has had a  certain 
impact on the production of companies in various industries, including the integrated circuit industry. 
The Chinese government has adopted effective anti -epidemic measures to help companies including 
integrated circuit companies resume work and pr oduction.  
 
Page 156 (Para 4.136)   
State -owned banks are among the major players in China 's financial sector. Large banks in the 
system (e.g. the Big Six state -owned commercial banks and the three policy banks) and most other 
financial institutions (e.g. cr edit cooperatives, non -bank financial companies, and insurance 
companies) are either directly state -owned or owned by other SOEs. In a report to the NPC, the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 59 - 
 
  State Council indicated that total assets of state -owned financial institutions at end -2017 was 
CNY 241 trillion, which represented 88% of the total.  
 
Question :  
24. What are, if any, the most significant actions taken by the Chinese authorities to reduce the 
State participation in the financial sector?  
 
Reply:  Financial institutions have always made independent decisions and operated independently 
in the Chinese mark et in accordance with market -oriented and law -based principles. Let 's take the 
six large state -owned commercial banks in China for an example. Although the six banks are 
controlled by the state, they have been listed in either the A -share or the H -share ma rket. Their 
operation and management need to fully perform relevant corporate governance procedures, and 
they should operate in a market -oriented manner in accordance with the principle of commercial 
sustainability, and accept the supervision of shareholde rs and other stakeholders.  
 
In terms of the securities business, the Chinese government respects the market rules, and steadily 
implements the reform of the stock issuance registration system step by step. The 
Chinese  government launched a science and tech nology innovation board at the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and experimented with a registration system for listed companies in June 2019, and kicked 
off the pilot of registration -based IPO system on the ChiNext stock market in June 2020. In the next 
step, base d on the pilots, the registration system will be implemented across the markets after 
further evaluation.  
 
Page 157 (Para 4.143)   
The new structure follows an integrated type of supervisory model. The Financial Stability and 
Development Committee (FSDC), e stablished in November 2017, is a financial regulatory body under 
the auspices of the State Council and headed by a Vice Premier, which is higher ranked than the 
ministry -level heads of the other financial regulators. The FSDC is tasked with, inter alia, 
implementing the decisions and plans of the State Council regarding the financial sector; deliberating 
major reform and development programmes for the financial sector; coordinating financial reform, 
development and regulation, issues concerning monetary po licy and financial regulation, and major 
issues concerning financial regulation; analysing international and domestic financial situations, 
addressing international financial risks, and conducting policy research on systemic risk prevention 
and treatment t o maintain financial stability; and guiding local financial reform, development, and 
supervision of the duty performance of local financial regulatory authorities and governments. During 
the review period, a new supervisory arrangement was adopted, combini ng the oversight structure 
of banking and insurance to form one single regulator, the CBIRC. The CBIRC was established in 
April 2018, as a result of a merger of the CBRC and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC).  
 
Questions :  
25. Can the Chinese authorities confirm the understanding that the FSDC is headed by a higher 
rank authority than the PBOC?  
 
Reply:  The FSDC under the State Council is a deliberation and coordination body of the State Council 
for overall planning and coordina tion of major issues of financial stability, reform and development. 
The FSDC is headed by the Vice Premier of the State Council in charge of financial affairs, and the 
President of the PBOC is the deputy head of this committee. As a member the FSDC, the P BOC 
undertakes the duties of the Office of the FSDC and is responsible for handling the daily affairs of 
the committee.  
 
26. Considering the tasks of the FSDC , how does it interact with the PBOC when dealing with 
financial regulation and monetary policy issues?  
 
Reply:  Since its establishment, the FSDC has actively played a leading role in planning financial 
reform, development and regulation as a whole, coord inating matters related to monetary policy 
and financial regulation, and coordinating and planning major matters of financial regulation, and 
has actively promoted finance 's serving the real economy, prevention of financial risks, the 
deepening of financia l reforms. As the Office and a member of the FSDC, the PBOC timely submits 
the major issues and matters involved in the performance of its duties to the FSDC for research and 
deliberation, and earnestly implement them according to the decisions and arrange ments of the 
FSDC.  
Page 165 (Para 4.185)   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Measures were taken during the review period to promote the internationalization of the CNY – 
among them, the recent reforms of the QFII/RQFII status (as described in Section 4.4.1.3.4.1) to 
further facilitate qual ified overseas investors to invest in China 's capital market. In 2019, the PBOC 
reformed the procedures for foreign Central Banks to have better access to China 's interbank market.  
 
Questions :  
27. Can the Chinese authorities detail the reforms carried out by  the PBOC to allow other 
countries ' Central Banks to have better access to China 's interbank market?  
28. What are, if any, the most recent data regarding the result of these reforms?  
 
Reply to questions 27 -28: In terms of entering the inter -bank bond market, the PBOC has, 
together with relevant departments, simplified the market entry procedures and material s of 
overseas central bank institutions, and reduced the time limit for its handling of each market entry 
procedures to less than 30 days. On this basis, the PBOC has updated the Operational Procedures 
for Overseas Central Bank Institutions to Enter China 's Interbank Inter -bank Market (the 
Procedures) and frequently asked questions (Q&A), and opened a column on its official website to 
publish the Chinese and English versions.  
 
In terms of entering the inter -bank foreign exchange market, there are three ways  for overseas 
central bank institutions to enter China 's foreign exchange market: through the agency of the PBOC, 
through the agency of members of China 's inter -bank foreign exchange market, and directly 
becoming overseas members of China 's inter -bank fore ign exchange market. Overseas central bank 
institutions can independently choose one or more ways to enter China 's inter -bank foreign exchange 
market and carry out foreign exchange spot, forward, swap and option transactions without lines of 
limit. 
 
Page 1 65 (Para 4.188)   
Regarding the necessary infrastructure for CNY internationalization, on 2 May 2018, the CNY Cross -
border Interbank Payment System (Phase II) was established. According to the authorities, it 
improved the settlement mode, extended the syste m's external service hours, lengthened the list of 
direct participants, and further improved the application system design.  
 
Question :  
29. How did the CNY Cross -border Interbank Payment System (Phase II) improve the settlement 
mode and the application system design?  
 
Reply:  The following optimization has been made to the design of the settlement mechanism and 
the application system of the CI PS (Phase II). In terms of operation time, 5x12 hours has been 
extended to 5x24 hours + 4 hours, fully covering the financial markets in all time zones around the 
world and supporting daily settlement. In terms of business functions, first, it supports the  Delivery 
Versus Payment (DVP) system, Payment Versus Payment (PVP) between CNY and foreign currencies, 
centralized central counterparty clearing and other businesses to meet the business needs of 
different financial markets. Second, a hybrid settlement me chanism of Real -time Gross Settlement 
(RTGS) and Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) is adopted to meet the differentiated needs of 
participants for liquidity management. In terms of the message standard, the internationally used 
ISO 20022 is adopted as the mess age standard.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
Page 4 (Para 2.1)   
In 1978, China made its historic decision of reform and opening up. After more than 40 years of 
reform and opening up, China has embarked on a new journey towards fully building a modern 
socialist country. China aims to coordinate the overall great rejuvenation strategy of the Chinese 
nation and the profound changes unseen in the world for a century. China draws up the Outline for 
the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economi c and Social Development and Long -range Objectives through 
the Year 2035, and embarks on a new journey towards the second centenary goal, which marks that 
China has entered into a new development stage. China 's economy has shifted from a stage of high -
speed growth to a stage of high -quality development. The basic national condition that China is still 
in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time has not changed. China 's 
international status as the world 's largest developing country h as not changed.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question:   
1. What are, according to the Chinese authorities, the main differences between the previous 
stage of high -speed growth and the current stage of high -quality development?  
 
Reply:  The original growth model in China that mainly relies on factor investment, ext ernal demand 
driver, investment driver and scale expansion, has been restricted increasingly. There is an urgent 
demand for changing development model, optimizing economic structure and transforming growth 
momentum. The characteristics of high -quality deve lopment phase include: First, the economic 
growth gradually decreases from the original high -speed growth of approximately 9% to the growth 
of approximately 6%; second, the growth model must be changed to pursuing high -quality and high -
efficiency, and cont inuously improving added value and competitiveness of products and market, so 
as to promote structure optimization and quality improvement through balanced development; third, 
the market -oriented reform must be sticked to, the decisive role of market in al locating resource 
shall be fully utilized so as to improve the allocation efficiency of social resources, the overall 
competitiveness of economy, and the sustainability of economic growth.  
 
Page 7 (Para 3.4)   
On 4 November 2020, China set up ten demonstrat ion zones on import promotion, including 
Shanghai Hongqiao Central Business District and Jinpu New Area in Dalian, Liaoning, covering the 
eastern, central, western regions as well as the old industrial base in Northeast China. These zones 
include sea, land  and air ports, reflecting the dynamism and potential of China 's import. The 
demonstration zones are designed to play an important role in four aspects. First, facilitating import 
and tapping import potential through innovation and reduction of institutional costs. Second, 
expanding the import of technical equipment a nd raw materials and promoting the deep integration 
of imports and industries. Third, increasing the supply of domestic high -quality goods, and leading 
and creating domestic demand with high -quality supply. Fourth, focusing on the import distribution 
centres as conditions permit and giving play to the exemplary role of the centres to surrounding 
areas.  
 
Questions :  
1. What are the goods covered in the "demonstration zones on import promotion " program?  
 
Reply:  The two functions of the national demonstration z ones on import promotion and innovation 
are "trade promotion " and "trade innovation ". The essence is to encourage each demonstration zone 
to give full play to its regional and industrial advantages and cultivate high -quality and efficient 
import platforms,  which are not limited to specific goods.  
 
2. What is, if any, the preliminary assessment regarding the performance of these zones in 
import promotion?  
 
Reply:  Since the establishment of the national demonstration zones on import promotion and 
innovation, th e demonstration zones have made full use of the markets and resources both at home 
and abroad in adjusting measures to local conditions, carrying out policy innovation and 
strengthening the efforts on cultivation, and preliminary results have been made in promoting 
imports, serving industries and unblocking both domestic and international circulations.  
 
Page 8 (Para 3.10)   
In August 2020, China issued the Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot Programme of the Innovative 
Development of Trade in Services to promote the transformation, upgrading and high -quality 
development of foreign trade. According to the Plan, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and other 
25 provinces/cities/regions are designated as pilot zones, which will comprehensively explore eight  
pilot tasks within the three -year pilot period. In the key areas of services trade under full competition 
or limited competition, and competitive elements of services trade under natural monopoly, China 
promoted the cancellation or relaxation of restricti ons on services trade, guided by the principles of 
full removal, substantial relaxation and orderly liberalization correspondingly.  
 
Questions :  
3. What are the eight pilot tasks that are being explored in the "Overal Plan for Deepening the 
Pilot Programme o f the Innovative Development of Trade in Services "?  
 
Reply:  The eight pilot tasks put forward in the Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot Programme of 
the Innovative Development of Trade in Services include the pursuit of improving the management WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 62 - 
 
  mechanis m, opening wider to the outside world, enhancing facilitation, innovating development 
modes, improving the promotion system, optimizing the policy system, improving the regulatory 
mode and improving the statistical system from an overall perspective.  
 
4. What are, if applicable, the main aspects of the program that are related to financial 
services?  
 
Reply:  According to the Pilot Programme of the Innovative Development of Trade in Services and 
the Tasks, Specific Measures and Division of Responsibilities for Pilots of the Innovative Development 
of Trade in Services printed issued together with the document, the work related to banking and 
insurance mainly includes implementing the reform of administrative license examination and 
approval in the pilot areas , supporting medical institutions to strengthen cooperation with domestic 
and foreign insurance companies, exploring the participation of commercial insurance in the 
construction of basic medical and elderly care service systems, supporting international c ooperation 
in the development of cross -border commercial medical insurance products, promoting overseas 
talents to practice in China, and innovating intellectual property and financial services, etc.  
 
Page 11 (Para 3.26)   
China continues enhancing liberali zation of trade and investment with its trading partners. In 
October  2019, the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between China and Eurasian 
Economic Union came into effect. In December 2020, the leaders of China and Europe jointly 
announced the c onclusion of negotiations on China -EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. 
Review and translation of the texts are now in process, with a view to signing the Agreement and 
bringing it into effect promptly. In the meantime, China favorably considers joini ng the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and has made 
informal contacts with relevant CPTPP signatories.  
 
Questions :  
 
5. What are the main benefits envisaged by the Chinese authorities from joining the CPTPP?  
6. What are the main expected gains to the Chinese economy in terms of economic 
sectors/products from joining the CPTPP?  
 
Reply to Question 6 -7: China is a staunch advocate of free trade. It has been calling for open, 
transparent and mutually beneficial regional free trade arrangements and is committed to building 
a high -level network of free trade zones. China has applied to join the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which will not only help further deepen reform  and 
push forward high -level opening -up but also inject new vitality into the economic and trade ties 
between China and other members and the regional economic integration process.  
 
Page 15 (Para 4.23)   
China values and supports the e -commerce related work  in the WTO. China has actively participated 
in relevant discussions, submitted concrete proposals, and joined the "Friends of E -Commerce for 
Development ". In January 2019, China, together with other 75 WTO Members, confirmed their 
intention to commence WT O negotiations on trade -related aspects of e -commerce. Since then, China 
has submitted four proposals, pushing the negotiations forward together with other participants. 
China also supports the work related to services domestic regulation within the WTO fr amework. In 
December 2017, 59 Members, including China, announced the initiation of the plurilateral 
negotiation on services domestic regulation. The negotiation has made substantial progress following 
three years of intensive consultations.  
 
Question :  
7. What are the main factors guiding the Chinese proposals on trade -related aspects of e -
commerce?  
 
Reply:  Adhering to the principles of openness, transparency and inclusiveness, China 's e-commerce 
proposal emphasizes on the development dimension with full r espect for the regulatory rights of 
Members, and focuses on cross -border trade in goods enabled by the Internet, as well as on such 
related services as payment and logistics services. China 's proposal puts forward negotiation 
suggestions from the following  aspects: first, clarifying the connotation of e -commerce and the 
application scope of rules; second, establishing a standardized and convenient trading environment WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  for e-commerce; third, creating a safe and credible market environment for e -commerce; four th, 
carrying out pragmatic and inclusive development cooperation.  
 
Page 17 (Para 4.33)   
China contributes constructively to the economic and trade cooperation of the BRICS countries. With 
other members, China actively facilitated the release of the joint c ommuniqués of Meetings of BRICS 
Trade Ministers from 2018 to 2020. The BRICS trade ministers reached consensus on supporting the 
multilateral trading system; opposing unilateralism and protectionism; promoting the Model E -Port 
Network; and making progress in terms of trade and investment facilitation, e -commerce, services 
trade, intellectual property rights, technical specifications and standardization, and MSMEs. These 
documents laid solid foundation for the BRICS leaders to deliver economic and trade outc omes. Since 
the outbreak of the pandemic, the BRICS countries have reached consensus on wide -ranging issues. 
In the field of economic cooperation and trade, the BRICS countries decided to strengthen the 
coordination of combating COVID -19, and jointly safeg uard the stability of the industrial chains and 
supply chains. This sends a strong message to the world that the BRICS countries are resolute in 
jointing hands and rising to the external challenges. The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 
2025 adopted at the 12th BRICS summit maps out the key areas of economic and trade cooperation 
and the way forward for the next five years.  
 
Questions :  
8. What are the main goals envisaged by the Chinese authorities under the strategic 
cooperation with the BRICS countri es?  
9. What are the main economic and financial projects being currently undertaken by means of 
the cooperation with the BRICS countries in their member countries territories?  
 
Reply to Question 9 -10: In 2009, the leaders of the BRICS countries held their first summit in 
Russia. To date, 13 summits and nine informal meetings have been convened. A multi -tiered 
practical cooperation framework led by the leaders ' summit plus the ministerial meetings has taken 
shape, covering a number of fields such as economy and tr ade, finance, science and technology, 
agriculture, culture, education, health, think tanks, and sister cities.  
 
Page 18 (Para 4.23)  
China values and supports the e -commerce related work in the WTO. China has actively participated 
in relevant discussions, submitted concrete proposals, and joined the "Friends of E -Commerce for 
Development ". In January 2019, China, together with other 75 WTO Members, confirmed their 
intention to commence WTO negotiations on trade -related aspects of e -commerce. Since then, Chi na 
has submitted four proposals, pushing the negotiations forward together with other participants. 
China also supports the work related to services domestic regulation within the WTO framework. In 
December 2017, 59 Members, including China, announced the initiation of the plurilateral 
negotiation on services domestic regulation. The negotiation has made substantial progress following 
three years of intensive consultations.  
 
Questions :  
10. What are the main characteristics of the Digital Silk Road and the Gre en Silk Road?  
 
Reply:  Guided by the ecological progress and green development concepts, the Green Silk Road 
aims to embed the principles of resource conservation and environmental protection in every 
dimension and phase of the Belt and Road Initiative to promote greener policy , infrastructure, trade, 
financial and people -to-people connectivity. After eight years of effort, cooperation in ecological 
progress has become an essential part of Belt and Road cooperation, bringing great benefits to the 
people along the Belt and Road. At the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2021, President Xi Jinping called 
for a closer partnership for green development, stressing that we could strengthen cooperation on 
green infrastructure, green energy and green finance, and improve the BRI International Green 
Development Coalition, the Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road Development, and 
other multilateral cooperation platforms to make green a defining feature of Belt and Road 
cooperation. This highlights the direction and key areas of the G reen Silk Road.  
 
11. What is the current state of the Digital Silk Road and the Green Silk Road?  
 
Reply:  First, a closer partnership for green development is in the making. The BRI International 
Green Development Coalition is now composed of more than 150 pa rtners from over 40 countries. 
A series of dialog and exchange events such as policy research conferences and the Belt and Road WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Green Innovation Conference have been held to promote global consensus on green development. 
Second, the green and low -carbon in vestment concept has taken root. In recent years, China 's 
investments in renewable energy project in Belt and Road countries have continued to grow, and a 
batch of clean energy projects have been implemented. Third, support and services for ecological 
conservation and environmental protection have been strengthened. Special meetings and joint 
research on key topics such as climate change and biodiversity conservation have been carried out, 
and a series of research reports including the Green Development Gui delines for Belt and Road 
Projects and the  Research Report on Belt and Road Carbon Market Mechanisms have been released. 
Fourth, the joint capacity building for environmental governance has been continuously enhanced. 
The South -South cooperation on climate  change plan has been implemented, and 40 cooperation 
agreements on climate change have been signed with 35 developing countries to help them improve 
their capacity for climate change response.  
 
12. What are the main features of green finance cooperation in th e Green Silk Road?  
 
Reply:  First, the top -level design has been strengthened. In 2016, China released the Guidelines 
for Establishing the Green Financial System in a bid to encourage and support financial institutions 
to strengthen environmental risk mana gement in Belt and Road projects and other investment 
projects. In 2017, China issued the Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road, which reiterates 
the importance of strengthening environment management in outbound investments and promoting 
the developme nt of the green financial system. Second, the Belt and Road Green Investment 
Principles has been promoted and applied on a wider scale. It was co -initiated by the Green Finance 
Committee of China Society for Finance and Banking and the City of London Corpo ration 's Green 
Finance Initiative, and global financial institutions and enterprises engaging in Belt and Road 
investments can sign up to it voluntarily.  
 
Page 26 (Para 6.1)   
Currently, the global industrial chains and supply chains are hampered, trade an d investment 
activities remain sluggish, and the momentum of global economic recovery is rather unstable. Facing 
the harsh and complicated international situation and the arduous tasks of domestic reform, 
development, and stability, especially under the se vere impact of COVID -19, China will uphold its 
belief in openness, cooperation, and unity for achieving win -win outcome, stay committed to 
expanding all -round opening up and exploring more efficient ways to connect domestic and foreign 
markets, and share p roduction factors and resources. The aim is to turn the market of China into a 
market for the world, a market shared by all, and a market accessible by all and bring more positive 
energy to the international community. China is committed to promoting mutua l opening up 
featuring shared benefits, shared responsibilities, and shared governance and building an open world 
economy.  
 
Questions :  
13. What are the main global/regional industrial chains in terms of economic sectors/products 
in which the Chinese economy takes part?  
 
Reply:  China is a powerhouse in both manufacturing and trade, with its economic sectors deeply 
integrated in global industr y chains and supply chains. Resource products, agricultural products and 
consumer products take a lion 's share in its imports. As an important trading partner of the ASEAN, 
EU, US, Japan and South Korea, China connects the downstream and upstream of the gl obal value 
chains and plays a vital role in aligning supply and demand and in keeping the global industry chains 
and supply chains stable and open. In the future, China will push forward high -level opening -up, 
further improve the quality of economic develo pment, continuously modernize its industry chains 
and supply chains, and share development opportunities with other parts of the world, thus giving 
fresh impetus to the global industry chains and value chains.  
 
14. What is the relative position of the Chinese firms in these global/regional industrial chains 
in terms of backward and forward linkages?  
15. How has this relative position of Chinese firms in global/regional industrial chains in terms 
of backward and forward linkages been evolving over time?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply to 15 -16: In the global industrial chain, China, the United States and Germany are the three 
production centers that deeply participate in the global industrial chain and drive the development 
of the production clu sters in Asia, North America and Europe. Most industries and products in China 
are located near the downstream of the global industrial chain, closer to the final consumer market. 
With forward participation in the global industrial chain increasing steadil y since 2008, China is 
playing the role as a key "hub" in the global industrial chain.  
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  JAPAN  
Report by the Government (WT/TPR/G/415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1.3 Trade facilitation  
 
(Question 1: Paragraph 3.18, page 49)  
In the Regulations on the Registration and Administrative Measures for the Registration of Overseas 
Producers of Imported Foods, the competent authorities of foreign countries are obliged to inspect 
and supervise manu facturing enterprises in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations, and to 
provide guarantees to the Chinese government. In addition, the scope of the regulation covers all 
food products. We would like you to provide us with a scientific basis for the e nactment of this 
management regulation.  
 
Reply: According to the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China and its regulations and 
other laws and administrative regulations, China has revised the previous two rules on the safety 
management of impo rted and exported food and the registration management of 
overseas  production enterprises of imported food. On April 12, 2021, the Measures of the 
People 's Republic  of China for the Administration of Imported and Exported Food Safety (Order 
No. 249 of the General Administration of Customs) and the Provisions of the People 's Republic of 
China on the Administration of the Registration of Overseas Production Enterprises of Imported Food 
(Order No. 248 of the General Administration of Customs) are announced, wh ich will take effect 
on January 1, 2022.  
 
Before the announcement, China issued a circular in accordance with relevant WTO rules, accepted 
the deliberation by WTO members, and adopted reasonable opinions and suggestions, which was in 
line with the relevan t WTO rules. Article 2 of Order No. 248 and Order No. 249 of the General 
Administration of Customs makes clear the scope of application of these two rules. In the near 
future, China will the Measures of the People 's Republic of China for the Administration  of Imported 
and Exported Food Safety (Order No. 249 of the General Administration of Customs) and the 
Provisions of the People 's Republic of China on the Administration of the Registration of Overseas 
Production Enterprises of Imported Food (Order No. 248  of the General Administration of Customs) 
in an appropriate form. Your concerns are welcome. Order No. 248 of the General Administration of 
Customs will not affect the implementation of the bilateral protocol. If the relevant countries 
(regions) and China  have otherwise agreed on the registration method and application materials, 
the contents agreed by both sides shall prevail.  
 
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.5 Export finance, insurance, and guarantees  
 
(Question 2: Paragraph 3.25, page 73)  
According to the information provided by the Chinese authorities, SINOSURE 's export credit 
insurance covered around 20% of total exports in 2018 and 2019. As China is not a member to the 
OECD 's Arrangement on Official ly Supported Export Credits, nor follows the notificaiton requirement 
therein, it is unclear whether such official export credits do not distort the international trade nor 
constitute subsidies prohibited under the WTO SCM Agreement. Japan would like to re quest China 
to provide explanation in this regard, with supporting evidences, if any.  
 
Reply : China 's export credit policies comply with WTO rules and do not constitute export subsidies 
or distort trade. SINOSURE does not provide export credit services.  
 
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core  
4.2.1 Actively participating in reform of the WTO, and opposin g unilateralism and 
protectionism  
 
(Question 3: Paragraph 4.19, page 15)  
Regarding the Law on Countering Foreign Sanctions (enforced from 10 June 2021), Japan would like 
to request China to answer:  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (1) whether foreign companies or individuals who stay in  China are obliged to enforce the 
countermeasures employed by China under Article 11 of the Law;  
(2) whether foreign companies or individuals who do not stay in China are obliged to enforce or 
cooperate in implementing countermeasures under Article 14 of the Law; and  
(3) if the answers to (1) and (2) are yes, what kind of sanction or legal responsibility (if any) may 
be imposed if such foreign companies or individuals fail to comply with Article 11 and/or Article 14, 
respectively.  
 
Reply: China 's formulation of the Anti -foreign Sanctions Law is a defensive measure to deal with 
and counterattack the containment and suppression of China by some of the countries. It is to 
counter, counterattack and oppose so -called "unilateral sanctions " of those fo reign countries against 
China, safeguard China 's sovereignty, security and development interests, and protect the legitimate 
rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organizations.  
 
According to Article 11 of the Anti -foreign Sanctions Law, all organi zations and individuals in China 
shall implement and carry out the counter -measures taken by the related departments of the State 
Council. The Constitution of China stipulates that foreign enterprises, other foreign economic 
organizations, Sino -foreign joi nt ventures and foreigners in China must observe Chinese laws. The 
provisions of Article 11 of the Anti -foreign Sanctions Law are consistent with those of the Constitution 
of China.  
 
If foreign countries take discriminatory restrictive measures against Ch inese citizens and 
organizations and implement the so -called "unilateral sanctions ", no matter in what name or excuse, 
the purpose will be to interfere in China 's internal affairs and seriously undermine the international 
rule of law. It is a manifestation  of bullying and illegal. Therefore, Article 12 of the Anti -foreign 
Sanctions Law stipulates that no organization or individual may implement or assist in the 
implementation of all and any discriminatory restrictive measures taken by any foreign countries 
against Chinese citizens and organizations.  
 
It is stipulated in Article 11 of the Anti -foreign Sanctions Law that, if organizations and individuals 
in China fail to implement the counter -measures taken by the relevant departments of the State 
Council, th e said departments may deal with them correspondingly according to law, and restrict or 
prohibit them from engaging in relevant activities, as well as investigate and affix legal liabilities of 
them according to law. In addition, if any organization or ind ividual implements or assists in the 
implementation of any discriminatory restrictive measures taken by foreign countries against 
Chinese citizens and organizations, concerned Chinese citizens and organizations may then bring a 
lawsuit to the people 's cour t according to law to demand cessation of such infringement or 
discriminatory restriction and compensation for losses, if any.  
 
(Question 4: Paragraph 4.19, page 15)  
Article 4 of the Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra -territorial Application of For eign Legislation 
and Other Measures (enforced on 9 January 2021) oblige Chinese citizens, companies and 
organisations to report to Chinese government if they face prohibition or restriction by foreign 
legislation and other measures from engaging in normal economic, trade and related activities with 
third countries (regions). Japan would like to request China to answer whether such report 
obligations will apply if the domestic transactions in China are prohibited or restricted by foreign 
legislation or not.  
 
Reply: If foreign laws and measures prohibit or restrict the normal economic, trade and related 
activities between Chinese citizens, legal persons or other organizations and third countries 
(regions), then this reporting obligation should also apply to t ransactions within or outside China.  
 
(Question 5: Paragraph 4.19, page 15)   
Please answer whether there is any case where compensation for damages are litigated under 
Article  9 of the Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra -territorial Application of Foreign Legislation 
and Other Measures and/or Article 12 of the Law on Countering Foreign Sanctions. If yes, please 
explain the detail of such cases.  
 
Reply: There are no such ca ses. 
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 6: Paragraph 4.19, page 15)  
Article 2, item (2) of the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (enforced on 19 September 2020) 
provides that a foreign entity will be listed as a unreliable entity, if such foreign entity "suspends 
normal transactions with an enterprise, other organiz ation, or individual of China or applies 
discriminatory measures against an enterprise, other organization, or individual of China, which 
violates normal market transaction principles and causes serious damage to the legitimate rights 
and interests of the enterprise, other organization, or individual of China. " Japan would like to 
request China to answer (i) under what situations "normal transactions " are suspended, and 
(ii) under what situations "normal market transaction principles " are violated.  
 
Reply:  Violating the principles of fairness, integrity and non -discrimination, and abnormally 
interrupting transactions with Chinese citizens, legal persons or other organizations.   
 
4.2.2 Deeply and fully participating in multilateral negotiations and discussions, and 
earnestly fulfilling the obligations as a WTO Member  
 
(Question 7: Paragraph 4.24, page 16)  
Regarding the statement of "China has fully fulfilled its obligations of no tification under all 
WTO agreements ", please answer which of the notified subsidies are relevant to the supports for 
transferring the production capacity from China to foreign countries, which is mentioned in some 
govermnet strategies such as in the 13th F ive-Year Plan. If such subsidies are not included in the 
notifications, please explain the reason.  
 
Reply : The 13th Five -Year Plan is a guiding document that does not involve specific subsidy policies . 
China does not need to make a notification.  
 
4.3 Promoting Fairer and More Equitable Global Economic Governance System  
 
(Question 8: Paragraph 4.34, page 17)  
Although China states that "China has deeply participated in APEC economic and trade cooperation, 
and is committed to building an Asia -Pacific community with a shared future ", the projects proposed 
in APEC including on SOEs have not been achieved for many years. Please explain the reason and 
claim that relevant ministries argue that make China difficult to agree on such projects and what is 
necessary to start working on those.  
 
Reply : China is an important participant, builder, and contributor to the prosperity of the Asia -
Pacific. China has always been committed to creating a more open and inclusive Asia -Pacific 
economy, boosting the well -being of the Asia -Pacific people, taking a clear stand in supporting the 
multilateral trading system and regional economic integration, promoting the establishment of a 
high-level Free  Trade  Area of the Asia-Pacific, and strengthening APEC practical cooperatio n in 
various fields to build an Asia -Pacific Community with a shared future. APEC cooperation should 
adhere to the principle of consensus, which is also the fundamental guarantee for APEC 's steady 
progress in the long run. At present, as the two implementa tion paths of the Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (RCEP and CPTPP) have made positive progress, APEC is developing the implementation 
plan of the cooperation vision for the next 20 years. China is willing to maintain close communication 
and coordinatio n with APEC parties, continue to give play to the important role of APEC in promoting 
economic prosperity and regional economic integration, and promote an early establishment of the 
Free Trade Area of the Asia -Pacific to provide support and guarantee for building an Asia -Pacific 
community with a shared future. China believes that the necessary precondition for carrying out 
relevant works under APEC is that research initiatives should be in an objective and neutral position, 
and do not presuppose any resear ch conclusions.  
 
5 DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD MARKET 
SYSTEM  
5.1 Generating New Demand Through Innovation -Driven Development and High -Quality 
Supply  
5.1.3 Dissolving excess production capacity and improving the quality of supply  
 
(Question 9: Paragraph 5.4, page 21)  
For addressing "zombie enterprises ", please answer what kind of measures are taken by China to 
prevent the flow of funds to zombie enterprises. Is there any system to ensure that debt exemption 
or other sup port which may extend life of zombie enterprises shall not be made? Does China think WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  that the bailout fund described in paragraph 3.208 of the Report by Secretariat does not extend the 
life of zombie enterprises?  
 
Reply: In 2016, the State Council issued the opinions on actively and steadily reducing enterprise 
leverage (GF [2016] No. 54), which prohibited precisely "Zombie Enterprises " from being the object 
of market -oriented debt to equity swap. In 2018, with the consent  of the State Council, the National 
Development and Reform Commission released the Notice on Further Doing a Good Job in the Debt 
Disposal of "Zombie Enterprises " and Enterprises with Excess Capacity Reduced (FGCJ [2018] 
No. 1756), which clearly requires t hat for "Zombie Enterprises " meeting the conditions for 
bankruptcy reorganization, local people 's governments at all levels, relevant state -owned assets 
management departments at all levels and financial regulatory authorities should actively promote 
the reorganization process for them. For "Zombie Enterprises " meeting the conditions for bankruptcy 
liquidation, they should be liquidated timely and effectively, and the government is strictly prohibited 
from maintaining the survival of any "Zombie Enterprises " through financial subsidies.  
 
5.3 Committed to Creating Market -Oriented, Law -Based and Internationalized Business 
Environment  
5.3.2 Further strengthening intellectual property rights protection  
 
(Question 10: Paragraph 5.14, page 23 -24)  
Are social media operators included in the scope of regulations under the E -commerce Law that 
would allow the revocation of licenses of platfor m operators who do not take necessary measures 
against sellers who infringe intellectual property rights?  
If not, how will social media operators be regulated?  
 
Reply: According to the E -commerce Law, "this Law applies to e -commerce activities within the 
territory of the People 's Republic of China. The e -commerce as mentioned in this Law refers to the 
business activities of selling goods or providing services through such information networks as the 
Internet. All the provisions of the laws and a dministrative regulations on the sale of goods or the 
provision of services shall apply. However, this Law shall not apply to the financial products and 
services that use information networks to provide news information, audio and video programs, 
publishin g and cultural products. "  
 
In order to refine and implement the relevant provisions of the E -commerce Law, the State 
Administration of Market Supervision issued on March 15, 2021 the Measures for the Supervision 
and Administration of Online Transactions,  which came into force on May 1, 2021. Article 2 of the 
Measures states that "within the territory of the People 's Republic of China, through the Internet and 
other information networks (hereinafter referred to as the network), these Measures shall apply t o 
the business activities of selling goods or providing services and the supervision and administration 
of market supervision and administration departments. These Measures shall also apply to the 
business activities of selling goods or providing services through information network activities such 
as social networking and live webcasts. "  
 
5.3.3 Implementing the Negative List for Market Access system across the board  
 
(Question 11: Paragraph 5.16, page 24)  
According to the China Promise Table, China has liberalized MA with limited joint ventures for GATS 
mode 3 of education services. Therefore, according to the Opinions on Further Reducing the 
Homework Burden and Out -of-School Learning Burden of Students in Compulsory Education 
(hereinafter referred to as  the "Opinions ") released by the Central Office of the Communist Party of 
China and the State Council on July 24, the following regulation may be a violation of Article 16 of 
GATS, Market Access. Japan would like to request China to answer the following qu estions.  
(1) As stated in "Opinions " 4-13, prohibiting the teaching school curriculum for profit (e.g., cram 
schools and prep schools) could be seen as limiting the number of educational service providers to 
zero, which may effectively be a violation of "Article 16(2)(a) Limitation on the number of service 
providers ". Please explain the China 's view on this point.  
(2) As stated in "Opinions " 4-13, the measure of not allowing new institutions and re -registering 
existing institutions as non -profit organiza tions could be seen as a request for education service 
providers to take a particular form, which may be a violation of "Article 16(2)(e), where services are 
provided by service providers through a statutory entity such as a joint venture, a measure 
restri cting or requiring a specific form for such statutory entity ". Please explain the China 's view on 
this point.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  As stated in "Opinions " 4-13, with regard to measures to prohibit foreign investment in such 
institutions, a total ban on investment, despite the  fact that joint ventures are allowed under mode 
3, may constitute a violation of "Article 16(2)(f) Restriction on the participation of foreign capital ". 
Please explain the China 's view on this point.  
 
Reply to the questions above: The overall goal of the  "double reduction " is divided into two 
aspects. In the school, we would further improve the teaching quality and service level, assign 
homework in a more scientific and reasonable way, and the after -school services will basically meet 
the needs of student s so that students can learn better inside the campus. Out of the school, we 
would comprehensively regulate the training action of off -campus training institutions, basically 
eliminate various chaos in subject -based off -campus training, so as to gradually cool down the heat 
of off-campus training. China is studying the issues raised.  
 
5.3.5 Improving the performance of state -owned assets and state -owned enterprises 
(SOEs) reforms  
 
(Question 12: Paragraph 5.18, page 24)  
Regarding the market -oriented reform of SOEs, please explain what system (if any) exists to ensure 
that SOEs act in a market -oriented way.  
 
Reply: In recent years, China has introduced and implemented the "1+N" policy system for state -
owned enterprise reform, and has achieved a series of significant progress in important areas and 
fields and key links of state -owned enterprise reform. The system includes defining and classifying 
the functions of state -owned enterpris es, improving the state -owned assets supervision system over 
time focusing on capital management, stripping enterprises from their social functions and solving 
problems left over by history, achieving major breakthroughs, fully completing the corporate 
restructuring of central enterprises, carrying out the tenure system of management members and 
contractual management, etc. At present, the three -year action of state -owned enterprise reform is 
being conducted under way. Continuing to promote state -owned ente rprises to establish and 
improve a corporate governance structure that meets the requirements of the market mechanism 
and has multiple checks and balances, implementing the functions and powers of the board of 
directors, deepening the reform of the three s ystems of labor, personnel and distribution, improving 
the market -oriented operation mechanism.  
 
(Question 13: Paragraph 5.18, page 24)  
Understanding the Chinese government absolutely or relatively control the shareholding (voting 
rights) of "mixed ownership " enterprise, Japan would like to request China to answer whether China 
will not plan to make reform of SOEs in a way under which priv ate investors will control the majority 
of shareholding (voting rights)?  
 
Reply: China is now actively developing a kind of mixed ownership economy with cross shareholding 
and mutual integration of state -owned capital, collective capital and non -public ca pital. Mixed -
ownership enterprises mainly include state -owned absolute holding enterprises, state -owned relative 
holding enterprises and shareholding enterprises. Not all mixed -ownership enterprises are absolute 
holding enterprises or relative holding ente rprises. The reform of mixed -ownership gives full play to 
the role of market mechanism, makes decisions on specific plans according to the actual situation 
of enterprises, takes the form of mixed, independent or controlled ownership as appropriate, and is 
implemented in mature enterprises one by one.  
 
(Question 14: Paragraph 5.18, page 24)  
Regarding the statement of "In 2020, China officially launched three -year action plan of SOE reform ", 
Japan would like to request China to explain the contents of the three -year action plan.  
 
Reply: The three -year action plan for reform of state -owned enterprises focuses on the following 
key tasks: First, improve the modern corporate system with Chinese  characteristics and form a 
scientific and effective corporate governance system; second, promote the layout optimization and 
structure adjustment of state -owned capital and improve the allocation efficiency of state -owned 
capital; third, actively yet prud ently promote the reform of mixed ownership and motivate 
enterprises of all types of ownership to learn each other 's good points for common development; 
fourth, stimulate the vitality of state -owned enterprises, perfect market -oriented management 
system an d improve efficiency; fifth, form a state -owned asset supervision system focusing on asset WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  supervision and further improve the systematic, targeted and effective characteristics of state -
owned asset supervision.  
 
Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/415)  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1 Main Features of the Economy  
 
(Question 15: Paragraph 1.2, page 16)  
As population aging accelerates, there is a possibility of tightening or shortage of financial resources 
for social security. What policy will the government adopt to assure adequate financial resources for 
social security?  
 
Reply: Actively coping with ag eing population is concerned with the national development and the 
well-being of the people. The Chinese government will continuously perfect relevant policies and 
vigorously promote the implementation of national strategy for coping with ageing of populat ion. 
First, expand the scale of endowment insurance fund in multiple channels. Push forward the 
investment and operation of basic endowment insurance fund steadily and strive to ensure that the 
basic pension is paid on time and in full amount. Second, deep en the reform of social insurance 
system such as endowment insurance and medical insurance. Establish the mechanism to determine 
the treatment of urban and rural residents on basic endowment insurance and normally adjust the 
basic endowment insurance, and guide and stimulate urban and rural residents to participate in the 
basic endowment insurance program as early as possible and pay as much as possible. Gradually 
improve the level of unified planning for endowment insurance, implement the system that the 
central government regulates the basic endowment insurance fund for enterprise employees, perfect 
the overall planning at the provincial level for endowment insurance, and promote the 
implementation of unified national planning for endowment insurance. Perf ect the funding 
mechanism for basic endowment insurance, promote all -round reform of the payment method for 
medical insurance, and boost the sustainable development of medical insurance system. Third, 
strengthen the management of budgets for social securit y fund. Standardize the budgets and final 
accounts preparation for social security fund, strengthen the submission and disclosure of social 
security fund budget, realize organic connection between budgeting and implementation, and 
effectively improve the u tilization efficiency of fund.  
 
(Question 16: Paragraph 1.3, page 16)   
While China announced eradication of absolute poverty in 2020, relative poverty still exsists. What 
policy will the government adopt to address this latter issue?  
 
Reply: After the ac hievements in poverty alleviation targets, the focus of work in Chinese 
agriculture, rural areas, and farmers will be historically shifted to comprehensive promotion of rural 
revitalization. Next, China will practically consolidate the achievements in pove rty alleviation and 
connect it with rural revitalization in an organic way, so as to make the foundation for poverty 
alleviation more stable and the achievements more sustainable. Enhance monitoring of the 
population who will fall back to poverty easily, a nd identify, interfere in and assist them as early as 
possible. Provide subsequent support for poverty -stricken people who move to other places, promote 
employment in multiple channels, strengthen social management and promote social inclusion. For 
the cou nties which have been lifted out of poverty, help them develop for a period. Set a transition 
period, during which the major assistance policies will remain unchanged for them. Stick to and 
perfect east -west collaboration, partner assistance and social ass istance, and make improvements 
according to the changes in situation and task.  
 
(Question 17: Paragraph 1.5, page 18)   
According to the proposal of the 14th Five -Year Plan (2021 -25) for National Economic and Social 
Development and the Long -Range Objective s Through the Year 2035 issued by Chinese government, 
China will boost its per -capita GDP to that of a moderately developed country. Please clarify the 
definition of "a moderately developed country  
 
Reply: This is based on the United Nations definition of  "moderately developed country ". 
 
(Question 18: Paragraph 1.17, page 20)   
Japan would like China to provide us with the breakdown of China 's foreign currency reserves except 
for US dollar (USD:58%, Other than USD:42% as of 2015).  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 72 - 
 
  Reply: Please refer to the data and statistics webpage of the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange of China. http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/DataandStatistics/index.html . 
 
(Question 19: Paragraph 1.19, page 21)  
Japan appreciates if China could clarify the schedule of introducing Digital RMB. Japan would like to 
request China to answer whether cross -border payments of Digital RMB is designed to used for. If 
yes, please clari fy the schedule of the introduction.  
 
Reply: As for the progress of the development of e -RMB, At present, the top -level design, function 
research and development and system debugging of the research and development experiment on 
e-RMB have been basically c ompleted. Based on the principles of steady, safe, controlled, innovative 
and practical experiment, it has selected some representative areas to conduct pilot projects and 
has issued the White Paper for the Progress of Research and Development of Chinese e -RMB.  
 
As for the cross -border payment of e -RMB, the People 's Bank of China will actively respond to the 
initiative to improve cross -border payment proposed by G20 and study the applicability of central 
bank digital currency in cross -border areas. Accordi ng to the domestic pilot projects and the demand 
of international community, the People 's Bank of China will explore pilot projects for cross -border 
payment based on the premise that it will fully respect the monetary sovereignty of both sides and 
comply w ith laws and regulations, meet the requirements of "no damage ", "compliance " and "inter-
connectivity ", and establish cooperation mechanism for exchange arrangement and regulation of 
legal digital currency, stick to the requirements of double -level operatio n and risk -oriented 
management and the principle of modular design, so as to meet the requirements of different 
countries for regulation and compliance.  
 
(Question 20: Paragraph 1.21, page 21)   
On September 21, the southbound link between China and Hong K ong opened while China plans to 
launch wealth management connect, but there is the upper limit on investment volume. Japan would 
like to ask whether there are any plans to raise or eliminate the limit in the future.   
 
Reply: The total annual quota of Bond Connect "South Connect " is equivalent to RMB 500 billion 
and the daily quota is equivalent to RMB 20 billion. The People 's Bank of China will adjust the total 
annual quota and daily quota of Bond Connect "South Connect " accor ding to the situation of cross -
border capital flow.  
The pilot business of "cross-border money management " adopts quota management mode, and the 
upper limit of south (north) connect is RMB 150 billion of net outflow (inflow). The quota for individual 
investors shall not exceed RMB 1 million. As the pilot projects advance and become mature in the 
future, the People 's Bank of China will adjust the total quota and the quota for individual investors 
at proper time according to the market demand and macro -econom ic situation, and meet the market 
demand as far as possible while effectively prevent risks.  
 
(Question 21: Paragraph 1.45, page 27)   
MOFCOM has not disclosed the position of the amount of the inward foreign direct investment (both 
the total and by countr y). Japan would like China to provide us with both flow and stock data. If not 
possible, Japan would like to know the reason.  
 
Reply: Ministry of Commerce publishes the Statistical Bulletin on Chinese Foreign Investment every 
year, which introduces the si tuation that China absorbs foreign investment in detail, including: the 
amount of foreign investment absorbed in the current year, the accumulated amount of foreign 
investment absorbed and investment of related countries and regions in China. For details p lease 
see http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/.  
 
(Question 22: Paragraph 2.3, page 31)  
Japan would like to know (i) whether the internet courts described in the paragraph handle cases in 
relation to the cross -border trade, and (ii) whether these courts have exclusive jurisdiction or non -
exclusive jurisdiction.  
 
Reply: Internet courts may deal with cross -border cases per the Civil Procedure Law of the People 's 
Republic of China, the Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on Issues Concerning the Hearin g 
of Cases in Internet Courts (Fa Shi [2018] No. 16), the Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on 
Issues Concerning Litigation Jurisdiction in Foreign -related Civil and Commercial Cases 
(Fa Shi [2020] No. 20) and the Notice of the Supreme People 's Court on Clarifying the Jurisdiction WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Criteria for the Level of Foreign -Related Civil and Commercial Cases of the First Instance and Issues 
Concerning Responsible Court Designation (Fa [2017] No. 359).  
 
The nature of the cases accepted and heard by the In ternet Court is the centralized 
jurisdiction designated by the Supreme People 's Court, not exclusive jurisdiction.  
 
(Question 23: Paragraph 2.4, page 31)   
Japan would like to request China to answer whether the disclosure obligations under the 
Government Information Disclosure Regulations (http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2019 -
04/15/content_5382991.htm) apply not only to the central government but also to t he local 
governments or not. （http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2019 -04/15/content_5382991.htm ） 
 
Reply: Applicable to both central and local governments.  
 
(Question 24: Paragraph 2.41, page 37)   
Japan would like to request China to explain what kind of mea sures are taken to prevent the 
government official from forcing foreign investors and foreign enterprises to transfer the technology, 
and what kind of remedies are available for the foreign investors and foreign enterprises which are 
forced to transfer the  technology.  
 
Reply: The Chinese government will earnestly fulfill its commitment to joining WTO and will not take 
technology transfer as the precondition for approving foreign investment projects. In accordance 
with relevant provisions in the Civil Code, the Chinese governmen t and related entities will not 
interfere in technology transfer or permit in any way. In accordance with Foreign Investment Law 
and the regulations on the implementation, our country encourages technical cooperation in foreign 
investment based on the prin ciples of voluntariness and business rules; the conditions for technical 
cooperation shall be determined by all investors through equal consultation based on the principle 
of fairness, and the administrative organ and its staff shall not force investors to  transfer 
technologies by employing administrative means. Besides, China has revised Regulations on the 
Import and Export of Technologies and laws and regulations on intellectual property, takes the 
enhanced protection and equal protection of intellectual property as the orientation, and actively 
creates sound legal environment and market environment for foreign investment.  
 
(Question 25: Paragraph 2.45, page 37)   
Regarding the Catalogue of Industries for the Guidance of Foreign Investment, Japan would lik e 
know which industries China intends to remove from the restricted and prohibited categories and 
add to the encouraged category in the future.  
 
Reply: Presently, the Catalogue of Industries for the Guidance of Foreign Investment does not exist. 
In 2018, China issued a negative list for foreign investment access to specify the foreign investment 
areas which are prohibited and restricted. The list is abstracted from the Catalogue of Industries for 
the Guidance of Foreign Investment. In June 2019, China issu ed the Catalogue of Industries for the 
Promotion of Foreign Investment (2019). For the specified contents, refer to the website: 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019 -06/30/content_5404701.htm  
 
(Question 26: Paragraph 3.55, page 63)   
Japan would like to request C hina to provide with the details regarding the changes introduced by 
the Rules on Questionnaires in Anti -Dumping Investigations in May 2018. Particularly, Japan would 
like to know what content in the questionnaire descriptions and requirements was deleted,  and why 
China deleted it regarding (iii), and how the questionnaire survey procedures and time requirements 
are regarding (iv) in paragraph 3.55 of the Report by the Secretariat.  
 
Reply: As for the deleted contents request ed by Japan, in practice, the re quirements of the 
Questionnaires in Anti -Dumping Investigations have not changed, but some contents are no longer 
outlined in the law. China has corrected and updated the inaccurate parts of the Secretariat  Report , 
and now the statement is more accurate.  
 
Questionnaires in Anti -Dumping Investigations provide for clear and strict questionnaire survey 
procedures and time requirements. For example, Article 13 provides that the answer sheets of the 
questionnaire shall be delivered to the investigating authority  within 37 days from the date of 
issuance of the questionnaire. If the interested parties fail to complete the answer sheet before the 
due date of the answer sheets with justified reasons, they should submit a written application to the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  investigating autho rity for the extension of the submission of the answer sheet 7 days before the 
submission deadline of the answer sheet, and explain the reasons for the extension. The 
investigating authority  shall give a written reply to the extension application of the interested party 
based on the specific circumstances of the interested party 4 days before the submission deadline 
of the answer sheet. If the investigating authority decides to agree to an extension, the extension 
period usually does no t exceed 14 days.  
 
(Question 27: Paragraph 3.1, page 45)   
When returning goods imported by China, the customs duty paid for the import must be declared at 
customs within one year from the date of import clearance, but before such declaration, the 
occurrenc e of a report of quality defects and approval by the Commercial Inspection Bureau is 
required, and this often takes a long period of time, such as several months. In many cases, it has 
been reported that it is difficult to complete the procedures within on e year because this period 
accounts for most of the time required for the procedures. Japan would like to request China to 
explain how China is going to deal with such a system that is difficult to implement in practice by 
improving the system.  
 
Reply: China is currently studying it.  
 
(Question 28: Paragraph 3.43, page 58)   
to provide the following information.  
We recognize the article 65 of the revised Forest Law stipulates about the timber legality.  
Will the legality of imported timber be checked under the article 65?  
 
Reply: Article 65 of the Forest Law stipulates that "Wood processing enterprises shall esta blish a 
storage ledger of raw materials and products. No organizations or individuals shall acquire, process 
or transport woods that are knowingly derived from illegal sources, such as illegal logging or 
deforestation. " This clause requires wood processing  enterprises in China to establish a storage 
ledger for raw materials and products and purchase timber from legal sources. The judicial 
interpretation of specific norms needs to be clarified in the Regulations on the Implementation of 
the Forest Law under revision.  
 
Could you provide the tentative schedule about when the related regulation will take into force? 
Appreciate if China could show when the outline of the related regulation will be made public.  
 
Reply: The revised Forest Law came into effect on July 1, 2020. The corresponding Regulation on 
the Implementation of the Forest Law is still being revised.  
 
Is China preparing new timber legality assurance system to follow the revised law and related 
regulation?  
 
Reply: In order to comply with  the revised laws and relevant regulations, some Chinese research 
institutions are cooperating with international institutions to study compliance with international 
norms, as well as timber legality assurance tools and systems in line with the actual situ ation in 
China. Meanwhile, they are providing wood processing enterprises with technical support to establish 
a storage ledger for raw materials and products and purchase timber from legal sources, and 
promoting the implementation of the forest law.  
 
(Ques tion 29: Paragraph 3.52, page 62)   
Is it possible under the domestic law for the MOFCOM to initiate original investigations, interim 
reviews and sunset reviews on its own initiative?  
 
Reply: Article 18 of the  Regulations  on Anti-dumping stipulates  that un der special circumstances, if 
MOFCOM has not received a written application for anti -dumping investigation, there is still sufficient 
evidence that the dumping and damage exist and there is a causal link between the two, it may 
decide to initiate an invest igation.  
Article 49 of the  Regulations  on Anti-dumping stipulates  that after the anti -dumping duty enters into 
effect, MOFCOM may, with justified reasons, decide to review the necessity of continuing to levy the 
anti-dumping duty.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 30: Paragraph 3.52, page 62)   
Does the MOFCOM consider the public interest in investigations? Please indicate the applicable 
domestic law.  
 
Reply: Article 20 of the Regulations of China on Anti -dumping provides that MOFCOM may obtain 
information from interest ed parties and conduct investigations by means of questionnaires, 
samplings, hearings, and on -site verifications. Article 20 also provides that MOFCOM shall provide 
relevant interested parties with opportunities to state their opinions and arguments. There fore, 
throughout the whole investigation process, the relevant interested parties may express their 
relevant opinions including those of the public interest, to MOFCOM. Article 37 of the Regulations of 
the People 's Republic of China on Anti -dumping further  provides that the levy of anti -dumping duties 
should be in the public interest.  
 
(Question 31: Paragraph 3.54, page 62 -63)  
The lack of required information is also observed in the final determinations. It is necessary to 
disclose essential facts not only  before the final determination is made but also in the final 
determination itself (if not properly disclosed before the final determination). Japan would like to 
request China to explain when and how China will improve this practice.  
 
Reply: MOFCOM  guarantees that all interested parties are informed of the information submitted or 
obtained by all parties and the investigating authority in the process of investigation in a timely 
manner through various forms such as public information rooms, informat ion platforms, and 
hearings. Second, subject to confidentiality requirements, MOFCOM has made timely and 
adequate  disclosure of relevant facts in the announcement of the Preliminary determination, the 
disclosure of  the basic facts on which the preliminary determination is based, the relevant disclosure 
of the on -site verification, and the disclosure of the basic facts before the final determination, so as 
to ensure that all interested parties are timely informed of relevant facts. The basic facts disclosed 
by China include but are not limited to investigation procedures, the collaboration situation of various 
interested parties, products under investigation and products of the same type, as well as data on 
dumping, damage, and the determination of causal lin k, calculation processes, methods, 
conclusions, and other information. Third, at the time of final determination, after considering the 
opinions of all interested parties, MOFCOM shall make further determinations in accordance with the 
laws and regulations  and relevant facts, and the relevant facts and laws and regulations shall be 
published in the final determination announcement.  
 
(Question 32: Paragraph 3.54, page 62 -63)  
WTO cases such as the Appellate Body Report of China – GOES (WT/DS414/AB/) found China failed 
to comply with Article 6.9 of the AD Agreement due to insufficient disclosure of essential facts. 
According to the Japanese exporters/producers, the disclosure of essential facts remains to be 
insufficient, and they cannot know and understand the facts and methodology used by the 
investigating authority for calculation of dumping margin. Japan would like to request China to 
explain when and how China will improve this practice.  
 
Reply: In addition to the above reply of Chin a to question 31, first, for exporters/producers who 
have separately determined the dumping margins, MOFCOM has separately disclosed to them the 
process of calculating the dumping margin and basic facts involving confidential information 
two times, respect ively after the initial determination and before the final determination. The 
disclosure contents include the data and sources of the calculation of dumping margin, descriptions 
in text of the identification method and basis of dumping margin, as well as t he calculation table of 
dumping margin in the form of electronic data. The calculation table includes relevant data (usually 
data provided by exporters/producers, sometimes including third -party data (BIA)), calculation 
formulas, calculation processes and conclusions, and other information, and calculations that the 
exporters/producers concerned can completely repeat or check, so as to verify the dumping margin. 
Second, after the preliminary determination and before the final determination, the 
exporters/pr oducers concerned have sufficient time and opportunities to communicate with the 
investigating authority or submit comments to them on the calculation and determination of their 
dumping margins. MOFCOM fully guarantees the understanding of basic facts by a ll interested 
parties.  
 
(Question 33: Paragraph 3.54, page 62 -63)  
Japanese producers/exporters had applied interim reviews three (3) times for chloroprene rubber 
(imposed since 10.05.2005), and one time for M -Dihydroxybenzene or Resorcinol (imposed WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  since 23.03.2013), all of which were rejected without detail explanation of such rejections. Japan 
would like to request China to provide with:  
(1) the information on, since 2018, how many applications of interim reviews have been filed by 
foreign producers/exp orters and how many such applications have been approved or not;  
(2) same information on the applications by domestic industry; and  
(3) detail standards for the requirement of "necessity of review ".  
 
Reply: The currently approved applications for interi m review have been fully reviewed by China 's 
investigating authority, and have been initiated after they are determined to meet the filing 
conditions.  
(2) As the same above.  
(3) According to Article 6 of Rules on Interim Review of Dumping and Dumping Margi ns (Order No.  4 
of the Ministry of Commerce in 2018), exporters and producers who apply for the interim review of 
dumping margin shall submit the following materials of evidence: ( I) The name, address and other 
relevant information of the applicant; ( II) Data on the domestic sales of the applicant within 
12 months before the application; ( III) Data on the applicant 's exports to China within 12 months 
before the application; ( IV) The various adjustments necessary to calculate the dumping margin and 
the prel iminary calculation results of the dumping margin; ( V) Reasons for why major changes in 
normal values, export prices, and dumping margins will continue; ( VI) Other contents that the 
applicant thinks needs to be explained. In the chloroprene rubber case, Ja panese enterprises failed 
to meet the above -mentioned evidence requirements in several interim review applications, so the 
investigating authority did not initiate the investigation.  
 
(Question 34: Paragraph 3.60, page 64)   
The term of China 's longest -standing anti -dumping measures on chloroprene rubber, which has been 
extended twice, will expire in 2022 without third extension via sunset review. Japan would like to 
ask China to answer:  
(1) whether China will set certain limitation on number of extension(s ) of anti -dumping measures 
by sunset review(s) or not; and  
(2) whether the length of anti -dumping measure from first imposition will be considered in sunset 
review (if initiated).  
 
Reply: (I) There are no such limitations on number.  
(II) In the sunset review investigation, China will strictly analyze the factors such as the export 
situation of the producers and exporters of the countries (regions) involved and the production and 
operation situation of domestic industries during the implementation  of the anti -dumping measures, 
assess whether the termination of the anti -dumping measures may lead to the continuation or 
recurrence of dumping and damage, and finally make a decision on whether to maintain the 
measures.  
 
(Question 35: Paragraph 3.79, pag e 69)   
Please answer whether the concept of "national security " has the same meaning among the different 
laws and regulations which refer to such concept. For example, Does the "national security " in 
Article  1 of the Export Control Law, the "national secur ity" in Article 1 of the Cybersecurity Law, and 
the "national security " in Article 1 of the Date Security Law have the same meaning?  
Please also explain what kind of securities are included in the concept of such "national security ".  
 
Reply: The three terms of "national security " mentioned in the Export Control Law, the Cybersecurity 
Law and the Data Security Law have the same meaning.  
 
(Question 36: Paragraph 3.79, page 69)   
Please answer whether the concept of "national security " as defined  in various laws and regulations 
includes the concept of "holistic approach to national security " which had been raised in the National 
Security Commission of CPC Central Committee in 2014 or not.  
 
Reply: To implement the overall concept of national secur ity, the 15th Session of the 12th NPC 
Standing Committee adopted the State Security Law of the People 's Republic of China on 
July 1, 2015, which clearly defines the concept of "national security ". Article 2 of the State Security 
Law states that "State security refers to the state power, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, 
the people 's well -being, sustainable economic and social development and other major interests of 
the state that are relatively free from danger and from internal and external threats, as well as the 
ability to guarantee sustainable security situation ".  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 37: Paragraph 3.79, page 69)   
If the concept of "national security " includes various type of safeties broadl y, would the legitimate 
business activities be prevented under the name of "national security "? For example, Japan concerns 
the possibility that China sets the scope of the controlled items under the Export Control Law too 
broadly, considering that the obj ectives of the Law include protection of "national security " and that 
export control operations stick to "holistic approach to national security ". In addition, the 
Cybersecurity Law and the Data Security Law stipulate that a security review should be condu cted 
if there is a risk of affecting national security. If the concept of "national security " is construed 
broadly, the scope of the security review will also become broader, which may lead to arbitrary 
review and operation. Such situation may violate nati onal treatment obligations stipulated in 
Article  17 of GATS. Please answer how China evaluate this risk.  
 
Reply: China 's Export Control Law is not intended to impose general restrictions on legitimate 
commercial activities, but to implement necessary management on foreign trade in the limited, 
sensitive and specific items. It provides a necessary legal guarantee to ensure the security of foreign 
trade activities, beneficial to China better fulfilling its international obligations and serving the 
interests of all parties in the world. China will continue to open wider to the outside world, firmly 
uphold the multilateral trad ing system based on WTO rules, and promote the construction of the 
open type world economic system.  
 
(Question 38: Paragraph 3.79, page 69)   
Japan would like to request China to answer when "Rare-Earth Management Regulation ", the draft 
of which was publis hed for public comment on 15 January 2021 
(https://www.miit.gov.cn/jgsj/zfs/gzdt/art/2021/art_0994492127994695baf1139a0d80dfc9.html ), 
will be enacted.  
 
Reply: The management regulations are still in the process of formulation at present.  
 
(Question 39: Paragraph 3.79, page 69)   
Regarding the "Rare-Earth Management Regulation " which was called for public comment in 
January  2021, Japan would like to have detailed explanation about the relationship between the 
legislative purpose on Article 1  and the actual enforcement of ensuring traceability of rare -earth 
products, or concisely , the reason why China regards it essential to ensure traceability for fulfilling 
such legislative purpose.  
 
Reply: The purposes of enacting the "Rare Earth Management Regulations " are first, to effectively 
safeguard national interests and industrial safe ty; second, to regulate the order of production and 
operation of rare earths according to law; and third, to improve the management system of rare 
earths. Traceability is of great significance to achieving the above purposes.  
 
Japan would also like to requ est the official explanation that, with regard to export of rare earth, the 
Export Control Law and related regulations will be implemented in consistent with the WTO rules 
such as GATT Article 11, including that domestic demand and foreign demand shall be treated 
without discrimination.  
 
Reply: China will formulate the Rare Earth Management Regulations in a manner consistent with 
the rules of the WTO.   
 
"Rare-Earth Management Regulation " Article 1 (Provisional Translation)  
This regulation enacts in order to standardize the management of the rare earth industry, guarantee 
the rational development and utilization of rare earth resources, promote the sustainable and sound 
development of the  rare earth industry, and protect the ecological environment and resource 
security.  
 
(Question 40: Paragraph 3.79, page 69)   
Section 3, Article (12) of the Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Establishment 
of a Sound Economic System with Green, Low -carbon and Circular Development 
(http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021 -02/22/content_5588274.htm ) refers to strict control on 
exports of highly polluti ve highly energy consumptive products. Japan would like to request China 
to answer whether any list or standard of such highly pollutive highly energy consumptive products 
will be prepared or not. If yes, Japan appreciates if China could clarify the schedu le of establishing 
such list or standard and whether the opportunities of public comments would be available.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: In September 2020, at the general debate of the75th Session of the UN General Assembly, 
China solemnly announced its goal of peak carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neutrality. This 
means not only a solemn commitment China has made to the world, but also an intrinsic requirement 
for China to achieve susta inable development and high -quality development. We will continue to 
develop trade in green products and build a green trading system industriously.  
 
(Question 41: Paragraph 3.90, page 71)   
Article 2 of the Export Control Law provides that the provision o f controlled items to "foreign " 
organisations and individuals (so called "deemed export ") is subject to the prohibition or restriction 
under this Law. Japan would like to request China to answer:  
(1) whether the provision of the controlled items to foreig n invested enterprises, which are legally 
speaking Chinese companies, will be subject to the prohibition or restriction under this Law or not.  
(2) whether the provision of the controlled items to Chinese invested enterprises which involve 
foreign individu als as their management members will be subject to the prohibition or restriction 
under this Law or not.  
(3) whether joint technical research or development project between Chinese companies or citizens 
and foreign companies or citizens will be subject to  the prohibition or restriction under this Law or 
not.  
(4) whether provision or sharing of technical information with foreign individuals employed by 
domestic enterprises will be subject to the prohibition or restriction under this Law or not.  
(5) whethe r provisions or sharing from Chinese enterprises or individuals to foreign enterprises or 
individuals which are performed outside China will be subject to the prohibition or restriction under 
this Law or not.  
(6) Japan is concerned that (i) to the extent the Law applies to transactions occurred outside China, 
such application may be regarded as excessive extraterritorial application and thus impermissible 
under the international law, and that (ii) lack of clarity in the scope of the application of the Law 
harms the predictability for the operation of foreign businesses. The paragraph 3.92 states that 
China is in the process of formulating supporting regulations and shall release further regulations at 
a later stage. Will China clarify under such regulations  the scope of "deemed export " and avoid 
excessive extra -territorial application of the Law?  
(7) Article 2 (c) 2 of the protocol on accession of China, China "shall provide a reasonable period for 
comment to the appropriate authorities before such measures  are implemented. " Please answer 
whether China will, in advance of enacting the above -mentioned further regulations, conduct a public 
comment before enactment of such regulations?  
 
Reply: At present, China is actively promoting the legislation of supporti ng laws and regulations for 
the Export Control Law, and will promulgate them in due course to further refine and implement the 
relevant systems established in the Export Control Law, so as to provide clearer and more specific 
guidance for all parties, incl uding foreign enterprises, to implement and abide by the Export Control 
Law. All the related members are welcome to continue to concern China 's legislative work, keep in 
communication with The Chinese side and put forward their comments and suggestions dur ing the 
public consultation period for laws and regulations.  
 
(Question 42: Paragraph 3.92, page 71)   
Japan concerns the possibility that China sets the scope of the controlled items under the Export 
Control Law too broadly, considering that the objectives of the Law include protection of "national 
interests ". If the scope of controlled items exceeds the o ne under international export control 
regimes, the measure may be an export restriction which is inconsistent with GATT Article 11.1.  
In this regard, Japan would like to requests China to answer following questions:  
(1) Article 4 provides that the contro l list will be prepared. Is Japan 's understanding correct that the 
controlled items under Article 2 (i.e., "dual-use items, military items, nuclear items and other goods, 
technologies, services and items relating to the maintenance of national security and  national 
interests, and performance of antiproliferation and other international obligations ") are to be 
provided by the control list under Article 4?  
(2) Para 3.92 of the Secretariat Report states that "Specific export control lists were also released. " 
What are the existing control list that were already released other than the list of dual -use items 
and of items subject to administration of export/import license 
(http://ww w.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/202012/20201203027833.shtml ) published on 
31 December 2021? What would be the prospect and schedule of establishing or revising control 
lists in future? Please also answer whether any public comment will be procured for them,  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: The Export control Law has taken effect formally. Before the promulgation of the new law, 
the contents that are not in conflict with the law can continue to be enforced and the existing control 
list will continue to be effective. Enterprise mangers can consult the relevant laws and regulations 
on the official website of the Ministry of Commerce. After the promulgation of the Export Control 
Law, the Ministry of Commerce revised and issued the Guiding Opinions of the Ministry of Commerce 
on The Establi shment of Internal Compliance Mechanism for Export Control over Exporters of Dual -
Use Items. At the same time, it issued the Internal Compliance Guide for Export Control of Dual -Use 
Items to provide compliance reference and guidance for exporters. Reply: T he Export Control Law 
stipulates that exporters have the obligation to provide end -user and end -use certification 
documents, which is consistent with the general international practice. In order to better enforce the 
law and improve the operability, the Ch inese government has now expedited its advances in 
formulation and amendment of the supporting complementary laws and regulations. The related 
regulations will be detailed further.  
 
According to the Export Control Law, the Chinese government will continue  to deepen multilateral 
and bilateral cooperation and exchanges in the field of export control, participate in the formulation 
of international rules, and make positive contributions to preventing the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and safegu arding world peace and security together with other countries.  
 
(Question 43: Paragraph 3.91, 3.94, page 71)   
The Export Control Law requires exporters to provide documentation proving the intended end -use 
and end -user of controlled goods, including services, and to apply for an export license, but if such 
regulations effectively place foreign businesses at a competitive disadvantage compared to domestic 
businesses in China, they may violate the national treatment obligations of Article 17 o f the GATS. 
We would like to know the Chinese government 's position on this point.  
 
Reply: The Export Control Law stipulates that exporters have the obligation to provide end -user and 
end-use certification documents, which is consistent with the general international practice.  
 
(Question 44: Paragraph 3.92, page 71)   
Article 2.2 of the Export C ontrol Law defines the "controlled items " to include technologies and data 
such as technical materials on the products. On the other hand, the important data will be protected 
under the Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law. Japan would like to request C hina to explain 
the relationship between technologies and data that are subject to the Export Control Law and 
important data under the Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law.  
 
Reply: According to Paragraph 2, Article 2 of Export Control Law of the People 's Republic of China, 
"controlled items " include the technical materials and other data relating to the items. The 
"data"therein  is determined in accordance with the export control list established by the Ministry of 
Commerce and other departments in accordance with the Export Control Law.  
 
(Question 45: Paragraph 3.92, page 71)   
The Export Control Law and the list of import/export  restrictions on Chinese commercial crypto have 
been published. However, it is quite difficult to take actions in accordance with these new rules in 
practice because they have been enforced in an extremely short period of time from the date of their 
promul gation, and because their details have been unclear (in particular, the relevant implementing 
regulations tend to be absent at the time of promulgation). Japan would like to request China to 
explain the schedule for the promulgation and enforcement of the relevant laws and regulations in 
future, and whether China plans to introduce improvements, such as the establishment of a grace 
period.  
 
Reply: At present, China is actively promoting the legislation of supporting laws and regulations for 
the Export Cont rol Law, and will promulgate them in due course to further refine and implement the 
relevant systems established in the Export Control Law, so as to provide clearer and more specific 
guidance for all parties, including foreign enterprises, to implement and  abide by the Export Control 
Law. All the members are welcome to continue to concern China 's legislative work, keep in 
communication with The Chinese side and put forward their comments and suggestions during the 
public consultation period for laws and reg ulations.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 46: Paragraph 3.92, page 71)   
Japan would like to request China to explain the relationship between the restriction list under 
Article  18 of the Export Control Law and the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (enforced on 
19 Septe mber 2020).  
 
Reply: The restriction list under Article 18 of the Export Control Law and the Unreliable Entity List 
are made from different legal systems.  
 
Aiming at the importers and end users who "have violated the requirements for end users or end 
use management " or "may e ndanger national security and interests " or "have used the Controlled 
Items for terrorist purposes ", the control list system establishes the restriction list and take 
necessary measures to prohibit and restrict the transaction of the Controlled Items, and order to 
suspend the export of the Controlled Items.  
 
In order to safeguard the national sovereignty, security and development interests, maintain a fair 
and free international economic and trade order, and protect the lawful rights and interests of 
Chine se enterprises, other organizations and individuals, China has established the Unreliable Entity 
List. The Unreliable Entity List aims at those foreign entities that violate the principles of normal 
market transactions, interrupt normal transactions with C hinese enterprises, take discriminatory 
measures and seriously harm the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises in 
international economic and trade activities, or harm China 's national sovereignty, security and 
development interests. Those a bove-mentioned foreign entities shall be listed into The Unreliable 
Entity List and the coping measures against them will be taken.  
 
(Question 47: Paragraph 3.92, page 71)   
Japan would like to request China to explain the relationship between the technolo gies which are 
subject to the restrictions under the Export Control Law and the list of technologies which are 
prohibited/restricted to be exported under the Foreign Trade Law.  
 
Reply: In accordance with the provisions of Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China and 
Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on Administration of Import and Export Technologies, 
the Chinese Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export is formulated, adjusted 
and issued by the Ministry of Commerc e jointly with the departments concerned under the 
State  Council. If any of them are civil -military dual -use technologies, they shall be subject to export 
control.  
The Chinese Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export is aimed at regulating 
management over technological exports, promoting technological advances and foreign economic 
and technological cooperation, and maintaining national economic se curity. Article Sixteen of the 
Foreign Trade Law specifies the concrete situations of the technological import and export restricted 
or prohibited.  
 
(Question 48: Paragraph 3.94, page 71)   
Japan concerns the possibility of excessive request of disclosure of technical information in the 
process of examining approval/rejection of application and end -users and usage under the Export 
Control Law, which could be inconsistent with Article 11.1 of GATT. Please explain whether any 
regulations or measures are expected to be established to prevent such excessive request of 
disclosure of technical information.  
 
Reply: The Chinese government will make a decision to license or not to license an export ap plication 
in accordance with the provisions of the Export Control Law, taking into account relevant factors. 
During the review process, the Chinese government will protect the commercial secrets of 
enterprises and safeguard their legitimate rights and inte rests in accordance with the law. To ensure 
the effective implementation of the systems established by the Export Control Law, the 
Chinese  government is actively promoting the legislation of other export -control -related regulations 
and will further refine the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law.  
 
(Question 49: Paragraph 3.95, page 72)   
Article 44 of the Export Control Law provides that any organization or individual outside of the 
territory of China that violates the provisions of this Law in rela tion to administration of export 
control, endangers the national security and national interests of China, and hinders the performance 
of non -proliferation and other international obligations, shall be subject to investigation and legal WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  liability in accord ance with the laws. Also, Article 45 of the Law provides for that transit, 
transshipment and through shipment, re -export of any controlled items shall be subject to this Law.  
Since Japan is concerned that these provisions assume extra -territorial applicat ion, Japan would like 
to request China to answer:  
(1) under what kind of situations companies or individuals outside the territory of China are subject 
to the application of the Export Control Law;  
(2) what kind of legal liability will be imposed on fore ign companies or individuals in accordance with 
this Articles 44 and 45;  
(3) whether any transit or re -export of a controlled item will be restricted or prohibited under this 
Law, even when such item is totally produced outside China; and  
(4) whether Chi na will clarify the scope of Articles 44 and 45 through the supporting regulations and 
avoid excessive extra -territorial application of the Law.  
(5) Article 2 (c) 2 of the protocol on accession of China, China "shall provide a reasonable period for 
comment to the appropriate authorities before such measures are implemented. " Please answer 
whether China will, in advance of enacting the above -mentioned further regulations, conduct a public 
comment before enactment of such regulations?  
 
Reply: At prese nt, China is actively promoting the legislation of supporting laws and regulations for 
the Export Control Law, and will promulgate them in due course to further refine and implement the 
relevant systems established in the Export Control Law, so as to provi de clearer and more specific 
guidance for all parties to implement and abide by the Export Control Law. All the related parties 
are welcome to continue to concern China 's legislative work, keep in communication with The 
Chinese side and put forward their c omments and suggestions during the public consultation period 
for laws and regulations.   
 
(Question 50: Paragraph 3.95, page 72)   
Article 48 of the Export Control Law provides for reciprocal measures against the country or region 
which abuses export contro l measures to endanger national security and national interests of China. 
Considering that export restrictions as retaliation could be inconsistent with Article 11.1 of GATT, 
Japan requests China to answer how China will operate this provision, and whether  China has a plan 
to abolish this provision or not.  
 
Reply: In order to better safeguard the national security, the Chinese government has set up parity 
provisions in the Export Control Law targeting abuse of export control measures by foreign countries, 
which conforms to the basic norms governing international relations, WTO rules and international 
recognized practice.  
China 's promulgation of the Export Control Law is not intended to impose general restrictions on the 
general trade between Chinese and fo reign enterprises, still less to restrain and suppress foreign 
enterprises through export control. As is known to all, China has always been firmly opposed to the 
abuse of export control measures under the pretext of national security and the obstruction o f normal 
international economic and trade exchanges and scientific and technological cooperation through the 
abuse of export control. In implementing the Export Control Law in the future, China will continue 
to learn from the beneficial experience and prac tices of WTO members in export control, intensify 
international cooperation and exchanges, and continue to open wider to the outside world.  
 
(Question 51: Paragraph 3.97 -102, page 72)   
Japan recognizes the refund rates of VAT at exports has been adjusted frequently, and several times 
in one year. Please explain how China assesses and decides such refund rates.  
Please also explain the standards on amendment of the refund rate and measure to ensure 
transparency and foreseeability, because an amendme nt of the refund rate may cause significant 
impact on global market price.  
 
Reply: After the issuance by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the State Taxation Administration 
of the Announcement on Increasing the Export Tax Refund Rate of Some Products in 2 020, the VAT 
rebate rate of all products, except for the high -pollution, high -energy consuming, and 
resource -based products, became equal to the applied rate.  
 
(Question 52: Paragraph 3.108 -114, page 73 -75)  
On Sep 21st, China announced that it will not build new coal -fired power projects abroad.  
Japan would like to ask related questions below.  
(1) Is it correct to understand that this new policy applies to the project that both public and private 
financial institutions?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (2) Will public finance inst itutions (e.g. China Eximbank, Sinosure etc.) end new supports for those 
projects in line with this policy? If yes, please explain in detail when and to what extent (Export 
Buyer 's Credit Insurance? Comprehensive Cover Insurance for export of parts for coa l-fired power 
plants? )these institutions end support?  
 
Reply: China has always attached great importance to green development and actively supported 
the related financial institutions in providing financing support for the global green and low-carbon 
development. It is learned that the China Development Bank and the Export -Import Bank of China 
(EIBC) have stopped providing new financing for coal -fired power station projects, and have properly 
handled relevant matters with all concerned parti es legally with good compliance in accordance with 
relevant international rules and practices. China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation will strictly 
implement relevant policies and properly deal with relevant matters after the specific policies of 
relevant competent authorities are clear and explicit.  
 
Reply: The Export -Import Bank of China has always attached importance to green and sustainable 
development  and has stopped providing financing for coal -fired power plant projects. In the 
meantime, it is offering financing support for green and low -carbon development in the countries 
where the projects are based.  
 
Does this mean that the contract can be withdrawn before the start of construction even if the 
project has already been concluded?  
 
Reply: The Export -Import Bank of China will, strictly pursuant to the international rules and with 
the premise of abiding by the law and compliance, handle the ensuing issues in a proper way with 
the parties concerned in the project . 
 
(Question 53: Paragraph 3.110, page 73)   
According to China, all projects by policy financial institutions,including the China Eximbank, operate 
according to market principles, and banks do not attach any additional conditions to their loans. 
Japan would like to request China to answer what kind of system or measure exists for ensuring 
such situation.  
 
Reply: in recent years, China 's financial institutions targeting the policy and development have 
made great efforts to formulate market -oriented operation and restraint mechanisms. From the debt 
side, China has raised funds through bond issuance in the financial market, implemented cost -benefit 
accounting management, and constantly enhanced the capabilities of risk prevention and dissolving, 
and consolidated the sustainab le financial foundation. From the asset side, we select the business 
objects in a market -oriented manner, and make decisions independently, bear risks, and undertake 
profits and losses by ourselves. At the same time, China 's financial regulatory and superv ising 
authorities have supervised the policy and development financial institutions based on capital 
adequacy ratio, provision coverage ratio, non -performing loan ratio and liquidity ratio to ensure their 
healthy and sustainable development.  
The Export -Import Bank of China conducts fund -raising (loan principal) at the capital market under 
the market principle, and implements appraisals, pre -loan investigations, loan release and recovery, 
and post -loan management by referring to commercialized conditions. E xcept for the norms in the 
banking industry , the Export -Import Bank of China does not attach any other conditions to the loans.  
 
(Question 54: Paragraph 3.120, page 76)   
Regarding the sentences of "the total amount of expenditure or revenue forgone was us ually not 
provided; according to the authorities, this is due to the lack of statistics on tax expenditures. ", 
Japan would like to request China to answer why such tax expenditure, which normally should be 
recorded and monitored, lacks the statics. How doe s China monitor whether the provided subsidies 
are used for appropriate purposes or not.  
 
Reply: China currently has no statistics on tax expenditures.  
 
(Question 55: Paragraph 3.120, page 76)   
Japan recognizes the Administrative Measures for the Manageme nt of Central Budgetary Investment 
Subsidy and Interest Discount Project has been enforced since 5 January 2017 
(https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/fzggwl/201612/t20161208_960831.html). Japan would like to 
request China to explain the amounts, recipients an d usages of subsidies and interest discount 
provided under this Administrative Measures.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply : The Interim Measur es provides mainly procedures and involves no specific allocation and use 
of funds. It is therefore not specific subsidy program subject to the notification obligation of the 
SCM Agreement.  
 
(Question 56: Paragraph 3.120, page 76)   
Regarding the amendment of the Interim Measures for the Management of Saving Energy and 
Emission Reduction Support Fund ( http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020 -
02/21/content_5481719.htm ), Japan would like to request China to explain the amounts, recipients 
and usages of the support provided under this Measures.  
 
Reply: Please refer to item 47 of subsidy notification (G/SCM/N/372/CHN) submitted by China to 
the WTO.  
 
(Question 57: Paragraph 3.120, page 76)   
Regarding the enforcement of the Interim Management Measures for Central Budgetary Investment 
(Support) for Hi -tech Industry Development Projects 
(https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghxwj/201612/t20161219_960912.html?code=&state=123 ), 
Japan would like to request China to explain the amounts, recipients and usages of the fund support 
provided under this Measures.  
 
Reply: China will study the relationship between the Measures and the obligation of subsidy 
notification.  
 
(Question 58: Paragraph 3.120, page 76)   
Japan would like to request China to explain the amounts, recipients and usage of the subsidies and 
other support provided for  the new energy vehicles.  
 
Reply: Please refer to item 54 of subsidy notification (G/SCM/N/343/CHN) submitted by China to 
the WTO.  
 
(Question 59: Paragraph 3.120, page 76)   
Section 4, Article (13) of the Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Accelerati ng the Establishment 
of a Sound Economic System with Green, Low -carbon and Circular Development 
(http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021 -02/22/content_5588274.htm ) refers to a subsidy and 
point bonus by local governments to promote green consumption. Japan would like to request China 
to answer whether such subsidy and point bonus will be given equally to foreign invested enterprises 
or not.  
 
China 's relevant polic ies treat domestic and foreign -invested enterprises equally.  
Reply: Fostering green and low -carbon lifestyles and promoting green consumption will effectively 
help China achieve its goals of peak carbon dioxide emissions and carbon neutrality. In promoting  
green consumption, we will treat all sectors of the economy equally, encourage the supply and 
consumption of green products and services and foster a new trend of green and low -carbon life in 
accordance with the principle of fairness toward both domestic and foreign investment entities.  
 
(Question 60: Paragraph 3.122, page 76)   
Indication of "there is no obligation to provide written information on programmes not contained in 
the subsidy notification " can be inconsistent with the China 's statement, "China  has always been a 
staunch supporter, active participant and major contributor to the multilateral trading system ", in 
paragraph 4.14 in the government report. Please explain China 's view about this contradiction.  
 
Reply: China firmly supports the multila teral trading system, earnestly fulfills its obligations of 
transparency, submits subsidy notifications in a timely and comprehensive manner, and tries its best 
to respond to the concerns of members. China earnestly replies to the written questions raised by 
other members on China 's subsidy notifications. Although China believes that the questionnaire 
should focus on the contents of the subsidy notifications, China has made every effort to verify and 
provide relevant information on issues unrelated to the n otification.  
 
(Question 61: Paragraph 3.123, page 76)   
Regarding the China 's indication of "no implicit subsidies were paid to China 's SOEs ", Japan would 
like to request China to provide a list of subsidies to SOEs (recipients, usages and amounts). Also, WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Japan would like to request China to explain what kind of system exists to ensure that the 
Government does not intervene in SOEs ' financing, operation, and management.  
 
Reply: China does not have subsidies especially for state -owned enterprises.  
 
(Question 62: Paragraph 3.123, page 76 -77)  
According to the Interim Regulation on the Supervision and Administration of State -owned Assets of 
Enterprises (last amended on 2 March 2019) and related regulations, it appears that State -Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Bodies decides importan t matters of SOEs such as division, 
merger, bankruptcy, dissolution, increase or decrease of capital, issuance of corporate bond, and 
supervise SOEs ' financial matters. Also, according to the Opinion by General Office of the CPC Central 
Committed as publis hed on 30 May 2021 ( http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021 -
05/30/content_5614000.htm ) and other regulations, it appears that important operation and 
management matters of SOEs are required to  be consulted with the Communist Party of China before 
SOE's decisions. Japan then would like to request China to explain on what ground China insists the 
Government does not intervene in SOEs ' financing, operation, and management.  
 
Reply: The Interim Regulation on the Supervision and Administration of State -owned Assets of 
Enterprises regulates the basic shareholder rights of the State -owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). The management on enterprises and supervision on financial 
affairs is mainly to prevent the loss of state -owned assets, which has nothing to do with interfering 
in the financing, operation and management of state -owned enterprises. The Opinion shall be subject 
to consultation with the enterprises ' Party Committee. The participation in discussion does not mean 
interfering in enterprises ' operation.  
 
(Question 63: Paragraph 3.124 -125, page 77 -78)  
Japan would like to request China to explain for what reasons China insist that the funds listed in 
Table 3 .15 and 3.16 do not provide any subsidies despite financed by the central and local 
governments, and are not relevant to this Review.  
 
Reply: The funds set up by China in accordance with the market -oriented principles operate in full 
accordance with marke t principles and they are completely independent market entities. China does 
not provide subsidies to any industry through the funds.  
 
Regarding the funds listed in Table 3.15 and 3.16 and the fund for promotion of venture investment 
in new industry and th e fund for leveling up manufacture industry, please answer (1) shares of 
members of the Communist Party in the managements of the funds;  
(2) the shares of current or ex governmental officers (local or central) in the managements of the 
funds; and  
(3) whe ther committees of the Communist Party exists in the funds.  
Please also provide the list of funds to which central or local government makes investment.  
 
Reply 1 -3: The funds set up by China in accordance with the market -oriented principles operate in 
full accordance with market principles and they are completely independent market entities. China 
does not provide subsidies to any industry through the funds.  
Fund investment management and decision -making is completely market -oriented, where the 
government  does not intervene or participate in the decision -making on any investment project of 
the funds. The specific source of funds is disclosed by the fund company in accordance with legal 
and regulatory requirements.  
 
(Question 64: Paragraph 3.126, page 78))  
Regarding the China 's indication of "the conclusions of the study are not credible as they are based 
on estimated data " on the OECD report on the semiconductor industry, please provide the list of 
governmental support to the semiconductor industry (type of support, authority of support. amount, 
recipient, loan amount from state -owned banks, investment from and return rate of governmental 
fund).  
 
Reply: For China 's support policy for the semiconductor industry, please refer to the subsidy 
notification (G/SCM/N/372/CHN) submitted by China.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 65: Paragraph 3.169, page 87)  
Japan would like to request China to provide with the details regarding its administrative measures 
for registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food.  
 
Reply: Please see the answer to question 1.  
 
(Question 66: Paragraph 3.181, page 92)  
Japan would like to request China to answer whether any element other than competition (such as 
political or diplomatic elements) may affect the procedures or results for the approval of mergers 
and acquisitions.  
 
Reply: According to the provisions of China 's Anti-Monopoly Law, the anti -monopoly law 
enforcement agency shall consider the following factors when reviewing whether the concentration 
of business operators: The first is the market share of the operators participating in the concentration 
in the releva nt market and their control over the market; second, the market concentration of 
relevant markets; third, the influence of operators ' concentration on market entry and technological 
progress; fourth, the influence of operators ' concentration on consumers a nd other relevant business 
operators; fifth, the influence of operators ' concentration on national economic development; 
sixth,  other factors affecting market competition should be considered that the anti -monopoly law 
enforcement agency of The State Counc il considers. Beyond that, anti -monopoly enforcement 
agencies do not consider other factors in their reviews.  
 
(Question 67: Paragraph 3.181, page 92)  
Please clarify the criteria and conditions for the recognition of market dominance and the conditions 
and scope of exemption from prior notifications obligation for corporate combinations, which appears 
to be unclear under the proposed amendment to the Antimonopoly Law. Please also answer whether 
there are any differences in the application of these regulat ions between SOEs and other enterprises 
or not.  
 
Reply: The Anti -Monopoly Law of China and the Interim Provisions on The Prohibition of Abuse of 
Dominant Market Position issued by the State Administration for Market Regulation have clearly 
stipulated the factors that need to be considered in determining an operator 's dominant market 
position. The Anti -Monopoly Law makes clear provisions on the concentration of business operators 
that may not be reported to the anti -monopoly law enforcement agency of the St ate Council: First, 
one business operator participating in the concentration owns more than 50% of the voting shares 
or assets of other business operators; second, more than 50 % of the voting shares or assets of each 
business participating operator are own ed by the same business non -participating operator. The 
above provisions of the Anti -Monopoly Law shall be equally applicable to all forms of market players, 
including Chinese state -owned enterprises.  
 
(Question 68: Paragraph 3.181, page 92)  
Japan would like to request China to explain the details of the criteria for corporate merger review, 
such as the basis for approval/disapproval/approval with conditions, the standard to determine the 
scope of market. In particular, please answer whether there are any  plans to clarify the standards 
for the addition or removal of the condition of "maintenance of independency of operation or assets " 
through new guidelines, etc..  
 
Reply: According to the Anti -Monopoly Law of China and the Interim Provisions on Examinatio n of 
Concentration of Business Operators, the decisions of examinations of business operators ' 
concentration shall include the following aspects. First, the decision prohibits concentration of 
business operators. Anti -monopoly law enforcement agencies, on the basis that the review of the 
concentration of business operators judges the results of the effect of excluding or restricting 
competition, can make a decision to prohibit concentration. The second is to unconditionally agree 
to the decision on the conc entration of undertakings. If the anti -monopoly law enforcement agency 
finds that the concentration of undertakings does not have the effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition after review, it shall make a decision to agree to the concentration. The  third is the 
decision to approve the concentration of undertakings with restrictive conditions. Where the 
concentration of business operators has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition, the anti -monopoly law enforcement agency sh all make a decision to prohibit the 
concentration of business operators. However, if the business operator can prove that the beneficial 
effect of the concentration on competition is significantly greater than the adverse effect, or is in the 
public intere st of the society, the anti -monopoly law enforcement agency may make a decision not WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  to prohibit the concentration of business operators. For concentration of business operators that is 
not prohibited, the anti -monopoly law enforcement agency may decide to attach restrictive 
conditions that reduce the adverse effects of concentration on competition.   
 
According to the provisions of China 's Anti -Monopoly Law, the anti -monopoly law enforcement 
agency shall consider the following factors when reviewing whether the concentration of business 
operators has or may have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition: The first is the market 
share of the operators participating in the concentration in the relevant market and their control 
over the market ; second, the market concentration of relevant markets; third, the influence of 
operators ' concentration on market entry and technological progress; fourth, the influence of 
operators ' concentration on consumers and other relevant business operators; fifth , the influence of 
operators ' concentration on national economic development; sixth, other factors affecting market 
competition should be considered that the anti -monopoly law enforcement agency of The State 
Council considers.  
 
According to the Interim Pr ovisions on the Review of the Concentration of Business Operators, the 
structural or behavioral conditions attached to the concentration of business operators may require 
operators to maintain the independence of some assets or businesses. The anti -monopol y law 
enforcement agency will make a decision based on the specific circumstances of the case. During 
the decision process, it needs to conduct in -depth investigation and evaluation, and negotiate with 
the centralized party to reach an agreement on the att ached conditions.  
 
(Question 69: Paragraph 3.205, page 98 -99)  
Japan would like to request China to explain on what grounds China does not agree with the IMF 's 
conclusion that productivity of China 's SOEs is generally low. Please provide the disclosable d ata 
which shows productivity of SOEs, which can prove China 's disagreement  
 
Reply: China does not recognize this data and conclusion quoted from IMF 's report which may lead 
misunderstanding, because China can not confirm the detailed information which leads to the 
mentioned conclusion, such as samples, data, research methods,etc. China does not have the data 
on average productivity gap between SOEs and  private companies. China does not agree with the 
IMF's conclusion.  
 
(Question 70: Paragraph 3.206, page 99)  
China indicates that SOEs  in China operate under market conditions, with no privileges granted by 
the Government. Please provide the supporting data or explain what systems exist to ensure it.  
Please explain the system, if any, system that provides for the separation of governmen t and SOEs 
with regard to government involvement in management and the dispatch of executives.  
 
Reply: Chinese law clearly protects fair competition among enterprises of all types of ownership, 
and does not grant privileges to state -owned enterprises. The  Company Law, the Enterprise 
State -owned Assets Law and other relevant laws and regulations and the company 's articles of 
association constitute a system for the selection and management of state -owned enterprise leaders. 
The Company Law and the Enterprise  State -owned Assets Law comprehensively and systematically 
regulate the corporate governance structure and the qualifications, production methods and 
selection procedures of its members. The company 's articles of association specify the company 's 
operation s and management, as well as the selection and management of shareholders, directors, 
supervisors, and senior managers.  
 
(Question 71: Paragraph 3.206, page 99)  
China has promoted so called "double -hundred action " to boost reform of 100 national SOEs and  
100 local SOEs since 2018. Japan would like to request China to answer:  
(1) whether any financial or other type of support to such selected SOEs has been given under such 
action or not; and  
(2) whether such action is disclosed or not.  
 
Reply: China did not provide financial support. At the same time, the "Double Hundred Action " was 
carried out in public, and the Japanese side also obtained information from public channels.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 72: Paragraph 3.207, page 99)  
Japan would like to request C hina to provide and explain the supporting data and system to the 
China 's statement that the Structural Reform Fund is established, invested, and operated in a 
market -oriented manner.  
Please also explain  
- why China has no information is available on the  paid-in capital of the Fund.  
- the amount, usage and recipient of the investment by the Fund.  
 
Reply: More information about the "China State -owned Enterprise Restructuring Fund " can be found 
at: http://www.gsxt.go v.cn 
 
(Question 73: Paragraph 3.208, page 99)  
Japan concerns that the bailout fund with a fundraising target of CNY 100 billion might hinder the 
appropriate withdraw of enterprises by extending those lives unnecessary, which should have 
withdrawn earlier from the market.  
Japan would like to request C hina to explain how it assesses the political legitimacy and sets the 
limitation of support to avoid harming market principles.  
 
Reply: Please see the answer to question 72.   
 
(Question 74: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
Japan would like to request China to explain the definition and scope of "government procurement " 
in China.  
 
Reply: Article 2 of the Government Procurement Law says: "The term 'government procurement ' as 
mentioned in the present law refers to the procurement of goods, projects and services within the 
lawfully made centralized procurement lists or above the procurement limits by the state organs, 
public institutions and bodies with public fiscal funds. " 
 
(Question 75: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
Japan would like to request China to answer whether China considers SOEs ' procurements are 
qualified to exemptions of government procurement under Article 3.8 of GATT or not.  
 
Reply: After 40 years of market -oriented reform, China 's SOEs have become independent market 
players operating on their own and responsible for their own profits and losses, and the government 
does not interfere with their operations.  
Article 2 of the Government Procurement Law says: "The te rm 'government procurement ' as 
mentioned in the present law refers to the procurement of goods, projects and services within the 
lawfully made centralized procurement lists or above the procurement limits by the state organs, 
public institutions and bodies  with public fiscal funds. " At present, the Government Procurement Law 
does not govern SOEs.  
 
(Question 76: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
China explained in the video message at GPA Committee meeting in October 2020 that SOEs in 
telecommunications, petrochemi cal, air transportation, auto industry, iron and steel industry, etc., 
do not perform the government functions. Please answer whether China understands these SOEs 
are not exempted from government procurement under Article 3.8 of GATT.  
 
Reply : Article 2 of the Government Procurement Law stipulates that: The term "government 
procurement " as mentioned in the present law refers to the procurement of goods, projects and 
services within the lawfully made centralized procurement lists or above the pro curement limits by 
the state organs, public institutions and bodies with public fiscal funds. At present, SOEs are not 
subject to the Government Procurement Law.  
 
(Question 77: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
Please answer whether China understands such SOEs p rovide TAXI services are not exempted from 
government procurement under Article 3.8 of GATT.  
 
Reply: Please see the answer to question 76.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 78: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
In the video message at GPA Committee meeting in October 2020, China categorized public 
institutions subject to Chinese 6th revised offer, by distinguishing hospitals which provide basic 
medical services and whose funds cannot or should not allocated by the market from hospitals which 
provide high -level medical services and  procure most of their fund from the market. Please answer 
whether China understands the hospital which provide high -level medical services and procure most 
of their fund from the market is a subject of exemption from government procurement under 
Article  3.8 of GATT or not.  
 
Reply: Hospitals with public service function are within the scope of government procurement. China 
has included three top -notch hospitals in Annex III: West China Hospital of Stomatology, 
Sichuan  University; Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital of Fudan University; and Hospital of 
Stomatology, Sun Yat -sen University.  
 
(Question 79: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
Please answer whether there is any difference between private hospitals and hospitals operated by 
central or local governments regarding treatment policies such as prescription of medicines and 
usage of medical equipment.  
 
Reply: China implements homogene ous management of the medical quality and safety of medical 
institutions at all levels and types, and does not differ depending on the host. Public medical 
institutions run by the central and local governments and private medical institutions run by social  
forces are managed in accordance with the same laws, regulations, and policy standards, and there 
is no difference in the use and management of drugs and medical equipment.  
 
(Question 80: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)   
Please explain the scope of procuring entities which are subject to the Government Procurement 
Law. Please also explain the legal status of this Law and whether any subordinate regulations will 
be enacted or enforced in accordance with this Law or not.  
 
Reply: For the scope of procuring entities which are subject to the Government Procurement Law 
of the People 's Republic of China , please refer to Reply to Japanese Question 74. The Government 
Procurement Law  is a basic law on government procurement in China . In addition, China has also 
formulated Regulations for the Implementation of the  Government Procurement Law of the People 's 
Republic of China , as well as many competent authority regulations and normative documents with 
respect to government procurement.  
 
(Question 81: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)   
Foreign Investment Law and its subordinate regulations provides that foreign invested enterprises 
shall not be discriminated over government procurement. On the other hand, Japan heard that the 
products and technologies of foreign invested enterprises are precluded from the SOEs ' 
procurements in the form of specification and other procurement conditions. Please answer whether 
China recognizes this situation.  
Please also answer whether, if such discrimination to the foreign invested enterprises is made, the  
governmental procurement becomes unlawful and invalid, and the relevant court will enforce the 
above -mentioned provisions of Foreign Investment Law and its subordinate regulations.  
 
Reply: State -owned enterprises should strictly abide by laws and regulati ons when carrying 
out bidding activities. According to Article 6, Article 18 and Article 20 of the Law of the 
People 's Republic  of China on Tendering and Bidding, the tenderee shall not restrict and exclude 
potential bidders in any way. At the same time, t he bidding activities are open to the public in 
accordance with the law and the qualification requirements are subject to social supervision and 
government supervision and inspection. The situation mentioned in the Japanese question does not 
match the fact s.  
 
There are no discriminatory regulations against foreign -invested enterprises in the field of the 
Chinese government procurement at the legal level or policy level. In recent years, China has made 
efforts for promoting the establishment of a unified, o pen-style and properly competitive 
government procurement market system. China will continue to strengthen the guidance and 
supervision of government procurement activities of various regions and competent authorities, and 
maintain level playing field in t he market. If any foreign -invested enterprise believes that it suffers 
from unfair treatment in government procurement activities, it can raise doubts and complaints to WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  competent authorities pursuant to the law. If this is verified to constitute differenti al treatment or 
discriminatory treatment for suppliers under unreasonable conditions, punishment shall be 
imposed  in accordance with the relevant provisions of government procurement laws and 
regulations. The Chinese courts strictly enforce the provisions of the Foreign Investment Law of the 
People 's Republic of China  and regulations for the implementation thereof.  
Procurement by state -owned enterprises is beyond the scope of government procurement, for which 
the Government Procurement Law is not applicable.  
 
(Question 82: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
Please answer whether there is any regulations or internal documents w hich obliges or encourage 
local governments and SOEs to procure the domestic products or services or not. If yes, please 
provide such regulations and documents.  
 
Reply: Article 10 of the Government Procurement Law of the PRC stipulates that the government 
shall procure domestic goods, construction and services, except in one of the following situations: 
(1) where the goods, construction or services needed are not available within the territory of the 
People 's Republic of China or, though available, cannot b e acquired on reasonable commercial terms; 
(2) where the items to be procured are for use abroad; and (3) other circumstances provided for 
other laws and administrative regulations. There is no provision in the Government Procurement 
Law that makes a commi tment to provide preferential treatment for goods, services and suppliers 
of a specific country.  
Procurement by state -owned enterprises is beyond the scope of government procurement, for which 
the Government Procurement Law is not applicable.  
 
(Question 83 : Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
Japan heard many Japanese and other foreign companies rarely succeeds the bidding in the 
governmental procurements. Japan would like to request China to provide:  
(1) the number of biddings performed in 2020;  
(2) the number of biddings won by SOEs or other Chinese invested enterprises; and  
(3) the number of bidding won by Japanese and other foreign invested enterprises.  
 
Reply: China has not yet joined the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). China 's 
government procurement laws and regulations do not make specific commitments to provide 
nondiscriminatory treatment for foreign goods, services and suppliers. Products and services 
provided by foreign -invested enterprises and Chinese -funded enterprises in China are treated 
equally in China 's government procurement market.  
In 2020, the scale of China 's government procurement market hit 3.7 trillion yuan. We don 't have 
data on the number of bids won by state -owned enterprises and other Chinese -invested enterp rises 
or Japanese and other foreign -invested enterprises.  
 
 
(Question 84: Paragraph 3.211, page 100)  Under the Circular on Promoting Fair Competition in 
Governmental Procurement and Enhancing Business Environment 
(http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/zcfg/mof/201908/t20190805_12605809.htm ), local governments were 
required to publish the result of examinations on the regulations and methods which prevent fair 
competition in the area of governmen t procurement. Japan would like to request China to explain 
where such result is published and what kind of problems were found in such result.  
 
Reply: Disposal results of local governments will be made public to the whole society by local 
competent autho rities.  
 
(Question 85: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
According to Nikkei newspaper on 21 May 2020, the Security Reliable Work Committee prepared 
certain lists of security reliable or information innovation enterprises and products called "secure 
and controllable/Information Technology Application Innovation ", and local governments, etc. 
procured the products from such lists. Also, a product needs to satisfy the requirements, such as 
"non-foreign invested ", "produced in China " or "designed in China " and so forth to be included in 
such lists. Japan would like to China to answer whether such reported matters are true or not, and 
if not true, what portion of the reported matters is not true.  
 
Reply: The Chinese Government backs up the innovations in infor mation technology applications, 
greets foreign -invested enterprises to participate in government procurement in accordance with WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  laws and regulations, and will make procurements in accordance with international practices. 
Information Technology Application Innovation Working Committee of China Electronics 
Standardization Association (CESA) is a non -profit social organization initiated and founded by 
various organizations engaged in the research, application and service of key software and hardware 
technologi es. Articles of association and membership accession regulations of CESA are jointly 
developed by members.  
For specific information, please refer to https://www.itaic.org.cn/gsz/index.htm . 
 
(Question 8 6: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
If local governments, etc. procure the products based on non -disclosed lists, such lists will be 
considered as documents that are not available to other countries or businesses and that are 
pertaining to or affecting trad e in goods. Japan considers such lists are subject to the disclosure 
obligations under Article 10.1 of GATT and Article 2(c)1 of China 's protocol accession, and failure of 
such disclosure is inconsistent with these provisions. Please answer the China 's opinion on this point.  
 
Reply: China has noted the concerns from Japan, and would like Japan to further clarify the 
information sources.  
 
(Question 87: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
Please answer whether there is any technical requirements applicable to each product and 
undisclosed to foreign invested companies, with respect to any system for regulating terms and 
conditions of procurements such as "secure and controllable/Information Technology Application 
Innovation " or terms and conditions of governm ental procurement.  
Please also answer whether the lists called as "secure and controllable " products and enterprises 
and "Information Technology Application Innovation " products and enterprises are applicable only 
to government procurement or not. If such  lists are also applicable to procurement by market players 
other than government, please explain China 's view on its consistency with the national treatment 
under Article 3.1 and 3.4 of GATT.  
 
Reply: Please see the answer to question 85.  
 
(Question 88: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)   
Industrial organizations have been formed to promote the system to determine the terms and 
conditions of procurements, called "secure and controllable/Information Technology Application 
Innovation ", but foreign enterprises are practically unable to participate in it. For example, the 
requirements for membership in the Information Technology Application and Innovation Working 
Committee of the China Electronics Industry Standardization Technology Comm ittee are that "the 
controlling shareholder of the enterprise must be a Chinese corporation or a Chinese citizen, the 
legal representative must be a Chinese citizen, and the percentage of foreign capital contribution 
must not exceed 25% ", and furthermore, approval from the Chinese government is required. It is 
said that by joining such an association, one can obtain information on such system, and get 
cooperation from other participants in the development of products compatible with such system. 
Japan would  like to know whether only products from companies that are members of such 
organizations can be eligible for government procurement or not.  
 
Reply: Please see the answer to question 85.   
 
If participation in such an organization is a requirement for government procurement, it makes the 
government procurement system more opaque, as the information on products of government 
procurement is shared and promoting development among participating companies. Furthermore, if 
participation in suc h organization is a requirement for government procurement, it is inconsistent 
with national treatment rules of the Foreign Investment Law. Please explain China 's view on these 
points.  
(Reference: https://www.itaic.org.cn/gsz/index.htm )  
 
Reply: Article 15 of the Foreign Investment Law stipulates that the state guarantees that foreign -
invested enterprises participate in the standard -setting work on an equal basis in accordance with 
the law, and strengt hen the information disclosure and social supervision of standard -setting. The 
mandatory standards formulated by the state are equally applicable to foreign -invested enterprises. 
Article 13 of the Regulations for the Implementation of the Foreign Investmen t Law stipulates that 
foreign -invested enterprises and domestic -funded enterprises shall participate in the formulation 
and revision of national standards, industry standards, local standards, and group standards on an WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  equal basis in accordance with the la w. Foreign -invested enterprises may formulate their own 
enterprise standards or jointly with other enterprises according to their needs.  
 
Foreign -invested enterprises may submit standard project proposals to the standardization 
administrative department a nd relevant administrative departments, put forward opinions and 
suggestions in the process of standard project establishment, drafting, technical review, and 
standard implementation information feedback and evaluation, and undertake the related work of 
standard drafting, technical review and translation of standards in foreign languages in accordance 
with regulations. Standardization administrative departments and relevant administrative 
departments shall establish and improve relevant working mechanisms, increase the transparency 
of standard formulation and revision, and promote the disclosure of information throughout the 
entire process of standard formulation and revision.  
 
(Question 89: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
According to the Reuters on 3 August 2021  (https://www.reuters.com/article/china -soe-buy-
chinese -targets -0803-idCNKBS2F404K), Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology on 14 May send an internal document, titled "The Circular for Guideline 
Standard for Exa mination of Imported Goods for Government Procurement (2021) " (the 
"Document  551"). The Document 551 was reported to guide 4 types (25%, 50%, 75% and 100%) 
of minimum local procurement rates for 315 products, such as medical equipments and ground radar 
equipment. Please answer whether the news report is true or false, whether "Document 551 "or 
similar document exists or not, and if exists, please provide us its detailed contents.  
 
Reply: The Document 551 is mainly aimed at the review of similar products of the same grade 
among domestic medical equipment. The document neither involves market trading rules nor 
contains restrictions on market subjects. It is only for internal reference of local finance and industry 
and information technology departments and has  no coercive force.  
 
(Question 90: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
Please answer whether the Document 551, which requires that the minimum procurement rates for 
domestic goods be 25 -100%, is applicable only to procurements by local governments, or applicab le 
also to procurements by SOEs or hospitals invested or operated by local governments.  
 
Reply:  The Document 551 neither involves market trading rules nor contains restrictions on market 
subjects. It is only for internal reference of local finance and ind ustry and information technology 
departments and has no coercive force.  
 
(Question 91: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
Since Document 551 directs the treatment of imports in government procurement and is pertaining 
to and affecting trade in goods, the Document 551 shall be subject to the disclosure obligation under 
Article 2(c)1 of China 's accession protocol and Article 10.1 of GATT. Japan considers non -disclosure 
of the Document 551, which is not available to other countries and businesses, is likely t o be 
inconsistent with these provisions. Please answer the China 's opinion on this point.  
 
Reply:  The Document 551 neither involves market trading rules nor contains restrictions on market 
subjects. It is only for internal reference of local finance and i ndustry and information technology 
departments and has no coercive force. Therefore, the document is not subject to the disclosure 
obligation under Article 2(c)1 of China 's accession protocol and Article 10.1 of GATT.  
 
(Question 92: Paragraph 3.213, page 1 00-102)  
According to the website below  
(https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/410133921?utm_source=wechat_session&utm_medium=social&s_
r=0), the Government Procurement Law obliges the government to procure local products and 
services, and 14 provinces in China are prioritizing purchase of local equipment. According to the 
website, 11 provinces among such 14 provinces promote the procurement of local products by 
preparing "the purchase catalogs " and standards for procurements, and 5 provinces require 
additional standards and examination when foreign products are procured. 
(https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/410133921?utm_source=wechat_session&utm_medium=social&s_
r=0)，Please answer the following questions:  
(1) Are the measures for priority purchase of local equipment explained in the website true?  If not 
true, please specify which parts of the article are not true.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (2) Are the measures for priority purchase of local equipment applicable only to procurement by 
local government such as provinces and cities, or also applicable to procurements by SOEs and 
hospitals operated by local government?  
(3) The measures as described in this website shall be subject to the disclosure obligations under 
Article 2(c)1 of China 's accession protocol and Article 10.1 of GATT, and therefore, non-disclosure 
of such measures is likely to be inconsistent with these Articles. Please explain the China 's view on 
this point.  
(4) Foreign Investment Law and the Regulations on the Implementation of the Foreign Investment 
Law provides for foreign invest ed enterprises shall be entitled to national treatment; however, the 
measures as described in the website are de fact discrimination against the foreign invested 
enterprises, which are more likely to sell imported goods. Please explain the China 's view on this 
point.  
The measures as described in this website prioritize procurement of local products and discriminatory 
against foreign products and services. China expressed its intention to enter into GPA at the Working 
Party for China 's accession to WTO, and has been engaged in the negotiations for accession to GPA. 
Introduction of such measures may suggest China 's lack of honesty for the negotiations for accession 
to GPA, and should be inconsistent with China 's expression at the Working Party for China 's acce ssion 
to WTO. Please explain the China 's view on this point.  
 
Reply 1-5: The website link provided in the question cannot be opened, and the domain name of 
the website is neither a portal of the central or local government departments, nor a designated 
media for the disclosure of government procurement information. We cannot confirm the measures 
described in the question.  
 
(Question 93: Paragraph 3.229, page 106)  
At the Working Party for China 's accession to WTO, China expressed its intention  to enter into GPA. 
Please explain China 's view on its time schedule to enter into GPA.  
 
Reply: The Chinese government is working hard for accession to the GPA as soon as possible. The 
seventh offer that China submitted to the WTO in October 2019 presente d a level basically on par 
with parties. In May 2020, China submitted to the WTO its government procurement report 
(2020  updated version) which fully presented the progress of the reform of China 's legal system for 
government procurement. While advancing t he offer negotiation, progress was also made in the 
legal adjustment negotiation. In June, 2021, China once again provided its seventh offer for the EU 
and Australia for its accession to the GPA as well as the reply to the list of issues of the government 
procurement report (2020 updated version). This showed China 's determination to join the GPA and 
to advocate the multilateral trade system.  
 
China 's accession to it would not be possible if only China only strives for it. It largely depends on 
the positio ns and expectations of participating parties. China has always believed that the sooner 
China joins the GPA, the sooner all parties will benefit from it. It is our hope that GPA parties can 
have a clear understanding of the current situations, be forward -looking and pragmatic in making 
their offers to China, and reach a conclusion that benefits all in the negotiation for China 's accession.  
 
(Question 94: Paragraph 3.230, page 106)  
According to the report by the Secretariat, it remains China 's priority to conclude its GPA accession 
before opening its government procurement market through bilateral/regional tracks. Could China 
explain reasons for prioritizing the GPA accession before the negotiation of market access terms on 
government procurement in EPA/FTA  regardless of the stagnation of the GPA accession process 
since 2014?  
 
Reply: China formally submitted its application for accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (the CPTPP) in September this year. Once the negotiations 
are launched, China will hold consultations with CPTPP Members on the opening of the government 
procurement market.  
 
(Question 95: Paragraph 3.245, page 108)  
For the further development of China 's content industry, the establishment of a sound competitive 
market and an appropriate copyright protection system is more imp ortant than the protection of 
domestic industry. However, China 's current strict regulations and barriers to entry for foreign 
content and foreign companies impede such a sound competitive market and appropriate protection WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  system. In this context, Japan wo uld like China to elaborate its view on opening the market to 
foreign content and foreign companies.  
 
Reply:  China protects copyright and relates copyright holders at home and abroad in accordance 
with the Copyright Law and other domestic laws and regulat ions as well as the international treaties 
to which accession has been ratified. With the gradual improvement of the relevant legal system, 
China will continue to promote international copyright cooperation to a larger scale, wider fields and 
a higher leve l, and make the global copyright governance system more just, more open, more 
inclusive and fairer.  
 
Japan would also like China to explain its efforts to protect the rights of a copyright holder. For 
example, since China 's regulatory standards for prior c ontent review and censorship of foreign 
content are unclear, Japan would like an explanation of the status of China 's efforts, including the 
outlook and schedule of formulation and promulgation of guidelines which stipulate practical 
requirements and proce dures.  
 
Reply:  China 's recent efforts to protect copyright holders are as follows:  
In terms of legislation, the Decision on Amending the Copyright Law of the People 's Republic of 
China for the third time was adopted on 11 November 2020. The amended Copyright Law was 
officially effective on 1 June 2021, featuring improved concepts and systems related to works and 
rights, strengthened punishment of infringements, and enhanced law enforcement means of 
copyright authorities. In addition, the newly revise d Civil Code of the People 's Republic of China, 
which took effect on 1 January 2021, provides an important system for strengthening IPR work. 
The Amendment (XI) to the Criminal Law of the People 's Republic of China, which took effect on 
1 March 2021, incre ases the statutory prison term for crimes of copyright infringement and 
intensifies the crackdown on copyright infringement.  
 
The domestic ratification process of the Marrakesh Treaty is expected to be completed in 2021, and 
relevant promotion and implemen tation work is also under preparation, which enables China to 
contribute more to the protection of the rights of persons who are blind, visually impaired, or 
otherwise print disabled to enjoy works and receive education on an equal basis.  
 
In terms of law enforcement, in June 2020, the National Intellectual Property Administration, the 
Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the 
Ministry of Public Security jointly launched the "Sword Net 20 20" campaign targeting copyright 
infringement and piracy on the Internet to severely crack down on copyright infringement and piracy 
in the fields of audio -visual works, e -commerce platforms, social platforms and online education, 
and regulate the order of  copyright dissemination on online platforms for literature, games, music 
and knowledge sharing. During the "Sword Net 2020 " campaign, a total of 3.2394 million infringing 
and pirated links were deleted, 2,884 infringing and pirated websites (APPs) were cl osed, 724 online 
infringement and piracy cases were investigated and handled, including 177 criminal cases involving 
RMB 301 million, and 925 online copyright dispute cases were settled. The order of network 
copyright has been further standardized and the environment of network copyright has been further 
purified. The "Sword Net 2021 " campaign was launched in June 2021, and relevant outcomes will 
be released at the end of this year.  
 
In addition, in order to standardize the copyright order in the film marke t, the Copyright 
Administration and the Film Administration of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of 
China and the Food -and Drug -Related Crime Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security 
jointly deployed a centralized action to cra ck down on the piracy and dissemination of theatrical 
films from February to March 2021, and took a variety of effective measures to severely crack down 
on illegal and criminal acts of piracy and dissemination of theatrical films during the Spring Festival . 
During the campaign, 39 key cases of the infringement and piracy of theatrical films were 
investigated and handled, and 45 infringing websites (official accounts) were closed. The piracy and 
dissemination of theatrical films were effectively suppressed.  
 
If China considers that its regulations on blocking foreign content will be consistent with the GATT 
and the WTO protocol on the accession of China, please explain the reasons in detail.  
 
Reply: For details, see Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Integrated 
Development of Cultural Creativity and Design Services and Related Industries. Viewed at:  
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014 -03/14/content _8713.htm . WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  China 's relevant measures are in compliance with WTO rules.  
 
(Question 96: Paragraph 3.250, page 108)  
According to amended Trademark Act entered into force in Nov. 2019, counter measure against bad -
faith application for trademark registration w as strengthened. Japan would like to know how Chinese 
relevant authority examines bad -faith of applicant and request China to provide the details regarding 
examination procedures for bad -faith application.  
 
Reply: In order to cope with the revision of the  Trademark Law, the Regulations on Regulating 
Trademark Registration Acts have been implemented since December 1, 2019. The regulations 
clarify the requirements for applying for trademark registration and the types of irregular 
applications, as well as the  factors that the trademark registration department can consider 
comprehensively when judging malicious trademark registration applications that are not intended 
for use, providing clear guidelines for combating malicious registration and improving the ope rability 
of legal regulations. Since 2020, the State Intellectual Property Office of China has continued to 
carry out special actions to combat malicious hoarding of trademarks and malicious trademark 
squatting that are not intended for use, clarifying the  specific circumstances of the review and 
handling of malicious hoarding and malicious squatting, and publicizing relevant applicants and 
Agency, the effect has been remarkable since its implementation.  
 
(Question 97: Paragraph 3.304, page 119)  
According  to Secretariat Report, Chinese custom officers have authority to conduct ex officio actions 
for import and export shipments. Aside from import and export shipments, Japan would like to know 
whether Chinese custom officers also have authority to conduct ex  officio actions for transit 
shipment.  
 
The relevant IPRs involved in import and export shipments that are protected by 
Chinese  laws and regulations are protected by the Chinese customs authorities.  
 
(Question 98: Paragraph 3.305, page 119)  
According to Secretariat Report, amended Criminal Law entered into force in Mar. 2021 provides for 
stronger criminal penalty for IPR infringement. Regarding IPR infringement, especially infringement 
for trademark right and copyright, can police or prosecut or suspend such infringement or initiate a 
prosecution for such infringer without right holder 's complaint?  
 
Reply: According to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, criminal cases of IPR infringement 
can be prosecuted by the procuratorate to the  court according to law to hold the criminal liability of 
the infringer. Public security authorities  shall file and investigate the case if they find criminal facts 
or suspects within their jurisdiction. Any entity and individual have the right and obligat ion to report 
to the public security authorities  if they find criminal facts or suspects. Victims have the right to 
report or sue the  criminal facts or suspects infringing their rights  to the public security authorities . 
 
(Question 99: Paragraph 3.264, pag e 111)  
In various countries, an applicant is allowed to submit an application (for patents and others) in 
foreign languages, especially in English, and to correct mistranslation of the translated sentences 
when necessary. Could China explain whether China  has plan to adopt such system?  
 
Reply: The Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law stipulate that all documents submitted in 
accordance with the Patent Law and the Regulations shall be in Chinese; Based on the patent right 
granted by the international application, if there are translation er rors in the translation, it can be 
corrected.  
 
(Question 100: Paragraph 3.240, page 108)  
Japan would like to know whether China has plan of or at least considering ratifying or acceding to 
the UPOV 1991, the Marrakesh VIP Treaty, the Trademark Law Treaty  (TLT) and the 
Singapore  Treaty on the Law of Trademarks (STLT) in the near future, and, if so, the state of play 
of such plan or consideration.  
 
Reply: The implementation of the protection of new plant varieties in China is led by the State 
Intellectual Property Office with the participation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and 
the National Forestry and Grassland Administration.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Since China acceded to the International Convention for the Protection of New Plant Varieties more 
than 20 yea rs, the protection of new plant varieties has been developed, and the review ability and 
protection level have also been improved. At present, China is revising the seed law, and the 
regulations on the protection of new plant varieties will be further revi sed. The main contents of the 
revision include expanding the protection scope, extending the protection chain, and establishing 
the EDV protection system, so as to make legal preparations for joining the UPOV1991 text.  
 
China officially launched the ratifi cation process of the Marrakesh Treaty in 2020 and will deliberate 
a proposal of the State Council on the Treaty at the 31st Session of the Standing Committee of the 
13th National People 's Congress on 19 October 2021.  
 
China is currently conducting studyin g and demonstration on issues related to the Trademark Law 
Treaty (TLT) and the Singapore Treaty on Trademark Law (STLT).  
 
(Question 101: Paragraph 4.37, 4.43 (Box 4.1), page 135 -137)  
The Report S415 explains that China has taken fisheries conservation mea sures in line with the 
revised Fisheries Law and regulations for its implementation in recent years. With regard to this, 
Japan would like to ask China what kind of standards were introduced to evaluate fisheries stocks 
as a result of the fisheries resourc e management. Also, according to paragraph 4.37, China has 
taken first steps to introduce a total allowable catch system, so Japan would like to ask if China has 
seized data of catch volume by species and areas, and if China publishes it as well as the res ults of 
evaluation of fisheries stocks.  
 
Reply: China publishes fishery statistical yearbooks every year, which contain seized data of catch 
volume by species and areas. Evaluations of fisheries stocks are conducted by relevant Chinese 
scientific research institutions by internationally accepted methods. After such evaluations, the 
relevant scientific research achievements are publicly released as appropriate.  
 
(Question 102: Paragraph 4.43 -44, page 136)  
Although the Secretariat report says that Chinese authorigy has strengthened the control over IUU 
fishing vessels recent years, many fishing vessels based in Chinese ports have been sighted being 
engaged in illegal fishing for squid in the Sea of Japan. In this context, Japan would like to request 
China to provide detailed information on the current situation of China 's control on these fishing 
vessels and the future plan.  
 
Reply: China is very concerned about IUU ships and has been severely cracking down on such ships 
in various ways in  accordance with the law. The first is to establish a multi -department joint 
coordination mechanism, strengthen departmental collaboration, and implement local territorial 
responsibilities. The second is to strengthen port management, confiscate and destro y all IUU ships 
and illegal catches found in accordance with the law, and hold relevant ship owners, crew members 
and other responsible persons accountable in accordance with the law, including criminal 
responsibility. The third is to organize and implemen t a series of special law enforcement actions of 
the "Fishery Policy Bright Sword ", to clean up and ban fishing -related "three -nos" vessels, negotiate 
with the China Coast Guard to strengthen maritime cruises, and strictly deal with the seized fishing -
related "three -nos" vessels in accordance with the law. All suspected illegal acts shall be transferred 
to the public security department. In the next step, China will continue to consolidate local territorial 
responsibilities, strengthen departmental coordina tion, and always maintain a high -pressure strike 
on fishing -related "three noes " ships. At the same time, it will strengthen the construction of fishery 
administration and fishing port supervision and law enforcement, and further enhance the 
supervision an d law enforcement capabilities.  
 
(Question 103: Paragraph 4.43, page 136)  
According to the report by the Secretariat, between January 2018 and early 2021, the 
Chinese  Government "imposed different levels of penalties on 84 deep -sea fishing vessels belonging 
to 51 enterprise ".  
Could China provide the details about infractions for which the Chinese Government imposed the 
penalties? (e.g. Sea areas in which the vessels in question oparated, species targeted by the vessels, 
basis for infractions.)  
 
Reply: The operating sea area is part of the exclusive economic zone of fishing countries, and part 
of the high seas of the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean; The fish caught are 
squid; The penalties are based on the Regulations on the M anagement of Ocean Fisheries and other WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  laws and regulations, and fishery development subsidy policies; Punishment measures include 
deduction of subsidies, cancellation or suspension of the qualifications of offshore fishing enterprises 
and offshore fishing  projects, fines on the captain of the fishing vessel involved, cancellation of the 
qualification certificate of the crew member, and inclusion of the person in charge or captain of the 
enterprise on the "blacklist " of practitioners, etc. .  
 
(Question 104: Paragraph 4.43, page 137)  
Regarding the FAO 's Port State Measures Agreement, the Chinese authorities are studying the 
possibility of acceding to the Agreement, according to the report by the Secretariat. Could China 
elaborate on the progres s of preparatory work for this possible accession?  
 
Reply: China agrees with the important role played by the Agreement on Port State Measures in 
combating IUU fishing. It appreciates the efforts of FAO and its member states to make the 
Agreement effectiv e, and is actively studying and promoting accession to the Agreement. China 's 
domestic port supervision involves multiple departments and requires coordination and joint 
management. Although there are still difficulties for China to join the Agreement in t he short term, 
China has included the list of IUU fishing vessels announced by the participating regional fisheries 
organizations into the scope of China 's port control. It is forbidden for fishing boats listed in IUU to 
enter Chinese ports, refuse to refu el, supply, and repair such fishing boats at Chinese ports, and 
refuse to unload, transfer, pack and process the fish caught by such fishing boats at Chinese ports. 
For Chinese fishing vessels entering foreign ports, China requires them to accept and coope rate with 
relevant countries to carry out port inspections in accordance with relevant international and relevant 
national laws. In order to further advance the process of joining the Port State Measures Agreement, 
China is advancing the reform of the fish ing port, strengthening the reporting of fishing boats 
entering and leaving the fishing port, establishing a catch traceability system, and prohibiting illegal 
catches from landing ashore. In May 2021, China and FAO jointly held an international seminar on  
advancing port state measures through video conferences, and organized domestic and foreign 
experts to discuss matters related to port state measures.  
 
(Question 105: Paragraph 4.44, page 152)  
Steelmaking capacity increase in foreign countries, mainly in ASEAN, has been promoted by the 
governmental strategies such as 13th Five -Year Plan and the Belt and Road Initiative. Please explain 
China 's view whether it considers the capacity increase, which significantly exceeds demands in the 
country invested by Chinese companies, in foreign countries does not cause excess capacity issues.  
 
Reply: At present, there is no data showing that there is a causal relationship between changes in 
foreign steel production capacity and the policies of the Chinese government. As of the end of 2018, 
China has completed the target of reducing crude steel production capacity by 150 million tons 
during the 13th Five -Year Plan period. The overall supply and demand situation of the iron and steel 
industry has beco me more reasonable, and the utilization rate of crude steel production has 
rebounded sharply.  
 
(Question 106: Paragraph 4.115 -119, page 152 -153)  
According to the following statistics disclosed in the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
of Chi na, it appears that production volumes of steel, aluminum and coal has increased for 
recent  three (3) years. Japan would like to request China to explain how China evaluate this situation 
in the context of excess capacity issues.  
(Steel)  
2018 
https://www.miit.gov.cn/gxsj/tjfx/yclgy/gt/art/2020/art_7e912c04b16d48c4a7609de9acee9a37.ht
ml  
2019 
https://www.miit.gov.cn/gxsj/tjfx/yclgy/gt/art/2020/art_78e06002ee5e441eb67427c450751fa9.ht
ml  
2020 
https://www.miit.gov.cn/gxsj/tjfx/yclgy/gt/art/2021/art_7e1abd4df2534112af929972244aa388.ht
ml  
 
(Aluminum)  
2018 
https://www.miit.gov.cn/gxsj/tjfx/yclgy/ys/art/2020/art_f26d2d6fab6a49ba825e64246260921d.ht
ml  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  2019 
https://www.miit. gov.cn/gxsj/tjfx/yclgy/ys/art/2020/art_96e67367c02f41ff8a0ee1cac2378e7e.ht
ml  
2020 
https://www.miit.gov.cn/gxsj/tjfx/yclgy/ys/art/2021/art_1c856f8 3c3234efd9fd01d7b4da3ff85.htm
l  
 
(Coal)  
2018 
http://219.235.131.8/pub/lwzb/gzdt/201905/t20190521_5097.html   
2019 
http://lwzb.stats.gov.cn/pub/lwzb/gzdt/202005/W020200528770641842151.pdf   
2020 
http://www.coalchina.org.cn//uploadfile/2021/0303/20210303022435291.pdf  
 
Reply: As for steel, China 's steel production mainly serves the needs of domestic economic 
constru ction and development. Since the outbreak of COVID -19, in particular, steel demand in the 
international market has been shrinking, but in China, the demand for steel has been strong. The 
output growth of steel and other products in the past three years has  mainly met the demands in 
the domestic market.  
As for aluminum, the development of electrolytic aluminum in China has based on the domestic 
demand. In 2020, balance in the supply and demand of electrolytic aluminum was basically 
maintained in China. With regard to coal, China strictly controls the amount of coal mined. In 
general, the management policy that outputs are determined by enterprises in the above fields 
themselves according to market needs has achieved good results in containing new capacities, and 
kept the bottom line of total capacity control.  
 
(Question 107: Paragraph 4.124, page 153)  
Please explain the system (if any) which ensures the China 's statement, "the Fund 's investment 
management and decision -making of the Fund are under the market p rinciples ".  
Please explain how is it possible to prove that it is under the market principles; for example, how 
the Fund decides and conducts exits and sales of investments as private funds usually do.  
Please explain why China did not confirm the figures  on shareholding in first term of China 's National 
IC Investment Fund. Please also clarify the share of investors and the conditions for receiving 
investment with respect to the second term of IC Investment Fund.  
 
Reply: National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Co., Ltd. is a corporate equity 
investment fund. It does not belong to any government department. Its management and decision -
making are completely market -oriented. Government department does not interfere with, nor 
participate in the decision -making progress of any investment program within the fund. The source 
of the fund will be released by the fund with accordance to requirements of Chinese law and 
regulation. The fund is operated in compliance with Company Law of China. Company  governing 
systems have been established accordingly, including general meeting of shareholders, board of 
directors and board of supervisors. The general meeting of shareholders is the supreme authority, 
the board of directors is responsible for implementi ng the decision from general meeting of 
shareholders and making decisions over certain major events in a legal manner. The senior 
managers of the fund is employed and designated by the board. The senior managers are responsible 
for daily operation of the f und. Board of supervisors is responsible for supervising the directors and 
the senior managers. Provincial level local funds and National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment 
Fund are both independently -operating market -oriented funds.  
 
(Question 108: Pa ragraph 4.132, page 154 -155)  
According to the Report S415, China is a world 's leading shipbuilder and MIIT is encouraging financial 
institutions to support the domestic shipbuilding industry. With respect to this, Japan would like to 
ask China if this fina ncial support covers fishing vessels for its modernization, and if so, could it 
potentially contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, which is considered as one of the world 's 
urgent problem to be addressed?  
 
Reply: China implements strict "shipping net work tool indexes " approval system for governing 
fishery ships and has established "two way control system of input and output ", controlling the total 
amount of ship, total power and total catch. By doing so, we gradually coordinated the relationship WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  betwe en the fishery capacity, total catch and the fishery resources carrying capacity, achieved 
sustainable utilization of marine fishery resources.  
 
(Question 109: Paragraph 4.143, page 157 -158)  
Please explain how CBIRC operates to achieve its mandate to "regulate and supervise banking and 
insurance institutions, maintain fair competition in the banking and insurance sectors ".  
 
Reply: Anti-unfair competition is the internal requirement of perfecting the market economy system 
and promoting high quality develo pment. According to Article 9 of the Law on Commercial Banks 
and Article 3 of the Banking Supervision Law, the CBIRC shall protect fair competition in the banking 
sector, and commercial banks shall not engage in any unfair competition. Articles 115 and 116  of 
the Insurance Law stipulate that insurance companies shall operate business according to the 
principle of fair competition, shall not commit unfair competition, and shall be prohibited from 
damaging the goodwill of competitors by fabricating or spreadi ng false facts, or disturbing the order 
of the insurance market by any other act of unfair competition. On the basis of such financial laws 
and administrative regulations as the Law on Commercial Banks, the Banking Supervision Law and 
the Insurance Law, th e CBIRC fully implements its regulatory responsibilities in the banking and 
insurance industry, severely cracks down on unfair competition, and effectively maintains the market 
competition order; it severely cracks down on illegal operations of banking and  insurance institutions 
and their employees, and their acts that damage the legitimate rights and interests of other financial 
institutions or disrupt financial order. It has strengthened market regulation and regulated market 
disorder through coordinated action at all levels, thus protecting the legitimate rights and interests 
of consumers and maintaining a fair and just market order.  
 
Please also explain how CBIRC assesses "fair competition " and what it does to ensure.  
 
Reply : Please refer to the above reply.  
 
(Question 110: Paragraph 4.204, page 169)  
Japan would like to know whether a provision of service through crowd computing itself will be 
included in the scope of the value -added telecom services, for which 50% cap of for eign shareholding 
is generally applied. For example, a foreign invested enterprise with 100% foreign shareholding may 
desire to provide its customers who bought its products with the maintenance and support services 
online through its crowd server. Is it a llowed for such 100% foreign invested enterprise to provide 
such maintenance and support services through its crowd server?  
 
Reply: Please clarify the business pattern of crowd computing.  
 
(Question 111: Paragraph 4.204, page 169)  
In China, Foreign companies are restricted from entering value -added communications and cloud 
services, which Japan is requesting to deregulate. In this context, Japan would like China to elaborate 
its view on opening the market to foreign companies. Japan  would like to know the reason why a 
guideline (for value -added telecommunication services and cloud services) which stipulates practical 
requirements and procedures of the regulation have not been formulated yet. If China plans to 
prepare such guidelines in future, Japan requests China to share the schedule for providing them.  
 
Reply: Currently, China is actively promoting the further opening of the telecom industry, with 
accordance to state 's requirement for constructing a new system of open economy. On top of 
fulfilling China 's promise of entering WTO, China is studying and investigating the feasibility of 
loosening the limitation of foreign capital share in the telecom industry in pilot districts.  
 
(Question 112: Paragraph 4.214 -222, page 170 -172)  
We understand that cybersecurity -related laws and regulations are subject to public comment, but 
have opinions from foreign governments and foreign companies been taken into account? If so, 
could China share with us specific examples?  
 
Reply: China follows th e principle of democratic legislation and attaches importance to extensively 
listening to opinions and suggestions from all quarters. When formulating laws and regulations 
related to cybersecurity, we paid attention to in -depth research in various places, and extensively 
listened to the opinions and suggestions of relevant departments, enterprises and experts through 
various methods such as holding seminars and demonstration meetings, and fully grasped all aspects 
of legislative needs. At the same time, the  Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and Personal WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Information Protection Law have been publicly solicited opinions from the public many times during 
the formulation process, and all domestic and foreign members of the public can submit their 
opinions onli ne or in paper.  
 
(Question 113: Paragraph 4.214, page 170)  
The scope of "critical information infrastructure " under Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law is 
stipulated in Article 31, but we understand that China has promised liberalization or partial 
liberalization in many of these areas. As the scope of "critical information infrastructure " is unclear, 
service providers in a wide range of fields that China has promised to liberalize under the GATS may 
be affected, and we would like to know the relationship  between the Law and the national treatment 
obligations of GATS.  
 
Reply: China has always complied with the WTO 's principles of national treatment and treats 
domestic and foreign service providers equally and equally. The relevant systems stipulated in 
Article  37 of the Cybersecurity Law have the same requirements for domestic and foreign service 
providers, and there is no requirement for foreign service providers to set higher obligations than 
similar domestic service providers and does no t constitute a violation of the principle of national 
treatment. The Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations clarified the 
definition of critical information infrastructure. Critical information infrastructure refers to importan t 
industries and fields such as public communication and information services, energy, transportation, 
water conservancy, finance, public services, e -government, national defense technology industry, 
and other important network facilities, information syst ems, etc. that may seriously endanger 
national security, national economy, people 's livelihood and public interests if they are damaged, 
lost function, or data leaked.  
 
(Question 114: Paragraph 4.214, page 170)  
Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law stipula tes that operators of "critical information infrastructures " 
are obligated to store personal information and critical data in China, and to conduct security 
assessments when providing such data outside China. In general, it is presumed that foreign 
operato rs consolidate and manage data centrally outside of China, and therefore, when fulfilling 
these obligations, it is assumed that there will be cases where additional burdens arise that do not 
arise for Chinese operators who consolidate and manage data domes tically. In this way, if foreign 
operators are effectively placed in disadvantageous competitive conditions compared to 
Chinese  domestic operators, there is a possibility that this will violate the national treatment 
obligations under Article 17 of the GAT S. We would like to know what the Chinese government 's 
position is on this point.  
 
Reply: It is a misinterpretation of the law to simply equate critical information infrastructure 
operators with foreign operators, and the scope of critical information inf rastructure is limited. The 
relevant provisions of the Cybersecurity Law treat domestic and foreign operators equally and make 
no difference. The primary starting point for China to formulate relevant policies is to support data 
flow and data development a nd utilization. But at the same time, it should be noted that disorderly 
circulation and sharing of data may lead to major risks in personal information protection and data 
security. Necessary, appropriate, and non -discriminatory management must be imposed . It is also 
a common international practice to strengthen the management of cross -border data flows.  
 
(Question 115: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Japan recognizes the Provisions on Ecological Governance of Network Information Content 
(http://www.cac.g ov.cn/2019 -12/20/c_1578375159509309.htm) provides for content restrictions 
of information on the Internet. Japan would like to request China to answer whether and how such 
restrictions will apply to the contents transmitted or imported from foreign countri es.  
 
Reply: Article 2 of the "Regulations on the Ecological Governance of Network Information Content " 
clarifies that these regulations apply to the ecological governance of network information content 
within the territory of the People 's Republic of China. Therefore, to engage in network information 
content services within the territory of the People 's Republic of China, the relevant requirements of 
the "Regulations " should be followed.  
 
(Question 116: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Japan would like China to answer when (1) the Regulation on the administration of commercial 
encryption which was issued on  20 August 2020, (2) Cyber Security Multi -Level Protection Scheme, 
(3) Data Security Management Measures, (4) Personal Information Outbound Transfer Security WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Review Measures, and (5) the amendment of Cybersecurity Review Measures, are expected to be 
enacte d and current situations of progress.  
 
Reply:  The Regulation on the Administration of Commercial Encryption (revised) has been included 
in the legislative work plan of the State Council for 2021. In the revision of the Regulation on the 
Administration of Commercial Encryption, China will abide by the principles of law, democracy and 
science, adhere to openness, transparency and scientific demonstration, widely solicit public 
opinions, and ensure that stakeholders participate in the revision by legal means.  
 
Reply: According to the Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law, and the Personal Information 
Protection Law, relevant supporting regulations such as data security management and data 
outbound security assessment are being formulated, and it is expected that the  public will solicit 
public opinions in the near future.  
 
(Question 117: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
The Cybersecurity Law provides that when selling network core products and specialized 
cybersecurity products, it is required to obtain a security cert ification following the related national 
standards and industry standards, it is assumed that technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures for these products will be established. Japan would like to request China to 
answer whether China inten d to notify such technical regulations, etc. to TBT Committee. If it fails 
to do so, it would be inconsistent with Article 2.9.2 of TBT Agreement.  
 
Reply: China has consistently complied with the requirements of the Technical Barriers to 
Trade  Agreement a nd notified the Technical Barriers to Technical Barriers Committee of relevant 
mandatory national standards and other technical regulations in a timely manner. Among the 
national standards related to information security, only "Computer Information System Security 
Protection Grade Classification Guidelines " (GB 17859 -1999) is a mandatory national standard. The 
rest are recommended national standards or guiding technical documents, and there are currently 
no issues such as notification of strong standards.  
 
(Question 118: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law obliges critical information infrastructure (CII) operators (CIIOs) 
to store personal information or important data collected during operations in China and to undertake 
a security review of such data when it is transferred outside of China. Please clarify the specific 
scope of CIIOs.  
The Cybersecurity Law and Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Regulations do not have 
exhaustive list in the definitions of CII or  CIIOs and are not foreseeable, even though it would cause 
a significant burden to the business entity if it falls under the category of CIIOs. Japan would like to 
ask China for its views on the possibility of an exclusive list of CII or CIIOs, where any u nlisted items 
will not be included as CII nor CIIOs.  
 
Reply: The Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations clarified the definition 
of critical information infrastructure. Critical information infrastructure refers to important i ndustries 
and fields such as public communication and information services, energy, transportation, water 
conservancy, finance, public services, e -government, national defense technology industry, and 
other important network facilities, information systems , etc. that may seriously endanger national 
security, national economy, people 's livelihood and public interests if they are damaged, lost 
function, or data leaked. Chapter 2 of the "Regulations " stipulates that the competent departments 
and supervisory departments of the above -mentioned important industries and fields are responsible 
for formulating key information infrastructure identification rules, and organizing the identification 
of key info rmation infrastructure in the industry and this field as the protection work department. 
The operator shall be notified of the determination result in a timely manner, and the public security 
department of the State Council shall be notified. Judging from the situation of various countries, it 
is quite complicated to specify the scope of key information infrastructure, and it is a process of 
continuous improvement and continuous adjustment in practice. At present, relevant departments 
are actively promoting  the establishment of rules for the identification of critical information 
infrastructure and the organization of identification in accordance with the "Regulations. "  
 
(Question 119: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law stip ulates that where it is truly necessary to provide the personal 
data and the important data to the outside of China due to business requirements, the data shall be 
subjected to a security assessment in accordance with the measures jointly formulated by the  State WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  cybersecurity and informatization departments and the relevant departments of the State Council. 
Japan would like to request China to answer when such measures jointly formulated by the State 
cybersecurity and informatization departments, etc. will be enacted.  
 
Reply: In accordance with the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and Personal Information 
Protection Law, relevant supporting regulations such as data security management and data exit 
security assessment are being formulated, and it is exp ected to solicit public opinions from the public 
in the near future.   
 
(Question 120: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Article 10 of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Regulations stipulates that the relevant 
competent departments in each indust ry and sector shall certify CIIs in their jurisdictional areas and 
notify it to the business operator. Does this provision means that the business operator is not 
required to treat any infrastructure as CII until it is notified as certified CII? In additio n, Japan would 
like to request China to answer what CII has already been certified.  
 
Reply: Please see the answer to question 118.   
 
(Question 121: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Article 2 of the Data Security Law provides, "data processing activities carried out outside China 
which harms the national security of China, the public interest, or the lawful rights and interests of 
citizens and organizations, are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law ". Please 
answer whether this provision means extraterritorial application of this Law or not. Please also 
provide the specific name and article of such "law" under which foreign organisation or individuals 
would be subject to the legal liability.  
 
Reply: In accordance with Article 2.2 of the Data Security Law of the anyone who conducts data 
processing activities outside the People 's Republic of China that harms the national security, 
public  interests, or the legi timate rights and interests of citizens or organizations of the 
People 's Republic of China shall be investigated for legal responsibility in accordance with the law. 
The above provisions of the Data Security Law have the necessary extraterritorial effect i n 
accordance with the principle of protective jurisdiction. Anyone who commits the above acts may be 
investigated for legal responsibility in accordance with the China 's Criminal Law, the law applicable 
on the Application of Civil Legal Relationship Concer ning Foreign Affairs and other laws.  
 
(Question 122: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Please answer whether the Data Security Law regulates foreign organisations and individuals acting 
in China or not.  
 
Reply: In accordance with Article 2.1 of the Data Sec urity Law of the People 's Republic of China, 
data processing activities and safety supervision inside the People 's Republic of China shall be subject 
this Law. Accordingly, foreign organizations and individuals conducting data activities in China shall 
also be subject to this Law.  
 
(Question 123: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Please clarify the scope of "data processing activities within or outside China ", which is regulated by 
the Data Security Law. Under current wordings of this Law, it appears any kind of data processing 
could be subject to this Law, which will significantly hinders the foreseeability of organisations and 
individuals in other countries.  Please consider to clarify more objective and reasonable standard by 
amending the relevant sentence more practically, such as "data processing activities ancillary to the 
products or services to Chinese market ". 
 
Reply: In accordance with the protective j urisdiction principle as provided in the Article 2.2 of the 
Data Security Law, this Law has necessary extraterritorial effects.  
 
(Question 124: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
With respect to the "management and supervision of data processing activities and  their security in 
China " as stipulated in Article 2 of the Data Security Law, please clarify the standard to determine 
whether or not the data processing or data security is conducted "within China ". As for the criteria 
for "within China ", please consider  to set objective and detail criteria, such as the location of the 
acting entities or the data storage location, etc  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: There are many links in data processing. According to the general understanding, whether 
the actual place of processing behavior o r the location of the server is located in China shall be taken 
as the judgment criterion, and pure network data transmission  shall usually not be regarded as 
processing within China.  
 
(Question 125: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Please answer the general contents of " management systems for data transactions ", "categorical 
and hierarchical system for data protection ", " systems for data security reviews " and "data security 
management systems for the entire process ", which is conte mplated to be established under the 
Data Security Law. Please also answer when such systems are expected to be established.  
 
Reply: As a basic law in the data field, the Data Security Law has established a basic system for 
data security protection and man agement, and relevant departments are formulating and improving 
related supporting regulations. Laws, regulations, and standards that have been issued or have been 
solicited for opinions include but are not limited to Regulations on the Protection of Criti cal 
Information Infrastructure, Regulations on the Protection of Cybersecurity Levels, Measures for 
Cybers Security Review, and Guidelines for Classification and Grading of Industrial Data (for Trial 
Implementation), Financial Data Security Data Security C lassification Guide, and other laws and 
regulations.  
 
(Question 126: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Article 21of Data Security Law (enforced from 1 September 2021) provides that a list of "important 
data" will be enacted by relevant governmental agencies. Japan would like to request China to 
answer:  
(1) when such list will be enacted; and  
(2) whether t he definition of "important data " in Data Security Law is same with the "important 
data" in Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law or not  
 
Reply:  The "important data " stipulated by Data Security Law is consistent with the "important data " 
stipulated by the Cybersecurity Law. For the specific situation of the formulation of the important 
data catalog.  
 
(Question 127: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Japan would like to re quest China to explain under what circumstances can the governmental 
agencies force the operators of networks, etc. to submit credit information of enterprises and 
individuals.  
 
Reply: China attaches great importance to the protection of personal informat ion, and has 
successively promulgated laws and regulations such as the Cybersecurity Law and the Personal 
Information Protection Law, and established systems and rules with clear rights and responsibilities, 
effective protection, and standardized use to pr otect the rights and interests of personal information 
in accordance with the law. According to the relevant provisions of the Personal Information 
Protection Law, in order to perform statutory duties, state agencies shall process personal 
information in a ccordance with the powers and procedures prescribed by laws and administrative 
regulations, and shall not exceed the scope and limits necessary to perform statutory duties.  
 
(Question 128: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Article 24 of the Data Security Ac t stipulates that "a national security review shall be conducted for 
data processing activities that affect or may affect national security. Please explain detail on what 
specific cases Article 24 applies to.  
 
Reply: China is currently working on the revision of the Cybersecurity Review Measures, and plans 
to include data processing activities that affect or may affect national security into the scope of 
review. The "Measures (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments )" has been publicly solicited from 
the public through the Chinese Government Legal Information Network and China Netcom from 
July 10 to July 25, 2021.  
 
(Question 129: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Please clarify the detail concept of "data which is sub ject to the controlled items ... related to 
maintenance of national security and interest and the performance of international obligations " 
under Article 25 of the Data Security Law, to which export control applies. The definition and scope 
of the controll ed items and contents of applicable export control is not stipulated in this Law, and WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  thus should be clarified. Please explain how to avoid making arbitrary operation, such as by 
considering industry policy perspectives.  
 
Reply: Please see the answer to q uestion 44.  
 
(Question 130: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
As for "other data processing persons " stipulated in Article 31 of the Data Security Act, since there 
is no definition and it is unclear which entities are covered, please clarify the specific scope of "other 
data processing persons ".  
In addition, as the criteria for determining "important da ta" stipulated in Article 31 remains unclear, 
please clarify the criteria for determining the applicable data.  
Please also answer the detail contents of security control over the transfer of important data to 
outside China and preparation status of such c ontents. Please explain how to ensure transparency 
and foreseeability of such contents, because such contents may become excessive restrictions on 
trade.  
 
Reply: The purpose of data exit management is to maintain national network security and protect 
the interests of the people. It is not to prevent the cross -border flow of data, let alone restrict 
international trade. According to the "Data Security Law ", relevant supporting regulations such as 
data security management and data outbound security assessmen t are being formulated, and it is 
expected that the public will solicit opinions from the public in the near future.  
 
(Question 131: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Article 35 of the Data Security Law obliges "relevant organizations and individuals " to cooperate 
when public security agencies and state security agencies need to inspect data to preserve national 
security or investigate crimes.  
Please answer whether organisations and individuals outside China is also obliged to cooperate un der 
this Law or not.  
Please also clarify the detail contents of applicable laws and regulations and relevant agencies related 
to the procedures for the above -mentioned data inspection.  
 
Reply: In accordance with Article 2 of the Data Security Law of the People 's Republic of China, data 
processing activities and its safety supervision inside the People 's Republic of China shall be subject 
to this Law.  
Anyone who conducts data processing activities outside the People 's Republic of China that harm 
the na tional security, public interests, or the legitimate rights and interests of citizens or 
organizations of the People 's Republic of China shall be investigated for legal responsibility in 
accordance with the law.  
 
(Question 132: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171) 
Article 44 of the Data Security Law provides, "where relevant regulatory departments performing 
data security oversight and management duties discover that data processing activities have 
relatively large security risks, they may conduct interview to th e relevant organizations or individuals 
and may require them to employ "measures to eliminate the potential risks. "  
Please clarify the detail contents or standard on "relatively large security risks " and" measures to 
eliminate the potential risks ".  
 
Reply: Article 27 of the Data Security Law of the People 's Republic of China stipulates that "In 
conducting data processing activities, one shall, in accordance with the provisions of laws and 
regulations, establish and improve a whole -process data security management system, organize 
data security education and training, and take corresponding technical measures and other 
necessary measures to safeguard data security. In conducting data processing activities by using 
the Internet or any other inform ation network, one shall perform the above data security protection 
obligations on the basis of the hierarchical cybersecurity protection system. " 
 
(Question 133: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
The Data Security Law requires private organisations in China  to prepare reports and system with 
respect to security assessment; but their detail contents are not clear. Please answer whether there 
is any plan to establish guideline, etc. on the system and so forth to be established by private 
organisations.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply : China would like  Japan to further clarify which provisions of the Data Security Law are 
involved in the above question.  
 
(Question 134: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, Personal Information Protection Law and related regulations 
provide for the following cybersecurity reviews by relevant authorities;  
(1) transfer of personal information and important data outside China by critical information 
infrastructure operators (Article 37 of the Cybersecurity Law);  
(2) transfer  of personal information outside China by operators of critical information infrastructure 
and personal information processors whose processing of personal information reaches the number 
prescribed by the State cyberspace administration(Article 38 of the P ersonal Information Protection 
Law);  
(3) data security review for data processing activities (Article 24 of the Data Security Law and 
Article  2 of Cybersecurity Review Measures);  
(4) procurement of network equipment and service by operators of critical i nformation infrastructure 
(Article 35 of the Cybersecurity Law); and  
(5) foreign listing of business operator which has more than one million of personal information 
(Article 6 of Cybersecurity Review Measures).  
In the process of these cybersecurity review, there is a concern that foreign entities may be 
subjected to less favorable treatment, or that trade secrets and technical information (such as source 
code) of companies may be excessively collected or leaked, which may violate the national treatment 
obligations stipulated in Article 17 of GATS and Articles 8.4 and 10.3 of RCEP Agreement, depending 
on the operation of reviews. Japan would like to request China to make the standards of such security 
reviews fair and clear and to ensure the transparency in their enforcements. On the condition, is 
there any legal security to prevent unfavorable treatment of foreign business operators and 
excessive collection and leakage of such confidential information? If so, pleas e explain.  
 
Reply: The cybersecurity review fully respects and strictly protects the company 's intellectual 
property rights and related trade secrets. Article 16 of the Cybersecurity Review Measures stipulates 
that "Relevant institutions and personnel par ticipating in cybersecurity review shall strictly protect 
business secrets and intellectual property rights of enterprises, undertake confidentiality obligations 
for undisclosed materials submitted by operators, product and service providers, and other 
undisclosed information learned during the review; Without the consent of the information provider, 
it may not be disclosed to unrelated parties or used for purposes other than review. "Article 17 
stipulates that "Operators or network product and service prov iders who believe that the reviewers 
are not objective and fair, or fail to assume the obligation to keep confidential the information learned 
during the review work, may report to the Cybersecurity Review Office or relevant departments. "  
 
(Question 135: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
The Provisions on Management of Automobile Data Security (enforced on 1 October 2021) appears 
not to have detail standards and procedures for "security review " under its Article 11. Please answer 
whether there  is any subordinate regulation or guideline to clarify such standards and procedures. 
If the answer is no, please answer when such standards and procedures are expected to be enacted.  
 
Reply: In accordance with the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and  Personal Information 
Protection Law, relevant supporting regulations such as data security management and data exit 
security assessment are being formulated, and it is expected to solicit public opinions from the public 
in the near future.  
 
These Regulat ions provides that international treaties committed by China shall prevail over these 
Regulations if there is any inconsistency. Please answer whether China recognizes any inconsistency 
between these Regulations and Articles 12.14 and 12.15 of RCEP Agreeme nt, and, if yes, how these 
Articles of RCEP Agreement will be applied.  
 
Reply: Article 11 of the Provisions on the Management of Automobile Data Security stipulates that, 
if there are different provisions in the international treaties or agreements commit ted by China, such 
international treaties or agreements shall apply, except the provisions on which China has declared 
reservations.  
 
Japan concerns the risk of inconsistency with Article 17 of GATS and Articles 8.4 and 10.3 of 
RCEP Agreement, if foreign operators do not receive national treatment, or if trade secrets or WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  technical information (such as source code) is collected unnecessary or leaked by governmental 
agencies. Please answer whether there is any system or measure to avoid  such situations or not.  
 
Reply: China 's measures are in compliance with the WTO rules and relevant treaty obligations  
 
(Question 136: Paragraph 4.217, page 171)  
Please clarify the detail and comprehensive scope of "commercial encryption "to be covered b y "the 
Regulation on the administration of commercial encryption " In addition, Japan is afraid that the 
security review, certification, import and export permits, and enforcement of the use of specific 
commercial encryption stipulated in the regulation may  constitute a violation of national treatment 
obligation if the conditions of competition for foreign products and services are effectively 
unfavorable compared to like domestic products and services. Please explain the China 's view on 
this point. Japan wo uld like China to answer how to make the requirements and standards fair and 
clear and to ensure the transparency of the operation so that foreign business entities are not treated 
unfavorably.  
 
Reply : Article 2 of the Regulation on the Administration of Commercial Encryption (Revised Draft 
for Comments) stipulates that commercial encryption referred to in this regulation means cipher 
techniques, products and services used for the protection or the security certification of information 
not involving state secret with specific transformation methods. Article 21 of the Encryption Law 
provides that people 's governments at all levels and their relevant departments shall abide by the 
principle of non -discrimination, and lawfully and equally tre at commercial encryption scientific 
research, production, sale, service, import and export, and other entities including foreign -funded 
enterprises. The state encourages cooperation in commercial encryption technology based on the 
principle of voluntarines s and business rules in the process of foreign investment. Neither 
administrative agency nor any of its employees shall use administrative means to force commercial 
encryption technology to be transferred. The research, production, sale, service, import an d export 
of commercial encryption shall not harm national security, the public interest or the lawful rights 
and interests of another person.  
 
(Question 137: Paragraph 4.217, page 171)  
Please clarify and specify the scope of the subject and standard of ex port and import regulations of 
commercial encryption, such as the commercial encryption that affects national security and the 
public interest and has encryption protection function as stipulated in the Regulation on the 
administration of commercial encryp tion.  
 
Reply: Article 28 of the Encryption Law provides that the commerce department of the State Council 
and the state cryptographic administrative authority shall, according to the laws, subject commercial 
encryption with encrypted protection functional ity relating to national security or public interest to 
import licensing and impose export control on commercial encryption relating to national security or 
public interest, or with respect to which China has an international obligation. A list of commerci al 
encryption under import licensing and a list of commercial encryption under export control have 
been developed and issued by the Ministry of Commerce in conjunction with the State Cryptography 
Administration and the General Administration of Customs. As  for the import of the items and 
technologies included in the List of Commercial Encryption under Import Licensing, an application 
shall be made to the Ministry of Commerce for the Import License for Dual -purpose Items and 
Technologies; as for the export o f the items and technologies included in the List of Commercial 
Encryption under Export Control, an application shall be made to the Ministry of Commerce for the 
Export License for Dual -purpose Items and Technologies.  
 
(Question 138: Paragraph 4.217, page 171)  
Japan would like to request China to explain what kind of merit or incentive, if any, is given to a 
company which voluntarily apply to qualified testing and certification agencies for the testing and 
certification of their commercial encryption produ cts under the Encryption Law.  
 
Reply : According to the Encryption Law, the State Administration for Market Regulation shall, 
together with the State Cryptography Administration, establish a unified national certification system 
for the certification of commercial encryption products listed in the Catalogue of Commercial 
Encryption Products Subject to Certification. The state shall encourage commercial encryption 
practicing entities to voluntarily accept the testing and certification of c ommercial encryption to 
improve market competitiveness. Any commercial encryption product relating to national security, 
national economy and people 's livelihood, or public interest shall be put on the list of key network WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  equipment and exclusive cybersecur ity products, and may be sold or provided only after a qualified 
institution finds the product to have passed testing and certification. The administration of 
commercial encryption products fully embodies the principle of non -discrimination and fair 
compet ition. Domestic and foreign products as well as domestic and foreign enterprises are equally 
subject to the administration.  
 
(Question 139: Paragraph 4.217, page 171)  
Article 25 of the Encryption Law provides that inspection and certification organizations of 
commercial encryption are obliged to keep commercial secrets confidential. Will such confidentiality 
obligations be applicable to other governmental agencies and t he Communist Party? Is there any 
possibility that the governmental agencies and the Communist Party may request the disclosure of 
commercial secrets for the purpose of national security or other reasons?  
 
Reply : The Encryption Law stipulates  that a crypto graphic administrative authority or relevant 
authority, or any of its employees, shall not require any commercial encryption practicing entity or 
commercial encryption testing and certification institution to disclose encryption -related exclusive 
informati on such as the source code to it, and shall strictly keep confidential any trade secret or 
personal privacy that comes to their knowledge in performing duties, without divulging or illegally 
providing the trade secret or personal privacy to another person.  
 
(Question 140: Paragraph 4.217, page 171)  
Some provisions in the Personal Information Protection Law appear to be redundant with or different 
from the Cybersecurity Law. For example, the Cybersecurity Law only refers to the consent of data 
subject as ju stification to process personal information; but the Article 13 of the Personal Information 
Protection Law allows other legitimate basis in addition to such consent. Also, under the Article 40 
of the Personal Information Protection Law, only "Operators of critical information infrastructure " 
and "personal information processors whose processing of personal information reaches the number 
prescribed by the State cyberspace administration " are obliged to store data domestically. Therefore, 
any other person shall not be required to store data domestically, and does not need to pass the 
security review under the Article 40, when such person desires to transfer the personal information 
outside  China in accordance with the Article 38.  
Please clarify whether we can understand that the provisions of the Personal Information Protection 
Law, which was enacted more recently and is less restrictive, prevails over the corresponding 
provisions of the C ybersecurity Law or not.  
 
Reply: First, in accordance with the development and popularization of information technology and 
the increasing needs of personal information processing situations, the Personal Information 
Protection Law expands the legal basis  for processing personal information on the basis of the 
Cybersecurity Law. In addition to obtaining individual consent, it also includes: necessary for the 
conclusion and performance of a contract in which the individual is a party, or necessary for the 
implementation of human resource management in accordance with the labor rules and regulations 
established in accordance with the law and the collective contract signed in accordance with the law; 
necessary to perform statutory duties or statutory obligatio ns and many other situations. Second, 
in order to meet the needs of international economic and trade exchanges and fully protect the rights 
and interests of personal information, the Personal Information Protection Law has established clear 
and systematic rules for the cross -border flow of personal information. According to the provisions 
of Article 38 and Article 40 of the Personal Information Protection Law, the personal information that 
should be stored in China is limited to the personal information col lected and generated by key 
information infrastructure operators and personal information processors who process personal 
information up to the number specified by the national cyberspace administration during operations 
in China; If it is really necessary  to provide it overseas, it shall pass the security assessment 
organized by the national cyberspace administration; Where laws, administrative regulations, and 
national cybersecurity and informatization departments provide that security assessments may not  
be required, those provisions shall prevail. For other personal information processors who provide 
personal information overseas, the Personal Information Protection Law provides for channels such 
as certification by professional institutions and in accor dance with standard contracts formulated by 
the national cybersecurity and informatization department.  
 
In addition, if the international treaties or agreements that the People 's Republic of China has 
concluded or participated in have provisions on the co nditions for providing personal information 
abroad, it can also be provided overseas in accordance with the provisions of the international 
treaties and agreements.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 141: Paragraph 4.219, page 171 -172)  
Foreign enterprises will lose foreseeabilit y and face obstacle in their business activities, unless the 
scope and interpretations of extraterritorial application in Article 3.2 of the Personal Information 
Protection Law will be clarified such as through guidelines. This Article 3.2 adopted same sta ndard 
with GDPR (EU General Data Protection Regulation); but GDPR has detailed interpretation guidelines. 
Please explain the China 's view on the article.  
 
Reply: Paragraph II of Article 3 of the Personal Information Protection Law of the 
People 's Republic  of China mainly applies to cross -border transactions targeting individuals in China, 
and personal information processing behaviors in such activities as recording and tracking the 
personal information of natural persons within Chinese territory to analyze  and evaluate the 
behaviors of such natural persons.  
 
(Question 142: Paragraph 4.219, page 171 -172)  
Article 38 of the Personal Information Protection Law (enforced from 1 November 2021) stipulates 
the following 4 requirements for the transfer of personal information outside China: (1) passing the 
security review conducted by the State cybersecurity administration;  
(2) obtaining certification in relation to personal information protection from professional 
institutions;  
(3) entering into a standard contra ct as prescribed by the State cyberspace administration with the 
overseas receiving parties to stipulate the rights and obligations of both parties; and  
(4) fulfilling the requirements stipulated in other laws or regulations, or in the rules set by the st ate 
cyberspace authorities.  
The details of the these requirements are unclear. Please clarify such details on the security review, 
certification and contract. If such details cannot be clarified, please answer when such details are 
expected to be clarified .  
Regarding the requirement (1), Japan recognizes that the draft of the Personal Information 
Outbound Transfer Security Assessment Measures (http://www.cac.gov.cn/2017 -
04/11/c_1120785691.htm) was disclosed on 13 June 2019 for public comments. Japan would like 
to request China to explain when the Regulations are expected to be enacted. In addition, Japan 
would like to request China to make the standards for (1) security reviews fair and clear and to 
ensure the transparency in their enforcements.  
Regarding the requirement (2), Japan would like to know when the detail on the certification in 
relation to personal information protection is expected to be enacted.  
 
Reply: In the field of personal information protection, China has issued an announcement in 
March  2019, establishing and implementing a mobile Internet application (App) security certification 
system, and evaluating whether the App 's collection and use of consumer personal information 
meets national standards. App security certification is currently b eing carried out in an orderly 
manner.  
 
Regarding the requirement (3), Japan would like to know when the standard contract is expected to 
be enacted.  
 
Reply: In accordance with the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and Personal Information 
Protection Law, relevant supporting regulations such  as data security management and data exit 
security assessment are being formulated, and it is expected to solicit public opinions from the public 
in the near future.  
 
(Question 143: Paragraph 4.219, page 171 -172)  
Please clarify the details of "Operators of Critical Information Infrastructure " and "personal 
information processors whose processing of personal information reaches the number prescribed by 
the State cyberspace administration ", which are subject to the domestic storage obligation in the 
Article 40 of the Personal Information Protection Law. If such detail has not been determined yet, 
please answer when such detail is expected to be determined.  
 
Reply: The Regulations on the Security Protection of Critic al Information Infrastructure clarified the 
definition of critical information infrastructure. Critical information infrastructure refers to important 
industries and fields such as public communication and information services, energy, transportation, 
water conservancy, finance, public services, e -government, national defense technology industry, 
and other important network facilities, information systems, etc. that may seriously endanger 
national security, national economy, people 's livelihood and public i nterests if they are damaged, WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  lost function, or data leaked. Chapter 2 of the "Regulations " stipulates that the competent 
departments and supervisory departments of the above -mentioned important industries and fields 
are responsible for formulating key inf ormation infrastructure identification rules, and organizing the 
identification of key information infrastructure in the industry and this field as the protection work 
department. The operator shall be notified of the determination result in a timely manne r, and the 
public security department of the State Council shall be notified. According to the Cybersecurity Law, 
the Data Security Law, and the Personal Information Protection Law, relevant supporting regulations 
such as data security management and data outbound security assessment are being formulated, 
and it is expected that the public will solicit public opinions in the near future.  
 
(Question 144: Paragraph 4.219, page 171 -172)  
Article 42 of the Personal Information Protection Law provides that, if any overseas organization or 
individual conduct processing of personal information in any manner which damages "the personal 
information rights and interests of citizens of China, or endanger the national security or public 
interests of China ", the provisi on of personal information to such organization or individual will be 
prohibited or restricted. It appears this requirement is unclear. Please clarify the detail standard for 
such requirement. Japan concerns arbitrary operation of this provision may lose f oreseeability in 
operations of processors of personal information.  
 
Reply: The Personal Information Protection Law is applicable to Chinese citizen information interest 
infringement that happened overseas, or personal information processing activities that  endanger 
China 's national security and public interests.  
The Cybersecurity Review Measures (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) was publicly 
solicited from the public in July this year. The Chinese side has fully studied the opinions put forward 
by all sectors of society. At present, relevant content, including supporting measures and standards, 
is still being improved.  
 
(Question 145: Paragraph 4.219, page 171 -172)  
Article 41 of the Personal Information Protection Law (enforced from 1 November 2021) and 
Article  36 of Data Security Law (enforced from 1 September 2021) requires consent of the competent 
government departments when domestic organizations and individuals provide data and personal 
information stored in China to foreign judici al or law enforcement authorities. Japan would like to 
request China to explain the procedures for obtaining the consent of the competent government 
departments.  
 
Reply: With regard to cross -border judicial or law enforcement activities, China proposes th at they 
should be handled in accordance with international judicial assistance treaties and agreements, 
administrative law enforcement assistance agreements and agreements on the basis of respecting 
national sovereignty and the principles of equality and r eciprocity. These shall also be applicable for 
cross-border data retrieval for judicial and administrative law enforcement. In the absence of 
relevant treaties or agreements, approval of the competent Chinese authorities is required according 
to the Person al Information Protection Law and the Data Security Law.  
 
(Question 146: Paragraph 4.219, page 171 -172)  
The Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law provides that China may employ 
equal measures against that nation or region based on the actual circumstances if any nation or 
region employs discriminatory, restrictive, or other similar measures against China. Please clarify 
the contents and standard on "discriminatory, restrictive, or other similar measures " and "equal 
measures ".  
 
Reply: In recent years, some countries have violated WTO rules and taken unreasonable 
prohibitions, restrictions, or other measures against China in the fields of investment and trade, and 
unreasonably suppressed Chinese enterprises. According to the principle of reciprocity, China has 
the right to take corresponding measures to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese 
enterprises and maintain the normal international economic and trade order. The above provisions 
of Data Security Law and Personal I nformation Protection Law are consistent with the relevant 
provisions of Foreign Investment Law and Foreign Trade Law.  
 
(Question 147: Paragraph 4.220, page 172)  
With regard to the cybersecurity assessment stipulated in Cybersecurity Review Measures, the 
provisions of the articles appear unclear as to when the cybersecurity assessment is necessary and 
what standard applies to such assessment. Please clarify more de tail requirements and standards. WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Please answer whether there is any plan to formulate guidelines or regulations that specify such 
detail requirements and standards. Japan would like to request China to make equal and transparent 
standards and to ensure tra nsparency of operation.  
 
Reply: The Cybersecurity Review Measures (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) was publicly 
solicited from the public in July this year. We have fully studied the opinions put forward by all 
sectors of society. At present, relevant content, including suppo rting measures and standards, is still 
being improved.  
 
(Question 148: Paragraph 4.220, page 172)  
Japan understand that the draft amendment of Cybersecurity Review Measures not only regulates 
the CIIOs but also regulates data processing persons, requirin g data processing persons to take 
cybersecurity assessment if date processing activity affects or may affect national security. Please 
clarify the scope of such data processing persons and data processing activities under this Measure.  
 
Reply: Please refe r to the answer to question 148.  
 
(Question 149: Paragraph 4.220, page 172)  
Regarding Article 10 of the Cybersecurity Review Measures, please clarify the specific scope and 
definitions of "core data ", "important data " and "large amounts of personal data " so that business 
operator can objectively understand the scope of these concepts  
 
Reply: Please refer to the answer to question 148.  
 
(Question 150: Paragraph 4.220, page 172)  
Article 16 of the draft amendment of Cybersecurity Review Measures provides that government 
organizations related to cybersecurity review may initiate cybersecurity review of data processing 
and listed activities outside of China that may affect national security. Please answer the detail on 
the element of "affect or may affect th e national security " regarding the assessment by CAC.  
 
Reply: Please refer to the answer to question 148.   
 
(Question 151: Paragraph 4.223, page 167 -172)  
Article 25 of the E -commerce Law provides that, "Where relevant competent authority requires an 
e-commerce operator to provide e -commerce data information according to laws and administrative 
regulations, such e -commerce operator shall provide ". Japan would like to request China to explain 
under what situations the Government can require the data informa tion, and what kind of data 
information will be required. Can such data information be provided to the Government by the e -
commerce operator without knowledge of relevant parties of e -commerce transactions?  
 
Reply:  According to the Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Online Transactions, 
online transaction operators should provide data and information on the prices, sales, and sales of 
goods or services in a specific time period, a specific variety, a nd a specific area in accordance with 
the requirements of the State Administration for Market Regulation and its authorized provincial 
market supervision and management departments.  
 
(Question 152: Paragraph 4.223, page 172)  
Does the scope of operators s ubject to the E -commerce law include suppliers of telecommunications 
service and computer related services, including cloud services, in terms of China 's commitments 
under the GATS? If so, what kinds of sub -sectors of those servies are included and what ot her 
sectors are not included?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the interpretation of the E -Commerce Law. 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_dzswf/ImportNews/201901/20 190102828936.shtml   
 
(Question 153: Paragraph 4.4 (Table A4.2), page 202)  
Regarding the Fund for distant water fishery of Rizhao City and Qingdao City, Shandong Province, 
listed in Table A4.2 Local government support to fishries as notified to the WTO, whose objective is 
to promote sustainable development of distant water fisher ies and improve the stability and safety 
of distant water fishing vessels, Japan would like to ask China what kind of requirements should be 
satisfied to grant such subsidies. Are they contingent upon fishing in areas beyond China 's 
jurisdiction? Are they conditioned to comply with obligations by relevant international agreements WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  and rules such as covered species and areas for fishing, catch volume, and installation of Global 
Positioning Systems and observer crew on board?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the Subsidy Notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China.  
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  JAPAN – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
Report by the Government (WT/TPR/G/415)  
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANK IND   
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core  
4.2.2 Deeply and fully participating in multilateral negotiations and discussions, and 
earnestly fulfilling the obligations as a WTO Member  
(Question 1: Paragraph 4.24, pa ge 16)  
China answered that it does not need to make notification about guiding documents such as the 
13th Five -Year Plan. Please identify and explain the measures, including subsidies, taken to realize 
the policy stipulated in guiding documents, i.e., tran sferring production capacity from China to 
foreign countries, mentioned in the 13th Five -Year Plan.   
If no subsidy programs or other measures are implemented in order to realize the transfer of 
production from China to foreign countries, please explain ho w China implements the policy 
described in the Plan.   
 
Reply: The 13th Five-year Plan was publicly released  and t he full text is available to all parties. It 
is a guiding document without  specific subsidy policy. Therefore, China does not need to make 
notification on it.  
As mentioned in "Section 2 International Cooperation on Production Capacity and Equipment 
Manufacturing" in Chapter 49 of the Outline, the purpose  is to promote deep integ ration of the global 
industrial chain and to foster new driving forces of economic growth in all countries, instead of 
"transferring production capacity" claimed by the parties concerned. While adhering to the principles 
of an enterprise -dominant pattern, market orientation, commercial considerations and international 
practices, the government is mainly responsible for providing  public services and striving for win -
win cooperation among all parties.  
 
4.3 Promoting Fairer and More Equitable Global Economic G overnance System  
(Question 2: Paragraph 4.34, page 17)  
Considering that the proposed works such as on SOEs in APEC are objective and neutral, and do not 
presuppose any conclusions, please explain why China still cannot agree or thinks those works are 
not so.   
 
Reply:  The necessary condition for carrying out relevant work under APEC is that the research  
initiative itself should be objective and neutral  without  presuppos ing any conclusions.  
 
5 DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD MA RKET 
SYSTEM  
5.1 Generating New Demand Through Innovation -Driven Development and High -Quality 
Supply  
5.1.3 Dissolving excess production capacity and improving the quality of supply  
(Question 3: Paragraph 5.4, page 21)  
Please provide the definition of the term "Zombie Enterprises " for which China prohibits financial 
support to maintain its survival. Please confirm that the rules that stipulates such prohibition are 
only those referred to in China 's answer to Question 9, and explain how to confirm that the 
compliance of these rule are ensured.  
Please also provide the data on the number of zombie enterprises that have been liquidated since 
the various opinions came into effect, referred to in China 's answer.   
 
Reply: "Zom bie enterprises" identified in accordance with relevant standards shall be disposed of in 
a market -based and law -based manner through merger, reorganization and bankruptcy liquidation.  
China adopted market mechanisms, economic means and law -based measures and successfully 
completed the task of "disposal of zombie enterprises and the enterprises in extreme difficulty" in 
more than three years.  
 
5.3 Committed to Creating Market -Oriented, Law -Based and Internationalized Business 
Environment   
5.3.3 Implementi ng the Negative List for Market Access system across the board   
(Question 4: Paragraph 5.16, page 24)   
It is said that China is studying the issues raised, but what is the outlook for when and how the 
"Opinions " will be institutionalized in the future?   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Could we understand that this institutionalized system will be consistent with international rules such 
as GATS, and when institutionalizing, it will take a highly transparent process such as incorporating 
the opinions of stakeholders?  
 
Reply: China has fully implemented the negative list system for market access, and revised the list  
based on an annual adjustment mechanism. Market entities and industry associations can offer 
advice and suggestions on the revision of the list. The negative list system for  market access has 
become more consistent, serious, and prestigious. T he system of market access rule  has become 
more unified  and predictable.  
 
5.3.5 Improving the performance of state -owned assets and state -owned enterprises 
(SOEs) reforms  
(Question 5: Paragraph 5.18, page 24)  
Please explain specific measures and requirements SOE should take/follow to meet the market 
mechanism.   
 
Reply: In the process of deepening the market -oriented reform of SOEs, China has been committed 
to promoting SOE s to establish a sound and balanced corporate governance structure that meets 
the requirements of the market mechanism, urging SOEs to implement functions and powers of the 
board of directors . China has been improving market -based operating mechanisms, con tinuously 
promoting the reform of state assets supervision system, and adopting multiple measures to 
strengthen the position of SOEs as market entities. In recent years, the SOEs reform  has made 
notable achievements which include defining and classifying t he functions of SOEs, gradually 
improving the state assets supervision system featured  by assets management, completing the 
transformation of central enterprises into companies, and adopting the tenure system and contract 
management for managers.  
 
2 TRADE  AND INVESTMENT REGIMES   
2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory framework and market access  
(Question 6: Paragraph 2.45, page 37)  
Japan would like to know whether and how China intends to ease restrictions in the "Special 
Administrative Measures for Marke t Access of Foreign Investment (Negative List) " in the future.   
 
Reply: China is  working on a  new edition of the negative list for market access of foreign investment 
to further ease restrictions on foreign investment. In the meantime , China is revising t he national 
negative list and the negative list of pilot free trade zones for market access of foreign investment 
to further ease restrictions on foreign investment in manufacturing and business services.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
(Question 7: Paragraph 3.1, page 45)  
According to the answer to question 27, "China is currently studying it. " Japan would like to request 
China to have more substant ial and detailed answer.   
 
Reply: Reports related to quality defects are generally issued by qualified third -party organizations . 
The time of releasing relevant report is  not subject to customs control. Therefore, the authorities 
are studying this issue.  
 
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
(Question 8: Paragraph 3.79, page 69)  
China answered that it would firmly uphold the multilateral trading system based on WTO rules, and 
promote the constructio n of the open type world economic system. Considering this reply, Japan 
would like to know what measures China is considering to ensure that a security review and 
operation in the Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law are not arbitrary under the name of 
'national security '.   
 
Reply: There are specific provisions on the review process and key national security risk factors in 
the Measures on Cybersecurity Review. Relevant cyber security reviews are conducted in accordance 
with laws and regulations. Cyber security reviews aim to guarantee the security of the supply chain WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  of critical information infrastructure and safeguard the national security, rather than  restrict or 
discriminate against foreign products and services.  
 
3.2.4 Export support and promotion   
(Question 9: Paragraph 3.97 -3.102, page 72)   
Please explain how we ensure the foreseeability on the amendment of the refund rate.  
 
Reply: According to the current policies, except "resource products and products whose production 
is energy -intensive or h ighly polluting", all products in China share the same rebate rate and duty 
rate, and the input VAT is fully refunded. Up to now, the pattern of canceling rebates for "resource 
products and products whose production is energy -intensive or highly polluting"  and full y refund ing 
of input VAT for other products has been established , which can ensure the predictability of the 
adjustment of rebate rate.  
 
3.2.5 Export finance, insurance, and guarantees  
(Question 10: Paragraph 3.110, page 73)  
China explained that financial institutions, including the Export -Import Bank of China, operate under 
market principles. Please explain whether any law or legislation stipulate it and provide 
data/evidence that demonstrates those institutions operate in ac cordance with market principles.  
 
Reply: Article 4 of the Law of Commercial Banks stipulates that "Commercial banks shall work under 
the principles of safety, fluidity and efficiency, with full autonomy and assum ing sole responsibility 
for their own risks , profits and losses, and with self -restraint. Commercial banks shall carry out 
business in accordance with laws free from any interference by entities or individuals. Commercial 
banks shall bear civil legal liabilities independently with all their propert ies as legal persons." The 
Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Export -Import Bank of China (CBRC 
Decree  [2017] No. 3) stipulates that "The Eximbank shall  establish a market -oriented operation and 
constraint mechanism, and develop itself into a policy -based financial institution featuring specific 
positioning, clear business, prominent functions, adequate capital, standardized governance, strict 
internal control, safe operation and good services." In practice, the Eximbank raises funds in 
accordance with market principles, and conducts project evaluation, pre -loan investigation, loan 
issuance and recovery and post -loan management with reference to commercial conditions.  
 
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1 Incentives  
(Questio n 11: Paragraph 3.120, page 76)   
China answered that it currently has no statistics on tax expenditures. Please explain how China 
plans government budget and secures government integrity without such statistics, including how 
China and other members can understand expenditure is not disto rtive for other members.   
 
Reply: The draft, review, approval and supervision of the budget, as well as the implementation 
and adjustment of the budget, are carried out in accordance with the Budget Law.  
For more information: please visit the following we b-link: 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/201901/d68f06b9ab3e4fa9b8225ad2034c654e.shtml  
 
(Question 12: Paragraph 3.122, page 76)   
China states that the questionnaire on subsidies should focus on the contents of the notified 
subsidies, but it has made every effort to verify and provide relevant information on issues unrelated 
to the notificati on. Please explain the reason China refuses to answer questions in the 
SCM committee meeting about subsidies that have not been notified, and answer the questions 
raised in the meeting.   
 
Reply:  China submitted the 2019 -2020 subsidy notification covering all provincial administrative 
regions and local governments at the provincial, city and county levels  this year . Particularly, China 
notified its fisheries subsidies in a separate chapter. Right before this Review, China has submitted 
the notifications of state trading and quantitative restrictions. China is currently working on 
preparation for notification of agricultural domestic support and will submit it as soon as possible.  
 
(Question 13: Paragraph 3.123, page 76)   
China answers that it does not have subsidies especially for SOEs. Please provide the list of subsidies 
to SOEs, including subsidies designed not only for SOEs.   
Please also indicate the percentage of the total subsidies that is granted to SOEs.   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: Please refer to China's notification  on subsidies to the WTO.  
 
There are news reports that enterprises funded by China 's state investment funds are more likely to 
receive loans from government -affiliated financial institutions. Please answer whether there is any 
legislation that encourages s uch loans.  
 
Reply: Financial institutions have their respective risk assessment systems when providing loans for 
enterprises. The loans depend on the profitability, asset quality and development prospect of the  
enterprises, rather than enterprise ownershi p. 
 
Please also provide the latter question; explain what kind of system exists to ensure that the 
Government does not intervene in SOEs ' financing, operation, and management.   
 
Reply: The Article 16 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China stipu lates that "state -
owned enterprises have the right to operate autonomously within the scope prescribed by laws and 
regulations." Article 6 of the Law on Enterprise State -Owned Assets  stipulates that " the State Council 
and the local people's governments sha ll, according to law, perform the contributor's functions, 
based on the principles of separation of government bodies and enterprises, separation of the 
administrative functions of public affairs and the functions of the state -owned assets contributor, 
and non-intervention in the legitimate and independent business operations of enterprises."  
 
(Question 14: Paragraph 3.124, 3.125, page 77, 78)  
China stated that funds operate in accordance with market -oriented principles without government 
intervention. Pl ease provide evidence, such as regulation of funds or legislation, that ensures the 
funds operate in accordance with market oriented principles and is not intervened by the 
government.  
China answers that the source of the fund will be released by the fund  in accordance with 
requirements of Chinese law and regulation. Please answer what law and regulation stipulates it in 
which article, and whether the mentioned funds in the question 63 are subject to such law and 
regulation.   
Please also answer to the thr ee questions made previously (referred below) to complement China 's 
claim that the government does not participate in the decision making of the funds.   
(1) shares of members of the Communist Party in the managements of the funds;  
(2) the shares of curren t or ex governmental officers (local or central) in the managements of the 
funds; and   
(3) whether committees of the Communist Party exists in the funds.   
 
Reply: Under China's state -owned assets management system, the government has established 
state-owned assets supervision and administration bodies, and authorized the bodies to exercise the 
functions of state -owned asset contributor on its behalf. The state -owned  assets supervision and 
administration body is the sole and specialized agency that performs the functions of the state -
owned assets contributor, as well as undertakes the duties of the state -owned assets contributor. 
The bodies performing the contributor's functions (state -ownership entity) exercises the functions 
and powers of the shareholders meeting or shareholders to appoint or remove, or suggest the 
appointment or removal of the members of the board of directors of state -owned enterprises 
(excluding employee directors), as these are the contributor's rights stipulat ed by the Company Law 
and the Law on Enterprises State -Owned Assets and other laws and regulations, which is not the 
government's intervention in the decision -making of state -owned enterprises. The relevant funds 
are operated in a market -oriented manner.  
 
(Question 15: Paragraph 3.126, page 78)   
China states that its support for the semiconductor industry is found in its subsidy notification. 
However, it does not include the IC Funds both financed by the central and local governments nor 
the loans by government -afficiated financial institutions in its subsidy notification. Please provide 
information on the activities of those funds and institutions, including the i nformation on the 
investment / loan amount, recipient, and return rate.  
 
Reply: Local and national integrated circuit industry investment funds are market -oriented funds 
that operate independently and are not subordinate to any government departments. The  funds 
investment management and decision -making are completely market -oriented, and the government 
department does not intervene or participate in any investment projects decision -making of the 
funds. Relevant funds do not need to be notified to the WTO.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization   
(Question 16: Paragraph 3.206, page 99)   
China states that Chinese law protects fair competition among enterprises of all types of ownership, 
and does not grant privileges to state -owned en terprises. Please name the law and the article that 
stipulates the above.   
In addition, please provide information on whether China regulates the goverment intervention to 
corporate decisions, for example by dispatching govermental officials/communist par ty members as 
board members of certain entities. If there are any legal basis that regulates such government/the 
communist party 's intervention to a company, please identify the legal basis.   
 
Reply: In the past more than 40 years of reform and opening up , China has been constantly fostering  
a market environment in which all kinds of enterprises use resource elements on an equal basis 
according to law, participate in competition in an open, fair and impartial manner, and are equally 
protected by law. As in dependent market entities, the state-owned enterprises compete on an equal 
basis with other market entities, complement  one another  and pursue  common  development. The 
state-owned enterprises  follow the laws and regulations related to market competition, which can 
be reflected in various laws and regulations  such as t he Anti -Monopoly Law , the Anti -Unfair 
Competition Law and the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Fair Competition Review 
System . 
 
(Question 17: Paragraph 3.207, page 99)    
China provides the URL of a website as the answer to question 72, but the access to the website 
from abroad seems to prohibit. Thus, please provide a written answer to Japan 's question as well as 
relevant information that is fully accessible from abroad . 
 
Reply : Foreign users can visit the above website  through test . 
 
(Question 18: Paragraph 3.208, page 99)  
China provides the URL of a website as the answer to question 73, but the access to the website 
from abroad seems to prohibit. Thus, please provide a  written answer to Japan 's question as well as 
relevant information that is fully accessible from abroad.  
 
Reply : Foreign users can visit the above website  through test . 
 
3.3.6 Government procurement  
(Question 19: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
China replies to our question as "At present, the Government Procurement Law does not govern 
SOEs. " In that sense, does China consider that SOEs ' procurements are not qualified to government 
procurement exception under Article 3.8 of GATT?   
 
Reply: The Government Procurement Law does not govern SOEs , which does not mean that the 
SOEs' procurement does not comply with the government procurement exceptions under Article 3.8 
of GATT. China is now actively joining the GPA. Whether the SOEs could b e included in the scope of 
China's future commitments in the GPA will depend on the outcome of the negotiations.  
 
(Question 20: Paragraph 3.210, page 99)  
China replies to our question as "Hospitals with public service function are within the scope of 
government procurement. " We would like to know specific definition of the "public service ". Do all 
public hospitals owned by central and local governments only have public service function? Are all 
public hospitals owned by central and local governments un der the coverage of the Government 
Procurement Law even when they raise most of their funds from the market?   
 
Reply: In the 6th revised offer  for accession to the GPA, China distinguished between hospitals that 
provide basic medical services and whose fu nding cannot or should not be allocated by the market 
and hospitals that provide high levels of medical services and receive the majority of their funding 
from the market. Under the public institutions reform program, the former is classified into Public 
Interest Category 1 institutions and the latter is classified into Public Interest Category 2 institutions. 
Currently, China has included in the bids the medical structures of all subordinate Public Interest 
Category 1 institutions of central and sub -centra l entities, and has included in Annex III three Public 
Interest Category 2 institutions, including the West China School  Hospital of Stomatology of Sichuan 
University, Eye and Ent Hospital of Fudan University, and Hospital of Stomatologu  of Sun Yat -sen WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  University. The legal system regarding government procurement shall apply for public hospitals 
whose procurement funds are included in central and local government budget s. 
 
(Question 21: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)   
Japan asks this question based on the article at the following URL. Please answer the original 
question 85.  
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO59142460V10C20A5000000/  
In addition to the above, Japan would also like China to answer question s below.  
Did the Security Reliable Work Committee pr epare certain lists of security reliable or information 
innovation enterprises and products called "secure and controllable/Information Technology 
Application Innovation "? Does local governments or SOEs procure products using lists that specify 
security re liable or information innovation enterprises and products? Does a product need to satisfy 
the requirements, such as "non-foreign invested ", "produced in China " or "designed in China " and 
so forth to be included in such lists?   
 
Reply:  China is not drawing up any plan to replace foreign technology. China is committed to 
opening up to the world. China welcomes more foreign companies to provide technology, products 
and services that mee t China's requirements. China's consistent position of supporting economic 
globalization and fostering an open world economy has not changed and will never change.  
 
(Question 22: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
Japan asks this question based on information included in the article at the following URL. Please 
answer the original question 86.  
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO59142460V10C20A5000000/  
In additon to above, Japan would also like China to answer questions below. Do local governments 
or SOEs pro cure the products based on non -disclosed lists of enterprises or products? If so, such 
lists will be considered as documents that are not available to other countries or businesses and that 
are pertaining to or affecting trade in goods. Japan considers suc h lists are subject to the disclosure 
obligations under Article 10.1 of GATT and Article 2(c)1 of China 's protocol accession, and failure of 
such disclosure is inconsistent with these provisions. Please answer the China 's opinion on this point.  
 
Reply: China has completely fulfilled  its WTO accession commitment, ensuring that government 
procurement complies only with published and publicly available laws, regulations, generally 
applicable judicial decisions, administrative decisions and procedures (standar d contract terms).  
 
(Question 23: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
Please explain what "laws and regulations " in "the answer to question 85 " 
specifically means. Also, is there a list of products subject to government procurement that meet 
some criteria based on this "laws and regulations "? 
If such a list exists, please indicate the specific requirements for being on that list.  
(Question 24: Par agraph 3.213, page 100 -102)  
Does "international practices " in "the answer to question 85 " mean the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement? If not, what exactly is this mean?  
 
Reply to question 23 -24: China has not yet joined the Agreement on Government Procurement 
(GPA).The Chinese government is working hard for accession to the GPA as soon as possible. The  7th 
offer that China submitted to the WTO in October 2019 presented a level basically similar to other 
GPA parties. Products and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises and Chinese enterprises 
in China are treated equally in China 's government procurement market.  
 
(Question 25: Paragraph 3.213, page 100 -102)   
China replies to our question as "The Document 551 is mainly aimed at th e review of similar products 
of the same grade among domestic medical equipment. " If so, why does the Document 551 contain 
the minimum local procurement rates such as 25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. China answered main 
aim of the Docment 551. Please provide detail ed contents of document 551 and detailed receipants 
of Document 551. China answers main aim of the Docment 551. Please provide detailed contents of 
document 551 and detailed receipants of Document 551.  
 
Reply: Based on the application scenarios of the relevant products, Document 551 is a guideline of 
product performance and functional indicators that aims to help purchasers determine the 
procurement demands. No transaction rules are involved and market players a re not bound  by the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Document . It is for the internal reference of local regulatory departments. Document 551 d oes not 
violate GPA rules and China's relevant commitments.  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
(Question 26: Paragraph 3.245, page 108)  
Japan wou ld like to appreciate for the explanaiton about China 's efforts to protect the rights of a 
copyright holder about the question 95. Japan would like to have explanation about the following 
two poin ｔs asked but not sufficinetly answered.   
• since China's regu latory standards for prior content review and censorship of foreign content 
are unclear, Japan would like an explanation of the status of China's efforts, including the 
outlook and schedule of formulation and promulgation of guidelines which stipulate prac tical 
requirements and procedures.   
• If China considers that its regulations on blocking foreign content will be consistent with the 
GATT and the WTO protocol on the accession of China, please explain the reasons in detail.   
 
Reply: China conducts prior c ontent review and censorship of foreign content in strict accordance 
with international treaties and domestic laws it has acceded to . China  has been abiding by the 
commitments made by its accession to the WTO.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.124 Electronic, IT, and integrated circuits  
(Question 27: Paragraph 4.124, page 153)  
China answered that the source of the fund will be released by the fund in accordance with 
requirements of Chinese law and regulation. However, the equity holders do not seem to have been 
made public by the fund. Please identify the legal basis which states the disclosure obligation of 
equity holders, and explain how China ensures the compliance to such disclosure requirement on 
what legal basis. Pleae answe r why the funds have not released it and when the information will be 
released by the fund.  
 
Reply: More information  about relevant funds  can be found at : http://www.gsxt.gov.cn  
 
4.4 Services  
4.4.1.2 Reform of the financial supervision framework  
(Question  28: Paragraph 4.143, page 157, 158)  
China explained the role of the CBIRC severly cracks down on unfair competition and maintains the 
market competition order. In this regards, please identify public information (or how members can 
access relevant informa tion) of any investigation records of such crackdowns. Please also provide 
the numbers of cases investigated and what measures were taken to correct unfair practices.  
Please explain what are the necessary conditions to realize fair competition in China and how it 
ensures fair competition between government -affiliated financial institutions and private companies.   
 
Reply: According to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and relevant financial laws and regulations ，
the CBIR C actively promotes anti -unfair competition in banking sector insurance sector, fights 
against  hard on various banking and insurance institutions and their employees who operate in 
violation of laws /regulati ons, and damage the legitimate rights and interests of other financial 
institutions and disturb the financial order, as a way to effectively  safeguard the order of fair 
competition in the financial market. The CBRC applies unified regulatory rules to state -owned 
financial institutions and private financial institutions. In October 2019, the State Council 
promulgated the Regulation on Optimizing the Business Environment, which clearly stipulates that 
"the state shall adhere to the equality of rights, opportu nities, and rules and ensure equal legal 
protection of economy under all types of ownership".  
 
4.4.2 Telecommunications   
(Question 29: Paragraph 4.214, page 170, 171)  
With regard to the industrial sectors related to critical information infrastructures listed in the "The 
Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations, " (e.g. Energy, Transportation) 
which was mentioned in the response to Question 118 , we would like to know  
(1) Other than those listed, what other industries and sectors do you envision at the moment?  
(2) The "The Provisions on Management of Automobile Data Security " and the "Measures for Data 
Security Management in the Industrial and T elecom Sector (Draft for Opinion) " stipulate the 
obligation of domestic storage and the safety assessment at the time of overseas transfer of WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  important data in the automobile industry and the industrial and telecom sector, imposing obligations 
as if they w ere critical information infrastructure operators. These sectors may not fall under the 
originally enumerated industrial sectors. Isn 't the scope of critical information infrastructures being 
expanded beyond the enumerated industrial sectors?   
 
Reply: Relevant provisions in China 's Cybersecurity Law and Data Security stipulate that 
administration departments in various industries shall undertake the duty to supervise data security 
in their respective industries and fields. The specific scope and security p rotection measures for 
critical information infrastructure shall be formulated by the State Council, and the administration 
departments in various industries shall guide and supervise the operation security protection of 
critical information infrastructure  in their respective industries. As the administrative department of 
industry and information technology in China, the Ministry of industry and information technology 
has drafted Measures for the Administration of Data Security in the Field of Industry and  Information 
Technology (Draft for Comment) in order to implement relevant laws and regulations and better 
promote the implementation of data security administration in the industry.  
 
(Question 30: Paragraph 4.214, page 170, 171)  
The answer to the Questio n 120 "Does this provision (the Article 10 of Critical Information 
Infrastructure Protection Regulations) means that the business operator is not required to treat any 
infrastructure as CII until it is notified as certified CII? In addition, Japan would li ke to request China 
to answer what CII has already been certified. " was "the reference to Question 118 ". However, there 
seems to be no answer in the answer of 118. We would like expext more lucid answer.   
 
Reply: Regulation on Protecting the Security of Critical Information Infrastructure stipulates that 
"CII" means any of network facilities and information systems in important industries and fields , 
such as public communication and information services, energy, transportation, water conservan cy, 
finance, public services, e -government, and science, technology and industry for national defense , 
that may seriously endanger national security, national economy and people's livelihood, and public 
interests in the event that they are damaged or lose their functions or their data are leaked. 
According  to the international common  practice, the determination results of important information 
infrastructure are not to be disclosed to the public in principle. After the protection department has 
determined t he important information infrastructure, it will inform the relevant operators through 
directional notices, so that they can implement the provisions of laws and regulations.  
 
(Question 31: Paragraph 4.214, page 170, 171)  
China answered that anyone who com mits an act that falls within Article 2 of the Data Security Law 
may be investigated for legal responsibility in accordance with the China 's Criminal Law, the law 
applicable on the Application of Civil Legal Relationship Concerning Foreign Affairs and othe r laws. 
Please answer the specific articles of these laws.   
 
Reply: The Chapter One of  the Criminal Law  clearly stipulates the crime of "endangering national 
security", which can be found in Article 102 - Article 113.  
 
(Question 32: Paragraph 4.214, page 170, 171)  
Please explain the concrete examples of data processing activities outside China, which are regulated 
by the Data Security Law and have extraterritorial effects.  
(Question 33: Paragraph 4.214, page 170, 171)  
China did not show specific cases tha t Article 24 of the Data Security Act applies to. Please explain 
details of what specific and typical cases that Article 24 of the Data Security Act applies to.  
 
Reply to question 32 -33: As the Data Security Act has entered into force since 1 September 2021,  
there is no such concrete examples  or specific cases.  
 
(Question 34: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)   
Please explain in detail the 'strict approval procedures ' and 'relevant national regulations ' as 
stipulated in Article 35 of the Data Security Act.  
 
Reply: Article 35 of Data Security Law stipulates that "as needed for maintaining national security 
or investigating crimes, a public security authority or national security authority shall legally acquire 
data in accordance with relevant provisions issued by the state and by strictly following approval 
procedures . Relevant organizations and individuals shall be cooperative in this regard ". Relevant 
specific procedures and specifications are in the process of drafting.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (Question 35: Paragraph 4.214, page 170 -171)  
As China said in the answer of question 135 that the relevant supporting regulations are being 
formulated, Japan would like to c larify whether such regulations provide the detailed standards and 
procedures for "security review " under the Article 11 of The Provisions on Management of Automobile 
Data Security (enforced on 1 October 2021).  
If the regulations don 't provide the detaile d standards and procedures for "security review ", Japan 
would like to know what the regulations provide.  
And as China said that "it is expected to solicit public opinions from the public in the near future " for 
the regulations, please answer when you plan  to solicit public opinions.   
Article 11 of The Provisions on Management of Automobile Data Security provides that international 
treaties committed by China shall prevail over the Regulation if there is any inconsistency. Please 
answer whether China recog nizes any inconsistency between the Regulation and Articles 12.14 
and 12.15 of RCEP Agreement, and, if yes, how these Articles of RCEP Agreement will be applied.  
And for the reservations China has declared, what exactly do these reservations refer to? Ple ase 
provide us with the information in detail with documents or texts on which it is based.   
 
Reply: According to the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection 
Law, China has studied and drafted the Measures for the Securit y Assessment for Cross -border Data 
Transfer (Draft), and defined the application scope, assessment content and assessment process for 
the security assessment for cross -border transfer of critical data and personal information, which is 
applicable to the se curity assessment under the several Provisions on the Management of Automobile 
Data Security. The draft has been publicly soliciting opinions from the public since 29 October 2021.  
 
(Question 36: Paragraph 4.219, page 171, 172)   
"The Safety Assessment Mea sures for Overseas Provision of Personal Information (Draft for 
Opinion) " published under the Cybersecurity Law broadly expands the scope of the safety 
assessment obligation at the time of outbound transfer to include "network operators ", making the 
regula tory scope wider than the Personal Information Protection Law. In the response to 
Question  116, it is stated that "relevant supporting regulations such as data security management 
and data outbound security assessment " are being formulated. Do you plan to broadly target 
"network operators " for domestic storage obligations and the safety assessment obligations at the 
time of overseas transfer, or is it expected to be limited to CIIOs and "personal information 
processors whose processing of personal information reaches the number prescribed by the State 
cyberspace administration? "   
 
Reply: According to the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection 
Law, China has drafted the Measures for the  Security Assessment for Cross -border Data Transfer 
(Draft), and defined the application scope, assessment content and assessment process for the 
security assessment for cross -border transfer of critical data and personal information. The draft has 
been pu blicly soliciting opinions from the public since 29 October 2021.  
 
(Question 37: Paragraph 4.219, page 171, 172)   
(1) In the answer to question 143, the following has not been answered, so we would like ask China 's 
response.  
(2) Please clarify the detail s of "personal information processors whose processing of personal 
information reaches the number prescribed by the State cyberspace administration. " If the details 
cannot be provided, please let us know when the details will be provided.   
(3) With regard to the prescribed quantity, the Personal Information Security Specification (dated 
as of October 2020) stipulates that the standard for establishing a personal information protection 
officer is mandated when processing personal data of 1 million individual s (100,000 individuals in 
the case of sensitive personal data). Is it expected that similar numerical standards will be adopted?  
 
Reply: According to the Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law, and Personal Information Protection 
Law, China has  drafted the Measures for the Security Assessment for Cross -border Data Transfer 
(Draft), and defined the application scope, assessment content and assessment process for the 
security assessment for cross -border transfer of critical data and personal information. The d raft has 
been soliciting opinions from the public since 29 October 2021 . 
 
(Question 38: Paragraph 4.220, page 172)   
In response to Question 148, China only answered that please refer to the answer to question 148. 
Since this answer seems to be a mistake, please provide an accurate answer.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: The Measures for Cybersecurity Review (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) has 
been publicly soliciting opinions from the public since July this year. The competent authorities have 
fully studied t he opinions put forward by all sectors of society. At present, relevant content, including 
supporting measures and standards, is still being improved.  
 
(Question 39: Paragraph 4.220, page 172)   
In your response to question 149, you referred to your response to question 148, but we believe 
that there is a typographical error in that response, so we would like you to respond again.  
 
Reply: The Measures for Cybersecurity Review (Revised Draft for Solicitation of Comments) has 
been publicly soliciting op inions from the public since July this year. The competent authorities have 
fully studied the opinions put forward by all sectors of society. At present, relevant content, including 
supporting measures and standards, is still being improved.  
 
It seems tha t you are promoting the classification of data in individual industry sectors such as 
industrial and telecom data safety management regulations and automobile management 
regulations.  
(1) Do you intend to develop specific lists of important data and core d ata for each industry in sectors 
other than sectors mentioned above?   
(2) In addition to the automotive and industrial and telecom sectors, what other industrial sectors 
are expected to define "important data " and "core data? "  
(3) Will there be a process  to listen to the opinions of relevant industries and other stakeholders in 
order to formulate a specific list of "important data " and "core data? " Will foreign entities be 
included?   
 
Reply: The Article 21 of the Data Security Law stipulates that each region or department shall, 
according to the categorized and hierarchical data protection system, determine the specific catalogs 
of important data in the region or department and in the relevant  industries and fields, and provide 
priority protection for data on the catalogs.  
 
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  ARGENTINA  
Informe Secretaria de la OMC  
Párrafo 3.3.7.5.1 Trademarks  
Subpárrafo 3.252.  
 
PREGUNTA Nº 1  ¿se pueden registrar como marca un término que sea igual o similar a una 
Indicación Geográfica (IG) de algún miembro de la OMC que tenga acuerdo con China?  
 
Reply: According to the Trademark Law , the Implementation Regulations of the Trademark Law  and 
the Administrative Measures Concerning the Registration of Collective Marks and Certification Marks , 
geographical indications can be applied for registration as certification marks or collective marks. 
Where a foreigner or a foreign enterprise applies for th e registration of a geographical indication as 
a collective mark or a certification mark, the applicant shall provide proof that the geographical 
indication is protected by law in its name in its country of origin. If a geographical indication of a 
WTO Mem ber has been registered as a collective mark or a certification mark of geographical 
indication in China, the application of others for a trademark that is the same or similar to the 
collective mark or the certification mark of geographical indication on t he same or similar goods will 
be rejected according to law. If a geographical indication of a WTO Member has not been registered 
as a collective mark or a certification mark of geographical indication in China, other people 's 
applications for a trademark t hat is the same or similar to the geographical indication trademark will 
be preliminarily examined and approved according to law, and the relevant right holders or 
interested parties may raise objections or apply for invalidation according to law.  
The provisions on the registration and protection of foreign geographical indication products in China 
are specified by  the Measures for the Protection of Foreign Geographical Indication Products , a 
normative document of China National Intellectual Property Ad ministration.  
 
Párrafo 3.3.7.5.2 Geographical indications  
Subpárrafo 3.256.  
 
PREGUNTA Nº 2 : ¿Podría explicar China cuáles son los criterios para proteger una IG de acuerdo 
al sistema sui generis mencionado?   
 
Reply: According to the Trademark Law , the Implementation Regulations of the Trademark Law  and 
the Administrative Measures Concerning the Registration of Collective Marks and Certification Marks , 
in China, a geographical indication can either be applied for registration as a certification mark or a  
collective mark, or be requested for protection as a geographical indication product. If protection is 
requested for a geographical indication product, it shall be conducted mainly according to the 
relevant provisions of the Provisions on the Protection o f Geographical Indication Products  and the 
Measures for the Protection of Foreign Geographical Indication Products . China National Intellectual 
Property Administration and State Administration for Market Regulation also jointly issued the 
Guidance on Furth er Strengthening the Protection of Geographical Indications . In addition, the 
Measures for the Administration on the Use of Special Signs of Geographical Indication Products 
(Trial)  were also issued.  
 
¿Cuáles son los procedimientos y criterios que se establecen para el registro de IGs extranjeras?  
 
Reply: Foreign geographical indications may be registered as collective marks or certification marks 
of geographical indications according to China 's tradem ark law system, The process is as follows: 
submission of application - formal examination - substantive examination - preliminary examination 
and approval announcement - objection - registration announcement or submission of application - 
formal examinatio n - substantive examination - rejection – reexamination of rejected application - 
first instance - second instance. The application procedures to be submitted include: application 
form, power of attorney, certificate of protection in the host country, cert ificate of right as principal, 
certificate of geographical division, rules for the administration on the use of geographical indications 
and trademarks, and certificate of supervision and management ability, etc. At the same time, when 
a foreign applicant applies to China for the registration of a geographical indication as a collective 
mark or a certification mark, it can be extended to China through the Madrid system based on the 
trademark application or registration with its original office.  
¿Qué costo t iene el registro?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: There is no charge for the registration of foreign geographical indication products through a 
special system. When registering as collective marks and certification marks of geographical 
indications according to China 's trademark  law system, the official charge is RMB 1,500 yuan for 
each collective mark or certification mark of geographical indication, and RMB 1,350 yuan for those 
submitted through electronic applications. When the trademark application or registration of a 
foreig n geographical indication with its original office is extended to China through the Madrid system, 
the specific charging standard can be found on the official website of the WIPO 
(https:/ /www.wipo.int/madrid/en/how_to/file/fees.html ). 
 
¿Existe intervención del país de origen de la IGs  que la ha reconocido o queda sólo a cargo de los 
productores el registro en China de una IG extranjera?  
 
Reply: The authorities in charge of the management and control of foreign geographical indication 
products in China shall be consistent with those in  their countries of origin. Where a foreign 
geographical indication is protected through China 's trademark system, the applicant shall entrust a 
trademark agency to submit an application for trademark registration of the relevant geographical 
indication to gether with a certification for the protection of the geographical indication in its country 
of origin. When the trademark of a geographical indication has been registered, its management and 
operating activities shall comply with the requirements of China 's trademark law system.  
 
Subpárrafo 3.257.  
PREGUNTA Nº 3:  ¿Se protegen las IGs extranjeras que no hayan sido registradas por alguna de 
las leyes mencionadas?  
 
Reply: For collective marks and certification marks of geographical indications, according to 
Article  10 of the Trademark Law , signs such as "a sign which is deceptive and easily misleads the 
public regarding the quality or origin of goods " and "signs detrimental to socialist morality or mores 
or having any other adverse effect " may no t be used as trademarks; Article 11 stipulates that "a 
sign only bearing the generic name, design or model of the goods " and "other signs lacking 
distinctiveness " may not be registered as trademarks. Meanwhile, Article 16 stipulates that where a 
trademark contains a geographical indication of the goods but the goods do not originate from the 
region indicated thereon, thus misleading the public, the trademark shall not be registered and shall 
be prohibited from use; however, those that have been registered i n good faith shall continue to be 
valid.  
For products enjoying geographical indication protection, according to the relevant rules of the WTO 
and the Measures for the Protection of Foreign Geographical Indication Products , a geographical 
indication applied  in China must obtain geographical indication protection in its country or region of 
origin.  
 
Subpárrafo 3.258.  
PREGUNTA Nº 4:  ¿Qué criterios hay establecidos en el sistema sui generis para tratar los genéricos, 
como así también las IGs que incluyen varios  términos inclusive genéricos?  
 
Reply: According to Article 5 of the Measures for the Protection of Products Bearing Foreign 
Geographical Indications  on the rules for the composition of the application name, generally, it is 
required to be composed of a name with a geographical indication (GI) function and a common name 
reflecting the true attributes of the product. In addition,  it requires that the GI name to be applied 
for is not a common name, and does not conflict with other prior rights such as the names of 
Chinese  GI products.  
 
Subpárrafo 3.259.  
PREGUNTA Nº 5:  ¿Cómo se protegen las IGs  que son homónimas con aquellas que sean iguales o 
similares a otras protegidas por acuerdos multilaterales o bilaterales?  
 
Reply:  China has not yet encountered the above situation in the implementation of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. If a GI product is requested for protection in such case, the above -
mentioned problems shall be resolved in accordance with the opposition proc edure stipulated in the 
Regulations on the Protection of Geographical Indication Products . GIs applied for registration as 
certification trademarks or collective trademarks shall be resolved in accordance with the procedures 
of rejection, opposition, and i nvalidation specified in the Trademark Law  and the Regulations for the 
Implementation of the Trademark Law . 
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Debe tenerse en cuenta que el Acuerdo ADPIC contempla la protección de IGs homónimas en el 
artículo 23.3.  
¿Están exceptuados de la protección por IGs los nombres de  las variedades vegetales, incluidas las 
variedades de vid y las  razas animales?  
 
Reply:  According to Article 5 of the Measures for the Protection of Products Bearing Foreign 
Geographical Indications  on the rules for name composition, th e name to be applied for shall not 
conflict with other prior rights such as the names of Chinese GI products.  
China 's trademark legal system stipulates the name composition of GI trademarks. A GI trademark 
must not be a common name for a commodity. If the relevant right holder or interested party 
believes that its prior rights have been damaged, they may file an objection or an application for 
invalidation in accordance with the law. The registered GI trademark becomes the common name of 
the goods approved for use, and any unit or individual can apply for cancellation.  
 
4.1.2.2 Legal and institutional framework  
PREGUNTA Nº 6:  ¿Podría brindarse mayor información en cuanto a excepción sobre Restricciones 
Inversión Extranjera Directa en sector Semillas, ya que el Informe sólo señala que fue realizada en 
soja y arroz, pero sin brindar mayores detalles o motivo?  
 
Reply: The negati ve list for foreign investment access lists the restrictions on soybeans and corn, 
not rice.  
 
4.1.2.4.3.1 Support measures  
PREGUNTA Nº 7:  ¿Podrían informarse los incentivos brindados por el gobierno al sector agrícola 
durante la pandemia de COVID -19 en 202 0 en los diferentes niveles administrativos?  
 
Reply:  In 2020, while strengthening the prevention and control of the epidemic in rural areas, the 
Chinese government further advanced agricultural supply -side structural reforms. The first was to 
improve agri cultural support and protection policies, stabilize subsidies for grain farmers, and adhere 
to and improve the minimum purchase price policy for rice and wheat. The second was to strengthen 
the construction of agricultural infrastructure, promote a new rou nd of high -standard farmland 
construction, implement the national black soil protection project, and promote protective farming 
models. The third was to strengthen the support of modern agricultural science and technology, 
enhance the construction of moder n seed industry infrastructure, continue to strengthen the 
construction of animal epidemic prevention and crop pest control systems, and improve the 
capability of agriculture against risks.  
 
PREGUNTA Nº 8:  En el párrafo 2.15 del informe de la Secretaría se  menciona que  el Consejo de 
Estado emitió las Orientaciones sobre la Promoción del Desarrollo del Comercio de Alta Calidad, en 
las que se reitera la intención de las autoridades de promover el desarrollo del comercio de alta 
calidad, en especial mediante l a innovación en ciencia y tecnología, la mejora de la estructura 
comercial y las inversiones en ambos sentidos.  
 
¿Qué acciones piensa llevar o está llevando a cabo el gobierno para lograr estos objetivos?  
 
Reply:  (1) Create a good environment for enhancing capacity for innovation in trade and promote 
the innovative development of foreign trade. Further deepen technological innovation, institutional 
innovation, model and business format innovation, and promote the f oreign trade development to 
evolve from being factor -driven to being innovation -driven, and from pursuing scale and speed to 
pursuing quality and efficiency. (2) Continuously optimize the international market layout, domestic 
regional layout, business enti ties, commodity structure and trade methods. Further explore 
traditional markets such as developed economies while expanding emerging markets. (3) Deepen 
reforms in the field of foreign trade and fully release the development potential of foreign trade. 
Fully implement the measures of the Trade Facilitation Agreement, promote paperless license 
application, strengthen the construction of a "single window " in international trade, and continue to 
improve the level of trade facilitation. (4) Further expand open ing up and share development results 
with other countries. In 2020, in addition to effectively controlling the spread of COVID -19 within 
the country, China also exported anti -pandemic materials to more than 200 countries and regions, 
which vigorously promo ted international anti -pandemic cooperation.   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Informe del Gobierno  
 
5.2.3 Fully implementing the rural revitalization strategy and steadily modernizing agriculture and 
rural areas  
 
PREGUNTA Nº 9:  ¿Podría  China  mencionar  cual es el tiempo estimado (periodo)  para cumplir con 
las nuevas  iniciativas para el sector  agrícola?  
 
Reply: It depends on the trend of the COVIED -19 and the development of the market.  
 
PREGUNTA Nº 10: En el párrafo 3.9 del Informe del Gobierno se menciona que  China ha establecido 
105 zonas experimentales de comercio electrónico transfronterizo en cinco t ramos, ha ofrecido 
orientaciones a las autoridades locales para que construyan laboratorios de ensayo de nuevas ideas, 
ha promovido la innovación de los modelos de negocio y ha creado un entorno de desarrollo justo, 
abierto y transparente.  
 
¿Podría descri bir brevemente las características de tales zonas, y en caso de poseer datos al 
respecto, comentar sobre los efectos observados de tales medidas?  
 
Reply: Since 2015, the Chinese government has approved the establishment of 105 cross -border 
e-commerce pilo t zones ( "pilot zones ") in five batches. Overall, these pilot zones are playing 
increasingly prominent roles n  the development of foreign trade. They have become new bright spots 
in foreign trade growth, new channels for innovation and entrepreneurship, and new drivers for 
transformation and upgrading.  
 
In terms of the encouragement and support for the developmen t of cross -border e -commerce, the 
Ministry of Commerce has, together with relevant departments, actively explored innovation, 
constantly strengthened top -level design, improved support policies, optimized the development 
environment and improved the develo pment level. We have guided the pilot zones to build a policy 
framework with "six systems and two platforms " as the core ( "Six systems " includes: information 
sharing system, financial system, intelligent logistics system, e -commerce credit risk systems, ai r 
defense systems and statistical detection system; "two platforms " are: the online "single window " 
platform and the offline "integrated park " platform), and copy and popularize 36 mature experiences 
and practices in 12 respects.  
 
On 5 July this year, the  General Office of the State Council issued the Opinions on Accelerating the 
Development of New Operations and New Models of Foreign Trade , which clearly puts forward such 
ideas as improving the support policies for the development of cross -border e -commer ce, solidly 
promoting the construction of pilot zones, supporting the development and growth of subdivision 
service platforms such as independent stations and station building tools, facilitating trade payment 
and settlement management, and strengthening t he construction of industry organizations and the 
cultivation of professionals, so as to promote the healthy and sustainable innovation and 
development of new forms and new models of foreign trade.  
 
PREGUNTA Nº 11:  En el párrafo 3.10 del Informe del Gobier no se indica que  en las esferas 
fundamentales del comercio de servicios en régimen de plena competencia o de competencia 
limitada, y en los elementos competitivos del comercio de servicios en régimen de monopolio natural, 
China promovió la anulación o la f lexibilización de las restricciones impuestas al comercio de 
servicios, guiándose por los principios de supresión total, flexibilización sustancial y liberalización 
ordenada.  
 
¿Podría mencionar si en tal marco se han implementado o se planea implementar m edidas que 
faciliten el comercio de servicios basados en conocimiento?  
 
Reply:  The Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot Programme of the Innovative Development of Trade 
in Services  stipulates that in qualified pilot zones, foreigners who have obtained permanent residence 
permits issued by the Chinese government and have patent agency qualifications issued in other 
countries are allowed to participate in the patent agent qualificatio n examination. Those who pass 
the examination will be issued a "Patent Attorney Qualification Certificate. " At present, this policy 
has been implemented in pilot zones of comprehensively deepening the innovative development of 
trade in services such as Bei jing, Suzhou, Nanjing, and Guangzhou.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  PREGUNTA Nº 12: En el párrafo 4.95 se menciona la implementación de nuevo impuesto ambiental 
con el fin de promover la protección del medio ambiente y reducir la contaminación, en el cual se 
prevén reducciones del imp uesto ambiental para las empresas con un nivel de contaminación inferior 
al estándar, a la vez que se han reforzado las sanciones.  
 
¿Podría comentar si este impuesto posee una articulación con el recientemente implementado 
mercado de carbono de China? De ser este el caso, ¿Podría comentar la dinámica de tal articulación?  
 
Reply:  On December 25, 2016, the Twenty -Fifth Session of the St anding Committee of the Twelfth 
National People 's Congress adopted the Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People 's Republic 
of China , which was formally implemented on January 1, 2018. In the three years since the 
environmental protection tax was levi ed, the tax system has operated steadily and smoothly, law 
enforcement has been steadily strengthened, and the green effect has gradually become apparent. 
The scale of environmental protection tax revenue has been generally stable, and the green taxation 
increasingly played a leading role, which has contributed to strengthening the ecological 
environment management and winning the battle against pollution.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  ARGENTINA  – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
Preguntas Adicionales de la Argentina - CHINA TPR WT/TPR/S/415  
 
POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
2.4 Régimen de inversión  
2.4.1 Marco reglamentario y acceso a los mercados  
El 15 de marzo de 2019, China adoptó la Ley de Inversión Extranjera, cuyo objetivo es mejorar el 
entorno empresarial para los inversores extranjeros y asegurar que las empresas con inversión 
extranjera participen en la competencia de mercado en pie de igualdad con sus homólogos 
nacionales, de conformidad con el ordenamiento  jurídico. El 31 de diciembre de 2019, el Consejo de 
Estado promulgó el Reglamento de Aplicación de la Ley de Inversión Extranjera. La Ley de Inversión 
Extranjera y su Reglamento de Aplicación entraron en vigor el 1 de enero de 2020. Posteriormente, 
se der ogaron las leyes y los reglamentos de aplicación anteriores relativos a los inversores 
extranjeros y a las empresas con inversión extranjera, a saber, la Ley de Empresas Conjuntas de 
Capital con Inversión China y Extranjera, la Ley de Empresas Conjuntas Co operativas con Capital 
Chino y Extranjero, y la Ley de Empresas con Inversión Extranjera, así como sus reglamentos y 
normas administrativos.   
 
1-¿Podría China detallar con mayor precisión en qué consiste la Ley de Inversión 
Extranjera y enumerar los requisi tos necesarios para aplicar por parte de los inversores 
extranjeros?   
 
Reply : Foreign investors investing in China should abide by the Foreign Investment Law and its 
supporting policies. China implements the pre -establishment national treatment and negative list 
management system for foreign investment. The negative list for foreign investment access 
uniformly lists special management measures for foreign investment access such as equity 
requirements and executive requirements . As for the a reas beyond  the negative list shall follow the 
principle of fairness toward both domestic and foreign investment.  
 
3.1 Medidas que afectan directamente a las importaciones   
3.1.1 Procedimientos y requisitos aduaneros y valoración en aduana   
En el inciso 3.2 se explica que los procedimientos aduaneros están regulados por varios instrumentos 
legislativos (cuadro 3.1). Los cambios introducidos recientemente en la Ley de Aduanas  y el 
Reglamento sobre Derechos de Importación y Exportación eliminaron las prescripciones 
administrativas sobre licencias para las importaciones y exportaciones temporales. Las 
modificaciones de otras reglamentaciones aduaneras, como las Disposiciones sob re la Tramitación 
por la Administración de Aduanas de las Declaraciones de Importación y Exportación de Mercancías 
y las Normas de la Administración de Aduanas sobre la Gestión de la Percepción de Derechos sobre 
las Importaciones y las Exportaciones, tenía n por objeto optimizar el entorno empresarial, reducir 
los costos de las transacciones institucionales, simplificar los procedimientos aduaneros y reducir el 
tiempo necesario para el despacho de aduana.    
 
2-¿Podría China detallar cuáles fueron todas las modificaciones realizadas sobre las 
reglamentaciones aduaneras?   
3- ¿Se han logrado los objetivos mencionados?   
4- ¿Podrían brindar detalles sobre el impacto económico que tuvo la aplicación del mismo?   
 
Reply to question 2 -4: China 's revision of customs -related laws and regulations in recent years 
mainly involves 43 provisions of Customs Law, Regulations on Import and Export Duties, Provisions 
of the Customs on the Administration of Declaration of Imported and Exported Goods and Measures 
of the Customs  for the Administration of the Collection of Duties on Imported and Exported Goods . 
With the improvement of relevant customs laws and regulations, the customs clearance procedures 
of China Customs have been further optimized and the business environment has been further 
improved.  
 
En el punto 3.5 dice que en 2019, la GACC inició una reforma d e la "declaración en dos etapas " de 
las importaciones, de modo que las empresas ya no necesitan presentar todas las declaraciones y 
documentos a la vez. La primera etapa consiste en presentar la declaración resumida junto con el 
conocimiento de embarque pa ra recoger las mercancías, y la segunda en completar todo el proceso 
de declaración en un plazo determinado. Según las autoridades, la reforma, que se llevó a cabo 
primero en algunas oficinas de aduanas, volvió más eficaz y sencilla la declaración de las e mpresas, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 127 - 
 
  aceleró el levante de la carga y mejoró la eficiencia del despacho de aduana. Se aplica en todo el 
país desde el 1 de enero de 2020.   
 
5-¿Podría China dar mayor detalle acerca de cómo ha logrado a través de su reforma  de 
la "declaración en dos et apas " de las importaciones volver más eficaz y sencilla la 
declaración de las empresas, acelerar el levante de la carga y mejorar la eficiencia del 
despacho de aduana?   
 
Reply : Through actively carrying out the reform of declaration system such as "two-step 
declaration ", China provides enterprises with  an alternative customs clearance mode rather than 
entering all 105 customs declaration information one -off. When enterprises adopt "two-step 
declaration ", they only need to declare at least 9 items of data to take the goods in the "General 
Declaration " stage . This helps solve  the problem that customs clearance cannot be carried out 
because the documents are not collected completely in advance . After the go ods are taken , 
enterprise s can choose to complete the remaining declaration items within specified time, which 
considerably improve s the customs clearance efficiency . In October 2021, the overall customs 
clearance time for goods using "two-step declaration " mode in China is 19.91 hours, which is 57.07% 
shorter than that of goods adopting  other modes.  
 
En el inciso 3.18 se informa que en febrero de 2020, la GACC  promulgó 10 medidas encaminadas a 
hacer frente a los efectos de la epidemia y promover el crecimiento sostenido del comercio exterior 
con miras a reducir el impacto de la COVID -19 en la economía china y fomentar el crecimiento 
sostenido del comercio exter ior al prevenir y controlar la epidemia.  
 
6-¿Podría China detallar cuáles son las medidas que se introdujeron a causa de la 
pandemia y explicar cuáles fueron los efectos de su aplicación?   
 
Reply : In February 2020, the General Administration of Customs issued the notice of Ten Measures 
to Deal with the Impact of the Pandemic  and Promote the Steady Growth of Foreign Trade, which is 
available  on its official website. The measures  include  increasing su pport ive measures , alleviating 
business difficulties of enterprises, speeding up the inspection and release of imported production 
equipment and raw materials  and promoting the expansion of imports of agricultural products and 
food,etc, which effectively m itigate the impact of the pandemic  on customs clearance of import and 
export . 
 
En el punto 3.19 explica que las autoridades han confirmado que las medidas relacionadas con la 
COVID -19 que afectan a las mercancías adoptadas por China en la esfera de la faci litación del 
comercio incluyen: i) un  aviso del MOFCOM  en el que se ofrecen directrices a las empresas sobre la 
solicitud de licencias de importación y exportación sin documentos impresos y se alienta activamente 
a que las soliciten de este modo, se simplifica aún más la documentación necesaria para solicitar  
licencias de importación y exportación sin documentos impresos, se optimizan los procesos de 
solicitud y actualización de claves electrónicas y se alienta a las empresas a que realicen estos 
trámites en línea; ii) una Circular del Ministerio de Agricultur a y Asuntos Rurales (MARA) por la que 
se aplican nueve medidas de facilitación correspondientes a tres categorías de trámites 
administrativos de aprobación en relación con la agricultura (renovación de licencias, simplificación 
del procedimiento de aprobac ión y optimización del proceso de aprobación).   
 
7-¿Podría China informar con mayor precisión cuáles son las medidas de facilitación 
correspondientes a las tres categorías de trámites administrativos de aprobación en 
relación con la agricultura (renovación de licencias, simplificación del procedimiento 
de aprobación y optimización del proceso de aprobación) que se introdujeron a 
causa de la pandemia?   
 
Reply : In order to effectively guarantee the  agricultural production during the pandemic , the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued the Notice on Optimizing Review and 
Approval  Services during the COVID -19 Pandemic  (Notice of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs [2020] No.1)  and t he Notice on Optimizing Veterinary Drug Examination and 
Approval  Services during the COVID -19 Pandemic (Notice of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs [2021] No.3) . rolling out facilitation measures to optimiz e agricultural administrative review 
and approval services. Please refer to  
http://www.moa.gov.cn/gk/tzgg_1/tz/202002/t20200213_6337012.htm   
http://www.moa.gov.cn/govpublic/xmsyj/202105/t20210514_6367752.htm  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 128 - 
 
  8 - Sírvase describir cuales fueron los logros obtenidos por su incorporación en cada uno 
de ellas.  
 
Reply : The above measures have effectively improved the efficiency of review and approval of 
related matters, met the needs of China 's agricultural production, and ensured the smooth operation 
of agricultural production and foreign trade.  
 
3.1.3 Aranceles  
3.1.3.1 Aranceles NMF aplicados  
En el punto 3.29 del informe se explica que el arancel más elevado de China (65%) se aplica a 20 
líneas arancelarias (trigo y morcajo (tranquillón); maíz, excepto para siembra; arroz; harina de trigo 
y morcajo (tranquillón); grañones, sémola y "pellets ", de cereales; determinados cereales en grano, 
molidos o tratados (de maíz y cebada); y vermut y demás vinos preparados con plantas aromáticas 
(en recipientes con capacidad superior a 2 litros). Cuatro líneas arancelarias están sujetas a un tipo 
del 57% (los demás tabacos elaborados (partida 2403 del SA), y 10 líneas arancelarias a un tipo del 
50% (7 correspondientes a la partida azúcar de caña o de remolacha y sacarosa químicamente pura, 
en estado sólido (partida 1701 del SA) y 3 a la de abonos minerales o qu ímicos (partida 3105 del 
SA).   
 
9-¿Podría China indicar si planea reducir estos aranceles tan elevados (65%) que se 
aplican a ciertos productos agrícolas? En caso de respuesta afirmativa sírvase indicar en 
detalle el plan para ello. En caso de respuesta n egativa sírvase indicar las causas por las 
cuales China no planea reducir tales aranceles.   
 
Reply : According to the Customs Import and Export Tariff of the People 's Republic of China (2021), 
21 tariff lines  apply  the MFN rate of 65%, among  which 19 tariff lines  are food products with tariff 
quotas and in-quota tariff  rate is only 1% -10%. The other two tariff lines  are vermouth wine and 
similar wines . The vermouth wine and similar wines  with small packages are subject to a  the 
provisional  preferential tariff rate of 14% . 
 
3.1.3.5 Exenciones o concesiones arancelarias   
En el inciso 3.36 dice que además, pueden aplicarse exenciones y reducciones de derechos de 
conformidad con las disposiciones establecidas en la reglamentación pertinente del Consejo de 
Estado a las mercancías importadas en zonas designadas, para empresas específicas o para usos 
específicos. Por ejemplo, los productos importados quedan exentos de derechos de importación y 
otros impuestos cuando entran en zonas especiales bajo supervisión aduanera. Se notificaron al 
Comité de Subvenciones y Medidas Compensat orias de la OMC diversas exenciones de los derechos 
de aduana en vigor durante el período 2017 -2018. No se dispone de información sobre posibles 
exenciones o reducciones de derechos de aduana introducidas desde 2019; las autoridades han 
indicado que no hay  datos disponibles sobre los ingresos no percibidos como consecuencia de las 
concesiones o exenciones arancelarias aplicadas en ese mismo período.   
 
10-¿Podría China explicar con mayor detalle cómo es el proceso para aplicar una exención 
o reducción aranc elaria a las mercancías importadas en una zona designada?  
 
Reply : Please refer to the relevant laws and regulations and announcements on the website of the 
General Administration of Customs for the application process of tariff reduction and exemption for 
imported goods in special customs supervision areas.  
 
3.2.2 Impuestos, cargas y gravámenes  
El punto 3.76 comenta que China aplica derechos de exportación de conformidad con el Reglamento 
sobre Derechos de Importación y Exportación. Se aplica n con miras a proteger el medio ambiente 
del país y a apoyar la utilización eficaz y el desarrollo sostenible de la energía y de los recursos 
escasos. Pueden aplicarse tipos arancelarios provisionales a las mercancías de exportación durante 
un plazo determ inado. El Consejo de Estado constituirá la Comisión Arancelaria del Consejo de 
Estado para adoptar una resolución sobre las mercancías sujetas al arancel provisional, los tipos 
arancelarios y el plazo de aplicación. Las autoridades afirman que los tipos ar ancelarios provisionales 
de exportación se ajustan según proceda sobre la base de consideraciones de desarrollo económico 
nacional.   
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  11- Sobre la aplicación de derechos de exportación de acuerdo con el Reglamento sobre 
Derechos de Importación y Exportación; ¿Podría China expresar los tipos arancelarios 
aplicados y detallar cómo es el procedimiento que aplica, como así también, demostrar 
la afirmación de que los tipos arancelarios provisionales de exportación se ajustan 
según proceda sobre la base de considera ciones de desarrollo económico nacional?   
 
Reply : The Import and Export Tariff issued by China annually lists the export tariffs of all goods. 
Details are available on the website of the Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance at 
http://gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu. According to relevant provisions of the Customs Law and 
the Import and Export Tariff Regulations, the Customs Tariff Commission of the State Cou ncil shall 
decide on the goods, tariff rates and time limits for which the provisional rate shall be applied. The 
provisional tariff rate  shall be adjusted once a year in principle.  
 
3.2.5 Financiación, seguro y garantías de las exportaciones  
En el párrafo 3.100 se explica que el Banco EXIM ofrece principalmente financiación en el extranjero 
a través de diversas actividades, como los créditos a la exportación (incluidos los créditos a la 
exportación para el vendedor y para el comprador), los préstamo s para construcción e inversión en 
el extranjero y los préstamos en condiciones favorables. Los créditos a la exportación para el 
comprador consisten en préstamos concedidos a prestatarios extranjeros para financiar sus 
importaciones de mercancías chinas, mientras que los créditos a la exportación para el vendedor 
consisten en préstamos otorgados a empresas nacionales dentro del ámbito de sus actividades de 
exportación. El Banco mantiene dos instrumentos preferenciales: los préstamos del Estado en 
condicion es favorables y los créditos preferenciales a la exportación para el comprador. Los 
préstamos en condiciones favorables se otorgan a países en desarrollo a tipos de interés inferiores 
a los de mercado y, por lo general, están vinculados a las exportaciones  chinas  Las autoridades 
señalan que todos los proyectos se rigen por los principios del mercado y que los bancos no exigen 
ninguna condición adicional en sus préstamos. El Banco EXIM presta sus servicios a diversas 
empresas. En 2018, realizó operaciones p or valor de USD 178.100 millones en concepto de 
liquidación internacional (USD 118.300 millones), cartas de garantía (USD 9.400 millones) y 
financiación del comercio (USD 50.300 millones), lo que supuso un aumento interanual del 8,85%.  
 
12-¿Podría China detallar el procedimiento que deben observar aquellos países en 
desarrollo que se encuentren interesados en obtener un préstamo en condiciones 
favorables según se expresa en el presente informe?   
 
Reply: Please visit the English website o f Export -Import Bank of China for details: 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn  
 
3.3 Medidas que afectan a la producción y al comercio   
3.3.1 Incentivos  
En el punto 3.115 se informa que durante el período examinado, China siguió ofreciendo incentivos 
y apoyo financiero a diferentes sectores y ramas de producción. Según las autoridades, con la 
aplicación de estas medidas se pretende acelerar la transformaci ón y modernización de las ramas 
de producción tradicionales, impulsar las incipientes, estimular la innovación, fomentar el desarrollo 
de zonas remotas, mejorar la competitividad de las pymes y atraer IED. También se concedió ayuda 
destinada a la protecció n del medio ambiente, la reducción de emisiones y el ahorro energético. En 
general, la ayuda, en forma de transferencias directas y preferencias fiscales, la otorgan el Gobierno 
central o los Gobiernos locales. Las autoridades han indicado que no se conced en incentivos en 
forma de acceso al crédito.   
 
13- ¿Podría China cuantificar los cambios o avances alcanzados mediante la 
implementación de incentivos y apoyo financiero a diferentes sectores y ramas de 
producción?   
 
Reply : Taking energy conservation and carbon reduction as an example, during the 13th Five-Year 
Plan period,  China promoted  energy -saving and carbon -reducing transformation  by adopting  
mandatory energy -saving standards . China s aved around 83 million tons of stand ard coal, equivalent 
to reducing emission of carbon dioxide by about 159 million tons.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.3.3 Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias   
3.3.3.1 Marco jurídico, institucional y normativo   
En el inciso 3.158 del informe se explica que durante el período objeto de examen, se llevó a cabo 
una reorganización sustancial de los organismos encargados de las cuestiones sanitarias y 
fitosanitarias (MSF). En 2018, la antigua Administración de Productos Alimenticios y Farmacéuticos 
de China, la Administración Gener al de Industria y Comercio y la Administración Estatal General de 
Supervisión de la Calidad, Inspección y Cuarentena (AQSIQ) se reestructuraron y pasaron a ser la 
Administración Estatal de Reglamentación del Mercado (SAMR), bajo cuya responsabilidad se 
estableció la Administración Nacional de Productos Médicos (NMPA). La Administración General de 
Aduanas (GACC) asumió muchas de las responsabilidades ejercidas anteriormente por la AQSIQ. 
Las responsabilidades respectivas de las diferentes instituciones encar gadas del régimen sanitario y 
fitosanitario de China figuran en el cuadro 3.17. El servicio de información MSF/OMC de China es el 
Servicio de Información y de Notificación MSF del Centro de Investigaciones sobre Normas 
Internacionales de Inspección y Cuare ntena y Reglamentos Técnicos, dependiente de la GACC. El 
organismo nacional encargado de la notificación es el Centro de Información y Notificaciones 
relativas a la OMC del Ministerio de Comercio (MOFCOM).   
 
14- ¿Podría China indicar las razones por las cuales se llevó a cabo una reorganización 
sustancial de los organismos encargados de las cuestiones sanitarias y fitosanitarias?   
15 -¿Qué resultados se esperan a partir de esa modificación?   
 
Reply : In March 201 8, the State Council Institutional Reform Proposal clearly stated that the entry -
exit inspection and quarantine management responsibilities and teams of the General Administration 
of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine should  be assigned to the General  Administration 
of Customs.  
 
The reform has integrat ed customs duties with the former  entry -exit inspection and quarantine 
duties . It is an important achievement of the continuous promotion of port customs clearance 
reform. After the reform, the customs assume s more supervision responsibilitie s in wider fields . The 
supervision team is larger and the supervision force is stronger . The re form further promotes the 
modernization of the customs governance system and governance capacity.  
 
En el apartado 3.163 se explica que el MARA prevé introducir un sistema de certificados de 
conformidad para los productos agropecuarios comestibles, así como  una Plataforma Nacional de 
Trazabilidad de la Calidad y la Inocuidad de los Productos Agropecuarios. Según las autoridades, 
estas medidas solo se aplican a las actividades de producción y transformación de productos 
agropecuarios comestibles llevadas a ca bo en China.    
 
16-¿Podría China dar mayor detalle acerca de cómo serán los cambios citados en el 
informe como el sistema de certificados de conformidad para los productos agropecuarios 
comestibles y la Plataforma Nacional de Trazabilidad de la Calidad y la Inocuidad de l os 
Productos Agropecuarios?   
17 - ¿Cuáles son los objetivos que se desean alcanzar con estos cambios?   
 
Reply to questions 16 -17: The certificat ion system of edible agricultural products aims to solve 
the problems of not shouldering the main responsibili ties for the quality and safety of agricultural 
products and the  ineffective c onnection between the market exit  and market access. The 
construction of a national traceability platform for agricultural product quality and safety aims to 
improve the supervision capabilities , which marks an important step to realize  whole -process 
traceability of agricultural products.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SINGAPORE  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
1.2.2 Monetary and exchange rate policy  
Page 21 (Para 1.19)  
 
1. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that "Since 2014, the PBOC has been developing a central 
bank digital currency, the e-CNY or e -renminbi. It is designed to be a legal tender combining 
digital currency and electronic payment characteristics, thus serving as cash  (M0). The e -CNY 
is currently being tested across several regions, selected banks, and electronic payment 
platfo rms. It is expected to offer a higher degree of anonymity and lower handling charges 
than those of existing payment providers, higher compatibility across platforms, and, by 
broadening the reach of people with limited access to finance, to lead to more fin ancial 
inclusion. The PBOC plans to use the e -CNY for domestic transactions initially. " Could China 
elaborate on the progress made or issues faced since  2014, and whether there are plans to 
expand the pilot programme beyond domestic transactions? If so, wh at would be the 
estimated roadmap and timeline?  
 
Reply:  The PBOC established a digital legal tender research group in 2014 to start researching on 
the issuance framework, key technologies, circulation environment and international experience for 
the count ry's digital currency. It then set up China Digital Currency Research Institute in 2016 and 
constructed the first generation prototype system for the digital legal tender of China in the same 
year. Upon approval of the State Council, it began to organize c ommercial institutions to conduct 
R&D experiment for the e -CNY at the end of 2017. Thus far, the experiment has largely completed 
such work as top -level design, functional R&D, system debugging, etc. Following the principles of 
steadiness, security, contro llability, innovation and practicability, the PBOC is now piloting the e -
CNY in some selected representative regions. Furthermore, it has released a White Paper on the 
R&D Progress of the e -Renminbi in China . 
 
1.3.2 Trends and patterns in FDI   
Page 29 (Para 1.48)  
 
2. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that "China continues to be a significant investor abroad ", 
and "the most important sectors for China 's FDI  abroad are leasing and business services, 
manufacturing, financial intermediation, and wholesale and retail trade ". Could China share 
more about the size of its outward FDI to the main destinations, by services sectors?  
 
Reply:  The statistical data of Ch ina on outward FDI are based on the classification of national 
economic sectors by the National Bureau of Statistics, which does not distinguish trade in services 
from trade in goods. For data on China 's outward FDI, please consult the Statistical Bulletin  of China 's 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment  issued by the Ministry of Commerce on its official website for 
various years in the past.  
 
2.4.1 Regulatory framework and market access  
Page 37 (Para 2.43)  
 
3. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that foreign investors "might need prior approval from the 
Government to invest in restricted markets ". Could China provide some examples of these 
"restricted markets "? 
 
Reply:  China applies pre -establishment national treatment and negative list systems to foreign 
investors. The negative list is issued or approved by the State Council and is available on the official 
website of the Central People 's Government of the People 's Rep ublic of China ( www.gov.cn ). 
 
2.4.2 Examination and approval procedures  
Page 41 (Para 2.52)  
 
4. The WTO Secretariat Report also notes that for investors interested to invest in a restricted 
industry, they "must comply with t he required administrative measures, such as those for 
equity shareholding and qualifications for senior management officers " and undergo "formal 
examination of relevant application materials ". Could China clarify on the other WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  requirements/measures which these investors would need to fulfil, as well as the estimated 
timeline for the entire approval process?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the Foreign Investment Law of the People 's Republic of China . 
 
2.4.3 Incentives to foreign direct investments  
Page 44 (Para 2.66)  
 
5. We understand that "when importing R&D equipment or procuring it domestically, qualified 
domestic and foreign R&D centres can apply for import duty, VAT, and consumption tax 
exemption, and a VAT refund for domestic equipment ". We would like to seek China 's 
clarifications on the qualification criteria, as well as whether these criteria would apply equally 
to all foreign and domestic R&D centres.  
 
Reply:  To encourage scientific research and tech development and promote the progress of science 
and technology, China refunds VAT for eligible domestic equipment procured by domestic or foreign 
R&D centers in its entirety. Specifically, the equipment refers to experimental equipment, d evices 
and apparatuses that create necessary conditions for scientific research, teaching and tech 
development.  
 
3.1.1.3 Trade Facilitation  
Page 49 (Box 3.1)  
 
6. We note that the measures to facilitate agri -food trade under Box 3.1, include "expedited 
proce ss to grant market access to more categories of agri -food products from more countries 
and to register more establishments ", as well as the establishment of "green lanes […] at key 
ports". Could China clarify when and how these measures would be implemente d? 
7. Specifically, we would like to seek China 's clarifications on (i) the agri -food product categories 
that are being considered for expedited market access; (ii) the registration process of 
establishments to export to China; and (iii) the criteria for green lane clearances for agri -food 
products. Would China consider a pre -export inspection and testing in the exporting country 
as a means of providing assurance of animal or plant heath or food safety, in order to facilitate 
clearance of the products upon  arrival in China? Under what circumstances would such a 
facilitated clearance be considered?  
 
Reply for 6 and 7:  The "green lanes for agri -food products " are opened by China in consultation 
with relevant countries. The goods imported or exported through t he "green lanes for agri -food 
products " mainly include the agricultural and by -products that are fresh and live, perishable and 
therefore have relatively higher requirement for the timing of customs clearance. The customs 
authorities of China and their for eign counterparts (including inspection and quarantine authorities) 
jointly confirm and exchange the catalogue (HS codes) of goods to be imported or exported in such 
manner that comply with their respective requirements. With regard to the "green lanes for  agri-
products ", the port inspection authorities, including customs authorities, on the two sides will take 
supervisory measures for such facilitated clearance within their terms of reference approved by state 
laws, regulations and policies.  
 
3.3.3.2 SPS M easures  
Page 87 (Para 3.169)  
 
8. With reference to China 's "administrative measures for registration of overseas manufacturers 
of imported food " as one of the specific trade concerns (STCs) raised in the SPS Committee, 
Singapore further notes that the latest announcement on the General Administration of 
Customs (GACC) Decree Order 248 in April 2021, where all food manufacturers, processes, 
and storage facilities of 20 food categories (expanded from 4  previously – meat, dairy, 
seafood, bird nest) would b e subject to registration. Could China provide information on how 
this new decree would be rolled out by 1 January 2022? Would advisories on the definition of 
these food categories, and the checklists of requirements for registration, as well as 
registrati on timeline and procedures be made available on its standardized National Single 
Window for international trade  (as mentioned in Para 3.6)?  
 
Reply:  As the safety of imported food bears on the physical health and personal safety of the general 
public, it is  an important livelihood issue. According to provisions of such laws and administrative WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  regulations as the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China as well as its implementation 
regulations, the Chinese Government has revised two former regulation s on the administration of 
food safety for import and export and on the registration administration of overseas manufacturers 
of imported food and on 12 April 2021 issued the Measures of the People 's Republic of China for the 
Administration of Food Safety for Import and Export (General Administration of Customs 
Order  No. 249) and the Provisions of the People 's Republic of China for the Registration 
Administration of Overseas Manufacturers of Imported Food (General Administration of Customs 
Order No.248), bo th of which were slated to take effect as of 1 January 2022. Before issuance, the 
Chinese Government made notifications according to relevant rules of the WTO, solicited comments 
from various WTO  members and adopted those reasonable, thus complying with re levant WTO rules. 
The General Administration of Customs Orders No. 248 and No.249 have both specified the scope 
of application for the two regulations in their Article 2. Moreover, the Chinese Government will make 
interpretations for the Measures of the Pe ople's Republic of China for the Administration of Food 
Safety for Import and Export (General Administration of Customs Order No.249) and the Provisions 
of the People 's Republic of China for the Registration Administration of Overseas Manufacturers of 
Imported Food (General Administration of Customs Order No.248) in an appropriate manner in the 
near future and you are welcome to follow such development. In addition, the  General Administration 
of Customs Order No.248 will not affect the implementation of bilateral protocols. Should a 
country/region have otherwise agreed with China on the method of registration and the submission 
of applications, such agreement shall preva il. 
 
3.3.7.2 Institutional reforms and IP -related policies   
Page 107 (Para 3.235)  
 
9. Regarding the Notice on Further Strengthening Intellectual Property Pledge Financing issued 
by the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) in 2019, could China share 
more about (i) how the valuation of IP is conducted (and by which type of entities); (ii) its 
efforts to increase liquidity of IP assets, including efforts to enhance the secondary market?   
 
Reply:  (i) In terms of intellectual property pledge financing, financial institutions e.g. banks need 
to comprehensively evaluate the tech innovation capability, development potential, brand value, etc. 
of an enterprise through its intellectual property, rather tha n evaluate the intellectual property alone. 
The Notice on Further Strengthening Intellectual Property Pledge Financing  issued under the 
leadership of China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission explicitly encourages commercial 
banks to create evaluat ion systems for the tech innovation capability of enterprises, with a view to 
reasonably analyzing the innovation -driven development capability and brand value of enterprises 
by comprehensively valuing their intellectual properties, like patent rights, tra demark rights, 
copyrights, etc., thereby grasping the direction of their development via the intellectual property 
pledge financing business. In the meantime, the notice proposes to create and improve intellectual 
property internal valuation systems, stren gthen internal capacity building for risk assessment and 
asset valuation, and explore the possibility of conducting internal assessment/valuation.The Asset 
Valuation Law of the People 's Republic of China , which was enacted in 2016, provides for the 
conditi ons and procedures for the establishment of asset valuation institutions as well as the 
procedures for actual valuation. In an effort to guide and regulate intellectual property valuation, 
competent authorities of China have issued a series of guidelines t hat serve as basic norms, including 
those for the valuation of intangible assets and those for the valuation of intellectual property assets. 
Valuation institutions shall value various intellectual properties, such as patents and trademarks, 
according to d ifferent methods, scenarios and circumstances.(ii) The Notice on Further 
Strengthening Intellectual Property Pledge Financing , issued by China National Intellectual Property 
Administration together with China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, se ts forth the 
need to explore effective means to dispose and transfer intellectual property pledged and give full 
play to various types of intellectual property trading platforms in disposing such pledged property.  
 
3.3.7.5.1 Trademarks  
Page 109 (Para 3.253 )  
 
10. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the CNIPA has adopted a sub-class system . "whereby 
goods and services under each Nice class are classified into sub -classes, and some sub -classes 
are further categorized into different groups ". Could China elaborat e on the objectives behind 
the further categorization, and whether it is a requirement for applicants to provide details of 
the sub -classes at the point of filing their trademark application?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  According to relevant provisions of the Trademark Law  and the Implementing Regulation for 
the Trademark Law  of China, an applicant for the registration of a trademark shall fill out the category 
and name of the goods that are going to use the trademark sought according to prescribed 
classification of goods. The name of the goods or services shall be completed a ccording to the 
category number and name given in the classification of goods and services; if a good or service is 
not listed in the classification table, the applicant shall attach an explanation on the good or service 
concerned.The Similar Goods and Ser vices Table  is formulated and circulated by the trademark 
registration authorities of China based on the Nice classification and their work experience over the 
years. As a matter of fact, it does not adopt the so -called "sub-class system ". As China is a me mber 
country of the Nice Union, an applicant shall declare its goods or services according to the Nice 
classification in filing its application. The Similar Goods and Services Table  does employ the system, 
content and rules of Nice classification, but divi des various types of goods and services into different 
similar groups in light of the trademark registration work in China. The table can serve as a reference 
for trademark examiners, trademark agents and trademark applicants in distinguishing similar good s 
or services.  
 
3.3.7.5.2 Geographical Indications  
Page 110 (Para 3.258)  
 
11. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the CNIPA has published Guidelines on Determining 
Common Names in Geographical Indication Protection (Draft)  in 2020, which clarified the 
"determining factors, cancellation, and other aspects of common names in terms of the 
common name determination in GI protection ". Could China clarify when these guidelines 
would be implemented? If so, do they have force of law?  
 
Reply:  China National Intellect ual Property Administration and State Administration for Market 
Regulation jointly issued the Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening the Protection of 
Geographical Indications  in early 2021. The Guidelines abovementioned have taken those opinions 
into account, but have not yet taken effect at present.  
 
3.3.7.5.3 Patents  
Page 111 (Para 3.263)  
 
12. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that CNIPA has amended the Patent Examination 
Guideli nes, to "clarify the examination standard in patent applications involving artificial 
intelligence […] ". We would like to seek China 's clarifications on its considerations and 
rationale for introducing these amendments.   
 
Reply:  In order to meet the need for intellectual property protection in new business types and 
areas and to enhance the building of intellectual property institutions in relevant domains, China 
National Intellectual Property Administration has been improving th e patent examination standards 
for concerned tech areas by way of stepping up investigations into social needs and perfecting the 
regular revision mechanisms for patent examination guidelines.  
 
3.3.7.6.1 Overview  
Page 117 (Table 3.32)  
 
13. We note from Table 3.32 that the patent disputes in 2020 reduced by more than 49.5% year -
on-year from "77,300 " in 2019 to "39,000 ". Could China elaborate on the reasons behind this 
drop?  
 
Reply:  The white paper 2019 was issued in 2020, while the white pap er 2018 was issued in 2019, 
so there is inconsistency between the years and the data in the question. China handled 
nearly  77,300 patent -related administrative law enforcement cases in 2018, including close 
to 34,600 patent dispute cases and nearly 42,700 patent counterfeiting cases. We 
handled  nearly  39,000 patent infringement administrative adjudication cases in 2019, an increase 
of 13.7% year on year over the 34,600 patent dispute cases posted in 2018. Also in 2019, we dealt 
with more than 7,300 patent c ounterfeiting cases, in sharp contrast to the almost 42,700 patent 
counterfeiting cases registered in 2018. The cause behind this sharp drop in the patent counterfeiting 
cases dealt with in 2019 was the reshuffle of China National Intellectual Property Adm inistration in 
2018 as a result of government restructuring. The reshuffle transferred the trademark and patent 
law enforcement responsibility to the market regulation comprehensive law enforcement teams WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  under the State Administration for Market Regulation . After the reform, moreover, the market 
regulation authorities focused their efforts on combating major counterfeit cases and some petty 
cases such as inadvertent use of others ' marks were not covered in the statistics due to changes in 
the statistical scope.  
 
3.3.7.6.3 Judicial Measures  
Page 118 (Para 3.297)  
 
14. Regarding the new IP Court of the Supreme Court established in January 2019, could China 
elaborate on the (i) percentage  of IP cases at the IP Court of the Supreme Court  which 
underwent mediation; (ii) the mediating institution (i.e. would it be the Court itself or other 
institutions) for these cases; and (iii) the mediation success rate among these cases?  
 
Reply:  From 1 J anuary 2019 to 30 December 2020, the IP Court of the Supreme Court concluded a 
total of 3,325 second -instance civil cases, of which 229 were closed by mediation and 786 were 
closed by withdrawal, together accounting for 30.5%.  
 
4.2.2.1 Overview including e nvironmental policy  
Page 141 (Para 4.59)  
 
15. The WTO Secretariat Report states that "a new Energy Law is currently being drafted ". Could 
China elaborate on this new law, and when it would be implemented?   
 
Reply:  The Energy Law  is right now in the stage of drafting and revising. It will be made available 
for public consultation in the period from April to May 2020. Nowadays, we are researching and 
reasoning the opinions from all sources and revising the draft law. In the next st ep, we will proceed 
according to legislative procedures.  
 
Page 141 (Para 4.60)  
 
16. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that China "is actively pursuing a policy of decoupling of 
economic growth and energy consumption, through increased energy efficiency ". How does 
China intend to increase energy efficiency in the various sectors? Are there currently any 
incentives/subsidies for companies to be more energy efficient and reduce their carbon 
emissions, and if so, whether they will apply to foreign  companies currently in China?  
 
Reply:  China has put in place a slew of policies in favor of environmental protection, energy 
conservation and emissions reduction under its current tax regimes. Firstly, it supports the 
development of clean energy and rene wables and guide enterprises to replace fossil fuels with 
clean  and renewable energy. Secondly, it reduces energy consumption and raises energy 
efficiency.  In addition, it has undergone several tax reforms to promote environmental 
protection.  Firstly, it introduced the environmental protection tax in 2018. Secondly, it launched the 
reform to impose ad valorem tax on resources in July 2016. For relevant incentive tax policies of 
China, please consult the latest notification on subsidies made by the Chinese Government to 
the WTO (G/SCM/N/372/CHN).  
 
Page 142 (Para 4.64)  
 
17. Regarding China 's Regulations on Carbon Emission Trading (Trial) and the 
Implementation  Plan on National Carbon Emission Trading Quota Determination and 
Distribution for 2019 – 2020 (Power Generation Industry) " as issued in December 2020 which 
provided "specific requirements for quota allocation and compliance ", could China clarify how 
its carbon emissions trading market would support China 's plans for emission intensity target 
for 2030 and carbon neutrality goal for 2060? How would these quotas be determined?  
 
Reply:  The carbon emission trading market of China will play an active role in helping the country 
to attain its 2030 carbon intensity goal and its 2060 carbon neutrality goal. Firstly, it can help to 
effectively realize the carbon emission goal through a quota management system; secondly, it can 
identify reasonable carbon prices through market mechanisms and therefore help to lower the cost 
of carbon emission reduction; and thirdly, it offers a flexible option for enterprises to reduce their 
carbon emissions, th us driving the investment in green, low -carbon sectors. The national carbon 
market has been officially launched in July 2021. The first compliance cycle covers 2,162 key WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 136 - 
 
  emitters in the power generation industry, involving 4.5 billion tons or so of carbon dioxide on a 
yearly basis and accounting for 45% of the annual carbon dioxide emissions across the country, 
making it the largest carbon market all over the world.In terms of quota distribution, the current 
system adopts the industry benchmark method (with  the leading emission level per unit product 
output/capacity in the industry used as the benchmark) to distribute the carbon emission quotas, 
following the emission intensity control principle. The quota distribution process is unified, open and 
transparen t across the country. The basis for quota distribution is the carbon emission data certified 
by competent authorities for ecological environment administration. According to the Regulations on 
Carbon Emission Trading (Trial) , key emitters can lodge complai nts and request review should they 
disagree with their emission figures certified.  
 
18. Could China elaborate on its future plans for the emissions trading market, including whether 
China will be including more industries in the emissions trading market, and i f so, what would 
these industries be and when might this occur?  
 
Reply:  China will expand the emissions trading market into more industries based on the emissions 
trading market functioning well for the power generation industry. To prepare for such expan sion, 
we have organized such high emission industries as power generation, petrochemical, chemical 
engineering, building materials, steel making, non -ferrous metal, paper making, aviation, etc. to 
calculate, submit and audit their emission data for years, hence the availability of relatively sound 
data for the expansion. To date, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment has commissioned relevant 
industry associations to conduct preliminary research on relevant industry standards and tech norms 
complying with  requirements of the national emissions trading market to be built. Following the 
principle of approving and issuing standards only when they are mature, moreover, it will ratchet up 
revising the national standards for calculating and reporting greenhouse gas emissions for particular 
industries and formulating industry -specific quota distribution plans. To sum up, it will give full play 
to market mechanisms in curbing the emission of greenhouse gases, promoting the innovation of 
green, low -carbon technologi es, guiding climate investment and financing, etc.  
 
Page 142 (Para 4.65)  
 
19. Other than the Notice on Establishing and Improving the Safeguard Mechanism of Renewable 
Energy Consumption , could China clarify its other existing or future policies relating to 
promotion of clean energy, reducing emissions from other industries, and increasing share of 
non-fossil energy?  
 
Reply:  Accelerating the development of clean energy and increasing the share of non -fossil energy 
in total energy consumption plays an important  role in driving down pollutant and carbon emissions. 
In addition to circulating the  Notice on Establishing and Improving the Safeguard Mechanism of 
Renewable Energy Consumption , which secures the exploitation and utilization of electricity derived 
from renewable sources, such as hydropower, wind power, solar power and biomass power, China 
has put in place many more special policies in this regard. For instance, it has circulated  the Guiding 
Opinions on Promoting the Integration of Power Generation, Grid, Load and Storage Sectors and the 
Development of Multi -energy Complementary Energy Systems  to improve the consumption of 
electricity derived from renewable energy and the efficien cy of power systems; it has issued the 
Notice on Guiding and Increasing Financial Support to Promote Healthy and Orderly Development of 
the Wind and Photovoltaic Power Industries, etc., the Several Opinions on Promoting the Exploitation 
and Utilization of Geothermal Energy  and the Guiding Opinions on Promoting the Industrialization of 
Bio-natural Gas  to accelerate the exploitation and utilization of wind, solar, geothermal and biomass 
energy; furthermore, it has released the Medium - and Long -term Developmen t Plan for the Pumped 
Storage Power Industry (2021 -2025)  and the Guiding Opinions for Accelerated Development of New 
Types of Energy Storage to improve the power system 's regulation capability and facilitate the 
consumption of power from renewable energy.  
 
4.4.1.3.7 Developments in the fintech industry  
Page 167 (Para 4.193)  
 
20. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the State Administration for Market Regulation  (SAMR) 
has issued a consultation draft of the Anti -Monopoly Guidelines on the Sector of Platform 
Economies in November 2020, which had expressly referred to the Anti-Monopoly Law.  Could 
China clarify the differences between the "Guidelines of the Anti -Monopoly Committee of th e 
State Council on Anti -Monopoly in the Field of Internet Platform Economy " which were in effect WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  since 7 February 2021 (mentioned in Page 90, Box 3.2), and the draft "Anti-Monopoly 
Guidelines on the Sector of Platform Economies "? What is the status of these draft guidelines? 
What are the key rules or obligations imposed in these draft guidelines to discipline the online 
market? Other than these guidelines, are there other regulatory instruments to discipline the 
online market?  
 
21. The same paragraph also s tates that "all companies engaged in Internet platform business 
must be subject to anti -monopoly supervision ". Could China clarify the scope of "Internet 
Platform business "?  
 
Reply for 20-21: In February 2021, the Anti -Monopoly Commission of the State Cou ncil of China 
issued the Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy Industry . Based on the Anti-Monopoly Law , 
the Guidelines  emphasizes that monopolistic activities in the platform economy industry should be 
subject to the Anti-Monopoly Law  and suppleme ntary  laws. The formulation and implementation of 
the Guidelines  provides targeted institutional rules for strengthening the anti -monopoly supervision 
of the platform economy, helps the anti -monopoly law enforcement agencies to unify the standards 
and improve the transparency of law enforcement, which is beneficial for  platform operators, 
platform sellers  and other m arket players to deepen their understanding of the Anti-Monopoly Law  
and effectively prevent and reduc legal risks. During the drafting process of the Guidelines , opinions 
from all quarters were solicited an d absorbed. Regarding the concept of Internet platform business,  
Article 2 of the Guidelines  makes it clear that an Internet platform refers to a business organization 
that uses network information technology to enable mutually dependent bilateral or multi lateral 
entities to interact under the rules provided by a specific carrier to jointly create value.  
 
4.4.2.2 Regulatory Framework  
Page 169 (Para 4.204)  
 
22. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that "for basic telecommunications, the controlling stake 
shall be held by the Chinese national ". Could China clarify the scope of "basic 
telecommunications "? Does this requirement only apply to mobile and fibre broadband 
operators?  
 
Reply:  According to the Regulation of the People 's Republic of China on Telecommunications , "Basic 
telecommunications business refers to the provision of basic facilities of public networks, public data 
transmission and basic speech communication ". The specific types and business definitions of basic 
telecommunications service s are stipulated in the Classified Catalogue of Telecommunications 
Services (2015 Version) . 
 
4.4.2.2.1 Developments in 5G  
Page 169 (Para 4.207)  
 
23. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that China 's Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) had issued different plans and notices for 5G. Could China elaborate on  its 
policy on the 5G Standalone Access (SA), as well as developments pertaining to the  5G Non -
Standalone Access (NSA)? Could China also update on the state of deployment for 5G SA and 
NSA across China?  
 
Reply:  Since the commercialization of 5G, China has supported telecom operators to carry out the 
construction of 5G SA networks, promote the joint construction and sharing of 5G networks, and 
increase the coverage of 5G networks in urban ar eas, counties and towns. At present, all the new 
5G base stations have adopted the SA mode, and the SA mode of 5G network has covered all 
prefecture -level cities across China . 
 
4.4.2.2.5 Cloud computing  
Page 170 (Para 4.213)  
 
24. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that "no substantial progress " was made on cloud -enabled 
services regulations. The Notice on Standardizing Cloud Service Market and Facilitating the 
Sound Development of the Industry  has not yet been implemented. Could China provide more 
information on its regulatory framework for cloud computing?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 138 - 
 
  Reply : The Chinese government strictly abides by WTO rules and relevant laws and regulations, and 
encourages foreign -funded enterprises t o participate in China 's cloud service market in a legal and 
compliant manner.  
 
4.4.2.2.6 Cybersecurity  
Page 171 (Para 4.215)  
 
25. The WTO Secretariat Report states that China 's network security is regulated by Article 21 of 
the Cybersecurity Law , which stipulates that China shall "implement a tiered system of 
network security protection ". We would like to seek China 's clarifications on whether this 
provision is intended to regulate network security of content distribution network, Internet 
exchan ges and/or domain name servers? If so, how does such "tiered system " operate in 
relation to such digital infrastructure?  
 
Reply:  The tiered system of network security protection stipulated in Article 21 of the Cybersecurity 
Law is the continuation and imp rovement of the information security protection system stipulated in 
the Regulations of the People 's Republic of China for Safety Protection of Computer Information 
Systems  promulgated in 1994. The Chinese competent authorities have solicited public opinio ns on 
the Regulations on Tiered Protection of Cybersecurity (Draft for Comments).  
 
Page 172 (Para 4.219)  
 
26. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the SAMR  and the Standardization Administration of 
China (SAC) jointly published the Information Security Technology – Personal Information (PI) 
Security Specification (GB/T 35273 -2020) (hereinafter referred to "Specification), which took 
effect starting 1 October  2020. Could China clarify on the authority -in-charge (i.e., SAMR, SAR 
or the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)) if interested persons have queries on the 
Specification.  
 
Reply:  For any questions about the content and clauses of the national -standar d Information 
Security Technology – Personal Information (PI) Security Specification (GB/T 35273 -2020) , please 
consult the SAMR (SAC). The competent national standardization technical committee will provide  a 
technical interpretation.  
 
27. We also note that Ar ticle 9.8 of the Specification states that "PI collected and generated in 
China can be transferred overseas, but the controller must comply with all relevant national 
regulations and standards ". Could China clarify how it would determine whether data 
controllers have complied with all relevant national regulations and standards, as well as which 
agencies would be making such determinations?   
 
Reply:  Article 38 of th e Personal Information Protection Law  clearly stipulates that the provision of 
personal information to any party outside the territory of China shall meet one of the following 
conditions: (1) security assessment organized by the national cyberspace administration has been 
passed; (2) personal information protection certification has been cond ucted by a specialized 
institution according to the provisions issued by the national cyberspace administration; (3) a 
contract has been concluded with the overseas recipient in accordance with the standard contract 
formulated by the national cyberspace ad ministration, agreeing on both parties ' rights and 
obligations; (4) other conditions provided in laws or administrative regulations or by the national 
cyberspace administration. At present, relevant supporting regulations such as those on the security 
assessment on outbound data are being formulated, and are expected to be open to the public for 
comments in the near future.  
 
28. In the same paragraph, we also note that China had published the first draft of the Personal 
Information Protection Law (PIPL) for public comments, on 21 October 2020. We understand 
that the PIPL will take effect from 1 November 2021. Could China clarify how should the 
Specification be interpreted with the PIPL, including whether the definition and classification 
of personal infor mation in the PIPL would prevail?   
 
Reply:  The Personal Information Protection Law of the People 's Republic of China  is China 's basic 
law for regulating the protection of personal information. The relevant supporting laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions will comply with the provisions of the Personal Information Protection 
Law. WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 139 - 
 
   
4.4.2.2.7 E -commerce  
Page 173 (Para 4.22 6)  
 
29. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the "E-commerce law holds liable both counterfeiters 
and e -commerce operators that fail to take appropriate measures to prevent sellers in violation 
of intellectual property rights (IPRs). It also provides that IP  holders can notify a platform 
owner of an alleged infringement, and the platform owner has the obligation to prevent the 
trade of the infringed good pending investigation. Platform operators that fail to fulfil their 
responsibilities in terms of IP protec tion within a specific time period are punishable by a fine 
ranging from CNY 50,000 to CNY 2 million ". Could China elaborate on the obligations and 
responsibilities of the platform operator, as well as how it assesses whether the platform 
operators have ta ken adequate remedial actions?  
 
Reply:  Article 45 of the  E-Commerce Law  stipulates that "Where an operator of an e -commerce 
platform knows or should have known that an operator on its platform has infringed any intellectual 
property right, it shall take necessary measures, such as deleting or blocking relevant information, 
disabling relevant links, and terminating transactions and services; otherwise, it shall be held jointly 
liable with the infringing party. " 
 
Page 173 (Para 4.228)  
 
30. The WTO Secretar iat Report notes that Article 22 of the E -commerce Law has spelt out the 
"fair competition obligations for all e -commerce operators, with special emphasis on those 
with dominant market positions ", and "operators with advantages in the market due to 
technol ogy or number of users are prohibited from abusing their position to exclude or restrict 
competition ". Could China clarify the criteria in defining an e -commerce operator as having a 
"dominant market position "?  
 
Reply:  China 's Anti-Monopoly Law , the Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant Market 
Positions  and the Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy Industry  by the Anti-Monopoly 
Commission of the State Council clearly stipulate the factors that need to be considered in 
determining  that operators have market dominance. These factors stipulated in the relevant 
legislation are equally applicable to all kinds of market entities, including e -commerce enterprises. 
In the practice of law enforcement, China 's law enforcement agencies will determine whether an 
operator has a dominant market position in accordance with the above provisions on a case -by-case 
basis.  
 
31. We would also like to seek China 's clarifications on the differences between the provisions 
listed in Article 22 of the E -commerce Law  and the "Guidelines of the Anti -Monopoly 
Committee of the State Council on Anti -Monopoly in the Field of Internet Platform Economy " 
(mentioned in Page 90,  Box 3.2)? Are there other regulations in place to prevent operators 
from engaging in anti -competition practices? If so, could China clarify how these laws will 
interact? Does China foresee overlapping provisions, and if so, how does China intend to 
addres s such overlaps?  
 
Reply:  In February 2021, the Anti -Monopoly Commission of the State Council of China issued the 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy Industry . Based on the Anti-Monopoly Law , the 
Guidelines emphasizes that monopolistic activities  in the platform economy industry should be 
subject to the Anti-Monopoly Law  and supplementary laws. Article 22 of the  E-commerce Law  
stipulates that if an e -commerce operator has a dominant market position due to such factors as its 
technological advantages, the number of users, its ability to control the relevant industry and the 
degree of dependence of other operators on the e -commer ce operator in transactions, it shall not 
abuse its dominant market position to eliminate or restrict competition. The E-Commerce Law  
stipulates more specific factors for determining the dominant position of e -commerce operators. 
Both the E-Commerce Law  and the Guide lines are beneficial  supplements to  the Anti-Monopoly Law . 
The E-Commerce Law  mainly provides for the abuse of market dominance , while the Guide lines is 
more comprehensive and the basic contents of both are consistent.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 140 - 
 
  Page 173 (Para 4.229)  
 
32. The WTO Secretariat Report states that "pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of the [E -commerce] 
Law, e -commerce operators must abide by the existing Chinese laws and regulations in 
respect of protection of personal data when collecting and using users ' personal data ". Could 
China clarify whether there are requirements for personal information to be stored onshore? 
If so, what are these requirements? Could China also clarify whether businesses operating in 
China can transfer personal information offshore , and if so, are there any 
conditions/requirements which these businesses would need to fulfil prior to the transfer?  
 
Reply:  Article 38 of the Personal Information Protection Law  clearly stipulates that the provision of 
personal information to any party outside the territory of China shall meet one of the following 
conditions: (1) security assessment organized by the national cyberspace administration has been 
passed; (2) personal  information protection certification has been conducted by a specialized 
institution according to the provisions issued by the national cyberspace administration; (3) a 
contract has been concluded with the overseas recipient in accordance with the standar d contract 
formulated by the national cyberspace administration, agreeing on both parties ' rights and 
obligations; (4) other conditions provided in laws or administrative regulations or by the national 
cyberspace administration. At present, relevant suppor ting regulations such as those on the security 
assessment on outbound data are being formulated, and are expected to be open to the public for 
comments in the near future.  
 
Page 173 (Para 4.230)  
 
33. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the "E-commerce Law pr ovides that China shall 
encourage cross -border e -commerce (CBEC) development ". Apart from "promoting CBEC ", 
the State Council also issued the Approval of the Establishment of Integrated Pilot Areas for 
Cross -border E -commerce  in April 2020, as well as exte nding the "List of Goods under Cross -
Border E -commerce Retail Importation to allow more foreign goods to be delivered to Chinese 
consumers through the CBEC retail importation programme " in December 2019. Could China 
elaborate on (i) the benefits which fore ign companies can gain from participating in the CBEC 
pilot areas; (ii) the number of foreign and local companies participating in such zones; and 
(iii) how digital trade has grown with the rise in number of these pilot areas?  
 
Reply:  Since 2015, the Chin ese government has approved 105 cross -border e -commerce (CBEC) 
pilot zones in five batches successively. In general, CBEC pilot zones have taken on increased 
importance, becoming a new highlight in foreign trade growth, a new channel for entrepreneurship 
and innovation, and a new drive for transformation and upgrading. To encourage and support CBEC, 
the Ministry of Commerce has worked with relevant departments to explore innovative options, 
improve supporting policies, foster enabling environment, and achie ve high -quality development 
of CBEC. The Ministry of Commerce has guided the pilot zones in establishing a policy framework 
centered on "six systems and two platforms. " The six systems refer to information sharing, financial 
services, intelligent logistics, e -commerce integrity, statistics monitoring, and risk prevention and 
control. The two platforms include the online comprehensive service platform and the offline 
industrial parks. This has produced 36 mature practices of experience in 12 aspects that have been 
replicated and promoted nationwide. On July 5, 2021, the General Office of the State Council 
released the Opinions of the State Council 's General Office on Speed ing Up the Development of New 
Business Forms and New Models of Foreign Trade, making it clear that China will improve support 
policies for CBEC, expand the integrated pilot zones, enhance refined service platforms such as 
independent CBEC sites and CBEC so ftware, streamline the management of payment and settlement, 
strengthen the organization and building of the industry and talent training, and promote the 
development of new forms and new models of foreign trade on a healthy, sustainable, and innovative 
basis. 
 
Page 174 (Para 4.233)  
 
The WTO Secretariat Report notes that the E -commerce Law "provides that e -commerce disputes 
can be settled by: (i) negotiating; (ii) requesting mediation by consumer organizations, industry 
associations, or other legally establ ished mediating organizations; (iii) filing complaints with relevant 
authorities; (iv) filing for arbitration; or (v) instituting legal proceedings. Additional measures to 
bolster e -commerce include the establishment of Internet courts ". 
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 141 - 
 
  34. Could China elabo rate on the implementation of Internet courts – what has the utilization rate 
been like? Are there avenues which foreign businesses or consumers can take to initiate legal 
proceedings for cases related to E -commerce? If so, whether these foreign businesses  or 
consumers need to fulfil certain conditions, such as requirements for the foreign businesses 
to have onshore commercial presence, or for these foreign businesses or consumers to be 
physically present in China while participating in Internet courts ?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, Chinese courts have vigorously launched online litigation to promote the 
transformation and upgrading of judicial models in the Internet era. On 17 June 2021, the 
Supreme  People 's Court of China issued the Rules of Online Litigation of People 's Courts 
(Fa Shi [2021] No. 12), forming a relatively systematic and complete online litigation rules system.  
As of June 2021, more than 3,500 courts in China have connected to the "China Mobile Micro Court " 
online litigation platform,  which has accumulated more than 1.265 billion visits, providing the public 
with diversified, full -chain, one -stop online litigation services. Between 1 January 2020 and 
31 May 2021, Chinese courts accepted 12.197 million cases filed online, accounting for  28.3% of  the 
total cases filed. There were 6.513 million online mediations, of which 6,142,900 were successful; 
1.288 million online court hearings, with the average online trial time of 42.34 minutes; 
and 33.833  million times of electronic service, accou nting for 37.97% of the total.  
Foreign companies or consumers may file e -commerce lawsuits that are in line with Chinese laws 
and judicial interpretations in Chinese courts, in accordance with the Civil Procedure Law of the 
People 's Republic of China and t he Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Jurisdiction over Litigation of Foreign -Related Civil and Commercial Cases 
(Amendment in 2020) (Fa Shi [2020] No. 20).  
 
4.4.3.1 Maritime transport  
Page 175 (Para 4.240)  
 
35. The WTO Secretariat Report notes that "between January 2018 and February 2020, eight 
foreign ships were so authorized " to operate in the domestic water transport sector. Could 
China clarify the circumstances under which the State Council may authorize oper ators to use 
foreign ships for such operations?  
 
Reply:  According to the Regulations on the Administration of Domestic Water Transport , water 
transport operators shall not use foreign vessels to operate China 's domestic waterway transport 
business, but in the absence of Chinese vessels that can meet the requirements of the applied 
transport, and in the case that the ports or waters where the vessels dock are open to the outside 
world, they shall be approved by the competent department of tr ansportation under the 
State  Council. Water transport operators may temporarily use foreign vessels for transport within 
the time limit or voyage prescribed by the competent department of transport under the State 
Council.  
 
Page 175 (Para 4.241)  
 
36. The WTO Secretariat Report states that China has "lifted the restrictions on foreign investment 
in international shipping and international shipping agency services in China ". Does the lifting 
of such foreign investment restrictions also include the shippi ng logistics sector?   
 
Reply:  China has lifted the restrictions on foreign investment in the international maritime industry, 
international ship agency, international ship management, and other international maritime auxiliary 
industries. Since logistics i s a cross -departmental field, please clarify the specific service sector 
referred to in the "shipping logistics sector " in the question.  
 
5. Appendix   
Page 190 (Table A2.3)  
 
37. Table A2.3 in the WTO Secretariat Report states that the "pre-school education, ordinary high 
school, and higher education institutions " in China  are "subject to Sino -foreign cooperative 
education, and led by the Chinese parties ". We would like to seek Chi na's clarifications on 
whether there are any requirements/conditions which foreign service suppliers or companies 
would need to fulfil before they can embark on cooperation with a local company in the 
aforementioned areas, in light of the "Opinions on Furt her Reducing the Burden of Homework 
and Off -Campus Training for Compulsory Education Students " jointly issued by the General WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 142 - 
 
  Office of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and the General Office of the State 
Council in July 2021? Apart from these  areas, could China also clarify whether foreign investors 
and service suppliers are able to invest and/or operate companies, as well as provide services, 
in the other education sub -sectors (e.g.  adult education services and other education 
services)?  
 
Reply: Foreign investment in sectors not included in the Negative List shall be managed in 
accordance with the principle of same treatment for domestic and foreign investment.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
QUESTION:  
 
3.1.3 Actively cultivating new forms and new models of foreign trade and promoting 
innovative development of trade in services  
Page 8 (Para 3.10)  
 
Regarding China 's Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot Programme of the Innovative Development 
of Trade in Services  issued in August 2020, could China elaborate on the "eight pilot tasks " which 
the various Chinese provinces/cities/regions designated as pilot zones, would need to undertake?  
 
Reply:  The eight pilot tasks proposed in the Comprehensively Deepen the Pilot Program of 
Innovative Development of Trade in Services  include  the pursuit of improving the management 
mechanism, opening wider to the outside world, enhancing facilitation, innovating development 
modes, improving the promotion system, opt imizing the policy system, improving the regulatory 
mode and improving the statistical system from an overall perspective. The full text of the plan and 
the interpretation information of the special press conference can be viewed on www.gov.cn  and 
www.mofc om.gov.cn . 
 
Page 8 (Para 3.11)  
 
We note China 's commitment to foster "an open, fair and non -discriminatory digital trading 
environment, and establish basic regimes and standards for property rights, transaction circulation, 
cross-border transmission and se curity protection of data resources ". Could China elaborate on its 
policies to promote such a digital trading environment , as well as the relevant measures in ensuring 
data security? Could China also elaborate on the obligations a foreign company would fac e when 
undertaking cross -border data activities under the PIPL as well as the new Data Security Law which 
entered into force on 1 September 2021?   
 
Reply:  China is actively creating an open, fair, and non -discriminatory digital trading environment. 
The Outline of the People 's Republic of China 14th Five -Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development and Long -Range Objectives for 2035  clearly propose s that it is necessary to promote 
international exchanges and cooperation in cyberspace, and to promote the formulation of 
international rules on digital and cyberspace with the United Nations as the main channel and the 
United Nations Charter as the basic  principle. Actively participate in the formulation of international 
rules and digital technology standards such as data security, digital currency, and digital tax. We 
will promote the construction of a global cooperation mechanism for network security, a nd build an 
international coordination and cooperation mechanism for protecting data elements, handling 
network security incidents and combating network crimes.  In accordance with the Cyber security Law , 
the Data Security Law  and the Personal Information Pr otection Law , relevant supporting regulations 
such as data security management and data exit security assessment are being formulated quickly, 
and it is expected to solicit public opinions from the public in the near future. Foreign companies 
carrying out cross-border data activities need to carry out security assessments in accordance with 
relevant legal requirements. The specific requirements have been clearly stipulated in relevant laws.  
 
In view of China 's recent request to accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans -Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP), would China foresee the need to make changes to its domestic laws and 
regulations such that it could undertake the data -related commitments under the CPTPP, such as 
the Article on Cross -Borde r Transfer of Information by Electronic Means, and the Article on Location 
of Computing Facilities?  
 
Reply:  China has always been an advocate for the construction of open, transparent, and mutually 
beneficial regional free trade arrangements, and is activ ely building a network of high -standard free WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 143 - 
 
  trade zones open to the world. Applying to join the CPTPP shows China 's willingness and 
determination to further deepen reform and open up its markets. In order to actively promote its 
accession to the CPTPP, Ch ina has conducted a full, in -depth and comprehensive study and 
evaluation of the rules of the CPTPP, collated reform measures and revising work of laws and 
regulations that may be required to join the CPTPP, and made relevant technological preparations 
for joining the CPTPP. China is willing to make unswerving efforts to fully meet the rules and 
standards of the CPTPP through active reform.  
 
3.5.1 Promoting high -quality development of pilot free trade zones  
Page 12 (Para 3.31)  
 
We understand that China 's pilot free trade zones introduced various "facilitation measures, such as 
establishing central warehouses for the return of imported goods sold via cross -border e -commerce 
businesses, and enabling paperless digital services for the entire procedure from ente rprises ' 
customs registration to port access. " Could China elaborate on its existing and future measures to 
promote the mutual recognition and acceptance, as well as the interoperability of digital cross -border 
documents (e.g. customs clearance forms) and those business documents used in trade (e.g. b ills 
of lading)?   
 
Reply : China continues to summarize the good experience and good practices generated in the pilot 
free trade zone and promote it to a larger scale. In 2020, 37 pieces of pilot free trade zone reform 
experience was promoted , including the "mode of central warehouses for purchase return of cross -
border e -commerce retail imports ", allowing companies to set up cross -border e -commerce retail 
import return center warehouses in special customs supervision areas, and to transfer the sorting 
and re turn processes outside the region to the zone, and the whole business return process is 
completed in a "one-stop" manner, which further reduces the company 's operating costs. In 2018, 
30 pieces of pilot free trade zone reform experience was promoted, including "paperless whole 
process of enterprise registration and e -port network access in customs ", by which enterprises fill in 
and submit the required informa tion through the e -port customs -enterprise cooperation platform, 
without leaving home they can do online registration, payment, and inquiries, and the whole process 
is paperless. The above two pieces of experience have been promoted nationwide, further enh ancing 
trade facilitation and optimizing the business environment.  
 
We also note that "98% of customs clearance is completed digitally at Shanghai Port, lowering direct 
costs by more than RMB 400 million each year ". Could China provide more details on the breakdown 
(by component) for its cost savings?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, the customs has continued to promote the paperless reform of customs 
clearance operations. Paperless operations include, but are not limited to: electronic declarations, 
modif ication  and revocation of the import/export goods declaration forms, issuance of certificates, 
etc. The Announcement of the General Administration of Customs on Matters Relating to Further 
Promoting the Paperless Reform of Customs Clearance Operations (No.25, 2014 ) clearly states: 
Enterprises that choose paperless operations should select the "paperless customs clearance " 
method at the e -port input terminal when declaring goods. Under the paperless mode, enterprises 
do not need to submit all kinds of paper materials on site, which greatly saves manpower and time 
costs.  
 
5.1.2 Pursuing innovation -driven development, and optimizing and upgrading the 
industrial structure   
Page 21 (Para 5.3)  
 
The Government Report states that China has "continuously strengthened innovation as the core of 
the modernization drive. Innovation platforms are established with a r apid pace. Enterprises as the 
main innovation driving force are encouraged to increase R&D input, while the government provides 
policy incentives that apply to all ". Could China elaborate on the "policy incentives ", as well as 
provide examples of how forei gn companies in China have benefitted from these "policy incentives "?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to China 's latest subsidy notification (G/SCM/N/372/CHN).  
 
We understand that China is currently taking actions to "foster new forms of digital economy 
businesses ". Could China clarify on the new forms of digital economy businesses, as well as elaborate 
on the measures which China will be taking to further grow it s digital economy?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 144 - 
 
   
Reply:  China attaches great importance to the development of new formats of digital economy, and 
has successively introduced a series of measures such as the "Internet + " action to accelerate the 
development of digital industrializatio n and industrial digitalization, and to promote the digital 
transformation of the economy and society. China will take new business forms and models that 
support online and offline integration as an important breakthrough in economic transformation as 
well as reform and innovation. China will break traditional conventional  thinking, to play the leading 
role of digital innovation in improving the quality and efficiency of the real economy more effectively, 
and to promote "Internet + ", big data, and platform economy to a new stage.  
 
We also note that China has been making "steady progress " in new infrastructure such as  "data 
centres ". Could China provide more information on its regulatory framework for data centres, 
including areas such as energy efficiency? Could China also clarify the definition of "data centre " and 
whether its regulatory framework for data centre covers the server rooms operated by companies? 
Are foreign investors allowed to invest in, own and/or operate the data centres, the server rooms, 
and/or the property housing the data centres in China? If so, what are the requirements they would 
need to fulfil?   
 
Reply : Internet Data Center (IDC) services belong to the category of value -added 
telecommunications services. For specific regulatory requirements, please refer to the Regulation on 
Telecommunications of the People 's Republic of China  issued by the Ministry of Indust ry and 
Information Technology. IDC business is currently not open to foreign investment.  
 
6. The Way Forward  
Page 26 (Para 6.2)  
 
We note that China will be introducing the Negative List for Cross -Border Trade in Services soon. 
Could China clarify on the scope and coverage of the negative list, including whether the list would 
cover all services sectors and four modes of supply? We would also like to understand whether the 
negative list will apply equally to all foreign service suppliers.  
 
Reply:  The upcoming Negative List for Cross -border Trade in Services  will uniformly list the 
measures taken by overseas service providers in terms of national treatment, market access, loca l 
presence, cross -border trade in financial services, etc. to provide services through "cross-border " 
methods (modes 1, 2 and 4) such as cross -border delivery, overseas consumption and movement 
of natural persons. The areas outside the list will be managed in accordance with the principle of 
internal and external consistency.  
 
We note that several sectors , such as telecommunication services, scientific research and technical 
services, are already covered in China 's Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for the 
Access of Foreign Investment  and the Negative List for Market Access (2020) . Are there plans to 
streamline these negative lists in the future, and if so, when might this be?   
 
Reply:  Regarding the negative list of market access, the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Ministry of Commerce have revised the Negative List for Market Access (2021)  
to further reduce the list items, which will be implemented after being submitted for approval in 
accordance with the procedu res. Regarding the negative list of foreign investment access, the 
National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce are formulating a new 
negative list, which has been publicly solicited for comments and will be implemented after bei ng 
submitted for approval in accordance with the procedures.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 145 - 
 
  BRAZIL  
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
Page 169 (Para 4.207)  
- On 6 June 2019, the MIIT  issued the Basic Telecommunication Business Operation License to three 
state-owned carriers (China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom) and a state -owned 
broadcasting company (China Broadcasting Network) to approve their operation of "fifth generation  
digital cellular mobile communication services ". As a consequence, the MIIT revised the 
Telecommunication Services Classification Catalogue (2015) to accommodate the new item. 
The 2019 revised Catalogue adds "A12-4 Fifth generation digital cellular mobile  communication 
services " to "A12 Cellular mobile communication services " under Category A "Basic 
telecommunication services ". The new item refers to voice, data, multimedia, and other services 
provided through fifth -generation (5G) digital cellular mobile communication networks. According to 
the authorities, by end -June 2020, more than 400,000 5G base stations had been built.  
 
Question :  
1. Can China give more information regarding its licensing framework? Can any of the licenses 
mentioned or any other licenses encourage the development, on the telecom market, of supply of 
the Open -RAN model and of the 5G standalone service architecture? If yes, how so.  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the relevant provisions of the Regulations on Telecommunication  for 
information regarding the licensing framework. The openRAN technology currently receives 
considerable attention of the world although it is still in  its infancy. China has been adhering to the 
principle of technology neutrality and keeping a close watch on its latest developments.  
 
Page 169 (Paragraphs 4.208 and 4.209)  
- In March 2020, the MIIT  issued the Notice on Promoting the Accelerated Development of 5G. It 
provides guidance for the industry to fully promote 5G network construction, application 
popularization, technological development, and security assurance.  
- In November 2019, the MIIT is sued the Plan for Advancing the 512 Program on 5G Plus 
Industrial Internet, a policy document to facilitate the integrated development of 5G and 
industrial Internet. It aims to promote the use of 5G technologies to upgrade five public service 
platforms by 2022.  
 
Questions :  
2. Could China elaborate on the developments and results of 5G operations in the counrty?  
 
Reply:  Since the commercialization of 5G, Chinese regulatory authorities have 
guided  telecommunications companies to actively carry out 5G network construction, promote the 
co-construction and sharing of 5G networks, and expand 5G network coverage in urban 
areas , counties, and towns. As of the end of August 2021, China has opened a total of more 
than 1.03 million 5G base stations, and has built and shared more than 500,000 5G base stations, 
covering all cities, over 97% of counties, and 40% of towns. The number o f 5G terminal links 
exceeded 400 million. China 's 5G application is active in innovation, which is reflected in a variety 
of activities such as the establishment of a 5G application industry phalanx and the "Bloom Cup " 
innovative 5G application competition . At present, there are more than 10,000 cases of 
innovative  5G application, and 5G has exerted an enabling effect in industry, medical care, education, 
transportation, etc.  
 
3. Which are the five public service plataforms  mentioned as targets for the development policy in 
place?  
 
Reply:  According to the Plan for Advancing the 512 Program on 5G Plus Industrial Internet, the 
five public service platforms refer to the five service platforms for transforming and promoting the  
internal 5G network of industrial Internet enterprises by relying on the industrial Internet innovation 
and development program to build a network test environment that meets the needs of industrial 
enterprises to carry out 5G network application R&D and verification, provide small and medium -
sized enterprises with a "5G+Industrial Internet " intranet construction and transformation template, 
carry out application consulting and R&D training, and improve public service capabilities.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 169 (Para 4.210)  
- On facility sharing, the MIIT continues to require basic telecommunications enterprises to carry 
out infrastructure construction in accordance with the requirements of sharing basic 
telecommunications facilities or co -construction. In addition, Internet ac cess service providers 
in China can provide Internet access services to users by leasing the network resources from 
basic telecommunications companies and wired access facilities service providers. In June 2020, 
China issued the Implementation Opinions on Supporting the Accelerated Development of 5G 
Networks Through the Co -construction and Sharing of Telecommunication Infrastructure. 
According to the authorities, as at end -June 2020, the sharing rate of newly built towers in 
China stood at 90%, which is equ ivalent to sharing the construction of 780,000 towers and 
saving a total of CNY 140 billion. As at end -2020, China 's telecom operators had opened more 
than 330,000 shared 5G base stations.  
 
Questions :  
4. Are all companies subject to mandatory infrastruct ure sharing? If not, how does China define 
which companies are subjected to such obligations?  
 
Reply:  At present, the Chinese government does not force all companies to share 
telecommunications infrastructure, but only requires basic telecommunications co mpanies to 
achieve joint construction and sharing through friendly consultations on the premise that they have 
the conditions for joint construction and sharing.  
 
5. Infrastructure sharing is critical for the deployment of service in certain areas. Given that, can 
China supply aditional information regarding infrastructure and spectrum sharing in their regulatory 
regime? How these measures can promote the deployment  of 5G?  
 
Reply:  In terms of telecommunications infrastructure, while continuing to promote the co -
construction and sharing of telecommunications infrastructure among basic telecommunications 
companies, the Chinese government actively promotes the sharing of telecommunications 
infrastructure and infrastructure resources such as transportation, power, and municipal services to 
support the large -scale deployment of 5G. Regarding spectrum sharing, first, the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology issu ed 5G frequency licenses (limited to indoor use) for shared use of 
the 3300 -3400MHz frequency band to China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Radio and Television 
in 2019. Second, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is studying and formulati ng 
relevant radio management policies for basic telecom operators to carry out 5G public mobile 
communication network sharing and frequency sharing, and further guide basic telecom operators 
to improve the efficiency and comprehensive benefits of 5G freque ncy resources.  
 
Page 170 (Para 4.211)  
- In November 2019, in order to further improve the service quality of the telecommunications 
industry, China officially rolled out a mobile number portability programme, which allows mobile 
users to keep their phone nu mbers when switching to a new mobile provider.  
 
Question :  
6. Are there any plans for expanding number portability to other services, for instance to fixed 
telephony?  
 
Reply:  According to the Measures for Administration of Number Portability Services , cellular mobile 
communication users (excluding Internet of Thi ngs users) of basic telecom operators have been able 
to use number portability services since November 27, 2019. Number portability is currently 
unavailable for other services as the corresponding technology, market, service, etc. are not 
prepared for this . In the later stage, efforts will be made to actively study the feasibility of providing 
number portability for corporate services by comprehensively considering the market, technology, 
service, and other factors.  
 
Page 170 (Para 4.212)  
- There were also new developments in the framework of spectrum management. In 2019, the 
MIIT promulgated provisions on the management of the use of the frequencies of enhanced Machine -
Type Communication (eMTC) systems, specifying th e usage frequency of eMTC systems, the 
management requirements of base station terminals, and other content. The Ministry also issued 
Announcement No.  52, 2019, which defines the catalogue, radio frequency specifications, and WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 147 - 
 
  management requirements of mic ro-power short -range radio transmitting equipment, with a view 
to further standardizing the management of such equipment.  
 
Question :  
7. In the context of 5G, are there coverage obligations related to spectrum auctions in place or 
planned in the auction proceedings or any other means of granting spectrum for those services ?  
 
Reply:  Currently, China allocates 5G spectrum by means of administrative license, and is studying 
and formulating relevant plans for implementing 5G frequency license by mean s of bidding. 
According to the Radio Frequency Utilization Requirements and Verification Administration  issued by 
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in 2017, 5G and other public mobile 
communications services should meet the following freq uency utilization requirements: frequency 
band occupancy is not less than 70%, regional coverage is not less than 60%, and the user load 
rate is not less than 60%.  
 
Page 172 (Para 4.221)  
- The Measures establish an interagency cybersecurity review body, w hich consists of members 
from 12 government agencies – the CAC, the NDRC, the MIIT, the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Ministry of National Security, MOFCOM, the Ministry of Finance, the PBOC, the SAMR, the National 
Radio and Television Administration, t he National Administration of State Secrets Protection, and 
the State Cryptography Administration – and is led by the CAC. The Office of Cybersecurity Review 
is established in the CAC.  
 
Question :  
8. Can China elaborate more on the coordination of its several bodies in the context of cybersecurity 
policies and regulations? What each of the referred Agencies is responsible for in the context of 
cybersecurity, data protection and other security relate d policies? Please specify which areas they 
are involved in, and if they have a complementary role in that matter.  
 
Reply:  Article 4 of the Measures on Cybersecurity Review stipulates that the Cyberspace 
Administration of China (CAC) shall establish a nat ional network security review mechanism in 
conjunction with relevant departments. The Office of Cybersecurity Review is established in the CAC 
and is responsible for formulating regulations and rules related to cybersecurity review and 
organizing cybersecu rity reviews.  
 
QUESTION REGARDING BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE SECRETARIAT REPOR T  
 
We noted the absence, in both the Secretariat 's and the Chinese reports, of information on support 
to develop, launch and produce civil aircraft. China has, however, notified two programs that 
explicitly benefit the aeronautical sector by the means of its most recent NFNs (G/SCM/N/372/CHN 
and G/SCM/N/ 343/CHN).  
 
Question :  
10.  We would like to know the Chinese opinion on the role that subsidies play in China 's aircraft 
manufacturing sector, particularly bearing in mind that China is a new entrant to this market. 
Furthermore, we would like to know the Chin ese opinion on the adequacy of the current WTO rules 
on subsidies to effectively address the distortions of the global aeronautical sector .  
 
Reply:  Subsidy policies for the development of the civil aviation industry shall comply with the 
current WTO subsidy rules.  
 
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT   
Page 18 (Para 1.6)   
• The COVID 19 pandemic has posed an unprecedented shock to China 's economy. Besides 
inflicting human costs, it has had a major impact on output, trade, and employment. At the 
beginning of 2020, economic growth fell to its lowest level in 40 years: between the last quarter 
of 2019 and the first quarter of 2020, gro wth fell by almost 13 percentage points, from 5.8% 
to -6.8%. Apart from financial services and information technology, all sectors were severely 
hit. Over 100 million workers were directly affected by the pandemic, by being put on unpaid 
leave in retention  schemes or reduced -work programmes, exiting the labour market, or 
becoming unemployed. In May 2020, the Government abandoned the announcement of the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 148 - 
 
  annual GDP target for the first time in more than 25 years due to factors that are difficult to 
predict, s uch as the coronavirus pandemic and uncertainties around trade.  
 
Question:   
30. According to Chinese authorities, what are the main factors that best explain the distinctive 
performance of the financial services sector, compared to other sectors of the econom y, during 
the pandemic?   
 
Reply:  First, China has always regarded the services of bancassurance institutions and the support 
of the real economy as the starting point and goal.  
Second, we paid attention to preventing and addressing stock risks, increased efforts to dispose of 
non-performing assets through various forms such as liquidation, write -off, and transfer, and 
conducted more stringent investigations on high -risk institutions to address the risks.  
Third, we took forward -looking measures to prevent r isks. 
 
Page 20 (Para 1.13)   
• With a view to safeguarding financial market stability and providing liquidity to the banking 
system during the pandemic, the PBOC expanded its relending facilities to provide targeted 
support to manufacturers of medical supplies and daily necessities. Furthermore, the authorities 
tolerated rising levels of non -performing loans in heavily impacted regions and sectors, and 
introduced a payment moratorium for most micro, small, and medium -sized 
enterprises  (MSMEs) and other eligible firms until end -2021. Furthermore, the PBOC lowered 
various policy rates. Non -interest rate instruments deployed by the PBOC aimed to provide 
additional support especially to smaller firms. They included expanding relending facilities, 
reducing ta rgeted reserve requirement ratios, increasing bank lending targets, expanding credit 
support by policy banks, subsidizing local banks ' repayment moratoria, and introducing a zero -
interest scheme for uncollateralized lending to MSMEs. The various measures l ed to a rapid 
increase in bank lending and had a significant positive measure on corporate bond issuance.  
 
Questions :  
31. Considering the higher tolerance level of non -performing loans in heavily impacted sectors, 
does the PBOC envision any program to rebala nce the risks related to these loans?   
 
Reply:  The Chinese government quickly responded to the COVID -19 strikes and implemented 
targeted policies. Remarkable results in controlling the epidemic and stabilizing the economy have 
been achieved, and the qualit y of credit assets in the banking industry was basically stable. 
Considering the time lag in the reflection of non -performing loans, the financial authorities support 
and encourage banks to increase provision for losses on non -performing loans as well as w rite-off 
and disposal of non -performing loans in order to cope with the possible downward pressure of bank 
credit asset quality under the impact of the COVID -19. 
 
32. In which sectors of the economy did the PBOC apply the policy of higher tolerance of non-
performance loans?   
 
Reply:  The Chinese regulatory rules do not provide different non -performing loan ratios by economic 
sector.  
 
Page 20 (Para 1.18)   
China continued its efforts during the review period to further internationalize the CNY; for example, 
it took measures including bilateral swap agreements, the pursuit of alternatives to the SWIFT inter -
bank payments system, and investment in credit rating agencies for sovereign debt. According to 
the authorities, China promotes the two -way openin g of the capital market, facilitates foreign 
investors to invest in CNY assets, optimizes policies on cross -border CNY business, promotes trade 
and investment facilitation, and further improves the CNY internationalization infrastructure. 
About  70 countrie s now also use the CNY as reserve currency. Yet as at mid -2020, only about 2% 
of global payments were conducted through the CNY. It would appear that regulations on capital 
movements (see below) constitute a major obstacle for the further internationalizat ion of the CNY.   
 
Question :  
33. What are, if any, the foreign partners with which the Chinese authorities are negotiating or 
envisioning future negotiations regarding trade in local currencies?   WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 149 - 
 
  Reply:  The People 's Bank of China  has signed local currency cooperation/settlement agreements 
with the central banks of 10 countries including Laos and Cambodia, and launched a local currency 
settlement (LCS) cooperation framework with the Central Bank of Indonesia. There is no negotiatio n 
or plan to start negotiations with the central banks of other countries on local currency settlement.  
 
Page 21 (Para 1.19)   
Since 2014, the PBOC has been developing a central bank digital currency, the e -CNY or e -renminbi. 
It is designed to be a legal te nder combining digital currency and electronic payment characteristics, 
thus serving as cash (M0). The e -CNY is currently being tested across several regions, selected 
banks, and electronic payment platforms. It is expected to offer a higher degree of anon ymity and 
lower handling charges than those of existing payment providers, higher compatibility across 
platforms, and, by broadening the reach of people with limited access to finance, to lead to more 
financial inclusion. The PBOC plans to use the e -CNY fo r domestic transactions initially.   
 
Questions :  
34. What is the PBOC 's current assessment of the development and operation of e -CNY?  
 
Reply:  The e -CNY mainly serves as cash (M0), which will coexist with physical CNY for a long time, 
and is subject to centralized management and two -tier operation. The e -CNY issuance right belongs 
to the state. The People 's Bank of China is responsible for e -CNY issuance, cancellation, inter -
institutional interconnection, and wallet ecological management. At the same time, commercial 
banks meeting the capital and technology requirements will be selected as designated operating 
institutions, which work together wi th relevant commercial institutions to provide e -CNY exchange 
and circulation services to the public. These institutions currently include commercial banks, telecom 
operators and Internet companies.  
 
35. What are the main challenges faced by the PBOC during th e development process of e -CNY?  
 
Reply:  With the deepening development of e -CNY and financial technology, regulatory rules and 
laws related to legal e -CNY and e -CNY-related business rules and systems need to be improved. In 
addition, the e -CNY acceptance environment needs to be further optimized and requires the 
engagement of all sectors of society.  
 
36. Has the project of developing a central bank digital currency (e -CNY or e -renminbi) been 
conceived of as an element of currency statecraft to foste r the renminbi as an international 
currency?   
 
Reply:  Cross -border payment involves many complex issues such as monetary sovereignty, foreign 
exchange management policies, exchange system arrangements, and regulatory compliance 
requirements, and remains to be a tricky problem to be addressed by the international community. 
Currency internationalization is a natural market selection process. The status of international 
currencies is fundamentally determined by economic fundamentals and the depth, efficiency,  and 
openness of the currency and financial markets. Digital RMB has the technical conditions for cross -
border use, but it is currently mainly used for domestic retail payment.  
 
In the future, the People 's Bank of China will actively respond to the Group o f Twenty (G20) and 
other initiatives to improve cross -border payments, and study the applicability of central bank digital 
currencies in cross -border fields. Based on the domestic pilot results and the needs of the 
international community, the People 's Ban k of China will explore cross -border payment pilots on the 
premise of fully respecting the monetary sovereignty of both parties and complying with laws and 
regulations, will establish legal digital currency exchange arrangements and regulatory cooperation 
mechanisms with relevant monetary authorities and central banks following the three requirements 
of "lossless ", "compliance " and "interoperability ", and will  adhere to the two -tier operation, risk -
based management re quirements and modular design principles to meet the regulatory and 
compliance requirements of various countries.  
 
The People 's Bank of China will also continue to advance the R&D pilot work in a steady and orderly 
manner; further expand the coverage of pilot test application scenarios in combination with the 
development plans and local characteristics of the pilot test areas; study and improve relevant 
systems and rules; study and formulate administrative methods related to e -CNY; strengthen the 
protection of perso nal information of e -CNY; deepen the research and evaluation of the in -depth WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  influence of legal digital currency on monetary policy, financial system, and financial stability; and 
actively engage in the international exchange on legal digital currency.  
 
Page 21 (Para 1.23)   
Against the background of dampening of domestic demand and weaker exports, partly resulting 
from trade tensions, the authorities resorted to various stimulus measures during the review period, 
involving taxes, access to credit, and infra structure investment; however, according to an OECD 
study, the stimulus may increase corporate sector indebtedness and, more generally, reverse 
progress in the deleveraging of state -owned enterprises (SOEs).   
 
Questions :  
 
37. What were the main consequences to the Chinese economy from the increased trade tensions 
with the US under the Trump administration?   
 
Reply:  Some changes have taken place in China -US relations in the past, which affected the 
economic and trade relati ons between the two coun tries. However, it must be noted that China and 
the United States share extensive common interests and continue to maintain close economic and 
trade ties. The impact of changes in China -US economic and trade relations on China 's economic 
growth is generall y limited. For example, in 2020, while China 's total imports fell by 0.8%, imports 
from the United States achieved a relatively rapid growth of 9.8%; while global cross -border direct 
investment has fallen sharply by approximately 40%, US non -financial dire ct investment in China 
reached US D 2.3 billion, a decrease of 14.2% over the previous year and China 's non -financial direct 
investment in the US registered US D 6.21 billion, an increase of 56.4%.  
 
38. As a result of the escalation of trade tensions with the US  has it been seen the emergence of 
any different pattern of trade and FDI of China and its major foreign partners?   
 
Reply:  Direct investment by Chinese companies follows commercial and market principles and global 
practice and is negotiated with foreign partners on an equal footing. There 's not really much of a 
difference in the pattern of trade and FDI of China.  
 
Page 22 (Pa ra 1.31)   
Under the One Belt and One Road Initiative, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, 
the Government seeks to connect nearly 140 countries and regions through rail lines, pipelines, 
highways, ports, and other infrastructure. As at March 2021, total expenditure under the 
BRI amounted to USD 640 billion. According an OECD study, infrastructure projects of the BRI may 
have an impact on the debt burden on recipient countries. Nonetheless, the authorities do not agree 
with the conclusion  of the study. The authorities also underline the trade -enhancing and mutually 
beneficiary nature of the projects.   
 
Questions :  
39. As it has been originally conceived of, does the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) contemplate the 
integration of South America under its wide trade and investment connections?   
 
Reply:  China 's "Belt and Road " Initiative (BRI) aims to continuously strengthen economic 
development cooperation with BRI countries through policy communication, facility connectivity, 
unimpeded tr ade, financial integration, and people -to-people bonds, promote the facilitation and 
liberalization of global trade and investment, and build together with BRI countries a community of 
shared interests, future, and responsibility featuring political mutual  trust, economic integration, and 
cultural inclusiveness.  
 
40. If so, what are the main areas of cooperation with South America seen as strategically important 
for the BRI?   
 
Reply:  The BRI is an economic cooperation initiative, not a geostrategic concept. It always adheres 
to the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration, upholds the concept 
of openness, greenness, and integrity, follows international rules and national laws, pursues 
environmental protection and sustainability, and is committed to jointly building high -quality, high -
standard projects.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  41. More specifically, does MERCOSUR play any important role under the strategic alliance of the 
BRI with South America?   
 
Reply:  As developing countries, China and MERCOSUR member states go through similar 
development stages, and face similar  development challenges and governance dilemmas. In recent 
years, some MERCOSUR member states including Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay have signed 
the "Belt and Road " cooperation documents with Ch ina. It is believed that in the future, the 
MERCOSUR will  help promote in -depth cooperation between member states and China in 
infrastructure, logistics and transportation, and economic and trade under the framework of the 
"Belt and Road Initiative ", and play a significant role in achieving mutual benefit and wi n-win results 
for the Chinese and Latin American people.  
 
Page 35 (Para 2.29)   
On 15 November 2020, China and 14 other countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) Agreement. The Agreement has provisions on trade in goods; rules of origin; 
customs procedures and trade facilitation; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards, 
technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures; trade remedies; trade in services; 
temporary movement of natural persons; investment; i ntellectual property; e -commerce; 
competition; small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs); economic and technical cooperation; 
government procurement; institutional provisions; and dispute settlement. It has four market access 
annexes (schedules of tariff c ommitments, schedules of specific commitments for services, 
schedules of reservations and non -conforming measures for services and investment, and schedules 
of specific commitments on temporary movement of natural persons). In general, tariffs on 90% of 
tariff lines will be eliminated; regarding trade in services, some participating signatories made 
commitments in over 100 sectors/subsectors. In addition, participating countries adopt a 
negative  list approach to make commitments on investment in non -service s sectors. The 
RCEP Agreement will take effect 60 days after its ratification by at least six Association of 
Southeast  Asian Nations (ASEAN) and three non -ASEAN signatories.  
 
Questions :  
42. What are the main results expected to the Chinese economy from is pa rticipation in the 
RCEP Agreement?   
43. Which Chinese economic sectors/products are likely to gain/lose consequent upon its entry into 
the RCEP Agreement?   
 
Reply to Question13 and 14:  The RCE P Agreement will significantly improve the overall business 
environment in the region, further enhance the trade creation effect, strengthen the division of labor 
and cooperation between the members, propel the expansion and upgrading of the consumer 
marke t, and promote the in -depth integration of the industry chains, supply chains and value chains 
in the region. After the RCEP Agreement takes effect, more than 90% of the goods trade in the 
region will eventually achieve zero tariffs, and the regional cumul ation rule will greatly lower the 
threshold for tariff preferences. The high -level trade in service and investment opening -up 
commitments made by the members will further unleash the potential of cooperation.  
 
Page 36 (Para 2.33)   
On 15 January 2020, Chin a and the United States signed the China -United States Phase 1 Economic 
and Trade Agreement. It contains provisions related to, inter alia, intellectual property, technology 
transfer, trade in food and agricultural products, and financial services.   
 
Quest ions:  
44. What are the main results so far from the Phase 1 agreement with the US to the 
Chinese  economy?   
 
Reply:  The China -US economic and trade agreement on the basis of equality and mutual respect is 
beneficial to both countries and the whole world. Since the agreement came into effect, the two  sides 
have communicated smoothly at all levels, jointly and steadily p romoted the implementation of the 
agreement, and maintained a good working relationship. In terms of optimizing the business 
environment, China has made positi ve progress in intellectual property protection, expanding access 
to agricultural products and fo od, and opening up financial markets in accordance with the needs of 
domestic reform and opening up. In terms of expanding procurement from the United States, China 
has carried out exclusions for market -based procurement with additional duties to facilitat e 
enterprises ' trade. Chinese companies have carried out procurement from the United States in WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 152 - 
 
  accordance with WTO rules and principles of marketization and commercialization, and achieved 
good results. In 2020, China 's imports from the United States total ed approximately 
USD 134.9  billion. Since 2021, China 's procurement from the United States has shown rapid growth.  
 
45. Overall, is this agreement seen as beneficial or detrimental to the bilateral trade relationship 
with the US both in a short -term and a long-term perspective?   
 
Reply:  After the China -U.S. economic and trade agreement was reached, China and the U.S. settled 
the conflicts and maintained a relatively stable relationship for a certain period of time. Global 
investment, trade, and financial markets continue to recover. Inte rnational organizations have raised 
their economic growth expectations. Multilateral platforms such as the Group of Twenty have 
positively evaluated that the agreement has injected positive energy into the stable growth of the 
global economy. After the une xpected COVID -19 outbreak, the political atmosphere and market 
conditi ons have changed significantly, which brought difficulties and challenges to the 
implementation of the agreement. Despite the challenges, China persisted in promoting reform and 
opening up, steadily promoted the implementation of the agreement, advanced bilateral economic 
and trade cooperation, stabilized market expectations, enhanced corporate confidence, and 
maintained the relative stability of the China -US economic and trade field. The  U.S. has given 
positive comments on the progress of the agreement on many public occasions. The U.S. business 
community has repeatedly sent letters to the leaders of China and the United States to express their 
affirmation and support for the agreement.Th e economic and trade teams of both sides maintained 
good exchanges, making the agreement one of the few communication platforms to maintain China -
US relations. It can be said that the China -US economic and trade agreement is conducive to 
stabilizing China -US economic and trade relations and injecting stability into global economic and 
trade development.  
 
Page 94 (Para 3.188)   
China has been active in international cooperation in the area of competition policy. By mid -2020, 
China signed 53 international anti -monopoly cooperation documents with 32 countries and regions 
and established bilateral and multilateral anti -monopoly cooperation mechanisms. Since its 
establishment in 2018, the SAMR has signed bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on anti -
monopoly  cooperation with the competition authorities of the European Union, Japan, the 
Republic  of Korea, Serbia, Belarus, the Philippines, and Morocco. China and the Russian Federation 
renewed their MOU on the Implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation and E xchanges in Anti -
monopoly and Anti -Unfair Competition (2020 -21). The SAMR extended the MOU on Cooperation with 
BRICS Countries in the Field of Competition Laws and Policies. China actively participated in the 
BRICS Competition Conference and furthered coop eration with BRICS countries in competition 
policy. China also carried out cooperation and coordination in many merger and monopoly agreement 
cases with its trade partners such as Canada, the European Union, Germany, India, the 
United  States, the Russian F ederation, and South Africa. China also participated in the 
United  Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) activities in the area of competition 
and consumer protection.   
 
Questions :  
46. What are the main goals envisaged by the Chinese authorities under the strategic cooperation 
with the BRICS countries?   
 
Reply:  Over the past more than ten years, the trade and investment cooperation among the BRICS 
countries has been continuo usly deepened, and their economic and trade ties have develope d 
rapidly. First, the BRICS countries have seen closer economic and trade ties. In 2020, the combined 
GDP of the BRICS economies accounted for 23% of the world total, compared with 12% when the 
BRIC was formalized in 2006, and their share in global trade i n goods increased from 12% to 18%. 
Second, the BRICS countries have seen productive outcomes of their cooperation. In 2013, President 
Xi Jinping proposed the vision of "integrated market " for the BRICS, pointing the way for cooperation 
and development of d eveloping countries. In 2017, China hosted the Ninth BRICS Leaders ' Summit 
in Xiamen, and the leaders of the five countries witnessed the signing of the BRICS Action Agenda 
on Economic and Trade Cooperation, ushering in a new era of BRICS economic cooperat ion and 
trade. At the 12th BRICS Leaders ' Summit in November 2020, the Strategy for BRICS Economic 
Partnership 2025 was adopted, which maps out the roadmap for BRICS cooperation in the next five 
years.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  47. What are the main economic and financial projects bei ng currently undertaken by means of the 
cooperation with the BRICS countries, within and beyond member countries territories?   
 
Reply:  First, Great Wall Motor Company Limited signed an investment agreement with the Russian 
side in May 2014. The Tula project was started in September 2015, and the factory was put into 
operation in June 2019. The construction of the engine plant was started  in April 2021 and is 
expected to be completed in 2022. Second, the Haier Russia Industrial Park project was launched 
by Haier Smart Home in January 2019, with a total capacity of more than three million home 
appliances such as refrigerators, freezers,  washing machines, TVs, water heaters and kitchen 
appliances. Up to date, the refrigerator and washing machine plants have been in operation.  
 
Page 149 (Para 4.101)   
China is the largest automobile market worldwide, both in terms of demand and supply. Accordin g 
to the results of the national survey of industries above a certain scale, the production volume of 
automobiles in 2018 and 2019 was around 27.8 million and 25.7 million, respectively.   
 
Questions :  
 
48. Has the heavy blow inflicted to the Chinese car industry during the COVID -19 pandemic been 
at least in part the result of a shortage of semiconductors worldwide along its value chain?   
 
Reply:  From January to August this year, China 's automobile production and sales showed a growth 
trend year-on-year, and the overall development of the automobile industry was sound.  
 
49. If so, how have the Chinese authorities reacted to this seemingly inherent fragility of its 
automotive industry in terms of industrial policy measures?   
 
Reply:  China establis hed a working group for the promotion and application of automotive 
semiconductors, organized a number of work coordination meetings, gave full play to the strength 
of local governments, vehicle companies and chip companies, strengthened supply and demand 
matching and work coordination, promoted the improvement of automotive chip supply capabilities, 
and strived to minimize the impact. In the next step, we will continue to play the role of special 
classes, strengthen operation monitoring, analysis, and judg ment, coordinate and solve related 
problems in a timely manner, and support enterprises to find alternative solutions through the 
enterprise measures implemented by C hina. We will guide enterprises to optimize the layout of the 
supply chain, improve the su pply capacity of automotive chips, and fundamentally improve the 
stability of the supply chain.  
 
Page 153 (Para 4.123)   
The 2014 Guidelines for Promoting the Development of the National Integrated Circuit Industry set 
specific targets to develop China 's IC and semiconductor industry. It identified the goals of raising 
the industry 's revenue to over CNY 350 billion by 2015, and achieving an annual rate of revenue 
growth of over 20% by 2020. Priority tasks include the establishment of the National Leading G roup 
for the Development of Integrated Circuit Industry, the initiation of the National Integrated Circuit 
Industry Investment Fund, and the promotion of safe and reliable hardware and software.   
 
Questions :  
50. What are the main fragilities of the Chinese se miconductor industry, if any, in terms of 
production shortages and technology gaps?   
51. Has China suffered from any significant disruption in the supply chain of semiconductors during 
and in the aftermath of the COVID -19 pandemic?   
52. If so, which policies have been implemented to counter this problem?   
 
Reply to Questions 21 -23: There is a certain technological gap between China 's integrated circuit 
industry and other countries. At the beginning of 2020, the COVID -19 epidemic has had a certain 
impact on the production of companies in various industries, including the integrated circuit industry . 
The Chinese government has adopted effective anti -epidemic measures to help companies including 
integrated circuit companies resume work and production.  
 
Page 156 (Pa ra 4.136)   
State -owned banks are among the major players in China 's financial sector. Large banks in the 
system (e.g. the Big Six state -owned commercial banks and the three policy banks) and most WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  other  financial institutions (e.g. credit cooperatives, non -bank financial companies, and insurance 
companies) are either directly state -owned or owned by other SOEs. In a report to the NPC, the  State 
Council indicated that total assets of state -owned financial institutions at end -2017 was 
CNY 241 trillion, which r epresented 88% of the total.   
 
Question :  
53. What are, if any, the most significant actions taken by the Chinese authorities to reduce the 
State participation in the financial sector?   
 
Reply:  Financial institutions have always made independent decisions and operated independently 
in the Chinese market in accordance with market -oriented and law -based principles. Let 's take the 
six large state -owned commercial banks in China for an example. Alth ough the six banks are 
controlled by the state, they have been listed in either the A -share or the H -share market. Their 
operation and management need to fully perform relevant corporate governance procedures, and 
they should operate in a market -oriented m anner in accordance with the principle of commercial 
sustainability, and accept the supervision of shareholders and other stakeholders.  
In terms of the securities business, the Chinese government respects the market rules, and steadily 
implements the refor m of the stock issuance registration system step by step. The 
Chinese  government launched a science and technology innovation board at the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and experimented with a registration system for listed companies in June 2019, and kicked 
off the pilot of registration -based IPO system on the ChiNext stock market in June 2020. In the next 
step, based on the pilots, the registration system will be implemented across the markets after 
further evaluation.  
 
Page 157 (Para 4.143)   
The new structure follows an integrated type of supervisory model. The Financial Stability and 
Development Committee (FSDC), established in November 2017, is a financial regulatory body under 
the auspices of the State Council and headed by a Vice Premier, which is  higher ranked than the 
ministry -level heads of the other financial regulators. The FSDC is tasked with, inter alia, 
implementing the decisions and plans of the State Council regarding the financial sector; deliberating 
major reform and development program mes for the financial sector; coordinating financial reform, 
development and regulation, issues concerning monetary policy and financial regulation, and major 
issues concerning financial regulation; analysing international and domestic financial situations , 
addressing international financial risks, and conducting policy research on systemic risk prevention 
and treatment to maintain financial stability; and guiding local financial reform, development, and 
supervision of the duty performance of local financia l regulatory authorities and governments. During 
the review period, a new supervisory arrangement was adopted, combining the oversight structure 
of banking and insurance to form one single regulator, the CBIRC. The CBIRC was established in 
April 2018, as a  result of a merger of the CBRC and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC).   
 
Questions :  
54. Can the Chinese authorities confirm the understanding that the FSDC is headed by a higher 
rank authority than the PBOC?   
 
Reply:  The FSDC under the State Counci l is a deliberation and coordination body of the State Council 
for overall planning and coordination of major issues of financial stability, reform and development. 
The FSDC is headed by the Vice Premier of the State Council in charge of financial affairs,  and the 
President of the PBOC is the deputy head of this committee. As a member the FSDC, the PBOC 
undertakes the duties of the Office of the FSDC and is responsible for handling the daily affairs of 
the committee.  
 
55. Considering the tasks of the FSDC, how does it interact with the PBOC when dealing with 
financial regulation and monetary policy issues?   
 
Reply:  Since its establishment, the FSDC  has actively played a leading role in planning financial 
reform, development and regulation as a whole, coordinating matters related to monetary policy 
and financial regulation, and coordinating and planning major matters of financial regulation, and 
has actively promoted finance 's serving the real economy, prevention of financial risks, the 
deepening of financial reforms. As the Office and a member of the FSDC, the PBOC timely submits 
the major issues and matters involved in the performance of its duties to the FSDC for research and 
deliberation, and earnestly implement them according to the decisions and arrangements of 
the FSDC.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 165 (Para 4.185)   
Measures were taken during the review period to promote the internationalization of the CNY – 
among them , the recent reforms of the QFII/RQFII status (as described in Section 4.4.1.3.4.1) to 
further facilitate qualified overseas investors to invest in China 's capital market. In 2019, the PBOC 
reformed the procedures for foreign Central Banks to have better a ccess to China 's interbank market.  
 
Questions :  
56. Can the Chinese authorities detail the reforms carried out by the PBOC to allow other countries ' 
Central Banks to have better access to China 's interbank market?  
57. What are, if any, the most recent data regarding the result of these reforms?  
 
Reply to questions 27 -28: In terms of entering the inter -bank bond market, the PBOC has, 
together with relevant departments, simplified the market entry procedures and materials of 
overseas central bank institutions, and reduced the time limit for its handling of each market entry  
procedures to less than 30 days. On this basis, the PBOC has updated the Operational Procedures 
for Overseas Central Bank Institutions to Enter China 's Interbank Inter -bank Market (the Procedures) 
and frequently asked questions (Q&A), and opened a column on its official website to publish the 
Chinese and English versions.  
In terms of entering the inter -bank foreign exchange market, there are three ways for overseas 
central bank institutions to enter China 's foreign exchange market: through the agency of th e PBOC, 
through the agency of members of China 's inter -bank foreign exchange market, and directly 
becoming overseas members of China 's inter -bank foreign exchange market. Overseas central bank 
institutions can independently choose one or more ways to enter  China 's inter -bank foreign exchange 
market and carry out foreign exchange spot, forward, swap and option transactions without lines of 
limit. 
 
Page 165 (Para 4.188)   
Regarding the necessary infrastructure for CNY internationalization, on 2 May 2018, the CNY Cross -
border Interbank Payment System (Phase II) was established. According to the authorities, it 
improved the settlement mode, extended the system 's external service hours, lengthened the list of 
direct participants, and further improved the appl ication system design.  
 
Question :  
 
58. How did the CNY Cross -border Interbank Payment System (Phase II) improve the settlement 
mode and the application system design?  
 
Reply:  The following optimization has been made to the design of the settlement mechanism  and 
the application system of the CIPS (Phase II). In terms of operation time, 5x12 hours has been 
extended to 5x24 hours + 4 hours, fully covering the financial markets in all time zones around the 
world and supporting daily settlement. In terms of busin ess functions, first, it supports the Delivery 
Versus Payment (DVP) system, Payment Versus Payment (PVP) between CNY and foreign currencies, 
centralized central counterparty clearing and other businesses to meet the business needs 
of different financial markets. Second, a hybrid settlement mechanism of Real -time Gross 
Settlement (RTGS) and Deferred Net Settlement (DNS) is adopted to meet the differentiated needs 
of participants for liquidity management. In terms of the message standard, the inte rnationally used 
ISO 20022 is adopted as the message standard.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
Page 4 (Para 2.1)   
In 1978, China made its historic decision of reform and opening up. After more than 40 years of 
reform and opening up, C hina has embarked on a new journey towards fully building a modern 
socialist country. China aims to coordinate the overall great rejuvenation strategy of the 
Chinese  nation and the profound changes unseen in the world for a century. China draws up the 
Outline for the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long -range Objectives 
through the Year 2035, and embarks on a new journey towards the second centenary goal, which 
marks that China has entered into a new development stage. China 's economy has shifted from a 
stage of high -speed growth to a stage of high -quality development. The basic national condition that 
China is still in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time has not changed. 
China 's international status as the world 's largest developing country has not changed.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 156 - 
 
  Question:   
1. What are, according to the Chinese authorities, the main differences between the previous 
stage of high -speed growth and the current stage of high -quality development?  
 
Reply:  The original growth model in China that mainly relies on factor investment, external demand 
driver, investment driver and scale expansion, has been restricted increasingly. There is an urgent 
demand for changing development model, optimizing economic stru cture and transforming growth 
momentum. The characteristics of high -quality development phase include: First, the economic 
growth gradually decreases from the original high -speed growth of approximately 9% to the growth 
of approximately 6%; second, the gro wth model must be changed to pursuing high -quality and high -
efficiency, and continuously improving added value and competitiveness of products and market, so 
as to promote structure optimization and quality improvement through balanced development; third, 
the market -oriented reform must be sticked to, the decisive role of market in allocating resource 
shall be fully utilized so as to improve the allocation efficiency of social resources, the overall 
competitiveness of economy, and the sustainability of econ omic growth.  
 
Page 7 (Para 3.4)  
On 4 November 2020, China set up ten demonstration zones on import promotion, including 
Shanghai Hongqiao Central Business District and Jinpu New Area in Dalian, Liaoning, covering the 
eastern, central, western regions as well as the old industrial base in  Northeast China. These zones 
include sea, land and air ports, reflecting the dynamism and potential of China 's import. The 
demonstration zones are designed to play an important role in four aspects. First, facilitating import 
and tapping import potential through innovation and reduction of institutional costs. Second, 
expanding the import of technical equipment and raw materials and promoting the deep integration 
of imports and industries. Third, increasing the supply of domestic high -quality goods, and le ading 
and creating domestic demand with high -quality supply. Fourth, focusing on the import distribution 
centres as conditions permit and giving play to the exemplary role of the centres to surrounding 
areas.   
 
Questions :  
2. What are the goods covered in the  "demonstration zones on import promotion " program?  
 
Reply:  The two functions of the national demonstration zones on import promotion and innovation 
are "trade promotion " and "trade innovation ". The essence is to encourage each demonstration zone 
to give full play to its regional and industrial advantages and cultivate high -quality and efficient 
import platforms, which are not limited to specific goods.  
 
3. What is, if any, the preliminary assessment regarding the performance of these zones in 
import pro motion?  
 
Reply:  Since the establishment of the national demonstration zones on import promotion and 
innovation, the demonstration zones have made full use of the markets and resources both at home 
and abroad in adjusting measures to local conditions, carr ying out policy innovation and 
strengthening the efforts on cultivation, and preliminary results have been made in promoting 
imports, serving industries and unblocking both domestic and international circulations.  
 
Page 8 (Para 3.10)   
In August 2020, China  issued the Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot Programme of the Innovative 
Development of Trade in Services to promote the transformation, upgrading and high -quality 
development of foreign trade. According to the Plan, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and othe r 
25 provinces/cities/regions are designated as pilot zones, which will comprehensively explore eight 
pilot tasks within the three -year pilot period. In the key areas of services trade under full competition 
or limited competition, and competitive elements  of services trade under natural monopoly, China 
promoted the cancellation or relaxation of restrictions on services trade, guided by the principles of 
full removal, substantial relaxation and orderly liberalization correspondingly.   
 
Questions :  
4. What are the eight pilot tasks that are being explored in the "Overal Plan for Deepening the 
Pilot Programme of the Innovative Development of Trade in Services "?  
 
Reply:  The eight pilot tasks put forward in the Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot Program me of 
the Innovative Development of Trade in Services include the pursuit of improving the management WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 157 - 
 
  mechanism, opening wider to the outside world, enhancing facilitation, innovating development 
modes, improving the promotion system, optimizing the policy  system, improving the regulatory 
mode and improving the statistical system from an overall perspective.  
 
5. What are, if applicable, the main aspects of the program that are related to financial services?  
 
Reply:  According to the Pilot Programme of the Inno vative Development of Trade in Services and 
the Tasks, Specific Measures and Division of Responsibilities for Pilots of the Innovative Development 
of Trade in Services printed issued together with the document, the work related to banking and 
insurance mai nly includes implementing the reform of administrative license examination and 
approval in the pilot areas, supporting medical institutions to strengthen cooperation with domestic 
and foreign insurance companies, exploring the participation of commercial i nsurance in the 
construction of basic medical and elderly care service systems, supporting international cooperation 
in the development of cross -border commercial medical insurance products, promoting overseas 
talents to practice in China, and innovating i ntellectual property and financial services, etc.  
 
Page 11 (Para 3.26)   
China continues enhancing liberalization of trade and investment with its trading partners. In 
October  2019, the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between China and 
Eurasian  Economic Union came into effect. In December 2020, the leaders of China and Europe 
jointly announced the conclusion of negotiations on China -EU Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment. Review and translation of the texts are now in process, with a view to si gning the 
Agreement and bringing it into effect promptly. In the meantime, China favorably considers joining 
the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and has made 
informal contacts with relevant CPTPP signatories.  
 
Questions :  
6. What are the main benefits envisaged by the Chinese authorities from joining the CPTPP?  
7. What are the main expected gains to the Chinese economy in terms of economic 
sectors/products from joining the CPTPP?  
 
Reply to Question 6 -7: China is a staunch advocate of free trade. It has been calling for open, 
transparent and mutually beneficial regional free trade arrangements and is committed to building 
a high -level network of free trade zones. China has applied to join the Comprehensive and 
Progre ssive Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which will not only help further deepen reform and 
push forward high -level opening -up but also inject new vitality into the economic and trade ties 
between China and other members and the regional economic integrati on process.  
 
Page 15 (Para 4.23)   
China values and supports the e -commerce related work in the WTO. China has actively participated 
in relevant discussions, submitted concrete proposals, and joined the "Friends of E -Commerce for 
Development ". In January 2019, China, together with other 75 WTO Members, confirmed their 
intention to commence WTO negotiations on trade -related aspects of e -commerce. Since then, China 
has submitted four proposals, pushing the negotiations forward together with other participants. 
China also supports the work rela ted to services domestic regulation within the WTO framework. In 
December 2017, 59 Members, including China, announced the initiation of the plurilateral 
negotiation on services domestic regulation. The negotiation has made substantial progress following 
three years of intensive consultations.  
 
Question :  
8. What are the main factors guiding the Chinese proposals on trade -related aspects of e -
commerce?  
 
Reply:  Adhering to the principles of openness, transparency and inclusiveness, China 's e-commerce 
proposal  emphasizes on the development dimension with full respect for the regulatory rights of 
Members, and focuses on cross -border trade in goods enabled by the Internet, as well as on such 
related services as payment and logistics services. China 's proposal put s forward negotiation 
suggestions from the following aspects: first, clarifying the connotation of e -commerce and the 
application scope of rules; second, establishing a standardized and convenient trading environment 
for e-commerce; third, creating a safe and credible market environment for e -commerce; fourth, 
carrying out pragmatic and inclusive development cooperation.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 158 - 
 
  Page 17 (Para 4.33)   
China contributes constructively to the economic and trade cooperation of the BRICS countries. With 
other members, China actively facilitated the release of the joint communiqués of Meetings of BRICS 
Trade Ministers from 2018 to 2020. The BRICS trade minis ters reached consensus on supporting the 
multilateral trading system; opposing unilateralism and protectionism; promoting the Model E -Port 
Network; and making progress in terms of trade and investment facilitation, e -commerce, services 
trade, intellectual property rights, technical specifications and standardization, and MSMEs. These 
documents laid solid foundation for the BRICS leaders to deliver economic and trade outcomes. Since 
the outbreak of the pandemic, the BRICS countries have reached consensus on wide-ranging issues. 
In the field of economic cooperation and trade, the BRICS countries decided to strengthen the 
coordination of combating COVID -19, and jointly safeguard the stability of the industrial chains and 
supply chains. This sends a strong messa ge to the world that the BRICS countries are resolute 
in jointing hands and rising to the external challenges. The Strategy for BRICS Economic 
Partnership  2025 adopted at the 12th BRICS summit maps out the key areas of economic and trade 
cooperation and th e way forward for the next five years.  
 
Questions :  
9. What are the main goals envisaged by the Chinese authorities under the strategic cooperation 
with the BRICS countries?  
10. What are the main economic and financial projects being currently undertaken by mea ns of 
the cooperation with the BRICS countries in their member countries territories ?  
 
Reply to Question 9 -10: In 2009, the leaders of the BRICS countries held their first summit in 
Russia. To date, 13 summits and nine informal meetings have been convened. A multi -tiered 
practical cooperation framework led by the leaders ' summit plus the ministerial meetings has taken 
shape, covering a number of fields such as economy and trade, finance, science and technology, 
agriculture, culture, education, heal th, think tanks, and sister cities.  
 
Page 18 (Para 4.23)  
China values and supports the e -commerce related work in the WTO. China has actively participated 
in relevant discussions, submitted concrete proposals, and joined the "Friends of E -Commerce for 
Development ". In January 2019, China, together with other 75 WTO Members, confirmed their 
intention to commence WTO negotiations on trade -related aspects of e -commerce. Since then, China 
has submitted four proposals, pushing the negotiations forward together with other participants. 
China also supports the work related to services domestic regulation within the WTO framework. In 
December 2017, 59 Members, including China, announced the initiation of the plurilateral 
negotiation on services domestic regulation.  The negotiation has made substantial progress following 
three years of intensive consultations.  
 
Questions :  
11. What are the main characteristics of the Digital Silk Road and the Green Silk Road?  
 
Reply:  Guided by the ecological progress and green development concepts, the Green Silk Road 
aims to embed the principles of resource conservation and environmental prote ction in every 
dimension and phase of the Belt and Road Initiative to promote greener policy, infrastructure, trade, 
financial and people -to-people connectivity. After eight years of effort, cooperation in ecological 
progress has become an essential part o f Belt and Road cooperation, bringing great benefits to the 
people along the Belt and Road. At the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2021, President Xi Jinping called 
for a closer partnership for green development, stressing that we could strengthen cooperation  on 
green infrastructure, green energy and green finance, and improve the BRI International Green 
Development Coalition, the Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road Development, and 
other multilateral cooperation platforms to make green a definin g feature of Belt and Road 
cooperation. This highlights the direction and key areas of the Green Silk Road.  
 
12. What is the current state of the Digital Silk Road and the Green Silk Road?  
 
Reply:  First, a closer partnership for green development is in the m aking. The BRI International 
Green Development Coalition is now composed of more than 150 partners from over 40 countries. 
A series of dialog and exchange events such as policy research conferences and the Belt and Road 
Green Innovation Conference have bee n held to promote global consensus on green development. 
Second, the green and low -carbon investment concept has taken root. In recent years, China 's 
investments in renewable energy project in Belt and Road countries have continued to grow, and a WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 159 - 
 
  batch of clean energy projects have been implemented. Third, support and services for ecological 
conservation and environmental protection have been strengthened. Special meetings and joint 
research on key topics such as climate change and biodiversity conservation  have been carried out, 
and a series of research reports including the Green Development Guidelines for Belt and Road 
Projects and the  Research Report on  Belt and Road Carbon  Market  Mechanisms have been released. 
Fourth, the joint capacity building for env ironmental governance has been continuously enhanced. 
The South -South cooperation on climate change plan has been implemented, and 40 cooperation 
agreements on climate change have been signed with 35 developing countries to help them improve 
their capacity  for climate change response.  
 
13. What are the main features of green finance cooperation in the Green Silk Road?  
 
Reply:  First, the top -level design has been strengthened. In 2016, China released the Guidelines 
for Establishing the Green Financial System in  a bid to encourage and support financial institutions 
to strengthen environmental risk management in Belt and Road projects and other investment 
projects. In 2017, China issued the Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road, which reiterates 
the importance  of strengthening environment management in outbound investments and promoting 
the development of the green financial system. Second, the Belt and Road Green Invest ment 
Principles has been promoted and applied on a wider scale . It was co-initiated by the G reen Finance 
Committee of China Society for Finance and Banking and the City of London Corporation 's Green 
Finance Initiative, and global financial institutions and enterprises engaging in Belt and Road 
investments can sign up to it voluntarily.  
 
Page 26 (Para 6.1)   
Currently, the global industrial chains and supply chains are hampered, trade and investment 
activities remain sluggish, and the momentum of global economic recovery is rather unstable. Facing 
the harsh and complicated international situatio n and the arduous tasks of domestic reform, 
development, and stability, especially under the severe impact of COVID -19, China will uphold its 
belief in openness, cooperation, and unity for achieving win -win outcome, stay committed to 
expanding all -round op ening up and exploring more efficient ways to connect domestic and foreign 
markets, and share production factors and resources. The aim is to turn the market of China into a 
market for the world, a market shared by all, and a market accessible by all and b ring more positive 
energy to the international community. China is committed to promoting mutual opening up 
featuring shared benefits, shared responsibilities, and shared governance and building an open world 
economy.  
 
Questions :  
14. What are the main global /regional industrial chains in terms of economic sectors/products in 
which the Chinese economy takes part?  
 
Reply:  China is a powerhouse in both manufacturing and trade, with its economic sectors deeply 
integrated in global industry chains and supply chai ns. Resource products, agricultural products and 
consumer products take a lion 's share in its imports. As an important trading partner of the ASEAN, 
EU, US, Japa n and South Korea, China connects the downstream and upstream of the global value 
chains and plays a vital role in aligning supply and demand and in keeping the global industry chains 
and supply chains stable and open. In the future, China will push forwar d high -level opening -up, 
further improve the quality of economic development, continuously modernize its industry chains 
and supply chains, and share development opportunities with other parts of the world, thus giving 
fresh impetus to the global industry chains and value chains.  
 
15. What is the relative position of the Chinese firms in these global/regional industrial chains in 
terms of backward and forward linkages?  
16. How has this relative position of Chinese firms in global/regional industrial chains in ter ms of 
backward and forward linkages been evolving over time?  
 
Reply to 15 -16: In the global industrial chain, China, the United States and Germany are the three 
production centers that deeply participate in the global industrial chain and drive the development 
of the production clusters in Asia, North America and Europe. Most indus tries and products in China 
are located near the downstream of the global industrial chain, closer to the final consumer market. 
With forward participation in the global industrial chain increasing steadily since 2008, China is 
playing the role as a key "hub" in the global industrial chain.  
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  COSTA RICA  
A. Informe de la Secretaría   
Página 119, párrafo 3.222   
3.222. Se observa también que el requisito de compra de productos nacionales no se aplica a las 
contrataciones de las empresas públicas, en tanto en cuanto estas no tienen la consideración de 
contrataciones públicas y no se rigen por la Ley de Contratación  Pública. Por consiguiente, las 
autoridades afirman que no se aplica un trato diferenciado a los bienes, servicios y proveedores 
extranjeros en las contrataciones de las empresas públicas, incluidas las esferas de la infraestructura 
y los servicios público s. Además, el artículo 16 de la nueva Ley de Inversión Extranjera (promulgada 
en marzo de 2019) dispone que "el Estado garantizará que las empresas con inversión extranjera 
puedan participar en las actividades de contratación pública en condiciones de comp etencia leal; los 
productos producidos y los servicios prestados por empresas con inversión extranjera en el territorio 
de China recibirán un trato igualitario en la contratación pública ".  
 
Pregunta:   
¿Podría China por favor brindar más información sobre si este trato igualitario solo lo reciben las 
empresas extranjeras que hayan invertido en China a través de una presencia comercial en el país 
(modo 3 de suministro de servicios) o también pueden recibirlo empresas que brinden servicios por 
otro modo de su ministro de servicios (modos 1, 2 o 4)?  
 
Reply: China 's Foreign Investment Law stipulates that "the state guarantees that foreign -invested 
enterprises participate in government procurement activities through fair completion according to 
the law. Products manufactured and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises within China 
shall be equally treated in government procurement according to the law. " The foreign -invested 
enterprises refer to companies that are wholly or partially invested by foreign investors and are 
registered and established in China in accordance with the Chinese law.  
 
Página 121, párrafo 3.230   
 
3.230. China no ha incluido ningún compromiso de acceso a los mercados en la esfera de la 
contratación pública en el contexto de ninguno de los ALC que ha negociado con sus interlocutores  
comerciales. Según las autoridades, la conclusión de la adhesión al ACP  antes de una liberalización 
a escala bilateral o regional del mercado de la contratación pública sigue siendo prioritaria para 
China.   
 
3.3.7 Derechos   
Pregunta:   
 
¿Podría China por favor brindar más información sobre el estado actual de su proceso de adh esión 
al ACP de la OMC?  
 
Reply:  China  is working hard to join the GPA at an early date. When China submitted the seventh 
bidding list to WTO for accession to the GPA, the bidding was of a roughly equivalent level to that of 
GPA participants. In May 2020, China submitted the Chinese Government  Procurement Report 
(updated in 2020) to WTO, which comprehensively reflected the reform of its legal system for 
government procurement. While advancing the bidding negotiations, China has promoted the legal 
revision negotiations simultaneously. In June 20 21, China provided to WTO its replies to the list of 
questions asked by EU and Australia about China 's 7th bidding list for accession to GPA and Chinese 
Government Procurement Report (updated in 2020), taking concrete actions to demonstrate its 
sincerity f or joining GPA and its resolve to preserve the multilateral trade system. GPA is a plurilateral 
agreement. Whether China will be able to accede to it doesn 't just rely on its own efforts, but to a 
large extent depends on the participants ' stance and expect ations. China believes the earlier it joins, 
the earlier relevant parties will benefit. China hopes GPA participants can ask for bidding in a 
pragmatic spirit, with a long -term view, and reach a mutually beneficial consensus on China 's 
accession as soon as  possible.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 161 - 
 
  Página 126, párrafo 3.257  
3.257. Según las autoridades, las indicaciones geográficas que no hayan sido registradas 
oficialmente siguen estando protegidas por las leyes pertinentes, por ejemplo, la Ley de Marcas de 
Fábrica o de Comercio, la Ley  de Represión de la Competencia Desleal, la Ley de Inocuidad de los 
Alimentos y la Ley de Calidad e Inocuidad de los Productos Agrícolas.   
 
Preguntas:   
Costa Rica reconoce la amplitud del ordenamiento jurídico en cuanto a la protección de indicaciones 
geográficas aun cuando estas no se encuentren registradas. ¿Han existido casos en los cuales se 
haya reconocido la protección de una indicación geográfica que no haya sido registrada previamente? 
¿Cómo se determina cuál ley es aplicable a cada caso? ¿Correspon de a las autoridades en sede 
administrativa o judicial determinarlo?   
 
Reply: Geographical indications can be put under protection with specially -designed systems or the 
Law of Trademarks. The Regulations on Protecting Products with Geographical Indications is 
applicable when a request for protection is submitted. The use of geographical indications should be 
in accordance with the law. Market entities using due authorized geographical indications should 
release the information in a p ublic announcement. Unregistered geographical indications are 
protected by the law.  
 
The Law of Trademarks, Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of Trademarks, and 
Guidelines for the Registration and Management of Collective Marks and Certificatio n Marks provide 
legal ground for the protection of geographical indications in China. Geographical indications should 
be registered in China National Intellectual Property Administration. Beijing Intellectual Property 
Court, Beijing Higher People 's Court a nd China Supreme People 's Court conduct judicial supervision 
over licensing registered geographical indications. China 's national market regulator and intellectual 
property authorities are the administrative law enforcement departments handling cases invol ving 
geographical indications. Civil cases arising from geographical indications should be lodged to 
people 's court in jurisdiction.  
 
China National Intellectual Property Administration makes administrative adjudication, including 
reviewing geographical i ndication applied for registration, reexamining the registration and deciding 
on invalidity of registration. It also offers guidance for trademark -related law enforcement, and is 
responsible for granting, reviewing, authorizing and protecting indications o f geographical origins. 
Involving parties can appeal against any ruling or adjudication made by China National Intellectual 
Property Administration to people 's courts within legal time limit.  
 
In the case of the Comité Champagne v. Beijing Shengyan Yimei Trading Co., Ltd., the court found 
that "in accordance with the principle of unanimous legal interpretation, unregistered geographical 
indications may seek civil remedy by referring to the protection of unregistered well -known 
trademarks ". In trademark dis pute case No. 3023790 of "XIANGLIAN & Picture ", the Trademark 
Review and Adjudication Board, based on the evidence submitted by the Xiangtan County Xianglian 
Association, determined that "Xianglian " was a geographical indication of lotus seeds, and partial ly 
cancelled the registration of the disputed trademark, clarifying that unregistered geographical 
indications can obtain administrative relief in trademark dispute procedures.  
 
The interested parties of geographical indications can seek relief from judic ial or administrative 
agencies, and administrative agencies can actively protect geographical indications through 
administrative law enforcement.  
 
Página 182, párrafo 4.145  
4.145. Durante el período objeto de examen, China siguió reformando su sector financiero. Al tiempo 
de adoptarse o modificarse diversos reglamentos cautelares y en materia de licencias, se 
establecieron varias medidas para liberalizar las actividades financieras y seguir promoviendo la 
participación extranjera en los sectores de la banca, los seguros, la administración de fondos de 
pensiones y los valores. En lo que respecta a la apertura del mercado financiero, en julio de 2019 
el FSDC anunció un conjunto de 11 medidas de reforma que abarcaban: i) las actividades de 
calificación cre diticia realizadas por empresas con inversión extranjera; ii) la participación extranjera 
en la gestión de activos; iii) medidas para alentar a las instituciones financieras extranjeras a invertir 
en las filiales de gestión de patrimonios de los bancos com erciales chinos; iv) la participación 
extranjera en la administración de fondos de pensiones; v) la participación extranjera en el corretaje 
de divisas;  vi) la supresión del límite a la participación extranjera en las compañías de seguros de WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 162 - 
 
  vida; vii) la supresión de las restricciones a la participación extranjera en las sociedades de gestión 
de activos de seguros; viii) la flexibilización de las restricciones a la entrada de compañías de seguros 
con inversión extranjera; ix) la eliminación de los límites a la participación extranjera en las 
sociedades de valores, las empresas de futuros y las empresas de gestión de fondos; x) la 
autorización del acceso de las instituciones financieras con inversión extranjera a las licencias de 
emisor de tipo A en el merca do de bonos interbancario; y xi) la autorización del acceso de las 
instituciones extranjeras a los mercados de bonos interbancarios.   
 
Pregunta:   
• ¿Podría China por favor brindar más información sobre cuáles de estas de medidas de 
liberalización del mercado  financiero favorecen el comercio transfronterizo de servicios 
financieros?  
 
Reply:  (1) Liberalization of the banking sector: abolished restrictions on foreign shareholding ratios 
in Chinese banks and financial asset management companies and equally implementing rules 
regarding equity shareholding ratio for Chinese and foreign banks; all owed branches of foreign banks 
to engage in government bond -related business; allowed foreign banks to set up both branches and 
subsidiaries; canceled the waiting period for foreign banks ' RMB business; lowered the threshold for 
foreign bank branches to ab sorb RMB retail deposits; adjusted the requirements for working capital 
deposits of foreign bank branches; abolished shareholding ratio caps of single Chinese bank and 
single foreign bank in Chinese commercial banks in accordance with the principle of equa l treatment 
for Chinese and foreign banks; abolished the total assets requirement for foreign banks to set up 
foreign legal person banks and branches in China.  
 
(2) Liberalization of the insurance sector: relaxed the foreign shareholding ratio of foreign -funded 
life insurance companies to 100%; relaxed the entry requirements for foreign -funded insurance 
companies by abolishing the 30 -year operating period requirement; lifted the requirement of setting 
up a representative office for two years for foreign -funded insurance institutions; aligned the 
business scope of foreign -funded insurance brokers with that of Chines institutions; allowed foreign 
financial institutions to take a stake in foreign -invested insurance companies in China; abolished the 
requirement  of 30-year operating period and total assets of not less than USD 200 million for foreign 
insurance brokers to develop insurance brokerage business in China.  
 
(3) Liberalization of the securities and futures industry: the restrictions on foreign sharehold ing in 
securities companies, fund management companies and futures companies have been lifted in 2020, 
ahead of the scheduled time of 2021; the revised rules of the QFII/RQFII system have been officially 
implemented in November 2020, which has lowered the entry threshold for foreign investors, 
facilitated investment operations and expanded the scope of investment; the futures market have 
been further opened up and the scope of specific varieties has been expanded. So far, nine specific 
varieties of futures options, including crude oil, have been made available to the public and foreign 
investors.  
 
Página 200, párrafo 4.230   
4.230 Con respecto a las empresas extranjeras, la Ley de Comercio Electrónico dispone que China 
fomentará el desarrollo del comercio electrónico transfronterizo (actividades de compraventa de 
productos en línea a través de las fronteras nacionales), que las autoridades ya han venido 
promoviendo en la práctica. El 27 de abril de 2020, el Consejo de Estado publicó la Aprobación 
del Establecimiento de Zonas Piloto Integradas para el Comercio Electrónico Transfronterizo en 
46 Ciudades y Zonas (Guo Han Nº 47, 2020). En consecuencia, llegó a 105 el número total de zonas 
piloto de comercio electrónico transfronterizo. En diciembre de 2 019, las autoridades ampliaron la 
Lista de Mercancías objeto de Importación al Por Menor mediante el Comercio Electrónico 
Transfronterizo a fin de permitir la entrega de una mayor cantidad de mercancías extranjeras a los 
consumidores chinos en el marco del  programa de importación al por menor mediante el comercio 
electrónico transfronterizo.  
 
Preguntas : 
• ¿Podría China por favor comentar un poco más en detalle sobre las Zonas Piloto Integradas 
para el Comercio Electrónico Transfronterizo?  
Reply:  Since 2015, the Chinese Government has granted the establishment of 105 comprehensive 
experiment zones for cross -border e -commerce in five batches. Generally speaking, the 
comprehensive experiment zones have been playing an increasingly important role in boosting WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  foreign trade, and they have emerged as a new momentum for foreign trade growth, innovation and 
entrepreneurship, and economic restructuring. In approving new comprehensive experiment zones, 
the Chinese Government will prioritize places boasting large -scale fo reign trade, strong momentum 
in innovation, and enabling infrastructure for the development of new business models.  
 
In terms of incentives for cross -border e -commerce, the Ministry of Commerce, together with other 
competent departments, has been active in  innovation and exploration. It has been dedicated to 
enhancing top -level design, improving supporting policies, optimizing the business environment and 
improving the development level. It offered guidance to comprehensive experiment zones to 
establish a p olicy framework with "six systems and two platforms " at the core, and promoted 36 
effective measures in 12 areas in a wider part of the country. It rolled out a policy of exempting 
retail exports without purchase certificates from taxes, and a supporting policy of checking the 
production and sales before le vying on taxes. Under its initiative, custom supervision codes including 
9610, 1210, 9710 and 9810 have been created. A net settlement approach taking costs of warehouse, 
logistics, taxation, and export payments into account is allowed for cross -border e -commerce 
businesses.  
 
In July 5, 2021, the General Office of the State Council released Guidelines for Developing New 
Business Models in Foreign Trade at a Faster Pace, which called for improving supportive policies for 
cross-border e -commerce, advancing th e building of comprehensive experiment zones, supporting 
the growth of platforms proving segment services, facilitating settlement, strengthening the building 
of guilds and fostering professionals.  
 
¿Qué requisitos debe cumplir un producto para ingresar a la lista de mercancías objeto de 
importación?  
 
Reply:  According to the Notice on Cross -border E -commerce Retail Import Tax Policy , the cross -
border e -commerce retail import tax policy applies to the following products imported from other 
countri es or regions and within the scope of the List of Goods under Cross -border E -commerce Retail 
Importation : (ⅰ) All cross -border e -commerce retail imports that are traded on the e -commerce 
transaction platforms connected to the customs and whose electronic i nformation of transaction, 
payment, and logistics are accessible; ( ⅱ) Cross -border e -commerce retail imports that are not 
traded on the e -commerce transaction platforms connected to the customs, but whose electronic 
information of transaction, payment, and  logistics can be provided by express and postal companies, 
promising to bear corresponding legal responsibilities for entering the country.  
 
Páginas 35 y 201, párrafos 2.3 y 4.233  
2.3 También se han tomado medidas en los últimos años para seguir poniendo al día la 
especialización judicial en cuestiones relacionadas con el comercio electrónico. Además del Tribunal 
de Internet de Hangzhou, establecido el 18 de agosto de 2017, el 9 de septiembre de 2018 y 
el 28 de septiembre de 2018 se establecieron el Tribunal de Internet de Beijing y el Tribunal de 
Internet de Guangzhou, respectivamente. Estos se ocupan de entender en 11 tipos de casos 
relacionados con Internet, como contratos de préstamos financieros, adquisición de bienes, 
servicios, diferencias e n línea sobre la responsabilidad extracontractual e infracciones del derecho 
de autor. Según las autoridades, a finales de diciembre de 2020 los tres Tribunales de Internet 
habían entendido en 248.258 casos relacionados con Internet.  
 
4.233. La Ley de Come rcio Electrónico dispone que las diferencias relativas al comercio electrónico 
pueden resolverse mediante: i) negociación; ii) solicitud de mediación de organizaciones de 
consumidores, asociaciones empresariales u otras organizaciones mediadoras legalmente  
constituidas; iii) presentación de reclamaciones ante las autoridades competentes; iv) solicitud de 
arbitraje; o v) incoación de procedimientos judiciales. Otra medida destinada a impulsar el comercio 
electrónico es el establecimiento de tribunales de Int ernet. Los tribunales de Internet de Beijing y 
Guangzhou se establecieron formalmente en septiembre de 2018, tras la apertura del primer tribunal 
de Internet de China en Hangzhou en 2017 (sección 2.1). Se han constituido tribunales de Internet 
que conocen de los asuntos relacionados con el comercio electrónico y las transacciones en línea. 
En general, todo el procedimiento de litigio se lleva a cabo en línea. Los tribunales de Internet 
pueden optar por completar una parte del procedimiento de litigio fuera de línea, previa solicitud de 
los litigantes o por las necesidades del juicio. En septiembre de 2018, el Tribunal Supremo del Pueblo 
dictó también las Disposiciones sobre varias Cuestiones relativas al Enjuiciamiento de Causas por 
los Tribunales de Interne t, a fin de regular las actividades procesales de los tribunales de Internet.   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Preguntas:  
¿Podría China por favor comentar un poco más en detalle el ámbito y tipo de casos que revisan estos 
tribunales de Internet? ¿Se requiere representación de un abogado  autorizado en China para acceder 
a ellos?  
 
Reply:  According to Article 2 of the Regulations of the Supreme People 's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Trial of Cases by Internet Courts (Fa Shi [2018] No. 16), the Beijing, Guangzhou, 
and Hangzhou Internet Courts have centralized jurisdiction over the following cases of first instance 
that should be accepted by the basic -level people 's courts within the jurisdiction of the cities where 
they are l ocated:  
 
(1)  Disputes arising from signing o r performing online shopping contracts through e -commerce 
platforms;  
(2)  Disputes over network service contracts, of which the signing and performance are completed 
on the I nternet;  
(3)  Disputes over financial loan contracts and small loan contracts, of which the signing and 
performance are completed on the Internet;  
(4)  Disputes over the ownership of copyright or neighboring rights of works published for the 
first time on the Internet;  
(5)  Disputes arising from infringements of the copyright or neighboring rights of works published 
or disseminated online on the Internet;  
(6)  Disputes over Internet domain name ownership, infringements, and contracts;  
(7)  Disputes arising from infringements of the personal rights, property rights and other civil rights 
of others on the Internet;  
(8)  Product liability disputes arising from product defects purchased through e -commerce 
platforms that infringe on the personal and property rights of others;  
(9)  Internet public interest lawsuits filed by procuratorial organs;  
(10)  Administrative disputes arising from administrative actions such as Internet information 
service management, Internet commodity trading and related service management by 
administrative  agencies; and  
(11)  Other Internet civil and administrative cases designated for jurisdiction by the people 's courts 
at higher levels.  
 
According to Article 263 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People 's Republic of China, foreigners, 
stateless persons, f oreign enterprises, and organizations who make or defend claims in the people 's 
courts and need to entrust lawyers to represent the litigation must entrust lawyers of the People 's 
Republic of China.  
 
B. Informe de Gobierno   
 
Página 8, párrafo 3.3   
 
3.3. Desde el último examen, China ha simplificado aún más los procedimientos de administración  de 
las importaciones y ha reducido continuamente los aranceles de importación. En noviembre de  2018, 
redujo los derechos de importación de 1.585 líneas arancela rias aplicables a equipos mecánicos y 
eléctricos, piezas y materias primas, etc. Cada mes de enero de 2019 a 2021, China ha aplicado 
aranceles de importación provisionales, que son más bajos que los tipos arancelarios NMF de más 
de 700 partidas de mercancí as, entre las que figuran algunos equipos avanzados, piezas de repuesto, 
productos de recursos y materias primas farmacéuticas. Cada mes de julio de 2019 a 2021, China 
ha cumplido activamente sus compromisos relativos a las concesiones de reducciones aranc elarias 
en el marco de la ampliación del Acuerdo sobre Tecnología de la Información (ATI), y ha puesto en 
práctica la cuarta, quinta y sexta rondas de reducciones arancelarias para determinados productos 
de tecnologías de la información. En 2010, China hab ía cumplido todos sus compromisos de 
reducción arancelaria contraídos en el marco de su adhesión a la OMC, reduciendo el nivel medio de 
los aranceles al 9,8%. Tras una nueva reducción arancelaria realizada por iniciativa propia, el nivel 
arancelario medio de China se situó en el 7,5% a principios de 2021.   
 
Pregunta:  
¿Podría China por favor brindar más información sobre cómo se divulgan estas reducciones 
arancelarias? ¿Se publican conforme se adoptan?   
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: Every year China releases the tariff adjustment plan for the next year, which can be obtained 
under "policies " on the website of the Tariff Department of the Ministry of Finance:  
http://gss.mof.gov.cn /gzdt/zhengcefabu . The tax reduction information published online is 
consistent with the actual tax reduction.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  OMAN  
Oman  
 
Questions based on Report by the Secretariat (WT/TPR/S/415)  
2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory framework and market access  
 
Page 37 , Para 2.45  
The Report states that " On 23 June 2020, the current version of the National Negative List was 
issued by the NDRC and MOFCOM to replace the 2019 version…… " 
And according to the Box 2.1 i n Page 38 which including the Main changes in the 2019 National 
Negative List for foreign investments and the 2019 Encouraged Catalogue in Services activities.  
 
QUESTION :  
Will these changes appear in the schedules commitments of Services of China?  
 
Reply:  Your interest in China 's opening up of trade in service is highly appreciated. China is willing 
to discuss the issue of market access with other members in the negotiations about market access 
to trade in services under the World Trade Organization framework.  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.5.3 Patents  
 
Page 113 , Para 3.272.  
In response to the challenges posed by the COVID ‑19 pandemic, the China Patent Information Center 
(CNPAT) developed in collaboration with the Patent Exam ination Cooperation (Beijing) Center of the 
Patent Office and the CNIPA to jointly develop an information -sharing public platform for patents 
related to the prevention of COVID ‑19. The platform provides precise patent information on almost 
10,000 patents.  
 
QUESTION :  
Is this platform available to use by foreigners?  
 
Reply: The platform is available to foreigners. In response to challenges posed by the COVID -19 
pandemic, China National Intellectual Property Administration launched the Information Sharing 
Platform for Patents on Pandemic Prevention Against COVID -19 in February 20 20. The English 
version of the platform, http://ncp.patentstar.cn, was put into official use on April 20, 2020. The 
registration -free platform is open to world countries free of charge, and provides in -time and 
professional patent information for pandemic response to medical institutions and research institutes.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  NORWAY  
4. Trade policy by sector  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.2.5 Shipbuilding  
Reference is made to para 4.130 and the 13th Five-Year Plan of China Ship Accessory and Equipment 
Industry, where specific goals for the proportion of domestic equipment in ship categories are 
outlined.  
 
Could you elaborate on which three ship models are included in the category where the goal is a  
proportion of domestic equipment of 80 %?  
- Which measures if any have been put in place to achieve the objectives outlined in the plan?  
 
Reply : The Action Plan o f Improv ing The Industrial Capacity of The Ship Equipment Industry .  
 
(2016 -2020) is a government guidance document.  
 
- Have the goals outlined in the plan been achieved?  
 
Reply: The Action Plan of Improving The Industrial Capacity of The Ship Equipment Industry (2016 -
2020) is a government guidance document.  
 
4.4 Services  
4.4.3.1 Maritime transport  
 
Reference is made to paragraph 4.241, where it is described how China has lifted  the restrictions on 
foreign investment in international shipping and international shipping agency services in China. 
Considering China 's previous efforts to gradually lift restrictions on FDI in the services sector, Norway 
would like to learn more about the outlook for further liberalisation of FDI in the maritime transport 
sector, including for Storage and Warehousing Services and Freight Forwarding Services.  
 
Reply: China will promote further liberalization in relevant service areas in accordance with the 
development needs of the domestic market. For specific progress , we suggest the Norwegian side 
to pay attention to the Special Administrative Measures (Negative List ) for the Access of Foreign 
Investment.  
 
Seafood  
 
Covid  measures  
The COVID -19 pandemic has had serious consequences around the world and different countries 
have chosen different approaches to fight the pandemic. The General Administration of Customs, 
Peoples Republic of China  implemented emergency preventive measures for foreign manufacturers 
of imported cold -chain foods with positive novel coronavirus nucleic acid  test results.  This was 
notified to the WTO as an emergency measure in  September  2020 and  is still in force. Since the 
implementation there has been  a lack of transparency and lack of written information when positive 
nucleic acid test results have been found. This has caused additional uncertainty for exporters of 
seafood and other f ood products, and hampers trade.   
China has referred to the  World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations document entitled COVID -19 and Food Safety: Guidance for Food Businesses 
of 7 April 2020. This guideline w as updated on 2 August 2021, and the updated guidance states that 
"neither  food nor food packaging is a pathway for the spread of viruses causing respiratory illnesses, 
including SARS -CoV-2" and that "SARS -CoV-2 is not a direct food safety concern ". The gu idance is 
in line with the current scientific evidence available on COVID -19 that indicate that food, food 
packaging or food handling is not a transmission route for corona virus  
 
Question  
When will  China lift the emergency measures  based on the updated g uidance  from FAO dated 
2 August 2021?  
 
Reply: China has implemented emergency preventive measures to strengthen the supervision of 
imported cold -chain food to protect  Chinese people 's safety and health, which is in full compliance 
with international rules and have not negatively affected the food trade to China. We have  taken WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 168 - 
 
  samples of imported cold -chain food and its packaging for nucleic acid testing in accordance with 
the law, with the aim of preventing the sp read of the coronavirus through cold -chain food. 
On October 17, 2020, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) announced that 
live NNV virus was isolated from the outer packaging of imported aquatic products, confirming that 
contact with  outer packaging contaminated with live NNV virus can lead to infection. China welcomes 
the import of high -quality, safe food products to China, and China 's attitude of expanding open ing-
up and imports is consistent and clear. However, with the development  of the global epidemic, 
consumers ' concerns and doubts about the safety of the food supply chain have increased, and 
believe that without consumer confidence there is no market and without market there is no trade. 
Under the current epidemic situation, we  hope that countries (regions) outside China that export 
food to China can follow the relevant guidelines issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) and require food enterprises exporting to China to take preventive 
measure s to ensure that  all food exported to China is not contaminated by the coronavirus. China is 
willing to work with all relevant parties t o respond to consumer concerns, to ensure food safety 
supply, and to maintain market stability, thus promot ing the healthy development of international 
trade.  
 
New regulations regarding imported food  
 
In April 2021, China notified two new decrees in the WTO SPS and TBS committees, decree  248 
"Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on the Registration and A dministration of Imported 
Food Overseas Production Enterprises " and decree 249 "Registration and Administration of Overseas 
Manufactures of Imported Food ". According to the notification, the  new regulations  will be 
implemented on 1 January 2022.  
However,  some of the new packaging and labelling requirements appear to have been implemented 
in advance of the notified date at least two airports (Shanghai Pudong and Guangzhou). 
According  to Shanghai customs authorities the requirements are in accordance with exi sting rules 
from 2011 (AQSIQ decree 135), which had previously not been implemented for fresh Atlantic 
salmon from Norway.  
Norway has  in written format  requested bilateral discussions with China to better understand how 
the new requirements will be applied  to prepare for the implementation  date on 1 January 2022.  So 
far, China has not responded to the request from the Norwegian side. Several WTO members have 
repeatedly urged China to provide more information on the system and how it will be implemented, 
but China has so far not responded to the request. Although the implementation date is approaching, 
it is unclear how the new requirements will be applied.  
While these measures are expected to have a significant impact on exports of seafood an d other 
food products to China, it is not  clear how the new measures will contribute to achieving China 's 
appropriate level of protection.  
 
Questions  
Which  specific food safety risks are addressed through these Decrees 248 and 249 and why are 
these risks a re not mitigated by China 's existing regulations?  
When will China provide  relevant information  on the  new measures, including the details of the 
system and information on how the new requirements will be applied?   
Will China consider delaying the implement ation of Decrees 248 and 249  in order to  allow both 
governments and industry to fully understand and comply with the new requirements contained in 
the regulations?   
 
Reply to the three question s above: Imported food safety concerns the health and life safety of 
the people and is key to people 's livelihood. In accordance with the provisions of the Food Safety 
Law of the People 's Republic of China and its implementing regulations and other laws and 
administrative regulations, we revised the two regulation s on the management of food safety of 
imports and exports and the management of registration of imported food production enterprises 
outside China, and announced on April 12, 2021 Measures of the People 's Republic of China for the 
Administration of Safety of Imported and Exported Food (Order No. 249 of the General 
Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China) and Provisions of the People 's Republic 
of China on the Administration of Registration of Overseas Imported Food Production Enterprises  
(Order No. 248 of the General Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China), which 
are to be implemented from January 1, 2022. Prior to official release, China, in accordance with the 
relevant rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), ha s notified and accepted the WTO members ' 
comments and suggestions, which is in line with the relevant WTO rules. The scope of application of 
the two regulations have been clarified in Article II, Order No. 248 and 249 of General Administration WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 169 - 
 
  of Customs. In the near future, China will interpret the Measures of the People 's Republic of China 
for the Administration of Safety of Imported and Exported Food (Order No. 249 of the General 
Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China) and Provisions  of the People 's Republic 
of China on the Administration of Registration of Overseas Imported Food Production Enterprises 
(Order No. 248 of the General Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China) in an 
appropriate form, to which we welcome  your attention. Besides, Order No.248 of the General 
Administration of Customs will not affect the implementation of bilateral protocols. Where  relevant 
countries (regions) and China have stipulations on the registration and application materials, such 
stipulations shall prevail.  
 
Article  11 in decree 248 states that "If relevant countries (regions) and China have separate 
agreements on registration method and application materials, (registration) shall be carried out 
following the agreement. Will China consider the initiation of bilateral discussions  in order to  clarify  
possible questions  exporting countries  might have  related to  bilateral agreements or protocols on 
trade in food products?  
 
Reply: If the exporting country has questions for bilatera l agreements or protocols related to food, 
China is willing to consider initiating bilateral consultations to solve the problem.  
 
Is it correct that some of the measures, such as packaging requirements, already have been 
implemented at local level at some airports? Can China explain why local customs authorities have 
different enforcement of national regulations?  
 
Reply: China Customs enforces the law within the customs territory. We suggest Norway further 
clarifying the "packaging requirements " referred t o in the question.  
 
Registration and listing of establishments   
China requires that all seafood producing establishments are registered and approved by the General 
Administration of Customs, Peoples Republic of China. Norway shared the first list of Norwegian 
producers of seafood with the Chinese competent authority in  2013 and  has since updated and 
amended the list of establishments on many occasions.   
 
While the Norwegian competent authority has worked hard  to respond  to and fulfil the requirements 
stipulated by the Chinese competent authority, repeated changes to the registration procedure, often 
with very short deadlines, impose  a substantial burden.  Simultaneously, there have been  significant 
delays in China 's approval procedures for the establish ments on these lists. While the companies are 
awaiting approval,  they cannot access the Chinese market, something which Norway experiences as 
a trade barrier.   
 
Question  
Norway sent an  updated list of seafood producing establishments to China on 27 January . The list  
contains  135 establishments that  have not previously  been registered or approved by the General 
Administration of Customs, Peoples Republic of China. When does China expect to complete the 
approval process of these 135 establishments?   
 
Reply: Given the large number of new aquatic product enterprises to be registered in China applied 
by Norway, the Chinese experts are reviewing the relevant information and will provide feedback 
immediately after the review is completed.  
 
Import licences f or Atlantic salmon  
Norway is of the understanding that China has implemented a new practice on the issuance of import 
licenses for Atlantic salmon from Norway.  The quantity per import license seems to be significantly 
reduced, and it appears that new impo rt licenses are not issued before the entire quantity of the 
current import license is fully utilised.   
 
The new practice for the issuance of import licenses may act as a barrier to trade, and  Norway has  
formally  requested consultations on this matter with  the General Administration of Customs of the 
People 's Republic of China  in accordance with the consultation mechanism in the Protocol on 
Inspection, Quarantine and Sanitary  Requirements for Atlantic Salmon Imported from the Kingdom 
of Norway into the Peop le's Republic of China between General Administration of Customs of the 
People 's Republic of  China and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries of the Kingdom of 
Norway signed 20  May 2019. So far,  China has not responded to the request.   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 170 - 
 
  Question  
Are the changes to the practice based on new regulations that been implemented  for the issuances 
of import licenses for Atlantic salmon from Norway, and if so, what is the rationale behind the 
changes?  
 
Reply: According to Administrative Measures for the Quarantine Approval of Imported Animals and 
Plants, an entity applying for going through the formalities of quarantine approval shall, before 
concluding a trade contract or agreement, file an application to the customs authorities and obtain 
the "Quarantine Permit ". The same applicant entity may, with regard to the same variety, the same 
exporting country or region, or the same processing or using entity, apply for the "Quarantine 
Permit " for only once. The infor mation on the use of the "Quarantine Permit " approved at the last 
time and the cancellation of the said permit upon verification shall be examined by the customs 
authorities in accordance with the relevant provisions. Exporters of relevant aquatic products  to 
China should comply with the approval management methods, which are not specific to any 
particular country or region.  
 
Subsidies : The Secretariat report paragraph 22, p.13 notes that in June 2019 China notified its 
support programs for the period 2017-18. However, it also notes that no information was provided 
by the authorities on how many of the programs were still active as at April 2021, and that the 
information provided by China has not enabled the Secretariat to have a clear picture of China 's 
support programs, particularly with regard to sectors such as aluminum, electric vehicles, glass, 
shipbuilding, semiconductors or steel.  How does the Chinese government work to ensure that 
incentives (e.g., R&D, environmental) are equally granted to SOE/ POE and foreign invested 
companies and do not constitute subsidies that should be notified under the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures?  
 
Reply: In July 2021, China has submitted the subsidy notification for 2019 -2020 to the WTO. It 
include s 71 subsidy policies at the central government level, and 374 subsidy policies at the local 
level of 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government 
as well as five cities specifically designated in the State plan . Please refer to the latest subsidy 
notification of China for relevant supporting projects.  
 
Government procurement : According to the Secretariat Report, paragraph 3.3.6, the total value 
of government procurement in China was reported to be worth CNY 3.3 trillion in 2019, with the 
majority of government procurement at the sub -Central Government level. Both the Government 
Procurement Law and the Tendering Law are currently under amendment. What will the Chinese 
government do to ensure that foreign invested companies, Chinese private companies and SOEs 
have more equal access to government contracts?   
 
Reply: There are no discriminatory provisions against foreign -invested enterprises in China 's 
government procurement, either at the legal level or at the policy level. In recent years, the Ministry 
of Finance has been promoting the construction of a unified, open, competitive and orderly 
government procurement market system, and will continue to strengthen the guidance and 
supervision of government procurem ent activities in all regions and departments , so as to maintain 
a fair and competitive market environment. If a foreign -invested enterprise believes that it has been 
treated unfairly in government procurement activities, it may submit a question and compl aint to 
the relevant departments in accordance with the law. If any of the conduct is found to constitute 
differential or discriminatory treatment of suppliers on unreasonable terms, it will be handled in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of governme nt procurement laws and regulations. Chinese 
courts strictly enforce the provisions of the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations.  
Procurement by state -owned enterprises is not part of government procurement and the government 
procurement law does not apply.  
 
Visa restrictions : We are receiving reports that China 's current restrictions on visa issuance make 
it challenging for foreign -invested companies to bring competent personnel who are foreign citizens 
into China. Which measures can Chin a take to ease this situation and make sure it does not come 
to be seen as a trade barrier?   
 
Reply: Foreigners who come to China to engage in necessary activities such as business and trade, 
science and technology, epidemic prevention cooperation and exchange, as well as those who really 
need to come to China for urgent humanitarian reasons, can apply fo r visas from Chinese embassies WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  and consulates. The relevant Chinese authorities will determine the visa entry policy according to 
the changes of the epidemic.  
 
IPR: China has made progress with regards to IPR in recent years, but infringements remain an 
issue and the appeal processes for claiming wrongful use of IPR, patents and trademarks can be 
complicated and time -consuming. What can the Chinese government do to address these concerns?   
 
Reply: Recently, the Supreme Court has issued judicial interpretati ons on evidence in civil litigation 
of intellectual property rights and other matters, which further facilitates parties to produce evidence, 
shortens the litigation cycle, reduces the cost of rights protection, increases the amount of 
compensation, and im poses heavier punishment for intellectual property infringements.  
On 1 January 2019, the IP Court of the Supreme Court was officially opened to handle the nationwide 
patent and other highly specialized intellectual property appeals, which is conducive to i mproving 
the quality and efficiency of trials.  
 
 
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  UNITED STATES  
Part I. Questions based on the Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/415)  
 
SUMMARY  
 
Page 12, Paragraph 15:  The Secretariat Report indicates that China 's "highest tariffs of 65% apply 
to 20 agricultural tariff lines. "  
• For each relevant product or product group, please explain China 's rationale for maintaining 
such high tariffs.  
 
Reply : In accordance with China 's WTO commitments, in 2021, a total of 21 tariff lines in China will 
implement the MFN rate of 65%, of which 19 are food products with tariff quotas, and the rate within 
tariff quotas is only 1% -10%. The other two tariff lines are vermouth wine and similar wines, and a 
preferential provisional tax rate of 14% is implemented  for small packages of vermouth wine and 
similar wines.  
 
Page 12, Paragraph 17: The Secretariat Report notes that imports of "all solid waste products " 
have been prohibited as of 1 January 2021, but "[c]ertain recycling materials " may be still imported.  
• Can China explain the scientific basis that it used to determine which categories of "recycling 
materials " are acceptable for importation and which categories are not acceptable for 
importation?  
• What is China 's policy regarding ex pansion of the list of "recycling materials " that are 
acceptable for importation? " Can China explain why it discriminates between domestically 
sourced solid wastes and certain recycling materials, which are not prohibited, and imports 
of solid wastes and c ertain recycling materials, which are prohibited?  
 
Reply  to two questions above: According to the Law of the People 's Republic of China on the 
Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste, raw materials derived from solid 
wastes which have been processed and treated comply with compulsory national product quality 
standards and pose no danger to publi c health and ecological safety, are not classified as solid wastes, 
and can be imported into China through normal product trade. Moreover, there is neither a list of 
"recycling materials " that are acceptable nor policy regarding expansion of the list.  
In accordance with the principles universally recognized by the international community, the proper 
disposal of domestically generated solid wastes is the responsibility and obligation of every country.  
 
Page 13, Paragraph 23:  The Secretariat Report notes that  China does not timely notify its 
subsidies, that China 's notifications of subsidies lack required information and that China 's 
notifications of subsidies do not include what appear to be the largest subsidies that China provides, 
which is through so -called "government guidance funds. " For many years, the United States and 
other Members have complained about China 's subsidies notifications being untimely, lacking in 
required information and incomplete.  In addition, the United States agrees with the Secretar iat's 
assessment that government guidance funds constitute subsidies. Given the enormous size of 
China 's government guidance funds and the significant support that they provide to China 's domestic 
industries, and given the assessment of the Secretariat and  WTO Members like the United States 
that these funds appear to constitute subsidies, what is China 's policy on notifying the WTO about 
them?  
 
Reply: In recent years, China has been committed to enhancing the transparency of its subsidy 
policies, has timely submitted notifications on subsidies at level of both central and local 
governments. There is no late or incomplete notification. China 's latest notification on subsidies 
for 2019-2020 includes 71 subsidies policies at the central level, and 374 sub sidies policies at the 
local level in 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central 
government, as well as 5 cities specially designated in the state plan. China 's funds set up in 
accordance with market principles is operat ed entirely in accordance with market principles, and are 
completely independent market entities. China has not provided subsidies for any industry through 
these funds.  
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  Page 13, Paragraph 23:  With regard to its "government guidance funds ":  
• Please explain how the investment decisions of the guidance funds are consistent with the 
usual investment practice of private investors, including for the provision of risk capital.  
• Please provide examples of specific equity investments that are consiste nt with the usual 
investment practice of private investors.  
 
Reply  to two questions above:  The investment management and decision -making of government 
guidance funds are completely market -oriented. Government departments do not intervene in or 
participate  in any investment project decisions of the funds. These funds were established in 
accordance with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China, and a fund governance 
structure was established for market -oriented operation. For example, the National I C Industry Fund 
is managed strictly in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations on private equity investment 
funds, and each investment requires a corresponding income.  
 
Page 14, Paragraph 29:  While the Secretariat Report does not directly discuss  China 's judicial 
system, it does note that China undertook wide ranging reforms in its intellectual property regime 
during 2018 and 2019, including with regard to "the infrastructure of IP courts. " A hallmark of 
democratic market economies is judicial independence. Since its last Trade Policy Review in 2018, 
has China taken any steps to promote judicial independence, i.e., the ability of Chinese judges to 
make decisions without interference from off icials from People 's Congresses, Communist Party 
officials, officials from Communist Party committees, officials from central government ministries, 
local government officials and officials from the procuracy?  
 
Reply: Article 131 of The Constitution of th e People 's Republic of China stipulates: The people 's 
courts exercise judicial power independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, and are not 
subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization or individual. According to 
relevant laws, no unit or individual may require judges to engage in affairs beyond the scope of their 
statutory duties. Judges shall be protected by law when they perform their statutory duties according 
to law. Judges shall be responsible for their conduc ts in performing their judicial duties and shall be 
responsible for the quality of handling cases for life within the scope of their duties.  
 
Page 14, Paragraph 33: Please provide additional details on how China 's carbon emissions trading 
framework will operate, including how it has structured the emissions cap and set prices on carbon 
to facilitate emissions reductions?  
 
Reply: China 's carbon emissions trading market is major institutional innovation which utilizes 
market mechanisms to con trol and reduce greenhouse gas emission and promote green and low -
carbon development, and an important measure to peak carbon dioxide emissions and achieve 
carbon neutrality. The first compliance period of the national carbon emissions trading market cover s 
about 4.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions, accounting for about 45% of the total carbon 
dioxide emissions in China, making China the largest carbon emissions trading market in the world. 
In addition, domestic carbon emissions trading market has achieved positive results. As of 
30 September 2021, China 's emissions trading market has achieved an accumulative trading volume 
of the national carbon emissions trading quota of 17.649 million tons, with a total transaction volume 
of RMB 801 million.  
 
In terms of institutional building, at the end of 2020, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment issued 
the Measures for the Administration of Carbon Emissions Trading (for Trial Implementation) 
(hereinafter referred to as the Measures), which initially establ ished a market regulation system for 
the national carbon emissions trading market, clarified the objects, contents and measures of market 
regulation by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and provincial and municipal ecology and 
environment authorities , standardized the market activities of key greenhouse gas emitters, and 
defined their responsibilities and obligations. In terms of quota allocation, the current quota is 
allocated free of charge with the industry benchmark method with intensity control a s the basic (the 
method for issuing quota based on the advanced emission level of output (capacity) per unit of 
product in the industry). This method is based on the actual output and the advanced carbon 
emission level of the industry, and the quota is all ocated free of charge and "linked " to the actual 
output, reflecting the principle of rewarding the advanced and punishing the backward.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  China will utilize the market mechanism to find a reasonable carbon price, guide the optimal 
allocation of carbon emissi on resources, and reduce the cost of emission reduction for the whole 
society.  
 
Page 15, Paragraph 15:  The Secretariat Report states: "The Made in China 2025 (or China 
Manufacturing 2025) intuitive (launched in 2015) and the Internet Plus initiative (launched in 2015) 
remain China 's main initiatives to promote the manufacturing sector. " Does China agree with this 
statement?  
 
Reply: " The Made in China 2025 " initiative is a manufacturing upgrading scheme proposed by China 
in response to the new industrial revolution by drawing lessons from common practices of developed 
countries in the light of its own industrial development stage. The "Guiding Opinions on Actively 
Promoting the "Internet Plus " Action Plan " are guidelines for accelerating the in -depth integration 
between the Internet and various fields and innovative development. In addition, other relevant 
documents are available on the official website of the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology . 
 
Page 15, Paragraph 34: The Secretariat Report notes that China 's Made in China 2025 industrial 
plan remains China 's main initiative for promoting many of China 's manufacturing industries. Among 
other things, this industrial plan sets forth specific domestic market share targets for these 
Chinese  industries to achieve by 2020 and 2025.  
• Please detail all of the policies and practices that China is using in an attempt to achieve 
the market sh are targets set forth in Made in China 2025.  
• Does China consider these policies and practices to be market -oriented? Please explain.  
 
Reply  to two questions above: The statement in the report that "'The Made in China 2025 '" 
initiative sets forth specific domestic market share targets for these Chinese industries to achieve 
by 2020 and 2025 " does not conform to the fact. Some indicators of "The Made in China 2025 " 
initiative are from academic advisory reports. They are predictive and guiding, are n ot linked to 
official policies or financial input, and are not compulsory. In fact, many countries have similar 
guiding indicators and schemes. "The Made in China 2025 " initiative follows the principles of 
openness, fairness and competition, and applies to  both domestic and foreign -invested enterprises 
equally. The Circular of the State Council on Several Measures Concerning Further Openness and 
Active Utilization of Foreign Investment issued in January 2017 clearly states that "'The Made in 
China 2025 ' initiative applies to both domestic and foreign -invested enterprises equally. " A number 
of foreign enterprises have been involved in the implementation of "The Made in China 2025 " 
initiative. China has always been an advocate, practitioner and promoter of globalization. China will 
continue to adhere to open and cooperative development, unswervingly implement "The Made in 
China 2025 " initiative in an open environment, and work with other countries to achieve win -win 
results.  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1 Main Features of the Economy  
Page 16; Table 1.1  The economic indicators provided in this table indicate that, based on 
GDP per capita, China falls into the World Bank 's upper middle income category and is close to the 
high income threshold of GDP per capita at 12,535. These economic indicators generally would not 
be considered developing. What indicators, justification or threshold does China base its continuing 
claim to developing co untry status at the WTO?  
 
Reply: The concept of developing countries is relative to developed countries, and international 
organizations do not have a unified definition of developing countries. However, on the whole, 
compared with developed countries, developing countries lag far behind in economic strength, per 
capita income, economic structure, industrial competitiveness, social security system, environmental 
protection and the ability to participate in global governance.  Since the reform a nd opening up, 
China has made remarkable economic and social progress. However, unbalanced, uncoordinated 
and unsustainable development remains a serious problem. There is a wide gap in regional 
development between urban and rural areas; the development pa ttern remains extensive, and there 
is still a significant gap in scientific and technological innovation capacity. On the whole, the objective 
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  is still in t he primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a long time to come has not changed. 
China 's international status as the world 's largest developing country has not changed.  
 
1.2.3 Fiscal policy  
Page 21, Paragraph 1.23:  What is the average debt ratio o f sub-central state -owned enterprises? 
What is the average debt ratio of other state -invested companies that might not meet the definition 
of a state -owned enterprise under Chinese law?  
 
Reply: In recent years, the average debt ratio of sub -central state -owned enterprises has remained 
stable with a slight decline, with the debt structure within a reasonable range. The assets and 
liabilities of enterprises invested by state -owned enterprises shall not be included in the statistics of 
Chinese government depa rtments.  
 
1.2.4 Structural measures  
Page 22, Paragraph 1.31.  Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI ), launched in 2013, the Chinese 
Government seeks to connect nearly 140 countries and regions through rail lines, pipelines, 
highways, ports, and other infrastructure. As of March 2021, total expenditures under the BRI 
amounted to USD 640 billion. Accordin g an OECD study, infrastructure projects of the BRI may have 
an impact on the debt burden on recipient countries. A recent Center for Global Development report 
found that eight BRI recipient countries —Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan —are at a high risk of debt distress due to BRI loans. These 
countries will all face rising debt -to-GDP ratios beyond 50 %, with at least 40 % of external debt owed 
to China once BRI lending is complete. The IMF has scrutiniz ed multiple aspects of the BRI, 
repeatedly warning of unsustainable debt levels, predatory lending, and the lack of project 
transparency.  
What steps is China taking to ensure that BRI projects uphold internationally accepted best practices 
in infrastructu re development and internationally based standards and financing so as not to cripple 
countries with unsustainable debt problems and the inability to finance maintenance and repair of 
infrastructure provided?  
 
Reply : This year marks the eighth anniversary of the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative. Over 
the last eight years, China has signed more than 200 Belt and Road cooperation agreements 
with over 100 countries and dozens of international organizations. Against the backdrop of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, Belt and Road cooperation has bucked the trend and demonstrated strong 
resilience to risk, playing a vital role in supporting countries around the world in battling the 
pandemic, maintaining economic stability and ensuring people ' s livelihoo ds. China always gives 
prominence to debt management and is committed to building a long -term, stable and sustainable 
financing system that is well -placed to manage risks. It also works to help the relevant countries 
strengthen their debt sustainability an d improve their ability to prevent sovereign risk. The Guiding 
Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road Initiative were jointly ratified by 
28 countries including China. Due to the impact of the pandemic and the resultant global recessi on, 
some developing countries are indeed struggling with heavy debt burdens. In view of this, China has 
canceled the debt of relevant African countries in the form of interest -free government loans due to 
mature by the end of 2020. In terms of the debt str ucture of debtor nations, most of the debts are 
owed to multilateral financial institutions and commercial creditors of developed countries, which 
should also play a part in relevant debt relief initiatives.  
 
In terms of investment and financing for specific projects, China always adheres to the principle of 
economic benefit and provides loans according to the actual conditions of the project countries to 
avoid new debt risks and financial burdens for the proje ct countries. Before providing funds for 
projects under the "Belt and Road Initiative ", Chinese banks will make strict calculations on the debt 
and solvency of borrowers, and continue to track and monitor relevant country and sovereign risks 
after lending.  Institutions including SINOSURE have also established relevant assessment, 
monitoring and management systems.  
 
• The BRI is allegedly plagued by an overall lack of transparency in publishing project details, 
selection criteria, financing terms and other rel ated information. What steps is China taking to 
improve data sharing and increase transparency?  
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  Reply: The "BRI" cooperation covers broad areas. The vast majority of the projects are obtained by 
enterprises through market competition. It is the project o wner or host government rather than the 
Chinese Government that determine how to operate and how to disclose project information.  
 
• To date, BRI projects have been dominated by China 's state -owned enterprises. Is China willing 
to promote greater inclusivity in BRI projects? If so, what steps has China taken to do so?  
 
Reply: China supports and guides market entities including private enterprises to contribute to the 
"BRI". In fact, pr ivate enterprises are also important forces participating in the "BRI". We have 
strengthened policy support, guidance and training for private enterprises in "going global ", guided 
them to focus on risk prevention, and urged them to operate in good faith, abide by local laws and 
regulations, and follow universally accepted international rules and standards. In the next step, 
China will continue to support and guide private enterprises to improve their operation level for 
"going global ", and participate in h igh-quality development of the "BRI". 
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.1 General Framework  
Page 31, Paragraph 2.1 footnote 4: Are there any plans to establish additional intellectual 
property courts beyond those in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Haikou?  
 
Reply: Intellectual property courts have been established in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Hainan Free Trade Port accord ing to the decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People 's 
Congress. Whether other intellectual property courts will be established or not is subject to the 
decision of the Standing Committee of the National People 's Congress.  
 
2.2 Trade Polic y Framework and Objectives  
2.2.2 Trade Policy Formulation and Objectives  
Page 33, Paragraph 2.14 – 2.17: The Secretariat Report states that China has updated and 
revised several of its measures at the national and regional levels. Can China confirm whether any 
measures related to the following initiatives were included in its most recent subsidy notification 
under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures or will be included in 
China 's next subsidy notification?  
 
• Belt and Road Initiative (BRI);  
• The State Council 's 2019 Guiding Opinions on Promoting High -quality Trade Development;  
• The Pilot Free Trade Zones program; and  
• The 2020 edition of the Catalogue of Encouraged Industries for Foreign Investment.  
 
Reply: China notified the WTO in strict accordance with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. If the subsidy policies involved in the implementation of the 
above -mentioned documents fall within the scope of notification, China will notify about them.  
 
Page 33, Paragraphs 2.16 and 2.17 : The Secretariat Report states that, since 2003, China has 
used Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) as a testing ground for nationwide investment liberalization and 
streamlined regulations of all types. As o f 2020, China had 21 PFTZs in place. Recognizing that, 
in June 2018, China issued the first version of a standalone Foreign Investment Negative List (the 
"Special Administrative Measures on Access to Foreign Investment ") and has revised it each year 
since then, how long of a pilot is China conducting via its PFTZs? Why does China continue to 
maintain and expand the number of PFTZs? If the PFTZs are meant to be "pilots, " does that mean 
that the investment rights under the PFTZs are not permanent and may, at some point, be 
consolidated into the Foreign Investment Negative List to apply on a national basis?  
 
Reply: Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) are test fields for China 's independent reform and opening -
up. The core task is institutional innovation. China will take the lead in promoting deeper reform and 
higher -level opening -up, and apply experience to a wider range, so as to explore ways to 
and accumulate experience for comprehensively deepening reform and opening up. 
Chinese  President Xi Jinping stressed that China will never stop its reform and opening -up. China 
will give full play to the leading role of PFTZs and promote the building of a new higher -level system 
of an open economy.  
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  2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
• Page 34, Paragraph 2.2 2: The Secretariat Report indicates that China 's domestic support 
notification remains outstanding. Please explain China 's policy on filing the required updated 
information on its domestic support programs.  
 
Reply: China will submit a notification on domestic support for agriculture as soon as possible.  
 
2.3.2 Regional and preferential agreements  
Page 35, Paragraph 2.31:  The Secretariat Report lists several Free Trade Agreements that China 
is in the process of negotiating. Since the publication of the report, it appears that China has made 
application to accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP) and could also be engaging with Uruguay on Free Trade Agreement conversations. Please 
provide updated information on these two initiatives.  
 
Reply: At the APEC Economic Leaders ' Meeting on 20 November 2020, Chinese President Xi Jin ping 
stated China will favorably consider joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). According to relevant provisions of the CPTPP, China has had 
informal contact with existing members and conducted a full, c omprehensive and in -depth study and 
assessment of the content of the CPTPP. On this basis and in accordance with relevant procedures 
and steps, on 16 September, China 's Commerce Minister submitted the application in written letter 
to Minister for Trade and  Export Growth of New Zealand, which is the depositary for the CPTPP, to 
formally apply for China 's accession to the CPTPP.  
 
2.3.3 Other agreements and arrangements  
• Page 36, Paragraph 2.34:  The Secretariat Report notes that China provides trade preferences 
to Least Developed Countries. Document G/RO/W/163/Rev.8 notes that China has not submitted 
reports on the covered imports from LDCs for nine years since 2010. What is China 's policy on 
submitting the missing reports?  
 
Reply: China has submitted relevant notification.  
 
2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory framework and market access  
Page 36, Paragraph 2.35 : The Secretariat Report discusses various aspects of China 's Foreign 
Investment Law (FIL). It notes that the FIL and its implementing regulations entered into force 
January 1, 2020. Does China believe that any further implementing regulations for the FIL are 
necessary? Please explain.  
 
Reply: The Foreign Investment Law and  its implementing regulations came into force on 
1 January  2020. At present, China has no plan to formulate other supporting implementing 
regulations for the FIL.  
 
Page 36, Paragraph 2.36 : Article 28 of the Foreign Investment Law states that, for industries not 
included in the Foreign Investment Negative List, the investment administration "shall be conducted 
on the principle of equal treatment to domestic and foreign investment. " Can Chin a clarify what it 
means by "the principle " of equal treatment? Does it provide equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
investment in all cases?  
 
Reply: For industries not included in the Foreign Investment Negative List, China accords the 
treatment to for eign investors and their investments no less favorable to that accorded to domestic 
investors and their investments. The state conducts a security review of foreign investment that 
impacts or may impact national security. Where the state has issued any oth er provisions on foreign 
investors ' investment in the banking, securities, insurance, and other financial industries or the 
securities, foreign exchange, and other financial markets within China, such provisions shall prevail.  
 
Page 36, Paragraph 2.38 : The  Secretariat Report states that China 's Foreign Investment Law, 
which entered into force in January 2020, accords foreign -invested companies "equal treatment " 
regarding, inter alia, participation in government procurement. Can China clarify how it is 
implementing this aspect of the Law in practice? That is, do foreign -invested companies in China WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  have the same rights as domestic companies in China in all instanc es in which the 
Chinese  Government or a Chinese state -owned enterprise is procuring goods or services?  
 
Reply: China 's Foreign Investment Law stipulates that the state ensures that foreign -invested 
enterprises have equal access to government procurement through fair competition in accordance 
with the law. Products and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises within the territory of 
China are equally treated in government procurement in accordance with law. The 
Chinese  Government imple ments relevant measures in government procurement in accordance with 
the provisions.  
 
Page 37, Paragraph 2.45, and Page 38, Chart 2.1 : In this section of the Report, the Secretariat 
discusses developments regarding China 's Foreign Investment Negative List. Over the past 
three  years, China has removed some restrictions from its Foreign Investment Negative List. 
However, unfortunately this element of the Report does not make clear that China does continue to 
prohibit or restrict foreign investme nt in several key sectors, including Internet and related services, 
cloud computing services, express delivery services, higher education services, news publishing 
services, film production, film distribution, medical institutions, legal services, market r esearch firms 
and certain agriculture sector investment. For each of the identified sectors, can China explain 
(1) why it continues to maintain investment restrictions and (2) its policy on removing the remaining 
investment restrictions?  
 
Reply: According  to the Provisions on Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment (State Council 
Decree  No. 346), foreign invested projects under any of the following circumstances shall be listed 
as prohibited ones: 1) projects endangering State security or damaging social a nd public interests; 
2) projects causing pollution or damage to environment, jeopardizing natural resources or impairing 
health of human body; 3) projects unfavorable to the protection and development of land resources 
as a result of occupation of large am ount of arable lands; 4) projects endangering the safety of 
military installation or the work efficacy thereof; 5) projects involving the making of products by 
utilizing the unique craftsmanship or technology of our country; or 6) other circumstances provi ded 
for in laws and administrative regulations. Foreign invested projects under one of the following 
circumstances shall be listed as restricted ones: 1) projects with backward teleology; 2) projects 
without any benefit to the conservation of resources and  the improvement of eco -environment; 
3) projects involving the exploration and exploitation of any special mineral resource the exploitation 
of which shall, as provided for by the State, be carried out in a protective way; 4) projects involving 
the industr y that is being opened up by the State step by step; or 5) other circumstances provided 
for in laws and administrative regulations.  
 
2.4.3 Incentives to Foreign Direct Investments  
Page 44, Paragraphs 2.66 and 2.67: The Secretariat Report states that Chin a has updated and 
revised several of its measures at the national and regional levels. For the following measures, can 
China confirm that these measures will be included in its subsidy notification under Article 25 of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Counter vailing Measures? In addition, if the following measures were 
included in China 's recent subsidy notification (G/SCM/N/372/CHN ), please identify the notified 
subsidy programs under which they fall.  
• Notice of the Ministry of Finance, the General Administration of Customs and State 
Taxation  Administration on Import Tax Policies that Support Sci -Tech Innovation during the 
13th Five -Year Plan Period (Cai Guan Shui No. 70, 2016);  
• Announcement on Continuing Corporate Income Tax Policies for Large -scale Development in 
the Western Region (MOF Announcement No. 23, 2020);  
• Notice on Preferential Corporate Income Tax Policies for the Haina n Free Trade Port (Cai  Shui 
[2020] No. 31);  
• Notice on Individual Income Tax Policies for High -end Talents in Short Supply in Hainan Free 
Trade Port (Cai Shui No. 32, 2020); and the  
• Notice on Individual Income Tax Incentives for Guangdong -Hong Kong, China -Macao, China 
Greater Bay Area (Cai Shui No. 31, 2019).  
 
Reply: Please see Item 2 of G/SCM/N/372/CHN for preferential tax policies for Large -scale 
Development in the Western Region. Individual income tax policies for the Hainan Free Trade Port 
and China G reater Bay Area are not subsidies that need to be notified. Corporate income tax policies 
for the Hainan Free Trade Port are temporary measures.  
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  Page 44, Paragraph 2.66:  Please identify the types of domestic equipment that are entitled to a 
VAT refund? Is this VAT refund also available to imported equipment?  
 
Reply: In order to encourage scientific research and technological development and promote 
scientific and technol ogical progress, China has fully refunded VAT for purchasing domestic 
equipment to eligible domestic R&D institutions and foreign -invested R&D centers. The equipment 
refers to experimental equipment, devices and instruments that provide necessary condition s for 
scientific research, teaching and scientific and technological development.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
Page 46 -47, Paragraph 3.8 : The Secretariat Report states that "[d]uring the review period, the 
GACC  issued various administrative measures for the inspection and/or quarantine of specific 
goods. " With regard to Decree 248 and Decree 249, which the General Administration of Customs 
of China issued in 2021, various WTO Members have expressed concern about  China 's failure to 
adhere to its WTO transparency obligations, the scope of impacted commodities and the Decrees ' 
requirements, which are neither clear nor well understood. In addition, the Decrees appear to 
propose onerous and redundant requirements that  are already met by existing measures, and they 
do not clearly state what food safety risks have necessitated their issuance. Given the scope of 
impact of Decrees 248 and 249, what is China 's view on delaying implementation of these Decrees 
until 2023 and immediately begin implementing its WTO transparency obligations?  
 
Reply: In accordance with laws and administrative regulations, such as, the Food Safety Law of the 
People 's Republic of China and the Regulation on the Implementation of the Food Safety Law  of the 
People 's Republic of China, China has organized the revision of regulations on the administration of 
safety of imported and exported food and the administration of registration of overseas imported 
food production enterprises. The Measures of the P eople 's Republic of China for the Administration 
of Safety of Imported and Exported Food (General Administration of Customs No.249) and the 
Provisions of the People 's Republic of China on the Administration of Registration of Overseas 
Imported Food Product ion Enterprises (General Administration of Customs No. 248) promulgated on 
12 April 2021 will come into force on 1 January 2022. Before the promulgation, China notified the 
WTO in accordance with the relevant rules, accepted comments of WTO members and ado pted 
reasonable opinions and suggestions, so it conform to relevant WTO rules. General Administration 
of Customs No. 248 and No.249 have been published on the official website of General 
Administration of Customs. Enquiries are welcome. Where an overseas i mported food production 
enterprise undergoes any change in its registration information during the validity period of 
registration, it shall handle procedures according to Article 19 of General Administration of 
Customs  No. 248.  
 
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.1 Import prohibitions  
Page 60, Paragraph 3.46:  The Secretariat Report states that, with regard to China 's regulation of 
"solid waste products, " several WTO members have urged China to "ensure t ransparency by 
notifying measures, both introduced and planned, and to consider less trade -restrictive measures. "  
• What is China 's policy on notifying to the WTO its requirements for import, including relevant 
contamination requirements, that it has implem ented for the importation of recycled raw 
materials?  
• Also, what is the relationship between these policies and China 's pro -circular economy 
narrative, given that China appears to include recyclable materials within the scope of "solid 
waste, " which is banned for importation?  
 
Reply  to two questions above: China 's measures on importation of solid wastes strictly comply 
with the formulation procedures of its laws and regulations, and China takes into full consideration 
the voices of all parties, adopts transitional policy arrangements, notifies the WTO in advance, and 
strictly follows international rules. For example, the notification of the first Catalogue of Solid Wastes 
Prohibited from Importation at the end of 2017 was nearly six months ahead of its implementation, 
and the Catalogue of Solid Wastes Prohibited from Importation at the end of 2018 and 2019 were 
released ei ght months and 20 months ahead of schedule respectively, leaving sufficient and 
reasonable transition period for relevant industries and enterprises to make adjustments.  
The definition of scrap and waste varies from country to country, and there is no unif ied 
understanding and standard internationally. The definition of solid waste in China follows the Law of WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  the People 's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid 
Waste, and is basically consistent with the internati onal legal meaning of waste in the Basel 
Convention. Wastes that can be used as raw material also fall under solid wastes. According to the 
Law of the People 's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by 
Solid Waste, China  prohibits the importation of solid wastes, but allows the importation of recycled 
raw materials that meet product quality standards, which ensures environmental protection in the 
process of developing a circular economy and promotes the recycling of domes tic and international 
resources, is highly consistent with the relevant requirements of the Circular Economy Promotion 
Law of the People 's Republic of China and the concept of vigorously promoting circular economy 
around the world, and will strongly promot e the healthy development of circular economy in China 
and the world.  
 
On the contrary, the United States has been exporting heavily polluted solid wastes to developing 
countries lacking technological capacity in the name of "recyclable materials " and "circular economy " 
for a long time, which is inconsistent with the goal of circular economy development and the 
requirements of sustainable development. China hopes that WTO members can actively fulfill their 
responsibilities in the international community and make due contributions to global environmental 
protection.  
China has s ubmitted its latest notification on quantitative restrictions to the WTO.  
 
3.1.5.2 Import licensing requirements  
3.1.5.2.1, Automatic Import Licensing Requirements  
• Page 61, Paragraph 3.48: Footnotes 62 and 63 indicate that some medical equipment is newly 
subject to import licensing and that other medical equipment is now exempt from licensing 
requirements. Where does China maintain a list of the medical equipment that is subject to 
import li censing?  
 
Reply : According to the Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China and Regulation of the 
People 's Republic of China on the Administration of the Import and Export of Goods and other 
relevant regulations, China implements automatic import licensing management for some 
mechanical and electrical products such as medical equipment. The Ministry of Commerce, together 
with the General Administration of Customs and other departments, shall formulate, adjust and 
publish the catalo gue of mechanical and electrical products subject to automatic import licensing. At 
present, the latest edition of the catalogue is Catalogue of Goods Subject to Automatic Import 
Licensing (2021) (Announcement No. 67 [2020] of the Ministry of Commerce and the General 
Administration of Custom s), which can be found in the Government Information Disclosure column 
on the website of the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures  
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping measures  
Page 62, Para graph 3.53: The Secretariat Report states that, in 2018, China amended three trade 
remedy measures, i.e., the Rules on Interim Review of Dumping and Dumping Margins, the Rules 
on Questionnaires in Anti -Dumping Investigations, and the Rules for Hearing of A nti-Dumping and 
Anti-Subsidy Investigations. Three years later, China has still not notified these measures to the 
WTO. The Secretariat Report states that China is preparing to notify these measures to the WTO. 
Please clarify when China intends to notify t hese measures to the WTO.  
 
Reply: The notification is under preparation  and will be submitted as soon as possible.  
 
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.2 Taxes, charges, and levies  
Page 68, Paragraph 3.78 and Table 3.11:  The Secretariat Report states that China continues to 
apply export duties on a wide range of products. It explains that, as of January 2021, "102 tariff 
lines (at the 8 -digit level) were subject to statutory export duties, unchanged since 2015, while 
75 tariff lines carried interim duties, down from 180 in 2017. " Although the Secretariat Report does 
not discuss the panel and Appellate Body findings on China 's export duties in DS394, DS395, DS398, 
DS431, DS432 and DS433, the United States notes that two panels and the Appellate Body found 
that paragraph 11.3 of part I of China 's WTO Protocol of Accession commits China to eliminate all 
export duties unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of the Protocol or applied in conformity with 
the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 and, further, that Article XX of the GATT 1994 is not WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  available to justify a violation of this commitment.  What is China 's policy on eliminating these export 
duties?  
 
Reply : According to Annex 6 of the Protocol on China 's Accession to WTO, China can retain export 
tax on a small number of products, while other products shall not be subject to export tax. At present, 
the products subject to export tariffs are all in line with China 's WTO accession commitments, and 
the export tar iff rate shall not exceed the upper limit of China 's WTO commitments.  
 
3.2.4 Export support and promotion  
Page 72, Paragraph 3.101:  The Secretariat Report explains that in China the value -added tax 
(VAT) may be rebated on exports, but exporters are generally entitled to VAT rebates lower than 
the VAT paid. It states that "four refund rates are in force: 13%, 9%, 6%, and 0%, with the 
proportion of tariff lines subject to each rebate rate being 61.2%, 18.9%, 0.1%, and 19.6%. " In 
connection with the 2012 Trade Policy Review of China, the Secretariat Report noted (in 
paragraph  143 of Part III) that "[t]he difference between the two rates c onstitutes a levy on exports, 
which may in turn constitute assistance to downstream processing of the products affected, and 
could affect China 's terms of trade. " It added that "China adjusts VAT rebate rates as part of its 
industrial policies, to control,  restrict, or otherwise 'manage ' the export of certain products. "  
• What is China 's view on the proposition that moving to a trade -neutral VAT system, in which 
input VAT is rebated in full for all exports, would allow the market, rather than the Chinese 
state, to play a decisive role in the allocation of resources? If not, please explai n.  
• Is China studying the possibility of adopting a VAT rebate policy pursuant to which the input 
VAT is automatically rebated in full for all exports, consistent with the policies prevailing in 
other WTO Members with a VAT system and how long would it tak e China to adopt and 
implement such a policy. Please explain.  
 
Reply  to questions above : it is clearly stated in paragraph 3.98 that "after the issuance by the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the State Taxation Administration of the Announcement on Increasing 
the Export Tax Refund Rate of Some Products in 2020, the VAT rebate rate of all products, except 
for the high -pollution, high -energy consuming, and resource -based products, became equal to the 
applied rate . 
 
3.2.5 Export finance, insurance, and guarantees  
Page 73, Paragraph 3.108:  The Secretariat Report states that "the bulk of export finance is 
provided by the China Export -Import Bank … and the state -owned China Export & Credit Insurance 
Corporation (SINOSURE). " On its website, China Development Bank, under international business 
products, lists a buyer 's credit as one of its product offerings. This product appears to be a loan 
provided to foreign importers or government agencies or banks of the importing country  that can 
only be used to purchase Chinese equipment and should be linked to a specific export -related 
project. The loan requires SINOSURE credit insurance and Chinese content of at least 50 %. Can 
China provide information on the financial terms and condi tions of the buyer 's credit program offered 
by China Development Bank?  
 
Reply : The buyer 's credit project contract of China Development Bank (CDB) is generally formulated 
based on a formatted text of the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) and co mpliant with 
loan market practices in the Asia Pacific region. For each project, CDB needs to conform to 
confidentiality clauses and requirements related to financing documents signed with the customer 
and shall not provide the financing documents to the o utside.  
 
Page 73, Paragraph 3.108:  Did the COVID -19 pandemic affect how China Eximbank and 
SINOSURE calculate risk in emerging markets? Please explain.  
 
Reply : The COVID -19 pandemic has brought about significant brunt to the countries around the 
world, and questions like conspicuous disparity in the pace of economic recovery, uneven vaccine 
distribution and unbalanced and insufficient development among different countries are still 
prominent. Judging from the relevant objective data of socio -economic development, we find the 
pandemic has caused different negative impacts on risks of different countries in the world (including 
those emerging market countries), but it is by far difficult to make a precise quantitative calculation.  
 
Page 73, Paragraph 3.110:  According to the Secretariat Report, China Eximbank offers 
"concessional loans … to developing countries at rates lower than market interest rates and are WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  usuall y tied to Chinese exports. " The United States notes that, in China 's questionnaire on export 
competition, it replied that Eximbank provides export financing for agricultural products.  
• Does China Eximbank  offer concessional loans to developing countries at rates lower than 
market rates for the export of agricultural products. If so, please provide a detailed 
description of the concessional loan program(s), and maximum repayment terms.  
 
Reply: The Export -Import Bank of China provides domestic working capital loans and export order 
financing for Chinese agricultural product exporters. According to The Ministerial Decisions on Export 
Competitions reached by the WTO members at the Tenth Session of the Minister ial-level Meeting on 
December 19, 2015, the export credit for agricultural products does not include the agricultural 
product working capital loans offered to the exporters. Therefore, the working capital loan associated 
with agricultural products provided  by the Export -Import Bank of China to exporters does not belong 
to the export credits for agricultural products; As for the agricultural export order financing provided 
in 2019 and 2020, the WTO agricultural export competition questionnaire has been compl eted as 
required.  
 
• Please explain if interest rates or premiums charged on concessional loans are risk -based, 
and whether the rates or premiums differ by country and/or by overseas borrowers.  
 
Reply: The loan interest rate of concessional loans will be based on a variety of  relevant factors, 
such as the country risk of the borrower.  
 
• Page 73, Paragraph 3.110:  How does China Eximbank decide when to use the concessional 
loan or preferential exports buyer 's credit versus its standard export credit products?  
 
Reply: The borrower, not the lender, has the right to choose which loan product to use. The borrower 
applies for a loan within the business scope of the Export -Import Bank of China based on its own 
situation, as well as the nature and characteristics of the project.   
 
• Page 73, Paragraph 3.110:  What are the longest repayment terms offered with China 
Eximbank 's seller 's credit support?  
 
Reply: The Export -Import Bank of China will determine the credit rep ayment term of the export 
seller in line with the borrower 's ability in operation and management, the borrower 's credit status, 
capital turnover, project operation, etc.  
 
• Page 74, Paragraph 3.111:  What are China Eximbank 's terms and conditions for the 
concessional loans, the preferential export buyer 's credits, and the standard export credits?  
 
Reply: The loan conditions will be determined for specific projects based on the market benchmark: 
on the basis of actuarial cost and risk quantification, with the goal of sustainable operation and be 
in line with the market rate of interest, overall considering the comprehensive contribution of 
customers and various costs such as capital, risk, tax and management expenses, predictin g the 
trend of the interest rate, and determine according to market competition and the principle of risk -
return matching.  
 
Page 73, Paragraph 3.113: The United States notes that, in China 's export competition 
questionnaire response, it indicates that SINOSURE also provides export financing for agricultural 
products.  
• Please explain if SINOSURE issues short -term credits for the export of agricultural products at 
market rates.  
 
Reply : SINOSURE  does not provide direct lending or credits. SINOSURE supports the Chinese 
agricultural exports through its short -term export credit insurance and premiums are collected on 
normal commercial conditions.  
• Also, please describe if rates or premiums charged ar e risk -based and whether the rates or 
premiums are by country and/or by overseas borrowers.  
 
Reply : The premium rate is determined according to the applicable country risk classification, the 
credit period, the credit rating of the borrower or the obligor , the country risk mitigation technique 
applied, buyer risk credit enhancements and other applicable factors.  
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  3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1 Incentives  
Page 77, Paragraph 3.124: With regard to China 's so-called "government guidance funds, " the 
Secretariat Report notes that the Secretariat was "unable to get clarity on what these funds are " 
from the Government of China. Why does China believe that these funds are not relevant to its Trade 
Policy Review?  
 
Reply: The funds set  up by China under market -oriented principles operate completely in accordance 
with the market principles as a completely independent market entity. China has not provided 
subsidies to any industry through the funds.  
 
Page 77, Paragraph 3.124: With regard to China 's subsidies notification, t he Secretariat Report 
states that China did not notify numerous "government guidance funds, " which provide financing to 
industries such as advanced manufacturing, new materials, and other innovative industries. Th e 
Secretariat Report also notes that was "unable to get clarity on what these funds are " from the 
Government of China.  Please provide additional information on each of the government guidance 
funds listed in Table 3.15, including:  
• What is the structure an d purpose of the fund?  
• What forms of assistance are granted under the fund, including whether the fund provides export 
support or promotion?  
• Please explain why China asserts that the financial support provided through the fund does not 
constitute subsidi es and therefore is not subject to the WTO 's notification requirement.  
 
Reply: The investment management and decision -making of government guidance funds are 
completely based on market principles, and government departments do not intervene or participate  
in the decision -making of any investment projects of the fund. The fund is established in accordance 
with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws, and its fund governance 
structure is also determined on the basis of such laws for market -based operation. China has not 
provided subsidies to any industry through the fund.  
 
Page 77,  Paragraph 3.124: With regard to China 's government guidance funds, the 
Secretariat  Report notes that China "uses public resources to make equity invest ments in industries 
that the Government considers important. "  
• How does the Government of China make these investment decisions? What factors does the 
Government consider?  
• How does China ensure that these investment decisions are consistent with the inves tment 
decisions of a private investor?  
 
Reply: The investment management and decision -making of government guidance funds are 
completely based on market principles, and government departments do not intervene or participate 
in the decision -making of any investment projects of the fund. The fund is established in accordance 
with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws, and its fund governance 
structure is also determined on the basis of such laws for market -based operation. China has not 
provided subsidies to any industry through the fund.  
 
Page 77, Paragraph 3.124: With regard to China 's government guidance funds, the 
Secretariat  Report notes that "these funds were in part privately funded. " For each of the 
government guidance funds listed in Table 3.15, please identify what part or percentage of the fund 
is privately funded versus government funded.  
 
Reply: The investment management and decision -making of government guidance funds are 
completely based on market principles, and government departments do not intervene or participate 
in the decision -making of any investment projects of the fund. The fund is established in accordance 
with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws, and it s fund governance 
structure is also determined on the basis of such laws for market -based operation. China has not 
provided subsidies to any industry through the fund.  
 
Page 78, Paragraph 3.125:  In addition to the government guidance funds referenced above , the 
Secretariat Report notes the existence of several policy -related funds targeting, for example, Made 
in China 2025 industries and the integrated circuit industry, among others.  Please provide additional 
information on each of the policy -related funds listed in Table 3.16, including:  
• What is the structure and purpose of the fund?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  • What forms of assistance are granted under the fund, including whether the fund provides export 
support or promotion?  
• Please explain why China asserts that the financial sup port provided through the fund does not 
constitute subsidies and therefore is not subject to the WTO 's notification requirement.   
 
Reply: The investment management and decision -making of government guidance funds are 
completely based on market principles, and government departments do not intervene or participate 
in the decision -making of any investment projects of the fund. The fund is established in accordance 
with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws, and its fund governance 
structure is also determined on the basis of such laws for market -based operation. China has not 
provided subsidies to any industry through the fund.  
 
Page 78, Paragraph 3.126:  The Secretariat Report cites an OECD study showing significant below 
market borrowing by Chinese semiconductor firms. China indicates that "the conclusions of the study 
are not credible as they are based on estimated data. " Using non -estimated data, what should be 
the findings with respect to borrowing by Chinese semiconductor firms?  
 
Reply: Commercial banks independently select customer groups and issue credits and loans 
according to their own strategic planning, development orientation, risk preference,  operation and 
management capabilities. The relevant decisions of commercial banks are market -based choices and 
behaviors in light of their own development situations . China 's subsidy policies for the semiconductor 
industry have been notified in accordance  with WTO regulations. The OECD report focuses on the 
global IC industry chain, suggesting that member countries jointly study the development law of the 
IC industry and promote the healthy development of the global IC industry. China has no targeted 
resea rch report or conclusion yet.  
 
Page 79, Paragraph 3.132:  The Secretariat Report notes that "the authorities indicate that a new 
fisheries policy would be issued soon. " What does China mean when it says that the report will be 
issued "soon? " What factors are being considered in formulating this policy? Is reducing capacity 
enhancing support being considered as part of the policy?  
 
Reply: In May 2021, the Ministry of Fin ance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued 
the Notice on Implementing Fishery Development Support Policies to Promote High -quality Fishery 
Development (Cai Nong [2021] No.41), proposing to build a fishery development support policy 
system in the new era coordinated with fishery resources conservation and industrial structure 
adjustment. The main adjustment of subsidy expense is to cancel direct cost subsidy, change the 
direction of subsidy, guide fishermen to conserve fishery resources, a nd emphasize more on green 
development, people 's livelihood and resource conservation. Specifically, since 2021, the fuel 
subsidy, which is a direct cost subsidy for fishery production, shall be completely abolished. China 
is supporting the ban on harmful fishery subsidies that contribute to excess capacity and overfishing 
with practical actions.  
 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
3.3.2.1 Overview  
• Page 79, Paragraph 3.133: The Secretariat Report explains that, since its previous Trade 
Policy Review, China has introduced or revised various laws and regulations related to standards 
and other technical requirements. Among others, this includes the issuance on 29 April 2020 of 
the Measures for the Environmental Management Registration of Ne w Chemical Substances by 
the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) (Order No. 12), which entered into force on 
1 January 2021. Could China please clarify its review timelines for new chemical submissions 
under MEE Order No. 12?  
 
Reply : According to th e Measures for the Environmental Management Registration of New Chemical 
Substances (Order 12 of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment), the state implements the 
environmental management registration system for new chemical substances. The "new chemical 
substances " referred to in these Measures refer to the chemical substances that are not listed in the 
Inventory of Existing Chemical Substances in China. China has fulfilled its obligation of transparency 
in accordance with the requirements of the WTO. In September 2 019, China notified the WTO of the 
Measures for the Environmental Management Registration of New Chemical Substances. In 
September 2020, China notified the WTO of the Guidelines for the Environmental Management 
Registration of New Chemical Substances.  
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  Page 79, Paragraph 3.133:  The United States and other WTO Members continue to have 
significant concerns because the only means that China 's National Medical Products Administration 
(NMPA) provides for cosmetics importers to establish conformity with good man ufacturing practices 
via the new Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation (CSAR) (G/TBT/N/CHN/1310), 
which entered into force on May 1, 2021, involves animal testing if the government of the exporter 
does not issue good manufacturing practices ( GMP) export certificates.   
• Will China consider alternative means for cosmetics importers to meet NMPA 's requirements for 
government -issued GMP export certificates such as statements of conformity from industry 
organizations or third -party programs under th e ISO/IEC 17065 Conformity Assessment 
Standard that align with the ISO 's GMP standard for cosmetics?  
• Will China ensure that NMPA, the State Administration for Market Regulation and the China 
National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment are tra nsparent and report publicly 
which GMP certificates or production licenses they are accepting as demonstrating conformity?  
 
Reply: Yes, China ensures that China National Accreditation S ervice for Conformity Assessment 
(CNAS) is transparent. In accordance with the requirements of relevant Chinese laws and regulations 
and national standards, relevant international standards and rules of IAF, ILAC and APAC, CNAS 
publishes the policies, procedures and rules on which its operation is based, publishes its 
accreditation results, and invites accredited stakeholders to fully participate in the decision -making 
and management process of CNAS. CNAS is regularly inspected by relevant Chinese authorities, and  
is regularly peer -reviewed by APAC, so as to ensure that the transparency of CNAS meets the 
requirements of relevant Chinese laws and regulations, national standards, relevant international 
standards and relevant rules of IAF, ILAC and APAC.  
 
The Regulati ons on the Administration of Cosmetic Registration and Filing Materials (No.32, 2021) 
issued by Na tional Medical Products  Administration puts forward completely consistent requirements 
on the setting of animal experiment alternatives for safety evaluation of imported and domestic 
cosmetics. Based on the principle of ensuring the quality and safety of product production and WTO 
non-discrimination, in terms of toxicology test project requirements and exemption conditions, 
domestic and imported ordinary cosmet ics manufacturers who have obtained the relevant 
qualification certification of production quality management system issued by the competent 
government department of the host country (region) and the product safety risk assessment results 
can fully confirm  the product safety may be exempted from submitting the toxicology test report of 
the product.  
 
Page 81, Paragraph 3.143 : The Secretariat Report states that China requires that mandatory 
standards undergo public review at the technical examination stage pr ior to being notified to the 
WTO.  However, the United States notes that WTO Members are obliged to notify comments at an 
early stage, and the United States is concerned that China 's measures are only notified to the WTO 
at a stage when major revisions can no longer be made.  Please explain if Chinese authorities ' current 
regulatory procedures preclude them from notifying measures to the WTO at an earlier stage.  If so, 
how can China let Members know when measures are undergoing public review?  
 
Reply : Article 25 of Measures for the Administration of Mandatory National Standards stipulates that 
mandatory national standards that do not adopt international standards or are inconsistent with the 
technical requirements for relevant international standards, a nd that have a major impact on the 
trade of any other member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), shall be notified according to 
the requirements of the WTO.  It is required that in the process of soliciting opinions in standard 
formulation, the standard draft for soliciting public comments domestically shall be notified 
externally. This practice can effectively shorten the revision cycle, organize the drafting departments 
to effectively study and deal with the notification opinions, and meet the TBT requi rements of early 
notification. In addition, Article 26 of the Measures for the Administration of Compulsory National 
Standards stipulates that in the event of major changes in relevant technical requirements for 
mandatory national standards under developme nt, public comments shall be solicited again; if a 
public notification is required, a notification shall be made again . 
 
• Page 81, Paragraph 3.143 : The Secretariat Report notes that China 's technical regulations 
sometimes refer to voluntary standards, rendering them mandatory.  Please confirm China 's 
policy on notifying these standards to the WTO.  
 
Reply: Technical regulations are mainly mandatory national standards in China. At present, the 
main situations in which mandatory national standar ds refer to voluntary national standards include: WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  first, the voluntary standards that provide basic categories such as terms, classifications and signs 
for mandatory standards; second, the voluntary testing standards that provide verification methods 
for m andatory standards. These voluntary standards shall still be implemented as voluntary clauses 
after being referred to.  
 
3.3.2.2 Product certification  
Page 82, Paragraph 3.148:  Will the China National Accreditation Service for Conformity 
Assessment consider accepting the results of conformity assessment procedures conducted by U.S. 
and international labs that are certified for Good Clinical Practices, per the International Counc il for 
Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use Guidelines or for Good 
Laboratory Practices?  
 
Page 83, Paragraph 3.151 : The Secretariat Report notes that random conformity sampling tests 
are conducted on imports that have already acquired a CCC mark.  
• Are domestic products listed in the CCC Catalogue also subject to random conformity sampling 
tests?  
• How does China ensure  that imports are not subject to a greater number of random conformity 
sampling tests compared to like domestic products?  
 
Reply to the above two questions: Medicinal Product Administration Law of the People 's Republic 
of China stipulates that "the drug supervision and administration department may conduct spot 
checks on the quality of drugs according to the needs of supervision and administration ". In practical 
work, the drug supervision and administration de partment formulates the corresponding drug quality 
spot check inspection plan and organizes implementation. The spot check inspection plan shall be 
formulated according to the needs of supervision and management, and there shall not be 
discriminatory treat ment because of whether the related products have obtained CCC certificates or 
whether they are imported products.  
 
3.3.2.3 Labelling and packaging  
Page 83, Paragraph 3.154:  The Secretariat Report details information from China 's Food Safety 
Law and other  laws regarding the labeling of pre -packaged foods.  
• How are these laws enforced?  
• Please describe any measures taken by China to ensure China 's labeling requirements are 
consistent with the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements and, as appropriate, are harmonized with 
relevant international standards.  
 
Reply: The market supervision department implements "indiscriminate " supervision on imported 
food and do mestic food sold in the market in accordance with relevant laws and regulations such as 
the Food Safety Law and Regulations on the Implementation of Food Safety Law as well as national 
food safety standards, strictly abides by the bottom line of food safet y and maintains a fair market 
order.  
 
Page 83, Paragraph 3.156 : The United States continues to be concerned that new cosmetics 
labelling requirements introduced via the Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation and 
its implementing measures poten tially create unnecessary obstacles to trade.  
• Why is China requiring foreign labels on products to exactly match the required Chinese labelling, 
if the foreign language labelling does not conflict with the product safety and effectiveness 
information on the Chinese label?  
• Will China provide at least two years for imported, previously -registered cosmetics to comply 
with new labelling requirements, so as to allow companies to sell through inventory already in 
China?  
 
Reply to the above two questions: First, the correspondence between Chinese and Englis h labels. 
The Measures for the Administration of Cosmetic Labels (No.77, 2021) issued by National Medical 
Products Administration does not require that all contents of Chinese labels should be consistent 
with those of the original packaging labels, but onl y requires that the contents of product safety and 
efficacy claims should be consistent with those of the original labels. Second, the problem of product 
transition period. Under the condition of the actual situation of the industry fully considered and 
avoiding the waste of packaging consumables, a reasonable transition period has been set for the 
industry. A two -year transition period has been given to products registered or filed before 
1 May 2022. If labels are not marked according to the Measures, cosm etics registrants and filers WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  shall complete the update of product labels before 1 May 2023 to ensure that they meet the 
provisions and requirements of the Measures.  
 
• Page 84, Paragraph 3.157:  The Secretariat Report refers to the State Administration of Market 
Regulation 's draft Measures for Supervision and Administration of Food Labeling, published in 
2019. Please explain the status of the draft measure and how China will address concerns rais ed 
that it is trade distorting?  
 
Reply: The legislative process of the Measures for Supervision and Administration of Food Labeling 
will be accelerated after research and demonstration are conducted on some of its issues.  
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary  requirements  
3.3.3.2 SPS measures  
Page 86, Paragraph 3.166:  The United States notes that China has made significant progress in 
establishing numerous pesticide maximum residue limits in a short period time.  Currently, China 
does not have a formal registration process to establish import tolerances for pesticides t hat are not 
approved for use in China.  The United States understands regulations for establishing import 
tolerances are currently under consideration by China.  
• Has China announced the implementation of an import tolerance policy?  
• Will the measure undergo public review; If so, when?  
 
Reply: China never declares and will not formulate regulations for establishing import tolerances .  
 
Page 86, Paragraph 3.168:  The Secretariat Report lists emergency measures that China notified 
in 2020 that were purportedly issued and implemented as preventative measures to stop COVID -19 
transmission in cold -chain foods. However, these measures are not consistent with the guidance 
provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) such as FAO/WHO 's FAO -WHO interim guidance: "COVID -19 and Food Safety: 
Guidance for competent authorities responsible for national food saf ety control systems, " dated 
22 April 2020, or FAO 's "COVID -19: Guidance for preventing transmission of COVID -19 within food 
businesses, " dated 2 August 2021. According to this guidance, current data indicates that neither 
food nor food packaging is a pathway for the spread of viruses causing respiratory illnesses, including 
SARS -CoV-2. In other words, SARS -CoV-2 is not a direct food safety  concern.  Like the FAO and the 
WHO, the U.S. Food and Agriculture Organization advises that "[c]urrent data indicates that neither 
food nor food packaging is a pathway for the spread of viruses causing respiratory illnesses, including 
SARS -CoV-2. In other words, SARS -Cov-2 is not a direct food safety concern. "  
• In light of this guidance, please provide the science - and risk -based justification for restrictions 
on imported cold -chain foods related to COVID -19 prevention.  
• Does China disagree with the guidanc e provided by the FAO and the WHO and China 's trading 
partners.  
 
Reply: In order to effectively prevent Novel Coronavirus from being introduced through imported 
cold chain food, according to the joint prevention and control mechanism of the State Council,  the 
State Administration for Market Regulation has raised requirements for the producers and operators 
of imported cold chain food that they shall not process, produce or sell imported cold chain food 
without inspection and quarantine certificate, nucleic  acid test certificate, disinfection certificate and 
traceability information. For the same batch of products tested positive in nucleic acid test, measures 
such as taking them off the shelves and stopping selling, and sealing up in special areas shall be 
implemented. The above measures comply with Article 42, Paragraph 1, Article 44 and Article 55 of 
the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases, 
Article  42, Paragraph 1 and Article 92, Paragraph 2 of the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic 
of China and other relevant laws and regulations, and are administrative acts according to law. The 
State Administration for Market Regulation will always strictly follow the deployment of the joint 
prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, and implement the relevant work 
requirements for pandemic prevention and control from the cold chain food.  
 
3.3.3.4 Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)  
• Page 88, Paragraph 3.171: The Secretariat Report indicates th at, in 2018, China reportedly 
amended its regulations on safety assessment, import approval, and labelling of agricultural 
GMOs, including the procedures relating to the dossier submission process. What is China 's policy 
on notifying these amendments and a ny future amendments to its biosafety approval procedures 
to the WTO?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Reply: In 2018, China did not revise the relevant laws and regulations on the safety management 
of agricultural genetically modified organisms.  
 
3.3.4 Competition policy and price controls  
3.3.4.1 Competition policy  
3.3.4.1.1 Legislative and institutional framework  
Page 89, 3.3.4.1.1, paragraph 3.173:  Under the revised institutional framework for China 's 
competition regime, three anti -monopoly agencies were merged into a single agency, the State 
Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR).  The new framework also includes the Anti -Monopoly 
Committee (AM C), which is headed by a leader of the State Council.  
• How do the functions of the AMC differ from those of the Anti -Monopoly Bureau (AMB) under 
SAMR, and what is the justification for maintaining this supervisory institution?  Does the AMC 
have influence o ver the decision -making of the AMB?  Does the AMC need to give its approval to 
the AMB 's decisions and, if so, for which decisions?  
 
Reply: According to the provisions of Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China, the Anti -
Monopoly Committee of t he State Council shall be responsible for organizing, coordinating and 
guiding anti -monopoly work, and shall mainly perform the following duties: First, study and 
formulate relevant competition policies; Second, organize investigations and evaluate the ove rall 
market competition, and issue evaluation reports; Third, formulate and issue anti -monopoly 
guidelines; Fourth, coordinate the anti -monopoly administrative law enforcement work; Fifth, other 
duties stipulated by the State Council. According to Article 10 of Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's 
Republic of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation shall be responsible for anti -
monopoly law enforcement.  
 
3.3.4.1.3 Dominant market positions  
Page 91 -92, Paragraph 3.178: Article 16(5) of the Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of 
Dominant Market Positions prohibits dominant firms from refusing counterparts access to essential 
facilities without justified reasons.   
• Please provide details on cases based on or involving Article 16(5).  
• Have intellectual property rights been considered an essential facility for purposes of this 
provision either in specific cases or policies?  
• Have private actions been brought in the courts concerning access to ess ential facilities?  If so, 
please describe them.  
 
Reply to the above questions: So far, there has been no such case for State Administration for 
Market Regulation that applies to the provisions of Article 16, paragraph I (5) of the 
Interim  Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant Market Positions on necessary facilities. Under 
certain circumstances, intellectual property rights may constitute necessary facilities, and the 
following factors can be considered in specific cases: (I) The comm itment made by the operator to 
the intellectual property rights; (II) Whether other operators shall obtain the license of the 
intellectual property right to enter the relevant market; (III) The impact and degree of refusing to 
license relevant intellectual  property rights on market competition and innovation of operators; 
(IV) Whether the rejected party lacks the willingness and ability to pay reasonable license fees; 
(V) Whether the operator has made a reasonable offer to the rejected party; (VI) Whether r efusing 
to license relevant intellectual property rights will harm the interests of consumers or social public 
interests.  
 
3.3.4.1.4 Mergers and acquisitions  
Page 92, Paragraph 3.181:  The Secretariat Report discusses China 's regulation of mergers and 
acquisitions.  
• During the review period, how many mergers that did not involve at least one non -Chinese party 
have been approved subject to conditions or failed to gain approval?  Non-Chinese in this context 
refers to entities that are not directly or indirectl y owned or controlled by a Chinese entity.  
• Please describe the process of getting the viewpoints of other government departments when 
reaching a decision in a merger case.  
• Please describe the role of the Anti -Monopoly Committee (AMC) in approving mergers.  
 
Reply: Since the previous review, China 's anti -monopoly law enforcement agencies have approved 
15 cases of operator concentration with restrictive conditions, and prohibited one case of operator 
concentration, including 14 cases of mergers and acquisitions that did not involve at least one non -WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Chinese party (all with conditional approval). According to the Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's 
Republic of China and relevant provisions, during the review process, the State Administration for 
Market R egulation may solicit opinions from relevant government departments, trade associations, 
operators, consumers and other units or individuals according to the needs of the review. In law 
enforcement practice, soliciting opinions from other government depart ments is mostly carried out 
in written form.  
 
According to Article 9 of the Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China, the State Council 
established an Anti -Monopoly Committee, which is responsible for organizing, coordinating and 
guiding anti -monopoly work and performing the following duties: Study and formulate relevant 
competition policies; Organize investigations, evaluate the overall market competition and issue 
evaluation reports; Formulate and issue anti -monopoly guidelines; Coordinate the anti-monopoly 
administrative law enforcement work and other duties stipulated by the State Council. According to 
Article 10 of Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China, the State Administration for Market 
Regulation  shall be responsible for anti -monopoly law enforcement, including the anti -monopoly 
review of operation concentration.  
 
3.3.4.1.6 Enforcement  
Page 93, Paragraph 3.186: The Secretariat Report discusses anti -monopoly enforcement in China 
and notes that enforcement can be delegated to provincial -level authorities.  
• Please provide detailed information on the delegation of responsibility in investigations to 
provincial -level administrations.  How is the determination made as to which provincial -level 
administration is appropriate?   
• What safeguards are in place against local protectionism, or favoritism of local interests?   
• What mechanisms are used by ensure consistent approache s across provinces in applying the 
Anti-Monopoly Law?  
• Are the parties able to meet with officials from such provincial -level administration to discuss 
the matter?   
• During the review period, how many first instance civil antimonopoly cases have ？ 
 
Reply: Article 10 of Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China stipulates that the anti -
monopoly law enforcement agency designated by the State Council shall be responsible for the anti -
monopoly law enforcement work. Paragraph II of Article 10 stipulates that the designated anti -
monopoly law enforcement agency may, as required by the work, empower corresponding agencies 
in the people 's governments of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under 
the Central Government to be  responsible for the anti -monopoly law enforcement work according to 
the Anti -Monopoly Law. In 2018, State Administration for Market Regulation released Notice on the 
Empowerment of Anti -monopoly Law Enforcement, making clear that the State Administration for 
Market Regulation (SAMR) is responsible for the unified anti -monopoly law enforcement, and directly 
governs or empowers the relevant provincial market regulatory departments to govern the following 
cases: cases of monopoly agreements or abuse of market  dominance or administrative power to 
eliminate or restrict competition across provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly 
under the Central Government, and abuse of administrative power by provincial people 's 
governments to eliminate or rest rict competition; cases of monopoly agreements or abuse of market 
dominance or administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition that are complicated or have 
major impacts nationwide; cases of monopoly agreements or abuse of market dominance or 
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition that the SAMR considers necessary to 
directly govern. Provincial market regulatory departments shall be responsible for the anti -monopoly 
law enforcement of cases of monopoly agreements or abuse of mar ket dominance or administrative 
power to eliminate or restrict competition within their respective administrative regions, and handle 
the cases in their own names in accordance with the law, and relevant treatment decisions shall be 
published according to law. Relevant cases can be known through the website of SAMR and other 
channels.  
 
According to Article 10 of Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China, SAMR has released 
three departmental regulations: Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly A greements, Interim 
Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant Market Positions, and Interim Provisions on Prohibiting 
the Acts of Eliminating or Restricting Competition by Abuse of Administrative Power, which clarify 
the principle of universal authorizati on, and the relevant contents are the same as Notice on the 
Empowerment of Anti -monopoly Law Enforcement.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  In terms of the unity of anti -monopoly law enforcement, the SAMR has released three departmental 
regulations: Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Mono poly Agreements, Interim Provisions on 
Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant Market Positions and Interim Provisions on Prohibiting the Acts of 
Eliminating or Restricting Competition by Abuse of Administrative Power, stipulating that the SAMR 
shall strengthen the guidance and supervision of provincial market supervision departments in 
investigating monopoly agreements, the abuse of dominant market position and the abuse of 
administrative power to exclude and restrict competition, so as to unify law enforcement stan dards.  
 
3.3.4.1.7 International cooperation  3.3.4.1.7  
• Page 94, Paragraph 3.188: In 2019, it appeared that the State Administration for Market 
Regulation (SAMR) was considering joining the ICN  Framework for Competition Agency 
Procedures (CAP), which allows competition agencies to confirm their adherence to fundamental 
principles of transparency and procedural fairness in antitrust enforcement.  What is China 's view 
on SAMR subscribing to the CAP ? Please explain.  
 
Reply: Since the implementation of Anti -Monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China, 
competition agencies in many countries and regions have invited Chinese anti -monopoly law 
enforcement agencies to join the International Competition Network (ICN). China holds a positive 
attitude towards joining ICN and hopes to maintain communication with ICN and competition 
agencies of relevant countries and regions on China 's anti -monopoly law enforcement agencies 
joining I CN and related issues.  
 
State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization   
• The Secretariat Report notes that "State participation varies from wholly SOEs  and majority 
state ownership to the State acting as another shareholder. " How does the Chinese government 
currently decide on the appropriate level of state ownership in a particular company? What 
factors influence that decision?   
 
Reply: Since 2018, posi tive progress has been made in SOE reform. State -owned enterprises have 
completed the corporate system restructuring in an all -round way, and their status as independent 
market entities has been further established on the institutional level. Central SOEs have completed 
the corporate system restructuring, and 96% of local SASAC -funded enterprises have also completed 
the corporate system restructuring. Stable progress has been made in the mixed ownership reform.  
 
Page 97, Paragraph 3.202   
The Secretariat Report notes that the State -Owned Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) is in charge of "contributing capital to … SOEs under its management. "  
• Please explain how SASAC makes its decisions on how to contribute capital.  
• Please  explain how these decisions are consistent with the actions of a private investor.   
 
Reply: SASAC  is subordinate to the State Council. According to the Company Law, Law on the 
State -Owned Assets of Enterprises and other laws and regulations, based on the principle of 
separating government administration from enterprise management, separating governmen t 
administration from state assets management, and separating ownership from management rights, 
SASAC  performs investor duties on behalf of the State Council, contributes to the invested enterprise 
as a shareholder, injects capital acting on market princip les and rule of law like other private 
investors, and has the right in major issues including benefiting from the return on assets and 
choosing managers. The supervision of enterprises by SASAC is based not on the supervision of 
administrative power, but o n the rights of investors, and the SASAC does not interfere with the daily 
business decisions of enterprises. SASAC appoints and dismisses the heads of central SOEs under 
its supervision through legal procedures instead of directly appointing senior manage rs. 
 
• Page 98 Table 3.24  : Does the Agricultural Bank of China support any agricultural equipment 
exports? If so, what financial terms and conditions does it offer?   
 
Reply: SOEs, private enterprises, foreign -funded enterprises, C hina-foreign joint ventures, etc. are 
all customer groups of commercial banks. On the premise of compliance with laws and regulations, 
commercial banks independently select customer groups according to their own strategic planning, 
development orientation, ris k preference, operation and management capabilities, etc., and issue 
credits and loans. The relevant decisions of commercial banks are market -oriented choices and 
behaviors in light of their own development situation.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 99, Paragraph 3.206: The Secreta riat Report assesses that "[t]he importance of SOEs in 
China 's economy, coupled with high amounts of financial support, may affect the functioning of 
market -oriented policies and practices. It would appear that SOEs in China often benefit from credits 
extended by state banks or other forms of financing, implicit grantees, capital injections, and 
preferential access to inputs. " The United States agrees with this assessment, which is an 
assessment shared by many other WTO Members and by many experts who analy ze China 's 
economic and trade regimes. However, the Secretariat Report notes that the Chinese authorities 
object to this assessment and insist that SOEs in China receive no preferences at all. Can China 
explain why it considers that Chinese SOEs operate on  the same terms and conditions as private 
enterprises?   
 
Reply: The Chinese government attaches great importance to the fair and equitable participation of 
SOEs in market competition. SOEs have been integrated with the market economy and become the 
main en tity independently engaging in market competition. They purchase and sell according to 
commercial considerations. They shall be subject to the same laws and rules as other enterprises in 
terms of access to funds, bankruptcy and competition legislation, and  do not enjoy privileges.  
 
Page 99, Paragraph 3.206:  According to the Secretariat Report, it appears "that SOEs in China 
often benefit from credits extended by state banks. " China disagrees with this view. Please explain 
how state banks determine the loan rate for SOE borrowers? How do they price the risk of lending 
to an SOE?   
 
Reply: SOEs, private enterprises, foreign -funded enterprises, C hina-foreign joint ventures, etc. are 
all customer groups of commercial banks. On the premise of compliance with laws and regulations, 
commercial banks independently select customer groups according to their own strategic planning, 
development orientation, ris k preference, operation and management capabilities, etc., and issue 
credits and loans. The relevant decisions of commercial banks are market -oriented choices and 
behaviors in light of their own development situation.  
 
3.3.6 Government procurement  3.3.6  
3.3.6.1 Overview  3.3.6.1  
• Page 99, Paragraph 3.210 and Table 3.25: The Secretariat  Report explains that in 2019 
procurement by sub -central entities accounted for 91.9 % of China 's total value of government 
procurement in 2019, while procurement by the central Government accounted for  8.1%. In 
footnote 170, the Secretariat Report states  that 31 provincial -level governments reported 
government procurement statistics to the central Government.   
• Can China clarify whether these central and sub -central level totals include procurement by 
SOEs. If not, please provide any available data regarding SOE procurements?   
• Does the China -provided sub -central data include data from any entities other than these 
31 provincial -level governments? Is there any government pro curement taking place in China 
that falls below the provincial level, such as in cities or towns? If so, does China have any 
estimates of the amounts that those levels of government are procuring?  
 
Reply to the above two questions: The Government Procurement Law shall not be applicable to 
state-owned enterprises. Local government procurement data cover the total amount of local 
government procurement at all levels.  
 
3.3.6.2 Legal and institutional framework 3.3.6.2  
Page 100, Paragr aph 3.212: The Secretariat Report explains that the Government Procurement 
Law is currently under amendment and that the Ministry of Justice is organizing a legislative review 
of the draft amendments.  
• Could China please provide any updates on the status o f this review and any anticipated timeline 
for adoption of the amended Government Procurement Law?  
 
Reply: The Chinese Government is actively promoting the amendments to the Government 
Procurement Law and the Bidding Law. The timeline for completing the a mendments depends on 
soliciting opinions from all parties concerned and the coordination with relevant departments.  
• Do the the draft amendments to Government Procurement Law include a definition for "domestic 
goods, services, and construction works "? If the draft amendments do not include this definition, 
what is China 's policy to ensure consistency across procuring entities in how they interpret these 
terms?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 192 - 
 
  Reply: The draft amendments to Government Procurement Law do not include a definition for 
"dome stic goods, services, and construction works ". The Foreign Investment Law effective in 
January  2020 stipulates that the state ensures that foreign -invested enterprises have equal access 
to government procurement through fair competition in accordance with the law. Products and 
services provided by foreign -invested enterprises within the territory of China are equally treated in 
government procurement in accordance with law.  
 
3.3.6.4 Other policy considerations in government procurement   
Page 105, Paragraph 3.225  The Secretariat Report refers to China 's "green packaging standards. "  
• What are China 's requirements for "green packaging standards? " What targets have been set?   
• How does China define "recyclable, " "organic, " and "renewable " in the context of "green 
packaging "?  
 
Reply to the above two questions:  China 's "green packaging standards " refer to the 
environmental protection requirements for packaging stipulated in the Standards for the 
Requirements for Government Procurement of Co mmodity Packaging (For Trial Implementation) and 
Standards for the Requirements for Government Procurement of Express Packaging (For Trial 
Implementation). For the interpretation of the recyclable, organic and renewable, please refer to the 
specific conten ts of the above two requirements standards. For example, the requirement of product 
packaging that "packaging for paper products shall be produced with more than 75% renewable 
fiber raw materials " reflects "renewable ". 
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  3.3.7  
3.3.7.2 Institutional reforms and IP -related policies   
Page 107, Paragraph 3.236: The Secretariat Report indicates that the China National Intellectual 
Property Administration published in May 2020 the Plan for Further Implementation of the 
National  Intellectual Property Strategy to Accelerate the Construction of an Intellectual Property 
Power Country. The Secretariat Report indicates that the referenced plan lists measures relating to 
"reduc[ing] subsidies or rewards for utility model, design , and trademark applications. "  
• Please provide a listing of existing subsidies and rewards for domestic utility model, design, and 
trademark applications and indicate whether each is scheduled to be reduced or eliminated.   
• Please explain whether the referenced measure applies to subsidies and rewards for applications 
for foreign patents and trademark.  
• Please provide a list of all subsidies and rewards for applications and registrations for foreign 
patents and trademarks as well as for international trademark registration under the Madrid 
Protocol and international patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.   
 
Reply to the above questions : China 's economy is now shifting from high -speed growth to high -
quality dev elopment. In order to meet the needs of economic and social development, in 2021, 
China National Intellectual Property Administration released a policy document regulating patent and 
trademark application behaviors, guiding local governments to adjust pate nt and trademark subsidy 
policies, and requiring that the subsidy of patent and trademark application stages at all levels be 
completely abolished. All localities shall not provide financial support to patent and trademark 
applications in any form includin g funds, rewards and subsidies. The scope of the existing local 
funding shall be limited to authorized invention patents (including invention patents authorized 
overseas through PCT and other means), and the funding method shall be post -authorization subsi dy. 
Subsidies and rewards for domestic utility models, designs and trademark applications shall be 
cancelled.  
China has had no policy of providing subsidies for patent application, granting and maintenance at 
the national level. In recent years, to promote  regional innovation capability and encourage the 
development of small and medium -sized enterprises, some local governments formulated and issued 
relevant policies for the purpose of stimulating innovation according to local conditions within the 
scope of local powers, and the relevant policies have been issued and explained by local governments. 
These policies are targeted at small and micro enterprises, with equal treatment for domestic and 
foreign enterprises. Similarly, relevant policy adjustment measur es shall also apply to subsidies and 
incentives for foreign patent and trademark applications.  
 
Page 108, Paragraph 3.239: The Secretariat  Report notes that "[t]he Copyright Act was revised 
in 2020. "  
• Article 24(13) of the new law authorizes exceptions and limitations to copyright and related 
rights for "other circumstances as provided in laws and administrative regulations. " Will China 's 
National Copyright Administration be the sole agency that will is sue regulations establishing WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 193 - 
 
  exceptions and limitations beyond those currently enumerated in Article 24(1) -(12), or will other 
agencies, such as copyright departments at the provincial or local level, have a co -equal 
authority?   
 
Reply: Laws and administra tive regulations shall have the right to provide exceptions to other 
circumstances.  
• Article 45 of the new law adds a right of remuneration for the public performance and 
broadcasting of sound recordings. Will the China Audio -Video Copyright Association (CAVCA) 
administer the new statutory license? What other collective management organizations will play 
a role in the administration of the Article 45 statutory license?   
• Have sound recording producers begun receiving royalty distributions under  the new license? If 
not, what is the estimated timeline for achieving this objective?   
• Does national treatment apply to the new right of remuneration such that non -Chinese recording 
companies can begin receiving royalties?   
• How does China 's reservation under Article 15 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT) relate to the new Article 45?   
 
Reply to the above questions: Regarding the broadcasting of phonograms, their dissemination to 
the public and remuneration, relevant departme nts will implement and adjust according to the newly 
revised Copyright Law. At present, China maintains the reservation to Article 15 of WPPT.  
 
• Article 47 of the new law clarifies that the right of retransmission for broadcasting organizations 
covers both wired and wireless means. Does the language in Article 47(3) referring to 
"information network " indicate that broadcasting organizations now have a right of 
communication that covers on -demand and other interactive communications, or is the right of 
commun ication limited to non -interactive communications?   
• What is the object of protection in Article 47? Is it the broadcasting signal, or the copyrighted 
program?   
• Why has China not amended its implementing regulations to take account of the changes in the 
new copyright law?   
 
Reply to the above questions:  According to Article 47 of the Copyright Law, a broadcasting station 
or television station shall have the right to prohibit the following acts conducted without its 
permission: Rebroadcasting a radio or television program broadcast by it by wired or wirele ss means; 
Recording and reproducing a radio or television program broadcast by it; Disseminating a radio and 
television broadcast by it to the public via information networks. The protection target is "radio or 
television program broadcast ", which is not s imply equivalent to programs or broadcast signals, but 
radio and television associated with program signals when playing. After the implementation of the 
newly revised Copyright Law, its relevant supporting laws and regulations, including the Regulations 
for the Implementation of the Copyright Law, will also be revised accordingly, which is currently 
under preparation and research.  
 
3.3.7.4 Copyright and related rights  3.3.7.4  
Page 108, Paragraph 3.246: The Secretariat  Report notes that "the National Copyright 
Administration administers copyright registration nationally. In the case of computer software, the 
Copyright Protection of China registers copyrighted works. "  
• Does the National Copyright Administration (NCAC) register all types of copy righted works, or 
has NCAC delegated that administrative function to the Copyright Protection Center of 
China  (CPCC)?   
• Under the new copyright law, Article 7 provides that "the local copyright authority at or above 
the county level shall be in charge of th e administration of copyright within its own jurisdiction. " 
Prior to the amendment of the Copyright Act, Article 7 delegated copyright administration to the 
government of each province, autonomous region, or municipality, but not local copyright 
authoritie s. New Article 7 now covers local copyright authorities. Under new Article 7, can a 
copyright owner now register claims to copyright at the local level, or is it still advisable or 
required to seek registration with the Copyright Protection Center of China ? What are the current 
registration application fees for copyrighted works, or is registration free?   
 
Reply to the above  questions: The National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC ) is 
responsible for copyright management nationwide, including copyright registration management. 
The copyright bureaus of all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the 
Central government shall be responsible for the registration  of works of their respective jurisdictions WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 194 - 
 
  or other copyright owners; National Copyright Administration of China has recognized China 
Copyright Protection Center as the software registration authority. Relevant registration fees shall 
be collected by vari ous registration agencies according to regulations, and some agencies are 
currently exempted from registration fees.  
 
Page 109, Paragraph 3.247 . The Secretariat Report notes that copyright registration is voluntary 
and is not a requirement for copyright pr otection. Does China collect data on the number of 
registration claims received and processed? If so, please provide this data for the review period. 
Have any trends in copyright registration been noted by the responsible agencies (e.g., NCAC and 
CCPC)?  
 
Reply: In 2020, the total number of copyright registration exceeded 5 million, among which, the 
authorship registration totaled more than 3.31 million, up 22.75% year -on-year, and software 
copyright registration surpassed 1.72 million, up 16.06% year -on-year, while pledge registration of 
copyright was 384, a decrease of 153 cases compared with last year.  
 
Page 109, Table 3.28: The Secretariat Report provides certain data relating to copyright 
management organizations in China.  
• Is the information in Table 3.28 applicable to the year 2020, or does it represent an average of 
the fees collected and number of members during the past  3-year review period, i.e.,  since 
China 's Trade Policy Review in 2018?  
• The data provided by the Secretariat Report only reflect remuneration collected and does not 
indicate any data regarding distribution. How much of the revenue did these collective 
management organizations distribute to their members?   
• Do these collective management organizations retain any fee for their services to their 
members? In the industry, this fee is sometimes called a management fee and is often stated in 
terms of a percentage of annual revenue. If so, please identify the fees retained by these 
collective management organizations.   
• The United States understands that the Music Copyright Society of China (MCSC) has reciprocal 
agreements with foreign collective managemen t organizations in the music industry. Please 
provide a breakdown of the collections MCSC received from, and distributed to, foreign collective 
management organizations for the period 2018 -2020.   
• The fees collected for the China Film Copyright Association as set forth in Table 3.28 
(RMB  27,400) appear to be significantly lower than comparable fees listed in the 2018 
Secretariat Report, which were reported to be RMB 160,000. Is there an explanation for this 
change?   
 
Reply to the above  questions: In 2020, the Music Copyright Society of China collected a total of 
RMB 408 million in royalties for music copyright, basically remaining unchanged from 2019; the 
China Audio -Video Copyright Association collected RMB 220 million in royalties for music copyr ight, 
showing a year -on-year decline; the China Written Works Copyright Society collected 
RMB 22.44  million in royalties, registering a year -on-year increase of 16%; The Images Copyright 
Society of China collected a total of over RMB 5 million in copyright  royalties for the year; the China 
Film Copyright Association received EUR 3,500 in copyright royalties to be distributed from SGAE 
in 2020. For details, please refer to the official website of each collective management organization.  
 
According to Article s 28 and 29 of the Regulation on the Collective Administration of Copyright, the 
organization for collective administration of copyright may withdraw a certain percentage of the 
royalties collected as management fees to maintain its normal business activit ies. The proportion of 
management fee collected by a collective management organization shall be gradually reduced with 
the increase of royalty income. The royalties collected by the collective management organization 
shall be fully transferred to the righ t holder after the management fees are deducted, and shall not 
be used for other purposes. In transferring royalties, the collective management organization shall 
prepare a record of such transfers, which should specify the total amount of royalties, the a mount 
of management fees, the name or title of the right holder, the title of the work/audio and video 
products, the usage, the specific amount of royalties transferred to each right holder, etc., and 
should be kept for more than ten year. According to Art icle 22 of the Regulation on the Collective 
Administration of Copyright of China, the reciprocal agreements concluded between the copyright 
collective management organizations and its foreign counterparts shall be reported to the Copyright 
Administration D epartment of the State Council for record and shall be announced thereafter.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  The fees charged by each collective management organization in China, the distribution ratio, and 
the relevant details can be viewed on their official websites.  
 
3.3.7.5 Industrial property  3.3.7.5  
3.3.7.5.2 Geographical indications  3.3.7.5.2  
Page 110, Paragraph 3.258  : The Secretariat  Report indicates that "[t]he CNIPA published 
Guidelines on Determining Common Names in Geographical Indication Protection (Draft) in 2020 , 
clarifying the determining factors, cancellation, and other aspects of common names in terms of the 
common name determination in GI protection. " What is the current status of those draft 
guidelines?  What is the current status of the Provisions for the Pr otection of Geographical Indications 
(Draft for Comment) issued by CNIPA on September 24, 2020?   
 
Reply: In early 2021, the China National Intellectual Property Administration and the State 
Administration for Market Supervision jointly issued the Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening 
the Protection of Geographical Indications, with the relevant requirements having been considered 
and reflected in the Guideline. The Guideline has not taken effect yet. The Provisions for the 
Protection of Geograp hical Indications (Draft for Comment) was made available for public 
consultation between September and October 2020, and the feedback is still being examined for 
further revision and improvement of the regulations.  
 
3.3.7.5.3 Patents 3.3.7.5.3  
Page 111, P aragraph 3.261: The Secretariat Report indicates that no patent -related compulsory 
licenses had been granted as of the date of the report. Has China issued any compulsory licenses 
after the issuance of the Secretariat Report?   
 
Reply: Chapter 6 of the Pate nt Law of China stipulates the applicable conditions for the compulsory 
licensing. In addition, it also sets forth the supporting departmental regulations of the Measures for 
Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation. Until now, no compulsory licenses have been issued.  
 
3.3.7.5.7 New plant varieties  3.3.7.5.7  
• Page 114, Paragraph 3.278:  The Secretariat Report indicates that China has acceded to 
the 1978 Act of the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV  1978) in 1999. Please explain China 's rationale for not acceding to UPOV 1991?  
 
Reply: China is working on it.  
 
3.3.7.5.8 Undisclosed information and trade secrets   
Page 115, Paragraph 3.284: The Secretariat Report describes the legal framework for the 
protection of undisclosed information and trade secrets in China.   
• Why did China reject recommendations to reduce disclosures required at the time that cosmetics 
products and ingredients are filed under the new Cosmetics Supervision and Administration 
Regulation (CSAR) (G/TBT/N/CHN/1310  came into force on May 1, 2021) to only what is 
necessary for its regulatory obligations, so as to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures.   
• Will China provide an update on the plans of the National Medical Products Administration and 
the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) to develop mechanisms and procedures 
to protect confidential business information and trade secrets marked as such by U.S. cosmetics 
and cosmetics ingredient companies, when cosmetics and cosmetics ingredients are registered 
or notified via the new Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation (CSAR) 
(G/TBT/N/CHN/1310), which came into force on May 1, 2021?   
 
Reply to the above two questions: For the question on trade se crets and intellectual property 
protection, according to the Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation, to further 
regulate the registration and filing management of cosmetics and new cosmetic ingredients, 
Measures for the Administration of the R egistration and Recordation of Cosmetics, Provisions for 
Administration of New Cosmetic Ingredient Registration and Recordation, and Provisions for 
Administration of Cosmetics Registration and Dossiers elaborate on the workflow and information 
requirements  for the registration and filing of cosmetics and new ingredients. It requires the 
registrant and the filer to submit safety -related information, which is also the prevailing rule for the 
inspection of health -related product safety in other countries. Regi stration and filing Information 
submitted by enterprises such as a brief description of the production process, and raw materials 
production process, is not supposed to be publicly disclosed by the government. The disclosure of 
government information is a measure by the Chinese government to accept social supervision and WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  protect the public 's right to know. According to the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government 
Information, the administrative authorities shall not disclose government information that in volves 
trade secrets, personal privacy, etc. where disclosure can cause damage to the legitimate rights and 
interests of third parties. Therefore, the question of damage to the trade secrets and intellectual 
property rights of enterprises does not apply.  
 
China attaches great importance to the protection of trade secrets of enterprises. The trade secrets 
of parties concerned should be kept confidential as required by Article 47 of the Regulations on the 
Supervision and Administration of Cosmetics, and the M easures for the Administration of 
Registration and Recordation of Cosmetics issued on January 7, 2021. Having taken full account of 
the protection of intellectual property rights and trade secrets of enterprises, China proposed in the 
process of developing  the relevant technical documents, that a summary of the basis for cosmetics 
efficacy claims should be submitted instead of the full text for the assessment of cosmetic efficacy 
claims; the technical requirements for the disclosure of new raw materials onl y contain basic 
information on raw materials, without requiring the disclosure of complete technical information. 
Regulatory authorities also strictly comply with the principle of protecting corporate trade secrets in 
the cosmetic registration and filing m anagement.  
 
For the question of submitting information related to the safety of cosmetic ingredients. Product 
safety is closely connected with the safety of raw materials, requiring registrants and filers in the 
application for registration, to clarify the  safety related information of raw materials, which is an 
important measure to ensure product safety. Meanwhile, to facilitate cosmetic registrants and filers 
to fill out the safety -related information of raw materials, the National Medical Products 
Admini stration issued the Provisions for Administration of Cosmetic Registration and Dossiers, which 
clearly states that if the raw material manufacturer has submitted safety -related information of raw 
materials in accordance with the requirements, the registran t and the filer only need to fill out the 
raw material submission code for relevance.  
 
Page 115, Paragraph 3.287: The Secretariat Report addresses the types of trade secret 
misappropriation made actionable under the Criminal Law. Does the Criminal Law address trade 
misappropriation by physical intrusion? If so, please identify the relevant provision of the Criminal 
Law.  
 
Reply: According to Article 219 of the Criminal Law of the People 's Republic of China, whoever 
engages in one of the following activi ties which encroaches upon commercial secrets shall be 
subjected to conviction and punishment for infringement of commercial secrets: (1) acquire a rightful 
owner 's commercial secrets via theft, lure by promise of gain, threat, or other improper means; 
(2) disclose, use, or allow others to use a rightful owner 's commercial secrets which are acquired 
through the aforementioned means; (3) disclose, use, or allow others to use, in violation of the 
agreement with the rightful owner or the rightful owner 's request of keeping the commercial secrets, 
the commercial secrets he is holding. Theft of commercial secrets includes theft of trade secret 
carrier in a tangible manner and other acts.  
 
The "three -in-one" trial of civil, administrative and criminal cases i nvolving intellectual property 
rights refers to the unified acceptance of civil, administrative and criminal cases by courts with 
jurisdiction over intellectual property civil cases. The Opinions of the Supreme People 's Court 
on Promoting the "Three -in-One" Trial of Civil, Administrative and Criminal Cases Involving 
Intellectual Property Rights in Courts Nationwide (Fa Fa [2016] No.17) provide for the promotion of 
the "three -in-one" trial.  
 
Pages 115 -16, Paragraph 3.287: The Secretariat Report references a n amendment to the 
"prerequisite for constituting a crime " of trade secret misappropriation. Effective March 1, 2021, an 
amendment to Article 219 of the Criminal Law changed the standard from "significant losses " to 
circumstances that are "serious " or "especially serious. " Separately, the Notice by the Supreme 
People 's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security of Issuing the Decision on Amending the 
Criteria for Launching Formal Investigation into Criminal Cases of Infringement upon Trade 
Secrets  (2020) provides the standard for the initiation of a formal investigation. Consistent with the 
"significant losses " standard in place at the time the Notice was issued, the Notice indicates that an 
investigation will not be initiated unless the victim of the alleged trade secret misappropriation has 
suffered losses of a specified minimum magnitude or the alleged violator has illegal gains of a 
specified minimum magnitude. The Notice is still in effect even though Article 219 no longer requires 
a showing of  losses but rather a showing of circumstances that are "serious " or "especially serious. " WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  When will the Supreme People 's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security amend the 
standard for the initiation of a trade secret investigation to bring it in line with the amendment of 
Article 219?   
 
Reply: China is working on it.  
 
3.3.7.6 Enforcement  3.3.7.6 3.3.7.6  
3.3.7.6.2 Administrative procedures  3.3.7.6.2  
Page 117, Paragraph 3.293: What is the relationship between the National Copyright 
Administration and the province -level copyright administrative authorities? What duties fall under 
the local administrative authorities that do not fall under the National Copyright Administration?   
 
Reply: According to Article 7 of China 's Copyright Law, the competent department of the national 
copyright authority is in charge of the national copyright management; local departments in charge 
of copyright at or above the county level are responsible for the copyright management in their 
admin istrative regions.  
 
3.3.7.6.3 Judicial measures  3.3.7.6.3  
Page 118, Paragraph 3.299: The Secretariat Report mentions that the courts have "made efforts 
to achieve coordination and proportionality between compensation for infringement damages and 
the marke t value of IPRs. " What were those efforts? How is the proportionality between infringement 
damages and market value determined? What is the ideal or optimum proportionality being sought?   
 
Reply: I. 1. We have increased compensation for infringement, introduced judicial interpretations 
to improve the punitive compensation system, and increased the punishment for malicious, repeated 
and other serious infringement of IPRs, so as to effectively deter infringers and ensure that "all 
losses are compensated and all punishments are appropriate. " 2. In the event that the right holder 
has difficulty in proving the total loss or infringement profit, the burden of proof will be appropriately 
reduced through th e use of evidence preservation.  
 
II. According to laws and regulations, there are three methods of calculating compensation for 
intellectual property infringement. First, the actual economic loss caused by the infringer to the right 
holder. Second, all the  profits gained by the infringer as a result of the infringement. Third, in the 
event that the aforementioned specific amount cannot be determined , the degree of infringement, 
the consequences of infringement, subjective fault and other factors shall be t aken into account.  
Due to the intangible nature of intellectual property rights, the precise calculation of compensation 
for infringement is a global problem. In this regard, Chinese courts have been committed to 
achieving coordination and proportionality compensation for infringement damages and the market 
value of IPRs.  
 
Page 118, Paragraph 3.300   
Please describe how the "Three -in-One" trial system works.   
 
Reply : The "three -in-one" trial of civil, administrative and criminal cases involving intellectual 
property rights refers to the unified acceptance of civil, administrative and criminal cases by courts 
with jurisdiction over intellectual property civil cases. The Opinions of the S upreme People 's Court 
on Promoting the "Three -in-One" Trial of Civil, Administrative and Criminal Cases Involving 
Intellectual Property Rights in Courts Nationwide (Fa Fa [2016] No.17) provide for the promotion of 
the "three -in-one" trial. 
 
Page 119, Parag raph 3.302:  The Secretariat Report mentions the Supreme People 's Court 's list 
of top 10 IP law cases of 2019. What determinations factor into naming a case as a top 10 IP law 
case? What are the effects of a case being named a top 10 IP law case?  
 
Reply : The annual top 10 IP law cases and top 50 typical IP law cases are named on the basis of 
public voting and expert selection. They may serve as reference cases.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR   
4.1.2 Agriculture  4.1.2  
4.1.2.1 Features and market development  4.1.2.1  
Page 120, Paragraph 4.2:  The challenges of the African Swine Fever amongst China 's domestic 
swine herd are well documented in Chinese official reports and statistics.   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  • Please provide a comprehensive list of national and sub-national support programs that were 
introduced to provide support to the swine sector, including both businesses and farmers.   
 
Reply: Please refer to China 's upcoming domestic support notification for agriculture.  
 
• What is China 's policy on submitting its domestic support notifications to the WTO?   
 
Reply: China will soon submit the notification of domestic support for agriculture.  
 
4.1.2.4 Policy instruments   
4.1.2.4.2  Measures affecting exports   
Page 126, Paragraph 4.18: According to the Secretariat Report, no data were available on food 
aid provided by China during the review period. The United States notes that in responding to the 
ECQ and AG ‑IMS, China stated that it has provided food aid through both multilateral and b ilateral 
channels, but it has never notified Table ES:3 and NF:1. What is China 's policy on providing these 
food aid notifications to the WTO?   
 
Reply: In response to appeals from the international community and requests for emergency 
humanitarian assistance from the countries concerned, China has provided multi -bilateral 
emergency food aid to the countries concerned. The emergency food aid provided by the Chinese 
government is non -reimbursable and in full compliance with WTO regulation s. It also requires the 
countries concerned to arrange the use of food aid provided by China in a manner consistent with 
WTO rules, and calls for the recipient countries not to monetize or re -export emergency food aid. 
The above -mentioned emergency food ai d has played a positive role in alleviating the humanitarian 
crisis in the countries concerned and has received unanimous praise from the international 
community and the countries concerned.  
 
Page 127, Paragraph 4.20: The Secretariat Report indicates that China 's state trading enterprises 
(STEs) have the exclusive right to import or export several products, including wheat, maize, sugar, 
rice, cotton, and several other products. The United States notes that wheat and wheat flour are 
subject to export quotas , which are managed by the National Development and Reform Commission 
and the Ministry of Commerce, and are allocated only to STEs. Please explain whether STEs with 
export quota allocation for wheat and wheat flour should be notified in the export competit ion 
questionnaire (ECQ).   
 
Reply: Please refer to the latest state trading notification submitted by China for the relevant 
information of state trading enterprises. According to the Measures for the Administration of Export 
Commodity Quotas (MOFTEC Order No. 12 of 2001), the allocation of quotas shall take into full 
consideration the export performance, quota utilization rate, operating capacity, production scale 
and resource status of the commodity in the last three years for the applicant enterprise or r egion. 
Apart from a small amount allocated to COFCO Group, China 's export quota for wheat flour is mostly 
allocated to non -state trading enterprises, rather than only to state trading enterprises. Enterprises 
receiving export quotas can make their own choi ce of export timing and export countries. We are 
not obliged to inform about the exact number of export quotas allocated.  
 
Page 127, Paragraph 4.21 and Table 4.7:  According to the Secretariat Report, Table 4.7 
describes the size of China 's export quotas for maize, rice, and wheat flour by state trading 
enterprises (STEs) in 2018, 2019, and 2020.   
• Please describe how export levels are determined by the STEs. How muc h was held in public 
stocks? If applicable, what year were those stocks procured?  
• Please describe how the sale contracts are negotiated by the STEs, and whether the sales are 
government -to-government credit agreements.   
 
Reply: Please refer to the latest s tate trading notification submitted by China for information on 
state trading enterprises.  
 
4.1.2.4.3 Internal measures 4.1.2.4.3  
4.1.2.4.3.2 Price controls and market price support systems  
Page 129 -130, Paragraph 4.25:  The Secretariat Report indicates that China has a minimum 
purchase price for rice and wheat meeting minimum requirements as part of its market price support 
systems.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  • With reports of corn and pork auctions, please confirm whether rice and wheat are the on ly 
commodities benefitting from a minimum purchase price support mechanism.  
 
Reply: China only implements a minimum purchase price for rice and wheat in major producing 
areas.  
 
• Please provide the value levels of nationwide support issued for China 's agric ultural commodities 
by year.  
• Please explain why China has not calculated the level of support as the amount equal to total 
Chinese production of these commodities and the price support level guaranteed for each 
commodity.  
 
Reply to the above  questions : China only implements a minimum purchase price for rice and 
wheat in major producing areas. China will soon submit a notification on domestic support for 
agriculture.  
 
4.1.3 Fisheries 4.1.3  
4.1.3.1 Features and market developments  
Page 133, Pa ragraph 4.34: The Secretariat Report states that between 2015 and 2019 there was 
a downward trend in employment, the number of fishing vessels, and the marine catch. However, 
efforts taken to address illegal fishing are not outlined in detail.   
• Is the reduction in employment, the number of fishing vessels, and the marine catch due to an 
increase in illegal fishing?  
 
Reply：The reduction in employment, the number of fishing vessels, and the marine catch does not 
relate to illegal fishing .  
 
• How does this reduction compare to numbers from distant water fishing, which appear to be 
underreported?  
 
Reply：During the period between 2016 and 2020, China did not approve any new distant water 
fishing enterprises or vessels, and kept the total number of its approved distant water fishing vessels 
around 2700. Requirements stipulated by the RFMOs on the limitation  of the number and total 
tonnage of fishing vessels, stock -specific fishing quota and conservation and management measures 
relating to closed fishing areas and closed fishing seasons are strictly observed. The annual catch by 
China 's distant water fleets h as been stabilized at around 2.3  million tons.  
 
• How will China prevent or mitigate spillover from legal to illegal fishing practices?   
 
Reply: There are two main reasons for the decline of legal fishing vessels: First, China has 
implemented the policy of fishing vessel reduction and/or conversion, and provided corresponding 
subsidies. Second, fishing is a tough industry. With the economic and social development in China, 
there are more employment options for labor forces, making fishing less attractive. Th ere is no 
evidence indicating that the decline in legal fishing has led to an increase in illegal fishing.  
 
4.1.3.2  Legal, institutional, and policy framework  
Page 135, Paragraph 4.37: According to the Secretariat Report, the Chinese authorities indicated 
that they are taking steps to introduce a total allowable catch system for fisheries. However, details 
about this system have not been released.  
• Please describe China 's current fishery  management system within its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). What is the status of China 's stocks within its EEZ? Is the status of China 's stocks public 
information? If so, where can it be found?  
 
Reply: China implements a total management system for mari ne fishery resources in waters under 
its jurisdiction and a "dual control " system for the number of fishing vessels and the power of main 
engines. Relevant Chinese research institutes continue to carry out investigations and assessments 
on fishery resources in exclusive economic zones and publicly release relevant scientific res earch 
achievements as appropriate.  
 
• Is China 's move toward a total allowable catch system a result of the depletion of China 's 
domestic fishery resources? In association with the introduction of catch limits, what is China 's 
policy regarding providing grea ter transparency in China 's domestic fishery stock assessments?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Reply : China has implemented a series of fishery management measures, such as, dual control of 
fishing vessels and total management system, to promote the coordinated development of fishing 
capacity, volume of catches and carrying capacity of fishery resources, thus realizing the sustainable 
utilization of marine fishery resources. China has set up the National Committee of Experts on Marine 
Fisheries Resource Assessment, and has enlisted fis hermen 's representatives and relevant industry 
associations to participate in the resource survey and assessment.  
 
• Can China clarify whether its catch limits apply to distant water fisheries as well as domestic 
fisheries?  
 
Reply : During the period between 2016 and 2020, China did not approve any new distant water 
fishing enterprises or vessels, and kept the total number of its approved distant water fishing vessels 
around 2700. Requirements stipulated by the RFMOs on the limitation  of the number and total 
tonnage of fishing vessels, stock -specific fishing quota and conservation and management measures 
relating to closed fishing areas and closed fishing seasons are strictly observed. The annual catch by 
China 's distant water fleets h as been stabilized at around 2.3 million tons.  
 
• Are vessels ' compliance with total allowable catch limits used as a factor to determine vessels ' 
eligibility for fishery subsidies and vessel licensing requirements?  
 
Reply: Article 3 of the Provisions on th e Administration of Fishing Licenses stipulates that the state 
shall manage the control quota for vessel and net devices, and implement the fishing license system 
and fishing quota system. The state shall, on the basis of the changes in fishery resources a nd the 
environmental conditions, determine the control quota for vessel and net devices and control the 
total fishing capacity and the number of fishing licenses. Article 9 stipulates that the competent 
fishery departments under the local people 's governme nts at or above the county level shall control 
the number and power of marine fishing vessels within their respective administrative regions within 
the scope of control quota for vessel and net devices issued by the state or the people 's governments 
of the  provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government. 
Article 20 stipulates that for varieties or water areas under the management of fishing quota, 
operation shall be conducted according to the fishing quota prescribed. Article 41 stipulates that for 
a fishing vessel subject to management of fishing quota, not exceeding quota is a necessary 
condition for passing the annual examination of fishing license.  
Regarding the granting of fishery subsidies related to fishing vesse ls, holding a qualified fishing 
license is a necessary condition for a fishing vessel to receive subsidies.  
 
Page 135, Paragraph 4.37: The Secretariat Report states that a revision to the Fisheries Law was 
drafted and comments were solicited in 2019. As of April 2021, the law is still under revision. Among 
the proposed revisions were strengthening management of fishing vessels and licenses, and 
responses to problems such as illegal shipbuilding, inconsistent ship certificates, and off -site 
anchoring. The Secretariat Report also references the establishment of a total allowable catch 
system. Does the Fisheries Law govern China 's distant water fishing fleet, and will the revision 
address growing issues such as labor practices aboard vessels? Much of the focu s seems to be on 
catch that is marketed domestically, and not for export.  
 
Reply : The Fisheries Law governs China 's distant water fishing fleet. China puts a high value on the 
protection of the rights and interests of fishermen. Provisions on protecting l abor rights and personal 
safety of fishing crew are explicitly stipulated in the Administrative Measures on Fishing Crew, the 
Regulations on Administration of Distant Water Fishery, and the Circular on Strengthening 
Management on Foreign Crews in Distant W ater Fishing Vessels, etc. Measures have been taken, 
such as increasing training for fishery companies and crews, requiring timely remuneration to crew 
members, improving working and living conditions as well as safety for crew on board, and providing 
medical treatment and psychological help for the sick crew in a timely manner via sending hospital 
ships and providing basic medicines. China 's administrative authorities have made it a key task to 
strengthen supervision of the safety conditions of distant wat er fishing, and hold the legal 
representatives of fishery companies, project managers and captains responsible for work safety. 
Meanwhile, the government will also provide support for fishing vessels to install lifesaving 
equipment, communication, navigati on and environmental protection facilities so as to ensure safety 
of fishing crew. China will keep on enforcing the safety regulations of fishing activities and take 
concrete actions to safeguard the legitimate rights and interest of fishing crew and fishe rmen.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Chinese distant water fisheries companies have independently established labor service cooperation 
relations with relevant labor source countries through market -based approaches in accordance with 
international practices in distant water fisheries, achieving mutual benefit and win -win results. 
Therefore, there is no issue of growing labor practices aboard vessels.  
 
Page 135, Paragraph 4.39:  The Secretariat Report notes that the 13th Five -Year Plan on Fishery 
Development (2016 - 2020) inclu des a "going out " strategy to support the orderly development of 
deep sea fisheries and strengthening bilateral and multilateral fishery cooperation. Can China provide 
more details regarding its "going out " strategy in connection with addressing harmful fi shing 
practices?  
 
Reply : In accordance with the rights granted by the international law and relevant bilateral 
cooperation agreements, China has conducted rational development and utilization of international 
living marine resources by developing distant water fisheries. In order to responsibly develop distant 
water fisheries, China attaches great importance to the scientific conservation and sustainable 
utilization of fishery resources and actively fulfills its international obligations. By formulating and 
revising laws and regula tions, such as, the Regulations on Administration of Distant Water Fishery, 
China has established a sound administration system for distant water fisheries, and implemented 
the strictest measures for monitoring and administration of positions of fishing ve ssels. In particular, 
in recent years, China has voluntarily imposed a fishing ban on part of the high seas and strictly 
supervised the transshipment activities on the high seas. China has joined eight regional fisheries 
management organizations, ranking a mong the top in terms of compliance. In addition, China 
actively works with the international community to severely crack down on IUU fishing activities.  
 
Page 135, Paragraph 4.39: The Secretariat Report indicates that one of the elements of the 
13th Five-Year Plan on Fishery Development (2016 - 2020) is to increase public financial investment 
in the fisheries sector to, inter alia,  establish a policy support system that is conducive to the 
development of modern fisheries. Elements include reform and improv ement of the fishery oil price 
subsidy and a focus on supporting the reduction in the number of boats, the renovation and 
transformation of fishing vessels, the construction of artificial reefs, the maintenance and 
transformation of fishing ports, the stan dardization of ponds, the further development of factory -
based aquaculture and subsidies for banned fishing. Has China introduced measures to implement 
elements referenced above? If so, what are the measures?  
 
Reply: Yes, the above -mentioned points have b een implemented. With respect to the fisheries 
subsidies, the main support at the central level includes stock enhancement, aquatic animal epidemic 
prevention, renovation and transformation of fishing vessels, aquatic breeding project, support to 
fishermen  and enterprises involved in the reduction of the number of fishing vessels and no longer 
engaging in fishing, and whose fishing vessels are dismantled or transformed into artificial reefs. 
Some support is provided to fisheries resource conservation, subsi dies for banned fishing, fishery 
and fishery administration informatization construction, navigation sign -post construction in fishing 
ports, fishing vessel pass guide and safety equipment construction, standardized and plant -based 
recycling water transfor mation in ponds and other aquaculture infrastructure construction. The 
specific content of the subsidies has been notified to the WTO.  
 
Page 135, Paragraph 4.39: The Secretariat Report describes how the 13th Five -Year Plan on 
Fishery Development (2016 -20) also includes principles related to people -oriented development and 
strengthened rule of law. How are these principles being applied to improve labor conditions and 
harvesting practices in China 's distant water fleet? Are there ways they are bein g extended to fleets 
with beneficial Chinese ownership operating under other flags?  
 
Reply : China puts a high value on the protection of the rights and interests of fishermen, especially 
in the distant water fishing area. Provisions on protecting labor rights and personal safety of fishing 
crew are explicitly stipulated in the Administrative Measures on Fishing Crew, the Regulations on 
Administration of Distant Water Fishery, and the Circular on Strengthening Management on Foreign 
Crews in Distant Water Fishing Vessels, etc. Measures have been taken, such as increasing training 
for fishery companies and crews, requiring timely remuneration to crew members, improving 
working and living conditions as well as safety for crew on board, and pr oviding medical treatment 
and psychological help for the sick crew in a timely manner via sending hospital ships and providing 
basic medicines. China 's administrative authorities have made it a key task to strengthen supervision 
of the safety conditions of  distant water fishing, and hold the legal representatives of fishery 
companies, project managers and captains responsible for work safety. Meanwhile, the government WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  will also provide support for fishing vessels to install lifesaving equipment, communicati on, 
navigation and environmental protection facilities so as to ensure safety of fishing crew. China will 
keep on enforcing the safety regulations of fishing activities and take concrete actions to safeguard 
the legitimate rights and interest of fishing cr ew and fishermen.  
 
4.1.3.3  Government support to the fisheries sector  
Page 136, Paragraph 4.40: The Secretariat Report states: "According to the authorities, the 
Government will shortly issue a new policy to terminate fuel and boat construction subsidies, with 
the last of these pay -outs being made at end -2020. " Does this include fuel subsidies to distant water 
fleets flagged to China?  
 
Reply: As stipulated in the Circular on Implementing Policy to Support Development of Fishery 
Sector to Promote High -Quality Development of Fishery Sector (Circular Cai  Nong [2021] No. 41) 
issued in May 2021, China has abolished fuel subsidies which directly cover the cost of fishing, and 
redirected the subsidies towards supporting national marine ranching a nd fisheries infrastructure 
construction, boosting green and circular development of fisheries sector, enhancing compliance 
capability with respect to international obligations and promoting oceanic resources conservation. 
The new subsidies policy, featuri ng the objective of green development, is designed to incentivize 
fishermen to preserve fisheries resources, reduce fishing intensity and promote the sustainable 
utilization of marine fishery sources.  
 
Page 136, Paragraph 4.40: The Secretariat Report note s that the Chinese authorities have 
indicated that they will soon introduce a new policy halting fuel and boat construction subsidies, with 
payouts for these programs ending at the end of 2020. Did payouts for these programs end at the 
end of 2020 or have they continued during 2021? If the payouts ended, have fuel and boat building 
subsidies been replaced by new forms of government support? If the payouts continued, has the 
annual amount of support remained approximately the same as under the fuel and boat building 
subsidies from 2018 -2020?  
 
Reply: As stipulated in the Circular on Implementing Policy to Support Development of Fishery 
Sector to Promote High -Quality Development of Fishery Sector (Circular Cai Nong [2021] No. 41) 
issued in May 2021, China has abolished fuel subsidies which directly cove r the cost of fishing, and 
redirected the subsidies towards supporting national marine ranching and fisheries infrastructure 
construction, boosting green and circular development of fisheries sector, enhancing compliance 
capability with respect to internat ional obligations and promoting oceanic resources conservation. 
The new subsidies policy, featuring the objective of green development, is designed to incentivize 
fishermen to preserve fisheries resources, reduce fishing intensity and promote the sustainab le 
utilization of marine fishery sources.  
 
The highlight of this reform is that, for the first time, China made it a key part of the overall fisheries 
subsidies policies to support the survey and conservation of fisheries resources and compliance 
capabili ty enhancement with respect to international obligations on distant water fisheries. The 
subsidy amount is determined on the annual rating of the distant water fisheries companies and 
their vessels on their compliance performance. In this way, fishing comp anies and fishermen are 
incentivized to meet international conservation obligations and preserve international fisheries 
resources. At the same time, subsidies for the survey on global fisheries resources will provide 
further scientific support on conserva tion and sustainable utilization of high seas fishery resources. 
It is worth noting that the new subsidy policy is a significant policy adjustment made by China to 
follow the general direction set by the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations. It is conduciv e to 
restoring oceanic resources, protecting ocean ecosystem and promoting sustainable development of 
global fisheries resources.  
 
Page 136, Paragraph 4.40: The Secretariat Report states that, according to the 
Chinese  authorities, the Chinese Government wi ll shortly issue a new policy to terminate fuel and 
boat construction subsidies. Has China issued this policy since the drafting of this report?  If so, how 
has this policy been implemented. If not, which fuel and boat construction subsidies will be 
terminated in the current draft of the policy? How does this new policy relate to the 13th Five -Year 
Plan on Fishery Development (2016 -20), particularly  its goal to establish a policy support system 
that is conducive to the development of modern fisheries?  
 
Reply: The new policy has been released and implemented. In May 2021, the Ministry of Finance 
and the the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs i ssued the Circular on the Implementation of WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Fishery Development Support Policies to Promote the High -Quality Development of Fisheries, with 
the following main support directions. (i) Fisheries development subsidies mainly support the key 
projects incorpora ted into national key projects and the upgrading and replacement of fishery 
facilities and equipment to promote safe production, and other aspects. (ii) Other general transfer 
payments mainly support local governments to coordinate the promotion of high -quality 
development of fisheries in the local region. During the "14th Five -Year Plan " period, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs will conduct a mid -term evaluation of the 
implementation and effectiveness of the policy throughout China, and according to the results of the 
evaluation and changes in the situation, make dynamic adjustments to the scale of local funds. The 
new policy mainly serves the 14th Five -Year Plan on Fishery Development " (2021 -2025) (not yet 
available , under preparation).  
 
4.1.3.4 Fisheries conservation measures  
Page 136, Paragraph 4.43: According to the Secretariat Report, the Chinese authorities have 
stated that China has taken steps to limit illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU ) fishing activities 
and to strengthen monitoring and control of the fisheries industry while undertaking investigations 
into and administering penalties for illegal fishing activity and enterprises.  
• Do China 's anti -IUU fishing efforts apply to distant wa ter fishing vessels that are owned and 
operated by Chinese companies but registered in and fly the flag of a third country? What laws 
and regulations apply to such vessels? Does China work with foreign countries and organizations 
to ensure that these vesse ls are properly monitored and controlled? If so, how?  
 
Reply: China actively joins the relevant RFMOs, legally engages in offshore fishing activities under 
the jurisdiction of RFMOs , and effectively fulfills the obligations as a RFMO member. In recent years, 
China 's compliance performance in offshore fisheries has ranked among the top RFMOs such as the 
IOTC, and the level of compliance has improved year by year. Since 2020, China has  established a 
compliance evaluation mechanism for pelagic fishery enterprises to quantitatively evaluate the 
annual compliance performance of offshore fishing enterprises and their fishing vessels, and used 
the compliance evaluation results as the basis f or implementing incentives and penalties. As a 
member of eight RFMOs, China has supported the inclusion of illegal fishing vessels in the RFMO IUU 
fishing list, and cooperated with coastal countries to jointly combat illegal fishing activities. Bilateral 
fisheries dialogues and consultation mechanisms have been established the US, EU, Australia, 
New Zealand, Argentina and other countries to exchange experiences and practices in combating 
IUU fishing.  
 
• Does China keep records of distant water fishing vessels that are Chinese -owned and operated 
but registered in and fly the flag of a third country? How does China make this information 
available to international observers?  
 
Reply : China has established re gulatory regimes on distant water fisheries compatible with 
international norms. Regulations on Administration of Distant Water Fishery and the Management 
Measures for Monitoring of Distant Water Fishing Vessels ' Position have been amended, and relevant 
implementing measures such as the Circular on Strengthening the Management of Transshipment 
on High Seas in Distant Water Fisheries and the Detailed Rules on Implementation of National 
Observer Administration on Distant Water Fisheries were issued. The licen sing and approval system 
for distant water fisheries, as well as systems for data collection and reporting, fishing vessels ' 
position monitoring and electronic fishing log books, are enforced and improved specifically for 
distant water fisheries. China pro hibits distant water fisheries companies, vessels and crews from 
engaging in, supporting or assisting IUU fishing. With the strengthening of its overall regulatory 
systems, China is making continuous efforts to develop its distant water fishery sector in a  regulated 
and orderly manner.  
 
• How many fishery access agreements, fishery cooperation agreements, fishery base 
agreements, and other fishery arrangements does China have with other countries? Do these 
agreements have provisions that ensure the sustainab ility of the stocks being fished?  
 
Reply: China carries out cooperation in fisheries with many Asian countries including Malaysia and 
Thailand, many African countries including Mauritania and Ghana, South American countries 
including Argentina and Uruguay, and Pacific Island countries including Pa pua New Guinea and 
Micronesia, and holds regular bilateral fisheries dialogues with the United States, the European Union 
and Russia. Fisheries cooperation agreements take a variety of forms, ranging from 
intergovernmental agreements to business -to-governm ent agreements to business -to-business WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  agreements. The intergovernmental agreements and intergovernmental dialogues cover a number 
of topics, such as establishing regular meeting mechanisms, strengthening bilateral cooperation in 
areas such as trade, techn ology, and training, law enforcement supervision and information 
exchange, joint resource surveys, and cooperation in combating illegal fishing.  
 
4.2 Mining and Energy  
4.2.2 Energy  
4.2.2.1  Overview including environmental policy  
Page 142, Paragraph 4.61:  The Se cretariat Report states that China is optimizing its energy 
system, promoting energy production and consumption reform, and building a clean, decarbonized, 
safe and efficient modern energy system. The Secretariat Report also states that coal continues to 
represent a large part of the country 's primary energy and is the main cause of air pollution. Would 
China please explain how it plans to decarbonize its electrical system and reform the coal sector of 
its energy economy to reduce coal consumption?  
 
Reply: China attaches great importance to optimizing energy system and promoting green and low -
carbon energy development. In the past five years, by vigorously developing non -fossil energy and 
implementing electric energy substitution, China 's coal consump tion as a percentage of energy 
consumption has decreased by approximately 7 percentage points. By 2020, the proportion of coal 
in total energy consumption had been reduced to 56.8%. China has proposed to strictly control coal 
fired power projects, includin g tight control over coal consumption growth in the 14th Five -Year Plan 
period and gradual reduction in the 15th Five -Year Plan period. To further reduce the proportion of 
coal consumption and carbon emissions, first, we implement alternative renewable ene rgy actions, 
pushing forward the development and utilization of non -fossil energy such as water, wind, solar, 
biomass and geothermal energy. By 2025 and 2030, non -fossil energy will account for about 20% 
and 25% of energy consumption, respectively. By 2030 , total installed capacity of wind and solar 
power generation will reach more than 1.2 billion kilowatts. Second, we continue to advance electric 
energy substitution, such as the promotion of industrial electric boilers, electric kilns, etc., to drive 
clean heating in northern areas. Third, we promote the clean and efficient use of coal, and push 
forward the ultra -low emission and energy -saving transformation of coal fired generating units, to 
reduce coal burning. Fourth, we actively carry out research and demonstration of carbon dioxide 
capture, utilization and storage technology.  
 
4.3.2 Selected subsectors  
4.3.2.2 Machinery and equipment  
Page 151, Paragraph 4.112: The Secretariat Report indicates that special funds from the central 
budget were set to be earmarked to support robotics research and development. What are the 
intended uses of the special funds? Has China introduced measures to appropriate the special funds? 
If so, what are the measures?  
 
Reply : China has not set special funds from the central budget to support robotics research and 
development.  
 
4.3.2.3 Iron and steel  
Page 152, paragraph 4.116:  The Secretariat Report notes that ongoing efforts in China to 
eliminate overcapacity in the steel industry are guided by government policies, s pecifically the 
Opinions on Reducing Overcapacity in the Steel Industry to Achieve Development by Solving 
Difficulties, which ostensibly prohibits the building up of new steel capacity.  Under this policy, China 
planned to cut 150 million tons by 2020 to br ing capacity closer to consumption.  However, the OECD 
estimates that nominal crude steel making capacity in China continued to rise from 2018 levels, 
reaching approximately 1.12 billion metric tons in 2020.  The OECD also found that 
approximately  39.4 milli on tons of capacity investments are planned or currently underway in China.  
 
• Given the continued rise in China 's steel capacity despite policies to reduce overcapacity in the 
steel sector, what additional steps has China taken to accelerate steel capacity reduction plans?  
 
Reply: Data on China 's steel production capacity should be subject to the data submitted by the 
Chinese government to the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC) and the data from the 
external bulletin of the National Bureau of Statistics. We are not sure of the source and basis of the 
data of the report issued by the OECD, and we do not th ink it is appropriate to use it as a basis for 
evaluating China 's steel production capacity. Since 2016, China has strictly implemented the capacity 
replacement policy for the construction of steel projects. The Ministry of Industry and Information WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Technol ogy (MIIT) has formulated the Notice on the Issuance of Implementation Measures for 
Capacity Replacement in the Steel Industry (MIIT Original [2021] No. 46), which requires all steel 
project construction to strictly implement the capacity reduction and rep lacement policy, with a 
reduction and replacement ratio of 1.5:1 in key areas and 1.25:1 in other areas. Steel projects under 
construction in China, all premised on capacity replacement, are of a completely different nature 
than the building up of new stee l capacity. The construction of these projects is subject to the 
withdrawal of the corresponding existing capacity to achieve the goal of reducing and adjusting the 
stock of capacity.  
 
• Does China agree that the need for government policy directives indicat es that market forces 
are weak or nonexistent in China?  
 
Reply: China does not agree with the statement that "China 's market forces are weak or nonexistent ". 
"Government policies and directives " is China giving decisive role to market in resource allocation 
and the specific embodiment of better playing government role. This assertion reflects the consistent 
"double standard " approach of the United States, which on the one hand imposes the label o f "market 
distortion and government subsidies " on the production and operation of Chinese steel enterprises 
following market principles, and demands that the Chinese government should strengthen its 
intervention and increase its efforts to reduce productio n overcapacity; on the other hand, it 
questions China 's market power is weak or nonexistent.  
 
Page 152, Paragraph 4.117:  The Secretariat Report notes that, according to the 
Chinese  authorities, zombie companies in the steel industry have been largely dismantled.  
• Can China identify how many zombie companies in the steel industry have been dismantled since 
China 's last Trade Policy Review in 2018?  
• When the Chinese authorities state t hat zombie companies in the steel industry have been 
"dismantled, " are they referring to a zombie company being liquidated through bankruptcy, or 
are they referring to a zombie company that has been acquired by or merged with another 
company, or both? If b oth, please indicate how many zombie companies in the steel industry 
have been dismantled by liquidation through bankruptcy versus by acquisition or merger since 
China 's last Trade Policy Review in 2018.  
 
Reply to the above two questions : From 2016 to 201 9, a total of 64.74 million tons of crude 
steel production capacity of "zombie enterprises " or enterprises with the characteristics of "zombie 
enterprises " were withdrawn.  
 
4.3 Manufacturing  
Page 153, Paragraph 4.124: The Secretariat Report states that, with regard to the National 
IC Industry Investment Fund, the Chinese authorities have stated that this Fund is not affiliated with 
any government authority. The Secretariat Report then cites OECD documentation of the 
Fund's shareholdings as of Octobe r 2019, which include 11.02% of shares held by the Ministry of 
Finance, 10.77% of shares held by China Development Bank Capital, and 7.35% of shares held by 
China National Tobacco, a central SOE. Given these shareholdings, what is China 's basis for stating  
that the Fund is not affiliated with any government authority?  
 
Reply : The National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund strictly follows applicable laws and 
regulations related to private equity investment funds in its management, and each investment shall 
obtain relevant gains. The fund has diversified capital sources of 19 shareholders including both 
state-owned and private enterprises. The fund operates in accordance with the Company Law and 
does not fall under any governmental authority.  The practices over the past five years reveal that 
only the decisions in line with corporate interests would be approved; the shareholders focus on the 
ROI, and would never provide free subsidy for any enterprise by following the government 's mindset 
and behaviors.  
 
4.3.2.4  Electronic, IT, and integrated circuits  
Page 154, paragraph 4.126: The Secretariat Report states that the State Council released the 
Policy on Promoting High -quality Development of Integrated Circuit Industry and Software Industry 
(Guo Fa No. 8, 2020). Under the Policy, China rolled out a wide range of favorable measures, such 
as preferential corporate income tax, favorable financing, support for R&D, preferential import duties 
for certain products, and simplified customs formalities.  What is C hina's policy on notifying the 
incentives referenced above in its subsidy notification under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Reply: Please refer to paragraph 35 of the latest notification of subsidies submitted by China, 
G/SCM/N/372/CHN, "Tax Benefits for Integrated Circuit Industry ". 
 
4.4 Services  
4.4.1 Financial services  
4.4.1.1 Overview  
Page 157, paragraph 4.141 : The Secretariat Report provides a description of the overall level of 
activity in the  insurance sector, broken down by key sub -sectors and measured by assets held by 
insurance companies. Can China further elaborate on this information and explain the level of assets 
held specifically by foreign -invested insurance companies, broken down by the same sub -sectors 
and broken down as a percentage of overall assets for each sub -sector.  
 
Reply: As of the end of December 2020, the life insurance companies ' assets totaled 19.98 trillion 
yuan, with Chinese funds accounting for 92.65% and foreign funds accounting for 7.35%; non -life 
insurance companies ' assets totaled 2.34 trillion yuan, with Chinese funds accounting for 96.07%, 
and foreign funds accounting fo r 3.93%.  
 
4.4.1.3 Recent regulatory developments  
4.4.1.3.1 Overview  
Page 158, paragraph 4.145: The Secretariat Report acknowledges efforts that China has made to 
allow greater foreign participation in asset management.China issued its first provincial -level 
financial asset management license to a foreign -invested company (for the purchase of distressed 
assets from banks) in February 2020, but since then it has not taken steps to issue either provincial 
or national licenses to foreign -invested companies. C urrently, China has five licensed national asset 
management companies, none of which are foreign -invested. What is China 's policy on increasing 
the total number of provincial or national licenses and offering foreign -invested companies ' greater 
access to them?  
 
Reply: Under the China -United States Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement, China allows U.S. 
financial service providers to apply for asset management company licenses starting at provincial 
level. We welcome applications from el igible U.S. investors.  
 
4.4.1.3.3 Regulatory developments in insurance  
4.4.1.3.3.1 Developments in licensing requirements  
4.4.1.3.4 Recent developments in securities activities  
4.4.1.3.4.1 Foreign participation  
Page 162, Paragraph 4.168: China has stated that the legislative work on the Futures Law is 
ongoing. China 's National People 's Congress Standing Committee conducted its first round of 
deliberations on a draft of the law and released it for public comment i n April 2021.  
 
Reply: The Twenty -eighth Session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People 's 
Congress (NPC) held from April 26 to 29, 2021, held the initial review on the Futures Law of the 
People 's Republic of China (Draft). The draft was published on April 29, 2021 on the website of the 
Chinese People 's Congress for comments, and the deadline for comments was May 28, 2021. The 
legislative departments, in conjunction with the CSRC and other relevant departments, made the 
absorption and adop tion based on careful study. The 102nd meeting of the council of chairmen of 
the Standing Committee of the 13th NPC held on September 28, 2021 recommended that the draft 
futures law would be considered again at the 31st meeting of the Standing Committee of  the 
13th NPC to be held from October 19 to 23, 2021.  
 
4.4.1.3.5 Developments in pension fund management  
Page 165, Paragraph 4.182: According to the Secretariat Report, with regard to the sector of 
pension fund management, "the FSDC announced that China wi ll permit foreign financial institutions 
to set up or to invest in Chinese private pension fund management companies. "  
 
• Please clarify whether the "FSDC " is the Financial Stability and Development Committee under 
China 's State Council. Please also provide more information regarding the FDSC 's 
announcement, including its date and title and whether it specifies which Chinese agency has 
oversight for acceptin g and reviewing any applications from foreign companies.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply : On July 20, 2019, the Office of the Financial Stability and Development Committee released 
the Relevant Measures for Further Opening Up the Financial Industry, introducing 11 measures to 
open up the financial sector, including "allowing foreign financial institutions to invest in the 
establishment and participation of pension management companies ". On the same day, the CBRC 
spokesman in an interview with reporters, has made it clear that the CBRC will do a good job in the 
licensing and admission of pension management companies with the relevant ministries and 
commissions by approving the matured companies.  
 
• Has China made publicly available any information on its licensing process in the pensi on fund 
management sector? If so, where? Does China follow the same process for accepting and 
reviewing applications from foreign companies as it does from Chinese companies?  
 
Reply: The CSRC  has not set up a separate license for the "private pension fund company ". 
Securities companies and fund companies approved by the CSRC, if meeting the relevant legal 
requirements, may raise and establish pension target funds or apply to the relevant autho rities to 
become pension fund management institutions in accordance with the law.  
 
• Is the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) the sole regulator in the 
pension fund management sector, or are other Chinese regulatory agencies also invo lved?  
 
Reply: In accordance with the administrative licensing work procedures under the Administrative 
Licensing Law, Provisions on Procedures for the Implementation of Administrative Licensing and 
other laws and regulations, the CSRC, through the CSRC we bsite, publishes the establishment of 
public fund management companies, official fund manager qualification approval application 
materials and application requirements, administrative licensing service guide, processing progress 
and results, etc. Query Gov ernment Affairs Service Platform Project on CSRC official website 
(www.csrc.gov.cn) for the specific information. China follows the same procedures for 
Chinese  companies in accepting and reviewing applications from foreign companies.  
 
• Does the regulatory process operated by the CBIRC and/or other regulators enable a foreign 
company to obtain licenses for all of the components of pension fund management under China 's 
system (e.g., custodian, asset management, trustee, etc.)?  
 
Reply: At present, in addition to the CBRC, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 
the Ministry of Finance, the People 's Bank of China, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and 
other institutions supervise the pension business of fund m anagement companies according to their 
regulatory responsibilities.  
 
• The Secretariat Report notes that the Chinese authorities have said that they have adopted a 
model of "one-on-one approvals " for any eligible companies. What does this mean in practice, 
and how would it contribute to China 's stated goal of allowing foreign financial institutions to set 
up their own private pension fund management companies?  
 
Reply: China 's pension management companies are still in the pilot phase, and there is only one 
CCB pension management company established by China Construction Bank (CCB). The CBIRC 
allows overseas financial institutions to invest in the establishment of pension management 
companies, and will adopt the "mature one, then approve one " approach to work with relevant 
ministries and commissions to do a good job in licensing access. Next, the CBIRC will promote the 
improvement of relevant laws and regulations.  
 
4.4.2 Telecommunications  
4.4.2.1  Overview  
Page 168, Box 4.2: Statistics in Box 4.2 in dicate that both fixed and mobile telecommunications 
service segments are dominated by companies that are majority state -owned enterprises. Of 
the 85,000 companies providing value -added telecommunications services, only 395 foreign -
invested companies were able to enter the market (via "information services and e -commerce -
related businesses "). How many of these 395 companies are wholly foreign -owned?  
 
Reply: By the end of 2020, there were 94,018 value -added telecommunications enterprises in China, 
including 395 foreign -invested telecommunications enterprises and 99 wholly foreign -owned 
telecommunications enterprises.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  4.4.2.2 Regulatory framework  
Page 168, Paragraph 4.202: It is the United States ' understanding that the 2000 Telecoms 
Regulations (l ast amended in 2016) are scheduled for review in 2021. Are draft amendments to 
the 2000 Telecoms Regulations currently available for public review and comment? If not, when will 
they be?  
 
Reply: At present, the Telecommunications Law is in the process of drafting, and related regimes 
are being revised and improved. We will follow the legislation procedures stipulated in the Legislation 
Law of the People 's Republic of China to do a good job in the research and demonstration, soliciting 
opinions, revision and improvement and other legislation works related to the Telecommunications 
Law. 
 
Page 169, Paragraph 4.204: Please explain China 's rationale for maintaining restrictions in the 
telecommunications sector that do not allow for meaningful foreign participation?  
 
Reply: China has opened up its telecommunications business to foreign investment in accordance 
with its WTO accession commitments. Foreign investors may participate in the business operation 
in the corresponding telecommunications field after obtaining license according to law. In recent 
years, China has continuously promoted the opening of the telecommunications market and the 
reform to streamline administration and delegate power, improve regulation, and upgrade  services, 
providing a favorable environment for foreign investors to invest and engage in telecommunications 
business in China. At the same time, China has been actively exploring to promote the further 
opening up of the telecommunications sector in China  (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.  
 
4.4.2.2.1 Developments in 5G  
Page 169, Paragraph 4.208: Do any Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 5G guidance 
documents acknowledge the potential benefits of open standards and access network component 
disag gregation ( "opeRAN ") in 5G network topology design?  
 
Reply: The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has not publicly released a similar 
5G guidance document, and we do not know about the information sources of the US. At present, 
openRAN has been closely followed in the global industry. China has always adhered to the principle 
of technology neutrality, acted on market principles, and will pa y close attention to the latest 
progress and future development trend of this technology. In the meanwhile, the Ministry of Industry 
and Information Technology encourages Chinese enterprises and institutions to actively participate 
in the international sta ndardization work related to 5G, so as to enhance the consistency between 
Chinese standards and international standards. In the next step, we will closely follow the 
development status of open standards and access network component decomposition (opeRAN) 
related technologies in 5G network topology design, and scientifically evaluate their potential 
benefits.  
 
4.4.2.2.5 Cloud computing  
Page 170, Paragraph 4.213: The Secretariat Report notes that China does not allow any direct 
provision of cloud computing services by foreign -invested companies and that their only access is 
through the negotiation of contractual partnerships with Chinese companies, where the Chinese 
company applies for the licenses needed to supply cloud computing services. Please explain China 's 
rationale for not liberalizing the cloud computing sector to allow for meaningful foreign participation?  
 
Reply: At present, China is actively promoting the further opening up of the telecommunications 
sector in accordance with the require ments of develop new systems for a higher -standard open 
economy. On the basis of China 's WTO commitments, China will study and explore the feasibility of 
relaxing the share ratio restriction of foreign capital in telecommunications field in pilot areas.  
 
Page 170, Paragraph 4.213: What are the key barriers to the implementation of the 2017 Notice 
on Standardizing Cloud Service Market and Facilitating the Sound Development of the Industry?  
 
Reply: Notice on Standardizing Cloud Service Market and Facilitating the Sound Development of the 
Industry has not been issued.  
 
4.4.2.2.6 Cybersecurity  
Page 170, Paragraph 4.214: The Secretariat Report discusses China 's Cybersecurity Law, which 
entered into force in June 2017, including draft implementing reg ulations that have implications WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  for cross-border dataflows and data localization. One troubling aspect of the Cybersecurity Law is 
Article 37, which mandates that "critical information infrastructure operators " store within mainland 
China all personal info rmation and "important data " gathered or produced within mainland China. 
The Cybersecurity Law also requires that network operators successfully complete a security 
assessment before any locally stored data can be transferred overseas. In connection with data 
flows, including cross -border data flows, China recently finalized a Data Security Law (approved in 
June 2021 and entered into force in September 2021) and a Law on Protection of Personal 
Information (approved in August 2021 and will enter into force in November 2021).  
 
• How and when will China implement the Data Security Law and the Law on Protection of Personal 
Information?  
 
Reply: The main starting point for China to formulate relevant policies is to support data flow and 
data development and utilization. However, it should be  noted that the disorderly circulation and 
sharing of data may lead to major risks in personal information protection and data security, and 
necessary, appropriate and non -discriminatory management should be imposed. Strengthening the 
management of cross -border data flow is also a common international practice. The Data Security 
Law has been implemented on 1 September 2021, and the Law on Protection of Personal Information 
will be implemented on 1 November 2021. Relevant departments will do a good job in se curity 
protection, supervision and management according to law.  
 
• How does China plan to rationalize any overlaps in regulatory jurisdiction among the Data 
Security Law, the Law on Protection of Personal Information and the Cybersecurity Law with 
regard to the obligations that apply to dataflows, including cross -border d ataflows? Has China 
withdrawn, or does China plan to withdraw, the draft implementing regulations relating to cross -
border data flows that previously were released in connection with the Cybersecurity Law?  
 
Reply: The provisions on cross-border data outflow in Data Security Law, the Law on Protection of 
Personal Information and the Cybersecurity Law have different emphasis, which are connected and 
complementary to each other, and there is no overlap of regulatory jurisdiction. Accord ing to 
Cybersecurity Law, Data Security Law and the Law on Protection of Personal Information, relevant 
supporting regulations such as data security management and security assessment on cross -border 
data outflow are being worked out, and it is expected to  solicit public comments in the near future.  
 
The Secretariat Report notes that the Chinese authorities plan to develop further regulations 
regarding critical information infrastructure operators. Can China elaborate on this intention? Which 
regulations ar e under development, and how do they relate to the Cybersecurity Law, the Data 
Security Law, the Law on Personal Information Protection or any other relevant measures that China 
already has in place? What is the intended subject matter of the planned regul ations regarding 
critical information infrastructure operators?  
 
Reply : Strengthening the protection of key information infrastructure is international common 
practice. For example, the US, Germany and Japan have enacted relevant laws to include important  
industries and fields into the scope of protection. According to the needs of China 's situation and 
drawing lessons from the practices of other countries, the Cybersecurity Law stipulates the 
protection system of key information infrastructure. Regulation  on Protecting the Security of Critical 
Information Infrastructure clarifies the scope and identification procedures of critical information 
infrastructure. Key information infrastructure refers to important industries and fields such as public 
communicati on and information services, power, traffic, water resources, finance, public service, e -
government, and other critical information infrastructure which —if destroyed, suffering a loss of 
function, or experiencing leakage of data —might seriously endanger na tional security, national 
welfare, the people 's livelihood, or the public interest. Chapter II of the Regulations stipulates that 
the competent departments and regulatory authorities of the above -mentioned important industries 
and fields, as protection dep artments, shall be responsible for formulating the identification rules of 
key information infrastructure, organizing the identification of key information infrastructure in their 
own industries and fields, and timely notifying the operators and the public  security department of 
the State Council of the identification results. In the meanwhile, according to the relevant provisions 
of Article 31 of the Cybersecurity Law, the State encourages operators of networks outside the 
[designated] critical information  infrastructure systems to voluntarily participate in the critical 
information infrastructure protection system.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 171, 4.218: The Secretariat Report indicates that VPN use has been prohibited via 
2018 legislation but that provisions appear to be in place that allow VPN use for commercial purposes 
in certain government -approved circumstances. Can China explain the legal basis and rationale for 
this distinction? What are the procedures and guidelines for commercial VPN approval and use? Do 
provisions for commercial VPN use accommodate the cross -border data flows of foreign enterprises? 
Please explain.  
 
Reply: Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a general network communication technology. To maintain 
a fair a nd orderly market order, promote the healthy development of the industry, the regulations 
formulated by our Ministry on cross -border telecommunication business activities are mainly based 
on the Telecommunications Regulation of the People 's Republic of Chi na (Order No.291 of the 
State  Council) and Measures on the Administration of International Communication Accesses 
(Order  No. 22 of the former Ministry of Information Industry). The targets of regulation are 
enterprises or individuals without the approval o f the competent telecommunications department 
and without the qualification for international communications business, renting international 
dedicated lines or VPNs and illegally carrying out cross -border telecommunications business 
activities. Relevant re gulations will not affect the normal cross -border access of domestic and foreign 
enterprises and users to the Internet and the legal and compliant development of various business 
activities. When foreign trade enterprises and multinational enterprises need  cross-border 
networking through special routes due to office use and other reasons, they can rent from telecom 
operators with international communication business qualifications with the approval of the 
competent telecommunications department.  
The manage ment methods vary across different countries. Those living, carrying out production and 
other activities in China shall abide by Chinese laws and regulations. Any activities involving legal 
operation and use shall be protected by law.   
 
4.4.3.1  Maritime transport  
Page 175, paragraph 4.237: The Secretariat Report states: "In order to encourage qualified 
Chinese -funded international 'Flag of Convenience ' ships to return to China, ships that were declared 
for import and were registered between September 2016 and September 2019 were exempt from 
customs duties and import VAT. " Did China include the customs duties incentives referenced above 
in its most recen t subsidy notification under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures?  
 
Reply: China is studying on this issue.  
 
Page 176, Paragraph 4.242: The Secretariat Report indicates that , under the Ship Tonnage Tax 
Law, "Chinese taxable ships and taxable ships whose country of registry has signed treaties or 
agreements that mutually grant MFN treatment clauses of ship taxes and fees " receive preferential 
rates. It also notes that there are special tax exemptions for "fishing and breeding fishing boats. " 
Can China explain the preferential rates given to some ships and the special exemptions for fishing 
and breeding fishing boats? Has C hina notified the incentives referenced above in its most recent 
subsidy notification under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?  
 
Reply: China is studying this issue.  
 
Page 176, Paragraph 4.244: Is there any foreign invest ment in Chinese ports in practice?   
 
Reply: Many Chinese ports have foreign investment.  
 
4.4.3.2 Air transport  
Page 177, Paragraph 4.250: Are there any requirements that persons or goods be transported 
on nationally registered airlines?  
 
Reply: The meaning of "nationally registered " is unclear. The specific requirements for Airlines 
(including nationally registered airlines) to transport pa ssengers and their luggage and goods shall 
be implemented in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Aviation Law and the 
announcement of the Civil Aviation Administration on the catalogue of prohibiting or restricting 
passengers from carrying  or checking items.  
 
Page 179, Table 4.25: Table 4.25 states that the Government of China intends to "arrange full 
subsidy from civil aviation development fund for B737NG aircraft data frame expansion projects. " WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Will China notify the incentives referenced above in its next subsidy notification under Article 25 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?  
 
Reply : According to ASCM Agreement, Notification of a measure does not prejudge either its lega l 
status under GATT 1994 and this Agreement, the effects under this Agreement, or the nature of the 
measure . China submits subsidy notification in accordance with WTO rules.  
 
5 APPENDIX TABLES  
Page 194, Table A3.2:  The Secretariat Report states that China has continued to provide financial 
support to the fisheries sector, but does not provide a value of support. Given China 's longstanding 
obligation to notify all of its fisheries subsidies under Article 25 of the Ag reement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, when will China finally provide a full accounting of all of its fisheries 
subsidies, particularly at the sub -central levels of government, which are more directly responsible 
for the fishing industry within  China 's jurisdiction?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China, there 
are a total of 6 fisheries subsidies at the central level and 45 at the local level.  
 
Part II. Questions based on the Government Report (WT/TPR/G/415)  
1 INTRODUCTION  
3.1.2  Continuously improving trade facilitation  
Page 7, Paragraph 3.7:  The Government Report indicates that customs clearance time for imports 
nationwide was 37.12 hours in March 20 21. Please explain how this figure was calculated. Please 
also explain what steps is China pursing to ensure adequate staffing and technology are available 
for customs clearance of perishable products.  
 
Reply: The overall customs clearance time of import refers to the time from arrival of imported 
goods to allowed pick-up of goods. This data is the average overall customs clearance time of actual 
entry and exit customs declarations within the corresponding time period, which is counted by all 
simple arithm etic averages included in the calculation of customs declarations.  
 
3.2.2  Actively expanding market access for foreign investment  
Page 9, Paragraph 3.16:  The Government Report provides examples of foreign investment 
restrictions lifted in a number of sectors, including the purchase and wholesale of rice, wheat, and 
corn. Please explain China 's rationale for maintaining foreign investment restrictions on cr op seed 
breeding for rice and soybeans and on biotechnology development of planting seeds across several 
planting seed varieties.  
 
Reply: Relevant departments are studying this issue . Expanding the opening up of seed industry is 
an important part of buildi ng a new pattern of comprehensive opening up of the country, which 
reflects China 's firm determination to expand opening up. Expanding the opening up of seed industry 
is the objective need of deepening the structural reform of agricultural supply side, whi ch will 
accelerate the introduction of foreign famous and excellent new varieties, the rapid development of 
characteristic crop industry and meet people 's needs for characteristic agricultural products. China 
will further optimize the development environme nt of seed industry, welcome foreign investment in 
seed industry and carry out seed production and business activities according to law.  
 
3.2.4 Promoting the innovation -driven development of national economic and 
technological development zones  
Page 10, Paragraph 3.19:  The Government Report notes that China has set up 217 national 
economic and technological development zones. However, the Ministry of Commerce lists 219 
national -level economic and technological development zones (http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/x glj/ 
kaifaqu.shtml) and the Ministry of Science and Technology lists an additional 168 national new and 
high-tech industrial development zones (http://most.gov.cn/zxgz/gxjscykfq/gxjsgxqml/).  
 
• What distinguishes the zones listed by the Ministry of Commerce from those listed by the Ministry 
of Science and Technology?  
 
Reply: National economic and technological development zones are the carrier platform for opening 
to the outside world and an imp ortant engine for regional economic development. In 1984, based 
on the successful experience of building special economic and technological zones, the State Council 
approved the establishment of the first batch of 14 national economic and technological dev elopment WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  zones in 12 coastal cities. Since its establishment more than 30 years ago, with the deepening of 
opening to the outside world, the layout of national economic and technological development zones 
has been continuously expanded inland. After years of development, there are now 230 national 
economic and technological development zones, covering 31 provinces (autonomous regions and 
municipalities) in China. National high -tech industrial development zones are established in some 
knowledge -intensive and  technology -intensive large and medium -sized cities and coastal areas to 
develop high -tech industrial development zones. In 1988, the first high -tech industrial development 
zone w as established, and as of now, there are 168 high -tech industrial development  zones 
nationwide.  
 
• For each type of zones, what percentage of companies participating in the zones are majority 
foreign -owned?  
 
Reply: Foreign -owned enterprises are relatively concentrated in national economic and technological 
development zones. According to statistics, national economic and technological development zones 
accounts for about 20% of the utilization of foreign capital in the whole country.  
 
• Article 12 of the Opinions on Advancing Innovation in National Economic and Technological 
Development Zones and Building a New Highland for Reform and Opening -up calls for 
strengthening cooperation between national economic and technological development zones and 
investment funds and/or industry funds. What investment funds and industry funds are currently 
active in the zones listed by the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology?  
 
Reply: National economic and technological development zone is industrial cluster. To encourage 
the development of manufacturing industry, the Op inions on Advancing Innovation in National 
Economic and Technological Development Zones and Building a New Highland for Reform and 
Opening -up proposes to strengthen cooperation with relevant investment funds, give full play to the 
role of industrial funds,  bank credit, securities market, insurance funds and national financing 
guarantee funds, and expand investment and financing channels for developing industrial clusters.  
 
Page 10, Paragraph 3.19: The Government Report notes that one of the 22 supportive measures 
offered by the Chinese government is "strengthening guarantees for productive factors. " Please 
explain in greater detail what guarantees are being provided, to whom they are being provided,  and 
what "productive factors " are being guaranteed?  
 
Reply : The Opinions of the State Council on Advancing the Innovation and Improvement of National 
Economic and Technological Development Zones and Creating New Highlands for Reform and 
Opening -Up clearly  states that China will strengthen the guarantee of factors and the intensive use 
of resources regarding land use, energy resources, talent policies, employment and 
entrepreneurship.  
 
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.2.2 Deeply and fully participating in multilateral negotiations and discussions, and 
earnestly fulfilling the obligations as a WTO Member  
Page 15, Paragraph 4.20: On April 8, 2020, the United States sent a request to China 's inquiry 
point for copies of several Chinese measures that did not appear to have been published. China 
refused to provide those measures to the United States. Instead, China indicated that it was not 
obligated to share measures that were  set to expire soon. Moreover, China 's response was received 
more than one year after the request was submitted, well beyond the 30 -day requirement 
(or 45 days in exceptional cases) for responding, as set out in Paragraph 2(C) of China 's Protocol of 
Access ion to the WTO. What is China 's policy on making all requested measures available to 
WTO Members without regard to whether the measures being requested are currently in effect, 
expired, or set to expire?  
 
Reply: China has always attached great importance t o compliance with WTO rules, and has been 
fulfilling its related obligations under the WTO framework. China will respond to the formal requests 
of WTO members for trade policies as defined in the relevant provisions of the Accession Protocol in 
accordance with the requirements of its accession commitments.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 15, Paragraph 4.21: The Government Report notes that new fisheries policies for 2021 -2025 
have been adopted that seek to promote the modernization and high -quality development of China 's 
fisheries s ector. Recently released government documents, notably the Administrative Measures for 
Fisheries Development Subsidy Funds, suggest that new fisheries policies will de -emphasize fishing 
vessel reduction while continuing to subsidize distant water fishing a ctivities that may contribute to 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.  
 
• Is fishing vessel reduction and/or conversion no longer a priority for China? Is China 's policy to 
continue fishing vessel reduction efforts during the 2021 -2025 period?  
 
Reply : During the "14th Five -Year Plan " period (2021 -2025), China will continue to implement the 
policy of fishing vessel reduction and/or conversion, and make it a priority, so as to reduce fishing 
intensity and protect marine fishery resources. At the same time, employment training of fishing 
vessel reduction and/or conversion for fishermen will continue to be carried out to provide fishermen 
with employment opportunities and positions.  
 
• Recent Chinese fisheries subsidy measures have mentioned "international contract performance 
(compliance) " as one of the new policy task factors based on which subsidies may be awarded. 
What are some examples of "international contract performance " benchma rks that fisheries 
enterprises must meet to receive fishery subsidies?  
 
Reply : Since 2020, China has established a mechanism of compliance performance assessment on 
distant water fisheries companies with respect to international regulations. China 's fisher ies 
administrative authorities carry out quantitative assessment annually on the compliance 
performance of distant water fisheries companies and their vessels, use the score of the annual 
assessment as the basis for subsidies or punishment, so as to incent ivize the fulfillment of 
international conservation obligations and preservation of international fisheries resources.  
China implements a compliance performance assessment system, and determines the amount of 
subsidies for fishing vessels based on their c ompliance with international conventions and production 
in compliance with laws. The compliance performance assessment is based on a scoring system. 
Many contents are included in the scope of assessment, including such pluses as vessel position 
monitoring,  fishing log submission, fishing vessel registration, routine notification, crew 
management, safety production, emergency rescue in accordance with laws, regulations and 
relevant RFMO requirements, and such minuses as illegal overstepping, illegal fishing and overfishing. 
The amount of subsidy is determined according to the final score of the enterprise that owns the 
fishing vessel.  
 
• How will subsidies contingent on distant water fishing be managed to ensure that Chinese fishing 
vessels do not engage in IUU fishing or overfishing in overseas waters?  
 
Reply : China relentlessly combats IUU fishing through tightening regulations on distan t water fishing 
vessels. In accordance with the Management Measures for Monitoring of Distant Water Fishing 
Vessels ' Position amended in 2020, a distant water vessel shall report its position once every hour, 
so as to prevent any production activity beyond  the permitted areas. It is more stringent than the 
international reporting standard of once every four hours. To prohibit transshipping and transporting 
of illegal catches, all high -seas transshipment activities shall be reported to China 's fisheries 
administrative authorities and the national observer system is rolling out gradually. China is 
committed to law enforcement on the high seas and contributes significant administrative resources 
to the crack -down of IUU fishing on the high seas. IUU fishing is punished with "zero tolerance ". If 
relevant RFMOs made affirmative determinations that Chinese companies or fishing vessels engaged 
in, supported or provided assistance to IUU fishing, China 's fishery administrative authority would 
punish the companies and  vessels concerned by fining, disqualifying them for fisheries subsidies, 
suspending or revoking their distant water fishing licenses and/or blacklisting the captain and 
management personnel, etc.  
 
4.4 Building International Platforms for Opening Up and Cooperation  
4.4.1 Promoting high quality cooperation for the Belt and Road Initiative  
Page 18, Paragraph 4.36: What steps is China taking to promote a high -quality Belt and Road 
Initiative?  
 
Reply : First, China is conducting high -quality policy matching, promoting soft linking of policies, 
rules and standards, and building more extensive and pragmatic partnerships. Second, China is WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  promoting the interconnectivity of infrastructure to achieve high -quality interconnective 
development. Third, China is promoti ng unimpeded and high -quality trade development and 
effectively boosting trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. Fourth, China is promoting 
the high -quality development of financial integration, establishing a sound, long -term, stable, 
sustai nable and diversified financing system with risks under control, supporting the effective 
operation of multilaterally developed financing cooperation centers, and encouraging multilateral 
and international financial institutions to participate in the inves tment and financing of the Belt and 
Road initiative. Fifth, China is promoting a high -quality people -to-people bond and deepening 
cooperation in various fields.  
 
Page 18, Paragraph 4.37: The Government Report states that, "with greater cooperation on green 
energy, green infrastructure and green finance, a Green Silk Road is being built. " However, "green " 
is a term that can have many meanings. Can China explain what it means by "cooperation  on green 
energy, infrastructure and finance "? Are there any publicly available Chinese documents that China 
can share with WTO Members on this topic?  
 
Reply: In April 2021, President Xi Jinping proposed at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for 
Asia Annual Conference 2021 that it is necessary to build closer green development partnerships, 
with cooperation in the fields of green infrastructure, green energy , and green finance strengthened, 
so that green can become a defining feature of Belt and Road cooperation ，which has further defined 
the direction and key actions of the construction of the Green Silk Road.  
Among them, green energy refers to cooperation wi th co-constructing countries in the fields of wind 
power, solar power and other renewable energy resources. Green infrastructure refers to the 
advocation of green and low -carbon construction and operation of infrastructure, and cooperation 
with co -construc ting countries in the field of green infrastructure construction. Green finance 
cooperation includes the promotion of the formation of the concept of common development of green 
finance, the best experience in the field of green finance, the capacity build ing in the field of green 
finance, the improvement of the green level of foreign investment, and other aspects.  
 
Page 18, Paragraph 4.37:  The Government Report refers to the greening of the Belt and Road 
Initiative and the emergence of the Green Silk Road. Given this development, will the 
Chinese  government instruct China Eximbank and SINOSURE to stop supporting certain energy 
projects such  as fossil fuel projects (e.g., coal fire plants, etc.)?  
 
Reply: China 's president Xi Jinping announced at the general debate of the 76th UN General 
Assembly that China will vigorously support the development of green and low -carbon energy in 
developing countries, and will no longer build new overseas coal -fired power generation projects. 
This is another key initiative since China 's declaration of peak carbon dioxide emissions and carbon 
neutrality, which is also an important action to promote the construction of the Green Silk Road. 
During the Belt and Road initiative construction, China will strictly implement the requirements of 
no longer building new overseas coal -fired power generation projects, and work with the co -
constructing countries t o respond to the global challenges of climate change together.  
 
4.5.2 Contributing to the implementation of UN 2030 agenda for sustainable development  
Page 20, Paragraph 4.49:  China has indicated that it helps developing country Members by 
building public  facilities and energy infrastructure and supporting wildlife protection. Would China 
explain how it helps developing country Members in these areas?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the white paper China 's International Development Cooperation in 
the New Era (full text)  
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/32832/Document/1696685/1696685.htm  
 
Page 20, Paragraph 4.49: As a major consumer of wildlife and wildlife products, please explain 
how China is supporting wildlife protection, including how China is working to ensur e that the wildlife 
products that China is importing and exporting are not illegally harvested or taken. In addition, what 
actions is China taking or planning to take to curb the demand for endangered totoaba bladder?  
 
Reply: The Chinese market regulators always attach great importance to wildlife supervision, 
strengthen wildlife supervision and law enforcement in accordance with the law, fulfill the 
responsibilities of member units of the inter -ministerial joint conference system on combating illegal 
wildlife trade, and enhance law enforcement cooperation with wildlife protection authorities. We will 
deploy local market regulators to strengthen the supervision and inspection of key food operation WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  places such as catering service enterprises, shopping malls a nd supermarkets, agricultural trade 
markets and other places, and urge food dealers to strictly implement the responsibility as entity for 
food safety, carry out the purchase inspection requirements of food and edible agricultural products, 
and implement t he relevant regulations prohibiting the trade of wildlife and their products. 
Procurement, operation, and use of wildlife meat and their products are strictly prohibited, and 
catering service enterprises are not allowed to engage in wildlife -based food . 
 
5 DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD MARKET 
SYSTEM  
5.1.4 Intensifying efforts to prevent and control pollution, and upholding the concept that 
clear waters and green mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver  
Page 21, Paragraph 5.5:  Could China explain how it enforces its modern environmental 
governance system, and how the emission permit system operates?  
Reply: The emission permit system is the core system of China 's ecological environment 
management s ystem, and the Chinese emission permit system is being carried out in an orderly 
manner. First, enterprises apply for key management and simplified management emission permits 
respectively, or conduct emission registration for classified management of emis sion permits 
according to the amount of pollutants produced, emissions and the degree of impact on the 
environment. Second, enterprises apply for emission permits or conduct emission registration 
through a nationally unified emission permit management info rmation platform to obtain a uniformly 
coded emission permit or emission registration form, so as to realize "one enterprise, one code ". 
Third, the ecological and environmental departments at or above the municipal level with districts 
shall issue emission  permits in accordance with the law, incorporate all pollution elements such as 
air, water, soil and solid waste into the emission permit management, and clarify the corporate 
emission control requirements and relevant ecological environment management req uirements, so 
as to realize "one enterprise, one certificate ". Fourth, licensed enterprises and emission registered 
enterprises have all been included in the scope of ecological environment supervision. We will urge 
enterprises to discharge pollutants with  and according to certificates, require management 
departments to supervise according to certificates, and strictly crack down on illegal acts of 
unlicensed and excessive emissions. Fifth, information on emission permits, emission registrations, 
implementa tion, supervision and law enforcement of emission permits shall be disclosed through the 
national emission permit management information platform to strengthen social supervision.  
 
5.3 Committed to Creating Market -Oriented, Law -Based and Internationalized Business 
Environment  
5.3.1  Further improving the top -level design of the business environment  
Page 23, Paragraph 5.9:  The Government Report states: "In October 2019, the State Council 
issued the Regulation on Improving the Business Environment to ensure that all market entities 
have equal access to various production factors and support policy. " Please explain how this 
Regulation operates to ensure that all market participants, including foreign market participants, 
have equal access to information as it relat es to agricultural and other market intelligence, including 
production, demand, and price data.  
 
Reply: China always extends the same treatment to all kinds of market entities. Through the 
implementation of the fair competition review system and other meas ures, we have made every 
effort to maintain fair competition in the market, ensuring that various market entities use 
production factors equally in accordance with law, participate in market competition fairly and 
receive equal legal protection. Since 2016 , China has reviewed 1.89 million policy and measure 
documents, revised and abolished nearly 30,000 policy and measure documents violating review 
standards, reviewed 857,000 new policies and measures, and corrected and stopped more 
than 4,100 policy and me asure violating review standards in a timely manner, which effectively 
promoted the construction of a unified and open market system with orderly competition, complete 
systems and sound governance, and provided a strong guarantee for high -level opening up.  
 
5.3.2 Further strengthening intellectual property rights protection  
Page 23, Paragraph 5.12: The Government Report indicates that "the 'three -in-one' reform of 
intellectual property trials is making solid progress. "  
• Please explain the "three -in-one" reform of intellectual property trials . 
 
Reply: The "three -in-one" reform of civil, administrative and criminal cases of intellectual property 
mainly refers to the reform of uniformly accepting civil, administrative and criminal cases of 
intellectual property by courts with jurisdiction over intellectual property civil c ases, aiming at WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  unifying judicial standards, improving trial quality and realizing all -round relief of intellectual 
property rights. It plays a positive role in optimizing the allocation of judicial resources, cultivating 
compound judicial talents and impr oving the overall effectiveness of judicial protection of intellectual 
property rights.  
 
• How many intellectual property -related three -in-one proceedings have been opened to date, and 
how many of them have involved a foreign right holder?  
 
Reply: The "three-in-one" trial of intellectual property cases is an institutional reform of the trial 
system. Civil, administrative and criminal cases of intellectual property are tried in accordance with 
the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law, the Administrative Proc edure Law and the Criminal 
Procedure Law respectively, not a lawsuit involving civil, administrative and criminal cases. 
At present, the "three -in-one" reform is being pushed forward in an order manner in over 
20 higher  courts, over 160 intermediate courts  and over 130 grass -roots courts in China.  
 
• Is there published information about these proceedings? Please explain.  
 
Reply: In July 2016, the Opinions of the Supreme People 's Court on Promoting the "Three -in-One" 
Trial of Civil, Administrative and Criminal Cases of Intellectual Property in Courts Nationwide 
(Fa Fa [2016] No.  17) was publicly issued, which clarified the relevant procedures of the "three -in-
one" reform.  
 
Page 24, Paragraph 5.15: The Government Report indicates that "China continuously improves 
the transparency of IPR protection. " Addressing transparency, the Supreme People 's Court revised 
the Provisions on the Publication of Judicial Process Information on the Internet by the Peop le's 
Courts  in 2016.  As revised, these Provisions require online publication of administrative, civil and 
criminal judgments and enforcement rulings, as well as "[o]ther judgment documents which have 
the effect of suspending or terminating litigation proce dures, or which affect the parties; substantive 
rights and interests or have a major impact on the parties; procedural rights and interest. "  
 
• On July 6, 2021, the European Union filed a "Request for Information Pursuant to Article 63.3 of 
the TRIPS Agreem ent" seeking further information on four judicial decisions in the interest of 
transparency (IP/C/W/682). According to the European Union 's information request, only one of 
the four cases was published online. What is China 's policy on publishing each of t he judicial 
opinions at issue online?  
 
Reply: The Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on the Issuance of Judgments on the Internet 
by the People 's Courts stipulates in detail the types of documents that can be published on the China 
Judgements Online and those that are not published on the Internet.  
 
• The Provisions on the Publication of Judicial Process Information on the Internet by People 's 
Courts  provide that publication requirements do not apply to in certain circumstances, such a s 
"court decisions involving state secrets or individual privacy " and "other cases and documents 
deemed inappropriate for online publication. " Does China refrain from publishing cases involving 
trade secrets and/or confidential business information? If so,  which exception provided in these 
Provisions applies? What is China 's policy on increasing transparency by publishing cases 
involving trade secrets and/or confidential business information, edited to redact information 
necessary to protect against the dis closure of trade secrets or confidential business information?  
 
Reply: China determines whether the judgments of specific cases involving trade secrets or 
commercial confidential information are published on the Internet according to the Provisions of the 
Supreme People 's Court on the Issuance of Judgments on the Internet by the People 's Courts. If 
disclosure is required, the information involving trade secrets will be deleted.  
 
5.3.5 Improving the performance of state -owned assets and sta te-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) reforms  
Page 24, Paragraph 5.18: The Government Report notes that China 's reform "to convert SOEs 
into standard companies has basically been completed. "  
• Please explain and provide additional information on how much direct and i ndirect ownership 
the Chinese government maintains in these "standard companies. " WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  • How does the "reformed " governance structure provide independence from the Chinese 
government and ensure that these "standard companies " act consistently with commercial 
considerations?  
• What is the legal distinction between majority -owned SOEs and majority -owned "standard 
compan ies"?  
• Please detail the reform of enterprises via "mixed ownership reform " by providing specific 
examples of the level of ownership by the Chinese government both before and after the mixed 
ownership reform. In these examples, please also detail the other  shareholders, besides the 
Chinese government, that are equity owners in these enterprises?  
• What enterprises are indirectly supervised by the State -Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission?  
• What enterprises are directly or indirectly supervi sed at the sub -central level of government?  
 
Reply to the above questions : China always adheres to the market -oriented reform of state -
owned enterprises. In the process of the reform, China has continuously improved the modern 
enterprise system, established a sound corporate governance mechanism with statutory and 
transparent rights and liabilities, coordinated operation and effective checks and balances, clarified 
the functions and powers of the board of directors, improved the market -based opera tion mechanism, 
and continued to promote the reform of the state -owned assets regulation system dominated by 
capital management. The reformed enterprises operate in accordance with the Company Law and 
articles of association to serve the interests of share holders. Shareholders shall appoint directors, 
supervisors and other senior executives to exercise their statutory and agreed rights in accordance 
with their shareholding ratios. As independent market entities, enterprises shall conduct production 
and oper ation independently, and shall not be directly controlled by the government. In accordance 
with the provisions of the Company Law, state -owned enterprises that have undergone the reform 
of the corporate system have set up such internal governance structure s as the board of directors, 
the board of supervisors, and managers, and formulated corresponding articles of association. The 
internal decision -making, governance, operation and management have been further standardized, 
and the shareholders shall bear li mited liabilities according to their respective shares. In the process 
of promoting the mixed -ownership reform, China has earnestly protected the property rights and 
interests of all kinds of investors and aroused the enthusiasm of all kinds of capitals to  participate 
in the development of mixed ownership economy. For example, China Unicom, introduced such large 
Internet companies as Tencent, Alibaba, JD.com and Baidu as large strategic investors to innovate 
a new model of integration of the telecom industr y with the Internet enterprises and low -cost user 
acquisition, thus realizing rapid development of industrial Internet services. In addition, Eastern Air 
Logistics Co., Ltd. introduced Legend Holdings and Global Logistic Properties as strategic investors 
to conduct the mixed -ownership reform. After the reform, a structure with each of the three parties 
holding 1/3 of the company 's shares was formed, which further improved the corporate governance 
structure and the operating efficiency. A wholly state -owned enterprise is a non -corporate enterprise 
established in accordance with the Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, and 
all the capital of the enterprise is state -owned capital. A wholly state -owned company is a corporate 
enterprise establ ished in accordance with the Company Law, and 100% of the capital is state -owned. 
SASAC only supervises Grade A enterprises directly funded by the state.  
 
5.3.8 Deepening reforms in fiscal, taxation, financial and other key areas  
Page 26, Paragraph 5.24:  
The Government Report discusses the loan prime rate mechanism.  
• Please explain the methodology for which banks are combined, and how they are combined, to 
calculate loan prime rates.  
 
Reply: The quoting bank submits the quotation to the National Inter -bank Funding Center based on 
the its loan interest rate to the premium clients by means of a medium -term lending facility (MLF) 
interest rate plus point formation. The National Inter -bank Funding Center removes the highest and 
lowest quotations to take the arit hmetic average and rounds it to the nearest integer multiple of 
0.05% to calculate the LPR.  
 
• Of the banks whose loans factor into the prime rate, which banks have any level of state 
ownership and what is the level of state investment in these banks?  
 
Reply: At present, on the basis of the original 10 national banks such as Industrial and Commerci al 
Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Bank of 
Communications, LPR quoting banks have added each 2 banks of Chengnan Commercial Bank, Rural WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Commercial Bank, foreign banks (Standard Chartered Bank and Citiba nk) and private banks to 18 
banks, which effectively enhanced the representativeness of LPR quotation. In the future, the 
People 's Bank of China will guide the market interest rate pricing self -discipline mechanism to 
periodically evaluate and adjust LPR q uotation banks based on the quotation quality.  
 
• Please explain and detail any instances in which banks with majority state ownership provide 
loans below the calculated loan prime rate?  
 
Reply: The relevant situation has been disclosed quarterly in the Monetary Policy Implementation 
Report. For details, please refer to the official website of the People 's Bank of China.  
 
6 THE WAY FORWARD  
Page 27, Paragraph 6.3:  Please explain what the Government Report means by "implement the 
UNFCC and the Paris Agreem ent"? Will China seek to raise its commitments under its Nationally 
Determined Contribution? If so, how will it align its commitments with the energy reforms and 
reductions in coal use necessary to achieve net zero emissions by 2050?  
 
Reply : It should be clarified that the Paris Agreement aims "to achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half 
of this century ", rather than "to achieve net zero emissions by 2050 ". China has never committed 
to achieving "net zero emissions by 2050 ". 
 
China has played an irreplaceably and key role in the conclusion of the Paris Agreement and 
is actively implementing the goals and requirements of the Agreement with actions. On 
22 September 2 020, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. The goals are fully consistent with the 
goals of the Paris Agreement, and show the greatest ambition of China. On 12  December 2020, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping further announced at the Climate Ambition Summit that China would 
lower its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by over 65% from the 2005 level, increase the 
share of non -fossil fuels in primary energy cons umption to around 25%, and bring its total installed 
capacity of wind and solar power to over 1.2 billion kW.  
 
As the largest developing country in the world, China still faces prominent unbalanced and 
inadequate development, and such problems as a coal -dominated energy structure, a heavy 
industry -dominated industry structure, and scientific and technological level to be improved. 
However, China is committed to the path of eco -friendly, green and low -carbon development, and 
will fulfill its commitments by a ctively assuming international responsibilities commensurate with its 
national conditions. In the near future, China will release the implementation plan and a series of 
supporting measures for peaking carbon dioxide emission in key fields and industries, continue to 
promote the adjustment of industrial and energy structures, and vigorously develop renewable 
energy. In addition, China will strongly support the green and low -carbon energy development of 
developing countries, and stop building new overseas co al power projects, so as to contribute to the 
global response to climate change.  
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  UNITED STATES – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS   
Summary  
 
Page 12, Paragraph 17: The Secretariat Report notes that imports of "all solid waste products " 
have been prohibited as of 1 January 2021, but "[c]ertain recycling materials " may be still imported.  
Can China explain the scientific basis that it used to determine which categories of "recycling 
materials " are acceptable for importation and which cate gories are not acceptable for importation?  
What is China 's policy regarding expansion of the list of "recycling materials " that is acceptable for 
importation? " Can China explain why it discriminates between domestically sourced solid wastes and 
certain re cycling materials, which are not prohibited, and imports of solid wastes and certain 
recycling materials, which are prohibited?  
 
Member Answer: Reply to two questions above: According to the Law of the People 's Republic of 
China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste, raw materials 
derived from solid wastes which have been processed and treated comply with compulsory national 
product quality standards and pose no danger to publi c health and ecological safety, are not classified 
as solid wastes, and can be imported into China through normal product trade. Moreover, there is 
neither a list of "recycling materials " that are acceptable nor policy regarding expansion of the list. 
In accordance with the principles universally recognized by the international community, the proper 
disposal of domestically generated solid wastes is the responsibility and obligation of every country.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 12, Paragra ph 17 :   
China has not answered the question "Can China explain why it discriminates between domestically 
sourced solid wastes and certain recycling materials, which are not prohibited, and imports of solid 
wastes and certain recycling materials, which are  prohibited? " Please provide a response to this 
question.   
 
Reply:  Unlike ordinary raw material products, solid wastes have inherent pollution properties. Scrap 
materials and wastes are defined in diverse ways across countries, without unified understandin g 
and standards among the international community.  In particular, the definition of solid wastes in 
China follows the provisions of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on the Prevention and 
Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste, which is basically consistent with the legal 
meaning of wastes under the Basel Convention. Namely, wastes that can be used as raw materials 
are also classified as solid wastes.  
As a developing country with the largest population in the world, China generat es a large amount of 
solid wastes annually, and recycling of domestically generated wastes that can be used as raw 
materials is one of the key initiatives to solve the disposal of solid waste which is a emergent problem 
on environment. According to the pri nciples universally recognized by the international community, 
the proper disposal of domestically generated solid wastes is the responsibility and obligation of 
every country. China has no obligation and no longer permits the disposal of what other countr ies 
claim as "recycling materials " while leaving environmental pollution behind at home.  
 
Page 13, Paragraph 23:  With regard to its "government guidance funds ":  
Please explain how the investment decisions of the guidance funds are consistent with the usu al 
investment practice of private investors, including for the provision of risk capital. Please provide 
examples of specific equity investments that are consistent with the usual investment practice of 
private investors.  
 
Member Answer: Reply to two questions above: The investment management and decision -making 
of government guidance funds are completely market -oriented. Government departments do not 
intervene in or participate in any investment project decisions of the funds. These funds were 
establi shed in accordance with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China, and a fund 
governance structure was established for market -oriented operation. For example, the National IC 
Industry Fund is managed strictly in accordance with the relevant laws an d regulations on private 
equity investment funds, and each investment requires a corresponding income.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Questions to Questions on Page 13, Paragraph 23 : Do any government 
departments fund the National IC Industry Fund? If so, please identif y them. Do these government 
departments have a role in investment decisions made by the National IC Industry Fund? If they 
have no role, who makes the investment decisions?   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Do any state -owned or state -invested enterprises fund the National IC Industry Fu nd? If so, please 
identify them. Do these state -owned or state -invested enterprises have a role in investment 
decisions made by the National IC Industry Fund? If they have no role, who makes the investment 
decisions? Do any other state entities fund the Na tional IC Industry Fund? If so, please identify 
them. Do these state entities have a role in investment decisions made by the National IC Industry 
Fund? If they have no role, who makes the investment decisions?  
 
Reply:  For the above three questions, the N ational IC Industry Fund is a corporate equity investment 
fund, which is not affiliated with any government departments. The Fund is completely market -
oriented in investment management and decision -making. Same as other international private 
equity funds, it aims to make profits for its shareholders, and all investment activities are solely 
responsible to its shareholders. To optimize its interests, the Fund has put in place relevant binding 
or restrictive conditions for the invested projects, which are all  regarded as business practices. 
Government departments do not interfere with or participate in any investment project decisions of 
the Fund. The specific sources of funds are disclosed by the Fund in accordance with legal and 
regulatory requirements.  The company operates in accordance with the Company Law and other 
relevant laws, and has established its corporate governance system such as Shareholders ' Meeting, 
the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors. The Shareholders ' Meeting is the supreme 
authority of the company, and the Board of Directors executes the resolutions of the Shareholders ' 
Meeting and decides on relevant major matters in accordance with the law.  The senior management 
of the company is appointed by the Board of Directors and is re sponsible for the daily operation and 
management of the company. The Board of Supervisors oversees the directors and senior 
management in performing their duties. Both the provincial fund and the National IC Industry Fund 
are market -oriented funds with ind ependent operations.  
 
Page 15, Paragraph 34: The Secretariat Report notes that China 's Made in China 2025 industrial 
plan remains China 's main initiative for promoting many of China 's manufacturing industries. Among 
other things, this industrial plan sets forth specific domestic market share targets for these 
Chinese  industries to achieve by 2020 and 2025.  
Please detail all of the policies and practices that China is using in an attempt to achieve the market 
share targets set forth in Made in China 202 5.  
Does China consider these policies and practices to be market -oriented? Please explain.  
 
Member Answer: Reply to two questions above: The statement in the report that "'The Made in 
China 2025 '" initiative sets forth specific domestic market share targets for these Chinese industries 
to achieve by 2020 and 2025 " does not conform to the fact. Some indicators of "The Made in China 
2025" initiative are from academic advisory reports. They are predictive and guiding, are not linked 
to official policies or financial input, and are not compulsory. In fact, many countries have similar 
guiding indicators and schemes. "The Made in China 2025 " initiative follows the principles of 
openness, fairness and competition, and applies to both domestic and foreign -invested enterprises 
equally. The Circular of the State Council on Several Measures Concerning Further Openness and 
Active Utilization of Foreign Investment issued in January 2017 clearly states that "'The Made in 
China 2025 ' initiative applies to both domesti c and foreign -invested enterprises equally. " A number 
of foreign enterprises have been involved in the implementation of "The Made in China 2025 " 
initiative. China has always been an advocate, practitioner and promoter of globalization. China will 
continue  to adhere to open and cooperative development, unswervingly implement "The Made in 
China 2025 " initiative in an open environment, and work with other countries to achieve win -win 
results.   
 
U.S. Follow -Up Questions to Questions on Page 15, Paragraph 34:  
Please identify (including by using titles and links) the academic advisory reports that provided 
indicators for the Made in China 2025 industrial plan . 
 
Reply:  The relevant indicators of "The Made in China 2025 " initiative were calculated by the 
preparers based on the research of public information at that time.  
 
Is one or more of these reports issued by the National Manufacturing Strategy Advisory Committee 
("NMSAC ")? Is it correct that the notice setting out th e Made in China 2025 industrial plan orders 
the establishment of NMSAC, which is to be responsible for "research[ing] the future of 
manufacturing development, strategic major issues, and provid[ing] consulting evaluation to major 
policies on the manufactur ing industry "?   WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: National Manufacturing Strategy Advisory Committee is a non -entity advisory body 
consisting of academicians and experts in industrial economy, specialized fields, industry 
associations and enterprise representatives organized by the  Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
other research institutions.  Every year, it spontaneously conducts research and investigation on 
forward -looking, strategic and long -term issues concerning the manufacturing industries, and puts 
forward advisory opinions  and suggestions. The published relevant research reports can be found 
through the public website.  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT   
1.2 Recent Economic Developments    
1.2.3 Fiscal policy    
Page 21, Paragraph 1.23:  What is the average debt ratio of sub -central stat e-owned enterprises? 
What is the average debt ratio of other state -invested companies that might not meet the definition 
of a state -owned enterprise under Chinese law?  
 
Member Answer: In recent years, the average debt ratio of sub -central state-owned enterprises 
has remained stable with a slight decline, with the debt structure within a reasonable range. The 
assets and liabilities of enterprises invested by state -owned enterprises shall not be included in the 
statistics of Chinese governmen t departments.   
 
U. S. Follow Up Questions to Question on Page 21, Paragraph 1.23:  
V. The United States notes that China did not answer the question on the average debt ratio for 
sub-central state -owned enterprises. The question asks for a numerical figure not about the stability 
or reasonableness of the debt. Please provide the average deb t ratio for sub -central state owned 
enterprises and please provide the average debt ratio for state owned enterprises broken down by 
province.  
Further, China did not answer the question on the average debt ratio of state -invested but not state -
owned compa nies. This question did not ask whether they were included in government statistics, 
but rather for the average debt ratio Please provide the average debt ratio for companies in which 
the government is a direct or indirect investor, but  that do not meet th e definition of a state -owned 
enterprise.    
 
Reply to the two questions above:  As of the end of the August of 2021, the average debt ratio 
for sub -central state -owned enterprises reached 62.7%. The assets and liabilities of companies 
invested by state -owne d companies are not included in the statistics of the Chinese government 
departments.  
 
1.2.4 Structural measures   
Page 22, Paragraph 1.31.  Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, the 
Chinese  Government seeks to connect nearly 140 countries and regions through rail lines, pipelines, 
highways, ports, and other infrastructure. As of March 2021, total expenditures under the BRI 
amounted to USD 640 billion. According an OECD study, infrastructure p rojects of the BRI may have 
an impact on the debt burden on recipient countries. A recent report for Global Development Center 
found that eight BRI recipient countries —Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan —are at a high risk of debt distress due to BRI loans. These 
countries will all face rising debt -to-GDP ratios beyond 50 %, with at least 40 % of external debt owed 
to China once BRI lending is complete. The IMF has scrutinized multiple aspects of the BRI, 
repeatedly warning of unsustainable debt levels, predatory lending, and the lack of project 
transparency.   
 
What steps is China taking to ensure that BRI projects uphold internationally accepted best practices 
in infrastructure development and internationa lly based standards and financing so as not to cripple 
countries with unsustainable debt problems and the inability to finance maintenance and repair of 
infrastructure provided?   
 
The BRI is allegedly plagued by an overall lack of transparency in publishi ng project details, selection 
criteria, financing terms and other related information. What steps is China taking to improve data 
sharing and increase transparency?  
 
Member Answer: The "BRI" cooperation covers broad areas. The vast majority of the project s are 
obtained by enterprises through market competition. It is the project owner or host government WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  rather than the Chinese Government that determine how to operate and how to disclose project 
information.   
To date, BRI projects have been dominated by Chi na's state -owned enterprises. Is China willing to 
promote greater inclusivity in BRI projects? If so, what steps has China taken to do so?   
 
Member Answer: China supports and guides market entities including private enterprises to 
contribute to the "BRI". In fact, private enterprises are also important forces participating in the 
"BRI". We have strengthened policy support, guidance and training for private enterprises in "going 
global ", guided them to focus on risk prevention, and urged them to operate in good faith, abide by 
local laws and regulations, and follow universally accepted i nternational rules and standards. In the 
next step, China will continue to support and guide private enterprises to improve their operation 
level for "going global ", and participate in high -quality development of the "BRI". 
 
U.S. Follow Up Questions to Que stions on Page 22, Paragraph 1.  
China notes that it "supports and guides " market entities , including the private sector , to contribute 
to the BRI. By what mechanism s or measures  does China support and guide the private sector to 
contribute to the BRI?  
 
Reply:  Private enterprises are a vital force to participate in the joint contribution of "Belt and Road " 
initiative, but relatively inexperienced in overseas development. China attaches importance to 
strengthening the guidance and support for private enter prises, mainly by providing public 
information, enhancing the guidance for development and other ways to serve private enterprises 
to "going global ". Chinese authorities have issued the guidelines which help promote private 
enterprises to pay attention to overseas risk prevention and control in "going global " strategy, urge 
them to comply with the law and operate in good faith, follow the generally ac cepted international 
rules and standards, continuously enhance brand awareness, actively fulfill their social responsibility, 
and steadily improve their competitiveness in the international market. The high -quality cooperation 
will facilitate mutually bene ficial and win -win development with the countries concerned.  
 
Does China "support and guide " market entities to increase transparency about project details, 
selection criteria, financing terms and other related information related to BRI projects?  If not, why 
not?   
 
Reply:  The joint contribution of BRI is an open and inclusive economic cooperation initiative, and 
upholds the principle of achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration. We welcome 
the participation of all countries around the w orld. In recent years, many US and 
European  multinational companies have participated in the BRI through third -party market 
cooperation, and China has signed agreements or reached consensus through third -party market 
cooperation with France, South Korea, S ingapore, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Germany, the  UK, 
Canada, and Japan among others. Specifically speaking at project level, it is generally up to the 
project owner or the host government to decide on the form of operation and how to disclose proje ct 
information, rather than the Chinese government. We encourage the enterprises concerned to 
disclose project -related information where conditions permit, and to follow the philosophy of 
openness, greenness and integrity in project cooperation, with the a ims of high standards, 
sustainability and benefiting people 's livelihood, so as to meet the legal requirements where the 
project is located and the appropriate standards for development needs.  
 
Please detail the policy support provided to private enterpris es that go global as part of the BRI.  
 
Reply:  Regarding the outbound investments made by various enterprises in the implementation of 
"going global " strategy, China adheres to the principles of taking the enterprises as main body, 
market orientation, commercial basis, and in line with international practices. The enterprises make 
independent decisions, bear their own risks and are responsible for thei r own profits and losses. 
China pays attention to strengthen the guidance and support for private enterprises, mainly by 
providing public information and strengthening the guidelines for development.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES    
2.2 Trade Policy Frame work and Objectives   
2.2.2 Trade Policy Formulation and Objectives    
Page 33, Paragraph 2.14 – 2.17 The Secretariat Report states that China has updated and revised 
several of its measures at the national and regional levels. Can China confirm whether any  measures 
related to the following initiatives were included in its most recent subsidy notification under WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Article  25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures or will be included in China 's 
next subsidy notification?  
The State Council 's 2019 Guiding Opinions on Promoting High -quality Trade Development; The Pilot 
Free Trade Zones program; and The 2020 edition of the Catalogue of Encouraged Industries for 
Foreign Investment.   
 
Member Answer: China submitted its subsidy notification to the WT O in strict accordance with the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. If the subsidy policies involved in the 
implementation of the above -mentioned documents fall within the scope of notification, China will 
notify them  to the WTO in the next step .   
 
U.S. Follow Up Question to Question on Page 33, Paragraph 2.14 -2.17:   
The United States notes that China did not answer the question of whether or not these programs 
are included in its most recent subsidy notification. Are any measures related to these initiatives 
included in China 's most recent subsidy notification? If they are, please indicate which programs in 
the notification are related to these initiatives. If  they are  not, why are they not included in China 's 
most recent subsidy notification?    
 
Reply: China has submitted its notification s to the WTO in accordance with the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. If the subsidy programs involved in the implementation of 
the above documents fall within the scope of notification, they will be notified to the WTO in due 
course.  
 
Page 33, Paragraphs 2.16 and 2.17 : The Secretariat Report states that, since 2003, China has 
used Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) as a testing ground for nationwide investment liberalization and 
streamlined regulations of all types. As of 2020, China had 2 1 PFTZs in place. Recognizing that, in 
June 2018, China issued the first version of a standalone Foreign Investment Negative List (the 
"Special Administrative Measures on Access to Foreign Investment ") and has revised it each year 
since then, how long of a  pilot is China conducting via its PFTZs? Why does China continue to 
maintain and expand the number of PFTZs? If the PFTZs are meant to be "pilots, " does that mean 
that the investment rights under the PFTZs are not permanent and may, at some point, be 
consolidated into the Foreign Investment Negative List to apply on a national basis?  
 
Member Answer: Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) are test fields for China 's independent reform and 
opening -up. The core task is institutional innovation. China will take the le ad in promoting deeper 
reform and higher -level opening -up, and apply experience to a wider range, so as to explore ways 
to and accumulate experience for comprehensively deepening reform and opening up. 
Chinese  President Xi Jinping stressed that China will never stop its reform and opening -up. China 
will give full play to the leading role of PFTZs and promote the building of a new higher -level system 
of an open economy.  
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Questions on Page 33, Paragraphs 2.16 and 2.17:   
We seek cla rification from China about whether the investment rights under the PFTZs are not 
permanent and may, at some point, be consolidated into the Foreign Investment Negative List to 
apply on a national basis.  
 
Reply:  The Negative List for Foreign Investment Access in the Pilot Free Trade Zone is based on the 
national opening measures, and  it further puts forward more open pilot measures for  pilot 
experimentation and  experience exploration. For example, the Negative Li st of the Pilot Free Trade 
Zone (2018 version) first lifted the restriction of "prohibiting investment in radioactive mineral 
smelting, processing and nuclear fuel production ", and after two years of implementation, the 
National Negative List for Foreign I nvestment Access (2020 version) lifted the relevant restrictions.  
 
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements   
2.3.1 WTO    
Page 34, Paragraph 2.22:  The Secretariat Report indicates that China 's domestic support 
notification remains outstanding. Please explain China 's policy on filing the required updated 
information on its domestic support programs.  
 
Member Answer: China will submit a notification on domestic support for agriculture as soon as 
possible.    
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 34, Paragraph 3.22:   
The United States thanks China for its response and would like to emphasize the critical importance 
of submitting notifications as quickly as possible and in an accurate and complete manner.  The 
resulting transparency from timely and complete notifications is crucial to an open and predictable 
trading system. The United States looks forward to reviewing China 's domestic support notification 
as soon as possible.   
 
2.4 Investment Regime    
2.4.1 Regulatory framework and market access    
Page 36, Paragraph 2.36 : Article 28 of the Foreign Investment Law states that, for industries not 
included in the Foreign Investment Negative List, the investment administration "shall be conducted 
on the prin ciple of equal treatment to domestic and foreign investment. " Can China clarify what it 
means by "the principle " of equal treatment? Does it provide equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
investment in all cases?  
 
Member Answer: For industries not included in the Foreign Investment Negative List, China accords 
the treatment to foreign investors and their investments no less favorable to that accorded to 
domestic investors and their investments. The state conducts a security review of foreign investm ent 
that impacts or may impact national security. Where the state has issued any other provisions on 
foreign investors ' investment in the banking, securities, insurance, and other financial industries or 
the securities, foreign exchange, and other financia l markets within China, such provisions shall 
prevail.  
 
U.S. Follow up Question to Questions on Page 36, Paragraph 2.36:   
The United States seeks clarification of China 's response with regard to its treatment of financial 
services. China notes that for in dustries that are no longer included in the Foreign Investment 
Negative List, China accords no less favorable treatment to foreign investors and their investment 
than it accords to domestic investors and their investments. Financial services is no longer i ncluded 
in the Foreign Investment Negative List; therefore, it appears that foreign investors and their 
investments in those sectors should receive no less favorable treatment than domestic investors and 
their investments. However, in its answer, China als o explains that, for financial services, other 
provisions relating to those sectors shall prevail. Do these "other provisions " provide that foreign 
investors and their investments are treated less favorably than domestic investors and their 
investments in any way? If so, why is that the case given that China 's overarching guidance is that 
investment shall be conducted on the principle of equal treatment?  
 
Reply:  Since the announcement of a series of opening measures in the financial industry in 2018, 
the ba nking and insurance industry has removed the relevant equity restrictions on foreign 
investment in the original Negative List for Foreign Investment Access, so it is no longer included in 
the Negative List for Foreign Investment Access. At present, China 's banking and insurance industry 
manages foreign investment according to the international practice of pre -establishment national 
treatment and negative list. National treatment for foreign investment shall be provided  to the 
foreign investment  that it is not included in the negative list of multilateral and bilateral free trade 
agreements and investment agreements. Since 2018, contents concerning banking and insurance in 
the negative list of multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements and invest ment agreements have 
been greatly reduced.  
 
Page 37, Paragraph 2.45, and Page 38, Chart 2.1 : In this section of the Report, the Secretariat 
discusses developments regarding China 's Foreign Investment Negative List. Over the past 
three  years, China has remo ved some restrictions from its Foreign Investment Negative List. 
However, unfortunately this element of the Report does not make clear that China does continue to 
prohibit or restrict foreign investment in several key sectors, including Internet and relate d services, 
cloud computing services, express delivery services, higher education services, news publishing 
services, film production, film distribution, medical institutions, legal services, market research firms 
and certain agriculture sector investment.  For each of the identified sectors, can China explain 
(1) why it continues to maintain investment restrictions and (2) its policy on removing the remaining 
investment restrictions?  
 
Member Answer: According to the Provisions on Guiding Direction of Foreig n Investment 
(State  Council Decree No. 346), foreign invested projects under any of the following circumstances 
shall be listed as prohibited ones: 1) projects endangering State security or damaging social and 
public interests; 2) projects causing pollutio n or damage to environment, jeopardizing natural WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  resources or impairing health of human body; 3) projects unfavorable to the protection and 
development of land resources as a result of occupation of large amount of arable lands; 4) projects 
endangering the  safety of military installation or the work efficacy thereof; 5) projects involving the 
making of products by utilizing the unique craftsmanship or technology of our country; or 6) other 
circumstances provided for in laws and administrative regulations. F oreign invested projects under 
one of the following circumstances shall be listed as restricted ones: 1) projects with backward 
teleology; 2) projects without any benefit to the conservation of resources and the improvement of 
eco-environment; 3) projects involving the exploration and exploitation of any special mineral 
resource the exploitation of which shall, as provided for by the State, be carried out in a protective 
way; 4) projects involving the industry that is being opened up by the State step by st ep; or 5) 
other circumstances provided for in laws and administrative regulations.  
 
U.S. Follow up Question to Question on Page 37, Paragraph 2.45, and Page 38, Chart 2.1:   
China has stated publicly that it will continue to remove restrictions from its Foreign Investment 
Negative List as part of China 's opening up.  With that in mind, can China please provide more details 
on its policy on removing remaining foreign investment restrictions?  
 
Reply:  Relevant Chinese authorities are studying and formulating  a new negative list for foreign 
investment access, and plan to further relax restrictions on foreign investment access.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE   
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports   
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements   
Page 46 -47, Paragraph 3.8 : The Secretariat Report states that "[d]uring the review period, the 
GACC issued various administrative measures for the inspection and/or quarantine of specific 
goods. " With regard to Decree 248 and Decree 249, which the General Administration of Customs 
of China issued in 2021, various WTO Members have expressed concern about China 's failure to 
adhere to its WTO transparency obligations, the scope of impacted commodities and  the Decrees ' 
requirements, which are neither clear nor well understood. In addition, the Decrees appear to 
propose onerous and redundant requirements that are already met by existing measures, and they 
do not clearly state what food safety risks have nece ssitated their issuance. Given the scope of 
impact of Decrees 248 and 249, what is China 's view on delaying implementation of these Decrees 
until 2023 and immediately begin implementing its WTO transparency obligations?  
 
Member Answer: In accordance with l aws and administrative regulations, such as, the Food Safety 
Law of the People 's Republic of China and the Regulation on the Implementation of the Food Safety 
Law of the People 's Republic of China, China has organized the revision of regulations on the 
administration of safety of imported and exported food and the administration of registration of 
overseas imported food production enterprises. The Measures of the People 's Republic of China for 
the Administration of Safety of Imported and Exported Food (Gene ral Administration of Customs 
No. 249) and the Provisions of the People 's Republic of China on the Administration of Registration 
of Overseas Imported Food Production Enterprises (General Administration of Customs No. 248) 
promulgated on 12 April 2021 will  come into force on 1 January 2022. Before the promulgation, 
China notified the WTO in accordance with the relevant rules, accepted comments of WTO members 
and adopted reasonable opinions and suggestions, so it conform to relevant WTO rules. General 
Admini stration of Customs No. 248 and No.249 have been published on the official website of 
General Administration of Customs. Enquiries are welcome. Where an overseas imported food 
production enterprise undergoes any change in its registration information durin g the validity period 
of registration, it shall handle procedures according to Article 19 of General Administration of 
Customs No. 248.   
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Question Page 46 -47, Paragraph 3.8    
What is the implementation period for the measure?    
 
Reply:  General Administration of Customs No.249 and  General Administration of Customs No.24 8 
were issued on 12 April 2021 and will be put in place on 1 January 2022.  
 
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports   
3.2.2 Taxes, charges, and levies   
Page 68, Paragraph 3.78 and Table 3.11:  The Secretariat Report states that China continues to 
apply export duties on a wide range of products. It explains that, as of January 2021, "102 tariff 
lines (at the 8 -digit level) were subject to statutory export duties, unchanged since 2015, while WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  75 tariff lines carried interim duties, down from 180 in 2017. " Although the Secretariat Report does 
not discuss the panel and Appellate Body findings on China 's export duties in DS394, DS395, DS398, 
DS431, DS432 and DS433, the United States notes that two panels and the Appellate Body found 
that paragraph 11.3 of part I of China 's WTO Protocol of Accession commits China to eliminate all 
export duties unless specifically provided for in Annex 6 of the Protocol or a pplied in conformity with 
the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994 and, further, that Article XX of the GATT 1994 is not 
available to justify a violation of this commitment. What is China 's policy on eliminating these export 
duties?  
 
Member Answer:  According to Annex 6 of the Protocol on China 's Accession to WTO, China can 
retain export tax on a small number of products, while other products shall not be subject to export 
tax. At present, the products subject to export tariffs are all in line with C hina's WTO accession 
commitments, and the export tariff rate shall not exceed the upper limit of China 's 
WTO commitments.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 68 Paragraph 3.78 and Table 3.11 :   
The Secretariat 's report identifies a total of 177 tariff lines (at the 8 -digit level) that China continues 
to subject to export duties. China has responded by claiming that, at present, all of China 's export 
duties are in line with China 's commitments in Annex 6 of its Protocol of Accession to the WTO. Th e 
United States notes that Annex 6 only lists 84 tariff lines (at the 8 -digit level) that China can continue 
to subject to export duties after its accession to the WTO. Can China explain how it justifies 
maintaining export duties on the additional 93 tarif f lines (at the 8 -digit level) that are not listed in 
Annex 6?   
 
Reply:  Due to the reversion of the World Custom Organization 's tariff schedule, the  adjustment of 
China 's sub-headings  and the gradual increase of China 's tariff lines, the number of tariff lines 
subject to export duties is on the rise, but the products subject to export  duties  are all in line with  
China 's commitments in Annex 6 of its Protocol of Accession to the WTO.   
 
3.2.4 Export support and promotion   
Page 72, Paragraph 3.101:  The Secretariat Report explains that in China the value -added 
tax (VAT) may be rebated on exports, but exporters are generally entitled to VAT rebates lower than 
the VAT paid. It states that "four refund rates are in force: 13%, 9%, 6%, and 0%, with the 
proportion of tariff lines subject to each rebate rate being 61.2%, 18.9%, 0.1%, and 19.6%. " In 
connection with the 2012 Trade Policy Review of China, the Secretariat Report noted (in 
paragraph  143 of Part III) that "[t]he difference between the two rates c onstitutes a levy on exports, 
which may in turn constitute assistance to downstream processing of the products affected, and 
could affect China 's terms of trade. " It added that "China adjusts VAT rebate rates as part of its 
industrial policies, to control,  restrict, or otherwise 'manage ' the export of certain products. "   
What is China 's view on the proposition that moving to a trade -neutral VAT system, in which input 
VAT is rebated in full for all exports, would allow the market, rather than the Chinese st ate, to play 
a decisive role in the allocation of resources? If not, please explain. Is China studying the possibility 
of adopting a VAT rebate policy pursuant to which the input VAT is automatically rebated in full for 
all exports, consistent with the pol icies prevailing in other WTO Members with a VAT system and 
how long would it take China to adopt and implement such a policy. Please explain.   
 
Member Answer: it is clearly stated in paragraph 3.98 that "after the issuance by the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and the State Taxation Administration of the Announcement on Increasing the Export 
Tax Refund Rate of Some Products in 2020, the VAT rebate rate of all products, except for the high -
pollution, high -energy consuming, and resource -based product s, became equal to the applied rate.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 72, Paragraph 3.101 :   
China did not answer either of the United States ' questions about the possibility of China moving to 
adopt a trade -neutral VAT system like other countr ies that maintain VAT systems. Can China respond 
to those questions?   
 
Reply:  Paragraph 3.98 clearly points out  that "the Ministry of Finance and State Taxation 
Administration of the People 's Republic of China issued an announcement to increase the export tax 
rebate rate of some products in 2020. After that, apart from  high pollution, high energy consumption 
and resource -based products, the VAT rebate rate of other products shall be equal to the applicable 
tax rate. " 
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  3.2.5 Export finance, insurance, and guarantees   
Page 73, Paragraph 3.108:  The Secretariat Report states that "the bulk of export finance is 
provided by the China Export -Import Bank … and the state -owned China Export & Credit In surance 
Corporation (SINOSURE). " On its website, China Development Bank, under international business 
products, lists a buyer 's credit as one of its product offerings. This product appears to be a loan 
provided to foreign importers or government agencies o r banks of the importing country that can 
only be used to purchase Chinese equipment and should be linked to a specific export -related 
project. The loan requires SINOSURE credit insurance and Chinese content of at least 50 %. Can 
China provide information o n the financial terms and conditions of the buyer 's credit program offered 
by China Development Bank?  
 
Member Answer: The buyer 's credit project contract of China Development Bank (CDB) is generally 
formulated based on a formatted text of the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) and 
compliant with loan market practices in the Asia Pacific region. For each project, CDB needs to 
conform to confidentiality clauses and requirements related to financing documents signed with the 
customer and shal l not provide the financing documents to the outside.   
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Question on Page 73, Paragraph 3.108:    
Please share specific information about the financial terms and conditions (interest rates, tenor, 
premium costs, Chinese content req uirements, etc.,) of the buyer 's credit program offered by China 
Development Bank .   
 
Reply:  The export buyer 's credit project contracts of China Development Bank (CDB) are generally 
based on the format text of the Asia -Pacific Loan Markets Association (AP LMA), and comply with the 
loan market practices in the Asia -Pacific region. For each project, China Development Bank is 
required to comply with the confidentiality clauses and requirements related to the financing 
documents signed with clients, and shall n ot disclose financing documents.  
 
Page 73, Paragraph 3.110:  According to the Secretariat Report, China Eximbank offers 
"concessional loans … to developing countries at rates lower than market interest rates and are 
usually tied to Chinese exports. " The United States notes that, in China 's questionnaire on export 
competition, it replied that Eximbank provides export financing for agricultural products.   
Does China Eximbank offer concessional loans to developing countries at rates lower than market 
rates for the export of agricultural products. If so, please provide a detailed description of the 
concessional loan program(s), and maximum repayment terms.   
 
Member Answer: The Export -Import Bank of China provides domestic working capital loans and 
export order financing for Chinese agricultural product exporters. According to The Ministerial 
Decisions on Export Competitions reached by the WTO members at the Tenth Session of the 
Ministerial -level Meeting on December 19, 2015, the export credit for ag ricultural products does not 
include the agricultural product working capital loans offered to the exporters. Therefore, the working 
capital loan associated with agricultural products provided by the Export -Import Bank of China to 
exporters does not belong  to the export credits for agricultural products; As for the agricultural 
export order financing provided in 2019 and 2020, the WTO agricultural export competition 
questionnaire has been completed as required.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 7 3, Paragraph 3.110:  
The United States thanks China for its answer. Can China please provide two examples of Export -
Import Bank of China 's concessional loans for Chinese agricultural product exporters destined to 
developing countries?  
 
Reply:  The Export -Import Bank of China provides domestic working capital loans and export order 
financing for Chinese agricultural exporters. The interest rate will be determined by considering the 
comprehensive contribution of customers and various costs such as capital, risk s, taxes and 
administrative expenses. In addition, it is determined according to the forecast of interest rate trend 
and market competition status, and based on the principle of matched risk and return. There is no 
preferential loan specifically for agricu ltural products.  
 
Page 73, Paragraph 3.110:  What are the longest repayment terms offered with China Eximbank 's 
seller 's credit support?  
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  Member Answer: The Export -Import Bank of China will determine the credit repayment term of 
the export seller in line with the borrower 's ability in operation and management, the borrower 's 
credit status, capital turnover, project operation, etc.  
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Question on Page 73, Paragraph 3.110:  
Please share specific information on the average longest  repayment term offered with China 
Eximbank 's seller 's credit support.    
 
Reply:  The repayment period of export seller 's credit of Export -Import Bank of China is determined 
according to the execution period of commercial contract for exports and the progress for Receipt of 
foreign exchange.  
 
Page 74, Paragraph 3.111:  What are China Eximbank 's terms and conditions for the concessional 
loans, the preferential export buyer 's credits, and the standard export credits?  
 
Member Answer: The loan conditions w ill be determined for specific projects based on the market 
benchmark: on the basis of actuarial cost and risk quantification, with the goal of sustainable 
operation and be in line with the market rate of interest, overall considering the comprehensive 
contribution of customers and various costs such as capital, risk, tax and management expenses, 
predicting the trend of the interest rate, and determine according to market competition and the 
principle of risk -return matching.  
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Que stion 74, Paragraph 3.111:    
Please share specific information about the financial terms and conditions (interest rates, tenor, 
premium costs etc.) of China Eximbank 's concessional loans, preferential export buyer 's credits, and 
standard export credits.  
 
Reply:  The loan conditions of specific projects shall be determined according to market benchmarks. 
The trend of interest rate shall be predicted based on actuarial cos t and risk quantification, aiming 
at sustainable operation, consistent with market interest rate, taking into account the comprehensive 
contribution of clients and various costs such as capital, risk, taxes and administrative expenses. 
And the interest rat e shall be determined according to the principle of market competition and 
matched risk and return.  
 
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade    
3.3.1 Incentives    
Page 77, Paragraph 3.124: With regard to China 's government guidance funds, the Secretariat 
Report notes that "these funds were in part privately funded. " For each of the government guidance 
funds listed in Table 3.15, please identify what part or percentage of the fund is privately funded 
versus gover nment funded.   
 
Member Answer: The investment management and decision -making of government guidance 
funds are completely based on market principles, and government departments do not intervene or 
participate in the decision -making of any investment projec ts of the fund. The fund is established in 
accordance with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws, and its fund 
governance structure is also determined on the basis of such laws for market -based operation. China 
has not provided s ubsidies to any industry through the fund.    
 
U.S. Follow -Up Questions to Question on Page 77, Paragraph 3.124   
China provided the above response to several U.S. questions regarding its government guidance 
funds. This response does not answer the question asked above. The United States asks China to 
identify what part or percentage of the fund is privately funded ve rsus government funded for each 
of the government guidance funds listed in Table 3.15.    
For funding provided by the government, is that funding in the form of equity, grants, or loans?    
Although China maintains that its government guidance funds, such as  the National IC Investment 
Fund (IC Fund), is managed on market principles, one investor in the IC Fund reported that in the 
State Council regulation establishing the Fund, there are provisions for the Ministry of Finance to set 
aside additional sums of m oney to pay the fixed return on the preferred stock of the Fund if 
profitability falls below a certain target. Therefore, it appears that the Government may be 
compensating other investors in the IC Fund if a certain level of return is not reached. Please 
comment on how this is consistent with the IC Fund being managed pursuant to market principles.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply  for above three questions : We are not in the know about the situation mentioned in above 
questions, therefore we are not in a position to comment on rele vant guesses and rumors.  
 
Page 78, Paragraph 3.125:  In addition to the government guidance funds referenced above, the 
Secretariat Report notes the existence of several policy -related funds targeting, for example, Made 
in China 2025 industries and the integrated circuit industry, among others.  Please provi de additional 
information on each of the policy -related funds listed in Table 3.16, including:   
What is the structure and purpose of the fund?   
What forms of assistance are granted under the fund, including whether the fund provides export 
support or pro motion?  
Please explain why China asserts that the financial support provided through the fund does not 
constitute subsidies and therefore is not subject to the WTO 's notification requirement.  
 
Member Answer: The investment management and decision -making o f government guidance 
funds are completely based on market principles, and government departments do not intervene or 
participate in the decision -making of any investment projects of the fund. The fund is established in 
accordance with the Company Law of t he People 's Republic of China and other laws, and its fund 
governance structure is also determined on the basis of such laws for market -based operation. China 
has not provided subsidies to any industry through the fund.   
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Questio n on Page 78, Paragraph 3.125  
The United States notes that China did not answer the question , which was about policy -related  
funds not government guidance funds. Please answer the initial question regarding the structure 
and purpose of, as well as the assistance provided through , the various policy -related  funds cited by 
the Secretariat.   
 
Reply:  Policy -related funds operate in line with market rule s, and the choice of investment projects 
shall be completely determined by the market.  
 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements    
3.3.2.1 Overview    
Page 79, Paragraph 3.133:  The United States and other WTO Members continue to have 
significant concerns because the only means that China 's National Medical Products Administration 
(NMPA) provides for cosmetics importers to establish conformity with good manufacturing practices 
via the new Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation (CSAR) (G/TBT/N/CHN/1310), 
which entered into force on May 1, 2021, involves animal testing if the government of the exporter 
does not issue good manufacturing practices (GMP) export  certificates.  
Will China consider alternative means for cosmetics importers to meet NMPA 's requirements for 
government -issued GMP export certificates such as statements of conformity from industry 
organizations or third -party programs under the ISO/IEC 1 7065 Conformity Assessment Standard 
that align with the ISO 's GMP standard for cosmetics?  
Will China ensure that NMPA, the State Administration for Market Regulation and the China National 
Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment are transparent an d report publicly which GMP 
certificates or production licenses they are accepting as demonstrating conformity?  
 
Member Answer: Yes, China ensures that China National Accreditation Service for Conformity 
Assessment (CNAS) is transparent. In accordance with  the requirements of relevant Chinese laws 
and regulations and national standards, relevant international standards and rules of IAF, ILAC and 
APAC, CNAS publishes the policies, procedures and rules on which its operation is based, publishes 
its accreditat ion results, and invites accredited stakeholders to fully participate in the decision -
making and management process of CNAS. CNAS is regularly inspected by relevant 
Chinese  authorities, and is regularly peer -reviewed by APAC, so as to ensure that the trans parency 
of CNAS meets the requirements of relevant Chinese laws and regulations, national standards, 
relevant international standards and relevant rules of IAF, ILAC and APAC.  
 
The Regulations on the Administration of Cosmetic Registration and Filing Mater ials (No.32, 2021) 
issued by National Medical Products Administration puts forward completely consistent requirements 
on the setting of animal experiment alternatives for safety evaluation of imported and domestic 
cosmetics. Based on the principle of ensur ing the quality and safety of product production and WTO 
non-discrimination, in terms of toxicology test project requirements and exemption conditions, 
domestic and imported ordinary cosmetics manufacturers who have obtained the relevant 
qualification cert ification of production quality management system issued by the competent WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  government department of the host country (region) and the product safety risk assessment results 
can fully confirm the product safety may be exempted from submitting the toxicology test report of 
the product.    
 
U.S Follow -up Question to Question on Page 79, Paragraph 3.133 :   
We appreciate the response from China, reaffirming its commitment to work via the China National 
Accreditation Service to align China 's conformity assessment p ractices with the relevant international 
standards and rules, such as those employed by the International Accreditation Forum (IAF) and the 
ILAC. Via CSAR and its implementation regulations , China  has said that cosmetics importers may be 
exempted from mand atory animal testing, if they can provide (1) a cosmetics safety assessment 
that meets the requirements of CSAR and (2) a GMP certificate issued by a government authority. 
As the U.S. government does not issue cosmetics GMP certificates , could China please clarify if it 
will accept  a GMP certificate, provided via the U.S. IAF or ILAC signatories, that accredit s U.S. 
conformity assessment bodies to use the ISO 17065 standard for conformity assessment to provide 
GMP certificates based upon the ISO 22716 cosmetics standard?  
 
Reply:  Pursuant to the Article 33 of the Regulations on the Administration of Cosmetic Registration 
and Filing Materials, except for exceptional circumstances, ordinary cosmetics manufacturers who 
have obtained the releva nt qualification certification of production quality management system 
issued by the competent government department of the host country (region) and results of the 
product safety risk assessment can fully confirm the product safety may be exempted from 
submitting the toxicology test report of the product. Cosmetics filer or the domestic responsible 
person who files for the record shall be  exempted from the submission of the product 's toxicology 
test report if the filing materials meet the above said requi rements.  
 
3.3.2.3 Labelling and packaging   
Page 83, Paragraph 3.154:  The Secretariat Report details information from China 's Food Safety 
Law and other laws regarding the labeling of pre -packaged foods.  
Please describe any measures taken by China to ensure China 's labeling requirements are consistent 
with the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements and, as appropriate, are harmonized with relevant 
international standards.   
 
Member Answer: The market supervision department implements "indiscriminate " supervision o n 
imported food and domestic food sold in the market in accordance with relevant laws and regulations 
such as the Food Safety Law and Regulations on the Implementation of Food Safety Law as well as 
national food safety standards, strictly abides by the bot tom line of food safety and maintains a fair 
market order.    
 
Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 83, Paragraph 3.154:   
Could China provide more detail in responding to the above  questions? What does "market 
supervision " entail? Could China please clar ify how the regulations are implemented and how 
consistency with international standards and WTO obligations is ensured?    
 
Reply:  China 's market regulators refer to the State Administration of Market Regulation (SAMR) as 
well as local market regulators. China earnestly fulfills its WTO obligations. China 's Food Safety Law, 
Regulations on the Implementation of the Food Safety Law, and national food safety standards have 
been notified to the WTO as required. We have also carefully examined, resp onded to and taken into 
account the comments from relevant members.  
 
Page 83, Paragraph 3.156 : The United States continues to be concerned that new cosmetics 
labelling requirements introduced via the Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation and 
its implementing measures potentially create unnecessary obstacles to trade.  
Why is China re quiring foreign labels on products to exactly match the required Chinese labelling, if 
the foreign language labelling does not conflict with the product safety and effectiveness information 
on the Chinese label?   
Will China provide at least two years for imported, previously -registered cosmetics to comply with 
new labelling requirements, so as to allow companies to sell through inventory already in China?  
 
Member Answer: First, the correspondence between Chinese and English labels. The Measures for 
the Adm inistration of Cosmetic Labels (No.77, 2021) issued by National Medical Products 
Administration does not require that all contents of Chinese labels should be consistent with those 
of the original packaging labels, but only requires that the contents of pr oduct safety and efficacy WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  claims should be consistent with those of the original labels. Second, the problem of product 
transition period. Under the condition of the actual situation of the industry fully considered and 
avoiding the waste of packaging cons umables, a reasonable transition period has been set for 
the industry. A two -year transition period has been given to products registered or filed before 
1 May 2022. If labels are not marked according to the Measures, cosmetics registrants and filers 
shall complete the update of product labels before 1 May 2023 to ensure that they meet the 
provisions and requirements of the Measures.    
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Question on Page 83, Paragraph 3.156:   
Why does China require that foreign companies ' labelling regarding  product safety and efficacy 
claims be "consistent " with China 's requirements, rather than requir e that the labelling does "not 
conflict " with China 's requirements?  Does China allow other countries that may need it the ability to 
provid e for variations in national versus international labelling?  
 
Reply:  According to Article 2 of the Measures for the Administration of Cosmetic Labels, the 
Measures is applicable to the labelling management of cosmetics manufactured and operated in 
China. A lso, China does not require the contents of the affixed Chinese label should be identical to 
those of the original packaging labels, but only requires that the contents of product safety and 
efficacy claims should be consistent with those of the original l abels. Therefore, China does not 
impose restrictions on the labeling which is mandatory by the regulations of the importing country 
(region) and does not conflict with Chinese laws and regulations. There is no such situation as 
mentioned in the U.S. concer ns. 
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements    
3.3.3.2 SPS measures    
Page 86, Paragraph 3.166:  The United States notes that China has made significant progress in 
establishing numerous pesticide maximum residue limits in a short period time.  Current ly, China 
does not have a formal registration process to establish import tolerances for pesticides that are not 
approved for use in China.  The United States understands regulations for establishing import 
tolerances are currently under consideration by Ch ina.   
Has China announced the implementation of an import tolerance policy?   
Will the measure undergo public review; If so, when?   
 
Member Answer: China never declares and will not formulate regulations for establishing import 
tolerances   
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Question on Page 86, Paragraph 3.166    
Please share the technical justification for the response provided above.   
 
Reply:  China never declares and will not formulate regulations for establishing import tolerances . 
 
Page 86, Paragraph 3.168:  The Secretariat Report lists emergency measures that China notified 
in 2020 that were purportedly issued and implemented as preventative measures to stop COVID -19 
transmission in cold -chain foods. However, these measures are not consistent with the guidan ce 
provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) such as FAO/WHO 's FAO -WHO interim guidance: "COVID -19 and Food Safety: 
Guidance for competent authorities responsible for national food  safety control systems, " dated 
22 April 2020, or FAO 's "COVID -19: Guidance for preventing transmission of COVID -19 within food 
businesses, " dated 2 August 2021. According to this guidance, current data indicates that neither 
food nor food packaging is a p athway for the spread of viruses causing respiratory illnesses, including 
SARS -CoV-2. In other words, SARS -CoV-2 is not a direct food safety concern. Like the FAO and the 
WHO, the U.S. Food and Agriculture Organization advises that "[c]urrent data indicate s that neither 
food nor food packaging is a pathway for the spread of viruses causing respiratory illnesses, including 
SARS -CoV-2. In other words, SARS -Cov-2 is not a direct food safety concern. "   
In light of this guidance, please provide the science - and risk-based justification for restrictions on 
imported cold -chain foods related to COVID -19 prevention.  
Does China disagree with the guidance provided by the FAO and the WHO and China 's trading 
partners.   
 
Member Answer: In order to effectively prevent N ovel Coronavirus from being introduced through 
imported cold chain food, according to the joint prevention and control mechanism of the State 
Council, the State Administration for Market Regulation has raised requirements for the producers WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  and operators of  imported cold chain food that they shall not process, produce or sell imported cold 
chain food without inspection and quarantine certificate, nucleic acid test certificate, disinfection 
certificate and traceability information. For the same batch of produ cts tested positive in nucleic acid 
test, measures such as taking them off the shelves and stopping selling, and sealing up in special 
areas shall be implemented. The above measures comply with Article 42, Paragraph 1, Article 44 
and Article 55 of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious 
Diseases, Article 42, Paragraph 1 and Article 92, Paragraph 2 of the Food Safety Law of the People 's 
Republic of China and other relevant laws and regulations, and are administrati ve acts according to 
law. The State Administration for Market Regulation will always strictly follow the deployment of the 
joint prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, and implement the relevant work 
requirements for pandemic prevention and  control from the cold chain food.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 86, Paragraph 3.168:    
In the original question, the United States asked China to provide the science - and risk -based 
justification for restrictions on imported cold-chain foods related to COVID -19 prevention. China did 
not do so. Instead, China stated that its restrictions are consistent with Chinese legal measures. Can 
China provide a science - and risk -based justification for its restrictions?    
 
Reply:  In order  to prevent the risk of the COVID -19 being imported through imported cold -chain 
food, effectively guarantee food safety and people 's lives and health, and maintain the safety of 
international trade supply chains, China has implemented measures for imported  cold-chain food 
under the premise of following international standards and rules - risk monitoring, suspension of the 
import of products from companies that have a cluster of infections, and implementation of 
emergency preventive measures for overseas man ufacturers of imported cold chain foods that have 
detected positive nucleic acid for the COVID -19. In this regard, some WTO members have expressed 
their concerns to China through several channels, and China is willing to share and exchange relevant 
informa tion with the members concerned.  
 
The Covid -19 pandemic has seriously jeopardized the safety and health of human lives, and has had 
a grave impact on the economic and social order and production of countries around the world. China 
has made great efforts t o effectively control the pandemic in its territory, but still is exposed to 
significant risk of reintroduction of COVID -19 through importation. Since last year, some countries 
have lifted the lockdown despite the increased new cases, and people started wo rking while still 
suffering from illness. As a result, many overseas manufacturing companies have reported clusters 
of infections among their employees. Chinese customs and local authorities have repeatedly detected 
positive nucleic acid for COVID -19 virus  on the inner and outer packaging of imported cold -chain 
food products or on the product itself, which indicates deficiencies in the food safety management 
systems of some overseas food companies that export to China. In this context, the General 
Administr ation of Customs (GAC), in order to protect food safety and consumer health, has deployed 
emergency preventive measures to monitor the risk of imported cold chain foods, suspend the import 
of products from companies reported with clusters of infections, an d apply a 1 -week or 4 -week 
suspension to overseas producers of imported cold chain foods that have tested positive for nucleic 
acid of the COVID -19. These measures have received proactive support and cooperation from many 
countries and establishments, and many of the exporters that experienced clusters of infections 
have suspended their exports to China voluntarily. Certainly, the establishments involved can 
resume their exports to China after taking measures to effectively eliminate the relevant risks and 
ensure food safety for their exports to China. China has notified the WTO of the above circumstances 
in an appropriate form.  
 
COVID -19 is a new virus, and many of its epidemiological characteristics remain uncertain. 
Considering the global prevalence, high  contagiousness, and high pathogenicity of Covide -19, China 
has taken corresponding emergency responses, which are important to prevent the risk of 
importation of Covide -19 virus through imported cold chain foods. On 17 October 2020, the Chinese 
Center for  Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) announced to the public that the live virus 
was detected on the outer packaging of imported cold -chain foods, which is the first time to confirm 
out of laboratory that COVID -19 can survive for a longer period of time on the outer packaging of 
items under special conditions of cold -chain transportation, suggesting that the virus has the 
possibility of cross -border importation over long distances with cold -chain items as the carrier. Given 
this situation, China has tightened the regulation of cold chain foods based on risk assessment, and 
the relevant practices conform to WTO rules. As a necessary measure to protect people 's health, it 
does not undermine the normal operations of international trade.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  China w elcomes the entry of high -quality and safe food from all members and strictly abides by the 
rules of the World Trade Organization. At present, the global pandemic prevention and control is still 
in a critical period. China calls on relevant members to foll ow the guidelines issued by the FAO and 
the WHO to establish an effective food safety management system and take various preventive 
measures to prevent exported food from being infected by COVID -19. China is willing to maintain 
communication with members o n related matters to ensure food safety from the source and enhance 
consumer confidence, and ensure the safety of the international food supply chain together with 
other members.  
 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization    
Page 97, Paragraph 3.199 : The Secretariat Report notes that "State participation varies from 
wholly SOEs and majority state ownership to the State acting as another shareholder. " How does 
the Chinese government currently decide on the appropriate level of state own ership in a particular 
company? What factors influence that decision?  
 
Member Answer: Since 2018, positive progress has been made in SOE reform. State -owned 
enterprises have completed the corporate system restructuring in an all -round way, and their statu s 
as independent market entities has been further established on the institutional level. Central SOEs 
have completed the corporate system restructuring, and 96% of local SASAC -funded enterprises 
have also completed the corporate system restructuring. Stab le progress has been made in the 
mixed ownership reform.    
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 97, Paragraph 3.199   
The United States notes that China did not answer the question as to how it determines the level of 
state ownership in a particular company. Please detail how China makes determinations about how 
much ownership stake to retain in a company that has undergone mixed ownership reform.    
Page 97, Paragraph 3.202 : The Secretariat Report notes that the State -Owned Asset Supervisio n 
and Administration Commission (SASAC) is in charge of "contributing capital to … SOEs under its 
management. "  
Please explain how SASAC makes its decisions on how to contribute capital.  
Please explain how these decisions are consistent with the actions o f a private investor.    
 
Member Answer: SASAC  is subordinate to the State Council. According to the Company Law, Law 
on the State -Owned Assets of Enterprises and other laws and regulations, based on the principle of 
separating government administration from enterprise management, separating governmen t 
administration from state assets management, and separating ownership from management rights, 
SASAC performs investor duties on behalf of the State Council, contributes to the invested enterprise 
as a shareholder, injects capital acting on market princip les and rule of law like other private 
investors, and has the right in major issues including benefiting from the return on assets and 
choosing managers. The supervision of enterprises by SASAC is based not on the supervision of 
administrative power, but o n the rights of investors, and the SASAC does not interfere with the daily 
business decisions of enterprises. SASAC appoints and dismisses the heads of central SOEs under 
its supervision through legal procedures instead of directly appointing senior manage rs. 
 
U.S. Follow Up Question to Question on Page 97, Paragraph 3.202    
If, as China claims, "SASAC injects capital on market principles and rule of law like other private 
investors " then can China provide examples of instances in which SASAC has withdrawn its capital 
from an SOE?   
 
Reply: The SASAC strictly follows the capital reduction procedures for enterprises in accordance 
with the law. Up to date, no capital reduction has occurred for the tier -one state -owned enterprise 
group. In the process of promoti ng mixed ownership reform of local state -owned enterprises, 
there  have been cases of transfer of state -owned equity. According to media reporting, on 
22 November  2019, Tianjin Yishang Group Co., a state -owned enterprise in Tianjin, transferred all 
its enti re shares to the private enterprise, China Fangda Group for RMB 2,269 million.  
 
Page 98 Table 3.24:  Does the Agricultural Bank of China support any agricultural equipment 
exports? If so, what financial terms and conditions does it offer?  
 
Member Answer: SOEs, private enterprises, foreign -funded enterprises, China -foreign joint 
ventures, etc. are all cu stomer groups of commercial banks. On the premise of compliance with laws 
and regulations, commercial banks independently select customer groups according to their own WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  strategic planning, development orientation, risk preference, operation and management 
capabilities, etc., and issue credits and loans. The relevant decisions of commercial banks are 
market -oriented choices and behaviors in light of their own development situation.    
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Question on Page 98, Table 3.24:    
China did not  answer the question. Do any of the Agricultural Bank of China 's credit and loan support 
cover equipment exports? Please provide specific information on the financial terms and conditions 
(interest rates, tenors, premium cost…etc.) of this type of support.   
 
Reply:  pursant  to the principle of marketization and rule of law, the Agricultural Bank of China 
determines the specific financing amount, term, interest rate, guarantee and among others 
according to the borrower 's position in credit, business risk, market operation and  other relevant 
factors.  
 
Page 99, Paragraph 3.206: The Secretariat Report assesses that "[t]he importance of SOEs in 
China 's economy, coupled with high amounts of financial support, may affect the functioning of 
market -oriented policies and practices. It would appear that SOEs in China often benefit from credits 
extended by state banks or other forms of financing, implicit grantees, capital injections, and 
preferential access to inputs. " The United States agrees with this assessment, which is an 
assessment  shared by many other WTO Members and by many experts who analyze China 's 
economic and trade regimes. However, the Secretariat Report notes that the Chinese authorities 
object to this assessment and insist that SOEs in China receive no preferences at all. Can China 
explain why it considers that Chinese SOEs operate on the same terms and conditions as private 
enterprises?   
 
Member Answer: The Chinese government attaches great importance to the fair and equitable 
participation of SOEs in market competition. SOEs have been integrated with the market economy 
and become the main entity independently engaging in market competition. They purchase and sell 
according to commercial considerations. They shall be subject to the same laws and rules as other 
enterprises in terms of access to funds, bankruptcy and competition legislation, and do not enjoy 
privileges.   
 
U.S. Follow Up Question to Question on Page 99, Paragraph 3.206    
Are SOEs provided loans from state -owned banks at the same rates as loans provided by state -
owned banks to private enterprises ?  
Page 99, Paragraph 3.206:  According to the Secretariat Report, it appears "that SOEs in China 
often benefit from credits extended by st ate banks. " China disagrees with this view. Please explain 
how state banks determine the loan rate for SOE borrowers? How do they price the risk of lending 
to an SOE?   
 
Member Answer: SOEs, private enterprises, foreign -funded enterprises, China -foreign jo int 
ventures, etc. are all customer groups of commercial banks. On the premise of compliance with laws 
and regulations, commercial banks independently select customer groups according to their own 
strategic planning, development orientation, risk preferenc e, operation and management 
capabilities, etc., and issue credits and loans. The relevant decisions of commercial banks are 
market -oriented choices and behaviors in light of their own development situation.    
 
U.S. Follow Up Question to Question on Paragra ph 3.206    
The United States notes that China did not answer the question regarding how state banks determine 
the loan rate for SOE borrowers nor the question about how the price the risk of lending to an SOE. 
China asserts, without explanation, that these  rates are market determined. Please answer the 
questions asked regarding how state banks determine the loan rate for SOE borrowers and how the 
price the risk of lending to SOEs.    
 
Reply to the above two questions:  Article 4 of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on 
Commercial Banks stipulates that commercial banks shall work under the principles of safety, fluidity 
and efficiency, with full autonomy and assume sole responsibility for their own risks, profits and 
losses, and with self -restraint.  Commercial banks shall carry out business in accordance with laws 
free from any interference by entities or individuals. Commercial banks shall bear civil legal liabilities 
independently with all their properties as legal persons. Also, article 35 of the Law stipulates that in 
offering loans to a borrower, a commercial bank shall strictly check the use of the loan by the 
borrower, the repayment ability of the borrower, and modes of repayment, etc. When granting loans, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  a commercial bank shall separate the c hecking process with the actual lending, and make 
examination and approval level -by-level. According to this law, commercial banks in China 
independently determine the factors to be considered and the information collected in the process 
of credit risk ass essment in accordance with the principles of marketization and rule of law, 
independently formulate relevant credit risk assessment procedures, and bear their own risks and 
profits and losses. Usually, when offering credit lines, a bank mainly pays attenti on to the following 
factors: whether the use of funds is compliant, the credit status of the entity (whether it is a debtor 
due to bad faith), financial statements, tax payment, profitability, trade habits, upstream and 
downstream customers, etc.  
 
3.3.7 In tellectual property rights    
3.3.7.5 Industrial property    
3.3.7.5.8 Undisclosed information and trade secrets   
Page 115, Paragraph 3.284: The Secretariat Report describes the legal framework for the 
protection of undisclosed information and trade secrets  in China.   
Why did China reject recommendations to reduce disclosures required at the time that cosmetics 
products and ingredients are filed under the new Cosmetics Supervision and Administration 
Regulation (CSAR) (G/TBT/N/CHN/1310  came into force on 1 May 2021) to only what is necessary 
for its regulatory obligations, so as to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures.   
Will China provide an update on the plans of the National Medical Products Administration and the 
State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) to develop mechanisms and procedures to 
protect confidential business information and trade secrets marked as such by U.S. cosmetics and 
cosmetics ingredient companies, when cosmetics and cosmetics ingredients are registered or notified 
via the new Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation (CSAR) (G/TBT/N/CHN/1310), 
which came into force on  1 May 2021?   
 
Member Answer: For the question on trade secrets and intellectual property protection, according 
to the Cosmetics Supervision and Administration Regulation, to further regulate the registration and 
filing management of cosmetics and new cosmetic ingredients, Measures for the Administration of 
the Registration and Recordation of Cosmetics, Provisions for Administration of New Cosm etic 
Ingredient Registration and Recordation, and Provisions for Administration of Cosmetics Registration 
and Dossiers elaborate on the workflow and information requirements for the registration and filing 
of cosmetics and new ingredients. It requires the registrant and the filer to submit safety -related 
information, which is also the prevailing rule for the inspection of health -related product safety in 
other countries. Registration and filing Information submitted by enterprises such as a brief 
descriptio n of the production process, and raw materials production process, is not supposed to be 
publicly disclosed by the government. The disclosure of government information is a measure by the 
Chinese government to accept social supervision and protect the publ ic's right to know. According 
to the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information, the administrative authorities shall 
not disclose government information that involves trade secrets, personal privacy, etc. where 
disclosure can cause damage to the legitimate rights and interests of third parties. Therefore, the 
question of damage to the trade secrets and intellectual property rights of enterprises does not 
apply.   
 
China attaches great importance to the protection of trade secrets of e nterprises. The trade secrets 
of parties concerned should be kept confidential as required by Article 47 of the Regulations on the 
Supervision and Administration of Cosmetics, and the Measures for the Administration of 
Registration and Recordation of Cosme tics issued on 7 January 2021. Having taken full account of 
the protection of intellectual property rights and trade secrets of enterprises, China proposed in the 
process of developing the relevant technical documents, that a summary of the basis for cosme tics 
efficacy claims should be submitted instead of the full text for the assessment of cosmetic efficacy 
claims; the technical requirements for the disclosure of new raw materials only contain basic 
information on raw materials, without requiring the disc losure of complete technical information. 
Regulatory authorities also strictly comply with the principle of protecting corporate trade secrets in 
the cosmetic registration and filing management.   
 
For the question of submitting information related to the safety of cosmetic ingredients. Product 
safety is closely connected with the safety of raw materials, requiring registrants and filers in the 
application for registration, to clarify the safety rela ted information of raw materials, which is an 
important measure to ensure product safety. Meanwhile, to facilitate cosmetic registrants and filers 
to fill out the safety -related information of raw materials, the National Medical Products 
Administration iss ued the Provisions for Administration of Cosmetic Registration and Dossiers, which WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  clearly states that if the raw material manufacturer has submitted safety -related information of raw 
materials in accordance with the requirements, the registrant and the fi ler only need to fill out the 
raw material submission code for relevance.    
 
U.S. Follow up Questions to Question on Page 115, Paragraph 3.284 :  
Will China  provide an update on the plans of the NMPA to develop mechanisms and procedures to 
protect confident ial business information and trade secrets marked as such by U.S. cosmetics and 
cosmetics ingredient companies, so as to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures?    
Will these mechanisms and procedures provide a means by which protections from unauth orized 
disclosures can be monitored and legally enforced within China  and abroad?    
 
Reply to the two questions above: There is no update at this time.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR   
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries    
4.1.2 Agriculture    
4.1.2.4 Policy instruments   
4.1.2.4.3  Measures affecting exports    
Page 126, Paragraph 4.18: According to the Secretariat Report, no data were available on food 
aid provided by China during the review period. The United States notes that in responding to 
the ECQ an d AG‑IMS, China stated that it has provided food aid through both multilateral and 
bilateral channels, but it has never notified Table ES:3 and NF:1. What is China 's policy on providing 
these food aid notifications to the WTO?   
 
Member Answer: In response to appeals from the international community and requests for 
emergency humanitarian assistance from the countries concerned, China has provided multi -
bilateral eme rgency food aid to the countries concerned. The emergency food aid provided by the 
Chinese government is non -reimbursable and in full compliance with WTO regulations. It also 
requires the countries concerned to arrange the use of food aid provided by China  in a manner 
consistent with WTO rules, and calls for the recipient countries not to monetize or re -export 
emergency food aid. The above -mentioned emergency food aid has played a positive role in 
alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the countries concern ed and has received unanimous praise 
from the international community and the countries concerned.   
 
Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 126, Paragraph 4.18:  
The United States thanks China for its transparency by explaining its international food aid p olicy 
and that it adheres to WTO rules. Will China notify  its international food aid donations (both 
bilateral  and multilateral) on Tables ES:3 and NF:1, along with  the above description , in future 
ECQ notifications? The United States  reaffirm s the importa nce of the notification process and its 
potential to provide the transparency for future discussions in the Committee on Agriculture.  
 
Reply:  In response to appeals from the international community and requests for emergency 
humanitarian assistance from the countries concerned, the Chinese government has provided food 
aid for many countries through bilateral and multilateral channels to help re levant countries cope 
with food shortages due to the COVID -19 pandemic and other causes. China 's action has played a 
positive role in alleviating the humanitarian crisis in the countries concerned and has received 
unanimous praise from the international co mmunity and the countries concerned. The emergency 
food aid provided by the Chinese government is non -reimbursable and in full compliance with 
WTO rules. China requires the countries concerned to arrange the use of food aid provided by China 
in a manner co nsistent with WTO rules, and calls for the recipient countries not to monetize or re -
export emergency food aid.  
 
4.1.2.4.3 Internal measures    
4.1.2.4.3.2 Price controls and market price support systems    
Page 129 -130, Paragraph 4.25:  The Secretariat Report indicates that China has a minimum 
purchase price for rice and wheat meeting minimum requirements as part of its market price support 
systems.   
With reports of corn and pork auctions, please confirm whether rice and wheat are the o nly 
commodities benefitting from a minimum purchase price support mechanism.  
 
Member Answer: China only implements a minimum purchase price for rice and wheat in major 
producing areas.    WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Please provide the value levels of nationwide support issued for China 's agricultural commodities by 
year.   
Please explain why China has not calculated the level of support as the amount equal to total Chinese 
production of these commodities and the price support level guaranteed for each commodity.  
 
Member Answer: China only implements a minimum purchase price for rice and wheat in major 
producing areas. China will soon submit a notification on domestic support for agriculture.    
 
Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 129 -130, Paragraph 4.25:   
The United States thank s China for its response, but would seeks clarification. Is China stating that 
it does not employ a minimum purchase price support mechanism for corn and pork? The 
United  States  looks forward to reviewing all of China 's current agricultural support policie s in its 
promised notification. The United States  reaffirm s the importance of  the notification process and its 
potential to provide the transparency necessary for a strong, functioning agricultural trading system.   
 
Reply:  China only implements a minimum purchase price for rice and wheat in major producing 
areas . 
 
4.1.3 Fisheries    
4.1.3.1 Features and market developments   
Page 133, Paragraph 4.34: The Secretariat Report states that between 2015 and 2019 there was 
a downwa rd trend in employment, the number of fishing vessels, and the marine catch. However, 
efforts taken to address illegal fishing are not outlined in detail.  
Is the reduction in employment, the number of fishing vessels, and the marine catch due to an 
increa se in illegal fishing?   
 
Member Answer : The reduction in employment, the number of fishing vessels, and the marine 
catch does not relate to illegal fishing.   
 
How does this reduction compare to numbers from distant water fishing, which appear to be 
underreported?   
 
Member Answer ：During  the period between 2016 and 2020, China did not approve any new 
distant water fishing enterprises or vessels, and kept the total number of its approved distant water 
fishing vessels around 2700. Requirements stipulated by the RFMOs on the limitation of th e number 
and total tonnage of fishing vessels, stock -specific fishing quota and conservation and management 
measures relating to closed fishing areas and closed fishing seasons are strictly observed. The annual 
catch by China 's distant water fleets has bee n stabilized at around 2.3 million tons.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 133, Paragraph 4.34:  
According to China 's official statistics, China 's distant water fishing fleet consisted of 2,491 vessels 
in 2017 and increased to 2,705 by 2020. Ho w can the number of licensed distant water fishing 
vessels increase if China did not approve any new distant water fishing vessels? Does China intend 
to keep the number of licensed distant water fishing vessels at around 2,700 vessels during the 
14th Five-Year Plan period?    
 
Reply : the number of China 's distant water fishing vessels increased from 2,491 in 2017 to 
2,705  in 2020. During this period, China did not approve any new distant water fishing vessels. The 
increased licensed distant water fishing vessels were all approved to be built before 2017, and it 
took time to build them and put them into use. According to the 13th Five-Year Plan, China kept the 
number of licensed distant water fishing vessels within 3,000. China intends to keep the n umber 
within 3,000 during the 14th Five-Year Plan period.  
 
4.1.3.3  Legal, institutional, and policy framework   
Page 135, Paragraph 4.37: According to the Secretariat Report, the Chinese authorities indicated 
that they are taking steps to introduce a total allowab le catch system for fisheries. However, details 
about this system have not been released.   
Please describe China 's current fishery management system within its Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ). What is the status of China 's stocks within its EEZ? Is the stat us of China 's stocks public 
information? If so, where can it be found?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Member Answer: China implements a total management system for marine fishery resources in 
waters under its jurisdiction and a "dual control " system for the number of fishing vessels and the 
power of main engines. Relevant Chinese research institutes continue to carry out  investigations and 
assessments on fishery resources in exclusive economic zones and publicly release relevant scientific 
research achievements as appropriate.  
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 135, Paragraph 4.37:   
Can China provide names and links to recent public assessments of China 's fishery resources in 
exclusive economic zones?    
 
Reply:  Relevant information are released on the websites of institutes of the Chinese Academy of 
Fishery Sciences. Links to recent public information:  
http://www.ysfri.ac.cn/info/1108/36290.htm  
http://www.ysfri.ac.cn/info/1108/36507.htm  
http://www.ysfri.ac.cn/info/1108/36327.htm  
http://www.ysfri.ac.cn/info/1108/36214.htm  
http://www.ysfri.ac.cn/in fo/1108/35911.htm  
 
4.1.3.3 Government support to the fisheries sector    
Page 136, Paragraph 4.40: The Secretariat Report states: "According to the authorities, the 
Government will shortly issue a new policy to terminate fuel and boat construction subsidies, with 
the last of these pay -outs being made at end -2020. " Does this include fuel subsidies to distant water 
fleets flagged to China?  
 
Member Answer ：As stipulated in the Circular on Implementing Policy to Support Development of 
Fishery Sector to Promote High -Quality Development of Fishery Sector (Circular Cai Nong [2021] 
No. 41) issued in May 2021, China has abolished fuel subsidies which directly cover the cost of 
fishing, and redirected the subsidies towards supporting national marine ranching and fisheries 
infrastructure construction, boosting green and circular development of fisheries sector, enhancing 
compliance capability with respect to internatio nal obligations and promoting oceanic resources 
conservation. The new subsidies policy, featuring the objective of green development, is designed 
to incentivize fishermen to preserve fisheries resources, reduce fishing intensity and promote the 
sustainable  utilization of marine fishery sources.   
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 136, Paragraph 4.40:   
In Circular Cai Nong [2021] No. 41, can you confirm that , in Article 2.2.2, the phrase  "abolish[ing] 
direct cost subsidies "refers specifically to ab olishing the fuel subsidy program for fisheries? Are any 
other direct cost subsidy programs for fisheries also abolished pursuant to this measure?  
 
Reply:  The new round measures to support the development of fishery sectors feature in the green 
and sustain able orientation, the d irect cost subsidies  has been abolished and the fuel subsidy 
program and boat construction subsidies  will no longer be put in place. In addition, the subsidy 
program will be coupled with administration of fishery sector and designed to incentivize fishermen 
to preserve fisheries resources . 
 
4.1.3.4 Fisheries conservation measures    
Page 136, Paragraph 4. 43: According to the Secretariat Report, the Chinese authorities have 
stated that China has taken steps to limit illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities 
and to strengthen monitoring and control of the fisheries industry while undertak ing investigations 
into and administering penalties for illegal fishing activity and enterprises.   
Do China 's anti -IUU fishing efforts apply to distant water fishing vessels that are owned and operated 
by Chinese companies but registered in and fly the fl ag of a third country? What laws and regulations 
apply to such vessels? Does China work with foreign countries and organizations to ensure that these 
vessels are properly monitored and controlled? If so, how?   
 
Member Answer: China actively joins the rele vant RFMOs, legally engages in offshore fishing 
activities under the jurisdiction of RFMOs, and effectively fulfills the obligations as a RFMO member. 
In recent years, China 's compliance performance in offshore fisheries has ranked among the top 
RFMOs such  as the IOTC, and the level of compliance has improved year by year. Since 2020, China 
has established a compliance evaluation mechanism for pelagic fishery enterprises to quantitatively 
evaluate the annual compliance performance of offshore fishing enterp rises and their fishing vessels, 
and used the compliance evaluation results as the basis for implementing incentives and penalties. WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  As a member of eight RFMOs, China has supported the inclusion of illegal fishing vessels in the RFMO 
IUU fishing list, and c ooperated with coastal countries to jointly combat illegal fishing activities. 
Bilateral fisheries dialogues and consultation mechanisms have been established the US, EU, 
Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and other countries to exchange experiences and pra ctices in 
combating IUU fishing.    
 
Does China keep records of distant water fishing vessels that are Chinese -owned and operated but 
registered in and fly the flag of a third country? How does China make this information available to 
international observer s?  
 
Member Answer ：China  has established regulatory regimes on distant water fisheries compatible 
with international norms. Regulations on Administration of Distant Water Fishery and the 
Management Measures for Monitoring of Distant Water Fishing Vessels ' Position have been amend ed, 
and relevant implementing measures such as the Circular on Strengthening the Management of 
Transshipment on High Seas in Distant Water Fisheries and the Detailed Rules on Implementation 
of National Observer Administration on Distant Water Fisheries wer e issued. The licensing and 
approval system for distant water fisheries, as well as systems for data collection and reporting, 
fishing vessels ' position monitoring and electronic fishing log books, are enforced and improved 
specifically for distant water f isheries. China prohibits distant water fisheries companies, vessels and 
crews from engaging in, supporting or assisting IUU fishing. With the strengthening of its overall 
regulatory systems, China is making continuous efforts to develop its distant water fishery sector in 
a regulated and orderly manner.  
 
How many fishery access agreements, fishery cooperation agreements, fishery base agreements, 
and other fishery arrangements does China have with other countries? Do these agreements have 
provisions that e nsure the sustainability of the stocks being fished?  
 
Member Answer: China carries out cooperation in fisheries with many Asian countries including 
Malaysia and Thailand, many African countries including Mauritania and Ghana, South American 
countries including Argentina and Uruguay, and Pacific Island countries including Papua New Guinea 
and Micronesia, and holds regular bilateral fisheries dialogues with the United States, the 
European  Union and Russia. Fisheries cooperation agreements take a variety of forms, ranging from 
intergovernmental agreements to business -to-government agreements to business -to-business 
agreements. The intergovernmental agreements and intergovernmental dialogues cover a number 
of topics, such as establishing regular m eeting mechanisms, strengthening bilateral cooperation in 
areas such as trade, technology, and training, law enforcement supervision and information 
exchange, joint resource surveys, and cooperation in combating illegal fishing.   
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 136, Paragraph 4.43:   Can China list all 
countries with which China has either business -to-government or intergovernmental agreements on 
fisheries?    
 
Reply:  Countries with which China has concluded intergovernmental agreements on fishe ries include: 
Japan, Korea, Russia, the Philippines, Mauritania and Argentina.  
 
4.2 Manufacturing    
4.3 4.3.2 Selected subsectors    
4.3.2.3 Iron and steel    
Page 152, paragraph 4.116:  The Secretariat Report notes that ongoing efforts in China to 
eliminate overcapacity in the steel industry are guided by government policies, specifically the 
Opinions on Reducing Overcapacity in the Steel Industry to Achieve Development by Solving 
Difficulties, which ostensibly prohibits the building up of new steel capacity.  Under this policy, China 
planned to cut 150 million tons by 2020 to bring capacity closer to consumption.  However, the OECD 
estimates that nominal crude steel making capacity in Chin a continued to rise from 2018 levels, 
reaching approximately 1.12 billion metric tons in 2020.  The OECD also found that approximately 
39.4 million tons of capacity investments are planned or currently underway in China.   
Does China agree that the need for  government policy directives indicates that market forces are 
weak or nonexistent in China?   
 
Member Answer: China does not agree with the statement that " China 's market forces are weak 
or nonexistent ". "Government policies and directives " is China giving  decisive role to market in 
resource allocation and the specific embodiment of better playing government role. This assertion WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  reflects the consistent "double standard " approach of the United States, which on the one hand 
imposes the label of "market distor tion and government subsidies " on the production and operation 
of Chinese steel enterprises following market principles, and demands that the Chinese government 
should strengthen its intervention and increase its efforts to reduce production overcapacity; on the 
other hand, it questions China 's market power is weak or nonexistent.    
 
U.S. Follow -Up Question to Question on Page 152, paragraph 4.116 :   
In its above response, China acknowledges that the Chinese government intervenes in the steel 
market through various policies and directives, but it claims that this intervention is only intended 
to ensure that resources are allocated in accordance with market principles. Ideally, in the 
United  States ' view, China would act like market economies and allow  the market itself to dictate 
outcomes, rather than government intervention. After many years of severe and persistent excess 
capacity in China 's steel industry, can China explain the efficacy of its intervention in the steel market 
in addressing this seri ous problem?  
 
Reply:  Excess capacity in the steel industry is a global problem, which have caused enormous 
difficulties for steel enterprises in developed, emerging and developing economies. China attached 
great importance to this problem and has taken ini tiatives to resolve excess capacity in the steel 
industry. Since 2016, China has been actively promoting the reduction of excess capacity in the steel 
industry by market -oriented and law -based means. As of 2020, China had reduced crude steel 
capacity by mo re than 150 million tons and clamped down "substandard steel " capacity of over 
140 million tons. China has paid a huge price for reducing excess capacity in the steel industry, 
with 272,000 workers in the steel industry resettled. The cost has achieved remarkable results. 
In 2016, the whole industry made profits instead of suffering losses, and the losses of member 
enterprises of China Iron and Steel Association decreased to 20%, with a profit of more than 
RMB 30 billion. In the following four y ears, the steel industry maintained the profits at a relatively 
high level, and enterprises maintained a strong momentum of development. China has made an 
important contribution to the recovery of the global steel industry by reducing excess capacity in it s 
steel industry.  
 
4.4 Services    
4.4.2 Telecommunication s   
4.4.2.2 Regulatory framework    
4.4.2.2.5 Cloud computing    
Page 170, Paragraph 4.213: The Secretariat Report notes that China does not allow any direct 
provision of cloud computing services by foreign -invested companies and that their only access is 
through the negotiation of contractual partnerships with Chinese companies, where the Chines e 
company applies for the licenses needed to supply cloud computing services. Please explain China 's 
rationale for not liberalizing the cloud computing sector to allow for meaningful foreign participation?  
 
Member Answer: At present, China is actively prom oting the further opening up of the 
telecommunications sector in accordance with the requirements of develop new systems for a 
higher -standard open economy. On the basis of China 's WTO commitments, China will study and 
explore the feasibility of relaxing the share ratio restriction of foreign capital in telecommunications 
field in pilot areas.   
 
U.S. Follow up Question on Question on Page 170, Paragraph 4.213:    
Can China please provide a more specific answer regarding cloud computing services as had been 
requested rather than  the telecommunications sector more generally?    
 
Reply:  China has fully fulfilled its commitments to WTO regarding the telecommunications sector, 
and is studying further opening -up of the telecommunications sector, including cloud computing. In 
the next step, China will, in accordance with the requirements of the new system with high -level 
opening -up, promote the opening -up of relevant businesses and explore ways to relax the 
restrictions on the foreign equity ratio in pilot a reas. 
 
Page 170, Paragraph 4.213: What are the key barriers to the implementation of the 2017 Notice 
on Standardizing Cloud Service Market and Facilitating the Sound Development of the Industry?  
 
Member Answer: Notice on Standardizing Cloud Service Market and Facilitating the Sound 
Development of the Industry has not been issued.   
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  U.S. Follow up Question on Question on Page 170, Paragraph 4.213:    
Has China permanently withdraw n this measure from consideration ?   
 
Reply:  Notice on Standardizing Clou d Service Market and Facilitating the Sound Development of the 
Industry has not been issued. Future updates will be released without delay.  
 
4.4.2.2.6 Cybersecurity    
Page 170, Paragraph 4.214:  The Secretariat Report notes that the Chinese authorities plan to 
develop further regulations regarding critical information infrastructure operators. Can China 
elaborate on this intention? Which regulations are under development, and how do they relate t o 
the Cybersecurity Law, the Data Security Law, the Law on Personal Information Protection or any 
other relevant measures that China already has in place? What is the intended subject matter of the 
planned regulations regarding critical information infrast ructure operators?   
 
Member Answer ：Strengthening the protection of key information infrastructure is international 
common practice. For example, the US, Germany, and Japan have enacted relevant laws to include 
important industries and fields into the scope  of protection. According to the needs of China 's 
situation and drawing lessons from the practices of other countries, the Cybersecurity Law stipulates 
the protection system of key information infrastructure. Regulation on Protecting the Security of 
Critical Information Infrastructure clarifies the scope and identification procedures of critical 
information infrastructure. Key information infrastructure refers to important industries and fields 
such as public communication and information services, power, t raffic, water resources, finance, 
public service, e -government, and other critical information infrastructure which —if destroyed, 
suffering a loss of function, or experiencing leakage of data —might seriously endanger national 
security, national welfare, th e people 's livelihood, or the public interest. Chapter II of the Regulations 
stipulates that the competent departments and regulatory authorities of the above -mentioned 
important industries and fields, as protection departments, shall be responsible for fo rmulating the 
identification rules of key information infrastructure, organizing the identification of key information 
infrastructure in their own industries and fields, and timely notifying the operators and the public 
security department of the State Cou ncil of the identification results. In the meanwhile, according 
to the relevant provisions of Article 31 of the Cybersecurity Law, the State encourages operators of 
networks outside the [designated] critical information infrastructure systems to voluntaril y 
participate in the critical information infrastructure protection system.    
 
U.S. Follow -up to Question to Question on Page 170, Paragraph 4.214 : 
In its answer, China notes that the Regulation Protecting the Security of Critical Information 
Infrastructure clarifies the scope of critical infrastructure and notes that important industries and 
fields. including "finance " are included under that rubric.  What is the China 's policy, including those 
of its financial services regulators, on providing further clarification regarding which financial services 
institutions qualify as critical information infrastructure operators (CIIOs)?   
 
Reply:  According to the Article 9 of the Regulation on Protecting the Security of Critical Information 
Infrastructure, protection departments shall formulate the identification rules for critical information 
infrastructure based on the actual situation in their own industries and fields. Article 10 provides 
that the protection departments are responsible for organizing the identification of the critical 
information infrastructure in their own industries and fields according to the identification rules, and 
notify ing the operators of the results in a timely manner. The protection departments of the financial 
industry are responsible for formulating identification rules for critical information infrastructure in 
the financial industry and organizing the identificati on of critical information infrastructure operators 
in their own industry based on such rules.  
 
4.4.3.2  Maritime transpor t   
Page 175, paragraph 4.237: The Secretariat Report states: "In order to encourage qualified 
Chinese -funded international 'Flag of Convenienc e' ships to return to China, ships that were declared 
for import and were registered between September 2016 and September 2019 were exempt from 
customs duties and import VAT. " Did China include the customs duties incentives referenced above 
in its most rec ent subsidy notification under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures?    
 
Member Answer: China is studying on this issue.   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  U.S. Follow Up Question to Question on Page 175, Paragraph 4.237:    
The United States notes that China did not answer this question. The United States asks that China 
respond to the question.    
 
Reply:  China is studying on this issue.  
 
Page 176, Paragraph 4.242: The Secretariat Report indicates that, under the Ship Tonnage  Tax 
Law, "Chinese taxable ships and taxable ships whose country of registry has signed treaties or 
agreements that mutually grant MFN treatment clauses of ship taxes and fees " receive preferential 
rates. It also notes that there are special tax exemptions for "fishing and breeding fishing boats. " 
Can China explain the preferential rates given to some ships and the special exemptions for fishing 
and breeding fishing boats? Has C hina notified the incentives referenced above in its most recent 
subsidy notification under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?    
 
Member Answer : China is studying this issue.    
 
U.S. Follow Up Question to Question on Page 175, Paragraph 4.242:   
The United States notes that China did not answer this question. The United States asks that China 
respond to the question.    
 
Reply:  China is studying on this issue.  
 
U.S. FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS ON QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT 'S REPORT    
3.2 Building a Highland for Foreign Investment    
3.2.3  Actively expanding market access for foreign investmen t   
 
Page 9, Paragraph 3.16:  The Government Report provides examples of foreign investment 
restrictions lifted in a number of secto rs, including the purchase and wholesale of rice, wheat, and 
corn. Please explain China 's rationale for maintaining foreign investment restrictions on crop seed 
breeding for rice and soybeans and on biotechnology development of planting seeds across severa l 
planting seed varieties.    
 
Member Answer: Relevant departments are studying this issue. Expanding the opening up of seed 
industry is an important part of building a new pattern of comprehensive opening up of the country, 
which reflects China 's firm dete rmination to expand opening up. Expanding the opening up of seed 
industry is the objective need of deepening the structural reform of agricultural supply side, which 
will accelerate the introduction of foreign famous and excellent new varieties, the rapid development 
of characteristic crop industry and meet people 's needs for characteristic agricultural products. China 
will further optimize the development environment of seed industry, welcome foreign investment in 
seed industry and carry out seed productio n and business activities according to law.    
 
Follow -Up to Question on Page 9, Paragraph 3.16:    
As reflected in the December 2020 Central Economic Work Conference communique and the 
February 2021 State Council Document No. 1, China has identified industr ialization of biotech nology  
seed breeding as a top priority. Yet, as shown by the addition of genetically engineered planting 
seeds to the restricted list in the July 2021 draft update to the Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited 
or Restricted to be Importe d, China is maintaining or even increasing relevant foreign investment 
restrictions. Can China explain this dichotomy?   
 
Reply:  Relevant departments are studying this issue. Expanding the opening up of seed industry is 
an important part of building a new pattern of comprehensive opening up of the country, which 
reflects China 's firm determination to expand opening up. Expanding th e opening up of seed industry 
is the objective need of deepening the agricultural supply -side structural reform, which will 
accelerate the introduction of foreign famous and excellent new varieties, the rapid development of 
characteristic crop industry and  meet people 's needs for characteristic agricultural products.  
 
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core    
4.2.2 Deeply and fully participating in multilateral negotiations and discussions, and 
earnestly fulfilling the ob ligations as a WTO Member    
Page 15, Paragraph 4.20: On April 8, 2020, the United States sent a request to China 's inquiry 
point for copies of several Chinese measures that did not appear to have been published. China 
refused to provide those measures to t he United States. Instead, China indicated that it was not WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  obligated to share measures that were set to expire soon. Moreover, China 's response was received 
more than one year after the request was submitted, well beyond the 30 -day requirement (or 
45 days in exceptional cases) for responding, as set out in Paragraph 2(C) of China 's Protocol of 
Accession to the WTO. What is China 's policy on making all requested measures available to 
WTO Members without regard to whether the measures being requested are curr ently in effect, 
expired, or set to expire?    
 
Member Answer: China has always attached great importance to compliance with WTO rules, and 
has been fulfilling its related obligations under the WTO framework. China will respond to the formal 
requests of WTO members for trade policies as defined in the relevant provisions of the Accession 
Protocol in accordance with the requirements of its accession commitments.   
 
U.S. Follow -Up Questions to Question on Page 15, Paragraph 4.20 :   
Can China expl ain why China did not respond in writing within 45 days to the U.S. inquiry point 
request made on April 8, 2020 as it was obligated to do under China 's Protocol of Accession to the 
WTO?  Why has China not provided the five legal measures listed below reque sted by the U.S. in its 
inquiry point request of April 8, 2020 or explained its position in writing to the United States:  
1. Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture on Printing and Distributing the 
Implementation Plan for the Adjustment of  the Distant Water Fishery Oil Price Subsidy Policy (Nong 
Ban Yu [2016] No. 43)   
2. Notice of the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture on Printing and Distributing the 
Implementation Plan for the Adjustment of the Domestic Fishery Fishing and Aquacu lture Oil Price 
Subsidy  (Nong Ban Yu [2016] No. 65)   
3. Overall Plan for China 's Distant Water Fishery Development (2001 -2010)  (issued 2001)   
4. Reply of the State Council on the Establishment of the National Integrated Circuit Industry 
Investment Fund (Guo Han [2014] No. 48)   
5. Notice of the Ministry of Finance on the Matter of the Exemption of the National Integrated Circuit 
Industry Investment Fu nd Co., Ltd. From the State -Owned Shares Social Security Transfer 
Obligation (Cai Jian [2015] No. 776)  
Why were none of these measures published in the MOFCOM Gazette as China was obligated to do 
under China 's Protocol of Accession to the WTO?   
 
Reply:  China has always attached great importance to compliance with WTO rules, and has been 
fulfilling its related obligations under the WTO framework. China will respond to the formal requests 
of WTO members for trade policies as defined in the relevant provisio ns of the Accession Protocol in 
accordance with its accession commitments.  
 
4.4 Building International Platforms for Opening Up and Cooperation    
4.4.1 Promoting high quality cooperation for the Belt and Road Initiative    
Page 18, Paragraph 4.37:  The Government Report refers to the greening of the Belt and Road 
Initiative and the emergence of the Green Silk Road. Given this development, will the 
Chinese  government instruct China Eximbank and SINOSURE to stop supporting certain energy 
projects such  as fossil fuel projects (e.g., coal fire plants, etc.)?    
 
Member Answer: China 's president Xi Jinping announced at the general debate of the 
76th UN General Assembly that China will vigorously support the development of green and low -
carbon energy in dev eloping countries, and will no longer build new overseas coal -fired power 
generation projects. This is another key initiative since China 's declaration of peak carbon dioxide 
emissions and carbon neutrality, which is also an important action to promote the  construction of 
the Green Silk Road. During the Belt and Road initiative construction, China will strictly implement 
the requirements of no longer building new overseas coal -fired power generation projects, and work 
with the co -constructing countries to r espond to the global challenges of climate change together.    
 
U.S. Follow -up Question to Question on Page 18, Paragraph 4.37:    
Under this new directive, will China Eximbank and Sinosure  stop providing export credit and 
insurance support to all overseas fossil fuel projects, including existing facilities?   
 
Reply:  China Eximbank and Sinosure will adhere to the philosophy of green development and 
promote transformation of their businesses with the aim of green development. They will resolutely 
implement what China 's president Xi Jinping announced at the general debate of the 76th UN General 
Assembly.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  5.3.4 Improving the property rights system and promoting the market -based allocation 
of production factor s   
Page 24, Paragraph 5.18: The Government Report notes that China 's reform "to convert SOEs 
into standard companies has basically been completed. "   
Please explain and provide additional information on how much direct and indirect ownership the 
Chinese government maintains in these "standard companies. "   
How does the "reformed " governance structure provide independence from the Chinese government 
and ensure that these "standard companies " act consistently with commercial considerations?    
What is the legal distinction between majority -owned SOEs and majority -owned "standard 
companies "?   
Please detail the reform of enterprises via "mixed ownership refo rm" by providing specific examples 
of the level of ownership by the Chinese government both before and after the mixed ownership 
reform. In these examples, please also detail the other shareholders, besides the Chinese 
government, that are equity owners in  these enterprises?   
What enterprises are indirectly supervised by the State -Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission?    
What enterprises are directly or indirectly supervised at the sub -central level of government?    
 
Member Answer : China al ways adheres to the market -oriented reform of state -owned enterprises. 
In the process of the reform, China has continuously improved the modern enterprise system, 
established a sound corporate governance mechanism with statutory and transparent rights and 
liabilities, coordinated operation and effective checks and balances, clarified the functions and 
powers of the board of directors, improved the market -based operation mechanism, and continued 
to promote the reform of the state -owned assets regulation syst em dominated by capital 
management. The reformed enterprises operate in accordance with the Company Law and articles 
of association to serve the interests of shareholders. Shareholders shall appoint directors, 
supervisors and other senior executives to exe rcise their statutory and agreed rights in accordance 
with their shareholding ratios. As independent market entities, enterprises shall conduct production 
and operation independently, and shall not be directly controlled by the government. In accordance 
with the provisions of the Company Law, state -owned enterprises that have undergone the reform 
of the corporate system have set up such internal governance structures as the board of directors, 
the board of supervisors, and managers, and formulated correspon ding articles of association. The 
internal decision -making, governance, operation and management have been further standardized, 
and the shareholders shall bear limited liabilities according to their respective shares. In the process 
of promoting the mixed -ownership reform, China has earnestly protected the property rights and 
interests of all kinds of investors and aroused the enthusiasm of all kinds of capitals to participate 
in the development of mixed ownership economy. For example, China Unicom, introd uced such large 
Internet companies as Tencent, Alibaba, JD.com and Baidu as large strategic investors to innovate 
a new model of integration of the telecom industry with the Internet enterprises and low -cost user 
acquisition, thus realizing rapid developme nt of industrial Internet services. In addition, Eastern Air 
Logistics Co., Ltd. introduced Legend Holdings and Global Logistic Properties as strategic investors 
to conduct the mixed -ownership reform. After the reform, a structure with each of the three pa rties 
holding 1/3 of the company 's shares was formed, which further improved the corporate governance 
structure and the operating efficiency. A wholly state -owned enterprise is a non -corporate enterprise 
established in accordance with the Law on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole P eople, and 
all the capital of the enterprise is state -owned capital. A wholly state -owned company is a corporate 
enterprise established in accordance with the Company Law, and 100% of the capital is state -owned. 
SASAC only supervises Grade A enterprises di rectly funded by the state.    
 
U.S. Follow Up Questions to Questions on Page 24, Paragraph 5.18  
How are companies who are partially owned by the government following mixed ownership reform 
considered under Chinese law?  
 
Reply:  The Company Law of the Peop le's Republic of China stipulates that the organizational form 
of the company consists of two types: limited liability company and joint -stock company. The mixed 
ownership enterprise is the description of partial limited liability company and joint -stock c ompany 
from the perspective of the nature of the company 's capital by all sectors of the society, which is 
equally protected and bound by the Chinese laws and regulations.  
 
How much ownership does the state retain in these enterprises?   
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  In the process of mixed ownership reform, enterprises adhere to the principles of applying 
targeted policies tailored to local conditions and specific industries and enterprises. They  can be 
independently run or controlled or joined in equity where appropriate. Depending on their own 
circumstances, they can determine a reasonable shareholding structure. In the case of commercial 
state-owned enterprises whose main businesses are in full y competitive industries and fields, the 
state-owned capital can hold absolute or relative shares, and those that require equity participation 
can also do so; at the same time, the shareholding ratio is not static and can be phased in and 
adjusted dynamica lly. 
 
For example, in the example of Eastern Air logistics cited, is it correct to understand that the state 
maintains a 33.3% ownership in Eastern Air Logistics following mixed ownership reform?  
 
Reply:  Eastern Air logistics is a mixed ownership enterpris e. To date, Eastern Airlines Industry 
Investment Co., Ltd., which is the subsidiary of state -funded enterprise China Eastern Airlines Group 
Co., Ltd., holds 40.50% of the equity of Eastern Air logistics, but it cannot be interpreted that the 
state holds 33 .3% of the equity of Eastern Air logistics.  
 
What is a "Grade A enterprise? Please provide a list of all Grade A enterprises . Please also provide 
details on all state funding provided to Grade A enterprises.  
 
Reply:  According to the Law of the People 's Republic of China on the State -Owned Assets of 
Enterprises, Interim Measures for the Administration of Supervision of State -owned Assets of 
Enterprises, Interim Measures for Assessment of the Operational Performance of Persons in Charge 
of Central Enterp rises and other relevant laws, regulations and rules, SASAC conducts annual and 
term performance assessment of the persons in charge of the enterprises under its supervision, and 
Grade -A enterprises are those with excellent performance assessment.  
 
On 13 J uly 2021, SASAC announced the list of 47 Grade -A enterprises in 2020 on its website. See 
www.sasac.gov.cn for details  
Are there other grades of enterprises? If so, please detail what these grades correspond to .  
 
Reply:  There are also Grade -B, Grade -C and Grade -D enterprises. China will disclose the relevant 
information in accordance with the Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on Disclosure of 
Government Information and other regulations.  
 
Is any state funding  provided indirectly by the state to Grade A enterprises?  
 
Reply:  No state funding is provided indirectly by the state to Grade A enterprises.  
 
5.3.8 Deepening reforms in fiscal, taxation, financial and other key areas   
Page 26, Paragraph 5.24:    
The Government Report discusses the loan prime rate mechanism.    
Can China explain the methodology for which banks are combined, and how they are combined, to 
calculate loan prime rates?  
 
Member Answer: The quoting bank submits the quotation to the National In ter-bank Funding 
Center based on the its loan interest rate to the premium clients by means of a medium -term lending 
facility (MLF) interest rate plus point formation. The National Inter -bank Funding Center removes 
the highest and lowest quotations to take  the arithmetic average and rounds it to the nearest integer 
multiple of 0.05% to calculate the LPR .  
Of the banks whose loans factor into the prime rate, which banks have any level of state ownership 
and what is the level of state investment in these bank s?  
 
Member Answer: At present, on the basis of the original 10 national banks such as Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank and 
Bank of Communications, LPR quoting banks have added each  2 banks of Chengnan Commercial 
Bank, Rural Commercial Bank, foreign banks (Standard Chartered Bank and Citibank) and private 
banks to 18 banks, which effectively enhanced the representativeness of LPR quotation. In the 
future, the People 's Bank of China w ill guide the market interest rate pricing self -discipline 
mechanism to periodically evaluate and adjust LPR quotation banks based on the quotation quality.   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  U.S. Follow Up Questions to Questions on Page 26, Paragraph 5.24    
What constitutes a "premium cl ient" for the purposes of providing interest rates to the National 
Inter-bank Funding Center?   
 
Reply:  For commercial banks, a "premium client " generally refers to one with the best credit, the 
lowest risk and good operating conditions. It shall be defined at the discretion of financial institutions.  
 
In its response, China notes that PBOC will "guide the market interest rate pricing self discipl ine 
mechanism to periodically evaluate and adjust LPR quotation banks based on the quotation quality. " 
Does this authority include the ability to adjust the LPR rate itself or just the banks that constitute 
the rate?    
 
Reply:  The loan prime rate (LPR) is based on the loan interest rate that quoting banks offer their 
premium clients. The LPR quoting bank shall submit their quotations to the National Inter -bank 
Funding Center (NIFC) by adding a few basis points to the interest rate of open market operations 
(mainly referring to the medium -term lending facility (MLF) rate). The NIFC shall get the LPR by 
calculating the arithmetic average of the quotations after excluding the highest and lowest ones. 
The People 's Bank of China shall guide the market interest ra te pricing self discipline mechanism in 
strengthening the supervision and management of the LPR, periodically evaluate the quotation 
quality to determine the survival of the fittest, and strengthen incentives and constraints on quoting 
banks.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  MEXICO  
I. INFORME DE LA SECRETARÍA (WT/TPR/S/415)  
2. REGÍMENES DE COMERCIO E INVERSIÖN  
2.1. Marco general  
(Pág. 35) 2.6. En principio, todas las normas relacionadas con el comercio formuladas por las 
autoridades a todos los niveles deben cumplir con los acuerdos c omerciales internacionales en los 
que China es parte, incluido el Acuerdo de Marrakech por el que se establece la Organización Mundial 
del Comercio y sus acuerdos complementarios, el Protocolo de Adhesión de China y el informe del 
Grupo de Trabajo sobre la  Adhesión de China. Los proyectos de ley y de reglamento a nivel de 
ministerio y departamento se publican en línea en chino durante 30 días como mínimo, para que el 
público pueda formular observaciones, salvo que el Consejo de Estado decida que se debe man tener 
su carácter confidencial. Las observaciones públicas pueden presentarse a través del sitio web del 
Ministerio de Justicia. En la Gaceta de Comercio Exterior y Cooperación Económica de China, editada 
por el Ministerio de Comercio (MOFCOM), se publican  las leyes, los reglamentos y las normas de 
China relacionados con el comercio.  
 
1.  Se menciona que la consulta pública es de conformidad con el Reglamento sobre los 
Procedimientos para la Formulación de Normas, y el Reglamento sobre los Procedimientos 
para la Formulación de Reglamentos; en ese contexto, podrían describir a grandes rasgos 
los procedimientos para la formulación tanto de normas, como de reglamentos 
administrativos y especificar si existe algún procedimiento adicional o especial para 
aquellas q ue tengan un posible impacto en el comercio exterior.  
 
Reply:  China does not quite understand this question and would like to ask Mexico for further 
clarification. China has publicly released trade -related measures.  
 
2. REGÍMENES DE COMERCIO E INVERSI ÓN  
2.4. Régimen de inversión  
2.4.2. Procedimientos de examen y aprobación  
(Pág. 49) 2.61. Las autoridades afirman que la SAMR  ha estado trabajando con los ministerios y 
organismos competentes a fin de acortar el tiempo necesario para el proceso de registro de las 
empresas y simplificar los procedimientos. La SAMR ha proporcionado orientaciones a los 
departamentos gubernamentales  locales competentes sobre la construcción de una plataforma 
unificada de servicios en línea para la constitución de empresas. Es posible tramitar en línea el 
registro de sociedades, la fabricación del sello oficial, la solicitud de facturas y la compra de  equipo 
de control fiscal cumplimentando un solo formulario. Las autoridades indican que se tarda menos de 
cinco días hábiles en constituir una empresa en China.  
 
2.  En el informe se menciona la construcción de una plataforma unificada de servicios en 
línea  para la constitución de empresas, ¿esta podrá ser usada por inversionistas 
extranjeros o sólo para nacionales que quieran crear una empresa? En caso de que pueda 
ser utilizada por inversionistas extranjeros, ¿podrá utilizarse en inglés?, ¿cuándo se tiene 
previsto su funcionamiento y en el sitio de qué dependencia se encontrará?  
 
Reply: As of the end of 2020, all 31 provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities) and Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps have all put in place a unified platform of online services for 
incorporation of companies. Currently, foreign investors can apply for incorporation of companies on 
the online service platform in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Next step, the State 
Administration of Market Supervision wil l continue to propel all the relevant local authorities to 
continuously improve the one -stop-shop online service platform, increase functions, make it more 
intelligent so as to provide better services for various market players, including foreign investors . 
 
3. POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
3.1. Medidas que afectan directamente a las importaciones  
3.1.3. Aranceles  
3.1.3.5. Exenciones o concesiones arancelarias  
(Págs. 62 -63) 3.36. Además, pueden aplicarse exenciones y reducciones de dere chos de 
conformidad con las disposiciones establecidas en la reglamentación pertinente del Consejo de 
Estado a las mercancías importadas en zonas designadas, para empresas específicas o para usos 
específicos. Por ejemplo, los productos importados quedan ex entos de derechos de importación y 
otros impuestos cuando entran en zonas especiales bajo supervisión aduanera. Se notificaron al WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Comité de Subvenciones y Medidas Compensatorias de la OMC diversas exenciones de los derechos 
de aduana en vigor durante el pe ríodo 2017 -2018. No se dispone de información sobre posibles 
exenciones o reducciones de derechos de aduana introducidas desde 2019; las autoridades han 
indicado que no hay datos disponibles sobre los ingresos no percibidos como consecuencia de las 
concesi ones o exenciones arancelarias aplicadas en ese mismo período.  
 
3.  De acuerdo a la Ley de Aduanas de China, Artículo 57, reducciones o extensiones se 
otorgarán a exportaciones o importaciones para áreas y empresas específicas, para 
propósitos específicos.  ¿Podría China proporcionarnos más información sobre qué 
sectores y qué objetivos persiguió la aplicación de esta medida durante 2019 y 2020?  
 
Reply: Article 57 of the Customs Law of the People 's Republic of China stipulates that "Reductions 
and exemptions can be granted to imports and exports in specific areas, by specific companies, or 
for specific purposes. The scope and measures of specific tax reductions or exemptions shall be 
determined by the State Council. Imports enjoying tariff reductions or exempt ions in accordance 
with this provision can only be used in specific areas, by specific companies, or for specific purposes. 
They shall not be used for other purposes without customs approval and payment of duties. " The 
article does not stipulate that reductions or extensions should be granted to exports and imports in 
specific regions and by specific companies for specific purposes. It is recommend Mexico phrase the 
question so that it is clear to us.  
 
3. POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
3.1. Medidas que afectan directamente a las importaciones  
3.1.6. Medidas antidumping, compensatorias y de salvaguardia  
3.1.6.1. Medidas antidumping  
(Pág. 71) 3.52. Como se señaló en exámenes anteriores, el MOFCOM es  el organismo encargado de 
iniciar y realizar las investigaciones antidumping, así como de determinar la existencia de dumping, 
de daño y de la relación causal entre ambos. La Oficina de Medidas Comerciales Correctivas e 
Investigaciones del MOFCOM es respo nsable de las investigaciones y determinaciones antidumping 
y en materia de derechos compensatorios y salvaguardias (con la excepción de las investigaciones 
antidumping relativas a productos agropecuarios, en las que la investigación sobre la existencia de  
daño la llevan a cabo conjuntamente el MOFCOM y el Ministerio de Agricultura).  
(Pág. 76) 3.68. Como se señaló en exámenes anteriores, el MOFCOM, y en concreto la Oficina de 
Medidas Comerciales Correctivas e Investigaciones, se encarga de investigar y det erminar si se ha 
producido un aumento de las importaciones y si se ha causado daño. Si una investigación está 
relacionada con productos agropecuarios, la investigación y la determinación deben llevarse a cabo 
conjuntamente con el Ministerio de Agricultura.  Los procedimientos de investigación no han variado 
desde entonces y se detallan en el informe del anterior examen de las políticas comerciales de China, 
como se detallan también las disposiciones en materia de salvaguardias establecidas en los ACR de 
los que China es signataria.  
 
4.  ¿Podría China indicar si el MOFCOM y el Ministerio de Agricultura deben emitir una 
única determinación a nombre de ambos organismos o cada uno puede emitir su 
determinación por separado?  
 
Reply: According to the law, anti -dumpi ng investigations involving agricultural products are 
conducted by the Ministry of Commerce in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry 
of Commerce is responsible for making a ruling based on the results of the investigation and 
announcin g the ruling. The Ministry of Agriculture does not make a ruling.  
 
5.  En caso que se trate del segundo escenario, ¿es posible que el MOFCOM  y el Ministerio 
de Agricultura lleguen a determinaciones contradictorias o al menos distintas? ¿Qué 
sucedería en ese caso?  
 
Reply: There is no such scenario.  
 
3. POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
3.1. Medidas que afectan directamente a las importaciones  
3.1.6. Medidas antidumping, compensatorias y de salvaguardia  
3.1.6.2. Medidas compensatorias  
(Pág. 74) 3.64. El número de investigaciones en mate ria de derechos compensatorios iniciadas por 
China y el número de medidas en vigor se han mantenido relativamente constantes en los cinco WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  últimos años (cuadro 3.9). Durante el período objeto de examen se iniciaron ocho investigaciones 
de ese tipo (desde 20 18), y se puso fin a dos de ellas, a una por consideraciones de interés público 
y a la otra por la retirada de la solicitud por el solicitante (cuadro 3.10). En enero de 2019, China 
realizó un examen por extinción de las medidas compensatorias aplicadas al  polisilicio de grado solar 
procedente de los Estados Unidos, examen que dio lugar al mantenimiento de los derechos 
definitivos impuestos en enero de 2020. En abril de 2019, China llevó a cabo un examen rebus sic 
stantibus  de las medidas compensatorias apl icadas a los granos de destilación desecados con 
solubles procedentes de los Estados Unidos, examen que dio lugar al mantenimiento de las medidas 
iniciales.  
 
6.  ¿Podría China especificar qué consideraciones de interés público tomó en cuenta para 
poner fin a  la investigación referida?  
 
Reply: During the countervailing investigation of imported sorghum originating in the United States, 
the investigating agency believed that countervailing measures were not in the public interest after 
considering the situation reported by downstream users and decided to drop the investigation.  
 
3. POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
3.3. Medidas que afectan a la producción y al comercio  
3.3.6. Contratación Pública  
3.3.6.2. Marco jurídico e institucional  
(Págs. 115 -116) 3.212. La Ley de Contratación Pública y la Ley de Licitaciones se hallan actualmente 
en proceso de modificación. El proyecto de Ley de Licitaciones modificada se publicó en línea para 
que pudieran formularse alegaciones públicas del 3 de di ciembre de 2019 al 1 de enero de 2020. El 
nuevo proyecto revisado, en el que se recogen esas alegaciones públicas, se ha sometido al examen 
del Consejo de Estado. Actualmente, el Ministerio de Justicia está organizando el examen legislativo 
del proyecto de  texto modificado. Según la Nota Explicativa del proyecto, en virtud de la Ley de 
Licitaciones modificada, entre otras cosas: i) se redefinirá su ámbito de aplicación y se 
desreglamentarán las actividades de licitación en las inversiones privadas; ii) mejo rará la 
transparencia de las actividades de licitación; iii) se ajustarán los plazos de los procedimientos de 
licitación a fin de mejorar la eficiencia; iv) se restringirá la utilización del criterio del precio más bajo 
en la valoración de las ofertas y se  priorizará la evaluación del costo del ciclo de vida; v) se 
promoverá la licitación electrónica; vi) se aclararán las prescripciones en materia de licitación en los 
proyectos de asociaciones público -privadas; y vii) se potenciará la lucha contra la colusi ón en las 
licitaciones y la vigilancia de los resultados de los contratos. El proyecto de Ley de Contratación 
Pública modificada se publicó en línea para que pudieran formularse alegaciones públicas del 4 de 
diciembre de 2020 al 5 de enero de 2021. Según l a Nota Explicativa del proyecto, en virtud de la 
Ley de Contratación Pública modificada, entre otras cosas: i) se ajustará el ámbito de aplicación de 
la Ley de Contratación Pública; ii) se dará pleno cumplimiento a los objetivos de la política de 
contratac ión pública mediante la inclusión de disposiciones sobre la promoción de la innovación y la 
protección de los intereses de los grupos vulnerables, y se especificarán las autoridades competentes 
y las medidas de aplicación pertinentes; iii) mejorarán y se a clararán los métodos y procedimientos 
de contratación pública; iv) mejorará el sistema de contratación pública; v) se fortalecerá la 
regulación de la demanda en la contratación pública; vi) mejorará la posición de las entidades 
contratantes; y vii) se simp lificarán los procedimientos de calificación de los proveedores. Según las 
autoridades, con la revisión de las dos Leyes se coordinarán mejor los sistemas de contratación 
pública y de administración de licitaciones de China y se armonizará la aplicación de  ambas Leyes.  
 
7.  Mexico would like to know what are the next steps for Government Procurement Law 
and the Tendering Law. Has the Ministry of Justice already reviewed the drafts 
amendments? Is there a timeline in place?   
 
Reply: The Chinese government is ac tively advancing the revision of the Government Procurement 
Law and the Tendering Law. The timeline for the revision will be determined based on opinions of 
stakeholders in coordination with relevant departments.  
 
3. POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
3.3. Medidas que afectan a la producción y al comercio  
3.3.6. Contratación Pública  
3.3.6.3. Métodos de contratación y utilización de la contratación electrónica  
(Pág. 118) 3.218. Durante el período objeto de examen, no se han introducido cambios en los 
métodos y procedimientos de contratación. La Ley de Contratación Pública, su Reglamento de WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Aplicación y las Medidas Administrativas pertinentes establecen seis méto dos de contratación: 
i) licitación pública; ii) licitación selectiva; iii) petición de precios; iv) negociación competitiva; 
v) consultas competitivas; y vi) contratación de proveedor único. Según datos facilitados por las 
autoridades, en 2019, la contrata ción mediante licitación pública representó el 78,31% de la 
contratación total, la licitación selectiva el 0,99%, la petición de precios el 1,41%, la negociación 
competitiva el 3,55% y la contratación de proveedor único el 6,19%. El valor de la contratació n 
de proveedor único disminuyó de CNY 552.700 millones en 2017 a CNY 204.600 millones en 
2019 (cuadro 3.27).  
 
8.  Mexico notes that in 2019, 78.31% of total procurement contracts were awarded 
through public tendering. Is there any limitation to the participation of foreign suppliers 
in this type of process?   
 
Reply: The Foreign Investment Law promulagated in January 2020 stipulates that foreign -invested 
enterprises can participate in government procurement activities through fair competition in 
accor dance with the law, and that the products produced and services provided by foreign -invested 
enterprises in China are treated equally in government procurement. Foreign companies can 
participate in Chinese government procurement activities on an equal foot ing in accordance with the 
law by incorporating companies in China.  
 
9.  In 2019, 0.99% of total procurement contracts were awarded through selective 
tendering. Could China provide more information of what were the principal exceptions 
used to apply this type of process?   
 
Reply: Article 29 of the Government Procurement Law st ipulates that selective tendering can be 
used for procurement of goods or services that meets one of the following criteria: (1) The goods or 
services are special and can only be purchased from a limited range of suppliers; or (2) the 
proportion of public tendering in the total value of government procurement projects would be too 
large.  
 
II. INFORME DE CHINA (WT/TPR/G/415)   
3. AVANCE HACIA UNA APERTURA DE ALTO NIVEL Y ESTUDIO DE NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS 
DE COOPERACIÖN BENEFICIOSAS PARA TODOS  
3.2. Creación de un en torno propicio para la inversión extranjera  
3.2.2. Ampliación activa del acceso a los mercados para la inversión extranjera  
(Pág. 11) 3.16. China ha acortado significativamente la Lista negativa sobre el acceso de las 
inversiones extranjeras. En junio de  2020, China publicó las Medidas Administrativas Especiales 
relativas al Acceso de la Inversión Extranjera (Lista Negativa) (edición de 2020). Desde 2017 China 
ha revisado cuatro veces la Lista negativa sobre el acceso de las inversiones extranjeras. En 
comparación con la edición de 2017, los artículos de la última Lista negativa nacional se han reducido 
de 63 a 33. A continuación se indican las principales modificaciones introducidas en las revisiones 
anteriores. Primero, en el sector de servicios, se elim ina la restricción que limitaba la participación 
extranjera en las empresas de transporte ferroviario de pasajeros, los agentes de transporte 
marítimo internacional y las empresas de transporte marítimo internacional; y se suprime la 
prescripción reglament aria de que la parte china posea la participación mayoritaria de control en las 
empresas conjuntas dedicadas a la construcción y explotación de redes de gasoductos y de tuberías 
para calefacción y suministro de agua, así como alcantarillado, en ciudades co n una población 
superior a 500.000 habitantes, y en salas de cine e instituciones de corretaje de espectáculos. 
Segundo, en el sector manufacturero, se elimina la restricción que limitaba la participación 
extranjera en las empresas dedicadas a la fabricaci ón de vehículos especiales, vehículos propulsados 
por energías alternativas y vehículos comerciales; y se levanta la prohibición de la inversión 
extranjera en la producción y transformación de minerales radiactivos y la producción de 
combustibles nucleares . Tercero, en el sector de la agricultura y la silvicultura, se eliminan las 
restricciones a la inversión extranjera en la compra y la venta mayorista de arroz, trigo y maíz; y se 
levanta la prohibición de la inversión extranjera en el desarrollo de recurs os de fauna y flora 
silvestres.  
 
Se menciona que la Lista negativa sobre el acceso de las inversiones extranjeras se redujo 
de 63 a 33 actividades. Si bien en el párrafo señalado se menciona cuáles son las 
actividades que se eliminaron, sería necesario sa ber cuáles son las actividades que aún 
se mantienen listadas. ¿Podría China señalarlas?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: Please refer to the Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (Negative 
List) (2020 Edition) . 
 
3. AVANCE HACIA UNA APERTURA DE ALTO NIVEL Y ESTUDIO DE NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS 
DE COOPERACIÖN BENEFICIOSAS PARA TODOS  
3.2. Creación de un entorno propicio para la inversión extranjera  
3.2.3. Ampliación del alcance de la inversión extranjera incentivada  
(Pág. 12) 3.18. En junio de 2019, China publicó el Catálogo de Sectores en los que se Incentiva la 
Inversión Extranjera (edición de 2019 ), con un total de 1.108 entradas. En ese instrumento se 
combinan las entradas de sectores incentivados que figuran en el Catálogo de Sectores para la 
Orientación de la Inversión Extranjera con las entradas del Catálogo de Sectores Ventajosos  para la 
Inversión Extranjera en las Regiones Central y Occidental de China,  de manera que se amplía 
significativamente el alcance de la inversión extranjera incentivada. En diciembre de 2020 se publicó 
el Catálogo de Sectores en los que se Incentiva la Inversión Extranjera (edición 2020) , que consta 
de 1.235 entradas, esto es, 127 entradas más que en la edición de 2019. La característica p rincipal 
de esta edición revisada es que incentiva aún más la inversión extranjera en la fabricación avanzada, 
los servicios modernos y los sectores ventajosos de las regiones central y occidental.  
 
10.  En diversas ocasiones el reporte menciona la ampliación  de las categorías de 
inversión extranjera incentivada y, en particular, el párrafo 3.18 menciona que dichas 
categorías pasaron de 1,108 entradas en la edición del 2019 del Catálogo de Sectores en 
los que se Incentiva la Inversión Extranjera a 1,235 en la edición del 2020. México quisiera 
conocer ¿cuáles son los incentivos que China otorga en general a los inversionistas 
extranjeros y algunos ejemplos de las actividades englobadas en dicho catálogo?  
 
Reply : please see the SCM  notification by China as contained in the WTO document 
G/SCM/N/372/CHN.  
 
3. AVANCE HACIA UNA APERTURA DE ALTO NIVEL Y ESTUDIO DE NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS 
DE COOPERACIÖN BENEFICIOSAS PARA TODOS  
3.3. Cooperación innovadora en materia de inversión en el extranjero y consecución de 
beneficios mutuos y resultados ventajosos para todos los países receptores  
3.3.1. Avances en la reforma del sistema de administración de las inversiones en el 
extranjero  y mejora del sistema de servicios públicos para esas inversiones  
(Pág. 12) 3.21. En enero de 2018, el Ministerio de Comercio y los ministerios y departamentos 
competentes publicaron conjuntamente las Medidas Provisionales relativas a la Presentación de 
Información sobre las Inversiones en el Extranjero  sujetas al trámite de Inscripción en el Registro o 
al procedimiento de Aprobación. En marzo de 2018, la Comisión Nacional de Desarrollo y Reforma 
inició la aplicación de las Medidas relativas a la Administr ación de las Inversiones en el Extranjero 
de las Empresas a fin de facilitar tales inversiones . En mayo de 2019, el Ministerio de Comercio 
publicó las Normas de Aplicación de la Presentación de Información sobre las Inversiones en el 
Extranjero sujetas al trámite de Inscripción en el Registro o al procedimiento de Aprobación. 
Además, el Ministerio de Comercio ofrece anualmente un servicio público para ayudar a las empresas 
a comprender el entorno empresarial de los países receptores y a cumplir mejor las le yes y 
reglamentos de esos países. Entre esos esfuerzos cabe destacar la formulación y publicación de la 
Guía para Países y Regiones sobre las Inversiones y la Cooperación en el Extranjero y el Informe 
sobre el Desarrollo de las Inversiones y la Cooperación  Económica de China en el Extranjero .  
 
11.  China menciona que anualmente su Ministerio de Comercio publica una Guía para 
Países y Regiones sobre las Inversiones y la Cooperación en el Extranjero y el Informe 
sobre el Desarrollo de las Inversiones y la Cooper ación Económica de China en el 
Extranjero. ¿Quisiéramos conocer si China publica esta guía en un portal de acceso 
general, o se publica únicamente para ciertos destinatarios? Si se pone a disposición del 
público en general, ¿también cuenta con una versión en inglés?  
 
Reply: China publishes the Guide for Countries and Regions on Overseas Investment and 
Cooperation and the Report on Overseas Investment and Economic Cooperation Development of 
China  on the website of the Ministry of Commerce every year. At present, the two documents have 
no English versions.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  COLOMBIA  
Informe de la Secretaría - Documento WT/TPR/S/415  
2. REGÍMENES DE COMERCIO E INVERSIÓN  
 
2.1 Marco General.  
2.6 En principio, todas las normas relacionadas con el comercio formuladas por las autoridades a 
todos los niveles deben cumplir con los acuerdos comerciales internacionales en los que China es 
parte, incluido el Acuerdo de Marrakech por el que se establece la Organización Mundia l del Comercio 
y sus acuerdos complementarios, el Protocolo de Adhesión de China y el informe del Grupo de 
Trabajo sobre la Adhesión de China. 2 Los proyectos de ley y de reglamento a nivel de ministerio y 
departamento se publican en línea en chino durante 30 días como mínimo, para que el público pueda 
formular observaciones, salvo que el Consejo de Estado decida que se debe mantener su carácter 
confidencial. Las observaciones públicas pueden presentarse a través del sitio web del Ministerio de 
Justicia. En la Gaceta de Comercio Exterior y Cooperación Económica de China, editada por el 
Ministerio de Comercio (MOFCOM), se publican las leyes, los reglamentos y las normas de China 
relacionados con el comercio.   
 
Pregunta 1. Podría el Gobierno de China br indar mayor información sobre ¿Cuáles son los 
criterios del Consejo de Estado para mantener el "carácter confidencial de los proyectos 
de ley y reglamentos relacionados con el comercio " para no publicarlos durante 30 días 
como mínimo para observaciones del  público?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with the Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations , the 
drafting authority shall publish the draft of the administrative regulations and their explanations to 
the public for comments, unless the State Council decides not to publish them. The time limit for 
soliciting opinions is usually no less than 30 days.  
 
3.1.1.3 Facilitación del comercio  
3.18 En febrero de 2020, la GACC promulgó 10 medidas encaminadas a hacer frente a los efectos 
de la epidemia y p romover el crecimiento sostenido del comercio exterior con miras a reducir el 
impacto de la COVID -19 en la economía china y fomentar el crecimiento sostenido del comercio 
exterior al prevenir y controlar la epidemia... Además, en marzo de 2020, la GACC pub licó la Lista 
de Medidas para Coordinar la Prevención y Control de Epidemias en los Puertos y Facilitar el 
Despacho de Aduana. Según se informa, esa lista contiene 50 medidas para aplicar las decisiones y 
disposiciones relativas a la prevención y el contro l de epidemias y la facilitación del despacho 
de aduana en los puertos, centradas en cuatro aspectos: i) prevenir la importación de casos de 
COVID -19; ii) facilitar el despacho de aduana; iii) reducir los costos de importación y exportación; 
y iv) garantiz ar el funcionamiento sin trabas de las cadenas industriales y las cadenas de suministro 
del comercio exterior.  
 
Pregunta 2. ¿Podría el gobierno China ampliar la información acerca de las 50 medidas 
relativas a la prevención y el control de las epidemias? ¿Estas medidas se encuentran 
publicadas en un sitio web?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to www.customs.gov.cn . 
 
3.2.4 Apoyo y promoción de las exportaciones  
 
El Servicio para Empresas Chinas de Reclamaciones relativas a Operaciones Comerciales en el 
Extranjero presta a las empresas chinas servicios de tram itación de reclamaciones, asesoría, 
creación de bases de talentos y apoyo a las empresas emergentes.  
 
Pregunta 3. El gobierno de Colombia desea conocer acerca de la implementación del 
servicio para empresas chinas de reclamaciones relativas a operaciones c omerciales en el 
extranjero. En particular ¿Cuál entidad presta este servicio?, ¿Tiene algún costo para los 
empresarios?  
 
 
2 Consejo de Estado, Guo Ban Fa N °29, 2014, Aviso de la Oficina General del Consejo de Estado sobre la 
Mejora de la Compatibilidad de las Políticas Comerciales.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: Established in 2006, the Overseas Commercial Complaint Service Center for 
Chinese  Enterprises of the Ministry of Commerce is a window for the Ministry of Commerce to serve 
local communities and enterprises, providing policy information, guidance for consultation and other 
public services for free, mainly for Chinese enterprises to carry  out overseas business activities.  
 
3.3. Medidas que afectan a la producción y al comercio  
 
3.122 Las notificaciones presentadas a la OMC y las respuestas dadas por China a las preguntas 
formuladas por otros Miembros no han permitido a la Secretaría tener  una visión general clara de 
los programas de ayuda de China. En particular, las notificaciones no contienen información sobre 
los niveles de gasto en determinados sectores como el aluminio, los vehículos eléctricos, el vidrio, 
la construcción naval, los s emiconductores, o el acero. No se ha facilitado a la Secretaría información 
sobre subvenciones después de las notificadas en 2019. En el Comité de Subvenciones y Medidas 
Compensatorias de la OMC, China suele responder a preguntas centradas en las notificac iones de 
subvenciones, pero no a las que se refieren a las políticas de subvención no abarcadas en las 
notificaciones. Las autoridades han indicado que, de conformidad con el Acuerdo sobre Subvenciones 
y Medidas Compensatorias de la OMC (Acuerdo SMC), no h ay ninguna obligación de facilitar 
información por escrito sobre los programas que no figuran en las notificaciones de subvenciones.  
 
Comentario. El gobierno de Colombia expresa su preocupación respecto a las afirmaciones 
de la Secretaria en relación con l a dificultad que se presenta para conocer con precisión 
el alcance de los programas de ayuda y de subvenciones de China en general ni sobre las 
subvenciones no abarcadas en las notificaciones.  
 
Reply : Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China.  
 
Pregunta 4. ¿El gobierno de China ha considerado alguna estrategia para robustecer el 
contenido de la información y transparencia sobre los programas de ayuda, en particular 
sobre las cuantías de las subven ciones centrales y subcentrales?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, China has been committed to enhancing the transparency of our subsidy 
policies and has submitted timely subsidy notifications covering both central and sub -central 
government levels. The latest subs idy notification submitted by China during the period from 2019 
to 2020 includes a total of 71 subsidy policies at the central level and 374 subsidy policies at the 
sub-central level in 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the  Central 
Government, as well as 5 cities directly designated by the State Council. China 's notification 
providing the subsidy amounts to the best of our ability. China hopes that the efforts and 
achievements made by China in the subsidy notification will b e objectively evaluated by members.  
 
Pregunta 5. ¿Podría el gobierno de China informar el término en el que la información de 
las subvenciones estará disponible de manera oportuna?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN  submitted by China.  
 
3.124. Además de los programas notificados, hay al parecer numerosas iniciativas para apoyar 
diferentes ramas de producción y atraer inversión extranjera. Los llamados "fondos 
gubernamentales de orientación ", o fondos de inversión dirigidos por el Gobierno , utilizan recursos 
públicos para efectuar inversiones de capital en sectores que el Gobierno considera importantes 
(cuadro 3.15). La Secretaría no ha logrado obtener información clara sobre en qué consisten estos 
fondos. Algunos todavía se están creando, y no está claro cuál será su cuantía definitiva. De acuerdo 
con algunas fuentes externas, son financiados mayoritariamente por el Gobierno central y los 
Gobiernos locales, grandes empresas de propiedad estatal e instituciones financieras de propiedad 
estatal. La mayor parte de los fondos se utilizan para financiar procesos de fabricación avanzada, 
nuevos materiales y otras ramas de producción innovadoras. La información facilitada en el 
cuadro  3.15 no ha sido confirmada por las autoridades, que han consider ado que no es pertinente 
para este examen. Afirman además que esos fondos son en parte de financiación privada, que no 
constituirían una subvención y que, por lo tanto, no estarían sujetos a notificación. Según las 
autoridades, no es necesario notificar es tos fondos en el marco del Acuerdo SMC ya que la ayuda 
proporcionada mediante estos fondos no constituye una subvención.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Pregunta 6. Colombia desea conocer con mayor precisión las razones por las cuales el 
gobierno de China considera que los "fondos guber namentales de orientación " y "los 
fondos de inversión dirigidos por el Gobierno " no constituyen una subvención.  
 
Reply: The investment management and decision -making of the funds is completely market -based, 
and government departments do not interfere with or participate in any investment project decisions 
of the funds. The funds and their management structure are established in accordance with the 
Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws, and operate on a market basis.  
 
En el párrafo 3.132, el Informe de la Secretaría menciona que " las cifras disponibles indican que 
China también siguió prestando un apoyo sustancial al sector pesquero. Además, una amplia 
proporción de la ayuda del Gobierno de China al sector se considera d irigida a la "creación de 
capacidad ". Las autoridades han indicado que pronto se promulgará una nueva política pesquera ". 
 
Pregunta 7. ¿Puede China compartir mayores detalles sobre la nueva política pesquera 
que tiene previsto implementar?  
 
Reply:  The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs jointly issued the 
Circular on Implementing the Supportive Policy for High -quality Development of the Fishery Industry 
in May 2021. For detailed information, please refer to http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021 -
07/05/content_5622531.htm .  
 
Pregunta 8. Se estima que China tiene alrededor de 17000 barcos pesqueros de 
transporte, de apoyo y de sumini stro en altamar. ¿Puede China proveer mayor información 
sobre el monto de recursos destinados a subvencionar este tipo de pesca, y mayor detalle 
sobre el tipo de subvenciones que otorga?  
 
Reply:  According to the statistics of the Chinese side, China has about 2,700 ocean fishing vessels, 
includinb about 1,500 working on the open sea. China doesn 't have 17,000 fishing vessles on the 
open sea. Columbia is asked to provide the source of this number f or China to check.  
 
According to the Notice of Implementing Supportive Policies to Promote the High -quality 
Development of Fishery issued in May 2021, the direct subsidy for fuel, which takes place during 
fishery production, will be cancelled in 2021. The Notice, for the first time, gives priority to subsidy 
for fishery resources survey and maintenance and developing the capability of implementing 
international conventions. China assesses the annual convention performance of oceangoing fishery 
enterprises a nd their fishing vessels and determines the amount of subsidy based on the assessment, 
so as to propel the enterprises to keep improving their performance capability and support them in 
performing international conventions. At the same time, China supports  global fishery resources 
survey and monitoring, and is working hard to provide scientific support for the maintenance and 
sustainable utilization of fishery resources in the open sea. This new policy on fishery subsidy is a 
major adjustment of China 's dom estic fishery support policies in response to the general trend of 
WTO's fishery subsidy negotiations. It is conducive to restoring the fishery resources and oceanic 
ecology and environment, and promoting the fishery sustainability worldwide.  
 
Pregunta 9. ¿Cómo concibe China en la nueva política pesquera, la "creación de 
capacidad " desde el punto de vista ambiental, en relación a la preservación del recurso y 
al control de la pesca ilegal y la disolución o la reducción gradual de las subvenciones a la 
pesca  dañina?  
 
Reply: please check the reply for question No. 7.  
 
Pregunta 10. ¿Los nuevos esfuerzos de la política pesquera contemplan el control de la 
pesca ilegal, se prevé un marco regulatorio para la preservación del recurso en la pesca 
de altamar?  
 
Reply:  China relentlessly  combat s IUU fishing through tightening regulations on distant water fishing 
vessels. In acc ordance with the Management Measures for Monitoring of Distant Water Fishing 
Vessels ' Position amended in 2020, a distant water vessel shal l report its position  once every hour, 
so as to prevent any production activity beyond the permitted areas . It is more stri ngent than the 
international reporting standard  of once every four hours. To prohibit transshipping and transporting 
of illegal catches, all high -seas transshipment activities shall be reported to China 's fisheries WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 255 - 
 
  administrative authorities  and the national observer system  is rolling out gradually . China is 
committed to law enforcement on the high seas  and contributes significant administrative resources 
to the  crack -down of IUU fishing  on the high seas . IUU fishing is punished with "zero tolerance ". If 
relevant RFMOs ma de affirmative determinations th at Chinese companies or fishing vessels engage d 
in, support ed or provide d assistance to IUU fishing, China 's fishery administrative authority w ould 
punish the companies and vessels concerned by fining, disqualifying them for fisheries subsidies, 
suspending  or revoking their distant water fishing licenses and/or blacklisting the captain and 
management personnel, etc.  
 
China endeavors to conduct sustainable high seas fishing. In addition to fulling obligations by the 
relevant  RFMOs, China has also fulfilled t he obligation of due diligence as a flag state in some high 
seas areas where there are  currently  no RFMO, including voluntary fishing moratorium, monitoring 
on fishing vessels ' position, limiting the number of fishing vessels, stri ngent supervision on high -
seas transshipment, increasing communication with coastal state via information exchange and joint 
scientific rese arch, et c. Since 2020, China has carried out independent fishing moratorium in the 
relevant waters of high seas of So utheastern Pacific and Southwestern Atlantic. Started as a pilot 
project,  the voluntary fishing moratorium has been officially instituted  as of 2021. During the fishing 
moratorium, all Chinese fishing vessels are prohibited from fishing so as to protect sq uid resources 
and their spawning groups. Moreover, China has actively assumed international obligations of 
conserving oceanic fisheries, by tracking and evaluating the effectiveness of the fishing moratorium 
in a timely manner, and sharing data and informa tion with relevant stakeholders.  
 
Pregunta 11. ¿Qué tipo de subvenciones se otorga al sector pesquero, cuál es la base para 
calcular el monto de la subvención, y cuáles son los montos de los programas de 
subvenciones en el período del examen?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China . 
 
En el párrafo 3.149, la Secretaría señala que "el sistema de certificación obligatoria de productos de 
China, que se aplica tanto a los productos nacionales como a las importaciones, tiene por objeto 
asegurar la conformidad de los productos con las prescripciones técnicas " Adicionalmente, afirma 
que "el sistema de CCC se basa en las normas nacionales obligatorias. Los productos enumerados 
en el Catálogo solo pueden salir  de la fábrica o ser vendidos, importados o utilizados en otras 
actividades comerciales una vez certificados y etiquetados " 
 
Pregunta 12. Colombia solicita a China aclarar si los productos de la actividad pesquera 
en el mar figuran en el catálogo obligator io de productos de China.  
 
Reply:  Listing in the catalogue of compulsory products depends on whether the products in question 
concern security issues. Please provide detailed information on the products used for sea fishing.  
 
3.3.3. Prescripciones sanitarias y fitosanitarias  
3.3.3.2  Medidas sanitarias y fitosanitarias  
Pregunta 13. Colombia solicita a China proveer mayor información acerca de las medidas 
sanitarias y fitosanitarias tomadas en el marco del covid 19. En particular, si considera o 
no flexibilizar perpetuar exigencias sanitarias y fitosanitarias que puedan tener 
repercusiones negativas en el comercio agrícola.  
 
Reply:  To protect people 's life safety and health, China has taken necessary temporary preventive 
measures to strengthen the supervision of imported cold -chain food. The relevant practices have 
been in full compliance with international rules and have not had any negative impact on the food 
trade to China. COVID -19 nucleic acid sampling tests have been conducted on imported cold-chain 
foods and their packaging according to law to prevent the transmission and spread of COVID -19 
through them. At the beginning, the samples of some imported food products, their exterior 
and interior packaging and inner walls of containers from so me countries were tested positive for 
COVID -19 by China Customs. In 17 October, 2020, the Chinese Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (China CDC) announced that live COVID -19 virus had been isolated from exterior 
packaging of imported aquatic product s, which further confirmed that exposure to exterior packaging 
contaminated by live COVID -19 virus could lead to infection. China welcomes the export of high -
quality and safe food to China, and China 's attitude towards opening up and expanding imports is 
consistent and clear. However, as the global epidemic develops, consumers ' concerns and doubts 
about the safety of the food supply chain have deepened. We believe that without consumer WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  confidence, there will be no market, and without market, there will be n o trade. Under the current 
epidemic situation, we wish that the countries (regions) overseas that wish to export food to China 
may require the enterprises exporting foods to China to, according to the relevant guidelines issued 
by the United Nations Food a nd Agriculture Organization (FAO), do well in all preventive 
management measures to ensure that the foods exporting to China have not been contaminated by 
COVID -19. China is willing to work with relevant parties to jointly ensure the safety of the food 
supply chain, eliminate consumers ' doubts, respond to consumers ' concerns, ensure safe food supply 
and maintain market stability, so as to promote the healthy development of trade.  
 
El Informe de la Secretaría de la OMC, párrafos 3.108 y 3.115, indica lo siguiente:  "3.108. La mayor 
parte de la financiación102, el segur o y las garantías de las exportaciones corre a cargo de varias 
instituciones financieras públicas con el mandato de promover el comercio exterior y las inversiones 
transfronterizas . El grueso de la financiación de las exportaciones proviene del Banco de Ex portación 
e Importación de China (Banco EXIM), que financia las exportaciones, y la Corporación de Seguros 
de Crédito y Exportación de China (SINOSURE), de propiedad estatal, que ofrece seguros de crédito 
a la exportación y garantías conexas. Las empresas de propiedad extranjera también pueden acceder 
a los servicios del Banco EXIM y SINOSURE. China no es miembro de la OCDE; no participa en el 
Acuerdo de la OCDE sobre directrices en materia de crédito a la exportación con apoyo oficial. Las 
autoridades indi can que China siempre ha participado activamente en las consultas del Grupo de 
Trabajo Internacional sobre Créditos a la Exportación, incluido su grupo de trabajo técnico.  
(…) 
3.115. Durante el período examinado, China siguió ofreciendo incentivos y apoyo financiero a 
diferentes sectores y ramas de producción. Según las autoridades, con la aplicación de estas medidas 
se pretende acelerar la transformación y modernización de las ramas de producción tradicionales, 
impulsar las incipientes, estimular la innova ción, fomentar el desarrollo de zonas remotas, mejorar 
la competitividad de las pymes y atraer IED. También se concedió ayuda destinada a la protección 
del medio ambiente, la reducción de emisiones y el ahorro energético. En general, la ayuda, en 
forma de transferencias directas y preferencias fiscales, la otorgan el Gobierno central o los 
Gobiernos locales. Las autoridades han indicado que no se conceden incentivos en forma de acceso 
al crédito ". (Subrayado por fuera de texto original).   
 
Como se puede observar, en el párrafo 3.115 se menciona que "Las autoridades han indicado que 
no se conceden incentivos en forma de acceso al crédito ", sin embargo, en el párrafo 3.108 del 
mismo informe, la misma Secretaría precisó que "La mayor parte de l a financiación, el seguro y las 
garantías de las exportaciones corre a cargo de varias instituciones financieras públicas con el 
mandato de promover el comercio exterior ". 
 
Pregunta 15. En efecto, Colombia desea conocer si existen diferencias entre las 
condiciones de financiación de las instituciones privadas y las públicas que expliquen el 
motivo por el cual en su mayoría las exportaciones cuentan con un financiamiento público, 
como podría ser el caso de unas tasas de interés más bajas por parte de los ban cos con 
participación estatal.  
 
Reply: Chinese SOEs are independent market entities. They have no institutional advantage over 
private businesses in the acquisition of credit. Whether a business can obtain credit and what credit 
rate it gets depends on it s profitability, asset quality and development prospects. SOEs of poor 
performance (e.g. zombie enterprises) would find it hard to obtain credit.  
 
Pregunta 16. Por favor aclarar por qué considera el Gobierno de la República Popular 
China que no se ofrecen incentivos de acceso al crédito para fomentar las exportaciones, 
y si las condiciones de los créditos otorgadas por el Banco de Exportación e Importación 
de China (Banco Exim) con participación estatal resultan más favorables que los 
otorgados por banco co merciales sin participación estatal.  
 
Reply: The loan business of the Export -Import Bank of China operates according to market principles. 
In accordance with the Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Export -Import Bank 
of China (Order No. 3 of 2017 by CBRC), the Export -Import Bank of  China shall establish a market -
oriented operational and restrictive mechanism. The principles and model of loan pricing of the 
Export -Import Bank of China are in line with the common practices of the banking industry.  
 
El Informe de la Secretaría de la O MC, párrafo 3.122, indica lo siguiente :  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  "3.122. Las notificaciones presentadas a la OMC y las respuestas dadas por China a las preguntas 
formuladas por otros Miembros no han permitido a la Secretaría tener una visión general clara de 
los programas de ayud a de China . En particular, las notificaciones no contienen información sobre 
los niveles de gasto en determinados sectores como el aluminio, los vehículos eléctricos, el vidrio, 
la construcción naval, los semiconductores, o el acero. No se ha facilitado a la Secretaría información 
sobre subvenciones después de las notificadas en 2019 . En el Comité de Subvenciones y Medidas 
Compensatorias de la OMC, China suele responder a preguntas centradas en las notificaciones de 
subvenciones, pero no a las que se refier en a las políticas de subvención no abarcadas en las 
notificaciones.112 Las autoridades han indicado que, de conformidad con el Acuerdo sobre 
Subvenciones y Medidas Compensatorias de la OMC (Acuerdo SMC), no hay ninguna obligación de 
facilitar información por escrito sobre los programas que no figuran en las notificaciones de 
subvenciones ". (Subrayado por fuera de texto original).  
 
En relación con lo dicho en el párrafo 3.122 del Informe transcrito, Colombia se permite expresar su 
preocupación por la falta  de una visión clara de los programas de ayuda de China que da a conocer 
la Secretaría de la OMC, a lo que hay que agregar que aún no se han notificado las subvenciones de 
los años 2019 y 2020 según el párrafo 3.121 del mismo Informe.  
 
Pregunta 17. En relación con el párrafo 3.122 del Informe de la Secretaría de la OMC, 
resultaría pertinente precisar si la frase "las notificaciones no contienen información 
sobre los niveles de gasto " significa que no se presentó un cumplimiento de lo dis puesto 
en el numeral ii), párrafo 3 del artículo 25 del Acuerdo SMC, al no informar sobre la cuantía 
de la subvención.  
 
Reply: In recent years, China has been committed to enhancing the transparency of our subsidy 
policies and has submitted timely subsidy notifications covering both central and sub -central 
government levels. The latest subsidy notification submitted by China during the period from 2019 
to 2020 includes a total of 71 subsidy policies at the central level and 374 subsidy policies at the 
sub-central level in 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
Government, as well as 5 cities directly designated by the State Council. China 's notification 
providing the subsidy amounts to the best of our ability. China ho pes that the efforts and 
achievements made by China in the subsidy notification will be objectively evaluated by members.  
 
Sobre el tema, igualmente llama la atención que, en el mismo Informe de la Secretaría de la OMC, 
párrafo 3.120, se indique: "En concreto, aportó información adicional sobre los beneficiarios y los 
criterios de admisibilidad de los programas. Sin embargo, en la mayoría de los casos no indicó el 
importe total del gasto y de los ingresos condonados; según las autoridades, ello se debi ó a la 
inexistencia de estadísticas sobre los gastos fiscales ".  
 
Pregunta 18. Lo anterior, debido a que, si las estadísticas sobre los gastos fiscales no 
existen y estas eran la única fuente para informar sobre la cuantía de la subvención, no 
se observa l a manera en la que se podría cumplir a cabalidad con lo dispuesto en el 
artículo  25 del Acuerdo SMC sobre la notificación de las subvenciones otorgadas.  
 
Reply:  China does not currently have statistics on tax expenditures, and China has notified most of 
the amount of financial support.  
 
En el párrafo 4.17 del Informe del Gobierno de la República Popular China se indica lo siguiente:  
"4.17. China considera que la reforma de la OMC debería aspirar a restablecer el funcionamiento 
normal de la Organización lo antes posible. En particular, los Miembros deben poner fin a la situación 
de estancamiento del Órgano de Apelación, frenar el unilat eralismo y el proteccionismo, y abordar 
de forma prioritaria la inequidad de las normas sobre la agricultura, un problema antiguo nunca 
resuelto. En este sentido, entre las cuestiones más apremiantes se encuentran los elevados niveles 
de MGA de que disfrut an los Miembros desarrollados y las legítimas peticiones de los Miembros en 
desarrollo sobre la constitución de existencias públicas con fines de seguridad alimentaria. A la luz 
de las lagunas y ambigüedades de las normas multilaterales vigentes respecto d e las medidas 
comerciales correctivas, se deberían aclarar y mejorar aún más las normas relativas a las medidas 
compensatorias y las medidas antidumping, a fin de evitar el uso indebido y el abuso de las medidas 
comerciales correctivas . Entretanto, es nece sario que las normas de la OMC se adapten a las 
realidades actuales y traten de obtener resultados en relación con nuevas cuestiones como la 
facilitación de las inversiones, el comercio electrónico, la reglamentación nacional en la esfera de los 
servicios y las mipymes ". (Subrayado por fuera de texto original).  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Pregunta 19. En relación con lo anterior, es de interés de Colombia conocer 
específicamente cuáles serían las lagunas y ambigüedades de las normas relativas a las 
medidas compensatorias y antidumpin g a las que se refiere la República Popular China.  
 
Reply:  Rules are the foundation for supporting and safeguarding open and non -discriminatory 
multilateral global trade mechanisms. Antidumping and countervailing duties are important part of 
negotiations about rules. Members of the WTO made arduous efforts for this, but there is still void 
and ambiguities in multilateral trade remedy rules, resulting in frequent inappropriate use of 
antidumping and countervailing duties. For example, the WTO Antidumping Ag reement set out 
general guiding principles for sunset review. In practice, some antidumping measures have been 
enforced for 20 years or even more (some for more than 40 years), and become "permanent " 
measures, restricting foreign trade and impeding domesti c industries from innovation and 
competition. Another example is that the Antidumping Agreement made no explicit provision on 
anti-circumvention rules, resulting in different approaches to the rules among WTO members. To 
make antidumping and countervailing  duty policies predictable, protect stakeholders ' legitimate 
rights and interests, and avoid adverse impacts of the measures on international trade order and 
members ' domestic industries, it is necessary to clarify and improve related rules.  
 
INFORME DEL GOBIERNO - DOCUMENTO WT/TPR/G/415  
5. PROFUNDIZACIÓN DE LA REFORMA EN TODOS LOS ÁMBITOS Y CREACIÓN DE UN 
SISTEMA DE MERCADO DE ALTO NIVEL  
5.1.2 Desarrollo impulsado por la innovación, y optimización y modernización de la 
estructura industrial  
 
5.3. China ha potenciado continuamente la innovación como elemento central del proceso de 
modernización. Las plataformas de innovación se establecen con rapidez. Se fomenta que las 
empresas, como principales promotoras de la innovación, aumenten su inversión en I+D, al tiempo 
que el Gobierno ofrece incentivos de política que se aplican a todos los sectores. Se observa un 
progreso constante de nuevos ti pos de infraestructura, como la 5G, los centros de datos, la 
computación en la nube y la Internet industrial. El sector industrial se moderniza con tecnologías 
digitales e inteligentes. A nivel nacional se están creando zonas experimentales de economía dig ital 
para promover el desarrollo impulsado por la innovación. Se adoptan medidas para fomentar nuevas 
formas de negocios en la economía digital. Desde el último examen, China ha dedicado esfuerzos a 
promover la creación de empresas y la innovación en todo el territorio nacional. Las experiencias de 
innovación y reforma se reproducen y aplican en todo el país. China ha celebrado la Semana Nacional 
de la Actividad Empresarial y la Innovación Masiva. Y se están construyendo centros de demostración 
de innovacio nes e iniciativas empresariales.  
 
Pregunta 20. ¿Podría el gobierno de China compartir información acerca de las estrategias 
implementadas para la transferencia de experiencias de innovación y reforma en todo el 
país?  
 
Reply:  Since 2016, the State Council has approved the building of 120 demonstration bases for 
innovation and entrepreneurship in two batches. Some of the bases are in a specific city, and some 
are in universities, research institutes and businesses. They are the  sources of the most dynamic 
innovation and development momentums. Statistics showed that the bases incubated an average of 
10,000 high -tech companies every year, and have seen rapidly growing startups. In December 2020, 
the General Office of the State Cou ncil released the Circular on Establishing the Third -batch of 
Demonstration Bases for Innovation and Entrepreneurship. For more information, click 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhuti/shuangchuang/index.ht m. 
 
5.2.1 Aceleración de la aplicación de las principale s estrategias regionales y de las 
estrategias coordinadas de desarrollo regional, y mejora de la distribución del desarrollo 
entre regiones.  
 
5.6. China presta mayor atención a las ventajas comparativas regionales y promueve el desarrollo 
urbano y rural i ntegrado. Avanza en el desarrollo coordinado de la región de Beijing -Tianjin -Hebei, 
en la planificación y construcción de alto nivel y alta calidad de la Nueva Área de Xiongan, en la 
construcción de la Área de la Gran Bahía de Guangdong -Hong Kong -Macao y e n el desarrollo 
integrado del Cinturón Económico del Yangtsé. China sigue impulsando el desarrollo de la región 
occidental a gran escala, nuevos avances en la revitalización del nordeste de China, el desarrollo de 
alta calidad de la región central y la mod ernización acelerada de la región oriental. Al mismo tiempo, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  China ha prestado apoyo a las antiguas zonas de base revolucionaria y a las zonas de minorías 
étnicas para acelerar su desarrollo, y ha fortalecido el desarrollo de las zonas fronterizas.  
 
Pregun ta 21. ¿Podría el gobierno de China compartir información acerca de las principales 
estrategias implementadas para promover el desarrollo de las regiones? ¿Qué tipo de 
ayuda provee el gobierno central a las regiones, en particular a las zonas de minorías 
étnicas para acelerar su desarrollo?  
 
Reply: Chinese strategies for regional development can be found on the website of the National 
Development and Reform Commission: https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/?code=&state=123 .  
China is perfecting the differentiated regional support policies to help ethnic regions enhance their 
capability of self -improvement based on local resources and conditions. It has given stronger support 
to ethnic regions in infrastructure construction and industrial restructuring to promote the high -
quality and high -efficiency development of agriculture and animal husbandry, improve living and 
working conditio ns in rural areas, and increase the wealth of farmers and herdsmen. It has also 
pushed for development and opening -up in border areas to continuously increase the ethnic groups ' 
sense of gain, happiness and security.  
 
En el párrafo 1.3, China plantea su c ompromiso y activa participación en la gobernanza mundial y 
la firme defensa del sistema multilateral de comercio al igual que su contribución a que la 
"globalización económica sea más abierta, inclusiva, equilibrada y beneficiosa para todos ". 
De manera co mplementaria, en el párrafo 4.17 China invita a "abordar de forma prioritaria la 
inequidad de las normas sobre la agricultura, un problema antiguo nunca resuelto. En este sentido, 
entre las cuestiones más apremiantes se encuentran los elevados niveles de M GA de que disfrutan 
los Miembros desarrollados y las legítimas peticiones de los Miembros en desarrollo sobre la 
constitución de existencias públicas con fines de seguridad alimentaria ". 
 
Finalmente, en el párrafo 4.24 se menciona que "China ha cumplido plenamente sus obligaciones de 
notificación en virtud de todos los Acuerdos de la OMC " 
 
Colombia como país en desarrollo, considera que en las negociaciones en curso, en 
especial, las de la reforma a la agricultura y el disciplinamiento de subvenciones a la 
pesca, y en el restablecimiento del liderazgo de la OMC para promover un comercio abierto 
y equilibrado, la transparencia es un principio fundamental que exige el firme compromiso 
de todos  sus miembros.  
 
Tanto el gobierno de la China como la Secretaría de la OMC en su Informe WT/TPR/415, 
refieren que China ha hecho esfuerzos para cumplir sus obligaciones de notificación en 
los distintos Acuerdos de la OMC. Sin embargo, en opinión de Colomb ia, existen rezagos 
en materias de gran envergadura, como los apoyos internos a la agricultura y los 
programas mediante los cuales se brinda un apoyo directo a sectores y actividades 
específicas en forma de subvenciones.  
 
Pregunta 22.Por lo anterior y dad a la importancia de dar fiel cumplimiento a los 
compromisos en materia de transparencia, y la necesidad de contar con información 
actualizada para las negociaciones, Colombia agradece a China informar si ha pensado en 
un plan de contingencia para ponerse a l día con las notificaciones pendientes.  
 
Reply : Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN  submitted by China for 
subsidies to the fisheries sector, and China will submit the notification of agricultural domestic 
support soon.  
 
En la sección 5.2.3 el gobierno de China refiere que desde 2018 "ha seguido avanzando en la reforma 
estructural relaci onada con la oferta en el sector agrícola. La producción, la elaboración y la venta 
de productos agropecuarios se han integrado de forma significativa. Se han potenciado aún más las 
diversas funciones del sector agrícola. Al mismo tiempo, China está decidi da a mejorar las políticas 
en materia de subvenciones agrícolas. Su sistema de subvenciones agrícolas, al igual que el 
correspondiente mecanismo de incentivos y desincentivos, tiene una orientación ecológica y aspira 
a promover el uso racional de los recur sos agrícolas y la protección del medio ambiente "  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Pregunta 23.  Colombia agradece a China, brindar información sobre las acciones que está 
tomando para mejorar las políticas en materia de subvenciones agrícolas, orientadas a 
lograr el objetivo de promover el uso racional de los recursos agrícolas.  
 
Reply:  Please refer  to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China for the 
subsidy policy, and China will submit the notification of agricultural domestic support soon.  
 
Pregunta 24.  Adicionalmente, Colombia agradece a China compartir información referida 
a las estrategias que aplica con base en el "Dictamen sobre la Promoción Integral de la 
Revitalización del Medio Rural y la Aceleración de la Modernización Agrícola y Rural ", 
adoptada  en enero de 2021 y las funciones y objetivos de la Administración Nacional de 
Revitalización del Medio Rural, constituida formalmente en febrero de 2021.  
 
Reply: The National Administration for Rural Vitalization is reshuffled from the former State Counci l 
Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development. The National Administration for Rural 
Vitalization is under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. Inaugurated on 
February 25, 2021, the National Administration for R ural Vitalization is responsible for the 
consolidation of the poverty reduction achievements and the implementation of the rural vitalization 
strategy.  
 
En la sección 5.3.5, párrafo 5.18 se menciona que "China está decidida a seguir impulsando la 
reforma de las empresas de propiedad estatal. Desde el último examen, la reforma de las empresas 
de propiedad estatal ha sido extensa e intensa, lo que ha permitido alcanzar logros importantes. 
China promueve la reforma orientada al mercado de las relacion es competitivas en sectores como 
la energía, los ferrocarriles, las telecomunicaciones y los servicios públicos ". 
 
Pregunta 25.  Colombia agradece a China informar, cuáles de las reformas institucionales 
enunciadas están dirigidas a las empresas estatales a grícolas.  
 
Reply:  The institutional reform mentioned in this question doesn 't concern state -owned agricultural 
companies yet.  
 
Pregunta 26.Así mismo, según información del gobierno de China, "en 2020, las 
importaciones y exportaciones de las empresas estatales representaron el 14,3% en el 
total de las importaciones y exportaciones. Colombia agradece informar cuál ha sido la 
participación de las empresas estatales agrícolas en el comercio exterior y en la inversión 
extranjera y en qué áreas o c adenas productivas.  
 
Reply:  Central agricultural enterprises are free market entities. As such, they engage in international 
trade and overseas investment in a broad range of areas, including agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery, based on th eir own strategic plans and market principles.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  UKRAINE  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT (WT/TPR/S/415)   
SUMMARY   
Page 11 (Para 11)   
The Report mentions a new Foreign Investment Law that was adopted with the aim of, inter alia , 
improving China 's business environment for foreign investors and ensuring that they participate in 
market competition on an equal basis. The legislation stipulat es that investors are protected against 
expropriation, restrictions on cross -border remittances, IPR infringement, and forced transfer of 
technology.   
 
Question:  
1. Could China kindly provide more information on recent legislative amendments, taken place w ith 
the adoption of the Foreign Investment Law, in particular in terms of the protection of property 
rights of foreign -invested enterprises and strengthening services for foreign investors?   
 
Reply:  China has continued its efforts to clean up and cancel policies and regulations that are 
inconsistent with the Foreign Investment Law. For example, in December 2020, China repealed the 
Regulations on Foreign Investment in Civil Aviation Industry and its s ix supplementary regulations. 
China 's Ministry of Commerce, in conjunction with the State -owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council, the State Taxation Administration, the State 
Administration for Market Regulation, China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange, intends to revise the Measures for the Administration of 
Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Measures "). The Measu res include defining its scope of the application, increasing the investment 
methods, significantly lowering the investment threshold, deepening the reforms to streamline the 
government, delegate power, and improve government services, and adopting new reg ulatory 
methods such as information reporting, self -regulation and information disclosure. The draft revision 
for public comments and the draft instructions were released for public comments last year. At 
present, the Ministry of Commerce is working with r elevant departments to further revise and 
improve the draft revision based on public comments.  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.3 Developments in Trade and Investment  
1.3.2 Trends and patterns in FDI  
Pages 27 -29 (Para 1.47)  
According to information, presented  in Table 1.6, inward foreign direct investment by financial 
intermediation sector amounted to USD 7.13 billion or 5.2% of total FDI in 2019.  
 
Questions:   
2. Ukraine would appreciate to know what countries are the most interesting for China in terms of 
FDI into the financial intermediation sector.  
 
Reply: China sincerely welcomes qualified financial institutions and investors from various countries 
to tap in to the Chinese capital market, seize the opportunity to expand the breadth and depth of 
investment and business launch in China, and jointly enjoy the dividends from sound and stable 
growth of China 's economy.  
 
3. What factors are considered for such FDI?  
 
Reply: Foreign direct investment needs to comply with the relevant provisions of Chinese laws, 
regulations and rules.  
 
4. What financial intermediations in particular are the most attractive for FDI?   
 
Reply: China sincerely welcomes qualified financial institutions and investors from various countries 
to tap into the Chinese capital market, seize the opportunity to expand  the breadth and depth of 
investment and business launch in China, and jointly enjoy the dividends from sound and stable 
growth of China 's economy.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES   
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements   
2.3.1 WTO  
Page 34 (Para 2.22)  
The Report notes that during the review period, China submitted various notifications to the 
WTO (Table A2.1). Nevertheless, some notifications, including those on state trading enterprises 
and domestic support, remain outstanding. Acc ording to the authorities, China is preparing new 
notifications.   
 
Question:  
5. Could China, please, identify the state of play regarding its notification process and indicate when 
it is going to submit outstanding notifications to the WTO?  
 
Reply:  China has already submitted the notification on state trading and will submit the notification 
on domestic support soon.  
 
2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory framework and market access  
Page 36 (Para 2.36)  
The Report informs that the Foreign Investment Law (FIL) grants national treatment to foreign 
investments in industries outside the Special Administrative Measures on Access to Foreign 
Investment. As we understand the FIL, the authorities established two types of negative lists - 
National Negative List  and PFTZ negative list.   
 
Questions:  
6.  Could China, please, specify the difference between National Negative List and PFTZ negative 
list?  
 
Reply: First, the scope of application is different. The National Negative List sets out the areas in 
which foreign investors are restricted and prohibited from investing in China. PFTZ negative list 
specifies the areas in which foreign investors are restricted a nd prohibited from investing within 
scope of China 's pilot free trade zones. Second, the degree of openness is different. In the 2020 
version, for example, the PFTZ negative list contains 30 special management measures, three fewer 
than the national versio n. PFTZs are more open to foreign investment in seven areas, including corn 
breeding, aquaculture fishing, publication printing, Chinese herbal medicine, value -added 
telecommunication, cultural performances, and education.  
 
7.  Ukraine would like to know the rationale for the necessity for China to retain two types of negative 
lists.  
 
Reply: PFTZs are a pilot ground for China to promote reform and opening up on its own, serving as 
new pacesetters of opening up to the outside wor ld. As some areas are not ready to be opened in 
the country, they should first be piloted in the PFTZ for stress testing and then promoted across the 
country after their conditions are well developed. In 2013, China 's first negative list of foreign 
investm ent access was formed in PFTZs, fundamentally changing the original "case-by-case 
approval " model of foreign investment management. The first list created the conditions for the 
national reform of the foreign investment management system in 2016. In 2017, based on the 
experience of implementing the negative list in PFTZs, the national version of the negative list for 
foreign investment access was launched, with the role of PFTZs as a pilot ground fully highlighted. 
Compared with the national version, the PF TZ negative list is more open, continuously giving full 
play to the role of a pilot ground.  
 
8. Does China use such negative lists in bilateral investment treaties with other countries?  
 
Reply:  Foreign investors and investment activities that comply with the provisions of the Foreign 
Investment Law shall be subject to the negative list of foreign investment access in accordance with 
the law. The use of the negative list under the framework of bilateral treaties is determined 
depending on the specific content of the treaties.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.3 Trade facilitation  
Page 49 (Para 3.18)   
The report describes developments in the field  of trade facilitation. Article 12 of the Agreement on 
Trade Facilitation envisages provisions on customs cooperation between parties and, from our point 
of view, should enhance bilateral cooperation in this sphere.  
 
Questions:   
9. Ukraine would appreciate if China could provide information on bilateral customs cooperation, 
which has been established to facilitate exchange of information on customs valuation.  
 
Reply:  China is willing to carry out bilateral cooperation and exchange w ith WTO members on 
customs valuation techniques. Please contact the international cooperation department of the 
General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) for its suggestions on specific cooperation 
mechanisms.  
 
10. Could China, please, describe the  mechanism for such customs cooperation?  
 
Reply:  China is willing to carry out bilateral cooperation and exchange with WTO members on 
customs valuation techniques. Please contact the international cooperation department of the 
General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) for its suggestions on spec ific cooperation 
mechanisms.  
 
3.1.3 Tariffs  
3.1.3.4 Preferential rates  
Page 53 (Para 3.33)  
The Report states that China applies preferential tariffs under its preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs).  
 
Questions:  
11. Could China, please, provide information on preferential trade agreements, their structure and 
scope of the products?  
 
Reply:  China joined the Asia -Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) under the auspices of the Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and th e Pacific in 2001. At present, China has made tariff concessions 
on more than 2,000 tariff lines of products, mainly including fish, vegetables, tea, chemical products, 
textile and clothing, footwear, iron and steel products, motor vehicle parts, machinery , electronics 
and instruments.  
 
12. Does China have any reciprocal PTAs?   
 
Reply:  According to the Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreement, WT/L/671 and the 
Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Agreement, WT/L/806 of WTO, preferential trade 
agreements are non -reciprocal in nature.  
 
3.1.4 Other charges affecting imports  
3.1.4.1 Value added tax (VAT)   
Pages  55-56 (Para 3.38)  
According to the Report, VAT accounted for 39.5% of total tax revenue in 2019 (up from 39.1% 
in 2017). In May 2018, VAT tiers were reduced to 16%, 10%, and 6% (from 17%, 11%, and 6% 
in 2017). Effective from April 2019, VAT was further reduced to 13%, 9%, and 6% (Table 3.4).   
Table 3.4 presents information on VAT exemptions, including on "self-produce d agricultural products 
sold by agricultural producers ".  
 
Questions:  
13.Would China kindly elucidate  what mechanism of VAT exemption is used in the agricultural sector: 
exemptions on transactions for the supply of only self -produced agricultural products or exemptions 
from VAT for business entities that supply mentioned agricultural products?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  Please refer to the notification on subsidy submitted by China, and the notification on 
domestic support for agriculture which will be s ubmitted by China soon.  
 
14. What are particularities of  tax credits formation on transactions for the supply of agricultural 
products?   
 
Reply:  Please refer to the notification on subsidy submitted by China, and the notification on 
domestic support for ag riculture which will be submitted by China soon.  
 
15. What was the influence of VAT reduction on increase in tax revenues  to the budget and on 
decrease of VAT avoidance cases?   
 
Reply:  The implementation of tax relief policies for taxpayers is conducive to reducing the tax burden 
of enterprises, stimulating the innovation and vitality of market players, improving their operational 
efficiency and promoting the sustainable growth of tax re venue.  
 
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.3 Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing   
Page 69 (Para 3.80)   
Under the Report, export restrictions, including prohibitions and licensing requirements are in place 
on a variety of items, as highlighted in China 's WTO notification in 2019 on its quantitative 
restrictions.   
 
Questions:  
16. Could China kindly confirm that notified quantitative restrictions, indicated in notification 
G/MA/QR/N/CHN /5/Rev.1 are still in place?  
 
Reply : Please  refer to the latest notification of quantitative restrictions submitted by the China.  
 
17. If so, does the Chinese Government plan to remove export restrictions on agricultural products 
in 2022 -2023?  
 
Reply:  No such plan currently.  
 
18. Could China kindly clarify what is the purpose for introducing and maintaining TRQ on export 
and import of w heat?   
 
Reply:  China has a large population, and wheat is one of the staple food crops. China therefore has 
to consider the balance of wheat supply and demand to ensure food security.  
 
Page 70 (Para 3.84)   
According to the Report the value of exports of goods subject to export licensing stood at 
USD 63.86  billion in 2020, up from USD 39.50 billion in 2017.   
Question:   
19. Could China kindly elaborate on reasons for an increase in the value of exports of goods subject 
to export licensing?   
 
Reply: The reason is due to the increase in the demand for related commodities and the increase in 
the prices of some commodities subject to export license management.  
 
Page 70 (Para 3.87)  
The Report mentions the amendments to the 2020 Catalogue that added 23 new items to the list 
subject to export restrictions, including technologies related to drones, production of space 
materials, design and construction of large -scale high -speed wind tunnels, and aerospace bearings 
and lasers.   
 
Ques tion:   
20. Could China kindly explain the reasons behind the increase of export restrictions?   
 
Reply:  National interests are inseparable from the concept of national security. Legislative purposes 
for export control of major countries lay store by the maintenance of national security and the 
protection of national interests. The main purpose for increasing  the above -mentioned export control WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  items is to formulate and adjust control lists in line with the internationally -accepted practices, which 
will be disclosed in a timely manner.  
 
3.3.1 Incentives  
Page 79 (Para 3.132)  
It is mentioned in the Report about China 's substantial support to its fisheries sector and plans of 
the authorities to issue a new fisheries policy soon.  
 
Question:  
21. Could China, please, inform more about the new fisheries policy and what goals and measures 
it will envisage?   
 
Reply:  For specific reference: In May 2021, China 's Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Affairs issued the Notice on Implementing Support Policies for Fishery Development and 
Promoting High -Quality Development of Fisheries ( Cainong [2021] No. 41). The main directions of 
support are as follows: (i) Subsidy funds for fishery development are mainly used to support key 
projects incorporated into national planning and the renovation of facilities and equipment for 
fisheries safety  production. (ii) Other general transfer payments are used to support local 
governments in coordinating and promoting the high -quality development of local fisheries. During 
the 14th Five -Year Plan period, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agricu lture and Rural 
Affairs will conduct a mid -term evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of policies across 
the country. According to the results of the evaluation and changes in the situation, they will 
dynamically adjust the scale of funds in a ll parts of the country.  
 
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements   
3.3.3.1 Legal, institutional, and policy framework  
Pages 84 -85 (Para 3.160)   
The Report describes legal and institutional changes on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) -related 
issues oc curred during the review period.   
 
Questions:  
22. Considering amendments to the rules, in particular regarding safety indicators, used in the 
course of importation of sunflower -seed oil in the territory of China, Ukraine would appreciate 
detailed clarifications about new requirements on this matter.   
 
Reply:  China has not made any changes to the registration procedures for exporters of imported 
feed of plant origin. According to the regulations of China, the competent department of the 
exporting co untry shall inspect the relevant exporters and recommend them to China after ensuring 
that they meet the requirements of China on inbound animal and plant quarantine and the provisions 
of bilateral protocols. China will audit the exporters and register the m after they pass the audit.  
 
23. Would China also clarify new measures, implemented due to amendment of procedure for 
registration of exporters of plant -based feeds, in particular sunflower meal, soya meal, sugar beet 
pulp, rapeseed meal?  
 
Reply:  China has not made any changes to the registration procedures for exporters of imported 
feed of plant origin. According to the regulations of China, the competent department of the 
exporting country shall inspect the relevant exporters and recommend them to China after ensuring 
that they meet the requirements of China on inbound animal and plant quarantine and the provisions 
of bilateral protocols. China will audit the exporters and register them after they pass the audit.  
 
Page 86 (Para 3.164)  
The Report informs on establishing cooperation on SPS -related issues with the relevant authorities 
in trading partners.  
 
Question:  
24.  Could China kindly advice on possible ways of establishing direct communication between 
Chinese and Ukrainian competent authorities, responsible for SPS -related issues, to cooperate more 
effectively?   
 
Reply:  China is open to the issue of establishing direct communication between the two countries ' 
sanitary and phytosanitary authorities. The General Administration of Custom s of China (GACC) WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  maintains regular communication and contacts with the officials in charge of SPS issues at the 
Embassy of Ukraine in China, exchanging information on market access and the quality and safety 
of different agro -food products, and holding bi lateral meetings at different levels. China expects the 
Ukrainian side to provide contact information of its sanitary and phytosanitary authorities in the 
hope of establishing direct communication channels between GACC and them, to further exchange 
informa tion and discuss cooperation on related matters .  
 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Page 97 (Para 3.196)  
The Report states that "China provided its last full notification on state trading enterprises (STEs) 
in 2018. The authorities indicate that a new notification would be submitted before mid -July 2021. 
The legislation regulating state trading has not changed since 2014, nor have the reasons for 
maintaining this practice or the products subject to it. According to the au thorities, state trading 
remains in place to ensure a stable supply and price of the products concerned, ensure food security, 
and protect exhaustible and non -recyclable natural resources and the environment. "  
 
Questions:  
25.  Could China kindly indicate whe n it will submit its new notification on state trading enterprises?  
 
Reply:  China has submitted the notification.  
 
26. Could China also kindly elaborate on its plans to reform the state trading policy?   
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification of state trading submitted by China.  
 
3.3.6 Government procurement  
3.3.6.7 Accession to the GPA and other international cooperation   
Page 106 (Para 3.229)  
The Report mentions that China became an Observer in the WTO Committee on Government 
Procurement in 2002. It initiated its GPA accession negotiation in 2007. During the review period, 
significant progress was made on the accession. China submitted its 6th revised market access offer 
on 20 October 2019.   
 
Question:  
27. Ukraine wo uld appreciate if China could make an update on the process of its accession to the 
Government Procurement Agreement after the introduction of its sixth revised market access offer 
in 2019.  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government is working hard to join the GPA at an early date. When China 
submitted the seventh bidding list to WTO for accession to the GPA, the bidding was of a roughly 
equivalent level to that of GPA participants. In May 2020, China submitted the Chinese Government 
Procurement Report (updated in 2020 ) to WTO, which comprehensively reflected the reform of its 
legal system for government procurement. While advancing the bidding negotiations, China has 
promoted the legal revision negotiations simultaneously. In June 2021, China provided to WTO its 
replie s to the list of questions asked by EU and Australia about China 's 7th bidding list for accession 
to GPA and Chinese Government Procurement Report (updated in 2020).  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.2 Institutional reforms and IP-related policies  
Page 107 (Para 3.236)  
It is stipulated in the Report, that the China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) 
published the Plan for Further Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy to 
Accelerate the C onstruction of an Intellectual Property Power Country in May 2020.  
 
Questions:  
28. How National Intellectual Property Strategy of China is envisaged to be incorporated into China 's 
national development strategy?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government has attached great importance to the work of intellectual property 
rights and has incorporated the relevant content of intellectual property rights into the overall 
national development plan and other schemes accordingly. The Outline  of the 14th Five -Year Plan 
(2021 -2025) for National Economic and Social Development and the Long -Range Objectives Through WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  the Year 2035, approved by the National People 's Congress in March 2021, proposes "implementing 
the national strategy of strengthenin g intellectual property rights ". In Chapter 7 of Part II, a whole 
section is devoted to the task of "improving the system of IPRs protection and application ". The 
number of high -value invention patents per 10,000 people is included in the 20 main indicator s of 
economic and social development in the 14th Five -Year Plan period. The recently issued Outline for 
Building a Country with Strong Intellectual Property Rights (2021 -2035) sets the goal of building a 
IPR powerhouse with Chinese characteristics and at t he world level, emphasizing that "we should 
take a strategy -led approach to conduct comprehensive planning, highlight key areas and major 
needs, and promote the deep integration of intellectual property rights with the economy, science 
and technology, cult ure, society and other aspects.  
 
29.Whether technical assistance has been sought and provided by the WIPO and/or other 
international organizations to help formulate CNIPA Policy in China?  
 
Reply:  In 2018, China invited a panel of experts from the World I ntellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) to conduct research in carrying out a ten -year evaluation of implementing the Outline for 
National Intellectual Property Strategy. The expert panel investigated the implementation of IPR 
strategy in Beijing and Shan ghai, visited relevant enterprises and innovation and start -up bases, 
and held a number of symposiums. The recommendations by the expert group provided useful 
references for China to formulate the Outline for Building a Country with Strong Intellectual Pro perty 
Rights (2021 -2035).  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR   
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries   
4.1.2 Agriculture  
Page 125 (Para 4.11)   
The Report mentions policy objectives in agriculture set out in the 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development, which included implementing the strategy of rural revitalization, 
strengthening the use of industry to supplement agriculture, and promoting the formation of a new 
type of urban -rural relationship betwee n industry and agriculture.   
 
Question:  
30. Could China, please, specify the Chinese policy in the field of modernizing agricultural sector 
according to the 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, in particular, concerning 
establishment of modern agricultural industrial parks and developing new business models 
(i.e. leisure agriculture, rural tourism, and rural e -commerce) and functioning of a new  type of 
urban -rural relationship between industry and agriculture?   
 
Reply:  The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs and the Ministry of Finance launched a national 
modern agricultural industrial park construction program in 2017. Built mainly at the  county level, 
national modern agricultural industrial parks are based on large -scale intensive breeding and 
planting to promote the integrated development of "production, processing and technology ", gather 
modern production elements and market entities, u pgrade the whole industry, increase the value of 
the whole industry chain, and fully implement the methods of green production. Innovative 
integration of science and technology and the mechanism of uniting and helping famers are the 
"engines " that drive ru ral industrial revitalization and agricultural modernization.  
 
Page 125 (Para 4.12)  
Under the Report, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued a 2020 -25 National Plan for 
Rural Industrial Development in July 2020. The Plan sets out the goals and revenue targets for rural 
industrial development over the period, with priorities including upgrading agricultural product 
processing industries, expanding rural speciality industries, improving agricultural tourism, 
developing new -type rural ser vice industries, promoting synergies between vertical integration of 
agriculture and rural industries development, and advancing entrepreneurship and innovation in 
rural areas.   
 
Question:  
31. Could China, please, clarify measures to be implemented in the field of agricultural policy 
according to the National Plan for Rural Industrial Development (2020 -2025)?   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  China has implemented a rural leisure tourism program. From 2018 to 2020, a total of 
656 Chinese beautiful leisure villages with obvious loca l characteristics, excellent service facilities, 
fine folk customs, and strong brand effects were promoted.  
 
4.2 Mining and Energy  
4.2.2 Energy  
4.2.2.1 Overview including environmental policy  
Page 142 (Para 4.64)  
The Report notes, that China issued the Regulations on Carbon Emission Trading (Trial) and the 
Implementation Plan on National Carbon Emission Trading Quota Determination and Distribution 
for 2019-2020 (Power Generation Industry) in December 2020. The Regulations provided a list of 
key emitters in the power generation industry that are included in the quota management, as well 
as the specific requirements for quota allocation and compliance, and officially launched the 
first compliance cycle of the national carbon market.  
 
Questions:  
32. Would China kindly elucidate if there are any plans to apply this system to the goods imported 
by China? If so, to which commodities will it be applied? What mechanism will  be applied?   
 
Reply:  According to Administrative Measures for Carbon Emission Permit Trading (For Trial 
Implementation), greenhouse gas emitters, which comply with the following criteria, shall be 
included in the list of key greenhouse gas emitters (hereinafter referred to as "key emitters "): 
(I) They are engaged in such industries that are covered by China Carbon Emission Trade Exchange 
(CCETE) . 
(II) Annual greenhouse gas emissions total 26,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.  
In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the 
provincial -level ecology and environment authorities shall develop the list of key emitters within 
their administrative jurisdictions, report to the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and make the 
relevant information public. The provinc ial-level ecology and environment authorities shall refer to 
gross carbon emission quota recognition and allocation plans formulated by the Ministry of Ecology 
and Environment, allocate the prescribed annual carbon emission quotas to key emitters within th eir 
administrative jurisdictions. Key emitters, organizations and individuals, which comply with the 
relevant national trading rules, are trading entities in China Carbon Emission Trade Exchange 
(CCETE).  
Visit http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021 -01/06/content_5577360.htm  for details.  
 
4.4 Services  
4.4.1 Financial services  
4.4.1.3 Recent regulatory developments  
4.4.1.3.7 Developments in the fintech industry  
Page 167 (Pa ra 4.196)   
The Report states, that on 31 December 2020, the US fintech company PayPal completed a stake 
acquisition deal that makes it the first foreign company to offer digital payment services in China. 
PayPal acquired a 30% stake in Gopay, a Chinese pro vider of electronic payment services, more 
than a year after its purchase of 70% of Gopay, making it the sole owner.  
 
Question:  
33. Could China, please, provide more details about the PayPal operational model in China and the 
list of services the company provides in China?  
 
Reply:  In September 2019, with the approval of the People 's Bank of China, PayPal became actual 
controller of Gopay Information Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Gopay ") through 
Paypal Information Technology (Sha nghai) Co., Ltd., a foreign -funded investment company invested 
and established in China. Gopay obtained Payment Business License in December 2011, and its 
business scope includes Internet payment, mobile phone payment, prepaid card issuance and 
acceptance (Hainan Province, Shaanxi Province, Yunnan Province, Hunan Province and Beijing). The 
payment services, provided by Gopay in China, include transfer of monetary funds between payers 
and payees via public networks or private networks; issuing and accepting prepaid value of goods 
or services purchased from entities other than the issuers under specific carriers and forms within 
the scope of the permitted business areas.  
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  PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE Report BY CHINA(WT/TPR/G/415)   
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -WIN 
COOPERATION  
3.1 Promoting the High -Quality Development of Trade  
3.1.3 Actively cultivating new forms and new models of foreign trade and promoting 
innovative development of trade in services  
Page 8 (Para 3.9)  
Under the Report, China actively promotes well -regulated, healthy and sustainable development of 
cross-border e -commerce and other new forms and modes. China has established 105 cross -border 
e-commerce pilot zones in five batches, guided the  local authorities to build test grounds, promoted 
business model innovation, and created a fair, open and transparent development environment.  
 
Questions:  
34. What are the main policy areas implemented in the field of cross -border e -commerce support?   
35. Could China further explain the characteristics of the cross -border e -commerce pilot areas?  
36. What is the methodology for implementing the policies in the fields of logistics, payments, and 
customs procedures in the pilot areas noted above?  
 
Reply  to 34 -36: Since 2015, the Chinese government has approved the establishment of 
105 comprehensive pilot zones for cross -border e -commerce (hereinafter referred to as 
"comprehensive pilot zones ") in five batches. Overall, the comprehensive pilot zones have played an 
increasingly prominent role in the development of foreign trade, featuring  a new highlight of foreign 
trade growth, a new channel for innovation and start -up, and a new dynamic force for transformation 
and upgrading.  
In encouraging and supporting the development of cross -border e -commerce, China 's Ministry of 
Commerce, in conju nction with relevant departments, has been exploring innovations, continuously 
strengthening top -level design, improving support policies, optimizing the development environment, 
and enhancing the level of development. The Ministry of Commerce has guided t he comprehensive 
pilot zones to build a policy framework with "six systems and two platforms " as the core, replicating 
and promoting 36 mature experiences and practices in 12 areas.  
On July 5, 2021, the General Office of the State Council issued the Guidel ines on Accelerating the 
Development of New Forms and Models of Foreign Trade, proposed to improve the development of 
cross-border e -commerce support policies; advance the construction of comprehensive pilot zones; 
support the development of independent st ations, building tools and other platforms for subdivided 
services; provide the convenient management of trade payment and settlement; strengthen 
developing industry organizations and fostering professional talent; and promote the development 
of new forms and models of foreign trade in a healthy, sustainable and innovative manner.  
 
Page 8 (Para 3.10)  
The Report mentions that China issued the Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot Programme of the 
Innovative Development of Trade in Services to promote the transformation, upgrading and high -
quality development of foreign trade.  
 
Question:   
37. Could China , please, provide some information on the preliminary results of this Pilot Program 
after the 1st year of implementation, what are the challenges and the main achievements so far?   
 
Reply:  Over the past year, China has achieved significant results in the comprehensive deepening 
of the pilot work. The Overall Plan for Comprehensively Deepening the Pilot Program of Innovative 
Development of Trade in Services proposed 122 tasks and initiatives, with 100 -odd implemented. 
The rest long -term work has also ma de important progress. The pilot areas continue to lead the 
reform, opening up and innovative development of China 's trade in services, serving as a pacesetter 
in the high -quality development of the trade in services.  
 
3.2 Building a Highland for Foreign I nvestment  
3.2.2 Actively expanding market access for foreign investment  
Page 9 (Para 3.17)  
The Report informs that China further opens up its financial services.   
 
Questions:  
38. What is the share of privately owned factoring companies in the overall number of factoring 
companies in China?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  According to incomplete statistics, as of the end of 2020, there were 8,553 legal entities of 
commercial factoring companies in Chin a. 
 
39. Are there any privately owned factoring companies with foreign capital? If yes, what instruments 
are used to monitor and to analyze factoring companies with FDI?  
 
Reply:  According to incomplete statistics, there are 405 commercial factoring compan ies 
registered  with foreign capital in China. Of them, 396 are registered in US dollars, 8 in Hong Kong 
dollars and 1 in euros. In terms of supervision, China treats all types of commercial factoring 
companies equally and strengthens supervision and management mainly through off -site supervision 
and on -site inspection. Commercial factoring companies are required to submit statement 
information on a regular basis, while on -site inspection is conducted according to the problems in 
off-site supervision a nd risk supervision requirements.  
 
40. Is there a regulation adopted specifically for such factoring firms?  
 
Reply:  China does not have any regulatory rules specifically for commercial factoring companies 
with FDI. As the supervisory rule -making authority for commercial factoring companies, China 
Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) issued the Notice of t he General Office of 
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission on Strengthening Supervision and 
Administration of Commercial Factoring Enterprises (CBIRC Office [2019] No. 205) in 2019. The 
Notice instructs all areas to strengthen the supervision o f commercial factoring companies when 
relevant matters are being handled and after they have been handled and promote the healthy 
development of the commercial factoring industry in six aspects including practicing legal compliance, 
strengthening supervisi on and management, steadily promoting classification for handling, strictly 
controlling market access, implementing supervisory responsibilities and optimizing business 
environment. In addition, local supervisory departments have also issued a series of ru les for the 
supervision of commercial factoring companies in their provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities directly under the central government.  
 
3.5 Developing High -Standard Pilot Free Trade Zones and Free Trade ports  
3.5.1 Promoting high-quality development of pilot free trade zones  
Pages11 -12 (Para 3.27)  
According to the Report, China has successively set up 10 pilot free trade zones since 2018 and, 
currently, a total of 21 pilot free trade zones have yielded positive results on furt her reform and 
opening up in terms of promoting liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment, enabling 
financial services to boost real economy and transforming government functions.   
 
Questions:   
41. Why were Free Trade Zones established as a p ilot? Will they be functioning on a regular basis in 
future?  
 
Reply:  PFTZs are a pilot ground for China 's reform and opening up. The core task is institutional 
innovation. In promoting deeper reform and higher level of openness on a pilot basis, China has 
been promoting such a practice in a larger scale after gaining experience, exploring ways to deepen 
reform and expand openness and accumulating relevant experience. President Xi Jinping stressed 
that China 's reform and opening up will not stop. C hina will play the leading role of PFTZs and 
develop new institutions for a higher -level open economy.  
 
42. What are the priority sectors that will benefit from the newly created Free Trade Zones?  
 
Reply:  Building PFTZs, including the newly established on es, is meant to provide an open, 
transparent and excellent business environment for all kinds of market entities set up in PFTZs by 
implementing a series of pilot initiatives in the liberalization and facilitation of investment and trade, 
financial service s for the real economy, and the transformation of government functions.  
 
43. Could China provide more details about the system of public services in Free Trade Zones?  
 
Reply:  PFTZs are committed to improving the effectiveness of government services by tak ing the 
lead in the reform separating permits from the business license and constantly facilitating the 
establishment of market entities. They provide quality public services for market entities by WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  strengthening the transparency in government affairs and p romote the "Internet plus government 
services " initiative.  
 
44. What are the underlying criteria in the geographical location of Pilot Free Trade Zones? Are these 
Free Trade Zones created on an industry -specific basis?   
 
Reply:  PFTZs  are established according to the needs of China 's reform and opening up, after 
comprehensive assessment and demonstration. There are 21 PFTZS across the country, covering 
coastal, inland and border areas. According to the functional positioning, resource endowment and 
industrial base, each PFTZ carries out the corresponding reform in transforming government 
functions and promoting the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment. In addition, with 
differentiated pilot contents, PFTZs have explor ed ways to deepen the overall reform and expand 
openness and accumulated relevant experience.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  EL SALVADOR  
Sección 2 ESFUERZOS CENTRADOS EN LA NUEVA ETAPA DE DESARROLLO, APLICACIÓN DE 
LA NUEVA FILOSOFÍA DE DESARROLLO Y PROMOCIÓN DE UN NUEVO PARADIGMA DE 
DESARROLLO DE ALTA CALIDAD  
 
Párrafo  2.1 Esfuerzos centrados en la nueva etapa de desarrollo 2.1. En 1978, China tomó la decisión 
sin precedentes de llevar a cabo un proceso de reforma y apertura. Tras más de 40 años de reforma 
y apertura, China ha iniciado una nueva singladura hacia la plena construcción de un país socialista 
moderno. Aspira a conjugar l a gran estrategia de renovación global de la nación china con los 
profundos cambios que no se habían visto en el mundo desde hacía un siglo. China elabora el esbozo 
del 14º Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo Económico y Social y Objetivos a Largo Plazo hasta el  
Año 2035, y emprende un nuevo rumbo hacia la meta del segundo centenario, que representa la 
entrada de China en una nueva etapa de desarrollo...  
 
P// Podría China brindar mayor información sobre el  14º Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo Económico 
y Social y Ob jetivos a Largo Plazo hasta el Año 2035, especialmente en relación con los componentes 
de comercio e innovación?  
 
Reply:  The Outline of the 14th Five -Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and 
the Long -Range Objectives Through the Year 203 5 has made overall arrangements for the high -
quality development of trade during the 14th Five -Year Plan period, which mainly includes:  
 
1. Promote domestic and international circulation and the coordinated development of import and 
export: we will cut ta riffs and government instituted transaction costs, and promote the 
diversification of import sources;  and optimize the quality and structure of exports; and optimize 
the plan for the international market; and innovatively develop service trade, promote the  pilot 
creation of an open platform for innovative development of service trade, and improve trade 
digitization.  
 
2. Buile a new open economy system: we will comprehensively improve the level of opening to the 
outside world, promote liberalization and fac ilitation of trade and investment, continue to deepen 
opening -up based on the flow of goods and production factors, and steadily expand institutional 
opening -up based on rules, regulations, management, and standard.  
 
3. Participate in the reform and devel opment of the global governance system and uphold and 
improve the multilateral economic governance mechanism: we will maintain the multilateral trade 
system, actively participate in the reform of the World Trade Organization (WTO); and implement 
the strate gy of upgrading free trade zones and build a global network of high -standard free trade 
zones; and optimize the layout of the FTZs, promote the implementation of the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement; and raise the standards of t he 
development of FTZs and promote the negotiation and signing of agreements on even more high -
level FTAs and regional trade.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  CANADA  
Page  9, paragraph  3.16:  
It is noted that China has revised its Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for the Access 
of Foreign Investment (2020 edition) . In its revision, China removed the restriction on foreign 
shareholding ratio in railway passenger transport companies, international shipping agents and 
international maritime transport companies.  
 
Question s:  
1. Could China confirm the current maximum ratio that a foreign shareholder can own in a 
Chinese  railway company?  
 
Reply:  According to the Special Administrative Measures (Negative List) for the Access of Foreign 
Investment (2020 edition), there is no res triction on foreign shareholding ratio in railway transport 
companies.  
 
2. Can a railway line itself be foreign -owned, or does the liberalization only apply to concession 
contracts to operate railway lines?  
 
Reply:  Since 2018, restrictions on foreign investment in trunk railway networks and railway 
passenger transport companies have been lifted from the Negative List.  
 
3. Are there any other sector -specific restrictions on foreign investment and participation in the 
supply of rail transportation in China?  
 
Reply:  The Negative List lists the special administrative measures for the access of foreign 
investment. Fields not on the Negative List shall be administered under the principle of equal 
treatment to both domestic and foreign investment.  
 
Page  11, paragraph  3.24:  
It is noted that in terms of services and investment, the overall level of openness of all parties to 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) is significantly higher than 
their WTO commitments, and the RCEP adopts a  negative list approach to investment liberalization.  
 
Question:  
4. Will China be converting its positive list under Annex II (Schedule of Specific Commitments for 
Services) of the RCEP to a full negative list, and if so, on what timeline?  
 
Reply:  According t o the RCEP Agreement, eight member states including China that have adopted 
a positive list for their commitments on trade in services promise to switch to a negative list within 
six years after the Agreement comes into force (within 15 years for Laos, Cam bodia and Myanmar).  
 
Page  12, paragraph  3.35:  
It is noted that for the Hainan Free Trade Port, a negative list for cross -border services trade is 
adopted. In the area of investment liberalization, market access is significantly expanded with less 
prohibiti ons and restrictions, highlighting the principle of "entry unless on the list ".  
 
Question:  
5. Is China considering extending the expanded market access for foreign investment in the Hainan 
Free Trade Port to other ports or areas within China (i.e. municipalities, provinces), or nationally?  
 
Reply:  The Special Administrative Measures for Cross -Border Service Trade at Hainan Free Trade 
Port (Negative List) (2021 Edition) was officially released in July 2021 and came into force on 
26 August. China is t aking the lead in formulating a national negative list for cross -border trade in 
services, which will be promulgated and implemented in accordance with the unified deployment of 
the State Council in due course.  
 
Page 13, paragraph 4.1: Fully Supporting Glo bal Cooperation on Combating COVID -19 
with Concrete Actions:  
The report notes that China is jointly addressing the challenges posed by the pandemic: In 
August  2021, the FAO/WHO updated its guidance document "COVID -19: Guidance for preventing 
transmission o f COVID -19 within food businesses " which reaffirmed that COVID -19 is not a direct WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 274 - 
 
  food safety concern. Despite this conclusion, China 's disputed COVID -19 emergency cold -chain 
import measures remain in place and continue to impede trade in food and agricult ural products.  
 
Question:  
6. Can China please elaborate when and how it will change its COVID -19 emergency import 
measures to reflect the scientific consensus embodied in the FAO/WHO guidance?  
 
Reply:  In order to effectively prevent Novel Coronavirus from being introduced through imported 
cold chain food, according to the joint prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, the 
State Administration for Market Regulation has raised requirements for the producers and operators 
of imported cold chain food that they shall not process, produce or sell imported cold chain food 
without inspection and quarantine certificate, nucleic acid test certificate, disinfection certificate and 
traceability inform ation. For the same batch of products tested positive in nucleic acid test, measures 
such as taking them off the shelves and stopping selling, and sealing up in special areas shall be 
implemented. The above measures comply with Article 42, Paragraph 1, Art icle 44 and Article 55 of 
the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious 
Diseases,  Article  42, Paragraph 1 and Article 92, Paragraph 2 of the Food Safety Law of the 
People 's Republic  of China and other relevant laws and  regulations, and are administrative acts 
according to law. The State Administration for Market Regulation will always strictly follow the 
deployment of the joint prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, and implement the 
relevant work requir ements for pandemic prevention and control from the cold chain food.  
 
Page 14, paragraph 4.12:  
It is noted that 142,000 expired CCC certificates were renewed in 2020 and that, in so doing, China 
recognized and accepted the conformity assessment results of the mutual recognition systems 
established through multilateral or bilateral channels.  
 
Questions:  
7. Could China clarify under which multilateral mutual recognition system(s) the conformity 
assessment results were accepted?  
 
Reply:  Such international mutual  recognition systems as IECEE and IECEX.  
 
8. Could China indicate whether the use of these system(s) to renew CCC certificates is a new 
practice?  
 
If so, could China indicate if the use of multilateral mutual recognition system(s) will be used 
consistently in future to renew CCC certificates?  
 
Reply:  It is not a new practice.  
 
Page 15, paragraph 4.20:  
China strictly abides by the WTO rules when mak ing and implementing economic and trade policies, 
so as to ensure the stability, transparency and predictability of those polices.  
 
Questions:  
9. What considerations have prevented China from signing on the U.S. ' revised transparency 
proposal (JOB/GC 204/Rev. 6-JOB CTG/14/REV.6), which was proposed at the General Council 
in July 2021?  
 
Reply:  China believes that the transparency proposal should cover all areas, including goods, 
services and intellectual property rights. Besides, in terms of improving transpare ncy, positive 
incentives shall dominate, and China does not support punitive measures involving the basic rights 
of members.  
 
Page 16, paragraph 4.27:  
As a member of the WTO Informal Working Group on MSMEs , China has always actively participated 
in relevant consultations. In this regard, China strongly supports cooperation among WTO members 
on MSMEs issues such as information exchange, sharing best practices and trade facilitation.  China 
also endorsed the B uenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women 's Economic Empowerment and is 
a participant of the WTO Informal Working Group (IWG) on Trade and Gender.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Questions:  
10. What types of initiatives would China like to see brought forward under the WTO Informal 
Working Group on MSMEs?  
 
Reply: In the context of global COVID -19 pandemic and world economic upheaval, we need to 
further unblock channels for information exchange fo r SMEs worldwide, establish a free, fair, 
non-discriminatory, transparent, foreseeable and open trade and investment environment, and 
facilitate MSMEs ' access to the international market and integration into the global supply chain.  
 
11. Does China have experience cooperating in other multilateral fora on MSMEs and if so, can China 
provide examples?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, China has constantly carried out dialogues, forums and exhibitions on 
policies and measures, trade and investment, be st practices, and scientific and technological 
innovation of MSMEs in such multilateral international organizations as APEC and BRICS, aiming to 
create a favorable environment for their internationalization. China Private -Owned Business 
Association has car ried out exchanges and cooperation with the World Association for Small and 
Medium Enterprises (WASME).  
 
12. How would China like to advance this work moving forward and what are China 's interests within 
the IWG?  
 
Reply:  During the 14th Five -Year Plan period, China will continue to adhere to market -oriented and 
law-based reform, create a more favorable development environment for SMEs, and publicize 
policies to ensure that favorable policies are sent to SMEs timely. In addition, China will work with 
other count ries to strengthen multilateral and bilateral cooperation among SMEs, stay committed to 
the path of openness, inclusiveness and win -win cooperation, and facilitate SMEs ' access to the 
international market and integration into the global supply chain. China  will exchange policies, 
information and experience with the WASME on private laborers and small and micro enterprises.  
 
Page 20, paragraph 4.49:  
As part of its contribution to the implementation of the UN 2030 agenda for sustainable development, 
China has sought to help other developing countries reduce poverty by providing assistance in the 
construction of rural public facilities, sharing experien ces in the conservation of agriculture and 
forestry, and offering technology transfer.  
 
Question:  
13. Can China provide examples where the country shared its experience in the conservation of 
forestry with other developing countries?  
 
Reply:  China has activel y shared its effective desertification control technology and experience with 
other countries, and organized and implemented multiple research and training programs on 
desertification control technology and comprehensive control of soil erosion. An interna tional 
technical assistance and exchange platform for desertification and land desertification prevention 
and control has been established in Gansu, and 36 "international training courses on desertification 
control technology and desertification control in  China " have been held. In 2006, the first "training 
course on desertification control in Arab States " was held in Ningxia, and 12 courses have been held 
so far. China has also carried out cooperation with African countries in afforestation and forestry 
research to enhance its capacity in forest resource administration. In order to ensure the talent 
support for the sustainable development of developing countries, China has organized training 
programs in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery to  train more technical talents for 
other developing countries.  
 
Page  21, paragraph  5.4: 
It is noted that China has undertaken supply -side structural reform for the iron and steel sector 
through market -oriented, law -based systematic and structural approaches .  
 
Question:  
14. Could China please elaborate what supply -side structural reform policies have been implemented 
and how these have impacted the overall capacity of the country 's iron and steel sector?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 276 - 
 
  Reply:  During the "13th Five-Year Plan " period, China has reduced its crude steel capacity by more 
than 150 million tons, and implemented equal or reduced capacity replacement for new smelting 
projects in the steel industry. Any planned or ongoing capacity investment in China needs to be 
premis ed on reducing more capacity, and there is no condition for the continued rising of China 's 
crude steel capacity.  
 
Page 23, Part V. paragraph 5.11  
On the topic of IPR protection, the report notes that "the Civil Code, officially implemented on 
1 January 2021, provides an important institutional basis for strengthening IPR protection, " and "the 
Copyright Law, amended in November 2020, improves the concepts and systems related to works 
and rights, and scales up the penalty on infringement. " 
 
Questio ns: 
15. Can China elaborate on the details of the amendments to the Copyright Law, and the policy 
rationale behind such changes?  
16. Do any of the amendments correspond to exceptions to the rights of creators or other flexibilities, 
for example exceptions to facil itate a consumer 's right to repair goods such as agricultural 
machinery?  
 
Reply for 15 and 16: The Copyright Law of the People 's Republic of China was amended for the 
third time in accordance with Decision on Amending the Copyright Law of the People 's Repu blic of 
China on 11 November 2020, and officially came into force on 1 June 2021. The amended Copyright 
Law strengthens the punishment of infringements, stipulates video works, reasonably expanded 
broadcasting rights, revises the definition of works, and i mproves relevant systems of ownership, 
restriction and exception of cooperative works. In addition, the newly revised Civil Code of the 
People 's Republic of China, which took effect on 1 January 2021, provides an important system for 
strengthening IPR work . The Amendment (XI) to the Criminal Law of the People 's Republic of China, 
which took effect on 1 March 2021, increases the statutory prison term for crimes of copyright 
infringement and intensifies the crackdown on copyright infringement.The newly revise d Copyright 
Law partially modifies the restrictions and exceptions on creators ' rights. For details, please refer to 
Article 24 of the Copyright Law. It has nothing to do with the right to repair goods such as agricultural 
machinery.  
 
Page 24, paragraph 5. 3.5 (5.18)  
China notes the launch in 2020 of a three -year action plan of SOE reform.  
 
Question:  
17.  Could China indicate when it will publicly release the plan?  
 
Reply:  The Three -year Action Plan for SOE  Reform (2020 -2022) was deliberated and adopted at 
the 14th Meeting of the Central Committee for Deepening Overall Reform on 30 June 2020.  
 
Page 25, paragraph 5.3.5 (5.18)  
China notes the mixed ownership reform of central SOEs.  
 
Questions:   
18. Does China in tend to permit the levels of private ownership in SOEs that can rise to the level of 
blocking or controlling stakes?  
 
Reply:  In the process of promoting the mixed -ownership reform, China adheres to the principles of 
"implementing policies depending on dif ferent regions, industries and enterprises, letting State -
owned capital play the role of the sole investor, the controlling shareholder or merely a shareholder 
wherever suitable, refraining from 'match -making ', applying the same policy to all SOEs and sett ing 
specific timelines ", For specific enterprises, appropriate ownership structures shall be determined 
based on the positioning and classification of enterprise functions. For all commercial SOEs whose 
core business belongs to industries and fields of suf ficient competition, state -owned capital may be 
the absolute or relative controlling shareholder, or be merely a shareholder if necessary. In addition, 
the ownership structure of mixed -ownership enterprises is not fixed, and will be adjusted 
dynamically ba sed on the distribution of state -owned capitals, industrial development and corporate 
strategies. The adjustment will be implemented step by step.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  19. Does China intend to permit the same level of participation for domestic private enterprises and 
foreign pri vate enterprises?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese Government always supports the equal participation of domestic private 
capitals, foreign capitals and other types of social capitals in the mixed -ownership reform of SOEs. 
The Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Transactions  of State -Owned Assets of 
Enterprises (Order No. 32 of the State -owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of 
the State Council and the Ministry of Finance in 2016) and the Measures for the Supervision and 
Administration of State -owned Equitie s of Listed Companies (Order No. 36 of the State -owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the Minister of Finance and the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission in 2018) explicitly require that the transfer of state -owne d 
property rights, the increase of registered capital and shares, and the transfer of state -owned 
equities of listed companies shall be carried out openly on the capital market, so as to ensure the 
market -based asset pricing and transparent operations. Fur thermore, the above documents stipulate 
that the transfer of property rights shall, in principle, not establish qualifications and conditions in 
respect of transferee, or such establishment shall not contain any content with clear orientation or 
violating the principle of fair competition, so as to provide equal opportunities for the participation 
of domestic private capitals, foreign capitals and other types of social capitals in the mixed -ownership 
reform.  
 
Page 25, Paragraph 5.19:  
It is noted that "China promotes the market -oriented reform of the competitive links in such 
industries as energy, railway, telecommunications and public utilities. China steadily advances the 
reform of mixed ownership, promotes the mixed ownership reform of enterprises in fully competitive 
industries and fields, and steadily explores the mixed ownership reform in key sectors such as 
electricity, oil, natural gas, railways, civil aviation, telecommunications and military industry. 
In 2020, China officially launched three -year action plan of SOE reform, starting a new boom in SOE 
reform. " 
 
Question:   
20. As the examples given of this SME development promotion seem to focus on the energy sector, 
could China elaborate on whether similar measures are applicable to o r developed for other 
sectors of the economy?  
 
Reply:  China understands that the context is the mixed ownership reform of SOEs. Please further 
clarify the relationship between the question and the context.  
 
21. Could China elaborate on what specific measures a re being undertaken to implement mixed 
ownership reforms in the rail and civil aviation sectors?  
 
Reply:  China has been steadily advancing market -oriented reform in sectors subject to natural 
monopoly, such as railways and rail transit, separating network and operation, and opening up 
competitive businesses in light of the characteristics of different industries, so as to promote market -
oriented allocation of public resources. For SOEs in important industries and key fields involving 
national security and l ifelines of the national economy, such as railways and civil aviation, the 
National Development and Reform Commission takes the lead in promoting the pilot and 
demonstration of mixed -ownership reform and introducing eligible private capitals as shareholder s 
to develop a mixed -ownership economy.  
 
22. Does China have any further plans to reduce state involvement in the transportation sector as 
part of its ongoing SOE reform efforts?  
 
Reply:  The Civil Aviation Administration of China has been implementing the thre e-year action plan 
for SOE reform, mainly targeting the enterprises affiliated to civil aviation administrative institutions. 
The purpose is to establish a modern enterprise system, enhance the vitality and efficiency of 
enterprises, and enhance their role  in ensuring the development of the industry. In the future, China 
will adopt a classified way to promote the SOE reform in the transport industry: Important 
communication infrastructure and hub transportation infrastructure will remain wholly stated -owned  
or state -holding, and eligible non -state enterprises will be allowed to participate in the construction 
and operation through franchising and government procurement of services in accordance with the 
law; In the fields of major river channels, oil and nat ural gas pipelines, and power grids, network 
and transport will be separated, and main and auxiliary industries will be separated. The pipeline WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 278 - 
 
  networks subject to natural monopoly will be wholly owned or absolutely controlled by the state, 
and competitive  businesses will be equally accessible for non -state capitals; In such fully competitive 
fields as express delivery and containers, all kinds of capitals will be actively introduced to realize 
diversity of equities and fair market competition in accordance  with market -based and law -based 
requirements.  
 
Page 26, Paragraph 6.2:  
It is noted that China will pursue high -quality development through higher -standard opening -up, 
and as part of this, the negative list for foreign investment access will be further shortened to treat 
all enterprises registered in China on an equal footing.  It is also noted in paragraph 6.2 that the 
Negative List for Cross -border Trade in Services will be introduced, and reform and innovation in 
trade and investment liberalization and facilitation will be deepened. According to news reports, 
Chinese Presiden t Xi Jinping made an announcement in a video address to the Global Trade in 
Services Summit of the 2021 China International Fair for Trade in Services (CIFTIS) that China will 
introduce the idea of a negative list for cross -border services trade  nationwide .  
(https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021 -09-02/President -Xi-Jinping -addresses -global -trade -in-
services -summit -13eopRZ7Tc4 /index.html ) 
 
Questions:  
23. Could China confirm what sectors will be targeted for the next shortening of the negative list for 
foreign investment access?  
 
Reply: It is proposed in the Outline of the "14th Five-Year Plan " that China will promote the opening 
of related businesses in the fields of telecommunications, internet, education, culture, and medical 
care in an orderly manner. Relevant Chinese authorities are working on a new negative list for 
foreign investment acce ss. 
 
24. Could China confirm the anticipated timeline, as well as actions and measures to be taken, for 
the introduction of the  Negative List for Cross -border Trade in Services . Further, could China 
elaborate on the scope (i.e. national, regional, local) and  sectors that will be included?  
 
Reply: The Special Administrative Measures for Cross -Border Service Trade at Hainan Free Trade 
Port (Negative List) (2021 Edition) was officially released in July 2021 and came into force on 26 
August. China is taking the lead in formulating a national negative list for cross -border trade in 
services, which will be promulgated and implemented in accordance with the unified deployment of 
the State Council in due course.  
 
Page 26, paragraph 6.2:  
Since its last trade policy re view, China has further promoted the development of small and medium -
sized enterprises and private businesses.  
 
Questions:  
25. How are SMEs defined for the purposes of statistical and policy analysis?  
 
Reply:  In order to promote the development of SMEs, in accordance with the Law of the People 's 
Republic of China on the Promotion of Small and Medium -Sized Enterprises, approved by the State 
Council, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the National Bureau of Statistics, the 
National Developmen t and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance jointly issued 
the Provisions on Criteria for Classifying Small and Medium -sized Enterprises (Gong Xin Bu Lian Qi 
Ye [2011] No. 300), which stipulates the criteria for classifying micro, small and medium -sized 
enterprises in different industries.  
 
26. Please provide statistics on; 1) the percentage of businesses that are SMEs; 2) percentage of 
total employment generated by SMEs; and 3) percentage of all exports and imports for SMEs, 
and the total number of SME s that are exporting and importing).  
 
Reply:  China released full -caliber data on MSMEs in China Economic Census Yearbook 2018.  
 
27. Does China collect statistics on SME ownership by diverse groups (e.g. women, youth, ethinic 
minorities, etc.)? If so, please pr ovide that information.  
 
Reply:  No. WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 279 - 
 
  28. Does China include provisions in its trade agreements that support SMEs in cross -border trade 
(e.g. cooperation, investment, etc.)? If so, please provide an overview of these provisions.  
 
Reply:  China has included provi sions on SMEs in its free trade agreements with the 
Republic  of Korea, Peru, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand to encourage the contracting parties to 
conduct cooperation and exchanges, so as to provide a favorable trade environment for SMEs. In 
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) signed in 2020, there is a 
chapter about SMEs to promote parties to the RCEP Agreement to strengthen their support for and 
input into SMEs and encourage SMEs to make more positive use of the RCEP  Agreement and the 
economic cooperation projects created by it, so as to enable SMEs better and faster integrate into 
regional value chains and supply chains.  
 
29. Do women and underrepresented groups in China face unique barriers to participating in 
internati onal trade?  
 
Reply:  Equal participation in economic activities and fair enjoyment of economic resources are the 
basic conditions for women 's survival and development. There are no specific obstacles restricting 
women 's participation in international trade when women and vulnerable groups participate in 
international trade in China. In promoting the strategic adjustment of economic structure and the 
reform and innovation of transforming the mode of economic development, China fully protects 
women 's economic rights and interests, and promotes women 's equal participation in economic 
development and equal enjoyment of the results of reform and development.  
 
30. Does the government of China have any programs in place to support these underrepresented 
groups in busine ss and international trade? If so, please describe.  
 
Reply:  The recently issued Outline for Women 's Development in China (2021 -2030) announced 
specific policies and measures to encourage women to participate in economy and trade and promote 
women 's entrepreneurship.  
 
31. Does China conduct impact assessments for their FTAs and if so, what process or framework 
does China use?  
 
Reply:  Since the FTAs came into force, Chinese embassies and consulates in FTA partners and 
relevant component authorities have be en following the implementation of the FTAs. Meanwhile, we 
have actively solicited opinions from local governments, business associations and enterprises. On 
this basis, China has held Free Trade Agreement Joint Committee Meetings with its FTA partners 
regularly to communicate and negotiate on the implementation of FTAs.  
 
32. Does China have a national strategy or program to support the internationalization of MSMEs?  
 
Reply:  Yes. The Law of the People 's Republic of China on the Promotion of Small and Medium -Sized 
Enterprises, and the Five -Year Action Plan for Promoting the International Development of Small and 
Medium -sized Enterprises (2016 -2020) issued by the MIIT and the Bank of China contain the 
contents of promoting the internationalization of SMEs.  
 
a. If so, what are some of the key components of the strategy or program?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the Law of the People 's Republic of China on the Promotion of Small and 
Medium -Sized Enterprises and the Fi ve-Year Action Plan for Promoting the International 
Development of Small and Medium -sized Enterprises (2016 -2020) for details.  
 
b. If so, does the strategy or program give consideration to MSMEs owned and/or led by 
women, ethnic minorities, youth, persons wit h disabilities or other underrepresented 
groups?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the Law of the People 's Republic of China on the Promotion of Small and 
Medium -Sized Enterprises for details. China has included provisions on SMEs in its free trade 
agreements with t he Republic of Korea, Peru, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand to encourage the 
contracting parties to conduct cooperation and exchanges, so as to provide a favorable trade 
environment for SMEs. In the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (R CEP) 
signed in 2020, there is a chapter about SMEs to promote parties to the RCEP Agreement to WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 280 - 
 
  strengthen their support for and input into SMEs and encourage SMEs to make more positive use of 
the RCEP Agreement and the economic cooperation projects created  by it, so as to enable SMEs 
better and faster integrate into regional value chains and supply chains.  
 
Secretariat Report – China  
Page 14, paragraph 28:  
It is noted in the report that important infrastructure projects implemented by SOEs are not covered 
by the Government Procurement Law.  
Question:  
1. Could China provide information on the value of infrastructure projects implemented by SOEs 
that are not cove red by the Government Procurement Law?  
 
Reply:  The government procurement stipulated in China 's Government Procurement Law refers to 
the behavior of state organs, public institutions, and social organizations at all levels to use financial 
funds in purchas ing goods, construction works and services within the centralized procurement 
catalogue formulated according to law or above the procurement quota standard. At present, China 
has not collected data on the value of infrastructure projects implemented by sta te-owned 
enterprises.  
 
Page 33, paragraph 2.14:  
The report noted that the Government continues to promote its vision to expand international trade, 
in part through the Belt and Road Initiative, which in part aims to promote cultural and educational 
exchanges.   
Question:  
2. How does China see its recent "Double Reduction " education policy as being in alignment with 
the vision of expanding international trade?  
 
Reply:  The general goal of ease the burden of excessive homework and off -campus tut oring for 
students undergoing compulsory education is divided into two aspects. On the campus, the quality 
of school education and teaching and service level have been further improved, the homework 
arrangement has been more rationally and reasonably desig ned to ensure the after -school service 
of the school basically meets the needs of students, and students learn better on the campus. Off 
the campus, the tutoring service offered by off -campus training institutions has been 
comprehensively standardized, irr egularities in off -campus tutoring of disciplines have been basically 
eliminated, and the popularity of off -campus tutoring has gradually cooled down.  
 
Pages 36 -37, paragraphs 2.35 -2.42:  
This section describes the changes brought by China 's Foreign Investm ent Law, which entered into 
force in March 2019. A new provision (Article 40) aims to allow China to take corresponding measures 
against any country or region that takes any "discriminatory, prohibitive, restrictive or other similar 
measures " against China . 
 
Question:  
3. Will China provide further clarity on what "discriminatory " or "restrictive " measures are of 
concern, and could potentially lead to corresponding measures by China?  
 
Reply:  China shall abide by WTO rules and make decisions according to the sp ecific measures taken 
by relevant members.  
 
Page 36, paragraph 2.38:  
It is noted that China 's Foreign Investment Law and its Implementing Regulations accord domestic 
companies and foreign -invested enterprises equal treatment regarding access to government 
funding arrangements, land supply, tax abatement or exemption, qualification licensing, standard 
setting, project application, or human resource policies, as well as in participation in government 
procurement, protection of intellectual property , and licensing formalities.  
 
Question:  
4. Can China further clarify how such commitments will be implemented, administered and 
enforced, including through associated legislation?   
 
Reply:  Since its accession to the WTO, China has earnestly fulfilled its comm itments and acted on 
the non -discrimination principle of the WTO. At present, many laws and regulations, such as Foreign WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 281 - 
 
  Investment Law, Regulations on the Implementation of the Foreign Investment Law and Government 
Procurement Law, have relevant provision s to ensure the equal treatment of foreign -invested 
enterprises. The implementation of these laws and regulations continuously guarantees the equal 
treatment of foreign -invested enterprises.  
 
Page 37, paragraph 2.41:  
It is noted that under China 's 2019 For eign Investment Law, legal liability shall be pursued in case 
of any IPR infringement. In addition, the FIL prohibits government officials from forcing foreign 
investors to transfer their technology by administrative means; it also requires the authorities  to 
keep confidential any trade secret of foreign investors that they may become aware of during the 
performance of their duties.  
 
Question:  
5. Does Chinese legislation prohibit any types of investment requirements that compel transfer of 
technology, includin g an implicit understanding that a foreign investor transfer technology to a 
joint venture partner?  
 
Reply:  There is no relevant laws or regulations that compel foreign investors to transfer their 
technology in China.  
 
6. Have there been any cases of legal liability being pursued against authorities for having failed 
to withhold technology -related trade secrets of foreign investors? If yes, can China please 
provide details about the cases?  
 
Reply:  The Foreign Investment La w clearly stipulates that the trade secrets of foreign investors and 
foreign -invested enterprises known by Chinese administrative organs and their staff while 
performing their duties shall be kept confidential according to laws, and shall not be disclosed or 
illegally provided to others. If disputes arise therefrom, the people 's court will provide relief 
according to law. According to incomplete statistics, there have been no such cases so far.  
 
7. Is China aware of any circumstances where local authorities or  government officials coerced a 
tech transfer from an investor? Have there been administrative determinations or court decisions 
in relation to compliance with Article 22 of the Foreign Investment Law? If so, could China share 
these or otherwise provide de tails?" 
 
Reply:  According to the Foreign Investment Law and its implementation regulations, China 
encourages technical cooperation in the process of foreign investment based on voluntary principle 
and commercial rules. The conditions of technical cooperati on shall be determined by all investors 
through equal consultation in accordance with the principle of fairness, and administrative organs 
and their staff shall not use administrative means to forcibly transfer technology. China has also 
revised the Regula tions on Technology Import and Export and laws and regulations on intellectual 
property to actively created a good legal environment and market environment for foreign 
investment under the guidance of strong and simultaneous protection of intellectual prop erty rights.  
 
Page  38, Box 2.1:  
As part of Box 2.1 (Main changes in the 2019 National Negative List for foreign investments and 
the 2019 Encouraged Catalogue), the following activities were added to the encouraged category: 
Services - Development of cold -chain logistics, e -commerce, construction and operation of special 
railway lines, etc.  
 
Question:  
8. Could China explain what is meant by "special railway lines " and provide additional information 
on the extent to which foreign investment is now permitted and encouraged in this area?  
 
Reply:  According to the provisions of the Railway Law, special railway lines refer to branch lines 
managed by enterprises or other units that connect with national railways or other railway lines.  
 
Page 38 and 39, Box 2.1:  
The Secretariat Report contains a table detailing the main changes in the 2019 National Negative 
List for foreign investments and the 2019 Encouraged Catalogue. It is noted that, in the Government 
of China 's National Negative List and Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment, the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  exploration, mining and mineral processing of rare earths, radioactive minerals, and tungsten have 
all been added to the list  of activities where foreign investment is prohibited.   
 
Question:  
9. Could China provide details on the rationale for adding "Exploration, mining and mineral 
processing of rare earths, radioactive minerals, and tungsten " to the Prohibited category in the 
National Negative List for foreign investments?  
 
Reply : In recent years, there are no new items  in the Negative List for the Access of Foreign 
Investments. The 2018 Negative List includes the prohibition of "investment in  exploration and 
exploitation of tungsten, molybdenum, tin, stibium and fluorite ", "investment in exploration, 
exploitation and ore dressing of rare earths " and "investment in exploration, exploitation and ore 
dressing of radioactive minerals ", while the content is reduced to the prohibition of investment in 
"exploration, exploitation and ore dressing of rare earths, radioactive minerals and tungsten " in 
the 2019 Negative List.  
 
Page  39-40, Box 2.2:   
As part of Box 2.2 (Main changes in the 2020 National Negative List for foreign investments and the 
2020 Encouraged Catalogue), the following activities were removed from the restricted category: 
Manufacturing - Manufacturing of commercial vehicles – requirement that foreign investment 
should not exceed 50%. However, Canada notes that on page 149, paragraph 4.98 of the 
WTO Secretariat Report, it is indicated that "In the automotive industry, Chinese parties must hold 
no less than 50% in the manufacturing of  passenger vehicles.59 In addition, a foreign investor may 
establish no more than two joint ventures in China to manufacture the same type of vehicles ." These 
restrictions are also confirmed on page 189, Table A2.3 (Industries in which FDI was/is restricted, 
2019 and 2020) of the WTO Secretariat Report.  
 
Question:  
10. What is the effect of removing the restriction for manufacturing of commercial vehicles fro m the 
2020 National Negative List, and will the foreign investment and joint venture restrictions noted 
elsewhere in the WTO Secretariat Report continue to apply to certain types of vehicles?  
 
Reply:  The Negative List for the Access of Foreign Investments  (2020 Edition) stipulates that "The 
share of Chinese investors of vehicle manufacturing companies should be not less than 50%, except 
for special vehicle, new energy vehicle, and commercial vehicle companies. A foreign company can 
establish two or fewer j oint ventures to produce similar vehicle products in China. (In 2022, the 
restriction of foreign share ratio in passenger car manufacturing and the restriction of the same 
foreign company can establish two or fewer joint ventures in China to produce simila r vehicle 
products will be removed.) " 
 
Page 40, Box 2.2:  
In the 2020 version of the Government of China 's National Negative List and Catalogue of Industries 
for Guiding Foreign Investment, the construction and operation of airport towers has been added to 
the list of activities where foreign investment is prohibited.   
 
Question:   
11. Could China explain its rationale for adding this activity to the list of activities where foreign 
investment is prohibited?  
  
Reply:  Considering that the Market Access Negative List stipulates that institutions not designated 
by the government are prohibited from investing in air traffic management systems. It is no longer 
listed in the 2020 edition of the Negative List for the Access of Foreign Investments. In order to 
further emphasize that towers are not included in airport construction and operation, the 
construction and operation of airport towers are included in the Negative List for the Access of 
Foreign Investments.  
 
Page  41, pa ragraph  2.50:  
It is noted that "On 18 June 2020, the State Council decided to temporarily adjust and implement 
the Regulations on Customs Affairs Guarantees, the Regulations on Import and Export Tariffs, the 
Regulations on International Maritime Transporta tion, the Regulations on the Inspection of Ships 
and Offshore Facilities, and the Regulations on the Administration of Domestic Water Transport, 
until 31 December 2024 ." WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Question:  
12. Could China further explain what was done to "temporarily adjust " these regulations? Does it 
mean that they no longer apply, and if so, what impact does this temporary adjustment have 
on foreign participation in the Chinese transportation sector?  
 
Reply:  To support the construction of Hainan Free Trade Port, the State Council decided to 
temporarily adjust the relevant provisions on the implementation of five administrative regulations 
including the Regulations on Customs Affairs Guarantees within Hainan Fre e Trade Zone from 
18 June 2020 to 31 December 2024. This is a temporary adjustment to some provisions of relevant 
laws and regulations.  
 
Page  42, paragraph  2.54:  
It is noted that Chinese authorities state that the contents and scope of foreign investment 
information reporting shall be determined by the principle of real necessity.  
 
Question:   
13. As the principle of real necessity is not defined in the Measures for Reporting of Information on 
Foreign Investment, issued by Government of China, would China be able to provide its 
understanding of what constitutes real necessity, as applied in this cas e to the contents and 
scope of foreign investment information?  
 
Reply:  In order to facilitate the investment of foreign -invested enterprises, China officially 
implemented the Foreign Investment Law and its regulations in 2020, cancelled the examination 
and approval and filing of the establishment and change of foreign -invested enterprises in the 
commercial department, and implemented the foreign investment information reporting system. 
China issued the Notice on Matters Concerning the Reporting of Informati on on Foreign Investment, 
which clarifies the reporting subject, content and process of foreign investment information.  
 
Page 42, Part 2, paragraph 2.54:  
China has been regularly updating its National Negative List for foreign investment in an effort to 
open additional sectors of its economy to foreign investment. However, sectoral regulators remain 
responsible for issuance of operating licenses and other approvals in many sectors.  
 
Questions:  
14. Can China explain how it ensures that the delays in or refusals  to issue sector -specific approvals 
and licenses administered by the ministries and agencies of the Government of China, other 
than MOFCOM in sectors open to foreign investment in accordance with the Foreign Investment 
Negative List do not defeat the purpo se of the Negative List in expanding market access for 
foreign investors?  
 
Reply:  China continues removing  and abolishing policies and regulations inconsistent with the 
Foreign Investment Law. According to the Foreign Investment Law and its implementation  
regulations, if a foreign investor invests in an industry or field where license is required in accordance 
with the law, unless otherwise provided by laws or administrative regulations, relevant competent 
department shall review the application for licens e filed by the foreign investor based on the same 
conditions and procedures as those for domestic investment, and shall not set discriminatory 
requirements on foreign investors in terms of license conditions, application materials, review links 
and time li mit for review. All departments shall abide by the Foreign Investment Law and other laws 
and regulations.  
 
Page  42-43, paragraph  2.59:   
It is noted that "Pursuant to the Circular on the Establishment of a System for Security Review of 
Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, foreign investments in Chinese domestic 
enterprises might be subject to national security review if the FDI is deemed  to have an influence 
on national security. It applies only to certain types of foreign M&A transactions. The Circular 
provides for the scope, content, working mechanism, and procedures for the M&A security review, 
and it creates a unified and standardized  security review system for M&A activities conducted by 
foreign investors ". 
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Questions:  
15. Could China confirm how "national security " is defined? Does the process apply to mergers and 
acquisitions in all sectors? Are there monetary thresholds that trigger a review?   
 
Reply:  In 2020, China issued the Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investment, which 
listed the situations where security review of foreign investment is required.  
 
16. Is the national security review linked to the process for notifying mer gers and acquisitions set 
out in section 3.3.4.1.4, page 92 -93 of the WTO Secretariat Report?   
 
Reply: No. 
 
Page 44, paragraph 2.68:  
It is mentioned that in response to the COVID -19 pandemic, several relief measures were taken or 
announced by China, including shortening the negative list on foreign investment, expanding the 
catalogue of industries where foreign investment is encouraged, encouraging financial institutions 
to increase foreign trade loans, and encouraging commercial insurance companies t o offer short -
term export credit insurance and lower premium rates.  
 
Questions:  
17. Which industries would have foreign investment encouraged?  
 
Reply:  In December 2020, China released the Catalogue of Industries to Encourage Foreign 
Investment (2020 Edition), which contains 1,235 items to further expand the scope of encouraged 
foreign investment, with the key focusing on manufacturing, producer services  and the central and 
western regions. Refer to http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/n/202012/20201203026619.shtml  for 
item details.  
 
18. Are these measures expected to be phased out as the COVID -19 pandemic comes to an end, or 
will they remain in place?  
 
Reply:  China will continue to take coordinated steps to advance major foreign investment projects, 
fully implement the negative list management system for foreign investment access, i mprove the 
facilitation of filing foreign investment projects, protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign 
investment, and improve services for foreign investment. China is in favor of increasing financial 
supports from banking and insurance ins titutions on all types of foreign trade enterprises, including 
wholly foreign -owned and Sino -foreign joint ventures. Relevant policies and measures have been 
introduced before the outbreak of COVID -19 pandemic and are equally applicable to all types of 
foreign trade enterprises. The reintroduction of relevant requirements in the context of COVID -19 is 
aimed at encouraging banking and insurance institutions to actively fulfill their social responsibilities 
and better support foreign trade enterprises of all types to cope with the short -term impact of the 
epidemic through financial services. Relevant measures are no different from those before the 
epidemic and relevant measures will continue to be effective at and after the outbreak of COVID -19.  
 
Page 49, Box  3.1  
It is noted that the GACC will provide more timely assistance to businesses (especially micro, small, 
and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs)) with import/export problems.  
 
Question:   
19. With regard to MSMEs and in particular, women -owned businesses, what assistance is China 
providing to women MSMEs in regard to problems they may encounter with import/export?  
 
Reply:  Women are an important force for economic, trade and social development. The number of 
women -owned/operated enterprises (including micro, smal l and medium -sized enterprises) is 
increasing, playing an important role in promoting economic development as well as import/export. 
In view of the difficulties facing different groups of women in employment and entrepreneurship, 
China has introduced suppo rtive policy measures including implementing small guaranteed loans to 
encourage women 's employment and entrepreneurship financial discount policy to foster and 
promote the employment of tens of millions of women, vigorously developing industries such as 
domestic services and handmade knitting to provide services for urban and rural women to start 
businesses or find jobs locally or in other places, implementing female college students employment 
and entrepreneurship supportive programs to provide employment  training, entrepreneurship WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 285 - 
 
  guidance, trainee positions, carrying out "Sunshine Project " to improve the quality of rural female 
labor force and their skills in entrepreneurship and employment. The Women 's Federations 
has organized and trained more than 100 ,000 women e -commerce leaders, helping more than 
15 million women increase their income and wealth. A service system of "Internet + Women 's 
Entrepreneurship " has taken shape, where 55% of Internet entrepreneurs are women, many of 
which are engaged in small, medium and micro businesses.  
 
Page 53, paragraph 3.1.3.3 – Bound Tariffs:  
While all tariffs were bound at ad valorem rates, applied MFN tariffs on 37 tarif f lines are non -ad 
valorem. At the time of China 's previous Trade Policy Review, the authorities indicated that ad 
valorem equivalents do not exceed the bound tariff rate in practice, as the lower rate is applied.  
 
Question:  
20. Could China confirm whether it continues its practice to apply the lower rate where non -ad 
valorem applied MFN tariffs exceed the bound (ad valorem) tariff rate?   
 
Reply:  After China 's accession to WTO, the specific tariff (ad valorem equivalent) implemented over 
the years have been str ictly in accordance with China 's WTO commitment to the ad valor tax rate 
conversion, and the specific tariff rate is recalculated regularly to ensure that the actual tariff rate 
does not exceed the ad valorem tax level of China 's commitment.  
 
Page 53, par agraph 3.1.3.4 - Preferential rates:  
China applies preferential tariffs under its preferential (PTAs) and regional trade agreements (RTAs). 
Hong Kong, China and Macao, China face the lowest average tariff duties, followed by Chile and New 
Zealand. The shar e of duty -free tariff lines in China 's RTAs ranges between 0.04% (RTAs with 
Hong Kong, China and Macao, China) and 6.6% (Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen and Matsu (Chinese Taipei)). Canada notes that China offers preferential treatment under 
its different bilateral and regional trade agreements. The Working Party Report on China 's Accession 
to the WTO, Paragraph 91, reads as a Most -Favoured Nation (MFN) forward commitment, stating 
that "the representative of China confirmed that for wood and paper products, the same rates of 
duty, including the rates applied under a preference programme, customs union or free -trade area, 
would be applied to all imports of wood and paper products. The Working Party took note of this 
Commitment. " Under existing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), China provides duty -free access for 
Singapore on all wood and paper products, which has not to date been extended to other 
WTO Members on an MFN basis.  
 
Question:  
21. When will China extend preferential access on wood and paper products to all WTO Members on 
an MFN basis?  
 
Reply:  At present, China has reduced import duties on wood and paper products through the interim 
import tariff rates, which are applicable to all WTO members.  
 
Pages  57-58, paragraph  3.41:  
It is noted that since 2014, the automobile purchase tax has been exempted for certain new energy 
vehicles (NEVs), and this exemption will remain in place until end -2022.  
 
Question:  
22. Does China plan to extend the NEV tax exemption beyond 2 022? 
 
Reply:  The NEV purchase tax exemption policy will expire on 31 December 2022. China will, by 
combining the national policy orientation, the development of the new energy vehicle industry, and 
the requirements from national tax reduction and fee reduction deploym ent etc., study the new 
energy vehicle purchase tax policy as a whole.  
 
Page 60, paragraph 3.46 – Import Prohibitions:  
Since 1 January 2021, imports of all solid waste products have been prohibited, and the previous 
regime for allowing imports of certain w astes under licensing conditions has been terminated. During 
the review period, questions and concerns about China 's changes to measures restricting and 
prohibiting imports of solid waste were raised in the WTO Committee on Import Licensing by the 
European  Union, the United States, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and Japan. Concerns 
related to, inter alia, the impact of these measures on global recycling processing capacity, and the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 286 - 
 
  apparent non -application of the same bans and restrictive contami nant standards to domestically 
sourced solid wastes. China was urged to ensure transparency by notifying measures, both 
introduced and planned, and to consider less trade -restrictive measures. In response, China has 
drawn attention to, inter alia, pollutio n in China and the imperative of limiting the negative effects 
of solid waste. Certain recycling materials for brass, iron -steel materials, copper, and cast aluminium 
alloys may be imported if they meet the required standards.  
Canada notes that high -qualit y scrap products are a valuable raw material for Chinese customers 
involved in various manufacturing sectors and a key component of a strong circular economy that 
ultimately helps to reduce waste.  
 
Questions:  
23. Has China considered measures to limit the impa ct of this prohibition on global recycling 
processing capacity? If so, please explain these measures in detail.  
24. Has China considered applying the same bans and restrictive contaminant standards to 
domestically sourced solid wastes?  
 
Reply:  Solid waste tre atment and disposal is a common issue faced by all countries in the world and 
each country shares a common responsibility in reducing solid waste pollution, and should strive to 
improve its capacity for solid waste treatment and recycling, rather than tran sferring solid waste 
pollution to other countries.  As a developing country with the largest population in the world, the 
Chinese government has made great efforts to promote ecological progress, actively promote green 
and sustainable development and meet t he people 's growing need for a beautiful ecological 
environment. While doing a good job of its own solid waste treatment and disposal, the prohibition 
on solid waste import is an inevitable choice made by China to effectively safeguard the safety of 
the na tional ecological environment and the health of its people. At present, prohibition on the solid 
waste import has become a legal system in China, and relevant departments of the 
Chinese  government will resolutely implement the requirements of relevant lega l systems and policy 
documents.  In accordance with the universally recognized principles of the international community, 
the proper disposal of solid waste generated in one 's own country is the responsibility and obligation 
of each country, and has nothing  to do with national treatment.  
 
Page 60, paragraph 3.46 – Import Ban for Wood Pellets for Energy Production:  
We note that China has used this measure to ban all imports of wood pellets for energy production.  
However, as produced in Canada, wood pellets ar e not a waste, are not recycled material and are 
not a contaminated product. To justify its ban, the most trade -restrictive form a technical regulation 
can take, China cited environmental objectives, notably in their response to Canada 's question on 
this s ubject at the TBT Committee in February 2021. However, Canada sees no logical link between 
banning wood pellets for energy production and the protection of the environment. On the contrary, 
Canadian wood pellets can contribute to China 's goal of enhancing environmental protections. Wood 
pellets are a renewable, low -carbon resource and switching energy production from coal to wood 
pellets has the potential to reduce GHG emissions.   
 
Questions:  
25. Canada reiterates that it does not wish to dispute China 's willingness to protect the environment, 
including by limiting harmful impacts resulting from contaminated waste material.  But, 
considering that wood pellets are made from pure forest fibre, such as logging residuals (small 
diameter stems and branches) and residues (sawdust) from logs being converted into lumber in 
sawmills, and present the environmental benefits potentials cited earlier, could China explain 
the logical link between its measure (banning wood pellets) and its stated objective (the 
protection of the environment)?   
26. If China considers that wood pellets for energy production, as a potential substitute for coal, 
would be harmful for the environment, could China detail the scientific evidence it used to make 
that determination and provide the testin g methodology it is using to determine whether 
materials are contaminated?   
27. What considerations has China given to Canada 's request to exempt wood pellets from the list 
of contaminated materials, given that they are neither contaminated nor waste materials ? 
28. How has China ensured that its ban on wood pellets is not more trade restrictive than necessary 
to meet China 's environmental and heath protection objectives?  
29. ISO standard 17225 -2:2021 lists wood pellet produced from by -products and residues from 
wood pr ocessing industry as a "solid biofuel ". On which international standard has China based 
its measure to categorise wood pellets as a "waste "?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 287 - 
 
  Reply for 25 -29: Canada 's understanding of China 's policy on pollution prevention and control from 
imported solid  waste is appreciated. China is a large country in agriculture and forestry, which 
produces a large amount of agricultural and forestry residues every year. In order to properly handle 
and dispose of agricultural and forestry residues, including wood pelle ts, the central and local 
governments support their harmless treatment and disposal. In addition, previous inspection and 
quarantine cases show that the source of imported wood refuse is complex, and there is a risk of 
carrying foreign pests. Pests interce pted by quarantine include insects, nematodes, weeds and fungi. 
To sum up, China clearly prohibits the import of wood refuse for the purpose of burning.  
 
Pages 62 -63, paragraphs 3.53 – 3.56:  
During the period of review, China introduced three sets of Rules: the Rules on Interim Review of 
Dumping and Dumping Margins; the Rules on Questionnaires in Anti -Dumping Investigations; and 
the Rules for Hearing of Anti -dumping and Anti -Subsidy Investigations. The reports mentions that 
China in currently preparing  a notification to the WTO for these rules.  
 
Question:  
30. Canada notes that all three Rules came into force in the first half of 2018, i.e. over two years 
ago. Can China explain why it has not yet complied with its obligation to notify changes to its 
trade re medy laws and regulations? Can China indicate when it will submit its notification to 
the WTO?  
 
Reply:  The notification is in preparation . 
 
Page 63, paragraph 3.55:  
The report notes that there were changes to the Rules on Questionnaires applicable in anti -dumping 
investigations, including "setting out the conditions for applying facts available. "  
 
Question:  
31. Would China provide more detail on these changes, particularly the changes to the use and 
application of facts available?   
 
Reply:  Article 25 of the R ules for Anti -dumping Investigations by Questionnaires stipulates that  
where an interested party fails to submit any necessary information as required within a prescribed 
period or significantly obstructs an investigation, the Investigation Authority may make a preliminary 
ruling or a final ruling based on the facts already obtained and the best information available. China 's 
regulations are consistent with those of the WTO.  
 
Page 70, Part 3, paragraph 3.86  
Article 4 of the Regulations on Adm inistration of Import and Export of Technologies, referring to the 
Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export, states that the import and export of 
technology shall conform to the country 's industrial policy, among others. China 's export restrictions 
or prohibitions of certain technologies based on industrial policy would appear to be inconsistent 
with GATT Article XXI.  
 
Questions:  
32. Could China explain how these policies align with GATT Article XXI or other WTO commitments?  
33. Among the Catalogue of Technologies ' Prohibited List items are the rare earth 's refining, 
processing, and utilization technologies. Could China explain how this prohibition is aligned with 
GATT or other WTO commitments?   
 
Reply for 32 -33: The Catalogue of Technologi es Restricted or Forbidden for Export is formulated, 
adjusted and promulgated by Ministry of Commerce jointly with relevant departments of the State 
Council in accordance with the Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China and the 
Regulations of t he People 's Republic of China on Administration of Import and Export of 
Technologies. The Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export aims to standardize 
the administration of technology export, promote scientific and technological progres s as well as 
economic and technological cooperation with foreign countries, and safeguard national economic 
security. The items in the catalogue are relevant to national security and conform to international 
practice.  
 
Page 71, Part 3, paragraph 3.91/3.93 : 
China 's Export Control Law is anchored in "the maintenance of national security and interests  …".  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 288 - 
 
  Questions:  
34. Considering that "national interests " is a novel concept in international export controls, can China 
explain how it defines "national interests " in this context?   
 
Reply:  National interests are inseparable from the concept of national security. The legislative 
purposes of major international countries ' export control all mention safeguarding national security 
and safeguarding national interests.  
 
35. Could China confirm if all goods that are under the export control regime have been notified to 
the WTO Council for Trade in Goods?  
 
Reply:  After the  promulgation of the Export Control Law, for better implementation of the law and 
enhancement of its operability, the Chinese government is accelerating the formulation and revision 
of supporting regulations and improving the control list. Relevant informa tion will be released in due 
course. Legislative procedures will be carried out in accordance with the Legislation Law and other 
relevant laws and regulations.  
 
Page 71 -72, paragraphs 3.90 -3.95 - Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing:  
On 17 Octo ber 2020, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed the Export Control Law, which 
entered into force on 1 December 2020. Under Article 2 of the Law, export control refers to 
"prohibitions or restrictions on transfer of controlled items from the territory of  the People 's Republic 
of China to overseas and the provision of controlled items by any citizen or incorporated or non -
incorporated organization of the People 's Republic of China to any foreign organization or individual ". 
The Law defines "controlled items " to include dual -use items (with both civilian and military 
applications), military products, and nuclear products. In addition, "controlled items " include "other 
goods, technologies, services that are related to the mai ntenance of national security and interests 
and the implementation of international obligations such as non -proliferation ". It also requires 
exporters to provide documentation establishing the intended end -use and end -user for the 
controlled items to be is sued by the end -user or the Government at the end -user's location… In 
addition to the established control lists, the new legislation authorizes export control authorities to 
list items for "temporary controls " for a provisional period of up to two years be fore determining 
whether to list the items on a control list. …The authorities indicate that China is in the process of 
formulating supporting regulations and shall release further regulations at a later stage… Under the 
Law, China may take measures recipr ocally, according to the actual circumstances, if any country 
or region "abuses " its export control measures in ways that endanger China 's national security and 
interest.  
 
Questions:  
36. Can China advise when the supporting regulations will be published and wh ether it will provide 
an opportunity for other WTO Members and foreign stakeholders to provide comments?  
 
Reply:  After the promulgation of the Export Control Law, for better implementation of the law and 
enhancement of its operability, the Chinese governm ent is accelerating the formulation and revision 
of supporting regulations and improving the control list. Relevant information will be released in due 
course. Legislative procedures will be carried out in accordance with the Legislation Law and other 
relevant laws and regulations.  
 
37. Pending publication of the regulations, can China provide detailed information on the application 
of the Export Control Law and how it is currently being implemented?   
 
Reply:  The Export Control Law has come into force. Pending the promulgation of new regulations, 
contents that do not conflict with the law in existing regulations shall continue to be implemented, 
and the existing control list shall continue to be effective.  
 
38. What resources are available to help businesses familiarize themselves with the requirements of 
the Export Control Law?  
 
Reply:  Enterprises can check relevant laws and regulations on the official website of the Ministry of 
Commerce. After the implementation of the Export Control Law, the Mini stry of Commerce revised 
and issued the Guiding Opinions of Ministry of Commerce on Establishing the Internal Compliance 
Mechanism for Export Control by Exporters of Dual -use Items, and at the same time issued the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Guidance of Internal Compliance of Export Control of Dual -use Items to provide compliance 
reference and guidance for exporters.  
 
39. Can China provide further information on the criteria used to determine the items to be listed 
on a "temporary control list "?  
Reply:  For better enforcement of law and the enhancement of its operability, the 
Chinese  government is accelerating the formulation and revision of supporting regulations to further 
refine relevant provisions.  
 
40. Given China 's very broad approach to "national security and interests ", can China expl ain and 
provide examples of what it considers as "abuse " of export control measures under the Export 
Control Law? In addition, can China provide information on what type of countermeasures can 
be considered under the Export Control Law?  
 
Reply:  China has always maintained that practical measures should be taken to promote 
international cooperation in materials, equipment and technologies for the purpose of peace, 
especially to avoid restrictive measures that are inconsistent with the international obligati ons 
undertaken. Therefore, the Chinese government, based on extensive suggestions from various 
parties and in order to better safeguard national security, has set up reciprocal provisions in the 
Export Control Law against foreign abuses of export control m easures, which is in line with the basic 
norms of international relations, WTO rules and internationally accepted practices. In accordance 
with the Export Control Law, the Chinese government will continue to deepen multi -bilateral 
cooperation and exchanges  in the field of export control, participate in international rule -making, 
and work together with other countries to make positive contributions to the non -proliferation  of 
weapons  of mass  destruction and to the protection of world peace and security.  
 
Page 75, paragraph 3.115:  
The report indicates that China does not grant incentives in the form of access to credit. However, 
an OECD report from 2021 on below -market finance found that, across many sectors, industrial 
firms based in China were more likely than their peers in other countries to have access to below -
market borrowing. The OECD 's 2019 Economic Survey of China also found that a third of all bank 
lending in China attracts interest rates that are equal to or below the country 's lending  benchmark.  
 
Question:  
41. Can China provide information on which policies and programs it has in place to facilitate access 
to below -market credit for certain of its industrial firms?   
 
Reply:  Commercial banks in China can independently select customer groups  and conduct credit 
allocation according to their own strategic planning, development positioning, risk  preference and 
management capacity. The relevant decision is a market -based choice made by of the commercial 
banks based on their actual development sta tus and is a market -based behavior.  
 
Page  76, paragraph  3.122:  
It is noted that the notifications submitted to the WTO and the replies provided by China to questions 
asked by other WTO Members did not enable the Secretariat to have a clear overall picture of China 's 
support programmes.  
 
Question:  
42. Could China give a specific indication of when it expects to provide a current and comprehensive 
accounting of its domestic support programs?   
 
Reply:  China will soon submit a notification of its domestic support programmes.  
  
Page 76 -77, Part 3: 3.3.1: Incentives; paragraph 3.123:  
The report acknowledges China 's position that the Government does not intervene in SOE 's 
financing, operation, and management.  
 
Question:  
43. Can China explain the role of the Communist Party of China committees within SOEs and extent 
to which these committees participate in the management of the enterprise?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  The Chinese government comprehensively promotes law -based governance and focuse s on 
the active role of the Rule of Law in the modernization of the national governance system and 
governance capacity. The Constitution of the People 's Republic of China, as the fundamental law of 
the country, clearly stipulates that the leadership of the CPC is the most essential feature of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics, and also provide that the state -owned enterprises have the right to 
operate autonomously within the scope of laws. The Company Law stipulates that organizations of 
the CPC shall be established in companies to conduct Party activities in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China (CPC).  
 
Page  77, paragraph  3.124:  
In paragraph 3.124, it is mentioned that government guidance fu nds or government -guided 
investment funds are in place to support different industries and attract foreign investment. These 
funds appear to be mostly financed by the central and local governments, large SOEs and state -
owned financial institutions. However , China has refused confirming information gathered by the 
Secretariat on these funds (Table 3.15) stating that "the information is not relevant to this Review ".  
Canada recalls that transparency is a fundamental pillar of the WTO system and that the Trade  Policy 
Review Mechanism is meant to allow a better understanding of the policies and practices of each 
Member. As such, information on measures supporting industries that China considers important is 
relevant to this Review irrespective  of whether or not these measures constitute specific subsidies 
for the purpose of the notification requirement under Article 25 of the ASCM.  
 
Question:  
44. During the period of review, what were the government guidance funds or government -guided 
investment funds in place? Coul d China please provide information on the objectives of each 
fund, the source of their funding, their size, their management, and the targeted sectors.  
 
Reply:  The funds set up by the Chinese government in accordance with market -based principles is 
operated completely according to  such market  principles and is a fully independent market entity, 
with its investment management and decision -making completely market -based. The government 
departments do not interfere with or participate in any investment decisions of the funds. The funds 
are also set up and structured in accordance with the Chinese Company Law and other laws, 
operating in a market -based manner.  
 
Page  77, paragraph  3.124:  
It is noted that "government guidance funds ", or government -guided investment funds, use public 
resources to make equity investments in industries that the Government considers important, with 
specific examples set out in Table 3.15 (G overnment guidance funds).  
 
Questions:  
45. Could China provide greater clarity on the scope of its "government guidance funds ", particularly 
those that cover the transportation sector?   
 
Reply:  The funds set up by the Chinese government in accordance with mar ket-based principles is 
operated completely according to such market  principles and is a fully independent market entity, 
with its investment management and decision -making completely market -based. The government 
departments do not interfere with or partic ipate in any investment decisions of the funds. The funds 
are also set up and structured in accordance with the Chinese Company Law and other laws, 
operating in a market - based manner.  
 
46. On what basis has China determined that these programs are not subsidies within the meaning 
of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures  and do not need to be notified?   
 
Reply:  The funds set up by the Chinese government in accordance with market -based principles is 
operated completely according to such market principles and is a fully independent market entity, 
with its investment management and decision -making completely market -based. The government 
departments do not interfere with or participate in any investment decisions of the funds. The funds 
are also set up and structured in accordance with the Chinese Company Law and other laws, 
operating in a market -based manner. China also does not provide subsidies to any industry through 
the funds.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 79, paragraph 3.129:  
The report notes that, in the wake of the COVID -19 pandemic, measures taken by regional 
governments included "extending government procurement to support SMEs ".  
 
Question:  
47. Could China please provide additional information on how government procurement was 
extended to support SMEs?  
 
Reply:  In 2011, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT) jointly issued the Inter im Measures on Promoting the Development of Small and 
Medium Enterprises through Government Procurement (Cai Ku No. 181, 2011) to expand the portion 
of government procurement contracts for SMEs through measures such as set -aside policy and 
evaluation prefe rences., etc. Since the implementation of the measures, more and more SMEs have 
actively participated in government procurement activities, and now the amount of government 
procurement awarded to SMEs accounts for more than 70% of the total amount of gover nment 
procurement. In December 2020, the Ministry of Finance, together with the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, studied and revised the Interim Measures on Promoting the Development 
of Small and Medium Enterprises through Government Procur ement, and issued the new Measures 
on Promoting the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises through Government Procurement 
(Cai Ku No. 46, 2020). With the revised Measures, relevant policies and measures have been 
improved.  
 
Page  79, paragraph  3.133:  
It is noted that the revised Standardization Law established a disclosure system for the self -
declaration of enterprise standards.  
 
Question:  
48. Could China provide details on how this disclosure system functions and how many times it has 
been used to self -declare enterprise standards?  
 
Reply:  The newly revised Standardization Law clearly puts forward that the state should implement 
the system of self-declaration and supervision of enterprise standards. Enterprises can log in to the 
public service platform of enterprise standard information anytime and anywhere, and disclose the 
implemented standards. As of October 2021, more than 340,000 enterpris es have published more 
than 2.04 million standards on the enterprise standard information public service platform, covering 
more than 3.46 million products.  
 
Page 81, Paragraph 3.144:  
The report notes that "among the national standards that correspond to t he relevant international 
standards, 92.4% of mandatory standards and 91.4% of voluntary standards were adoptions or 
adaptations of international standards. " Canada is aware that China is leading a number of ISO 
Technical Committees related to minerals and  metals.  
 
Question:   
49. Could China provide details on which ISO minerals/metals standards they have not adopted, and 
why?  
 
Reply:  China has always valued the adoption of international standards, and the field of 
minerals/metals is one of the key areas for C hina to adopt international standards, and now the 
international standards that have been transformed and are being transformed have reached 70% 
of the total number of ISO mineral/metal standards. It has been found that a small number of ISO 
standards are not suitable for application in China due to their inconsistency with China 's domestic 
geographical conditions and environmental factors, unsuitable test environment, lack of 
corresponding products, and non -conforming technical conditions., etc.  
 
Page 83, Part III, Trade Policies and Practices by Measure; Labelling and packaging; 
paragraph 3.154:  
The report notes that the labels and instructions must comply with the provisions of the Food Safety 
Laws and other relevant laws.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question:  
50. Could China please provide a list as well as internet links for the 'other relevant laws ' and 
administrative regulations that impact labels and instructions of imported pre -packaged food or 
food additives?  
 
Reply:  For Measures for Supervision and Administr ation of Food Labelling, there are still some issues 
being studied, communicated, and coordinated, and the legislative procedure will be accelerated 
after an agreement  is reached.  
 
Page 83, Part III, Trade Policies and Practices by Measure; Labelling and p ackaging; 
paragraph 3.157:  
The report states , "The draft Measures for Supervision and Administration of Food Labelling, 
published by the SAMR in November 2019, have not yet been adopted by the legislature. " 
 
Questions:   
51. Could China provide a timeline for when the new Measures for Supervision and Administration 
of Food Labelling will be adopted?  
52. Will China notify the WTO of the adoption of the Measures for Supervision and Administration of 
Food Labelling and if so, when?  
53. As well, could China provide a list of all laws and administrative regulations that will change 
upon adoption of the Measures for Supervision and Administration of Food Labelling and specify 
how these laws and regulations will change?   
 
Reply:  For Measure s for Supervision and Administration of Food Labelling, there are still some issues 
being studied, communicated, and coordinated, and the legislative procedure will be accelerated 
after an agreement  is reached.  
 
Page 84, Part III, paragraph 3.159:  
The rep ort states, "As set out in the Food Safety Law, local food safety standards may be developed 
and published by the health administrative departments of provinces, autonomous regions, or 
municipalities directly under the Central Government for local specialt ies without national food safety 
standards.  These must be reported to the heath administrative department of the State Council for 
recordation and must be immediately repealed after the relevant national food safety standards are 
issued. " 
 
Question:  
54.  Could China explain how they will ensure that the development of local food safety standards 
in the absence of national food safety standards will not create confusion and misinterpretation.  
 
Reply:  The Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China stipula tes that imported food, food 
additives, and food -related products should comply with China 's national food safety standards. The 
national food safety standards basically cover food trade categories in China.The Food Safety Law 
of the People 's Republic of China provides for local food safety standards. The provincial health 
administrative departments can develop and release local food safety standards only for "local 
specialties " in China and for those without national food safety standards.  
 
55. Could China explain how Importers would be aware that a local or national food safety standard 
has entered into force.  
 
Reply:  National food safety standards issued by the State Council 's health administrative 
departments and local food safety standards re leased by provincial health administrative 
departments have been marked respectively with their release date and implementation date.  
 
56. Request Could China confirm that imported products will be required to meet the local food 
safety standards in the absenc e of a national food safety standard. If the local food safety 
standards will apply to imported products, could China explain how trading partners will be made 
aware of these import requirements.  
 
Page 85, paragraph 3.161:  
The report notes that under Chin a's Food Safety Law and implementing regulations – which contain 
provisions on traceability of food and agricultural products sold in China – food producers should 
hold primary accountability for food safety.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Question:  
57. Could China provide a definition of a food producer, as there are many people responsible for 
food safety along the agricultural production chain. In addition, could China provide clarification 
of which aspects of food safety accountability are distributed across the production chain with 
respect to food and agricultural products sold in China?   
 
Reply: Item (I) of Article 2, Paragraph I, of the Food Safety Law stipulates that those engaging in 
food production and processing (hereinafter referred to as food production), and food sales and 
catering services (hereinafter referred to as food business operation)  within the People 's Republic of 
China shall abide by this Law . Therefore, food producers refer to units and individuals engaged in 
food production and processing, food sales and caterin g services. In addition, according to Article 2, 
Paragraph II, of the Food Safety Law, this Law shall also be applicable to the marketing of edible 
agricultural products. The Food Safety Law and the Regulation on the Implementation of the Food 
Safety Law s tipulate in detail the main responsibility of food safety that food producers shall perform.  
 
Page 85, Part III, paragraph 3.162:  
Canada recalls that China 's 13th Five -Year Food Safety Plan (2016 -20) set out the priority goals and 
associated tasks to impro ve food safety governance and the development of the food industry.  
 
Question:  
58. Has China developed a new five year food safety plan to cover the years of 2021 -26? Does China 
have any planned upcoming sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory initiatives not referenced in 
the TPR reports that will impact Canadian exports of agriculture, f orestry, or aquatic products?   
 
Reply : The State Administration f or Market Regulat ion is formulating the Modernization Plan of 
Market Regulat ion during the 14th Five -Year Plan, which includes work on food safety. In addition, 
in May 2019, the Opinions of t he CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Deepening Reform 
and Strengthening Food Safety (hereinafter referred to as the Opinions) was issued . The Opinions 
analyz ed the situation of food safety, clarified the guiding ideology, basic principles and overall 
objectives of food safety work, focused  on establishing the strictest standards, implementing the 
strictest supervision  and accountability, imposing the strictest punishment, ensuring due 
responsibilities of producers and operators, promoting the high -quality development of the food 
industry, improving the ability of food safety risk management, promoting the social co -governance 
of food safety, and strengthening organizational leadersh ip, etc. The Opinions put forward a series 
of policy measures and deepening reform requirements  based on the reality, and aiming at treating 
both the symptoms and root causes. Centering on people 's concern, the Opinions arranged and 
carried out the crucial  actions of food safety assurance project construction, and concentrated on 
solving the outstanding problems in the current food safety field. The Opinions put forward the short -
term goals in 2020 and the medium -and long -term goals in 2035, aiming at treat ing both the 
symptoms and root causes , with the latter as the core . By 2020, a food safety supervision system 
based on risk analysis and supply chain management will be initially established, and the overall 
level of food safety will basically adapt to the  goal of building a well -off society in an all -round way. 
By 2035, the national governance system and governance capacity in the field of food safety will be 
basically modernized.  
 
Page 86, Part III, paragraph 3.165:  
The report notes that China submitted 1 65 notification to the SPS Committee during the review 
period. Canada submitted a number of comment letters on China 's SPS notifications during the 
review period. However to date, Canada has only received a response to one letter.  
 
Question:  
59. Could China p lease explain how it implements the SPS Committee Recommended Procedures for 
Implementing the Transparency Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7) (G/SPS/7/Rev.4)?  
 
Reply:  China 's sanitary and phytosanitary legislation fully fulfilled the transparency obligations 
of WTO and conformed to the provisions and requirements of WTO SPS Agreement. In the legislative 
process, the domestic compliance assessment was carried out in the draft stage, and WTO members 
were notified to make comments, giving other members sufficient period for transition and comment. 
After that, the comments from members will be taken into full consideration and appropriate 
modifications and adjustments will be made to relevant measures. In a word, China fully  considered 
the principles and provisions of SPS Agreement in the legislative process, and China 's SPS -related WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  measures fully met the relevant requirements of WTO SPS Agreement from substantive content to 
legislative procedures.  
 
60. Canada requests that China  provides a response to Canada 's comment letters on notifications  
• G/SPS/N/CHN/1149;  
• G/SPS/N/CHN/1150;  
• G/SPS/N/CHN/1164;  
• G/SPS/N/CHN/1173;  
• G/SPS/N/CHN/1192  
 
Reply:  G/SPS/N/CHN/1150 is the external notification of China 's National Food Safety Standard 
Maximum Levels of Contaminants in Foods (GB2762). Canada 's comments have been well received 
and will be studied with other domestic and foreign comments.  
 
61. Canada would appreciate if China could provide a timeline within which it will respond to 
Canada 's com ments. Canada looks forward to receiving responses from China.  
 
Reply:  China 's relevant measures are in line with the SPS agreement. After receiving comments 
from members, China will take it seriously for consideration and revise/adjust relevant measures 
where appropriate.  
 
Page 86, Part III, paragraph 3.167:  
We note that the Secretariat Report indicates  that "In 2020, the GACC  issued the Announcement on 
Adjusting the Supervision Requirements for Certain Imports and Exports. This is aimed at optimizing 
the port business environment and reducing the burden on enterprises through removing certain 
SPS-related reporting, registratio n, certification, inspection, and other regulatory requirements. " 
 
Question:  
62. What specific measures are being affected through this announcement, and when will those 
changes take effect?  
 
Reply: In 2020, the Announcement on Adjusting the Supervision Requi rements for Certain Imports 
and Exports issued by GACC cancelled the supervision requirement of submitting the detection 
records of toxic and harmful substances in fruits to the local customs when registering outbound 
fruit orchards and packaging factories . This measure can reduce the entrusted testing time and 
shorten the time limit for registration. The announcement took effect on 28 August 2020.  
 
Page 86 -87, Part III, paragraph 3.168:  
The report notes that "In order to prevent the reintroduction of the COVID -19 virus through imported 
cold-chain food and to protect the health and safety of consumers, the GACC implemented 
emergency preventive measures for foreign manufacturers of imported cold -chain foods with 
positive novel coronavir us nucleic acid results. " 
Canada recalls that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) guidance document entitled "COVID -19: Guidance for preventing 
transmission of COVID -19 within food busin esses ",updated in August 2021, reaffirmed that neither 
food nor food packaging is a pathway for the spread of viruses causing respiratory illnesses, 
including  SARS -CoV-2., There is also no recommendation of environmental sampling and testing for 
COVID -19 in food processing facilities or on food.   
Since June 2020, China has implemented measures, that have resulted in a number of trading 
partners ' meat establishments suspended from exporting to China, including Canada. Canada is 
concerned that China 's COVID -19 measures are creating unnecessary trade disruptions. Canada is 
also concerned with the lack of clarity and predictability with China 's reinstatement process for 
establishments suspended due to China 's COVID -19 related SPS measures.  
 
Questions:  
63. The updated FAO/WHO guidance reconfirms that food and food packaging does not present a 
risk of transmission of COVID -19. How is China taking this updated guidance into account for 
their COVID -19 related SPS measures?  
 
Reply:  In order to effectively prevent Novel Coronavirus from being introduced through imported 
cold chain food, according to the joint prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, the 
State Administration for Market Regulation has raised requirements for the producers and operators WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 295 - 
 
  of imported cold chain food that they shall not process, produce or sell imported cold chain food 
without inspection and quarantine certificate, nucleic acid test certificate, disinfection certificate and 
traceability inform ation. For the same batch of products tested positive in nucleic acid test, measures 
such as taking them off the shelves and stopping selling, and sealing up in special areas shall be 
implemented. The above measures comply with Article 42, Paragraph 1, Art icle 44 and Article 55 of 
the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases, 
Article  42, Paragraph 1 and Article 92, Paragraph 2 of the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic 
of China and other relevant laws and  regulations, and are administrative acts according to law. The 
State Administration for Market Regulation will always strictly follow the deployment of the joint 
prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, and implement the relevant work 
requir ements for pandemic prevention and control from the cold chain food.  
 
64. Will China remove their COVID -19 related SPS measures based on the updated FAO/WHO 
guidance, and what are the timelines for the removal of these measures?  
 
Reply:  In order to effectively  prevent Novel Coronavirus from being introduced through imported 
cold chain food, according to the joint prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, the 
State Administration for Market Regulation has raised requirements for the producers and op erators 
of imported cold chain food that they shall not process, produce or sell imported cold chain food 
without inspection and quarantine certificate, nucleic acid test certificate, disinfection certificate and 
traceability information. For the same batc h of products tested positive in nucleic acid test, measures 
such as taking them off the shelves and stopping selling, and sealing up in special areas shall be 
implemented. The above measures comply with Article 42, Paragraph 1, Article 44 and Article 55 o f 
the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Diseases, 
Article  42, Paragraph 1 and Article 92, Paragraph 2 of the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic 
of China and other relevant laws and regulations, and are ad ministrative acts according to law. The 
State Administration for Market Regulation will always strictly follow the deployment of the joint 
prevention and control mechanism of the State Council, and implement the relevant work 
requirements for pandemic prev ention and control from the cold chain food.  
 
65. Canada once again requests that China share with WTO Members any scientific evidence they 
have that suggests there is a risk of transmission of COVID -19 through food, food packaging or 
food handling.  
 
Reply:  China has adopted necessary temporary preventive measures to strengthen supervision over 
imported cold chain food to protect people 's live and health. Relevant practices fully comply with 
international rules and have not had a negative impact on food trade exported to China. China has 
conducted sample nucleic acid test on the imported cold chain food and its packaging according to 
law, aiming at preventing COVID -19 from transmitting through cold chain food. In the early stage, 
General Aministration of Custom s detected positive nucleic acid on Novel Coronavirus in food 
products, inner and outer packaging and container inner wall samples imported from some countries. 
On 17 October 2020, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention announced that live virus es 
of COVID -19 were separated from the outer packaging of imported aquatic products, further 
confirming that contact with the outer packaging contaminated by live viruses of COVID -19 can 
cause infection. China welcomes the export of high -quality and safe f ood to China, and our attitude 
of opening wider to the outside world and expanding imports is consistent and clear. However, with 
the development of the global epidemic, consumers ' concerns the safety of the food supply chain 
have deepened. We believe that  consumer confidence is the cornerstone of market, and there is no 
trade without market. Under the current epidemic situation, overseas countries (regions) hoping to 
export food to China are required to take various preventive management measures to ensure  that 
food exported to China is not contaminated by COVID -19 according to the relevant guidelines issued 
by United  Nations  Food and Agriculture  Organization  (FAO). China is willing to work with relevant 
parties to ensure the safety of food supply chain, respond and dispel consumers ' concern, ensure 
the safe supply of food and maintain market stability, so as to promote the healthy development of 
trade.  
 
It is paramount that Members base any SPS measures taken to control COVID -19 on sound scientific  
principles and an assessment of risks, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by 
the relevant international organizations, and that these SPS measures are not sustained without 
sufficient scientific evidence. Canada reiterates its reques t that China provide the scientific 
justification for their COVID -19 related SPS measures and the scientific justification for maintaining 
COVID -19 related measures despite the updated guidance from FAO/WHO.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Question:  
66. Canada requests that China provide a summary of its assessment of risks, taking into account 
the risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations, that 
serves as the basis for their COVID -19 related SPS measures.  
67. How was China 's assessment of risk updated to take into account the scientific evidence outlined 
in the August 2, 2021 guidance from the FAO/WHO?  
68. How is China considering the SPS measures put in place by the exporting countries to prevent 
the contamination of COVID -19 on exports?  
69. How was t his information taken into account during the development of China 's COVID -19 
related SPS measures?  
70. Canada requests details from China on any reviews conducted on the national controls put in 
place to control COVID -19 domestically. As well, could China pl ease explain the alignment 
between its domestic COVID -19 controls and controls on imports to prevent any discrimination 
between domestic products and imports?  
 
Reply  for 66-70: The effectiveness of COVID -19 epidemic prevention and control in China has 
attracted worldwide attention, which not only effectively safeguarded the lives and health of Chinese 
people, but also provided Chinese experience for the world. "Prevention on both people and stuff " is 
one of the important experiences. China has carried out systematic and continuous monitoring and 
evaluation on the risk of cold chain food contaminated by COVID -19 and virus transmission. Through 
comprehensive analysis of monitoring data of tens of millions of foods and their packaging, combined 
with the tracea bility evidence of several epidemiological investigations in COVID -19 pandemic, it is 
judged that cold chain food and its packaging may become the carrier of COVID -19 transmission 
because they are contacted by infected cases of COVID -19 during production a nd processing, and 
low temperature is good for the survival of COVID -19; In the absence of effective protection, 
frequent close contact with the outer packaging or means of transport contaminated by live virus of 
COVID -19 may lead to human infection. Accor dingly, China has formulated a series of technical 
guidelines for COVID -19 epidemic prevention and control for cold chain foods, put forward 
operational guidelines for the protection requirements of related production, transportation and 
consumption proces ses involved in cold chain food, and make adjustment according to the 
development of epidemic situation, so as to maximize the scientificity and accuracy of "prevention 
on stuff " work and effectively maintain and consolidate the effectiveness of epidemic p revention and 
control work in China. The epidemic -related measures taken by China have scientific basis, and 
relevant risk assessment has been carried out, which is in line with the relevant provisions of the 
WTO SPS Agreement and the relevant requirements  of WHO/FAO. Facts have proved that the 
measures taken by C hina have achieved good results, and China looks forward to working with other 
WTO members to win the fight against the epidemic.  
 
71. Canada requests that China provide additional information and cla rity on its reinstatement 
process for foreign establishments suspended due to China 's COVID -19 related SPS measures. 
In particular, Canada requests the following information:  
a. What are China 's expected timelines to reinstate suspended establishments that are 
eligible to resume exports to China?  
b. Could China please provide clarity on the process it is undertaking to reinstate foreign 
establishments suspended due to China 's COVID -19 related SPS measures in a timely 
fashion? Furthermore, ho w does China plan to carry out this activity while ensuring there 
is no undue delay?  
 
Reply:  China has adopted necessary temporary preventive measures to strengthen supervision over 
imported cold chain food to protect people 's live and health. Relevant pra ctices fully comply with 
international rules and have not had a negative impact on food trade exported to China. China has 
conducted sample nucleic acid test on the imported cold chain food and its packaging according to 
law, aiming at preventing COVID -19 from transmitting through cold chain food. In the early stage, 
General Aministration of Customs detected positive nucleic acid on Novel Coronavirus in food 
products, inner and outer packaging and container inner wall samples imported from some countries. 
On 17 October 2020, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention announced that live viruses 
of COVID -19 were separated from the outer packaging of imported aquatic products, further 
confirming that contact with the outer packaging contaminated by live  viruses of COVID -19 can 
cause infection. China welcomes the export of high -quality and safe food to China, and our attitude 
of opening wider to the outside world and expanding imports is consistent and clear. However, with 
the development of the global ep idemic, consumers ' concerns the safety of the food supply chain WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 297 - 
 
  have deepened. We believe that consumer confidence is the cornerstone of market, and there is no 
trade without market. Under the current epidemic situation, overseas countries (regions) hoping to 
export food to China are required to take various preventive  management measures to ensure that 
food exported to China is not contaminated by COVID -19 according to the relevant guidelines issued 
by United  Nations  Food and Agriculture  Organization  (FAO). China is willing to work with relevant 
parties to ensure the safety of food supply chain, respond and dispel consumer s' concern, ensure 
the safe supply of food and maintain market stability, so as to promote the healthy development of 
trade.  
 
Page 87, Part III, paragraph 3.169:  
The report notes that "eight new STCs were raised in the SPS Committee, regarding…(ii) 
admini strative measures for registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food;…and (viii) 
delays in approving requests for new listings or reinstatements of export establishments. "  
With regards to the STC on administrative measures for registration of ove rseas manufacturers of 
imported food, Canada and other Members continue to raise concerns that China 's new regulations 
(Decree 248 and Decree 249) will negatively impact international trade. Questions still remain 
regarding the implementation of these Decrees. Responses provided by China do not provide 
sufficient clarity for Canada to understand how to comply with the measures. Therefore, Canada 
continues to request that China delay implementation of the new Decrees for 18 months to provide 
a reasonable  timeframe for trading partners to adjust and avoid unnecessary trade disruptions.  
With regards to the STC on delays in approving requests for new listings or reinstatements of export 
establishments, Canada and other Members continue to experience signific ant undue delays in 
China 's approval procedures for food products and establishments seeking to export to China. 
Canada continues to wait for China to update lists of approved Canadian products and facilities 
eligible to export to China. As well, there are  also a number of Canadian establishments that are still 
waiting for approval from China to be added to the list of establishments eligible to export. The 
excessive delays, lack of transparency, and the failure to provide a rationale of approval procedures  
for foreign export establishments results in significant uncertainty and disruption for Canadian 
exports.  
 
Questions:  
72.  Canada once again requests that China provide a clear explanation of the timelines for the 
publication of all the implementation guide lines or supporting documents for Decrees 248 and 
249. Canada notes the importance of these documents for trading partners to ensure that they 
will meet the requirements under the Decrees.  
73. Canada urges China to delay the implementation of Decrees 248 and 249 for 18 months to allow 
both governments and industry to fully understand and comply with the new requirements 
contained in the Decrees. Will China delay the implementation date of Decree 248 and 
Decree  249 to provide trading partners with sufficient ti me to adjust to the new requirements 
and prevent unnecessary trade disruptions?  
74. Canada recalls that a number of Canadian products, establishments, and facilities are waiting 
for China to update their lists to be eligible for exports. Canada requests that C hina provide clear 
timelines for the acceptance of all Canadian food and food products, establishments and facilities 
awaiting approval and/or registration by China. As well, Canada requests that China provide a 
timeline for the publication of these lists without undue delay.  
75. Canada recalls that a number of Canadian products, establishments, and facilities are waiting 
for China to update their lists to be eligible for exports. Canada requests that China provide the 
reason why Canadian products or establishm ents have not been approved.  
76. Canada recalls that a number of Canadian products, establishments, and facilities are waiting 
for China to update their lists to be eligible for exports. Canada requests that China provide a 
clear explanation of the undue delay s of these approval procedures.   
 
72-76 Reply:  The safety of imported food has a bearing on people 's health and life safety, and is a 
major livelihood issue. According to the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China and its 
implemention regulation s as well as other laws and administrative regulations, China revised the 
original two regulations on the safety management of import and export food and the registration 
management of overseas production enterprises of imported food and released Measures of the 
People 's Republic of China for the Administration of Safety of Imported and Exported Food 
(Order  No. 249 of the General Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China ) and 
Provisions of the People 's Republic of China on the Administration of Registration of Overseas 
Imported Food Production Enterprises (Order No. 248 of the General Administration of Customs of 
the People 's Republic of China) on 12 April 2021, which  were implemented from 1 January 2022. WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 298 - 
 
  Before their release, C hina made a notification according to the relevant rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), accepted the comments of WTO members, and adopted reasonable opinions 
and suggestions, which are in line with the relevant rules of WTO. Article 2 of Decrees No . 248 and 
No. 249 of the General Administration of Customs has defined the scope of application of the two 
regulations. In the near future, China will interpret Measures of the People 's Republic of China for 
the Administration of Safety of Imported and Exp orted Food ( Order No. 249 of the General 
Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China ) and Provisions of the People 's Republic 
of China on the Administration of Registration of Overseas Imported Food Production Enterprises 
(Order No. 248 of the General Administration of Customs of the People 's Republic of China) in a 
proper way, please stay tuned. Order No.248 of the General Administration of Customs will not affect 
the implementation of bilateral protocols. If there is another agreement betw een the relevant 
countries (regions) and China on the registration method and application materials, the agreement 
between both parties shall prevail.  
 
Page 87, paragraph 3.169  
Canada notes that eight new specific trade concerns (STC) were raised against China in the 
SPS Committee during the review period, including one related to the delays in approving requests 
for new listings or reinstatements of export establishments.  
 
Question:  
77. Can China please describe the actions its taken to address this STC to d ate?  
 
Reply:  China implements the system of market access and enterprise registration for meat and 
aquatic products in strict accordance with domestic laws and regulations. Only products from 
enterprises that meet the requirements after evaluation and examination can be exported to China. 
There have been cases of fake certificates in Canada, and some issues have been found in Canadian 
meat products imported to China, and in January of this year, the COVID -19 nucleic acid was 
detected positive in Canada 's import aquatic  products. China hopes that Canada will strengthen the 
supervision of its export institutions and enterprises in accordance with the relevant requirements 
of the bilateral agreement, SPS agreement and WHO/FAO, ensure the safety of products exported 
to Chin a, and take practical actions to increase the confidence of Chinese consumers in related 
Canadian products. China conducts an orderly risk assessment of the agricultural and food product 
quarantine access applications submitted by various members and revie ws the enterprises so as to 
ensure that relevant products meet China 's requirements for quarantine of imported animals and 
plants, prevent the introduction of the epidemic, and ensure the facilitation and sustainability of 
agricultural and food products tr ade while risks are under control.  
 
Page 88, Part III, paragraph 3.171:  
The report notes that "Reportedly in 2018, MARA amended the regulations on safety assessment, 
import approval, and labelling of agricultural GMOs; apparently these regulations provide for 
additional in -country trials and studies on new biotech events as part of the dossier submission 
process. "  
 
Questions:  
78. Based on the Secretariat Report, Canada could not discern the relevant WTO notification 
associated with these a mendments that are to be submitted to the WTO SPS Committee to allow 
trading partners the opportunity to comment and have their comments taken into account.  
79. Could China please confirm the WTO notification associated with these amendments and provide 
the we b link to the final regulations?  
80. Could China please provide further details on the amendments brought to its regulations on the 
safety assessment, import approval, and labelling of agricultural GMOs in 2018? What new 
requirements were introduced with the 2018 amendments?  
81. Canada respectfully requests that China elaborate on how the amendments regarding additional 
in-country trials and studies impact the timelines for China 's approvals of GMO events.   
 
78-81 Reply:  In 2018, the Ministry of Agriculture and R ural Affairs did not revise the relevant laws 
and regulations on the safety management of agricultural genetically modified organisms.  
 
Page 97, Trade Policies and Practices by Measure; 3.3.5 State trading, state -owned 
enterprises, and privatization; para graphs 3.196/3.197:  
The Secretariat report notes that China has indicated that its full notification on its state -trading 
enterprises would be submitted to the WTO "before mid -July 2021 ". Given that China 's state trading WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 299 - 
 
  enterprises have exclusive rights to import certain key agricultural products, such a notification 
would improve transparency in the operation of these entities.  
 
Question:  
82. Could China provide an update on when it expects to submit a notification to the W orking Party 
on State Trading Enterprises?   
 
Reply: China has submitted the notification on state -owned trade.  
 
Page 99, Part 3: Trade policies and practices by measure; 3.3: Measures affecting 
production and trade; 3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterpr ises, and privatization; 
paragraph 3.206:  
The report acknowledges China 's position that its SOEs operate under market conditions with no 
privileges granted by the Government. However, government -led restructuring of SOEs leads to 
creation of entities of si ze and scope that would not likely occur under normal market conditions.  
 
Question:  
83. Can China explain how it intends to mitigate the market distortions created through these 
actions, including effects on competition with private firms in international markets?   
 
Reply:  After more than 40 years of reform and opening up, China has continuously created a market 
environment in which all kinds of enterprises use resource elements equally according to law, 
participate in competition openly and f airly, and are equally protected by law. State -owned 
enterprises have been integrated with the market economy across the board. China 's state -owned 
enterprises, like private enterprises and foreign -owned enterprises, are independent market entities. 
They e ngage in commercial activities based on commercial considerations and participate in 
competition on an equal footing. Whether in China or other countries, state -owned enterprises shall 
strictly abide by local laws. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China  applies equally to 
all enterprises, and treats foreign -owned enterp rises, foreign enterprises, state -owned enterprises 
and private enterprises equally.  
 
Page 102, paragraph 3.215:  
The report notes that authorities have been promoting the use of public -private partnerships (PPP) 
in investments in infrastructure and public utilities. It further notes that foreign investors are allowed 
to participate in PPP projects and there are alrea dy numerous such cases in practice.  
 
Questions:  
84. Would China have any statistics concerning the value of PPP projects undertaken in infrastructure 
and public utilities?  
85. Could China please provide examples of or further information on foreign investor part icipation 
in PPP projects?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to http://www.cpppc.org/gjjcsszlk.jhtml .  
 
Page 103, paragraph 3.219:  
On the matter of e -procurement, it is noted in the report China planned to fully implement e -
tendering by the end 2020.  
 
Question:  
86. Could China please clarify what, if anything, remains to be implemented with regards its e -
tendering plans?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to "Internet plus Tendering/Procurement " Action Plan (2017 -2019)  
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017 -02/28/content_5171770.htm . 
 
Page 104, paragraph 3.221:  
It is noted in the Report that: "China maintains buy -national policies in government procurement. 
Article 10 of the Government Procurement Law provides that unless the subject matter cannot be 
obtained within the territory of China or cannot be obtained wi th reasonable commercial terms, or 
the procurement is for use outside the territory of China, the procuring entities shall procure 
domestic goods, services, and construction works ". 
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question:  
87. Could China please provide information on how "domestic goods, services, and construction 
works " are defined?  
 
Reply:  At present, there is no definition standard for domestic goods, construction and services, nor 
relevant identification work has been carried out in field of government procurement. The Foreign 
Investm ent Law enacted in January 2020 clearly stipulates that the state ensures that foreign -
invested enterprises participate in government procurement activities through fair competition in 
accordance with the law, and that products and services provided by for eign-invested enterprises in 
China are treated equally in government procurement in accordance with the law.  
 
Page 104, paragraph 3.222 : 
The Report notes that "foreign -invested enterprises can participate in government procurement 
activities through fair competition; products produced and services provided by foreign -invested 
enterprises within the territory of China shall be treated equally in government procurement ".  
 
Question:  
88. Could China please provide examples of or information on the value or s hare of procurements 
activities by foreign -invested enterprises?  
 
Reply:  China has not conducted special statistics on the procurement of foreign -invested 
enterprises.  
 
Page 104, paragraph 3.223:  
The report notes that China issued new Measures on Promotin g the Development of Small and 
Medium Enterprises through Government Procurement (MOF Circular Cai Ku No. 46, 2020) on 
18 December 2020 and that the new Measures provide more details on the SME contract set -aside 
policy.  
 
Questions:  
89. Could China please pro vide information on how SMEs are defined?  
 
Reply: According to the Administrative Measures for Promoting the Development of Small and 
Medium -Sized Enterprises through Government Procurement (Caiku [2020] No.  46), stricter 
conditions have been attached on small and medium -sized enterprises enjoying govern ment 
procurement policies on the basis of meeting Provisions on Criteria for Classifying Small and Medium -
sized Enterprises (No  .300 [2011] of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology). The term 
"small and medium -sized enterprises " as mentioned here refers to medium -sized enterprises, small 
enterprises and micro -enterprises established within the territory of the People 's Republic of China 
according to law and determined according to the Provisions on Criteria for Classifying Small and 
Medium -sized Enterprises, except those who are the same person in charge of large enterprises or 
have direct holding and management relations with large enterprises. Individual industrial and 
commercial households that meet the criteria of small and medium -sized ent erprises shall be 
regarded as small and medium -sized enterprises in government procurement activities.  
 
90. Could China please clarify whether foreign and/or foreign -invested SMEs are eligible for the SME 
contract set -asides?  
 
Reply:  China has not joined the GPA, nor has it signed agreements with other countries or regions 
to open its government procurement market to foreign suppliers. The Foreign Investment Law 
enacted in January 2020 clearly stipulates that the state ensures that foreign -invested enterprises  
participate in government procurement activities through fair competition in accordance with the 
law, and that products and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises in China are treated 
equally in government procurement in accordance with the law . Foreign enterprises can participate 
in Chinese government procurement activities on an equal footing according to law through 
enterprises registered in China.  
 
Page 105, paragraph 3.227:  
The report notes that to address the COVID -19 pandemic, China esta blished "green channels " for 
government procurement in relation to the prevention and control of the pandemic.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 301 - 
 
  Question:  
91. Could China provide specific example of "green channels " established?  
 
Reply:  To address the COVID -19 pandemic, the Ministry of Finance issued the Notice on Facilitating 
Procurement for Pandemic Prevention and Control, establishing the "green channels " for government 
procurement in relation to the prevention and control of the pand emic. State institutions, public 
institutions, and social organizations at all levels that apply government budgetary funds to procure 
commodities, engineering projects, and services for pandemic prevention and control are allowed to 
be free from the metho ds and procedures stipulated in the Government Procurement Law and 
procure imported supplies without government approval.  
 
Page 106, paragraph 3.229:  
The report notes that progress has been made since the last TPR towards China 's accession to 
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), including its 6th revised market access 
offer in October 2019.  
 
Question:  
92. Is it China 's intention to continue accelerating the negotiation process to accede to the GPA?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government is committed to joining the GPA as soon as possible. China 's 7th bid 
for GPA accession submitted to the WTO in October 2019 has been roughly comparable to the level 
of the participating parties. In May 2020, China submitted to the WTO the Country Report on 
Government Procurement in China (Update in 2020), which comprehensively reflected the reform of 
China 's legal system on government procureme nt. While advancing the negotiation on bid, the 
negotiation on legal adjustment should be promoted simultaneously. In June 2021, China submitted 
to the WTO its response to the 7th bid from the EU and Australia for China 's accession to the GPA 
and the list of issues in China 's National Report on Government Procurement (Update in 2020), 
which demonstrated with concrete actions China 's sincerity in joining the GPA and its determination 
to uphold the multilateral trading system. It is not enough to rely on China 's unilateral efforts to join 
the GPA, it actually depends to a large extent on the positions and expectations of the participants. 
China always believes that the sooner China joins, the sooner all parties will benefit. It is hoped that 
The GPA participant s will offer price to China in a pragmatic way based on the current situation and 
long-term perspective, so as to reach mutually beneficial and win -win negotiation results on China 's 
accession to the GPA at an early date.  
 
Page 106, paragraph 3.3.6.7 – Accession to the GPA and other international cooperation:  
Canada notes China 's stated priority to conclude its GPA accession before liberalizing its government 
procurement market through bilateral/regional tracks.  
 
Question:  
93. Given that China asp ires to modernize its existing FTAs and has expressed interest in acceding 
to other FTAs that have high standard rules and ambitious market access commitments, when 
does China intend to conclude its GPA accession process?  
 
Reply:  please refer to the reply  to question 92.  
 
Page  107, paragraph 3.236:  
It is noted that one of the 100 measures under The Plan for Further Implementation of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy is to "ensure that decisions to grant awards or to promote or appoint 
staff in un iversities are not solely  [emphasis added] based on patent filings and grant rates ". 
 
Question:  
94. Can China confirm whether patent filings and grant rates will continue to be one of the factors 
considered for decisions on grant awards, and university staff appointments and promotions?  
 
Reply:  China will earnestly implement the Plan for Further Impleme ntation of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy to speed up the construction of intellectual property rights power 
propulsion plan goal for the construction of the intellectual property system in colleges and 
universities, and in policies of title p romotion, performance appraisal, post appointment, project 
concluding, talents evaluation and scholarship judgment. It will resolutely put an end to simply take 
the amount of patent applications and authorizations as the assessment content, while increase the 
weight of the performance of patent conversion in the evaluation.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Page  109, paragraph 3.250:  
It is noted that: "amendments to the Trademark Law entered into force in November 2019. The 
objectives of these amendments are to curb bad -faith applications …" 
 
Questions:  
95. Can China provide any information or data concerning the effectiveness of these amendments 
with respect to reducing bad -faith trademark applications and registrations, such as concerning 
applications rejected or registrations invalidated on the basis of bad faith behaviour?   
 
Reply: China National Intellectual Property Administration strictly implements Article IV of the 
Trademark Law, which stipulates that a bad faith application for trademark registration for a purpose 
other than use shall be rejected. Ealier move has been made in cracking down against trademark 
hoarding, and the proliferation of malicious trademark registration has been curbed to a certain 
extent, which has reduced the time cost and economic cost of enterprises ' rights protection through 
follow -up procedures, enhan ced the confidence of enterprises in protecting intellectual property 
rights, and formed a powerful deterrent to potential malicious registration behaviors. The 
governance of trademark registration order from the source has achieved initial results.  
 
96. Are there any specific criteria that a foreign company must meet to establish the legal standing 
needed to bring forward a case under the trade secrets provisions of the amended Anti -Unfair 
Competition Law?   
 
Reply:  Chinese courts equally protect IPR of rig ht holders from all countries according to law and 
focus on strengthening the judicial protection of trade secrets of Chinese and foreign right holders. 
The Civil Procedure Law of the People 's Republic of China and other relevant laws and regulations 
provide the conditions for filing lawsuits.  
 
Page  111, paragraph 3.263:  
It is noted that: "The CNIPA  also amended the Patent Examination Guidelines in order to clarify the 
examination standard in patent applications involving artificial intelligence and other new industries. 
The amendment entered into force in February 2020. " 
 
Questions:  
97. Can China pr ovide further information on how examinations standards were clarified for patent 
applications involving artificial intelligence technologies?  
98. Can China elaborate on the policy rationale behind these changes, and how they were 
developed?  
99. Do these a mended examination standards also cover patent applications in which the 
invention process was assisted by or conducted by artificial intelligence technologies?   
 
97-99 Reply: Section 6 is added in Chapter 9, Part II of Guidelines for Patent Examination, w hich 
came into effect on 1 February 2020. The general principles of examination were established in 
Section 6.1 "Examination Benchmarks ". First, the principle of overall consideration of claims; 
Second, to clarify whether the claims belong to the rules and  methods of intellectual activities; Third, 
to clarify whether the claims belong to the review standards of technical schemes; Fourth, to further 
clarify the principle of relevance consideration in creative judgment. At the same time, Guidelines 
for Patent  Examination explains and illustrates the concept of "mutual support and interaction in 
function ". 
 
Page 114, Paragraph 3.280:  
The Secretariat report mentions the role of the National Forestry and Grassland Administration 
(NFGA ) regarding the protection of plant varieties.  
 
Questions:  
100. Could China provide an update on NFGA 's planned revision of the Implementation Regulation 
of the Forestry Law?  
 
Reply:  The revised Forestry Law came into effect on 1 July 2020. The correspon ding Implementation 
Regulations of the Forestry Law is still under revision.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 303 - 
 
  101. If there are international trade implications to the updated provisions, could China confirm 
that it plans to notify the measures for comment, pursuant to the WTO TBT Agreem ent?  
 
Reply:  The Implementation Regulations of the Forestry Law is still under revision.  
 
Page  115, paragraph 3.283:  
It is noted that: "The authorities started reviewing the Regulations on the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants in 2019. The Supreme People 's Court plans to issue a judicial interpretation on the 
Provisions on Application of Law in the Trial of Disputes over New Plant Variety Rights in 2021. " 
 
Question:  
102. Can China confirm whether these measures are being undertaken with a vi ew to acceding to 
the UPOV 1991 treaty?  
 
Reply:  The judicial interpretation of new plant varieties issued by the Supreme People 's Court this 
year is made in accordance with the existing laws of China, and some of its provisions are made 
with reference to r elevant contents of the International Convention for the UPOV 1991 treaty.  
 
Page  115, paragraphs 3.285/3.286:  
It is noted that: "The Anti -Unfair Competition Law, as amended in 2019, contains revised provisions 
on trade secrets. Article 9 defines "trade sec rets" as "technical information, business operation 
information, and other commercial information that are not known to the public, have commercial 
value, and for which the trade secret owner has adopted corresponding measures to maintain its 
confidentiali ty … [and] The amendment adds new types of trade secret infringements, particularly 
the acquisition of trade secrets through "cyber invasion… [and] … expands the scope of persons who 
are subject to the provisions of trade secret infringement to include all  individual and legal persons… " 
 
Questions:  
103. Can China confirm whether the definition of "trade secret owner " under the amended Anti -
Unfair Competition Law, and the corresponding availability of remedies under the Law, can include 
foreign companies, including those without a formal market presence in China, if they are subject 
to the acquisition of trade secrets through "cyber invasion " by any "individual or legal persons " in 
China?  
 
Reply:  Equal protection according to law is the basic guideline for the judicial protection of IPR in 
China. Foreign companies can protect trade secrets in China through judicial proc edures in 
accordance with the provisions of the Law of the People 's Republic of China Against Unfair 
Competition on the protection of trade secrets and relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Law of 
the People 's Republic of China and the Law of the Peop le's Republic of China on the Legal Application 
Regarding Foreign -related Civil Relations.  
 
104. Are there any specific criteria that a foreign company must meet to establish legal standing 
needed to bring forward a case under the trade secrets provisions of the amended Anti -Unfair 
Competition Law?   
 
Reply: Please refer to the reply to question 96.  
 
Page 116, Part 3: Trade policies and practices by measure; 3.3.7 Intellectual property 
rights; 3.3.7.5.8 Undisclosed information and trade secrets; paragraph 3.288:  
 
Question:  
105. How does China decide what is the scope of necessary information to be disclosed when 
applying for licenses from the government?  
 
Reply:  According to the Law on Administrative Licenses, the implementation and results of an 
administrative license shall be made public, except for those involving state secrets, trade secrets 
or personal privacy. Without the consent of the applicant, the administrative organ and its staff and 
the personnel participating in the expert evaluation shall not disclose the business secrets, 
undisclosed information or confidential business information submitted by the applicant, unless 
otherwise stipulated by law or involving national security or major social and public interests; Where 
the administrati ve organ discloses the aforesaid information of the applicant according to law, the 
applicant is allowed to raise objections within a reasonable time limit.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Page 116, paragraph 3.290:  
The report indicates that "in China, IP holders have the possibility of bringing action against the 
infringer either directly in a court or by requesting the competent administrative authority to handle 
the case. An administrative resolution is not necessary prior to the judicial resolution. " 
 
Questions:  
106. Can China explain the difference in procedure between cases dealt with by governmental 
authorities (at the administrative level) and cases dealt with by the courts?  
107. Are there any incentives or other considerations for IP holders to choose to go one part icular 
route when bringing an action for infringement?  
 
106-107 reply: Article 65 of the Patent Law provides that, without the permission of the patentee, 
disputes arising from executing his/her patent, that is, infringement of his/her patent rights, the 
parties shall negotiate to resolve. If the parties are unwilling to negotiate or negotiation fails, the 
patentee or the interested party may take legal action in the people 's court, or may request the 
competent patent management department to solve. If the competent department finds the 
infringement established, it can order the infringer to immediately stop the infringement. The parties 
may appeal against the decision to the people 's court within fifteen days from the date of receiving 
the notice of the  decision in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Law of the 
People 's Republic of China. In the case that the infringer does not take legal action and does not 
stop the infringement, the competent patent management department can apply to the peopl e's 
court for compulsory execution. At the request of the party concerned, the competent patent 
management department may mediate the amount of compensation for infringement of patent 
rights. If mediation fails, the party concerned may take legal action in  the people 's court according 
to the Civil Procedure Law of the People 's Republic of China.  
Actions by the competent patent management department and the people 's court to handle patent 
infringement disputes according to law are different approaches to res olve the dispute. The parties 
may seek corresponding remedies in accordance with the law.  
 
Page 125, Trade Policies by Sector: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries; Internal 
measures; Support measures; paragraph 4.11:  
The Secretariat in its report mentions  China 's 14th Five Year Plan policy objectives, which include 
"implementing the strategy of rural revitalization, strengthening the use of industry to supplement 
agriculture, and promoting the formation of a new type of urban -rural relationship between ind ustry 
and agriculture. The authorities state that steps to implement the goals/reforms contained in the 
above -mentioned plans include promotion of large -scale construction of high -standard farmland, 
demarcation of functional areas of grain production and e ssential production areas for agricultural 
products, strengthened innovation in agricultural science and technology, and promotion of whole -
process mechanized production of major crops. Additionally, support is being given to establishing 
modern agricultur al industrial parks and townships and industry clusters, and developing new 
business models (i.e. leisure agriculture, rural tourism, and rural e -commerce). Other areas of focus 
include encouraging clean agricultural production, developing a three -year act ion plan to protect and 
restore the rural environment, promoting rural culture, and improving transport infrastructure, 
utilities, and public service delivery. " 
 
Questions:  
108. Could China describe the activities associated with "large-scale construction of high -standard 
farmland, and how China plans to define "functional areas of grain production and essential 
production areas "?  
 
Reply: According to the General Rules for Construction of High Standard Farmland, the construction 
of high standard farmland is the construction activities of land leveling, soil improvement, irrigation 
and drainage, field roads, farmland protection and ecological environment maintenance, farmland 
transmission and distribution, and other engineering const ruction to improve farmland production 
conditions, eliminate major limiting factors, and enhance the quality of arable land, and ensure its 
efficient utilization.  
 
109. Could China provide information and budgetary amounts of national and sub -central 
agricultural programs that have been introduced so far under the 14th Five Year Plan?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 305 - 
 
  Reply：At the national level, please refer to China 's Domestic support. At sub -central level, there 's 
no such information.  
 
Page 127, paragraph 4.22; and, page 128, Table 4.9 : 
The Secretariat report mentions that support programmes  covering the period 2017 -18 were notified 
by China under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). The 
only new notified programme introduced in 2018 was the subsidy for a new round of returning 
cultivated land to forests and  grassland. In addition, in Table 4.9 below, the Secretariat notes that 
"Forestry -related subsidies are not included in this table, with the exception of those related to 
turning cultivated land into forest. " 
 
Question:  
110. What other forest sector subsid ies have been introduced by China since its last TPR?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification of subsidies submitted by China.  
 
Page 130, Trade Policies by Sector: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries; Internal 
measures; Support measures; paragraph 4.26:  
The Secretariat in its report states that "Grain reserves of maize, rice, soya beans, and wheat are 
maintained by the Central Government and local governments; according to the authorities, the 
reserves are used only to cope with major natural disasters or other emergencies. " 
 
Question:  
111. Could China explain how it establishes the volumes for its grain reserves and the prices at 
which it acquires these stocks?   
 
Reply:  The number and scale of government grain reserves are determined b y the overall 
consideration of population, production, consumption, trade and other factors, and adjusted 
according to changes in the situation at the appropriate time. Reserve grain purchase prices are 
generally determined by enterprises in line with the market.  
 
112. Could China explain how long these stocks are held and how they are disposed in the absence 
of a natural disaster or emergency?  
 
Reply:  Under normal circumstances, reserve stocks generally remain relatively stable. At the same 
time, a balance d rotation of reserves is implemented to ensure the quality of reserves and storage 
safety.  
 
113. Could China indicate which level of government covers the storage costs of these stocks?  
 
Reply:  The finance departments at the same level are responsible fo r the expenditure of the 
government reserves.  
 
Page 136, paragraph 4.40:  
It is mentioned that "the Government will shortly issue a new policy to terminate fuel and boat 
construction subsidies. " It is also noted that "China is a major player in the distant water fisheries 
segment. "  
 
Questions:  
114. Can China elaborate on this statement and describe whether this termination applies to 
subsidies provided from the central/local governments or both?  
115. Will China provide alternative subsidies to replace these subsidies?   
 
Reply for 114 -115: In May 202 1, the Ministry of Finance and the the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs issued the Circular on the Implementation of Fishery Development Support Policies to 
Promote the High -Quality Development of Fisheries, with the following main support directi ons. 
(i) Fisheries development subsidies mainly support the key projects incorporated into national key 
projects and the upgrading and replacement of fishery facilities and equipment to promote safe 
production, and other aspects. (ii) Other general transfe r payments mainly support local 
governments to coordinate the promotion of high -quality development of fisheries in the local region. 
During the "14th Five -Year Plan " period, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Affairs will co nduct a mid -term evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of the policy WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 306 - 
 
  throughout China, and according to the results of the evaluation and changes in the situation, make 
dynamic adjustments to the scale of local funds.  
 
116. Would termination o f fuel and boat construction subsidies affect China 's distant water fishing 
capacity?   
 
Reply:  During the "13th Five -Year Plan " period, China has exercised strict control over the scale of 
deep-sea fishing vessels, and no new pelagic fishery enterprise and vessel has been approved during 
the period of 2016 -2020, and the total number of deep -sea fishing vessels was controlled at 
about 2,700. China strictly complies with the system of vessel number and tonnage quotas for fishing 
vessels and fishing quotas for fish species in each RFMO, and strictly enforces the conservation and 
management regulations regarding closed areas and closed  periods. The pelagic fishing production 
is mainly determined by RFMO quotas and resource management requirements of fishing countries, 
and the fishing production was stabilized at about 2.3 million tons from 2016 to 2020. The scale will 
continue to be con trolled during the "14th Five -Year Plan " period. China believes that fuel subsidies 
are the most harmful subsidies, which are not conducive to the conservation and sustainable 
utilization of global fisheries resources, and should be eliminated, and all WTO members shall be 
encouraged to eliminat e fuel subsidies that benefit marine capture fisheries.  
 
Pages 137 -140, Paragraphs 4.2 to 4.2.2  
The report 's sectoral review of the trade policies of China 's mining sector makes no reference to 
environmental consideration, in contrast to the report 's revie w of China 's energy sector, which 
immediately follows after.  
 
Question:   
117. Could China elaborate on its environmental regulations/standards when it comes to 
mining/mineral exploitation, processing, and production, especially with regard to processes th at 
are of particular environmental concern, such as those related to rare earth minerals?  
 
Reply:  China has developed sound emission standards for pollutants in mining, processing and 
production. In terms of ferrous metal smelting, emission standards for p ollutants from Iron Ore 
Mining and Beneficiation Industry (GB 28661) and a series of emission standards for iron and steel 
smelting have been issued. In the field of nonferrous metal smelting, the Emission Standards for 
Pollutants from Lead and Zinc indust ries (GB 25466), Emission Standards for Pollutants from Copper, 
Nickel and Cobalt Industries (GB 25467), Emission Standard for Pollutants from Magnesium and 
Titanium Industry (GB 25468), Emission Standards for Pollutants from Tin, Antimony and Mercury 
Industries (GB)30770), Rare Earth Industry Pollutant Discharge Standard (GB 26451) etc. have been 
issued, which cover standards on pollutant discharge from mining to subsequent smelting process, 
playing an important role in promoting green and sustainable deve lopment of the industry and 
environment quality improving.  
 
Page 140, paragraph 4.56: The report notes that China 's energy consumption structure continued 
to change during the review period, as the proportion of coal declined, accounting for 57.7% of the 
total energy consumption, down from 63.8% in 2015. Petroleum accounts for 18.9%, natural gas 
accounts for 8.1%, and primary electricity and other energy such as hydropower, nuclear power, 
and wind power account for 15.3%.  
 
Question:  
118. As China is diversifying its energy mix, will there be greater consideration for ESG standards 
and performance of the countries from which China imports fossil fuels? Will China demonstrate 
preference for oil producers with higher ESG standards?  
 
Reply:  China conducts its own fossil energy imports by enterprises on commercial principles, under 
the framework of laws and regulations, industrial environmental protection and other policies, as 
well as WTO rules. China supports enterprises to actively promote a nd practice carbon reduction and 
environmental protection measures while carrying out normal oil and gas trade. Reportedly, there 
are currently no oil and gas trade policies and constraints at the Chinese government level regarding 
ESG ratings.  
 
Page 142, paragraph 4.66:  
The report notes that China implemented a new environmental tax policy aimed at promoting 
environmental protection and reducing pollution.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 307 - 
 
  Question:  
119. Can China share additional details on how this tax applies to the different sectors w ithin its 
energy mix?  
 
Reply:  Since January 2018, the Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People 's Republic of China 
has been officially implemented, and Article 10 specifies the emissions of taxable air pollutants, 
water pollutants and solid waste an d decibels of noise, as well as the calculation method and order. 
In April 2021, in order to further implement the Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People 's 
Republic of China, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, together with the Ministry of Fi nance 
and the State Taxation Administration, issued the Announcement Issuing Pollutant Discharge 
Coefficients and Material Balance Methods for Taxable Pollutant Discharges Subject to Environmental 
Protection Tax (No. 16 of 2021), which provides for the cal culation methods of emissions of taxable 
pollutants for pollutant emitters that do not have monitoring conditions.  
 
Page 150, paragraph 4.107:   
It is noted that "The Automobile Mid - and Long -term Development Plan (launched in 2017) is the 
main strategic plan to promote the auto industry. The Plan aims to, inter alia, improve the innovation 
system and promote the development of key areas, such as NEVs, smart network  cars, and energy -
saving cars. The Plan also emphasizes the importance of strengthening international cooperation ." 
 
Question:  
120. Could China provide additional information on financial support for the automotive sector 
provided under the Automobile Mid - and Long -term Development Plan, including the overall amount, 
areas targeted, and eligibility of foreign entities?   
 
Reply:  The Plan is of a guiding nature and does not involve specific subsidy policies.  
 
Page 151, Paragraph 4.112:  
The report notes that in 2016, the Government launched the Robotics Industry Development Plan 
(2016 -2020).  
 
Question:  
121. Can China elaborate on which sub -sectors had success under the Robotics Industry 
Development Plan (2016 -2020), and in which sub -sectors there remain development gaps?  
 
Reply:  For the intelligent transformation needs of domestic manufacturing industry, robotics 
companies continu e to innovate products and solutions, and industry applications gradually extend 
to furniture, food, metallurgy, construction, textiles, casting, forging, ceramics and sanitary ware 
and other traditional industries, which effectively solved the enterprise labor difficulties, as well as 
harsh environments and high -risk operations and other industry problems. However, there are still 
development gaps in the fields of automobiles, electronics and other fields that require high levels 
of robot technology, and i n the fields of medical care, helping the elderly and disabled, and other 
fields that require high levels of robot safety and interactivity.  
 
Page  154, paragraph  4.128:  
It is noted that "The Made in China 2025 initiative considers shipbuilding as one of its 10 priority 
sectors. The Plan has the overarching strategic objective to make China strong in high -end 
shipbuilding. Furthermore, in the context of the 13th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development, the MIIT unveiled in December 2016 the Shipbuilding Industry Deepening Structural 
Adjustment, Accelerating Transformation and Upgrading Action Plan (2016 -20), outlining the reform 
and transformation upgrade needed for the shipbuildi ng industry ." 
Canada also notes that page 13, paragraph 23 of the WTO Secretariat Report indicates that China 's 
WTO notifications do not contain information on expenditure levels in certain sectors, including 
shipbuilding.  
 
Questions:  
122. Is China able to  confirm the overall amount of incentives and financial support provided for 
the domestic shipbuilding industry?   
 
Reply:  The Shipbuilding Industry Deepening Structural Adjustment, Accelerating Transformation 
and Upgrading Action Plan (2016 -2020) is a government guiding document and does not provide 
direct incentives and financial support to the domestic shipbuilding industr y. WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 308 - 
 
   
123. In addition to the Made in China 2025 initiative, could China identify and provide additional 
information on the specific programs, funds, and other mechanisms it is using to support the 
domestic shipbuilding industry?   
 
Reply:  No more information  is available at this time.  
 
Page  155, paragraph  4.133:  
It is noted that "In 2019, a plan to merge the country 's two largest state -owned shipbuilders – the 
China State Shipbuilding Corp. (CSSC) and the China Shipbuilding Industry Co. (CSIC) – was 
announced . The authorities state that as at March 2021, the joint reorganization of the CSSC and 
the CSIC had not yet been completed ." 
 
Questions:  
124. What was the rationale for this merger, and what is the current anticipated timeline for its 
completion?  
 
Reply:  The SASAC website announced to the public in October 2019 that CSSC and CSIC  
implemented a joint reorganization. The implementation of restructuring is conducive to resolving 
structural contradictions such as overcapacity, better implementing the requirements of supply -side 
structural reform, is conducive to the concentration of r esearch and development resources, 
improving the level of ship development and manufacturing, and has positive significance for the 
development of enterprises. The reorganization and integration of CSSC and CSIC is required to 
pass international anti -monop oly review. Since the announcement of restructuring matters to the 
public, the enterprise has been steadily promoting related matters. Please pay attention to the 
enterprise business change registration for specific information.  
 
125. Is China 's legal fram ework for competition (as outlined in Section 3.3.4.1, pages 89 -94 of the 
WTO Secretariat Report) being taken into account as part of this merger process?   
 
Reply:  The two are not directly related.  
 
126. Can China provide further information on the current  breakdown of state -owned, domestic, 
and foreign private entities in China 's shipbuilding sector?  
 
Reply:  No relevant information is available.  
 
Page 158, paragraph 4.145:  
China continued to reform its financial sector during the review period. While a nu mber of licensing 
and prudential regulations were adopted or amended, several measures were taken to liberalize 
financial activities and to further promote foreign participation in the banking, insurance, pension 
fund management, and securities industries.  As regards the opening of the financial market, in 
July 2019, the FSDC announced a package of 11 reform measures covering: (i) credit rating by 
foreign -invested companies; (ii) foreign participation in asset management; (iii) steps to encourage 
foreign fi nancial institutions to invest in wealth management subsidiaries of Chinese commercial 
banks; (iv) foreign participation in pension fund management; (v) foreign participation in currency 
brokerage; (vi) lifting the foreign ownership cap on life insurance c ompanies; (vii) lifting the 
restrictions on foreign ownership in insurance asset management companies; (viii) relaxing the entry 
restrictions on foreign -invested insurance companies; (ix) lifting foreign ownership limits on 
securities companies, futures co mpanies, and fund management companies; (x) allowing foreign 
invested financial institutions access to Type -A underwriting licences in the interbank bond market; 
and (xi) allowing foreign institutional access to inter -bank bond markets.  
 
Questions:  
127. Does China have intentions to revise its WTO Schedule of Specific Commitments to reflect its 
recent financial services liberalization?  
 
Reply:  China is ready to discuss further liberalization of relevant services with other parties within 
the framework of multilateral negotiations on market access for trade in services.  
 
128. Have these changes resulted in changes in the level of foreign participation in the Chinese 
financial sector?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 309 - 
 
   
Reply:  In recent years, with the implementation of a numb er of initiatives to open up the capital 
market to the outside world, the proportion of foreign investors ' shareholdings has been increasing. 
Next, the CSRC will continue to unswervingly expand the opening of the capital market to the outside 
world, and fu rther enhance the convenience of foreign participation.  
 
Page  170, paragraph  4.214:  
It is noted China 's cybersecurity law requires that personal information and other 'important data ' 
be stored within the mainland of China, which can increase cost of compl iance. As well, is it noted 
that China 's cybersecurity law also stipulates conditions about a security assessment of locally stored 
data.  
 
Question s:  
129. Could China provide information on the costs of retention of 'important ' data?  
130. Could China explain what a "security assessment of locally stored data " might entail and 
related costs?  
 
Reply  for 129 -130: Article 21 of the Data Security Law provides that China establishes a data 
classification and grading protection system. According to the importance of data in economic and 
social development as well as once tampered with, destruction, leakage, illegal ac cess, or illegal use, 
the degree of harm caused to national security, public interests or the legitimate rights and interests 
of individuals and organizations, China protects data in a classified and grading manner. Based on 
the national data security coor dination mechanism, China coordinates relevant departments to 
develop an important data directory and strengthen the protection of important data. Data related 
to national security, the lifeblood of the national economy, important people 's livelihood, and major 
public interests belong to the national core data, with a more stringent management system 
implemented. In accordance with the data classification and grading protection system, all regions 
and departments should determine the directory of important data for themselves as well as relevant 
industries and fields, with the data included in the directory for key protection. The classification and 
grading protection system is implemented to ensure unambiguity, consistency and stability of data 
regulatory e nvironment.  
 
Page 171, paragraph 4.217:  
The Encryption Law was also enacted on 26 October 2019 and came into effect on 1 January 2020. 
It encourages enterprises to voluntarily apply to qualified testing and certification agencies for the 
testing and certification of their commercial encryption p roducts. However, testing and certification 
might be mandatory for certain commercial encryption products and services that may affect 
"national security, national welfare and people 's livelihood, and society 's interest " and shall be 
included in the Catalo gue of Critical Network Equipment and Network Security -specific Products.  
 
Questions :  
131. Could China please define what products involving "national welfare ", "people 's livelihood " and 
"the society 's interest " are?  
 
Reply:  The implementation scope of mandatory testing and certification system is limited, only 
applicable to the commercial cryptography products involving national security, national economy 
and people 's livelihood and social public interests, meanwhile, the management scope is clearly 
defined through the product catalogue prepared, which will not pose unnecessary restrictions on the 
market and industry.  
 
132. Could China clarify which international standards will be the basis for China 's technical 
regulations regarding commercia l cryptography?  
133. How will China ensure that that all stakeholders can participate in the creation of commercial 
cryptography standards?   
 
Reply:  The Standardization Law provides that the development of standards should be widely 
consulted to ensure th e standards to be scientific, normative and timely and to improve the quality 
of standards. Foreign enterprises are welcome to participate in the standard development in 
accordance with the law. The National Information Security Standardization Technical C ommittee 
(SAC/TC 260) is responsible for the development of cryptography -related standards, and its WG3 
Cryptography Standards Working Group is responsible for the research and development of 
cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic modules, and key managem ent standards. National WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 310 - 
 
  Information Security Standardization Technical Committee encourages enterprises, universities, 
research institutes, testing and certification institutions and users to join the working group 
voluntarily to improve the participation and breadth of standard development and give full play to 
the main role of enterprises; at the same time, the standard is open for public consultation for 
60 days during the development process to encourage all sectors of society and related parties to 
actively study and submit their opinions. Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening the 
Administration of Industrial Standards requires that industry standards should protect foreign -
invested enterprises to participate equally in the development of industry s tandards in accordance 
with the law.  
 
134. Could China please indicate whether core and ordinary cryptography (as referenced in 
People 's Republic of China 's Cryptography Law) will, along with commercial cryptography, also be 
subject to the new regulations?  
 
Reply:  Both core and ordinary cryptography are subject to The People 's Republic of China 's 
Cryptography Law.  
 
135. Could China please indicate how the scope of application definition in its Cryptography Law 
will ensure only legitimate objectives pertaini ng to cryptographic goods will be pursued? Could China 
please provide precise definitions of core, ordinary and commercial cryptography products 
referenced in the Law?  
 
Reply:  The Cryptography Law stipulates that commercial cryptography products shall be s ubject to 
testing and certification, mainly voluntary testing and certification, and only commercial 
cryptography products involving national security, national economy and people 's livelihood, and 
social public interests shall be subject to compulsory tes ting and certification. For the definitions of 
core, common and commercial cryptography, please refer to Chapter 2 Core and Ordinary 
Cryptography and Chapter 3 Commercial Cryptography of the People 's Republic of China 's 
Cryptography Law fore details.  
 
136. Could China please indicate when the Regulations on the Administration of Commercial 
Cryptography will be opened for public comments again and when China plans to notify the measure 
to the WTO TBT Committee?  
 
Reply:  Regulation on the Administration of Commercial Cipher Codes (Revision) has been included 
in the State Council 's legislative work plan for 2021. The revision of the Regulation on the 
Administration of Commercial Cipher Codes will follow the principles of l aw, democracy and science, 
adhere to openness and transparency, scientific evidence in the revision process, widely solicit 
opinions, and guarantee the participation of stakeholders in the revision activities through legal 
channels.  
 
Page 172, paragraph 4.220:  
Following the entry into force of China 's Cybersecurity Law, Canada understand that China has 
released the Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) Security Protection Regulations in Aug 2021. 
The draft Revised Measures on Cybersecurity R eview was released in July 2021 for public comments. 
China also implemented the provision of the Cybersecurity Law concerning national security review 
requirements for CIIOs purchasing certain network products and services. This was made through 
the Measur es on Cybersecurity Review, and was jointly adopted on 27 April 2020 (effective 
1 June 2020) by the CAC and 11 other government agencies.The Measures seek to implement 
Article  35 of the Cybersecurity Law, which established a cybersecurity review requiremen t on 
network products and services procured by CIIOs. Purchases of network products or services with a 
potential effect on national security are subject to the cybersecurity review system outlined under 
the Measures. Such network product and services inclu de core network devices, high -performance 
computers and servers, mass storage devices, large databases and application software, network 
security devices, cloud computing services, and other network products and services that have a 
significant impact on t he security of the critical information infrastructure.  
 
Questions:  
137. In the Measures on Cybersecurity Review, could China please provide defined criteria that 
operators of Critical Information Infrastructure are to use in assessing a security threat?   
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 311 - 
 
  Reply:  Measures for Cybersecurity Review (revised draft for comment) has been released in July 
this year for public comments, the relevant content and so on is under improvement, welcome 
continued attention.  
 
138. Could China please explain how the Meas ures on Cybersecurity Review provide for 
WTO TBT Agreement consistent legitimate objectives, National Treatment, MFN and notification?   
 
Reply: Strengthening cybersecurity and data security management is not only necessary to maintain 
personal information security and national security, but also a common practice of all countries, and 
many countries have already taken legal and administrative measures in this regard. Insisting on 
opening up to the outside world is a basic state policy of China, and China will, as always, welcome 
foreign products and services to enter the Chinese market in compliance with Chinese legal 
requirements.  
 
139. With respect to the revised Measures on Cybersecurity Review, could China elaborate on the 
criteria that CII o perators and data processors are to use in assessing whether a cyber security 
review is triggered?  
 
Reply:  Measures for Cybersecurity Review (revised draft for comment) has been released in July 
this year for public comments, the relevant content and so o n is under improvement, welcome 
continued attention.  
 
140. The Data Security Law sets requirements for entities processing 'important data ' and 
transferring it across borders. With a view to better understanding the legitimate objectives of the 
Law and the  risks of non -fulfilment, can China please provide more clarification regarding the 
meaning of 'important data '? 
 
Reply:  Please refer to the reply to question 130.  
 
141. Could China please provide clarification of how the inclusion, in the Data Security La w, of 
language on reciprocal Chinese actions, to address other countries ' discriminatory actions, is 
consistent with the TBT Agreement 's obligations?  
 
Reply:  Strengthening cybersecurity and data security management is not only necessary to maintain 
person al information security and national security, but also a common practice of all countries, and 
many countries have already taken legal and administrative measures in this regard. Insisting on 
opening up to the outside world is a basic state policy of Chin a, and China will, as always, welcome 
foreign products and services to enter the Chinese market in compliance with Chinese legal 
requirements.  
 
142. In order to provide clarity and predictability, will China include a clear definition of 'Critical 
Informat ion Infrastructure ', which is referenced in both the draft cybersecurity measure and the 
draft Data Security Law?  
143. Will China publish a list of CII after CII are designated?   
 
Reply for 142 -143: Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) Security Protec tion Regulations 
provides a clear definition of critical information infrastructure. Critical information infrastructure 
refers to critical network facilities, information systems in public communications and information 
services, energy, transportation, w ater conservancy, finance, public services, e -government affairs, 
national defense science and technology industry and other important industries and fields, as well 
as other important network facilities, information systems once damaged, losing function o r suffering 
data leakage, may seriously jeopardize national security, livelihood, public interest. Chapter II of 
the Regulations provides that the competent departments and regulatory departments of the above -
mentioned important industries and fields shall , as the protection work department, be responsible 
for the development of critical information infrastructure identification rules, organizing the 
identification of the critical information infrastructure of the industry and the sector, timely 
notificatio n of the results to the operator, and notify the State Council public security departments.  
 
Page 171 -172, paragraph 4.219:  
[…] China published for public comment the first draft of the Personal Information Protection Law, 
the country 's first comprehensive law regulating, inter alia, the processing of PI.124  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 312 - 
 
  Questions:  
144. Could China please explain how the law ensures that the degree of data accuracy and update 
timeliness required is limited to that which is commensurate with the risk of n on-compliance?  
145. How will China ensure that the measure is proportionate to the use the data will have?  
146. How will China ensure that the measure is sufficiently precise that firms can reasonably and 
consistently comply with it?  
147. Will China provid e a clearer definition of what constitutes 'accuracy ' and 'timeliness of 
updates '?  
 
Reply for 144 -147: After the implementation of the Personal Information Protection Law, the focus 
will be on the following aspects: First, personal information processors fulfill their obligations to 
protect the security of personal information. This includes the development of internal management 
systems and operational procedures, regular compliance audits of personal information activities, 
and the fulfillment of persona l information leakage notification and remediation obligations. Second, 
the departments performing personal information protection duties perform their duties in 
accordance with the law. This includes conducting publicity and education on personal informat ion 
protection, guiding and supervising personal information processors to carry out personal 
information protection work, receiving and handling complaints and reports related to personal 
information protection, organizing the assessment of personal infor mation protection of applications 
and other personal information and publishing the assessment results, and investigating and 
handling illegal personal information activities. Third, the national cyberspace department plans and 
coordinates relevant departm ents to promote relevant personal information protection work. This 
includes the development of specific rules and standards for the protection of personal information, 
the development of special rules and standards for personal information protection for small personal 
information processors, handling sensitive personal information and new technologies and new 
applications such as face recognition and artificial intelligence, improving the personal information 
protection complaints and reporting mechanisms . By improving the personal information protection 
system, preventing and punishing infringements on the rights and interests of personal information, 
strengthening publicity and education on personal information protection and other means to form 
a good e nvironment where the government, enterprises, relevant social organizations and the public 
participate in the protection of personal information, and to promote the smooth implementation of 
the law.  
 
Page  175, paragraph  4.240:  
It is noted that China 's Cabotage regime includes both domestic ownership and registry 
requirements, and that domestic water transport operators may not use foreign -flagged ships unless 
they obtain permission to temporarily operate a foreign -flagged vessel, which is subject to tim e and 
voyage limits. It is also noted that with respect to the latter, eight foreign -flagged vessels have been 
temporarily permitted to operate in China 's waters between 2018 and 2020.  
 
Questions:  
148. Could China indicate how many domestic water transpor t operators sought permission to 
operate foreign -flagged vessels in China 's waters in the reporting period, and which activities they 
sought to undertake (e.g. transport of goods or towing)?   
 
Reply:  From 2018 to 2020, there are 8 foreign vessels temporari ly engaged in China 's domestic 
waterway transport, involving 3 domestic waterway transport operators, mainly engaged in heavy 
cargo, dangerous liquid cargo transport, etc.  
 
149. Could China indicate whether the foreign -flagged vessels permitted to operate in China 's 
waters must also be owned by a Chinese company?   
 
Reply:  There is no requirement in the current regulations that vessels temporarily engaged in 
domestic waterway transportation in China must be owned by Chinese companies.  
 
150. Could China explain whether there are any fees or costs required from domestic water 
transport operators using foreign -flagged vessels in China 's waters, and whether the foreign -flagged 
vessel must pay any fees or costs associated with the activity? If there are addit ional fees and costs, 
how are they calculated?  
 
Reply:  The use of foreign vessels for domestic waterway transportation is a purely operational 
market practice, and the Chinese transport authorities have no additional regulations on this.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 313 - 
 
   
151. Could China indicate if there are proscribed timelines or average timelines for decisions when 
domestic water transport operators seek permission to use foreign -flagged vessels in China 's 
waters?  
 
Reply:  According to the Provisions on the Administration of Domestic Waterway Transport, approved 
by the Ministry of Transport, waterway transport operators can charter foreign vessels between ports 
in the People 's Republic of China to engage in no more than two  consecutive voyages or a period of 
30 days of temporary transport.  
 
Page 175, paragraph 4.241:  
It is noted that China recently revised regulations on foreign investment in international shipping 
and international shipping agency services.  
 
Question:  
152. Could China indicate how much foreign investment in international shipping and international 
shipping agency services has occurred since it revised its regulations in this area?  
 
Reply:  There is no relevant statistics data available.  
 
Page  176, paragraph  4.244:  
It is noted that "The authorities state that no state -owned ports are operated by third parties 
(including foreign companies) under concession agreements. There are no restriction s on the share 
ratios of FDI in investment in Chinese ports. Information was not available as to whether there is 
any foreign investment in Chinese ports in practice. Various SOEs provide port services ."  
 
Questions:  
153. Could China indicate whether there is foreign investment in China 's ports, and if so, which 
specific ports and under what conditions?   
Reply: China has many ports with foreign investment components, in line with the relevant laws and 
regulations on foreign investment, the spec ific investment conditions belong to the content of 
corporate business negotiations, and there is no uniform requirements.  
154. Could China provide more information on which SOEs provide port services, as well as which 
port services they provide?   
 
Reply:  Port enterprises provide port handling, warehousing, tugboat operations and other services 
in accordance with the the Law on Ports, the Provisions on the Administration of Port Operations.  
 
Page 176 -177, paragraph 4.246:  
It is noted that "According to the Catalogue of Central Determined Prices and the Regulation on Port 
Charges, port operating service charges are divided into market -regulated price, government -guided 
price, and government pricing. Among them, the government -guided and government -priced port  
charges are decided by the MOT and the NDRC. Market -set port charges, such as port handling lump 
sum charges, may be set by port operators themselves ." 
Question:  
155. Could China confirm if these port charges are applied to domestic and foreign entities o n a 
non-discriminatory basis?   
 
Reply:  Chinese port charges are applicable to domestic and foreign entities and there is no 
discrimination.  
 
Pages 201 -203, Table A4.2  
Table A4.2 lists several measures notified by China that are maintained by several coastal provinces.  
 
Questions:  
156. Can China elaborate on the ways in which the subsidy program in the fifth entry listed on 
page 202 (titled: "Fund for marine and fishery development (Xiamen City) ") promotes distant water 
fisheries?   
 
Reply:  Please refe r to the notification of subsidies that China has already submitted.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 314 - 
 
  157. Can China provide more details on the eligibility requirements for distant water fishing 
enterprises under the subsidy program in the sixth entry listed on page 202 (titled: "Fund f or distant 
water fishery development (Rizhao City) ") as well as under the seventh entry listed on page 202 
(titled: "Fund for distant water fishery (Qingdao City) ")?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the notification of subsidies that China has already submitted.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 315 - 
 
  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
Página 30 en su párrafo 1.42, referente a las exportaciones de servicios:  
- ¿A qué se debe el aumento constante de las exportaciones de servicios durante el 
período  2015-2019?  
 
Reply:  From 2015 to 2019, the Chinese service industry developed by leaps and bounds. The 
added  value of the Chinese service industry increased from CNY34.9745 trillion in 2015 to 
CNY53.4233 trillion in 2019, with an average annual growth rate of 11.2%. This lai d a solid industrial 
foundation for the development of China 's trade in services.  
 
- ¿Cuáles iniciativas o medidas ha implementado el Gobierno para fomentar dichas 
exportaciones, duración de éstas, cuántas empresas se han beneficiado y de que sectores?  
 
Reply: The Chinese service industry has continuously gained ground in opening -up. Since 2013, 
opening -up of the service industry has become an important part of the construction of nationwide 
pilot free trade zones (such as China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone ). In 2015, a comprehensive 
pilot campaign for expanding the opening -up of Beijing service industry was launched, which gave 
impetuses to China 's further opening -up in the fields of finance, science & technology, information, 
culture & creativity and busin ess services. In 2016, China launched a pilot campaign for innovation 
and development of trade in services, accelerated the expansion and opening -up of transportation, 
education, medical care, finance, professional services and other fields, sharpened comp lementary 
advantages in sync with the pilot free trade zones, and developed a strategic platform for China 's 
service sector to open to the outside world in the new era. The abovementioined measures vigorously 
propelled the rapid development of China 's trad e in services.  
 
Página 36 en su párrafo 2.6, sobre las normas relacionadas con el comercio:  
- ¿Cuáles criterios considera el Consejo de Estado para mantener una norma confidencial?  
 
Reply: China has announced trade -related measures in accordance with WTO rules and its accession 
commitments.  
 
- ¿Estas normas son notificadas a la OMC?  
 
Reply:  China has announced trade -related measures in accordance with WTO rules and its accession 
commitments.  
 
Página 83 en su párrafo 3.102, relacionado a las exportacione s de las zonas francas experimentales:  
- ¿Cuáles productos o servicios se están exportando bajo este régimen?  
 
Reply:  Pilot free trade zones are a experimental field for China 's independent reform and opening -
up. The purpose of building pilot free trade zones is to explore ways and gain experience for 
comprehensively deepening reforms and expanding opening -up by implementing a series of pilot 
measures in terms of liberalization and facilitation of investment and trade, financial services for the 
real economy, transformation of government functions, among others. Situated in different locations, 
various pilot free trade zones are characterized by different resource endowments and industrial 
structures. Therefore, diffferent major commodities or services are exported by these pilot free trade 
zones. These pilot free trade zones serve as a window for China to open wider to the outside world. 
Enterprises from all over the world are we lcome to seek business opportunities in the pilot free trade 
zones across China.  
 
- ¿Qué porcentaje de empleos se ha generado en estas zonas francas durante el período sujeto 
de examen?   
 
Reply: Up to now, these pilot trade zones have not conducted special statistics on their employment 
rates as yet.  
 
Página 86 en su párrafo 3.115, referente a los incentivos y apoyo financiero a diferentes sectores y 
ramas de producción:  
- ¿Cuáles ayudas en forma de transferencias directas se han otorgado?  
 
Reply: Please ref er to the latest subsidy notification submitted by China.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 316 - 
 
  - ¿Cuál ha sido el impacto y/o resultados de la aplicación de estas medidas?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest subsidy notification submitted by China.  
 
- ¿Qué tipos de sectores y ramas de producción han sido beneficiados?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest subsidy notification submitted by China.  
 
Página 86 en su párrafo 3.124, sobre los llamados "fondos gubernamentales de orientación ", o 
fondos de inversión dirigidos por el Gobierno:  
- ¿Cuál es el objetivo de estos fondos, cuáles s ectores de la rama productiva son apoyados y 
qué requisitos debe cumplir una empresa para beneficiarse de estos?  
- ¿Qué resultados socioeconómicos se prevén lograr con la implementación de estos fondos?  
- ¿Se beneficiaron las empresas extranjeras en las mism as condiciones que las empresas 
nacionales?  
- ¿Tienen una duración establecida?  
- ¿Puede una institución gubernamental hacer uso de estos fondos?  
 
Reply:  China established the government guidance funds in accordance with market -based 
principles. The investment management and decision -making of the funds is completely market -
based, and government departments do not interfere with or participate in any investment project 
decisions of the funds . The funds and their management structure are established in  accordance 
with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws, and operate on a market 
basis. China does not provide subsidies to any industry through the funds.  
 
Página 177 en su párrafo 4.126, sobre la Política de Promoción del Desarr ollo de Alta Calidad del 
Sector de los Circuitos Integrados y el Sector de los Programas Informáticos:  
- ¿En qué consisten las medidas sobre apoyo a la investigación y el desarrollo?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to Subsidy Notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by  China.  
 
- ¿Qué acciones se han implementado para motivar a empresas extranjeras a invertir en China 
en áreas de investigación y desarrollo?  
 
Reply:  China constantly optimizes the business environment for foreign -funded enterprises. 
Domestic and foreign -funded enterprises are treated equally without discrimination according to 
relevant policies . 
 
- ¿Qué medidas se contemplan en la política "Go Global "?  
 
Reply:  China is a staunch supporter of economic globalization and trade liberalization. The worldwide 
semiconductor enterprises and various types of funds are welcome to start up businesses or make 
investments in China.  
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – ADDITIONAL QUESTIO NS 
3.1.3 ARANCELES   
3.1.3.4 Aranceles preferenciales   
Pág. 61   
Párrafo  3.34. "China también otorga un trato arancelario preferencial a las importaciones 
procedentes de PMA que han establecido relaciones diplomáticas con ella y ultimado el canje de 
notas diplomáticas. En febrero de 2021, China aplicaba aranceles nulos al 97% de las l íneas 
arancelarias de 41 PMA. Los PMA y China han presentado al Comité de Normas de Origen de la OMC 
comunicaciones relativas a las tasas de utilización de las exportaciones de los PMA en el marco del 
arreglo comercial preferencial de China para los PMA. "  
 
1. ¿Estaría en disposición de considerar el gobierno de China la aplicación de trato 
arancelario preferencial también para las importaciones de países en desarrollo 
pertenecientes al Grupo ACP que han establecido relaciones diplomáticas con ella y 
ultimado el canje de notas diplomáticas?  
 
Reply : The relevant preferential tax rate is only applicable to the least developed countries, and 
China does not currently consider expanding  the scope of application.  
 
3.2 Medidas que afectan directamente a las exportaciones   
3.2.4 Apoyo y promoción de las exportaciones   
Pág. 83   
Párrafo  3.102. "La promoción de las exportaciones puede adoptar también la forma de exenciones 
de los derechos de importación para determinados productos (sección 3.1.3). Aparte de su función 
primordial como terreno de prueba para las reformas de política, las zonas francas experimentales 
han atraído a empresas que exportan. Desde 2013, China ha establecido un número creciente de 
zonas francas experimentales en todo el país; actualmente  hay 31. En la Zona Franca Experimental 
de Shanghái, por ejemplo, los beneficios a que pueden acogerse las empresas consisten en un tipo 
reducido del impuesto sobre la renta de las sociedades del 15% (frente al tipo ordinario del 25%) 
durante cinco años en  sectores como los circuitos integrados, la inteligencia artificial, la biomedicina 
y la aviación civil; la reducción del impuesto sobre la renta de las personas físicas para el personal 
extranjero de las empresas de la Zona Franca Experimental; y la simpl ificación de los trámites 
aduaneros para las importaciones y exportaciones de la Zona Franca Experimental. "  
 
2. ¿Las autoridades de China están contemplando la posibilidad de incrementar los 
beneficios para los inversionistas extranjeros que se instalen en las zonas francas 
experimentales, así como la inclusión de otros sectores además de los ya existentes 
(circuitos integrados, la inteligencia artificial, la biomedicina y la aviación civil)?   
 
Reply:  The Pilot Free Trade Zone is a testing ground  for the Chinese government 's independent 
reform and opening up. It aims to provide an open, transparent and excellent business environment 
for all kinds of market players, including foreign investors, through early and pilot trials in investment 
and trade liberalization and facilitation, financial services for the real economy, and transformation 
of government functions.  
 
Pág. 88   
Párrafo  3.124. "Además de los programas notificados, hay al parecer numerosas iniciativas para 
apoyar diferentes ramas de producción y atraer inversión extranjera. Los llamados "fondos 
gubernamentales de orientación ", o fondos de inversión dirigidos por el Gobierno, utilizan recursos 
públicos para efectuar inversiones de capital en sectores que el Gobierno considera important es 
(cuadro 3.15). La Secretaría no ha logrado obtener información clara sobre en qué consisten estos 
fondos. Algunos todavía se están creando, y no está claro cuál será su cuantía definitiva. De acuerdo 
con algunas fuentes externas, son financiados mayorit ariamente por el Gobierno central y los 
Gobiernos locales, grandes empresas de propiedad estatal e instituciones financieras de propiedad 
estatal. La mayor parte de los fondos se utilizan para financiar procesos de fabricación avanzada, 
nuevos materiales y  otras ramas de producción innovadoras. La información facilitada en el 
cuadro  3.15 no ha sido confirmada por las autoridades, que han considerado que no es pertinente 
para este examen. Afirman además que esos fondos son en parte de financiación privada, q ue no 
constituirían una subvención y que, por lo tanto, no estarían sujetos a notificación. Según las 
autoridades, no es necesario notificar estos fondos en el marco del Acuerdo SMC ya que la ayuda 
proporcionada mediante estos fondos no constituye una subv ención. "  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 318 - 
 
  3. ¿Qué  resultados  debe cumplir una empresa para beneficiarse de estos?    
4. ¿Cuáles son los criterios o razones por las cuales China considera que estos fondos, 
no se consideran subvenciones, por lo que son compatibles con el Acuerdo SMC?    
 
Reply to 3 and 4:  The funds established by China based on the market -oriented principle operate 
in full accordance with the market principle and are completely independent market players. Their 
investment management and decision -making are market -oriented,  and government authorities do 
not intervene and participate in any investment project decision -making of the funds. The funds are 
also founded and established in accordance with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China 
and other laws to carry out  market -oriented operations. Relevant policies treat domestic and 
FIEs equally.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  PHILIPPINES  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
I. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
Para 1.35 (Page 24)  
China 's merchandise exports increased every year between 2016 and 2019, to attain a peak of 
nearly USD 2.6 trillion in 2020 (Chart 1.1 and Table A1.2). In the first half of 2020, export levels fell 
due to the COVID -19 pandemic, but China 's share of global manufacturing exports rose to a record 
high in the second  half of the year. Exports received a boost because China was the 
first manufacturing power to resume operations after the first wave of international shutdowns, and 
it is the world 's bigger producer of protective health equipment, such as masks and surgic al gowns, 
and electronics related to working from home.  
 
Question:  
1. What is the share of export of protective health equipment and electronics related to working from 
home to the total export of China? How much did China 's export of these products increase since 
the pandemic began?  
 
Reply: Masks and protective clothing were subject to statistics as separate independent tax numbers 
in March 2020. From April to December 2020, masks and protective clothing accounted for 2.6%  of 
the export value over the same period. The annual export of "tablet computers " and laptops in 
"electronic products " was RMB 797.59 billion in 2020, a year -on-year increase of 20.9%, accounting 
for 4.4% of the total export value in 2020.  
 
Para 1.44 (Pa ge 27)  
Services imports grew from USD 436 billion in 2015 to USD 506 billion in 2019, but fell to 
USD 380 billion in 2020. Travel is traditionally by far the most important individual category, though 
its share had already declined before the pandemic, followed by transport services and business 
services. While the contribution of travel and construction servi ces decreased, the relative 
importance of telecommunications, computer and information services, and of charges for the use 
of intellectual property grew over time.  
 
Question:  
2. What is the reason for such decline in travel during pre -pandemic times?  
 
Reply : As pointed out in the Secretariat report, before the pandemic, China 's trade in services 
increased from USD 436 billion in 2015 to USD 506 billion in 2019. During the period, the imports 
of knowledge intensive services of China such as telecommunications , computers and information 
services continued to grow, and the opening -up of the financial industry boosted the rapid growth 
of imports of financial services. In contrast, the proportion of imports of traditional services such as 
travel and transportation  in China 's trade in services as a whole showed a relative decline.  
 
Para 1.48 (Page 29)  
China continues to be a significant investor abroad, although annual outward flows have dropped 
considerably since 2017. The most important destinations are Hong Kong, China; the British Virgin 
Islands; Singapore; the United States; and Indonesia (Table 1. 7). Projects under the BRI play an 
important role for outward investment. The most important sectors for China 's FDI abroad are 
leasing and business services, manufacturing, financial intermediation, and wholesale and retail 
trade (Table 1.8).  
 
Question:  
3. What is the reason for such decline in the outflow of FDI? Is there a complete list of projects 
benefitting from China 's investments under the BRI?  
 
Reply: In the review period, the foreign direct investment of China fluctuated to a certain extent, 
which was the result of the joint action of many factors and was a kind of normal trade and 
investment. Generally speaking, the structure of the foreign direct investment of China has 
continuously been optimized. Meanwhile, Chinese foreign investors ' investment behavior is more 
rational and prudent, and they always pay more attention to the quality and efficiency of investment. 
It is foreseen that China 's foreign direct investment will present a steady, orderly and healthy 
development trend in the future. For the  project information of the BRI, please refer to the BRI 
website ( http://www.zgydyl.org/ ). WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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II. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
Para 2.19 (Page 34)  
During the review period, as reflected in several measures, China attached great importance to 
addressing climate change issues. The authorities indicate that the country implements an active 
national strategy on climate change and has achieved positive re sults through a series of measures, 
such as industrial restructuring, energy structure optimization, energy conservation and efficiency 
improvement, the establishment of a carbon emissions trading market, and expanding the forest 
carbon sink. They also exp ect that China will reach a peak in carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 
and carbon neutrality before 2060.  
 
Question:  
4. Please cite evidences to support claim that China has achieved positive results in addressing 
climate issues. By how much did carbon emi ssions decrease over the recent years?  
 
Reply: China has taken a series of measures to adjust the industrial structure, improve the energy 
structure, save energy and improve energy efficiency, and made positive progress in addressing 
climate change. Through preliminary calculation, it can be found that China 's carbon emission 
intensity in 2019 is 51.9% of that in 2005, a decrease of about 48.1% compared with that number 
in 2005, which has gone beyond the action goal of controlling greenhouse gas emiss ion by 2020 and 
a decrease of 40% -45% compared with that in 2005, which is equivalent to a cumulative reduction 
of carbon dioxide emission of about 5.7 billion tons, basically reversing the rapid growth trend of 
carbon dioxide emission. Therefore it has ma de great contributions to the global response to climate 
change.  
 
Para 2.29 (Page 35)  
On 15 November 2020, China and 14 other countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) Agreement.15 The Agreement has provisions on trade in goo ds; rules of origin; 
customs procedures and trade facilitation; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; standards, 
technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures; trade remedies; trade in services; 
temporary movement of natural persons; investmen t; intellectual property; e -commerce; 
competition; small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs); economic and technical cooperation; 
government procurement; institutional provisions; and dispute settlement. It has four market access 
annexes (schedules of tari ff commitments, schedules of specific commitments for services, 
schedules of reservations and non -conforming measures for services and investment, and schedules 
of specific commitments on temporary movement of natural persons).16 In general, tariffs on 90%  
of tariff lines will be eliminated; regarding trade in services, some participating signatories made 
commitments in over 100 sectors/subsectors. In addition, participating countries adopt a negative 
list approach to make commitments on investment in non -services sectors. The RCEP Agreement 
will take effect 60 days after its ratification by at least six Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and three non -ASEAN signatories.  
 
Question:  
5. By how much are China 's exports and imports expected to grow in the years following entry into 
force? What is the expected net effect of the RTA on China 's GDP? How is this expected to affect 
economic growth in the following years?  
 
Reply : The completion of the RCEP FTA means that about one -third of the global economy will form 
an integrated market, which would not only promote further opening of China 's trade in goods, 
services and investment, but also significantly improve the overall business environment in the 
region, enhance the trade creation effect brough t about by FTAs, and promote the development of 
regional economic integration in East Asia. China has not yet measured the specific numbers.  
 
Para 2.30 (Page 35)  
On 26 January 2021, the Protocol to Upgrade the Free Trade Agreement between China and 
New Zealand was signed; it has not yet entered into force. The Upgrade Protocol revised the original 
agreement in five areas (rules of origin, customs procedures and trade facilitation, technical barriers 
to trade, trade in services, and cooperation); furthermore , it added e -commerce, government 
procurement, competition policy, and environment and trade chapters to the Agreement.  
 
Question:  
6. When is entry into force expected and what are the terms of this FTA?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Reply : In the Protocol to Upgrade the Free Trade Agreement between China and New  Zealand , the 
two countries have made commitments to further liberalization in the areas of trade in goods, trade 
in services and investment, as well as commitments to enhance cooperation in e -commerce, 
competition policy, go vernment procurement, environment and trade, which will further deepen 
pragmatic cooperation between China and New Zealand in various fields and improve both the 
interests of enterprises and the welfare of the peoples of the two countries. The Protocol wil l enter 
into force on the 60th day after the date of the exchange of written notifications between the parties 
confirming that the domestic legal procedures necessary for entry into force have been completed, 
or such other period as agreed by the parties i n their written notifications.  
 
Question:  
7. By how much are China 's exports and imports to and from New Zealand expected to grow in the 
years following entry into force? What is the expected net effect of the FTA on China 's GDP? How is 
this expected to affect economic growth in the following years?  
 
Reply:  China has not yet measured the specific numbers.  
 
Para 2.33 (Page 36)  
On 15 January 2020, China and the United States signed the China -United States Phase 1 Economic 
and Trade Agreement.18 It contains provisions related to, inter alia , intellectual property, technology 
transfer, trade in food and agricultural products, and financial services.  
 
Question:  
8. When is entry into force expected and what are the terms of this FTA?  
 
Reply: On January 15, 2020 (EST), China and the United States signed the Economic and Trade 
Agreement between the Government of the People 's Republic of China and the Government of the 
United States of America in Washington, D.C. For the Agreement text, please see: 
http://www.m ofcom.gov.cn/article/ae/ai/202001/20200102930845.shtml . 
 
Question:  
9. By how much are China 's exports and imports to and from the United States expected to grow in 
the years following entry into force? What is the expected net effect of the FTA on China 's GDP ? How 
is this expected to affect economic growth in the following years?  
 
Reply: In 2020, China 's exports of goods to the United States denominated in US dollars increased 
by 7.9%, much higher than the growth rate of China 's overall exports of 3.6%; and wh ile China 's 
total imports fell by 0.8%, its imports from the United States still achieved a rapid growth of 9.8%. 
Therefore, it can be predicted that China and the United States will continue to grow with close 
economic and trade relations. The characteristics of China 's economy with sufficient potential, good 
resilience and large room for development have not changed.  
 
Para 2.34 (Page 36)  
China continues to grant unilateral preferences to least developed countries (LDCs). According to 
the autho rities, since 2015, it has implemented zero tariffs on 97% of taxable items for LDCs that 
have established diplomatic relations with China and completed the exchange of diplomatic notes. 
As at end -August 2020, 39 LDCs had been given unilateral preferences.  Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, 
and Kiribati were added to the list of beneficiaries on 1 July 2020, 1 September 2018, and 
1 August  2020, respectively. Since 1 January 2020, Equatorial Guinea has been excluded from the 
list, as it "graduated " from the LDC categ ory in June 2017.  
 
Question:  
10. Which LDCs have benefitted from zero tariff on 97% of taxable items?  
 
Reply:  China provides zero -tariff to products under 97% of all tariff lines exported to China from 
the LDCs that have established diplomatic relations with China. Up to now, China has provided the 
above -mentioned treatment to 42 LDCs that have exchanged diplomati c notes, boosting greatly the 
exports from the LDCs to China. Since 2008, China has been the major export market for the LDCs, 
importing about one fourth of their total exports.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Para 2.36 -2.38 (Page 36)  
2.36. The FIL grants national treatment to foreign investments in industries outside the Special 
Administrative Measures on Access to Foreign Investment (National Negative List) through the "pre-
establishment national treatment and negative list management system ", under which foreign 
investors and their i nvestments are to be granted treatment no less favourable than that granted to 
domestic investors and their investments at the establishment stage (FIL, Article 4). Article 28 of 
the FIL stipulates that "for industries outside of the National Negative List , the investment 
administration shall be conducted under the principle of equal treatment to domestic and foreign 
investment ". Furthermore, the FIL 's Implementing Regulations require that FIEs and wholly Chinese -
invested enterprises be equally treated in s uch aspects as government funding arrangements, land 
supply, tax and fee reduction and exemption, qualification licensing, development of standards, 
project applications, and human resource policies.  
2.37. The authorities state that the system was develop ed after being implemented in PFTZs and 
was expanded nationwide in 2016, followed by the adoption of the National Negative List in 2017.   
2.38. The FIL and its Implementing Regulations also accord domestic companies and FIEs equal 
treatment regarding acces s to government funding arrangements, land supply, tax abatement or 
exemption, qualification licensing, standard setting, project application, or human resource policies. 
In addition, FIEs are accorded equal treatment under the FIL in, inter alia , particip ation in 
government procurement, protection of intellectual property, and licensing formalities. Article 10 of 
the FIL provides that foreign companies may comment on new legislation and administrative rules 
concerning foreign investment.  
 
Question:  
11. By how much is this expected to increase foreign investments into China?  
 
Reply: In recent years, China has promoted the implementation of high -standard investment 
liberalization and facilitation policies, and expanded foreign investment market access and the  scope 
of foreign investment encouragement. We have introduced and implemented the Foreign Investment 
Law, improved services to foreign enterprises, increasing our market appeal to foreign investors. 
From January to August 2021, foreign direct investment i nto the Chinese mainland, in actual use, 
surged 27.8% year on year to US D 113.78 billion.  
 
Para 2.62 (Page 43)  
China offers various tax incentives to FIEs to promote sectors deemed beneficial to the development 
of its economy. Most equipment imported to be  used in projects in sectors listed in the Catalogue of 
Encouraged Industries may benefit from customs duty exemptions. Goods listed in the Catalogue of 
Products Imported for Foreign Investment Projects and Not Eligible for Tax Exemption and in the 
Catalog ue of Imported Major Technical Equipment and Products Not Eligible for Tax Exemption (last 
revised in 2019 and entered into force on 1 January 2020) are excluded from this treatment.  
 
Question:  
12. Please provide more details on the tax incentives and customs  duty exemptions. What is the 
criteria to qualify for such?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the notification on subsidies submitted by China (G/SCM/N/372/CHN).  
 
Para 2.63 (Page 43)  
In September 2018, the Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, the NDRC, and 
MOFCOM jointly issued the Notice on Widening the Scope of Application of Temporary Waiver for 
Withholding Income Tax for Overseas Investors Using Distributed Profi ts for Direct Investments 
(Cai Shui No. 102, 2018). According to the Notice, the scope of application of the favourable tax 
policy put in place in 2017 (Cai Shui No. 88, 2017) was expanded from encouraged FIPs to all non -
prohibited FIPs and areas. Under th e Notice, profits derived by foreign investors from resident 
companies in China are entitled to a tax deferral incentive and will not trigger withholding tax if the 
investors reinvest the profits in any non -prohibited FIPs.  
 
Question:  
13. What is the effective period of this temporary waiver and what is the criteria to qualify for the 
tax waiver?   
 
Reply: The document was jointly issued by the Ministry of Finance, the State Taxation Administration, 
the National Development and Reform Commission and the  Ministry of Commerce and has been WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 323 - 
 
  promulgated and implemented since January 1, 2018. There is no expiration time limit for the policy. 
For details, please refer to this document.  
 
III. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
Para 3.26 (Page 51)  
With respect to agriculture, the main decreases in tariff rates can be found under food preparations. 
The tariff average under HS Chapter 16 (preparations of meat and fish) dropped from 10.4% in  2017 
to 5.5% in 2021, and the maximum tariff rate dropped from 23%  to 12%. The tariff average under 
HS Chapter 19 (preparations of cereals, flour, starch, or milk) dropped from 17.5% in 2017 to 9.0% 
in 2021, and the maximum tariff rate dropped from 30% to 10%. Under HS Chapter 20 (preparations 
of vegetables, fruit, or nu ts), the tariff average dropped from 20.1% in 2017 to 6% in 2021.  
 
Question:  
14. What is the reason behind the decline in tariff rates on food preparations?  
 
Reply: China unswervingly pursues the opening strategy featuring mutual benefits and win -win 
situation . In 2018, China initially reduced tariffs for four times, involving more than 3000 tax items. 
The total tariff decreased from 9.8% to 7.4%, including daily consumer goods with strong demand 
from the people.  
 
Para 3.30 (Page 53)  
Between 2017 and 2021, ave rage tariff rates decreased across all HS sections except for 03 (fats 
and oils) and 19 (arms and ammunition). The most significant drops were seen in HS Sections 04 
(prepared food, beverages); 11 (textiles and articles); 12 (footwear and headgear); 14 (pr ecious 
stones, etc.); 17 (transport equipment); 20 (miscellaneous manufacturing); and 21 (works of art, 
etc.) (Chart 3.2).  
 
Question:  
15. What is the reason behind the decrease in average tariff rates in HS Sections 04, 11, 12, 14, 
17, 20, and 21?   
 
Reply:  Please refer to the reply of question 12.  
 
Para 3.34 (Page 53)  
China also grants preferential tariff treatment to imports from LDCs  that have established diplomatic 
relations with China, and completed the exchange of diplomatic notes. By February 2021, China had 
implemented zero tariffs on 97% of tariff lines for these 41 LDCs. Submissions have been made by 
LDCs and China to the WTO C ommittee on Rules of Origin regarding utilization rates of LDC exports 
under China 's LDC preferential trade arrangement.  
 
Question:  
16. What is the net effect on China 's GDP? How does this affect China 's economic growth?  
 
Reply: China has been the largest export market of the least developed countries in the world 
since 2008. By absorbing the exports of the least developed countries, China has made positive 
contributions to their growth, helping them better integrate into the multilateral trading sy stem and 
enjoy the fruits of economic globalization. In turn, products from the least developed countries have 
also played a positive role in China 's economic development.  
 
Question:  
17. Is China expected to grant the same preferential tariff treatment to imp orts from more LDCs in 
the coming years? If so, how is this expected to affect China 's economic growth?  
 
Reply: Please refer to the reply of question 9.  
 
Para 3.1.4.1 (Page 55)  
In 2019, VAT accounted for 39.5% of total tax revenue (up from 39.1% in 2017). In May 2018, VAT 
tiers were reduced to 16%, 10%, and 6% (from 17%, 11%, and 6% in 2017).42 Effective from 
April 2019, VAT was further reduced to 13%, 9%, and 6% (Table 3.4).  
 
Question:  
18. How did the reduction in the VAT rates affect the share of VAT i n the total tax revenue?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  19. What is the net effect of this reduction in VAT rates to China 's GDP? How did this affect 
consumption, exports, imports, and total tax revenue?  
 
Reply to the two questions above: Reduction of VAT rate is a major measure in further  alleviating 
the business burden and motivating the market vitality. It is a significant reform for choice for tax 
system improvement and optimizing income distribution structure, and it makes a major choice of 
the macro policies to support steady growth, safeguard employment and adjust the structure.  
 
Para 3.66 (Page 66)  
During the review period, China did not initiate any new safeguard investigations. As indicated in 
the previous Review, China imposed a safeguard measure on sugar on 22 May 2017.China notified 
to the WTO that the measure would remain in force for three years (i.e. until May 2020). China did 
not notify an extension of the safeguard measure. On 16 October 2018, Brazil requested 
consultations with China pursuant to the Understan ding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) on certain Chinese measures concerning imports of sugar. This request 
covers: (i) China 's 22 May 2017 safeguard measure on imported sugar; (ii) China 's administration 
of its TRQ for sug ar; and (iii) China 's so-called "automatic import licensing " system for out -of-quota 
sugar. The European Union, Thailand, and Guatemala requested to join the consultations.85 A panel 
has not been established as of the writing of this report.  
 
Question:  
20. What is the reason behind imposing a safeguard measure on sugar?  
 
Reply:  The Ministry of Commerce of China, upon the application of the domestic industry, initiated 
a safeguard measure investigation on imported sugar products (hereinafter referre d to as 
"investigated products "). The investigation authorities investigated whether the quantity of imported 
investigated products has increased, whether the increase has caused any damage to the domestic 
industry and the extent of the damage (if any), the causal relationship between t he increase in the 
quantity of imported products and the damage. The investigation authorities ruled that the increase 
in the quantity of imported sugar has caused serious damage to the Chinese sugar industry and 
there was a causal relationship between the  increase in the quantity of imported products and the 
serious damage. Therefore, C hina decided to take safeguard measures on imported sugar.  
 
21. What countries were affected by this and how do the safeguard measures vary per country?  
 
Reply:  According to Ann ouncement No.26 [2017] of the Ministry of Commerce, all the 
import  operators shall pay the corresponding customs duties at the customs of the 
People 's Republic  of China according to the tariff for the safeguard measures when they import sugar 
products beyo nd the tariff quota, effective from May 22, 2017. Sugar imports from developing 
countries and regions are exempted from this measure as long as the market share of any of these 
suppliers remains below 3% and the national total share is no more than 9%. An exemption list was 
included in the annex of the Announcement. Within the three -year period of the safeguard measures, 
if the share of imports of the excluded developing countries (regions) exceeds 3% in a given year, 
the safeguard  measures may be applied t o their products from the following year. According to 
Announcement No.58 [2018] of the Ministry of Commerce, since the import share of countries 
(regions) with import shares below 3% in the aforementioned exemption list exceeded 9% in 
aggregate, it was de cided that starting from August 1, 2018, the list was canceled and safeguard 
measures were applied to all out -of-quota sugar imports.  
 
Para 3.97 (Page 72)  
Exporters are entitled to VAT rebates.  
 
Question:  
22. What is the qualification to be entitled to VAT rebates?  
 
Reply: At present, all export enterprises in China can apply the export tax rebate system according 
to relevant regulations.  
 
23. How did the VAT rebates affect China 's economic growth over the recent years? How did the 
VAT rebates affect China 's exports? What is the net effect of total exports less VAT rebates?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: VAT rebate enables Chinese enterprises to participate in international market competition on 
a fair position. On the whole, tax rebates for products in export and taxes collection in import 
constitute a neutral institutional arrangement conducive to the fo rmation of a fair environment for 
market competition.  
 
Para 3.235 (Page 107)  
In 2019, the CNIPA, together with other relevant authorities responsible for the Innovation Policy, 
issued the Notice on Further Strengthening Intellectual Property Pledge Financing, which implements 
support measures to improve the service system of IP pledge financing, strengthen service 
innovation, enhance risk management, and improve supporting measures. It also establishes an 
online channel to facilitate the registration  of patent pledges. In 2020, there were 12,039 patent 
and trademark pledge financing cases, totalling CNY 218 billion in loans, an increase of 43.8% for 
patents and 43.9% for trademarks from 2019.  
 
Question:  
24. How does the IP Pledge Financing work? Who m ay qualify for the same?  
 
Reply: In IP pledge financing, commercial banks accept pledge of property rights in registered 
trademarks, patents, copyrights and other IPRs legally owned by an individual, enterprise or other 
organization, which can be transferr ed in accordance with law, to grant loans or provide other credit 
in accordance with laws and regulations and relevant credit policies.  Therefore, individuals, 
enterprises or other organizations that pledge their own or others ' legally owned property rights in 
intellectual property that can be transferred according to law and meet the credit conditions of 
commercial banks can obtain IP pledge financing from commercial banks.  
 
Para 3.246 (Page 108)  
The National Copyright Administ ration administers copyright registration nationally. In the case of 
computer software, the Copyright Protection Centre of China registers copyrighted works.  
 
Question:  
25. Why is the registration of computer software different from other works? Is there a  sui generis 
system of protection for computer software?  
 
Reply:  In order to promote the development of China 's software industry and improve the innovation 
ability and competitiveness of China 's IT industry, the state copyright administrative department 
encourages software registration and provides  protection for registered software.  
 
Para 3.294 (Page 118)  
During the review period, copyright surveillance of large -scale video, music, and literatu re websites, 
as well as online storage service providers, was strengthened. In 2018 and 2019, early  warnings for 
14 batches of key works, and 139 films and television works, were issued. These were reaffirmed 
by resident and non -resident right holders. The  authorities have actively implemented outreach and 
training activities on enforcement and produced specific publications to inform the public.  
 
Question:  
26. What are early warnings? How does China enforce these early warnings if the online platform 
or intermediate service provider is not located in China?  
 
Reply : In accordance with the National Copyright Administration of China 's Opinions on Further 
Strengthening Copyright Supervision of Works Distributed  on the Internet and the work plan for 
copyright supervision, an early warning list of key works for copyright protection will be issued 
regularly based on the authorization of w orks reported by rights holders. Relevant ISPs shall take 
the following protection measures for key works in the list: ISPs directly providing content shall not 
provide works in the list without permission; ISPs providing storage space shall prohibit users  from 
uploading works in the list; Relevant ISPs shall expedite the processing of notifications from rights 
holders of works in the list regarding the removal of related content or disconnection of links. The 
local copyright supervisory authorities shall i ssue early warning notices to the major ISPs in the 
region and increase copyright supervision. Unauthorized illegal dissemination of key works in the 
warning list through information networks should be quickly investigated and strictly punished 
according t o law.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  IV. TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
Para 4.34 (Page 133)  
During the period between 2015 and 2019, there was a downward trend in employment, the number 
of registered fishing vessels, and the marine catch. Aquaculture production remained relatively 
stable (Table 4.13).  
 
Question:  
27. What is the reason behind the downward trend in employment, the number of registered 
fishing vessels, and the marine catch?  
 
Reply: The main reasons for the decline of the above three indicators are: First, the 
Chinese  government has promoted the reductio n of marine fishing vessels and transition to other 
industries, as well as the implementation of the total management system of offshore fishery 
resources. Second, the fishing industry involves a large number of  tough jobs . With China 's economic 
and social  development, the labor force has more options, making the fishing industry less attractive.  
 
Para 4.48 (Page 138)  
China continued to liberalize its mining sector during the review period. For example, the 2019 
National Negative List and Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) Negative List removed foreign investment 
prohibitions on the exploration or mining of molybdenum, tin, antimony, and fluorite. In the 2018 
PFTZ Negative List, the measure that oil and natural gas exploration and development shall be 
restricte d to equity joint ventures or contractual joint ventures was abolished, and the same measure 
was abolished nationally in 2019. No modification pertaining to mining was made to the 2020 editions 
of National and PFTZ Negative Lists. The only foreign investme nt limitation in mining consists of 
prohibition of foreign investment in the exploration, exploitation, and processing of rare earths, 
radioactive minerals, and tungsten.  
 
Question:  
28. Did liberalizing the mining sector, particularly removing the foreign investment prohibitions 
on the exploration or mining of molybdenum, tin, antimony, and fluorite, generate inward FDIs into 
the sector? Are there special policies, requirements or incenti ves in place for potential investments 
or investors in mining?  
 
Reply: For the details, please refer to the negative list for the foreign investors and the Catalogue 
of Industries for Encouraging Foreign Investment (2020 edition) . 
 
Para 4.55 (Page 140)  
Regarding trade in mineral resources, according to the Catalogue of Commodities Subject to the 
Administration of Export Licences for 2020, exports of certain mineral products, including coal and 
oil (excluding lubricating oil), are subject to an export quota  and an export licence, while exports of 
rare earth minerals, tin and tin products, tungsten and tungsten products, molybdenum and 
molybdenum products, antimony and antimony products, indium and indium products, coke, 
lubricating oil, and fluorite are subj ect to an export licence. " 
 
Question:  
29. What is the rationale of China for imposing export quota and export licensing on certain 
mineral  resources? Did this policy encounter concerns from trading partners, particularly under 
WTO rules (GATT)?  
 
Reply: Quota management has been implemented for the export of some resource mineral products, 
mainly to ensure national economic security and make rational full use of relevant resources; The 
administration of export licenses for certain mineral resources  is mainly for the purpose of rational 
allocation of resources, standardization of the order of export operations and safeguarding of 
national economic interests and security.  
 
Para 4.56 (Page 140)  
China is the world 's largest energy producer and consumer . In 2019, its total primary energy  
production was 3.97 billion tonnes of standard coal equivalents (SCEs). The energy self -sufficiency 
rate was 78.5%. China 's energy consumption structure continued to change during the review 
period, as the proportion of coal declined, accounting for 57.7% of the total energy consumption, 
down from 63.8% in 2015. Petroleum accounts for 18.9%, natural gas accounts for 8.1%, and WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  primary electricity and other energy such as hydropower, nuclear power, and wind power account 
for 15.3%.  
 
Question:  
30. China 's current energy mix is still heavily sourced on coal, and its pledge to have carbon 
dioxide emissions peak by 2030 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 would at least mean 
significant shift to renewable sources of energy. What is the target energy mix  by 2030 to achieve 
this goal?  
 
Reply: By 2030, non -fossil energy makes up approximately 25% of one -time energy consumption, 
and wind -power and photovoltaics of more than 1.2 billion kW will be developed.  
 
31. It only mentioned China 's carbon dioxide emi ssions target to peak by 2030, but the level is 
not specified. Is the country still heading to maintaining its commitment of over 65% carbon intensity 
reduction as conveyed in its latest 2020 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) pronouncement?  
 
Reply:  China will stick to this series of targets. By 2030, carbon dioxide emission per Chinese unit 
GDP will decrease by over 65% compared with that in 2005, non -fossil energy will make 
approximately 25% of one -time energy consumption, and the total installed c apacity of wind power 
and solar power will hit more than 1.2 billion kW.  
 
Para 4.63 (Page 142)  
In December 2017, China launched the construction plan for the National Carbon Emission Right 
Trading Market (Power Generation Industry) to start building its N ational Carbon Emission Trading 
System. According to the plan, the power generation industry will be the first to carry out 
transactions on the national carbon market, which will be gradually expanded to other industries. 
In 2018, the work of responding to  climate change was adjusted and incorporated into the mandates 
of the newly formed Ministry of Ecology and Environment.  
 
Question:  
32. The report states that power generation will be the first to carry out transactions on the 
national carbon market and it will be gradually expanded to other industries. What other sectors or 
industries are being considered? Is there an official timeline as  to when each of the additional sectors 
will be included in the national carbon market? What measures has the government undertaken to 
encourage or promote reduction in carbon emission and participation in the market? How successful 
is the national carbon market so far?  
 
Reply: In July of this year, the national carbon market initiated officially the on -line transactions, 
and has achieved active results. During the first performance period, 2162 of the key emission 
entities in the power generation industry  were included, covering an annual carbon dioxide emission 
of around 4.5  billion tons, making up approximately 45% of the national figure in this regard. Up 
until 30 September 2021, the accumulated quota transactions on the national carbon market has 
been 17.649 million tons, with the accumulated transaction amount having been RMB 801 million.  
The construction of China 's carbon emissions trading market is in its infancy, and relevant laws and 
regulations are still being explored and improved. In the future , the capacity of the carbon emissions 
trading market will be gradually expanded depending on the operations of the market. Meantime, 
China will also actively promote reductions in carbon emissions with various policy measures, and 
actively engage itself i n promotion of market -oriented mechanisms of energy consumption 
entitlement trading and green power trading, etc.  
 
For next step, China will, based on the sound operations of the carbon market in the power 
generation industry, expand the market 's industrial coverage. To encourage the market involvement 
and fully exert the market mechanism 's significant functions in curtailing the green -house gas 
emissions, the Chinese side will continue to promote constructions of the national carbon market 
policy system, infrastructure and its technical regulation system.  
 
33. What other sectors/ industri es are targeted to be included in the carbon trading market? Is 
there any timeline on when the market will be expanded to include these additional sectors?  
 
Reply: Capacity expansion of the carbon emissions trading market will need a comprehensive study, 
with no specific timetable available for the time being.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Para 4.66 (Page 142)  
On 1 January 2018, China implemented a new environmental tax policy aimed at promoting  
environmental protection and reducing pollution.  
 
Question:  
34. What has been achieved so far by the new environmental tax policy which was launched 
in 2018? Was it effective?  
 
Reply: On December 25, 2016, the Environmental Protection Law of the People 's Republic of China 
was passed at the 25th Session of the Standing  Committee of the 12th National People 's Congress 
(NPC), and was officially implemented starting January 1, 2018. For the past three years since the 
start of levying the environmental protection tax, operations of the tax system was stable and 
smooth, and the rigidity of law enforcement was being steadily increased, with gradual appearance 
of green effects. The income and scale of environmental protection tax is basically stable, and the 
"vanguard " role of green tax is increasingly important, which has cont ributed to strengthening the 
improvement of ecological environment and winning the battle of pollution prevention and control. 
The tax departments and ecological and environmental departments nationwide have fully 
implemented the environmental protection t ax law, realized the expectation of regulation of 
"Three  Enhancements, Three Incentives and Three Reductions ", and promoted the ecological 
civilization and green development drive. 1. Realize the "Three Enhancements " in law enforcement 
rigidity, tax orient ation and synergistic benefits. 2. Fulfill the "Three Incentives " of cleaner production, 
centralized treatment and recycling. 3. Achieve the "Three Reductions " of excessive discharge rate, 
pollution discharge and environmental cost of GDP.  
Over the past three years, the over standard rate of on -line pollution monitoring has decreased 
from 11.32% in 2018 to 9.74% in 2020, indicating the obvious regulation effect  of the environmental 
protection tax; The decreases in the annual average of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions 
of major air pollutants declared by taxpayers were 3.5% and 3.1% respectively, and the increases 
in the annual average of chemical oxyg en demand and ammonia nitrogen emissions of major water 
pollutants were 3.8% and 3.3% respectively. The area and proportion of blue sky and white clouds, 
clear water and green banks have increased significantly, and the environment has improved notably 
year by year.  
 
Para 4.92 (Page 148)  
China is the world 's largest producer of industrial goods. In 2018, with a total value -added amounting 
to some USD 4 trillion, the Chinese manufacturing sector accounted for 28% of global manufacturing 
output.54 The sector  is an important driver of China 's economy, despite its shrinking contribution to 
the country 's GDP. Its share as a percentage of GDP stood at 27.2% in 2019, down from 29% 
in 2015. Additionally, its share in private sector employment was around 15.4% in 20 18.55 In 2019, 
manufactured products accounted for 95.4% of China 's exports (up from 93.7% in 2016) and 66.5% 
of its imports (up from 64.9% in 2016).  
 
Question:  
35. What is the reason behind the decline in the percentage share of the manufacturing industry 
in China 's total GDP?  
 
Reply: In recent years all the way, the proportion of China 's manufacturing industry in GDP has 
shown a downward trend. The decrease in the proportion of manufacturing industry is the objective 
and direct resu lt of the changes in the stage of the economic and social development and industrial 
transformation and upgrading of China. Now, China has in fact entered into the late stage of 
industrialization, with a decrease in the proportion of manufacturing industry  and an increase in the 
proportion of service industry, which is consistent with the historical experience of developed 
countries. At the same time, industrial upgrading has led to the refinement of the division of labor. 
The R&D, design, logistics, market ing and other links originally belonging to the manufacturing 
industry are separated from the manufacturing industry to become independent producer services 
and to be statistically included in the service industry, which will also lead to the further decli ne of 
the proportion of the manufacturing industry from the statistical perspective. Meanwhile, the overall 
quality and efficiency of the Chinese domestic manufacturing industry is not high, and the problem 
of imbalance and insufficiency in development is still prominent. The supply structure has not yet 
been able to meet the demands of consumption upgrading, while other industries show too high 
return on investment, resulting in a "siphon " effect on capital and talent, which inhibits the 
development of the  manufacturing industries. An overall downward trend is formed in the share of 
the manufacturing industries.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Para 4.93 (Page 148)  
The authorities consider that China 's performance in manufacturing is largely attributed to its 
increasing integration in gl obal value chains, driven by factors including trade and investment 
liberalization, abundant and productive labour, a large domestic market, high -quality infrastructure, 
and innovation. However, the long -term sustainability of the sector may face environme ntal 
challenges and excess capacity. Firms in this sector may consistently face low capacity utilization 
rates, as well as incurring losses. Nevertheless, the authorities state that, currently, there is no 
excess coal production capacity in China; since 20 16, it has closed more than 1 billion tonnes of 
outdated coal production capacity, and the proportion of outputs of large -scale coal mines with or 
above 1.2 million tonnes per year has exceeded 80%. They also state that the steel, cement, 
aluminium, and ch emicals sectors have sound profitability levels, and they consider that there is no 
excess capacity in these industries.  
 
Question:  
36. What is China 's policy on environment with respect to pollutant industries, such as steel and 
chemicals? Further, how did China address the sustainability of the manufacturing sector given 
environmental challenges and concerns on excess capacity, specifically, for steel  and shipbuilding?  
 
Reply: China has been leading the world in promoting the ultra -low emission transformation and 
environmental emission of the steel industry. During the period of "the 14th Five Year Plan ", China 
will continue to deepen the supply -side structural reform, consolidate the achievements in reducing 
overcapacity in the steel industry, and promote the high -quality development of relevant industries. 
Meanwhile, China encourages shipbuilding enterprises to vigorously accelerate the transformatio n 
of green and intelligent manufacturing, strengthen the research and development of green and 
intelligent ships, and support the efforts to resolve overcapacity through legalized and market -based 
measures, so as to promote their sound and sustainable deve lopment.  
 
Para 4.101 (Page 149)  
China is the largest automobile market worldwide, both in terms of demand and supply. According 
to the results of the national survey of industries above a certain scale60, the production volume of 
automobiles in 2018 and 2019 was around 27.8 million and 25.7 million, respectively.  
 
Question:  
37. What the top countries from which China imports automobiles, automotive parts, and 
components?  
 
Reply: According to 2019 trade data, the top five countries importing automobiles (chassis included) 
to China were Germany, Japan, the United States, Slovakia and the United Kingdom, while the top 
five importing automobile parts were Germany, Japan, South Korea, the United States and Mexico.   
 
38. What the top countries to which China exports automobiles, automotive parts, and components?  
 
Reply: According to 2019 trade data, the top five countries exporting automobile parts from China 
were the United States, Japan, South Korea, Mexico and Germany, while the top five countries 
exporting automobile (chassis included) were Mexico, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Afri ca and 
Chile.  
 
39. What is the automobile industry 's percentage share in China 's GDP?  
 
Reply: According to the Statistical Communique of the People 's Republic of China on the 2020 
National Economic and Social Development , the 2020 automobile output in China is 25.325 million. 
At present, there are no statistics on its proportion of GDP.  
 
Para 4.3.2.5 (Page 154)  
The Made in China 2025 initiative considers shipbuilding as one of its 10 priority sectors. The Plan 
has the overarching strategic objective to make China strong in high -end shipbuilding. Furthermore, 
in the context of the 13th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, the MIIT unveiled 
in December 2016 the Shipbuilding Industry Deepening Structural Adjustment, Accelerating 
Transformation and Upgrading Action Plan (2016 -20), outlining the reform and transformation 
upgrade needed for the shipbuildi ng industry.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Questions:  
40. Why is China shifting to high -end shipbuilding and what types of ships/vessels are these in the 
shipbuilding segment? Is there a guiding study or policy behind this shift?  
 
Reply: The gradual transformation of shipbuilding industry in China from low end to medium and 
high end results from the scientific and technological progress and the continuous improvement of 
basic capacity of shipbuilding industry in China, and it is also the basic natural law of industrial  
development. High -end products of ships mainly include high -tech and high value -added ships such 
as large liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships and super large container ships. We encourage shipbuilding 
enterprises to strengthen scientific research, so as to provide more and better products for the 
society and realize their own sound development.  
 
Para 4.197 (Page 167)  
China is the world 's largest telecommunications market in terms of mobile, fixed -telephone, fixed -
broadband, and mobile broadband subscription s.111 In 2020, information, communication, and 
computer services accounted for 16.5% of total services exports (14.3% in 2019) and 8.7% of total 
services imports (5.3% in 2019).  
 
Question:  
41. What is the telecommunication industry 's percentage share in China 's GDP?  
 
Reply: According to the Statistical Communique of the People 's Republic of China on the 2020 
National Economic and Social Development, the total amount of 2020 telecom services in China is 
RMB 13675.8 billion. At present, there are no statistics on its proportion of GDP.  
 
Para 4.200. (Page 168)  
Foreign ownership p articipation in telecom companies (2019): In the basic telecoms sector, the 
proportions of overseas public shares of China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom 
were 17.15%, 27.28%, and 20.1%, respectively. By end -2020, a total of 395 foreign -invested 
enterprises had entered China 's telecoms market, mainly engaged in information services and e -
commerce -related businesses.  
 
Questions:  
42. In the report, a total of 395 foreign -invested enterprises had entered China 's telecoms market, 
mainly engaged in information services and e -commerce -related businesses by the end of 2020. 
May we request for information on the incentives provided by the Government of China to foreign 
investors in the telecommunications sector? Are there also subsidies/ incentives provided to those 
investing in less developed areas/ last mile connectivity?  
 
Reply: China will strictly fulfill  the commitments for the accession to the WTO and welcomes qualified 
foreign telecom service providers to provide services in China. For the less -developed areas, one of 
major measures in telecommunications is to shorten the "digital gap " between the urban  and rural 
areas. Related departments of China research and formulate the Universal Service Compensation 
Mechanism of telecommunications, which gives strong support to telecommunication enterprises in 
speeding up the provision of information service and gu arantee to the poor areas particularly.  
 
Para 4.225 (Page 173)  
By law, all e -commerce operators, except individuals who sell their own agricultural products or 
handcrafts or who carry out sporadic and small transactions, are required to obtain a business  
license. E -commerce operators must fulfil their taxation obligations and could enjoy preferential tax 
treatments according to relevant laws and regulations.  
 
Question:  
43. What is the threshold volume or amount of sales considered as "sporadic and small 
transactions "?  
 
Reply:  On March 15, 2021, the State Administration for Market Regulation issued the Regulation for 
Online Transaction S upervision to provide guidelines for implementing the E -commerce Law, 
effective on May 1, 2021. According to Article 8 of the regulation, online transaction  operators must 
not violate laws, regulations or decisions of the State Council, or engage in unlice nsed operations. 
In addition to circumstances not required to be registered per Article 10 of the E -commerce Law of 
the People 's Republic of China, online transaction operators shall register as market entities WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 331 - 
 
  accord ing to law. For online orders of cleani ng, washing, sewing, hairdressing, home moving, key 
making, plumbing, home appliance and furniture repair and maintenance and other labor activities 
for the convenience of the public not needing to be licenses according to law, individuals engaged in 
such activities do not need to register per Article 10 of the E -commerce Law of the 
People 's Republic  of China. Individuals engaged in online transaction activities, with annual 
transactions not exceeding RMB 100,000, do not need to register per Article 10 of t he E-commerce 
Law of the People 's Republic of China. For the same operator opening multiple online stores in the 
same platform or different platforms, the online transactions of different store s are calculated as a 
whole. Individuals engaged in sporadic an d small transaction activities subject to administrative 
licensing according to law shall register as a market entity according to law.  
 
Para 4.227 (Page 173)  
Article 17 of the E -commerce Law further fosters consumer protection by requiring e -commerce 
operators to disclose truthful, accurate, and timely information concerning commodities or services 
and to avoid engaging in misleading and deceptive practices.  
 
Question:  
44. What practices are considered misleading and deceptive practices in e -commerce? Are there any 
stipulations on sanctions for misleading and deceptive practices in e -commerce?  
 
Reply : On March 15, 2021, the State Administration for Market Regulation issued the Regulation for 
Online Transaction S upervision, effective on May 1, 2021. According to Article 14 of the regulation, 
online transaction operators must not violate the Law of the People 's Republic of China Against Unfair 
Competition, or engage in unfair competition that disrupts the order of market competition or harms 
the legitimate rights and interests of other operators or consumers. For details, see: 
http://www.gov.cn/ zhengce/zhengceku/2021 -03/16/content_5593226.htm . In terms of legal 
liability, Article 85 of the E -Commerce Law, Article 43 of the Regulation for Online Transaction 
Supervision, and Article 20 of the Law A gainst Unfair Competition provide for penalties for  misleading 
and deceptive practices.  
 
Para 4.230. (Page 173)  
Regarding foreign business, the E -commerce Law provides that China shall encourage cross -border 
e-commerce (CBEC ) development. In practice, the authorities have been promoting CBEC (activities 
of purchasing or selling products via online shopping across national borders). On 27 April 2020, 
the State Council issued the Approval of the Establishment of Integrated Pilo t Areas for Cross -border 
E-commerce in 46 Cities and Areas (Guo Han No. 47, 2020). This brought the total number of CBEC 
pilot zones to 105. In December 2019, the authorities extended the List of Goods under Cross -border 
E-commerce Retail Importation to al low more foreign goods to be delivered to Chinese consumers 
through the CBEC retail importation programme.  
 
Question:  
45. The E -commerce Law provides that China shall encourage cross -border e -commerce (CBEC) 
development. In this regard, as MSMEs continue to b e less represented in the global trade3, can 
China share some best practices on how it enables/supports MSMEs to participate in cross -border 
e-commerce? Does the government provide incentives to these MSMEs? If yes, what are these 
incentives?  
 
Reply: First, we have significantly reduced the specialization threshold of international trade, so that 
a large number of SMEs that "lacked knowledge, capital and capability " could become operators of 
the new trade model. More than 30,000 enterprises have brought their filing to the online 
comprehensive service platform in the cross -border e -commerce pilot zone. Since this year, the 
platform has seen over 5,000 newcomers. Seco ndly, through policy innovation, we have enabled 
some products that had difficulties in going global to be sold in the world market more conveniently 
and efficiently. At the same time, innovations in import processes have allowed more foreign quality 
produ cts to enter the domestic market through online shopping. Third, the long -tail effect. By 
integrating fragmented demand and developing the part of market that traditional trade failed to 
reach, we have cultivated new growth drivers of foreign trade.  
 
In or der to support the medium and small -sized enterprises in participating in cross -border e -
commerce, China has introduced a series of tax policies. For example, the tax exemption policy for 
 
3 OECD, 2020.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  VAT without a ticket is temporarily implemented if the goods under t he supervision of "single 
window " platform in China (Hangzhou) Cross -Border E -Commerce Comprehensive Pilot Zone comply 
with requirements, which is also promoted to those comprehensive pilot zones with the approval of 
the State Council. Preferences to the t ariff, VAT at import link and consumption tax are provided to 
the imported goods within the single trade limit among those retail imported goods in cross -border 
e-commerce.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Para 1.3 (Page  4) 
In 2020, the sudden COVID -19 pandemic ravaged the world and the global economy fell into a deep 
recession. China has fully supported global cooperation on combating COVID -19. It has made 
contributions to maintaining the stability of the global industri al chains and supply chains, and 
building a global health community for mankind. China has been upholding the principle of pursuing 
shared benefits through consultation and collaboration, and promoting Belt and Road cooperation 
with all parties. China acti vely participates in global governance, firmly supports the multilateral 
trading system, and resolutely opposes unilateralism and protectionism. China further advances the 
building of free trade areas, continuously improves the level of South -South coopera tion, and makes 
economic globalization more open, inclusive, beneficial to all, balanced, and win -win.  
 
Question:  
46. Can China provide specific examples of measures, policies, or initiatives undertaken in its 
response to COVID -19 which are contributory to global cooperation on combating COVID -19, such 
as on vaccine development and supply chain integration, among others?  
 
Reply : Since the outbreak of COVID -19, China has been taking a positive attitude toward global 
cooperation in vaccine supply, encouraging various vaccine R&D entities to strengthen international 
exchange in vaccine development, production and use, and maintaining  close communication with 
international organizations such as the WHO, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation and 
the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations.  
First, the list of vaccine products available for foreign export has been anno unced, in which 
four vaccine products produced by Chinese enterprises have been included. Secondly, we 
supported  vaccine manufacturers to apply for inclusion in the Emergency Use List (EUL) of the 
World  Health Organization (WHO). At present, WHO has includ ed the relevant vaccines of Sinopharm 
and Kexing Biopharm in the EUL.  
 
For example, in late May 2021, BRICS Vaccine R&D Center -China Center was launched by Sinovac 
Research and Development Co., Ltd. The center will work with countries from the BRICS and ot her 
parts of the world to cooperate with universities, research institutions, disease control institutions 
and industries through online and offline approaches to monitor epidemic changes and virus 
mutations, facilitate vaccine research and commercializati on, and discuss vaccine application 
strategies. It invites outstanding scientists worldwide to join the team, so as to advance the 
construction of a global R&D system and platform, and strengthen international R&D collaboration 
in developing and testing va ccines and other pharmaceutical products.  
 
As of early October 2021, China has provided more than 1.4 billion doses of vaccines to more than 
110 countries and international organizations through donations, exports, and joint production. 
China has launched vaccine co -production initiatives in 11 countries and will do so together with 
more developing countries. Chinese companies also produces  vaccines for some foreign countries, 
helping to boost global vaccine production capacity.  
 
II. GROUNDING ITS EFFORTS I N THE NEW DEVELOPMENT STAGE, APPLYING THE NEW 
DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY, AND FOSTERING A NEW DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM SO AS 
TO PROMOTE HIGH -QUALITY DEVELOPMENT  
Para 2.4 -2.5 (Page 5)  
2.4. First, China carried out COVID -19 prevention and control and pursued econom ic and social 
development in a coordinated way, and achieved continuous and stable recovery of the economy.  
2.5. In 2018, the GDP reached RMB  91,928.1 billion, an increase of 6.7% over the previous year. 
In 2019, the GDP stood at RMB 98,651.5 billion, an increase of 6.0%. In 2020, the GDP amounted 
to RMB 101,598.6 billion, an increase of 2.3%, and the total economic output crossed RMB 
100 trillion threshold. In 2020, 11.86 million new jobs were created; the disposable income per WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 333 - 
 
  capita of urban and rural residents grew by 2.1% in real terms, which was basically in line with 
economic growth; and the registered urban unemployment rate was 4.2%.  
 
Question:  
47. How did China generate 11.86 million in employment in 2020 alone immediately following the 
direct impact of the COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
Reply: In the whole year of 2020, the urban employment of China increased by 11.86 million, above 
the annual targ et. The urban survey unemployment rate averaged 5.6%, below the expected 
regulation target. First, introduce new ways to develop the employment guarantee mechanism to 
promote the resumption of work and recovered production of enterprises. Establish a 24 -hour labor 
scheduling guarantee mechanism in time for key enterprises to help tens of thousands of key 
enterprises engaged such as pharmaceutical material production solve the urgent need of the 
employment of more than 1 million people. Second, implement the  policy combining "reduction, 
postponement, exemption, rebate and subsidy ", effectively alleviate the difficulties and pressure of 
enterprises and stabilize the employment stock. In the whole year, the burden of enterprises was 
reduced by RMB 1.54 trillion  in the three social insurances of pension, unemployment and work -
related injury, and RMB 104.2 billion was returned for job stabilization through unemployment 
insurance. Third, make every endeavor to broaden employment channels and keep the employment 
of key groups stable. At the end of last year, the overall employment rate of college graduates was 
over 90%, and the total number of migrant workers restored to 98.2% of the previous year. The 
number of domestic poor workers reached 32.43 million, with an in crease of 10% over that in the 
previous year. Fourth, optimize public employment services, carry out actions to improve vocational 
skills, and improve the efficiency of supply and demand matching. Organize and carry out a series 
of activities such as one -hundred -day online recruitment for millions of job seekers and one -
hundred -day free online skill training, and provide more than 100 million people with various 
employment services.  
 
48. What recovery plans and/or programs were put in place and how were they ca rried out 
immediately and effectively?  
 
Reply: In response to the pandemic impact, China has carried out related work in the following 
aspects to promote enterprises in their resumption of work and production. First, implement tax 
reduction and exemption policies and social insurance fee reduction and exemption policies. Second, 
reduce the electricity price for the general industrial and commercial fields and cancel the port 
construction fee. Third, improve the efficiency and level of resumption of work an d production by 
focusing on pandemic prevention materials, daily necessities, public services, public utilities and 
high-tech industries. Fourth, focus on small and medium -sized enterprises, implement the special 
action of digital energy enabling for small  and medium -sized enterprises, and help enterprises to 
adopt cloud working style, use the cloud applications, and make transformation and upgrading.  
 
III. PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -
WIN COOPERATION  
Para 3.2 (Page 6)   
Facing the complicated and profound changes in domestic and international environment, in 
November 2019, China issued the Guiding Opinions on Promoting the High -quality Development of 
Trade , which called for speeding up the transformation from the opening up based on flows of goods 
and factors of production to the opening up based on rules and related institutions, vigorously 
optimizing trade structure, enhancing the balanced and coordinated  development of trade, and 
promoting orderly and free flow of production factors, efficient allocation of resources and in -depth 
integration of domestic and international markets to realize the high -quality development of trade.  
 
Question:  
49. Please provide  more information on how the Guiding Opinions on Promoting the 
High-Development of Trade has helped speed up exports and imports. Has this led to any concrete 
trade measures?  
 
Reply:  The Guiding Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Advancing the 
High-quality Development of Trade has played an important role in promoting the high -quality 
development of China 's foreign trade and helping China 's trade partners to share the opportunities 
and achievements of China 's trade development.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 334 - 
 
  (1) We have enhanced trade innovation capacity to create sound business environment and promote 
the innovative development of foreign trade. New business models and forms have prospered, with 
the number of cross -border e -commerce pilot zones jumping to 105 , more than 1,800 overseas 
warehouses for enterprises being built in the pilot zones, and the number of pilot market 
procurement trade mode increasing to 31.  
(2) We have promoted the optimization of foreign trade structure. We have continuously optimized 
international and domestic market layout, business entities, commodity structure and trade patterns. 
We have continue to develop the traditional markets such as those of developed economies while 
expanding into emerging markets.  
(3) We have further expanded  opening up to share our development achievements with other 
countries. China has actively expanded imports and held a high -standard China International Import 
Expo to fully stimulate the import potential. The cumulative merchandise imports are expected to  
exceed 22 trillion U.S. dollars in the next 10 years. In 2020, on the basis of ensuring domestic 
epidemic prevention and control, China had made efforts to export epidemic prevention materials to 
more than 200 countries and regions, which has significantl y promoted international cooperation in 
fighting against the COVID -19. 
 
Para 3.3 -3.4 (Page 7)  
3.3. Since the last review, China has further streamlined import administration procedures and 
continuously lowered import tariffs. In November 2018, China lowered the import duties 
on 1,585  tariff lines covering mechanical and electrical equipment, parts and raw materials, etc. In 
each January from 2019 to 2021, China implemented interim import tariff rates, which are lower 
than the MFN tariff rates of over 700 items of goods, including some advanced equipment, spare 
parts, resource products and pharmaceutical raw materials. In each July from 2019 to 2021, China 
actively fulfilled its commitments on concessions for tariff reductions in the Information Technol ogy 
Agreement (ITA) expansion, and implemented the 4th, 5th and 6th round of tariff reduction for 
certain information technology products. By 2010, China had fulfilled all of its WTO accession 
commitments for tariff reduction, reducing the average tariff l evel to 9.8%. After further self -initiated 
tariff reduction, China 's average tariff level stood at 7.5% at the beginning of 2021.  
3.4. On 4 November 2020, China set up ten demonstration zones on import promotion, including 
Shanghai Hongqiao Central Busine ss District and Jinpu New Area in Dalian, Liaoning, covering the 
eastern, central, western regions as well as the old industrial base in Northeast China. These zones 
include sea, land and air ports, reflecting the dynamism and potential of China 's import. The 
demonstration zones are designed to play an important role in four aspects. First, facilitating import 
and tapping import potential through innovation and reduction of institutional costs. Second, 
expanding the import of technical equipment and raw mat erials and promoting the deep integration 
of imports and industries. Third, increasing the supply of domestic high -quality goods, and leading 
and creating domestic demand with high -quality supply. Fourth, focusing on the import distribution 
centres as cond itions permit and giving play to the exemplary role of the centres to surrounding 
areas.  
 
Question:  
50. Does China have any plans in the short -term to engage its non -FTA trade partners in bilateral 
FTA negotiations? If so, how does China 's self -initiated tari ff reduction on various products factor 
into its plans on engaging trade partners in bilateral and/or further regional trade agreements?  
 
Reply:  China actively supports the construction of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 
and continues to conduct free trade negotiations with African countries and regions with such an 
intention. In recent years, China has taken the initiative to reduce tariffs several times, and the total 
tariff level has now been cut to 7.5%. At the same time, China is vigo rously weaving a global network 
of high -standard FTAs, and is expecting to sign free trade agreements with more trade partners 
intending to join. Whether it 's a tariff reduction initiated by China or a negotiated free trade 
agreement, the goal is to furthe r expand openness, tear down trade barriers and promote trade 
liberalization and facilitation.  
 
51. What is the impact of China 's import promotion initiatives on its domestic industries, noting that 
these industries may potentially be manufacturing of intermediate goods since the expansion of 
importation of technical equipment and raw materials are among the targeted activities? Ar e there 
any mitigating measures in place to ensure that its domestic industries are not compromised by 
such promotion programs?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 335 - 
 
  Reply: The Chinese market has constantly expanded its opening to the outside world. More foreign 
high-quality products and ser vices are welcome to enter the Chinese market to better meet the 
ever-improving consumption needs of domestic customers. For example, China has held the China 
International Import Expo for three consecutive years, which aims to promote opening and global 
exchange through active measures, which is conducive to deepening the supply side structural 
reform, expanding medium and high -end supply, enabling customers to experience and enjoy global 
good goods without going abroad, and better meet the people 's needs for a better life. So, it is an 
effective carrier to promote high -quality economic development. The Expo is conducive to all 
countries to share development opportunities in China, expand cooperation space and tighten ties 
of interest. It is a practical mov e to boost the construction of a community with a shared future for 
mankind.  
 
52. Please provide more information on the import administration procedures that have been 
streamlined  
 
Reply: China will continue to optimize the procedures for import license management, and ensure 
the latest conditions can always be reported to the Import License Committee in a timely manner.  
 
Para 3.5 (Page 7)  
In January 2020, China notified measures implementing the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) to 
the WTO ahead of schedule, including measures like "Exchange of Information ", "Provision of 
Information " and "Establishment and Publication of Average Release T imes". So far, China has fully 
implemented the measures stipulated in the TFA.  
 
Question:  
53. Please provide more details on the trade measures implemented.  
 
Reply: China has informed the WTO of its implementation of the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, 
and has repeatedly shared its own measures and achievements in implementing the agreement with 
the WTO Trade Facilitation Committee. For details, it is advised to visit the relevant pages of the 
WTO website.  
 
Para 3.32 (Page 11)  
Since the last review, China has signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with Mauritius and Cambodia 
respectively, signed protocols on upgrading FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand respectively, and 
signed Protocol of the Second Phase of FTA with Pakistan. China -Mauritius FTA came i nto effect on 
1 January 2021, which is the first FTA signed between China and an African country. The protocol 
upgrading China -Chile FTA came into effect in March 2019. In addition, in December 2018, the 
Mainland of China signed the Agreement on Trade in G oods under the Closer Economic Partnership 
Arrangement (CEPA) with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macao Special 
Administrative Region respectively. In November 2019, the Mainland of China signed the Agreement 
Concerning Amendment to th e CEPA Agreement on Trade in Services with the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region and the Macao Special Administrative Region respectively.  
 
Question:  
54. How is this expected to affect China 's trade relations with the rest of Africa?  
 
Reply: The China -Mauritius Free Trade Agreement is the first free trade agreement signed between 
China and an African country. The conclusion and entry into force of the agreement will 
further  enhance the level of mutually beneficial cooperation between China and Mauritius,  promote 
China -Africa cooperation and contribute to the construction of a closer China -Africa community of 
common destiny.  
 
After the agreement taking effect, in the field of trade in goods, the proportion of product tax items 
that China and Mauritius fin ally achieve zero tariffs has reached 96.3% and 94.2% respectively. In 
trade in services, both sides have also promised to open up more than 100 sub -sectors. And in the 
field of investment, this is the first time that China has upgraded the original invest ment protection 
agreement with an African country. Moreover, the two sides have also reached agreements in many 
fields, such as economic and technical cooperation, rules of origin, trade remedies, and technical 
barriers to trade. The China -Mauritius Free T rade Agreement will create a more open, transparent 
and easy business environment for enterprises, improve the well -being of the two peoples, help the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  economic recovery after the pandemic, and play a good demonstration role in deepening China -
Africa cooper ation.  
 
55. Does this open up greater opportunities for China in terms of trade in the African region?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the reply of question 52.  
 
Para 3.25 (Page 11)  
Up to now, China has signed 19 free trade agreements with 26 countries or regions, in which over 
90% of China 's tariff lines are or will reduce to zero. Currently, there are 12 ongoing negotiations 
for new FTAs or upgrading existing ones, including China -Japan -Republic of Korea FTA, China -Gulf 
Cooperation Council FTA, China -Sri Lanka FTA, China -Israel FTA, China -Norway FTA, China -Republic 
of Moldova FTA, China -Panama FTA, China -Palestine FTA, the Second Phase of China -Republic of 
Korea FTA, the upgrading of China -Peru FTA, and the follow -up talks for the upgraded China -
Singapore FTA, and the China -Belarus Agreement on Trade in Services and Investment.  
 
Question:  
56. How are these expected to affect China 's net exports and its overall economy?  
 
Reply: Through the Free Trade Agreement, China and its trading partners could work togethe r to 
reduce and remove trade and investment barriers, expand two -way market access, establish a stable, 
transparent and predictable institutional framework for bilateral trade and investment, reduce the 
import and export costs of intermediate products, enh ance the competitiveness of enterprises, and 
provide customers with more diversified choices In 2020, the import and export volume between 
China and its free trade partners realized an increase of 3.2% year -on-year, 1.3 percentage points 
higher than the gr owth rate of the total import and export volume over the same period . 
 
V. DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD MARKET 
SYSTEM  
Para 5.11 (Page 23)  
First, China steadily pushes forward the legislation on IPR protection. The Civil Code, officially 
implemented on 1 January 2021, provides an important institutional basis for strengthening 
IPR protection. The Copyright Law, amended in November 2020, impro ves the concepts and systems 
related to works and rights, and scales up the penalty on infringement. The Trademark Law, 
amended in April 2019, effectively regulates bad -faith trademark registration and applications that 
are not for use, and strengthens the  protection of the exclusive right to trademark use. The Patent 
Law, amended in October 2020, increases the compensation for infringing patents, improves the 
burden of proof, and establishes the patent term compensation system, so as to further strengthen 
patent protection. In addition, the Anti -unfair Competition Law, amended in April 2019, introduces 
the punitive compensation system for infringement of trade secrets to further strengthen the 
protection of trade secrets.  
 
Question:  
57. How do the amendment s in the Trademark Law effectively regulate bad faith registrations and 
strengthen the protection of exclusive right to trademark?  
 
Reply: On April 23, 2019, the Standing Committee of the National People 's Congress adopted a 
decision on amending the Trademark Law of the People 's Republic of China , and the amended 
provisions have come into effect since November 1, 2019. The amendment mainly includes two 
aspects: first, new rules regulating malicious registr ation, cracking down on malicious applications, 
hoarding registration and other illegal acts have been added, which provides that "malicious 
trademark registration applications that are not for the purpose of use shall be rejected " and serve 
as a cause for  filing trademark opposition and declaring registered trademarks invalid; besides, the 
obligations of the agency, as well as the penalties for malicious registration and malicious litigation 
were clarified in the amendment. Secondly, new rules regarding th e penalties for infringement of 
exclusive trademark rights have been added and the cost of violation has been significantly raised. 
On the basis of the punitive compensation system established in the Trademark Law, the 
infringement compensation amount for malicious infringement of exclusive trademark rights has 
been increased from one to three times the amount  to one to five times the amount, and the 
maximum amount of statutory compensation has been increased from three to five million yuan. In 
addition, th e disposal of counterfeit registered trademarks and the materials and tools mainly used 
for the manufacture of counterfeit registered trademarks is clarified. Third, special crackdown actions WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  were carried out. Over the past three years, the State Intellect ual Property Office has continued to 
crack down on patent applications not aimed at protecting innovation and malicious trademark 
registrations not aimed at use. As of May 2021, a total of over 150,000 cases of malicious registration 
of hoarded trademarks were rejected and 220,000 irregular patent applications were confirmed.  
 
Para 5.14 (Page 23)  
Third, China actively carries out law enforcement actions to protect IPRs. China organizes special 
law enforcement actions for IPR protection, focusing on key area s such as e -commerce, food and 
drug, and software, as well as key places such as exhibitions and imports and exports. Since 2018, 
six government departments have been jointly launching campaigns targeting counterfeit and 
shoddy food in rural areas. In 2019 , China National Intellectual Property Administration issued 
the 2019 Action Plan for Special Actions on IPR Protection to guide local law enforcement. The State 
Administration for Market Regulation and China National Intellectual Property Administration j ointly 
issued the Iron Fist Action Plan for Intellectual Property Enforcement 2019, which cracked down hard 
on violations of trademarks, patents and geographical indications, and investigated and dealt with 
more than 70,000 illegal cases.  
 
Question:  
58. Does China address the proliferation of counterfeit products in online platforms?  
 
Reply : China attaches great importance to management of counterfeit products. First, we have 
improved the relevant rules and regulations. We have developed and introduced th e Measures for 
the Supervision and Administration of Online Trading , specifying the registration of online business 
entities, the main responsibility of online platform operators, consumer rights protection and other 
issues, which has brought into being an  online trading market governance system of multiple 
participants, efficiency and coordination, and regulated operation. We also promoted the amendment 
of provisions of intellectual property protection in the E-commerce Law . Second, we have 
strengthened th e supervision and law enforcement regarding online transactions. Giving full play to  
the Inter -Ministerial Joint Conference on Online Market Supervision, and taking special actions for 
online market supervision, we have cracked down on counterfeiting and o ther illegal acts in 
accordance with the law, and promoted the improvement of online product quality. Third, we have 
urged the platforms to take responsibilities. We have guided the platforms to strengthen 
management and self -discipline, effectively fulfil l their legal responsibilities and obligations in 
ensuring product quality, so as to promote the healthy development of the platform -based economy.  
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  CHILE  
WT/TPR/S/415 - Informe de Secretaría OMC  
3 POLÍTICAS Y PRÁCTICAS COMERCIALES, POR MEDIDAS  
3.1 Medidas que afectan directamente a las importaciones  
3.1.2 Normas de origen  
Párrafo 3.22, pág. 57  
Las normas de origen preferenciales se aplican de conformidad con lo especificado en los diversos 
acuerdos preferenciales suscritos por China. También se emplean para otorgar un trato preferencial 
a las importaciones procedentes de los países menos adelantados (PMA). En general, entre los 
criterios utilizados para determinar el origen figuran los siguient es: cambio de la clasificación 
arancelaria; si el producto se ha obtenido totalmente en una parte; valor de contenido regional; 
operación de elaboración; u otros requisitos. La mayoría de los acuerdos de libre comercio (ALC) 
prevén la posibilidad de acumul ación bilateral. Desde el anterior examen de China se han notificado 
a la OMC normas de origen de los ALC suscritos con Chile; Macao, China; y Georgia. Las principales 
características de todas las normas de origen preferenciales de China en vigor se descri ben en el 
informe elaborado por la Secretaría para el examen anterior de China. A fin de facilitar el despacho 
conforme a la reglamentación aduanera, China amplió sus sistemas de redes electrónicas en relación 
con el origen, que permiten transmitir en tiem po real datos electrónicos relativos a los certificados 
de origen; los sistemas abarcan actualmente 16 países y regiones en el marco de 13 ACR . 
 
Pregunta : El párrafo 3.22 indica que "la mayoría de los acuerdos de libre comercio (ALC) prevén la 
posibilidad de acumulación bilateral ". Al respecto, Chile agradecería a China indicar si cuenta 
actualmente con disposiciones de Acumulación Extendida o Acumulación Diagonal en sus acuerdos 
comerciales, junto con compartir información respecto a cómo opera  - y características desde la 
perspectiva de la fiscalización – de la acumulación extendida en la práctica comercial de China.  
 
Reply: China has not fully adopted diagonal accumulation rule yet.  
 
3.1.3 Aranceles  
3.1.3.3 Aranceles consolidados  
Párrafo 3. 32, pág. 61  
Cuando China pasó a formar parte de la OMC, consolidó el 100% de sus aranceles a tipos ad valorem  
comprendidos entre el 0% y el 65% para los productos agropecuarios (según la definición de la  OMC) 
y entre el 0% y el 50% para los productos no agropecuarios. El promedio aritmético de los tipos 
consolidados actuales es del 9,6% (el 15,1% para los product os agropecuarios y el 8,8% para los 
no agropecuarios); los tipos consolidados finales se tienen que aplicar para 2023 a más tardar. Si 
bien todos los aranceles se consolidaron a tipos ad valorem, los aranceles NMF aplicados a 37 líneas 
arancelarias son a t ipos no ad valorem. Cuando se realizó el anterior examen de China, las 
autoridades indicaron que, en la práctica, los equivalentes ad valorem no son superiores a los tipos 
consolidados, puesto que se aplica el tipo más bajo.  
 
Pregunta : De acuerdo con el p árrafo 3.32, si para un producto el arancel NMF aplicado es de 
carácter no ad valorem, pero el arancel consolidado de dicha mercancía es ad valorem, el resultado 
será un arancel NMF compuesto; es decir, conformado por un componente específico (dependiente 
del volumen), sujeto a un nivel de arancel ad valorem máximo (equivalente al consolidado). Al 
respecto, Chile agradecería a China indicar si existe algún Reglamento o Ley interna en China que 
vele que este principio sea respetado en la práctica, además de la Lista relativa a las mercancías de 
China del Anexo del GATT.  
 
Reply: After joining WTO, the specific tariff (ad valorem equivalent) imposed by China has always 
been transformed from the ad valorem tariff that China promised while joining WTO, to ensure that 
the tariff actually imposed will not exceed what China has promised. The transformation is based on 
the average import price of the latest year provided by the customs. However, for certain tax items, 
China has excluded them from influences of some factors including no import record in a certain 
year or excessive fluctuation of import price. Every year, China publishes Import and Export Tariff 
of the People 's Republic of China, which lists specific tariff, compound tariff and other tariffs. The 
document can be obtained from the "Policy Publish " section of website of Chinese Ministry of Finance 
Tariff Department: http://gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu . 
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.1.6 Medidas antidumping, compensatorias y de salvaguardia  
3.1.6.1 Medidas antidumping  
Párrafo 3.53, pág. 71  
El marco jurídico para la realización de investigaciones antidumping y la aplicación de medidas 
antidumping sigue estando constituido por la Ley de Co mercio Exterior, el Reglamento Antidumping 
y varias normas publicadas, algunas de ellas provisionales. Durante el período objeto de examen, 
tres de esas normas fueron modificadas (véase infra); no se han introducido otros cambios en los 
procedimientos anti dumping, que se tratan en detalle en algunos exámenes anteriores de China. 
Según las autoridades, China está preparando una notificación a la OMC relativa a esas normas 
modificadas. En 2018, China notificó a la OMC sus Normas Provisionales para la Aplicaci ón de las 
Resoluciones de la Organización Mundial del Comercio relativas a Diferencias sobre Medidas 
Comerciales Correctivas, que entraron en vigor el 29 de julio de 2013.  
 
Pregunta : De acuerdo al párrafo 3.53, el marco jurídico de las medidas antidumping en China 
incluye normas publicadas, siendo algunas de ellas provisionales. Al respecto, Chile agradecería a 
China compartir las razones de porqué algunas normas son provisionales.  
 
Reply: The three new regulations currently being revised by China are not provisional rules. The 
other provisional rules were made around 2002.  
 
Pregunta : El mismo párrafo menciona que China está preparando una notificación a la OMC relativa 
a esas normas  modificadas. Al respecto, Chile agradecería a China indicar cuando se realizaría la 
notificación de dichas normas.  
 
Reply: The notification is in preparation.  
 
Párrafo 3.54, pág. 71  
El 4 de abril de 2018, el MOFCOM  promulgó las Normas relativas al Examen Intermedio sobre la 
Existencia de Dumping y los Márgenes de Dumping (Normas relativas al Examen Intermedio), en 
sustitución de las Normas Provisionales relativas al Examen Intermedio sobre la Existencia de 
Dumping y  los Márgenes de Dumping que llevaban en vigor desde 2002. En virtud de esas Normas 
se introdujeron diversos cambios. En primer lugar, se mejoraron y aclararon las disposiciones 
relativas a los derechos y obligaciones del organismo investigador y de las pa rtes interesadas, en 
particular: i) se aclaró el plazo para la presentación de una solicitud de examen periódico con el fin 
de brindar la oportunidad de presentar dicha solicitud en circunstancias especiales; ii) se aclaró que 
los exportadores y los fabric antes deben presentar pruebas que demuestren la necesidad de un 
examen; iii) se aclaró el plazo de que dispone la rama de producción nacional para solicitar la 
presentación de pruebas durante el examen; iv) se aclaró que el exportador/productor puede 
prese ntar una solicitud de examen intermedio; y v) se eliminó la disposición según la cual el examen 
periódico no está completo como lo está un examen automático de fin del período. En segundo lugar, 
se adoptaron procedimientos de examen periódico y prescripcio nes en materia de plazos más claros 
y más estrictos para asegurar la eficiencia de las investigaciones. En tercer lugar, se incorporaron 
disposiciones para estar en conformidad con las normas de la OMC (por ejemplo, mejorando la 
descripción de las encuesta s por muestreo y la divulgación antes de la resolución definitiva).  
 
Pregunta : De acuerdo al párrafo 3.54, se introdujeron varios cambios a la normativa relativas al 
Examen Intermedio en materia de medidas antidumping en China. Entre ellos, se indica que "se 
aclaró que los exportadores y los fabricantes deben presentar pruebas que demuestren la necesidad 
de un examen ". En relación con ello, Chile agradecería a China indicar los parámetros que se tendrían 
a la vista para probar si las pruebas presentadas po r los exportadores y los fabricantes serían 
suficientes para demostrar la necesidad de un examen.  
 
Reply: Article 6 of the Rules on the Mid -Term Review of Dumping and Dumping Margin provides 
that, To file an application for mid -term review, an exporter or manufacturer shall submit the 
following evidence materials: (a) the name, address and other relevant circumstances of the 
applicant; (b) the domestic sales data of the applicant within 12 months prior to filing of the 
application;(c) the applic ant's data of export to China within 12 months prior to filing of the 
application; (d) the various adjustments that must be made for calculating the dumping margin and 
the preliminary calculation results of the dumping margin; (e) the reasons for the conti nuity of the 
significant changes in the normal value, export prices and dumping margin; and (f) other contents 
that the applicant deems necessary to explain. The Anti -Dumping Agreement of the People 's Republic WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  of China stipulates that the application for m id-term review requires demonstration of necessity. The 
principles set forth in the Chinese regulations are consistent with the Agreement.  
 
Párrafo 3.56, pág. 72  
El 4 de mayo de 2018 entraron también en vigor las Normas de 2018 relativas a las Audiencias en 
el marco de Investigaciones Antidumping y Antisubvenciones. Estas Normas sustituyeron a tres 
normas por las que se regían esas audiencias desde 2002. Las modifi caciones introducidas se 
referían a lo siguiente: i) la creación de un procedimiento de audiencia unificado (ya no se hace 
distinción entre los diferentes tipos de investigaciones (investigaciones antidumping, investigaciones 
en materia de derechos compens atorios e investigaciones sobre la existencia de daño)); ii) la mejora 
de las disposiciones de procedimiento y la aclaración de los derechos y obligaciones del organismo 
investigador y de las partes interesadas (también con respecto al examen por dicho org anismo de 
la necesidad de confidencialidad, su notificación de la celebración de audiencias a través de anuncios 
en línea, su explicación de los motivos por los que no se celebra una audiencia y la concesión a las 
partes interesadas de la oportunidad de ex presar sus opiniones); iii) la introducción de 
procedimientos de audiencia y de prescripciones en materia de plazos más claros y más estrictos; y 
iv) el establecimiento de disposiciones compatibles con las normas de la OMC en relación con los 
derechos de l as partes interesadas a exponer al organismo investigador sus opiniones/razones por 
otros medios si no están físicamente presentes en la audiencia.  
 
Pregunta : De acuerdo al párrafo 3.56, se introdujeron cambios a "las Normas de 2018 relativas a 
las Audiencias en el marco de Investigaciones Antidumping y Antisubvenciones " en China. Entre 
ellos, se indica "la creación de un procedimiento de audiencia unificado (ya no se hace distinción 
entre los diferentes tipos de in vestigaciones (investigaciones antidumping, investigaciones en 
materia de derechos compensatorios e investigaciones sobre la existencia de daño)) ". Al respecto, 
Chile agradecería a China aclarar si el procedimiento común para los tres tipos de investigacio nes 
para las audiencias contempla participación solamente de las partes interesadas a la investigación, 
o si es participación de público amplio. Adicionalmente, Chile agradece a China compartir cualquier 
información adicional sobre el procedimiento de audi encia unificado que pueda proporcionar.  
 
Reply: Article 13 of the Rules on the Hearings for Anti -Dumping and Countervailing Investigations 
provides that interested parties have the right to register for hearings in accordance with the time 
limits and manne r prescribed by the investigating authority. No party has the obligation to attend 
the hearing. Failure to attend the hearing does not prejudice the legitimate right of the interested 
party to express its views and state its reasons to the investigating au thority through other means.  
 
Párrafo 3.60, pág 73 -74 
Las medidas antidumping más antiguas de China en vigor se refieren al caucho cloropreno de la 
República de Corea, los Estados Unidos, el Japón y la Unión Europea; los cables de fibra óptica 
monomodo, de  dispersión sin cambios, de la República de Corea y el Japón; la fécula de patata 
(papa) de la Unión Europea; el nonilfenol de la India y el Taipei Chino; el papel para condensadores 
electrolíticos del Japón; y el bisfenol A de la República de Corea, el Ja pón, Singapur y el Taipei Chino.  
 
Pregunta : En relación con las medidas antidumping más antiguas de China que se encuentran en 
vigor, mencionadas en el párrafo 3.60, y considerando que algunas de ellas se han extendido por 
más de 15 años, Chile agradecería a China compartir si ha considerado actual izar su procedimiento 
de exámenes por expiración.  
 
Reply: Article 49 of Anti -Dumping Regulation of the People 's Republic of China provides that after 
the anti -dumping measures have taken effect, the Ministry of Commerce may, with justifiable 
reasons, decid e to review the necessity of continuing the anti -dumping duties; it may also decide to 
review the necessity of continuing the anti -dumping measures after a reasonable period of time, at 
the request of the interested party and after reviewing the correspond ing evidence provided by the 
interested party. And the implementation time of China 's measures is shorter than the 
implementation time of the measures of the main member countries applying trade remedies.  
 
3.2 Medidas que afectan directamente a las exporta ciones  
3.2.1 Procedimientos y requisitos aduaneros  
Párrafo 3.74, pág. 77  
Tras el brote mundial de COVID -19, China puso en marcha una serie de medidas de facilitación del 
comercio y en materia de cumplimiento con miras, entre otras cosas, a contener la COVID -19, 
mantener las corrientes comerciales de suministros médicos y reduci r al mínimo la perturbación WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  causada por la COVID -19. Se adoptó un plan de emergencia destinado a simplificar aún más los 
procedimientos aduaneros, incluidas las inspecciones y la cuarentena, y a reducir los derechos 
portuarios. En febrero de 2020, la GACC adoptó 10 medidas para ayudar a los nuevos importadores 
y exportadores a superar los desafíos relacionados con la pandemia, entre ellas la simplificación de 
los procedimientos de registro de empresas y los trámites de despacho, la optimización de los 
servicios de control y certificación previos a la exportación, y el suministro de información mercantil 
actualizada.  
 
Pregunta:  El párrafo 3.74 menciona entre las medidas adoptadas por la GACC en febrero de 2020 
para ayudar a los nuevos importadores y exportado res a superar los desafíos relacionados con la 
pandemia, la optimización de servicios de control y certificación previos a la exportación. Al respecto, 
Chile agradecería a China compartir información y características sobre la capacidad de fiscalización 
o vigilancia física con que cuenta para asegurar el cumplimiento de los requisitos en la materia de 
parte de sus socios comerciales. Adicionalmente, Chile agradecería si China pudiera compartir 
información respecto al porcentaje de envíos que es inspeccionad o, en relación con el total de ellos.  
 
Reply: Please further elaborate on this question, especially what exact certification services?  
 
Párrafo 3.75, págs. 77 y 78  
Las autoridades han impuesto también medidas más estrictas de control a las empresas 
dedicadas  a la exportación de equipos de pruebas de la COVID -19 y otros dispositivos médicos. El 
31 de marzo de 2020, el MOFCOM, la GACC, y la Administración Nacional de Productos Médicos 
publicaron el Anuncio Nº  5, 2020, sobre las Medidas para Ga rantizar la Exportación Ordenada de los 
Suministros Médicos; posteriormente, el 25 de abril de 2020, el MOFCOM, la GACC y la 
Administración Estatal de Reglamentación del Mercado (SAMR) publicaron el Anuncio Nº  12, 2020, 
sobre el Refuerzo de la Reglamentaci ón de la Calidad de los Suministros Exportados para Luchar 
contra la COVID -19. En los Anuncios se introdujo un nuevo procedimiento de verificación de la 
calidad para la exportación de productos médicos, en particular el requisito de presentar un 
certificad o válido de registro del dispositivo médico en China. Además, los exportadores deben 
acreditar que los productos cumplen las normas de calidad del país importador  
 
Pregunta : En relación con las medidas de control impuestas a las empresas importadoras de 
dispositivos y equipos de prueba relacionados con el COVID -19 que se mencionan en el párrafo 3.75, 
Chile agradecería a China indicar si existe un estándar mínimo para la exportación de pruebas y 
dispositivos médicos relativos a COVID -19  
 
Reply: Since the outbreak of COVID -19, while taking the situation under control inside the country, 
China has also joined the international community in fighting against the epidemic by exporting 
medical supplies, ensuring product quality and safety and following  export regulations . According to 
the announcement, all medical supplies in line with Chinese quality standards or foreign quality 
standards can be exported.  
 
3.3 Medidas que afectan a la producción y al comercio  
3.3.1 Incentivos  
Párrafo 3.127, pág. 90  
Habida cuenta de la importancia de la economía china y del volumen de la ayuda gubernamental 
otorgada a las distintas empresas, se ha indicado que las medidas de apoyo del país pueden afectar 
a los mercados mundiales, las ramas de producción de fases ulter iores del proceso productivo y 
determinadas cadenas de valor. Estos efectos no pueden cuantificarse en cifras totales, ya que no 
se dispone de los datos pertinentes. No obstante, en un estudio de la OCDE se constata, por ejemplo, 
que la ayuda financiera de  China al sector energético y la concesión de fondos en condiciones 
favorables a la fundición de aluminio, sumadas a las restricciones de exportación de aluminio en 
bruto, dan a los exportadores chinos de productos semiacabados de aluminio una ventaja 
considerable en relación con los costos, lo que tiene importantes repercusiones en los mercados 
mundiales. Las autoridades dicen que no están de acuerdo con esta opinión y han indicado que China 
no concede subvenciones al sector energético ni fondos en condici ones favorables a la fundición de 
aluminio.  
 
Pregunta:  El párrafo 3.127 citado destaca que, considerando la importancia de la economía china 
y del volumen de la ayuda gubernamental otorgada a las distintas empresas, las medidas de apoyo 
del país pueden afectar a los mercados mundiales, las ramas de producción  de fases ulteriores del 
proceso productivo y determinadas cadenas de valor. Considerando ello, y en particular el alto grado WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  de participación de China en las cadenas globales y regionales de valor, Chile agradecería a China 
indicar cual ha sido el enfoque  que ha desarrollado en materia de políticas públicas, específicamente 
a nivel de las políticas comerciales del gobierno central y de los gobiernos regionales, y que se han 
aplicado para amortiguar las consecuencias económicas de la pandemia.  
 
Reply: To co pe with the COVID -19 impact, Chinese government has timely adopted a list of 
measures such as tariff and administration fee reduction, deferring repayment of principal and 
interest, reduction of the cost of comprehensive financing and others. Also, China h as innovated the 
mechanisms of direct access to financial funds and monetary policy tools and implemented 
large-scale enterprise aid policy. Altogether, the above measures have helped to stabilize China 's 
economy.  
 
3.3.2 Normas y otras prescripciones técni cas  
3.3.2.2 Certificación de productos  
Párrafo 3.146, págs. 93 y 94  
Salvo el establecimiento de la SAMR y la abolición simultánea de la AQSIQ, no se han producido 
cambios en las leyes y reglamentos por los que se rige el sistema de certificación de China desde el 
examen anterior. La certificación y la acreditación se rigen por los instrumentos siguientes: la Ley 
de Calidad de los Productos; la Ley de Inspección de Mercancías de Importación y Exportación; el 
Reglamento sobre Certifica ción y Acreditación; el Reglamento sobre la Certificación Obligatoria de 
Productos; las Medidas relativas a la Administración de los Órganos de Certificación; las Medidas 
relativas a la Administración de los Certificados y las Marcas de Certificación; las Medidas relativas 
a la Administración de la Certificación de Productos Orgánicos; y las Medidas relativas a la 
Administración de la Certificación de Productos de Bajo Consumo Energético y Bajas Emisiones de 
Carbono. China gestiona un sistema de certificaci ón voluntaria y un sistema de certificación de 
productos obligatoria.  
 
Pregunta : El párrafo 3.146 menciona, entre los instrumentos que rigen la certificación y 
acreditación, los siguientes: Ley de Calidad de los Productos; Ley de Inspección de Mercancías d e 
Importación y Exportación; Reglamento sobre Certificación y Acreditación, y Reglamento sobre la 
Certificación Obligatoria de Productos. Al respecto, Chile agradecería a China compartir (de estar 
disponibles) versiones de estos instrumentos en inglés.  
 
Reply: The Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on Certification and Accreditation is 
currently being revised, translation of which will begin later.  
The Chinese version of Measures for the Administration of Certification Institutions is available at:  
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fgs/202011/t20201103_322872.html#  
The Chinese version of Measures for the Administration of Authentication Certificates and 
Authentication Marks is available at:  
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/bgt/202106/t20210625 _331457.html  
The Chinese version of Measures for the Administration of Energy -saving and Low -carbon -emission 
Product Certification is available at:  
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/b gt/202106/t20210625_331496.html  
 
Pregunta:  Junto con ello, Chile agradecería a China compartir más información sobre el resto de 
las medidas mencionadas: Medidas relativas a la Administración de los Órganos de Certificación; 
Medidas relativas a la Administ ración de los Certificados y las Marcas de Certificación; Medidas 
relativas a la Administración de la Certificación de Productos Orgánicos, y: Medidas relativas a la 
Administración de la Certificación de Productos de Bajo Consumo Energético y Bajas Emision es de 
Carbono.  
 
Reply: Please refer to the website of State Administration for Market Regulation.  
 
Párrafo 3.169, pág. 100  
Durante el período objeto de examen se plantearon ocho nuevas preocupaciones comerciales 
específicas en el Comité MSF. Estas hacían referencia a: i) las restricciones a la importación de carne 
de bovino procedente de los Estados Unidos; ii) las medidas adm inistrativas para el registro de 
fabricantes extranjeros de alimentos importados; iii) las medidas relacionadas con la COVID -19 que 
afectan al comercio de alimentos y productos agropecuarios; iv) las restricciones relacionadas con 
la gripe aviar altamente patógena; v) el reconocimiento de la equivalencia para terceros en el marco 
del Acuerdo Económico y Comercial, Fase 1, entre China y los Estados Unidos; vi) un nuevo modelo 
de certificado sanitario propuesto para las importaciones de camarón; vii) las rest ricciones a las WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  importaciones de carne de bovino; y viii) el retraso en la aprobación de las solicitudes de nueva 
inscripción y restablecimiento de establecimientos de exportación. Con anterioridad al período objeto 
de examen se habían planteado en el Comi té MSF otras cinco preocupaciones relacionadas con las 
medidas adoptadas por China (cuadro 3.19).  
 
Cuadro 3.19 Preocupaciones comerciales específicas relacionadas con las MSF planteadas 
contra China, de 1 de enero de 2018 a 13 de abril de 2021  
 
 
 
Pregunta : En relación con las preocupaciones comerciales mencionadas en el párrafo 3.169, en 
particular sobre las medidas administrativas para el registro de fabricantes extranjeros de alimentos 
(destacada también en el cuadro 3.19), Chile agradecería a Ch ina informar cómo se implementará 
el nuevo sistema de registro de fabricantes extranjero señalado, además compartir más información 
de cómo será entrada en vigor, y se aplicarán flexibilidades temporales desde su entrada en vigor 
para que las empresas expo rtadoras se adapten.  
 
Reply: According to the Food Safety Law and its enforcement regulations and the rules of 
administrative laws and regulations, China has revised two regulations governing the safety 
management of import and export food and the registra tion management of overseas production 
enterprises of imported food. And the revised regulations were published on 12th April, 2021, 
including the Administrative Measures on the Safety of Import and Export Food (the 249th order of 
General Customs) and Prov isions for the Administration of the Registration of Overseas 
Manufacturers of Imported Food (the 248th order of General Custom). The two new regulations will 
take effect from January 1st, 2022. Before releasing the new regulations, China has reported the 
revisions with accordance to WTO requirements, with fully compliance with WTO regulations. The 
second articles of the 248th and 249th order of the Chinese General Customs have stipulated the 
scopes of the two revised regulations. In the near future, China will release explanation for the above 
two new regulations, in a proper manner. The release of the 248th order will not impact the 
implement of the bilateral protocol. If have reached agreement with China on taking different 
registration and application me thods, such agreement will continue to be used . 
 
Pregunta : Chile agradecería a China compartir más información sobre el registro de fabricantes 
mencionado, en particular respecto a los siguiente:  
- Formato de registro que deben completar las empresas extranj eras 
- Indicar si se requiere o no de inspección. De requerirse ésta, Chile agradecería a China 
aclarar si se trata de una inspección física a cada establecimiento exportador.  
WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  - Si es posible o no validar la inspección que realiza la autoridad sanitaria al momento de 
emitir la resolución que autoriza el funcionamiento de la planta, o en su defecto, la inspección 
de una auditoria para certificación ISO22000 o FSSC22000.  
- Plazo que la GACC tiene para realizar la evaluación y notificar a la autorida d competente y 
a la empresa exportadora.   
- Criterio o criterios mediante los cuales se define el periodo por el cual dura o se mantiene el 
registro de las empresas.  
 
Reply: General Administration of Customs organizes review group to evaluate and review imp orted 
foods production enterprise beyond Chinese border. The group will conduct its work with accordance 
to the result of risk review and international practices and will also initiate prior communication and 
negotiation with the corresponding authorities of the country (region) where the enterprise is located. 
The time for production enterprise outside China to finish registration after filing application is 
subject to the application materials and the enterprise 's conformance to the standards.  
 
Pregunta : En el marco de la aplicación de las nuevas medidas administrativas para el registro de 
fabricantes extranjeros de alimentos importados, Chile agradecería a China compartir si considera 
que el sistema de gestión de la inocuidad de los alimentos y los proce dimientos que Chile 
actualmente tiene acordados con China se ajustan a estos nuevos requerimientos  
 
Reply: The safety of imported foods is a serious livelihood issue, because it concerns the health and 
life of Chinese people. According to the Food Safety Law and its enforcement regulations and the 
rules of administrative laws and regulations, China has revised two regulations governing the safety 
management of import and export food and the registration management of overseas production 
enterprises of imported food. And the revised regulations were published on 12th April, 2021, 
including the Administrative Measures on the Safety of Import and Export Food (the 249th order of 
General Customs) and Provisions for the Administration of the Registration o f Overseas 
Manufacturers of Imported Food (the 248th order of General Custom). The two new regulations will 
take effect from January 1st, 2022. Before releasing the new regulations, China has reported the 
revisions with accordance to WTO requirements, with  fully compliance with WTO regulations. The 
second articles of the 248th and 249th order of the Chinese General Customs have stipulated the 
scopes of the two revised regulations. In the near future, China will release explanation for the above 
two new regu lations, in a proper manner. The release of the 248th order will not impact the 
implement of the bilateral protocol. If have reached agreement with China on taking different 
registration and application methods, such agreement will continue to be used . 
 
3.3.4 Política de competencia y controles de precios  
3.3.4.1 Política de competencia  
3.3.4.1.4 Fusiones y adquisiciones  
Párrafo 3.183, pág. 106  
A fin de facilitar la notificación, se han establecido procedimientos de examen abreviados para 
aplicarlos a los casos definidos como "simples ". Las normas que rigen esos casos figuran en las 
Disposiciones Provisionales sobre el Examen de la Concentración de Empresas de la SAMR y en las 
Orientaciones sobre la Notificación de Casos Simples de Concentración de Empresas de la SAMR 
(modificadas el 29 de septiembre de 2018). Los casos simples se deben publicar durante 10 días en 
el sitio web de la SAMR para que el público pueda formular observaciones. Los casos simples 
requieren documentación más sencilla y menos consultas, y tienen por objeto lograr un 
procedimiento más eficiente y breve.  
 
Pregunta : El párrafo 3.183 menciona el establecimiento de procedimientos de examen abreviados 
para aplicarlos a los casos definidos como "simples ", en el contexto de la notificación de fusiones y 
adquisiciones. Al respecto, Chile agradecería a China compartir los parámetros o criterios que se 
tendrían a la vista para definir lo s casos como "simples ", para los fines de iniciar los procedimientos 
de examen abreviados mencionados.  
 
Reply: According to Article 17 of the Interim Provisions of Measures on the Examination of 
Concentrations of Undertakings issued by the State Administra tion of Market Supervision, if one of 
the following conditions is met, the business operator may report as a simple case, and the State 
Administration of Market Supervision shall review it according to the simple case procedure: (1) in 
the same relevant ma rket, the sum of the market shares of the operators participating in the 
concentration is less than 15%; in the upstream and downstream markets, the market share of the 
operators participating in the concentration is less than 25%; the concentration operat ors who are WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  not in the same relevant market and do not have upstream and downstream relations account for 
less than 25% of the market share in each market related to the transaction; (2) the business 
operators participating in the concentration establish a  joint venture outside China, and the joint 
venture does not engage in economic activities within China; (3) a business operator participating 
in the concentration acquires the equity or assets of an overseas enterprise, and the acquired 
overseas enterpris e is not engaged in economic activities within the territory of China; (4) a joint 
venture jointly controlled by two or more business operators is controlled by one or more of them 
through concentration.  
 
Operator participating in concentration complying with Article 17 of the Interim Provisions of 
Measures on the Examination of Concentrations of Undertakings shall not report as simple case, if 
the operator met the following situations, (1) a joint venture jointly controlled by two or more 
business operators is controlled by one or more of the operators through concentration and the joint 
venture is competing with controlling operator in the same relevant market and the sum of their 
market share exceeds 15%; (2) the relevant market i n which the concentration of undertakings 
involved is difficult to define; (3) the concentration undertakings may produce adverse influence 
over market entrance and technology progress; (4) concentration of undertakings may produce 
adverse influence over c onsumers and other related operators; (5) concentration of undertakings 
may produce adverse influence over China 's national economic development; (6) concentration of 
undertakings may produce other influence that Chinese Sate Administration of Market regul ation 
regards as harmful for market competition.  
 
Cuadro A1. 2 Exportaciones de mercancías por Secciones y principales 
Capítulos/subpartidas del SA, 2015 -2020  
Pág. 210  
 
 
Pregunta : En relación con la línea 95 "Juguetes, juegos y artículos para recreo o deporte ", indicada 
en el cuadro A1.2, Chile agradecería a China indicar si existe un estándar mínimo para la exportación 
de juguetes.  
 
Reply: There is no minimum standard for toys exports.  
 
WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  WT/TPR/G/415  - Informe de Gobierno (China)  
 
2 ESFUERZOS CENTRADOS EN LA NUEVA ETAPA DE DESARROLLO, APLICACIÓN DE LA 
NUEVA FILOSOFÍA DE DESARROLLO Y PROMOCIÓN DE UN NUEVO PARADIGMA DE 
DESARROLLO DE ALTA CALIDAD  
2.3 Hacia un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo  
Párrafo 2.3, pág 6  
China propone acelerar los esfuerzos para impulsar un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo que tenga 
como eje principal la circulación interna y en el que las circulaciones interna e internacional se 
refuercen entre sí. El nuevo paradigma de desarrollo no es un c iclo de desarrollo a puerta cerrada. 
Al aprovechar plenamente el potencial de la demanda interna, el nuevo paradigma de desarrollo 
sirve para conectar mejor los mercados nacional e internacional, permite explotar mejor los 
mercados y recursos internacional es y nacionales para alcanzar un desarrollo más sólido y 
sostenible. De este modo, se dará rienda suelta al inmenso potencial del mercado y la demanda 
interna de China, que cuenta con 1.400 millones de habitantes y más de 400 millones de personas 
de ingres os medios. En el proceso de construcción de un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo, China 
ampliará aún más su nivel de apertura, desarrollará un nuevo sistema de economía abierta de más 
alto nivel y creará mayor demanda para el mundo, al tiempo que proporcionará  amplios mercados 
y más oportunidades de desarrollo para todos los países  
 
3 AVANCE HACIA UNA APERTURA DE ALTO NIVEL Y ESTUDIO DE NUEVAS PERSPECTIVAS 
DE COOPERACIÓN BENEFICIOSAS PARA TODOS  
Párrafo 3.1, pág. 8  
China prosigue de manera más exhaustiva la a pertura de nuevos sectores y esferas más amplias, y 
se apoya en las ventajas de sus inmensos mercados interiores para promover la cooperación 
internacional y conseguir que la apertura reporte beneficios mutuos y redunde en resultados 
positivos para todos. China aspira a promover la apertura común del mundo dedicando esfuerzos a 
su propia apertura. Está decidida a impulsar de manera integral la apertura a niveles superiores y a 
promover la liberalización y la facilitación del comercio y las inversiones.  
 
6 EL CAMINO A SEGUIR  
Párrafo 6.1, pág. 30  
En la actualidad, las cadenas industriales y de suministro mundiales se ven obstaculizadas, las 
actividades de comercio e inversión siguen siendo poco dinámicas, y el impulso de la recuperación 
económica mundial es bastante inestable. Frente a la dura y complicada situación internacional y a 
las arduas tareas de reforma, desarrollo y estabilidad a nivel nacional, especialmente en el marco 
de los graves efectos de la COVID -19, China mantendrá su confianza en la ape rtura, la cooperación 
y la unidad con el fin de lograr resultados beneficiosos para todos, y seguirá decidida a ampliar la 
apertura general y a estudiar formas más eficientes de conectar los mercados nacionales y 
extranjeros, y de compartir los factores de  producción y los recursos. El objetivo es convertir el 
mercado de China en un mercado para el mundo, un mercado compartido por todos y accesible para 
todos, y aportar más energía positiva a la comunidad internacional. China está decidida a promover 
la ape rtura mutua, que conlleva beneficios, responsabilidades y un sistema de gobernanza 
compartidos, y a crear una economía mundial abierta.  
 
Pregunta : En el párrafo 2.3 se indica que "un nuevo paradigma de desarrollo que tenga como eje 
principal la circulació n interna y en el que las circulaciones interna e internacional se refuercen entre 
sí" y agrega que este "nuevo paradigma ... no es un ciclo de desarrollo a puerta cerrada. Al 
aprovechar plenamente el potencial de la demanda interna, ... sirve para conecta r mejor los 
mercados nacional e internacional, permite explotar mejor los mercados y recursos internacionales 
y nacionales para alcanzar un desarrollo más sólido y sostenible ". Luego, en párrafo 3.1, agrega que 
"China prosigue de manera más exhaustiva la a pertura de nuevos sectores y esferas más amplias, 
y se apoya en las ventajas de sus inmensos mercados interiores para promover la cooperación 
internacional y conseguir que la apertura reporte beneficios mutuos y redunde en resultados 
positivos para todos ". Finalmente, el párrafo 6.1 indica que, "en la actualidad, las cadenas 
industriales y de suministro mundiales se ven obstaculizadas ". Respecto a todo lo anterior, Chile 
agradecería a China compartir su visión acerca del rol que desempeñan las Cadenas Globa les y 
Regionales de Valor, así como los encadenamientos productivos,  en sus relaciones con el mundo en 
desarrollo, particularmente en el marco de la iniciativa "One belt, One road ", para restablecer el 
funcionamiento de estas "cadenas industriales y de suministro mundiales ". 
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: Every sector of China 's economy is deeply participated in global industry chain and supply 
chain. They are important trading partners to various countri es along the "belt and road ", they 
connect the upstream and downstream of global value chain, they are the important link connecting 
production and terminal market demand. Therefore, they are an important pillar safeguarding the 
stability and circulation o f global industry chain and supply chain. In the future, China will more 
actively promote the level of opening up, further improve the quality of China 's economic 
development and improve the modernization of industry chain and supply chain. China will shar e 
development opportunity with the word and inject more momentum to global industry chain and 
supply chain.  
 
China 's economy has deeply integrated into the world economy. China is the principle trading partner 
to over 120 countries and regions including t he United State, EU, Japan and India. China has 
established industry chain pattern featuring "mutual integration " with countries around the world 
including various developing countries.  
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  NEW ZEALAND  
REPORT BY THE WTO SECRETARIAT (WT/TPR/S/415)  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 Trade Policy Framework and Objectives  
2.2.2 Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Page 33, paragraph 2.17  
"2.17. Since 2013, China has established an increasing number of PFTZs [Pilot Free Trade Zones]. 
In 2020, three PFTZs were established in Beijing, Anhui, and Hunan, while the area of the Zhejiang 
PFTZs was expanded. This brought the total to 21, including the e xisting 18 PFTZs (in Chongqing, 
Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Sichuan, Tianjin, Yunnan and Zhejiang). "  
 
Question 1:   
 
• New Zealand welcomes the growth in the number and scope of Pilot Free Trade Zones 
(PFTZs) in recent years. What data is available on the extent to which liberalisations and 
streamlined policies initially introduced in PFTZs been rolled out nationally in recent years, 
and what further reforms cu rrently being tested in PFTZs are intended to be implemented 
nationally in the near future?  
 
Reply: The important mission for the construction of pilot free trade zones (PFTZs) is to explore 
how to deepen reformation and open more widely for the purpose o f more replicable and scalable 
experience. E.g., the implementation of management mode of national treatment before admission 
with additional negative list for foreign investments, and "single window " for international trade, etc. 
was promoted across the c ountry after having been explored in the pilot free trade zone. Currently, 
the Central Government of China has already replicated and promoted an accumulation of 
278 experience explored in the PFTZs to the whole country or the specific areas, in the fields  
including trading, investment, finance, turnover, etc. The relevant promotions can be inquired at the 
website of the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
With further advance of the construction of PFTZs, China will continuously summarize and evaluate 
the innovative e xperience in the PFTZs for the application in wider range.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
Page 34, paragraph 2.22  
"2.22. During the review period, China submitted various notifications to the WTO (Table  A2.1). 
Nevertheless, some notifications, including those on state trading enterprises and domestic support, 
remain outstanding. According to the authorities, China is preparing new notifications. "  
 
Question 2:   
 
• New Zealand notes that, since the finalisation of the Secretariat 's report, China has 
submitted some additional notifications, which are welcomed; but that those on state trading 
enterprises and domestic support continue to remain outstanding. Recalling that China has 
consistently underlin ed the great importance it has attached to notifications since joining 
the WTO, when can up -to-date and complete notifications be expected?  
 
Reply: China has submitted the state trading notification. At present, we are making all efforts to 
prepare for th e notifications of domestic agricultural support, which shall be submitted as soon as 
possible.  
 
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4 Investment Regime  
2.4.1 Regulatory framework and market access  
Page 36, paragraphs 2.44 -2.48  
This section specifies the amendments in recent years to the National Negative List, the Market 
Access Negative List, the Catalogue of Encouraged Industries for Foreign Investment, and the Pilot 
Free Trade Zones Negative List.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question 3:   
 
• New Zealand welcomes the introduction of the negative lists during this period, and the 
progressive reductions of the number of items on the respective negative lists since, as well 
as additions to the catalogue, and encourages China to continue to liberal ise and improve 
the conditions for foreign investment. Further to paragraphs 2.68 and 2.69 of the 
Secretariat 's report, what further liberations are planned in the near future, including in 
response to the COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
Reply: It is pointed out in t he Report on the Work of the Government in  2021 by the government 
of China to further cut down the negative list for the admission of foreign investments. Currently, 
China is in revisions of the negative list for the admission of foreign investments in the whole country 
and the PFTZs, and will further cut down the specific management measures of negative list to 
continue opening more widely.  
 
Question 4:   
 
• There have been a nu mber of significant new regulations affecting the education and tutoring 
industries over the review period, including restrictions on foreign investment, curricula, and 
teaching materials. What are the policy objectives of these reforms, and have they been  
designed to ensure they are no more burdensome than necessary to achieve their objective?  
 
Reply: The general goal of ease the burden of excessive homework and off -campus tutoring for 
students undergoing compulsory education is divided into two aspects. On the campus, the quality 
of school education and teaching and service level have been further improved, the homework 
arrangement has been more rationally and reasonably designed to ensure the after -school service 
of the school basically meets the needs o f students, and students learn better on the campus. Off 
the campus, the tutoring service offered by off -campus training institutions has been 
comprehensively standardized, irregularities in off -campus tutoring of disciplines have been basically 
eliminated , and the popularity of off -campus tutoring has gradually cooled down.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
Page 45, paragraphs 3.2 -3.11   
This section s ets out recent changes to China 's Customs Law and various other customs -related 
regulations, and improvements to the National Single Window, to improve efficiency of trade.  
 
Question 5:   
 
• New Zealand commends the significant reforms made over the review period, and the 
resultant significant reduction in overall customs clearance time for imports. What reforms 
are planned for the coming period, including to streamline trade in the COVID -19 
environment?  
 
Reply: China focuses on concerns of market entities, summarizes and sorts reflected problems of 
enterprises and insists on being problem -oriented. China has  recently printed and issued the 
Notification on the Optimization of Business Environm ent at Ports for Further Deepening the Reform 
to Facilitate Cross -Border Trade, which puts forwards 27 measures in five aspects to further optimize 
the business environment at ports and facilitate the cross -border trade.  
 
Question 6:   
 
• How does China facilitate expeditious movement of trade in essential goods – imports, 
exports and goods in transit – in a COVID -19 environment?  
 
Reply: Since the occurrence of COVID -19 pandemic, the related services and functions for the 
declaration and clearing of epidemic prevention supplies have been provided at "single window " of 
international trade. The prompt function for detailed declaration of the  mask, protective clothing, 
breathing machine and other prevention and control supplies was added, the passenger manifest 
declaration system has been optimized and they are exempted from the application for on -spot 
inspection, etc., so as to take the advan tages of "single window " in whole -process, one -stop, round -WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 350 - 
 
  the-clock, zero -contact and other characteristic business transactions, to safeguard successful 
customs clearance of enterprises with all strength.  
 
In order to improve the efficiency of import and export clearance, China Customs has strived for 
promoting the reform of "two-step declaration ", "advanced declaration " and "two-stage admission ", 
allowing enterprises to choose appropriate clearance mode fre ely based on the import and export 
schemes, to continuously consolidate the effect of reducing clearance time. Besides, the Customs 
has also actively participated in global anti -epidemic cooperation, ensuring orderly clearance of 
epidemic prevention suppli es and the clearance of vaccines and other important epidemic prevention 
supplies.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1 Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
Page 46, paragraph 3.5  
"3.5. In  2019, the GACC launched a reform of the "two-step declaration " for imports, which means 
that enterprises do not need to submit all declarations and documents at one time. The first step 
involves making the summary declaration with the bill of lading to pi ck up the goods. The second 
step involves completing the whole declaration process within a specified time. According to the 
authorities, the reform, which was first piloted in some customs offices, made enterprise declaration 
more efficient and convenient , accelerated cargo release, and further improved the efficiency of 
customs clearance. It has been applied across the country since 1 January 2020. "  
 
Question 7:   
 
Could China clarify whether the "two-step declaration " system for imports applies to China 's 
Authorised Economic Operators (AEO), or whether a different declaration system applies –and if so, 
what that is?  
 
Reply: According to Announcement on the Comprehensive Promotion of "Two-Step Declaration " 
Reform by Ge neral Administration of Customs, "For consigners and consignees of general or above 
credit rank, "two-step declaration " applies to all actually -imported goods ", namely that the import 
"two-step declaration " mode applies to AEO enterprises. On July 31, 2019 , General Administration 
of Customs issued announcement No. 127 of 2019 to carry out pilot reform of "two-step declaration " 
for the imported goods. Under the mode, firstly, goods can be taken delivery of after the declaration 
of enterprise summary with the  approval of the Customs; Secondly, enterprises complete declaration 
within the regulated time period.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.3 Tariffs  
3.1.3.1 Applied MFN tariffs  
Page 51, paragraph 3.25 -3.27 
This section outlines reductions in China 's simple applied MFN tariff over the review period, 
from 9.3% on 1 December 2017 to 7.1% on 1 July 2021, with reductions across both agricultural 
and non -agricultural tariffs.  
 
Question 8:   
 
• New Zealand welcomes China 's tariff reductions over the review period. Can China outline 
the reasons for these reductions, and their impacts?  
 
Reply: China stands firm to observe the opening strategy of mutual benefit and win -win result. In 
2018, China had reduced the tariff voluntarily for four times successively which involves more than 
three thousand tax items, with the overall tariff level reducing to 7.5% from 7.4%, and focused on 
reducing some tariffs on industrial products and the cars, and also those on the daily consumption 
goods with increasing public demands as well as implemented zero tariff on anti -cancer drugs.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTI CES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.1 Import prohibitions  
Page 60, paragraph 3.46  
"3.46. Since 1 January 2021, imports of all solid waste products have been prohibited, an d the 
previous regime for allowing imports of certain wastes under licensing conditions has been 
terminated.56 These wastes were contained in the Catalogue of Restrictive Solid Waste (that can be 
used as raw materials) and the Catalogue of Non -restrictive Solid Waste. During the review period, 
questions and concerns about China 's changes to measures restricting and prohibiting imports of 
solid waste were raised in the WTO Committee on Import Licensing by the European Union, the 
United States, Canada, the Re public of Korea, Australia, and Japan. Concerns related to, inter alia, 
the impact of these measures on global recycling processing capacity, and the apparent non -
application of the same bans and restrictive contaminant standards to domestically sourced so lid 
wastes. China was urged to ensure transparency by notifying measures, both introduced and 
planned, and to consider less trade -restrictive measures. In response, China has drawn attention 
to, inter alia, pollution in China and the imperative of limiting  the negative effects of solid waste.57 
Certain recycling materials for brass, iron -steel materials, copper, and cast aluminium alloys may 
be imported if they meet the required standards.58"  
 
Question 9:   
 
• New Zealand acknowledges and supports the right of all WTO Members to regulate to achieve 
legitimate domestic health and environmental objectives, and applauds China 's stated 
proactive policy objectives in relation to sustainable development and encourages valid 
actions to limit harmful environmen tal impacts from contaminated waste inside its borders. 
Could China please state how it has ensured that the import ban is not more trade restrictive 
than necessary to achieve China 's environmental and health protection objectives, and that 
the rules that apply to foreign products are no less favourable than those accorded to 
domestic products. New Zealand encourages China to ensure the scope of affected products 
does not extend beyond waste products to purposefully produced co -products such as 
vanadium sla g.  
 
Reply: Solid waste treatment and disposal is a common environmental issue faced by all countries 
in the world. As the most populous nation in the world and a developing country, while doing a good 
job in its own solid waste treatment and disposal, ban ning the import of solid waste is an inevitable 
choice for China to effectively safeguard the national ecological environment security and people 's 
health. According to the principles generally recognized by the international community, it is the 
respectiv e responsibility and obligation of each country to deal properly with the solid waste 
generated in its own country, which has nothing to do with national treatment.  
Solid waste is clearly defined in the Chinese law. In accordance with Article 124 of the L aw of the 
People 's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Solid Waste Pollution, solid waste refers 
to solid, semi -solid and gaseous articles in containers that have lost their original utilization value or 
have been abandoned or scrapped altho ugh they have not lost their utilization value, and substances 
and articles that are included in solid waste management according to laws and administrative 
regulations. The connotation and definition of solid waste in China is basically the same with the 
legal meaning of waste in the international Basel Convention. In addition, China has also formulated 
relevant solid waste identification standards and procedures. Those measures can effectively ensure 
that the import prohibition measures do not exceed the scope of solid waste. According to the Law 
of the People 's Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Solid Waste Pollution, vanadium 
slag is definitely a solid waste. There are many kinds and large quantities of residues generated in 
the processin g and treatment of vanadium slag, the reuse of vanadium extraction tailing is limited, 
most of them need to be stored and buried, and the environmental and health risks are high. If you 
intend to build treatment facilities in China to dispose of your own v anadium slag in a proper way, 
China is willing to provide exchanges and assistance in technology and equipment.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.6 Anti -dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures   
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping measures  
Pages 63 -66, paragraphs 3.57 -3.65  
These paragraphs (and Tables 3.7 -3.10) set out the 34 anti -dumping and 8 countervailing 
investigations initiated by China during the review period (from 2018).  
 
Question 10:   
 
• New Zealand notes that it has joined as a third party the WTO case relating to China 's 
adoption of anti -dumping and countervailing duties against Australian barley, and is also 
following the imposition of similar duties on Australian wine. New Zealand particip ates in 
WTO disputes where we judge they raise systemic issues of importance to the effective 
functioning of the multilateral rules -based trading system, reflecting the importance we 
place on upholding international rules and norms and ensuring internation al trade rules are 
fairly applied.  We would welcome any updates from China on its decision to impose 
additional duties on imports of these two products from Australia and encourage China to 
engage with Australia to resolve these issues, and issues affectin g other trade in goods, in 
a WTO -consistent manner.  
 
Reply: The anti -dumping and countervailing investigations of imported barley originating in 
Australia and imported wine shall be initiated by the Ministry of Commerce of China according to law 
upon the request of relevant domestic industries. During such survey, the investigation authority 
will fully protect the rights of all parties, hear the opinions of all parties, give the parties enough 
opportunities to participate in the survey process, and finally  make an objective, fair and impartial 
decision and take trade remedy measures according to law. Now, the above two cases have entered 
into the WTO dispute settlement procedure, of which the expert panel for the DS598 case (barley 
case) has been establishe d. China has adhered to the multilateral trading system, respected and 
heeded WTO rules and always handled disputes in accordance with WTO dispute settlement 
procedures. Meanwhile, China also respects New Zealand 's right as a WTO member to participate in 
the trial of relevant dispute cases as a third party.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1 Incentives  
Page 75, paragraph 3.122  
"3.122. The notifications submitted to the WTO and the replies provided by China to questions asked 
by other Members did not enable the Secretariat to have a clear overall picture of China 's support 
programmes. In particular, the notifications do not contain information on expenditure levels in 
certain sectors such as  aluminium, electric vehicles, glass, shipbuilding, semiconductors, or steel. 
Information on subsidies going beyond the 2019 notification was not made available to the 
Secretariat. In the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, China genera lly 
provides answers to questions that focus on its subsidy notifications, but not on subsidy policies 
not covered in its notification.112 The authorities indicate that under the provisions of the 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement), there is no obligation 
to provide written information on programmes not contained in the subsidy notification. "  
 
Question 11:   
 
• New Zealand welcomes China 's latest notification on subsidies covering the years 2019 and 
2020, provided after the  finalisation of the Secretariat 's report, but notes that the 
Secretariat 's comments about the difficulty of obtaining a clear overall picture of China 's 
support programmes, including in the absence of expenditure levels in certain sectors and 
subsidy policies not covered in its notifications, remain pertinent – especially given the size 
of the Chinese economy means such measures may have wider impact. Recalling China 's 
welcome recognition at its last Trade Policy Review that "the quality of our  notifications 
needs to be further improved " and its statement that China was "doing its utmost to 
continuously improve our work ", can China please outline the steps it is taking to further 
improve transparency?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 353 - 
 
  Reply: In recent years, China has made gre at efforts to improve the transparency of subsidy 
policies, and timely submitted subsidy notifications covering the central and local government levels. 
The latest subsidy notification for 2019 -2020 submitted by China includes 71 subsidy policies at the 
central government level, and 374 subsidy policies at the local level of 31 provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the central government as well as five cities specifically 
designated in the State plan.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTIC ES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1 Incentives  
Page 79, paragraph 3.132  
"3.132. Available figures indicate that China also continued to provide substantial support to its 
fisheries sector. China 's subsidy notification refers  to six different programmes at the Central 
Government level and 25 programmes at the local level.120 For example, CNY 398.5 million was 
provided in 2017 and 2018 for stock enhancement. According to external estimates, China 's 
government support to its fis heries sector totalled USD 7.3 billion in 2018.121 Moreover, a large 
share of China 's government support to the sector is considered as "capacity -enhancing ". The 
authorities indicate that a new fisheries policy would be issued soon. "  
 
Question 12:   
 
• Can China please provide information on this new fisheries policy, and any changes to the 
nature of fisheries subsidies in its latest fisheries subsidies notification (G/SCM/N/372/CHN)?  
 
Reply: The new fishery support policy implemented by China in May 20 21 complies with the trend 
of international fishery subsidies, and cancels direct cost subsidies, changes the way of subsidies, 
and guides fishermen to conserve fishery resources. In May 2021, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rur al Affairs issued the notice on implementing fishery development 
support policies and promoting high -quality development of fishery (CN [2021] No. 41). The main 
support directions are as follows.  
• (I) The fishery development subsidy fund should mainly be used to support the key projects 
included in the national planning and the upgrading of facilities and equipment such as 
fishery safety production promotion. First, to support the construction of na tional marine 
ranching. It should be used to support national marine ranching, artificial reefs and relevant 
supporting platforms, repair the marine ecological environment and conserve marine fishery 
resources. Second, to support the construction of modern  fishery equipment and facilities. 
It should be used to focus on supporting offshore fishing vessels and ocean fishing vessels, 
as well as the upgrading and transformation of facilities and equipment such as pollution 
prevention and fire -fighting, life -saving communication, production and living of fishing 
vessels, assisting in the construction of deep -sea aquaculture facilities and equipment such 
as deep -water net cages and large intelligent aquaculture equipment, and supporting the 
establishment of facili ties and equipment such as preliminary processing of aquatic products 
and refrigeration and preservation. Third, support the construction of fishery infrastructure 
and public facilities. Focus on supporting the coastal fishing port economic zones included in 
the national plan, renovate, renovate and maintain the public welfare infrastructure of fishing 
ports in the region, and support the construction of ocean fishing bases. Fourth, support the 
green circular development of fisheries. Focus on supporting th e centralized and continuous 
standardized transformation of inland aquaculture ponds, the standard treatment of 
aquaculture tail water, and the allocation of intelligent water quality monitoring and 
environmental regulation system. Fifth, support the inves tigation and conservation of fishery 
resources and the improvement of international contractual capacity. Focus on supporting 
ocean going fishing vessels that implement international conventions and conserve 
international fishery resources, guide the ratio nal use of marine fishery resources, and 
support the investigation and monitoring of fishery resources.  
• (II) Other general transfer payments mainly support local governments ' overall planning to 
promote the high -quality development of fisheries in the reg ion. First, subsidies for the 
conservation of fishery resources shall be granted to offshore fishing vessels that comply 
with the provisions on the conservation of fishery resources, and the intensity of subsidies 
shall be strictly controlled; the subsidy standard shall be prepared and issued by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs and Ministry of Finance. Second, other local expenditures for 
fishery development and management overall planned by the regions. It is mainly used for 
reducing ships and cha nging production by offshore fishermen, green development of WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 354 - 
 
  aquaculture industry, equipment allocation and operation and maintenance of fishery law 
enforcement boats and terminals, fishery informatization, processing and circulation of 
aquatic products, r enewal and transformation of offshore fishing vessels and onboard 
facilities, conservation of fishery resources, etc., to implement national fishery policies and 
complete relevant tasks and objectives. Among them, it is necessary to effectively ensure 
the demand for subsidies for fishermen to reduce ships and change production, reduce 
fishing intensity and protect marine fishery resources. During the 14th Five Year Plan period, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs will c onduct a mid -
term evaluation of the implementation and effect of local policies, and dynamically adjust 
the scale of local funds according to the evaluation results and changes in the situation.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Aff ecting Production and Trade  
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
3.3.2.1 Overview  
Page 81, paragraph 3.144  
"3.144. As at end -2020, there were 39,460 national standards (2,133 mandatory and 
37,327  voluntary standards). According to the authorities, at end -2020, among the national 
standards that correspond to the relevant international standards, 92.4% of mandatory standards 
and 91.4% of voluntary standards were adoptions or adaptations of international standards, 
compared with 74.3% and 85.9% at end -2017. Of the national standards approved in 2020 
(before  15 July), 4.0% were mandatory, compared with 2.8% in 2018. " 
 
Question 13:   
 
• New Zealand welcomes reference in the report to the increasing percentage of 
Chinese  standards that correspond  to relevant international standards, and encourages 
further such progress. In that respect, and noting the regulatory reforms on cosmetics over 
the period since China 's last TPR, could China please explain the rationale for only accepting 
regulator -issued  GMP certification as an alternative to animal testing requirements for non -
special use cosmetics imported into China, given that it is common practice internationally 
that such goods are accepted as low -risk products?  
 
Reply: In order to ensure the produ ction quality and safety of products, according to item (2) of 
paragraph 1 of Article 33 of the provisions on the administration of cosmetics registration and filing 
data (No. 32 of 2021) issued by the State Food and drug administration, the production ent erprises 
of imported ordinary cosmetics have obtained the relevant qualification certification of production 
quality management system issued by the competent department of the government of the host 
country (region), If the product safety risk assessment results can fully confirm the safety of the 
product, the toxicological test report of the product can be exempted.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Pages 99, paragraph 3.206  
"3.206. The importance of SOEs in China 's economy, coupled with high amounts of financial support, 
may affect the functioning of market -oriented policies and practi ces. It would appear that SOEs in 
China often benefit from credits extended by state banks or other forms of financing, implicit 
guarantees, capital injections, and preferential access to inputs. The authorities object to this 
statement and indicate that S OEs in China operate under market conditions, with no privileges 
granted by the Government. "  
 
Question 14:   
 
• New Zealand notes the comments of the Secretariat, and also that China states in its report 
(page 24, paragraph 5.18) that it is "committed to pus hing forward the reform of State -
owned Enterprises ", and refers to its "three -year action plan of SOE reform, starting a new 
boom in SOE reform ". Noting that the Report on the Work of the Government in 2019 stated 
that China would "follow the principle of competitive neutrality ", so that "enterprises under 
all forms of ownership will be treated on an equal footing ", what role will this principle play 
in China 's action plan of SOE reform?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 355 - 
 
  Reply: China has  put more emphasis on building a high standard market system, improving the fair 
competition system, strengthening the basic position of competition policy, improving the property 
right protection system based on the principle of fairness  and accelerating the reform of state -owned 
enterprises.  
 
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3.6 Government procurement  
3.3.6.4 Other policy considerations in government procurement  
Page 104, paragraph 3.221  
"3.221. China maintains buy -national policies in government procurement. Article 10 of the 
Government Procurement Law provides that unless the subject matter cannot be obtained within 
the territory of China or cannot be obtained with reasonable commercial terms, or the procurement 
is for use outside the territory of China, the procuring entities shall procure domestic goods, services, 
and construction works. The Measures for the Administration of Government Procurement of 
Imported Products (Cai Ku No. 119, 2007) further require that in each sp ecific case, the conditions 
that allow procurement of imported products need to be verified by the financial authorities. "  
 
Question 15:   
 
• At China 's previous Trade Policy Review, New  Zealand asked what percentage of contracts 
were awarded to foreign businesses under the above exceptions in the last four years; China 
replied that it "does not have this statistic ". Is such data now collected, and if no t, could 
China do so going forward, in the interests of transparency?  
 
Reply: China currently has no statistics on the proportion of contracts awarded to foreign 
enterprises. After China 's accession to the GPA, it will perform relevant transparency obliga tions in 
accordance with Article 16 of the GPA.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.2 Agriculture  
4.1.2.4.4 Levels of support  
Page 130 -131, paragraph 4.30  
"4.30. The OECD continues to calculate estimates of support  to agriculture in China that provide 
more up -to-date indicators over the review period (with data available up to 2019) than do China 's 
support notifications to the WTO (which cover up to 2016). However, the authorities indicate that 
OECD data do not refl ect China 's official position and that they could not confirm OECD estimates; 
they do not agree with the methodologies or data source of the estimation. "  
 
Question 16:   
 
• When can an up -to-date and complete notification of China 's domestic support measures 
since 2017 be expected, noting that without such notifications, little official data is available 
on current government support to the agriculture sector?  
 
Reply: China will submit itsDomestic Support notifications for the foll owing years later this year or 
early next.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3 Fisheries  
4.1.3.4 Fisheries conservation measures  
Page 136 -137, paragraph 4.44  
4.44. "… China has not acceded to the FAO 's Port State Measures Agreement; the authorities state 
that they are studying this possibility and that the Government has included the list of IUU fishing 
vessels released by the acceding regional fisheries organizations into the controlling scope of 
Chinese ports… "  
 
Question 17:   
 
• Can China provide an update on its progress in considering accession to the Port State 
Measures Agreement and when it expects this to conclude?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 356 - 
 
  Reply: China recognizes the important role played by the Agreement on Port State Measures to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in combating IUU fishing, 
appreciates the efforts made by FAO and member states for the entry int o force of the Agreement, 
and is actively studying and promoting accession to the Agreement. China 's domestic port 
supervision involves multiple departments, which need multi -department coordination and joint 
management. Although there are still difficulti es in China 's accession to the Agreement in the short 
term, China has included the list of IUU fishing vessels published by the regional fisheries 
organizations it has joined into the scope of China 's port control, prohibited IUU fishing vessels from 
enter ing Chinese ports, refused such fishing vessels to refuel, supply and repair in Chinese ports, 
and refused the unloading, transhipment, packaging and processing of the catch carried by such 
fishing vessels in Chinese ports. For Chinese fishing vessels ente ring foreign ports, China require 
them to accept and cooperate with relevant countries in port inspection in accordance with relevant 
international and national laws. In order to further promote the process of acceding to the Agreement 
on Port State Measur es to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
China is promoting the reform of fishing ports, strengthening the reporting of fishing vessels entering 
and leaving fishing ports, establishing a catch traceability system and prohibiting the landing of 
illegal catches. In May this year, China and FAO jointly held an international seminar on promoting 
Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing in the form of video  conference, and organized domestic and foreign experts to 
discuss matters related to joining Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Mining and Energy  
4.2.2 Energy  
4.2.2.1 Overview including environmental policy  
Page 141, paragraph 4.60  
"4.60. The authorities state that China regards the development of clean and low -carbon energy as 
the main direction for adjusting the energy mix. China intends to gra dually reduce its proportion of 
coal consumption, increase its proportion of non -fossil energy consumption, reduce carbon dioxide 
and pollutant emission levels, and optimize the distribution of energy production. The country is 
actively pursuing a policy o f decoupling of economic growth and energy consumption, through 
increased energy efficiency. In the context of the 13th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development (2016 -20), the national objective for the reduction of energy consumption per unit 
of GDP is 15%, and intermediary objectives are set on an annual basis. In 2015, energy consumption 
per unit of GDP dropped by 5.3%, surpassing the objective of 3.1%, and in 2016 it dropped by 4.8% 
(objective of 3.4%). The authorities indicated that the energ y consumption per unit of GDP dropped 
by 3.5% in 2017, 3% in 2018, and 2.5% in 2019. "  
 
Question 18:   
 
• New Zealand commends China 's efforts to decouple economic growth and energy 
consumption, and to accelerate its energy transition, and notes the results achieved to date. 
What further concrete measures will China take to ensure it is able to meet its important 
pledge to strive to hav e carbon dioxide emissions peak by 2030 and to achieve carbon 
neutrality by 2060?  
 
Reply: First, a clean, low -carbon, safe and efficient energy system will be built to control the total 
amount of fossil energy. We will achieve improvement in utilization e fficiency, implement renewable 
energy substitution actions, and deepen the power system reform to build a new power system with 
new energy as the main body. Second, pollution and carbon reduction actions will be implemented 
in key industries. The green man ufacturing will be promoted in the industrial field, energy -saving 
standards will be upgraded in the construction field, and the formation of green and low -carbon 
transportation modes will be accelerated in the transportation field. Third, major breakthrou ghs will 
be promoted in green and low -carbon technologies. The research on low -carbon, cutting -edge 
technologies will be deployed, and the popularization and application of pollution and carbon 
reduction technologies will be accelerated. Fourth, the green and low -carbon policies and the market 
system will be improved. The fiscal, taxation, value and financial policies conducive to the 
development of green and low -carbon will be improved, the trading of carbon emission rights will be 
accelerated, and the gre en finance will be actively developed. Fifth, the green and low -carbon life 
will be advocated, and the green travel will be encouraged. Sixth, the ecological carbon sequestration 
capacity will be enhanced, and the full play of the carbon sequestration of f orests, grasslands, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  wetlands and oceans will be given. Seventh, the international cooperation on climate change will be 
strengthened, the formulation of international rules and standards will be promoted, and the 
Green  Silk Road will be built.  
 
4 TRADE PO LICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.2 Telecommunications  
4.4.2.2 Regulatory framework  
4.4.2.2.6 Cybersecurity  
Pages 171 -172, paragraph 4.219  
"4.219. … Regarding cross -border transfer, Article 9.8 of the Specification states that PI 
[Personal  Information] collected and generated in China can be transferred overseas, but the 
controller must comply with all relevant national regulations and standards. On the specific 
legislation concerning PI protection, on 21 October 2020, China published for pu blic comment the 
first draft of the Personal Information Protection Law123, the country 's first comprehensive law 
regulating, inter alia, the processing of PI.124"  
 
Question 19:   
 
• New Zealand notes that the Personal Information Protection Law was passed into law in 
August 2021 and is scheduled to enter into force on 1 November 2021. Can China provide 
more information on the implementation of this law, and elaborate on the regulation s, 
standards and requirements that are applied to personal information that can be transferred 
overseas?  
 
Reply: Article 38 of the Personal Information Protection Law clearly stipulates that the provision of 
personal information abroad shall meet one of t he following conditions: first, it shall pass the security 
assessment organized by national cyberspace administration department; second, according to the 
provisions of the national cyberspace administration department, it has been certified by professiona l 
institutions for personal information protection; third, according to the standard contract formulated 
by the national cyberspace administration department, sign a contract with the overseas receiver to 
stipulate the rights and obligations of both partie s; fourth, other conditions stipulated by laws, 
administrative regulations or the national cyberspace administration department. At present, 
relevant supporting regulations such as data going abroad security assessment are being 
formulated, and it is expec ted to solicit opinions from the public in the near future.  
 
REPORT BY CHINA GOVERNMENT (WT/TPR/S/415)  
 
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -WIN 
COOPERATION  
3.1 Promoting the High -Quality Development of Trade  
3.1.3 Actively cultivating new forms and new models of foreign trade and promoting 
innovative development of trade in  services  
"3.9. … On 1 January 2019, the E -commerce Law came into effect. The standards of the e -commerce 
sector have been continuously improved and the integrity and trustworthiness of the sector have 
been further deepened. "  
 
Question 20:   
 
• Can China pr ovide a further update on how the Electronic Commerce Law has been 
implemented and how it has helped facilitate e -commerce? What is the relationship between 
the E-commerce Law and the Personal Information Protection Law?  
 
Reply: In order to better implement the Electronic Commerce Law and other provisions: first, the 
member units of the inter -ministerial joint conference on network market supervision are joined to 
continue to deploy and carry out special actions on network market supervision (Cyber Sword 
Action), focus on tackling prominent problems such as undermining the order of fair competition, 
purify the network market environment, effectively promote the implementation of platform 
corporate responsibilities, and promote the healthy and orderly development of e -commerce, 
earnestly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of business operators and consumers.  
Second, on May 1, 2021, the Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Online Transactions 
were promulgated , the Electronic Commerce Law was further refined and improved, and a series of WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  specific systems and rules were formulated to standardize transaction behavior, compact the main 
responsibility of the platform and protect the rights and interests of consumer s.  
 
Question 21:   
 
• Can China provide more detail on the types of measures it has put in place to help improve 
the integrity and trustworthiness of the e -commerce sector?  
 
Reply: Article 17 of the Electronic Commerce Law  stipulates that "e-commerce operators shall fully, 
truly, accurately and timely disclose commodity or service information to protect consumers ' right 
to know and right of choice. E -commerce operators shall not conduct false or misleading business 
publicity by means of fict itious transactions and fabricated user evaluations, so as to deceive and 
mislead consumers. "  
 
Article 39 of the Electronic Commerce Law  stipulates that "operators of e -commerce platforms shall 
establish and improve the credit evaluation system, publicize the credit evaluation rules, and provide 
consumers with ways to evaluate the commodities sold or services provided on the platform. The 
operator of the e -commerce platform shall not delete the evaluation of consumers on the 
commodities sold or services provided on its platform. "  
 
Article 41 of the Electronic Commerce Law  stipulates that "e-commerce platform operators shall 
establish rules for the protecti on of intellectual property rights, strengthen cooperation with 
intellectual property rights holders and protect intellectual property rights according to law. "  
 
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core  
4.2.2 Deeply and fully participating in multilateral negotiations and discussions, and 
earnestly fulfilling the obligations as a WTO Member  
Page 15, paragr aph 4.21  
This sub -section (paragraphs 4.20 -4.24) states that China strictly abides by WTO rules when making 
and implementing economic and trade policies, so as to ensure the stability, transparency and 
predictability of those policies. In paragraph 4.21, it notes China 's fishery policies for 2021 to 2025 
"incorporate fishery management elements into subsidy policies ".  
 
Question 22:   
 
• Can China provide information on how it will ensure transparency of its existing subsidy 
policies, and how it intends to reform subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and 
overfishing?  
 
Reply: The new fishery support policy promulgated and implemented b y China in May 2021 complies 
with the trend of international fishery subsidies, cancels direct cost subsidies, changes the subsidy 
methods, and guides fishermen to conserve fishery resources. Specifically, in May 2021, the Ministry 
of Finance and the Minis try of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued the Notice on Implementing Fishery 
Development Support Policies and Promoting High -Quality Fishery Development (CN [2021] No. 41), 
the main support directions are as follows.  
• (I) The fishery development subsidy fund should mainly be used to support the key projects 
included in the national planning and the upgrading of facilities and equipment such as 
fishery safety production promotion. First, to support the construction of national marine 
ranching. It should be  used to support national marine ranching, artificial reefs and relevant 
supporting platforms, repair the marine ecological environment and conserve marine fishery 
resources. Second, to support the construction of modern fishery equipment and facilities. 
It should be used to focus on supporting offshore fishing vessels and ocean fishing vessels, 
as well as the upgrading and transformation of facilities and equipment such as pollution 
prevention and fire -fighting, life -saving communication, production and li ving of fishing 
vessels, assisting in the construction of deep -sea aquaculture facilities and equipment such 
as deep -water net cages and large intelligent aquaculture equipment, and supporting the 
establishment of facilities and equipment such as prelimina ry processing of aquatic products 
and refrigeration and preservation. Third, support the construction of fishery infrastructure 
and public facilities. Focus on supporting the coastal fishing port economic zones included in 
the national plan, renovate, reno vate and maintain the public welfare infrastructure of fishing WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  ports in the region, and support the construction of ocean fishing bases. Fourth, support the 
green circular development of fisheries. Focus on supporting the centralized and continuous 
standar dized transformation of inland aquaculture ponds, the standard treatment of 
aquaculture tail water, and the allocation of intelligent water quality monitoring and 
environmental regulation system. Fifth, support the investigation and conservation of fishery  
resources and the improvement of international contractual capacity. Focus on supporting 
ocean going fishing vessels that implement international conventions and conserve 
international fishery resources, guide the rational use of marine fishery resources,  and 
support the investigation and monitoring of fishery resources.  
• (II) Other general transfer payments mainly support local governments ' overall planning to 
promote the high -quality development of fisheries in the region. First, subsidies for the 
conser vation of fishery resources shall be granted to offshore fishing vessels that comply 
with the provisions on the conservation of fishery resources, and the intensity of subsidies 
shall be strictly controlled; the subsidy standard shall be prepared and issue d by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Affairs and Ministry of Finance. Second, other local expenditures for 
fishery development and management overall planned by the regions. It is mainly used for 
reducing ships and changing production by offshore fisherm en, green development of 
aquaculture industry, equipment allocation and operation and maintenance of fishery law 
enforcement boats and terminals, fishery informatization, processing and circulation of 
aquatic products, renewal and transformation of offshor e fishing vessels and onboard 
facilities, conservation of fishery resources, etc., to implement national fishery policies and 
complete relevant tasks and objectives. Among them, it is necessary to effectively ensure 
the demand for subsidies for fishermen t o reduce ships and change production, reduce 
fishing intensity and protect marine fishery resources. During the 14th Five Year Plan period, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs will conduct a mid -
term evaluation of the implementation and effect of local policies, and dynamically adjust 
the scale of local funds according to the evaluation results and changes in the situation.  
 
Question 23:   
 
• How does China ensure that its fisheries subsidies do not provide support for Il legal, 
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing?  
 
Reply: China relentlessly combats IUU fishing through tightening regulations on distant water fishing 
vessels. In accordance with the Management Measures for Monitoring of Distant Water Fishing 
Vessels ' Position amended in 2020, a distant water vessel shall report its position once every hour, 
so as to prevent any production activity beyond the permitted areas. It is more stringent than the 
international reporting standard of once every four hours. To prohi bit transshipping and transporting 
of illegal catches, all high -seas transshipment activities shall be reported to China 's fisheries 
administrative authorities and the national observer system is rolling out gradually. China is 
committed to law enforcement  on the high seas and contributes significant administrative resources 
to the crack -down of IUU fishing on the high seas. IUU fishing is punished with "zero tolerance ". If 
relevant RFMOs made affirmative determinations that Chinese companies or fishing ves sels engaged 
in, supported or provided assistance to IUU fishing, China 's fishery administrative authority would 
punish the companies and vessels concerned by fining, disqualifying them for fisheries subsidies, 
suspending or revoking their distant water fishing licenses and/or blacklisting the captain and 
management personnel,  etc.  
 
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND MANKIND  
4.5 Continuously Strengthening the South -South Cooperation  
4.5.2 Contributing to the implementation of UN 2030 agenda for sust ainable development  
Page 20, paragraph 4.49  
Paragraph 4.49 states, inter alia, that China helps other developing members by building public 
facilities and energy infrastructure as part of its contribution to the implementation of the UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development.  
 
Question 24:   
 
• New Zealand welcomes China 's recent announcement that it would not build new coal -fired 
power projects abroad. China has also said it will step up support for other developing 
countries in developing green and low -carbon energy. How does China ensure that its WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  overseas investment in energy infrastructure is carried out in a manner that aligns with the 
UN 2030 Agenda environmental protection targets?  
 
Reply: According to international rules and management, overseas projects should comply with the 
laws and regulat ions and environmental protection standards of the host country and are supervised 
by the host country.  
 
Question 25:   
 
• To what extent does China 's implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development include reform of any environmentally harmful fossil fuel related -activities as 
set out in SDG target 12.c.1?  
 
Reply: In recent years, China has implemented national strategies for activel y responding to climate 
change, and adopted a series of policy measures such as adjusting industrial structure, optimizing 
energy mix, improving energy conservation and efficiency, establishing market mechanisms, and 
increasing forest carbon sinks. Positiv e progress has been made in various aspects. Greenhouse gas 
emissions have been effectively controlled. In 2020, China 's carbon emission intensity was 18.8% 
lower than that in 2015 and 48.4% lower than that in 2005, which went beyond China 's promise of 
40%-45% reduction to the international community and basically reversed the rapid growth of 
carbon dioxide emissions. In 2020, China 's non -fossil energy accounted for 15.9% of energy 
consumption, an increase of 8.5 percentage points from 2005. Reliance on coa l consumption has 
been reduced significantly, and positive results have been achieved in energy mix optimization.  
 
China has been advancing low -carbon pilot demonstration, improving its capability to adapt to 
climate change, and raising the low -carbon awar eness of the whole society. While effectively 
responding to climate change at home, we are also actively participating in leading global climate 
governance, and played an important role in promoting the conclusion and entry into force of the 
Paris Agreemen t as well as the formulation of its implementation rules. We actively implement the 
South -South Cooperation Plan to address climate change, and help other developing countries, 
especially the least developed countries, African countries, and small island c ountries improve their 
capability of responding to climate change.  
 
6 THE WAY FORWARD  
Page 26, paragraph 6.2  
"6.2. China will pursue high -quality development through higher -standard opening -up …. The 
Negative List for Cross -border Trade in Services will be introduced, and reform and innovation in 
trade and investment liberalization and facilitation will be deepened. "  
 
Question 26:   
 
• New Zealand welcomes China 's frequent high -level expressions of commitment to further 
economic and trade open ing up, and encourages continued and meaningful economic reform 
that supports openness and liberalisation and economic growth. The introduction of a 
negative list for cross -border trade in services provides an important tool and opportunity 
to drive these reforms through new opening of China 's services sector. When can this 
services negative list be expected, and what are its goals and likely goals?  
 
Reply: China is actively promoting the domestic approval procedure of the Upgrade Protocol, will 
maintain c lose communication with New Zealand and the Upgrade Protocol will enter into force as 
soon as possible after the approval is completed.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  UNITED KINGDOM  
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1 Main Features of the Economy  
Paragraph  1.5 
 
UK Question : The 14th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2021 -25) sets out a 
plan for "significant green transformation of production and lifestyles ". Does the Chinese government 
promote environmental sustainable certified g oods through public procurement and domestic policy? 
How does China identify goods it considers to be environmentally sustainable?  
 
Reply:  China is constantly improving the green product certification and labeling system, expanding 
the scope of green product certification, increasing the supply of green products, expanding the 
scale of government procurement, promoting the acceptance of certi fication results, and promoting 
green production and green consumption.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.2  Monetary and exchange rate policy  
Paragraph  1.13 
 
UK Question:  What was the proportion and value of the increase in non -performing loans that went 
to state -owned enterprises in comparison to privately owned; Chinese compared to foreign -invested; 
and MSMEs compared to other sized firms?  
 
Reply : China has no relevant s tatistics currently.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.2  Monetary and exchange rate policy  
Paragraph  1.19 
 
UK Question : The e -CNY seems to be primarily designed for domestic payments within China. Are 
there any plans for e -CNY to be used for cross -border transactions in the future? Has China 
undertaken any analysis as to the impact of the e -CNY on the internationalisation of the Chinese 
yuan? How will non -banking entities, such as state -owned telecoms, be involved in the e -
CNY network ?  
 
Reply:  e-CNY is mainly positioned as cash payment voucher (M0) and coexists with physical RMB 
for a long time. The right to issue e-CNY belongs to the state. People 's Bank of China is responsible 
for the issuance, cancellation, inter -institutional interconnection and wallet ecological management 
of e-CNY. At the same time, it carefully selects commercial banks with certain conditions in capi tal 
and technology as designated operating institutions, and designated operating institutions and 
related commercial institutions are responsible for providing e-CNY exchange and circulation services 
to the public. At present, these institutions include c ommercial banks, telecom operators and 
Internet enterprises.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2 Recent Economic Developments  
1.2.4  Structural measures  
Paragraph  1.31  
 
UK Question:  On what basis does China disagree with the conclusions of the OECD study on the 
impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the debt burden of recipient countries? What 
mechanisms does China use to assess the impact of loans for infrastructure investm ent on a 
country 's debt burden?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 362 - 
 
  UK Question:  What assessments has China made of the trade -enhancing impact of BRI 
infrastructure projects? Does China plan to make any adjustments to the BRI to account for the 
potential impact on the debt burden of recipi ent countries?  
 
Reply to two questions above : 
This year marks the eighth anniversary of the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the last 
eight years, China has signed more than 200 Belt and Road cooperation agreements with over 
100 countries and dozens of international organizations. Against the backdrop of the COVID -19 
pandemic, Belt and Road cooperation has bucked the trend and demonstrated strong resilience to 
risk, playing a vital role in supporting countries around the world in battling t he pandemic, 
maintaining economic stability and ensuring people 's livelihoods. China always gives prominence to 
debt management and is committed to building a long -term, stable and sustainable financing system 
that is well -placed to manage risks. It also w orks to help the relevant countries strengthen their 
debt sustainability and improve their ability to prevent sovereign risk. The Guiding Principles on 
Financing the Development of the Belt and Road Initiative were jointly ratified by 28 countries 
includin g China. Due to the impact of the pandemic and the resultant global recession, some 
developing countries are indeed struggling with heavy debt burdens. In view of this, China has 
cancel led the debt of relevant African countries in the form of interest -free government loans due to 
mature by the end of 2020. In terms of the debt structure of debtor nations, most of the debts are 
owed to multilateral financial institutions and commercial creditors of developed countries, which 
should also play a part in releva nt debt relief initiatives.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.1 General Frameworks  
Paragraph  2.6  
 
UK Question : Why does China not publish all relevant trade laws and regulations and other 
measures in a WTO official language, with a consultation period? How does the State Council make 
decisions as to which laws and regulations "need to be kept confidential " before t heir promulgation 
and are therefore not subject to consultation?  
 
Reply : Paragraph  2 of Article 67 of the Legislation Law of the People 's Republic of China stipulates: 
"The drafts of administrative regulations shall be made public to solicit opinions, unl ess otherwise 
decided by the State Council. " Paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the Regulations on Procedures for the 
Formulation of Administrative Regulations stipulates: "In drafting administrative regulations, the 
drafting departments shall make public the dr afts of such administrative regulations and the 
explanations thereof for comments, unless otherwise decided by the State Council. The period for 
seeking comments shall not be less than 30 days. " Paragraph 2 of Article 20 stipulates: "The 
legislative affair s department of the State Council may make public the drafts for review or the 
revised drafts and the explanations hereof for comments. The period for seeking comments shall not 
be less than 30 days. " Article 34 stipulates: "The drafting of the drafts of l aws to be submitted by 
the State Council to the National People 's Congress or its Standing Committee for deliberation shall 
be handled with reference to the relevant provisions of these Regulations. " Article 62 of the 
Regulations on Optimizing Business Env ironment stipulates: "Unless required by the law for 
confidentiality, public opinions shall be solicited through the newspaper, the Internet and otherwise 
for the formulation of administrative regulations, rules and administrative regulatory documents 
which are closely related to production and business activities of market players, and a proper 
feedback mechanism for adoption of opinions shall be established. The period for seeking public 
comments shall generally be no less than 30 days. " 
 
Article 9 of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets stipulates: "The 
following matters in relation to the national security and interests shall be determined as State 
secrets if the divulgence thereof may cause damage to the national securi ty and interests with 
respect to the politics, economy, national defense, foreign affairs and etc.: (1) Secrets involved in 
significant decisions on the State affairs... (4) Secrets involved in national economic and social 
development... " Article 14 of the Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on the Disclosure of 
Government Information stipulates: "It is not allowed to disclose any government information that 
has been identified as state secrets in accordance with the law, any gov ernment information the 
disclosure of which is prohibited by laws or regulations, or any government information the disclosure 
of which might endanger national security, public security, economic security or social stability. " WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 363 - 
 
  In recent years, the State Co uncil and relevant departments have adhered to democratic legislation 
and open -door legislation, and publicly solicited opinions on most draft laws and administrative 
regulations according to law, effectively guaranteeing citizens, legal persons and other organizations ' 
right to know, participate, express and supervise, and continuously improving the quality of 
legislation by absorbing reasonable suggestions, and achieved good results. In the next step, China 
will further promote the work of  soliciting opin ions from the public on draft laws and administrative 
regulations in strict accordance with the law, continuously improve the transparency of government 
work,  and create a stable, fair, transparent and predictable business environment ruled by law.  
 
SECRE TARIAT REPORT (S415)  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.2 Trade Policy Framework and Objectives  
2.2.2   Trade policy formulation and objectives  
Paragraph  2.19  
 
UK Question : We note that the report states China has attached great importance to addressing 
climate change issues in the last 5 years, and that China has been making efforts to expand the 
forest carbon sink. Are China 's efforts limited to just domestic efforts or does it seek to expand the 
forest carbon sink internationally through its trade poli cy? What methods has China been using to 
increase the forest carbon sink?  
 
Reply:  According to the overall arrangements for developing forest carbon sink and grassland carbon 
sink to respond to climate change, China has guided local areas to take strong measures to promote 
afforestation on a large scale, all -of-society voluntary tree p lanting, forest city, rural greening, and 
major ecological protection and restoration programs. It has also implemented the national program 
of nurturing forests and improving forest quality. As a result, the national forest resources have 
increased steadi ly with better quality, and China registers the largest increase in forest stock in the 
same period. The ecological situation in forests, grasslands, wetlands and deserts across the country 
has kept improving with reinforced carbon sink effects and other e cological functions. Greater efforts 
have been made to manage forests and grasslands, protect non -commercial forests and natural 
forests, protect grassland and wetland eco -system, nurture natural reserves, protect wild animals 
and plants, and prevent and c ontrol fire hazards and hazardous pests in forests and grasslands. 
These efforts have effectively abated carbon emissions caused by the loss of resources.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.3  Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1  WTO  
Paragraph  2.20  
 
UK Question : Does China have any intentions of becoming a participant, rather than just an 
observer, to the Plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft? In addition, does China have 
intentions to become a signatory to the W TO Pharma Agreement?  
 
Reply : China  supports the process of multilateral trade liberalization and is willing to conduct 
dialogues and discussions with interested WTO members under the WTO framework.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.3  Trade Agreements and Arran gements  
2.3.2  Regional and preferential agreements  
Paragraph  2.33  
 
UK Question:  How is the China -United States Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement and the 
specific agreements to purchase US products and services consistent with China 's MFN obligations? 
Given that it is not a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, will the technical commitments on 
market opening, recognition, IP, tech transfer within it be made available on an MFN basis?  
 
Reply:  Chinese enterprises will import more qualit y products and services from the US pursuant to 
the WTO rules and market and business principles. The huge and continuously growing China market 
will have more demands for quality and fair -priced goods and services. In fact, as the 
Chinese  economy recovers , the country has imported more quality goods from around the world, WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 364 - 
 
  including the US. The upbeat trade momentum fully demonstrates that China 's economic 
development will create great opportunities for other countries to expand their trade cooperation 
with China. China welcomes enterprises from foreign countries to engage in fair competition in the 
Chinese market, and Chinese consumers will choose products and services based on their 
performance -to-price ratio.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
2 TRADE AND INVEST MENT REGIMES  
2.4  Investment Regime  
2.4.1  Regulatory framework and market access  
Paragraph s 2.36 - 2.38 
 
UK Question:  How are measures monitored, supervised, and enforced – including at the local level 
– to ensure treatment is equal between FIEs and Chinese enterprises (state -owned and private)?  
 
Reply:  China fulfills its WTO commitments and does not discriminate agains t FIEs. Foreign 
enterprises are the participants, contributors and beneficiaries of China 's development. China will 
open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and interests of FIEs , create a 
market -oriented, law -based and internation alized business environment, and attract more 
foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share the dividends of China 's reform and 
development.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4  Investment Regime  
2.4.1  Regulatory framework and market acces  
Paragraph  2.40 
 
UK Question : What measures is China taking to ensure that the process of approval for cross -
border remittances is swift, efficient, reliable, and transparent – so that foreign -invested firms can 
carry o ut their operations with greater certainty?  
 
Reply : The materials and procedures required for cross -border remittances involved in different 
business backgrounds are all made public and transparent, and the regulatory authorities disclose 
all related laws  and regulations. Involving the permission of the administrative agency, procedures 
and time limits of related laws and regulations will be applied.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
2 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
Paragraph  2.46  
 
UK Question : What is China 's basis for reserving 123 items for state -investment only, and how is 
this consistent with its claim that state -owned firms operate as normal market actors?  
 
Reply:  China side  does not  understand  what does  "China reserves 123 items for state-investment 
only"refer to . If this  refers to the 123 access items listed in the Negative List for Market Access 
(2020 Edition) issued by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of 
Commerce in November 2020, UK may have misunder stood that. These 123 items are all established 
in accordance with China 's current laws, regulations and decisions of the State Council which are 
uniformly applicable to various market entities such as domestic and foreign capital, state -owned 
assets and p rivate capital. Except for very few industries such as tobacco monopoly products, which 
only allow state -owned assets, no access restrictions are set for non -state-owned capital in most 
items.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1.  Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
Paragraph s 3.4 - 3.7  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 365 - 
 
  UK Question : Why do Chinese customs authorities review the declared inter -company price 
annually even if there is no significant price (or transfer price) variance between years?  
UK Question : Can China please provide clear guidance on whether and how an importer can 
voluntarily disclose a retrospective upward transfer pricing adjustment (where this is aligned to the 
foreign exchange control requirements)?  Is it also possible to grant refund applications for overpaid 
customs duty and import VAT in the case of a retrosp ective downward transfer pricing adjustment?  
 
Reply  to questions above : According to the relevant provisions of the Customs Law of the People 's 
Republic of China  and the Measures of the Customs of the People 's Republic of China for Examining 
and Approving the Duty -paid Value of Import and Export Goods , the duty -paid value of import and 
export goods shall be examined and determined by the Customs on the basis of the transaction price 
of the goods. When the transaction price cannot be determined, th e duty -paid value shall be 
assessed by the Customs according to law. When the Customs has doubts about the authenticity 
and accuracy of the declared price, or believes that the special relationship between the buyer and 
the seller affects the transaction p rice, the Customs shall conduct price questioning and negotiation 
according to the procedures.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1.  Customs procedures, valuation, and requir ements  
3.1.1.2  Customs valuation  
Paragraph  3.16  
 
UK Question : Is it possible to include China Customs ' position on customs valuation methodology 
when issuing a customs valuation ruling (especially as it concerns related party transactions)?  
 
Reply : According to the provisions of the Measures of the Customs of the People 's Republic of China 
for Examining a nd Approving the Duty -paid Value of Import and Export Goods , taxpayers may 
submit a written application and ask the Customs to make a written explanation on how to determine 
the duty -paid value of their import and export goods after the Customs examines an d determines 
the duty -paid value of import and export goods. The Customs shall issue the Notice of Customs 
Valuation of the People 's Republic of China  as required.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1.  Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
3.1.1.3  Trade facilitation  
Paragraph  3.18  
 
UK Question:  What assessments have been made and/or data gathered on how different types of 
firms, state -owned, private, foreign and domestic have utilised the epidemic -related measures?  
 
Reply:  The measures taken by China Customs to deal with the epidemic are applic able to all types 
of enterprises.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.3  Tariffs  
Paragraph s 3.25 - 3.37  
 
UK Question : The UK is encouraged by China 's commitment to reduce tariffs on agriculture and 
agriculture food products.  Is there a similar commitment to reduce tariffs for imports of red meat 
and dairy products?  
 
Reply : China  has not made a commitment to reduce impor t tariffs on red meat and dairy products.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1.3  Tariffs  
3.1.4.1  Value added tax (VAT)  
Paragraph  3.39  
 
UK Question : Has China recently changed its policy regarding VAT on international shipping revenue 
at a regional level, such as lifting an exemption?   
 
Reply : No changes recently.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1  Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.4  Other charges affecting imports  
3.1.4.3 Automobile Purchase Tax  
Paragraph  3.41  
 
UK Question : Does the Automobile Purchase Tax and the Consumption Tax count as double taxation 
in the purchase of automotive vehic les? Further, will China look to introduce the Automobile Purchase 
Tax on NEVs which are currently exempt from the tax until the end of 2022?  
 
Reply:  First, like most countries, China implements the compound vehicle tax. The Consumption 
Tax is levied on th e production of certain vehicles (passenger cars and medium - and light -duty 
commercial cars), with a differentiated tax rate for passenger cars according to engine displacement, 
with the purpose of guiding consumption and promoting energy conservation and emission reduction. 
The Automobile Purchase Tax is a special -purpose tax levied on the purchase of automobiles, 
including cars, tramcars, trailers and motorbikes. Mainly used for road construction and maintenance, 
the Automobile Purchase Tax is of great im portance for promoting transport infrastructure 
construction. Different in their purpose and link of collection, Automobile Purchase Tax and 
Consumption Tax complement each other and play a better adjusting role together to effectively 
raise fiscal revenue s, guide production and consumption, promote energy conservation and emission 
reduction, and boost the healthy development of the auto industry. They don 't count as double 
taxation.Second, the current policy that exempts NEVs  from Automobile Purchase Tax will expire on 
December 31, 2022. We will study whether to introduce this tax on NEVs by making comprehensive 
considerations for national policies, development status of the NEV industry, and the country 's 
requirements for tax  and fee reduction.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.5  Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
3.1.5.2  Import licensing requirements  
Paragraph s 3.47 – 3.51  
 
UK Question : Can the lead -time of import licenses be reduced and the approval process be clear 
and publicly available? Can the move to paperless issuance of these import licenses be accelerated, 
as this would not only reduce lead time but also reduce the arch iving burden on paper copies?  
 
Reply : China  will continue to optimize import licensing management procedures, and the latest 
situation will be notified to the Import Licensing Committee in a timely manner.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.3  Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
Paragraph  3.79  
 
UK Question:  How does China ensure and assess that these export restrictions are not unfairly 
trade distorting?  
 
Reply:  China will implement the above measures in a manner consistent with WTO rules.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.3  Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
Paragraph  3.84 
 
UK Question:  How does China account for this significant increase in the value of exports subject 
to export licensing restrictions?  
 
Reply : The reason is due to the increase in the demand for related commodities and the increase in 
the prices of some commodities subject to export license management.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.2 Measures Directly Affe cting Exports  
3.2.3  Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
Paragraph  3.92  
 
UK Question:  Does China have a planned schedule for when these new regulations might emerge, 
and whether they will be made available for consultation or implemented wit h immediate effect?  
 
Reply : At present, China is actively advancing the adoption of supporting regulations of the Export 
Control Law, and will promulgate it in due course to further refine and implement the relevant 
systems established by the Export Control Law so as to provide bette r support for all parties to 
implement and comply with the Export Control Law under clear and specific guidelines. Members are 
welcomed to continue to pay attention to this.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.2 Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.4  Export support and promotion  
Paragraph  3.104  
 
UK Question : Which countries do the 6,472 newly established foreign -funded Pilot Free Trade Zone 
enterprises come from? What is the process and timeline for assessing pilot programmes in PFTZs 
and considering broadening out nationwide roll -out for special policies tri alled in FTZs? Does China 
have any plans to make the PFTZs permanent?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government welcomes investors from all over the world to invest in the FTZ. 
FIEs in the FTZ are from different countries and regions.The FTZ carries the important mi ssion of 
making explorations for deepening the reform, expanding opening -up, and gathering more 
experience that can be promoted nationwide. Since the Shanghai PFTZ was established in 2013, 
China has continuously summarized and assessed the innovative exper ience in the FTZ and the 
possibility of implementing it in a larger scope. Altogether 278 items of experience have been 
promoted cumulatively on the national level, such as the pre -access national treatment and 
negative -list management for foreign investme nt, and "single window " for international trade. You 
may check relevant information on the website of Chinese Ministry of Commerce.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
3.2 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.2.5  Export finance, insurance and guarantees  
Paragraph  3.110  
 
UK Question : How does China Eximbank demonstrate that its loans "operate " according to market 
principles? Does it publish loan conditions and contrac ts? 
 
Reply:  The Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Export -Import Bank of China 
(Order No. 3 of 2017 by CBRC) stipulates that the Export -Import Bank of China is obliged to establish 
market -driven operation and disciplinary mechanisms. In  practice, the Export -Import Bank of China 
implements the development requirements of modernized finance, and its operation, management 
and types of business are all carried out pursuant to the bank operational regularity.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  A loan contract is a legal docume nt signed between a bank and its client, and it can be disclosed 
only with mutual consent by the two parties under the contract. For the business performance of 
the Export -Import Bank of China, it is advisable to refer to the annual report published on its  official 
website.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S413)  
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3  Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1  Incentives  
Paragraph  3.120  
 
UK Question : How will China address the issue around lack on tax expenditures so that the total 
amount of expenditure and revenue forgone to be made publicly available?  
 
Reply:  Currently, China does not conduct statistics of tax expenditures.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade   
3.3.1  Incentives   
Paragraph s 3.121 – 3.122   
 
UK Question : Could  China  please  explain why is has not provided information on expenditure levels  
for certain critical sectors under its  previous  notification,  as is required under article 25.3 of the 
SCM Agreement?  Could China please confirm  whether it has included expenditure  levels  for these 
sectors in its 2021 subsidy notificatio n?  
 
Reply: In recent years, China has been committed to strengthening the transparency of subsidy 
policies and timely submitted subsidy notifications covering the central and local governments at all 
levels. The latest 2019 -2020 subsidy notification(G/SCM /N/372/CHN) covers 71 subsidy policies at 
the central government level and 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities, as well 
as 5 specifically designated cities. For aluminium  and glass sector, China has included subsidy 
programs  concerning energy saving and environment in our notification (G/SCM/N/3 43/CHN). For 
electric vehicles (such as item 19 at the central level and many items at the local level), fisheries 
and shipbuilding  (item 74 -79 at the central level and many items at the local level), semi -conductors 
(item 41 at the central level and some at the local level), and steel sectors (item 60 at the central 
level and some at the local level). In addition, construction sector  is subject to service sector, which 
shall not be included in the SCM subsidy notification.   
 
UK Question:  How will China seek to improve its transparency arrangements in terms of its 
subsidies notifications, to provide WTO and WTO members with more inform ation and clarity on its 
support programmes?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, China has been committed to strengthening the transparency of subsidy 
policies and timely submitted subsidy notifications covering the central and local governments at all 
levels. The l atest 2019 -2020 subsidy notification  (G/SCM/N/372/CHN)  covers 71 subsidy policies of 
the central government, 374  subsidy policies  of 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities, as well as 5 specifically designated cities. We hope that our efforts  for and results in 
subsidy notifications will be fairly assessed by other WTO members.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1  Incentives  
Paragraph  3.123  
 
UK Question : The report states that the authorities disagree that the Government is involved in 
the financing and management of companies through SOEs.  However, on page 24, Paragraph  5.18 
of the Report by China (WT/TPR/G/415),  it states that "China has reorga nized and set up state -
owned capital investment and operation companies to effectively promote the reform of the 
authorized management system of state -owned capital, and further improve the supervision system 
of state -owned assets ", emphasising that SOEs a re 'state-owned  assets '. As China considers SOEs WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 369 - 
 
  to be state -owned assets, could China  please  clarify  the scope of its role in the supervision of  'state-
owned assets ', if the Government does not intervene in the financing, operation or management 
of SOEs?  
 
Reply : In accordance with Law of the People 's Republic of China on State -Owned Assets in 
Enterprises, the State Council and local people 's governments shall, in accordance with the 
provisions of laws and administrative regulations, respectively per form the duties of investors on 
state-funded enterprises on behalf of the state, and enjoy the rights and interests of investors. For 
detailed information, please refer to the Law of the People 's Republic of China on State -Owned Assets 
in Enterprises.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade   
3.3.1  Incentives   
Paragraph  3.124  
 
UK Question : Could  China  please  provide clarity on the structure of its "government guidance 
funds, " specifically, what authority supervises the provision of these funds,  and what criteria is used  
to determine those industries that are sufficiently "important " to receive support? Does Ch ina 
recognise the relevance of greater transparency given the potential impact of Chinese support 
measures on global markets, downstream industries, and value chains (made in paragraph 3.127)?  
 
Reply:  The investment management and decision -making of government guidance funds are 
completely market -oriented without intervention by government departments. The 
Chinese  government has not participated in the decision -making of any investment projects. 
Additi onally, government guidance funds and their governance structure are established in 
conformity with Chinese laws, such as the Company Law. Such funds are under market -oriented 
operations. As China has not provided subsidies to any industries through such f unds, it is not 
necessary for it to notify WTO.  
 
UK Question:  Could China please explain the grounds for their assessment that  government 
guidance funds ' do not constitute  subsidies, as per Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures?  
 
Reply:  The investment management and decision -making of government guidance funds are 
completely market -oriented without intervention by government departments. The 
Chinese  government has not participated in the decision -making of any investmen t projects. 
Additionally, government guidance funds and their governance structure are established in 
conformity with Chinese laws, such as the Company Law . Such funds are under market -oriented 
operations. As China has not provided subsidies to any industr ies through such funds, it is not 
necessary for it to notify WTO.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1  Incentives   
Paragraph  3.126  
 
UK Question:  If the authorities cannot confirm the results of the OECD study on semiconductor 
support or its data – can they provide their own data on the amounts of state and state -associated 
support and financing terms provided to China 's semiconductor sector? Is th is support reserved for 
domestic companies only?  
 
Reply : For supporting policies for the semiconductor industry, please refer to subsidy notifications 
(G/SCM/N/372/CHN ) submitted by China.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements  
Paragraph s 3.134 – 3.135  
 
UK Question:  The China Standards 2035 research project recommends reducing to two categories 
of standards: national standards and association standards – can China indicate when this change 
is expected to happen, and how the role of international standards will compare with national 
standards and association standards?  
 
Reply:  "China Standard 2035 " Research is a standardization research project organized by 
Chinese  Academy of Engineering. In the Project, it mainly analyzes the existing shortcomings and 
problems by evaluating the achievements in standard system structure, standardizatio n 
management efficiency and internationalization integration in China 's standardization development 
in recent years, and puts forward opinions and suggestions on China 's standardization development 
in the future from the perspective of research institution s for reference by all parties. In the research 
process of the Project, it draws lessons from the experience of relevant international and foreign 
standardization institutions, and strengthens communication and interaction. The General 
Administration of Ma rket Supervision (Standards Committee) will comply with the relevant 
requirements of WTO when formulating standardization policies with reference to relevant research 
results.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Meas ures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements  
Paragraph  3.139 & Footnote 125  
 
UK Question:  What percentage of enterprises in technical committee working groups are foreign -
funded? What percentage of new standards developed acknowledge input from FIEs?  
 
Reply:  Among the 1,337 established technical committees, 804 had absorbed 3,217 members of 
foreign -funded enterprises, accounting for 60.1% of the total number of technical committees by 
the end of June 2021. Among the 4,547 newly registered technical committees in the first half 
of 2021, 210 came from foreign -funded enterprises, accounting for 4 .62% of the newly added 
members this year. Representatives of these foreign -funded enterprises participated in the pre -
research, project approval, drafting and examination of China 's standards to varying degrees, which 
played a role in improving the techni cal level of China 's standards and enhancing the consistency 
with international and foreign standards.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements  
Paragraph  3.144  
 
UK Question:  Where an international standard has been adopted or "adapted " into a national 
standard, how can foreign companies certified compliant with the international standard be sure that 
they meet the requirements of the adapted Chinese standard?  
 
Reply:  According to the Standardization Law, it is not allowed to produce, se ll, import or provide 
products and services that do not meet mandatory standards. Therefore, products exported to China 
shall meet the technical requirements of China 's mandatory standards.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEA SURE  
3.3 Measures affecting production and trade  
3.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements  
3.3.2.2.  Product certification  
Paragraph s 3.146 – 3.153  
 
UK Question : Does China collect information relating to unsafe and non -compliant products, and 
are any measures taken to assure that goods continue to meet the standards against which they 
were originally certified? If so, how is this done? Does China share informatio n or report information 
relating to unsafe and noncompliant products with other countries? If so, how is this done?  
 
Reply:  As for CCC and other product certification, Chinese market supervision departments regularly 
collect information on certified produ cts that do not meet the requirements of product certification. 
In the meantime, a peer -to-peer sharing mechanism of relevant information can be established with 
relevant countries under the relevant intergovernmental cooperation mechanism and framework.  
In the field of certification supervision, China 's market supervision departments have adopted a risk -
based supervision mechanism and targeted risk management and control measures pursuant to the 
characteristics of different consumer goods.  
 
UK Question : Do regulators take a risk -based approach towards inspection of businesses, and does 
the inspection and enforcement approach differ according to region? Please can China share its risk -
framework for consumer goods and construction products, and explain how it regulates construction 
product safety?  
 
Reply:  Based on the concept of risk management, market supervision departments carry out 
product quality and safety risk monitoring, mainly including risk information collection, risk 
monitoring, risk assessment,  risk disposal and other links and contents, and urge enterprises to 
strengthen risk management, promote the improvement of product standards, remind consumers 
to take risk prevention measures, and prevent and resolve risks in time pursuant to the risk 
monitoring results. There is no regional difference in relevant supervision and inspection methods.  
Market supervision departments mainly focus on examining and weighing quality and safety 
indicators, environmental protection indicators and performance indic ators for the risks of building 
materials products. Supervision methods mainly include supervision and spot check, production 
license, risk monitoring and administrative punishment  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.3  Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
3.3.3.2  SPS measures  
Paragraph s 3.165 – 3.168  
 
UK Question:  In line with the G20 commitment (referenced also in G415 report  paragraph 4.32) 
that "emergency measures designed to tackle COVID -19, if deemed necessary, must be targeted, 
proportionate, transparent, and temporary " – can China confirm that such measures will continue 
to be monitored and ultimately discontinued? When clear of any infection, are delisted manufacturers 
able to apply for relisting in a swift and transparent process?  
 
Reply:  To effectively prevent the risk of novel coronavirus from importing cold chain food, as for 
the producers and operators of imported cold chain food, the General Administration of Market 
Supervision required that imported cold chain food without inspection and quarantine certificate, 
nucleic acid detection certificate, disinfection certificate and traceability information shall not be 
processed, produced and put on the market pursuant to the arrangement of joint prevention and 
control mechanism of the State Council. Measures such as removing off the shelf and stopping selling, 
and sealing up in special areas shall be implemented for the same batch of products with positive 
novel coronavirus nucleic acid results. The above measures comply with Paragraph 1 of Article 42, 
Article 44 and Article 55 of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Prevention and Control of 
Infectious Diseases , Paragraph 1 of Article 42 and Paragraph 2 of Article 92 of the Food Safety Law 
of the People 's Republic of China and other relevant laws and regulations, and are administrative 
acts according to law.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  UK Question : China continues to maintain eme rgency preventive measures for foreign 
manufacturers of imported cold -chain foods with positive novel coronavirus nucleic acid results.  We 
note the updated FAO "Guidance for preventing transmission of COVID -19 within food businesses " 
states that food or fo od packaging is not a pathway for the spread of viruses causing respiratory 
illness, including SARS -CoV-2 and would like to ask China to share any evidence it has gathered 
which confirms that food is a source for the transmission of SARS -CoV-2. Will China be reviewing 
their measures to take into consideration such updated international guidance?  
 
Reply:  The measures to food and agriculture products adopted by China are in line with Article 42 
Paragraph 1, Article 44, Article 55 of the "Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases " and 
Article 42 and Article 92 of the Food Safety Law, and these mea sures have scientific basis and comply 
with WTO rules.  
 
To protect people 's life safety and health, China has taken necessary temporary preventive measures 
to strengthen the supervision of imported cold -chain food. The relevant practices have been in full  
compliance with international rules and have not had any negative impact on the food trade to China. 
COVID -19 nucleic acid sampling tests have been conducted on imported cold -chain foods and their 
packaging according to law to prevent the transmission and  spread of COVID -19 through them. At 
the beginning, the samples of some imported food products, their exterior and interior packaging 
and inner walls of containers from some countries were tested positive for COVID -19 by China 
Customs. In 17 October, 2020,  the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) 
announced that live COVID -19 virus had been isolated from exterior packaging of imported 
aquatic  products, which further confirmed that exposure to exterior packaging contaminated by live 
COVID -19 virus could lead to infection. China welcomes the export of high -quality and safe food to 
China, and China 's attitude towards opening up and expanding imports is consistent and clear. 
However, as the global epidemic develops, consumers ' concerns an d doubts about the safety of the 
food supply chain have deepened. We believe that without consumer confidence, there will be no 
market, and without market, there will be no trade. Under the current epidemic situation, we wish 
that the countries (regions) o verseas that wish to export food to China may require the enterprises 
exporting foods to China to, according to the relevant guidelines issued by the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), do well in all preventive management measures to e nsure that 
the foods exporting to China have not been contaminated by COVID -19. China is willing to work with 
relevant parties to jointly ensure the safety of the food supply chain, eliminate consumers ' doubts, 
respond to consumers ' concerns, ensure safe f ood supply and maintain market stability, so as to 
promote the healthy development of trade.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.3  Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements  
3.3.3.3  Inspection and quarantine  
Paragraph  3.170  
 
UK Question:  What processes are in place to ensure exported seed and propagating material meets 
the marketing/quality requirements of the importing country, and w hat process should be followed 
if not?  
 
Reply:  China has formulated the following processes for exported seeds and propagation materials:  
(I) Registration  
Enterprises engaged in exporting seeds and propagation materials shall apply to the local Customs 
for registration. After the Customs assesses its epidemic prevention conditions and confirms that 
they meet the requirements, they are allowed to engage in the business of exporting seeds and 
propagation materials.  
(II) Official inspection  
(1) In accordance with the planting and growth conditions, the Customs shall carry out annual official 
inspections on export planting bases, processing and packaging plants and storage warehouses, 
including the operation of quality m anagement system, records of occurrence and control of plant 
diseases and insect pests, records of incoming and outgoing accounts, etc., and make supervision 
records.  
(2) The customs conducts pest monitoring and investigation on the planting base during t he 
production and planting to ensure compliance with the relevant requirements of the importing 
country.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  (III) Export quarantine  
The customs conducts pre -export quarantine on seeds and propagation materials to be exported, 
focusing on checking whether th ey carry harmful organisms concerned by the importing country, 
and taking samples for laboratory testing. The customs will issue a phytosanitary certificate to allow 
for export after confirming they meet the requirements of the importing country.  
 
SECRETA RIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3  Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.4  Competition policy and price controls  
3.3.4.1  Competition policy  
3.3.4.1.1  Legislative and institutional framework  
Paragraph s 3.173 - 3.175  
 
UK Question : Could China please outline the penalties in place for the Chinese government and for 
state-owned entities if competition law is breached? How does China ensure that competition law is 
being enforced at all provincial and local levels of  government, in the same way and with the same 
level of fairness and impartiality across all provinces?  
 
Reply:  The Anti -Monopoly Law , Article 8, stipulates that no administrative organ or organization 
empowered by a law or administrative regulation to ad minister public affairs may abuse its 
administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition. Chapter V "Abuse of Administrative Power 
to Eliminate or Restrict Competition " provides specific manifestations of the abuse of administrative 
power to elimin ate and restrict competition prohibited by law. The Anti-Monopoly Law , Article 51, 
specifies the accountabilities for the abuse of administrative power to eliminate and restrict 
competition: Where an administrative organ or organization empowered by law or  administrative 
regulation to administer public affairs abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict 
competition, the superior authority thereof shall order the agency to make rectification and impose 
punishments on the directly responsible per sons in charge and the other directly liable persons. The 
Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency may offer suggestions to the relevant superior authority 
regarding how to handle the abuse according to law. Where a law or administrative regulation 
provides ot herwise for the handling of an administrative organ or organization empowered by law 
or administrative regulation to administer public affairs that abuses its administrative power to 
eliminate or restrict competition, such provisions shall prevail.  
 
Regarding the uniform enforcement of anti -monopoly law by provincial market supervision 
departments, as specified by the Anti -Monopoly Law , Article 10, the anti -monopoly law enforcement 
agency designated by the State Council shall be responsible for the an ti-monopoly law enforcement 
work. It is cleared that the enforcement of the anti -monopoly law is subject to the central authority, 
which is conducive to ensuring the uniformity of anti -monopoly law enforcement. Given the heavy 
caseload of anti -monopoly, it  is not practical for the Anti -monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under 
the State Council to deal with all cases directly. For this reason, the Anti -Monopoly Law,  Article 10, 
further specifies the Anti -monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under the State Council m ay, as 
required by the work, empower corresponding agencies in the people 's governments of the provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government to be responsible for 
the anti -monopoly law enforcement work according to this Law. To ensure the uniformity of anti -
monopoly law enforcement, the State Administration of Market Supervision issued the Notice on 
Authorization of Anti -Monopoly Law Enforcement , and three departmental regulations, i.e. Interim 
Provisions on Prohibit ing Monopoly Agreements , Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Dominant 
Market Positions , and the Interim Provisions on Prohibiting the Acts of Eliminating or Restricting 
Competition by Abuse of Administrative Power  based on the provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law , 
Article 10, which stipulate that the State Administration of Market Supervision shall strengthen the 
guidance and supervision to provincial market supervision departments on their investigation and 
punishment of monopoly agreements, acts of abuse of market dominance positions and abuse of 
administrative power to exclude and restrict competition, and develop unified law enforcement 
standards.  
 
UK Question:  Could China please explain what improvements are being made to the anti -monopoly 
system  and rules, and why these are necessary?  
 
Reply:  For now, progressive efforts is made on the revision of the Anti -Monopoly Law . In 
October  2021, the 31st meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People 's Congress WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  will deliberate the State Council 's proposal for the review of the draft amendment to the 
Anti-Monopoly Law . In this revision, it is planned to further refine the anti -monopoly rules of the 
platform economy, improve the system of concentration of undertakings, monopoly agreem ents, 
abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition, etc., and increase penalties for 
monopolistic behaviors. China has been committing to promoting institutional improvement and 
improving the legal system of anti -monopoly since the last  review. First, the Anti -Monopoly Law is 
being revised. The draft amendment to the Anti -Monopoly Law has been completed to consolidate 
the legal basis for anti -monopoly law enforcement by summarizing China 's anti -monopoly law 
enforcement practices and abso rbing and learning from the practices and experience of other 
countries. Second, More detailed regulations of the anti -monopoly law have been provided. Following 
the integration and optimization of regulations and normative documents, five departmental 
regulations, including the Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements, Interim Provisions 
on the Review of Concentration of Undertakings & Provisions on Prohibiting the Abuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights to Preclude or Restrict Competition were developed to provide uniform anti -
monopoly law enforcement procedures, standards and measures. Third, anti -monopoly guide system 
has been expanded and improved. 6 guides of the Anti -Monopoly Committee of the State Council, 
including the Guide for Counterin g Monopolization in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Platform Economy Industry have been promulgated, providing more 
detailed rules and regulations and further enhance the operability and predictability of the anti-
monopoly legal system.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.4  Competition policy and price controls  
3.3.4.1  Competition policy  
3.3.4.1.4  Mergers and acquisitions  
Paragraph s 3.181 - 3.183  
 
UK Question : Could China please explain what happens to the notification requirements to 
the SAMR if, during the merger review, a case is changed from being a 'simple ' case to a more 
complex one?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with the Anti -Monopoly Law and the Interim Provisions on the Review of 
Concentration of Business Operators and the Guiding Opinions on Streamlined Declaration of Market 
Concentration Cases by the State Administration for Market Regulation, w hen a business operator 
applies for the declaration of concentration of undertakings, the Anti -Monopoly Bureau revoke the 
identification of the simple case which shall not be deemed as a simple case as reviewed and ask 
the applicant to refile the case base d on the above -mentioned legislation and guidance.  
 
UK Question : Could China please explain how long the public has to comment on more complex 
merger cases, and if there are any statutory deadlines by which the SAMR must complete the merger 
review?  
 
Reply: According to the Anti -Monopoly Law, the Anti -monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under the 
State Council shall, within 30 days upon receipt of the documents and materials submitted by the 
business operators, conduct a preliminary examination of the declared  concentration of business 
operators, make a decision on whether to conduct further examination, and notify the business 
operators of that decision in written form. Where the Anti -monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under 
the State Council decides to conduct f urther examination, it shall, within 90 days from the date of 
decision, complete the examination, make a decision on whether to prohibit the concentration, and 
notify the business operators of the decision in written form. Under any of the following 
circum stances, the Anti -monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under the State Council may, after 
notifying the business operators concerned in written form, extend the time limit of examination as 
prescribed in the preceding paragraph, with the extension being no more  than 60 days: 1. The 
business operators agree to extend the time limit of examination; 2. The documents or materials 
submitted by business operators are inaccurate and need further verification; 3. The relevant 
circumstances have significantly changed aft er the declaration by the business operators. Where the 
Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency under the State Council fails to make a decision within the 
time limit, business operators may implement the concentration. The timing for comments falls 
under the  time limit specified by the said law.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.4  Competition policy and price controls  
3.3.4.1  Competition policy  
3.3.4.1.6  Enforcement  
Paragraph  3.187  
 
UK Question : How many actions have been taken against SOEs and/or public utility providers in 
the field of anti -monopoly enforcement?  
 
Reply:  Anti-monopoly Law of the People 's Republic of China  equally treats all types of market 
subjects, including state -owned enterprises. Since the implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law , 
the law enforcement investigation involves market subjects of different nature, such as state -owned 
enterprises, private ent erprises and foreign -funded enterprises.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.5  State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Paragraph  3.200  
 
UK Question : What  changes in management, operations, decision -making, and processes do the 
Chinese government expect mixed -ownership reform to achieve? And what is the role for the State 
via SASAC and local SASACs in a mixed ownership SOE?  
 
Reply: The mixed ownership reform aims to promote the in -depth transformation of the operation 
mechanism of mixed -ownership enterprises through the cross -holding and mutual integration of 
state-owned capitals and non -public capitals. The SASAC, as the representat ive of the investors of 
state-owned enterprises, mainly works to improve the relevant system and regulations, determine 
operating procedures, and ensure that the mixed ownership reform is completed in market -oriented, 
open, fair and just manners in the pro cess of promoting mixed ownership reform.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.5  State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Paragraph  3.205  
 
UK Question:  Do the Chinese authorities have data to substantiate their disagreement with the 
claims made by the IMF about the productivity gap between SOEs and the private sector?  
 
Reply:  China does not recognize this data and conclusion quoted from IMF 's report which may lead 
misunderstanding, because China can not confirm the detailed information which leads to this 
conclusion, such as samples, data, research methods,etc. China does not have the data on average 
productivity gap between SOEs and private companies. China does not agree with  the IMF's 
conclusion.  
 
UK Question : Could China please clarify how its mixed ownership model will comply with its 
FTA obligations?  
 
Reply:  FTAs signed by China do not involve clauses related to the mixed ownership model.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.5  State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privat ization  
Paragraph s 3.206 - 3.208  
 
UK Question:  Can Chinese authorities provide data or evidence to refute the claims made in the 
report about credit and financing extended by state -owned banks to other SOEs – including WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 376 - 
 
  amounts/proportions of lending goin g to SOEs vs private businesses; average interest rates offered; 
and disbursements to SOEs from bailout funds?  
 
Reply:  OEs, private enterprises, FIEs, and Sino -foreign joint ventures are customer bases of 
commercial banks. Commercial banks, on the premise of compliance with laws, autonomously select 
customer bases and grant credit, in accordance with their strategic planning, development 
positioning, r isk appetite, and business management capability. Relevant decisions of commercial 
banks are market -oriented selection and behaviour, based on their actual development.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Aff ecting Production and Trade  
3.3.5  State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Paragraph  3.209  
 
UK Question:  On what basis are SOEs determined to be active in "sector considered vital for China 's 
economy and to safeguard national security "? Could China provide a list of SOEs it considers to be 
in this category and confirm whether it has included state funds (capital injections, preferential 
finance, allocations from state funding/subsidy programmes, tax exemptions, etc.) provided to these 
business operations within its latest subsidy notification to the WTO?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government has always treated and protected all types of market entities 
equally and has not provided special subsidies to SOEs. Once conditions prescribed in subsidy policies 
are satisfied, market entities can enjoy subsidies equally. For subsidy policies that need to be notified 
to WTO, please refer to China 's subsidy notifications( G/SCM/N/372/CHN ). 
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.2  Legal and institutional framework  
Paragraph  3.210  
 
UK Question : Can China confirm whether amendments to the Government Procurement Law will 
be in line with the expectations set out in the GPA? How will China ensure that the Government 
Procurement Law will be followed by procuring entities at regional, sub -central and other levels of 
government?  
 
Reply : China  is not a member of GPA ，the amendments to the Government Procurement Law have 
not been approved by the National Congress. The Chinese government is actively promoting the 
revision of the "Government Procurement Law ." This revision of the law will draw on international 
rules such as GPA, optimize procurement procedures, further emphasize open competition, fairness 
and transparency, and strive to improve the current government procurement system to provide 
institution al guarantees for optimizing the business environment for government procurement.  
 
The Government Procurement Law is a legally binding law, and violations of the Government 
Procurement Law will be punished in accordance with the law. For details, please r efer to Chapter 8 
(Legal Liability) of the Government Procurement Law. The financial departments of the people 's 
governments at all levels are responsible for the supervision and management of government 
procurement, and supervise and manage the implementa tion of the Government Procurement Law.  
 
UK Question : Are there any laws or regulations governing the implementation of infrastructure 
projects by SOEs? Are foreign suppliers able to bid for these contracts?  
 
Reply : Enterprises  of all types of ownership can participate in infrastructure projects in accordance 
with laws and regulations, and there are no regulations specifically for state -owned enterprises ' 
participation in infrastructure projects. China ensures that foreign -invested enterprises have equal 
access to government procurement through fair competition in accordance with the law. Products 
and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises withi n the territory of China are equally treated 
in government procurement in accordance with law. Foreign -invested enterprises may, in 
accordance with the law, equally enjoy the State policies concerning the support of enterprise 
development.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.2  Legal and institutional framework  
Paragraph  3.215  
 
UK Question : How and where are Public -Private Part nership (PPP) opportunities advertised? How 
does China ensure that foreign suppliers are granted equal opportunities to domestic suppliers for 
such contracts?  
 
Reply:  China has neither joined the GPA nor signed the market opening agreement for government 
procurement with any other countries or regions. As specified by the Foreign Investment Law 
implemented in January 2020, foreign -invested enterprises are protected and entitled to 
participating in government procurement activities through fair competition in accordance with the 
law, and the products produced and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises in China will 
be treated equally in government procurement. Foreign companies can participate in Chinese 
government procurement activities on an equal footing in accordance with the law by registering 
companies in China. China currently has no statistics on the participation of international suppliers 
in domestic p ublic bidding.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.4  Other policy considerations in Government Procurement  
Paragraph  3.218  
 
UK Question : Could China provide the percentage of public tendering opportunities that were 
awarded to international suppliers, and their total value as a percentage of the whole?  
 
Reply : China  has no relevant statistics. In accordance with Foreign Investment Law, China ensures 
that foreign -invested enterprises have equal access to government procurement through fair 
competition in accordance with the law. Products and services provi ded by foreign -invested 
enterprises within the territory of China are equally treated in government procurement in 
accordance with law.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6 Government Procurement  
3.3.6.3  Procurement methods and e -procurement  
Paragraph  3.219  
 
UK Question : The UK has found some accessibility issues with China 's Tendering Public Service 
platform. The platform seems to be inaccessible outside of China. How does China ensure that 
foreign suppliers are able to access and interact with this, and other e -procurement platforms?  Does 
China have detailed information of where e -procurement has and has not yet been fully 
implemented?  
 
Reply：In 2000, China establ ished the website http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/. The central government 
and all provinces across the country have established an information system that includes functions 
such as filling in government procurement plans, managing review experts, and managing age ncies.  
 
UK Question : Is the National Public Resources Trading Platform accessible outside of China? Are 
there English translation options?  
 
Reply: Please refer to http://www.ggzy.gov.cn/.  This website can be visited outside of China.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 378 - 
 
  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.3  Procurement methods and e -procurement  
Paragraph  3.220  
 
UK Question : Could China provide additional information and data on the evaluation of the 
transparency of government procurement, following the Notice on Disclosure of Future Government 
Procurement Plans?  
 
Reply : For more information, please refer to http://www.ggzy.gov.cn/  and www.mof.gov.cn.   
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.4  Other policy considerations in Government Procurement  
Paragraph  3.221  
 
UK Question : China is currently applying to accede to the GPA. China 's buy -national policies conflict 
with GPA Article IV. 1 -2. How does China intend to rectify this and will it be removed?  
 
Reply:  The Policy does not violate WTO rules. China ensures that foreign -invested enterprises have 
equal access to government procurement through fair competition in accordance with the law. 
Products and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises within the territory of China are 
equally treated in government procurement in accordance with law.   
UK Question:  Can the government of China confirm tha t products and services of Foreign -invested 
companies in China are considered "domestic " under Article 10 of the Government Procurement 
Law?  
 
Reply: In accordance with the Foreign Investment Law, China ensures that foreign -invested 
enterprises have equal access to government procurement through fair competition in accordance 
with the law. Products and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises within the territory of 
China are equally treated in government procurement in accordance with law.  
 
SECRET ARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.4  Other policy considerations in Government Procurement  
Paragraph  3.222  
 
UK Question:  Could China clarify the meaning of 'foreign -invested enterprise ' in Article 16 of the 
new Foreign Investment Law (FIL), and whether there is any difference between this and a foreign -
owned enterprise?  
 
Reply : In accordance with the Foreign Investment Law , the Foreign -invested enterprises mentioned 
in this Law refer to enterprises that are wholly or partly invested by foreign investors and registered 
within the territory of China under the Chinese laws. There is no such a conception of "foreign -owned 
enterp rise"in the Foreign Investment Law.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.4  Other policy considerations in Government Procurement  
Paragraph  3.223  
 
UK Question : Are measures relating to "small -value contracts " targeted only at Chinese SMEs, or 
SMEs from any country? How does China intend to approach such set asides and preference schemes 
through its GPA Accession?  
 
Reply:  Supporting SMEs is a basic policy function of government procurement and a common 
practice all over the world. China is not a member of GPA. China will fulfill its commitments after it 
becomes a member of GPA.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES  AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.4  Other policy considerations in Government Procurement  
Paragraph  3.224  
 
UK Question : Which standards does China use to determine "energy -saving and environmentally 
friendly products " for the purposes of favourable treatment? Are international standards recognised 
when evaluating bidders?  
 
Reply:  China 's government procurement adopts rele vant national certification results, and such 
certifications are made in accordance with national standards and industry standards.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.6  Government Procurement  
3.3.6.6  Supplier complaint mechanism  
Paragraph  3.228  
 
UK Question : As the Finance Department is not an independent review body, how does China 
ensure review processes are undertaken fairly and impartially?  
 
Reply:  The finan cial departments of the people 's governments at all levelsresponsible for the 
supervision and management of government procurement. The financial department shall set up a 
special agency to perform the duties of supervision and management of government pro curement 
(including complaint handling) in accordance with the law. The agency does not carry out, participate 
in, or interfere with specific procurement activities to ensure the fairness of government procurement 
activities. The complaint handling decisio n made by the financial department is not a final ruling. If 
the relevant parties are dissatisfied with the handling results, they can apply for administrative 
reconsideration or file an administrative lawsuit with the people 's court in accordance with the  law, 
so as to fully protect the remedy rights of market entities.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.2 Institutional reforms and IP -related policies  
Paragraph  3.236  
 
UK Question:  The UK notes the Plan for Furthering Implementation of the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy to Accelerate the Construction of an Intellectual Property Power Country . Can 
China provide an update on plans to eliminate subsidies for patent and trademark applications 
(including international applications), and confirm if all subsidies for patents and trademarks will be 
eliminated by 2025?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 380 - 
 
  Reply:  China doesn 't have a national policy on subsidizing the application for and grant and 
maintenance of patent. To boost regional innovation capability and encourage the development of 
SMEs, some local governments have, within their scope of authority, issued policies to  invigorate 
innovation based on local conditions in recent years. Such policies are targeted at small and micro 
enterprises and applicable to both Chinese and foreign firms. We are also inspired by the experience 
of developed countries like Japan and Singa pore regarding how they use IP policies to support the 
innovative development of SMEs.  
 
The Chinese economy is transitioning from high -speed growth to high -quality development. To adapt 
to economic and social development, China National Intellectual Prope rty Administration issued 
policy documents this year to standardize patent and trademark applications, guide local areas to 
adjust their policy on patent and trademark subsidy, and push the comprehensive cancellation of 
subsidy and reward for patent and tr ademark application. The subsidy in the application stage has 
already been cancelled according to the Notice . Existing local subsidy is limited to granted patent 
for invention (including those granted overseas through PCT and other means) and it shall be 
provided after the patent grant. It will be gradually decreased in the future and will be completely 
cancelled by 2025.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.2 Institutional reforms and IP -related policies  
Paragraph  3.237  
 
UK question : Given the importance of international co -operation to innovation, can China confirm 
that foreign -owned intellectual property can be transferred in and out of China without restriction?  
 
Reply：China has been following TRIPs, TRIMs and other WTO agreements , as well as its accession 
commitments. The terms and conditions on technology transfer in foreign investment in China should 
be negotiated and determined by all concerned investors. According to current laws in China, it is 
not mandatory that foreign ente rprises should transfer their technologies when cooperating with 
Chinese enterprises. Article 22 of the Foreign Investment Law puts it clearly that during the process 
of foreign investment, the State shall encourage technology cooperation on the basis of f ree will and 
business rules. Conditions for technology cooperation shall be determined by all investment parties 
upon negotiation under the principle of equity. No administrative department or its staff member 
shall force any transfer of technology by admi nistrative means.The choice of technology transfer is 
independently made by enterprises for maximizing benefits of business activities, which cannot be 
manipulated by the government. Whether foreign enterprises will transfer their technologies is an 
indepe ndent behavior of the cooperation parties, and the Chinese Government cannot interfere with 
it. 
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.3  International Context  
Paragraph 3.240  
 
UK Question : The Secretariat Report notes China 's accession to the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual 
Performances ". Could China provide an update on any plans to accede to the Hague Agreement?  
 
Reply : China may submit an application for accession, and the relevant domestic procedures are in 
progress.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.5.1 Trademarks  
Paragraph 3.250  
 
UK question : Could China elaborate on the measures they have brought in to strengthen protection 
and curb bad faith filings since the last Trade Policy Review?  How are these measures being 
monitored to ensure these objectives are being achieved?  
 
Reply:  On April 23, 2019, the Standing Committee of the National People 's Congress adopted the 
revise d Trademark Law of the People 's Republic of China , and the revised  Law came into force on 
1 November  2019. The revis ed Law  involved the following aspects : 
(1)  Articles are added to curb bad faith registration and fight illegal acts such as bad faith application 
and hoarding. It is stated th at "A bad faith application for trademark registration for a purpose other 
than use shall be rejected ", and that can be cited as the reason to demur to a trademark and nullify 
a registered trademark. Articles are also added with regards to the obligations of agencies and 
punishment on bad faith registration and litigation.  
(2)  Violation of the right to exclusively use the registered trademark is subject to more serious 
punishment, which increases the cost of breaking the law. In addition to the punitive compe nsation 
system affirmed in the Trademark Law , the revision increases the compensation for vicious violation 
of the right to exclusively use the registered trademark from between one time and three times to 
between one time and five times, and increases the upper limit of compensation from three mill ion 
yuan to five million yuan. The revision also specifies how to deal with goods using fake registered 
trademark and the materials and tools used to produce such goods.  
(3) Special campaigns have been launched. In the past three years, the China National  Intellectual 
Property Administration has made consistent efforts to fight patent application not aimed to 
protecting innovation and bad faith trademark registration not for the purpose of use. By May 2021, 
the Administration had cumulatively rejected 150, 000 bad faith filings for trademark registration 
and hoarding and confirmed 220,000 unusual patent applications.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual propert y rights  
3.3.7.5.1 Trademarks  
Paragraph 3.253  
 
UK question : Could China provide more detail on theis  sub-class system as part of the Nice 
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks? For instance, in 
what ways has the CNIPA found it beneficial to refer to an additional sub -class system?  
 
Reply:  Pursuant to the Trademark Law  and the Regulation on the Implementation of the Trademark 
Law, a trademark registration applicant shall, according to the prescribed classification of goods, 
enter the class and designation of goods on which the trademark is to be used. The name of the 
goods or service shall be entered according to the class number and name indicated in the table of 
classification of goods and services. Where the name of the goods or service is not included in the 
table of classification of goods and services, a d escription of the goods or service shall be attached.  
 
The Table on the Differentiation of Similar Goods and Services  is developed and published by the 
department of trademark registration based on the NICE Classification and long years of working 
experien ce. The Table on the Differentiation of Similar Goods and Services  doesn 't adopt a so -called 
sub-class system. China is a member to the NICE Union. The applicant shall enter the goods and 
service according to the NICE Classification. The Table on the Differentiation of Similar Goods and 
Services  adopts the system, contents and rules of NICE Classification, and classifies goods and 
services into similar groups according to the actual situation of trademark registration in China. The 
Table on the Differe ntiation of Similar Goods and Services  can serve as a reference for trademark 
inspectors, agencies and registration applicants to determine the classification of similar goods or 
services.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.5  Industrial Property  
3.3.7.5.3  Patents  
Paragraph  3.261  
 
UK Question : Can China provide any update on the development of Implementing Regulations 
following the CNIPA draft amendments issued in November 2020? When will any amendments 
become law in China?  
 
Reply : The Proposals for Amendments to the Implementing Regulations of the Patent  Law (Draft for 
Comment) is being solicited for comments and will be officially announced after adoption .  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3     TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3    Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7   Intellectual propert y rights  
3.3.7.5.3  Patents  
Paragraph  3.271  
 
UK Question : Can China please clarify how patent term extension for marketing approval delays is 
calculated, and if it is only available to novel drugs that are approved for marketing for the first time 
in China (and not those that have had approval previously elsewher e in the world)?  
 
Reply : The Proposals for Amendments to the Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law (Draft for 
Comment) is being solicited for comments and will be officially announced after adoption.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3     TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3    Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7   Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.5  Industrial property  
3.3.7.5.8  Undisclosed information and trade secrets  
Paragraph s 2.284 - 2.289  
 
UK Question:  Does the legal framework governing the protection of undisclosed information and 
trade secrets, contain provisions that permit government officials and external experts to disclose 
trade secrets and other confidential business information without the cons ent of the applicant? Can 
China give examples of this, particularly situations where reasons of national security or public 
interest might justify the disclosure of such information? Is China considering further amendments 
to the legal framework?  
 
Reply : The Anti-Unfair Competition Law (revised  in 2019) revised  the definition of "trade secrets ", 
and heavier penalties will be imposed on infringements of trade secrets. In order to further 
strengthen the protection of trade secrets, the State Administration f or Market Regulation is actively 
promoting the revision of the "Provisions on the Protection of Trade Secrets. "  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.7  Intellectual property rights  
3.3.7.6 Enforcement  
Paragraph s 3.290 - 3.305  
 
UK Question : Considering the unique 'Three -in-One' litigation in intellectual property rights -related 
cases, is there an accessible  database available which provides rulings and evidence of strengthening 
of the case law based on precedence?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 383 - 
 
  Reply:  The Three -in-One model unique to i ntellectual property is not a  type of litigation, but a 
reform of the trial system. It mainly refers to the acceptance of IPR civil, administrative and criminal 
cases all by the courts with jurisdiction over IPR civil cases.  
 
UK Question : Given on -going concerns with the scale of the manufacture of counterfeits, and their 
distribution (both domestically and cross -border), how will China further improve proactive 
enforcement measures against infringing goods?  
 
Reply:  In September 2020, the Supreme People 's Court issued the Opinions on Increasing the Law -
based Penalty of Intellectual Property Infringement. It is made to f urther strengthen the application 
of preservation measures, support judgments on stopping infringement according to law, and 
increase compensation and criminal crackdown  according to law. In cases of taking IPR infringement 
as the main business, counterfeiting the registered trademarks of goods such as materials for 
disaster relief and epidemic prevention during a specific period, and engaging in criminal behaviors 
for in fringing IPR again after receiving administrative penalty for infringing IPR, the penalty shall be 
heavier according to law, and probation shall not be applied in general. It also helps to recover illegal 
income according to law, strengthen the application  of fines as penalty, and deprive criminals of the 
ability and conditions to infringe IPR again.  
 
Regulations on the Transfer of Suspected Criminal Cases by Administrative Law Enforcement Organs 
was promulgated and implemented by the State Council on Augus t 7, 2020; on August 14, 2020, 
China issued the Opinions on Strengthening the Destruction of Infringing and Counterfeit 
Commodities will be issued. In April 2021, the State Administration of Market Supervision issued the 
Regulations on Assisting Investigat ion and Management of Market Supervision Law Enforcement 
Inspection Cases to promote coordination of law enforcement among regions.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.2  Agriculture  
4.1.2.3  Policy objectives and reforms  
Paragraph  4.11 
 
UK Question : Can China provide further detail on the specific support needed to implement the 
goals/reforms for agricultural modernisation, in particular what support is being given towards 
establishing modern agricultural industrial parks and townships and industry c lusters, and 
developing new business models (i.e., leisure agriculture, rural tourism, and rural e -commerce)?  
 
Reply:  Relevant work has been done as follows:Utilizing the rural characteristic advantageous 
resources, China will establish comprehensive agri cultural industry chain, retaining the principal part 
of the agricultural industry within county level, allowing the farmers to enjoy more benefit from 
industrial added value. Encouraging the agricultural business operators to produce according to 
standard s. Building modern agricultural industry park, agricultural industry town, cluster of 
characteristic advantageous agricultural industry and promote the construction of public -benefit 
agricultural product market and backbone circulation network for agricult ural products. Developing 
leisure agriculture industry and superior rural tourism routes and optimize related facilities. China 
will promote the construction of model development park for demonstrating the integration of the 
first, second and third industr ies and technology demonstration park. Also, we will establish modern 
forest industry demonstration district and organize and initiate "10 thousands enterprises to boost 
village development " program.  
 
UK Question : What support is being given towards encouraging clean agricultural production, 
developing a three -year action plan to protect and restore the rural environment, promoting rural 
culture, and improving transport infrastructure, utilities, and public service  delivery?  
 
Reply:  Relevant work has been done as follows:  Implement the national black soil protection project 
and promote the mode of conservation farming. Improve the cropland fallow rotation system. 
Continue to promote the reduction and efficiency enh ancement of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, 
and promote green products and technologies for the prevention and control of crop diseases and 
insect pests. Strengthen the resource utilization of livestock and poultry manure. Comprehensively 
implement th e comprehensive utilization of straw and the recycling of agricultural film and pesticide WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 384 - 
 
  packaging, and strengthen the research and development and promotion of degradable agricultural 
film.  
 
Build a number of demonstration counties for comprehensive tre atment of agricultural non -point 
source pollution in the Yangtze River Economic Zone and the Yellow River Basin. Support the 
construction of national agricultural green development pioneer areas. Strengthen the conservation 
of aquatic biological resources,  promote the construction of fishery law enforcement capabilities 
focusing on the Yangtze River, ensure the effective implementation of the ten -year ban on fishing, 
and do a good job in ensuring the resettlement of fishermen who retreat. Develop water -saving 
agriculture and dry farming. Promote the comprehensive management of desertification, rocky 
desertification, slope farmland soil erosion and soil pollution prevention, groundwater protection and 
over-exploitation control in key areas.  
 
Scientifically carry out large -scale land greening operations. Comprehensively promote the 
prohibition of grazing rotation and rest grazing on the grasslands, strengthen the prevention and 
control of grassland rodents, and steadily restore the grassland ec ological environment.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.2  Agriculture  
4.1.2.4  Policy instruments  
4.1.2.4.2  Measures affecting exports   
Paragraph  4.18  
 
UK Question : Could  China please explain the delay in  submitting its  2020 notification on 
State  Trading Enterprises, as per its obligations under  Article XVII of  GATT 1994, and  provide an 
update on when it plans to  submit this notification?   
 
Reply: China  has submitted the new  notificatio n on State Trading  before the review.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.2  Agriculture  
4.1.2.4  Policy instruments  
4.1.2.4.3  Internal measures  
4.1.2.4.3.1  Support measures  
Paragraph  4.22   
 
UK Question:  We note that China has notified a programme introduced in 2018 regarding a subsidy 
for returning cultivated land to forests and grassland. How does China ensure that this subsidy does 
not drive landowners to  convert existing forest and grassland and then restore this for the purpose 
of claiming the subsidy, and is the subsidy limited to land? Is there a cut -off date for how long the 
agricultural land must have been in place, and how is this monitored? What ha s been the progress 
and results of the programme to date?  
 
Reply:  Returning cultivated land to forests and grassland is a major decision made by the 
Chinese  government from the strategic perspective of the long -term development of the country 
and the nati on, focusing on the overall sustainable development of the economy and society.  
 
China implements land use control in accordance with the law. Based on the results of national land 
surveys and annual change surveys, returning cultivated land to forests and grassland is 
strictly  limited to the scope of land that can be returned as provided by the law. A total 
of 14.27  million hectares of cultivated land were returned to forests and grassland. In 2018, China 
implemented a total of 825,800 hectares of returningcultivated land to forests and grassland, 
including 752,600 hectares of forests and 73,200 hectares of grass.  
 
China implements land use control in accordance with the law. Based on the results of national land 
surveys and annual change survey s, returningcultivated land to forests and grassland is strictly 
limited to the scope of land that can be returned as provided by the law. It is forbidden to include 
the cultivated land illegally destroyed by forests and grasses for reclamation into the im plementation WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 385 - 
 
  scope of the project of returning  cultivated land to forests and grassland. After returning cultivated 
land to forests and grassland, the local people 's government shall register and confirm the rights of 
returning cultivated land to forests a nd grassland in accordance with the law, and issue ownership 
certificates, thereby protecting the legal rights and interests of land contractors and consolidating 
the results of returning cultivated land to forests and grassland.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415 )  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.2.4  Policy instruments  
4.1.2.4.4  Levels of support  
Paragraph  4.29  
 
UK Question : Given that China hasn 't notified domestic support for agriculture since 2012, are 
there plans to notify domestic support schemes?  
 
Reply:  Domestic Support n otification s from China covers marketing year 2016. China will submit its 
DS notifications for the following years later this year  or early next.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3  Fisheries  
4.1.3.2 Legal, institutional, and policy framework  
Paragraph  4.37  
 
UK Question : Please could China provide more information on the total allowable catch system, 
and the timescale for establishing it?  
 
Reply:  In 2017, the Ministry of Agriculture (renamed Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs today) 
issued the Notice on Further Str engthening the Management of Fishing Ships in China and Controlling 
the Total Catch of Marine Fishery Resources . The Notice set the target of total output of marine 
fishery by 2020 and pledged to further set the control target afterwards.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3  Fisheries  
4.1.3.2 Legal, institutional, and policy framework  
Paragraph  4.39 
 
UK Question:  Given the importance WTO members accord to sustainable fisheries and the impact 
of subsidies in this regard, can China clarify how its "going out " strategy (and "substantial support 
to its fisheries sector " referenced in S415, Paragraph 3.132) will operate  in a way to protect global 
fishing stocks, and will it commit to providing timely and complete notifications about subsidies that 
support all aspects of its fisheries sectors?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with the rights granted by international law and relevan t bilateral cooperation 
agreements, China has rationally developed and utilized international marine biological resources 
through the development of offshore fisheries. For the responsible development of deep -sea fisheries, 
China attaches great importance to the scientific conservation and sustainable use of fishery 
resources, and actively fulfills its international obligations. Through the formulation and revision of 
"Pelagic Fishery Management Regulations " and other laws, regulations and rules, a complete  
offshore fishery management system has been established, and the world 's most stringent fishing 
vessel position monitoring and management measures have been implemented. Especially in recent 
years, China has taken the initiative to implement independent f ishing moratoriums in some high 
seas, and has taken the initiative to implement strict supervision of reprinting activities on the high 
seas. China has joined 8 regional fisheries management organizations, and the performance of the 
contract is ranked in t he forefront. At the same time, China is actively working with the international 
community to severely crack down on IUU fishery activities.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 386 - 
 
  China has promptly and completely notified the central -level fishery subsidies (G/SCM/N/372/CHN)  
from 2019 to 2020,  and has fulfilled its diligence obligations for local fishery subsidies. In the future, 
we will continue to report in a timely manner.  
 
China has notified its subsidies for the fisheries sector in a special chapter in the 2021 subsidy 
notification(G/SCM/ N/372/CHN). Six subsidies from the central government and 45 subsidies from 
local governments are included. China 's efforts for notification about subsidies for the fisheries sector 
deserve recognition by WTO members.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3  Fisheries  
4.1.3.3  Government support to the fisheries sector  
Paragraph  4.40  
 
UK Question : What capital investment, production subsidies and promotional support have been 
given to Chinese aquaculture businesses and to the processing sector over the last 3 years? Was 
any of this support given specifically to support the fishing industry due to C ovid-19 prevention 
measures and the subsequent consequences of those prevention measures to domestic and 
international markets?  
 
Reply:  From 2018 to 2020, the Chinese central government handed out the following subsidies 
related with aquaculture: public anti -epidemic subsidy for aquatic animals and subsidy for aquatic 
elite breeding. China has notified WTO of its fishery subsidies in 2017 -2018 and 2019 -2020.  
 
UK Question : Could  China  please  confirm whether the policy to terminate fuel and boat construction 
subsidies  has now been implemented? If so, could  China please confirm whether the last  of its fuel 
and boat construction subsidies were  made at the end of 2020?  Could  China please confirm whether 
it has included  its fuel and  boat construction subsidies  in its next new and full subsidy notification?  
 
Reply : Fuel and boat construction subsidies  (2019 -2020)  have been notified to 
the WTO (G/SCM/N/372/CHN).  In accordance WTO notification rules, the next subsidy 
notification  (2021-2022) should  be submitted in 2023, and the new notification work has not yet 
been prepared.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1  Agricultu re, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3  Fisheries  
4.1.3.4  Fisheries conservation measures  
Paragraph  4.43  
 
UK Question : What specific measures has China taken to strengthen the monitoring and control of 
fishing vessels and do these measures apply to international vessels?  
 
Reply:  China attaches great importance to the conservation and sustainable use of marine resources, 
and has always required all ocean -going fishery enterprises and fishing vessels to engage in fishing 
production in compliance with laws and regulations. In recent years, China has revised and 
promulgated the "Regulations on the Management of Oceanic Fisher ies", established a sound 
management system for oceanic fisheries, implemented a series of monitoring measures, and 
imposed strict supervision on ocean -going fishing vessels. In particular, the most stringent ocean -
going fishing vessel position monitoring system is implemented, requiring all fishing vessels to report 
their positions automatically within one hour. The internationally accepted measure is to require 
fishing vessels to report positions within 4 hours to prevent fishing vessels from illegally fi shing. 
China has cracked down on violations of laws and regulations with "zero tolerance ", and imposed 
severe penalties on all offshore fishing enterprises and fishing vessels that violated the regulations 
through investigation and verification.  
 
Since 20 20, China has established a mechanism of compliance performance assessment on distant 
water fisheries companies with  respect to  international regulations. China 's fisheries administrative 
authorities carry out quantitative assessment annually on the compliance performance of distant WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 387 - 
 
  water fisheries companies and their vessels, use the score of the annual assessment as the basis for 
subsidies or punishment, so as t o incentivi ze the fulfillment of international conservation obligations 
and preservation of international fisheries resources.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3  Fisheries  
4.1.3.4  Fishe ries conservation measures  
Paragraph  4.44  
 
UK Question : What are the main barriers preventing China from acceding to the FAO 's Port State 
Measures Agreement, and how is China evaluating the success of control measures in place to 
prevent Illegal Unreported and Unregulated fishing?  
 
Reply : China  recognizes the important role of Port State Measures Agreement in fighting IUU fishing, 
appreciates the FAO and its members ' efforts to bring the Agreement into force, and is actively 
studying and promoting its own accession to the Agreement. Port regulat ion in China involves 
multiple departments, which conduct joint management through coordination. There are difficulties 
for China to join the Agreement in the near term, but China has incorporated the lists of IUU fishing 
ships published by regional fisher y organizations that have joined the Agreement in its port 
regulation. It prohibits the listed IUU fishing ships from entering Chinese ports, refuses their request 
for refueling, replenishment and repair at Chinese ports, and bars their catches from being unloaded, 
transshipped, packaged and processed at Chinese ports. China asks Chinese fishing ships entering 
foreign ports to accept and cooperate in the host country 's port inspection in accordance with 
relevant international and national laws. To expedite the process to accede to the Port State 
Measures Agreement, China is implementing a fishing port reform, strengthening the reporting of 
fishing ships entering and leaving the ports, creating a tracing system of catches, and prohibiting 
illegally obtained c atches from coming onshore. In May this year, China and FAO co -hosted the 
international seminar on promoting port state measures via video link, at which Chinese and foreign 
experts held discussions on matters concerning the accession to the Agreement.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Mining and Energy  
4.2.1  Mining  
Paragraph  4.48  
 
UK Question:  Why does China maintain foreign investment restrictions in the "exploration, 
exploitation, and processing of rare earths, radioactive minerals and tungsten " and when might 
these be lifted?  
 
Reply : In accordance with the needs of national economic and social development, encourage and 
guide foreign investors to invest in specific industries, sectors and regions. China protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of FIEs , create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized 
business environment, and attract more foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share 
the dividends of China 's reform and development . 
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Energy  
4.2.2.1  Overview including environmental policy  
Paragraph  4.62 
 
UK Question : Can further information be provided about which non -fossil energies China plans on 
focusing on in  achieving its objectives for green and low -carbon energy development?  
 
Reply : In accordance with the Outline for the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development and Long -range Objectives through the Year 2035, China will accelerate the 
development of non -fossil energy, increase the scale of wind power and photovoltaic powe r 
generation, accelerate the development of distributed energy in the eastern and central regions, 
develop offshore wind power, speed up the construction of hydropower bases in the southwest, WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 388 - 
 
  promote the construction of coastal nuclear power, and build a b atch of multi -energy complementary 
clean energy base, the proportion of non -fossil energy in total energy consumption will increase to 
about 20%.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Energy  
4.2.2  Mining and Energy  
4.2.2.1 Overview including environmental policy  
Paragraph s 4.63 – 4.64  
 
UK Question : Can more detail be provided on Carbon Emissions Trading and associated regulations 
and how does China plan to use its ETS to bring down CO2 emissions across other sectors?  
 
Reply : At the end of 2020, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment issued the Measures for the 
Administration of Carbon Emissions Trading  (for Trial Implementation), primarily establishing the 
regulatory system of the national carbon market. The Measures  specified the targets, contents and 
measures of market regulation of departmental, provincial and municipal ecological and 
environmental authorities, standardized the market activities of key GHG emitters, and specified 
relevant responsibilities and oblig ations. The national carbon market officially came online and 
started trading in July this year. It included 2,162 key emitters in the power generation industry in 
the first performance cycle. For many years, China has also carried out the emission account ing, 
reporting and inspection of other high -emission industries such as petrochemical, chemical industry, 
building materials, iron and steel, non -ferrous metals, paper making and aviation, gathering solid 
statistics. Next we will systematically reduce the CO2 emission in other sectors by broadening the 
industrial coverage of the carbon market and optimizing the methods of quota distribution. Building 
on the sound operation of the carbon market for power generation industry, we will expand the 
market to cove r more high -emission industries, improve the methods of emission quota distribution, 
and give full play to the market 's important role in controlling GHG emissions, promoting innovation 
in green and low -carbon technologies, and guiding climate investment a nd financing.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Energy  
4.2.2  Mining and Energy  
4.2.2.3 Oil  
Paragraph  4.78 
 
UK Question:  Can China confirm how many multinational corporations have entered the Chinese 
petrol station market; and what market share is currently held by Chinese SOEs?  
 
Reply:  China has no relevant statistics currently.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICI ES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Energy  
4.2.2  Mining and Energy  
4.2.2.3 Gas  
Paragraphs  4.80 – 4.81  
 
UK Question:  As part of China 's gas market reforms, how will China ensure access for private and 
foreign -invested firms to gas transmission infrastructure, such as pipelines and liquid natural 
gas (LNG) terminals, owned by Pipe China?  
 
Reply:  All market players can equally use gas transmission infrastructure in  accordance with 
Chinese  laws and regulations without discrimination.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 389 - 
 
  SECRETARIAT  REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.2 Energy  
4.2.2  Mining and Energy  
4.2.2.5 Electricity  
Paragraph  4.87  
 
UK Question:  How will China provide greater market access for overseas firms in new energy 
technologies, such as offshore wind, and provide a level playing field for foreign -owned and private 
companies to compete with Chinese state -owned enterprises – including in pro curement?  
 
Reply:  China has implemented a negative list for foreign investment market access. Except for those 
fields in the negative list, foreign -invested companies can enter the Chinese market.  
 
UK Question:  How does China manage localisation requirem ents to ensure a transparent, open and 
fair market for international firms in the civil nuclear sector?  
 
Reply : China  fulfills its WTO commitments and does not discriminate against FIEs. Foreign 
enterprises are the participants, contributors and beneficiaries of China 's development. China will 
open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and interests of FIEs, create a 
market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, and attract more 
foreign -invested ente rprises to invest in China and share the dividends of China 's reform and 
development.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.1  Recent developments  
Paragraph  4.93 
 
UK Question:  It is noted that China states that "the steel cement, aluminium, and chemicals sectors 
have sound profitability levels, and they consider that there is no excess capacity in these industries. " 
For the steel sector, the OECD suggest that the difference betw een global steel production and 
capacity will be 477mmt in 2021. This is equivalent to over 19% of global steel production. Equally, 
OECD data shows that China has consistently had significantly more steel capacity than production, 
including a difference o f more 100mmt between capacity and production in 2020. In light of this, 
how has China concluded that there is "no excess capacity " in the industry? How does China plan to 
work with global partners to help resolve the issue of excess steel capacity to the benefit of all 
partners?  
 
Reply:  Overcapacity is a universal, cyclical and structural issue in economic development and a 
common challenge facing the whole world. The underlying causes of this round of steel overcapacity 
are the global economic downturn a nd the slump in steel demand triggered by the 2008 financial 
crisis. During the 13th Five -Year Plan period (2016 -2020), China cut its crude steel capacity by more 
than 150 million tons and eliminated the substandard steel capacity by 100 million tons. In 2 019, 
China had a crude steel capacity of 1.06 billion tons and produced 996 million tons of crude steel, 
with a capacity utilization rate of 94%, which was higher than the global average.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.1  Recent developments  
Paragraph  4.97  
 
UK Question : What has been the impact to China 's aerospace and shipbuilding industries following 
the removal of the foreign equities cap and other liberalisation efforts in the manufacturing sector ?  
 
Reply : China  welcomes foreign investment in China 's aerospace and shipbuilding industries.  Foreign 
enterprises are the participants, contributors and beneficiaries of China 's development of 
manufacturing sector .China will continue to reduce listed industries on the National Negative List for 
Foreign Investment , and will open up wider to the out side world, protect th e legitimate rights and 
interests of FIEs , create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 390 - 
 
  and attract more foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share the dividends of China 's 
reform and development.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4  TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3  Manufacturing  
4.3.2  Selected subsectors  
4.3.2.2  Machinery and equipment  
Paragraph 4.112  
 
UK Question : Were the funds made available as part of the Robotics Industry Development Plan 
(RIDP) notified as subsidies? In addition, are there any plans to replace the RIDP?  
 
Reply:  The RIDP is for guidance purposes and does not provide specific subsidies, so ther e is no 
need to notify the funds to WTO.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.2  Selected Subsectors  
4.3.2.2 Machinery and equipment  
Paragraph 4.114  
 
UK Question : Can China provide more information regarding the strategies and specific policies 
being implemented to achieve the aims of the strategic actions in machinery and equipment 
industries?  
 
Reply : Please  refer to the Section 3, Chapter 8, Outline for the 14th  Five-Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development and Long -range Objectives through the Year 2035. Greater efforts will be 
made to attract and utilize foreign capital. Foreign companies are welcomed to participate in 
accordance with Chinese laws and regu lations.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.2  Selected subsectors  
4.3.2.3  Iron and Steel  
Paragraph  4.117  
 
UK Question : This paragraph  notes that by the end of 2019, China had reduced crude steel 
production capacity by 170mmt in cumulative terms, and a further 140mmt of steel production not 
conforming to quality standards was ( "cut"). While we welcome the efforts made by China in this 
regard, the latest data from the OECD shows that between 2018 and 2020 Chinese capacity 
increased by around 33mmt and in 2021 China 's crude steel output reached a record high 
of 1160mmt, despite capacity swap measures being in place to prevent capacity incre ases in 
Chinese  production. How does China account for this discrepancy?  Can China provide further 
information on the new measures to cut steel capacity, announced in 2021?  
 
Reply:  Steel overcapacity: In accordance with China 's statistics, during the 13th Five -Year Plan 
period (2016 -2020), China cut its crude steel capacity by more than 150 million tons and eliminated 
the substandard steel capacity by 100 million tons. In 2019, China had a crude steel capacity 
of 1.06 billion tons and produced 996 million tons of crude st eel, with a capacity utilization rate of 
94%, which was higher than the global average.  
 
UK Question : This Paragraph notes that "the authorities state that the capacity of "standard steel " 
has been fully banned. " What constitutes "standard steel "?  
 
Reply : This is a clerical error. It should be "substandard steel ". 
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 391 - 
 
  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements  
4.3.2.4  Electronic, IT, and integrated circuits  
Paragraph  4.126  
 
UK Question:  How do the authorities at every level implement the intellectual property protection 
system, and ensure that international companies are not directly or indirectly forced or unfairly 
influenced to give up or exchange their IP/knowledge in order to progres s approval processes for 
favourable measures? What guarantees are in place to ensure their commercial control of their 
knowledge assets and the results of R&D that they generate in China?  
 
Reply:  Since 2015, the Chinese government has established 105 cros s-border e -commerce pilot 
zones. On the whole, the pilot zone 's role in the development of foreign trade has become 
increasingly prominent, and it has become a new bright spot for foreign trade growth, a new channel 
for innovation and entrepreneurship, and  a new driving force for transformation and upgrading. 
The Chinese government optimizes the development environment for cross -border e -commerce. On 
July 5 this year, the General Office of the State Council issued the "Opinions on Accelerating the 
Developme nt of New Formats and Models of Foreign Trade " to further promote the healthy and 
sustainable development of new formats and models of foreign trade.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.2  Selected Subsectors  
4.3.2.5  Shipbuilding  
Paragraph  4.129  
 
UK Question : Acknowledging China 's Shipbuilding Industry Deepening Structural Adjustment, 
Accelerating Transformation and Upgrading Action Plan (2016 -2020), what specific measures have 
been (or wi ll be) put in place to comply with environmental good practices and promote green 
shipping and energy efficiency, beyond the plan to replace old fleets with new greener vessels?  
 
Reply:  The green concept runs through the whole industrial chain of shipbuilding and the whole life 
cycle of products. Focusing on promoting ecological product design, clean production process, 
efficient energy utilization and recycling of renewable resources, strengthen the awareness of energy 
saving in design, actively p romote the application of new energy -saving and environmental 
protection materials and processes and tooling, support enterprises to carry out technical 
transformation in energy -saving, environmental protection, green and safe production, accelerate 
the co nstruction of green manufacturing system, and establish a green and safe shipbuilding 
technical specification and standard system.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.3 Manufacturing  
4.3.2  Selected Subsectors  
4.3.2.5 Shipbuilding  
Paragraph  4.133  
 
UK Question:  Can China provide a further update regarding the plan to merge the two largest 
state-owned shipbuilders?  
 
Reply : Not completed yet.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 392 - 
 
  SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.1  Financial Services  
4.4.1.3  Recent Regulatory Developments  
4.4.1.3.1  Overview  
Paragraph  4.145  
 
UK Question : What specific measures were taken to liberalise financial activities and to further 
promote foreign participation in the banking, insurance, pension fund management, and securities 
industries?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to Para.3.17 of China policy statement.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4. Services  
4.4.1 Financial Services  
4.4.1.3. Recent Regulatory developments  
4.4.1.3.7 Developments in the Fintech Industry  
Paragraph 4.189  
 
UK Question : Can China please provide further informa tion on how the 2019 Fintech Development 
Plan is progressing? Specifically, if China plans to reduce of data localisation and establishment 
requirements or establish third -party electronic payment services in China and other areas of the 
digital economy?  
 
Reply : Data localization related work will be carried out in accordance with national laws and 
regulations and the actual needs of industry supervision. There is currently no plan to reduce related 
requirements.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.1  Financial services  
4.4.1.3  Recent regulatory developments  
4.4.1.3.7  Developments in the fintech industry  
Paragraph  4.192  
 
UK Question:  Given the absence of a unified regulatory regime for fintech firms, does China have 
plans to set up a single supervisory authority for the regulation of the fintech industry, and/or to 
harmonise regulations applicable to this sector? If so, can test cases  be provided to establish the 
efficacy of the existing system? How does China plan to balance the drive for financial standardisation 
and supervision with the disruptive influences of financial innovation?  
 
Reply:  The People 's Bank of China adheres to the  principle of licensed operation of financial services, 
designs a rigid, flexible, and innovative trial -and-error-tolerant mechanism, and introduces financial 
technology innovation supervision tools that not only maintain the bottom line of safety, but als o 
encourage reasonable innovation, guiding financial institutions and technology companies to use 
technology to improve the quality and efficiency of financial services in a market environment where 
risks are controllable.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.1  Financial services  
4.4.1.3  Recent regulatory developments  
4.4.1.3.7  Developments in the fintech industry  
Paragraph  4.195  
 
UK Question : What are the specific cross -border restrictions for processing of anonymised or 
pseudonymised personal data of customers within China 's territory, with a view to utilise those WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 393 - 
 
  learnings in other markets? Are there any restrictions on repatriation of earni ngs in non -renminbi 
denominated currencies?  
 
Reply : In accordance with Article 21 of Foreign Investment Law, f oreign investors ' capital 
contribution, profits, capital gains, assets disposal income, intellectual property license fees, legally 
obtained damages or compensation, liquidation proceeds, etc., may be freely remitted to overseas 
in RMB or foreign exchange according to law.  Article 24 of the "Regulations on the Administration of 
Credit Investigation Industry " (Order No. 631 of the State Council of the People 's Republic of China) 
stipulates that "The sorting, storage and processing of information collected by credit investiga tion 
agencies in China shall be carried out in China. Credit reporting agencies that provide information 
to overseas organizations or individuals shall abide by laws, administrative regulations and the 
relevant provisions of the credit reporting supervisio n and management department of the 
State  Council. At the same time, the relevant provisions of the "Data Security Law of the 
People 's Republic of China " and the "Personal Information Protection Law of the People 's Republic 
of China " need to be applied.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4. TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.2  Telecommunications  
4.4.2.2 Regulatory Framework  
4.4.2.2.5 Cloud Computing  
Paragraph  4.213  
 
UK Question : Can China provide more information on the plans to open up cloud services to foreign 
investment as contained in the 2017 Notice?  
 
Reply:  China will study the possibility of further opening up related fields in accordance with the 
development needs of the  domestic market.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4. TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.2  Telecommunications  
4.4.2.2 Regulatory Framework  
4.4.2.2.6 Cybersecurity  
Paragraph  4.214  
 
UK Question : What progress has China made on developing a definition of "important data " relating 
to cross border data flows?  
 
Reply:  According to the "Cyber Security Law ", "Data Security Law " and "Personal Information 
Protection Law ", relevant supporting regulations  such as data security management and data exit 
security assessment are in the process of being formulated.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4.3  Transport  
4.4.3.1  Maritime transport  
Paragraph  4.240  
 
UK Question : Does China consider the following maritime services as cabotage and therefore 
excluded from the rules related to foreign flagged vessels: bunkering; dredging; movement of empty 
containers (when not carried against payment); feeder services; and offshore se rvices (wind and 
hydrocarbon energy construction and servicing).  
 
Reply:  According to the Regulations on the Administration of Domestic Waterway Transportation, 
domestic waterway transportation refers to commercial passenger transportation and cargo 
transportation in which the port of departure, port of call, and port of destination are all within the 
navigable waters managed by the People 's Republic of China. Waterway transportation operators 
are not allowed to use foreign ships to operate China 's domesti c waterway transportation business. 
However, in the case that there is no Chinese ship that can meet the transportation requirements WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 394 - 
 
  applied for, and the port or water area where the ship calls is a port or water area open to the 
outside world, with the pe rmission of the competent department of transportation under the State 
Council, water transport operators may temporarily use foreign ships for transportation within the 
time limit or voyage set by the competent department of transportation under the State  Council.  
 
SECRETARIAT REPORT (S415)  
4 TRADE POLICES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.3  Transport  
4.4.3.2  Air transport  
Paragraph s 4.251 - 4.252  
 
UK Question:  China currently unilaterally prevents any UK -China scheduled passenger air services, 
contrary to provisions in the bilateral UK -China air services agreement.  Can the Chinese authorities 
provide any information as to when this restriction will be lifted?  
 
Reply : Since  the outbreak of the new crown epidemic, China has, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the International Health Regulations, the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
and China 's Border Health and Quarantine Law, the Civil Aviation Law, an d other laws and regulations, 
adopted a series of temporary control measures on international passenger flights, which has 
effectively prevented the cross -border spread of the epidemic while meeting the necessary personnel 
exchange requirements. Such measu res are risk mitigation measures implemented by China in 
accordance with relevant regulations of WHO and ICAO and domestic legislation in the event of 
public health emergencies and pandemics, which do not violate the bilateral air services agreement, 
and a lso comply with the requirements of WTO rules. The current global epidemic situation is still 
complicated and severe. According to changes in the global epidemic situation, relevant measures 
will be dynamically adjusted in a timely manner, and the orderly recovery of international passenger 
flights will be steadily promoted under the premise of effective prevention and control measures.  
 
UK QUESTIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING N EW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -
WIN COOPERATION  
3.1 Promoting the High -Quality Development of Trade  
3.1.3  Actively cultivating new forms and new models of foreign trade and promoting 
innovative development of trade in services  
Paragraph  3.9 
 
UK Question : Can more information be provided about the 105 cross -border e -commerce pilot 
zones that China has established, including how they create a fair, open and transparent 
development environment?  
 
Reply:  Since 2015, the Chinese government has established 105 cross-border e -commerce pilot 
zones. On the whole, the pilot zone 's role in the development of foreign trade has become 
increasingly prominent, and it has become a new bright spot for foreign trade growth, a new channel 
for innovation and entrepreneurship,  and a new driving force for transformation and upgrading. 
The Chinese government optimizes the development environment for cross -border e -commerce. On 
July 5 this year, the General Office of the State Council issued the "Opinions on Accelerating the 
Devel opment of New Formats and Models of Foreign Trade " to further promote the healthy and 
sustainable development of new formats and models of foreign trade.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -
WIN COOPERATION  
3.1 Promoting the High -Quality Development of Trade  
3.1.3  Actively cultivating new forms and new models of foreign trade and promoting 
innovative development of trade in s ervices  
Paragraph  3.10 
 
UK Question : Can more information be provided about the Overall Plan for Deepening the Pilot 
Programme of the Innovative Development of Trade in Services Programme and how it will impact 
on foreign trade?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 395 - 
 
  Reply:  The eight pilot tasks proposed in the "Comprehensive De epening of the Pilot Program for the 
Innovation and Development of Service Trade " include: comprehensively explore and improve the 
management system, comprehensively explore the expansion of opening up, comprehensively 
explore and improve the level of conv enience, comprehensively explore innovative development 
models, comprehensively explore and improve the promotion system, comprehensively explore and 
optimize the policy system, comprehensively explore and improve the supervision model, and 
comprehensively  explore and improve the statistical system. The full text of the plan and the 
interpretation information of the special press conference can be viewed on the website of the 
Chinese Government and the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
UK Question : On 12 August 2020, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued a circular 
on a pilot project blueprint for further innovating and developing trade in services, "The Overall Plan 
to Launch Innovative Development Pilots to Comprehensively Deepen Trade in Services. " Has there 
been further developments on the proposals for the legal services sector?  
 
Reply:  In terms of legal services, the "Comprehensive Deepening of Service Trade Innovation and 
Development Pilot Program " proposes to further explore ways and mechanisms for closer business 
cooperation between law firms in the pilot regions and law firms in Hong Kong and Macau, and 
further explore ways and mechanisms for intensifying business cooperation between Chinese law 
firms and foreign law firms in pil ot areas where conditions permit. Currently, these two pilot 
measures have been implemented.  
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -
WIN COOPERATION  
3.1 Promoting the High -Quality Development of Trade  
3.1.3  Actively cultivating new forms and new models of foreign trade and promoting 
innovative development of trade in services  
Paragraph 3.11  
 
UK Question:  How will China ensure that the significant requir ements under its Cybersecurity Law 
and Data Security Law, including requirements for data localisation and restrictions on cross -border 
transfers, do not constitute barriers to trade?  
 
Reply:  The primary starting point for China to formulate relevant poli cies is to support data flow 
and data development and utilization. But at the same time, it should be noted that disorderly 
circulation and sharing of data may lead to major risks in personal information protection and data 
security. Necessary, appropriate , and non -discriminatory management must be imposed. 
Strengthening the management of cross -border flows of data is also a common international practice 
and will not cause obstacles to trade.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -
WIN COOPERATION  
3.2 Building a Highland for Foreign Investment  
3.2.1  Fully implementing the Foreign Investment Law and its implementing regulations  
Paragraph  3.14  
 
UK Question:  How are the intellectual property and technology transfer protections in the Foreign 
Investment Law monitored and enforced to ensure that administrative bodies at all levels do not 
directly or indirectly require, force, pressure or otherwise interfere with  the transfer or licensing of 
technology in order to secure relevant approvals?  
 
Reply : China  has been following TRIPs, TRIMs and other WTO agreements, as well as its accession 
commitments. The terms and conditions on technology transfer in foreign invest ment in China should 
be negotiated and determined by all concerned investors. According to current laws in China, it is 
not mandatory that foreign enterprises should transfer their technologies when cooperating with 
Chinese enterprises. Article 22 of the F oreign Investment Law puts it clearly that during the process 
of foreign investment, the State shall encourage technology cooperation on the basis of free will and 
business rules. Conditions for technology cooperation shall be determined by all investment parties 
upon negotiation under the principle of equity. No administrative department or its staff member 
shall force any transfer of technology by administrative means.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 396 - 
 
  The choice of technology transfer is independently made by enterprises for maximizing b enefits of 
business activities, which cannot be manipulated by the government. Whether foreign enterprises 
will transfer their technologies is an independent behavior of the cooperation parties, and the 
Chinese Government cannot interfere with it.  
 
GOVERNM ENT REPORT (G415)  
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR 
WIN-WIN COOPERATION  
3.2 Building a Highland for Foreign Investment  
3.2.2  Actively expanding market access for foreign investment  
Paragraph  3.16  
 
UK Question:  Given that China has significantly shortened the negative list for foreign investment 
access regime and stated its commitment to opening to foreign investment, does Chin a plan to 
eliminate joint venture requirements across all sectors?  
 
Reply:  China will continue to reduce listed industries on the National Negative List for Foreign 
Investment , and will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and interests 
of FIEs , create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, and 
attract more foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share the div idends of China 's 
reform and development.  
 
UK Question:  Whilst direct market access barriers, such as negative lists, are problematic – 
businesses tell us that indirect market access barriers (such as opaque and slow licensing 
requirements) are far more ch allenging. How does China plan to also address indirect market access 
barriers?  
 
Reply : China  protects the rights of foreign investors in accordance with laws and regulations. All 
departments and regions shall not implement restrictive measures outside th e negative list of foreign 
investment , strictly enforce the Foreign Investment Law and supplementary regulations, and ensure 
that foreign -invested enterprises enter the fields that have been opened to foreign investors on an 
equal basis in accordance with  laws and regulations.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR 
WIN-WIN COOPERATION  
3.2 Building a Highland for Foreign Investment  
3.2.2  Actively expanding market access for foreign investment  
Paragraph  3.17  
 
UK Question:  The European Chamber of Commerce in China has reported that in 2020, the 
combined market share of China 's four biggest insurance companies —Ping An, China Life, People 's 
Insurance Company of China and China Pacific —stood at 60%, against the combined 7.8% s hare of 
foreign -invested insurers. In the banking sector, the market share of foreign banks in China, in 
terms of total assets, stood at 1.2 %. This is significantly lower than in similar economies. What 
measures will China take to address the overwhelming  dominance of domestic firms in China 's 
banking and insurance markets and promote greater competition?  
 
Reply:  As for the banking sector, in 2018, the cap of foreign investment shareholding ratio in 
Chinese commercial banks was lifted and the unified equity investment ratio rules for both domestic 
and foreign investment were implemented. The Regulations on the Adm inistration of Foreign -
invested Banks and the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulation on the 
Administration of Foreign -invested Banks were revised in October and December 2019 respectively, 
which removed the total assets requirement of USD 10 billion for foreign banks to set up 
foreign -invested legal person corporate banks in China and the total assets requirement of 
USD 20 billion for foreign banks to set up branches in China. The restrictions on Chinese 
shareholders of Sino -foreign joint v enture banks were eased as well, and the requirement that the 
sole or major Chinese  shareholder must be a financial institution was also lifted.  
 
As for the insurance sector, as of the end of 2019, the requirements of operating business for 
30 years and op erating a representative office for 2 consecutive years before the establishment of 
a foreign insurance institution were lifted nationwide, and foreign insurance group companies were WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 397 - 
 
  allowed to invest in the establishment of insurance institutions. From 20 20, the cap of foreign 
investment shareholding ratio in life insurance companies was eased to 100%.  
 
UK Question : Has there been consideration of lessening the regulatory and administrative burdens 
currently facing foreign firms operating as Representativ e Offices in China? In particular, permitting 
the opening of third branch offices or lowering the requirements for representatives.  
 
Reply: In October 2019, the State Council issued the Regulation on Improving the Business 
Environment to ensure that all market entities have equal access to various production factors and 
support policy. It promulgated institutional regulations on shortening the t ime needed to start a 
business, ensuring equal access to the market, and promoting credit supervision. Inspection has 
been conducted through the "random selection of both inspectors and inspections targets and the 
prompt release of inspection results ". In addition, China has also promoted the "Internet Plus 
Regulation ".  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR 
WIN-WIN COOPERATION  
3.5 Developing High -Standard Pilot Free Trade Zones and Free Trade ports  
3.5.1  Promoting high -quality development of pilot free trade zones  
Paragraph  3.27  
 
UK Question : The first round of Free Trade Zones was announced in 2013. Are there further plans 
for the liberalisation of legal services sector or greater cooperation between foreign and domestic 
firms under these zones? Are there any plans to expand these liberalisati on measures more broadly?  
 
Reply:  In terms of legal services, the "Comprehensive Deepening of Service Trade Innovation and 
Development Pilot Program " proposes to further explore ways and mechanisms for closer business 
cooperation between law firms in the pilot regions and law firms in Hong Kong and Macau, and 
further explore ways and mechanisms for intensifying business cooperation between Chinese law 
firms and foreign law firms in pilot areas where conditions permit. Currently, these two pilot 
measures ha ve been implemented.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
4 ACHEVING SHARED GROWTH THROUGH DISCUSSION AND COLLABORATION AND 
BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY  
4.1 Fully Supporting Global Cooperation on Combating COVID -19 with Concrete 
Actions  
Paragraph  4.2  
 
UK Question : We would welcome an update on how China is ensuring that its financial institutions 
are working towards international best practice for lending for example under the G20 's Operational 
Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, in particular their tran sparency provisions, and in aligning their 
financing with international standards like the G20's QII Principles.  
 
Reply:  China will continue to reduce listed industries on the National Negative List for Foreign 
Investment , and will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and interests 
of FIEs , create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, and 
attract more foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share the div idends of China 's 
reform and development.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)   
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
A COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core  
4.2.2  Deeply and fully participating in multilateral negotiations and discussions, and 
earnestly fulfilling the obligations as a WTO Member  
Paragraph  4.20  
 
UK Question : As China is not a signatory country to WTO Pharmaceutical Agreement, and hence is 
not aligned with a number of other WTO trading partners, some key commodities in UK supply chains 
(such as some alkaloid -based medicaments and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredi ents (API)) incur WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 398 - 
 
  significant duty liabilities. These are inevitably passed on to the end -user. Can China confirm if it 
has an intention to sign up to this agreement, to address this disparity and level the playing field as 
a global leader in API exports?  
 
Reply:  China supports the process of multilateral trade liberalization and is willing to conduct 
dialogues and discussions with interested WTO members under the WTO framework.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)   
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE  CONSTRUCTION OF 
A COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core  
4.2.2  Deeply and fully participating in multilateral negotiations and discussions, and 
earnestly fulfilling the o bligations as a WTO Member  
Paragraph  4.24  
 
UK Question : The report states that "in 2019, China submitted the New and Full Subsidy Notification 
at the central and sub -central government level during the period from 2017 to 2018. The 
notification covers 79 subsidy programmes at central level and 420 ones at sub -central level 
(31 provinces/autonomous regions/municipalities and 5 cities directly designated by the State 
Council) ".  
Page 13, Paragraph 23 of the WTO Secretariat report state s that, "the notification contains 
information on 79 central -level and 420 subcentral -level programmes, many of which, however, had 
expired by the time of the notification " and that "no information was provided by the authorities on 
how many of the program mes were still active as at April 2021 ". Could  China  please provide  an 
updated figure on how many central and subcentral -level programmes are currently  active?  
 
Reply : Please  refer to China 's latest subsidy notification(G/SCM/N/372/CHN).  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)   
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
A COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.2 Firmly Supporting the Multilateral Trading System with the WTO at its Core  
4.2.3  Supporting a bigger role of the  WTO  
Paragraph  4.26 
 
UK Question : Can China provide more information on its MC12 interest in investment facilitation, 
services domestic regulation and e -commerce? Does China support further liberalisation?  
 
Reply:  China believes that MC12 will be a testimony to Members ' confidence in the  multilateral 
trading system. China is willing to work with other Members to build consensus, to support the new 
Director -General 's work, and to achieve outcomes on issues such as fisheries subsidies, fighting 
COVID -19 pandemic, agriculture, investment fac ilitation, services domestic regulation, e -commerce, 
and the Appellate Body reform.  
 
China will continue to reduce listed industries on the National Negative List for Foreign Investment , 
and will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and interests of FIEs , create 
a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, and attract more 
foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share the dividends of China 's reform and 
development.  
 
In November 2019, 92 members issued the Joint Ministerial Statement on Investment Facilitation 
for Development during the Informal WTO Ministerial Meeting in Shanghai. In 2020, the Investment 
Facilitation for Development proceeded into negotiating stage. T ogether with over 100 members, 
China is fully participating in the process. With joint efforts, the participants are working towards an 
early integration of investment facilitation into the multilateral framework, and an outcome that 
benefits all WTO membe rs.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)   
4   BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
A COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.4  Building International Platforms for Opening Up and Cooperation  
4.4.1  Promoting high quality cooperatio n for the Belt and Road Initiative "  
Paragraph  4.36  
 
UK Question : What is the shared vision of the "Green Silk Road ", and will Chinese investment be 
restricted or prioritised to countries where it has Free Trade Agreements in place? And what steps 
will China take in practice to address green development agenda in greening the Silk Road?  
 
Reply:  The Green Silk Road is d esignated to achieve an international consensus on as well as 
cooperation and concerted actions in the green development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
integrate sustainable development into the BRI, and assist the BRI countries in realising goals 
related  to environment and development in 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.  
 
Chinese investment will not be restricted or prioritised  to countries where it has Free Trade 
Agreements in place. Enterprises can autonomously make decisions in line with the market principle 
and assume responsibility for their own profit and loss.  
 
The Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road and the Belt an d Road Ecological and Environmental 
Cooperation Plan were issued in 2017. Chinese and foreign partners jointly established the Belt and 
Road Initiative International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC). Besides, 39 global large financial 
institutions have signed the Green Investment Principles (GIP) for the Belt and Road (BRI) jointly 
released by China and the UK. China initiated the Initiative for Belt and Road Partnership on 
Green  Development in June 2021. In addition, the Green Development Guidelines for  Foreign 
Investment and Cooperation were released in 2021. Research reports, such as the 
Green  Development Guidance for BRI Projects and the BRI and Carbon Pricing Mechanism were 
issued as well.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)   
4   BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOM Y AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
A COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND  
4.4  Building International Platforms for Opening Up and Cooperation  
4.4.3  Innovatively holding the Canton Fair, China International Fair for Trade in Services, 
China Intern ational Consumer Products Expo and China International Fair for 
Investment & Trade  
Paragraph  4.42 
 
UK Question : What were the main outcomes of the China International Fair for Trade in Services, 
are there any plans for another such Fair and, if so, is there a possibility of it being held in another 
nation?  
 
Reply:  The 2021 China International Service Trade Fair (h ereinafter referred to as the Service Trade 
Fair) was successfully held in Beijing, China from September 2 to 7. As a window to expand opening 
up, a bridge to deepen cooperation, and a stage to lead innovation, the Service Trade Fair has been 
further enhan ced, and it has been highly praised by the international community. Currently, we have 
no plans to hold another similar fair.  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)   
4 BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
A COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FO R MANKIND  
4.5 Continuously Strengthening the South -South Cooperation  
4.5.3  Supporting capacity -building for home -grown development of other developing 
countries  
Paragraph  4.50  
 
UK Question:  Did any of the initiatives under China 's international development cooperation 
activities involve objectives or outcomes relating to environmental sustainability?  
 
Reply:  Overseas investment that does not meet the environmental protection, energy consumption 
and safety standards of the investment  destination country is listed as restricted overseas WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 400 - 
 
  investment by the government. In July 2021, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Ecology 
and Environment jointly issued the Guidelines for Green Development of Outbound Investment and 
Internatio nal Cooperation, actively guiding enterprises to participate in outbound investment and 
cooperation in the field of green development. On September 21, President Xi Jinping, at the 
General  Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, said that China will 
step up support for other developing countries in developing green and low -carbon energy, and will 
not build new coal -fired power projects abroad. This statement is widely welcomed by the 
international community. China takes the improv ement of global environmental governance and 
active response to climate change as important considerations when providing development 
assistance.  
 
UK Question:  Can China provide details on what capacity -building they will deliver for developing 
countries to enhance scientific and technological cooperation to achieve diversified, independent and 
sustainable development? Does China have examples of successful training programmes in space 
and satellite applications and, if so, which countries participated?  
 
Reply:  The lack of technology is an important factor restricting the development of developing 
countries, and technical cooperation is an important means to improve this situation. China has 
carried out extensive technical cooperation with relevant countri es, covering many fields such as 
agriculture, handicrafts, petroleum technology, radio and television, and clean energy, significantly 
improving the technology and management level of these  countries. China has held international 
training  programme  on the application of Beidou technology, with participants from Indonesia, Egypt, 
Pakistan , etc..  
 
GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)   
5 DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD 
MARKET SYSTEM  
5.1 Generating New Demand Through Innovation -Driven Devel opment and High -
Quality Supply  
5.1.2  Pursuing innovation -driven development, and optimizing and upgrading the 
industrial structure  
Paragraph  5.3  
 
UK Question:  Can more detail be provided on the national -level pilot zones of digital economy for 
innovation -driven development that are under construction, including whether or not one of the aims 
is to foster investment from international businesses?  
 
Reply:  The con struction of the national digital economy innovation and development pilot zone 
focuses on promoting the "four new ". The first is to activate new elements and explore an efficient 
allocation mechanism for data production elements. The second is to cultivat e new kinetic energy, 
focus on strengthening the productivity of the digital economy, and promote the deep integration of 
the Internet, big data, artificial intelligence and the real economy. The third is to explore new 
governance methods and build new pro duction relations in the digital economy. Focus on solving the 
problem that traditional governance and regulatory models cannot meet the new requirements of 
the new situation and requirements of the development of the digital economy, accelerate the digita l 
transformation of the government, explore a collaborative governance system with multiple 
participation, and develop platform economy and sharing economy new formats inclusively and 
prudently. The fourth is to build new facilities and continuously streng then the foundation for the 
development of the digital economy. In response to the low level of networking and the low level of 
resource sharing of facilities such as data centers in some traditional industries and rural areas, 
systematically deploy broadb and, mobile Internet, data centers, electronic certificates, electronic 
archives and other platform facilities to create a new type of inclusive digital economy infrastructure 
that serves the people. China welcomes qualified foreign -funded enterprises to i nvest and start 
businesses in China 's Digital Economy Innovation and Development Pilot Zone.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  GOVERNMENT REPORT (G415)  
5 DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD 
MARKET SYSTEM  
5.3 Committed to Creating Market -Oriented, Law -Based and Internationalized 
Business Environment  
5.3.5  Improving the performance of state -owned assets and state -owned enterprises  
(SOEs) reforms  
Paragraph  5.18  
 
UK Question : Can China clarify which specific market -oriented reform measures have been 
introduced in energy, railway, telecoms and public utilities, and by what metrics/data it judges these 
reforms to have been successful? What measures has China taken to ensure that  foreign 
investors/FIEs might benefit from these market -oriented reforms?  
 
Reply:  Regarding the reform of the oil and gas system, promote the reform of the operation 
mechanism of the oil and gas pipeline network to ensure the safe and stable supply of oil  and gas. 
Regarding the reform of the electric power system, one is to continuously improve the trading 
mechanism. The second is to carry out pilot projects for green power trading. In September 2021, 
the nationwide green power trading pilot program was of ficially launched, with the first transaction 
volume reaching 7.8 billion kWh. Third, take the power spot market as the core, and coordinate the 
promotion of power market -oriented reforms. Continue to promote the trial operation of the spot 
pilot long -term settlement. Advance the construction of the second batch of pilot power spot markets 
in an orderly manner. Regarding the reform of the railway system, the reform process has been 
actively and steadily promoted, and the relevant reform plan is currently be ing studied and drafted.  
In accordance with the needs of national economic and social development, China will encourage 
and guide foreign investors to invest in specific industries, sectors and regions. Foreign investors 
and foreign -invested enterprises m ay enjoy preferential treatment in accordance with laws, 
administrative regulations or the provisions of the State Council.  
 
UK Question : Could China please expand on how reorganising and setting up state -owned capital 
investment and operation companies has helped to promote  the reform  of the  authorised 
management  system of state -owned capital and assets? Could China please provide clarity on what 
improvements it plans to make, the role of the State -owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council in this process, and whether it plans to publish all materials related 
to the reform plan?  
 
Reply:  In the reform of th e state -owned capital authorized operation system, measures such as 
strengthening the supervision of state -owned assets and the system of investor representative 
agencies grant authorization and decentralization to state -owned capital investment, operating  
companies, other commercial enterprises, and public welfare enterprises, forming a corporate 
governance structure with effective checks and balances, and a flexible and efficient market -oriented 
operating mechanism. The State -owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the 
State Council has issued the "List of Authorized Decentralization of State -owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission of the State Council (2019 Edition) ".  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  UNITED KINGDOM – FOLLOW -UP QUESTIONS  
Secretariat Report (S415)  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.2  Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.4  Export support and promotion  
Paragraph 3.104  
 
UK Question:  Which countries do the 6,472 newly established foreign -funded Pilot Free Trade Zone 
enterprises come from? What is the process and timeline for assessing pilot programmes in PFTZs 
and considering broadening out nationwide roll -out for special policies tri alled in FTZs? Does China 
have any plans to make the PFTZs permanent?   
 
Response:  The Chinese government welcomes investors from all over the world to invest in the  FTZ. 
FIEs in the FTZ are from different countries and regions. The FTZ carries the important mission of 
making explorations for deepening the reform, expanding opening -up, and gathering more 
experience that can be promoted nationwide. Since the Shanghai PFTZ was es tablished in 2013, 
China has continuously summarized and assessed the innovative experience in the FTZ and the 
possibility of implementing it in a larger scope. Altogether 278 items of experience have been 
promoted cumulatively on the national level, such as the pre -access national treatment and 
negative -list management for foreign investment, and "single window " for international trade. You 
may check relevant information on the website of Chinese Ministry of Commerce.   
 
Suggested Follow -up: Can China expan d on the 'FIEs in the FTZ are from different countries and 
regions ' point in their response, by providing a list of such countries and regions (or even a 
breakdown by continent)?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government welcomes investors from all over the world to invest in the FTZ. 
Foreign -invested enterprises in the FTZ come fr om hundreds of countries and regions, including 
Hong Kong, China, the United States, Singapore, Canada, and the United Kingdom. It is understood 
that British companies have invested in Shanghai, Hainan, Tianjin, Liaoning and other FTZs.  
 
Can China provide a direct link to the section of their Ministry of Commerce website that contains 
the relevant information?   
 
Reply:  The Pilot Free Trade Zone has now promoted a total of 278 institutional innovations at the 
national level. And the relevant information can be found on the Ministry of Commerce 's official 
website the Department of Pilot Free Trade Zone and Free Trade Port) . Website: 
zmqgs.mofom.gov.cn/article/fztg . 
 
UK Question:  We would welcome an update on how China is ensuring that its financial institution s 
are working towards international best practice for lending for example under the G20 's Operational 
Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, in particular their transparency provisions, and in aligning their 
financing with international standards like the G 20's QII Principles.  
 
Suggested follow ups:   
How is China actively ensuring that 's its financial institutions are working towards international best 
practise for lending, for example under the G20 's OGSF, in particular their transparency provisions?  
How has China ensured that its financial institutions align their financing with international standards 
like the G20 's QII principles?   
 
Reply:  In 2017, China committed itself to the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing, 
and in 2019 to the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment .China emphasizes the 
importance of ensuring that creditors and debtors in the public and p rivate sectors carry out 
transparent, sound and sustainable financing practices.  The outcome document G20 Principles for 
Quality Infrastructure Investment is based on and supports development, which deepens and 
extends the relevant consensus of Hangzhou Su mmit and provides a useful reference for all parties 
to promote quality infrastructure investment in the future. China will work with other parties  to 
further support the construction of high -quality, sustainable, risk -resistant, reasonably priced and 
inclusive infrastructure, so that all countries can give full play to their resource endowments, better 
integrate into global value chain and realize the mutual development of the global economy.  
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  CHINESE TAIPEI  
PART I: REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT (WT/TP R/S/ 415)  
1. ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2.2 MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY   
Page 20 (Para 1.13)  
With a view to safeguarding financial market stability and providing liquidity to the banking system 
during the pandemic, the PBOC expanded its relending facilities to provide targeted support to 
manufacturers of medical supplies and daily necessities. Furthermore, the authorities tolerated rising 
levels of non -performing loans in heavily impacted regions and sectors, and introduced a payment 
moratorium for  most micro, small, and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) and other eligible firms 
until end -2021. Furthermore, the PBOC lowered various policy rates. Non -interest rate instruments 
deployed by the PBOC aimed to provide additional support especially to small er firms. They included 
expanding relending facilities, reducing targeted reserve requirement ratios, increasing bank lending 
targets, expanding credit support by policy banks, subsidizing local banks ' repayment moratoria, 
and introducing a zero -interest s cheme for uncollateralized lending to MSMEs. The various measures 
led to a rapid increase in bank lending and had a significant positive measure on corporate bond 
issuance.   
 
Question(s):   
The financial support for micro, small, and medium -sized enterprise s (MSMEs) might only delay their 
bankruptcy; once the supporting measures expire, a large number of defaults might occur and lead 
to higher financial risks. Could China please share with us how does it stabilize the financial market 
while maintaining liqui dity?  
 
Reply:  Regarding financial services for MSMEs, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CBIRC) has always attached equal importance to "preventing risks " and "promoting 
development ". It guides banking and insurance institutions to explore and improve the financial 
service modes for MSMEs based on their strategic position and business features and on the principle 
of accountable cost, controllable risk and sustainable business develop ment. The modes include 
setting up special institutions, improving the lean management of MSME loans, applying fintech, 
realizing accurate grant and timely risk prevention and control of credit capital, using information 
sharing mechanism, and raising the capability of proactive risk management. In general, risks are 
controllable and business is sustainable regarding the current universal MSME loans in the banking 
system.  
 
2. TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES   
2.2.2 TRADE POLICY FORMULATION AND OBJECTIVES   
Page 33 (Para 2.17)  
Since 2013, China has established an increasing number of PFTZs. In 2020, three PFTZs were 
established in Beijing, Anhui, and Hunan, while the area of the Zhejiang PFTZs was expanded. This 
brought the total to 21, including the existing 18 P FTZs (in Chongqing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanghai, 
Sichuan, Tianjin, Yunnan and Zhejiang).  
 
Question(s):   
Currently, there are 21 pilot free trade zones (PFTZs ) in China. What are the differences between 
the various PFTZs, especially concerning their respective functions, goals, structures and scales? 
Provinces or cities might compete with each other for investment funds, talents, etc. Could China 
please share w ith us what is the solution?  
 
Reply:  The general plans for each PFTZ specify their requirements, functions, layout, main measures 
and safeguards. Those PFTZs established earlier, such as the Shanghai PFTZ, have also formed plans 
for deepening the reform a nd comprehensively deepening the reform, and the PFTZs in Guangdong, 
Tianjin and Fujian have made plans for further deepening the reform. Those plans can be found on 
the website of the Chinese government or of Chinese Ministry of Commerce.  
The various PFTZ s have made differentiated explorations based on their respective plans, positioning 
and local conditions. They have probed and formed promotable experience in different areas and all 
played a demonstrative and leading role as the highland of opening -up.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  2.4.3 Incentives to foreign direct investments   
Page 43(Para 2.68)   
As a response to the COVID -19 pandemic, several relief measures were taken or announced for 
foreign investors. For example, all export tax rebates must be made in full without delay except for 
energy -intensive and polluting products. In addition, the measures provide that China will work to 
shorten the negative list on foreign investment and expand the catalogue of industries where foreign 
investment is encouraged, encourage financial  institutions to increase foreign trade loans to cope 
with the impact of the pandemic, and encourage commercial insurance companies to offer 
short-term export credit insurance and lower premium rates. Under the measures, recent tax and 
fee relief policies designed to help companies in difficulty should equally apply to both domestic 
enterprises and FIEs.   
 
Question(s):  
According to the report, as a response to the COVID 19 pandemic, several relief measures were 
taken or announced for foreign investors, suc h as expediting export tax rebates, shortening the 
negative list on foreign investment, encouraging financial institutions to increase foreign trade loans, 
encouraging commercial insurance companies to offer short -term export credit insurance and lower 
premium rates, etc.  
Could China please share with us its plans and projects for facilitating foreign trade loans, offering 
short-term export credit insurance, and lowering premium rates? Are these projects applicable to all 
domestic and foreign enterprises?   
 
Reply: Yes. 
 
3. TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE   
3.1.1 CUSTOMS PROCEDURES, VALUATION, AND REQUIREMENTS   
Page 47 (P ara 3.11)   
The authorities indicate that, in October 2020, the overall clearance time for imports nationwide 
was 43.48 hours, reduced by 55.35% compared with 2017.   
 
Question(s):  
We note that the overall clearance time for imports nationwide was reported to be 43.48 hours in 
October 2020, for a reduction of 55.35% compared with 2017. Recently, the COVID -19 pandemic 
and global po rt congestions have caused some delays in customs clearance. Could China please 
share with us the change in customs clearance time due to these recent developments? Besides the 
facilitation measures to deal with the COVID -19 pandemic, are there any measure s adopted to deal 
with port congestions?   
 
Reply:  China has improved the efficiency of terminal operation by increasing bridge cranes, reducing 
berth occupation by feeder vessels, and bettering the terminal work arrangement and personnel 
allocation. China has also accelerated terminal construction to be more responsive to emergencies. 
The approval and relevant formalities for the entry of international vessels are all handled at the 
dedicated window for international trade, where zero waiting time is basica lly realized. Moreover, 
the handling of other vessel related matters doesn 't interfere with the time for customs clearance.  
 
3.1.5.1 Import prohibitions   
Page 58  (Para 3.45)   
China notified to the WTO its import prohibitions in place for the period 2018 -20. These prohibitions 
applied to certain toxic substances and wild animal products; certain old/second -hand mechanical 
and electrical equipment; certain hazardous chemicals, pe sticides, and persistent organic pollutants; 
mercury -added products; certain solid wastes; ractopamine; certain types of filament lamp; and 
charcoal imported from Somalia. This list of prohibited products is also contained in MOFCOM 's 
Catalogue of Commodit ies Subject to Import Prohibition. In 2018, MOFCOM and the GACC adjusted 
the list of used mechanical and electrical products prohibited from import, by removing from the 
Catalogue used mechanical and electrical products such as aircraft engines, ship engin es, 
non-medical X -ray equipment, and computer gamespot.   
 
Question(s):  
We note that MOFCOM and the GACC  adjusted the list of used mechanical and electrical products 
prohibited from import by removing from the Catalogue used mechanical and electrical products, 
such as aircraft engines, ship engines, non -medical X -ray equipment, and computer gamespot. Could WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  China please share with us the reasons for prohibiting imports of these goods and why it agreed to 
resume imports of these goods in 2018, especially gamespot?  
 
Reply:  According to the Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China , MOFCOM and GACC 
put certain used mechanical and electrical products in the Catalogue of products prohibited from 
import in order to defend national security and protect public interests, people 's health and safety, 
and the environment. In 2018, MOFCOM and GACC adjusted the C atalogue by removing aircraft 
engines, ship engines, non -medical X -ray equipment and computer gamespot from the Catalogue 
for the reason that these products pose fairly small risks to national security, public interests, human 
health and safety, and the en vironment.  
 
3.2.2 Taxes, charges, and levies   
Page 68(Para 3.77)   
Export duties are calculated based on the transaction value of exports, plus transport -related fees, 
and insurance cost. In 2020, all export duties were ad valorem. Certain items are subject to the 
interim export tariff levied at a rate of zero.   
 
Question(s):  
We understand  that China reserves the right to levy export tariffs on some products in its accession 
protocol. According to the report, c ertain items are subject to the interim export tariff levied at a 
rate of zero. Could China please share with us the items that are subject to the interim export tariff 
levied at a rate of zero and the reasons for such reduction?   
 
Reply: The Customs Import and Export Tariff of the People 's Republic of China  that China releases 
annually lists the export tariff of all goods. Relevant in formation can be found under "policies " on 
the website of the Tariff Department of the Ministry of Finance, 
http://gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu . 
 
3.3  Measures Affecting Production and Trade   
3.3.3 Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements   
3.3.3.3 Inspection and quarantine   
Page 88 (Para 3.170)   
The Law on Entry and Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine and its Implementing Regulations regulate 
the inspection of animals, plants, and related products that enter, exit, or transit through China; 
containers,  packing materials, and bedding materials that contain or carry animals, plants, and 
related products; and means of transport from animal/plant epidemic or infected areas.   
 
Question(s):  
1. Could China please indicate the species of concerned quarantine pests for imported plants and 
plant products and also provide the list? If the quarantine pests are intercepted at the border, 
how is the shipment disposed? Under what conditions the consignment can be treated to 
eliminate quarantine pests and t hen be released?   
2. Regarding the existing trade of plants and plant products, could China please share with us under 
what specific circumstances or conditions import quarantine measures will be changed/adjusted 
(including the adoption of import prohibition measures)?   
 
Reply to the above two questions: For the species of concerned quarantine pests for imported 
plants and plant products, please see the Catalogue of Quarantine Pests for Import Plants (Joint 
Announcement No. 413) issued on 16 April, 2021 and it s implementing regulations. The disposal 
methods of intercepted quarantine pests shall be implemented in accordance with the Law on Entry 
and Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine and its implementing regulations. Relevant competent 
authorities will timely adju st import quarantine measures in accordance with relevant laws, 
regulations and international standards and notify relevant stakeholders of the adjustments.  
 
3.3.7 Intellectual property rights   
3.3.7.5.2 Geographical indications   
Page 11 0 (Para 3.258 )  
The China -United States Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement contains GI -related provisions, 
particularly: (i) using relevant factors when making determinations for genericness, including usage 
of a term in dictionaries, newspapers, and websites; how the g ood referred to not providing GI 
protection to individual components of multi -component terms if the individual component is generic; 
and (iii) publicly identifying which individual components are not protected when granting GI WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 406 - 
 
  protection to multi -componen t terms. The CNIPA published Guidelines on Determining Common 
Names in Geographical Indication Protection (Draft) in 2020, clarifying the determining factors, 
cancellation, and other aspects of common names in terms of the common name determination in 
GI protection.  
 
Question(s):  
1. It appears that there are neither procedures nor legal grounds provided in the Provisions on the 
Protection of Geographical Indication Products (hereinafter "Provisions on GI Products ") that can 
be used to revoke protected GI products derived from China (h ereinafter "Chinese GI products "). 
Accordingly, could China please explain whether there are any procedures that can be 
implemented to revoke Chinese GI products protected by the "Provisions on GI Products " under 
the current legal system of China. If so, w hat are the relevant laws and grounds for revocation?   
2. Have the Guidelines on Determining Common Names in Geographical Indication Protection 
(hereinafter "Guidelines ") taken effect? If not, when are they expected to take effect?   
3. After the "Guidelines " take effect, can they be applied to GIs registered as collective trademarks 
or certification trademarks?   
4. What are the "procedures related to cancellation " mentioned in Article 6 of the "Guidelines "? Can 
the "Guidelines " alone constitute a sufficient legal ba sis for the competent authority to revoke 
Chinese GI products after they take effect, or should the revocation be based on some other laws?   
 
Reply to 1 -4: In September and October 2020, the Provisions on GI Products (draft for opinions) 
was issued to solicit public opinions, which included provisions on the procedures of revocation. 
Feedback is being studied to further perfect the Provisions. In early 2021, the China National 
Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA) and State Administration for Mar ket Regulation (SAMR) 
jointly released the Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening the Geographical Indication 
Protection, which absorbed relevant requirements in the Guidelines. The Guidelines has not taken 
effect yet.  
 
When trademark protection is app lied, according to trademark law, relevant right holders or 
stakeholders may demur, apply for nullification or revocation and three -year non -use of a GI 
trademark. A registered GI trademark is valid for ten years, at the end of which period the GI 
trademar k will be cancelled in accordance with law unless the registrant applies for renewal 
according to prescribed procedures. A registered GI trademark is the common name of products for 
which the use of the GI trademark has been approved. Any unit or individua l may apply for 
revocation.  
 
4.TRADE POLICY BY SECTOR   
4.2 MINING AND ENERGY   
4.2.2 ENERGY   
Page 143 (Para 4.77)   
In 2020, China processed 670 million tonnes of crude oil. Foreign investors can participate in refining 
projects and are not subject to limit ations in terms of legal forms.  
 
Question(s):  
Could China please share with us whether there are any restrictions on foreign investors in terms of 
business structures when participating in refining projects? For example, whether a foreign investor 
can operate as a sole proprietorship?   
 
Reply: According to the negative list of foreign investment, there are no restrictions on foreign 
investors in terms of business structures when participating in refining projects. They can operate 
as a sole  proprietorship.  
 
4. TRADING POLICIES BY SECTOR   
4.2 MINING AND ENERGY   
4.2.2 ENERGY   
Page 144 (Para 4.78)   
Distribution of gasoline/petrol is mostly operated by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC). Foreign investors can participate in 
the retail distribution sector, as China has lifted restrictions on foreign investment in the construction 
and operation of petrol stations. The authorities indicate that a number of multinational  corporations 
have entered the Chinese petrol station operation market.   
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question(s):  
1. Could China please explain whether there are any restrictions on foreign -invested enterprises in 
terms of business structures when participating in the distribution ser vices of gasoline/petrol?   
2. Are foreign -invested enterprises treated the same as domestic enterprises when operating the 
retail distribution services of gasoline/petrol?   
 
Reply to 1 -2: According to the current negative list of foreign investment, retail service of 
gasoline/petrol is neither prohibited nor restricted for foreign investors, which can invest and operate 
in those areas and enjoy the same treatment as domestic enterprises. Relevant laws and regulations 
shall apply when fixed  asset investment and industrial licensing are concerned.   
 
4. TRADING POLICIES BY SECTOR   
4.2 MINING AND ENERGY   
4.2.2 ENERGY   
Page 145 (Para 4.87)   
In 2019, China lifted the requirements that the construction and operation of gas pipeline networks 
in cit ies with a population of more than 500,000 must be controlled by Chinese shareholders. 
However, for construction and operation of nuclear power plants, the Chinese parties must be the 
controlling shareholders (Table 4.19). Private investment, including for eign investment, is 
encouraged in the development of the renewable energy sector. In the new 36 -Clause on Private 
Investment (State Council Circular 2010/13), domestic private capital is "encouraged " to build new 
energy sectors such as wind, solar, geother mal, and biomass power. Electricity generation from wind, 
solar, or biomass power is also listed in the "encouraged " section of the Catalogue of Encouraged 
Industries for Foreign Investment (2020 edition). China also promotes electricity generation with 
nuclear energy; as in the case of renewable energy, FDI is encouraged.   
 
Question(s):  
1. As indicated in the reports, China encourages private enterprises to invest in new and renewable 
energy. Could China please share with us how China encourages these investments?   
 
Reply: Foreign investors who invest in areas encouraged by the nation are entitled to preferential 
policies on tax, land use, etc.  
 
2. Are the encouraged conditions for new and renewable energy applicable to both domestic and 
foreign -invested e nterprises?   
 
Reply: yes. 
 
4. TRADING POLICIES BY SECTOR   
4.3.2.3 IRON AND STEEL   
Page 152 (Paras 4.117)   
The authorities indicate that, by the end of 2019, China had reduced crude steel capacity by 
about  170 million tonnes in cumulative terms, which outperformed the goal of the 13th Five -Year 
Plan for Economic and Social Development of reducing 150 million tonnes of excess steel capacity 
ahead of the 2020 deadline. They also note that zombie companies have  been largely dismantled in 
the iron and steel industry. In addition, steel production not conforming to quality standards was 
cut by 140 million tonnes in 2017. The authorities state that the capacity of "standard steel " has 
been fully banned.   
 
Question(s):  
1. Could China please explain whether it will continue setting targets and deadlines for the reduction 
of steel capacity  in the future?   
 
Reply: By the end of 2018, China had completed the target of reducing 150 million  tons of crude 
steel capacity during the 13th Five-year Plan period, and the supply -demand situation in the iron and 
steel industry was more reasonable. The main task in the 14th Five-year Plan period is continuing to 
consolidate the achievements in capacity reduction, deepening the supply -side struc tural reform, 
and promoting the high -quality development of iron and steel industry.  
 
2. Could China please also elaborate on  the effects of steel capacity  reduction measures on China 's 
steel prices and economic growth?   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply: Since we began to reduce the steel overcapacity, iron and steel enterprises have turned 
profitable, and the industry has performed much better than in 2015 with a notably lower debt -to-
assets ratio. The improved situation of iron and steel industry has greatly contributed to China 's 
economic stability.  
 
PART II: REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT (WT/TPR/G/415)   
4. BUILDING AN OPEN WORLD ECONOMY AND PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 
COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE FOR MANKIND   
4.1 Fully Supporting Global Cooperation on Combating COVID -19 with Concrete Actions   
Page 13 (Para 4.2)   
During the COVID -19 outbreak when people 's safety and health were seriously endangered, China 
mobilized maximum efforts and resources within the shortest period of time to contain the spreading 
of the pandemic. With arduous efforts, China made major strategic achievements in fighting against 
the pandemic and took the lead in resuming work and production. The complete industrial chains 
and strong support systems in China play a positive role in bo osting the recovery of the world 
economy. As combating the pandemic is the most urgent task facing the international community, 
President Xi Jinping is promoting international cooperation and calling for building a global health 
community for mankind, stre ngthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and jointly addressing 
the challenges posed by the pandemic. China has been actively fulfilling its international obligations 
and made significant contribution to the global cooperation on combating COVID -19.  
 
Question(s):  
According to the report, China mobilized maximum efforts and resources within the shortest period 
of time to contain the spread of the COVID -19 pandemic. With arduous efforts, China made major 
strategic achievements in fighting against the pandemic and took the lead in resuming work and 
production. Could China please explain what kind of relief and revitalization measures has it adopted 
to help domestic enterprises? How much cash spending or other government funding has been 
provided for relief and revitalization measures and what has been the amount in terms of GDP?   
 
Reply: To cope with the repercussions of COVID -19, the Chinese government adopted a string of 
policy measures in a timely manner, including reduction in tax and fee , postponement in the 
repayment of principal and interests, and reduction in overall financing cost. It has created 
innovative mechanisms such as the direct allocation of fiscal fund and direct benefit of monetary 
policy tools, implemented large -scale reli ef policies, and consistently helped private enterprises and 
SMEs clear their debts. Meanwhile, in response to the contracted demand caused by the pandemic, 
China has issued policies to increase domestic demand and promote consumption, drive the upgrade 
of traditional consumption patterns, and stimulate investment in infrastructure and other key areas 
to quickly stabilize the economy.  
 
5. DEEPENING REFORM ACROSS THE BOARD AND BUILDING A HIGH -STANDARD 
MARKET SYSTEM   
5.3 Committed to Creating Market -Oriented, Law -Based and Internationalized Business 
Environment   
5.3.5 Improving the performance of state -owned assets and state -owned enterprises 
(SOEs) reforms   
Page 24 (Para 5.18)   
China is committed to pushing forward the r eform of State -owned Enterprises. Since the last review, 
the SOE reform has been extensive and intensive, making significant achievements. The reform to 
convert SOEs into standard companies has basically been completed and the corporate legal person 
govern ance structure has been further improved. China has reorganized and set up state -owned 
capital investment and operation companies to effectively promote the reform of the authorized 
management system of state -owned capital, and further improve the supervis ion system of state -
owned assets. China promotes the market -oriented reform of the competitive links in such industries 
as energy, railway, telecommunications and public utilities. China steadily advances the reform of 
mixed ownership, promotes the mixed o wnership reform of enterprises in fully competitive industries 
and fields, and steadily explores the mixed ownership reform in key sectors such as electricity, oil, 
natural gas, railways, civil aviation, telecommunications and military industry. In 2020, C hina 
officially launched three -year action plan of SOE reform, starting a new boom in SOE reform. As 
of January 2021, the total number of central enterprises directly supervised by State -owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State C ouncil was 97, among which more than 
70% were mixed ownership enterprises. Listed companies have become the major player in the 
mixed ownership reform of central SOEs. The total assets and the profits of listed companies WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 409 - 
 
  controlled by central SOEs accounte d for 67% and 88% respectively of the total amount of central 
SOEs.   
 
Question(s):  
The 2020 -2022 three -year action plan of SOE reform aims to improve the performance of 
Chinese  SOEs and enhance their competitiveness. It also claims to have established a subsidy 
system which conforms to international practices. Could China please elaborate the relations 
between enhancing SOEs ' competitiveness and the established subsidy system, and al so provide 
some specific examples of this, especially concerning key industries, such as semiconductors and 
the national defence industry. How have the sizes and the approaches of providing subsidies changed 
in recent years?   
 
Reply: The document titled Several Policies on Promoting the High -quality Development of 
IC Industry  and Software Industry in the New Period  (Guo Fa [2021] No.8) includes a series of 
universal policies. All semiconductor enterprises set up within China, regardless of their ownership 
and source of investment, are entitled to relevant tax preferences pursuant to the policies. China 's 
semiconductor industry policy encourages and advocates global cooperation and actively creates a 
market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business e nvironment for various kinds of market 
entities to invest and do business in China.  
 
Page 25 (Para 5.19)   
Since the last review, China has further promoted the development of small and medium -sized 
enterprises and private businesses. Market entities other than power grid enterprises are allowed to 
set up electric power sales enterprises to engage in competitiv e electric power sales business. 
Restrictions on private enterprises investing in nuclear power construction have been gradually 
relaxed. Meanwhile, qualified private enterprises are allowed to import crude oil through non -state 
trading. Restrictions on oi l and gas exploration and exploitation have been removed. Private 
enterprises may engage in mobile communication resale business under guidance. In addition, the 
long-term work mechanism is further improved, so that commercial banks are confident, willing,  
and able to lend to private enterprises. Efforts have been made to simplify procedures of MSMEs ' 
deregistration.   
 
Question(s):  
As indicated in the report, since the last review, China has further promoted the development of 
small and medium -sized enterprises and private businesses. Qualified private enterprises are 
allowed to import crude oil through non -state trading. Could China please explain the qualifications 
that are required to import crude oil through non -state trading?   
 
Reply: The following documents, which can be found on MOFCOM 's website, enumerate the 
conditions for applying to import crude oil through non -state trading.  
1. Notice of the Ministry of Commerce on the Work Concerning Applications of Crude Oil Processing 
Enterprises for Qualification for Non -State Trade Importation  (Letter No. 407 [2015] of the Ministry 
of Commerce)  
2. Conditions and Procedures for Enterprises in China (Zhejiang) Pilot Free Trade Zone to Apply for 
Qualifications to Import Crude Oil Through Non-state Trading  (MOFCOM Notice No.25)  
3. Conditions and Procedures for Enterprises in China (Fujian) Pilot Free Trade Zone to Apply for 
Qualifications to Import Crude Oil Through Non -state Trading  (MOFCOM Notice No.46, 2019)  
4. Annual notice: Import of C rude Oil Through Non -state Trading: Total Amount Allowed, Conditions 
for Application, Procedures of Application  
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  EUROPEAN UNION  
WT/TPR/S/415 – WTO Secretariat 's Report WT/TPR/S/415  
SUMMARY  
Page 11, para 11  
An important point in the accession protocol is non -discriminatory treatment of foreign companies. 
Although a new Foreign Investment Law was adapted, full equal treatment of companies was not 
achieved.  
 
EU question No 1:  Could China elaborate on the timef rame and the follow -up - when will China 
implement which concrete reform steps?  
 
Reply : China fulfills its WTO commitments and does not discriminate against FIEs. FIEs  equally 
enjoy the State policies concerning the support of enterprise development in accordance with laws 
and regulations. China adheres to the basic State policy of opening to the outside world and 
encouraging foreign investors to invest within the terri tory of China. China maintains a policy of 
high-level investment liberalization and facilitation, establishes and improves a mechanism for 
foreign investment promotion, and creates a stable, transparent, predictable and fair market 
environment. Foreign ent erprises are the participants, contributors and beneficiaries of China 's 
development. China will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of FIEs, and attract more foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and s hare the 
dividends of China 's reform and development.  
 
Page 11, Para 12  
The Report states that "Projects in the encouraged category are eligible for preferential treatment ".  
 
EU Question No 2:  Could China please list the encouraged categories and explain where the lists 
of such projects are to be found. What is the criteria for updating the lists? What is 'preferential 
treatment '?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to : 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020 -12/28/content_5574265.htm   
Foreign investment in the industries within the catalogue can enjoy preferential treatment such as 
taxation  and land use if the conditions are met.  
 
1 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.2  Recent economic developments  
1.2.4 Structural Measures  
Page 22, para 1.27.  
Structural reforms since China 's previous review include the implementation of tariff cuts 
(Section  3.1.3), the further opening of the financial sector with a shortening of the negative list for 
financial FDI, and the removal of restrictions on the investment quota for foreign institutional 
investors (Section 4.4.1). The market -opening measures mentioned  above are in contradiction with 
the "Buy China " clause for the acquisition of high -tech products.  
 
EU Question No 3:  Although China is not yet a party to the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement, do the authorities consider that the application of this c lause, which discriminates 
between local and foreign manufacturers, is aligned with the WTO principles?  
 
Reply : The clause mentioned does not violate WTO rules. In accordance with the Foreign Investment 
Law, China ensures that foreign -invested enterprises have equal access to government procurement 
through fair competition in accordance with the law. Products and services provided by foreign -
invested enterprises within the territory of China are equally treated in government pro curement in 
accordance with law.  
 
Page 22, para 1.29.  
While the Report refers to the progress of the SOE reform, China never released the details of this 
plan to the public. State ownership remains important, even in non -strategic, commercially oriented 
sectors, with SOEs still having large market shares. At the same time, reform of SOEs proceeded 
almost exclusively in the context of mixed ownership (Section 3.3.5). Given the global weight of the 
Chinese economy and the strategic role these companies play,  their presence in the national and WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  international market is quite relevant. The latest reforms of SOEs have covered issues such as their 
classification or mixed ownership.  
 
EU Question No 4:  
a) Can China provide feedback in terms of when will the government publish its plan for SOE 
reform and subject it to peer review to ensure that it is in line with WTO commitments on state 
owned bodies?  
 
Reply : China fulfills its WTO commitments . China 's SOEs  reform information is disclosed in 
accordance with Chinese laws and regulations.  
 
b) Does China envisage to ensure  competitive neutrality so that SOEs do not enjoy a competitive 
advantage as compared to other market participants as part of the reforms that Chinese authorities 
are currently considering to transform China into a sustainable and resilient economy? If so, what 
are these specific measures an d what is the expected timetable for their implementation?  
 
Reply : China ensures fair competition among enterprises of all types of ownership and will treat 
enterprises of all types of ownership fairly in terms of element acquisition, access permits, business 
operations, government procurement, and bidding.  
 
1.3 Developm ents in Trade and Investment  
1.3.1 Trends and patterns in merchandise and services trade  
Page 24, para 1.38  
The Report (section 1.3.1) documents a sizeable change in the relative share of the US in China 's 
imports, dropping from nearly 9% in 2015 to 6.6 .% in 2020. Meanwhile, the relative share of imports 
from Asian countries has increased.  
 
EU Question No 5 : It would be interesting if China could elaborate upon the possible drivers behind 
these changes in shares across trade partners. More specifically,  to what extent can they be traced 
to issues such as, e.g., the US trade policy towards China, "near-shoring " strategies within Asia, or 
other considerations?  
 
Reply:  The changes in different trading partners ' shares in China 's total imports are an objective 
reflection of accumulated various factors, namely, the supply and demand structure in international 
trade, environments of international trade and changes in different partners ' industrial 
competitiveness. China will work with all other WTO membe rs to uphold the spirit of openness, 
cooperation, mutual benefit and win -win, promote trade and investment liberalization and 
facilitation, safeguard the stability of the global industrial chain and supply chain, and promote the 
world economic recovery and  growth.  
 
Page 26, para 1.42  
The Report states that Chinese services exports have been increasing in recent years, notably in the 
areas of communication, computer, information, and maintenance.  
 
EU Question No 6 : Could China explain how these trends in export services relate to the objectives 
of the Pilot Programme of the Innovative Development of Trade in Services to promote the 
transformation, upgrading and high -quality development of foreign trade?  
 
Reply : The Pilot Programme of the Innovative Development of Trade in Services is one of the 
important platforms in promoting the transformation, upgrading and high -quality development of 
China 's foreign trade. In the past five years since the pilot programme was initiated, pilot regions 
have explored new ways and taken the initiative to make innovations, with remarkable results made 
in the pilot work. Multiple batches of practical and institutional innovations have been replicated and 
promoted nationwide, which have given a strong boost to the high -quality development of China 's 
trade in services . 
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  2  TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.3 Trade Agreements and Arrangements  
2.3.1 WTO  
Page 34, Para. 2.22  
The Report states that during the review period, China submitted various notifications to the WTO 
(Table A2.1). Nevertheless, some notifications, including those on state trading enterprises and 
domestic support, remain outstanding.  
 
EU Question No 7 : Could China explain the reasons for the repeated delays, especially in the area 
of subsidies, with the understanding that the lack of administrative capacity does not apply in China 's 
case? Could China also clarify the timeline of the pending notifications?  
Reply:  China has submitted a notification on state trading before this review. A t present, China is 
preparing the notification on domestic support for agriculture and will submit it later  this year  or 
early next. In recent years, China has been committed to enhancing the transparency of its subsidy 
policies and always submitted subsid y notifications in a timely manner.  
 
2.3.2 Regional and preferential agreements  
Page 36, Para. 2.33  
"On 15 January 2020, China and the United States signed the China -United States Phase 1 Economic 
and Trade Agreement.18 It contains provisions related to, inter alia, intellectual property, technology 
transfer, trade in food and agricultural products, and financial services. "  
 
EU question  8:  
a) Do the horizontal disciplines of this agreement, notably on intellectual property, technology 
transfer a nd financials services apply erga omnes?  
b) How will China ensure that the treatment accorded to agricultural products in that agreement 
will not disadvantage other WTO members?  
 
Reply to a and b : Chinese enterprises will import more quality products and se rvices from the US 
pursuant to the WTO rules and market and business principles. The huge and continuously growing 
China market will have more demands for quality and fair -priced goods and services. In fact, as the 
Chinese economy recovers, the country has  imported more quality goods from around the world, 
including the US. The upbeat trade momentum fully demonstrates that China 's economic 
development will create great opportunities for other countries to expand their trade cooperation 
with China. China welcomes enterprises from foreign countries to engage in fair competition in the 
Chinese market, and Chinese consumers will choose products and services based on their 
performance -to-price ratio.  
All of China 's agricultural imports from the United St ates are made under market conditions based 
on commercial considerations, and the administrative measures taken by China on the import of 
agricultural products are implemented on the basis of most -favored -nation treatment.  
 
2.4  Investment Regime  
2.4.1 Re gulatory framework and market access  
Page 37, para 2.41  
Under the FIL, legal liability shall be pursued in case of any IPR infringement. In addition, the FIL 
prohibits government officials from forcing foreign investors to transfer their technology by 
administrative means; it also requires the authorities to keep confidential any trade secret of foreign 
investors that they may become aware of during the performance of their duties.  
In practice however, the situation is different. Despite prohibition of f orced administrative technology 
transfer, these measures have been not enough to protect the foreign investors as in many cases 
they have to comply with the Chinese company 's requirements to enter the Chinese market.  
 
EU Question No 9 :  
a) What kind of measures can China put in place to encourage Chinese companies to comply with 
the prohibition of forced technology transfer protected in the law?  
 
Reply : China  has been following TRIPs, TRIMs  and other WTO agreements, as well as its accession 
commitments. The terms and conditions on technology transfer in foreign investment in China should 
be negotiated and determined by all concerned investors. According to current laws in China, it is 
not ma ndatory that foreign enterprises should transfer their technologies when cooperating with 
Chinese enterprises. Article 22 of the Foreign Investment Law puts it clearly that "During the process 
of foreign investment, the State shall encourage technology coo peration on the basis of free will and WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 413 - 
 
  business rules. Conditions for technology cooperation shall be determined by all investment parties 
upon negotiation under the principle of equity. No administrative department or its staff member 
shall force any tran sfer of technology by administrative means. "  
The choice of technology transfer is independently made by enterprises for maximizing benefits of 
business activities, which cannot be manipulated by the government. Whether foreign enterprises 
will transfer th eir technologies is an independent behavior of the cooperation parties, and the 
Chinese Government cannot interfere with it.  
 
b) With regard to trade secrets, enforcement measures need to be developed to ensure 
compliance. How does China envisage to reach th ese objectives of effective protection?  
 
Reply : The Anti -Unfair Competition Law (2019 Revision) revised the definition of trade secrets, and 
heavier penalties will be imposed on infringements of trade secrets. In order to further strengthen 
the protection of trade secrets, the Provisions on the Protection of Trade Secrets are being revised.  
 
Page 41 , para 2.49  
The 2020 PFTZ Negative List, issued on 23 June 2020 and entered into force on 23 July 2020, 
reduced the number of restrictive measures from 95 in 2017 to 30 in 2020 (Chart 2.1).  
China is implementing and maintaining a National Negative List fo r Foreign Investment on which 
listed industries are prohibited or subject to licensing for investment and operation within the 
country. It also has a Catalogue of Encouraged Industries for Foreign Investment, for the opposite 
purpose. Both lists have been updated throughout the last 4 years in order to change substantially 
the number of sectors included.  
 
EU Question No 10 :  
a) Is China planning to continue this tendency of reducing listed industries on the National 
Negative List for Foreign Investment?  
b) Is China also evaluating to expand industries included on Catalogue of Encouraged Industries 
for Foreign Investment?  
 
Reply to a and b : China  will continue to reduce listed industries on the National Negative List for 
Foreign Investment, and will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of FIEs , create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, 
and attract more foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share the dividends of Chi na's 
reform and development.  
 
3  TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1  Measures Directly Affecting Imports  
3.1.1. Customs procedures, valuation, and requirements  
Page 46, para 3.6  
China maintains a standardized National Single Window (NSW) for international trade 
(www.singlewindow.cn), initiated in 2016 and based on the China E -Port. 
 
EU Question No 11:  Could China provide further clarifications regarding the digitalization for its 
national operators, including the postal service?  
 
Reply:  China will further promote the digitalization of national operators, including the postal 
service,taking digital technology as a key driving force to promote industry reforms, accelerate the 
improvement of the digital level of the entire postal indu stry chain, and improve the industry 's data 
governance capabilities.  
 
Page 47 para. 3.9  
The Report states that enterprises are classified into different groups based on risk analysis, which 
is based on their credit rating and the characteristics of the commodities they import. Additionally, 
transport modes have different risk indices, for exa mple, relating to sensitive routes and the country 
of departure.  
 
EU Question No 12 : Could China identify the authority or institution responsible for establishing 
credit ratings and explain related procedures and criteria for the credit rating classifica tion of 
enterprises, including the availability of an impartial review of credit ratings granted?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 414 - 
 
  Reply:  According to China 's risk management system, enterprises are divided into different 
categories in view of the results of risk analysis. Goods exported by high -risk enterprises and other 
goods considered to be high -risk by risk analysis must be inspected, while other exports may be 
released through rapid customs clearance or "low-risk inspection ". China is speeding up the 
construction of its social credit system and actively building a new credit -based regulatory 
mechanism. This work is led by the National Development and Refo rm Commission. As a participant 
in the above mechanism, China recently revised the Measures of the Customs of the 
People 's Republic of China for the Administration of Enterprises ' Credit Registration and Filing  
(hereinafter referred to as the Credit Measur es), which will be implemented on November 1, 2021. 
The Credit Measures adopts  "strengthening the management on both ends and promoting the middle 
part" to enhance credit management. On one hand, for "advanced certified enterprises " with the 
highest credit  rating by China Customs, special validation standards and procedures have been 
formulated, and a special validation team has been established for field validation. "Advanced 
certified enterprises " are equivalent to Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs) in China. China 
provides an abundance of facilitation measures to improve the customs clearance efficiency and 
reduce cost for enterprises, and actively realize mutual recognition with international AEOs, so that 
AEOs may enjoy the facilitation measures of mu tual recognition countries or regions. On the other 
hand, for "dishonest enterprises " with the lowest credit rating by China Customs, strict identification 
procedures and notification procedures have been formulated. Enterprises are given full rights of 
statement and defense. For "dishonest enterprises ", China carries out strict supervision by increasing 
the inspection ratio, shares the data of the "list of seriously dishonest entities " at the national level, 
and conducts "joint disciplinary actions " with o ther ministries and commissions in accordance with 
the relevant procedures.  
 
Page 47 para. 3.11  
The authorities indicate that, in October 2020, the overall clearance time for imports nationwide 
was 43.48 hours, reduced by 55.35% compared with 2017.  
 
EU Question No 13 : Could China provide further clarification on this data? Does this data cover all 
customs operations from the arrival of the good until customs clearance?  
 
Reply:  The overall customs c learance time of import refers to the time from the arrival of imported 
goods to when the goods can be picked up. The data represents the average overall customs 
clearance time on the actual inbound and outbound customs declaration within the corresponding  
time period, which is equal to the simple arithmetic mean of all customs declarations included in the 
calculation. The customs declarations and case -involved customs declarations of solid waste, direct 
return, and imported coal are not included in the sta tistical data of the corresponding reporting 
period in 2020. The national overall customs clearance time of import decreased by 55.35% 
in October 2020 compared to that in 2017 " refers to the reduced proportion of the overall customs 
clearance time in the corresponding time period relative to the overall customs clearance time of the 
customs declarations that were cleared in 2017.  
 
3.1.1.3 Trade facilitation  
Page 49, Box 3.1  
Box 3.1 lists with regard to import facilitation of food and agricultural product imports the availability 
of "Expedited process to grant market access to more categories of agri -food products from more 
countries and to register more establishments. Shorten ing of quarantine approval process. "  
 
EU Question No 14 : Those statements appear not to be applicable to EU food and agriculture 
products exported to China. Could China provide concrete examples where more categories of food 
and agriculture products and/or more establishments from the EU were approved?  
Reply: China is actively promoting the access of EU agricultural products, such as Portuguese fresh 
pears. In 2021, 44 dairy enterprises from 11 countries including Belgium, Germany and France, 
1 bee product enterprise from Slovenia, and 17 rice enterprises from I taly have been approved.  
 
Page 60, para 3.47  
China 's import licensing system includes automatic and non -automatic import licences. Furthermore, 
China applies import licences to specific dual -use substances for the purposes of safeguarding 
national securi ty and public interest. Recently this category of goods was expanded to encryption. 
Companies willing to import encryption solution must undergo complicated procedures and expose 
their IPR.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 415 - 
 
  EU Question No 15 : Could China provide explanations about the link between these developments 
and increasingly present notion of "secure and controllable " in public procurement? What is the 
impact of the S&C policy on foreign companies per sector?  
 
Reply:  Foreign -invested enterprises have equal access to government procurement through fair 
competition in accordance with the Foreign Investment Law. Products and services provided by 
foreign -invested enterprises within the territory of China are equally treat ed in government 
procurement in accordance with law.  
 
3.1.6  Anti-dumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures  
3.1.6.1 Anti -dumping measures  
Page 63, para 3.55  
The Report indicates changes to China 's Anti -Dumping legislation related to:  
"(i) extendi ng the application of questionnaire surveys beyond determining dumping and dumping 
margins to include determining damage issues (emphasis added). "  
"(v) incorporating WTO -consistent provisions into the rules relating to handling of information that 
require s confidentiality, providing interested parties with an opportunity to comment, and setting 
out the conditions for applying facts available. "  
 
EU Question No 16 :  
a) As regards (i), could China explain what "damage issues " refers to? Is this a questionnaire 
concerned with injury and who are the intended recipients? If it is related to injury assessment how 
does it differ compared to previous practice?  
 
Reply:  The new rules have integrated all the dumping and damage questio nnaire investigation 
procedures originally subordinate to different departments. It is stipulated in Article 3 of The 
Provisional Rules on Antidumping Investigations by Questionnaires that in the process of anti -
dumping investigation, the investigation aut hority may issue questionnaires to producers or 
exporters, domestic producers, domestic importers and downstream users in the investigated 
country (region), as well as other interested organizations and individuals (hereinafter referred to 
as interested pa rties). Compared with the previous provisional rules, the Provisional Rules on 
Antidumping Investigations by Questionnaires have been extended to damage investigation.  
 
b) As regards (iv), could  China explain the conditions applicable for applying facts avai lable in 
anti-dumping investigations?  
 
Reply : In accordance with Article 25, the Provisional Rules on Antidumping Investigations by 
Questionnaires, if the interested party fails to submit the necessary information as required within 
the specified time or seriously hinders the investigation process, the investigation authority may 
make a preliminary or final decision based on the facts obtained and the best 
information  available.  The legal provisions of China are consistent with Article 6 and Annex II to the 
WTO Anti -dumping Agreement.  
The Report also refers to the adaptation of "clearer and stricter " periodical review procedures and 
time requirements to ensure investigation effic iency.  Also, the Rules on Hearings have been replaced 
with the same intention of becoming clearer and stricter (for instance regarding deadlines and rights 
of parties).  
 
EU Question No 17:  Could China explain what "clearer and stricter ' means in this cont ext? Can 
China guarantee that the changes do not limit the current rights of parties and do not entail increased 
burden to the parties?  
 
Reply:  Compared with previous provisional rules, the Provisional Rules on Antidumping 
Investigations by Questionnaires  supplement the form of questionnaire distribution, specifies objects 
and strictly stipulates the time of relevant procedures. For example, Article 7 of the Rules stipulates 
that, the investigation agency shall usually publish the questionnaire on its offi cial website within 
ten working days as of the deadline of registration, and notify the interested parties that have 
registered and the government of the exporting country (region). China 's Provisional Rules on 
Antidumping Investigations by Questionnaires fully protect the rights of the interested parties, which 
are consistent with the principle of the Anti -dumping Agreement.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.2  Measures Directly Affecting Exports  
3.2.1. Customs procedures and requirements  
Page 68, para. 3.73  
Under China 's risk management system, enterprises are classified into different groups based on 
risk analysis. As with import procedures, customs inspection and supervision depend upon the 
enterprise 's rating (Section 3.1.1). Goods exported by high -risk enterprises and other  high-risk 
goods (based on risk analysis) are inspected, while other exports are released through fast -track 
clearance or a "low-risk examination ".  
 
EU Question No 18:  Please provide more details and explanations regarding  China 's risk 
management system a nd the related classification of enterprises, including whether a risk profile 
applies to countries and the discretion of the customs officer to applying risk profiles?   
What are the existing procedures for an impartial review of the risk management system /risk 
profiles?  
 
Reply:  Based on the requirements on risk management in the Revised Kyoto Convention  and the 
Risk Management Outline of the World Customs Organization , the risk prevention and control center  
acts as a platform and channel on -site as required by the whole process management of the business 
function management departments, to support business function management through parameters, 
rules, instructions and site connecting; implement the manageme nt framework through selection, 
inspection and punishment, execute decisions, and command on -site operations through parameters, 
rules and instructions; promote and improve the integrated rapid response and emergency 
management mechanism of China Customs. The closed -loop risk management mode with 
information collection, risk analysis, risk early warning, risk disposal and instruction evaluation as 
the main links starts from the collection and integration of internal and external risk information, 
rely on bi g data, timely issue risk early warning and implement risk disposal (through different 
disposal means such as control and inspection by on -site units, starting inspection and handing over 
anti-smuggling cases upon risk orders) based on information analysis  and judgment, conduct 
instruction evaluation according to the feedback results from law enforcement departments, and 
incorporate the feedback results and evaluation results into the risk information, thereby forming a 
circular optimizing mode to continuou sly improve the accuracy of risk disposal.  
 
3.2.2 Taxes, charges, and levies  
Page 68, 3.76  
Interim tariff rates may be applied to export goods within a certain period. The State Council shall 
establish the Customs Tariff Commission to decide on the good s subject to interim tariff, the tariff 
rates, and the time -limit. The authorities state that interim export tariff rates are adjusted as 
appropriate based on national economic development considerations.  
 
EU Question No 19:  Could China explain how goods subject to interim tariffs are decided and how 
often the list changes? Where are changes to the list announced and where is the list published?  
 
Reply:  China adjusts the provisional tax rate every year according to the actual  situation. Detailed 
information, please refer to http：//gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu . 
 
3.2.3  Export prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing  
Page 71, para 3.89  
The Report documents that the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export, 
published in August 2020 by MOFCOM and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), 
introduced new lists of restricted and prohibited items and technologies.  
 
EU Question No 20 :  
a) The EU would like to request China to explain the relationship between the technologies which 
are subject to the restrictions under the Export Control Law (e.g. the lists formulated under the 
implementing administrative laws and regulation s) and the list of technologies which are 
prohibited/restricted to be exported under the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for 
Export. The EU would also like to request China to clarify whether the lists originate from multilateral 
non-proliferation efforts or whether it is based on national considerations, and if so which ones?  
b) With specific regard to control of technology export, the EU would like to request China to 
explain the inter -relations between the different pieces of relevant legislation, including the 
relationship between the restriction list under Article 18 of the Ex port Control Law and the Provisions 
on the Unreliable Entity List.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 417 - 
 
   
Reply to a and b:  The Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export is a catalogue 
published of the technologies prohibited or restricted from import and export. It was for mulated and 
adjusted according to the Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China and the Regulations 
on Technology Import and Export Administration of the People 's Republic of China, and executes 
management according to the Regulations. The Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden 
for Export does not lie in the applicable scope of the Export Control Law. Article 1 of the Export 
Control Law explicitly stipulates that the purpose of the legislation is to safeguard the national 
security and interests and perform international duties like anti -proliferation, etc. The 
Chinese  Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export aims to regulate management 
over technological exports, promote technological advances a nd foreign economic and technological 
cooperation, and maintain national economic security. Article Sixteen of the Foreign Trade Law 
specifies the concrete situations of the technological import and export restricted or prohibited.  
 
Article 18 of the Expo rt Control Law stipulates that the management and control list and the 
unreliable entity list are different institutions with different legal grounds. The former was made 
according to the Export Control Law, while the latter was under the Regulations on Un reliable Entity 
List. The two list systems ' legislative purposes, applicable ranges, and detailed measures and 
procedures are all different.  
 
Page 71, para 3.91  
The Report states that the Export Control Law defines "controlled items " to include dual -use items 
(with both civilian and military applications), military products, and nuclear products. In addition, 
"controlled items " include "other goods, technologies, services that are related to the maintenance 
of national security and interests and the imple mentation of international obligations such as non -
proliferation ". This is a very broad concept, which could lead to excessive control without clear limits.  
 
EU Question No 21:   
a) Could  China consider defining the scope of controlled items more precisely, notably the types 
of items and categories are covered under these lists ?  
b) How does China define these to guarantee the security of investments for foreign investors?  
c) What products are possibly included in the 4th category of controlled goods listed in the Export 
Control Law?  
d) Does China publish the annual implementation reports of the ECL?  
 
Reply to above four questions:  
To safeguard the national security and interests, perform the international duties of anti -proliferation, 
etc., according to the international treaties and the multilateral export control mechanisms the 
Chinese government has joined, and by referring to th e prevailing international approaches, the 
Chinese government has formulated and makes adjustments with the control list. The coverage of 
the Chinese control list is far narrower than those of the other world major countries in America and 
Europe, and ther e is no so -called "over-regulation ".After the promulgation of the Export Control Law, 
in order to better enforce the law and improve the operability, the Chinese government has now 
expedited its advances in formulation and amendment of the complementary la ws and regulations, 
and is improving the control list. Relevant progress will be released in time.  
 
Page 71, para 3.92  
The Secretariat Report states that "Specific export control lists were also released " in addition to the 
list of dual -use items and of items subject to administration of export/import license 
(http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/202012/20201203027833.shtml ).  
 
EU Question No 22:  The EU would like to request China which types of items and categories are 
covered under these lists with and whether corresponding references to the lists of multilateral 
export control regimes will be published to provide legal clarity.  
 
Reply:  Since the 1990s, China has already promulgated 6 administrative regulations in export 
control sector and 1 set of divisional rules, all of which are attached with separate controlled item 
lists, covering military and nuclear items, monitored chemicals and the dual -use items and 
technologies associated with nuclear, biology, chemistry and missiles. After the promulgation of the 
Export Control Law, the Chinese government is working on the formulation and revision of supporting 
regulations, and will continue t o improve the control list and release it to the public in time.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 71, para 3.93 and 94  
The Secretariat report documents that the Export Control Law provides for the establishment of 
control lists of foreign business entities that "possibly endanger national security and interests ". 
Article 13 of the Law provides that approval or disapproval of exports will be based on eight criteria, 
including national security and 'interests ', relevant credit records of exporting companies, and "other 
factors stipul ated by laws and administrative regulations ".  
 
EU Question No 23 : The EU would like to request China to clarify the difference between 'national 
security ' and 'national interests ' criteria and concerns that may lead to the approval or disapproval 
of exports. The EU would also like to request China to clarify which "other factors stipulated by laws 
and administrative regulations " will apply to export controls, or any related plans f or the introduction 
of such laws and regulations.  In particular, the EU is concerned that 'other factors ' may include the 
possibility of request for disclosure of technical information (e.g. trade secrets) in the process of 
export controls. The EU would to  request further clarifications to China in this respect.  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government will consider all relevant factors and decide on approval or denial 
of the export applications under the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law. In the process  of 
review, the Chinese government will protect the business secrets of enterprises and safeguard their 
legal interests in accordance with the law. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the 
systems established in the Export Control Law, the Ch inese government is actively promoting the 
legislation of supporting regulations to further detail the relevant provisions of Export Control Law.  
Page 72, para 3.95 Under the Expert Control Law (Article 48), China may take measures 
reciprocally, according to the actual circumstances, if any country or region "abuses " its export 
control measures in ways that endanger China 's national security and interest.  
 
EU Questio n No 24:  Could China clarify what would constitute "abuses " of export control measures? 
Could China also clarify what would constitute "reciprocal  measures "?  
 
Reply : In recent years, some countries abuse export control measures groundlessly, which is 
unfavorable to the peaceful use of scientific and technological achievements for development by all 
countries, especially the developing countries, unfavorable to the normal international scientific and 
technological exchanges and economic and trade cooperatio n, unfavorable to the safe and smooth 
operation of global industrial chains and supply chains. It seriously undermines the common interests 
of the international community, and China is firmly opposed to it. China always believes that concrete 
measures shou ld be taken to promote international cooperation in material, equipment and 
technology for peaceful purposes, and in particular, to avoid restrictive measures inconsistent with 
the international obligations. Therefore, in order to better safeguard the nati onal security, the 
Chinese government has set up parity provisions in the Export Control Law targeting abuse of export 
control measures by foreign countries on the basis of extensive suggestions from different parties, 
which conforms to the basic norms gov erning international relations, WTO rules and international 
recognized practice.  
 
According to the Export Control Law, the Chinese government will continue to deepen multilateral 
and bilateral cooperation and exchanges in the field of export control, participate in the formulation 
of international rules, and make positive contributions to preventing the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and safeguarding world peace and security together with other countries.  
 
3.2.4  Export support and promotion  
Page 72, para 3.102.  
The Report states that since 2013, China has established an increasing number of PFTZs across the 
country; currently, there are 31 PFTZs.  
 
EU Question No 25:  
a) Where are the 31 PFTZs located?  
b) Where can details of the preferential income/corporate tax rates applicable in the various 
PFTZs be found?  
Reply to a and b :Please refer to http://zmqgs.mofcom.gov.cn/  
c) Do different rates apply to different indu stries within the same PFTZs?  
Reply: Please clarify what kind of "rates" that EU wants to know.  
d) Could you please provide more detailed information on the customs regime applicable to 
Hainan?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  Please refer to http://en.hnftp.gov.cn/policies/Trade/.   
 
Page 73, para 3.109.  
The Report states, the main mandate of China Eximbank 'includes facilitation of export and import 
of equipment and new - and high -tech products, and assisting Chinese companies with comparative 
advantages in their offshore projects '  
 
EU Question No 26:  
a) Could China explain what is involved in assisting companies in this context, including the 
project involved, whether financial assistance is available and what comparative advantages mean 
in this context?  
 
Reply:  The Measures for the Supervision and Adminis tration of the Export -Import Bank of China 
(Order No. 3 of 2017 by CBRC) stipulates that the Export -Import Bank of China shall establish a 
market -oriented operational and restrictive mechanism to develop into a policy -based financial 
institution with clear  positioning, distinct businesses, prominent functions, sufficient capital, 
standardized governance, strict internal control, safe operation and good services. In practice, the 
Export -Import Bank of China implements the development requirements of moderniz ed finance, and 
its operation, management and types of business are all carried out pursuant to the bank operational 
regularity.  
 
b) We understand that China Eximbank  is the main official export finance lender in China. Could 
China explain whether and how other Chinese banks are also involved, with financial backing from 
the state, in export finance – e.g. China Development Bank, Bank of China, Industrial and 
Commercia l Bank of China, China Construction Bank or Agricultural Bank of China. Are the financial 
decision of these bank always taken on commercial merits and in line with market terms or do they 
follow government policies and/or decisions?  
 
Reply : China 's commer cial banks are independent market players ，financial decision of these bank 
always taken on commercial merits and in line with market terms.  
 
c) According to the World Bank analysis, about 40% of official Chinese lending to developing 
countries comes directly from China Eximbank virtually all loans are tied to sourcing of exports from 
China. Does China consider concessional loans to developing coun tries that are tied to sourcing from 
Chinese exporters, and not in accordance with requirements of the OECD Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits, as subsidies within the meaning of WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties? Are all  relevant programmes notified to the WTO and if not, why?  
 
Reply:  China 's export credit policy complies with WTO rules, it is not export subsidy.  
 
3.2.5  Export finance, insurance, and guarantees  
Pages 74 -75, para s 3.112 -3.114  
The Report describes SINOSURE 's activities and products.  
 
EU Question No 27:  Could China please provide more details regarding SINOSURE  operational 
decisions, including the objective assessment criteria and the commercial considerations applied? 
To what extent are these decisions impartial and not based on the Government 's policies/decisions?  
 
Reply:  SINOSURE is a policy insurance compan y , operating as an independent legal entity.D etails 
regarding SINOSURE operational decisions  based on its commercial consideration which belongs to 
the company 's business secrets. In 2020, SINOSURE received sovereign credit ratings from the 
three  major in ternational credit rating agencies Moody 's, Standard & Poor 's, and Fitch, which reflect 
their unanimous recognition of SINOSURE 's position as a policy -oriented insurance institution and 
confirmation of its solid business performance.  
 
3.3  Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1  Incentives  
Page 75, para 3.115.  
The Report states that "During the review period, China continued to provide incentives and financial 
support to different sectors and industries. Generally, support is grante d by the Central Government 
or local governments in the form of direct transfers and tax preferences "  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  EU Question No 28:   
a) Could China explain what are these direct transfers and what are the criteria for granting such 
support?  
b) Which sectors and industri es benefit from these transfers?  
c) Under which headings is the information reported in China 's Subsidy Notification to the WTO?  
 
Reply  to a,b,c : Please refer to China 's subsidy notification submitted to the WTO.  
 
Page 75, para 3.115.  
The Report states that 'The authorities indicate that under the provisions of the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), there is no obligation to provide  written 
information on programmes not contained in the subsidy notification '.  
 
EU Question No 29:  Could China explain under what provisions of the ASCM , they would provide 
written answers to questions posed about programmes not contained in their Subsidy Notification in 
the interest of transparency?  
 
Reply:  China firmly upholds the multilateral trading system, earnestly fulfills its transparency 
obligation, submits the subsidy notification in a timely and comprehensive manner, and tries its best 
to respond to members ' concerns. China has earnestly replied to  the written questions raised by 
other members on China 's subsidy notification. Although China considers the questionnaire should 
focus on the subsidy notification, it has done its best to verify and provide relevant information on 
the issues unrelated to the notification. China hopes all members can carefully read the written reply 
it provides.  
 
Page 76, Para 3.123.  
The Report states that "it would appear that transparency on government support may also be 
hampered, as the Government, through numerous sta te-owned enterprises (SOEs), is involved in 
the financing and management of companies, making it difficult to identify the precise policy 
actions  (…)" The authorities do not agree with this statement and indicate that no implicit subsidies 
were paid to China 's SOEs. According to the authorities, the Government does not intervene in SOEs ' 
financing, operation, and management . 
 
EU Question No 30:   
a) Could China clarify if State -Owned Enterprises have access to preferential financing from 
state-owned banks? Do they receive any loan guarantees?  
 
Reply:  State -owned enterprises, private enterprises, FIEs are all customer groups of commercial 
banks. On the premise of compliance with laws and regulations, commercial banks may 
independently select customer groups and issue credit loans according to their own strategic 
planning, development orientation, risk preference, operation and management capabilities. The 
relevant decision -making of commercial banks is a market -oriented choice made from their own 
actual devel opment, which is a market -oriented behavior.  
 
b) What is the form of financing of the SOEs with losses? Does the government inject funds 
directly?  
 
Reply:  The financing of state -owned enterprises depends mainly on their profitability, asset quality, 
and development prospects. State -owned enterprises with good development prospects are still 
capable of obtaining market financing even if they suffer temporary  operating losses. Those that 
have completely lost their profitability and do not have the value to be saved will be gradually cleared 
up in accordance with the market -oriented mechanism.  
 
c) Could China provide a list of the SOEs that have received a direct transfer of funds from the 
State, and the yearly amounts received by each of them?  
 
Reply:  The SOEs have integrated with the market economy and become independent participants 
in market competition. They purchase and sell on the basis of commercial consid erations, and 
subject to the same laws and rules as other enterprises, and do not enjoy privileges in terms of 
access to funds, bankruptcy, and competition legislation. Relevant government information will be 
disclosed in accordance with the provisions of government information disclosure regulations, while WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 421 - 
 
  information related to listed companies will be disclosed in accordance with the information 
disclosure rules for listed companies.  
 
Page 77, para 3.124 and Page 78, para 3.125  
The Report refers to so -called "government guidance funds " (Table 3.15) and 'other funds that are 
related to government policies which appear to conduct direct investments to support a particular 
policy initiative (Table 3.16). These funds include expenditures under the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), and funds for China 's SOEs. According to the authorities, the incentives provided by these 
funds do not constitute subsidies and are not required to be notified under the SCM Agreement. '  
 
EU Question No 31:   
a) Could China specify why these funds would not constitute subsidies that require an ASCM 
notification?  
b) What are the precise differences between the so -called "government guidance funds ", which 
use public resources to make equity investments in industries t hat the Government considers 
important, and government subsidies, which are required to be notified under the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)?  
c) Is the funding provided by these funds available to non -Chinese enterprises a nd investors 
active in the areas in question as well? Are there any additional conditions that a non -Chinese 
enterprises or investors must fulfil in order to qualify for this funding (compared with a Chinese 
enterprise or investor)?  
d) What is the role of st ate officials, Party cells or Party officials in the management of the funds?  
 
Reply to a b c d: The funds established by China based on the market -oriented principle operate 
in full accordance with the market principle and are completely independent mark et players , they 
are not governmental agencies or party organizations. Their investment management and decision -
making are market -oriented, and government authorities do not intervene and participate in any 
investment project decision -making of the funds. The funds ar e also founded and established in 
accordance with the Company Law of the People 's Republic of China and other laws to carry out 
market -oriented operations. Relevant policies treat domestic and FIEs equally.  
 
Page 78, para 3.126  
Chinese authorities state t hat they cannot confirm the findings of an OECD study that highlights 
subsidy -induced distortions in the semiconductor industry, owing to the fact that the study used 
'estimated data '.  
 
EU Question No 32:  Could China provide the data on subsidies granted to the semiconductor 
industry and/or individual companies in this sector, thus allowing the OECD to improve its study ?  
 
Reply:  Please  refer to the subsidy  notification  submitted  by China.  
 
Page 78, para 3.127  
The Report refers to an OECD study (contested by China) which found that China 's financial support 
on energy and concessional finance for aluminium smelting, coupled with export restrictions on raw 
aluminium, provide Chinese exporters of semi -finished aluminium goods with a significan t cost 
advantage.  
 
EU Question No 33:  Are there any reforms planned in regards to financial support on energy and 
concessional finance for aluminium smelting and export restrictions on raw aluminium?  
 
Reply : China does not provide financial support on energy and concessional finance for aluminium 
smelting .  
 
3.3.2  Standards and other technical requirements   
3.3.2.1 Overview   
Page 79, para 3.133  
According to the Report, China introduced several new regulations and laws on standards and 
technical requirements during the reporting period. Moreover, the revised Standardisation Law 
entered into force.  
 
EU Question No 34 :  
a) How will China ensure no further decoupling from international standards?   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 422 - 
 
   
Reply:  Standardization has long been high on China 's agenda. China  has formulated and 
promulgated Measures for the Administration of Adoption of International Standards early in 2001, 
which clearly propose s that the international standards shall be adopted identically wherever 
possible during the formulation and amendment of national standards, so as to advance technology, 
improve product quality, open wider to the outside world, and step up the efforts to link China and 
the international community. Over the past two decades, China  has always been committed to 
promoting and encouraging the adoption of international standards based on China 's status quo in 
industrial development. Projects in key areas using i nternational standards are supported with higher 
priority and streamlined procedures, as an endeavor to transform international standards after 
modification into the standards of China more quickly. China  has specified that "adoption of 
international stand ards" shall be adopted "in view of national conditions " in the Standardization Law 
of the People 's Republic of China newly issued at the end of 2017, and identified the key areas and 
work in standardization in the Guidelines for the Adoption of Internation al Standards in National 
Standards at the end of 2020. Of all the national standards corresponding to international 
standards,  92.4% are mandatory national standards, and 91.4% are voluntary ones.  
 
b) Can China confirm that access to standardisation working groups (WGs) and technical 
committees (TCs) has become easier in general but also specifically in relation to WGs 2 and 3 
of TC 260?  
 
Reply : Under  the National Information Security Standardization Technical Committee (SAC/TC260) 
are six working groups and one special working group, in which the WG 2 was revoked in early 2019. 
The SAC/TC 260 together with its working groups has always been welcoming the participation of 
more and more enterprises, universities, research institutes, ex amining and licensing organizations 
and users. In so doing, we can have more participants involved in the formulation of standards on 
a wider basis and give full play to the principal role of enterprises. Till now over a thousand members 
have been enrolled  in all working groups, who thereby have their say in the standardization work 
pertaining to their respective areas.  
 
c) Companies report being affected by late announcement of new regulations, which means 
higher adjustment costs. How can China ensure that ea rly information of new regulation is also 
available to foreign companies?  
 
Reply : The Measures for the Administration of Mandatory National Standards was adopted on 
December 13, 2019. During the compilation of the measures, the WTO notification and deliberation 
work of The Measures for the Administration of Mandatory National Standards (Dr aft for Comment) 
began in May 2019. Since then, China received comments and suggestions from six institutions 
(from US and Korea, etc.) and made response respectively.  
 
Page 79, Para. 3.134   
The Report states that The Standardization Law classifies China 's standards into five major 
categories: national, sector, local, association, and enterprise. It explains that national standards 
include both voluntary and mandatory standards; sector standards and local standards are voluntary.   
 
EU Question No 35:  What is the classification of association and enterprise standards? Can foreign 
invested companies take part in the development of sector, local and association standards?   
 
Reply : According  to the Measures for the Administration of Local Standards, local standards shall 
be developed for the purpose of meeting local natural conditions, customs and other special technical 
requirements, so standards for industries and products that may affect trade are unlikely to be 
covered by local standard s. According to the Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthening the 
Administration of Industrial Standards, standards for industries shall ensure that foreign -invested 
enterprises can join the development of industrial standards based on laws and regulations  and on 
an equal footing.  
 
Page 80, par. 3.135  
The Report describes the Plan for Deepening Standardization Reform.  
 
EU Question No 36:  Could China provide detailed information related to the specific effects of the 
extension of mandatory standards on imp orts of products, in particular as regards product 
certification, etc. (see 3.149 and 3.152)   WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 423 - 
 
   
Reply:  In accordance As specified in Article 25 of the Standardization Law, products or services 
failing to comply with mandatory standards shall not be manufactured, sold, imported or supplied. 
Therefore, after mandatory national standards took effect, products  failing to comply with the 
standards cannot be imported. In accordance with Regulations on Certification and Accreditation and 
the Administrative Regulations on Compulsory Product Certification, products in the compulsory 
product certification catalog can not be imported without certification.  
 
Page 81, para 3.140  
The Report states that the responsibility of the MIIT and other institutions in regard to standard 
setting has remained largely unchanged since the previous Review. This means that access to 
standard -setting bodies for foreign companies is still out of reach. Standardization process in China 
in specific high -tech sectors has become very active. Foreign companies cannot participate in the 
process, despite recognized expertise at international leve l.  
 
EU Question No 37:  Does China intend to allow foreign companies to participate in the standard -
setting process?   
 
Reply : In accordance with the Foreign Investment Law of the People 's Republic of China, China 
ensures that foreign -invested enterprises have equal access to the standard -setting work according 
to law, and strengthens information disclosure and social supervision regarding standard -
setting.China has been committed to openness, transparency, and non -discriminatio n in 
standardization and actively supported foreign -invested companies ' equitable participation in the 
work with our efforts to build an open, fair and equitable environment of standardization for both 
domestic -funded enterprises and foreign -invested enter prises.  
 
Page 81, para. 3.144:  
According to the authorities, at end -2020, among the national standards that correspond to the 
relevant international standards, 92.4% of mandatory standards and 91.4% of 
voluntary  standards  were adoptions or adaptations of international standards, compared with 74.3% 
and 85.9% at end -2017. Of the national standards approved in 2020 (before 15 July), 4.0% were 
mandatory, compared with 2.8% in 2018.  
 
EU Question No 38:  Could China please provi de a breakdown of the data in order to show the 
percentage split between international standards that have been adopted without any change and 
those that were "adaptations of international standards ".  
 
Reply : Of all international standards adopted in China, 64.17% are identically adopted and 35.83% 
adopted after modification, the ratio of which standing at 1.8:1.  
 
3.3.2.2 Product certification  
Page 83, para 3.152  
According to the Report, procedures to obtain the CCC mark have remained largely unchanged since 
the previous Review. Compulsory Chinese Certification has been for years on the list on the technical 
requirements adversely affecting trade. It is a clear red tape obstacle for SMEs. Acknowledging 
reductions of the list, there are still more than one hundred industrial products.  
 
EU Question No 39:  Is it China 's intention to streamline the procedures to obtain the CCC in the 
near future? Would China consider recognizing and accepting international c ertification?   
 
Reply: China  will continue the reform on the CCC Scheme. Multiple measures will be taken to 
facilitate enterprises to obtain the CCC mark, including adjusting the list in accordance with the 
principle of necessity and minimization, generalizing the certification units  on a reasonable, risk -
assessment basis, promoting SDoC, and authorizing more certification bodies. China always attached 
great importance to international cooperation on compulsory certification and have carried out 
multilateral and bilateral cooperation to facilitate trade. Regarding multilateral cooperation, each 
year we would recognize and transfer thousands of IECEE/CB and IECEx certificates; Regarding 
bilateral cooperation, we have signed 126 MOUs with more then 30 foreign institutes and 
government se ctions, as well as agreements on cooperation in the field of conformity assessment in 
relation to electrical and electronic equipment and components with New Zealand and the Republic 
of Korea.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 424 - 
 
  Page 83, par. 3.152  
According to the Report, "19 products tha t have been accredited by self -declaration "  
 
EU Question No 40:  Could China specify how a product can obtain the accreditation for self -
declaration? What procedures need to be followed and what requirements need to be met?   
 
Reply:  For details, please refer to Implementation Rule for China Compulsory Certification: Self -
Declaration  contained in the Announcement of the CNCA on Further Improving the Self -Declaration 
Evaluation of China Compulsory Certification and Clarifying Relevant A ccreditation Requirements  
(Announcement No. 26, 2019) 
(http://www.cnca.gov.cn/zw/gg/gg2019/202007/t20200714_59707.shtml ). 
 
3.3.2.3 Labelling and packaging   
Page 83, Para. 3.154  
The Report states that "Pre-packed food without labels and/or instructions in Chinese or whose labels 
or instructions do not comply w ith the provision of the Law may not be imported. "  
 
EU Question No 41:   
a) Can these labels be affixed in China in a customs warehouse or other designated area prior to 
the product entering the market?  
b) Can the labels be affixed to the product (i.e. stickers) or do they need to be attached to the 
product packaging?   
 
Reply:  The Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Food Labeling currently has some 
issues under study, communication and coordination. After a consensus is reached, the legislative 
process can be accelerated.  
 
Page 83, para 3.155 -3.156  
Several changes to labelling and packaging requirements took place during the review period. For 
example, the Food Safety Law and its implementing measures that sets out detailed requirements. 
Moreover, other new legislation like the New Cosmetic Regulation contai ns mandatory information 
requirements such ingredients/ quantity that may get in conflict with protection of trade secrets with 
commercial value, i.e. formula.   
 
EU Question No 42   
a) In case of conflict with rights and obligations for the exporter, could Chi na explain how they 
would guarantee consistency between different legislative pieces?   
Reply:  China attaches great importance to the protection of business secrets. The Regulation on the 
Supervision and Administration of Cosmetics and the Measures for the Administration of the 
Registration and Recordation of Cosmetics include detailed provisions on the protection of business 
secrets, and, in accordance with the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information, keep 
secret information involving bus iness secrets. In full consideration for the protection of business 
secret and intellectual property right, China only requires enterprises to submit the abstract rathe r 
than the full text of materials used to assess the claimed effects of cosmetics. To pr otect consumers ' 
legal rights and interests, information released to the public domain is limited to basic product 
information and doesn 't involve business secret.  
 
b) Will China coordinate ongoing revision processes impacting rules on the labelling and fore see 
a transition period before entry into force of these different measures in order to allow manufacturers 
enough time to adapt to new requirements?  
 
Reply:  The Regulations on Labels of Cosmetics issued by the National Medical Products 
Administration (No .77 of 2021) will come into effect on May 1, 2022. The Regulations leaves a 
reasonable transition period for the industry in full consideration for the industry 's actual situations 
and avoids the waste of packaging materials. It allows a two -year transitio n period for products 
already registered or kept on record before May 1, 2022. If the products are not properly labeled in 
accordance with the Regulations, the registrant must update the labelling prior to May 1, 2023 to 
comply with the Regulations.The Mea sures for the Supervision and Administration of Food Labeling 
currently has some issues under study, communication and coordination. After a consensus is 
reached, the legislative process can be accelerated.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.3.3  Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements   
3.3.3.1 Legal, institutional, and policy framework   
Page 86, para 3.164  
The Report states that from 2018 to early 2021, the GACC signed several memoranda of 
understanding or cooperation protocol with the relevant authorities in 28 trading pa rtners on SPS -
related issues. This established system of negotiating one protocol per product and per country is 
inefficient, extremely slow and takes years to be implemented. The need for on -site audits, 
inspection visits and explicit authorizations is a huge burden for both sides, the competent authorities 
and the exporting establishments.  
 
EU Question No 43 :Would China be willing to recognize or accept the validity of competent 
authority certification for certain products and process steps?   
 
Reply : China  is willing to discuss this issue and probe into certification effectiveness according to 
the characteristics of different products.  
 
3.3.3.2 SPS measures   
Page 86, para 3.168  
The Report describes the emergency preventive measures for foreign manufacturers of imported 
cold-chain foods with positive novel coronavirus nucleic acid results implemented by GACC. This was 
notified to the WTO as an emergency measure in 2020, which is s till in force. It has been reported 
that, in 2020, the city of Shenzhen introduced COVID -19 handling and testing requirements for 
imports of frozen meat and seafood.  
At the time of the Notification, the EU argued that China had not provided trade partners with official 
results, information on methods of analysis applied to recover nucleic acid or the living virus from 
food and packages. China had not provided substantiated theories on how the transmission of the 
virus from packages and food is cons idered to happen. Also, it was not consistent with the scientific 
reasoning behind the Emergency Measure description in art 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.   
 
EU Question No 44 : 
a) In view of the updated guidance of FAO related preventing transmission of COVID -19 wi thin 
food businesses that was published in August 2021, when will China lift this emergency measure?  
b) How does China reconcile the fact that no other WTO Member has adopted similar restrictions 
and there is no evidence in peer reviewed scientific literatur e that would suggest the transmission 
of COVID 19 through food?  
c) Is China ready to discuss the risk assessment underlying the Emergency Measures?   
 
Reply  to a, b, c : To protect people 's life safety and health, China has taken necessary temporary 
preventive measures to strengthen the supervision of imported cold -chain food. The relevant 
practices have been in full compliance with international rules and have not had any negative impact 
on the food trade to China. COVID -19 nucleic acid sampling tests have been conducted on imported 
cold-chain foods and their packaging according to law to prevent the transmission and spread of 
COVID -19 through them. At the beginning, the samples of some imp orted food products, their 
exterior and interior packaging and inner walls of containers from some countries were tested 
positive for COVID -19 by China Customs. In 17 October, 2020, the Chinese Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention (China CDC) announce d that live COVID -19 virus had been isolated from 
exterior packaging of imported aquatic products, which further confirmed that exposure to exterior 
packaging contaminated by live COVID -19 virus could lead to infection. China welcomes the export 
of high -quality and safe food to China, and China 's attitude towards opening up and expanding 
imports is consistent and clear. However, as the global epidemic develops, consumers ' concerns and 
doubts about the safety of the food supply chain have deepened. We believ e that without consumer 
confidence, there will be no market, and without market, there will be no trade. Under the current 
epidemic situation, we wish that the countries (regions) overseas that wish to export food to China 
may require the enterprises expor ting foods to China to, according to the relevant guidelines issued 
by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), do well in all preventive 
management measures to ensure that the foods exporting to China have not been contaminated 
by COVID -19. China is willing to work with relevant parties to jointly ensure the safety of the food 
supply chain, eliminate consumers ' doubts, respond to consumers ' concerns, ensure safe food supply 
and maintain market stability, so as to promote the healthy deve lopment of trade.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 85, para 3.161   
The Report states that "a draft of the Implementing Regulations was notified to the WTO in 2017. " 
It would appear that an underlying principle of the Law and the Implementing Regulations is that 
food producers should  hold primary accountability for food safety; they also contain provisions on 
traceability of food and agricultural products sold in China ".  
 
EU Question No 45:  How will China ensure the traceability of food and agricultural products in the 
case of fraudulent tampering with or removal of lot codes and other traceability information?  
 
Reply:  According to the Food Safety Law  and its regulations, a food producer is  the first responsible 
person for food safety and shall be responsible for traceable information.  
 
Page 87, para 3.169  
EU Question No 46:  
a) On the Draft Administrative Measures for Registration of Overseas Producers of Imported 
Foods, could China explain when it will develop detailed guidelines, implementing rules and template 
forms?  
b) Will China define the product categories by their HS number s that must register under the 
'registration with recommendation ' procedure, and the types of operations that must register? Will 
China provide for realistic and practicable implementation and transition periods of at least 
18 months after detailed guidanc e is available?  
c) Will China ensure that once registrations are approved and registration numbers are allocated, 
provisions related to labelling under Article 15 be implemented with adequate transition periods?   
 
Reply  to a,b,c : The safety of imported food is related to people 's health and life safety, a significant 
livelihood issue. According to the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China  and its 
regulations and other laws and administrative regulations, China has revised the previous two rules 
on the safety management of imported and exported food and the registration management of 
overseas production enterprises of imported food. On Apri l 12, 2021, the Measures of the 
People 's Republic of China for the Administration of Imported and Exported Food Safety  (Order 
No. 249 of the General Administration of Customs) and the Provisions of the People 's Republic of 
China on the Administration of th e Registration of Overseas Production Enterprises of Imported Food  
(Order No. 248 of the General Administration of Customs) are announced, which will take effect on 
January 1, 2022. Before the announcement, China issued a circular in accordance with releva nt 
WTO rules, accepted the deliberation by WTO members, and adopted reasonable opinions and 
suggestions, which was in line with the relevant WTO rules. Article 2 of Order No. 248 and Order 
No. 249 of the General Administration of Customs makes clear the sc ope of application of these two 
rules. In the near future, China will the Measures of the People 's Republic of China for the 
Administration of Imported and Exported Food Safety  (Order No. 249 of the General Administration 
of Customs) and the Provisions of the People 's Republic of China on the Administration of the 
Registration of Overseas Production Enterprises of Imported Food  (Order No. 248 of the General 
Administration of Customs) in an appropriate form. Your concerns are welcome. Order No. 248 of 
the Ge neral Administration of Customs will not affect the implementation of the bilateral protocol. If 
the relevant countries (regions) and China have otherwise agreed on the registration method and 
application materials, the contents agreed by both sides shall prevail.  
 
Page 87, Table 3.19  
China still applies export restrictions due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) against a 
number of EU Member States. Member States have since a long time back been officially recognized 
as having a negligible BSE risk  status in accordance with the OIE provisions.   
 
EU Question No 47 : Could China indicate how it will address and resolve the STCs  raised multiple 
times by the EU during the last decade, namely those related to BSE, avian influenza and African 
swine fever?  
 
Reply:  For the above special trade concerns raised by EU, China has previously made formal 
responses at the relevant WTO commit tees. EU may refer to China 's previous responses.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.3.4  Competition policy and price controls   
3.3.4.1 Competition policy  
3.3.4.1.1 Legislative and institutional framework   
Page 89, para 3.173  
The Report refers to the establishment of SAMR in 2018. According to the press, a reorganisation of 
SAMR 's Anti -Monopoly Bureau is underway.  
 
EU Question No 48:  Could China explain the details of the reorganisation and how the 'new SAMR 
Anti-Monopoly Bureau ' will be organised, what resources and what statute it will have (still a bureau 
under the SAMR?).   
 
Reply : In 2018, China government decided to integrate the responsibilities of the former State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, the responsibilities of General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, the responsibilities of the former State Administration for 
Food and Drug, the price supervision and inspection as well as anti -monopoly law enforcement 
responsibilities of the National Development and Reform Commission, the centralized anti -monopoly 
law enforcement responsibilities of the Ministry of Commerce, and the responsibiliti es of the Anti -
monopoly Commission Office under the State Council, to establish the State Administration for 
Market Regulation for achieving unified anti -monopoly law enforcement. At present, China is 
improving its anti -monopoly system and mechanism and en riching its anti -monopoly supervision 
force.  
For detailed information about Anti-Monopoly Bureau , please refer to SAMR 's website 
http://www.samr.gov.cn/jg/sjzz/201812/t20181218_278207.html  
 
Page 90, para 3.175  
The Report explains that the draft AML 'was completed and submitted to the State Council in 
December  2020'.  
 
EU Question No 49:  
a) Could China indicate whether a publicly accessible version of the draft AML is available and 
when the draft AML is expected to be adopted and promulgated?  
 
Reply : Yes, a publicly  accessible version of the draft AML is available for collecting public comments  
(http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjjg/202004/t20200414_314212.html ).  
After the adoption of the amended AML, it will be publicly promulgated.  
 
b) Will the amendment of the AML be used  to increase the procedural fairness guarantees of 
parties and third parties specific to AML enforcement?  
 
Reply:  China protects the legitimate rights and interests of parties  and third parties specific to AML 
enforcement  in accordance with law s and regulations. After the adoption of the amended AML, it will 
be publicly promulgated.  
 
c) Will the amended AML introduce criminal sanctions for individuals for the infringement of the 
AML? If so, what would the procedural rules be for the imposition of criminal sanctions on individuals 
and what procedural fairness guarantees would be available for individuals charged with 
infringements of the AML?   
 
Reply:  After the adoption of the amended AML, it will be publicl y promulgated.  
 
d) Will the amended AML contain specific provisions targeted at the developments caused by 
digitalisation and if yes could China outline the gist of these proposed amendments?   
 
Reply:  After the adoption of the amended AML, it will be publicly  promulgate d.  
For the detailed information, please refer to the draft AML  
http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjjg/202004/t202004 14_314212.html  
 
3.3.4.1.2 Monopoly agreements   
Page 91, para 3.177  
EU question No 50:  would it be possible for China to offer statistics about the use of the 
AML leniency programme?   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  Up to now, in the horizontal monopoly agreement cases, some operators in more than 
10 cases have been exempted or mitigated for providing important evidence.  
 
3.3.4.1.3 Dominant market positions   
Page 92, para 3.180  
This paragraph refers to the fine levels, which can be imposed under the AML.  
 
EU question No 51:  How is this scale applied to SOEs? Are SOEs fined at the same levels as 
privately owned enterprises?   
 
Reply : The Anti -Monopoly Law equally treats all enterprises including state -owned enterprises, 
private enterprises, and FIEs without discrimination.  
 
3.3.4.1.4 Mergers and acquisitions   
Page 92, para 3.182  
The Report explains that 'Operators participating in a concentration proposal may submit to the 
SAMR a proposal with a commitment to implement certain remedies that would alleviate the anti -
competitive effect. ' Section 3.187 explains that 'Concerning concentration of undertakings, the SAMR 
received 503 notifications, investigated 462 cases, and concluded 465 cases. Among the closed 
cases, five were approved with conditions, accounting for about 1.1%. ' So far, under AML 
enforcement, remedies have never been imposed on transactions am ong purely Chinese enterprises. 
In a few remedies cases there has been participation of a Chinese enterprise, the Chinese enterprise 
has been the target of a takeover or it may have been a joint venture.  
 
EU question No 52:  
a) Could China explain what are the  factors leading to this situation and why none of SAMR 's 
interventions (approvals with remedies) to date relate to transactions involving only domestic 
enterprises and all cases have concerned transactions between foreign enterprises, or where at least 
one of the parties (the acquirer) is a foreign enterprise?   
b) Among the remedies applied by SAMR, there is the 'hold separate ' behavioural obligation. 
Could China explain how this remedy alleviates the competition concerns identified, and how it is 
made possib le for the parties to eventually merge their activities?   
 
Reply:  Since the implementation of the Anti -monopoly Law of China, accumulatively there are 
49 centralized business operator cases attached to restrictive conditions, and 29 cases are currently 
being supervised and executed. Chinese anti -monopoly law enforcement agencies prudently protect 
the legitimate rights and interests of business operators in accordance with the law. The process 
and results of law enforcement are open and transparent . They treat state -owned enterprises, 
private enterprises, domestic enterprises and FIEs equitably, enforce the law fairly and justly, and 
guarantee thatall types o f market players participate in market competitions on an equal basis. The 
Interim Provisions on Centralized review of Business Operators issued by State Administration for 
Market Regulation also specifies that "all operators are treated equally ". The so -called selective 
enforcement does not exist in practice. The reason why there are so many approved cases involving 
foreign enterprises with additional restrictive conditions is related to the significant competitive 
advantages and strong market strength of some foreign enterprises in some certain industries and 
markets.  
 
3.3.4.1.5 Administrative monopoly   
Page 93, para 3.185  
The Report describes that 'Any administrative measures that have the effect of eliminating or 
restricting competition should not be put into place unless they fall into the exceptions prescribed 
by the State Council Opinions. '  
 
EU question No 53:  What is the methodology, criteria and standards applied in determining the 
compatibility of measures with the FCRS?  
 
Reply:  Since the estab lishment and enforcement of the fair competition review system in 2016, the 
Chinese government has promulgated a series of policies and measures to expand the review scope, 
advance the review mechanism, refine the review criteria, strengthen supervision an d review, and 
continuously strengthen the rigid constraints of the system so as to ensure its effective 
implementation. In June 2021, the State Administration for Market Regulation and other 
four authorities revised and adopted the Detailed Rules for the I mplementation of the Fair WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Competition Review System, which further specified the scope of the review, detailed the review 
standards, and perfected the review mechanism. This forms a strong guarantee for effectively 
promoting the fair competition review sys tem with greater efforts.  
 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Page 97, para 3.199   
"SOEs are divided into commercial entities and public welfare entities "  
 
EU Question No 54 : As regards SOEs that are "commercial entities ": What other public policy aims 
do these commercial SOEs pursue that might lead them to not act on the basis purely commercial 
considerations?  
 
Reply:  As regards to commercial -oriented SOEs, they act on commercial considerations.  
 
Page 97, para 3.200  
State owned enterprises policy must be consistent with the overall competition policy and with public 
support and subsidies policy. According to the report, privatization of SOEs is not planned.   
 
EU Question No 55:  Could China provide more information on the reform mentioned in the 
paragraph 3.200? Could China explain the content of the structural plan? Does it mean that China 
is going to favour mixed -ownership companies?   
 
Reply : China  will actively and steadily advance the ref orm of mixed ownership, promote the in -
depth transformation of the operating mechanism of mixed -reformed enterprises, and ensure that 
the vitality of enterprises is strengthened, and efficiency and efficiency are improved.  
 
Page 98, para 3.205   
"SOEs are very important in China 's economy, in particular for the Government 's employment and 
social and regional policy objectives " 
 
EU Question No 56:  Could China confirm whether all SOEs operate according to commercial 
considerations, as required by China 's WTO accession commitments? If not, what other 
considerations guide their operations?   
 
Reply:  Commercial -oriented SOEs act on commercial considerations.  
 
Page 98, para 3.205  
As stated in this section, the IMF found that the productivity of China 's SOEs is generally low 
compared with that of privately owned companies - the average productivity gap between SOEs and 
private companies is estimated at about 20%. Chinese authorities, however, assert in this section 
that they do not agree with the IMF 's analysis (i.e. that SOEs are less productive), although also 
other studies indicate that private Chinese companies are more innovative and productive.   
 
EU Question No 57:  Could China point us to research that supports their view? Are there any 
official Chinese data on the productivity differences among workers in SOE 's and workers in private 
enterprises?  
 
Reply:  China does not recognize this data and conclusion quoted from IMF 's report which may lead 
misunderstanding, because China can not confirm the detailed information which leads to this 
conclusion, such as samples, data, research methods,etc. China does not have the data on average 
productivity gap between SOEs and  private companies. China does not agree with  the IMF's 
conclusion.  
 
Page 99, para 3.206   
The authorities object to this statement and indicate that SOEs  in China operate under market 
conditions, with no privileges granted by the Government.  
 
EU Question No 58:  Could China explain what mechanisms exist to ensure that SOEs operate under 
market conditions? How do the authorities ensure that no informal priv ileges are granted, for 
example in the form of easier access to licences, lower prices charged by other SOEs, or 
encouragement to prefer other SOEs in the purchases by SOEs?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 430 - 
 
  Reply : In accordance with Article 16, the Constitutionla  Law of the People 's Republic of China, state -
owned enterprises have the right to operate independently. In accordance with to the provisions of 
Articles 6 and 14 of the State -owned Assets Law of the People 's Republic of China, the government 
does not inte rfere with the autonomous business activities of state -owned enterprises, and only 
performs the duties of investors. According to Article 5, Article 63, Article 71, Article 73 of the 
Government Procurement Law of the People 's Republic of China and Article 6, Article 18 and 
Article  20 of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Tendering and Bidding unreasonable 
conditions and standards shall not be applied to exclude and restrict potential bidders. Therefore, 
state-owned enterprises do not enjoy the abo ve-mentioned preferential treatment in bidding and 
procurement activities.  
 
Page 99, para 3.207   
The Report asserts that the China Structural Reform Fund is established for financing of SOEs. 
According to the Report, it is a market based credit safeguard fund for central SOEs.   
 
EU Question No 59:  Are any other public institutions, like SASAC, contributing to the fund? Are 
any public owned banks or insurance companies involved in the financing of the Fund? How was the 
fund financed?   
 
Reply:  The information of the Fund (including contributors ' information) can be found via National 
Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System  (http://www.gsxt.gov.cn ). Among the contributors, 
there is no banks or insurance companies.  
 
3.3.6  Government procurement   
3.3.6.1 Overview   
Page 99, para 3.210  
The paragraph reports that "according to data provided by the authorities, the total value of 
government procurement in China was CNY 3.3 trillion in 2019 (the latest year for which data were 
made available), accounting for 3.3% of GDP (Table 3.25) ".  
 
EU Question No 60:  Can China provide the data for 2020 as well?   
 
Reply : The total value of government procurement in China was CNY 3.7 trillion in 2020.  
 
3.3.6.2 Legal and institutional framework   
Page 100, para 3.211 and 3.212  
In paragraph 3.211, it is reported that "there have been no major changes to China 's legislative and 
regulatory regime concerning " and in point 3.212 "that the Government Procurement Law and the 
Tendering Law are currently under amendment ".  
 
EU Question No 61:  
a) When does China expect adoption of the amendments to Government Procurement Law and 
Tendering Law?   
b) Can China explain how these amendments will contribute to bringing the legal framework for 
public procurement in line with GPA principles and international best practices?   
c) Could China inform and elaborate on the main findings of public consultations conducted in 
connection with the amendments?   
d) Could China provide an update on dev elopments and policies in volume -based procurement 
(VBP) schemes, in particular in sectors of pharma and medical devices?   
 
Reply  to a,  b, c, d: The Chinese government is actively promoting the revision of Government 
Procurement Law and Bidding Law. The co mpletion time of the revision depends on the consultation 
with relevant parties and coordination with relevant departments. Promoting the consistency 
between domestic government procurement legal system and GPA and other international rules is 
one of the i mportant goals of the revision of Government Procurement Law. This revision will draw 
lessons from GPA and other international rules, optimize procurement procedures, further emphasize 
open competition and fairness and transparency, and strive to improve t he current government 
procurement system, so as to provide institutional guarantee for optimizing the business 
environment of government procurement.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  3.3.6.4 Other policy considerations in government procurement   
Page 104, para 3.221 and para 3.222  
China maintains buy -national policies in government procurement. Article 10 of the Government 
Procurement Law provides that unless the subject matter cannot be obtained within the territory of 
China or cannot be obtaine d with reasonable commercial terms, or the procurement is for use outside 
the territory of China, the procuring entities shall procure domestic goods, services, and construction 
works. (…).  
China 's government issued new procurement guidelines in May, "Auditing guidelines for government 
procurement of imported products, " that require up to 100% local content on hundreds of items 
including medical equipment and pharmaceutical products, erecting fresh barriers for foreign 
suppliers .  
 
EU Question No 62:  Are the guidelines public? Could China provide the full list of products affected 
by the regulation?   
 
Reply : At present, China has not accede the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), nor 
has it signed agreement s with other countries or regions. The Guidelines mentionedn above  and 
other policies do not violate GPA rules and China commitments. The Guidelines  is only for the internal 
reference of local regulatory authorities, and has no binding force.  
 
3.3.6.6 Supplier complaint mechanism  
Page 106, para 3.228  
Reference is made to "that the finance authorities at different levels of government review suppliers ' 
complaints regarding government procurement activities at their respective levels. The result s of 
complaint reviews are published in designated media. "  
 
EU Question 63:  Could China specify in how many cases of the filed complaints a non -compliance 
with the relevant rules was found?   
 
Reply : China  suggest EU to clarify what does "relevant rules " refer to.  
 
3.3.6.7 Accession to the GPA and other international cooperation  
Page 106, para 3.229  
As it is mentioned in the Report, China is currently negotiating the terms of its eventual accession 
to the GPA. The EU notes that China 's commitment, in the context of its GPA accession bid, is to 
implement a transparent and non -discriminatory public procurement framework. China Government 
Procurement Law also requires publication of government procurement related information. The 
Report in point 3.220 notes that "that the transparency of government procurement has been 
significantly improved across the country ". The EU notes that the Chinese authorities may have 
endorsed new measures in support of buy -local policies and these measures seem not be mentioned 
in the Government or Secretariat Report and/or publically available.   
 
EU Question 64:  
a) Can China clarify the legal status of the document 551 of 14 May titled 'Regarding the 
publication of 'government procurement of imported goods auditing guidelines (2021 version) ' and 
provide explanation of its content and scope?   
b) Can China clarify the legal status of the document from the Ministry of Emergency 
Management on fi refighting equipment and provide explanation of its content and scope?   
c) In respect to local content requirement, are there other existing or planned (legal and 
administrative) measures in China 's domestic government procurement framework that will need to 
be adjusted to comply with GPA rules?   
d) Which measures China is implementing and/or plans to implement in order to improve 
transparency of government public procurement framework?   
 
Reply to a , b, c, d: The Guidlines mentioned above is  for the internal reference of local regulatory 
authorities only, and has no binding force. There is no local content requirement in China 's 
Government Procurement Law and regulations. China has continuously improved the transparency 
of government procurem ent to ensure that government procurement information is released with 
complete content and elements in a timely manner. Procurement intention, procurement budget, 
procurement announcement, procurement documents, procurement results and other procurement 
project information, complaints, supervision and inspection decisions made by the financial 
department, the assessment results of centralized procurement agencies, and the records of illegal WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  and untrustworthy behaviors shall all be made public free of charg e on the  www.ccgp.gov.cn, and 
suppliers can obtain government procurement information in a timely, accurate and convenient 
manner. At the same time, the transparency of government procurement shall be comprehensively 
evaluated through third -party evaluatio n. 
 
Page 106, para 3.230  
China has not included any market access commitments in the area of government procurement in 
the context of any of the FTAs that it has negotiated with trading partners. According to the 
authorities, it remains China 's priority t o conclude its GPA accession before liberalizing its 
government procurement market through bilateral/regional tracks.   
 
EU Question No 65:  
a) When can GPA Parties expect a new revised offer by China, taking into account the comments 
made on the sixth revised offer from 2019?   
 
Reply : The Chinese government is working to access the GPA. The level of the 7th bid for China 's 
accession to GPA submitted to WTO in October 2019 is roughly equivalent to that of participants. In 
May 2020, China submitted the Report on China 's Government Procurement (updated version 
of 2020) to the WTO, which fully reflected the reform of China 's government procurement legal 
system. While advancing the bid negotiation, China is simultaneously pushing ahead with the legal 
adjustment negotiation. In June 2021, China submitted to the WTO the reply to the 7th bid of EU 
and Australia on China 's accession to GPA and the list of questions in the Report on China 's 
Government Procurement (updated version of 2020), wh ich demonstrated China 's sincerity in joining 
GPA and its determination to safeguard the multilateral trading system through practical actions.  
GPA is a multilateral agreement and China 's unilateral efforts are not enough in the process of joining 
the GPA,  which depends to a great extent on the positions and expectations of the participants. 
China always believes that the sooner China joins GPA, the sooner all parties will benefit. It is hoped 
that GPA participants will base themselves on the present, focus  on the long -term development, 
offer China a practical price, and reach a mutually beneficial and win -win negotiation result on 
China 's accession to GPA as soon as possible.  
 
b) What is China 's timeline for the revision of its legislative framework concerning  public 
procurement?   
 
Reply : The Chinese government is actively promoting the revision of the Government Procurement 
Law. The completion time of the revision will depend on the consultation and coordination.  
 
c) Does China intend to make its legislation GPA -compatible before ensuring access ion to the 
WTO's GPA? What is the roadmap for the implementation of the different reforms that are required 
to make Chinese Procurement law GPA -compliant?   
 
Reply : Promoting  the consistency between China 's government procurement legal system and GPA 
and other international rules is one of the important objectives of the revision of the Government 
Procurement Law. This revision will draw lessons from GPA and other international rules, optimize 
procurement p rocedures, further emphasize open competition and fairness and transparency, and 
strive to improve the current government procurement system to provide institutional guarantee for 
optimizing the business environment of government procurement.  
 
3.3.7 Intel lectual property rights   
3.3.7.2 Institutional reforms and IP -related policies   
Page 107, para 3.236  
The Report refers to the objectives of the Plan for Further Implementation of the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy to Accelerate the Construction o f an Intellectual Property Power Country, among 
them the objective to reduce low -quality patent applications and malicious filing of trademarks.   
 
EU Question No 66:   
a) What steps have been taken or are planned to reduce low -quality patent applications and 
malicious filing of trademarks including on the basis of the Plan for Further Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy to Accelerate the Constructi on of an Intellectual Property 
Power Country?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 433 - 
 
  Reply : With respect to patent, China has taken a series of measures to crack down on irregular 
patent application practices and promote patent quality from the source. In 2007, China formulated 
the Provisions  on Regulating Patent Application (CNIPA Order No. 45), which was amended (CNIPA 
Order No. 75) in 2017. To ensure the realization of the legislative purpose of the Patent Law to 
encourage genuine innovative activities and combat and curb all kinds of abnor mal patent application 
practices that are not aimed at protecting innovation, China issued the Measures on Regulating 
Patent Application (CNIPA Announcement No. 411) on March 11, 2021, which has supplemented and 
improved the definition of abnormal patent a pplication and further regulated such a practice. In 
addition, China has also set up a high -quality development orientation by cracking down on patent 
application agency practices that do not aim at innovation and fully abolishing the funding and 
incentive s for patent and trademark application across China.  
 
Regarding trademark, on April 23, 2019, the Standing Committee of the National People 's Congress 
adopted a decision on amending the Trademark Law of the People 's Republic of China, with the 
amended provisions having come into effect since November 1, 2019. The amendments provide a 
direct legal basis for regulating malicious registration, severely punishing trademark infringement, 
strengthening the protection of trademark rights and optimizing  the business environment. In line 
with the revision of the Trademark Law, the departmental Provisions on Regulating Trademark 
Application and Registration has come into force since December 1, 2019, which has put the revision 
of the Trademark Law into pra ctice and improved the operability of relevant provisions. In the next 
step, China will continue to promote the preparation of amendments to the Trademark Law and its 
implementing regulations, conduct research and demonstration on key issues such as regula ting 
malicious registration, optimizing the authorization and confirmation procedures, and strengthening 
the protection of trademark rights, so as to continuously refine the trademark legal system. Since 
March 2021, China has cracked down on malicious trad emark application, disruption of the 
management order of trademark registration, and those acts leading to a huge adverse social impact.  
 
b) What results have been achieved as regards the measures to reduce low -quality patent 
applications and malicious filing of trademarks?   
 
Reply : To promote the high -quality development of intellectual property rights, China has taken a 
series of initiatives and achieved results, optimizing the structure of effective invention patents 
that are maintained by the number of years. Of valid invention patents in China (excluding 
Hong Kong, China, Macao, China and Chinese Taipei), 281,000 have been maintained for over 
10 years, making up 11.5% of the total, an increase of 0.2 percentage points over th e end of the 
13th Five -Year Plan period.  
 
China  has strictly implemented the provisions of Article 4 of the Trademark Law on rejecting 
malicious trademark registration applications not for the purpose of use. China  has more strictly 
cracked down on tradema rk hoarding, with the overflowing malicious trademark registrations curbed 
to a certain extent. In 2020, China  rejected 15,600 malicious trademark registration applications 
and 46,000 from January to September 2021. These efforts have reduced the time and economic 
costs for enterprises to defend their rights through follow -up procedures and boosted their 
confidence in protecting IPRs. They form a strong deterrent to potentially malicious registrations, 
with initial results made in the source management of t rademark registration order.  
 
Page 108, para 3.238.  
The China Manufacturing 2025 strategy highlights, inter alia, the importance of IP protection and 
enforcement to promote IP -intensive sectors such as robotics, information technology, and clean 
energy.  
 
EU Question No 67:   
a) Could China provide information about the specific IPR measures undertaken in the framework 
of the China 2025 strategy for robotics and 3D printing?  
 
Reply : To meet the demand for IPR protection in new business forms and models includ ing the 
robotics industry and strengthen the development of IPR systems in related fields, China has 
continuously improved the examination standards in related technical fields by increasing the survey 
and research of social needs and refining the mechanis m of regular revision of patent examination 
guidelines. In 2017, China revised the Patent Examination Guide to explicitly include technical 
solutions related to new business models in the scope of patent protection objects and improved the 
requirements for  writing claims of inventions involving computer programs. In 2019, China revised WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 434 - 
 
  the Patent Examination Guide, adding specific chapters to define the examination rules for patent 
applications involving new fields and business forms such as AI, "Internet plus", big data and 
blockchain. China refined the examination rules from various perspectives such as judgment of 
authorized objects, novelty and inventiveness examination, claim and specification drafting and 
interpreted the rules through typical cases, b oth positive and negative. In 2020 and 2021, China 
continued to revise the Patent Examination Guide, which has been open for public comments. The 
relevant modifications further identify and improve the object examination benchmarks of 
applications for inve ntion patents involving computer programs, making clear that claims of patent 
applications for inventions concerning computer programs can be written as computer program 
products and that the improvement of the internal performance of computer by algorithm s and the 
effect of user experience enhancement should be considered in the inventive review.  
 
b) How the participation of foreign investment and technologies has been ensured? How 
protection of IPR of foreign companies is guaranteed?   
 
Reply : The Chinese gov ernment has always been committed to treating and protecting the 
intellectual property rights of domestic and foreign enterprises on an equal footing. China National 
Intellectual Property Administration protects the IPRs of foreign investors and their inve stment 
enterprises in strict accordance with relevant provisions of the Foreign Investment Law and other 
regulations.  
 
3.3.7.3 International context  
Page 108, paragraph 3.240  
In the TPR  of 2018 China indicated that it would start the work on becoming member of the Hague 
Agreement concerning the international registration of industrial designs after completing the 
revision of the Patent Law.  
 
EU Question No 68:  Has the work on becoming member of the Hague Agreement concerning the 
international registration of industrial designs started and what are China 's plans and timeline in this 
regard?   
 
Reply : China  is currently moving forward with the domestic submission and approval procedures 
for accession to the Hague Agreement in an effort to submit its application as soon as possible.  
 
3.3.7.4. Copyright and related rights   
Page 108, para 3.245  
The Report makes  a reference to the Regulations on Collective Copyright Management.   
 
EU Question No 69:  Has China introduced or intends to introduce a legal framework for copyright 
collective management organisations in addition to the Collective Management of Copyright 
Regulations of People 's Republic of China? Are there plans to increase the number of CMO s?  
 
Reply:  The "Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on Collective Management of Copyrights " 
is a special regulation for the management of collective management organizations, within the 
framework of the entire copyright legal system. According t o Article 7 of the Regulations, 
Chinese  citizens, legal persons, or other organizations that enjoy copyright or copyright -related 
rights can initiate the establishment of copyright collective management organizations if they meet 
certain conditions. Up to now, no application for the establishment of a new CMO.  
 
3.3.7.5 Industrial property   
3.3.7.5.1 Trade marks  
Page 109 -110, para 3.250, para 3.255 and Table 3.29  
The legal framework for the protection and enforcement of trademarks is provided by the Trademark 
Law. Amendments to the Trademark Law entered into force in November 2019. The objectives of 
these amendments are to curb bad -faith applications, strengthen protection, and foster a favourable 
business environment. Despite this, EU companies compl ain that such applications for registration 
have increased.  
 
EU Question No 70:   
a) Does China have data to confirm that the number of bad faith applications has decreased?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 435 - 
 
  Reply:  China  has strictly implemented the provisions of Article 4 of the Trademark Law on rejecting 
malicious trademark registration applications not for the purpose of use. China  has more strictly 
cracked down on trademark hoarding, with the overflowing malicious tra demark registrations curbed 
to a certain extent. In 2020, China  rejected 15,600 malicious trademark registration applications 
and 46,000 from January to September 2021. These efforts have reduced the time and economic 
costs for enterprises to defend their rights through follow -up procedures and boosted their 
confidence in protecting IPRs. They form a strong deterrent to potentially malicious registrations, 
with initial results made in the source management of trademark registration order.  
 
b) Is China consider ing adopting guidelines helping its administration and courts in applying the 
new rules?  
 
Reply:  In line with the revision of the Trademark Law, the departmental Provisions on the Regulation 
of Trademark Applications for Registration has come into force si nce December 1, 2019. The 
Provisions has identified the requirements for applying for trademark registration and the types of 
irregular applications, as well as the factors that can be considered comprehensively by the 
trademark registration department whe n judging malicious trademark registration applications not 
for the purpose of use. It has provided well -defined guidelines for combating malicious registration 
and improving the operability of legal provisions. In July 2019, China National Intellectual Pr operty 
Administration launched the revision of trademark examination and review standards to be in 
consistent with the fourth amendment to the Trademark Law, the Civil Code and the revision of 
relevant laws, regulations and judicial interpretations. In Jul y 2021, the Trademark Examination and 
Review Standards (Draft for Comments) was open to the public for comments. The drafted Standards 
has improved the content of the examination and review of malicious trademark applications, added 
the examination and rev iew standard of malicious registration not for the purpose of use, and defined 
the interpretation, applicable elements, considerations, and applicable circumstances of each 
relevant legal provision on the examination and review of malicious trademark regis tration, with 
explanation made through typical cases.  
 
c) Would China consider instructing its courts to share with the parties to proceedings the 
evidence submitted by the trademark owner in non -use cancellation proceedings?  
 
Reply:  China protects the legal rights of trademark owners in judicial trials in accordance with the 
law. 
 
d) Please explain if any rules or procedures exist to prevent or dispute fraudulent trademark 
registration?  
 
Reply:  Article 7 of the Trademark Law specifies that the application for registration and use of a 
trademark shall follow the principle of honesty and credit, which is one of the basic principles of the 
Trademark Law. According to Article 44, the registered trademark can be declared invalid ex officio 
and other units or individuals can also request to declare the registered trademark invalid if a 
registered trademark has been obtained by deceptive means or other improper means.  
 
3.3.7.5.2 Geographical indications  
Page 110, para 3.256  
The Report states that in 20 20, CNIPA established the Technical Sub -committee on Geographical 
Indications of the National technical Committee on Knowledge and Intellectual property Management 
Standardization.   
 
EU Question No 71:  
a) Could China provide information on the competences of this Technical Sub -committee on 
Geographical Indications?   
 
Reply: In 2020, China  approved the establishment of the Technical Sub -Committee on Geographical 
Indications under China National Technical Committee for the Standardization of Knowl edge and 
Intellectual Property Management. The sub -committee is responsible for the standard making and 
revision related to the protection of geographical indication products, boosting the high -quality 
development of geographical indications. It also organ izes making and revising the national 
standards for the basic general category and product category of geographical indications.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  b) Could China elaborate on the upcoming reform on geographical indications, following the 
announcement by President XI Jinping o f a new law on GIs?   
 
Reply: The Outline for Building a Country with Strong Intellectual Property Rights (2021 -2035) 
states that China will explore the formulation of laws and regulations on geographical indications 
and improve a unified geographical indic ation protection system featuring the mutual coordination 
of specific protection and trademark protection. Currently, China  is advancing relevant research and 
drafting work in accordance with the above -mentioned arrangement.  
 
3.3.7.5.3 Patents  
Page 111, para 3.264  
The Report acknowledges that with the new Patent Law, the level of patent protection has been 
further increased.  
 
EU Question No 72:  Does China have a strategy for improving patent quality and avoid bad faith 
patenting and abuse of patent rights?  
 
Reply: According to the 14th Five -Year Plan of Intellectual Property Rights, China has made 
arrangements for the IPR work in the next five y ears and included the "number of high -value 
invention patents per 10,000 people " as the main indicator. The Outline for Building a Country with 
Strong Intellectual Property Rights (2021 -2035) specifies the need to coordinate the relationship 
between quantit y and quality of IPRs in a bid to achieve the higher -quality and safer development 
that is more efficient, equitable and sustainable.  
 
Page 111, paragraph 3.265  
The Report states that in November 2020, the CNIPA issues draft amendments to the Implementing  
Regulations of the Patent Law for public consultation.   
 
EU Question No 73:  Could China explain the timeline for the adoption of the amendments to the 
Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law and the tools it foresees to ensure consistency of 
application of the new rules?   
 
Reply : Currently , the Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law is put under the legislative review, 
with public comments being solicited. After the deliberation is approved, the Regulations will be 
officially published and  implemented. In order to ensure the smooth implementation of the amended 
Patent Law and its implementing regulations, China  has initiated the revision of the patent review 
guidelines and is improving the IT examination system.  
 
3.3.7.5.7 New plant varieties  
Page 114, paragraph 3.278  
In the TPR of 2018, China indicated that it would start the work to join UPOV Conventions 1991 in 
combination with the revision of the Regulation on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.   
 
EU Question No 74 : Could China explain its plan and timeline for the revision of the Regulation on 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants and the joining of UPOV Conventions 1991?   
 
Reply:  China will join UPOV Conventions 1991 in combination with the revision of the Regulation on 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants  in due course, and no specific timeline currently.  
 
3.3.7.5.8 Undisclosed information and trade secrets   
Page 115, paragraph 3.285  
The Report makes reference to the amendment of the Anti -Unfair Competition Law in 2019 with 
regard to trade secrets.   
 
EU Question No 75:  Could China indicate the number of administrative and court cases related to 
trade secrets initiated since the entry into force of the amendments to the Anti -Unfair Competition 
Law in 2019?  
 
Reply:  From January 2019 to the end of 2020, Chinese courts accepted more than 1,200 civil and 
criminal cases related to trade secrets.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 116, para 3.289  
The Report refers to one of the provisions under the China -United States Phase 1 Economic and 
Trade Agreement, i.e. the burden shifting to an accused p arty in civil proceedings for 
misappropriation when the holder of a trade secret has produced prima facie evidence of a 
reasonable indication of trade secret misappropriation by the accused party.   
 
EU Question No 76:  Could China explain the standard that is used in assessing the prima facie 
evidence related to trade secrets? Would China consider providing guidance on the standards of 
prima facie evidence and rules of burden of proof transfer e.g. through judicial interpretation?   
 
Reply:  The Law of the People 's Republic of China Against Unfair Competition provides the 
assignment of prima facie evidence and burden of proof related to trade secrets. Article 32 provides 
that "in the civil judicial procedures for infringement of trade secrets , the right holder of the trade 
secret shall provide prima facie evidence to prove that confidentiality measures have taken on the 
claimed trade secret and reasonably demonstrate that the trade secret has been infringed. The 
alleged infringer shall prove t hat the trade secrets claimed by the right holder do not belong to the 
trade secret under this law. The alleged infringer shall prove that there is no infringement of trade 
secrets if the right holder of the trade secret provide prima facie evidence to rea sonably demonstrate 
that the trade secret has been infringed, and provide one of the following evidence: (a) there is 
evidence that the alleged infringer has a channel or opportunity to obtain the trade secret, and the 
information used is substantially the  same with the trade secret; (b) there is evidence that the trade 
secret has been disclosed or used by the alleged infringer, or is under the risk of being disclosed or 
used; (c) there is other evidence that the trade secret has been infringed by the alleg ed infringer ". 
The Regulations of the Supreme People 's Court on Issues Regarding the Application of Law in Hearing 
Civil Cases of Trade Secret Infringement, which came into effect on September 12, 2020, further 
clarifies the relevant issue.  
 
3.3.7.6 Enforc ement  
Page 117, paragraph 3.291  
The Report recalls one of the provisions of the China -United States Phase 1 Economic and Trade 
Agreement concerning the obligation to 'provide legal presumptions of copyright ownership and 
waive certain other requirements f or bringing copyright infringement claims. ' It seems that currently 
e-commerce platforms require a Chinese IP certificate from right holders both in copyright and 
trademark infringement cases.   
 
EU Question No 77:  Is China considering guidance or legislative act to clarify that e -commerce 
platforms should accept international registration designating China in copyright and trademark 
infringement cases?  
 
Reply:  The Supreme People 's Court does not yet have such a pla n. 
 
3.3.7.6.3 Judicial measures   
Page 118, para 3.297  
The European Union would like to ask China to clarify a number of points about the so -called 'anti-
suit injunctions ', 'act preservation measures ' under article 100 of the China civil procedure law. 
These measures prevent European right holders from enacting an injunction to recall from the 
channels of commerce products that are infringing their patent.  
 
EU Question No 78:  Could China clarify the t ime during which these "act preservation measures " 
will remain in place? Will they remain in place in case of an appeal from the decision of the 
intermediate court?   
 
Reply:  Article 13 of the Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on Issues Regarding the 
Application of Law in Examining Cases of Act Preservation in Intellectual Property Disputes stipulates 
that where the people 's court rules on the adoption of act preservati on measures, the duration of 
the preservation measure shall be reasonably determined based on factors such as the request of 
the applicant or the specific circumstances of the case. The effect of ruling to stop infringing IPR 
shall be maintained until the case decision takes effect.  
 
The Supreme People 's Court 2020 annual report qualifies OPPO v Sharp as a "big" IP case and 
describes that, after the Shenzhen intermediate court at OPPO 's request issued an anti -suit 
injunction, Sharp obtained a decision from the Munich District Court requiring OPPO to apply to the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 438 - 
 
  Chinese court for withdrawal of that injunction in relation to the German case, upon which the 
Shenzhen intermediate court exp lained to Sharp the "serious legal consequences of violating the 
judgment of the Chinese court. "4  
 
EU Question No 79:  As the Report notes violation of the judgement is already subject to daily 
penalties of 130,000 euros (1 million RMB) could China clarify what these "serious legal 
consequences " are, and whether they are different from the daily penalties?  
 
Reply : Accordi ng to the law, the parties to the case shall consciously fulfill the obligations written 
in the effective adjudication document. Refusal to fulfill the judgment or ruling of the people 's court 
that has taken legal effect is an act of obstruction of litigat ion. The fine is the measure taken against 
obstruction of civil litigation as provided in the Civil Procedure Law of the People 's Republic of China.  
Based on the typical case of Conversant Huawei the Supreme People 's Court IP Tribunal published 
adjudicatio n guidelines for deciding on an anti -suit injunction and daily penalties.5  
 
In its response to the EU Information request under Article 63(3) TRIPS China stated: "It should be 
pointed out that the "typical " cases, "typical technology cases " and "big" cases mentioned in the EU 
communication are cases for reference and have no legal effect of general application. These cases 
and adjudication guidelines extracted from these cases serve to timely summarize the trial 
experiences, strengthen publicity of th e rule of law and provide references for judicial practices and 
legal education. "  
 
However, in the 2018 Trade Policy Review China seems to have stated that this type of guidance 
does have a status in the Chinese Legal system.  
As part of the reply to EU Q uestion 81 on Trademarks "Would China consider instructing its 
administration and courts to explain in their decisions the reasons, in some detail, why submitted 
evidence of a well -known trademark holder is regarded as insufficient? " China stated:  
'In Jun e 2018, the Supreme People 's Court issued the Guidance for Strengthening and Standardizing 
Reasoning in Judicial Documents, in order to further strengthen and standardize the reasoning the 
judicial documents of the people 's courts, and improve the reasonin g level the quality of the 
judgment documents. ' (WT/TPR/M/375/Add.1 Page - 360) 
 
EU Question No 80:  Could China therefore clarify what is the status of these adjudication guidelines 
for deciding on an anti -suit injunction and daily penalties in light of the  above reply?  
 
Reply:  The "major cases ", "typical cases ", "typical technical cases " and the key points of decisions 
selected by the Chinese courts are reference cases with no universal application. These cases and 
the main points of decisions summarized on the basis of which  reflect the judicial philosophy, trial 
ideas and decision metho ds of the Supreme People 's Court in handling difficult, complex and new 
types of IPR cases. Their role is to summarize trial experience, strengthen the promotion of the rule 
of law, and provide reference for judicial practice and legal teaching and researc h. 
 
4  TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1  Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.2.3 Policy objectives and reform  
Page 125, para 4.11  
The Report describes the four elements contained in China 's 13th Five -Year Plan for Economic and 
Social Development (2016 -20) for agriculture.  
 
EU question No 81:  Could China provide details about these four main elements?  
 
Reply:  For detailed information. please refer to  Chapter 18,Chapter 19,Chapter 20 and Chapter 21, 
China 's 13th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2016 -20).  
Please refer to http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016 -03/17/content _5054992.htm  
 
4 Published on 22 April 2021. http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun -xiangqing -297991.html#. 2020  
4 Published on 22 April 2021. http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun -xiangqing -297991.html#. 2020 Top 10 IP 
Cases and 50 Typical IP Cases of the Chinese Courts , source: Supreme People's Court ...  
5 Supreme People's Court "adjudication guidelines" Published 26 February 2021 on 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun -xiangqing -288131.html .  
5 Supreme People's Co urt "adjudication guidelines" Published 26 February 2021 on 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun -xiangqing -288131.html . Summary of the Adjudication Gist of the Intellectual 
Property C ourt of the Supreme People's Court (2020).  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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4.1.2.4.1 Border measures  
Page 125, para 4.14  
China continues to make use of tariff rate quotas, which are administered through import licences. 
TRQs on agricultural products and their utilization, 2018 -19 are listed in Table 4.5.   
 
EU ques tion No 82:  According to official forecasts (for example from International Grain Council), 
maize imports by China are forecast at 20 million tonnes in 2020/21 and 2021/22, i.e. much above 
the WTO TRQ of 7.2 million tonnes. Under what conditions are the maize imports in excess of the 
WTO TRQ imported? With full duty of 65% paid or under some specific, ad hoc preferential 
arrangements?  
 
Reply : Imports  are determined according to market demand. If the quantity of imported corn 
exceeds 7.2 million tons, the tariff duty o n maize imports in excess will be subject to tariffs at out -
of-quota rate.  
 
4.1.2.4.2 Measures affecting exports  
Page 126, para 4.18  
China notified the WTO that export subsidies were not granted to agricultural products during the 
calendar years 2018 and 2019. The authorities did not provide an update as to whether export 
subsidies were provided in 2020. As indicated in its previous Rev iew, China replied to the 
questionnaire on export competition, circulated on 31 October 2016, that it provides export financing 
programmes (i.e. export credit, export credit guarantees, and insurance programmes) covering, 
inter alia, agricultural goods. Wi th respect to the questionnaire on export competition circulated on 
17 January 2020, the authorities indicate that the related information would be disclosed in its 
coming notification. No data were available on food aid provided by China during the review  period.  
 
EU Question No 83:  Has China disclosed this information? Is it compatible with WTO exports tax 
and subsidies regime?  
 
Reply:  China has not yet. disclosed this information  Yes, it is  compatible with WTO exports tax and 
subsidies regime . 
 
4.1.2.4.3.2 Price controls and market price support systems  
Page 129, para 4.25  
The Report describes that China implements a minimum purchase price policy for rice and wheat, 
considered to be the two most important grain varieties, in major producing are as.  
 
EU question No 84 : How does China intend to reform its current minimum price schemes for cereals 
in future in view of China 's overall policy transition aimed at repurposing agricultural subsidies?  
 
Reply : China  is a populous country. Rice and wheat are the most important rations in China, which 
have a bearing on national food security. At present, the minimum purchase price policy for rice and 
wheat complies with WTO rules. China will adhere to and improve this policy, set a reasonable 
minimum purchase price level, and ensure domestic food security.  
 
4.1.3 Fisheries  
4.1.3.2 Legal, institutional, and policy framework  
Page 135, para 4.38  
The Report states that under the Fisheries Law, foreigners and foreign fis hing vessels engaging in 
fishery production in waters under China 's jurisdiction must be approved by MARA. If the vessels 
belong to China 's trading partners that have signed relevant treaties/agreements with China, the 
matters are handled in accordance with these treaties. The Special Administrative Measures for the 
Access of Foreign Investment in the Pilot Free Trade Zones (2019) (FTA Negative List) lifted 
restrictions on foreign investment in aquatic product fishing in seas and inland waters  under China 's 
jurisdiction. The authorities indicate that the Government currently imposes no restrictions on FDI 
in aquaculture production.  
 
EU Question No 85:  Could China provide data on foreign fishing vessels approved by MARA and 
foreign companies ' investment in aquaculture? What is the foreign share of total Chinese production?   
 
Reply : China  has no such statistics currently.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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4.2.2  Energy  
Page 141, para 4.60  
The authorities state that China regards the development of clean and low -carbon energy as the 
main direction for adjusting the energy mix.  
 
EU Question No 86:  Will China equally pursue a clean energy policy in the rollout of its overseas 
investments and development aid?  
 
Reply:  Overseas investment that does not meet the environmental protection, energy consumption 
and safety standards of the investment destination country is listed as restricted overseas 
investment by the government. In July this year, t he Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment jointly issued the Guidelines for Green Development of Outbound 
Investment and International Cooperation, actively guiding enterprises to participate in outbound 
investment and cooperation  in the field of green development. On September 21, President Xi Jinping, 
at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, said that China 
will step up support for other developing countries in developing green and low -carbon energy, and 
will not build new coal -fired power projects abroad. This statement is widely welcomed by the 
international community. China takes the improvement of global environmental governance and 
active response to climate change as important conside rations when providing development 
assistance.  
 
4.2.2.5 Electricity  
Page 147, para 4.88  
With regard to the reform of the electric power system the Report states, 'The new tariffs are set to 
come into force on 1 January 2021. Certain large industrial and commercial consumers are 
encouraged to buy electricity from generation companies based on direct electricity purchase 
agreements at negotiated prices '.  
 
EU Question No 87:  Could China please list what are the 'certain large industrial and commercial 
consumers '?  
 
Reply : China  has no such statistics currently.  
 
Page 148, para 4.91  
EU Question No 88:  Could China explain how the 'pilot spot markets ' function and what industries 
are involved in this scheme? In the provinces where this operates, does this system replace the 
system of negotiating prices by large industrial and commercial consumers? What sectors/companies 
avail of this pilot spot market mechanism?  
 
Reply : The role of the power spot market pilot is to form a market -oriented power and electricity 
balance mechanism, and give full play to the decisive role of the market in the allocation of power 
resources. The power spot market pilot projec ts mainly involve industries such as power generation, 
transmission and distribution, power sales, and large industrial and commercial users. Currently, 
there is no bargaining policy for large -scale industrial and commercial electricity consumers.  
 
4.3 Ma nufacturing  
4.3.1 Recent developments  
Page 148, para 4.95  
The XIV Five -Year Plan sets out China 's economic and social guidelines for the period 2021 -2025. 
One of its major objectives is the dual circulation strategy, which aims to consolidate China 's 
qualitative growth model through structural reforms that reduce its dependence on the outside world 
in favor of domestic production. According to the government, this strategy will be a decisive step 
towards China 's goal of achieving full development by 20 35. It does not appear that the 
Chinese  authorities will facilitate the opening of the market to foreign companies, except for those 
sectors that China needs to develop.   
 
EU Question No 89:  Does China consider that those targets compatible with the Dual c irculation 
strategy may hamper market access to foreign companies?  
 
Reply : China  has always been an important destination for foreign investment. In the past four 
years, the amount of attracted foreign investment remained second in the world. Whether in the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 441 - 
 
  domestic circulation, the overseas circulation or the dual circulations with d omestic and overseas 
markets reinforcing each other, foreign -invested enterprises are undoubtedly important market 
entities. Foreign enterprises are the participants, contributors and beneficiaries of China 's 
development. Fostering the new development para digm will bring broader market opportunities to 
multinational enterprises. China will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights 
and interests of FIEs , create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business 
environment, a nd attract more foreign -invested enterprises to invest in China and share the 
dividends of China 's reform and development.  
 
4.3.2  Selected subsectors  
4.3.2.1  Automobiles, automotive parts, and components  
Page 150, para 4.104  
The Report describes efforts by China in the field of New Energy Vehicles (NEVs). However, E -Mobility 
will only develop its full potential if car - and battery manufactures, as well as charging network 
provider and private households have barrier free access to electr icity from renewable energy 
sources.  
 
EU Question No 90:  
a) How will China ensure that all market players have access to green electricity?  
 
Reply : China  will speed up the construction of a new power system with new energy as the main 
body, guide green pow er consumption in a market -oriented way, and reflect the environmental value 
of green power.  
 
b) We understand that the current NEV purchase subsidy scheme will be effective until end 
of 2022. Is there already any indication on how the NEV purchase subsidies scheme will be structured 
after 2022?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the subsidy notification submitted by China for the subsidies of NEVs.   
 
c) Most European countries are following WTO rules and offer NEV purchase subsidies for 
all NEVs. Why is China only subsidising locally produced NEVs? ， 
 
Reply:  China abides by the WTO rules in providing subsidies for NEVs and treats both locally 
produced NEVs and imported NEVs equally.  
 
Page 150, paragraph 4.108  
The Report mentions the commercialization of highly automated vehicles by 2025.  
 
EU question No 91:  
Could China indicate:  
a) whether this ambitious deadline will be met;  
b) which level of autonomy is being envisaged (L4 or L5);  
c) is the road and telecommunication infrastructure already adapted to welcome such a 
deployment and to what extent;  
 
Reply to a, b, c:  This goal is of a guiding nature and does not have mandatory binding force on 
market entities. China will support and encourag e the large -scale commercialization of highly 
autonomous vehicles.  
 
4.3.2.2 Machinery and equipment  
Page 151, para 4.114.  
Other strategic actions in machinery and equipment industries include: (i) the MIIT 's Guiding 
Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Environmental Protection Equipment Manufacturing 
Industry, which set the goal of reaching a production value of CNY 1 trillion for environmental 
equipment manufacturing by 2020; and (ii) the Action Plans  for High -End Smart 
Remanufacturing  (2018 -2020). In addition, the Plan of Intelligent Manufacturing 
Development  (2016 -2020), issued by MIIT and the MOF, was put in place to guide the development 
of intelligent manufacturing. The Plan, inter alia, sets the goals of completing the digitalization of 
traditional manufacturing sectors by 2020, establishing an intelligent manufacturing support system, 
and achieving intelligent transformation of key industries by 2025.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 442 - 
 
  EU Question No 92:  
a) Could China provide details on the Plan of Intelligent Manufacturing Development in respect 
to the industrial machines (and subgroups?)  
 
Reply : This Plan o nly covers the 2016 -2020 time period. There is no specifi c content  for "industrial 
machinery " in this Plan.  
For detailed information, please refer to http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017 -
11/11/content_5238913.htm.   
 
b) Which are the measures foreseen in the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social 
Development (2021 -25) for industrial robots and key safety machinery components for the years to 
come? Under which conditions foreign companies will be allowed to participat e?  
 
Reply : Please refer to the Section 3, Chapter 8, Outline for the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development and Long -range Objectives through the Year 2035. Greater efforts will be 
made to attract and utilize foreign capital. Foreign comp anies are welcomed to participate in 
accordance with Chinese laws and regulations.  
 
4.3.2.3 Iron and Steel  
Page 152, para 4.116  
Efforts by China to eliminate production overcapacity in the steel industry are guided by the Opinions 
on Reducing Overcapacity in the Steel Industry to Achieve Development by Solving Difficulties 
(Guo Fa No. 6, 2016).  73 Among other actions, the Opinions prohibit the building up of new steel 
capacity. China also intends to encourage enterprises to eliminate part of th eir steel production 
capacity through, inter alia, proactive capacity elimination, mergers and acquisitions and 
restructuring, transformation and conversion of production lines, relocation and reconstruction, and 
global cooperation in production capacity. Under the Opinions, China plans to cut additional crude 
steel capacity by 150 million tonnes by 2020, to bring capacity closer to consumption.  
 
EU Question No 93:  
a) Has China met this target? Which other measures are envisaged?  
b) How have steel output capac ity (in tons) and steel output (in tons) in China developed lately? 
Could you add numbers for China steel output capacity (in tons) and steel output (in tons) and the 
development in recent years?  According to the OECD, in 2020 a large number of economies, many 
of which are GFSEC members, experienced steep declines in their steel production. On the other 
hand, China, as the world 's largest steel producer, reportedly recorded steel output growth of 7% 
in 2020, boosting its share of global steel production to 57%.  
c) Could you add information on new steel investments in China, announced in 2021, e.g. the 
instalment of 18 new blast furnace projects with a total capacity of 35 mio tons per year (as reported 
lately by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air,  see https://energyandcleanair.org/china -
2021q2 -coal-steel-co2/)  
d) How have cross -border investments by Chinese companies in steel developed? Could you add 
numbers for China induced cross-border investments in steel output capacity (in tons)? Has the 
more stringent environmental regulation in China itself led to more investment by Chinese 
companies e.g. in other Southeast Asian countries with fewer environmental restrictions?  
e) Could China explain the reasons for not joining the multilateral discussions in the 
GFSEC  (Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity)?  
 
Reply to questions above:  Steel overcapacity: overcapacity is a universal, cyclical and structural 
issue in economic development and a common challenge facing the whole world. The underlying 
causes of this round of steel overcapacity are the global economic downturn and the slump in steel 
demand triggered by the 2008 financial crisis. During the 13th Five -Year Plan period (2016 -2020), 
China cut its crude steel capacity by more than 150 million tons and eliminated the substandard 
steel capacity by 100 million tons. In 2019, China ha d a crude steel capacity of 1.06 billion tons and 
produced 996 million tons of crude steel, with a capacity utilization rate of 94%, which was higher 
than the global average.   
China government does not adopt such a nation wide plan on new steel investments  in China, 
announced in 2021 , China wold lime EU side to provide more information or a linkage from a 
governmental department website.  
China 's investment overseas complies with laws and regulations of host country. In 2013, China 
issued the Guideline on En vironmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation, which 
clearly stated that "the projects invested in, constructed and operated by enterprises shall comply WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 443 - 
 
  with the laws and regulations of the host country, and shall apply for relevant permits on 
environmental protection from the local government ". In 2021, China issued the Guideline on Green 
Development in Foreign Investment and Cooperation, proposing that "if the host country does not 
have relevant laws and regulations or the environmental protection standards are too low, Chinese 
enterprises are encouraged to carry out investment cooperation activities according to the standards 
of international organizations or of multilateral institutions or the Chinese standards ".  
On the p latform of the G20 Global Forum on Steel Overcapacity, all parties have fully discussed the 
issue of steel overcapacity, and now this platform has completed its mission. The global steel 
industry can continue to conduct exchanges and cooperation on steel i ssues, and China is also willing 
to conduct bilateral exchanges with major trading partners on issues related to steel trade.  
 
4.3.2.4 Electronic, IT, and integrated circuits  
Page 153, para 4.124  
EU Question No 94 : Could China confirm the current shareholders of the fund? Could China confirm 
whether any state or party officials are part of the management of the fund?  
 
Reply:  China has provided relevant information as listed in the Secretariart Report. The 
fundestab lished by China based on the market -oriented principle operate in full accordance with the 
market principle and are FIEs independent market subjects. Their investment management and 
decision -making are FIEsmarket -oriented, and government authorities do not  intervene and 
participate in any investment project decision -making of the funds.  
 
Page 154, para 4.91  
EU Question No 95 : Regarding the Policy on Promoting High -quality Development of Integrated 
Circuit Industry and Software Industry (Guo Fa No. 8, 2020 ) – could China indicate when will this 
policy enter into force?  
 
Reply:  It came into effect on 27 July 2020.  
 
Can China explain the following:  
a) 'preferential corporate income tax ' – what is the rate of tax to apply versus the standard rate?  
b) 'favourable financing ' could China please provide details as to what are the favourable terms 
which will apply ? 
c) 'support for R&D ' – what is the nature of the support envisaged?  
d) 'preferential im port duties for certain products ' – what are the preferential rates to apply 
versus the standard rates and what are the products concerned?  
 
Reply to questions above:  The Policy is equally applied to all semiconductor companies established 
within the territory of China, regardless of the nature of ownership or domestic and foreign 
investment, can enjoy relevant preferential tax policies in accordance with regulations. C hina 
encourages and advocates global cooperation in the semiconductor industry, and actively creates a 
market -oriented, legalized business environment for various market players to invest in China.  
 
4.4 Services  
4.4.1 Financial Services  
Page 155, para 4.136  
EU Question No 96:  
a) In order to obtain a better understanding of the actual impact of the recent liberalisation and 
the evolution of the participation of foreign -invested companies in the financial sector in t he Chinese 
market, could China identify the market share of foreign -invested companies in the banking, asset 
management. and life and non -life insurance sectors for each of the years from 2016 -2020, as well 
as the total assets of Chinese state -owned financ ial institutions and the percentage of their market 
share in these same sectors for the same period?  
b) China has focused its recent reforms on removing foreign equity caps and joint venture 
requirements, as well as revising its prudential and supervisory re gime. Nonetheless, in order to be 
able to take advantage of these openings in the Chinese market, foreign financial institutions need 
to obtain the necessary licences and authorisations, a complicated regulatory process which has 
created difficulties for a nd acted as a barrier to the participation of foreign institutions in the past. 
How will China guarantee that foreign financial institutions are able to obtain licences and 
authorisations in an efficient and transparent manner in the future?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply to questions above:  As of December 2016, the total assets of banking institutions were 
RMB 232 trillion. The original insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled 
RMB 926.6 billion, with Chinese capital accounting for 97.96% and foreign capita l 2.04%. The 
original insurance premium income of non -life insurance companies totaled RMB 2,169.3 billion, with 
Chinese capital making up 93.60% and foreign capital 6.40%. In 2016, foreign -funded banks ' assets 
totaled RMB 2.93 trillion, accounting for abo ut 1.66% of the total assets of commercial banks 
(excluding post banks).  
 
Up to December 2017, the total assets of banking institutions were RMB 252 trillion. The original 
insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled RMB 1054.1 billion, wit h Chinese 
capital taking up 98.04% and foreign capital 1.96%. The original insurance premium income of non -
life insurance companies totaled RMB 2604 billion, including 92.57% of Chinese capital and 7.43% 
of foreign capital. In 2017, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled RMB 3.24 trillion, accounting for 
about 1.70% of the total assets of commercial banks (excluding post banks).  
 
As of December 2018, the total assets of banking institutions were RMB 268 trillion. The 
original  insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled RMB 1,175.6 billion, 
comprising 98.06% of Chinese capital and 1.94% of foreign capital. The original insurance premium 
income of non -life insurance companies totaled RMB 2,626.1 billion, with Chinese capital accounting 
for 91.90 % and foreign capital 8.10%. In 2018, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled 
RMB 3.35 trillion, accounting for about 1.64% of the total assets of commercial banks (excluding 
post banks).  
 
Up to December 2019, the total assets of banking institutions were RMB  290 trillion. The original 
insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled RMB 1,301.6 billion, with Chinese 
capital accounting for 98.06% and foreign capital 1.94%. The original insurance premium income of 
non-life insurance companies totale d RMB 2,962.8 billion, with Chinese capital making up 90.53% 
and foreign capital 9.47%. In 2019, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled RMB 3.48 trillion, taking 
up about 1.50% of the total assets of commercial banks (including post banks).  
 
As of December 2 020, the total assets of banking institutions amounted to RMB 320 trillion. The 
original insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled RMB 1358.4 billion, 
with 97.44% of Chinese capital and 2.56% of foreign capital. The original insurance pr emium income 
of non -life insurance companies totaled RMB 3,167.4 billion, with Chinese capital making up 89.97% 
and foreign capital 10.03%. In 2020, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled RMB 3.78 trillion, 
accounting for about 1.46% of the total assets of c ommercial banks (including post banks).  
 
In July 2017, PBoC issued an announcement to define the access procedures, practice requirements 
and code of conduct for overseas agencies to conduct credit rating business in the inter -bank bond 
market. In July 201 9, the Financial Committee of the State Council further made clear that foreign -
funded rating agencies can rate all types of bonds in the inter -bank bond market and exchange bond 
market. In November 2019, China issued the Interim Measures for the Administr ation of the Credit 
Rating Industry, identifying that foreign credit rating agencies enjoy national treatment when 
applying to expand their business in China. In May 2020, the Financial Committee of the State 
Council once again stated that it would promote  the further opening of the credit rating industry to 
the outside world. In addition, in the vast majority of countries across the world, financial institutions 
are required to hold a license to operate. On the basis of prudential supervision and risk cont rol, 
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) is committed to improving the 
business environment, optimizing the supervision of foreign -funded institutions and steadily 
promoting the opening up of the banking and insurance sectors to the o utside world. Since 2018, 
CBIRC has announced three rounds of 34 new measures for opening up, involving the abolition of 
restrictions on shareholdings of foreign investors, relaxation of conditions for access to foreign 
institutions and business, expansion  of the business scope of foreign institutions, optimization of 
regulatory rules for foreign institutions and simplification of administrative licensing processes. 
Currently, the threshold for foreign -invested financial institutions to obtain banking and i nsurance 
licenses has been significantly lowered with a simplified process.  
 
Page 156, para 4.138  
EU Question No 97:  
a) Given its stated goal to open up its financial services market, does China believe the continuing 
strong dominance of state-owned financial institutions may have a negative effect on full 
participation on the part of foreign -invested financial institutions?   WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 445 - 
 
  b) Could China give an overview over the prudential regulations applying to state -owned asset 
management companies?  
 
Reply  to questions above : China 's financial services market is promising, featuring strong appeal. 
In recent years, China has taken the initiative to adapt to changes in the international economic and 
financial development and the objective need for reform and development of the financial sector. It 
has further expanded the high -level two -way opening, including the relaxation of foreign -invested 
institutions and business access conditions and the complete abolition of foreign shareholding 
restrictions  in banking, securities, life insurance and other industries. In the next step, China will 
continue to steadily promote the opening up of the financial sector to the outside world, implement 
the pre -entry national treatment plus negative list management sy stem, further optimize regulatory 
rules, improve the business environment, and continue to attract high -quality foreign investment 
with professional characteristics to enter the Chinese market.  
 
Currently, the five financial asset management companies (FAM Cs) are all state -owned or state -
controlled financial institutions. The main regulatory rules applicable to them include: the Banking 
Supervision and Administration Law, the Regulations for Financial Asset Management Companies, 
the Measures for Supervision  of Financial Asset Management Companies, the Measures for Capital 
Management of Financial Asset Management Companies (Trial), and the Guidelines for Financial 
Asset Management Companies Supervising Consolidated Financial Statements (Trial). Through the 
above regulatory rules, the CBIRC has established a risk -based prudential regulatory framework 
for FAMCs, with the basic elements including but not limited to: corporate governance, risk control, 
internal transactions, capital adequacy, financial soundness, information resource management and 
information disclosure. Group prudential supervision focuses on the specific risks associated with 
group operations, including but not limited to: multiple leverage, risk contagion, risk concentration, 
conflict of intere st, internal transactions and risk exposures. The CBIRC regularly evaluates and 
revises relevant regulatory rules in a timely manner to ensure the effectiveness of supervision 
of FAMCs.  
 
Page 157, para 4.139  
The Reports states that 'The authorities have i ntroduced a phased deferment of loan repayments 
scheme, in which banks have been allowed to grant deferment of loan repayments to micro, small, 
and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) and other eligible firms upon application ' (emphasis added).  
 
EU Question No 98:  Can China state, what are the 'other eligible firms ' which benefit from this 
deferment of loan repayments? How long will this arrangement last?  
 
Reply:  According to the arrangement of the State Council, in 2020 the People 's Bank of China 
created the Inclusive Scheme of D eferment of Loan Repayments  for Micro and Small Enterprises and 
the Credit Loan Support Scheme, two direct monetary policy tools, to help micro and small 
enterprises (SMEs) overcome their liquidity difficulties caused by the  pandemic. According to the 
Schemes, SMEs and banks may negotiate deferred repayment of principal and interest for maturing 
loans. The State Council decided at its executive meeting held in March 2021 to further extend the 
implementation period of the two direct monetary tools to the end of 2021 to help SMEs get through 
short-term liquidity difficulties and play a better role in stabilizing the economy and employment.  
 
Page 158, para 4.146  
EU Question No 99:  
a) In line with the stated goal to open up China 's financial services industry, can China provide 
an overview as to the implementation of mandatory time lines for the processing of license 
applications on the part of foreign -invested insurance providers?  
b) Related, does the sectorial regulator, the CBIRC, allow for the parallel submission of license 
applications to operate in different Provinces?  
c) Are foreign -invested financial service providers going to be considered as participants in 
possible further pilo t zones for specific insurance or banking services?  
d) In line with the stated goal to open up China 's financial services industry, can China provide 
an overview over how it intends to limit disparate impacts on the operation of foreign financial 
institution s from sectorial data localisation requirements?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with the Insurance Law and the Regulations on Insurance Companies, China 
Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC), has followed the principle of consistency 
between China an d other countries to conduct the administrative licensing related to market access WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 446 - 
 
  for insurance companies. According to relevant regulations, there is no restriction on the number of 
foreign insurance companies applying in parallel to set up their branche s across provinces and also 
no restriction on foreign banks to submit parallel license applications in provinces. China does not 
exclude foreign financial service companies from pilot insurance or banking services.  
The current policies concerning localizat ion requirements for core facilities of foreign financial 
institutions aim to secure the stable operation of data information and information systems. The 
opening up of the financial services industry is subject to the compliance with Chinese laws and 
regulations. In the next step, Chinese financial regulators will further strengthen and regulate the 
management of data security in accordance with the Network Security Law, the Data Security Law 
and the Personal Information Protection Law.  
 
Page 160, section 4.4.1.3.2.3  
EU Question No 100:  Could China explain as to why, in its view, international ratings agencies had 
to adapt a China -specific ratings methodology that differs from that applied in other WTO member 
States?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, PBoC h as strengthened the supervision of credit rating agencies and defined 
the norms of rating procedures and relevant business rules by enabling rating agencies to improve 
the quality of ratings. However, no special restrictions or specific requirements have e ver been 
imposed on the rating methods used by credit rating agencies, with both domestic and foreign rating 
agencies treated equally. Credit rating agencies conduct their business independently in accordance 
with the law and are not subject to interferenc e from any entity or individual.  
 
4.4.1.3.4.3 Foreign activities of Chinese companies  
Page 164, paragraph 4.181.  
The Report states that: "Regarding foreign activities of Chinese securities companies, in 
September  2018, the CSRC  issued the Administrative Measures for the Overseas Establishment, 
Acquisition, and Shareholding of Financial Institutions of Securities Companies and Securities 
Investment Fund Management Companies to further clarify the conditions for Chinese companies 
going abroad and to strengthen the parent company 's control over its overseas subsidiaries ".  
 
EU question No 101:  
a) Could China indicate the administrative measures that Chinese companies have to follow to 
strengthen the parent company 's control?  
b) Could Ch ina indicate the scope of companies to which these measures apply? In particular, 
are Chinese manufacturers owning overseas subsidiaries subjected to these administrative 
measures?  
 
Reply:  In order to urge securities and fund management institutions to st rengthen the control over 
their overseas subsidiaries, the Measures for the Administration of Overseas Establishment, 
Acquisition and Participation of Securities Companies and Securities Investment and Fund 
Management Companies  sets out the following measu res. First, Article 9 specifies that overseas 
subsidiaries should be wholly -owned. Secondly, Article 12 requires that overseas subsidiaries should 
have a clear, well -defined and transparent shareholding structure and that the level of legal entities 
should  be appropriate to the capital scale, operation and management capacity and risk control level 
of overseas subsidiaries. Third, Article 14, Article 16, Article 17 and Article 18 require that securities 
and fund management institutions should participate in  the governance of overseas subsidiaries. 
Fourth, Articles 20 to 27 require securities and fund operators to strengthen compliance 
management, risk management and internal control of their overseas subsidiaries. The Measures is 
applicable for securities fi rms and securities investment and fund management companies outside 
of China in their establishment or acquisition of subsidiaries or shareholding in operating institutions.  
 
Page 165, par. 4.182 -4.184  
EU Question No 102: Are there any additional steps being planned or taken to support and promote 
access of foreign financial institutions to Chinese private pension fund management market and to 
support overall growth of this segment? When will the pilot programme, under which this segment 
still oper ates, cease to function?  
 
Reply:  As of the end of June 2021, China Securities Regulatory Commission has approved 
154 pension funds, 115 of which have been established, with a size of RMB 76.131 billion in duration 
and about 2,531,800 holders.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  4.4.2 Teleco mmunications   
4.4.2.2 Regulatory Framework  
Page 169, para 4.204  
EU Question No 103:  Could China confirm that a foreign -invested enterprise can be set up in a 
PFTZ, making use of their less restrictive foreign -ownership restrictions, to serve clients with its 
value -added telecommunications services across mainland China and not just in the PFTZ itself?  
 
Reply:  PFTZs are a pilot ground for China 's reform and opening  up. The core task is institutional 
innovation. In promoting deeper reform and higher level of openness on a pilot basis, China has 
advocated such a practice in a larger scale after gaining experience, exploring ways to deepen reform 
and expand openness an d accumulating relevant experience. China will play the leading role 
of PFTZs and develop new institutions for a higher -level open economy.  
 
4.4.2.2.1 Developments in 5G  
Page 169, para 4.204  
EU Question No 104:  Could China provide context for the very si gnificant drop in market shares 
of international telecommunications infrastructure vendors, particularly during the so -called Phase  2 
and Phase 3 of China 's 5G network roll -out? We note that this development appears to follow a 
longer -term trend in China and is contrary to competitive market shares that international vendors 
can commandeer in other markets that provide for fair and open access.  
 
Reply:  Fair competition is one of the important principles of China 's market regulation. China, as 
always, embraces eligible foreign enterprises to invest and operate in China. Regarding 
telecommunications, China offers services within the scope of WTO commitments to  domestic and 
foreign investors on an equal footing.  
 
4.4.2.2.5 Cloud computing  
Page 170, para 4.213  
The Chinese cloud service market is dominated by important domestic players, especially Alibaba 
and Tencent.   
China is still an interesting market for foreign cloud service companies, as the market for 
Software -as-a-Service (SaaS) is underdeveloped. Main focus of Chinese players is Infrastructure -
as-a-Service (IaaS).  
 
EU Question No 105 : Is Software -as-a-Service covered by China 's Classification Catalogu e of 
Telecommunications Services as a form of Internet data centre (IDC) services, as there is only little 
connection to physical infrastructure?   
Reply:  Please refer to item B11 of the Classification Catalogue of Telecommunications Services for 
details.  
 
4.4.2.2.6 Cybersecurity  
Page 170, para 4.214  
China 's rules on critical information infrastructure discriminately affect companies needing to 
transfer data abroad, a category in which foreign companies are overrepresented. The restrictions 
apply also to so me types of non -personal data. Furthermore, the scope may create uncertainty 
because it is too broad, affecting operators and services providers.   
 
EU Question No 106 :  
a) Which of part of GATS Article XIV does China rely on to justify this measure, in particular as 
regards non -personal data?  
b) Is China considering amending or changing the law? Has China considered modifying the scope 
of the law in order to make it more preci se? Are the foreign and national providers treated equally?  
 
Reply  to questions above : Strengthening the protection of critical information infrastructure is a 
common international practice. For example, the United States, Germany, Japan have developed 
relevant laws to protect important industries and areas. According to the practical needs, China has 
drawn on the practices of some countries to formulate the Cybersecurity Law that specifies the 
protection system for critical information infrastructure. The  Regulations on the Security and 
Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure  defines the scope of critical information 
infrastructure and the procedures for its identification. It should be made clear that the Cybersecurity 
Law set the same requireme nts for domestic and foreign service providers and does not establish 
higher obligations for foreign service providers than similar domestic service providers. Similarly, WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 448 - 
 
  Chinese service providers offering overseas services will also follow relevant legal requirements of 
other countries, such as addressing the increased compliance costs of the General Data Protection 
Regulation  (GDPR).  
 
Page 172, Para 4.220  
The purchase of network products and services, including application software can be subject to a 
cybersecurity review.   
 
EU Question No 107:   
a) Which of part of GATS Article XIV does China rely on to justify this measure?  
b) How will China ensure that the cybersecurity review, which constitutes a prior authorisation 
mechanism involving several actors and agencies (Report 4.221 and 4.222), is not more burdensome 
than necessary to achieve the stated policy goals?  
 
Reply  to questions above : Critical information infrastructure is vital to national security, economic 
security, social stability, and public health and safety. A cybersecurity review on operators ' 
procurement of products and services aims to detect and avoid risks and hazards to t he operation 
of critical information infrastructure at an early stage, in an effort to safeguard the supply chain 
security of critical information infrastructure and national security.  
 
4.4.2.2.7  E-commerce  
Page 172, Para 4.223   
EU Question No 108:  
a) Can China explain which operators are covered by the scope provision of the e -Commerce law 
(Article 2: This Law applies to electronic commerce activities carried out within the territory of the 
People 's Republic of China)? In particular, are e -commerce operators established in third countries 
subject to the market entity registration obligation in Article 10?  
b) What are the first main experiences of the implementation of the e -Commerce law? In 
particular , have the provisions on notice and action procedures (Articles 42 -45) proven to be 
successful in protecting IPR?  
 
Reply  to questions above : In accordance with the protocol on China 's accession to the WTO and 
related commitments, except for demanding a "commercial presence " in China, e -commerce 
operators established outside China are not required to register as market entities in China. In other 
word, they can engage in cross -border e -commerce activities.The protection of intellectual property 
rights is th e common goal of many laws, including the e -Commerce Law. The effectiveness of China 's 
IPR protection is evident to all, which is inseparable from China 's legislative and law -enforcement 
efforts in related areas.  
 
4.4.3 Transport  
4.4.3.1  Maritime transport  
Page 175, Para 4.237  
EU Question No 109 : Can China clarify if any other criteria are applied to determine whether 
international -flagged vessels are qualified to return under preferential conditions to China, apart 
from being declared for import and registered between September 2016 and September 2019?  
 
Reply:  The duty -free registration policy for foreign -flagged vessels has expired and discontinued. 
At present, foreign -flagged vessels need to go through import procedures for registration in Chin a 
according to relevant laws and regulations.  
 
Page 175, para. 4.238 -4.239   
EU Question No 110 :  
a) Please explain the rules and policies to determine freight pricing (costs of transportation)?  
b) Please provide additional details explaining that flight pricing is based on commercial 
consideration and that disguised discrimination does not apply to a parti cular country/destination?  
Can China explain according to which metrics COSCO is determined as the world 's biggest shipping 
company, as this information does not tally with the results of many industry -established rankings?  
 
Reply  to a,b,c : The pricing of ocean freight in China is determined by market supply and demand. 
It is set based on the combined capacity of COSCO 's fleet.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 449 - 
 
  Page 176, Para 4.243  
EU Question No 111:  Was the support made available under the International Logistics Guarant ee 
Coordination Mechanism also available to international shipping lines?   
 
Reply:  The support provided under the International Logistics Guarantee and Coordination 
Mechanism is applicable to international shipping companies.  
 
Page 176, Para 4.245  
EU Question No 112:  Can China clarify whether any other port services can be provided wit hout a 
permit?   
 
Reply:  According to the Port Law  and the Regulations on the Operation and Management of Ports , 
those engaging themselves in port operations shall apply for a port operation license; units providing 
port services for ships, those offering leasing and maintenance of port facilities, equipment and 
machinery, and operators handling port cargos shall be filed with local authorities.  
 
4.4.3.2  Air transport  
EU question No 113 : Does China intend to participate in the international Carbon Offsetti ng and 
Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA)? If not, does China support some other kind 
of global climate plan for aviation?  
 
Reply:  In the spirit of openness and cooperation, China is willing to reiterate its basic position on 
international aviation emissions reduction. China insists that the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main channel for global cooperation in climate 
change matters, and that all countries should give full play to their role in promoting global green 
and low -carbon aviation development through cooperation, mutural learning and benefits for all in 
accordance with the basic principl es and modalities established by the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement, especially the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities. China has always opposed ignoring the national conditions of countries and 
their differences in the development stages of civil aviation and pursuing the "one-size-fits-all" 
approach in formulating and implementing international aviation emission reduction policies. China 
will further promote the green and low -carbon transformation of civil aviation transportation. It is 
willing to maintain communication and strengthen cooperation with all sides to make more 
independent contributions to the sustainable development of global civil aviation. On the CORSIA 
issue, China submitted its pos ition statement to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
in June 2020.  
 
Page 177, para 4.250  
As at end -2020, 67 airlines were established in China; 50 were state owned, 9 have foreign equity 
participation, and 8 are listed as stock companies. The CAAC has approved 14 private or private -
holding airlines. Information was not available as to whether it is required for persons or goods to 
be transported on nationally registered airlines. Restrictions on foreign investment in civil aviation 
remain unchanged.  
We consider that China could issue new CRS (Computerized Reservation System) regulations to 
replace current rules (2012 CRS (CCAR -315)) allowing meaningful market access and full reciprocity 
with the EU.   
 
EU Question No 114 : Is the Chinese regulator, CAAC, going to change restrictions on "transport 
E-ticket itinerary system " allowing foreign CRS companies to issue that official document?   
 
Reply: Currently, the Civil Aviation Administration of China is promoting the revision of the 
Regulations on the Services and Management of Computerized Reservation System of Civil Aviation , 
which will be announced after the revision is completed.  And China would suggest EU to make 
clarifications on this question and provide more background information.  
 
Page 177, para 4.252  
The Report states that "international passenger flights [...] hav e remained at low level ". This is 
linked to China keeping the frequencies limited. In contrast, the national flights are said to be 
"recovered by end -2020".  
 
EU question No 115 : When would China be ready to lift the unilateral limitations of international  
air services agreements?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 450 - 
 
   
Reply:  Since the COVID -19 outbreak, China has taken a series of temporary control measures on 
international passenger flights in accordance with relevant provisions of the International Health 
Regulations  and the Convention on International Civil Aviation  as wel l as China 's Law on Health and 
Quarantine at Borders , the Law on Emergency Response , and the Civil Aviation Law . While the needs 
of necessary personnel movements are met, the cross -border spread of the epidemic has been 
prevented. Such measures are risk mi tigation measures implemented by China in accordance with 
relevant WHO and ICAO regulations and domestic legislation in the event of public health 
emergencies and the pandemic. They do not violate bilateral air transport agreements and are 
consistent with WTO rules. Amid the current complex and severe pandemic, China will make dynamic 
adjustments to relevant measures according to its changes and steadily promote the orderly 
resumption of international passenger flights under the premise that all preventive and control 
measures are effective.  
 
Page 179, Table 4.25  
EU Question No 116:  Did the policies and support established by the CAAC in response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic also apply to international and Chinese foreign -invested airlines?   
 
Reply:  In response to the COVID -19 pandemic , measures  such as support  international scheduled 
passenger flights that have not been suspended or resumed , international cargo flights that do not 
carry passengers ,etc also apply to international and Chinese foreign -invested airlines .  
 
WT/TPR/G/415 – WTO Government 's Report  
2.1 Grounding its Efforts in the New Development Stage  
"China draws up the Outline for the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and 
Long-range Objectives through the Year 2035, and embarks on a new journey towards the 
second  centenary goal, which marks that China has entered into a new development stage. " 
 
EU Question No 117:  
a) Regarding the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long -range 
Objectives through the Year 2035, could China give information on the timeframe for the elaboration 
of the plans including for the various sectors. For what sectors are plans being developed? When 
and where will the plans be published?   
 
Reply:  These plans  will be released to the public in accordance with laws and regulations. We 
suggest EU refer to relevant website of government department for further information. For example, 
the 14th Five -Year Plan  for Commerce Development has released on MOFCOM 's website.  
 
b) China announced in February 2021 that it had successfully eradicated extreme poverty within 
China, yet it still labels itself as the world 's largest developing country while it states that it is  shifting 
from high -speed growth to high -quality development. What is the criteria that China uses to refer 
to itself as a developing country, and how would this be justified notably based on China 's 
macroeconomic and trade performance described in page 5 of the report?   
 
Reply : The concept of 'developing countr y' is relatively  to 'developed  country ', and international 
organizations do not have a unified definition. However, in general, compared with developed 
countries, developing countries have obvious gaps in economic strength, per capita income, 
economic structure, industrial competitiveness, social security system, environmental protection, 
and ability to participate in global governance.  
After decades of reform and opening up, China 's economi c and social development has made great 
progress. However, the problem of unbalanced and inadequate development is still prominent, and 
the contradictions between industrial structure, urban -rural gap, social welfare and environmental 
issues are still prom inent. China is still the largest developing country in the world. As a large and 
responsible developing country,  China has always undertaken obligations that are consistent with 
its own level of economic development and capabilities.  
 
Page 6, para 2.6  
The Report refers to high levels of outbound Chinese FDI.  
 
EU Question No 118:  Could China explain which measures it has put in place to support these high 
levels of outbound FDI?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 451 - 
 
  Reply:  The measures include: First, we deepen the reform of "streamlining administration, 
delegating powers, and improving regulation and services " to facilitate outbound investment; second, 
we encourage Chinese enterprises to participate in outbound investment c ooperation in digital 
economy, green development and other areas while guiding Chinese enterprises to make efficient 
use of resources and protect the eco -environment; third, we require our enterprises to strictly abide 
by the laws and regulations of the ho st country, respect the local religious culture and customs, and 
earnestly fulfill their social responsibility; fourth, we encourage the enterprises to take root in local 
areas, commit to long -term development, and strengthen local staff training.  
 
Page 7,  para 3.8.  
In addition, China has continuously deepened the reform of China Compulsory Certificate (CCC) 
scheme. 62 products with relatively standardized industry development and lower risks were 
removed from the CCC catalogue. Enterprises self -declaratio n assessment mechanism was 
introduced to the CCC scheme, applying to 19 products. Certification process was optimized and the 
certification period was reduced by more than 30%.  
 
EU Question No 119:  
a) With regards to the CCC Scheme and the SDoC (self -declaration) scheme – Could China 
explain the differences between the normal CCC Scheme and SDoC scheme ? Could China explain 
on what basis (risk -assessment) the products are selected to SDoC scheme? In thi s respect, is China 
planning to expand the scope of the SDoC scheme, as it is very narrow at the present.   
 
Reply : The CCC scheme is implemented in two ways: third -party certification and self -declaration 
(SDoC). The main difference between the two is as f ollows. The former is implemented by a third -
party certification body in accordance with the requirements of the certification rules evaluation, 
with certificates issued for those qualified. The latter is organized for evaluation by manufacturers 
in accord ance with the (SDoC) rule requirements. After confirming those complying with the rules, 
manufacturers sign a SDoC that, coupled with relevant supporting materials, is uploaded to a 
designated website for follow -up supervision. In determining the compulsor y certification directory, 
in which products should be implement in the SDoC scheme, regulators will taken into account the 
closeness of the product to average consumers, the probability of danger, the degree of harm, the 
maturity of industries, product sa mpling pass rate and other factors. The CCC directory will be 
adjusted as appropriated according to the implementation, including the transfer of products in and 
out and the adjustment of the implementation model.  
 
b) With regards to the 62 products, could Ch ina explain what kind of certification is currently 
required for these products (and provide a list of them) as well as explain what kind of risk 
assessment/management processes China is using in this context?   
 
Reply : Transferring out 62 products in the CCC directory no longer needs to carry out the CCC. 
Enterprises can choose whether to conduct the CCC according to their own needs. Regulatory 
authorities will take into account the closeness of products to average consumers, the probability of 
danger,  the degree of harm, the maturity of industries, product sampling pass rate and other factors 
so as to adjust the CCC directory as appropriated, including the transfer of products in and out and 
the adjustment of the implementation model.  
 
c) With regards to the 30% estimate, what is the actual estimated period for product 
certification? And are any Foreign -invested Certification bodies authorised to carry out CCC 
Certification in China?  
 
Reply : According to the rules, the certification period is 90 days. Thr ough various optimization and 
simplification measures, the actual certification period is controlled in about 60 days, with the 
shortest ranging from 10 to 15 days. In accordance with China 's Certification and Accreditation 
Regulations, designated bodies a nd laboratories for mandatory certification should be located in 
China. Certification bodies and laboratories in China, regardless of being funded by China and other 
countries, can apply for designation qualificaion. They enjoy the same treatment. Now, 11 foreign -
invested laboratories are designated, with no foreign -invested certification bodies designated.  
 
d) The revision of the Regulations of China on Certification and Accreditation is expected to relax 
market access for the 'Foreign -invested Conformity Ass essment Bodies ' in China and Overseas 
locations ". When will the ( draft ) revision of the Regulations be made available to public?   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 452 - 
 
  Reply : The above -mentioned Regulations of China on Certification and Accreditation  are still under 
revision and recommended for continued attention.  
 
Page 8, Para 3.11  
China seeks to foster "an open, fair and non -discriminatory digital trading environment, and 
establishing basic regimes and standards for property rights, transaction circulation, cross -border 
transmission and security protection of data resources. "  
 
EU Question No 120:  Restrictions on "important data " are introduced by China, but it is not clear 
to businesses which classes of data are included. Furthermore , the list of data classes will reportedly 
vary per industry and per sector, and regional authorities may establish their own lists. In this light, 
how will China ensure the regulatory environment for handling non -personal data is unambiguous, 
non-arbitrar y, stable and non -discriminatory, so as to achieve the aims stated in para 3.11? Once 
the rules are clearly defined, will there be guidance or transitional periods or grace periods for 
companies to adapt to the new rules?  
 
Reply:  Article 21 of the Data Se curity Law provides that China establishes a data classification and 
grading protection system. According to the importance of data in economic and social development 
as well as once tampered with, destruction, leakage, illegal access, or illegal use, the degree of harm 
caused to national security, public interests or the legitimate rights and interests of individuals and 
organizations, China protects data in a classified and grading manner. Based on the national data 
security coordination mechanism, China coordinates relevant departments to develop an important 
data directory and strengthen the protection of important data. Data related to national security, 
the lifeblood of the national economy, important people 's livelihood, and major public interests 
belong to the national core data, with a more stringent management system implemented. In 
accordance with the data classification and grading protection system, all regions and departments 
should determine the directory of important data for themselves as wel l as relevant industries and 
fields, with the data included in the directory for key protection. The classification and grading 
protection system is implemented to ensure unambiguity, consistency and stability of data 
regulatory environment.  
 
Page 8, para 3.12  
The Report states that China "unswervingly promotes opening up, improves the legal system for 
foreign investment, continuously liberalizes foreign investment market access, and expands the 
encouraged categories for foreign investment ".  
 
EU Question No 121 : Can China provide further clarification on the timeline - when will it fully 
open the remaining restricted and/or prohibited sectors to foreign investors?  
 
Reply : China will continue to reduce listed industries on the National Negative List for Foreign 
Investment , and will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and interests 
of FIEs, create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, and 
attract more foreign -invested enterp rises to invest in China and share the dividends of China 's 
reform and development.  
 
Page 8, para 3.14  
In terms of investment promotion, the new Law requires improving the transparency of foreign 
investment policies, ensuring that foreign -invested enterpr ises participate in market competition on 
an equal footing, strengthening services for foreign investment, as well as encouraging and guiding 
foreign investment in accordance with laws and regulations. In terms of investment protection, the 
new Law require s strengthening the protection of property rights of foreign -invested enterprises, 
reinforcing the constraints on the formulation of normative documents related to foreign investment, 
encouraging local governments to keep their commitments, and establishin g a complaint mechanism 
for foreign -invested enterprises. In terms of investment administration, the new Law requires that 
foreign investment shall be subject to an administrative system of pre -establishment national 
treatment plus negative list. Foreign i nvestment in sectors not included in the Negative List shall be 
supervised and managed in accordance with the principle of same treatment for domestic and foreign 
investment. The approval and record -filing of the establishment and changes of foreign -invest ed 
enterprises by the authorities in charge of commerce shall be removed. The foreign investment 
information reporting system shall be fully implemented. In addition, the new Law clearly stipulates 
that forced technology transfer through administrative mea ns is prohibited.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 453 - 
 
  EU Question No 122:  
a) Another means through which forced technology transfer to competitors may happen is 
through Joint Ventures. Is China considering reviewing its Joint Venture requirements for investment 
in any of the areas where it is currently required to have a Chinese pa rtner?  
 
Reply : China  has been following TRIPs, TRIMs and other WTO agreements, as well as its accession 
commitments . The terms and conditions on technology transfer in foreign investment in China should 
be negotiated and determined by all concerned invest ors. According to current laws in China, it is 
not mandatory that foreign enterprises should transfer their technologies when cooperating with 
Chinese enterprises. Article 22 of the Foreign Investment Law puts it clearly that "During the process 
of foreign  investment, the State shall encourage technology cooperation on the basis of free will and 
business rules. Conditions for technology cooperation shall be determined by all investment parties 
upon negotiation under the principle of equity. No administrativ e department or its staff member 
shall force any transfer of technology by administrative means. " The choice of technology transfer 
is independently made by enterprises for maximizing benefits of business activities, which cannot 
be manipulated by the gove rnment. Whether foreign enterprises will transfer their technologies is 
an independent behavior of the cooperation parties, and the Chinese Government cannot interfere 
with it.In recent years, FDIs in China have undergone great changes in terms of forms. S ino-foreign 
joint ventures were no longer the mainstream. Most new foreign -invested enterprises were 
incorporated in China as wholly foreign -owned enterprises, and the contents, forms and timelines of 
technology transfer between the parent company and the subsidiary or between subsidiaries are 
business decisions made by multinational corporations based on the competition environment, and 
are not forced by the government.  
 
b) When will China merge the currently separate legal regimes for foreign and domestic 
investors?  
 
Reply : In order to further expand opening up, actively promote foreign investment, protect the 
legitimate rights and interests of foreign investment, standardize foreign investment management, 
facilitate the formation of a comprehensive and new opening -up pattern, and promote the healthy 
development of the socialist market economy, in accordance with the Constitution  Law, China 
enacted the Foreign Investment Law .Foreign -invested enterprises may, in accordance with the law, 
equally enjoy the support  policies . 
 
c) Why do es China maintain a separate registration and reporting system for foreign investors 
and foreign -invested enterprises?  
 
Reply : In order to facilitate the investment in China of foreign -invested enterprises, China officially 
implemented the Foreign Investment Law and its regulations in 2020, and adopted international 
practice, cancelled the examination and approval and filing of the establishment and change of 
foreign -invested enterprises in the commercial department, and implemented the foreign inve stment 
information reporting system.  
 
d) How does China intend to ensure Foreign Invested Entities "market competition on an equal 
footing " in a market dominated by SOEs , which also benefit from various forms of government 
support and subsidies?  
 
Reply : First, with more than 40 years of reform and opening -up, China 's state -owned enterprises 
(SOEs) have become independent market players, competing and developing on an equal footing 
with other types of market players. Meanwhile, China 's private economy has continued to grow, 
which contributes to more than 50% of the country 's tax revenue, over 60% of GDP, more than  70% 
of the technical innovation achievements, over 80% o f the urban labor employment, and more than 
90% of the quantity of enterprises and new urban jobs, playing an increasingly important role in 
China 's economic development. Therefore, the idea that the Chinese market is dominated by SOEs 
is not true. China h as established the basic status of competition policy, and promotes the 
transformation of industrial policies to be functional and inclusive, where subsidies and other 
supportive policies treat all types of enterprises fairly. Third, China is continuing to  ease market 
access, and promote fair competition, eliminate irregular subsidies and preferential policies, and 
continue to build a market -oriented, legalized, and international business environment. Under the 
guidance of the negative list for market acces s and the list of foreign investment catalogue, foreign -
invested enterprises will enjoy more business opportunities and more space for development.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 454 - 
 
  e) What measures does China take to ensure that forced technology transfer does not take place 
in any form or through any means, including at regional or provincial level?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the reply to Question a) . 
 
f) Based on Article 35 of FIL, Measures for Security Review of Foreign Investment entered into 
force on 18 January 2021. How does China ensure that the concepts of public interest and national 
security would not be used to undermine the rights and interests o f foreign investors?  
 
Reply : China  ensures fair competition among enterprises of all types of ownership and treats them 
fairly in terms of access to factors, entry permits, business operations, government procurement 
and bidding in accordance with the pri nciple of competitive neutrality.  China has developed a security 
review system for foreign investment with the aim of promoting openness to the outside world while 
preventing national security risks. In the implementation, we will precisely determine the s cope of 
review, avoid generalization of review, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign 
investors in accordance with the law.  
 
Page 10, para 3.2.3  
Comment: The existing 'Encouraged catalogue for foreign investment ' and the existing 'Negative list 
for foreign investment ' contain some contradictions. Although investments in certain sectors are 
included in the Encouraged Catalogue for foreign investment, the same investments are subject to 
restrictions according to the Negative list.  
 
EU Question No 123:  
a) What are the practical measures that China is taking in order to resolve such contradictions?  
b) Does China co nsider binding its level of openness in the WTO?  
 
Reply to a and b : China  will continue to reduce listed industries on the National Negative List for 
Foreign Investment , and will open up wider to the outside world, protect the legitimate rights and 
interests of FIEs, create a market -oriented, law -based and internationalized business environment, 
and attract more foreign -invest ed enterprises to invest in China and share the dividends of China 's 
reform and development.  
 
Page 10, para 3.3  
EU Question No 124 : How has cooperation between Chinese firms and partners in overseas 
infrastructure development evolved in terms of volume an d quality, in particular regarding 
Environmental, Social and Governance standards, following the implementation of the Decision 
on Eliminating a Number of Administrative Licenses, revised the Regulations on Contracting Foreign 
Projects?  
 
Reply : In 2020, China has overcome the adverse impact of COVID -19 on its foreign contracted 
engineering sector, which maintained a steady growth on the whole. Over the year of 2020, the 
value of new contracts signed in 184 countries and regions around the world is U SD 255.54 billion, 
and the turnover is US D 155.94 billion. The foreign contracted engineering business covers a wide 
range of industries, with transportation construction, common construction, power engineering, 
petrochemicals, etc. as the main areas where  both the new contracts signed and completed turnover 
account for more than 75% of the total.  
 
Page 10, para 3.19  
The Report refers to 22 supportive measures.  
 
EU Question No 125 : Are these measures available for non -Chinese enterprises and investors 
active in the areas in question as well?  
 
Reply : These  measures are applied equally to non-Chinese enterprises and investors .  
 
Page 10, para 3.20  
The Report states: "China continuously improves, promotes and guarantees the policy and service 
system for outbound investment. "  
 
EU Question No 126 : Could China explain how it promotes and guarantees its outbound 
investments?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 455 - 
 
   
Reply:  Please refer to Para 3.3( Pursuing Innovative C ooperation in Outbound  Investment and 
Achieving Mutual Benefits and Win -Win with the Host Countries ), the policy statement by China .  
 
Page 11, para 3.5.1  
EU Question No 127:  Could China provide more clarity in terms of timeline - when will it extend 
the pilot FTZ policies nationwide? What are the practical measures that China will take in order to 
increase market access for foreign investors compared with domestic ones in its  FTZs, in particular 
the newest ones?  
 
Reply : The important mission of the construction of the pilot free trade zone is to explore for 
deepening reforms and expanding opening up, and to form more replicated and popularized 
experiences. At present, at the national level, a total of 278 experiences of pilot free trade zone 
reform  have been promoted.In recent years, China has continuously reduced the negative list of 
foreign investment access and relaxed foreign access. Among them, the negative list of the pi lot 
free trade zone has been reduced 6 times, and the special management measures have been 
reduced from 190 to 30. The negative list of foreign investment access will be further reduced. At 
present, the National Development and Reform Commission and the M inistry of Commerce are 
working with relevant departments to carry out work related to the revision of the negative list of 
the country and the pilot free trade zone, and will further reduce the special management measures 
for the negative list and continu e to expand the opening up.  
 
Page 13, para 4.7.  
The Report asserts that China is making every effort to improve the accessibility of vaccines.  
 
EU Question No 128 : How does China plan to increase support for multilateral efforts to increase 
vaccine supply to partner countries via COVAX as the most effective way to coordinate vaccine 
delivery efforts and maximize impact for developing partner countries?  
 
Reply : China  actively participates in the COVAX, donating US D 100 million to COVAX for the 
distribution of vaccines to developing countries.  
 
Page 14, para 4.11  
"China is taking trade facilitation measures during the pandemic ".  
 
EU Question No 129:  In view of the updated guidance of FAO related preventing transmission of 
COVID -19 within food businesses that was published in August 2021, when will China extent trade 
facilitating measures to food and agriculture products?   
 
Reply : The measures to food and agriculture products adopted by China are in line with Article 42 
Paragraph 1, Article 44, Article 55 of the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases and 
Article 42 and Article 92 of the Food Safety Law, and these measures  have scientific basis and comply 
with WTO rules.  
 
Page 14, para 4.12  
The Government Report states that "In 2020, a total number of 142,000 expired CCC certificates at 
home and abroad were renewed. "  
 
EU Question No 130:  In 2020, what was the number of CCC certificates that remained expired 
i.e. what share does 142 ,000 represent? Additionally, what share of the 142 ,000 certificates were 
from third countries?  
 
Reply:  In 2020, due to the epidemic, all certification certifi cates that have expired or need to be 
supervised, audited, and recertified were renewed. About 10% were from third countries.  
 
Page 14, para 4.17  
a) What is the concrete meaning of China 's claimed "abuse " of trade defense instruments?  
 
Reply : The Chinese side has noted that anti -dumping and anti -subsidy measures have been 
increasing in recent years. In the past 20 -plus year, the use of anti -dumping and anti -subsidy 
measures has not been limited to traditional users. The ambiguity of the rules lead s to frequent 
improper use of anti -dumping and anti -subsidy measures. Different application of the same rules WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 456 - 
 
  has led to an increasing number of disputes under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in recent 
years. In addition, out of policy considerations,  it is common to see excessive use of anti -dumping 
and anti -subsidy measures has caused serious disruptions to international trade and to domestic 
market of the members under investigation and caused damage to the interests of their downstream 
industries. For example, the measures have been implemented upon some members for 20 years 
or even longer, and in one extreme case anti -dumping measures have been put in place for more 
than 40 years, thus becoming "permanent " measures, which constitute barriers to for eign trade and 
hinder domestic industrial innovation and competition of the country in concern.  
 
b) How China intends to ensure that WTO subsidy rules also keep in step with the changing 
environment. The modernization of the ASCM is missing from the list of reform topics, as is the 
reduction of overcapacities.  
 
Reply : Rules are the foundation that underpins and upholds an open, non -discriminatory global 
multilateral trading system. At present, the world economy is recovering slowly, trade protectionism 
is raising its head, and the multilateral trading system is facing severe challenges. In this context, 
China believes that it holds great significance for the development of the multilateral trading system 
to continue to advance rules negotiation in a balanced manner. The negotiation on anti -dumping 
and anti -subsidy rules is the main content of the rules negotiation, and is also the core component 
of the Doha Development Agenda. In view of the increasing number of anti -dumping and 
countervailing measures in rece nt years, which have disturbed the international trade order, we 
believe that the anti -dumping and countervailing rules need to be further clarified and strengthened 
than ever before. China is ready to join hands with other members to advance negotiations on trade 
remedy rules in a balanced manner and carry out necessary reforms to the WTO rules.  
 
Page 15, para 4.19  
The Report states that "China always believes that unilateralism and protectionism are undermining 
the rules -based, free and open international trade order " and that "China expressed its serious 
concern and strong opposition to the unilateral and protectionist actions that specific members have 
taken. " On 10 June 2021, the Standing Committee of China 's National People 's Congress pass ed a 
law on Countering Foreign Sanctions. This law provides a wide margin of discretion to the 
Chinese  authorities to counter actions by other countries.  
 
EU Question No 131  
a) What criteria will be used to determine whether an action by a foreign state war rants a 
countermeasure under this new law?  
b) How is this new law consistent with the steps taken to improve the system of fair competition 
(section 5.21, p.25)?  
c) How will it be ensured that this law will not be used to discriminate against non -Chinese 
compa nies?  
 
Reply to a, b and c : China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, insists on the 
five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non -aggression, 
non-interference in each other 's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful 
coexistence, and safeguards the international system with the United Nations as its core and the 
international order based on international law, develops friendly cooperation with countries around 
the world, and pr omotes the building of a community with a shared future for mankind. China 's Anti -
foreign Sanctions Law is a defensive measure to deal with and fight back against some countries ' 
containment and suppression of China, and it is to counter, fight back and op pose foreign countries ' 
so-called "unilateral sanctions " against China, safeguard China 's sovereignty, security, and 
development interests, and protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and 
organizations. China is prudent in formulati ng and using this law, and will not abuse it.  
 
According to Paragraph II of Article 3 of the Anti -foreign Sanctions Law, where a foreign country in 
violation of international law and basic norms of international relations contains or suppresses China 
under  various pretexts or pursuant to its own laws, adopts discriminatory restrictive measures 
against any Chinese citizen or organization, and meddles in China 's internal affairs, China shall have 
the right to adopt corresponding counter measures. This provisi on is the basis for China to decide 
whether to take counter measures. Whether or not to take counter measures and what kind of 
counter measures to take depends first on the specific situation of the so -called sanctions taken by 
foreign countries against Ch ina. The act of foreign countries in violation of international law and the 
basic norms of international relations taking so -called "unilateral sanctions " against Chinese citizens WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 457 - 
 
  and organizations according to their domestic laws, and meddling in China 's internal affairs 
constitutes an illegal act in international law. It is fully in line with the spirit of international law for 
China to take counter measures according to law.  
 
The promulgation of the Anti -foreign Sanctions Law does not conflict with Chin a's goal of establishing 
a sound market economy with fair competition, and will not adversely affect China 's opening -up. 
China 's determination and will to deepen reform and open wider to the outside world are unshakable. 
Meanwhile, China 's determination an d will to safeguard its sovereignty, security and development 
interests are also steadfast. In recent years, the National People 's Congress and its Standing 
Committee have attached great importance to the legal system construction regarding safeguarding 
national security and opening wider to the outside world. On 10 June this year, in addition to the 
Anti-foreign Sanctions Law, the Hainan Free Trade Port Law of the People 's Republic of China and 
the Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People 's Congress to Authorize the Shanghai 
Municipal People 's Congress and Its Standing Committee to Develop Pudong New Area Regulations 
were adopted. These are all new measures taken by China to deepen reform and open wider to the 
outside world.  
 
China always welcomes and supports foreign enterprises, non -governmental organizations, and 
individuals to conduct business, exchange, and cooperation in China, and protects their rights and 
interests in accordance with the law. The Constitution of the People 's Republic of China clearly 
stipulates that the People 's Republic of China protects the lawful rights and interests of foreigners, 
foreign enterprises, and foreign organizations within Chinese territory; and that they must abide by 
the laws of the People 's Republic of China. Paragraph I of Article 11 of the Anti -foreign Sanctions 
Law stipulates that organizations and individuals in the territory of China shall implement the 
countermeasures adopted by the relevant departments of the State Council. The provisio n is clear, 
and there is no discrimination.  
 
Page 15, para 4.20  
China has been actively participating in the WTO negotiations on all issues. Our aim is to establish 
international trade rules that respond to the development of the times and needs of the in dustries, 
and take full consideration of members ' economic development level and capability. China has 
participated in the regular meetings of WTO councils and committees in a constructive way and 
raised issues of its concern. China has earnestly fulfilled  its commitments to the WTO, implemented 
the commitment to open goods and services markets, and strengthened the protection of intellectual 
property rights. In addition, China has taken initiatives to further opening up, making contribution 
to build an ope n world economy. China strictly abides by the WTO rules when making and 
implementing economic and trade policies, so as to ensure the stability, transparency and 
predictability of those polices.  
 
EU Question No 132 :  
a) It is not uncommon for the EU and othe r WTO members to come across binding resolutions in 
the area of government procurement that China did not notify to the WTO. Is China committed to 
ensuring full transparency in the administrative guidelines and decisions it makes in all economic 
sectors, i ncluding in government procurement?  
b) Could China demonstrate how its trade policies related to beef, pork, poultry, feed additives, 
low risk, processed foods, fruit and vegetables reflect the WTO SPS Agreement, in particular the 
obligations of  Art. 3 (harmonisation with international standards), Art. 4 (equivalence), Art. 5 
(assessment of risk), Art.  6 (adaptation to regional conditions) and Art. 8 (approval procedures ) 
 
Reply to a and b : China fulfills  the WTO commitments and ensures that government procurement 
is only bound by published and publicly available laws, regulations, universally applicable judicial 
decisions, administrative decisions and procedures (standard contract terms).  
According to the  Standardization Law " and the "Management Measures for Mandatory National 
Standard, in the formulation and implementation of China 's mandatory national standards, China 
will take full analysis and comparison of the relevant laws, regulations and standards of the 
International Organization for Standardization and other countries or regions, and will fully consider 
the coordination with international standards; and if international standards are not adopted or the 
technical requirements are inconsistent with relevant international standards, they will be notified 
in strict accordance with relevant requirements.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 458 - 
 
  Page 16, para 4.24  
The Report reads that "China has fully fulfilled its obligations of notification under all 
WTO agreements. "  
 
EU Question No 133: 
The latest Chinese DS:1 notification covers the year 2016. In the meantime China has changed its 
support policy, but no notification has been forwarded to give members the possibility to 
examine/analyse these changes. Could China indicate when it inte nds to submit its DS:1 notifications 
for the years after 2016, as well as the necessary DS:2 notifications for Blue and Green Box 
measures implemented since 2016?  
 
Reply:  Domestic Support n otification s from China covers marketing year 2016. China will sub mit its 
DS notifications for the following years later this year  or early next.  
 
Page 18, para 4.4.1  
EU Question No 134:  
a) How is China working with Chinese firms and lenders to deliver more sustainable impact of 
BRI projects in partner countries? How does China address possible negative externalities of such 
projects such as debt sustainability risks or detrimental climate ch ange and environmental impact?  
 
Reply : This year marks the eighth anniversary of the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative. Over 
the last eight years, China has signed more than 200 Belt and Road cooperation agreements 
with over 100 countries and dozen s of international organizations. Against the backdrop of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, Belt and Road cooperation has bucked the trend and demonstrated strong 
resilience to risk, playing a vital role in supporting countries around the world in battling the 
pandem ic, maintaining economic stability and ensuring people 's livelihoods. China always gives 
prominence to debt management and is committed to building a long -term, stable and sustainable 
financing system that is well -placed to manage risks. It also works to h elp the relevant countries 
strengthen their debt sustainability and improve their ability to prevent sovereign risk. The Guiding 
Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road Initiative were jointly ratified by 
28 countries including China. Due to the impact of the pandemic and the resultant global recession, 
some developing countries are indeed struggling with heavy debt burdens. In view of this, China has 
canceled the debt of relevant African countries in the form  of interest -free government loans due to 
mature by the end of 2020. In terms of the debt structure of debtor nations, most of the debts are 
owed to multilateral financial institutions and commercial creditors of developed countries, which 
should also play  a part in relevant debt relief initiatives.  
 
b) What are the Environmental, Social and Governance standards underpinning projects under 
the Green Silk Road?  
 
Reply to a and b:  In pursuing the "Belt and Road " Initiative, China has always upheld the concept 
of green development, promoted green and low -carbon construction and operation of infrastructure; 
emphasized the concept of ecological civilization in investment and trade; and participated in 
cooperation in such areas as ecological environment governance, biodiversity protection, and 
response to climate change. The following measures have been taken to make projects more 
sustainable and to prevent negative impacts on the ecological environment and climate change:  
 
First, The Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce proposes points that "pay attention to environmental protection, labor protection and 
corporate culture construction ", and the Measures for the Administrat ion of Outbound Investment 
by Enterprises issued by the National Development and Reform Commission makes it clear that "pay 
attention to ecological and environmental protection ". 
 
Second, the Ministry of Commerce and the former Ministry of Environmental Protection jointly issued 
the Guideline on Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation. The National 
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the People 's Bank of China, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the All -China Federation of Industry and Commerce jointly issued the 
Code of Conduct for Overseas Investment Operations of Private Enterprises. These documents 
provide operational guidelines on ecological and environmental protection for enterprises en gaging 
in outbound investment.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 459 - 
 
  Third, the Ministry of Commerce updates the Guidance  for Countries  (Regions) Outbound  Investment 
Cooperation on a yearly basis, which contains requirements on environmental protection of various 
countries, and supports the ecological and environmental protection work in the process of pursuing 
the "Belt and Road " Initiative.  
 
In 2013, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (former Ministry of 
Environmental Protection) jointly issued the Guidelin e on Environmental Protection in Foreign 
Investment and Cooperation , which clearly stated that "the projects invested in, constructed and 
operated by enterprises shall comply with the laws and regulations of the host country, and shall 
apply for relevant p ermits on environmental protection from the local government ". 
 
In 2021, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment jointly issued the  
Guideline on Green Development in Foreign Investment and Cooperation , proposing that "if the host 
country does not have relevant laws and regulations or the environmental protection standards are 
too low, Chinese enterprises are encouraged to carry out investment cooperation activities according 
to the standards of international organizations or o f multilateral institutions or the Chinese 
standards ".  
 
c) Can China provide more information on the development of the Digital Silk Road and how do 
data protection and privacy safeguards feature in these initiatives?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, a batch of cro ss-border fiber optic cables and submarine cables have been 
up and running. Cross -border e -commerce has become a new highlight of the "Digital Silk Road " 
cooperation, while digital content and online tourism have flourished. Countries have been expanding 
cooperation in smart cities, intelligent transportation, telemedicine, online education and other 
industrial applications, so that the achievements in Internet development can benefit their people. 
In addition, China has played an essential role in building  a community with a shared future in 
cyberspace. It has opened the "China Belt and Road Network (yidaiyilu.gov.cn) " to publish 
information on cooperation between China and countries along the "Belt and Road " routes in digital 
fields such as AI, big data, c loud computing and smart cities as well as infrastructure interconnection 
and digital economy. The data protection and privacy protection requirements set in the relevant 
initiatives can promote more in -depth information flow, technology exchanges, digital  trade and 
commerce across countries.  
 
Page 20, para 4.5.3  
EU question No 135:  
a) How do China -supported capacity -building programmes integrate global sustainability goals 
to which China has adhered to, in particular the Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Agreement 
targets?  
 
Reply:  China is implementing the United Nations 2030 Age nda for Sustainable Development 
(2030  Agenda) and the Paris Agreement on climate change. It has provided support and assistance 
to developing countries in achieving sustainable development goals and addressing climate change 
under the framework of South -South cooperation. In recent years, China has set up the Peace and 
Development Fund, the South -South Cooperation Assistance Fund and the Climate Change South -
South Cooperation Fund to support developing countries in implementing the 2030 Agenda, including 
capacity -building projects in developing countries. Such efforts have bridged capacity gaps, removed 
bottlenecks in achieving the SDGs, and achieved diversified, autonomous and sustainable 
development. China has also been working to improve the capacity of o ther developing countries, 
especially the least developed countries, African countries and small island states, in addressing 
climate change. China has also provided references for other countries, especially developing 
countries, to implement the 2030 Age nda by publishing progress reports on the 2030 Agenda, 
releasing cases of poverty reduction, and building innovative demonstration zones for the 
2030 Agenda.  
 
b) Which quality control measures are in place to ensure that China -supported capacity -building 
programmes effectively contribute to those goals?  
 
Reply:  China has assisted other developing countries in mapping out their development blueprints 
scientifically. According to the needs of recipient countries, it has helped them formulate 
development plans, policies and regulations in relevant fields and enhance d the capacity for planning 
and coordinated development. It has shared development experiences and strengthened the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 460 - 
 
  development of bilateral human resources mechanisms for development cooperation. Based on the 
actual needs of countries, China has provided targeted capacity -building support by cooperating with 
multiple international organizations or institutions, including the United Nations, in multilateral 
capacity building. China will further improve the supervision and management mechanism and 
project ev aluation mechanism. Based on its own national conditions and drawing on international 
experience, it will revise and refine the foreign aid statistical indicator system, operate a modern 
foreign aid statistical information system, and enhance the effective ness of capacity building.  
 
Page 21, para 5.1.4  
EU question No 136:  Could China further elaborate and provide more information on the modern 
environmental governance system that it is establishing? Is this approach going to be extended and 
applicable to C hina's overseas lending and development aid?  
 
Reply:  In March 2020, China issued the Guiding Opinions on Building a Modern Environmental 
Governance System  in a bid to provide institutional support for a better ecological environment. The 
guideline aimed t o put in place by 2025 a sound environmental governance system that specifies 
responsibilities of governments at all levels and firms, encourages public participation and features 
stronger government supervision. Efforts will be made to build an open and r egulated environmental 
treatment market. The country will offer a level playing field for all types of enterprises. Greener 
approach of production shall be promoted among firms, and innovative technologies strengthened 
to reduce pollutants, while firms wil l be required to disclose their pollution -related information and 
held responsible for its authenticity, according to the guideline. China takes the improvement of 
global environmental governance and active response to climate change as important considera tions 
when developing development assistance.  
For more information, please refer to http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2020 -
03/03/content_5486380.htm  
 
Page 22, para 5.2.3  
The Report reads "China commits itself to improving agricultural subsidy policies. Its agricultural 
subsidy system, as well as relevant incentive and disincentive mechanism, is green -oriented and 
aims at promoting rational utilization of agricultural resources and protection of ecological 
environment ".  
 
EU Question No 137:  With the objectives of sharing good agricultural practices and repurposing 
agricultural subsidies, could Ch ina give details about its new agricultural subsidy system, type of 
supports, as well as relevant incentive and disincentive mechanism, notably in terms of global budget 
and eligibility criteria? Are the payments to farmers linked to environmental mandator y requirements?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to China 's Domestic support notifications.  
 
Page 25, para 5.21 and 5.22  
The Report refers to the Fair Competition Review System (FCRS) and to the Anti -Monopoly Law 
(AML).  
EU Questions No 138  
a) Could China clarify the relationship between the two sets of rules? When a document is 
reviewed under the FCRS, can a review under the AML also be carried out? Are the substantive rules 
of the AML applied in the FCRS review?    
b) Is SAMR applying an economic analysis in the enforcement of the FCRS to decide whether a 
subsidy distorts competition and the level playing field, and if yes, is it similar to the one SAMR is 
applying in the enforcement of the AML?  
c) In how many FCR reviews has SAMR  analysed the use of subsidies by the authorities? What 
proportion is that of all FCR reviews?  
d) What has been the typical outcome of the reviews regarding subsidies? Has the application of 
the FCRS led to the annulment of decisions to give subsidies, repay ment of subsidies to the granting 
authority or amendment of subsidy schemes?  
e) How does China ensure the respect of the findings of a FCR by the targeted authority?  
(i) Does the FCRS only provide for self -review and self -discipline or will a higher -level a uthority 
supervise the enforcement of the FCRS?  
(ii) Is third parties ' review being used in applying the FCRS, and how are the opinions of 
third parties being enforced?  
f) It seems that only a limited number of FCRS  review are published. Does China have any plans 
to publish all reviews?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 461 - 
 
  g) Does 'the Action Plan for Building a High -standard Market System, which requires 
comprehensive improvement of the fair competition system, including strengthening the binding 
force o f the fair competition review system, intensifying and improving anti -monopoly and anti -
unfair competition law enforcement, and eliminating regional segmentation and local protection ' 
mean that China has concrete plans to establish a legal basis for the FC RS in the AML or other 
legislation. If so, what will that imply for the relation between the FCRS and the AML on the one 
hand and other economic policy measures on the other hand?  
 
Reply to questions above : The fair competition review system (FCRS) aims t o maintain a unified 
national market and fair competition. According to the system, administrative organs and 
organizations authorized by laws and regulations to manage public affairs should conduct a fair 
competition review to assess the impact on market competition when formulating regulations, 
normative documents, other policy documents and specific policy measures involving economic 
activities of market players, in an effort to prevent the exclusion and restriction of market 
competition. The assessment is carried out by a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Policies and measures found to violate the standards of fair competition review shall be corrected 
and stopped in a timely manner.  
 
China attaches great importance to the quality and effectiveness of the fair competition review. To 
ensure the effective implementation of the system, the State Council requires that the State 
Administration for Market Regulation, the National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Commerce should establish and improve the inter -ministerial 
joint meeting system for fair competition review, and coordinate, supervise and guide the national 
fair competition review; local people 's governments at all levels above the count y level are 
responsible for establishing and improving the joint meeting system for fair competition review, 
coordinate, supervise and guide the regional fair competition review, and report annually to the 
people 's government at the level and the joint mee ting at higher level on the implementation of the 
fair competition review system, so as to accept guidance and supervision. Supervision mechanisms 
for spot checks, assessments and third -party evaluations as well as accountability mechanisms have 
been estab lished to strengthen the rigid constraints of the system and the effectiveness of review.  
 
The Opinions of the State Council on the Establishment of a Fair Competition Review System in the 
Construction of the Market System  and the Rules for the Implementation of the Fair Competition 
Review System  adopt provisions on public matters and content. In the next step, the work of fair 
competition review will continue to be done in accordance with the law and regulations.  
China has established the basic status of competition policy, coordinated other policies based on the 
competition -related one, focused on building a unified, open and high -standard market system with 
orderly competition, complete systems and perfect governance, and created a market -oriented, rule -
of-law and internationalized business environment.  
 
Page 25, para 5.22  
The Report explains that since 2018, China 's anti -monopoly law enforcement agencies have 
investigated and concluded 1,406 cases of concentration of business operators.  
 
EU Q uestion No 139  
a) Of the 1406 cases, how many concentrations involve SOEs?  
b) Of the '171 cases of administrative power abuse to exclude and restrict competition ' how many 
concerned the use of subsidies?  
 
Reply to a and b:  Of the 171 cases of administrative power abuse to exclude and restrict 
competition , 3 cases  concerned the use of subsidies . China has no statistics concerning cases involve 
SOEs. More Information on cases of concentration of business operators  is released on the website 
of SM AR. For details, please refer to http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/.   
 
Other questions  
 
EU Question No 140:  
In the ILO Centenary Declaration for the future of work (2019), the ILO members unanimously 
committed to work towards ratification of outstanding ILO fundamental conventions. In this regard, 
could China inform of its work towards the ratification of four u nratified ILO fundamental convention 
on freedom of association, right to organise, collective bargaining and on abolition of forced labour 
(C029, C087, C098 & C105)?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 462 - 
 
   
Reply : The issue of labor conventions ratification is not within the scope of trade poli cy review. It is 
recommended that the EU learn about relevant information through multilateral and bilateral 
mechanisms in the labor field.  
 
EU Question No 141:  
European Rail Supply companies and other stakeholders reported that overall accessibility of the 
Chinese rail supply market to foreign companies declined drastically over the past decade. What are 
the plans of CHN government to lower market entry barriers for foreign Rail Supply companies to 
achieve a level playing field?   
 
Reply : China  suggest EU refer to Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access 
(Negative List) issued by relevant Chinese authorities. China adheres to the basic State policy of 
opening to the outside world and encouraging foreign investors to invest w ithin the territory of China. 
China maintains a policy of high -level investment liberalization and facilitation, establishes and 
improves a mechanism for foreign investment promotion, and creates a stable, transparent, 
predictable and fair market environme nt. In accordance with the needs of national economic and 
social development, China may encourage and guide foreign investors to invest in specific industries, 
sectors and regions.  
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 463 - 
 
  EUROPEAN UNION - FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS  
WT/TPR/S/415  – WTO Secretariat repo rt 
 
Page 22, para 1.29.  
While the Report refers to the progress of the SOE reform, China never released the details of this 
plan to the public. State ownership remains important, even in non -strategic, commercially oriented 
sectors, with SOEs still having large market shares. At the same time, reform of SOEs proceeded 
almost exclusively in the context of mixed ownership (Section 3.3.5). Given the global weight of the 
Chinese economy and the strategic role these companies play, their presence in the national and 
international marke t is quite relevant. The latest reforms of SOEs have covered issues such as their 
classification or mixed ownership.  
 
EU Question No 4a:  
a) Can China provide feedback in terms of when will the government publish its plan for SOE 
reform and subject it to peer review to ensure that it is in line with WTO commitments on state 
owned bodies?  
 
Reply:  China fulfills its WTO commitments . China 's SOEs  reform information is published  in 
accordance with Chinese laws and regulations.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 4a:  
Obviously information is disclosed in accordance to Chinese laws and regulations. In this regard, 
which law and/or regulation prevents Chin a from releasing its 3 -year action plan on SOEs covering 
the 2020 -2022 period of time? Does China intend to publish its action plan ex -post?  
 
Reply:  China 's SOEs reform practices have been made available to the public through various 
channels. Media briefi ngs are held to provide timely comprehensive and systematic information on 
the progress of the SOEs reform. In addition, China has maintained active communication with the 
international community such as co -organizing dialogues on SOEs reform with the Euro pean Union 
Chamber of Commerce in China and the American Chamber of Commerce in China.  
 
EU Question No 4b):  
Does China envisage to ensure competitive neutrality so that SOEs do not enjoy a competitive 
advantage as compared to other market participants as part of the reforms that Chinese authorities 
are currently considering to transform China into a sustainable and resilient economy? If so, what 
are these specific measures and what is the expected timetable for their implementation?  
 
Reply:  China ensures fair competition among enterprises of all types of ownership and will treat 
enterprises of all types of ownership fairly in terms of element acquisition, access permits, business 
operations, government procurement, and bidding.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 4b): China indicates it does ensure competitive neutrality between 
SOEs and the private market. How does China reconcile this competitive neutrality with the fact that 
it set up several SOEs rescue funds in 2020 and 2021 like th e Tianjin state owned asset high quality 
development fund, the Henan SASAC credit guarantee fund, the Hebei SOE credit guarantee fund, 
etc.? 
 
Reply: These funds are established in accordance with market -oriented and law -based principles, 
and Chinese Govern ment does not intervene with their operations.  
 
Page 24, para 1.38  
The Report (section 1.3.1) documents a sizeable change in the relative share of the US in China 's 
imports, dropping from nearly 9% in 2015 to 6.6.% in 2020. Meanwhile, the relative share o f imports 
from Asian countries has increased.  
 
EU Question No 5 : It would be interesting if China could elaborate upon the possible drivers behind 
these changes in shares across trade partners. More specifically, to what extent can they be traced 
to issue s such as, e.g., the US trade policy towards China, "near-shoring " strategies within Asia, or 
other considerations?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 464 - 
 
  Reply:  The changes in different trading partners ' shares in China 's total imports are an objective 
reflection of accumulated various factor s, namely, the supply and demand structure in international 
trade, environments of international trade and changes in different partners ' industrial 
competitiveness. China will work with all other WTO members to uphold the spirit of openness, 
cooperation, mutual benefit and win -win, promote trade and investment liberalization and 
facilitation, safeguard the stability of the global industrial chain and supply chain, and promote the 
world economic recovery and growth.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 5 : Thank you for the reply. The EU would appreciate if China could 
provide some further details notably by providing examples of sectors where these factors drive 
observed trends.  
 
Reply : At the beginning of each year, the State Council Information Office he ld press conference 
introducing development of China 's foreign trade. For more detailed information about China 's 
foreign trade, please refer to  
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020 -01/14/co ntent_5468996.htm  (for 2019)  
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021 -01/14/content_5579875.htm  (for 2020)  
Also, more information is available at China Statistical Yearbook under the section "Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation ".  
Please refer to http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/  
 
Page 36, Para. 2.33  
"On 15 January 2020, China and the United States signed the China -United States Phase 1 Economic 
and Trade Agreement.18 It contains provisions related to, inter alia, intellectual property, technology 
transfer, trade in food and agricultural products, and financial services. "  
 
EU question  8:  
a) Do the horizontal disciplines of this agreement, notably on intellectual property, technology 
transfer and financials services apply erga omnes?  
b) How will China ensure that the treatment accorded to agricultural products in that agreement 
will not disa dvantage other WTO members?  
 
Reply to a and b : Chinese enterprises will import more quality products and services from the US 
pursuant to the WTO rules and market and business principles. The huge and continuously growing 
China market will have more deman ds for quality and fair -priced goods and services. In fact, as the 
Chinese economy recovers, the country has imported more quality goods from around the world, 
including the US. The upbeat trade momentum fully demonstrates that China 's economic 
development  will create great opportunities for other countries to expand their trade cooperation 
with China. China welcomes enterprises from foreign countries to engage in fair competition in the 
Chinese market, and Chinese consumers will choose products and service s based on their 
performance -to-price ratio.  
All of China 's agricultural imports from the United States are made under market conditions based 
on commercial considerations, and the administrative measures taken by China on the import of 
agricultural produc ts are implemented on the basis of most -favored -nation treatment.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 8:  The EU would welcome further clarification by China on  the 
China -United States Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement. In particular, do the horizontal 
disciplines related to, inter alia, intellectual property, technology transfer, trade in food and 
agricultural products, and financial services apply erga omnes ? In addition, as regards the trade 
facilitating measures for agricultural products, such as the automatic listing of establishments and 
the approval procedures, will China extend these to all WTO members?  
 
Reply : Relevant provisions  on intellectual prope rty protection, technology transfer and opening -up 
of financial services  in China -United States Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement are conducive 
to deepening China 's reform and opening -up, further improving the business environment, and 
better protecting  the legitimate rights and interests of foreign enterprises from all over the world, 
including European enterprises. China 's large and expanding domestic market will increase demand 
for high -quality commodities and services. With the continuous economic re covery, China will import 
more high -quality commodities from all over the world, and China 's economic development will bring 
opportunities for all members  to expand trade cooperation with China.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 465 - 
 
  Page 71, para 3.89  
The Report documents that the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export, 
published in August 2020 by MOFCOM and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), 
introduced new lists of restricted and prohibited items and technologies.  
 
EU Question No 20 :  
a) The EU would like to request China to explain the relationship between the technologies which 
are subject to the restrictions under the Export Control Law (e.g. the lists formulated under the 
implementing administrative laws and regulations) and the list o f technologies which are 
prohibited/restricted to be exported under the Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for 
Export. The EU would also like to request China to clarify whether the lists originate from 
multilateral non -proliferation efforts  or whether it is based on national considerations, 
and if so which ones?   
b) With specific regard to control of technology export, the EU would like to request China to 
explain the inter -relations between the different pieces of relevant legislation, includi ng the 
relationship between the restriction list under Article 18 of the Export Control Law and the Provisions 
on the Unreliable Entity List.  
 
Reply to a and b:  The Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export is a catalogue 
published of t he technologies prohibited or restricted from import and export. It was formulated and 
adjusted according to the Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China and the Regulations 
on Technology Import and Export Administration of the People 's Republic  of China, and executes 
management according to the Regulations. The Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or 
Forbidden for Export does not lie in the applicable scope of the Export Control Law . Article 
1 of the Export Control Law explicitly stipulates that  the purpose of the legislation is to safeguard 
the national security and interests and perform international duties like anti -proliferation, etc. The 
Chinese Catalogue of Technologies Restricted or Forbidden for Export aims to regulate management 
over tec hnological exports, promote technological advances and foreign economic and technological 
cooperation, and maintain national economic security . Article Sixteen of the Foreign Trade Law 
specifies the concrete situations of the technological import and expor t restricted or prohibited.  
 
Article 18 of the Export Control Law stipulates that the management and control list and the 
unreliable entity list are different institutions with different legal grounds. The former was made 
according to the Export Control L aw, while the latter was under the Regulations on Unreliable Entity 
List. The two list systems ' legislative purposes, applicable ranges, and detailed measures and 
procedures are all different.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 20 : The EU would also like to req uest China to clarify whether the 
lists originate from multilateral non -proliferation efforts or whether it is based on national 
considerations, and if so which ones?  
 
Reply:  The Catalogue of Prohibited and Restricted Technologies (hereinafter referred to as "the 
Catalogue ") is formulated in accordance with  the Foreign Trade Law and the Regulations on the 
Administration of Import and Export of Technologies. According to Article  16 of the Foreign Trade 
Law, the Government  may restrict or forbid the  export of relevant goods or technology if:   
(1) it is necessary to restrict or forbid the export for the purpose of maintaining national  security, 
social public good or public moralit y; (2) it is necessary to restrict or forbid the export for the purpose 
of protecting human health or security, protecting the life or health of any animal or plant, or 
protecting the environment;  (3) other exports need to be restricted or prohibited  in accordance with  
the provisions of laws and administrative regulations ;(4) other exports need to be restricted or 
prohibited according to the provisions of international treaties and agreements that China has 
concluded or participated in .  
 
Page 71, para 3.92   
The Secretariat Report states that "Specific export control lists were also released " in addition to the 
list of dual -use items and of items subject to administration of export/import license 
(http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/202012/20201203027833.shtml ).  
 
EU Question No 22:  The EU would like to request China which types of items and categories are 
covered under these lists with and whether corresponding references to the lists of multilateral 
export control regimes will be published to provide legal clarity.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 466 - 
 
  Reply:  Since th e 1990s, China has already promulgated 6 administrative regulations in export 
control sector and 1 set of divisional rules, all of which are attached with separate controlled item 
lists, covering military and nuclear items, monitored chemicals and the dual -use items and 
technologies associated with nuclear, biology, chemistry and missiles. After the promulgation of the 
Export Control Law, the Chinese government is working on the formulation and revision of supporting 
regulations, and will continue to improv e the control list and release it to the public in time.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 22:  The EU would like to ask China to clarify whether corresponding 
references to the lists of multilateral export control regimes will be published to provide legal cla rity. 
This question has not been answered.  
 
Reply:  As a responsible country, China has established an export control system and issued a list 
of dual -use nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile items to actively fulfill its international non -
proliferation obligations and maintain world peace and securi ty. China is a member of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group, and China 's nuclear dual -use list is completely consistent with international 
mechanisms. China has not yet joined other multilateral export control mechanisms such as MTCR, 
AG, WA, but the list of dual -use biological, chemical, and missile items also takes the list of relevant 
international mechanisms for reference.  
 
Page 71, para 3.93 and 94  
The Secretariat report documents that the Export Control Law provides for the establishment of 
control lists of  foreign business entities that "possibly endanger national security and interests ". 
Article 13 of the Law provides that approval or disapproval of exports will be based on eight criteria, 
including national security and 'interests ', relevant credit records of exporting companies, and "other 
factors stipulated by laws and administrative regulations ".  
 
EU Question No 23 : The EU would like to request China to clarify the difference between 'national 
security ' and 'national interests ' criteria and concerns that may lead to the approval or disapproval 
of exports. The EU would also like to request China to clarify which "other factors stipulated by laws 
and administrative regulations " will apply to export controls, or any related plans fo r the introduction 
of such laws and regulations. In particular, the EU is concerned that 'other factors ' may include the 
possibility of request for disclosure of technical information (e.g. trade secrets) in the process of 
export controls. The EU would to request further clarifications to China in this respect.  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government will consider all relevant factors and decide on approval or denial 
of the export applications under the relevant provisions of the Export Control Law. In the process of 
review, the Chinese government will protect the business secrets of enterprises and safeguard their 
legal interests in accordance with the law. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the 
systems established in the Export Control Law, the Chi nese government is actively promoting the 
legislation of supporting regulations to further detail the relevant provisions of Export Control Law.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 23: The reply did not clarify the difference between 'national 
security ' and 'national interests ' criteria. The reply also does not cover clarifications which "other 
factors stipulated by laws and administrative regulations " will apply to export controls, or any related 
plans for the introduction of such laws and regulations. Could China please complete this reply?  
 
Reply:  All major countries in the world consider safeguarding national security and interests as an 
important f actor in export control legislation and practice. According to Article 13 of China 's Export 
Control Law, "national security and interests " is one of the considerations of the national export 
control which decides the approval or disapproval of the export o f controlled items based on "national 
security and interests " and other factors. It is in line with common practice around the world.  
 
Article 13 of the Export Control Law contains miscellaneous provisions (other factors stipulated by 
laws and administrat ive regulations) on factors to be considered for the export of controlled items. 
This is a kind of legislative technique commonly used to make sure that this Law is in line with other 
laws and administrative regulations that may provide for related issues.  At the same time, this is 
also a restriction on the legislative level. Only the laws formulated by the National People 's Congress 
and its Standing Committee and the administrative regulations formulated by the State Council can 
set this clause, which help s to ensure the authority and stability of relevant regulations.After the 
promulgation of the Export Control Law, in order to implement the law and enhance its operability, 
China is speeding up the formulation and revision of supporting regulations.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 467 - 
 
  Page 72, para 3.102.  
The Report states that since 2013, China has established an increasing number of PFTZs across the 
country; currently, there are 31 PFTZs.  
 
EU Question No 25 c):  
c) Do different rates apply to different industries within the same PFTZs?  
 
Reply:  Please clarify what kind of "rates" that EU wants to know.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 25 c):  In some PFTZs are there various tax rates applicable within 
the same PFTZ? If yes - in which PFTZ, what are the different rates applicable, on which products?  
 
Reply:  Currently, preferential corporate income tax policies are only applicable  to qualified 
enterprises in the Hainan Free Trade Port and the Lingang New Area of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade 
Zone.  
 
Firstly, for qualified  enterprise in  the Hainan Free Trade Port, the corporate income tax will be levied 
at a reduced tax rate of 15%. This policy applies to the entire Hainan Free Trade Port.  
Secondly, for qualified enterprise in the Lingang  New Area of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone, 
the corporate income tax shall be levied at a reduced tax rate of 15% within 5 years from the date 
of establishment. The above -mentioned preferential policies are only for qualified enterprises, not 
for spec ific products.  
 
Page 73, para 3.109.  
The Report states, the main mandate of China Eximbank 'includes facilitation of export and import 
of equipment and new - and high -tech products, and assisting Chinese companies with comparative 
advantages in their offs hore projects '  
 
EU Question No 26 b):  
We understand that China Eximbank  is the main official export finance lender in China. Could China 
explain whether and how other Chinese banks are also involved, with financial backing from the 
state, in export finance – e.g. China Development Bank, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercia l 
Bank of China, China Construction Bank or Agricultural Bank of China. Are the financial decision of 
these bank always taken on commercial merits and in line with market terms or do they follow 
government policies and/or decisions?  
 
Reply : China 's commer cial banks are independent market players ，financial decision of these bank 
always taken on commercial merits and in line with market terms.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 26 b):  China indicates that "China 's commercial banks are 
independent market players , financial decisions of these banks are always taken on commercial 
merits and in line with market terms ". How does China reconcile this with the CBIRC Three -year 
action plan for improving corporate governance of the banking and insurance sectors(2020 -2022) 
Section II, stipulating "Members of the Party joining the Boards of Directors, Boards of Supervisors 
and the senior management positions shall rigorously implement the decisions by the Party 
organisation. Taking the entity into account, a list of major oper ational and management issues 
previously researched and discussed by the Party Committee shall be drawn up and updated.   Major 
operational and management issues must have been discussed by the Party Committee before being 
decided upon by the Board of Direc tors or the senior management. " Can we understand the reply 
that the above -mentioned banks provide export finance using the public funds? If so, can you 
describe the official control mechanism that makes sure that the banks follow in their lending the 
WTO rules?  
 
Reply:  Chinese commercial banks maintain consistency with general international standards in 
terms of corporate governance principles and frameworks. Corporate governance structure of 
Chinese commercial banks operates following the principle of res ponsibility, accountability, 
coordination, effectiveness, and balance. Major business decisions are made by the Board of 
Directors and the senior management in accordance with business principles.  
 
EU Question No 26 c):  
According to the World Bank analysis, about 40% of official Chinese lending to developing countries 
comes directly from China Eximbank virtually all loans are tied to sourcing of exports from China. WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 468 - 
 
  Does China consider concessional loans to developing coun tries that are tied to sourcing from 
Chinese exporters, and not in accordance with requirements of the OECD Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits, as subsidies within the meaning of WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties? Are all  relevant programmes notified to the WTO and if not, why?  
 
Reply:  China 's export credit policy complies with WTO rules, it is not export subsidy.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 26 c):  Can China confirm that the concessional loans (i.e. on terms 
better than  in the market would provide) provided during the period relevant for this report by China 
EXIM Bank or China Development Bank to developing countries were not tied, de jure or de facto, 
to sourcing of goods from Chinese exporters?  
If the above -mentioned loans were tied and adhered to OECD rules on tied aid (and hence would 
benefit from the WTO safe harbour), how does China reveal the relevant information to verify this, 
either at the WTO or OECD level?  
 
Reply:  China Development Bank is not an official exp ort credit agency of China. Its loans provided 
to developing countries follow market rules. No financial subsidies is provid ed. The loans provided 
by China Development Bank do not fall into the category of preferential loans.  
 
Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Export -Import Bank of China 
(Order  No. 3 [2017] of the China Banking Regulatory Commission) stipulates that Exim Bank shall 
establish a market -oriented operation and discipline mechanism and develop itself into a policy -
based fina ncial institution featuring specific positioning, clear business, prominent functions, 
adequate capital, standardized governance, strict internal control, safe operation and good services. 
Exim Bank complied with the requirements of financial modernization  and development, and carried 
out operation, management and various businesses in accordance with the laws of bank operation. 
Therefore, its loan terms for different projects are determined based on market benchmarks.  
 
Page 76, Para 3.123.  
The Report stat es that "it would appear that transparency on government support may also be 
hampered, as the Government, through numerous state -owned enterprises (SOEs), is involved in 
the financing and management of companies, making it difficult to identify the precise policy 
actions  (…)" The authorities do not agree with this statement and indicate that no implicit subsidies 
were paid to China 's SOEs. According to the authorities, the Government does not intervene in SOEs ' 
financing, operation, and management . 
 
EU Question No 30:   
a) Could China clarify if State -Owned Enterprises have access to preferential financing from 
state-owned banks? Do they receive any loan guarantees?  
 
Reply:  State -owned enterprises, private enterprises, FIEs are all customer groups of co mmercial 
banks. On the premise of compliance with laws and regulations, commercial banks may 
independently select customer groups and issue credit loans according to their own strategic 
planning, development orientation, risk preference, operation and mana gement capabilities. The 
relevant decision -making of commercial banks is a market -oriented choice made from their own 
actual development, which is a market -oriented behavior.  
 
b) What is the form of financing of the SOEs with losses? Does the government inje ct funds 
directly?  
 
Reply:  The financing of state -owned enterprises depends mainly on their profitability, asset quality, 
and development prospects. State -owned enterprises with good development prospects are still 
capable of obtaining market financing eve n if they suffer temporary operating losses. Those that 
have completely lost their profitability and do not have the value to be saved will be gradually cleared 
up in accordance with the market -oriented mechanism.  
 
c) Could China provide a list of the SOEs th at have received a direct transfer of funds from the 
State, and the yearly amounts received by each of them?  
 
Reply:  The SOEs have integrated with the market economy and become independent participants 
in market competition. They purchase and sell on the basis of commercial considerations, and 
subject to the same laws and rules as other enterprises, and do not enjoy privileges in terms of WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  access to funds, bankruptcy, and competition legislation. Relevant government information will be 
disclosed in accordan ce with the provisions of government information disclosure regulations, while 
information related to listed companies will be disclosed in accordance with the information 
disclosure rules for listed companies.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 30:  EU Question 30 c) asked for a list of SOEs that have received, 
in the past, direct transfers, and the yearly amounts received by each of them. China 's reply 
mentions that relevant information "will be disclosed " in the future. While the EU takes note of th e 
commitment by China to disclose such information for the future, could China provide a list of SOEs 
that have received, in the past, direct transfers, and the yearly amounts received by each of them?  
Reply:  Enterprise (including SOEs) information such as  shareholder 's name, capital contribution, 
etc is made public, please refer to www.gsxt.gov.cn for more informaiton.   
 
Page 83, para 3.155 -3.156  
Several changes to labelling and packaging requirements took place duri ng the review period. For 
example, the Food Safety Law and its implementing measures that sets out detailed requirements. 
Moreover, other new legislation like the New Cosmetic Regulation contains mandatory information 
requirements such ingredients/ quantit y that may get in conflict with protection of trade secrets with 
commercial value, i.e. formula.  
 
EU Question No 42  
a) In case of conflict with rights and obligations for the exporter, could China explain how they 
would guarantee consistency between differe nt legislative pieces?  
 
Reply:  China attaches great importance to the protection of business secrets. The Regulation on the 
Supervision and Administration of Cosmetics and the Measures for the Administration of the 
Registration and Recordation of Cosmetics include detailed provisions on the protection of business 
secrets, and, in accordance with the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information, keep 
secret information involving business secrets. In full consideration for the protection of  business 
secret and intellectual property right, China only requires enterprises to submit the abstract rathe r 
than the full text of materials used to assess the claimed effects of cosmetics. To protect consumers ' 
legal rights and interests, information r eleased to the public domain is limited to basic product 
information and doesn 't involve business secret.  
 
b) Will China coordinate ongoing revision processes impacting rules on the labelling and foresee 
a transition period before entry into force of these different measures in order to allow manufacturers 
enough time to adapt to new requirements?  
 
Reply:  The Reg ulations on Labels of Cosmetics issued by the National Medical Products 
Administration (No.77 of 2021) will come into effect on May 1, 2022. The Regulations leaves a 
reasonable transition period for the industry in full consideration for the industry 's actual situations 
and avoids the waste of packaging materials. It allows a two -year transition period for products 
already registered or kept on record before May 1, 2022. If the products are not properly labeled in 
accordance with the Regulations, the regist rant must update the labelling prior to May 1, 2023 to 
comply with the Regulations.The Measures for the Supervision and Administration of Food Labeling 
currently has some issues under study, communication and coordination. After a consensus is 
reached, the  legislative process can be accelerated.  
 
Follow -up to  EU Question No 42 : EU is thankful for the clarification and confirming the transition 
period for labelling under Regulations on Labels of Cosmetics. Could China confirm whether it expects 
the same coo rdination and transition period for regulations related to Food Safety Law?  
 
Reply:  Food Safety Law and its Implementing Regulations do not have specific requirements for the 
administration  of specific food production varieties. China sets corresponding requirements 
according to specific provisions on food production and administration.  
 
Page 98, para 3.205  
"SOEs are very important in China 's economy, in particular for the Government 's emplo yment and 
social and regional policy objectives " 
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  EU Question No 56:  Could China confirm whether all SOEs operate according to commercial 
considerations, as required by China 's WTO accession commitments? If not, what other 
considerations guide their operat ions?  
 
Reply:  Commercial -oriented SOEs act on commercial considerations.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question No 56:  
EU question 56 concerned * all* SOEs, but China 's reply only mentions "commercial -oriented SOEs ". 
Could China confirm whether * all* SOEs , also other than "commercial -oriented SOEs ", act on 
commercial considerations, as required by China 's WTO accession commitments? If not, what other 
considerations guide their operations? What is the role of the "Government 's employment and social 
and regi onal policy objectives " mentioned in para 3.205 of the secretariat report?  
Reply: China has been conscientiously fulfilling its WTO accession commitments, and adhering to 
the market -oriented direction in the SOEs reform. The SOEs, as important market playe rs, continue 
to stimulate their vitality through market -oriented reforms. The SOEs engage in commercial 
activities based on commercial considerations. The SOEs in the public welfare category introduce 
market mechanisms, and raise the efficiency and capabil ities of public service primarily for the 
purposes of ensuring people 's livelihood, serving the society at large, and providing public goods 
and services.  
 
Page 106, para 3.228  
Reference is made to "that the finance authorities at different levels of gove rnment review suppliers ' 
complaints regarding government procurement activities at their respective levels. The results of 
complaint reviews are published in designated media. "  
 
EU Question 63:  Could China specify in how many cases of the filed complaints  a non -compliance 
with the relevant rules was found?   
 
Reply : China  suggest EU to clarify what does "relevant rules " refer to.  
 
Follow -up to EU Question 63 : The EU would like to clarify the question. The EU is interested 
against which rules and /or criteria the government reviews suppliers ' complaints and in how many 
cases of the filed complaints a non -compliance with these rules was found?  
 
Reply : Chinese government reviews complaints in accordance with relevant laws and regulations 
such as the Gove rnment Procurement Law. Regarding how many cases of the filed complaints a non -
compliance with these rules were found, there is no relevant data for the time being.  
 
Page 108, para 3.238.  
The China Manufacturing 2025 strategy highlights, inter alia, the importance of IP protection and 
enforcement to promote IP -intensive sectors such as robotics, information technology, and clean 
energy.  
EU Question No 67:  Could China provide information ab out the specific IPR measures undertaken 
in the framework of the China 2025 strategy for robotics and 3D printing?  
 
Reply : To meet the demand for IPR protection in new business forms and models including the 
robotics industry and strengthen the developmen t of IPR systems in related fields, China has 
continuously improved the examination standards in related technical fields by increasing the survey 
and research of social needs and refining the mechanism of regular revision of patent examination 
guidelines.  In 2017, China revised the Patent Examination Guide to explicitly include technical 
solutions related to new business models in the scope of patent protection objects and improved the 
requirements for writing claims of inventions involving computer progra ms. In 2019, China revised 
the Patent Examination Guide, adding specific chapters to define the examination rules for patent 
applications involving new fields and business forms such as AI, "Internet plus ", big data and 
blockchain. China refined the examin ation rules from various perspectives such as judgment of 
authorized objects, novelty and inventiveness examination, claim and specification drafting and 
interpreted the rules through typical cases, both positive and negative. In 2020 and 2021, China 
continued to revise the Patent Examination Guide, which has been open for public comments. The 
relevant modifications further identify and improve the object examination benchmarks of 
applications for invention patents involving computer programs, making clear that claims of patent 
applications for inventions concerning computer programs can be written as computer program WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  products and that the improvement of the internal performance of computer by algorithms and the 
effect of user experience enhancement should b e considered in the inventive review.  
 
How the participation of foreign investment and technologies has been ensured? How protection of 
IPR of foreign companies is guaranteed?   
 
Reply : The Chinese government has always been committed to treating and protec ting the 
intellectual property rights of domestic and foreign enterprises on an equal footing. China National 
Intellectual Property Administration protects the IPRs of foreign investors and their investment 
enterprises in strict accordance with relevant pr ovisions of the Foreign Investment Law and other 
regulations.  
 
Follow up to EU Question No 67:  Is China developing safety standards for robots (whether they 
be public or private, national or regional) and what would be the applicable IPR provisions for such 
standard -setting activity?  
Could you please specify in more detail the 2019 changes to China 's Patent Examination Guide, and 
could you please clarify whether this Guide contain any examples of application of those 
amendments to robots?  
 
Reply:  China has carried out relevant works on developing standards for robots, including the 
environmental reli ability of industrial robots, electrical safety requirements for service robots, and 
safety requirements for weeding robots.The National Standards Committee has issued the Provisions 
of National Standards Involving Patents (Interim), which stipulate that t he content of the necessary 
patent principles, procedures and requirements of national standards involving patents must comply 
with the Provisions. The Provisions also apply to industry standards and local standards that involve 
patents in the development and/or revision process.  
 
Detailed changes to China 's Patent Examination Guide are as follows: Part 2, Chapter 9 adds the 
Section 6 named "Relevant Regulations on the Examination of Invention Patent Applications 
Containing Algorithm Features or Business Ru les and Method Features ", under which are 
three  subsections 6.1  (Examination Benchmarks), 6.2 (Examination Examples)  and 6.3  (Writing of 
Instructions and Claims).  
 
Page 116, para 3.289  
The Report refers to one of the provisions under the China -United Stat es Phase 1 Economic and 
Trade Agreement, i.e. the burden shifting to an accused party in civil proceedings for 
misappropriation when the holder of a trade secret has produced prima facie evidence of a 
reasonable indication of trade secret misappropriation by the accused party .  
 
EU Question No 76:  Could China explain the standard that is used in assessing the prima facie 
evidence related to trade secrets? Would China consider providing guidance on the standards of 
prima facie evidence and rules of burden of proof transfer e.g. through judicial inter pretation?  
 
Reply:  The Law of the People 's Republic of China Against Unfair Competition provides the 
assignment of prima facie evidence and burden of proof related to trade secrets. Article 32 provides 
that "in the civil judicial procedures for infringeme nt of trade secrets, the right holder of the trade 
secret shall provide prima facie evidence to prove that confidentiality measures have taken on the 
claimed trade secret and reasonably demonstrate that the trade secret has been infringed. The 
alleged infr inger shall prove that the trade secrets claimed by the right holder do not belong to the 
trade secret under this law. The alleged infringer shall prove that there is no infringement of trade 
secrets if the right holder of the trade secret provide prima fa cie evidence to reasonably demonstrate 
that the trade secret has been infringed, and provide one of the following evidence: (a) there is 
evidence that the alleged infringer has a channel or opportunity to obtain the trade secret, and the 
information used i s substantially the same with the trade secret; (b) there is evidence that the trade 
secret has been disclosed or used by the alleged infringer, or is under the risk of being disclosed or 
used; (c) there is other evidence that the trade secret has been inf ringed by the alleged infringer ". 
 
The Regulations of the Supreme People 's Court on Issues Regarding the Application of Law in Hearing 
Civil Cases of Trade Secret Infringement, which came into effect on September 12, 2020, further 
clarifies the relevant issue.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 472 - 
 
  Follow -up to EU Question 76: Could China explain what kind of clarifications are provided for the 
assessment of prima facie  evidence in the Regulations of the Supreme People 's Court on Issues 
Regarding the Application of Law in Hearing Civil Cases of Trade Secret Infringement? Could China 
cite the relevant provisions of the Regulations?  
 
Reply : Article  32 of the Anti -Unfair Competition Law provides rules for the prima facie evidence 
submitted by the right holder claiming trade se crets - "Evidence that the alleged infringer  has a 
channel or an opportunity to access the trade secret and that the information it uses is substantially 
the same as the trade secret ." 
 
Article 12 of the Provisions of the Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on Several Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Infringements upon Trade 
Secrets further defines the determination of whether employees and former employees "have 
channels or opportunities to acquire " trade secrets  as follows, "A people 's court may, when 
determining whether an employee or a former employee has channels or opportunities to obtain a 
right holder 's trade secret, consider the following factors in relation thereto: (1) his or her duties, 
responsib ilities and authority; (2) the job undertaken by him/her, or task assigned to him/her by 
the entity; (3) specific circumstances of his or her participation in production and distribution 
activities relating to the trade secret; (4) whether he/she keeps, us es, stores, reproduces, controls 
or otherwise accesses or obtains any trade secret and the carrier thereof; and (5) other factors that 
need to be taken into consideration. " 
 
Page 141, para 4.60  
The authorities state that China regards the development of c lean and low -carbon energy as the 
main direction for adjusting the energy mix.  
 
EU Question No 86:  Will China equally pursue a clean energy policy in the rollout of its overseas 
investments and development aid?  
 
Reply:  Overseas investment that does not meet the environmental protection, energy consumption 
and safety standards of the investment destina tion country is listed as restricted overseas 
investment by the government. In July this year, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of 
Ecology and Environment jointly issued the Guidelines for Green Development of Outbound 
Investment and International  Cooperation, actively guiding enterprises to participate in 
outbound  investment and cooperation in the field of green development. On September 21, 
President Xi Jinping, at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, sai d that China will step up support for other developing countries in developing green 
and low -carbon energy, and will not build new coal -fired power projects abroad. This statement is 
widely welcomed by the international community. China takes the improveme nt of global 
environmental governance and active response to climate change as important considerations when 
providing development assistance.  
 
Follow up to EU Question No. 86 : With regards to President Xi Jinping 's announcement at the 
General Debate of t he 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, when will new coal -fired power 
projects abroad be effectively halted and will this commitment cover plants approved but not yet 
built?  
 
Reply:  Relevant departments of Chinese government are drawing up detailed wo rk plans currently. 
China will fulfill its commitments .  
 
Page 155, para 4.136  
EU Question No 96:  
a) In order to obtain a better understanding of the actual impact of the recent liberalisation  and 
the evolution of the participation of foreign -invested companies in the financial sector in the Chinese 
market, could China identify the market share of foreign -invested companies in the banking, asset 
management. and life and non -life insurance secto rs for each of the years from 2016 -2020, as well 
as the total assets of Chinese state -owned financial institutions and the percentage of their market 
share in these same sectors for the same period?  
b) China has focused its recent reforms on removing foreign  equity caps and joint venture 
requirements, as well as revising its prudential and supervisory regime. Nonetheless, in order to be 
able to take advantage of these openings in the Chinese market, foreign financial institutions need 
to obtain the necessary licences and authorisations, a complicated regulatory process which has WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  created difficulties for and acted as a barrier to the participation of foreign institutions in the past. 
How will China guarantee that foreign financial institutions are able to obtai n licences and 
authorisations in an efficient and transparent manner in the future?  
 
Reply to questions above:  As of December 2016, the total assets of banking institutions were 
RMB 232 trillion. The original insurance premium income of life insurance com panies totaled 
RMB 926.6 billion, with Chinese capital accounting for 97.96% and foreign capital 2.04%. The 
original insurance premium income of non -life insurance companies totaled RMB 2,169.3 billion, with 
Chinese capital making up 93.60% and foreign cap ital 6.40%. In 2016, foreign -funded banks ' assets 
totaled RMB 2.93 trillion, accounting for about 1.66% of the total assets of commercial banks 
(excluding post banks).  
 
Up to December 2017, the total assets of banking institutions were RMB 252 trillion. The original 
insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled RMB 1054.1 billion, with Chinese 
capital taking up 98.04% and foreign capital 1.96%. The original  insurance premium income of non -
life insurance companies totaled RMB 2604 billion, including 92.57% of Chinese capital and 7.43% 
of foreign capital. In 2017, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled RMB 3.24 trillion, accounting for 
about 1.70% of the total a ssets of commercial banks (excluding post banks).  
 
As of December 2018, the total assets of banking institutions were RMB 268 trillion. The original 
insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled RMB 1,175.6 billion, comprising 
98.06% of Chin ese capital and 1.94% of foreign capital. The original insurance premium income 
of non-life insurance companies totaled RMB 2,626.1 billion, with Chinese capital accounting 
for 91.90% and foreign capital 8.10%. In 2018, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled  RMB 3.35 
trillion, accounting for about 1.64% of the total assets of commercial banks (excluding post banks).  
 
Up to December 2019, the total assets of banking institutions were RMB 290 trillion. The original 
insurance premium income of life insurance com panies totaled RMB 1,301.6 billion, with 
Chinese  capital accounting for 98.06% and foreign capital 1.94%. The original insurance premium 
income of non -life insurance companies totaled RMB 2,962.8 billion, with Chinese capital making 
up 90.53% and foreign c apital 9.47%. In 2019, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled 
RMB 3.48 trillion, taking up about 1.50% of the total assets of commercial banks (including post 
banks).  
 
As of December 2020, the total assets of banking institutions amounted to RMB 320 trillion . The 
original insurance premium income of life insurance companies totaled RMB 1358.4 billion, 
with 97.44% of Chinese capital and 2.56% of foreign capital. The original insurance premium income 
of non -life insurance companies totaled RMB 3,167.4 billion, with Chinese capital making up 89.97% 
and foreign capital 10.03%. In 2020, foreign -funded banks ' assets totaled RMB 3.78 trillion, 
accounting for about 1.46% of the total assets of commercial banks (including post banks).  
 
In July 2017, PBoC issued an anno uncement to define the access procedures, practice requirements 
and code of conduct for overseas agencies to conduct credit rating business in the inter -bank bond 
market. In July 2019, the Financial Committee of the State Council further made clear that fo reign-
funded rating agencies can rate all types of bonds in the inter -bank bond market and exchange bond 
market. In November 2019, China issued the Interim Measures for the Administration of the Credit 
Rating Industry, identifying that foreign credit ratin g agencies enjoy national treatment when 
applying to expand their business in China. In May 2020, the Financial Committee of the State 
Council once again stated that it would promote the further opening of the credit rating industry to 
the outside world. I n addition, in the vast majority of countries across the world, financial institutions 
are required to hold a license to operate. On the basis of prudential supervision and risk control, 
China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) is committe d to improving the 
business environment, optimizing the supervision of foreign -funded institutions and steadily 
promoting the opening up of the banking and insurance sectors to the outside world. Since 2018, 
CBIRC has announced three rounds of 34 new measu res for opening up, involving the abolition of 
restrictions on shareholdings of foreign investors, relaxation of conditions for access to foreign 
institutions and business, expansion of the business scope of foreign institutions, optimization of 
regulatory  rules for foreign institutions and simplification of administrative licensing processes. 
Currently, the threshold for foreign -invested financial institutions to obtain banking and insurance 
licenses has been significantly lowered with a simplified process . 
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 474 - 
 
  Follow -up to EU Question No 96:  Could China inform on whether there is a delay between a 
submission of an application for a license and the acknowledgement of such an application on the 
part of the relevant regulator (CBIRC, CSRC)? If so, how long does it take the regulator to 
acknowledge receipt of an application?  
 
Reply:  In the vast majority of countries in the world, operating in the financial industry requires a 
license. In addition to prudential supervision and risk control, CBIRC has been committed to 
improving the business environment, optimizing the supervision of f oreign institutions and steadily 
promoting the opening up of the banking and insurance industry. Since 2018, CBIRC has 
announced  34 new liberalization measures, such as lifting restrictions on foreign ownership, further 
opening market to foreign institutio ns and businesses, expanding business scope of foreign 
institutions, optimizing rules for supervision of foreign institutions and simplifying administrative 
licensing process. Currently, the threshold for foreign financial institutions to obtain banking an d 
insurance licenses has been significantly lowered and the whole process has been simplified.  
 
According to the Provisions of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission on 
Administrative Licensing Procedures and other regulations, if the applic ation materials are complete 
and satisfy the prescribed requirements, the authority shall accept the administrative licensing 
application within five days after it receives complete application materials, and shall issue to the 
applicant an acceptance noti ce. If the authority accepting the application finds that the application 
materials are incomplete or fail to satisfy the prescribed requirements in comparison with the 
catalogue of and requirements for the format of application materials for administrativ e licensing 
items, it shall, within five days after receiving the application materials, issue to the applicant a 
notice of supplements and corrections so as to inform the applicant of all required supplements and 
corrections at one time, and require the a pplicant to submit the supplemented and corrected 
application materials within three months after the issuance of the notice of supplements and 
corrections. The CBIRC carries out relevant work in strict accordance with relevant laws and 
regulations without  any delay.  
 
Page 157, para 4.139  
The Reports states that 'The authorities have introduced a phased deferment of loan repayments 
scheme, in which banks have been allowed to grant deferment of loan repayments to micro, small, 
and medium -sized enterprises ( MSMEs) and other eligible firms upon application ' (emphasis added).  
 
EU Question No 98:  Can China state, what are the 'other eligible firms ' which benefit from this 
deferment of loan repayments?  How long will this arrangement last?  
 
Reply:  According to the arrangement of the State Council, in 2020 the People 's Bank of China 
created the Inclusive Scheme of Deferment of Loan Repayments for Micro and Small Enterprises and 
the Credit Loan Support Scheme, two direct monetary policy tools, to hel p micro and small 
enterprises (SMEs) overcome their liquidity difficulties caused by the pandemic. According to the 
Schemes, SMEs and banks may negotiate deferred repayment of principal and interest for maturing 
loans. The State Council decided at its exec utive meeting held in March 2021 to further extend the 
implementation period of the two direct monetary tools to the end of 2021 to help SMEs get through 
short-term liquidity difficulties and play a better role in stabilizing the economy and employment.  
 
Follow -up to EU question no 98 : Can China state what the 'other eligible firms ' are on top of 
MSMEs and SMEs? How long will this arrangement last?  
 
Reply:  In 2020, the PBOC created the Inclusive Scheme of Deferment of Loan Repayments for Micro 
and Small Ent erprises and the Credit Loan Support Scheme, two direct monetary policy tools, to 
help micro and small enterprises (SMEs) overcome their liquidity difficulties caused by the pandemic.  
This arrangement will be  extended until the end of 2021.  
 
Page 169, par a 4.204  
EU Question No 103:  Could China confirm that a foreign -invested enterprise can be set up in a 
PFTZ, making use of their less restrictive foreign -ownership restrictions, to serve clients with its 
value -added telecommunications services across mainland China and not just in the PFTZ itself?  
 
Reply:  PFTZs are a pilot ground for China 's reform and opening  up. The core task is institutional 
innovation. In promoting deeper reform and higher level of openness on a pilot basis, China has 
advocated such a practice in a larger scale after gaining experience, exploring ways to deepen reform WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 475 - 
 
  and expand openness an d accumulating relevant experience. China will play the leading role of 
PFTZs and develop new institutions for a higher -level open economy.  
 
EU Follow -up question to 103 : Could China confirm that a foreign -invested enterprise set up in 
a PFTZ can serve cli ents with its value -added telecommunications services across mainland China 
and not just in the PFTZ itself?  
 
Reply : The scope of operating Internet access  service (providing Internet access service for Internet 
users) is limited to the PFTZ,  other pilot services  can be served across the nationwide .  
 
Page 177, para 4.250  
As at end -2020, 67 airlines were established in China; 50 were state owned, 9 have foreign equit y 
participation, and 8 are listed as stock companies. The CAAC has approved 14 private or private -
holding airlines. Information was not available as to whether it is required for persons or goods to 
be transported on nationally registered airlines. Restric tions on foreign investment in civil aviation 
remain unchanged.  
We consider that China could issue new CRS (Computerized Reservation System) regulations to 
replace current rules (2012 CRS (CCAR -315)) allowing meaningful market access and full reciprocity 
with the EU.   
 
EU Question No 114 : Is the Chinese regulator, CAAC, going to change restrictions on "transport 
E-ticket itinerary system " allowing foreign CRS companies to issue that official document?   
 
Reply:  Currently, the Civil Aviation Administration of China is promoting the revision of the 
Regulations on the Services and Management of Computerized Reservation System of Civil Aviation , 
which will be announced after the revision is completed.  And China woul d suggest EU to make 
clarifications on this question and provide more background information .  
 
Follow -up to EU question No 114: EU stakeholders reported difficulties with market access in this 
area. New CRS regulations should fully open Air Ticket Distrib ution Market, i.e Chinese airline 
domestic, Chinese airline international, foreign airline international, and foreign airline 
codeshare/interline domestic segments. These new rules would ensure real enforcement of China 's 
Anti-Monopoly Law, particularly wi th regard to abuse of dominant position and anti -competitive 
market practices and allow fair competition.  
However, foreign companies need to be able to print what it is called "transport E -ticket itinerary ", 
as travel agencies have to deliver that official  document for domestic flights. It seems that only 
Travelsky may have authorization from CAAC.  
Based on this further background, the EU would appreciate if China completed its reply.  
 
Reply : According  to Chinese regulations on invoice administration, the air transport E -ticket itinerary 
is within the scope of invoice administration. It is a reimbursement voucher for passengers buying 
e-tickets of airlines registered in China and is not applicable to fl ights operated by foreign airlines. 
Foreign airlines may provide relevant valid bills as passenger reimbursement vouchers in accordance 
with applied regulations . 
 
WT/TPR/G/415  – Government report  
Page 18, para 4.4.1  
EU Question No 134:  
a) How is China worki ng with Chinese firms and lenders to deliver more sustainable impact of 
BRI projects in partner countries? How does China address possible negative externalities of such 
projects such as debt sustainability risks or detrimental climate change and environme ntal impact?  
 
Reply : This year marks the eighth anniversary of the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative. Over 
the last eight years, China has signed more than 200 Belt and Road cooperation agreements 
with over 100 countries and dozens of international organizations. Against th e backdrop of the 
COVID -19 pandemic, Belt and Road cooperation has bucked the trend and demonstrated strong 
resilience to risk, playing a vital role in supporting countries around the world in battling the 
pandemic, maintaining economic stability and ensur ing people 's livelihoods. China always gives 
prominence to debt management and is committed to building a long -term, stable and sustainable 
financing system that is well -placed to manage risks. It also works to help the relevant countries 
strengthen their debt sustainability and improve their ability to prevent sovereign risk. The Guiding 
Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road Initiative were jointly ratified by WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 476 - 
 
  28 countries including China. Due to the impact of the pandemic and the resultant global recession, 
some developing countries are indeed struggling with heavy debt burdens. In view of this, China has 
canceled the debt of relevant African countries in the form  of interest -free government loans due to 
mature by the end of 2020. In terms of the debt structure of debtor nations, most of the debts are 
owed to multilateral financial institutions and commercial creditors of developed countries, which 
should also play  a part in relevant debt relief initiatives.  
 
b) What are the Environmental, Social and Governance standards underpinning projects under 
the Green Silk Road?  
 
Reply to a and b:  In pursuing the "Belt and Road " Initiative, China has always upheld the concept 
of green development, promoted green and low -carbon construction and operation of infrastructure; 
emphasized the concept of ecological civilization in investment and trade; and participated in 
cooperation in such areas as ecological environment governance, biodiversity protection, and 
response to climate change. The following measures have been taken to make projects more 
sustainable and to prevent negative impacts on the ecological environment and climate change:  
First, The Measures for the Administration o f Overseas Investment issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce proposes points that "pay attention to environmental protection, labor protection and 
corporate culture construction ", and the Measures for the Administration of Outbound Investment 
by Enterprises is sued by the National Development and Reform Commission makes it clear that " 
pay attention to ecological and environmental protection ". 
 
Second, the Ministry of Commerce and the former Ministry of Environmental Protection jointly issued 
the Guideline on En vironmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation. The National 
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the People 's Bank of China, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the All -China Federation of Industry and Commerce joint ly issued the 
Code of Conduct for Overseas Investment Operations of Private Enterprises. These documents 
provide operational guidelines on ecological and environmental protection for enterprises engaging 
in outbound investment.  
 
Third, the Ministry of Com merce updates the Guidance  for Countries  (Regions) Outbound  Investment 
Cooperation on a yearly basis, which contains requirements on environmental protection of various 
countries, and supports the ecological and environmental protection work in the process  of pursuing 
the "Belt and Road " Initiative.  
 
In 2013, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (former Ministry of 
Environmental Protection) jointly issued the Guideline on Environmental Protection in Foreign 
Investment and Coo peration , which clearly stated that "the projects invested in, constructed and 
operated by enterprises shall comply with the laws and regulations of the host country, and shall 
apply for relevant permits on environmental protection from the local governmen t". 
 
In 2021, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment jointly issued the  
Guideline on Green Development in Foreign Investment and Cooperation , proposing that "if the host 
country does not have relevant laws and regulations or the environmental protection standards are 
too low, Chinese enterprises are encouraged to carry out investment cooperation activities according 
to the standards of international organizations or of multilateral institutions or the 
Chinese  standards ".  
 
c) Can China provide more information on the development of the Digital Silk Road and how 
do data protection and privacy safeguards feature in these initiatives?  
 
Reply:  In recent years, a batch of cross -border fiber optic cables and submarine ca bles have been 
up and running. Cross -border e -commerce has become a new highlight of the "Digital Silk Road " 
cooperation, while digital content and online tourism have flourished. Countries have been expanding 
cooperation in smart cities, intelligent trans portation, telemedicine, online education and other 
industrial applications, so that the achievements in Internet development can benefit their people. 
In addition, China has played an essential role in building a community with a shared future in 
cyberspa ce. It has opened the "China Belt and Road Network (yidaiyilu.gov.cn) " to publish 
information on cooperation between China and countries along the "Belt and Road " routes in digital 
fields such as AI, big data, cloud computing and smart cities as well as in frastructure interconnection 
and digital economy. The data protection and privacy protection requirements set in the relevant WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 477 - 
 
  initiatives can promote more in -depth information flow, technology exchanges, digital trade and 
commerce across countries.  
 
Follow  up to EU Question No. 134:   
How does China assess and monitor the implementation of the Code of Conduct for Overseas 
Investment Operations of Private Enterprises and the Guideline on Environmental Protection in 
Foreign Investment and Cooperation (2013)? Can China provide more information on the 
expectations and objectives related to the implementation of the Guideline on Green Development 
in Foreign Investment and Cooperation (2021)?  
Can China expand on the data and privacy protection requirements set in Digital Silk Road initiatives 
and technology exchanges across countries?  
 
Reply : China  encourages Chinese enterprises to attach great importance to environment protection 
in overseas investment. The implementation of the Guidelines for Environmental Protection in 
Foreign Investment and Cooperation helped enterprises increase their awareness  of environmental 
protection, gain better understanding of and comply with environmental protection laws and 
regulations of host countries, and actively fulfill their social responsibilities, thereby making positive 
contributions to the sustainable develop ment of host countries.  
 
Guideline on Green Development in Foreign Investment and Cooperation (2021) aims to encourage 
and guide enterprises to carry out green investment, green construction, green production, green 
operation and green innovation. Chinese  enterprises will join hands with host countries to build a 
clean and beautiful world, and make due contribution to addressing global climate change and 
promoting low -carbon transformation and post -epidemic green recovery.  
 
In order to ensure the rapid development of the digital economy while carrying out data security 
governance and protecting personal privacy from infringement, China has always been committed 
to strengthening and improving the construction of data regulations, systems and standar ds. In this 
regard, a number of regulations have been released, including the Network Security Law, Data 
Security Law, and Personal Information Protection Law, etc., which have further improved the legal 
and institutional environment. China continuously in creased the supervision of data security and 
privacy protection to ensure the scientific use of big data, and safeguard data security and personal 
privacy. China will carry out international exchanges and cooperation in the fields of data security 
governan ce, data development and utilization, participate in the formulation of international rules 
and standards related to data security.  
 
Page 20, para 4.5.3  
EU question No 135 b) : Which quality control measures are in place to ensure that China -
supported capa city-building programmes effectively contribute to those goals?  
 
Reply:  China has assisted other developing countries in mapping out their development blueprints 
scientifically. According to the needs of recipient countries, it has helped them formulate 
development plans, policies and regulations in relevant fields and enhanced the capacity for planning 
and coordinated development. It has shared development experiences and strengthened the 
development of bilateral human resources mechanisms for development  cooperation. Based on the 
actual needs of countries, China has provided targeted capacity -building support by cooperating with 
multiple international organizations or institutions, including the United Nations, in multilateral 
capacity building. China wil l further improve the supervision and management mechanism and 
project evaluation mechanism. Based on its own national conditions and drawing on international 
experience, it will revise and refine the foreign aid statistical indicator system, operate a mod ern 
foreign aid statistical information system, and enhance the effectiveness of capacity building . 
 
Follow up EU Question No. 135 : Can China provide more information on its foreign aid statistical 
indicator system and which principles will underpin revisions to turn it into a "modern " information 
system?  
 
Reply:  The foreign aid statistical indicator system is under formulation and imp rovement. The EU 
has carried out a large number of practices in the field of development assistance, and China 
welcomes experience sharing from the EU.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  ICELAND  
I. Fisheries subsidies:  
According to the report, no updated data were available on fisheries su bsidies from 2019, and on 
fuel subsidies to the fisheries sector over the whole review period.  
 
Question:  Could China please elaborate on these subsidies and inform when these will be notified 
to the SCM Committee?  
 
Reply : China has already notified the fisheries subsidies (2019 -2020) to the SCM Committee of  WTO.  
 
II. Financial support to the aluminium sector:  
 
Question:  Could China please provide information regarding its financial support to the aluminum 
sector and indicate when China will notify such support programmes to the WTO (see para 23 of 
WT/TPR/S/415)?  
 
Reply : please see the SCM notification by China as contain ed in the WTO document 
G/SCM/N/372/CHN.  
 
III. SPS 
According to the report, China introduced emergency measures on new testing requirements for 
foreign manufacturers of imported cold -chain foods in 2020 due to the COVID -19 pandemic. The 
measures are still in force.  
 
Question:  Could China elaborate on how l ong such emergency measures will remain in force and 
any further information regarding the scientific rationale and implementation of these measures?  
 
Reply: In order to effectively prevent the risk of the COVID -19 virus being imported through 
imported col d-chain food, the State Administration for Market Supervision, following the instruction 
from the State Council 's joint prevention and control mechanism, requested that those producers 
and operators of imported cold -chain food who cannot present inspection  and quarantine certificate, 
nucleic acid monitoring certificate, disinfection certificate, and traceability information shall not 
engaged in cold -chain food processing, producing and sales on the market. Any products of the same 
batch that are tested COVI D-19 positive shall be removed from the shelfs and prohibited from selling, 
and shall be sealed in storage in the special zone. The above measures are in line with Article 42 
Paragraph 1, Article 44, Article 55 of the "Law of the People 's Republic of China  on the Prevention 
and Control of Infectious Diseases " and Article 42 Paragraph 1 and Article 92, paragraph 2 of the 
"Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China ". 
 
IV. Energy  
According to the report, private investment, including FDI, is encouraged in the development of the 
renewable energy sector. In the 36 -Clause on Private Investment, domestic private capital is 
encouraged to build new energy sectors such as wind, solar, geo thermal and biomass power.  
 
Question:  Are there any restrictions or joint venture requirements regarding foreign investments 
in the renewable energy sector?  
 
Reply: According to the negative list for foreign investment, the Chinese side shall hold the 
controlling majority of shares in the joint ventures regarding the construction and operation of 
energy and nuclear power stations. There is no restriction on access to wind power, solar power, 
geothermal power and biomass energy.  
 
V. Gender  
What is the participation of women in the economy of China?  
Have specific barriers that limit women 's participation in trade been identified?  
Has China implemented any specific measures to encourage women 's participation in trade and 
promote women 's entr epreneurship, or are such measures being developed?  
Are the effects of trade policy on women and men measured and monitored, and if so, how?  
 
Reply: Equal participation in economic activities and fair access to economic resources are the basic 
conditions f or women 's survival and development. In promoting the strategic adjustment of WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  economic structure and the reform of transforming the economic development modes, China fully 
protects women 's economic rights and interests, and promotes women 's equal participa tion in 
economic development and equal enjoyment of the results of reform and development. Specifically, 
more and more women  are gradually getting  out of poverty and the number of poor women has  
dropped by a large margin ; women 's equal employment rights  have been guaranteed ; efforts have 
been made to promote women 's employment and entrepreneurship, and supportive policies and 
measures  have been introduced  in light of the difficulties faced by different groups of women in 
employment and entrepreneur ship. For example, China implements the financial discount policy of 
small secured loans to encourage women 's employment and entrepreneurship; develop domestic 
service and hand -woven industries to provide services for urban and rural women to find jobs near 
their home  and facilitate transfer employment; carry out employment and entrepreneurship support 
actions for female college students, and provide employment training, entrepreneurship guidance 
and trainee positions for female college students; implement the "Sunshine Project ", improve the 
quality and employment skills of rural female workers , and create conditions for promoting the 
transfer of rural female workers to non -agricultural industries and cities and towns. There are no 
specific barriers to women 's participation in trade.  
 
The recently released Outline for the Development of Chinese Women (2021 -2030) announced 
specific policies and measures to encourage women to participate in economy and trade and promote 
women 's entrepreneurship, including : 1. Improve laws, regulations and policies to ensure women 's 
equal access to economic resources, participation in economic construction and enjoyment of 
economic development fruits;  2. Intensify efforts to eliminate gender discr imination in employment, 
implement laws, regulations and policies  across the board  to eliminate gender discrimination in 
employment, and create a gender -equal employment mechanism and market environment ; 
3. Promote women 's employment and entrepreneurship. Improve the public employment service 
system, deepen the special activities of employment services, and promote the match of job and 
women. Give full play to the function of modern service industry and new business forms to absorb 
women  to the job market , and support women to participate in the skills training of employees in 
new business forms and new  economic  models. Provide more assistance and help for women with 
employment difficulties to find job through multiple chan nels. Support the development of national 
traditional handicrafts industry, improve the degree of organization, and promote the employment 
of women of all ethnic groups  to find jobs locally . Support female scientific and technological talents 
to join in sc ientific and technological entrepreneurship, develop rural e -commerce, encourage 
migrant women to return home to start businesses, and support women willing to start businesses 
in the countryside. Develop new financial and insurance products and service mo dels, and broaden 
financing channels for women 's entrepreneurship ; 4. Promote the employment and entrepreneurship 
of female college students ; 5. Improve women 's employment structure, optimize the lifelong 
vocational skills training system, enhance women 's vocational skills, and make more efforts to 
cultivate knowledge -based, skilled and innovative female workers. Constantly increase the 
proportion of women employed in high -tech industries, strategic emerging industries and modern 
service industries. Gradual ly eliminate occupational gender segregation and increase the proportion 
of women among employed persons in urban units. Expand the scale of rural women 's employment 
transfer and narrow the employment transfer gap between men and women ; 6. Strengthen the 
cultivation of female professional and technical personnel ; 7. Improve the labor safety of female 
workers ; 8. Safeguard the labor rights and interests of female workers and create favorable 
conditions for the career development of women after giving birth ; 9. Guarantee rural women 's 
equal enjoyment of various economic rights and interests.  
 
China will further strengthen the assessment and monitoring of women and men in trade policies.  
 
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  SAUDI ARABIA  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE Secretariat Report  
2  TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
4.4.1.3.3 Regulatory developments in insurance  
4.4.1.3.3.1 Developments in licensing requirements  
Page 161 (Para 5)  
Since 2018, the Central Government has launched several measures to open up the insurance 
industry, i ncluding abolishing the requirement of having a representative office in China for at least 
two years and 30 -year operation period to establish foreign -invested insurance institutions in China, 
allowing foreign insurance groups to invest in insurance insti tutions, and opening -up measures in 
the field of insurance intermediaries. On 15 October 2019, the State Council announced its decision 
to modify certain provisions in the Administrative Regulations on Foreign invested Insurance 
Companies100; it was follow ed in December 2019 by implementing rules published by the CBIRC.  
 
Questions:  
1. Could you provide information about the health insurance scheme in China, How health 
insurance is funded (state, employer, individual)? Is there a minimum coverage in health 
insurance?  
 
Reply: At present, China has initially established a multi -level system of medical security with basic 
medical insurance as the main body, various forms of supplementary medical insurance and 
commercial health insurance as supplements, and medical assistance as the foundation. Basic 
medical insurance includes basic medical insurance for employees and basic medical insurance for 
urban and rural residents. The medical insurance for employees covers the employed population and 
adopts a financing mechan ism which combines the payments of employers and the payments of 
employees. The premium rate of employers shall be controlled at about 6% of the total wage of 
employees, and the premium rate of employees is generally 2% of their wage incomes. Medical 
insurance for residents covers the non -employed population, and adopts a financing mechanism 
combining financial subsidies with individual contributions, with fixed financing amounts and annual 
adjustments. In 2020, the financial subsidy standard of medical ins urance for residents was no less 
than RMB 550 per person per year, and the rate for individual contribution was RMB 280. At present, 
the proportion of inpatient medical expenses paid within the scope of medical insurance for residents 
is around 70%, and th e payment cap by the insurance fund is about 6 times the per capita annual 
disposable income of local residents.  
 
PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
3  PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -WIN 
COOPERATION  
2  TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES  
2.4  Investment Regime  
2.4.3 Incentives to foreign direct investments  
Page 44 (Para 4)  
Page 9 (4)  
3.2.2 Actively expanding market access for foreign investment  
China further opens up its financial services … Third, as for the insurance sector, as of the end 
of 2019, the requirements of operating business for 30 years and operating a representative office 
for 2 consecutive years before the establishment of a foreign insurance institution were lifted 
nationwide, and foreign insurance group companies were allowed to invest in the establishment of 
insurance institutions. From 2020, the cap of foreign investment shareholding ratio in life insurance 
companies was eased to 100%.  
 
Questions:  
1. Would you please  explain the effect of liberalizing the insurance sector for foreign investment 
on promoting , attracting  international investment and the mutual benefits achieved for the investors 
and the insurance sector in China?  
 
Reply: By the end of December 2020, overseas insurance agencies from 16 countries and regions 
had established 66 foreign -funded insurance agencies in China, with more than 1,800 branches at 
all levels. By the end of December 2020, the total assets of foreign insu rance companies were 
RMB 1.7 trillion, an increase of more than 113 times compared with 2002 when China entered 
the WTO, with an average annual compound growth rate of 30.08%. In 2020, the original insurance WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 481 - 
 
  premium incomes of foreign insurance companies a mounted to RMB 352.4 billion, more than 
75 times higher than that in 2002, with an average annual compound growth rate of 27.22%.  
 
Opening to the outside world has comprehensively accelerated the development of China 's insurance 
industry, continuously impr oved the multi -level, wide coverage and differentiated insurance service 
system, constantly improved the service capacities and levels of insurance agencies, and significantly 
enhanced the risk management ability. The financial regulatory framework has bee n continuously 
improved and the regulatory effectiveness has continuously enhanced. Opening up has brought a 
win-win effect to China 's insurance industry.  
 
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 482 - 
 
  BRUNEI DARUSSALAM  
Questions regarding Secretariat Report  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3 Fisheries  
4.1.3.2 Legal, institutional, and policy framework  
Pg. 134  
4.36. MARA leads the preparation of draft laws and regulations related to fisheries, develops 
departmental regulations, and guides fishery law d evelopment. Local governments are in charge of 
fisheries affairs in their respective administrative areas, including marine fisheries in contiguous sea 
areas (unless the State Council designates otherwise). Official information was not provided on the 
presence of SOEs in the shipping sector.  
 
Question:  Can the People 's Republic of China provide further information on the presence of SOEs 
in the fishing and shipping sector?  
 
Reply : For further information on the SOEs  in the shipping sector, please see the list of the SOEs at 
Central level at the following website :  
(http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/index.html).  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3 Fisheries  
4.1.3 .2 Legal, institutional, and policy framework  
Pg. 135  
4.39. The main government strategy for the fishing sector implemented during the review period 
was the 13th Five -Year Plan on Fishery Development (2016 -20).32 The Plan sought to tackle some 
of the main challenges facing the sector, including infrastructure weaknesses and old fishing vessels, 
and requirements in the areas of fisheries insurance and the development of a legal framework for 
fisheries and its enforcement. ... One of the elements of the Plan is to increase public financial 
investment in the fisheries sector to, inter alia, establish a policy support system that is conducive 
to the development of modern fisheries. Elements include reform and improvement of the fishery oil 
price subsidy and a fo cus on supporting the reduction in the number of boats, the renovation and 
transformation of fishing vessels, the construction of artificial reefs, the maintenance and 
transformation of fishing ports, the standardization of ponds, the further development o f factory -
based aquaculture, and subsidies for banned fishing.33 
 
Question: Has a new Five -Year Plan on Fishery Development for post 2020 been introduced and if 
so could the People 's Republic of China provide further information?  
 
Reply : The 14th Five -Year Plan on Fishery Development has not been published, as it is still in the 
process of drafting.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.1 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
4.1.3 Fisheries  
4.1.3.3 Government support to the fisheries sector  
Pg. 135  
4.40. Support to the sector is provided by both the Central Government and local/provincial 
governments. China 's latest notification to the WTO covers the period 2017 -18 and contains six 
incentives/support programmes at the Central Government level; these relate to fuel subsidies and 
supporting fish processing, enhancing fish stocks, supporting aquatic breed improving farms, 
preventing aquatic animal disease, and scrapping and renovating fishing vessels (Table A4.1). 
According to the authorities, the Govern ment will shortly issue a new policy to terminate fuel and 
boat construction subsidies, with the last of these pay -outs being made at end -2020.  
4.41. Twenty -three programmes over the period 2017 -18 were notified to the WTO regarding 
measures in place in th e coastal provinces of Hebei, Jilin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, 
Guangdong, and Liaoning. These included support for marine economic development, marine and 
fishery structural adjustment, aquatic breeding, supporting fishermen during the closed se ason, 
fishery insurance, fishery management and industry development, fishing vessel standardization WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 483 - 
 
  and scrapping, processing, aquaculture, and distant water fisheries (Table A4.1). Pending China 's 
new notification to the SCM Committee, information was no t available on any new support/incentive 
schemes introduced at the local government level from the beginning of 2019. The authorities 
indicate that the notification is being prepared.  
 
Question:  Are there any other types of support to the fisheries sector provided by the Government 
either at the Central or local level besides those listed in the Secretariat Report?  
 
Reply : Please  see the SCM notification by China as contained in the WTO document 
G/SCM/N/372/CHN.  
 
Questions regarding Government Report  
 
3 PURSUING HIGH -LEVEL OPENING UP AND EXPLORING NEW PROSPECTS FOR WIN -WIN 
COOPERATION  
3.4 Building a Global -Oriented Network of High -Standard Free Trade Areas and  
Promoting the Liberalization and Facilitation of Trad e and Investment  
Pg. 11  
3.24. In November 2020, China signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (RCEP) with the ten ASEAN countries, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia and 
New Zealand. RCEP is a modern, comprehensive, high -quality l arge-scale regional free trade 
agreement that delivers mutual benefits. In terms of trade in goods, over 90% of products will 
eventually enjoy zero tariff. The principle of regional accumulation is adopted to deepen the industrial 
chains and value chains w ithin the region. In terms of services and investment, the overall level of 
openness of all parties is significantly higher than their WTO commitments. The RCEP adopts a 
negative list approach to investment liberalization. It also covers modern rules on is sues such as 
intellectual property rights, e -commerce, competition policy, government procurement, conformity 
assessment procedures, etc.  
 
Question:  What is the status of the People 's Republic of China 's ratification of the RCEP?  
 
Reply : China  has officially ratified the RCEP agreement, and submitted the letter of approval to the 
Secretary -General of the ASEAN on 15 April 2021.  
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 484 - 
 
  MALAYSIA  
SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
PAGE 33   
(2.2.2) Trade policy formulation and objectives   
2.13. Trade policy objectives are also outlined in sectoral and provincial Five -Year Plans and various 
Administrative Measures (such as negative lists and catalogues) that provide guidance to the 
implementation of the overall policies, such as on products that are subject to  licences or export 
duties; industries that can benefit from preferential treatment; and sectors in which investment is 
encouraged, permitted, or restricted.  
 
Question:  
Please elaborate China 's initiatives/regulations on legality and sustainability for ti mber and timber -
based industry. We wish to know timber sectors that are targeted, the type of policies or measures 
to be implemented or already implemented and the status of implementation.   
 
Reply:  Please see sectoral and provincial Five -Year Plans.  
 
PAGE 44   
(2) TRADE AND INVESTMENT REGIMES   
(2.4.3) Incentives to foreign direct investments   
2.68. As a response to the COVID -19 pandemic, several relief measures were taken or announced 
for foreign investors. For example, all export tax rebates must be ma de in full without delay except 
for energy -intensive and polluting products. In addition, the measures provide that China will work 
to shorten the negative list on foreign investment and expand the catalogue of industries where 
foreign investment is encour aged, encourage financial institutions to increase foreign trade loans to 
cope with the impact of the pandemic, and encourage commercial insurance companies to offer 
short-term export credit insurance and lower premium rates. Under the measures, recent tax  and 
fee relief policies designed to help companies in difficulty should equally apply to both domestic 
enterprises and FIEs.   
 
Question:   
Appreciate if China could further elaborate about current incentive schemes that are being offered 
primarily to entic e foreign investors to cope with the impact of COVID -19 pandemic and benefits of 
these incentives to the foreign investors.   
 
Reply: In order to implement the central government 's work plan on stabilizing foreign investment, 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has issued policy documents to guide local commercial 
authorities to help foreign -invest ed enterprises stabilize their production and operation, strengthen 
services and attract investment, and minimize the impact of the epidemic. The Mini stry of Commerce 
has made solid efforts in stabilizing foreign investment in six main areas, striving to minimize the 
impact of the epidemic. First, we have promoted more foreign -invested enterprises to resume work 
and production in an orderly manner, with priority given to supporting the resumption of production 
and supply of leading foreign -invest ed enterprises, so as to maintain the stability of the global supply 
chain. Second, we have implemented major foreign investment projects, sped up large projects  
under construction, and helped solving major difficulties. Third, we have continued to expand foreign 
investment access, and reduced the negative list of foreign investment access in both the Pilot Free 
Trade Zones and the whole country. Fourth, we have i mproved the opening -up platforms, sped up 
the reform and opening up innovation pilots in PFTZs, and made better use of the national economic 
development zone to stabilize foreign trade and foreign investment. Fifth, we have strengthened the 
protection of t he legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors, and established a sound service 
system for foreign investment. Sixth, we have continued to optimize the environment for foreign 
investment. The implementation of the Foreign Investment Law and its im plementing regulations 
has enhanced the confidence of foreign investors to make long -term investment in China.  
 
PAGE 49  
Box 3.1 GACC trade facilitation measures   
3. Import facilitation of food and agricultural product imports.   
Question:    
Malaysia would like to obtain more information about the Green Lanes, including criteria to be eligible 
for the Green Lanes.    WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 485 - 
 
  Reply: The "Green Lanes for Agricultural Products " is set up by China and the countries concerned 
on the basis of negotiation, and the com modities entering and leaving China through the green lanes 
are mainly fresh, perishable, and agricultural products with strict requirements for customs clearance 
time at the port. Customs (including inspection and quarantine departments) of the two countr ies 
confirm and exchange the list of import and export commodities (HS code) that meet their own 
requirements. Both sides will post the "Green Lanes for Agricultural Products " logo printed in the 
language and script of both countries for vehicles transport ing agricultural products across the 
border that meet the loading conditions and loading ratio. Customs and other port inspection 
departments of both countries will jointly provide facilitation and supervision measures for the 
"Green Lanes for Agricultural  Products " within the scope of national laws, regulations and policies, 
including optimizing the customs clearance process, simplifying customs clearing procedures, 
improving work efficiency and customs clearance security, reducing customs clearance costs,  
providing special customs clearance services like "Door-to-door" service, as well as achieving 
differentiated management of companies. Vehicles that have finished cross -border transportation of 
agricultural products and vehicles that do not meet the requi rements of agricultural products loading, 
should leave China through the port of entry and exit.  
 
PAGE 53  
(3) TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE   
(3.1.3.1) Applied MFN tariffs   
3.30. Between 2017 and 2021, average tariff rates decreased across all HS sections except 
for 03 (fats and oils) and 19 (arms and ammunition).  
 
Question:  
This paragraph indicates that the average tariff rates in 2021 have decreased across all HS sections 
except for fats and oils and arms and ammunition. Could China clarify reasons for the retention of 
the 2021 tariff rates for fats and oils?   
 
Reply: China unswervingly pursues an opening -up strategy of mutual benefit and win -win 
cooperation. The year of 2018 saw four independent tariff reductions in China, involving more 
than 3,000 tariff items , with the total tariff level reduced from 9.8% to 7.4% and the majority of 
sections experiencing a reduction in tariff rates. As Section 03 (fats and oils) is not adjusted, the 
tariff rate for this category is maintai ned. 
 
PAGE 75  
(3) TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICE BY MEASURE   
(3.3) Measures Affecting Production and Trade   
(3.3.1) Incentives  
3.116. The Government 's Five -Year Plans for Economic and Social Development serve as a reference 
for the design of support policies  and for the identification of priority areas, even though the plans 
do not outline specific measures. The 13th Five -Year Plan (2016 -20) highlighted the importance of 
innovation capacity, and advocated increased innovation in agriculture, strategic emergin g 
industries, intelligent manufacturing, and services. In addition to the Five -Year Plans for Economic 
and Social Development, there are also sector -specific Five -Year Plans for individual industries.   
Question:  
China is one of the world 's major exporters of soybean and soybean -based products. Does China 
have specific agricultural supports/ incentives for the oil seeds producer (especially soybean)?   
 
Reply: Please see the Domestic Support notifications submitted by China.  
 
PAGE 80  
3.3.2 Standard s and other technical requirements   
3.135. The Plan for Deepening Standardization Reform issued by the State Council proposes that 
the current mandatory national, sector, and local standards will be gradually integrated into 
mandatory national standards; t he three -level system of mandatory national, sector, and local 
standards concerning environmental protection, engineering, construction, and medicine and 
healthcare will be retained. Sector standards in military industries involving national security and 
secrets, such as nuclear and aerospace, are managed by the National Defence Science and 
Technology Industry Authorities of the State Council.   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 486 - 
 
  Question:   
Please elaborate on the standards/technical regulations adopted or revised regarding timber and 
timber -based importation into China. We wish to know the timber sectors that are targeted, type of 
policies or measures to be implemented or already implemented, status of implementation and likely 
duration.    
 
Reply: The laws covering the import of wood a nd wood products are the revised Forestry Law , which 
came into force on July 1, 2020. The I mplementing Regulations of the Forestry Law  is still under 
revision.  
 
There are three national standards involving the import of timber and wood products: 
1. GB/T 18513 -2001 "Names of Major Imported Timber in China ". This standard collects a total 
of 423 (class) timber names from all over the world, which are summarized from 
1,010  species,  basically including the important commercial timber species from all over the  world. 
2. GB/T 35380 -2017 Determination method of waste wood in imported logs. Providing for the terms 
and definitions, test items and determination methods for the control and determination of waste 
wood in imported logs in China, it applies to the contr ol and determination of waste wood in imported 
logs in China. 3. GB18580 -2017 "Indoor Decoration Materials Formaldehyde Emission Limits in 
Manufactured Panels and Products ". It specifies the formaldehyde emission limits in man -made 
panels and their product s. At present, China 's formaldehyde emissions from man -made panels and 
their products must meet the mandatory standards of GB18580 -2017 "Indoor Decoration Materials 
Formaldehyde Emission Limits in Manufactured Panels and Products ". 
 
PAGE 83  
3.3.2.3 Labelli ng and packaging   
Question:   
Are there any specific criteria for the labelling or marking on the imported genetically modified foods?   
 
Reply: Yes, but some issues are still being studied and coordinated in developing the Measures for 
Food Labeling Supervision and Management. The legislative process will begin after consensus is 
reached.  
 
PAGE 88  
3.3.3.4 Genetically modified organisms (GMOs)   
3.171. China has so far approved the certificates of import safety only for the following genetically 
engineered crops for processing as raw materials: soybeans, corn, rapeseed, cotton, beets, and 
papayas, and their products. As indicated by the authorities during China 's previous Review, safety 
evaluation is required for research, testing, pro duction, processing, operation, and import of 
agricultural GMOs in China. This is undertaken by China 's National Agricultural Genetically Modified 
Organisms Safety Council. China 's agricultural GMO safety assessment systems are governed by the 
Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Genetically Modified Plants, Guidelines for the Safety 
Assessment of Genetically Modified Animals, and Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Genetically  
Modified Microorganisms for Animals, as well as several measu res on safety assessment, testing, 
and regulation of agricultural GMOs. Reportedly in 2018, MARA amended the regulations on safety 
assessment, import approval, and labelling of agricultural GMOs; apparently these regulations 
provide for additional in -count ry trials and studies on new biotech events as part of the dossier 
submission process.   
Question:  
Malaysia would like to know what are the amended regulations on safety assessment, import 
approval, and labelling of agricultural GMOs that are in these regu lations?  
 
Reply: In 2018, China did not revise the regulations and rules related to the safety management of 
agricultural GMOs.  
 
PAGE 85  
(3) TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICE BY MEASURE   
(3.3.3) Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements   
(3.3.3.1) Legal, institut ional, and policy framework   
3.162. China 's 13th Five -Year Food Safety Plan (2016 -20) set out the priority goals and associated 
tasks to improve food safety governance and the development of the food industry. These included, 
inter alia, increasing inspections and testing, addressing pollution, im proving food safety standards 
and their integration with international standards, upgrading research and testing capacities, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 487 - 
 
  strengthening enforcement and improving related laws and regulations. The authorities indicate that 
several steps have been taken t o realize the goals in the Food Safety Plan including: projects to 
formulate or revise standards and inspection methods; revisions to Administrative Measures on Food 
Safety Standards; improvements to data collection to inform food safety risk assessments t hrough 
monitoring activities, studies, and surveys; improvements to quantitative risk assessment 
techniques and models in the fields of chemistry and microbiology in order to discover and assess 
food safety hazards developed by the China National Center fo r Food Safety Risk Assessment; 
updates to the Manual of National Food Safety Standards; and strengthened sampling inspection 
and monitoring of food safety. The authorities also indicate that China has become increasingly 
active in developing international food standards.   
 
Question:  
What are the impacts of COVID -19 on the food supply chain in China and the Chinese consumer 
behaviours?    
 
Reply: Since the outbreak of the COVID -19, the global agricultural trade has faced severe tests of 
production shutdown, reduced consumption and poor logistics. The Chinese government has taken 
a series of measures to help foreign trade companies resume work and production and trade 
enterprises to resume business and market activities. Besides, multiple measures ha ve also been 
taken to protect the stability of the international logistics supply chain, so as to reduce the negative 
impact of the epidemic. According to China Customs ' statistics, from January to August 2021, China 
imported USD 147.2 billion of agricultu ral products, up 35% year -on-year. Overall, the COVID -19 
epidemic has limited impact on China 's imported food supply chain.  Since 2020, as a small number 
of imported cold chain food packages have been tested positive for the coronavirus, the Chinese 
govern ment has strengthened the testing and decontamination of imported cold chain food in order 
to effectively prevent the virus from spreading through cold -chain food. Through the preventive 
measures mentioned above, consumer confidence and the flow of the foo d supply chain have been 
well-protected.  
 
 
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  BANGLADESH  
Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/415)  mentioned at para -3.34.that  
 
"China also grants preferential tariff treatment to imports from LDCs  that have established diplomatic 
relations with China, and completed the exchange of diplomatic notes. By February 2021, China had 
implemented zero tariffs on 97% of tariff lines for these 41 LDCs. Submissions have been made by 
LDCs and China to the WTO C ommittee on Rules of Origin regarding utilization rates of LDC exports 
under China 's LDC preferential trade arrangement. " At this context Bangladesh likes to extend its 
sincere thanks to the Government and people of China extending duty free and quota free  market 
access of 97% tariff lines originated from LDCs.  
 
Question 1: Bangladesh likes to know that either the Chinese Government has plan to implement 
the "Preferential Rules of Origin for Least Developed Countries " decision adopted in 
Nairobi  Ministeria l Conference (WT/MIN(15)/47 — WT/L/917) in 2015?  
 
Reply: The Administrative Measures of the PRC Customs on Rules of Origin of Imported Goods from 
the Least Developed Countries Entitled to Special Preferential Tariff Treatment became effective 
on 1 April 2 017.  
 
Question 2: Does Chinese government has any plan to extend the DFQF scheme to the countries 
for a certain period after graduation?  
 
Reply: As one of the most open markets to the LDCs, China is and has continued implementing 
zero tariffs for 97% of its tariff lines for LDCs ' exports to China.Transitional periods have already 
been provided for recently graduated LDCs.  
 
Question 3:  Even though Government of China has given 97% of product duty free and quota free 
access exported from LDCs. But the expo rt of Bangladesh is insignificant in relation to import from 
China. We believe that investment from China may reduce this gap considerably. Does the 
government has any plan to encourage Chines investors to invest in Bangladesh?  
 
Reply : Bangladesh  is an important economic and trade partner of China in South Asia. China 
encourages Chinese enterprises to invest in Bangladesh in accordance with market -oriented 
principles and internationally accepted rules, and enhance the level of economic a nd trade 
cooperation between the two countries by deepening bilateral investment cooperation.  
 
Question 4 : China is a staunch supporter, an active participant and an important contributor for 
the multilateral trading system. Please elaborate on China 's efforts to promote a bigger role of the 
WTO and China 's expectation for the 12th Ministerial Conference?  
 
Reply : In November 2019, China successfully hosted the Informal WTO Ministerial Meeting in 
Shanghai. During the Second China International Import Expo, China and the WTO jointly released 
the World Trade Report 2019 （Chinese Version).  
 
As a member of the WTO Informal Working Group on MSMEs, China has always actively participated 
in relevant consultations. In this regard, China strongly supports cooperation  among WTO members 
on MSMEs issues such as information exchange, sharing best practices and trade facilitation. After 
the outbreak of COVID -19, China and other Members of the Working Group issued a joint statement 
in May 2020 to support MSMEs in response t o COVID -19. At the end of 2020, a package of 
six proposals was adopted as the WTO joint statement initiative.  
 
China 's LDCs and Accessions Programme (the "China Programme ") was set up to help the LDCs  join 
the WTO. By the end of 2020, China had contributed a total of USD 4.2 million to the "China 
Programme ". This Programme provides technical assistance and capacity -building to the acceding 
parties, supports the accession work of the WTO, and enhances t he representativeness of WTO 
membership, contributing to strengthening the multilateral trading system. In September 2018 
and December 2019, the 7th and 8th China Round Table meetings took place in Kazakhstan and 
Russian Federation respectively. In Decembe r 2020, the 9th China Round Table meeting was held 
virtually as one of the events to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the WTO. In March 2021, China 
shared its experience in joining the WTO with other acceding parties online.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 489 - 
 
  At the same time, China also  signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement with the 
WTO through the South -South Cooperation Assistance Fund, pledging to provide USD 8 million to 
the WTO for designing or implementing research -related projects regarding Aid for Trade and 
other  areas. In May 2019, the WTO launched the project of "Improving Access To Trade and 
Market  Access Statistics and Developing Trade In Value -Added Databases " with USD 1.1 million from 
the above -mentioned fund, helping developing members collect detailed offi cial trade statistics. This 
project is of vital importance to building a real global computing system of trade in value -added and 
global value chains, and provides capacity -building to those members in Asia and Africa.  
 
China is constructively participati ng in discussions on issues such as women 's economic 
empowerment, trade and health, and trade and environment. China co -sponsored the Trade and 
Health initiative to update the WTO rules to keep pace with the times.  
 
China believes that MC12 will be a testi mony to Members ' confidence in the multilateral trading 
system. China is willing to work with other Members to build consensus, to support the new Director -
General 's work, and to achieve outcomes on issues such as fisheries subsidies, fighting COVID -19 
pandemic, agriculture, investment facilitation, services domestic regulation, e -commerce, and the 
Appellate Body reform.  
 
 
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  INDONESIA  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
3 TRADE POLICIES AND PRACTICES BY MEASURE  
3.1.5.1 Import prohibitions  
Page 58 Para 3.45  
Based on Secretariat Report, China maintains import prohibitions on toxic substances and wild 
animal products; certain old/second -hand mechanical and electrical equipment; certain hazardous 
chemicals, pesticides, and persistent organic pollutants; mercury -added products; certain solid 
wastes; ractopamine; certain types of filament lamp; and charcoal imported from Somalia.  
Indonesia also notes that during the COVID -19 pandemic (since January 2020), the Government of 
China has prohibited all wild animal trad ing activities.  
 
Questions:  
1. Please clarify on this matter, particularly the relevance of the prohibition on wild animal to the 
pandemic.  
 
Reply:  Since the outbreak of COVID -19 Pandemic, the worldwide scientists have spared no effort to 
trace "the origins o f novel coronavirus ". A report of joint WHO -China study released in March  2021,  
entitled "WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS -CoV-2: China Part ", assesses four 
possibilities for origins of novel coronavirus, and doesn 't rule out wild animals. Ban on wildlife trade 
has been a temporary control measure since the early 2020. Currently, the import and export of live 
terrestrial wildlife is still suspended. China spares no effort to cooperate with the World Health 
Organization to carry out virus traceab ility. 
 
Reply:  The prohibition on wildlife trade is a temporary regulatory measure implemented in 
early 2020. So far, the import and export of the live terrestrial wildlife is still suspended. China is 
actively carrying out virus source tracing work in coo peration with the World Health Organization. 
However, there is no scientific evidence that COVID -19 originated from wildlife so far.  
 
2. Indonesia also welcomes the clarification and explanation from China if Arowana classified as a 
wild animal in China.  
 
Reply:  According to the relevant provisions of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on the 
Protection of Wildlife , the wild population of arowana (scientific name: Scleropages formosus) is 
approved as key wild animal under national -level prote ction. But artificially -bred arowana population 
is not within the administration scope for key wild animals under national -level protection.  
 
3. Please explain in detail the requirements and procedures for importation of Arowana.  
 
Reply:  Please confirm whethe r "Arowana " is "Scleropages Formosus ". For Scleropages formosus, 
import and export of the wildlife and its derivative products listed in the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora  (hereinafter referred to as the Con vention) 
should be approved by the wild animal protection department of the State Council or the State 
Council in accordance with Wild Animal Conservation Law . As CITES Management Authority in China, 
the Endangered Species Import and Export Management Offi ce of the People 's Republic of China will 
issue permits for the import and export of Scleropages formosus according to laws and the 
Convention , as well as the decision of the competent department of aquatic wild animals.  
 
3.1.6.3 Safeguard measures  
Page 67  Para 3.67  
According to the Secretariat, the laws and regulations governing safeguard measures in China did 
not change during the review period, i.e., the Regulations on Safeguards which last amended 
in 2004.  
 
Questions:  
4. Based on Chapter II: Investigation in Article 4 of the Regulations of the 
People 's Republic  of China on Safeguards ( "China Safeguard Regulations "): "If the Ministry of 
Commerce decides to initiate an investigation without having received any written 
application  for applying sa feguard measures, it shall proceed only if it has sufficient evidence of 
injury to a domestic industry due to the increase in quantity of an import. " What are the 
indicators to determine that there is sufficient evidence of injury to a domestic industry?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 491 - 
 
   
Reply:  According to Article 8 of the Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on 
Safeguard  Measures , the following factors shall be taken into account in the MOFCOM 's 
determination of the damage caused to the domestic industry by the increase of the quantity of 
imported products: (1) The absolute and relative increase rate and the increased quantity of the 
imported products; (2) The proportion of the increased products  in the domestic market; (3) The 
impacts of the imported products on the domestic market, including the impacts on the domestic 
industry in terms of quantity, sales, market share, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and 
losses, employment, etc.; (4 ) Other factors that cause damage to the domestic industry. When 
registering a case for investigation, the MOFCOM refers to this provision, and judges whether there 
is sufficient evidence to show that the domestic industry has been damaged by examining the  above 
factors.  
 
5. Referring to Article 12 of the China Safeguard Regulations, could China please clarify who are 
the parties that categorized as "other interested parties "?  
 
Reply: China 's regulations on various interested parties are consistent with WTO r egulations, which 
usually refer to the subjects with interests in cases.  
 
6. Indonesia notes that there is no specific provision to administer consultation mechanism in China 
Safeguard Regulations. Could China please provide the provision on consultation mech anism 
prior to the application of a safeguard measure?  
 
Reply:  Article 24 of the Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on Safeguard Measures 
stipulates that before taking safeguard measures, the MOFCOM shall offer opportunities to the 
governments o f the countries (regions) that have a material interest in the export business operators 
of relevant products.  
 
7. Indonesia also notes that there is no mechanism and indicator to create structural adjustment 
program in safeguard investigation. Could China please provide information regarding this 
matter?  
 
Reply:  Article 26 of the Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on Safeguard Measures  
stipulates that if the following conditions are met, the term for implementing a safeguard measure 
may be extended: (1) The safeguard measure decided pursuant to the provisions of this Regulation 
remains to be necessary for preventing or remedy serious damage; (2) Proofs show that the relevant 
domestic industry is undergoing readjustment; (3) The obligation to  inform relevant parties for 
negotiations has been performed; (4) The measure during the extended term shall not be stricter 
than that during the term prior to the extension.  
 
3.3 Measures Affecting Production and Trade  
3.3.1 Incentives  
Page 76 Para 3.118  and 3.119  
3.118. At the central level, support is provided in form of preferential taxes, payment and stamp 
duty exemptions, tariff and VAT reductions, and fiscal appropriation. Fifteen of the 79 programmes 
had already expired by the time of provision of the notification (Table A3.2). No information was 
provided by the authorities on how many of the programmes were still active as at April 2021.  
3.119. At the subcentral level, the notification contains 420 programmes in 31 provincial 
administrations and 5 designated city administrations. Of these programmes, 283 were still active 
in 2019. No information was provided by the authorities on how many of the programmes were still 
active as at April 2021.  
 
Questions:  
8. Could China provide an update regarding how many of those programmes were still active, 
both in the central and subcentral level.  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China.  
 
9. Please provide detailed information on the form of incentives offered to these specific sectors, 
as well as the economic costs (revenue forgone) and its effectiveness on the sector 's growth.  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 492 - 
 
   
10. Could China explain the se incentive programmes which provided for certain sectors with its 
commitment under SCM Agreement?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest subsidy notification G/SCM/N/372/CHN submitted by China.  
 
3.3.2 Standards and other technical requirements  
Page 79 Para 3 .134 
The Standardization Law classifies China 's standards into five major categories: national, 
sector, local, association, and enterprise.  The national standards include both voluntary and 
mandatory standards. Sector standards and local standards are volu ntary. The Law also stipulates 
that, where there are other provisions on the formulation of mandatory standards in laws, 
administrative regulations, and decisions of the State Council, such provisions shall prevail.  
 
Question:  
11. Please elaborate in detail on how the Chinese authorities could monitor and facilitate these 
five standards.  
 
Reply:  According to Article 29 of the  Standardization Law of the People 's Republic of China, the 
competent departments of national standards, industry standards and l ocal standards shall establish 
standard implementation information feedback mechanisms. For national standards, a national 
standard implementation information feedback platform has been established to dynamically solicit 
public opinions on the revisions fo r national standards. At present, this platform has solicited more 
than 3,000 public opinions in total.  
 
In 2020, the State Administration of Market Supervision (the Standardization Administration of China) 
issued the Guiding Opinions on Further Strengthen ing the Administration of Industry Standards  and 
Administrative Regulations for  Local Standards. From then on, the State Administration of Market 
Supervision (the Standardization Administration of China) has carried out annual supervision and 
random inspec tion to help resolve the problems in the formulation and administration of industry 
standards and local standards without delay. In particular, the Guiding Opinions on Further 
Strengthening the Administration of Industry Standards  expressly sets forth that  foreign -invested 
enterprises shall be permitted to take part in the formulation of industry standards on an equal basis 
pursuant to the law.  
 
In 2019, the Standardization Administration of China and the Ministry of Civil Affairs jointly 
promulgated the Administrative Regulations for Group Standards  to expound on the intellectual 
property administration system of group standards. In addition, the Standardization Administration 
of China and the Ministry of Civil Affairs make clear group standards in non -conformity with 
mandatory standards, and instruct the relevant social groups to make corrections within specified 
deadlines. The relevant group standards would be abolished in case of failure to make corrections 
at the expiry of deadlines.  
 
12. Please also explain  in brief the differences between these five standards.  
 
Reply:  China 's Standard System consists of five categories of standards, namely, national standards, 
industry standards, local standards, group standards, and corporate standards. The main differences 
among these standards are explained as follows:  
 
Firstly, objects and scope of application of standards are different. Compulsory national standards 
must be formulated for technical requirements designed to protect personal health, security of lives 
and property of the people, national security and ecological environment security, as well as 
technical requirements for meeting the fundamental needs of economic and social management. 
Recommended national standards can be formulated to meet technic al requirements designed to 
serve basic general purposes, assort with compulsory national standards and set the pace for various 
related industries. If recommended national standards are absent and technical requirements need 
to be unified in a certain ind ustry across the country, industry standards can be formulated. In order 
to meet the special technical requirements for local natural conditions and customs, local standards 
can be formulated. The State encourages social organizations and enterprises to fo rmulate such 
group standards and corporate standards that are more demanding than the relevant technical 
requirements of the recommended standards. The formulation of group standards must be aimed to WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 493 - 
 
  meet the market and innovation needs, lay store by new t echnologies, new industries, new business 
formats and new modes, and fill the gaps in the standards.  
 
Secondly, the effectiveness of standards is different. Only national standards fall into mandatory 
standards and recommended standards. Other four categor ies of standards are all recommended 
standards.  
 
Thirdly, the nature of standards is different. National standards, industry standards and local 
standards are promulgated by the governmental authorities, which are attributed to fundamental 
public benefits.  Group standards and corporate standards are independently formulated by the 
market in order to meet the market and innovation needs.  
 
3.3.5 State trading, state -owned enterprises, and privatization  
Page 97 Para 3.198  
The Secretariat mentioned that the China Tobacco International Inc. considered as STEs by 
authorities. Indonesia also notes that China has notified several State Trading Product and 
Enterprises to the WTO, including the China Tobacco International Inc. (CNTC). 
 
Question:  
13. As the biggest cigarette corporation of the world, could the CNTC influence the Chinese tobacco 
policy, including control the export and import of the tobacco industry in China? Please explain 
in detail.  
 
Reply:  Law of the People 's Republic of China on Tobacco Monopoly and Regulation on the 
Implementation of the Law of the People 's Republic of China on Tobacco Monopoly stipulate that 
"the State shall exercise monopoly administration in accordance with law over the production, sale, 
import and export of tobacco monopoly commodities, and adopt a tobacco monopoly license system " 
and "the tobacco monopoly administrative department under the State Council shall take charge of 
the nationwide tobacco monopoly affairs ". China 's tobacco policy  is formulated by the tobacco 
monopoly administrative department under the State Council (the State Tobacco Monopoly 
Administration) in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. The China Tobacco International 
Inc. engages in the production, operation , import and export of tobacco monopoly products 
according to national laws and regulations and administrative license.  
 
14. Is there any export and import restriction measures on tobacco industry? If so, may the 
Chinese government please explain the purpose a nd scope of the measures?  
 
Reply:  In order to control tobacco, fulfill the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control , the 
Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products  and our WTO accession commitments, China 
has taken relevant trade restrictio n measures. For details, please refer to China 's notification on 
state trading.  
 
3.3.6 Government procurement  
3.3.6.2 Legal and institutional framework  
Page 100 Para 3.211  
There have been no major changes to China 's legislative and regulatory regime concerning 
government procurement since the previous Review. The Government Procurement Law remains the 
primary legislation regulating government procurement activities. It applies to procurements of 
goods, services, and  construction works by state organs, public institutions, and social 
organizations.  The Government Procurement Law does not apply to SOEs; a large number of 
infrastructure projects and public utility works carried out by SOEs are therefore excluded from th e 
scope of application of the Government Procurement Law. (…) 
 
Question:  
15. Please elaborate the definition of social organizations.  
 
Reply:  No definition of group organization is specified in China 's current law. "Group Organizations ", 
mentioned in Governmen t Procurement Law of the People 's Republic of China , refer to such relevant 
organizations that purchase with fiscal funds.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 494 - 
 
  Page 100 Para 3.212  
(…) the amended Tendering Law will, inter alia: (i) redefine its scope of application and deregulate 
tendering activities in private investments; (ii) enhance transparency of tendering activities; 
(iii) adjust the time periods in tendering procedures in order to improve efficiency; (iv) restrict the 
use of lowest price criteria in tender evaluation and encourage life -cycle cost assessment; 
(v) promote e -tendering; (vi) clarify tendering requirements in public -private partnership (PPP) 
projects; and (vii) enhance anti -collusion in tendering and the monitoring of contract 
performance  (…) 
 
Questions:  
16. Please  elaborate more on point (i) redefinition its scope of application and point (ii) enhance 
transparency of tendering activities.  
 
Reply:  Since 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission and relevant departments 
have officially launched the revisio n of the Tendering and Bidding Law, which has been included in 
the State Council 's legislative plan for 2021. The Ministry of Justice is currently leading the legislative 
review work. The Law of the People 's Republic of China on Tendering (Revised Draft fo r Public 
Comment)  significantly expands the items to be included in the tender announcements, tender 
documents, and bid -winning announcements to fully guarantee the right of potential bidders and 
bidders to know the results of pre -qualification, bid evalua tion and bid selection. It is the first time 
to make provisions for public bidding plans based on international practice. We vigorously promote 
the use of standard bidding documents.  
 
17. What are the differences from previous Law?  
 
Reply:  The Tendering Law (R evised Draft for Public Comment) consists of 8 chapters and 94 articles. 
Changes include revision of 58 articles, inclusion of 2 8 new articles, and deletion of 2 articles. 
8 articles have remained unchanged. The main amendments include the promotion of streamlining 
administration and delegation of powers in the field of bidding, improving the transparency and 
standardization of bidding, implementing the autonomy of bidders, and improving the efficiency of 
bidding.  
 
Page 100 Para 3.212  
(…) Ac cording to its Explanatory Note, the amended Government Procurement Law will, inter alia: 
(i) adjust the scope of application of the Government Procurement Law; (…)   
 
Question:  
18. Please elaborate regarding the adjustment of scope of application of the GP Law. 
 
Reply:  The Tendering Law (Revised Draft for Public Comment) further clarifies the scope of projects 
subject to tendering, greatly relaxes the requirements for the procurement methods of private 
investment projects, and stimulates the vitality of priv ate investment. A number of pre -approval and 
record -filing matters, such as the approval of the bidding plan for enterprise investment projects 
and self -invitation bidding and record -keeping, have been cancelled, and more in -process and post -
event supervis ion are adopted to reduce institutional transaction costs.  
 
Page 102 Para 3.214  
(…) The new Measures further strengthen the information release system and provide that a 
designated Internet media is the principal channel for publishing government procureme nt 
information. They specify that the Government Procurement website (www.ccgp.gov.cn) and its 
subordinate provincial -level websites should serve as the platform for the collection and publication 
of government procurement information.  
 
Question:  
19. Does it m ean that central government procurement information is available in 
www.ccgp.gov.cn and local government procurement information is available in respective 
provincial -level websites? Please clarify and specify the provincial -level websites.  
 
Reply:  The government procurement information of central budget units is published on the China 
Government Procurement Network (www.ccgp.gov.cn). The government procurement information 
of local budget units is published on the corresponding provincial sub -networ k of China Government WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 495 - 
 
  Procurement Network, which can be accessed through links on the China Government Procurement 
Network.  
 
Page 103 Para 3.219 and 3.120  
3.219. With regard to e -procurement, China planned to fully implement e -tendering by end -2020 
(…). 
3.220. To enhance predictability of government procurement and facilitate suppliers ' awareness of 
market opportunities, the MOF issued a Notice on Disclosure of Future Government Procurement 
Plans (MOF Notice Cai Ku No. 10, 2020), which requires that all pro curing entities should disclose 
their procurement plans in advance where possible (…).  
 
Question:  
20. Indonesia would appreciate if China could provide the progress on implementation of 
e-tendering and disclosure of procurement plan.  
 
Reply:  According to Notice on Disclosure of Government Procurement Intentions , in principle, for 
procurement projects launched by provincial budgeters since 1 January 2021 and procurement 
projects launched by budgeters below the provincial level since 1 January  2022, procurement 
intentions shall be disclosed in accordance with regulations.  
 
3.3.6.4 Other policy considerations in government procurement  
Page 104 Para 3.223  
Furthermore, Article 9 of the Government Procurement Law provides that government procurement 
shall be carried out to facilitate the realization of the economic and social development policy goals 
of the State, including environmental protection, assistance to underdeveloped or ethnic minority 
regions, and promoting the development of SMEs. According to the  authorities, SMEs became more 
active in participating in government procurement activities in the past 10 years. More than 70% of 
China 's government procurement in value terms is currently performed by SMEs. To address issues 
arising in the implementation  of previous Measures, China issued the new Measures on Promoting 
the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises through Government Procurement (MOF Circular 
Cai Ku No. 46, 2020) on 18 December 2020. The new Measures came into force on 1 January 2021, 
and the previous Measures ceased to apply at the same time.  
 
Question:  
21. It is noted that new measures on promoting SMEs on more details on the SME contract set -
aside policy. Since the implementation of new measures, has SMEs ' participation in 
government procurement increased?  
 
Reply:  The Measures on Promoting the Development of Small and Medium Enterprises through 
Government Procurement came into force on January 1, 2021, and there is no relevant statistical 
data yet.  
 
3.3.6. 6 Supplier complaint mechanism  
Page 106 Para 3.228  
The supplier complaint mechanism remained unchanged during the review period.191 The 
Government Procurement Law and the Measures for Handling Challenges and Complaints against 
Government Procurement (MOF Order No. 94, 2017) require that the finance authorities at different 
levels of government review suppliers ' complaints regarding government procurement activities at 
their respective levels. The results of complaint reviews are published in designated media.  
 
Questions:  
22. Is the supplier complaint mechanism the same for all type of procurement (goods, services, 
construction works)? If no, please explain.  
 
Reply:  This complaint mechanism is applicable to the procurement of goods, services, an d projects 
specified in the Government Procurement Law, but not to the procurement of projects specified in 
the Tendering Law.  
 
23. Does the designated media refer to Government Procurement Website ( www.ccgp.gov.cn )? 
 
Reply:  Government Procurement Website ( www.ccgp.gov.cn ) and its provincial -level branches 
make public complaint handling decisions. In addition, China Government Procurement News , China WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 496 - 
 
  Government Procurement Magazine , China State Finance  and other media also publish the relevant 
government procurement information.  
 
3.3.6.7 Accession to the GPA and other international cooperation  
Page 106 Para 3.228  
3.230. China has not included any market access commitments in the ar ea of government 
procurement in the context of any of the FTAs that it has negotiated with trading partners. According 
to the authorities, it remains China 's priority to conclude its GPA accession before liberalizing its 
government procurement market throu gh bilateral/regional tracks.  
 
Questions:  
24. Indonesia would appreciate if China can clarify whether foreign companies/suppliers can 
participate in government market in China at the moment?  
 
Reply:  China has not yet joined the GPA, nor has it signed agreements with other countries or 
regions on the opening of the government procurement market. Therefore, China 's government 
procurement market is not yet open to foreign suppliers. The Foreign Investme nt Law implemented 
in January 2020 clearly stipulates that the state guarantees that foreign -funded enterprises 
participate in government procurement activities through fair completion according to the law. 
Products manufactured and services provided by fo reign-funded enterprises within China shall be 
equally treated in government procurement according to the law. Foreign enterprises can participate 
equally in Chinese government procurement activities through registered enterprises in China in 
accordance wi th the law.  
 
25. Could China provide information on its legal regime regarding the openness of government 
procurement market for foreign suppliers? (aside from market access commitments in 
bilateral/multilateral/regional agreements if they apply)  
 
Reply:  The Foreign  Investment  Law implemented in January 2020 clearly stipulates that the state 
guarantees that foreign -funded enterprises participate in government procurement activities 
through fair completion according to the law. Products manufactured and services  provided by 
foreign -funded enterprises within China shall be equally treated in government procurement 
according to the law. Foreign enterprises can participate equally in Chinese government procurement 
activities through registered enterprises in China i n accordance with the law.  
 
26. What procedures shall be followed by government authorities where they intend to obtain 
imported goods?  
 
Reply:  Where products, needed by procurement demander, are unavailable or cannot be obtained 
under reasonable commercial conditions within the territory of China, and procurement of imported 
products are separately required according to the laws and regulations,  procurement activities shall 
be carried out pursuant to the law under the premise of the approval by financial authorities in 
accordance with Administrative Measures on Government Procurement of Imported Products .  
 
PART III: GENERAL QUESTIONS  
 
Question:  
27. With respect to anti -dumping measure, Indonesia notes that China has been imposed 6 (six) 
anti-dumping duties to Indonesian exporters, with 1 (one) anti -dumping duty imposition 
(20,2%) is currently on -going for Stainless Steel and Billet product. In this r egard, based on 
Article 11 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, an anti -dumping duty shall remain in force only as 
long as and to the extent necessary to counteract dumping which is causing injury and the 
authorities shall review the need for the continued impos ition of the duty. Indonesia believes 
that since anti -dumping duty imposed in 2019, China 's domestic industry shall be gradually 
recovered from injury. Could China please provide an update information referring to this 
matter?  
 
Reply:  On 23 July 2018, upon  the application of domestic industries, the MOFCOM issued a notice 
on filing an anti -dumping investigation on imported stainless steel billets and hot rolled stainless 
steel plates/coils produced in the European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea and Indones ia. 
On 22 July 2019, the MOFCOM  issued the announcement of the final ruling of the case and decided 
to implement anti -dumping measures for 5 years. After the ruling of the original trial, no relevant WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  interested parties applied for legal procedures to review the domestic industrial condi tions. As of 
now, there is no new evidence showing that domestic industries have recovered from the damage.  
 
28. Indonesia is aware that the Government of China has notified its new regulations 
(Decrees  248 and 249) to the related WTO Committees. In this regar d, Indonesia would seek 
a clarification and explanation regarding:  
a) The timeline of the implementation these Decrees, including the transition period;  
b) The procedures and guideline for exporters to obtain an import permit from GACC, as well 
as the website to  apply;  
 
Reply a-b: Imported food safety is closely related to the health and life safety of the people, which 
is a major livelihood issue. In accordance with Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China , 
regulations for its implementation and other l aws and administrative regulations, China has amended 
two original  administrative regulations on safety of imported and exported food and registration of 
overseas production enterprises of imported food. On April 12, 2021, Administrative Measures of the 
People's Republic of China for Safety of Imported and Exported Food (Decree No. 249 of the General 
Administration of Customs) and Administrative Regulations of the People 's Republic of China on 
Registration of  Overseas Production Enterprises of Imported Food  (Decree No. 248 of the General 
Administration of Customs) were promulgated, which will take effect since January 1, 2022. Prior to 
the promulgation, China issued a notification in accordance with the relevant rules of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), a ccepted the comments of WTO members, and adopted reasonable 
opinions and suggestions, which complied with the relevant WTO rules. The scope of application of 
these two regulations has been made clear in Article 2 of Decree No. 248 and Decree No. 249 of the  
General Administration of Customs. In the near future, China will Administrative Measures of the 
People 's Republic of China for Safety of Imported and Exported Food (Decree No. 249 of the General 
Administration of Customs) and Administrative Regulations o f the People 's Republic of China on 
Registration of  Overseas Production Enterprises of Imported Food  (Decree No. 248 of the General 
Administration of Customs) in an appropriate form. Please stay tuned. Decree No. 248 of the General 
Administration of Custom s will not hinder the enforcement of the bilateral protocol. In case that the 
relevant country (region) and China have agreed otherwise on the registration approaches and 
application materials, such agreement shall be honored in accordance with the agreeme nt between 
the parties concerned.  
 
c) The coverage of these Decrees, detailed with HS code, since the government not specify 
which product included in "food-related products " category.  
 
Reply:  The HS code of the products involved with registration of overseas production enterprises 
will be released in the near future, which can be inquired on the official website of the General 
Administration of Customs at that time. According to the definition  of food -related products in Food 
Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China , given that such products and their production, 
processing and storage requirements differ from those of food, Article 2 of Decree No. 248 of the 
General Administration of Custo ms has clarified that this regulation is not applicable for production, 
processing and storage enterprises of food -related products.  
 
d) GACC also requires the importers to include a registration number on both the inside and 
outside of the packaging. Could t he government ensure this measures do not create a 
barrier for importers, particularly in terms of cost?  
 
Reply:  It is required to mark registration number on the food label, and the relevant requirements  of 
National Food Safety Standard —General Rules for the Labeling of Prepackaged Food  (GB7718 -2011) 
shall prevail. At present, with the exception of infant formula milk powder, the labels of other 
imported food in Chinese can be attached in customs warehouses or other designated locations prior 
to access int o the market, which will not erect obstacles for importers.  
 
29. Indonesia notes that Forest Law of the People 's Republic of China has amended in 
December  2019 which entered into force in July 1, 2020. Indonesia is interested in learning 
more about the Forest Law's implementation, especially in relation to the prohibition of trade 
in timber products originating from illegal activities. Indonesia would also appreciate it if China 
could explain the implementation not only in domestic trade but also in global trad e. 
 
Reply : The Forest Law of the People 's Republic of China is a domestic law, which requires that a 
timber distribution and processing enterprise shall establish a journal of receipt and shipment of raw WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  materials and products and buy timber from legal sources. It will have an indirect effect on combating 
the global trade in illegal timber products and promoting the trade in legal and sustainable forest 
products.China always upholds "zero tolerance " attitu de, goes all out to crack down upon smuggling 
crime of endangered species and their products (including endangered timber), and vigorously 
conducts international law enforcement cooperation and exchanges.  
 
30. Could China provide brief information or summary o n how to conduct Mutual Recognition 
Agreement with regard to the importation of log and timber? Is this also regulated under 
Forest  Law or stipulated in other regulations?  
 
Reply : In order to promote the facilitation of regional legal timber trade, NFGA an d 
Indonesia  Department of forestry have some pre -coordination, and hope to determine the legality 
information of import timber on the place of origin, quantity, material, legal verification 
documents  by signing legality mutual recognition agreement, helpin g enterprises from both parties 
to buy timber from legal sources. This agreement is not stipulated in the Forest Law of the 
People 's Republic  of China and requires a mutual recognition agreement signed by both countries.  
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  INDONESIA – ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
PART I: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
3.3.7.5 Industrial property  
3.3.7.5.1 Trademarks  
Page 109 Para 3.252  
Registration is a prerequisite for protection, and ownership is determined on a first -to-file basis. 
According to Article 18 of the Trademark Law, foreign businesses are required to appoint a 
Chinese  trademark agent. The period of protection is 10 years. According to the authorities, the 
request to renew the registration is to be filed 12 months before the date of expiration.  
 
Questions:   
1. Where can importers get information about Chinese trademark agents?  
 
Reply:  The trademark agency information filed in China National Intellectual Property Administration 
has been published in "Trademark Agency " at "China Trademark website " (http://sbj.cnipa.gov.cn). 
The parties can check for themselves.  
 
2. What kind of collaboration exists between Indonesian herbal medicine manufacturers and 
Chinese trademark agents? Please describe the requirements and procedures.   
 
Reply: According to Article 18(2) of the Trademark Law , "a foreign national or a foreign enterprise 
intending to apply for trademark registration and handle other trademark -related matters in China 
shall authorize a legally formed trademark agency to do so ". Indonesians can independently choose 
and entrust trademark agencies recorded in China National Intellectual Property Administration to 
handle trademark matters. According to the Trademark Law  and its implementing regulations, the 
party who entrusted trademark  agency to apply for trademark registration or handle other trademark 
matters, shall submit a power of attorney.  
 
3. Given that herbal medicine is a cultural legacy of the country, what is the ownership status of 
Indonesian herbs that will be marketed in Chin a? Is it still owned by the Indonesian herbal medicine 
manufacturer, or is it owned by a Chinese trademark agent? Please explain.  
 
Reply:  The trademark agency is entrusted by the agent to handle the trademark registration 
application or other trademark -related matters.  It dose not involve ownership issues.  Therefore, the 
ownership of the goods remains with the Indonesian herb manufacturer.  
 
4 TRADE POLICIES BY SECTOR  
4.4 Services  
4.4.1 Financial services  
4.4.1.1 Overview  
Page 156 Para 4.135  
The sector accounted for 7.9% of GDP in 2019 and 2018; it employed 8.2 million people in 2019, 
up from 6.9 million in 2018. Its structure is still unbalanced, with a significant predominance of 
banks over other types of financial institutions. The stock market is relatively small. Market 
capitalization of listed domestic companies stood at CNY 8.5 trillion in 2019, representing roughly 
59.3% of GDP.85 By contrast, according to the World Bank, the ratio of total bank credi t to GDP  stood 
at 164.6% in 2019. Commercial banks ' dominance of the sector is evident from their participation 
in the system 's total assets: over 82% of assets and liabilities of banking institutions, up from some 
78% for both indicators in 2018. The auth orities indicated that in 2020, the market capitalization of 
listed domestic companies stood at CNY 79.72 trillion, representing 78.5% of GDP. In 2018, 2019, 
and 2020, equity financing86 of non -financial sectors stood at CNY 861.5 billion, CNY  918.9 billio n, 
and CNY 1.26 trillion, respectively; non -financial companies issued CNY 1.65 trillion, 
CNY 2.58 trillion, and CNY 3.45 trillion in corporate bonds (including corporate goods, convertible 
bonds, and exchangeable bonds), respectively, in those same years through the exchange bond 
market. The exchange bond market issued local government bonds totaling  CNY 2.56 trillion, 
CNY 2.83 trillion, and CNY 2.42 trillion, respectively, in 2018, 2019, and 2020.  
 
Question:   
4. Could China please elaborate the regulation regarding the trading of foreign corporate or 
government bond conducted by the foreign bank? Is it possible for foreign bank to act as an agent 
to trade foreign corporate and government bonds, especially those wi th investment grade?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Reply:  According to the Regulation  on the Administration of Foreign -funded Banks  of the 
People 's Republic of China , foreign banks can issue, redeem and underwrite government bonds as 
agents , can buy and sell  government bonds and financial bonds, and buy and sell negotiable 
securities denominated in foreign currencies other than stocks.  
 
4.4.1.3.2 Regulatory developments in banking  
Page 158 Para 4.146 and 4.147  
 
Question:  
5. We noted the developments in licensing of foreign banks w ithin China in subsection 4.4.1.3.2.1 
'Developments in licensing of foreign banks ', it may not be directly related, however Indonesia would 
want to learn more about the process of new product licensing for foreign banks. Please provide 
more information.  
6. Is there any substantial change in the process/procedure during the last several ye ars? 
 
Reply to Questions 5 -6: According to Article 42 of the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of 
the Regulation on the Administration of Foreign -funded Banks  of the People 's Republic of China , "to 
launch a new product within its business scope, a for -profit foreign -funded bank or a branch office 
thereof shall, within five days after launching the product, file a written report with the CBIRC or the 
local CBIRC office. " Therefore,  the launch of new products within the scope of business of foreign 
banks  does not require permission from the CBIRC, but is reported in written forms by foreign banks 
to the CBIRC or the local CBIRC office within 5 days after its operation. The regulation has not 
changed in recent years.  
 
4.4.1.3.3 Regulatory developments in i nsurance  
Page 161 Para 4.165  
Foreign ownership limits were also lifted on life insurers and insurance asset management 
companies. In 2018, the PBOC announced that the foreign ownership cap on life insurance 
companies would be raised to 100% by 2021. Subsequently, in July 2019, the FSD C announced that 
China will accelerate this transition timeline by allowing Chinese life insurance companies to be fully 
foreign -owned in 2020. On 9 December 2019, the CBIRC released the Notice Concerning Clarification 
of the Time-frame  for the Cancellatio n of Foreign Ownership Restrictions on Joint Venture Life 
Insurance Companies. The Notice states that all restrictions on foreign ownership of joint -venture 
insurance companies that engage in life insurance operations will be officially lifted starting 
1 January  2020, giving foreign investors the opportunity for full ownership. In addition, in line with 
FSDC 's announcement, the CBIRC is revising the Interim Administrative Regulations on Insurance 
Asset Management Companies, which lift the 25% foreign owners hip cap on insurance asset 
management companies.  
 
Questions:   
7. Could you please clarify whether insurance asset management companies are the same with 
general (non -life) insurance companies? If they are not the same, kindly confirm if China 's policy 
regard ing foreign ownership limitation in general and life insurance within China is the same?  
 
Reply:  According to the relevant Chinese laws, insurance asset management companies are 
different market entities from life insurance companies and non -life insurance companies. There is 
no share ratio restriction for both foreign -owned life insurance companies and non -life insurance 
companies in China.  
 
8. Furthermore, if foreign investors may have full ownership of an insurance company, will the 
insurance company still in the form of a Chinese company entity, or can it be transformed into a 
fully foreign entity?  
 
Reply:  The question requires further clarification. From the perspective of national treatment, 
foreign insurance companies in the Chinese market are subject to the same regulatory rules as 
Chinese insurance companies.  
 
9. Could you please confirm whether th e policy that lifted foreign ownership limits also applies 
to any new foreign insurance company that is planning to set up its company in China?  
 
Reply:  Any eligible foreign investor may establish a wholly -owned life insurance company in China.  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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4.4.1.3.5  Developments in pension fund management  
Page 165 Para 4.182 - 4.184  
Questions:   
10. Could the government kindly elaborate more on pension system in China? Is there any 
minimum capital limitation difference for domestic and foreign entities to set up a private pension 
fund management companies in China?  
11. From paragraph 4.182, stated that C hina will permit foreign financial institutions to set up or 
invest in Chinese private pension fund management companies. Could the government confirm 
whether it will be in the form of a branch, a representative office, or a joint venture only?  
12. It is also mentioned in paragraph 4.184, that authorities are considering to formulate new 
laws and regulations in order to promote individual pillar -three pensions. Could the government 
provide more information on what will be regulated and the time-frame /plan to im plement the new 
laws and regulations?  
 
Reply to questions 10 -12: Currently, China has put in place a pension insurance system 
encompassing urban workers and urban and rural residents. The employee pension insurance regime 
is comprised of three levels: bas ic pension insurance, enterprise (occupational) pensions, personal 
savings pension insurance and commercial pension insurance.  On July 20, 2019, the Office of the 
Financial Stability and Development Committee released the Relevant Measures for Further Open ing 
Up the Financial Industry, introducing 11 measures to open up the financial sector, including 
"allowing foreign financial institutions to invest in the establishment and participation of pension 
management companies ". The CSRC has not set up a separate  license for the "private pension fund 
company ". The Chinese government attaches great importance to the development of personal 
savings pension insurance and commercial pension insurance (pension insurance as the third pillar), 
two tasks have been initially specified for the development of the third pil lar: First, it is to create a 
market -oriented personal pension system backed by tax and other policies, with voluntary 
participation by individuals. Second, it is to regulate the development of personal commercial 
pension finance, in accordance with market  rules of operation and supervision.  
 
4.4.1.3.7 Developments in the fintech industry  
Page 166 Para 4.192  
Questions:   
13. Based on paragraph 4.192, there is no comprehensive regulation that governs/regulates the 
financial technology (fintech) in the China. Fintech operators could also perform business as an 
administrative support service for financial services. Could the government explain further which 
regulator/authority supervises the fintech peer -to-peer lending.   
 
Reply:  According to the Interim Measures for the Administration of the Business Activities of Online 
Lending Information Intermediary Institutions , P2P lending is jointly supervised by multiple parties. 
The CBIRC is responsible for formulating policies and regul ating business, while local governments 
are responsible for the supervision of online lending institutions, risk prevention and disposal, etc.  
 
14. Could the government also inform whether there is any regulation which stipulates the 
obligation to implement an ti-money laundering and counter -terrorism financing in the China? Is 
there a mechanism which allows the exchange of information between parties/regulators/authorities 
regarding shareholders that invest in peer -to-peer lending or any person that provides 
lending/investment to Indonesian company?  
 
Reply:  China has established a comprehensive anti -money laundering and counter -terrorism 
financing legal system, with the Anti-Money Laundering Law , the Anti-Terrorism Law  and the 
Criminal Law as the legal basis fo r anti-money laundering and counter -terrorism financing. The PBoC 
is the administrative department of the State Council for anti -money laundering. The PBoC, either 
alone or in conjunction with relevant departments of the State Council, has formulated and i ssued 
regulations and normative documents such as the Administrative Measures for the Freezing of Assets 
Relating to Terrorist Activities  and the Provisions on Anti -money Laundering through Financial 
Institutions , which are available on the Chinese governm ent website and the official website of PBoC.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  PART II: QUESTIONS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
2 GROUNDING ITS EFFORTS IN THE NEW DEVELOPMENT STAGE, APPLYING THE NEW 
DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY, AND FOSTERING A NEW DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM SO AS 
TO PROMOTE HIGH -QUALITY DEVELOPMENT  
Page 4 Para 2.1 and 2.2  
(…) China draws up the Outline for the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 
and Long -range Objectives through the Year 2035, and embarks on a new journey towards the 
second centenary goal, which marks that China has entered into a new development stage. China 's 
economy has shifted from a stage of high -speed growth to a stage of high -quality development. The 
basic national condition that China is still in the primary stage of socialism and will remain so for a 
long time has not changed. China 's international status as the world 's largest developing country 
has not changed.  
 
Questions:  
15. Could the Government of China please elaborate more on the implementation of the 14th Five-
Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long -range Objectives through the Year 2035?  
 
Reply:  On March 11 this year, at the fourth session of the 13th National People 's Congress, the 
Outline for the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic and Social Development and Long -Range Objectives 
through the Year 2035  (the Outline) was reviewed and adopted. At present, all provinces and 
departments are actively planning and advancing tasks clarified in the Outline. Given that it is still 
in the preliminary stag e of implementation and summary and evaluation have not yet been carried 
out, the overall implementation of the Outline cannot be provided for the time being.  
 
16. Indonesia observes that China 's economy has shifted from a stage of high -speed growth to a 
stage  of high -quality development by adhering to the concept of innovative, coordinated, green, 
open and shared development. What particular steps/measures will China take to achieve high -
quality development, and how would it benefit the Chinese economy?  
 
Reply: Promoting high -quality development is the fundamental requirement for determining 
development ideas, formulating economic policies and implementing macroeconomic regulation in 
both now and future. The Chinese government is making efforts to accelerate t he creation and 
improvement of the institutional environment, and is gradually establishing an indicator system, 
policy system, standard system, statistical system, performance evaluation and performance 
assessment methods for high -quality development. We are also focusing on promoting high -quality 
development in key areas such as manufacturing, high -tech industries, service industries, and 
infrastructure and public services to drive and lead overall high -quality development.  
 
17. Indonesia also observes that b ased on the Government Report and UNCTADstat of Country 
Classification, China 's international status remains a developing country. Indonesia would like to 
share China 's point of view on this issue, particularly in terms of the characteristics of developing  
and developed countries.   
 
Reply:  Under the strong and correct leadership of the CPC, the Chinese government has led the 
people of the whole country to adhere to the basic national policy of reform and opening -up, give 
full play to institutional advantages, and follow the general global t rends. After decades of hard work 
and unremitting efforts, our economic and social development has indeed made considerable 
progress, and our comprehensive national strength is also increasing. However, China still faces the 
serious problem of unbalanced a nd inadequate development, and the task of its own development 
remains daunting. According to the report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC, China 's 
international status as the world 's largest developing country remains unchanged.  
 
2.4.2 Foreign tra de  
Page 5 Para 2.8 and 2.9  
Questions:   
18. According to the report from China, overall imports and exports of Chinese goods grew 
by 12.5 %year on year. China also reported that its exports and imports of products had achieved 
all-time highs. What strategies did the government implement to ensure that goods exports and 
imports rose year after year? Please elaborate.  
 
Reply:  The Chinese gover nment, in accordance with the requirements of high -quality development, 
has issued a number of documents, including the Implementation Opinions of the General Office of WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  the State Council on Advancing the Innovative Development of Foreign Trade , and Opinion s of the 
General Office of the State Council on Accelerating the Development of New Forms of Business and 
New Models of Foreign Trade  in the past two years, focusing on the following aspects: first, continue 
to promote the innovative development of foreign  trade. Second, accelerate the development of new 
business models in foreign trade. Third, actively expand imports.  
 
19. What specific measures has the Chinese government taken to facilitate trade?   
 
Reply:  In recent years, the Chinese government has taken a number of measures  to continue to 
promote trade facilitation. First, we have enhanced the level of trade facilitation through the 
expansion of "single window " system in international trade. Second, we ha ve expanded the scope 
of paperless import and export license application and customs clearance operations. Third, China 's 
pilot free trade zones have played a pilot role in promoting trade facilitation.  
 
PART III: GENERAL QUESTIONS  
 
Question:   
20. Regarding f inancial service sector, Could China please explain the regulation regarding 
offshore funding for banks?   
 
Reply:  In January 2017, PBoC issued the Notice of the People 's Bank of China on Matters Concerning 
the Macro -Prudential Management of Full-Covered Cross -Border Financing  (No. 9 [2017] of the 
People 's Bank of China), which allows both enterprises and financial institutions to independently 
conduct cross -border financing business in both domestic and foreign currencies within the cross -
border financing cap linked to their net assets and in accordance with relevant regulations.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
PART I: Questions Regarding the Secretariat Report  
 
Page 33 (Para 2.112)  
Reflecting China 's broader industrial and economic goals, the Plan aims to widen market access for 
foreign investment by, inter alia, loosening foreign investment restrictions in various sectors such 
as manufacturing and finance, as recently reflected in the negative lists  for foreign investments 
(Section 2.4).  
 
Question 1 : 
The Chinese government is operating the negative lists for foreign investments for the purpose of 
widening market access for foreign investment, and recently the Chinese government also 
announced that i t plans to introduce negative lists in the services sector as well. Could you please 
explain the prospects for the liberalization of audio -visual and digital contents service sector, if the 
negative lists in the service sectors should be introduced?   
 
Reply: China will consider the possibility of further opening relevant service sectors according to the 
development needs of its domestic market.  
 
Page 37 (Para 2.40)  
With respect to cross -border remittances, in accordance with the FIL, a foreign investor may  freely 
transfer inward and outward, in CNY or foreign currencies, inter alia, its capital contributions, profit, 
capital gains, proceeds from disposition of assets, royalties from IPRs, lawfully obtained 
compensation or indemnity amounts, and proceeds fro m liquidation. Under the FIL, no entity or 
individual shall illegally restrict, inter alia, the type of currencies, amount, or frequency of such 
remittances.  
 
Question 2 : 
This paragraph stipulates that foreign investors are freely to transfer inward and outward capital 
contributions, profit, capital gains, proceeds from disposition of assets, royalties from IPRs, lawfully 
obtained compensation or indemnity amounts, and proc eeds from liquidation. Could you provide a 
detailed explanation for the procedure, documents that need to be submitted, and the procedure 
period for the overseas remittance?  
 
Reply:  According to the Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the People 's Republic of China , 
the state does not impose restrictions on current international payments and transfers. Foreign 
exchange receipts and payments under current accounts shall have a true and legal basis for 
transactions. The handling bank shall conduct a r easonable review of the authenticity of the 
transaction documents and their consistency with foreign exchange receipts and payments. For 
foreign exchange expenditures on capital items such as investment and capital contributions, the 
payment shall be made in banks that conduct foreign exchange settlement and sales business with 
valid documents in accordance with regulations. The documents to be reviewed by the bank and the 
processing period vary according to different businesses. Most of the time, the docum ents are mainly 
materials that verify the authenticity and legality of the remittance, such as copies of business 
licenses of relevant institutions, contracts, financial statements, tax vouchers, and profit distribution 
resolutions (required when profits a re remitted), etc.  
 
Page 42 (Para 2.58)  
In the case of projects involving "serious " overcapacity, the approval process is outlined in the 
Guiding Opinions on Resolving Serious Production Overcapacity Conflicts, Guo Fa No. 41, 2013. In 
accordance with requirements of existing policies, projects designed to expand capacity in any of 
these sectors are strictly prohibited.  
 
Question 3 : 
With regard to the projects of which the approval process is outlined in the Guiding Opinions on 
Resolving Serious Production Overcapacity Conflicts, could China explain details regarding the 
criteria for dete rmining whether a certain project involves "serious " overcapacity?  
 
Reply:  The State Council 's Guiding Opinions on Resolving Contradictions in Severe Overcapacity 
requires all localities not to approve and file new capacity projects in industries with sev ere 
overcapacity, and does not stipulate the project approval procedures. At present, projects in China 's WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 505 - 
 
  overcapacity industries have basically implemented equal capacity and reduction replacements. 
Therefore, there is no overcapacity in a single project.  
 
Page 42 (Para 2.59)  
Pursuant to the Circular on the Establishment of a System for Security Review of Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, foreign investments in Chinese domestic enterprises 
might be subject to national security revi ew if the FDI is deemed to have an influence on national 
security. It applies only to certain types of foreign M&A transactions. The Circular provides for the 
scope, content, working mechanism, and procedures for the M&A security review, and it creates a 
unified and standardized security review system for M&A activities conducted by foreign investors. 
The FIL and its Implementing Regulations contain provisions on national security review. In 
April 2019, the NDRC issued Announcement No. 4, 2019, clarifying that the application materials for 
the security review of foreign investment shall be received by the NDRC Government Affairs Service 
Hall. On 19 December 2020, the NDRC and MOFCOM issued the Measu res for the Security Review 
of Foreign Investment, further clarifying the review authorities, scope, and procedures, which aimed 
at improving the standardization, accuracy, and transparency of security review. The Measures came 
into force on 18 January 202 1. 
 
Question 4 : 
Pursuant to the Circular on the Establishment of a System for Security Review of Acquisition of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, FDI and certain types of M&As that are considered to 
influence national security might be subject to national securit y review. Which institutions decide 
whether a project influences national security and what is the legal basis to make such decision?  
 
Reply:  According to the Notice on Establishment of the Security Review System for Mergers and 
Acquisitions of Domestic E nterprises by Foreign Investors: The relevant review will be led by the 
National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce under the leadership 
of the State Council. According to the industries and fields involved in foreign mergers an d 
acquisitions, M&A security reviews will be carried out in conjunction with relevant departments. The 
decision will be made in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Notice on Establishment of 
the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisition s of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors.  
 
Page 46 (Para 3.4)  
3.4. Import declarations may be submitted on paper or in electronic format through the single 
window system (see below). The use of a customs broker is mandatory. Documents to be provided  
with import declarations are listed in the Provisions on the Customs Administration of Declarations 
for the Import and Export of Goods. They include contracts, invoices, a packing list, a list of freight 
(manifest of cargo), bills of ladings (transport bi lls), acting customs clearance authorization 
entrustment agreement, import licences, and any other import documents as prescribed by the 
GACC. The authorities indicate that since 2020 some documents, including contracts and packing 
lists, no longer need to  be submitted to customs in the import declaration process, and other required 
documents have been simplified or optimized for the application and printing processes. The GACC 
does not charge fees for making customs declarations or for the use of the Natio nal Single Window 
(see below). With the consent of the GACC, import declarations may be filed, and customs clearance 
may take place, in advance of the goods ' arrival in China8; according to the authorities, this is 
encouraged.  
 
Question 5 : 
In spite of China 's continued efforts to improve customs clearance, Chinese customs ' administrative 
procedures still lack transparency. Also, excessive requests for document submission deter 
predictability. In this regard, could China explain its efforts at the centra l/local government level to 
increase transparency and predictability of customs?  
 
Reply:  Import declaration can be submitted in paper form or electronic form through the single 
window system. The consignee of imported goods and the entrusted customs decla ration enterprise 
can declare to the customs. In August 2021, the General Administration of Customs of the 
People 's Republic of China jointly launched 27 measures in 5 areas to enhance the level of cross -
border trade facilitation and promote the high -quality development of foreign trade. In recent years, 
China has adopted various measures to continuously improve the level of transparency, and the 
relevant practices are highly consistent with international rules such as WTO. Regarding the so -WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 506 - 
 
  called "Chinese Customs administrative procedures still lack transparency " that the ROK mentioned, 
it is recommended that it be asked to provide specific examples and evaluation criteria.  
 
Page 71 (Para 3.90./3.91/3.94/3.95)  
3.90. On 17 October 2020, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed the Export Control Law, 
which entered into force on 1 December 2020. Under Article 2 of the Law, export control refers to 
"prohibitions or restrictions on transfer of controlled items from the territory of the People 's Republic 
of China to overseas and the provision of controlled items by any citizen or incorporated or non -
incorporated organization of the People 's Republic of China to any foreign organization or individual ".  
 
3.91. The Law defines "controlled items " to include dual -use items (with both civilian and military 
applications), military products, and nuclear products. In addition, "controlled items " include "other 
goods, technologies, services that are related to the maintenance o f national security and interests 
and the implementation of international obligations such as non -proliferation ". It also requires 
exporters to provide documentation establishing the intended end -use and end -user for the 
controlled items to be issued by th e end -user or the Government at the end -user's location. End -
users are required to commit not to change the end -use or transfer the item to any third party 
without authorization from the Chinese export control authorities. Exporters and importers are 
further obliged to report any potential change in the end -use or end -user. 3.94. Exporters must 
apply for an export licence from the relevant export control authority in order to export any item 
listed on a control list or subject to temporary controls. Article  13 of the Law provides that approval 
or disapproval of exports will be based on eight criteria: national security and interests, international 
obligations and external commitments, the type of exports, the sensitivity of controlled items, the 
countries or  regions they are bound for, the end -users and end -uses, relevant credit records of 
exporting companies, and "other factors stipulated by laws and administrative regulations ". For 
goods, technologies, and services other than those listed on the export cont rol list and temporarily 
controlled items, an exporter must apply to the national export control authorities for an export 
licence, if the exporter knows or should know, or has been notified by the national export control 
authorities, that the relevant goo ds, technologies, and services may endanger national security and 
interests, or may be used for the design, development, production, or use of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery, or may be used for terrorism. 3.95. Under the Law, China  
may take measures reciprocally, according to the actual circumstances, if any country or region 
"abuses " its export control measures in ways that endanger China 's national security and interest.  
 
Question 6 : 
China 's Export Control Law includes "other goods, technologies, services that are related to the 
maintenance of national security and interests and the implementation of international obligations 
such as non -proliferation " in the "controlled items " defined in th e law. Also, it allows China to take 
reciprocal measures when another country or region "abuses " its export control measures in ways 
that endanger China 's national security and interest. Could China explain what the criteria of 
interpretation would be to e nsure objective application of the terms "national security and interests " 
and "abuses " mentioned in the Export Control Law?  
 
Reply:  China 's Export Control Law fully draws on international practices and provides for the purpose 
and scope of control, the c ontrolled items, the control measures, supervision and management, and 
legal responsibilities, etc.  
In recent years, certain countries have abused export control measures with unwarranted excuses. 
This is detrimental to the peaceful use of fruits of scient ific and technological progress to promote 
development by countries, especially developing countries, detrimental to the normal scientific and 
technological exchanges and economic and trade cooperation of the international community, and 
detrimental to the  secure and smooth operation of the global industrial and supply chains. It also 
seriously harms the common interests of the international community. China firmly opposes the 
practice and in response to it, China 's Export Control Law includes corresponding  clauses against 
foreign countries ' abuse of export control measures. China 's practice aligns with the basic norms of 
international relations and conforms to WTO rules and widely accepted international practices.  
 
Page 71 (Para 3.92)  
While the previous ex port control framework still remains in place on a number of fragmented lists 
of items, the new Export Control Law provides for the establishment of a single framework for 
restricting exports of controlled items through published control lists. According t o the authorities, 
China has formulated six administrative laws and regulations on export control, including the 
Administrative Rules on Monitored Chemicals, the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Exports, the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Administrative Regulations on the Export of  Military Products, the Regulations on the Export Control 
of Dual -use Nuclear Items and Related Technologies, the Regulations on the Export Control of 
Missiles and Missile -related Items and Technologies, and the Regulations on the Export Control of 
Dual-use Biological Items and Related Equipment and Technologies. Specific export control lists were 
also released. In addition to the established control lists, the new legislation authorizes export control 
authorities to list items for "temporary controls " for a provisional period of up to two years before 
determining whether to list the items on a control list. The authorities indicate that China is in the 
process of formulating supporting regulations and shall release further regulations at a lat er stage.  
 
Question 7 : 
Para 3.92 states that, in addition to the established control lists, China 's new legislation authorizes 
export control authorities to list items for "temporary controls " for a provisional period of up to 
two years before determining whether to list the items on a control list.  
In the case of when an item is listed for "temporary controls " before determining whether to be 
added on a control list, what is the subsequent effect on the export of the item? Will there be the 
same level of restriction as when the item is listed on the export control list?  
 
Reply: The same management measures are applied to items for temporary controls and items on 
a control list. The Chinese government will conduct a timely assessment before the expiration of the 
temporary control period.  
 
Page 71 (Para 3.93)  
3.93. Besides the item -based control lists, the Law provides for the establishment of control lists of 
foreign business entities that fall under one of the following cases: (i ) violate end -user or end -use 
restrictions; (ii) "possibly endanger national security and interests "; or (iii) use controlled items for 
terrorist purposes. Chinese exporters will be barred from dealing with foreign business entities on 
the controlled list.  However, they will be able to request exemptions under certain conditions, 
according to the Law.  
 
Question 8 : 
With regard to China 's Export Control Law mentioned in para 3.93, what are the exemptions under 
which the Export Control Law does not apply? Als o, what are the requirements to be fulfilled for a 
case to be exempted from the Law?  
 
Reply:  China is stepping up efforts to promote the formulation and revision of supporting regulations 
to further specify relevant exemptions and requirements and will en act such supporting regulations 
in a timely manner.  
 
Page 72 (Para 3.94)  
For goods, technologies, and services other than those listed on the export control list and 
temporarily controlled items, an exporter must apply to the national export control authorities for 
an export licence, if the exporter knows or should know, or has  been notified by the national export 
control authorities, that the relevant goods, technologies, and services may endanger national 
security and interests, or may be used for the design, development, production, or use of weapons 
of mass destruction and t heir means of delivery, or may be used for terrorism.  
 
Question 9  
Could China explain on which standard the Chinese government determines if the exporter "knows 
or should know ", with regard to applying for an export license for goods, technologies, and s ervices 
other than those listed on the export control list and temporarily controlled items?  
 
Reply:  China 's Export Control Law fully draws on international practice and mature practices of 
other countries and provides for comprehensive export control. Ac cording to the law, for items not 
on the export control list, if an exporter knows or should have known, or is notified by the export 
control administrative department of the state that the relevant items may have certain risks 
including endangering nation al security and interest, the exporter shall file an application for a 
license. It is so provided for the purpose of better fulfilling the international non -proliferation 
obligations and maintaining national security. Regarding the standards to determine "knows or 
should have known ", China will make decisions and take actions in accordance with relevant laws 
and regulations while taking into consideration international practices and actual conditions.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 81 (Para 3.145)  
Between January 2018 and 13 April 2021, China submitted 344 TBT notifications, most of them 
under Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement.128 In the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
between January 2018 and 13 April 2021, 25 specific trade concerns (STCs) were raised by Members 
regarding TBT measures maintained or planned by China, including 9 new STCs.129 
 
Question 10 : 
China 's amended Safety technical specification on lithiumion cells and batteries used in portable 
electronic equipment, notified to WTO in March, requires to specify  cell information even on cells 
used as components. The Safety technical specification used to include exceptions that, in the case 
cell manufacturers and end -product manufacturers agreed, cells used as components may not be 
required to specify cell inform ation on them. Could China provide reasons why the exception was 
deleted? Also, could China reconsider the decision deleting the exception, as it would overburden 
enterprises?  
 
Reply:  Technical specification is very important for the safe use of cells and  batteries. As important 
components of a battery, cells cannot be effectively traced and identified if without necessary 
specification. Recent years have witnessed quite a number of incidents where unspecified cells led 
to confusion for market regulators. Therefore, China, upon extensive survey and consultation, 
introduces relevant requirements for specifying technical information even on cells used as 
components in GB 31241 -20XX.  
 
Page 81 (Para 3.145)  
Between January 2018 and 13 April 2021, China submitted 344 TBT notifications, most of them 
under Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement.128 In the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
between January 2018 and 13 April 2021, 25 specific trade concerns (STCs) were raised by Members 
regarding TBT measure s maintained or planned by China, including 9 new STCs.129 
 
Question 11 : 
To Korea 's knowledge, China has not notified the WTO TBT Committee of the Regulation on 
the Administration of Commercial Cypher Codes of China. Korea asks China to notify the 
WTO TBT Committee of the mentioned Regulation according to the WTO TBT 10.1.  
 
Reply:  In terms of commercial cypher code products, since 1 January 2020, the examination and 
approval of varieties and models of commercial cypher code products have been cancelled according 
to law, and a commercial cypher code authentication system uniformly i mplemented by the state 
have been established. The management of commercial cypher code products fully embodies the 
principles of non -discrimination and fair competition, equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
products and domestic and foreign -invested en terprises, implements compulsory testing and 
certification for commercial cypher code products involving national security, national economy and 
people 's livelihood and social public interests, and implements voluntary testing and certification for 
other c ommercial cypher code products.  
 
Page 86 (Para 3.163.)  
MARA plans to introduce an edible agriculture product compliance certificate system and a National 
Agriculture Product Quality and Safety Traceability Platform. According to the authorities, these 
measures are only applicable to domestic production and operation of edible agricultural products.  
 
Question 12  
According to Para 3.163, MARA plans to introduce an edible agriculture product compliance certificate 
system and a National Agriculture Product Q uality and Safety Traceability Platform. Could China 
explain the improvements in the edible agriculture product compliance certificate system compared 
to the certification of Pollution -free Agricultural Product?  
 
Reply:  In 2017, the Central Office and the  State Council issued the Opinions on Innovating Systems 
and Mechanisms to Promote the Green Development of Agriculture, which proposed to improve the 
certification system for edible agricultural products in line with market access. In 2019, the Opinions 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Deepening 
Reform and Strengthening Food Safety Work proposed: to accelerate the establishment of a 
certification system for edible agricultural products. In the past two years  of trial implementation, 
the certification system has been advancing quickly and has achieved remarkable results. Trial work WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  has been carried out in 760 counties across the country, and 335,000 production enterprises, 
cooperatives, family farms and 427,00 0 small farmers have issued certificates of compliance.  
 
Page 93 (Para 3.185)  
The mechanism requires that all administrative rules, norms, and measures in relation to market 
access, industrial development, investment promotion, tendering activities, government 
procurement, business operation norms, and qualification criteria go thro ugh fair competition review 
before being introduced. Any administrative measures that have the effect of eliminating or 
restricting competition should not be put into place unless they fall into the exceptions prescribed 
by the State Council Opinions.  
 
Question 13  
Para 3.185 states that there are certain exceptions allowing an administrative measure to have the 
effect of eliminating or restricting competition. Could China provide details regarding the exceptions 
prescribed by the State Council Opinions?  
 
Reply:  China established and implemented the fair competition review system in 2016. It is clearly 
provided that administrative agencies and organizations authorized by laws or regulations to perform 
the function of administering public affairs should conduct fa ir competition reviews to evaluate 
impacts on market competition and prevent the restriction or exclusion of competition when 
formulating regulations, normative documents, other policy documents, and specific policy measures 
on individual cases that are re lated to economic activities of market entities. Some exceptions are 
also provided for. In June 2021, five authorities including the State Administration for Market 
Regulation issued the Rules for the Implementation of the Fair Competition Review System, w hich 
further clarified the circumstances and conditions for exceptions and provided the regulatory basis 
for formulating policy measures where exceptions apply.  
 
Page 97 (Para 3.197)  
STEs in China have the exclusive right to import or export the following  products: wheat, maize, 
sugar, tobacco, rice, cotton, crude and processed oil, refined coal, chemical fertilizers, tungsten and 
tungstate products, antimony, and silver. The authorities indicate that STEs in China operate 
following the market mechanism, w ith no government interference.  
 
Question 14 : 
Para 3.197 states that the Chinese authorities indicated that STEs  in China operate following the 
market mechanism, with no government interference. Could China provide a broad explanation on 
how Chinese STEs are operated according to the market mechanism, including how the price of 
items and total import/export quantiti es are determined?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification on state trading submitted by China.  
 
Page 97 (Para 3.200.)  
The authorities indicate that, while privatization of SOEs is not planned, progress has been achieved 
in mixed -ownership reform.  According to the authorities, in November 2020, the Central Commission 
for Comprehensive Reforms approved a new proposal for a structural plan of China 's SOEs.  
 
Question 15 : 
It is mentioned in Para 3.200 that the Central Commission for Comprehensive Reforms approved a 
new proposal for a structural plan of China 's SOEs in November 2020. Could China elaborate on the 
newly approved structural plan of China 's SOEs including the progresses achieved regarding mixed -
ownership reform?  
 
Reply:  Mixed -ownership reform is an important way for the Chinese government to guide state -
owned enterprises to deepen SOE reform. It aims to enable state capital and non -public capital to 
learn from each other 's strengths and reinforce each other for common de velopment through cross -
shareholding and mutual integration. In recent years, China has actively carried out pilot mixed -
ownership reforms in important areas, encouraging related enterprises to introduce social capital to 
optimize ownership structure, impr ove corporate governance structure, establish flexible and 
efficient market -oriented operating mechanism and effective incentive and restraint mechanism, and 
promote capitals of various ownership to learn from each other 's strengths and reinforce each othe r 
for common development. First, the proportion of non -public capital rights and interests in mixed -
ownership enterprises has further increased. Second, the governance system of mixed -ownership WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  enterprises has become more perfect. At present, among the sta te-owned enterprises that have 
completed the mixed -ownership reform, the number of enterprises in which non -public shareholders 
dispatch directors to participate in company management is 70%, initially forming a corporate 
governance system with clear  accou ntability  and shared  responsibility mechanism, coordinated 
operation and effective checks and balances. Third, mixed -ownership enterprises are more dynamic. 
Nearly 70% of enterprises have made solid progress in the reform of labor, personnel and 
distributi on systems, effectively stimulating the vitality of enterprise development momentum. After 
the mixed -ownership reform is completed, more than 70% of the state -owned enterprises have 
achieved profit growth.  
 
Page 100 (Para 3.212)  
3.212. Both the Government  Procurement Law and the Tendering Law are currently under 
amendment. The draft amended Bid Invitation and Tendering Law was published online for public 
comment from 3 December 2019 to 1 January 2020. A further revised draft reflecting those public 
comment s has been submitted to the State Council for review. At present, the Ministry of Justice is 
organizing a legislative review of the draft amendments. According to the Explanatory Note on the 
Draft, the amended Tendering Law will, inter alia: (i) redefine i ts scope of application and deregulate 
tendering activities in private investments; (ii) enhance transparency of tendering activities; 
(iii) adjust the time periods in tendering procedures in order to improve efficiency; (iv) restrict the 
use of lowest pri ce criteria in tender evaluation and encourage life -cycle cost assessment; 
(v) promote e -tendering; (vi) clarify tendering requirements in public -private partnership (PPP) 
projects; and (vii) enhance anti -collusion in tendering and the monitoring of contra ct performance.  
 
The draft amended Government Procurement Law was published online for public comment from 
4 December 2020 to 5 January 2021. According to its Explanatory Note, the amended Government 
Procurement Law will, inter alia: (i) adjust the scope of application of the Government Procurement 
Law176; (ii) give full play to the policy goals of government procurement policy by including provisions 
on promoting innovation and safeguarding the interest of vulnerable groups, and specify relevant 
competent authorities and implementation measures; (iii) improve and clarify government 
procurement methods and procedures; (iv) improve the system of government procurement 
contracts; (v) strengthen demand management in government procurement; (vi) enhance t he 
position of procuring entities; and (vii) simplify supplier qualification procedures. According to the 
authorities, the revision of the two Laws will further align China 's government procurement and 
tendering administration systems and harmonize the app lication of the two Laws. 176 The amended 
draft Law provides that government procurement refers to the act of obtaining goods, construction 
works, and services by state organs, public institutions, social organizations, and other procuring 
entities, for th e purpose of fulfilling government affairs and public services, via contract means with 
fiscal funds or other public resources.  
 
Question 16 : 
Para 3.212 states that both China 's domestic law, namely Government Procurement Law and the 
Tendering Law, are currently under amendment. By when will the amendment procedure be 
completed for the Government Procurement Law and the Tendering Law? Also, will the amended 
Government Procuremen t Law be applied to SOEs? Lastly, what would the 'other procuring entities ' 
on the footnote 176 imply?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government is actively advancing the amendment to the Government 
Procurement Law  and the Tendering Law . The time for the completion of the amendment depends 
on the opinions of the parties concerned and the coordination with relevant departments. The 
application of the Government Procurement Law  will be adjusted in light of China 's offer for joining 
the GPA. The definition of other proc uring entities will be clarified through amendments.  
 
Page 104 (Para 3.222)  
3.222. It is also noted that the buy -national requirement does not apply to procurements by SOEs , 
as they are not considered as government procurement in China and are not bound by the 
Government Procurement Law. Therefore, the authorities state that there is no differential treatment 
of foreign goods, services, and suppliers in SOEs ' procurements, i ncluding those in the areas of 
infrastructure and public utilities. In addition, Article 16 of the new Foreign Investment Law (FIL) 
(promulgated in March 2019) provides that "the State shall guarantee that foreign -invested 
enterprises can participate in go vernment procurement activities through fair competition; products 
produced and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises within the territory of China shall be 
treated equally in government procurement ".  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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Question 17 : 
Para 3.222 states that the buy -national requirement does not apply to procurements by SOEs, as 
they are not considered as government procurement in China and are not bound by the Government 
Procurement Law. In that case, could China explain what law or reg ulation would apply to administer 
and regulate procurement by SOEs?  
 
Reply:  State -owned enterprises must conduct tenders for the following construction projects, 
including project survey, design, construction, supervision, and procurement of important equipment 
and materials related to project construction, in accordance with the  Tendering Law: ( i) Large -scale 
infrastructure, public utilities, and other projects related to social public interest and public security; 
(ii) Projects that use state -owned funds or state financing in whole or in part; and  (iii) Projects that 
use loans a nd aid funds from international organizations or foreign governments. The specific scope 
and scale standards of construction projects that are subject to bidding in accordance with the law 
shall be formulated by the development and reform department of the  State Council in conjunction 
with relevant departments of the State Council, and shall be announced and implemented after being 
approved by the State Council.  
 
Page 105 (Para 3.224)  
3.224. With regard to environmental protection, China maintains policies to provide more favourable 
treatment to energy -saving products and environmentally friendly products in government 
procurement. Such policies were first introduced in 2004 and 2006. D uring the review period, China 
adjusted implementation measures in this regard. Specifically, in 2019, the MOF, the NDRC, the MEE, 
and the SAMR jointly issued a Notice on Adjusting and Optimizing Execution Mechanisms 
for Government Procurement of Energy -Saving Products and Environmentally Labelled Products 
(Cai Ku No. 9, 2019).185 Under the old measures, relevant authorities published not only the 
catalogues but also the lists of brands and models that had been granted conformity certificates for 
such purpo ses.186 Under the new measures, the authorities publish only the generic catalogues and 
energy conservation and environment protection standards187, and not the lists of brands and 
models. Product brands and models that have been granted certificates by re cognized certification 
agencies are eligible for favourable treatment in government procurement. According to the 
authorities, such adjustments made it unnecessary for suppliers to apply for being included on the 
list and provide more equal opportunities f or suppliers. The new Measures also enhance the 
obligation of procuring entities to implement such policies.  
 
Question 18 : 
According to Para.3.224, the authorities publish only the generic catalogues and energy conservation 
and environment protection stan dards, and not the lists of brands and models. However, the 
footnote 187 states that product lists are still published. This part is confusing, please clarify.  
 
Reply : In accordance with the Notice on Adjusting and Optimizing Execution Mechanisms for 
Government Procurement of Energy -Saving Products and Environmentally Labelled Products  
(Cai Ku No. 9, 2019), energy -saving products and environmentally labelled products for government 
procurement are subject to item list management, and the list of energy -saving products for 
government procurement and the list of environmentally labelled products for government 
procurement are no longer released. The product lists mentioned in footnote 187 refer to item lists.  
 
Page 105 (Para 3.224)  
3.224. With regard to environmental protection, China maintains policies to provide more favourable 
treatment to energy -saving products and environmentally friendly products in government 
procurement. Such policies were first introduced in 2004 and 2006. D uring the review period, China 
adjusted implementation measures in this regard. Specifically, in 2019, the MOF, the NDRC, the MEE, 
and the SAMR jointly issued a Notice on Adjusting and Optimizing Execution Mechanisms for 
Government Procurement of Energy -Saving Products and Environmentally Labelled Products 
(Cai Ku No. 9, 2019).185 Under the old measures, relevant authorities published not only the 
catalogues but also the lists of brands and models that had been granted conformity certificates for 
such purpo ses.186 Under the new measures, the authorities publish only the generic catalogues and 
energy conservation and environment protection standards187, and not the lists of brands and 
models. Product brands and models that have been granted certificates by re cognized certification 
agencies are eligible for favourable treatment in government procurement. According to the 
authorities, such adjustments made it unnecessary for suppliers to apply for being included on the 
list and provide more equal opportunities f or suppliers. The new Measures also enhance the WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  obligation of procuring entities to implement such policies.  
 
Question 19 : 
Para 3.224 states that China maintains policies to provide more favorable treatment to energy -
saving products and environmentally fr iendly products in government procurement. With regard to 
the more favorable treatment to environmentally friendly products in government procurement, 
does the environmental standard mentioned in Para.3.224 include only national standards? Or does 
it also accept international environmental standards?  
 
Reply:  China accepts relevant national certification results for government green procurement of 
energy -saving and environmentally -friendly products, and such certifications are granted in 
accordance with national standards and industry standards.  
 
Page 106 (Par a 3.229.)  
China became an Observer in the WTO Committee on Government Procurement in 2002. It initiated 
its GPA accession negotiation in 2007. During the review period, significant progress was made on 
the accession. China submitted its 6th revised market access offer on 20 October 2019.193 The new 
offer, for the first time, included non -sensitive military procurement. It also added seven provinces 
and municipalities, 16 SOEs, and 36 local universities. No minority autonomous regions at the 
provincial level  were included in the new offer, and some SOEs in the infrastructure and public utility 
sectors are missing. Some services sectors are not included in the offer. On 29 May 2020, China 
circulated its updated Replies to the Checklist of Issues, which contain  comprehensive information 
on China 's government procurement regime.194 Consultations continue between China and 
GPA Parties to address the remaining issues in the accession process.  
 
Question 20 : 
Para 3.229 mentions China 's continued effort to accede to the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement. At the GPA committee formal meeting in June, China explained its endeavor to complete 
early accession to the GPA, and circulated its written replies to other GPA members ' comments and 
requests. Could Chin a provide explanations regarding its further plans to accede to the agreement?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government is committed to joining the GPA as soon as possible. The level of 
the seventh bid for China 's accession to the GPA submitted to the WTO in Octobe r 2019 is roughly 
equivalent to that of the participating parties. In May 2020, China submitted the State Report on 
China 's Government Procurement (updated in 2020) to the WTO, which fully reflects the reform of 
China 's government procurement legal system.  While advancing the bid negotiation, the legal 
adjustment negotiation is also being promoted simultaneously. In June 2021, China again submitted 
to the WTO its responses to the EU and Australia 's 7th bid for China 's accession to the GPA and the 
list of is sues in the Report on the State of China 's Government Procurement (updated in 2020). 
Practical actions have demonstrated China 's sincerity in joining the GPA and determination to 
safeguard the multilateral trading system. The GPA is a multilateral agreemen t. It is not enough to 
rely on China 's unilateral efforts to join the GPA. It depends to a large extent on the positions and 
expectations of the participants. China always believes that the sooner China joins, the sooner all 
parties will benefit. It is hoped that the GPA participants will be based on the current situation and 
have a long -term view, pragmatically ask China for a price, and reach a mutually beneficial and win -
win negotiation result for China 's accession to the GPA as soon as possible.  
 
Page 106 (Para 3.239.)  
China amended its Anti -Unfair Competition Law in April 2019 and its Trademark Law in 
November  2020. The amendments to the Patent Law were reviewed twice by the NPC Standing 
Committee in October 2020 and are expected to be implemented  from 1 June 2021. The Copyright 
Law was revised in November 2020. Other IP -related laws have remained unchanged since the 
previous Review (Table A3.3).  
 
Question 21 : 
Korea highly appreciates China 's overall maintenance of its laws and regulations to protect 
rightholders ' intellectual property rights. However, problems including online infringement and bad 
faith trademark registration persist. We expect the Chinese government to take a more active ro le, 
making sure its various efforts to improve the system can effectively prevent infringements in the 
actual market. In this regard, could China explain if it has further plans to ensure the effective 
enforcement of policies mentioned in the Review?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 513 - 
 
  Reply: China has amended many laws including the Patent Law, the Trademark Law, the Copyright 
Law, and the Anti -Unfair Competition Law to enact up to five times the amount of damage for 
infringements in its major intellectual property legal systems, the highe st globally. This is intended 
for enhanced IP protection. China will dutifully enact relevant provisions on punitive damages, 
strengthen the civil proceedings for IP protection, give full play to the role of administrative courts 
in handling IP cases, proc ess criminal IP infringement cases in accordance with the law, and severely 
crack down on IP crimes, in order to provide a strong legal and judicial support for the creation of a 
stable, fair, transparent, and predictable business environment.  
 
China Natio nal Intellectual Property Administration has adopted strict measures to implement 
Article  4 of the Trademark Law regarding the rejection of malicious trademark registration 
applications with no intention for use, a further step to stop trademark hoarding a t an earlier stage. 
It has to a certain extent curbed the proliferation of malicious trademark registrations. In 2020, 
China rejected 15,600 malicious trademark registration applications with no intention for use. The 
number of rejections was 46,000 from J anuary to September 2021. This measure has reduced the 
time and economic costs for companies to protect their rights through subsequent procedures, and 
strengthened their confidence in intellectual property protection. It is also a powerful deterrent to 
potential malicious applicants. We are glad to see some preliminary fruits in restoring trademark 
registration order from the source.  
 
In order to strengthen intellectual property protection, regulate the economic order of platforms, 
and promote the sustainable and healthy development of e -commerce, the State Administration for 
Market Regulation drafted the Decision on Amending the E -Commerce Law of the 
People 's Republic  of China (Draft for Comments) and proposed to make amendments to Article 43 
and A rticle 84 of the E -Commerce Law of the People 's Republic of China. In the next step, the State 
Administration for Market Regulation will work closely with the legislature to promote the adoption 
of the amendment to the E -Commerce Law as soon as possible.  
 
Trade secrets belong to an important type of intellectual property. The protection of trade secrets 
forms an important part of China 's anti -unfair competition efforts, including the administrative law -
enforcement efforts. China revised the Anti -Unfair Comp etition Law in 2017 and in 2019 respectively 
to improve the provisions on the protection of trade secrets. At present, the State Administration 
for Market Regulation is advancing the formulation and enactment of the Regulation on the 
Protection of Trade Se crets in an orderly manner. The expected Regulation is now undergoing legal 
review.  
 
Page 123 (Para 4.9)  
4.9. Since China 's previous Review, FDI restrictions on companies selecting and cultivating new 
varieties  of crop and producing  seeds  have been eased,  except  for soybean  and rice; the requirement  
for Chinese parties to be controlling shareholders now applies only to corn. With respect to wheat, 
the Chinese shareholding threshold  has been reduced  to 34% (Table A2.3).  
 
Question 22  
According to Para 4.9, China has eased FDI restrictions on companies related to seed production, 
except for corn. Could China please explain why corn is excluded?  
 
Reply:  Further opening up the seed production sector forms an important part of unfolding a  new 
pattern of comprehensive opening up, and it reflects China 's firm determination to actively open up 
to the outside world. It is also a concrete measure to meet the actual need of deepening the 
agricultural supply -side structural reform, which is condu cive to speeding up the introduction of 
foreign premier, special, high -quality, and new varieties, accelerating the development of unique 
crop sectors, and meeting the needs of the people for special agricultural products. China will further 
optimize the d evelopment environment of the seed production sector. Foreign investors are welcome 
to invest in the seed production sector and engage in seed production activities in accordance with 
the law.  
 
Page 125 (Para 4.11)  
4.11. Policy objectives for modernizing the agricultural sector are also contained in China 's 13th Five-
Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (2016 -20), which has four main 
elements:strengthening the capacity for ensuring the safety of agricultural products; (ii) establishing  
a modern agricultural operations system; (iii) improving technology and equipment and increasing 
information technology (IT) application in agriculture; and (iv) improving systems for providing WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  support and protection for agriculture. It also contains goal s for developing the agricultural 
biotechnology segment, including genetically modified crops. In the 14th Five -Year Plan for Economic 
and Social Development, policy objectives in agriculture included: implementing the strategy of rural 
revitalization, str engthening the use of industry to supplement agriculture, and promoting the 
formation of a new type of urban -rural relationship between industry and agriculture. The authorities 
state that steps to implement the goals/reforms contained in the above -mention ed plans include 
promotion of large -scale construction of high -standard farmland, demarcation of functional areas of 
grain production and essential production areas for agricultural products, strengthened innovation 
in agricultural science and technology, and promotion of whole -process mechanized production of 
major crops. Additionally, support is being given to establishing modern agricultural industrial parks 
and townships and industry clusters, and developing new business models (i.e. leisure agriculture , 
rural tourism, and rural e -commerce). Other areas of focus include encouraging clean agricultural 
production, developing a three -year action plan to protect and restore the rural environment, 
promoting rural culture, and improving transport infrastructur e, utilities, and public service delivery.  
 
Question 23 : 
As mentioned in Para 4.11, China 's 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic  and Social  Development 
includes the policy objective of (iv) improving systems for providing support and protection for 
agriculture. Could China provide a detailed explanation on specific methods it is considering to apply, 
or any legal or institutional basis it will  use, in an effort to improve the system to protect agriculture?  
 
Reply:  The 14th Five -Year Plan and the Outline of Long -Term Goals for 2035 proposes to improve 
the agricultural and rural input guarantee system, build a new agricultural subsidy policy system, 
and improve the minimum grain purchase price policy. Deepen the refo rm of supply and marketing 
cooperatives. Allow rural employment and entrepreneurial personnel to settle in their place of origin 
or employment and entrepreneurship and enjoy relevant rights and interests, and establish a system 
of part -time and part -time p ay for scientific research personnel in rural areas and leave their jobs 
to start a business.  
 
Page 126 (Para 4.15 -16)  
4.15. The  NDRC  is responsible  for allocating  TRQs for grains  and cotton,  and MOFCOM  allocates  the 
rest. Some  products  subject  to TRQs (i.e. grains,  cotton,  and sugar)  are also subject  to state trading.  
In these cases, one part of the quota is allocated to state trading enterprises and the other part to 
other enterprises. The administration methods of the TRQs as described by China in its notification 
to the WTO remained unchanged.  
4.16. The importation of grain (wheat, maize, and rice), sugar, tobacco, and cotton is subject to 
state trading.  
 
Question 24 : 
With regard to the importation of grain (wheat, maize, and rice), sugar, tobacco, and cotton which 
are subject to state trading, what percentages of t he TRQs for these items are allocated to state -
owned enterprises and private enterprises respectively?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification on state trading submitted by China.  
 
Page 136 (Para 4.43)  
China is a major player in the distant water fisheries segment. As indicated by the FAO, China 
reported about 2.26 million tonnes from its "distant water fi shery " in 2018; however, this is 
considered to be an underestimate, as the report provided details on species and fishing areas only 
for catches marketed in China (about 40% of the total of distant water catches).35 The authorities 
indicate that China has taken measures recently to strengthen monitoring and control of fishing 
vessels, enhance its international compliance capability, fulfil its international obligations to conserve 
high-seas fishery resources, and prevent illegal, unreported, and unregulated  (IUU) fishing 
activities  (Box 4.1). They also indicate that China has undertaken investigations into various kinds 
of illegal fishing activities, and punished illegal enterprises and fishing vessels in accordance with 
the law. According to the authorities, between January 2018 and  early 2021, the Government 
imposed different levels of penalties on 84 deep -sea fishing vessels belonging to 51 enterprises.  
 
Question 25 : 
With regard to the Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated(IUU) fisheries, Para 4.43 said the Chinese 
government impos ed penalties on 84 vessels during the past three years. Could China explain what 
the penalties were and how effective these were in preventing reoccurrence of IUU fisheries? Also, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  please elaborate on the Chinese effort to prevent Chinese fishing vessels ' IUU fishing in unauthorized 
area.  
 
Reply:  China is very concerned about IUU  ships. It will never tolerate and has adopted concrete 
measures to severely crack down on IUU fisheries. Firstly, China has established a multi -agency 
joint coordination mechanism to strengthen interdepartmental collaboration and urge local 
authorities to  shoulder their responsibilities. Secondly, China has strengthened port management. 
All IUU ships and illegal catches, once identified, will be confiscated and destroyed. Those responsible, 
including ship owners and crew members, will be held accountable a nd their liabilities, including 
criminal liabilities, will be investigated in accordance with the law. Thirdly, China has organized a 
series of special law -enforcement actions, known collectively as "Liangjian " or Sword Up, to eliminate 
IUU fishing boats a nd IUU fisheries, and to strengthen maritime cruises. IUU fishing boats are seized 
and responsible persons strictly punished in accordance with the law, with those suspected of having 
violated the law handed over to the police. In the next step, China will  continue to urge local 
authorities to take their territorial responsibilities, strengthen interdepartmental coordination, and 
always maintain a high -pressure strike on IUU boats. At the same time, China will strengthen the 
law-enforcement forces of fisher y administrations and fishing ports and further improve their 
supervision and law enforcement capabilities.  
 
Page 142 (Para 4.64)  
In December 2017, China launched the construction plan for the National Carbon Emission Right 
Trading Market (Power Generation  Industry) to start building its National Carbon Emission Trading 
System. According to the plan, the power generation industry will be the first to carry out 
transactions on the national carbon market, which will be gradually expanded to other industries. 
In 2018, the work of responding to climate change was adjusted and incorporated into the mandates 
of the newly formed Ministry of Ecology and Environment.  
 
Question 26 : 
Under the construction plan for the National Carbon Emission Right Trading Market launched in 
December 2017, Chinese carbon emission trading system (ETS) is currently applied only in the power 
generation sector. Para 4.64 states that the transactions on th e national carbon market will be 
gradually expanded to other industries. Please elaborate if there is any concrete plan on this, and 
what industries are being considered for future application of the ETS system?  
 
Reply:  The construction of China 's carbon emission trading market is in its infancy, and relevant 
laws and regulations are still being explored and improved. In the future, the capacity of the carbon 
emission trading market will be gradually expanded depending on the operation of the carbon 
emissi on trading market. China will expand the scope of the market to cover industries on the basis 
of the good operation of the carbon market in the power generation industry. In order to make basic 
preparations for expanding the coverage of the national carbon  market, we have organized and 
carried out data accounting, reporting and verification of high -emission industries such as power 
generation, petrochemical, chemical, building materials, steel, nonferrous metals, paper and aviation 
for many years, and have a relatively solid data foundation. In the next step, we will systematically 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from other sectors by expanding the scope of the carbon market 
to cover industries and optimizing allowance allocation methods. On the basis of the  good operation 
of the carbon market in the power generation industry, we will expand the scope of market coverage 
to more high -emission industries and optimize the specific methods for adjusting the allocation of 
allowances and give full play to the impor tant role of market mechanisms in controlling greenhouse 
gas emissions, promoting green and low -carbon technological innovation, and guiding climate 
investment and financing.  
 
Page 46 (Para 4.87)  
In 2019, China lifted the requirements that the construction and operation of gas pipeline networks 
in cities with a population of more than 500,000 must be controlled by Chinese shareholders. 
However, for construction and operation of nuclear power plants , the Chinese parties must be the 
controlling shareholders (Table 4.19). Private investment, including foreign investment, is 
encouraged in the development of the renewable energy sector. In the new 36 -Clause on Private 
Investment (State Council Circular 2 010/13), domestic private capital is "encouraged " to build new 
energy sectors such as wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass power. Electricity generation from wind, 
solar, or biomass power is also listed in the "encouraged " section of the Catalogue of Encou raged 
Industries for Foreign Investment (2020 edition). China also promotes electricity generation with 
nuclear energy; as in the case of renewable energy, FDI is encouraged.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question 27  
It is mentioned in Para.4.87 that China promotes electricity generat ion with nuclear energy in line 
with encouraging to build new energy sectors such as wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass power. 
Could China explain the long term policy direction regarding construction and operation of nuclear 
power plants?  
 
Reply:  Nuclear power is a stable and reliable clean and low -carbon energy, and it is an important 
way to ensure energy security and respond to climate change. To realize China 's "carbon peak and 
neutrality " goals, China will actively and orderly develop nuclear power on the premise of ensuring 
safety, and contribute to the global response to climate change and the transformation towards 
green energy.  
 
Page 169 (Para 4.204)  
4.204. The regulations on foreign investment in telecommunications services in China are s tipulated 
in, inter alia , the Special Administrative Measures on Access to Foreign Investment (National 
Negative List) and the Pilot Free Trade Zone Special Administrative Measures on Access to Foreign 
Investment (PFTZ Negative List). Telecommunications co mpanies are subject to the provision of 
telecommunications services pursuant to the market opening commitments made at China 's 
accession to the WTO. These specify that the foreign share ratio for value -added telecommunications 
services (except for e -commerce, domestic multi -party communications, storage -forwarding, and 
call centres) shall not exceed 50%; for basic telecommunicat ions, the controlling stake shall be held 
by the Chinese national. Within the PFTZs, there is no restriction on the foreign share ratio for 
investment in information services (application store only) and Internet access service. For 
investment in domestic virtual private network (VPN) services, the foreign share ratio shall not 
exceed 50%.  
 
Question 28 : 
Para 4.204 states that the foreign share ratio for value -added telecommunications services (except 
for e-commerce, domestic multi -party communications, sto rage-forwarding, and call centers) shall 
not exceed 50%. Please explain if China has any plan to additionally extend the mentioned exception 
lists (e -commerce, domestic multi -party communications, storage -forwarding, and call centers) 
which are not subject  to foreign equity limitation (50%) in the value -added telecommunication 
services sector.  
 
Reply: China will study the possibility of further opening up related services in accordance with the 
development needs of the domestic market.  
 
PART II: Questions Regarding the Government Report  
 
Page 6 (Para 2.17)  
In 2018, 2019 and 2020, the flows of outbound direct investment reached USD 143.04 billion, 
USD 136.91 billion and USD 132.94 billion respectively. The investment of Chinese enterprises in 
host countries expanded local employment and tax revenue. In 2019, overseas Chinese enterprises 
contributed a total of USD 56 billion in taxes revenue to the inves ted countries or regions. By the 
end of 2019, overseas Chinese enterprises employed 2.266 million foreign employees, accounting 
for 60.5% of the total overseas employees.  
 
Question 1  
Regarding the statistics mentioned in the para 2.17, could China provide the following statistics 
respectively for each country China 's outbound direct investment headed to?  
i) foreign direct investment of Chinese enterprises, ii)  taxes revenue to the invested countries or 
regions, iii)  overseas employees  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the Statistical Bulletin of China 's Outward Foreign Direct Investment over the 
years, available on the official website of the Ministry of Commerce of China, for relevant statistics 
on China 's outbound direct investment.  
 
Page 21 (Para 5.4)  
From 2016 to 2018, China had reduced more than 150 million tons of crude steel production 
capacity, meeting the target of the 13th Five Year Plan two years ahead of schedule.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Question 2  
Para 5.4 provides statistics regarding reduction of crude steel produc tion capacity from 2016 
to 2018. Could China additionally provide statistics for reduction of crude steel production capacity 
from 2019 to 2020?  
 
Reply:  China has completed the 13th Five -Year Plan of Crude Steel Capacity Reduction in advance 
by the end of 2018 and submitted relevant statistics. There is no new crude steel capacity reduction 
data for 2019 -2020.  
 
Page 23  (Para 5.11)  
The Copyright Law, ame nded in November 2020, improves the concepts and systems related to 
works and rights, and scales up the penalty on infringement.  
 
Question 3  
According to the article 12 of China 's Copyright Law (Revised in November 2020), the natural person, 
legal person  or unincorporated organization whose name is attributed to the work is its author and 
has corresponding rights in the work, except where there is evidence to the contrary. Currently for 
foreign rightholder 's work to be distributed in China, the authorizat ion that the rightholder owns the 
copyright or related rights is required. As it seems that the revised article regarding legal 
presumptions of copyright ownership could affect the current authorization system, Korea would like 
to ask if there will be any changes on the current authorization system following the revision of the 
Copyright Law.  
 
Reply:  Article 12 of China 's current Copyright Law is about how to identify the author and register 
a work. It is not related the authorization system and does not a ffect the current authorization 
system.  
 
Page 23  (Para 5.11)  
The Copyright Law, amended in November 2020, improves the concepts and systems related to 
works and rights, and scales up the penalty on infringement.  
 
Question 4 : 
The article 45 of the Copyright Law (Revised in November 2020) stipulates remuner  ation for the 
producers of phonogram where phonograms are used in wired or wireless public dissemination, or 
for public broadcast through technical equipment for transmitting  sound. Could you provide the 
detailed process of collecting remuneration and payment to the producers of phonogram, reflecting 
the revision? Also, how could the performers that have related rights to the performance fixed on 
phonogram possibly exercise th eir right, regarding wired or wireless public dissemination or public 
broadcast through technical equipment for transmitting sound?  
 
Reply:  China will further improve and clarify the process for the collection of remuneration and 
payment for the producers  of phonogram in practice according to the revised Copyright Law. The 
Copyright Law does not stipulate the rights of performers to the performance fixed on phonogram.  
 
Page 27 (Para 6.3.)  
China will further implement the United Nations Framework Conventio n on Climate Change and the 
Paris Agreement to address climate change. Moreover, China will strive to peak carbon dioxide 
emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 to promote sustainable development.  
 
Question 5  
According to Para 6.3., in fu rther implementing the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Paris Agreement to address climate change, China has set a goal of 
achieving carbon neutrality by 2060. Could China explain if it has any specific action plans toward 
the goal?  
 
Reply:  China has issued opinions on peaking carbon emission and achieving carbon neutrality and 
action plan for peaking carbon emission before 2030, and will successively issue implementation 
plans for peaking carbon emissions in key areas and indu stries and a series of supporting and 
safeguarding measures, and achieve emission reduction goals through a package of practical and 
effective measures. China continuously promotes the adjustment of industrial structure and energy 
structure, vigorously dev elops renewable energy, and speeds up the planning and construction of 
large-scale wind power photovoltaic base projects in desert, Gobi and wilderness. The first batch of WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  projects with installed capacity of about 100 million kilowatts have been launched i n an orderly 
manner recently. Strict control should be imposed on coal -fired power projects and the growth of 
coal consumption during the 14th Five -Year Plan period. The growth of coal consumption will be 
gradually reduced during the 15th Five -Year Plan pe riod. China will vigorously support the green and 
low-carbon energy development of developing countries, stop building new coal -fired power projects 
overseas, and contribute to the global response to climate change.  
 
PART III: Other Questions  
 
Question 1  
In order to maintain economic activities between Korea and China amid the ongoing pandemic, the 
two countries have introduced a "Fast Track ". Recently, however, business people with an invitation 
letter are required to undergo a 2 -to-3-week qua rantine period. In this vein, the effectiveness of the 
Fast Track does not meet our expectations. Could China provide any future plans to ensure that the 
Fast Track works properly according to its original purpose, if there 's any?  
 
Reply:  It is suggested that this issue be solved through bilateral channels.  
 
Question 2  
In the case of when medical equipment made in Korea is exported to Korea and re -imported to China 
with the purpose of breakdown repair service, import prohibitions apply under China 's Law on 
Inspection and Management of old/second -hand mechanical and electrical equipment, Article 31. 
When it comes to export and re -import for breakdown repair services, could China explain why these 
cases become subject to import prohibitions? Also, cou ld China consider institutional improvement 
to regard the above mentioned cases as an exception to import prohibition?  
 
Reply:  According to the Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China, in order to safeguard 
national security, social and public  interests, protect people 's health or safety and the environment 
as well as other reasons, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs have 
included some used mechanical and electrical products in the catalogue of used mechanical an d 
electrical products prohibited from import. In 2018, The Ministry of Commerce and the General 
Administration of Customs adjusted the catalogue of used mechanical and electrical products 
prohibited from import. In view of the fact that used mechanical and  electrical products such as 
aircraft engines, marine engines, non -medical X -ray equipment and electronic game machines have 
limited risks in safeguarding national security, social public interests, protecting people 's health or 
safety, and protecting the environment, the above products have been deleted from the 
prohibited  import catalogue. In 2020, the State Council issued Several Measures on Promoting 
the Reform and  Innovation of Trade and Investment Facilitation in Pilot Free Trade Zones  and the 
State  Council issued Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Accelerating the 
Development of New Forms of Business and New Models of Foreign Trade , all of 
which  provided  policy support for the development of bonded maintenance busin ess. Please refer to 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2021 -09/03/content_5635110. htm and 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2021 -07/13/content_5624621. htm  
 
Question 3  
It is known that China is pursuing the accession to the CPTPP, and in the subsequent Korea -China 
FTA negotiations, the investment regime is under discussion. Could you please explain if China is 
willing to discuss the CPTPP -level investment regime in the o ngoing subsequent Korea -China FTA 
negotiations?  
 
Reply : China and Republic of Korea are actively promoting the second phase of bilateral FTA 
negotiations in accordance with the consensus already reached, and conducting consultations on 
service trade and investment liberalization by negative lists.  
 
Question 4  
China deleted joint -venture foreign investment restrictions for private hospitals under the CAI, and 
we would like to know if this is applied only to the EU. If so, please explain how China would exclude 
other countries so that they cannot be applied to th is new rule.  
 
Reply:  The CAI has not yet come into effect. China will study the possibility of further opening up 
relevant markets based on the development needs of the domestic market.  
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  INDIA  
Page 4 Paragraph 1.3  
Background:  
China further advances the building of free trade areas, continuously improves the level of South -
South cooperation, and makes economic globalization more open, inclusive, beneficial to all, 
balanced, and win -win. 
 
Question 1 : 
Can China explain the steps taken to suppor t the objectives of South -South cooperation, 
globalization more open, inclusive, beneficial to all, balanced and win -win?  
 
Reply : As a member of the developing world, China has always been sharing its development 
opportunities with other developing countr ies. With the Fund for South -South Cooperation, China 
has collaborated with the WTO, the International Trade Center (ITC) and other international 
organizations on personnel training, database development and organization of investment 
facilitation forums. Under the WTO 's Aid for Trade initiative, China has also made donations to set 
up the "China s LDCs and Accession Program " to help LDCs  better integrate into the multilateral 
trading system and share the fruits of economic globalization. In addition, China actively encourages 
APEC, G20 and other multilateral platforms to jointly support the multilateral trading system and 
foster an open, inclusive, balanced and win -win investment and trade environment for all.  
 
Page 4 Paragraph 2.1  
Background:  
China 's economy has shifted from a stage of high - speed growth to a stage of high -quality 
development. The basic national condition that China is s till in the primary stage of socialism and 
will remain so for a long time has not changed. China 's international status as the world 's largest 
developing country has not changed.  
 
Question 2 :  
As per the Per capita income level, the Chinese economy belongs  to 'upper -middle income ' 
(World  Bank).  How can China still claim to be a developing country?  
1. What are the indicators which China is using to claim such a status?  
2. What measures are taken to address/balance the contradictory goals of high -speed growth 
and the primary stage of socialism?  
 
Reply : The concept of developing countries is relative to developed countries, and international 
organizations do not have a unifi ed definition of developing countries. However, on the whole, 
compared with developed countries, developing countries lag far behind in economic strength, per 
capita income, economic structure, industrial competitiveness, social security system, environmen tal 
protection and the ability to participate in global governance.  Since reform and opening up, China 
has witnessed remarkable economic and social progress. However, the problem of unbalanced, 
uncoordinated and unsustainable development remains obvious. T here is a wide gap between urban 
and rural areas and between different regions, with a relatively extensive development mode. And 
China is clearly ill -equipped for scientific and technological innovation. Taken together, the objective 
fact that China remai ns a developing country is unassailable. China is still in the primary stage of 
socialism and will remain so for a long time has not changed. China 's international status as the 
world 's largest developing country has not changed.  
 
Page 4 -5 Paragraphs 2.1 & 2.3  
Background:  
The potentials of vast market and domestic demand of China 's 1.4 billion people and more than 
400 million middle -income population will be fully unleashed. In the process of building a new 
development paradigm, C hina will further improve its level of opening up, develop a new system for 
a higher -standard open economy, and create more demand for the world, while providing broad 
markets and more development opportunities for all countries.  
 
Question 3 : 
China is requ ested to provide justification for the following:  
"China 's economy has shifted from a stage of high -speed growth to a stage of high -quality 
development. " Explain the part of para 2.3 as well mentioned as background.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 520 - 
 
  Reply : High-quality development is an embodiment of the new development concept, where 
innovation becomes the first driving force, coordination an endogenous feature, green the universal 
form, openness the necessary path, and sharing the fundamental purpose. Ent ering the stage of 
high-quality development, the main characteristics of China 's economic development are: shifts from 
high-speed to medium -high speed in economic growth, from pursuit of scale and speed to quality 
and efficiency in economic development, fr om a focus on capacity increase to a balance between 
adjusting existing resources and optimizing additional resources. Besides, our development driver 
has shifted from factor inputs to innovation. Grounding our efforts in the new development stage, 
China w ill implement the new development concept completely, accurately and comprehensively, 
accelerate the fostering of a new development pattern, promote high -quality development, and 
pursue high -standard opening up, so as to break  new ground for win -win cooper ation, and inject 
stronger energy into the world economy.  
 
Page 5 Paragraph 2.6  
Question 4 : 
What are sidelined products? Can China provide a detailed list of Sidelined Products mentioned in 
para 2.6?  
 
Reply:  China has no such list for now.  
 
Page 7 Paragraph 3.3  
Background:  
Since the last review, China has further streamlined import administration procedures 
and continuously lowered import tariffs. In November 2018, China lowered the import duties on 
1,585 ta riff lines covering mechanical and electrical equipment, parts and raw materials, etc. In each 
January from 2019 to 2021, China implemented interim import tariff rates, which are lower than the 
MFN tariff rates of over 700 items of goods, including some ad vanced equipment, spare parts, 
resource products and pharmaceutical raw materials.  
 
Question 5.  
Chinese tariff applications have seen an increase in the application of non -ad valorem tariffs.  The 
WTO's TAO database indicates NAVs tariffs on two six -digit HS Codes 852110 and 852580. The 
Online WITS database indicates the presence across seven tariff lines like 8521101100B, 
8521101900B, 8521102000B, 8525801200B, 8525801301B, 8525801302B, 8525801390B.  Both 
these tariff lines belonged to the electrical and ele ctronics sector.  Further the application of NAVs 
tariff has been observed to influence the MFN applied averages.  
Is it a new trend that  has been followed by China, and does the Chinese applications of Non -
Ad Valorem tariffs on new national lines reflects the domestic compulsions?  
 
Reply : China has never applied Non -Ad Valorem tariffs (NAVs) on new national lines. Since China 's 
accession to the WTO, NAVs have been implemented on tariff lines 852110, 852530 and  852540. 
According to the 2007 revisions of the WCO Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, 
all the goods in the new line 852580 are from lines 852530 and 852540, so NAVs are also applicable.  
 
1. If this is true, China is requested to provide a co mplete list of NAV tariff lines. In China 's 
view, why are these NAVs WTO compatible measure?  
2. Further, China is requested to provide Ad Valorem Equivalent 's (AVEs)of these NAVs  tariff 
applied on the national tariff lines. How does such a non -transparent tariff become facilitating 
trade measures?  
 
Reply  1-2: Non Ad -valorem tariffs (Ad Valorem Equivalents) implemented over the years since 
China 's accession to the WTO are converte d strictly in accordance with the Ad -valorem tariff rate of 
China 's WTO commitment, and the NAV rate is recalculated on a regular basis to ensure that the 
actual rate does not exceed the Ad -valorem tariff level of China 's commitment. The list of NAV lines 
is included in the Import and Export Tariff of the People 's Republic of China released annually, which 
is available in "Policy Release " of the website of the Tariff Department of China 's Ministry of Finance. 
See the website link: http://gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt /zhengcefabu . 
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 7 Paragraph 3.7  
Question  6: 
China is requested to share the sector -wise, FCL and LCL -wise time taken for customs clearance and 
other procedures; and Further, the composition and weightage of these in terms of sector, FCL and 
LCL-wise in the overall trade (imports and exports).  
 
Reply : Currently, China Customs adopts the WCO 's methods to measure the time required for the 
release of goods to gauge the overall clearance time. The overall customs clearance time is 
calculated by customs declaration units, which mainly spans from the arrival of import and export 
goods to the lifting  of import and export supervision by the Customs. The overall customs clearance 
of import goods begins with the declaration of arrival of the means of transport carrying the import 
goods in China, and that of export goods starts with the arrival of goods a t the supervision site. The 
time is measured in hours. The declaration form included in the calculation of customs clearance 
time serves as the actual inbound and outbound customs declaration form, and the overall customs 
clearance time is the arithmetic a verage of the total customs clearance time of each declaration form 
included in the calculation of customs clearance time. The overall customs clearance time of each 
declaration form = end time - start time. At the beginning of 2020, China has notified the  WTO on 
the advance implementation of the "determination and publication of average clearance time " 
measures specified in the Trade Facilitation Agreement. Relevant data have been publicly released 
at a press conference of the General Administration of Cus toms on imports and exports in 2020. As 
for the question raised by India, it is suggested that the Indian side further clarify the connotation 
and specific concerns of the "sector " in the phrase "sector -wise" and the "other procedures " in 
"customs clearanc e and other procedures ", so that the Chinese side can provide targeted answers.  
 
Page 22 Paragraph 5.8  
Question  7: China states that in recent years it is committed to improving its agricultural subsidies 
paradigm.  In this context, it is requested to provi de information about the incentive and disincentive 
mechanisms that are being implemented by the government in recent years to rationalize the 
agricultural subsidies.  
 
Reply:  In 2016, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture jointly issued the "Reform 
Program for Establishing a Green and Ecological -oriented Agricultural Subsidy System ", focusing on 
the role of market in price formation, motivating farmers and va rious sectors of the society, and 
improving the efficiency of the use of subsidies. The reform of agricultural "three subsidies ", 
including the comprehensive agricultural subsidies, direct subsidies for grain farmers and subsidies 
for good crop seeds, has been pushed forward. Agricultural ecological resources have been better 
protected and arable land have become more fertile. We encouraged the development of moderate -
scale agricultural operations of various forms, implemented the strictest system of arable  land 
protection in China, explored arable land rotation fallow system, and expanded the scale of the new 
round of forestation programs.  
 
Questions based on Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/415)  
Page 10 Paragraph 1  
Question 8 : Can China list out some of the m ajor market oriented reforms which has helped in 
poverty alleviation.  
 
Reply:  First, we have developed leisure agriculture, rural tourism and other new business forms 
through a number of approaches including strengthening the construction of supporting facilities, 
and developing special tourism products; second, we have supported t he establishment of poverty 
alleviation industrial parks, so as to achieve the integrated development of the first, second and 
third industries; third, we have strengthened the construction of the origin market system of 
agricultural products in poor areas . For example,we set up distribution centers and packaging and 
refrigeration facilities, built wholesale markets, and strengthened the construction of cold chain 
logistics and distribution system; fourth, we have broadened marketing channels for agricultur al 
products, such as promoting the connection  between production and marketing of agricultural 
products in poor areas, introducing agricultural products through "Internet + " projects, and 
promoting poverty alleviation by means of e -commerce; fifth, we have  intensified efforts in 
production and marketing of information services, including bringing information services to villages 
and rural households, which has helped poor households to better search information and made 
their lives more convenient. Cell pho nes have become "new farming tools " for poverty -stricken 
households.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 10 Paragraph 2  
Question 9 : What was the reason due to which financial services and information technology 
remained unaffected from COVID -19? 
 
Reply:  For the moment, China 's banking and insurance industries are operating soundly with risks 
generally under control, and the operating and regulatory indicators are in a relatively good state. 
There are several main reasons for this.  First, we have always taken banking and insurance 
institutions ' services and support for the real economy as the starting point and ultimate purpos e of 
our work. Second, we have paid attention to and taken a lot of measures on the prevention and 
disposal of stock risks. High -risk institutions have been subjected to stricter inspection and risk 
disposal. Third, we have proactively adopted some risk pr evention measures to enhance the risk 
resistance capacity of banking and insurance institutions. At present, all the risks, whether at 
individual, regional or systemic level, are well under control.  
 
Page 10 Paragraph 3  
Question 10 : Can China provide an insight on its regulations on capital movements which are in 
place on inflows and outflows? Please also share the detailed list of countries to which it has provided 
bilateral lending.  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the Monetary Policy Implementation Report regul arly updated on the website 
of the People 's Bank of China and the website of the Bureau of Foreign Exchange 
https://www.safe.gov.cn/.  
 
Page11 Paragraph 9  
Question 11 : Can China provide the list of top 20 Sectors of its FDI?  For those sectors provide the 
eligibility criteria or eligible entities, available routes and sectoral caps on investment. Also provide 
the details of investment under Belt Road Initiative.  
 
Reply: China publishes Foreign Investment Statistical Bulletin every year, which provides detailed 
information about foreign investment flowing into China, including the main sources, total amount 
and industrial distribution. For more information on the 2020 Fore ign Investment Statistical Bulletin, 
please see http://wzs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/ .  
 
Page 11 Paragraph 11  
Background:  A new Foreign Investment Law was adopted, with the aim of, inter alia, improving 
China 's business environment for foreign investors and ensuring that they participate in market 
competition on an equal basis. The legislation stipulates that investor is pro tected against 
expropriation, restrictions on cross -border remittances, IPR infringement, and forced transfer of 
technology.  
 
Question 12 : India would like to understand are there any exception under the foreign investment 
law of China where State may expr opriate the foreign investors? If yes then please enlist details 
under what conditions protection against expropriation are not available to the foreign investors.  
(In their new legislation on investment (under article 20) they have carved out an 
exceptio n) 
 
Reply:  Please see relevant provisions of the Foreign Investment Law . 
 
Page 12 Paragraph 17  
Background: Some changes were made in the import regime on prohibition and licensing. Since 
1 January 2021, imports of all solid waste products have been prohibited, and the previous regime 
for allowing imports of certain wastes under licensing conditions has been terminated. Certain 
recycling materials for brass, iron -steel materials, copper, and cast aluminum alloys may be 
imported if they meet the required standards. Automatic import licensing requirements, in place for 
monitoring purposes have been removed on certain items and non -automatic import licensing 
requirements were removed for some use d mechanical and electrical products.  
Question 13 : Against the above -mentioned background India requests China to provide an insight 
into its updated import licensing regime focusing on the key changes made and the requirements 
for imports in the new regim e. 
 
Reply:  Since 2021, China has completely banned all solid waste imports. Raw materials that are 
obtained  from solid waste processing are not regarded as solid waste, provided they are in line with WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 523 - 
 
  mandatory national product quality standards and do not endanger public health and ecological 
safety. Recycled copper raw materials, and recycled iron and steel raw  materials mentioned in the 
question can enter China through normal product trade.  
 
Page 13 Paragraph 23  
Question 14 : India requests China to provide the details of incentives and financial support it 
provides to different sectors and industries. Also provide the detailed information on how many such 
programmes are active at present? Does China agree to the fact its financial support programme 
which are currently active are compatible with the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervaili ng Measures?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification on subsidies submitted by China. Since the accession 
to the WTO, China has comprehensively strengthened alignment with multilateral trade rules and 
strictly complied with the WTO disciplines on s ubsidies.  
 
Page 20 Paragraph 1.16  
Background: China has a managed floating exchange rate regime. Since 2015, the exchange rate 
of the Chinese yuan (CNY) has been determined with reference to a basket of currencies with a 
publicly known composition; the CN Y's central parity is determined daily as a "fix"… 
Question 15 : Against the above -mentioned background India request China to throw some light on 
its existing exchange rate regime and explain the composition to a basket of currencies.  
 
Reply:  In 2005, China began to implement a managed floating exchange rate system based on 
market supply and demand, adjusted by reference to a basket of currencies. 2015 saw further 
improvements to the market -based RMB exchange rate formation mechanism, reflecti ng the decisive 
role of market supply and demand in determining exchange rate, especially in terms of the reference 
rate. 
 
Since 2015, the China Foreign Exchange Trade Center (CFETS) has released a number of RMB 
exchange rate indices, including the China F oreign Exchange Trade Center (CFETS) RMB exchange 
rate index, the RMB exchange rate index with reference to the Bank for International 
Settlements  (BIS) currency basket, and the RMB exchange rate index with reference to the special 
drawing rights (SDR) cur rency basket. Taking the CFETS RMB exchange rate index as an example, 
the currency basket includes USD, EUR, JPY, GBP, AUD, NZD, SGD, CHF, CAD, Malaysian Ringgit, 
Russian Ruble, etc.  
 
Page 20 Paragraph 1.18  
Background: China continued its efforts during the review period to further internationalize the 
CNY; for example, it took measures including bilateral swap agreements, the pursuit of alternatives 
to the SWIFT interbank payments system, and investment in credit rating agencies for sovereign 
debt. 
China promotes the two -way opening of the capital market, facilitates foreign investors to invest in 
CNY assets….  
 
Question 16 : What would be the impact of bilateral swap agreements and other 
arrangements/measures mentioned in the text on international t rade and economic growth? Which 
countries currently have access to China 's capital market? What are the conditions of opening up 
the market for any country?  
 
Reply:  In terms of currency swaps, bilateral local currency swap arrangements are an important 
component of the global financial safety net, as they can provide emergency liquidity support and 
enhance market confidence, and have played a positive role in safeguarding the normal operation 
of international trade activities and maintaining economic and fi nancial stability.  
In terms of capital market liberalization, China has lifted the restrictions on the pilot countries and 
regions for Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII). Now, investors from all 
countries and regions around the worl d can invest in China 's capital market in accordance with 
relevant regulations.  
 
Page 20 Paragraph 1.21  
Question 17 : Are the regulations on capital movements available? If so, please provide the details 
and means of accessing such regulations.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 524 - 
 
  Reply:  Please refer to the  Monetary Policy Implementation Report  regularly updated on the website 
of the People 's Bank of China and the website of the Bureau of Foreign Exchange 
https://www.safe.gov.cn/ . 
 
Page 31 Paragraph 2.3  
Background: Steps were also taken in recent years to further modernize the judicial specialization 
for issues related to e-commerce. In addition to the Hangzhou Internet Court, which was established 
on 18 August 2017, the Beijing Internet Court and the Guangzhou Internet Court were established 
on 9 September 2018 and 28 September 2018, respectively. They aim to handle 11 typ es of Internet 
related cases, including contracts for financial loans, the purchase of goods, services, online disputes 
about torts, and copyright infringements. The authorities state that the three Internet Courts had 
dealt with 248,258 Internet -related c ases by end -December 2020.  
Question: 18. Against the above -mentioned background can China throw some light on 
establishment and operational mechanism of the internet courts?  
 
Reply:  In addition to the Hangzhou Internet Court, which was established on 18 Au gust 2017, the 
Beijing Internet Court and the Guangzhou Internet Court were established on 9 September 2018 
and 28 September 2018, respectively. The Supreme People 's Court of China issued and implemented 
the Provisions of the Supreme People 's Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases by 
Internet Courts (Fa Shi [2018] No. 16) on September 6, 2018, which provides a series of regulations 
on the jurisdictions and appeal mechanisms of Internet Courts and the construction of litigation 
platforms, as well as litigation rules such as identity authentication for online litigation.  
 
In terms of trial mode, the internet courts fully integrate Internet technology into the case processing 
process with the idea of "online trial of Internet -related disputes " to redesign each process. At the 
filing stage, the parties ' application for filing and prosecution materials can be submitted to the court 
online, and the court verifies the identity of the parties through real -name authentication software; 
after filing, the court serves the litigation materials to the parties by electronic service; at the court 
session, with the prior consent of the parties, the court adopts the online authentication of the 
parties ' identity information and intelligent voice recognition conversion for the court trial. The court 
hearing is conducted in an online trial mode. At the same time, the court can also be converted 
online and offline according to the parties ' wishes and trial needs. The trial transcript is an electronic  
document automatically converted from the trial process by the voice recognition system, which is 
sent to the parties for verification after the trial. If the parties have objections to the transcript, they 
can send their amendment suggestions to the cler k and confirm online; finally, after the case is 
closed, the one -click filing system embedded in the court platform is used to file all kinds of litigation 
materials.  
 
In terms of collection, cross -examination and authentication of evidence, for the eviden ce that needs 
to be presented in the trial, electronic evidence generated and stored in the online platform can be 
imported in one click. Non -electronic evidence can be converted into electronic evidence for 
submission by scanning or taking photos, but phy sical comparison is required. If the parties make 
any objection, it needs to be transferred to offline for further verification. For the evidence that has 
been uploaded to the Internet Court platform before the trial, the parties can both express their 
cross-examination opinions in text form online and supplement their cross -examination opinions 
during the trial.  
 
Page 33 Paragraph 2.16 -17  
Question 19 : What are the incentives provided under these Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs)? What 
does the PFTZs provide additional to other programmes/schemes? The PFTZs were established on a 
pilot basis and have expanded in number. Are these going to be made permanent?  
 
Reply:  The Pilot Free Trade Zone is a testing ground for the Chinese government 's independent 
reform and opening up. The purpose of building the FTZs is to further promote high -standard 
opening -up by implementing a series of pilot initiatives in such areas as liberalization and facilitation 
of investment and trade, financial services fo r the real economy, and the transformation of 
government functions. The institutional innovations made will be promptly expanded to a wider 
scope after summary and evaluation. The overall plan of each pilot FTZ sets out its general 
requirements, functional  positioning, location layout, main measures and guarantee mechanisms, 
etc., which is available at http://www.gov.cn or http://www.mofcom.gov.cn.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 525 - 
 
  Since 2013, the number of China 's pilot FTZs have gradually increased from 1 in Shanghai to 
21 across China. President Xi Jinping emphasized that both China 's reform and opening up will not 
stop. China will play a leading role in the pilot FTZs and promote the construction of a new higher -
standard open economy.  
 
Page 45 Paragraph 3.3  
Question 20 : What are the var ious measures China has undertaken to simplify and facilitate 
registration procedures? Under what circumstances will China not check the approval certificate of 
Foreign -invested enterprises (FIEs)?  
 
Reply:  The measures China has undertaken to simplify and facilitate registration procedures are as 
follows:  
1. Branches established by the consignee or consignor of import and export goods according to law 
may register themselves, for which the consignee or consignor shall apply to the customs offic e 
where the branch is located with the Registration Form of Customs Declaration Entities. The 
consignor or consignee of import and export goods and their branches registered at the customs 
may handle import and export declaration throughout the country. (A nnouncement No. 191, 2018  of 
the General Administration of Customs)  
2. For enterprises registered in pilot free trade zones to apply for "Registration of Customs 
Declaration Units ", "record -filing instead of examination and approval " shall apply. (Announce ment 
No. 182, 2019 of the General Administration of Customs)  
3. The registration validity period of customs declaration enterprises and their branches will be 
canceled nationwide and replaced with long -term validity. (Announcement No. 213, 2019 of the 
General Administration of Customs)  
4. To cancel the "Registration of Customs Declaration Enterprises " subject to customs administrative 
examination and approval. (Order No. 81 of the President of the People 's Republic of China)  
The Customs will no longer check  the Approval Certificate of Foreign -invested Enterprises when the 
foreign -invested international forwarding agent applies for customs declaration for inbound and 
outbound express and the consignee or consignor of foreign -invested import and export goods 
cancels the registration at the Customs. (Announcement No. 226, 2019 of the General Administration 
of Customs)  
 
Page 46 Paragraph 3.4 . 
Question  21: What are the various documents that need not be submitted as part of import 
declaration process? Can a list of the required documents under the new procedure be accessed 
online?  
 
Reply:  According to Article 27 of Chapter 4 of the Provisions of the Customs of the 
People 's Republic  of China on the Administration on Declaration of Import and Export Goods, the 
documents and instruments attached to the declaration form for import and export goods include: 
(1) Contracts; (2) Invoices; (3) A packing list; (4) A list of freight (manifest of cargo); (5) Bills of 
ladings (waybills); (6) A power of attorney for customs declaration; (7) The license certificate for 
import and export; (8) The manual for processing trade required by the customs. A list of the 
relevant documents is available online.  
 
Page 46 Paragraph 3.5  
Background:  
In 2019, the GACC launched a reform of the "two-step declaration " for imports, which means that 
enterprises do not need to submit all declarations and documents at one time. The first step involves 
making the summary declaration with the bill of lading to pick up the goods. The second step involves 
completing the whole declaration process within a specified time.  
Question 22 : What is the specified time for completion of the whole declaration process?  
 
Reply:  The second step declaration refers to the completion of  the whole  declaration , payment of 
duties  and other custom s clearance procedures  by enterprises  within 14 days as of the date when 
the arrival of the means of transport in China.  
 
Page 68 Paragraph 3.73  
Question  23: What is the risk management system in China? What are different categories of risk? 
What are the parameters of calculation of such risk? Can such information be accessed online?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 526 - 
 
  Reply:  Referring to the requirements on risk management in the Revised Kyot o Convention and the 
WCO Customs Risk Management Compendium , the Risk Prevention and Control Center serves as  
the platform and channel where  the whole -process management requirements of the business 
function management department to  act on the site. It con nects the site through parameters, rules 
and instructions to support the business function management. The Center is responsible for  decision  
execution  under  the management framework of selection, inspection and execution, and direct 
operations on site through parameters, rules, instructions . It helps  improve the integrated customs 
rapid response and emergency management mechanism.  It has a c losed-loop risk ma nagement 
mode with information collection, risk analysis, early warning, risk disposal and instruction 
evaluation as the main links . Starting from the integration of internal and external risk information,  
and based on big data and analysis  of the informat ion, it release s early warning  as proper and 
disposes of the risk in a  timely manner  (through issuing risk instructions, different disposal means 
such as control and examination  by on -site units, launching  inspection s, and handing over to anti-
smuggling authorities  will be  adopted ). At last, according to the execution results of the law 
enforcement department, the instructions are evaluated. Meanwhile, the execution  and evaluation 
results will be  incorporated into the risk information, so as to form a loop optimization mode and 
continuously raise the accuracy of risk management.  
 
Types of r isk include  transport  tool risks (such as concealing in or modification of transport vehicles,  
plant residues, zoonotic vector s, etc. ), container risk s (such as concealing in  empty containers , 
unqualified quarantine treatment process , etc.), wood packaging risk s (IPPC logo  not attached , live 
insects, etc.), goods risk (such as  those  from countries or regions  affected by an infectious 
disease , etc.) .  
 
Page 69 Para graph 3.85  
Background:  
The authorities state that the measures of administration at designated ports for the export of 
liquorice and liquorice products, and natural sand shall be cancelled in 2021.  
Question 24 : By when does China anticipate that the measur e of administration at designated ports 
for the export of liquorice and liquorice products, and natural sand shall be removed?  
 
Reply:  According to Announcement No. 71 [2020] of the Ministry of Commerce and the General 
Administration of Customs―Announcement on Issuing the Catalogue of Goods Subject to Export 
License Administration , which was released on December 30, 2020, the measure of administration 
at designated ports for the export of liquorice, liquorice products, and natural sand (t o 
Hong Kong,  China, Macao, China, and Chinese Taipei)  shall be cancelled. The announcement has 
been implemented from January 1, 2021.  
 
Page 69 Paragraph 3.89  
Question: 25. Could China clarify on what is the criteria on the basis of which competent commerc e 
authority at the provincial level grants approval regarding transfer of any technology subject to 
export restrictions.  
 
Reply:  When reviewing applications for export of restricted technologies, the provincial commerce 
authority, together with the science  and technology administration, will assess whether a technology 
export may affect national security, public interest or public morality, human health or safety, the 
lives or health of animals and plants, and whether it will damage the environment, based o n 
Article  16 of the Foreign Trade Law and Article 8 and 9 of the Measures for the Administration of 
Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export, and then decide whether to approve the exports 
accordingly.  
 
Page 71 Paragraph 3.89  
Question  26: Could China clarify what is the competent commerce authority whose approval is 
required for exports of technology? Are the decisions of such authority final in such matters? Can 
such decisions be appealed to any higher authority? If so, please specify the authority. What are the 
parameters the competent commerce authority evaluates when considering a request for export of 
technology?  
 
Reply:  In China, technology exports fall into three categories: prohibited technology exports, 
restricted technology exports, and free technology exports. The vast majority of technologies can 
be exported freely, contracts related to which take effect from the date of signing and do not require 
the approval of government departments. Export  licenses for restricted export technologies are WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 527 - 
 
  managed by the competent department of commerce of the province, autonomous region or 
municipality directly under the Central Government where the technology export operator is located, 
together with the com petent department of science and technology administration. The decision 
made by the competent provincial department is final. Whoever that is not satisfied with the approval, 
permission and other decisions of the competent department can apply to the Mini stry of Commerce 
or the provincial people 's government for administrative reconsideration or bring a lawsuit to the 
people 's court. Provincial commerce departments, together with the competent administrative 
departments of science and technology review the  application for export of restricted technologies. 
Based on Article 16 of the Foreign Trade Law and Article 8 and Article 9 of Measures for the 
Administration of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export, they make assessments on 
whether the expor t of relevant technologies may affect national security, public interest or public 
morality, human health or safety, animal and plant life or health, and whether it will damage the 
environment, and grant approvals accordingly.  
 
Page 71 Paragraph 3.90 -3.91  
Question 27 : Could China provide further clarification as regards their alignment with international 
security standards and their conformity with WTO Agreements.  
 
Reply:  They are consistent with WTO rules and international prac tices.  
 
With such a broad definition of "controlled items ", could China clarify the interpretation of "dual-use 
items " under it? Are all "dual-use items " subject to export control under the Export Control Law? 
What is the process for evaluating the same?  
 
Reply:  The Export Control Law provides for the scope of application, and the Chinese government, 
in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non -
proliferation, will develop and adjust the control lis t in accordance with international treaties to which 
it is a party and multilateral mechanisms for export control, taking into account prevailing 
international practices, and make timely public announcements.  
 
Page 71 Paragraph 3.92  
Background:  
While the previous export control framework still remains in place on a number of fragmented lists 
of items, the new Export Control Law provides for the establishment of a single framework for 
restricting exports of controlled items through pu blished control lists. According to the authorities, 
China has formulated six administrative laws and regulations on export control, including the 
Administrative Rules on Monitored Chemicals, the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Exports, the 
Administr ative Regulations on the Export of Military Products, the Regulations on the Export Control 
of Dual -use Nuclear Items and Related Technologies, the Regulations on the Export Control of 
Missiles and Missile -related Items and Technologies, and the Regulation s on the Export Control of 
Dual-use Biological Items and Related Equipment and Technologies. Specific export control lists were 
also released. In addition to the established control lists, the new legislation authorizes export control 
authorities to list i tems for "temporary controls " for a provisional period of up to two years before 
determining whether to list the items on a control list. The authorities indicate that China is in the 
process of formulating supporting regulations and shall release further regulations at a later stage.  
 
Question  28: Could China provide further clarification as to the list of items for which the previous 
export control framework still remains in place? India also notes that China seeks to formulate 
supporting regulations that  shall released at a later stage. Could China provide an approximate time 
frame regarding the sharing of supporting regulations in public domain and its eventual 
implementation?  
 
Reply:  Since the 1990s, China has issued six administrative regulations and one departmental rules 
in the field of export control, with separate lists of controlled items, covering military chemicals, 
nuclear chemicals, and controlled chemicals as well as nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile -
related dual -purpose items and te chnologies. In addition, the Ministry of Commerce has also issued 
relevant lists and supervision announcements. After the introduction of China 's Export Control Law, 
we are stepping up in developing and revising supporting regulations, improving the control list, and 
promoting timely release in accordance with the legislative procedures.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Page 71 Paragraph 3.93  
Question 29 : Could China please provide further clarification as regards establishment of control 
lists of foreign business entities?  
India understands that China has sought to implement a "Unreliable Entities List ", that suspends 
normal transactions from any foreign persons or entities which engage in certain activities 
endangering China 's national sovereignty, security or development, causin g serious damage to the 
legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises, organizations.   
Are these the same?  
China is also requested to also clarify whether such a list is aligned with international security 
standards and their conformity with WTO Agreements.  
 
Reply:  The control list and the list of unreliable entities under Article 18 of the Export Control Law 
are different regimes with different legal bases. The former is based on the Export Control Law and 
the latter on Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List. Leg islative purpose, scope of application, 
specific measures and procedures of the two list regimes are completely different.  The relevant 
measures are consistent with WTO rules.  
 
Page 72 Paragraph 3.94  
Question 30 : Could China please clarify whether the cri teria proposed is in conformity with 
international security standards and their conformity with WTO Agreements?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government firmly upholds WTO rules and strictly fulfills its relevant obligations. 
The relevant legislation is in line wit h WTO rules.  
 
Page 72 Paragraph 3.95  
Question: 31. Could China please clarify the types of measures that it seeks to take in the event 
of such alleged "abuses " and explain whether such measures will be in conformity with its obligations 
under the WTO Agreements?  
 
Reply:  China firmly opposes the abuse of export control measures by individual countries in the 
name of "trumped up charges " to hinder normal internat ional scientific and technological exchanges 
and economic and trade cooperation, which is detrimental to the common interests of the 
international community. To this end, the Chinese government, based on extensive suggestions from 
various parties, has set up reciprocal provisions in the Export Control Law against foreign abuse of 
export control measures, which is in line with the basic norms of international relations, WTO rules 
and international practices.  
 
Page 72 Paragraph 3.100; 3.101  
Background:  
The latest adjustment to VAT rebate rates (Announcement No. 15, 2020) increased VAT refund rates 
for 1,464 goods as from 20 March 2020.101 The announcement includes 380 agricultural and 
agricultural -related items and increases the rebate rate from 6% to 9%. The  rate for the 
remaining  1,084 tariff lines in the Announcement increased from 9% to 13%.  
Following the most recent round of adjustments of VAT rebate on exports, four refund rates are in 
force: 13%, 9%, 6%, and 0%, with the proportion of tariff lines subject to each rebate rate 
being  61.2%, 18.9%, 0.1%, and 19.6%, respectively. Products not subject to VAT rebate include 
high-energy -consuming products, high -polluting products, and endangered species of fauna and 
flora.  
 
Question 32 : Could China elabora te how the VAT rebate on exports is calculated and/ or fixed? 
What are the indirect taxes taken into account? How are the inputs consumed in the production of 
export product accounted for?   
 
Reply : After the issuance by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and th e State Taxation Administration 
of the Announcement on Increasing the Export Tax Refund Rate of Some Products in 2020, the VAT 
rebate rate of all products, except for the high -pollution, high -energy consuming, and 
resource -based products, became equal to t he applied rate.  
 
Page 72 Paragraph 3.102  
Question: 33.  Could China elaborate on the conditions that make PFTZs  attractive for exports? Are 
the listed benefits available to only those companies that export? Are the benefits specific to the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 529 - 
 
  listed industries? Could China please clarify whether its Pilot Free Trade Zones (PFTZs) are in 
conformity with the Agreement o n Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)?  
 
Reply:  Since the establishment of the Pilot Free Trade Zones in 2013, we have conducted a number 
of reforms to achieve trade and investment liberalization and facilitation. For example, the 
introduction of international trade "single window ", and "integrated cus toms clearance " have 
significantly promoted trade facilitation and reduced business operating costs. These measures are 
in principle applicable to all market players in the PFTZs.  The higher level of independent reform and 
opening initiatives implemented i n the PFTZs are in line with WTO rules and China 's WTO accession 
commitments.  
 
Page 72 Paragraph 3.103  
Background:  
Companies located in the Shanghai PFTZ  can produce either in bonded or non -bonded areas. The 
payment of import tariffs by companies located in bonded areas is suspended and only becomes 
effective when final products are sold to the rest of China. The PFTZ also features a distinctive 
mechanism for dispute resolution, with arbitration governed by a separate set of Arbitration Rules 
issued by the Shanghai International Arbitration Centre.  
 
Question: 34. Could China clarify whether import tariffs are only exempted for those companies 
that do not se ll their products in the rest of China?  
 
Reply:  There are some misinterpretations of this policy on the Indian side. With reference to the 
Special Appendix No. 4 of the WCO International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization 
of Customs Procedu res on pilot free zone rules, in terms of import tariff policy, the bonded goods 
that enter the bonded area and other areas under special supervision of the Customs but have not 
yet been sold the domestic market are deemed to be outside the customs territo ry and don 't have 
to deal with the tariff formalities until they finally enter the domestic market. They are NOT exempted 
from import tariffs. The policy applies uniformly across the country and is not unique to the Shanghai 
Pilot Free Trade Zone.  
 
Page 73 Pargraph 3.108  
Background: Export finance, insurance, and guarantees are predominantly granted by a number 
of policy financial institutions with the mandate to promote foreign trade and cross -border 
investment. The bulk of export finance is provid ed by the China Export -Import Bank (China Exim 
bank), which provides export finance, and the state -owned China Export & Credit Insurance 
Corporation (SINOSURE), which provides export credit insurance and related guarantees. Foreign -
owned companies are also  eligible for the services of China Exim bank and SINOSURE. China is not 
a member of the OECD; it does not participate in the OECD 's Arrangement on Officially Supported 
Export Credits. The authorities indicate that China has always been actively involved i n the 
consultation of the International Working Group on export credits, including its technical working 
group.  
 
Question 35 : 
1. (a) Could China elaborate on what terms and conditions is the export finance provided by China 
Exim Bank? (b) What is the rate of interest?  
2. Is it comparable with market interest rate? What are the terms of export credit insurance and 
guarantees? Can the exporter secure export finance in the absence of a guarantee? What is the 
rate of insurance premium for such credit guarantee?  
 
Reply: The interest rate of export credit shall be determined according to the following principles: 
on the basis of actuarial cost and risk quantification, with the goal of sustainable operation and be 
in line with the market rate of interest, overall consid ering the comprehensive contribution of 
customers and various costs such as capital, risk, tax and management expenses, predicting the 
trend of the interest rate, and determine according to market competition and the principle of risk -
return matching.  
 
Whether export credit insurance is required for a borrower is determined on a case -by-case basis. 
China Exim Bank does not require all loan projects to be covered by export credit insurance.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 530 - 
 
  Page 73 Paragraph 3.109  
Background:  
China Exim bank is a state -owned policy bank with the status of an independent legal entity. It is 
dedicated to supporting China 's foreign trade, investment, and international economic cooperation. 
It was created in 1994 to provide financing for the importation and exportation of ca pital goods and 
services and for Chinese companies that undertake overseas construction and investment projects. 
Its main mandate includes facilitation of export and import of equipment and new - and high -tech 
products, and assisting Chinese companies with comparative advantages in their offshore projects. 
According to the authorities, the Government injects capital into China Exim bank as its shareholder; 
in the course of business, China Exim bank raises funds mainly by issuing bonds in both domestic 
and in ternational capital markets.  
 
Question 36 : Could China elaborate on the 'comparative advantages ' which the Exim bank provides 
to Chinese companies? What is the financial contribution made by the Chinese government in 
Exim bank?   
 
Reply:  The Export -Import Bank of China assists Chinese enterprises in overseas business by 
providing financing services according to its business responsibilities. The Measures for the 
Supervision and Administration of the Export -Import Bank of China (Order No. 3  of 2017 by CBRC) 
stipulates that the Export -Import Bank of China shall establish a market -oriented operational and 
restrictive mechanism to develop into a policy -based financial institution with clear positioning, 
distinct businesses, prominent functions,  sufficient capital, standardized governance, strict internal 
control, safe operation and good services. In practice, the Export -Import Bank of China implements 
the development requirements of modernized finance, and its operation, management and types of 
business are all carried out pursuant to the bank operational regularity.  
  
Page 73 Paragraph 3.110  
Question 37 : Could China elaborate what is understood by 'tied to Chinese exports ' in the context 
of concessional loans offered to developing countries? How are these loans tied to Chinese exports? 
What is the rate at which such loans are given?   
 
Reply:  The Export -Import Bank of China sets the loan interest rate on the basis of the ove rall 
consideration of macro policy orientation, capital supply and demand, loan capital cost, capital 
occupation cost, project risk compensation, operation and management expenses, interbank 
quotation level and other factors.  
 
Page 74 Paragraph 3.111  
Quest ion 38 : Could China provide the value of investment/ concessional business made by 
Exim bank in the 90 countries in the ASEAN region, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, and the South Pacific.   
 
Reply:  From 2013 to 2018, China provided RMB 131.1 billion in preferential loans for foreign aid, 
accounting for 48.52% of the total foreign aid.  
 
Page 75 Pargraph 3.115  
Question 39 : Could China list the sectors and industries to which it has provided incentives  and 
financial support?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification of subsidies submitted by China.  
 
Page 76 Paragraph 3.118  
Question 40 : Could China clarify how many programmes are currently active at the central as of 
this FY? What is the amount of support specifically provided to the fisheries sector?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification of subsidies submitted by China.  
 
Page 77 Paragraph 3.124  
Question 41 :  
a. Could China further elaborate on these "government guidance funds "? What are these funds? How 
are these funds financed?  What is the amount that the Chinese government contributes to these 
funds?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 531 - 
 
  b. As mentioned, "according to some external sources, they are m ostly financed by the 
Central  Government and local governments, large SOEs, and state -owned financial institutions "; 
If so, what are the policy objectives of such funds?  
c. Are the funds utilised for promoting certain specific industries, or are these availab le to all 
industries?  
d. Can the funds deployed can be treated as financial contribution by government through 
entrustment to a private body to carry out functions which would normally be vested in the 
government, as in Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iv) of ASCM ?  
e. Could China please provide additional information on the disbursement and beneficiaries of such 
funds? What are the criteria for receiving the incentives under these funds?  
 
Reply to Questions a -e: The investment management and decision -making of the government 
guidance fund is completely market -oriented. Government departments do not interfere with and 
are not involved in any investment project decisions of the fund, which is established and operated 
with a market orientation in accordance with China 's Company Law. China has not provided subsidies 
to any industry through the Fund, therefore no notification to the WTO is required.  
 
Page 78 Paragraph 3.125  
Background:  
In addition, some other funds that are related to government policies appear to conduct d irect 
investments to support a particular policy initiative (Table 3.16). These funds include expenditures 
under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and funds for China 's SOEs. According to the authorities, 
the incentives provided by these funds do not con stitute subsidies and are not required to be notified 
under the SCM Agreement.  
Question 42 : Could China elaborate on the value of investments made by these funds till date? Are 
there any more such funds (other than those mentioned in the Secretariat 's repo rt)? 
 
Reply:  The investment management and decision -making of the government guidance fund is 
completely market -oriented. Government departments do not interfere with and are not involved in 
any investment project decisions of the fund, which is established and operat ed with a market 
orientation in accordance with China 's Company Law. China has not provided subsidies to any 
industry through the Fund, therefore no notification to the WTO is required.  
 
Page 78 Paragraph 3.126  
Question 43 ; Can China provide the details of  financial support provided to the semiconductor 
sector at national, provincial and municipal levels?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the latest notification of subsidies submitted by China.  
 
Page 78 Paragraph 3.127  
Background:  
Given the importance of the Chinese economy and the size of government support accorded to 
individual companies, China 's support measures are reported to be susceptible to affect global 
markets, downstream industries, and individual value chains. Such effects of China 's support canno t 
be quantified in general, as relevant data are not publicly available. Nevertheless, a study by the 
OECD found, for example, that China 's financial support on energy and concessional finance for 
aluminium smelting, coupled with export restrictions on raw  aluminium, provide Chinese exporters 
of semi -finished aluminium goods with a significant cost advantage, leading to important 
repercussions in global markets. The authorities state that they do not agree with this view, and 
indicate that China does not pr ovide subsidies on energy and concessional finance for aluminium 
smelting.  
 
Question 44 : 
a. Could China clarify whether financial support on energy and concessional finance for 
aluminium goods can be treated as a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of WTO ASCM?  
b. If so, whether China will notify such subsidy programme to the WTO? And if not, wh y China 
does not agree that such programmes are subsidies within the meaning of ASCM?  
c. What kind of concessional financing is available for aluminium smelting? Which sectors 
specifically benefit from the export restrictions on raw aluminum? Is there any dat a to 
quantify such benefits?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 532 - 
 
  Reply to a-c: China does not encourage the development of high energy -consuming and high -
polluting industries, nor will China encourage relevant enterprises to expand their production 
capacity.  
 
Electrolytic aluminum, identified as resource product that is highly energ y-consuming and highly -
polluting, is subject to restrictions on financing, and there is no related subsidies for it.  
China has always attached great importance to deepening the supply -side structural reform of 
electrolytic aluminum industry. In order to re gulate the investment and construction order of 
electrolytic aluminum industry and strictly control the new capacity, The State Council issued the 
Guiding Opinions on Resolving the Serious Overcapacity Contradiction (Guo Fa [2013] No. 41) 
in 2013. We expli citly required local governments to review and abolish preferential policies on land, 
resources, taxation and electricity prices that hurt fair competition in the process of attracting 
investment. We strictly controlled the increase of production capacity,  achieving good results and 
keeping the bottom line of total production capacity control.  
In recent years, China has been actively advancing the high -quality development of aluminum 
industry, and accelerating the establishment of a "dual circulation " devel opment pattern in which 
domestic economic cycle plays a leading role while international economic cycle remains its extension 
and supplement. The price of electrolytic aluminum at home and abroad is determined by market 
supply and demand. Aluminum processi ng enterprises do not have raw material cost advantages, 
and they improve their international competitiveness mainly through technological progress and 
optimized management. Moreover, China 's aluminum products are mainly for domestic consumption 
demand, wi th exports taking up a relatively small proportion of the output. In 2020, China 's 
aluminum exports were 4.63 million tons, down 10% year -on-year, only accounting for 8% of 
China 's aluminum output.  
 
Page 79 Paragraph 3.132  
Background:  
Available figures i ndicate that China also continued to provide substantial support to its fisheries 
sector. China 's subsidy notification refers to six different programmes at the Central Government 
level and 25 programmes at the local level.120 For example, CNY 398.5 million was provided 
in 2017 and 2018 for stock enhancement. According to external estimates, China 's government 
support to its fisheries sector totalled USD 7.3 billion in 2018.121 Moreover, a large share of China 's 
government support to the sector is con sidered as "capacity -enhancing ". The authorities indicate 
that a new fisheries policy would be issued soon.  
 
Question 45 :  
a. Could China further elaborate on the kind of "capacity -enhancing " support it has been 
providing?  
b. The estimates of other research poi nt to subsidies of the order of USD 7.3 Billion in 2018. 
How much of China 's fisheries support is reported to the WTO as Subsidies?  
c. What are main components of China 's fisheries subsidies? Are there any fuel subsidies?  
 
Reply a -c: For details on China 's fishery subsidy policies, please refer to the notification on subsidies 
submitted by China to the WTO. As early as 2015, China has decouped fishery subsidies from oil 
consumption and oil price. For details, please see the Notice of Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Affairs on Adjusting Oil Price Subsidy Policies for Domestic Fishing and 
Breeding Industry to Promote Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Fishery Industry 
(Caijian  [2015] No. 499). India 's claim that "the estimates of other research point to subsidies of 
the order of USD 7.3 Billion in 2018 " is not from official sources, and grossly overestimates China 's 
subsidy figures.  
 
Page 79 Paragraph 3.133  
Question 46 : Can China please elaborate the key changes introduced by virtue of the revised 
Standardization Law?  
 
Reply:  First, the scope of standard formulation has been expanded. The newly revised 
Standardization Law expands the scope of standard formulation from the original focus on the 
industrial sector, to agriculture, service sector and social institutions among othe rs. 
 
Second, the unified management of mandatory standards has been strengthened. The newly revised 
Standardization Law integrates the original mandatory national standards, industry standards and WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 533 - 
 
  local standards to mandatory national standards, and sets a  strict definition on the scope of 
mandatory standards.  
 
Third, the legal status is given to association standards. The newly revised Standardization Law 
provides that the state encourages social organizations to develop their standards to satisfy the 
needs of the market and innovation. This move has changed the standard system of China solely 
provided by the government.  
 
Fourth, the disclosure and supervision system for self -declaration of enterprise standards has been 
established. The newly revised Standa rdization Law has abolished the original filing system for 
enterprise standards, and replaced it by a disclosure and supervision system for self -declaration of 
enterprise standards. It requires enterprises to disclose to society the information on implemen ting 
product and service standards.  
Fifth, internationalization of standards has been enhanced.  
 
Background:  
Since its previous Review, China introduced or revised various laws and regulations related to 
standards and other technical requirements. On 1 Jan uary 2018, the revised Standardization Law 
entered into force and included new provisions such as those on association standards. According to 
the authorities, the Law improved the procedures for setting mandatory standards (or technical 
regulations), clea rly defined local and sector standards, and established a disclosure system for self -
declaration of enterprise standards. On 6 January 2020, the SAMR promulgated the Measures for 
the Administration of Mandatory National Standards, which stipulate the proce dures for making and 
revising mandatory standards. They entered into force on 1 June 2020. On 16 January 2020, the 
SAMR promulgated the Measures for the Administration of Local Standards, which stipulate 
procedures for making and revising local standards; they entered into force on 1 March 2020.  
Question 47 : China is requested to make available all laws, regulations, technical documents and 
standards in English or either of two WTO languages. Such notification would help the developing 
country MSME 's trade  and facilitate overall trade, enhancing the south -south development.  
 
Reply:  On January 6, 2020, the Measures for the Administration of Mandatory National Standards 
was promulgated by the SAMR  Order No. 25. The draft of these measures for public comments was 
notified to the WTO in May 2019. The Measures for the Administration of Mandatory National 
Standards (Chinese -English version) has been published.  
 
Page 79, Paragraph: 4.1.2.4.3.3  
Backgrou nd:  
"Under a subsidized agricultural insurance scheme, insurance premiums are subsidized by the 
Central Government and local governments, so that farmers pay only a balance of 20% -30% of the 
premium. The insurance scheme covers natural disasters such as r ainstorms, floods, and droughts, 
but not income or levels of production. The distribution of financing between the Central Government 
and local governments varies by crop (Table 4.11). Data on total expenditures were not available. "  
 
Table 4.11 Distributi on of the financing of the agricultural insurance scheme between 
central and local authorities  
 
Crops  Breeding   Non-
Commercial 
Forestry  Commercial 
Forestory  Tibetan 
Varieties and 
Natural 
Rubber  
Central 
Government  40% in central 
and western 
regions; 35% in 
the eastern region  50% in central and 
western regions;40% 
in the eastern region  50% 30% 40% 
Local 
Governments  25% 30% 40% 25% 25% 
 
Question48 :  
a. How many agricultural products are covered under this agricultural insurance scheme? Could 
China share a list of such products?  
b. Has China notified this agricultural insurance scheme to WTO? How does this scheme comply 
with the provisions under the AoA?   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 534 - 
 
  Reply:  China will soon submit a notification on domestic support of agriculture. China implements 
agricultural support policies in strict accordance with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and related 
rules.  
 
Page 80 Paragraph 3.134  
Background:  
The Stan dardization Law classifies China 's standards into five major categories: national, sector, 
local, association, and enterprise. The national standards include both voluntary and mandatory 
standards. Sector standards and local standards are voluntary. The La w also stipulates that, where 
there are other provisions on the formulation of mandatory standards in laws, administrative 
regulations, and decisions of the State Council, such provisions shall prevail.  
Question  49:  
China is requested to provide details of the differential treatment regarding mandatory and non -
mandatory standards.  Further, it is requested to answer the following questions:  
a. Does it apply conditional access restrictions in its national, sector, local, association -wise 
legislations a nd orders?  
b. What is the role of non -mandatory standards? Is it used as a building block to prepare 
Chinese local (domestic) firms ' for external markets?  
 
Reply to a:  According to the Standardization Law, mandatory national standards shall be formulated 
for technical requirements regarding people 's health, life and property, national security, ecological 
and environmental security, and the basic needs of economic and social management. Mandatory 
standards must be implemented for such areas. Products and ser vices failing to meet the mandatory 
standards must not be produced, sold, imported or provided. At the same time, the Measures for 
the Administration of Mandatory National Standards further clarifies that mandatory national 
standards shall be managed by a designated supervision department which may handle violations 
of mandatory national standards based on laws, administrative regulations and departmental rules. 
These measures clarify that the universality principle shall be followed in developing mandatory  
national standards and give priority to developing standards for cross -disciplinary products or 
services.  
 
Reply to b:  Voluntary national standards are developed for technical requirements used for meeting 
the general needs, supporting mandatory national standards or guiding related industries. 
Enterprises are encouraged and guided to implement such standards, so as to provide technical 
support for economic and social development. China 's non -mandatory standards are not used as a 
building block to prepare Chinese local (domestic) firms ' for external markets.  
 
Page 81 Paragraph 3.144  
Background:  
As at end -2020, there were 39,460 national standards (2,133 mandatory and 37,327 voluntary 
standards). According to the authorities, at end -2020, among the national standards that correspond 
to the relevant international standards, 92.4% of mandatory standards and 91.4% of voluntary 
standards were adoptions or adaptations of international standards, compared with 74.3% 
and 85.9% at end -2017. Of the national s tandards approved in 2020 (before 15 July), 4.0% were 
mandatory, compared with 2.8% in 2018.  
Question 50 : China is requested to furnish the sectoral distribution of 2,133 mandatory standards 
and used for import restrictions.Further, it is requested to ans wer the following questions:  
 
Reply:  The 2,133 mandatory national standards are divided into five categories: human, animal and 
plant health, life and property safety, national security, ecological and environmental security and 
economic and social management. Specifically, human, animal and plant health mainly includes 
health, medical devices, animal and plant health; life and property safety mainly includes the safety 
of consumer goods and general industrial products; ecological and environmental security mainly 
includes pollutant emissions  and resource conservation. The 2,133 mandatory national standards 
are managed by 33 designated organs of the State Council, including the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the Ministry of Emer gency 
Management, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs 
and the National Medical Products Administration. The list of competent departments of mandatory 
national standards can be obtained at the National Pub lic Service Platform for Standards Information. 
Mandatory national standards are accessible by the public for free.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 535 - 
 
  According to the Standardization Law, products and services failing to meet the mandatory standards 
must not be produced, sold, imported or  provided. Therefore, products exported to China shall 
comply with the technical requirements of China 's mandatory standards.  
 
1. Are these mandatory standards applied to products at the chapter, heading or sub -heading levels?  
 
Reply:  Products regulated by mandatory national standards, with matching products at the chapter, 
heading or sub -heading levels of the HS system, corresponds to such products.  
 
2. Is China Standards mapped to the HS system?  
 
Reply:  For non -adoption of international standards or inconsistency of mandatory national standards 
with technical requirements of the relevant international standards that poses a significant impact 
on the trade of other WTO members, China will notify according to WTO requirements,  with the 
content including the HS code of the product involved.  
 
3. Has China undertaken any assessment regarding the impact of these standards and mandatory 
measures on imports into the country?  
 
Reply:  In the standard -making process, the impact of technical content on the import and export 
trade and industrial development of the products concerned are taken into account.  
 
Page 82 Paragraph 3.149  
Question 51 : 
a. Can China please clarify on what basis produc ts are selected to be listed in the Compulsory 
Product Certification Catalogue (CCC Catalogue)?  
 
Reply:  Article 28 of China 's Certification and Accreditation Regulation clearly provides that for 
protecting national security, preventing fraud, protecting human health or safety, protecting animal 
and plant life or health, and protecting the environment, products subject to compulsory certification 
requirement shall be certified and marked with a certification mark before leaving the factory or 
being sold, imported or used in other business activities.  
 
b. China is also requested to clarify whether these mandatory certification requirements are in 
conformity with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement).  
 
Reply:  Article 28 of China 's Certification and Accreditation Regulation clearly provides that for 
protecting national security, preventing fraud, protecting human health or safety, protecting animal 
and plant life or health, and protecting the environment, products subject to compu lsory certification 
requirement shall be certified and marked with a certification mark before leaving the factory or 
being sold, imported or used in other business activities. This provision is in full compliance with 
the TBT Agreement. The CCC catalogue is also made according to this article.  
 
Page 84 Paragraph 3.187  
Question 52 : Could China please provide a broad timelines regarding the implementation of 
Measures for Supervision and Administration of Food Labelling and Wildlife Protection Law as well as 
information regarding their key features or changes it seeks to implement.  
 
Reply:  Measures for Supervision and Administration of Food Labelling is currently under 
demonstration, discussion and coordination, and the legislation procedures will be expedited after 
the consensus is reached.  
 
Page 85 Paragraph 3.161  
Question 53 : Could China kindly provide information on the key features of the Implementing 
Regulations of the Food Safety Law and its implications after it has entered into force in 
December  2019?  
 
Reply:  The Implementing Regulations of the Food Safety Law revised in 2019 i mplements the 
requirements of strengthening food safety, targets problems, promotes institutional innovation, and 
ensures the full implementation of the provisions of the new food safety law. It clarifies the legal 
obligations and responsibilities of food producers and marketers, strengthens food safety supervision 
and administration, elaborates on discretion, and further enhances the operability of the law.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 536 - 
 
   
Page 85 -86 Paragraph 3.162  
Question 54 : How does the Chinese legislation governing the country 's sanitary and phytosanitary 
requirements incorporate the principles contained in the WTO Agreement on the application of 
SPS measures?  
 
Reply:  China 's legislation governing sanitary and phytosanitary  issues is in full compliance with the 
principles set in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
provides equal treatment to members and follows the non -discriminatory principles of national 
treatment and MFN treatment of the SPS Agreement. Risk assessment has been conducted for 
relevant measures to provide sufficient scientific basis for implementation. The measures are 
moderate and do not constitute obstacles to trade. Based on international standards, mutual 
recogniti on of measures with other members has been actively promoted. At the same time, China 
fully fulfills the obligation of transparency, notifies the draft, and provides other members with 
sufficient transitional period and time for comment. In short, China fu lly considers the principles and 
provisions of the SPS Agreement in the legislative process, conducts domestic compliance 
assessment at the draft stage, and notifies the WTO to seek comments from other members. Further, 
China sincerely considers the member s' comments and makes amendments as appropriate to 
relevant measures. China 's SPS -related measures, from the substantial connotation to the legislative 
process, are in full compliance with the relevant requirements of the WTO SPS Agreement.  
 
Page 86 Paragr aph 3.164 & 3.3.3.2  
Question 55 : Which trading partners has China signed a memoranda of understanding or 
cooperation protocol on SPS related issues? Could China provide information on how it applies 
international standards?  
 
Reply:  Relevant Chinese authorities have been committed to practical cooperation with customs 
and inspection and quarantine departments of trading partner countries and improvement of 
communication and coordination mechanisms. We have expanded market access for high -quality 
food and agricultural products while maintaining biosecurity and food safety of agricultural products, 
and implemented higher -standard cross -border trade facilitation measures.  
 
Page 86 Paragraph 3.166  
Background:  
The authorities indicate that, over t he period January 2018 to December 2020, China issued 
22 national standards, including 4 revised ones, for animal health and 77 national standards in the 
phytosanitary area (including 2 revised standards). In 2019, China released the latest versions of 
the National Food Safety Standard – Maximum Residue Limits for Pesticides in Foods and the National 
Food Safety Standard – Maximum Residue Limits for Veterinary Drugs in Goods, which are applicable 
to foods sold in the Chinese market.  
 
Question 56 :  
Could Ch ina provide details of where the risk assessment undertaken by it in respect of standards 
that are not based on internationally accepted standards can be accessed in English? Further, China 
is requested to answer the following question:  
1. Explain why it applied a national standard instead of following internationally accepted Codex 
standards? Was the measure based on the guideline by the Codex for establishing the MRL 
standards for pesticides and veterinary drugs for foods followed?  
 
Reply : China 's standards in this regard are developed in accordance with the provisions of the 
WTO SPS Agreement, and are based on existing international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations.  
 
Page 86 Pargraph 3.168   
Background:   
In order to prevent the reintroduction of the COVID -19 virus through imported cold -chain food and 
to protect the health and safety of consumers, the GACC implemented emergency preventive 
measures for foreign manufacturers of imported cold -chain foods with positive novel coronavir us 
nucleic acid results. This was notified to the WTO as an emergency measure in 2020, which is still 
in force. It has been reported that, in 2020, the city of Shenzhen introduced COVID -19 handling and 
testing requirements for imports of frozen meat and se afood. In response to the pandemic, China WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 537 - 
 
  has also taken measures to facilitate the imports of food and agricultural products and simplify 
sanitary approval for imported special medical supplies.   
 
Question 57.  
To prevent the reintroduction of the COVID -19 virus, GACC implemented preventive measures for 
foreign manufacturers of imported cold -chain foods to protect the health and safety of the country, 
as China has started to open the wet market.  
In this regard, India requests China to provide information on  other measures, besides consignment 
being confiscated, taken by China to avoid the risk of spreading the virus?  
 
Reply:  China adopts necessary temporary preventive measures to strengthen the supervision of 
imported cold -chain foods for protecting people 's life and health. Relevant practices are in full 
compliance with international rules and have not negatively affected th e food exports to China. China 
conducts sampling tests of nucleic acid of COVID -19 virus on imported cold -chain food and 
its packaging, with the aim of preventing the spread of COVID -19 through cold -chain food. 
On October 17, 2020, the Chinese Center for D isease Control and Prevention announced that 
live COVID -19 virus was found from the outer package of imported aquatic products, further 
confirming that contact with outer packaging contaminated with live COVID -19 virus can lead to 
infection. China welcomes  the export of high -quality and safe food products to China. China 's attitude 
of expanding openness and imports is consistent and clear. However, as the global pandemic 
continues to evolve, consumers ' concerns and doubts about the safety of the food supply  chain have 
deepened, and we believe that without consumer confidence there is no market and without market 
there is no trade. Under the current epidemic situation, we hope that countries (regions) exporting 
food to China follow the relevant guidelines iss ued by the FA0 and require food exporters to 
implement all preventive measures to ensure that the food exported to China is not contaminated 
by the COVID -19 virus.  
 
Page 87 Paragraph 3.169  
Background:  
During the review period, eight new STCs were raised in  the SPS Committee, regarding: (i) 
restrictions on imports of US beef; (ii) administrative measures for registration of overseas 
manufacturers of imported food; (iii) actions related to COVID -19 that affect trade in food and 
agricultural products; (iv) res trictions related to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI); (v) 
recognition of equivalence for third parties as part the China -United States Phase 1 Economic and 
Trade Agreement; (vi) a proposed new health certificate format for shrimp imports; (vii) re strictions 
on bovine meat imports; and (viii) delays in approving requests for new listings or reinstatements 
of export establishments. An additional five STCs were raised in the SPS Committee regarding 
Chinese measures in place prior to this review period  (Table 3.19).   
Question 58 : Could China indicate its decision and next steps regarding new health certificate 
format for shrimp imports?   
 
Reply:  China adopted the Official Letter of the Food Bureau of the General Administration of Customs 
on Revisi ng the Hygiene Certificate for Aquatic Products Exported to China (Shi Pin Han (2020) 
No. 288) in November 2020 and provide the copy of the new Hygiene Certificate for Aquatic Products 
Exported into China to all relevant countries or regions, including India. Please provide feedback to 
China in a timely manner.  
 
Page 88 Paragraph 3.171  
Question 59 :  
(a) Could China clarify key features of the amendment of the regulations on safety assessment, 
import approval, and labelling of agricultural GMOs?   
 
Reply:  In 2018, China did not revise the regulations and rules related to the safety of agricultural 
GMOs.  
 
(b) What is the rationale behind additiona l in-country trials and studies on new biotech events as 
part of the dossier submission process?   
 
Reply:  In 2018, China did not revise the regulations and rules related to the safety of agricultural 
GMOs.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 538 - 
 
  Page 89 Paragraph 3.172   
Question 60 :  
China is requested to provide details of how it proposes to implement the Food Safety Law 
regulations, which would enforce the conspicuous labelling of GMO 's when it has not streamlined the 
earlier rules on GMOs of 2018.  
India requests China to provide details on the measure it proposes to address and avoid overlapping 
laws and regulations.   
 
Reply:  The Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China and t he Implementing Regulations of 
the Food Safety Law of the People 's Republic of China clearly provide that the production and 
marketing of genetically modified food are subject to conspicuous labelling. Regarding the 
management of genetically modified food,  the Regulations on the Safety Management of Agricultural 
Genetically Modified Organisms, the Measures for the Safety Assessment and Management of 
Agricultural Genetically Modified Organisms, the Measures for the Management of Agricultural 
Genetically Modi fied Organisms Labeling and other regulations, rules and relevant standards 
introduced by China 's agricultural sector are building blocks of the regulatory system for the safety 
of agricultural GMOs. The State Administration for Market Regulation will work  with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development to study and formulate the Measures for the Labeling of 
Genetically Modified Food.  
 
Page 89 Paragraph 3.173   
Question  61: Could China please clarify the provincial and local enforcement of the Anti -Monopoly 
Law.  
 
Reply:  The second paragraph of Article 10 of China 's Anti -monopoly Law provides that the anti -
monopoly enforcement agency of the State Council may, in accordance with its work, authorize the 
corresponding agency of the people 's governments of provinces, autonomous regions and cities 
directly under the Central Government to be responsible for the relevant anti -monopoly enforcement. 
In 2018, the State Administration for Market Regulation issued the Notice on Anti -monopoly 
Enforceme nt Authorization, which clarifies that provincial market regulation departments are 
responsible for anti -monopoly enforcement of cases regarding monopoly agreements, abuse of 
dominant market position, and abuse of administrative power to exclude competitio n within their 
administrative regions. Since the implementation of China 's Anti -Monopoly Law in 2008, more 
than 350 monopoly cases have been investigated and handled by local agencies, effectively 
protecting fair market competition and safeguarding consume r interests.  
 
Page 91 Paragraph 3.176  
Question 62 : How does the SAMR interacts with ministries in charge of industrial policies? Could 
China also clarify how coordination between AML policy and industrial policies are conducted, 
including the manner in whi ch different policies are prioritized?   
 
Reply:  There is no conflict between China 's Anti -Monopoly Law and industry policies, and the State 
Administration for Market Regulation will seek and consider the views from relevant sectors in 
monopoly case investigations and concentrated anti -monopoly reviews of operators. In 2016, China 
established a fair competition review system specifying that administrative organs and organizations 
authorized by laws and regulations to manage public affairs shall conduc t fair competition reviews, 
assess the impact on market competition, and prevent the exclusion and restriction of market 
competition when formulating rules, regulatory documents, other policy documents and case -by-
case review measures related to economic a ctivities of market entities. China emphasizes the 
primary role played by competition policies and clarifies to coordinate industrial and other related 
policies based on the competition policy.  
 
Page 97 Paragraph 3.197  
Question 63 : Could China please indic ate the working procedure of the STEs with the exclusive 
right to import or export the mentioned products?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the state trad ing notification already submitted by China.  
 
Page 100 Paragraph 3.212  
Question 64 : Could China clarify by when it envisages the amendments of its draft Government 
Procurement Law and the Tendering Law are supposed to come into force?  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 539 - 
 
  Reply:  The Chinese government is actively promoting the revision of the government procurement 
law and the bidding law. When th e law revision work to be completed shall be decided after 
consultation with relevant parties and coordination with relevant departments.  
 
Page 102 -103 Paragraph 3.215  
Question 65 : Can China provide statistics and data on the value of PPP projects?  
 
Reply:  China does not yet have statistics on the value of PPP projects nationwide.  
 
Page 103 Paragraph 3.219  
Question 66 : Could China please describe how these e -commerce procurement models operate?  
 
Reply:  China has been steadily promoting electronic proc urement since the launch of the 
"Chinese  government procurement website " in 2000. The central government and all provinces have 
established information systems that include government procurement plan filling, evaluation expert 
management, agency management and other functions. Some centralized procurement agencies 
have built transaction systems such as electronic shopping malls, and relevant central departments 
have also built electronic procurement platforms in areas such as agricultural products and official 
air ticket procurement.  
 
Page 104 Paragraph 3.221   
Question 67 : Does China plan to adjust its domestic procurement framework to comply with 
GPA rules?  
 
Reply:  China will revise its domestic laws and regulations to comply with GPA -related requirements 
after completing negotiations to join the GPA.  
 
Page 106 Paragraph 3.233  
Background:  
China 's participation in trade in IP has increased, as shown by the growth in total receipts of fees 
for the use of IP from USD 14 billion in 2010 to USD 41 billion in 2019. The trade deficit in this rubric 
has incrementally narrowed down since 2010, reflecting the export activity related to royalties and 
licensing fees.  
 
Question  68:  
Kindly provide a complete break up in terms of different IPRs ' (including patent, trademark, 
undisclosed information, among others) contribution to the reven ue generated from IP.  
 
Reply:  According to statistics, in 2019, the added value of China 's patent -intensive industry reached 
RMB 11.5 trillion, up 7% year -on-year, accounting for 11.6% of the GDP; the added value of China 's 
copyright sector reached RMB 7.3  trillion, up 10.34% year -on-year, accounting for 7.39% of the  GDP. 
 
Page 107 Paragraph 3.235  
Question  69: Kindly explain whether Intellectual Property Pledge Financing has been successful in 
case of smaller businesses including MSMEs? Whether IP Pledge Financing has been successful in 
sectors other than film and music industries, biotech and software industri es? Whether such support 
is provided to foreign entities as well?  
 
Reply:  1. China encourages commercial banks to increase their support for intellectual property 
pledge financing for innovative (technology -based) small and micro businesses. 2. At present,  
intellectual property pledge financing mainly focuses on patent rights and trademark rights. 
3. Subject to relevant laws of China, commercial banks can provide intellectual property pledge 
financing to foreign entities.  
 
Intellectual property pledge finan cing broadens the financing channels of MSMEs and effectively 
alleviates their burden of the financing. In addition, intellectual property pledge financing is available 
to all sectors with IPR, and there are enterprises in all sectors that have received fi nancing support 
through IPR. Intellectual property pledge financing is also open to foreign entities. As per the 
Measures for Pledge Registration of Patent Rights and Provisions on Procedures for Pledge 
Registration of Exclusive Rights to Registered Tradem arks, China  National Intellectual Property 
Administration handles pledge registration for foreigners, foreign enterprises or other foreign 
organizations that apply for pledge registration of patent rights or exclusive rights to trademarks WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 540 - 
 
  and are qualified  after examination. According to incomplete statistics, in 2020, five foreign 
enterprises received pledge financing support, with an amount exceeding USD 800 million.  
 
Page 108 Paragraph 3.245 -246 
Question 70 : Post the advent of coming -of-age technologies including Machine Learning, Artificial 
Intelligence and Internet of Things, has there been any change in the way computer software is 
protected in the territory of the China? Is computer software is also prote cted under the patent 
regime?  
 
Reply:  The Regulation for Protecting Computer Software were formulated according to the Copyright 
Law to protect the rights and interests of computer software copyright owners, adjust the interests 
in the development, dissemination and use of computer software, encourage the development and 
application of computer software, and promote the development of software industry and national 
economic informatization. A new round of amendments to the regulation will be made per the newly 
revised Copyright Law. As per Art icle 6 of the Measures for the Registration of Computer Software 
Copyright, the National Copyright Administration is the competent department for nationwide 
software copyright registration, and it certifies the Copyright Protection Center of China as the 
registration agency. With the approval of the National Copyright Administration, the center may set 
up local software registration offices.  
 
Page 109 -110 Paragraphs 3.250 and 3.254   
Question 71 : How does China determine whether a trademark application/regis tration is a bad faith 
application/registration?   
 
Reply:  Provisions on Regulating Application for Trademark Registration, a departmental regulation, 
came into effect on 1 December 2019 to support the revised Trademark Law. The provisions provide 
the requi rements for applying for trademark registration, the types of non -standard applications, 
and the factors that the trademark registration departments may consider when judging malicious 
trademark registration applications that are not for the purpose of use . According to Article 8, the 
trademark registration department may consider the following factors when judging whether the 
trademark registration application violates Article 4 of the Trademark Law. (1) The number of 
trademarks applied for registration by the applicant or his/her affiliated natural persons, legal 
persons, other organizations, and designated categories of use, trademark transactions, etc.; (2)  the 
industry that the applicant is involved, business conditions, etc.; (3) the applicant has been 
confirmed by effective administrative decisions or rulings or judicial decisions to have engaged in 
bad-faith registration of trademarks and infringement of the exclusive right of others to register 
trademarks; (4) the trademark applied for registrati on is the same or similar to others with a certain 
degree of popularity; (5) the trademark applied for registration is the same or similar to the names 
of well -known figures, business names, short names of enterprises or other businesses marks, etc.; 
(6) other factors that the trademark registration department deems necessary for consideration.  
 
Page 111 Paragraph 3.263  
Question 72 : What is IP regime applicable on "data" in China?  
 
Reply : At present, although "data" itself is not within the scope of works explicitly listed in China 's 
Copyright Law, the database can be protected by the C opyright Law. In addition, big data -related 
technical solutions f or solving certain technical problems enjoy patent protection if the  conditions for 
patent authorization are met. Conspicuous marks used on data products with distinguishing effect 
can be applied for trademark registration. Internal data and information of the enterprise can be 
protected as trade secrets before disclosure.  
 
Page 113 Pargraph 3.271  
Question 73 : China 's laws on patents have undergone significant changes post signing of China -
US Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement. China has introduced revisions allowing for "Effective 
Patent Term Extension '' and "Effective M echanism for "Early Resolution of Patent Disputes ''. What 
has been the impact of such provisions on the domestic pharmaceutical industries? Has there been 
any surge in patent infringement cases post this revision?  
 
Reply : The above provisions of the Patent Law can stimulate the development of innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry and protect the interests of patent owners. No surge in patent cases has 
been observed as a result of the amendment.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 541 - 
 
  This amendment has a po sitive effect on both innovative and generic drug enterprises. It enhances 
the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of patent owners, promotes the balance between 
innovative and generic drug enterprises and increases the accessibility of drugs . As the new law has 
been in effect for a relatively short time, the number of relevant cases needs to be further evaluated.  
 
Page 110 Paragraph 3.260   
Question 74 : Has there been any study identifying reasons why GI protection as certification marks 
or collective marks under Trademark Law outnumbers the number of GI filed/protected under the 
sui generis  system of protection?  
 
Reply:  First, the procedures of GI trad emark confirmation have become more concise and efficient, 
and are flexible to respond to market demand. The applicant can adjust its GI trademark (such as 
changes on font, color and figure , etc.) and register again according to the development of the time s, 
market environment and different consumer groups to enhance market competitiveness and attract 
different consumers. Second, the legal basis for GI trademark protection has become more 
systematic and comprehensive through laws, regulations and rules, nam ely the Trademark Law, the 
Implementing Rules of the Trademark Law, and the Measures for the Registration and Administration 
of Collective and Certification Trademarks. Third, the protection of GI trademarks has become more 
effective and all -round, the exc lusive rights of registered GI trademarks are protected by law, and 
no one is allowed to use it without the permission of the right owner. The registered GIs enjoy 
all-round protection in trademark registration, customs filing, civil litigation, administra tive 
enforcement and criminal protection. The right holder and interested parties can also claim their 
rights and interests and timely seek remedies through procedures such as opposition, invalidation 
and revocation. Fourth, GI trademarks can be registered  in other countries through the Madrid 
System to fully protect their interests in overseas markets.  
 
Page 110 Paragraph 3.256   
Question 75 : Does the sui generis system provide for the protection of products other than wines, 
spirits, and agricultural products? If yes, whether the protection of such goods is equal to the one 
granted to wines and spirits? Whether foreign GI products (such as textiles, handicrafts, and other 
manufactured goods) are also accorded protection under the sui gener is system of protection?  
 
Reply:  As per Article 2 of the Regulations on the Protection of Geographical Indication Products, 
GI products shall originate from a specific region, whose quality, reputation or other characteristics 
are essentially depend ent on the natural and human factors of the origin, and are examined and 
approved to be named after the geographical name, including: (1) planting and breeding products 
from the region; (2) products produced or processed in the local region according to speci fic 
procedures, with raw materials from the region or partly from other regions. For foreign GI products, 
Measures for Foreign Geographical Indication Protection, a normative document issued by China 
National Intellectual Property Administration, specifies  the provisions and procedures for their 
registration and protection in China, and those that meet the requirements can be recognized and 
protected.  
 
Page 116 Paragraph 3.7.6  
Question  76: When are the interim tariffs applied? What class of goods are subject to this tariff and 
what is the maximum rate of the tariff imposed? What is the time limit for such interim tariff? Can 
the information on the rate of interim tariff, time period and reasoning for such imposition available 
publicly/online? If so, pl ease provide the same.  
 
Reply:  China adjusts the interim tariff rate each year based on the actual situation, and the list of 
goods with interim tariff rate is included in the Customs  Import and Export Tariff of the 
People 's Republic of China released annu ally. It can be obtained from the "Policy Release " module 
of the official website of the Tariff Department of the Ministry of Finance at 
http: //gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 542 - 
 
  Page No. 124, Table 4.4  
Background:  
 
Table 4.4 Main agriculture -related laws, December 2020  
Law (date of last 
amendment)  Coverage  
Law on Promotion of 
Agricultural Mechanization, 
2004 (2018)  Provisions to encourage and support peasants and agricultural production 
and operation organizations to use advanc ed machines, promote 
mechanization, and develop modern agriculture.  
 
Question 77 : 
a. What type of measures are provided in the Law on Promotion of Agricultural Mechanization?   
The law has eight chapters and 35 articles, around the promotion of agricultural mechanization 
development of scientific research and development, quality assurance, promotion of the use of 
social services and support measures and other related links to make provisions. Measures include: 
state support for agricultural mach inery producers plus research and development inputs to support 
technological innovation in the agricultural machinery industry; strengthen the construction and 
maintenance of agricultural mechanization infrastructure; local people 's governments at or abov e 
the county level in charge of agricultural mechanization work departments should provide free 
information services for farmers and agricultural production and management organizations.  
b. What has been the impact of the law on the mechanization process t ill now? Which of the measures 
has been the most efficient?   
 
Reply:  Since the implementation of the Law on Promotion of Agricultural Mechanization, the State 
Council and local governments at all levels has been fully implementing the law, adhering to the 
principle of combining government support and market guidance, and promoting the rapid growth 
in the number of agricultural machinery and equipment, continuous expansion of agricultural 
machinery operating area, and steady improvement in the level of agric ultural mechanization. 
China 's agricultural production has achieved a historic leap from using human and animal labor to 
mechanical operations. By the end of 2020, the number of China 's agricultural machinery and 
equipment reached 204 million units, with t he total power of agricultural machinery 
reaching  1.056TW, an increase of 64% than in 2004.  
Since the promulgation of the Law on Promotion of Agricultural Mechanization, the main system 
provided by the law have been effectively implemented. First, the capacity in scientific research and 
innovation has been steadily improved. Second, advanced and applicable agricultural machinery is 
widely used. Third, agricultural machinery operation enjoys rapid development.  
 
Page 126 Paragraph 4.18  
Question 78 : Could  China please clarify whether export subsidies were provided in 2020 to 
agricultural products?  
 
Reply:  No export subsidy has been provided for agricultural products since China 's accession to 
the WTO in 2001.  
 
Page 127 Paragraph 4.19  
Background:  4.19 Export taxes are levied on four tariff lines (at the HS 8 -digit level) relating to 
products of animal origin, and two tariff lines on raw hides and skins (Table 3.11).  
 
Question 79 : China imposes export taxes on f our tariff lines related to bones treated with acid, 
powder and waste of bones, and dried hides and skins of goats. It is requested to provide reasons 
for imposing export taxes on these specific tariff lines.  
 
Reply:  According to Annex 6 of the Protocol o f Accession of the People 's Republic of China to the 
WTO, China may retain export tariffs on a small number of products. Export tariffs are not levied on 
other products. All products for which China currently levies export tariffs are consistent with 
China 's WTO accession commitments, and all export tariff rates do not exceed the upper limit of 
China 's WTO accession commitments.  
 
Page 129 -30 Paragraph 4.25  
Background:  
Only when the market prices of rice and wheat fall below the minimum procurement prices (MPPs) 
can farmers sell the commodities that meet quality requirements to designated enterprises, so as to 
reduce losses caused by falling grain prices. These prices, as well as limited total purchase volumes, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 543 - 
 
  are set on a yearly basis b y the NDRC in consultation with MARA and other government agencies. 
The MPP of rice in 2018 was substantially lowered, while the MPPs of wheat in both 2018 and 2019 
were slightly lowered. (Table 4.10).  
 
Question 80 :  
India has the following questions regarding China 's Public Procurement and Distribution policies:   
a. It is evident from the Secretariat Report that minimum procurement prices (MPPs ) for all 
commodities listed in Table 4.10 have fallen. What is the reason for such decline in prices?  
 
Reply:  The minimum purchase price s for rice and wheat are determined by factors such as  the cost 
of grain production, market supply and demand, domesti c and international market prices and 
development  of industries . 
 
b. MPPs and limited total purchase volumes are set on a yearly basis. How are the limited 
purchase volumes determined? What are the crops for which China has determined limited 
total purchase v olumes?  
 
Reply: b.China has a pre -determined target on the volume of rice and wheat for the minimum price 
purchase. The pre -determined target is 50 million tons for rice in 2020. The pre -determined target 
is 37 million tons for wheat in 2020.  
 
c. How does t he government dispose of the procured quantities?  
 
Reply:  c.Public stocks are auctioned according to domestic rules, without designating usage. All 
eligible companies can participate in the auctions.  
 
Page 130 Paragraph 4.29  
Background:  
In December 2018, China notified its domestic support commitments for the calendar years 2011 
to 2016.These notifications show no support under the Blue Box (production limiting schemes) 
until 2016, when China notified corn producer subsidies paid, based on f ixed area and yields.  
 
Question 81 : According to China 's DS:2 notification (G/AG/N/CHN /49), the corn producer subsidy 
(Blue Box measure) became effective in 2016 and was supposed to apply till 2018.  
Regarding China 's Blue Box measures, India has the following questions:  
a. Is China continuing with the corn producer subsidy beyond 2018? How l ong does China 
intend to continue its application?   
 
Reply:  a.China has a pre -determined target on the volume of rice and wheat for the minimum price 
purchase. The pre -determined target is 50 million tons for rice in 2020. The pre -determined target 
is 37 m illion tons for wheat in 2020.  
 
b. In DS:2 notification (G/AG/N/CHN/48), China notified a blue box measure for target price 
policy reform of Cotton. This was supposed to apply till 2019. Is this measure still in 
application?   
 
Reply:  b. Yes.  
 
Page 130 -131 Paragraph 4.30  
Background:  
The OECD continues to calculate estimates of support to agriculture in China that provide more up -
to-date indicators over the review period (with data available up to 2019) than do China 's support 
notifications to the WTO (which cover up to 2016). However, the authorities indicate that OECD data 
do not reflect China 's official position and that they could not confirm OECD estimates; they do not 
agree with the methodologies or data source of the estimation.   
 
Question 82 : How does OECD 's methodology differ from China 's?  
 
Reply : China  welcomes the discussion of different methodologies at the technical level.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 544 - 
 
  Page No. 130, Table 4.10  
Background:  
 
Table 4.10 Minimum procurement prices, 2016 -21 
Commodities  2016 (CNY/Tonnes)  
Rice – early long -grain non -glutinous  2,660 
Rice – late long -grain non -glutinous  2,760 
Rice – round -grained non -glutinous  3,100 
 
Question  83: It has been identified that in DS:1 notification for the year 2016 (G/AG/N/CHN/47) 
China had provided the procurement price data for Indica and Japonica Rice. But, in Secretariat 
Report (Reference Table 4.10), data is given only for rice. So, could China provide the break up and 
calculation of procurement prices of Indica and Japonica Rice for 2016 onwards?  
 
Reply:  The minimum purchase price for early Indica, medium and late Indica and Japonica rice 
produced in 2016 was 2.66, 2.76 and 3.1 yuan per kilogram respectively, those produced in 2017 
was 2.6, 2.72 and 3 yuan per kilogram respectively; those produced in 2018  was 2.4, 2.52 and 
2.6 yuan per kilogram respectively; those produced in 2019 was 2.4, 2.52 and 2.6 yuan per kilogram 
respectively; and those produced in 2020 was 4.84, 5.08 and 5.2 yuan per kilogram respectively.  
 
Page 135 Paragraph 4.37  
Question 84 : Does this law regulate China 's fishing activities in high seas and other nations ' 
territorial waters (distant water fisheries)? Can China specify of the conventions on sustainable 
fishing it is member/party?  
 
Reply:  The Fisheries Law regulates China 's fishing activities on the high seas and in waters under 
the jurisdiction of other countries . China is  revisi ng the Fisheries Law  and will develop detailed 
provisions on the management and punishment of offshore fisheries.  As of now, China  is a signatory 
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and a party of nine international and regional 
fisheries organizations, i.e. the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commissio n (IOTC), the International Whaling Commission (IWC), 
the Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the Inter -American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), 
South Pa cific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO), the North Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (NPFC), and the South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA).  
 
Page 135 Paragraph 4.38  
Background:  
Under the Fisheries Law, foreigners and foreign fishing vessels engaging in fishery production in 
waters under China 's jurisdiction must be approved by MARA.   
 
Question 85 :  
a. India request China to further elaborate on the criteria based on which foreign fishing vessels 
are approved?  
b. Additionally, are t here any differences between the former and the criteria based on which 
domestic fishing vessels are approved? If yes, can China please list them?   
 
Reply:  China reviews and approves the entry of foreign fishing vessels according to the provisions 
of bilat eral agreements. The standards of fishing vessels shall comply with the provisions of 
respective bilateral agreements.  
 
Page 135 Paragraph 4.39  
Background:  
The Plan 's basic principles are to: (i ) adhere to ecology as a priority and promote green development, 
with a shift in focus from quantity growth to improving quality and efficiency; (ii) promote innovation 
and scientific development; (iii) implement a "going out " strategy involving, inter ali a, the orderly 
development of deep -sea fisheries, improvements to the industrial chain, and strengthening of 
bilateral and multilateral fishery cooperation;  
 
Question 86 : Could China further elaborate on what does the "going out strategy " entail? Whether 
any subsidies are being given for the achievement of the goals of this Plan, especially capacity 
building subsidies?   WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 545 - 
 
   
Reply:  As per the rights vested by international law s and relevant bilateral cooperation agreements, 
China rational ly develop s and uses international marine biological resources  through its deep -sea 
fisheries. In order to develop deep-sea fisheries responsibly, China attaches great importance to the 
scientif ic conservation and sustainable use of fishery resources and actively fulfills its international 
obligations. China has established a comprehensive management system for deep -sea fisheries by 
revising the Regulations on the Administration of Deep -sea Fishe ries, and implements the most 
stringent management measures for monitoring the position of fishing vessels in the world. In 
particular, China has taken the initiative in recent years to order fishing bans for itself in some high 
seas areas and conduct stri ct supervision on transshipment activities  in the high seas. China has 
joined eight regional fisheries management organizations and ranks high in compliance. At the same 
time, China actively works with the international community to crack down on IUU.  
 
In May 2021, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs issued the 
Notice on Implementing Fisheries Support Policy for Its High -Quality Development. The highlight of 
this latest adjustment to the fisheries support policy is that , for the first time, China made it a key 
part of the subsidies to support survey and conservation of fisher y resources and international 
compliance capability enhancement. The subsidy amount is determined on the annual rating of deep -
sea fisher y companies  and their vessels on their compliance performance. In this way, China 
incentivizes fishing companies and fishermen to enhance their compliance capability, supports deep -
sea fishing vessels to better fulfill international conventions and guides the rationa l use and 
conservation of marine fishery resources. At the same time, China supports the the survey and 
monitoring on global fisheries resources and strives to provide further scientific support on 
conservation and sustainable utilization of high seas fish ery resources. China 's new policy on 
fisheries subsidies is a significant adjustment on domestic fisheries support policies to follow the 
general direction set by the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations. It is conducive to restoring oceanic 
resources, pro tecting ocean ecosystem and promoting sustainable development of global fisheries 
resources.  
 
Page 136 Paragraph 4.40  
Question 87 : Have the fuel subsidies been terminated as of now?  
 
Reply:  China has terminated fuel subsidies.  
 
Page 136 Paragraph 4.43  
Question 88 : Can China provide more information on how it defines illegal fishing activities?  
 
Reply:  Illegal fishing activities, in general sense, refer to those violating the laws and regulations of 
the country with jurisdiction over the relevant waters or of international organizations, or those 
violating the laws and regulations of the flag state. Chi nese ocean fishing vessels operating in the 
waters of other countries, regardless of their flags, shall comply with relevant Chinese laws and 
regulations at the same time, otherwise they will be considered as IUU.  
 
Page 139 Paragraph 4.51  
Background:  
Accor ding to the authorities, in 2018 alone, 1,248 mining rights were granted, of which 772 were 
allocated through competitive procedures, 55 through agreements, and the remainder through 
automatic allocation to the holders of the related exploration rights. Th ree hundred sixty exploration 
rights were granted, of which 175 were funded by the Government, 90 were granted through 
competitive procedures, 37 were filed through prior applications, and 58 were granted through 
agreements.  
 
Question 89 : Out of the 1,248 mining rights that were granted, could China specify how these were 
distributed between domestic and foreign companies?  
 
Reply:  Both Chinese and foreign companies can participate in the allocation of mining rights in 
accordance with the relevant procedures.  
 
Page 139 Paragraph 4.52  
Background:  
Some specific measures were adopted to further standardise and strengthen the approval  
management of rare earth and tungsten exploration and mining.   WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 546 - 
 
  Question 90 : Can China please specify and elaborate on the measures adoptedto standardise and 
strengthen the approval management of rare earth and tungsten exploration and mining?  
 
Reply : Please refer to Notice by the Ministry of Natural Resources of Further Regulating the 
Administration of Approval of Rare Earth and Tungsten Mineral Rights at 
http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018 -12/27/content_5352593.htm  
 
Page 142 Paragraph 4.62  
Background:  
The broader objectives set for green and low -carbon energy development in the 13th Five -Year Plan 
for Energy Development include that by 2020: (i) the proportion of non -fossil energies in total energy 
consumption should be over 15%; and (ii) the carbon dioxi de emission per unit of GDP should 
decrease by 18% compared with that in 2005.  
 
Question 91 :Can China specify whether it was able to achieve the objectives mentioned?  
 
Reply:  As planned by the 13th Five -Year Plan for Energy Development, China has been accelerating 
the green and low -carbon energy transition since the 13th Five -Year Plan was issued. By 2020, the 
proportion of non -fossil energy in China 's total energy consumption  had reached 15.9%, and 
CO2 emissions per unit of GDP had decreased by 18% compared to 2015, outperform ing the targets 
set in the 13th Five -Year Plan.  
 
Page 142 Paragraph 4.63  
Background:  
In December 2017, China launched the construction plan for the National Carbon Emission Right 
Trading Market (Power Generation Industry) to start building its National Carbon Emission Trading 
System.   
 
Question 92 :  
India requests China to share its insights on the working of the National Carbon Emission Right 
Trading  Market. Is it open to all sectors? The sectors and industries allowed under the NCERTM?  
 
Reply : At the end of 2020, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment issued the Measures for the 
Administration of Carbon Emissions Trading (for Trial Implementation) , primarily establishing the 
regulatory system of the national carbon market. The Measures specified  the targets, contents and 
measures of market regulation of departmental, provincial and municipal ecological and 
environmental authorities, standardized the market activities of key GHG emitters, and specified 
relevant responsibilities and obligations.  
 
The national carbon market officially came online and started trading in July this year. It included 
2,162 key emitters in the power generation industry in the first performance cycle. For many years, 
China has also carried out the emission accounting, rep orting and inspection of other high -emission 
industries such as petrochemical, chemical industry, building materials, iron and steel, non -ferrous 
metals, paper making and aviation, gathering solid statistics. Next we will systematically reduce the 
CO2 emis sion in other sectors by broadening the industrial coverage of the carbon market and 
optimizing the methods of quota distribution. Building on the sound operation of the carbon market 
for power generation industry, we will expand the market to cover more h igh-emission industries, 
improve the methods of emission quota distribution, and give full play to the market 's important 
role in controlling GHG emissions, promoting innovation in green and low -carbon technologies, and 
guiding climate investment and finan cing.  
 
Page 142 Paragraph 4.66  
Background:  
On 1 January 2018, China implemented a new environmental tax policy aimed at promoting 
environmental protection and reducing pollution.  
 
Question 93 : India would welcome further information from China regarding  how the working of 
the new environmental tax policy. Which sectors or companies are affected? What has been the 
outcome of the policy so far?  
 
Reply:  Since January 2018, the Environmental Protection Tax Law of the People 's Republic of China 
has been officially implemented, and Article 10 specifies the emissions of taxable air pollutants, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 547 - 
 
  water pollutants and solid waste and decibels of noise, as well a s the calculation method and order. 
In April 2021, in order to further implement the Environmental Protection Tax Law of the 
People 's Republic of China, the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, together with the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Taxation A dministration, issued the Announcement Issuing Pollutant 
Discharge Coefficients and Material Balance Methods for Taxable Pollutant Discharges Subject to 
Environmental Protection Tax (No. 16 of 2021), which provides for the calculation methods of 
emissions of taxable pollutants for pollutant emitters that do not have monitoring conditions.  
 
Page 143 Paragraph 4.69  
Question 94 :Can China elaborate on the measures undertaken to control the new capacity of coal -
fired power strictly?   
 
Reply:  China will strictly control coal -fired power projects. In principle, China will not construct new 
coal-fired power projects solely for the purpose of power generation and will consider the demand 
for approving supporting power source projects with a certa in scale to ensure the security of power 
supply and regulatory power source projects to promote new energy consumption. Continuous 
efforts are made to phase out backward coal -fired power production capacity, and close and 
integrate small coal -fired power p lants. China vigorously develops new energy, such as wind and 
photovoltaic power, coordinates the construction of wind and photovoltaic power projects and the 
upgrading of coal -fired power plants, and gives full play to the supportive and regulatory role o f 
coal-fired power to new energy development and consumption. China promotes the energy -saving 
and emission -reducing transformation, heat supply transformation and flexible transformation of 
coal-fired power units. China encourages thermal power enterprise s to seek comprehensive energy 
services transformation characterized by "power generation + " , and vigorously studies carbon 
capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) and resource recycle and utilization technology.  
 
Page 148 Paragraph 4.91  
Background:  
The trial of "pilot spot markets ", where trading of electricity takes place on a spot basis instead of 
by medium - to long -term contracts, began in August 2017 in eight areas (Guangdong, west of Inner 
Mongolia, Zhejiang , Shanxi, Shandong, Fujian, Sichuan, and Gansu).  
 
Question 95 : China is requested to share its finding from the trial of the pilot spot market where 
electricity trading takes place? What were the challenges it came across? Does China plan to enforce 
the programme permanently?  
 
Reply:  At present, China has identified 14 pilot  spot markets  in two batches, of which the 
first eight ones have conducted trail operations with different settlement intervals . As the spot 
market development is still in the initial stage, pilot areas have been summing up experience and 
improving  trading rules. China will continue the market -oriented reform  on the power sector, 
accelerate the construction of  spot markets  for electricity,  optimize  the allocation of power resources, 
and promote clean and low -carbon energy  development.  
 
Page 148 Paragraph 4.94  
Question 96 : Can China elaborate in detail on the policy initiatives in force to address the challenges 
facing manufacturing?  
 
Reply:  First, China promotes industrial base upgrading and modernization of the industrial chain. 
Secon d, China expedites the development of high -end, smart and green manufacturing. Third, China 
continues to deepen reform and opening up. China deepens reforms on streamlining administration 
and delegating power, improving regulation, and upgrading services a nd on other key areas, further 
expands the high -level opening of the manufacturing sector, and improves the market -oriented, 
law-based and international business environment.  
 
Page 148 Paragraph 4.94  
Background:  
As described in detail in the previous Rev iew, major initiatives include the Made in China 2025 (or 
China Manufacturing 2025) initiative (launched in 2015), and the Internet Plus initiative (launched 
in 2015).  
 
Question  97: What is the major initiative of Made in China 2025?   
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 548 - 
 
  Reply:  Made in China 2025 is the first ten -year guideline of China to implement the strategy of 
rejuvenating the country through manufacturing. It focuses on nine strategic tasks, including 
improving manufacturing innovation capacity, strengthening basic industr ial capabilities and 
improving brand quality , and five projects, namely construct ing manufacturing innovation center, 
strengthening industrial foundation  and promoting  intelligent manufacturing, green manufacturing 
and high-end equipment innovation.  
 
a. Can C hina elaborate on the Made in China and Internet Plus initiatives?   
 
Reply:  The Opinions on Active Promotion of 'Internet + ' is the guideline for pacing up the in -depth 
integration between the Internet and various fields and for encouraging innovation -driven 
development. Eleven key tasks have been assigned based on "Internet + " entrepreneurship and 
innovation, collaborative man ufacturing, modern agriculture and intelligent energy among others. 
Both documents are publicly released and are available online.  
 
b. Which sectors are going to be affected?  What are its salient features? What has been the 
outcome so far?   
 
Reply:  The most notable feature of the two documents is the adherence to the market -oriented 
principle to highlight the main role of enterprises in the market. Made in China 2025 and the Opinions 
on Active Promotion of 'Internet + ' significantly improve industri al innovation capacity, optimize the 
industrial structure, and significantly enhance the level of open development. The shareholding 
restrictions of foreign equity in automobiles, ships and aircraft are gradually being lifted. Tesla, BASF, 
ExxonMobil, Sams ung and other multinational enterprises have expanded their investments in China. 
China welcomes enterprises from all over the world to actively participate in China 's manufacturing 
development, share development opportunities and market space brought by t he opening up of 
China 's manufacturing industry, and achieve win -win cooperation.  
 
Page 149 Paragraph 4.96  
Question 98 : Can China elaborate on the "Supply -side Structural Reform? " How successful has it 
been? What are the challenges they are facing?   
 
Reply:  The supply -side structural reform focuses on liberating and developing social productivity, 
promoting structural adjustment and enhancing total-factor productivity. Main measure s include: 
expediting clearance  of more industries with overcapacity, establishing fair, open and transparent 
market rules and a law-based business environment , reducing the business cost of  all types in the 
society, shoring  up shortcomings in infrastructure, giving full play to the initiative of enterprises and 
entrepreneurs, upgrading the industrial chain, accelerating the construction of a unified, open, 
competitive and orderly modern market system, and improving the finan cial system 's ability to serve 
the real economy. During the 13th Five -Year Plan period, a total of 64.74 million tons of crude steel 
production capacity of "zombie enterprises " were phased out . At present, the international and 
domestic environment for manufacturing development is undergo ing profound changes, and  China  
is still facing shortcomings  of weak independent innovation capability and insufficient support of 
scientific and technological innovation to the manufacturing industry.  
 
Page 150 Paragraph 4 .107  
Question 99 : Can China share the progress made under The Automobile Mid - and Long -term 
Development Plan launched in 2017?Has the ongoing pandemic impacted the Plan in any way? What 
are the challenges that China is facing vis -à-vis the Plan?   
 
Reply:  The Development Plan is a guidance document rather than a compulsory one.  
 
Page 151 Paragraph 4.111  
Background:  
The authorities note that machinery industry policy aims to pursue innovation -driven development; 
promote the transformation towards an  intelligent, green, and service -oriented machinery industry; 
promote the optimization of industrial structures; improve product quality; improve the utilization 
rates of resources and energies; and reduce pollutant emissions  
 
Question  100: Against the backdrop of the understanding that any industrialisation efforts will 
eventually lead to environmental degradation (forwards or backwards). Can China share how it plans 
to pursue an innovation -driven, intelligent, green, and service -oriented ma chinery industry in detail?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 549 - 
 
   
Reply:  China will focus on the in -depth integration of the new generation of information technology 
and advanced manufacturing technology, speed up the development of intelligent manufacturing, 
continue to promote technique in novation, equipment upgrading, management optimization and 
smart production, and further promote the digital transformation and intelligent upgrading of the 
machinery industry.  
 
Page 155 Paragraph 4.134  
Question 101 : Could China explain any proposed steps  in its "market based " approach to 
developing this new market?   
 
Reply:  China would like India to further clarify the question.  
 
Page 156 Paragraph 4.137  
Question 102 : How many joint stock commercial banks does China have?   
 
Reply:  Up to now, there are 12 national joint -stock commercial banks in Chin a. In addition to th ese, 
most of the large state -owned banks  and city commercial banks also operate as companies limited 
by shares . 
 
Page 158 Paragraph 4.145  
Question  103: Are these reform measures already in effect? In so, could China provide comparative 
statistical information about performance of the sector before and after the implementation of these 
measures? If not in effect, when are they slated to be implemented?  
 
Reply:  In terms of allowing foreign institutions to enter the interbank bond market, China has 
steadily promoted the opening up of the interbank bond market to the outside world in recent 
years.The restrictions on QFII/RQFII  investment quota and RQFH pilot countries and regions have 
been lifted in September 2019. In terms of allowing foreign financial institutions to obtain Class A 
underwriting licenses in the interbank bond market, the market evaluation of foreign banks ' 
participation in the Class A principal underwriter business of debt financing instruments for non -
financial enterprises was launched. In terms of allowing foreign participation in credit rating, in 
January 2019 and May 2020, S&P and Fitch, two of the three ma jor international rating agencies, 
have been allowed to enter the Chinese market to develop their business in the form of sole 
proprietorship, and Moody 's has entered the Chinese market in the form of joint venture.  
 
Page 168 Paragraph 4.200 Box 4.2  
Backg round:  Foreign ownership participation in telecom companies (2019): In the basic telecoms 
sector, the proportions of overseas public shares of China Telecom, China Mobile, and China Unicom 
were 17.15%, 27.28%, and 20.1%, respectively. By end -2020, a total of 395 foreign -invested 
enterprises had entered China 's telecoms market, mainly engaged in information services and e -
commerce -related businesses.  
 
Question  104: Could China provide the details of its GATS commitments in the telecom sector, 
particularly i n Modes 1 and 3? Does China have any proposed steps to liberalise foreign ownership 
participation?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the Table of Specific Commitments For Concessions on China 's Trade in 
Services (WT/L/432). China will study the possibility of further liberalization in accordance with the 
development needs of the domestic market.  
 
Page 169 Paragraph 4.20 4  
Background:  These specify that the foreign share ratio for value -added telecommunications 
services (except for e -commerce, domestic multi -party communications, storage -forwarding, and 
call centres) shall not exceed 50%.  
 
Question  105: What are the limi ts on e -commerce and other services provide by means of digital 
trade? Could China clarify how they are classified as per the UN CPC?  
 
Reply:  Please refer to the Special Administrative Measures for Foreign Investment Access (Negative 
List) for details. Th e Chinese negative list of open areas is classified according to China 's National 
Economic Classification.  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 550 - 
 
   
Page 170 Paragraph: 4.4.2.2.6  
Question  106: Could China explain the measures it takes for regulating the cross -borders flows of 
data from China to abroad? On the corollary, what are the laws protecting the data when transferred 
to China from abroad? Is there any authority exercised by the State over such transferred data?   
 
Reply:  The Network Security Law, the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection 
Law have made clear provisions on the management of cross -border flow of data, including the 
responsibilities and obligations undertaken by enterprises and other entities of cross -border flow of 
data, and the state 's regulat ory requirements for cross -border flow of data.  
 
Page 173 Paragraph 4.230  
Background:  Regarding foreign business, the E -commerce Law provides that China shall encourage 
cross-border e -commerce (CBEC) development. In practice, the authorities have been pro moting 
CBEC (activities of purchasing or selling products via online shopping across national borders).  
 
Question 107 : Can China clarify what are the customs duties that are imposed on these items, and 
other kinds of digital goods and services?  
 
Reply:  Tariffs imposed on imported goods is in accordance with the tariff rules of the People 's 
Republic of China. For digital products and services realized through electronic transmission, China 
currently maintains the practice of not imposing tariffs in accor dance with the requirements of 
WTO regulations.  
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 551 - 
 
  INDIA - ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS  
Questions based on Secretariat Report (WT/TPR/S/415)  
Page 86 Pargraph 3.168  
Background:  
In order to prevent the reintroduction of the COVID -19 virus through imported cold -chain food and 
to protect the health and safety of consumers, the GACC implemented emergency preventive 
measures for foreign manufacturers of imported cold -chain foods with positive novel coronavirus 
nucleic acid results. This was notified to the WTO as an emerg ency measure in 2020, which is still 
in force. It has been reported that, in 2020, the city of Shenzhen introduced COVID -19 handling and 
testing requirements for imports of frozen meat and seafood. In response to the pandemic, China 
has also taken measures  to facilitate the imports of food and agricultural products and simplify 
sanitary approval for imported special medical supplies.  
 
Questions:  
1. What is the scientific basis for various non -tariff barriers placed by China in importing cold chain 
food products - especially meat, fishes, shrimps, etc.?  
2. What is the scientific basis for suspending import declaration of establishments whose 
consig nments have tested positive for COVID -19 nucleic acid?  
3. What is the basis for undertaking video inspection on establishments whose consignments have 
tested positive for COVID -19 nucleic acid?  
 
Questions 1 -3 are answered together with questions 13 and 1 4. Please refer to the replies to 
questions  13 and 14.  
 
4. So far, how many video inspections have been carried out in establishments across the world?  
5. So far, how many establishments in the world have been suspended indefinitely from exporting 
to China  and which countries do these establishments belong to? Can the Chinese side provide a 
country wise break up of number of establishments which have been suspended indefinitely?  
6. So far, how many suspensions of establishments have been revoked after the establishments 
undertook corrective actions. Can the Chinese side provide a country wise break up of number of 
establishments whose indefinite suspensions have been revoked?  
 
Reply to questions 4, 5 and 6:  Relevant information has been published on the we bsite of the 
General Administration of Customs of China. Please log on the website for detailed information . 
 
7. What are the criteria for suspending establishments indefinitely and can Chinese side provide the 
relevant GACC notification in this regard?  
 
Reply:  China does not have a measure in place for suspending establishments indefinitely from 
exporting goods to China.  
 
8. How can mere presence of COVID -19 nucleic acid in the packages be equated to presence of a 
virulent virus?  
 
Reply:  Mere presence of COVID -19 nucleic acid in the packages  does not mean the presence of a 
virulent virus . 
 
9. Can the Chinese side share the scientific basis for possibility of transmission of COVID -19 through 
cold chain food items ？ 
 
Reply:  Please refer to "Suggestions of Chinese Experts on the Second Phase of SARS -CoV-2 Global 
Traceability Research Convened by WHO ". 
 
10. Can the Chinese side share the technical details of sample tests done by its Customs authorities?   
 
Reply:  China strictly follows Chinese food safety rela ted laws and regulations as well as national 
food safety standards to conduct sample tests.  
 
11. What is the view of the Chinese side on the updated guideline issued by FAO on August 02, 2021 
on preventing transmission of COVID -19 within food business whi ch clearly states that COVID -19 is 
not a food safety hazard?  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 552 - 
 
  12. Why does the Chinese side continue to test for COVID -19 nucleic acid in packages when the 
updated guideline states that there is no evidence to date of the virus being transmitted by food or  
food packaging as COVID -19 cannot multiply in food and needs animal or human hosts to multiply?  
 
Reply to questions 11 -12: "Prevention and control on both people and objects " is one of the 
important experiences of China in effectively responding to COVID -19 pandemic. China has carried 
out systematic and continuous monitoring and evaluation on the risk of cold chain food contaminated 
by COVID -19 virus and its transmission. Through comprehensive analysis of monitoring data of tens 
of millions of foods and th eir packagings, combined with the traceability evidence of several 
epidemiological outbreaks in COVID -19 pandemic (and one of them was traced to the source of live 
COVID -19 virus detected on the surface of cold chain food packaging), it is determined  that cold 
chain food and its packaging may become a carrier for spreading COVID -19 virus because they are 
contacted by COVID -19 patients during production and processing, and low temperature conditions 
are favorable for the survival of COVID -19 virus . Without effective protection, frequent close contact 
with the packaging or means of transport contaminated by live COVID -19 virus may lead to human 
infection. At the same time, National Health Commission organized experts from the National Food 
Safety Risk Assessment Center to conduct a comprehensive study on the risks of cold chain food 
spreading to COVID -19 virus and the prevention and control strategies.  
 
13. How does Chinese side view the statement by FAO that "such contamination may precipitate 
unjustif ied trade restriction, even though it is not a food safety hazard? " 
14. The non -tariff barriers placed by Chinese side on seafood exporting industry have led to decline 
in exports of marine products from several countries and have led to several complaints  and trade 
disputes. Is the Chinese side willing to compensate the losses which arose due to these unjustified 
trade restrictions?  
 
Replies to questions 1, 2, 3, 13 and 14:  The COVID -19 pandemic has seriously jeopardized the 
safety and health of human live s, and has had a grave impact on the economic and social order and 
production of countries around the world. China has made great efforts to effectively control the 
pandemic in its territory, but still is exposed to significant risk of reintroduction of COVID-19 through 
importation.  Since last year, some countries have lifted the lockdown despite the increased new 
cases, and people started working while still suffering from illness. As a result, many overseas 
manufacturing companies have reported clusters o f infections among their employees.  Chinese 
customs and local authorities have repeatedly detected positive nucleic acid for COVID -19 virus on 
the inner and outer packaging of imported cold -chain food products or on the product itself, which 
indicates defi ciencies in the food safety management systems of some overseas food companies that 
export to China.  In this context, the General Administration of Customs (GAC), in order to protect 
food safety and consumer health, has deployed emergency preventive measur es to monitor the risk 
of imported cold chain foods, suspend the import of products from companies reported with clusters 
of infections, and apply a 1 -week or 4 -week suspension to overseas producers of imported cold chain 
foods that have tested positive fo r nucleic acid of the COVID -19. These measures have received 
proactive support and cooperation from many countries and establishments, and many of the 
exporters that experienced clusters of infections have suspended their exports to China voluntarily. 
Certainly, the establishments involved can resume their exports to China after taking measures to 
effectively eliminate the relevant risks and ensure food safety for their exports to China. China has 
notified the WTO of the above circumstances in the appropria te form.  
 
COVID -19 is a new virus, and many of its epidemiological characteristics remain uncertain.  
Considering the global prevalence, high contagiousness, and high pathogenicity of Covide -19, China 
has taken corresponding emergency response measures, whi ch are important moves to prevent the 
risk of importation of Covide -19 virus through imported cold chain foods.  On 17 October 2020, the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention and Control (CDCPC) announced to the public 
that the live virus was de tected on the outer packaging of imported cold -chain foods, which is the 
first time to confirm out of laboratory that COVID -19 can survive for a longer period of time on the 
outer packaging of items under special conditions of cold -chain transportation, su ggesting that the 
virus has the possibility of cross -border importation over long distances with cold -chain items as the 
carrier.  Given this situation, China has tightened the regulation of cold chain foods based on risk 
assessment, and the relevant practices conform to WTO rules. As a necessary measure to protect 
people 's health, it does not undermine the normal operations of international trade.  
 
China welcomes high -quality, safe foods from all countries to enter the Chinese market in stric t 
compliance with WTO rules.  At present, as the global pandemic prevention and control is still in a WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 553 - 
 
  critical stage, we call upon relevant countries and regions to establish effective food safety 
management systems in strict accordance with the guidelines jointly issued by the FAO and WHO, 
and to take preventive measures to avoid the contamination of exported foods with COVID -19. China 
stands ready to keep in touch with the competent authorities of WTO members on related matters 
to ensure food safety at sou rce, enhance consumer confidence, and work together to safeguard the 
safety of the international food supply chain.  
 
Page 79 Para 3.3.2  
Questions  
1. Can the Chinese side explain the extra -ordinary delays in updating lists of enterprises exporting 
fruits and vegetables which are shared with GACC by various countries?  
 
Reply:  In accordance with the requirements of Chinese laws and regulations related to imported 
fruits, all enterprises that export to China can engage in relevant trade during the valid period after 
being registered by China.  Before the expiration, if the enterprises apply for extension of registration, 
the official authorities of the ex porting countries need to check and verify their compliance with the 
protocol and China 's import veterinary and phytosanitary requirements before recommending the 
extension of registration to China. China will conduct a retrospective inspection and decide whether 
to accept the applications for extension of registration.  
Some exporting countries cannot provide materials in time or fail to cooperate with China to carry 
out relevant assessment and inspection work, thus making it impossible for China to review and 
ratify the applications of the enterprises concerned.  
 
2. Can Chinese side explain the logic of not updating the list of fruits exporting establishments from 
several countries on the premise of COVID -19?  
3. Can Chinese side explain the basis for arbit rarily demanding video inspections of establishments 
exporting fruits and vegetables on the premise of COVID -19?  
 
Reply to Q2 -3: The issues mentioned in the Q2 -3 do not existed . In case of no update, it is because 
some exporting countries cannot provide relevant materials in time or fail to cooperate with China 
to carry out relevant assessment and inspection work, thus making it impossible for China to review 
and ratify the applications of the enterprises concerned.  
China conducts video inspection s on fruit exporters for the prevention and control of COVID -19, in 
an effort to forestall the spread of COVID -19 through fruits. Since the outbreak of COVID -19, the 
Chinese authorities have repeatedly detected positive nucleic acid of COVID -19 on imported  fruits 
and packaging samples from some countries, indicating contamination by COVID -19. China has 
taken the necessary provisional preventive measures to tighten supervision of fruit exporters in 
order to protect people 's life safety and health. Relevant p ractices are fully consistent with 
international rules and have not adversely affected the fruit trade destined for China.  
 
Page 86 Paragraph 3.166  
Questions  
1. Has the China imposed pesticide residue certificate requirements for each batch of products suc h 
as Spices imported from any country? What is the usual timeline provided to these countries for 
implementing this certificate requirement?  
 
Reply:  China does not require countries to provide pesticide residue test certificates for every batch 
of their p roducts exported to China, and only requires that each batch of Indian cumin seeds 
exported to China be accompanied by an official test report on specific pesticide residue items issued 
by India effective 1 October 2021.  Since 2020, Indian cumin seeds expo rted to China have been 
detected by the Chinese customs authorities for a number of times in a row with pesticide residues 
exceeding the Chinese national standards. India has not responded positively to the three 
notifications from China and has not adopte d measures to effectively control the problem of pesticide 
residues in cumin seeds exported to China.  In view of the fact that the problem of excessive pesticide 
residues in Indian cumin seeds exported to China has not been effectively controlled for a lon g time, 
in order to protect the health of Chinese consumers, China has to take early warning and control 
measures, requiring that effective from 1 October 2021, each batch of Indian cumin seeds exported 
to China should be accompanied by a test report on sp ecific items of pesticide residues.  
 
2. Is China aware that such additional test requirements without providing reasonable timeline for 
implementation act as a serious non -tariff barrier towards spices imported into China?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 554 - 
 
  Reply:  China has notified India of the relevant requirements in August 2021. However, no response 
has been received from India. As of 11 November, China has not obtained any pesticide residue test 
report format from India that meets China 's requirements.  
 
Page 86 Paragraph 3.168  
Questions  
1. What is the basis for Chinese side testing COVID -19 nucleic acid materials in non -cold chain non -
food items such as leather, cotton yarn and engineering goods , etc., even when the consignments 
have taken more than a month on transit in sea?  
2. Does the Chinese side realize that such unscientific testing leads to negative importer sentiment 
and acts as a non -tariff barrier in trade of these commodities?  
3. Is China aware that raising unnecessary concerns regarding COVID -19 contamination negat ively 
impacts imports from other countries? What measures has China taken to avoid using the pretext 
of COVID -19 contamination as an economic coercive tool?  
 
Replies to Questions 1 -3: China has no intention to set up non -tariff barriers, much less the 
alleged "economic coercion ".China is strongly opposed to unilateralism and protectionism measures, 
including the economic coercive measures. China actually is a victim of these measures i tself. 
 
Page 12 Para 21  
Background : During the review period, a new Export Control Law was adopted; it provides for the 
establishment of a single framework for restricting exports of controlled items, i.e. dual -use items 
(with both civilian and military ap plications); military products; nuclear products; and goods, 
technologies, and services that are related to the maintenance of national security and interests and 
the implementation of international obligations such as nuclear non -proliferation.  
 
Questions  
1. Will China 's Export Control Law impact exports of materials which are declared to be used for 
civilian purposes?  
2. Is China 's export control law impacted by political considerations?  
 
Reply to questions 1 -2: China 's Export Control Law provides for controlled items. In order to 
safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non -proliferation, 
the Chinese government will formulate and adjust control lists in accordance with int ernational 
treaties and multilateral export control mechanisms to which it has acceded, and refer to 
international practices, and issue the lists publicly in a timely manner.  
China 's Export Control Law is a comprehensive and basic law to strengthen and re gulate export 
control activities in order to further safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international 
non-proliferation obligations in the new situation. This law draws experience from international 
practices and provides stronger legal guarantee for export control.  
 
Page 177 Section 4.4.3.2 & Para 4.253 on Page178  
Questions  
1. What is the scientific basis for "five-ones" policy and circuit breaker system in the aviation sector?  
 
Reply:  Since the outbreak of COVID -19, China has adopted a series of provisional control measures 
for international passenger flights in accordance with the relevant provisions of the International 
Health Regulations and the Convention on International Civil Aviation, as well as the Law on Health 
and Qua rantine at the State Borders, the Law on Emergency Response and the Civil Aviation Law, 
which have effectively prevented the spread of the pandemic across borders while meeting the needs 
of people -to-people movement.  The "Five-Ones" policy is an interim me asure taken due to the 
impact of the pandemic and the irregular aviation order. It applies equally to international flights 
operated by Chinese and foreign airlines.  
 
2. Does China realize the adverse impact of its aviation sector policies on the overall t rade and 
people -to-people movement?  
 
Reply:  The global aviation industry has been devastated by the pandemic. In the Chinese market 
alone, for example, the Chinese civil aviation industry was estimated to suffer a total loss of 
USD 15.1 billion in 2020, in cluding a loss of USD 12.3 billion for airlines and USD 3.6 billion for 
airport companies.  In addition, the pandemic has caused immeasurable negative impacts such as 
lack of confidence among the traveling public, loss of talents in the industry, and disrup tions in the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 555 - 
 
  global supply chain. To promote the industry 's recovery, China 's civil aviation has taken a series of 
measures to effectively prevent the spread of the pandemic across borders while meeting the needs 
of people -to-people movement. China firmly supports the work of ICAO and hopes to work hand in 
hand with other countries for the recovery, revitalization and sustainable development of the 
industry in the post -pandemic  era. 
 
3. What were the reasons that China decided to implement these measures wi thout any form of 
consultations whatsoever with stakeholders?  
 
Reply:  Since the outbreak of COVID -19, China has adopted a series of provisional control measures 
for international passenger flights in accordance with the relevant provisions of the International 
Health Regulations and the Convention on International Civil Aviation, as well as the Chinese Law 
on Health and Quarantine at the State Borders, the Law on Emergency Response and the Civil 
Aviation Law, which have effectively prevented the sp read of the pandemic across borders while 
meeting the needs of people -to-people movement.  
 
4. What are the reasons for the Chinese side denying permissions for operations of chartered flights 
from countries even after confirmation that the flight will not have any incoming passengers into 
China?  
5. Why are foreign airlines denied landing rights to Beijing while Chinese carriers were allowed to 
have flights which provided them undue commercial advantages?  
 
Reply  to Q4 -5: After the outbreak of the pandemic, in accordance with Chinese Law on Health and 
Quarantine at the State Borders, Emergency Response Law, Civil Aviation Law and other laws and 
regulations, China has taken measures to divert international passenger flights  destined for Beijing 
at the first point of entry, which is an interim measure taken due to the impact of the pandemic and 
irregular aviation order. There is no discrimination between Chinese and foreign airlines for 
international flights. The working mech anism for the prevention and control of the pandemic in 
Beijing provides coordination for the gradual resumption of direct flights to Beijing. At this stage, 
the number of flights that can resume direct flights to Beijing and the number of inbound passenge rs 
that can be accommodated are very limited.  
 
6. Did China place restrictions on imports of consignments through air freight from countries which 
were affected by COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
Reply:  For the air transportation of cargo, Chinese civil aviation enfo rces ICAO standards and does 
not impose additional restrictions on air cargo imported from countries affected by COVID -19. 
 
7. Is the Chinese side aware that unofficial instructions or orders are being issued to Chinese carriers 
to follow restrictions on i mports of consignments through air freight from countries which were 
affected by COVID -19 pandemic?  
 
Reply:  For the air transportation of cargo, Chinese civil aviation enforces ICAO standards and does 
not impose additional restrictions on air cargo import ed from countries affected by COVID -19. 
 
8. What are the steps that the Chinese side has adopted to prevent using informal channels and 
pressure to impose restrictions on imports from other countries?  
 
Reply:  For the air transportation of cargo, Chinese c ivil aviation enforces ICAO standards and does 
not impose additional restrictions on cargo transport.  
 
Page 86 Para 3.165  
Questions  
1. Will decrees 248 and 249 issued by GACC increase non -tariff barriers for export of food and 
agricultural products to Chin a, especially from developing countries?  
2. Will existing trade in food products be negatively impacted because of implementation of these 
decrees 248 and 249?  
 
Reply to Q1 -2: Provisions on the Administration of Registration of Foreign Enterprises Produci ng 
Imported Food (General Administration of Customs Decree No. 248) aims to optimize the registration 
process, apply classification management to different categories of foreign manufacturers, clarify 
the main responsibility of enterprises and regulatory r esponsibility of the competent authorities of WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 556 - 
 
  the host country (region), and improve the applicability of the provisions to enhance operability.  The 
said provisions will not affect the implementation of the agreements that have been negotiated 
between the relevant members and China. In order to ensure the normal operation of food trade 
destined for China after the implementation of Decree 248 and 249 of the General Administration of 
Customs, the General Administration of Customs informed the rel evant countries (regions) by letter 
at the end of September 2021 on the application for registration of different types of overseas 
imported food production enterprises and the material requirements to be submitted.  
 
3. What are the objective criteria used  to assess whether relevant competent authority in a country 
has passed the equivalence assessment and review of GACC?  
 
Reply:  The contents and standards of the equivalence assessment and review will be enforced based 
on the relevant guidelines of the WTO ，OIE, IPPC  and CAC，the relevant inspection and quarantine 
requirements agreed between the General Administration of Customs and the competent authorities 
of the host country (region), relevant Chinese laws and regulations and national food safety 
standards.  
General Administration of Customs is responsible for organizing the assessment and review team to 
carry out assessment and review, and will communicate and consult with the competent authorities 
of the host country (region) where the enterprise is located in advance based on the risk assessment 
results and international practices.  
 
4. What will be the impact of these decrees on some of the bilateral protocols which have been 
signed between China and other countries on export on food items and agricu ltural products?  
 
Reply:  The General Administration of Customs Decrees 248 and 249 will not affect the 
implementation of the bilateral protocol s. Where the relevant countries (regions) and China have 
otherwise agreed on the registration method and applicat ion materials, it shall be implemented in 
accordance with mutual agreement s. 
 
5. Since time is short and China has not released many details on equivalence assessment and 
review of the GACC, will China extend the implementation date for decrees 248 and 249 ? 
 
Reply:  China published on 12 April 2021 the Measures for the Safety Administration of Imported 
and Exported Food (General Administration of Customs) and the Provisions on the Administration of 
Registration of Foreign Enterprises Producing Imported Food (General Administration of Customs 
Decree No. 248), which will come into effect from 1 January 2022. The General Administration of 
Customs has granted a corresponding transition period between the issuance and implementation 
of Decree No. 248 and Decree No . 249.  
 
6. Will China accept the list of establishments provided by equivalent agency and update the lists as 
provided or insist on other measures before these establishments are accepted? If yes, what will be 
the other measures and what are the objective criteria for accepting establishment?  
 
Reply:  China has published  the Measures for the Safety Administration of Imported and Exported 
Food (General Administration of Customs Decree No. 249) and the Provisions on the Administration 
of Registration of Forei gn Enterprises Producing Imported Food (General Administration of Customs 
Decree No. 248) on the website of the General Administration of Customs. Please clarify the meaning 
of the term "equivalent agency " before further reply  could be made . 
 
Page 100 Para 3.3.6.2  
Questions  
1. Do article 533 and article 566 in China 's civil code affect the sanctity of commercial contracts 
signed by foreign enterprises with Chinese enterprises?  
2. Do article 533 and article 566 provide an easy premise for Chinese compani es to violate 
commercial contracts with foreign enterprises?  
3. How does China ensure that the provisions in China 's Civil Code related to change in contract 
situation are enforced only in exceptional cases and do not provide Chinese companies an easy 
premise to engage in price gouging?  
 
Reply to questions 1 -3: China 's Civil Code provides that the legal status of the parties to civil legal 
relations is equal. Article 4 of C hina's Civil Code stipulates that all parties to civil legal relations are 
equal in l egal status in civil activities. In civil activities within the territory of the WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 557 - 
 
  People 's Republic  of China, the Civil Code shall be equally applied to foreign and Chinese enterprises 
without differences.  
 
China 's Civil Code adheres to the principle of good faith and stipulates that contracts shall be fully 
performed. Article 7 of the Civil Code stipulates that the parties to civil legal relations shall conduct 
civil activities under the principle of good faith, a dhere to honesty, and fulfill their promises. 
Article  509 of the Civil Code stipulates each party shall fully perform its own obligations as agreed. 
Chinese enterprises and foreign enterprises should follow the principle of good faith, uphold honesty, 
keep promises and fully fulfill their obligations according to the agreement. Either party should 
strictly abide by the contract.  
 
Article 533 of the Civil Code conforms to the international common practice, which is based on the 
principle of fairness and prot ects the rights of the parties more comprehensively. Article 533 
stipulates that where the basic conditions of a contract undergo a material change unforeseeable by 
the parties at the time of contracting which is not a commercial risk after the formation o f the 
contract, rendering the continuation of the performance of the contract unconscionable for either 
party, the adversely affected party may renegotiate with the other party; and if the renegotiation 
fails within a reasonable time limit, the party may r equest the people 's court or an arbitration 
institution to modify or rescind the contract. The people 's court or arbitration institution shall change 
or rescind the contract based on the actual circumstances of the case, in accordance with the 
principle of  fairness. This provision is limited to circumstances , in which  significant changes have 
taken place after the contract is established  in the basic conditions of the contract that cannot be 
foreseen by the parties at the time of concluding the contract and  are not commercial risks. If it is 
unfair for one party to continue to perform the contract, it is impossible for both parties to foresee, 
control, based on the principle of fairness, and does not belong to commercial risks after the 
establishment of the contract. Due to the imbalance of contractual interests caused by the change 
of basic conditions of contract and the fair adjustment based on the principle of fairness, Germany, 
France, the UK. , and the United States and the General Principles of Internati onal 
Commercial  Contracts all have similar systems, which are in line with international common practice. 
Article 566 is a general provision on the legal consequences after the termination of the contract. 
Neither Article 533 nor Article 566 will provide a  loophole for the breach of a signed commercial 
contract by either party to the contract.  
 
The relevant provisions are the confirmation of the consistent practice. Articles 533 and 566 of 
China 's Civil Code have been practiced for many years. Whether in do mestic or international trade, 
China has strictly applied relevant regulations in accordance with the law, which has effectively 
protected the orderly development of international trade. It is impossible to facilitate any party to 
violate good faith, defau lt on contractual obligations or commit fraud, and will continue to provide 
strong legal guarantee and a fair, just, and good legal environment for international trade.  
 
Page 99 Para 3.3.6  
Questions  
1. Can China provide a list of all central government tenders / contracts in which foreign companies 
competed with domestic companies for the past five years? In all such tenders, how many of these 
tenders were won by foreign companies? How many of these tenders had requirement for domestic 
brands and indigenous designs? What is the value of the contracts won by foreign companies?  
 
Reply:  China has not yet joined the GPA, nor has it signed any government procurement market -
opening agreements with other countries or regions. As specified by the Foreign Investment Law 
implemented in January 2020, foreign -invested enterprises are protected and  entitled to participate 
in government procurement activities through fair competition following the law, and the products 
produced, and services provided by foreign -invested enterprises in China will be treated equally in 
government procurement. Foreign e nterprises may, on an equal footing, participate in Chinese 
government procurement activities through enterprises registered in China. China currently does 
not have any statistics on the awarding of government procurement contracts to foreign companies. 
China will fulfill relevant transparency obligations as per Article 16 of the GPA after joining the GPA.  
 
2. In China 's government procurement at Central and local level, is there a standard definition of 
what constitutes a "domestic product "? What are the rules / basic principles adopted in defining 
domestic products?  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 558 - 
 
  Reply:  At present, for the purpose of government procurement, no definition standard for domestic 
products, projects and services has been established, and no appropriate identification work has 
been carried out in this regard. Except for procurement projects involving national security and state 
secrets, the Chinese government will equally treat all products produced and services provided in 
China by foreign -invested enterprises and local ent erprises in procurement.  
 
3. The dual circulation strategy has laid a great deal of emphasis on building domestic brands. 
Chinese state media is rife with articles about increase in consumption of domestic brands. What 
specific measures have China adopted  to give foreign brands and foreign companies a level playing 
field in government procurement?  
 
Reply:  The Chinese government practices fair competitive procurement to ensure that all legal 
persons of different ownerships and unincorporated organizations e stablished in China, no matter 
Chinese enterprises or foreign -owned enterprises, will participate in government procurement 
activities through fair competition. According to the Government Procurement Law, the government 
shall procure domestic products, pr ojects and services. Except for procurement projects involving 
national security and state secrets, the Chinese government will provide equal treatment to all 
products produced and services provided in China by foreign -invested enterprises and local 
enterp rises in procurement. The Chinese government has lately issued the Notice on Implementing 
Equal Treatment Policies to Chinese and Foreign Enterprises in Government Procurement Activities 
to further regulate the implementation of the policies in different p rovinces and municipalities. In 
the government procurement activities, any Chinese or foreign enterprises who believe that their 
rights and interests have been compromised by any procurement documents, procurement process, 
contract award, or the concluded scope of work, may raise a question or complaint as per applicable 
regulations. The financial department at different levels will accept and fairly handle complaints from 
suppliers as according to the law. No differential or discriminatory treatment shall be given to 
Chinese and foreign enterprises in the complaint acceptance. The legitimate rights and interests of 
suppliers involved in the government procurement shall be well protected.  
 
Page 113 Pargraph 3.271  
Questions  
1. It is difficult to patent speci fic therapeutic methods in China, including for traditional medicines. 
Could China explain how these restrictions comply with TRIPS Article 27.1?  
 
Reply:  Article 25(1)(3) of the Chinese Patent Law stipulates  that "the methods for diagnosis and 
treatment of diseases " shall not be granted as patent rights. Chapter 1(4.3), Part II of the Patent 
Examination Guidelines stipulates  that "for humanitarian considerations and social ethical reasons, 
doctors should have the freedom to choose various method s and conditions in the process of 
diagnosis and treatment. In addition, such methods are implemented directly on living human or 
animal bodies, which cannot be utilized in industry and are not inventions in the meaning of patent 
law. For this reason, meth ods for diagnosis and treatment of diseases are not patentable. " 
Article  27.3 of the TRIPS Agreement also clearly stipulates that member countries may exclude the 
patentability of methods for diagnosis and treatment of diseases, and China 's provisions are 
consistent with that of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
2. The registration of APIs for exports takes only a couple of months in market economies, but the 
Chinese side insists on registration of formulation also for the export of APIs. The registration of 
formulatio n takes almost two -three years and hence, the simple process of registration of API also 
gets unduly delayed. Could you explain how does these provisions comply with the provisions 
of WTO?  
 
Reply : APIs shall be reviewed and approved together when the appli cation for registration of 
pharmaceutical preparations is submitted, and APIs used for imitating or importing domestic on -
market drugs ' pharmaceutical preparations can be reviewed and approved separately.  
 
3. Before registration of formulation, testing on formulation is carried out by NIFDC. Even though 
the standard time period for testing of formulation, as mentioned by NIFDC, is 30 days, in selective 
cases the testing of formulation gets delayed giving adv antage to the local manufacturers. C hina is 
requested to share details of the time taken in testing the formulations of the local manufacturers 
as compared to the formulations sent by the foreign companies.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 559 - 
 
  Reply:  Pursuant to the 2007 Regulations on the A dministration of Drug Registration, the standard 
time period for testing of drugs during their registration is 30 days, which is in line  with the drugs 
manufactured abroad. The 2020 Regulations on the Administration of Drug Registration 
implemented on 1 Ju ly 2020 also raises the same requirements for the time taken in testing the 
drugs of local and foreign manufacturers, and no discrimination is found.  
 
4. The lack of harmonization and convergence with international standards of China 's drug and 
vaccine tra ceability standards remain top concern of the industry. China has joined the International 
Council for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for pharmaceuticals for human use (ICH) 
in 2017 and NMPA has recently released road -map specifying time -lines for  implementing ICH 
guidelines. Will NMPA provide enough time for manufacturers and all parties involved in the supply -
chain to ensure a smooth transition to international standards especially for the imported drugs?  
 
Reply:  After joining ICH, China has fully accepted ICH ideas and technical requirements that 
represent a higher level of registration of pharmaceuticals across the globe, and it is gradually 
aligning with international rules. Since then, China has fully assessed  and analyzed the guidelines 
already approved or being coordinated by ICH. First, for the existing ICH guidelines before its entry, 
China has organized competent functional units to explore the feasibility of directly implementing 
ICH guidelines in China, and proposed its own timelines and roadmaps. After taking advice of 
domestic and overseas industrial suggestions, soliciting public opinions, and making adequate 
research, China finalized the timelines and roadmaps for implementing ICH guidelines and relea sed 
an announcement on applicable ICH guidelines. Second, for the ICH guidelines under coordination, 
China dispatched experts to participate in the formulation and revision work together with those 
experts from other ICH member states, and in accordance wi th the coordination progress, 
simultaneously organized domestic regulatory bodies and industry experts to discuss subsequent 
timelines and roadmaps of implementing ICH guidelines, including setting up a transition period for 
accommodating new ICH guideline s. After the coordination work is done by ICH, China will release 
an announcement on applicable guidelines after fully soliciting industry opinions. Meanwhile, China 
did not release the translated ICH guidelines in Chinese together with the applicability a nnouncement 
for ensuring the consistence and convergence of ICH international standards.  
 
5. Chinese Volume Based Procurement (VBP) Policy has significantly reduced drug prices. However, 
the problems with drug selection, procurement and quality supervision  has taken a toll on the market 
competition. China announces drugs to be taken up in VBP at the last moment which is detrimental 
to the foreign companies giving them limited time for preparation to apply for VBP. Will China 
announce list of drugs to be inc luded in the next three years so as to give level -playing field to all 
the players? What step is China taking to halt the VBP conducted at provincial level considering the 
high risk of treatment replacement for patients? What step is China taking to introd uce reasonable 
price competition rules and avoid awarding bids quoting extremely low prices so as to increase 
companies motivation to maintain and improve drug quality?  
 
Reply:  China Anti -monopoly Enforcement Regimen protects a fair market competition and maintains 
the interests of consumers in strict compliance with applicable laws. During the enforcement of laws, 
China treated all kinds of enterprises in the same way, including foreign enterprises, creating a 
market -oriented, legitimate, and international  fair competition environment for domestic and foreign 
ones.  
 
Most drug prices are independently determined by manufacturers based on production costs and 
competitiveness in a competitive market. Chinese Volume Based Procurement (VBP ) Policy makes it 
possible for drug manufacturers to calculate production costs by estimating sales and lower these 
costs through mass production, which plays a great role in bringing down drug prices. During the 
tendering process, China is improving the p ractice of awarding bids quoting extremely low prices, 
and introducing sanctions such as including those drug enterprises having won the VBP bid at low 
prices but refused to perform the contracts into the list of violations, and paying extra expenses 
arising out of the guarantee of supply. According to the Price Law of the People 's Republic of China, 
other pricing acts of drug enterprises are also prohibited, such as dumping the drugs at prices lower 
than their costs to rule out the competitors or monopoliz ing the market, disturbing normal production 
order, or injuring legitimate interests of China or other enterprises. The above measures can be 
adopted for effectively avoiding awarding bids quoting extremely low prices and protecting the 
motivation of drug manufacturers to constantly improve their drug quality.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Questions based on Government Report (WT/TPR/G/415)  
Page 20 Para 5.1.  
Background  
China has proposed Dual Circulation Strategy (DCS)  as a new economic and developmental model 
that seeks to spur domes tic demand in China.  
 
Questions  
1. Through DCS, is China promoting economic nationalism over free market economy?  
 
Reply:  Building a new development pattern is a strategy to upgrade China 's economic development 
level in the new era, and to shape China 's international economic cooperation and new competitive 
edges. A new development pattern never means a closed domestic circulation, but represents an 
open domestic and international dual circulation. China will open its door wider instead of closing it. 
China 's links with the world economy will be closer. It provides broader market opportunities to 
other countries, and becomes a great attraction for international commodities and factor resources. 
China will further reduce tariffs and institutional costs, set u p a batch of innovation demonstration 
zones for promoting imported trade, and increase the imports of high -quality products and services. 
Furthermore, China will continue to encourage free trade zones, advance the construction of Hainan 
Free Trade Port, an d build a new highland for opening -up. China is glad to sign high -standard free 
trade agreements with more countries, and accelerate the execution and implementation of C hina-
Europe Investment Agreement and other  agreements.  
 
2. Will DCS negatively impact market access for foreign products in China?  
 
Reply:  China proposes to accelerate efforts to foster a new development paradigm with domestic 
circulation as the mainstay and domestic and international circulations reinforcing each other . As 
mentioned in the keynote speech by President Xi Jinping at the Fourth Chin a International Import 
Expo, China will resolutely advance a higher -level opening -up, expand exports and promote 
balanced trade development. As a result, a new development pattern does not mean a closed 
domestic circulation, but represents more open domest ic and international dual circulation. In this 
process, China will give further play to the role of imports, and share market opportunities with the 
world.  
 
According to the statistics, from January to October this year, China 's total imports reached RMB 
14.18 trillion, with a year -on-year growth of 21.8%. Steadily increased imports promotes domestic 
grand circulation and effectively guarantees economic development, industrial transformation and 
consumption upgrade.  
 
3. Will DCS negatively impact foreign in vestments and Foreign Invested enterprises in China?  
 
Reply:  Accelerating the formation of a new development pattern is a decision made by China based 
on its own development status and the changes in environment and conditions, as well as a strategic 
plan focusing on the present and looking into the future. Building new development pattern never 
means a closed domestic circulation, but represents more open domestic and international dual 
circulation. Foreign investments are an integral part of domestic gran d circulation and a key link in 
domestic and international dual circulation. Under the new development pattern, China  insists on 
the strategic base point of expanding domestic demand, fully enhancing the level of opening -up, 
optimizing foreign investment e nvironment, promoting the attraction of global factor resources, 
introducing new technologies, new economy, and new types of operation, and making better use of 
domestic and international resources. In this way, foreign -invested enterprises will enjoy more  
development opportunities and broader development space in China, go deeper into China 's 
development process, and achieve win -win cooperation.  
 
4. Can Chinese side elaborate on how it plans to integrate the domestic and global economies 
via DCS?  
 
Reply:  By tapping the potential of domestic demand, China will facilitate the connection between 
domestic and international markets, and make better use of these two markets for more robust and 
sustainable development. In the past, under the external envir onment of economic globalization, by 
putting both ends of the production process on the whole market, market and resources contributed 
a lot to China 's rapid development. In the context of increased protectionism, depressed world 
economy, and declining glo bal market, China must give full play to its domestic super -large market WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 561 - 
 
  advantages, and add momentum to domestic economic development and global economic recovery 
by flourishing domestic economic and promoting domestic grand circulation.  
 
Additional Questions from India for China Trade Policy Review  
 
Paragraph 4.191 of the Secretariat Report:  
 
Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent are responsible for most of the high -profile innovations that have 
occurred in China's finance industry. Millions of people use Tenc ent's WeChat Pay and Alibaba's 
Alipay daily to make third -party mobile payments. The fintech products currently offered include 
mainly online payment services, Internet banking, Internet loans, crowdfunding, Internet wealth 
management, Internet securities,  and Internet insurance. Tech companies are required to obtain 
the corresponding financial licences to conduct financial services business.   
 
1. What are the regulatory requirements to be fulfilled by foreign entities for providing online 
payment services in China, particularly those denominated and paid in renminbi?  
 
Reply:  According to the Announcement No.7 [2018] of the People's Bank of China (PBOC), where 
an overseas institution is to provide electronic payment services for domestic and cross -border 
transactions of an entity within the territory of the People's Republic of China, such overseas 
institution shall establish a foreign -funded enterprise within the territory of the People's Republic 
of China and obtain the payment business permit and become a non-bank payment institution 
according to the requirements and procedures as prescribed in the Administrative Measures for 
the Payment Services Provided by Non -financial Institutions (Order No. 2 [2010], hereinafter 
referred to as Order No.2). The regulato ry requirements for non -bank payment institutions include 
but are not limited to Order No. 2, Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative 
Measures for the Payment Services Provided by Non -financial Institutions, Announcement No.  7 
[2020] of  the People's Bank of China (Related Matters for Foreign -Invested Payment Institutions) 
and other relevant regulatory documents. Regarding the business of denominated and paid in 
RMB, payment institutions that have obtained the "Internet Payment" business license can carry 
out cross -border RMB settlement related businesses in accordance with the current provisions on 
cross-border RMB settlement business. In 2014, PBOC issued Implementing the Several Opinions 
of the General Office of the State Council on Sup porting the Steady Growth of Foreign Trade 
(Yin Fa 2014 No.168), thereby clarifying that banking financial institutions and payment 
institutions that have obtained a business permit for "Internet payment" in accordance with the 
law shall cooperate with eac h other. Banking financial institutions and payment institutions shall 
sign a cross -border e -commerce RMB settlement agreement, and shall report such agreement to 
the branches of the PBC for recordation. In 2020, PBOC issued the Notice of Further Optimizin g 
the Cross -border RMB Policies to Support the Stability of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment 
(Yin Fa [2020] No. 330, hereinafter "Notice No. 330") to support domestic banks in cooperating 
with legal transfer and clearing institutions and non -bank payme nt institutions in providing 
cross-border RMB receipt and payment services for market entities concerning new forms of trade 
such as cross -border e -commerce, market procurement trading methods, and comprehensive 
foreign trade services under the premise of compliance with laws and regulations.  
 
2. Is the regulatory framework for domestic and foreign service providers at par or are there 
any additional obligations for non -Chinese entities?  
 
Reply:  The same regulatory framework is implemented for domestic and foreign entities to 
conduct payment services in China, and no additional obligations are imposed on non -Chinese 
entities.  
 
3. China is requested to elaborate if there exist any preferential treatment accorded to 
electronic payment service suppliers, includ ing assured license approval agreements, for 
any particular WTO member, vis -à-vis other Members.  
 
Reply : All WTO members are treated equally in China, and no preferential treatment is given to 
electronic payment service providers of specific WTO members.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 562 - 
 
  Paragraph 4.195 of the Secretariat Report:  
 
On 21 March 2018, the PBOC circulated Announcement No. 7, 2018, which allows qualified foreign 
institutions to provide electronic payment services in respect of both domestic transactions and 
cross-border transactions. To provide third -party electronic payment services in China, qualified 
foreign investors must establish a foreign -invested payment institution and obtain a payment 
business operating licence in accordance with the 2010 Administrative Measu res on Payment 
Services of Non -financial Institutions. In addition, they must store, process, and analyse in 
Chinese territory all personal information and financial data collected and generated in China. 
Where international transfers of such information a re necessary to process cross -border 
transactions, the transfer must comply with applicable laws and regulations.   
 
1. Which are the qualification requirements for foreign institutions to provide electronic 
payment services for domestic transactions and cr oss-border transactions?  
2. What are the requirements for a qualified foreign investor to obtain a payment business 
operating licence?  
 
Reply  to Q1 -2: According to Announcement No. 7 [2018] (Relevant Issues  concerning 
Foreign -funded Payment Institutions) o f PBOC, (1) an overseas institution shall provide electronic 
payment services for domestic and cross -border transactions of an entity within the territory of 
the People's Republic of China, such overseas institution shall establish a foreign -invested  
enter prise within the territory of the People's Republic of China and obtain the payment business 
permit according to the requirements and procedures as prescribed in Order No. 2; (2) an 
overseas institution shall have a safe and standardized business system an d a disaster recovery 
system that can independently complete payment business within the territory of the People's 
Republic of China; (3) the personal information and financial information collected and generated 
by foreign -funded payment institutions with in the territory of the People's Republic of China shall 
be stored, processed, and analyzed within the territory of China. Where such information must 
be transmitted overseas for processing cross -border business, the transmission shall comply with 
the laws , administrative regulations, and provisions of the relevant regulatory departments, and 
the foreign -funded payment institutions shall require the overseas entities to perform the 
corresponding obligation of maintaining the information confidential and obt ain the consent of 
the entities of such personal information; (4) the corporate governance, daily operations, risk 
management, disposition of funds, deposit of excess reserves, and emergency arrangements of 
foreign -invested  payment institutions shall compl y with the supervision requirements of the 
People's Bank of China for non -banking payment institutions.  
 
3. Is there any distinction or categorisation between institutions that can supply electronic 
payments services in respect of domestic transactions and  those that can supply such 
services in respect of cross -border transactions?  
 
Reply:  Institutions providing electronic payment service d both  for domestic transactions and 
cross-border transactions must obtain a payment business license issued by the Peopl e's Bank of 
China , and institutions that intend to provide electronic payment services for cross -border 
transactions shall, after obtaining a payment business license, carry out cross -border RMB filing 
and registration of the list of trade foreign exchange  receipts and expenditures enterprises in 
conformity to the relevant provisions.  
 
4. In US -China Phase One Agreement, China committed under Article 4.4 to provide a 
time-bound, expedited and assured license approval for US electronic payment service -
suppliers, and has also committed to accept any applications from US electronic payment 
services suppliers. There is also an explicit commitment to make a determination (whether 
positive or adverse) within 90 working days of accepting the applicati on. Is the assured 
licence approval procedure guaranteed under the US -China Phase One Agreement, different 
from the payment business operating licence under the 2010 Administrative Measures on 
Payment Services of Non -Financial Institutions?  
 
Reply:  In Chin a-US Phase One Agreement , the Chinese commitment is based on the 
administrative review and approval provisions of the Decision of the State Council on 
Implementing Access Administration of Bank Card Clearing Institutions (Guo Fa [2015] No. 22), 
the details  are as follows: an applicant applying to become a bank card clearing institution shall 
file a preparation application with the PBC in accordance with the provisions and the PBC shall, WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 563 - 
 
  after soliciting consent from the CBRC, make a decision approving or di sapproving the preparation 
within 90 days of the date of acceptance. After the preparatory work is completed, an applicant 
meeting the conditions of permit may file an application with the PBC for starting business. The 
PBC shall, after soliciting consent from the CBRC, make a decision approving or disapproving the 
application within 90 days of the date of acceptance.  
 
Paragraph 4.193 of the Secretariat Report:  
 
On 10 November 2020, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) issued a 
consultation draft of the Anti -Monopoly Guidelines on the Sector of Platform Economies, aiming 
to prevent monopolistic behaviour by Internet platforms to ensure fair competition and strengthen 
anti-monopoly law enforcement. All companies engaged in Interne t platform business must be 
subject to anti -monopoly supervision. The draft expressly refers to the Anti -Monopoly Law, and 
set rules to discipline the online market, in compliance with the provisions already stated under 
the Anti -Monopoly Law.  
 
1. What are  the activities that are considered anti -monopoly behaviour under the Guidelines?  
 
Reply:  In February 2021, the Anti -monopoly Commission of the State Council issued Guidelines 
for Anti -monopoly in the Field of Platform Economy. The guidelines, based on the  Anti-Monopoly 
Law, emphasize that monopoly activities in the field of platform economy should be governed by 
the Anti -monopoly Law and related supporting regulations, rules and guidelines, sending a clear 
signal that Internet platforms are not outside the  scope of the anti -monopoly law. Highly 
consistent with the structure of the Anti -Monopoly Law, the Guidelines consists of six chapters, a 
total of 24 Articles, including general provisions, monopoly agreements, abuse of market 
dominance, concentration of operators, abuse of administrative power to exclude and restrict 
competition, and supplementary provisions, making relatively detailed provisions on the 
application of the Anti -monopoly Law in the field of platform economy. According to the Anti -
Monopoly L aw and the Guidelines, monopoly agreements involving the platform economy, abuse 
of dominant market position, and concentration of operators that have or may have the effect of 
excluding or restricting competition are all monopolistic behaviors.  
 
Paragraph  4.220 of the Secretariat Report:  
 
China also implemented the provision of the Cybersecurity Law concerning national security review  
requirements for CIIOs  purchasing certain network products and services. This was made through 
the Measures on Cybersecurity Review, and was jointly adopted on  27 April 2020 (effective 
1 June 2020) by the CAC and 11  other government agencies. The Measures seek to implement 
Article 35 of the Cybersecurity Law, which established a cybersecurity review requirement on 
network products and services procured by CIIOs. Purchases of network products or services with 
a potential effect on national security are subject to the cybersecurit y review system outlined 
under the Measures. Such network product and services include core network devices, 
high-performance computers and servers, mass storage devices, large databases and application 
software, network security devices, cloud computing s ervices, and other network products and 
services that have a significant impact on the security of the critical information infrastructure.   
 
1. What is the criteria to determine whether any network product or service would have a 
significant impact on the  security of critical information infrastructure, or a potential effect 
on national security?  
 
Reply:  The Cybersecurity Review Measures specifies that the network products and services 
procured by operators of critical information infrastructure that affec t or may affect national 
security, shall be subject to cybersecurity review. The review focuses on assessing the possible 
national security risks associated with the procured network products and services by critical 
information infrastructure operators, s uch as the risk of critical information infrastructure being 
illegally controlled, interfered with or damaged, and important data being stolen, leaked, or 
destroyed after the use of products and services;  compliance of product and service providers 
with Ch inese laws, administrative regulations, departmental rules, as well as early detection and 
the avoidance of risks and hazards associated with the operation of critical information 
infrastructure from the procured products and services.  The Measures makes i t clear that network 
products and services mainly refer to core network equipment, high -performance computers and 
servers, mass storage devices, large databases and application softwares, network security WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
- 564 - 
 
  equipment, cloud computing services, and other netw ork products and services that have a 
significant impact on the security of critical information infrastructure. The Measures (Revised 
Draft for Public Comments) was made available for public comment in July 2021, and further 
revisions and improvements are  being made to the Measures.  
 
Paragraph 3.93 of WT/TPR/S/415  
 
Besides the item based control lists, the Law provides for the establishment of control lists of 
foreign business entities that fall under one of the following cases: (i)  violate end -user or end -use 
restrictions; (ii) "possibly endanger national security and interests"; or (iii) use controlled items 
for terrorist purposes. Chinese exporters will be barred from dealing with foreign business entities 
on the controlled list. However, they will be ab le to request exemptions under  certain conditions, 
according to the Law .  1.Could China please provide further clarification as regards 
establishment of control lists of foreign business entities? It is understood that China has sought 
to implement a "Unre liable Entities List" whereby, a foreign entity is included in the list if it engages 
in certain activities that endanger national sovereignty, security or development interests of China, 
and violate the principles of normal market transactions, interrupti ng normal transactions with 
Chinese entities, or adopting discriminatory measures against Chinese entities, seriously 
damaging the rights and interests of Chinese enterprises, organizations.   Are these the same?  
 
Reply:  The control list under the Export Control Law and the list of unreliable entities are different 
legal regimes. Article  18 of the Export Control Law makes specific provisions on the control list 
system. Article 2 of the Regulations on the  Unreliable Entit ies List makes specific provisions on 
the list of Unreliable Entities system.  
 
2. China is requested to clarify whether and how such a measure of "unreliable entities list" is 
in conformity with its obligations under WTO  Agreements.  
 
Reply:  The Chinese gover nment firmly upholds multilateralism and the multilateral trading 
system. The introduction of the Regulations on the Unreliable Entities List is aimed at protecting 
the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens, legal persons and other organizati ons, and 
safeguarding normal transnational economic and trade exchanges a s well as  a fair and free 
international economic and trade order, which is in conformity to  the WTO rules.  
 
 
  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  TURKEY  
THE GOVERNMENT REPORT  
 
3. Pursuing High -Level Opening Up And Expl oring New Prospects For Win -Win 
Cooperation, 3.1 Promoting the High -Quality Development of Trade, 3.1.3 Actively 
cultivating new forms and new models of foreign trade and promoting innovative 
development of trade in services, pg. 8, 3.9  
 
It is stated in the Government Report that "China actively promotes well -regulated, healthy and 
sustainable development of cross -border e -commerce and other new forms and modes. China has 
established 105 cross -border e -commerce pilot zones in five batches,  guided the local authorities to 
build test grounds, promoted business model innovation, and created a fair, open and transparent 
development environment. Meanwhile, in view of the characteristics of small transaction volume 
with high frequency of cross -border e -commerce, China explored and formed a number of 
experiences and practices by using new technologies and tools, which have been replicated and 
adopted nationwide. On 1 January 2019, the E -commerce Law came into effect. The standards of 
the e -commerce  sector have been continuously improved and the integrity and trustworthiness of 
the sector have been further deepened ." 
 
Question: Could China explain what are the new technologies and tools harnessed to manage the 
cross-border e -commerce that have distin ctive features of being executed in small transaction 
volume with high frequency ? 
 
Reply:  Up to now, China has 105 comprehensive pilot zones for cross -border e -commerce 
(hereinafter referred to as Comprehensive Pilot Zones). The local -level Comprehensive P ilot Zones 
have explored the construction of "six systems and two platforms ", The six systems refer to 
information sharing, financial services, intelligent logistics, e -commerce integrity, statistics 
monitoring, and risk prevention and control. The two pla tforms include the online comprehensive 
service platform and the offline industrial parks. Generally speaking, the trade policies implemented 
in the Comprehensive Pilot Zones are no different from other regions. No pre -approval for new 
business models is r equired, such as cross -border e -commerce, which can be operated on a 
voluntary and market -oriented basis.  
 
6. The Way Forward, pg. 27, 6.3  
It is stated in the Government Report that "China will uphold and practice multilateralism, and join 
efforts with other members to tackle global challenges and build a community with a shared future 
for mankind. China will continue sharing its useful experience in pandemic prevention and control 
with other countries, and try its best to assist countries and regions wi th difficulties to fight against 
the pandemic. China will actively participate in the WTO reform, improve global governance, and 
promote high -quality Belt and Road cooperation. China will further implement the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate  Change and the Paris Agreement to address climate change. 
Moreover, China will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality 
by 2060 to promote sustainable development. As a developing member, China will continue 
deepening South -South cooperation and contributing to poverty eradication, debt relief, and 
economic growth of developing members ."  
 
Question:  What are the major actions planned in order to reach the 2030 and 2060 goals related 
to climate change ? Could China kindly provide further information about these actions ? 
 
Reply:  China is fully committed to development path that prioritizes ecology and g reen and low -
carbon, and actively undertakes international responsibilities in line with its own national conditions. 
In addition to promoting the release of opinions on carbon peaking and carbon neutrality and the 
action plan for carbon peaking by 2030, C hina will release the implementation plan for carbon 
peaking in key areas and industries and provide a series of support measures, building up a "1+N" 
policy system targeting carbon peaking and carbon neutrality. China continues to promote 
industrial  and e nergy restructuring and vigorously develop renewable energy. China will strictly 
control the growth of coal consumption in the 14th Five -Year Plan period and gradually reduce it in 
the 15th Five-Year Plan period. China will strongly support the green and l ow-carbon development 
of energy in developing countries, and will not build any new coal -fired power projects outside China, 
so as to contribute to the global response to climate change.  
 WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  THE SECRETARIAT REPORT  
 
3. Trade Policies And Practices By Measure, 3.1 Measures Directly Affecting Imports, 
3.1.5 Import prohibitions, restrictions, and licensing, pg. 58, 3.43  
It is stated in the Government Report that "China continues to classify imports into three categories: 
not restricted, restricted, and prohibited.  The import of restricted goods is administered through 
licences or import quotas, although the latter were not applied during the review period. The 
licensing system does not differentiate between the origins of products unless otherwise provided 
for in R TAs entered into by China.53" 
 
Question:  Could China provide additional information on restricted and prohibited commodities, as 
well as provide an explanation of how these classifications are formed ? 
 
Reply:  According to the provisions of the Foreign Trade Law of the People 's Republic of China  and 
other laws and administrative regulations and China 's WTO accession commitment, based on the 
maintenance of national security, public interest or public morality, protection of human, animal and 
plant life or health, protection of the environment and security of specific industries, protection of 
international financial status and balance of payments, maintenance of normal trade order, as well 
as the implementation of international treaties and agreeme nts concluded or participated in, China 
restricts and regulates the flow of some goods, which is how the current import and export 
management measures of prohibited and restricted goods have been developed.  
 
 
4. Trade Policies by Sector, 4.1. Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 4.1.2 Agriculture, 
4.1.2.4 Policy instruments, 4.1.2.4.2 Measures affecting exports, pg. 126 -127, 4.18  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that "China notified the WTO that export subsidies were not 
granted to agricultural produc ts during the calendar years 2018 and 2019. The authorities did not 
provide an update as to whether export subsidies were provided in 2020. As indicated in its previous 
Review, China replied to the questionnaire on export competition, circulated on 31 Octo ber 2016, 
that it provides export financing programmes (i.e. export credit, export credit guarantees, and 
insurance programmes) covering, inter alia, agricultural goods. With respect to the questionnaire on 
export competition circulated on 17 January 2020,  the authorities indicate that the related 
information would be disclosed in its coming notification. No data were available on food aid provided 
by China during the review period. " 
Question:  Could China give any approximate date for the information to be disclosed ? 
 
Reply:  China will soon submit a notification of its domestic support programmes.  
 
4. Trade Policies by Sector, 4.4 Services , 4.4.2 Telecommunications, 4.4.2.2 Regulatory 
framework, 4.4.2.2.7 E -commerce, pg. 173, 4.230  
It is stated in the Secretariat Report that "Regarding foreign business, the E -commerce Law provides 
that China shall encourage cross -border e -commerce (CBEC) development. In practice, the 
authorities have been promoting CBEC (activities of purchasing or s elling products via online 
shopping across national borders). On 27 April 2020, the State Council issued the Approval of the 
Establishment of Integrated Pilot Areas for Cross -border E -commerce in 46 Cities and Areas 
(Guo Han No. 47, 2020). This brought the  total number of CBEC pilot zones to 105. In 
December  2019, the authorities extended the List of Goods under Cross -border E -commerce Retail 
Importation to allow more foreign goods to be delivered to Chinese consumers through the CBEC 
retail importation pro gramme.126" 
 
Question: Could China provide detailed information about:  
- What kind of rights and privileges that cross -border e -commerce pilot zones have and how 
an e-commerce activity conducted with a pilot zone differs from the one that is conducted 
with outer regions ? 
- How China sets the infrastructure and necessary mechanisms for the efficient operation of 
consolidation centres of dispatches ? What kind of mechanisms and frameworks are 
constituted to support those centres for effective and  efficient operations ?  
- What kind of incentives have been allocated to the companies engaged in e -commerce 
business ? Which criteria are set for provision of incentives for those companies ? 。 
 
Reply to the above questions:  Since 2015, China has approved 1 05 cross -border e -commerce 
(CBEC) pilot zones in five batches successively. To encourage and support CBEC, the Ministry of WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Commerce has guided the pilot zones in establishing a policy framework centered on "six systems 
and two platforms. " This has produced  36 mature practices of experience in 12 aspects that have 
been replicated and promoted nationwide. On July 5, 2021, the General Office of the State Council 
released the Opinions of the State Council 's General Office on Speeding Up the Development of New 
Business Forms and New Models of Foreign Trade, making it clear that China will improve support 
policies for CBEC, expand the integrated pilot zones, enhance refined service platforms such as 
independent CBEC sites and CBEC software, streamline the manageme nt of payment and 
settlement, strengthen the organization and building of the industry and talent training, and promote 
the development of new forms and new models of foreign trade on a healthy, sustainable, and 
innovative basis.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  ECUADOR  
Informe de la Secretaría de la OMC, documento WT/TPR/S/415,  
15 de septiembre de 2021.  
 
1. Página 38, párrafo 2.16  
Podría por favor, China, explicar ¿A qué se refiere el calificativo "experimental "? ¿Se establecen de 
forma permanente ese tipo de Zonas Francas? ¿Qué mecanismos de verificación se utiliza para que 
esos incentivos concedidos se ajusten a la normativa multilateral? ¿Los incentivos fiscales se otorgan 
a todas las empresas por igual o exis te algún tipo de criterio específico para su concesión (sector, 
consumo externo o interno, requisitos de desempeño, por citar algunos ejemplos)? Sobre la 
agilización de los reglamentos ¿existen procedimientos simplificados de Reglamento y normas 
técnicas p ara las zonas francas experimentales?  
 
Reply:  The Pilot Free Trade Zone is a testing ground for China 's independent reform and opening 
up. The core task is institutional innovation, which means promoting deeper reform and higher level 
of opening -up on an early and pilot basis, and experience gained in the process will be promoted to 
a larger scale, so as to explore ways to deepen reform, further opening up and accumulate 
experience. In the past eight years since the establishment of the Pilot Free Trade Zo ne, a series of 
reform initiatives have been launched, which have significantly improved the level of trade facilitation 
and reduced the operating costs of enterprises. In principle, these measures are applicable to all 
market players in the FTZ. The highe r-level independent reform and opening up initiatives 
implemented in the FTZ are in line with WTO rules and China 's WTO accession commitments.  
 
2. Página 66, párrafo 3.43  
En relación con las tres categorías o clasificaciones de las importaciones.  ¿Existe  una dirección 
electrónica de consultas en línea sobre los productos restringidos o prohibidos, y que permita 
identificarlos por medio de subpartida arancelaria bajo codificación del Sistema Armonizado?  
 
Reply:  Issues related to prohibited imports and restricted imports can be consulted through the 
public message platform of the Ministry of Commerce ( http://gzly.mofcom.gov.cn ). 
 
3. Página 91, párrafo 3.133  
"El 1 de enero de 2018 entró en vigor la Ley de Normalización revisada, que incluía nuevas 
disposiciones, relativas por ejemplo a las normas de asociaciones. Según las autoridades, esta Ley 
supone una mejora de los procedimientos de establecimiento de normas obliga torias (o reglamentos 
técnicos), define claramente las normas locales y sectoriales y establece un sistema de divulgación 
para la autodeclaración de las normas empresariales (…) ".  
¿Las normas empresariales son de carácter obligatorias o voluntarias? ¿cuál  es la relación entre las 
normas locales y sectoriales? ¿se podría entender que éstas abarcarían a las empresariales? Bajo lo 
expuesto,  podría China explicar si ¿contempla dentro de su normativa una disposición sobre las 
normas conocidas como privadas y c ómo establece en su normativa si una norma es obligatoria o 
voluntaria?  
 
Reply:  The newly implemented Standardization Law of the People 's Republic of China in 
January  2018 stipulates that standards include national standards, industry standards, local 
standards, group standards, and enterprise standards. National standards are classified into 
compulsory standards and voluntary standards. Industry standards and local standards are 
voluntary standards. Compulsory national standards are coded GB, and the volu ntary national 
standards are coded GB/T. Compulsory national standards shall be developed for technical 
requirements that protect human health and life and property safety, that maintain national security 
and environmental safety. Compulsory standards must  be implemented. Products and services not 
meeting compulsory standards shall not be produced, sold, imported, or provided.  
 
4. Página 93, párrafo 3.143  
"Las autoridades han indicado que, antes de su aprobación, las normas obligatorias que puedan 
tener un efecto significativo en el comercio y cuyo contenido técnico no esté en conformidad con el 
previsto en las normas internacionales pertinentes deben notificarse a la OMC ". 
¿Qué sucede con esas normas cuyo contenido técnico no esté en conformidad con el prev isto bajo 
las normas internacionales pertinentes, después de su notificación a la OMC? ¿Existe algún plazo de 
adopción y de recepción de comentarios, a fin, de ser el caso, de incluir elementos o ajustes según 
la normativa internacional?  WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  Reply:  China stri ctly follows the WTO/TBT agreement on technical regulations, and actively uses 
international standards as the basis for the development of compulsory national standards; if there 
are no international standards or international standards do not apply due to  basic climatic factors 
or geographical factors or basic technical issues, compulsory national standards are developed 
according to the industry situation. Meanwhile, China completely fulfills the obligation of notification 
and carefully studies the commen ts and suggestions of members, which would be adopted if 
appropriate. For compulsory national standards, a transition period has been provided according to 
the actual situation.  
 
5. Página 98, párrafo 3.163  
"El MARA prevé introducir un sistema de certific ados de conformidad para los productos 
agropecuarios comestibles, así como una Plataforma Nacional de Trazabilidad de la Calidad y la 
Inocuidad de los Productos Agropecuarios. Según las autoridades, estas medidas solo se aplican a 
las actividades de produc ción y transformación de productos agropecuarios comestibles llevadas a 
cabo en China ".  
¿Podría informarnos China si se piensa solicitar este sistema a los productos importados? De ser el 
caso, ¿cómo se aplicaría o verificaría los requisitos considerando que esos procesos productivos y 
de transformación se llevan fuera de China?  
 
Reply:  China would suggest Ecuador to make clarifications on this question and provide more 
background information.  
 
6. Página 99, párrafo 3.168  
"….la GACC ha adoptado medidas preventivas de emergencia destinadas a los fabricantes 
extranjeros de alimentos de la cade na de frío importados en los que se haya detectado ácido nucleico 
del nuevo coronavirus. Esta medida se notificó a la OMC como medida de urgencia en 2020, y todavía 
sigue en vigor. Se ha informado de que en 2020 la ciudad de Shenzhen introdujo prescripcion es 
para la manipulación y la realización de pruebas de importaciones de carne y productos del mar 
congelados en relación con la COVID -19. En respuesta a la pandemia, China también ha adoptado 
medidas para facilitar las importaciones de alimentos y producto s agropecuarios y simplificar la 
aprobación sanitaria de los suministros médicos especiales importados (recuadro 3.1) ".  
¿Podría informarnos China, en virtud de la actual coyuntura en donde se observa una evolución 
favorable de la situación internacional d e la crisis sanitaria internacional, si la medida seguirá aún 
vigente, y por cuánto tiempo? ¿Se tiene previsto una fecha de desmonte de la medida? En el marco 
de las medidas de facilitación de las importaciones de alimentos se prevé algún procedimiento par a 
facilitar la adopción de las medidas preventivas de emergencia referidas al control y verificación, 
¿cómo se aplica esa medida en el caso de las medidas indicadas en el párrafo 3.168 ?  
 
Reply:  China has adopted necessary temporary preventive measures to  strengthen supervision over 
imported cold chain food to protect people 's live and health. Relevant practices have not had a 
negative impact on food trade exported to China. China has conducted sample nucleic acid test on 
the imported cold chain food and i ts packaging according to law, aiming at preventing COVID -19 
from transmitting through cold chain food. In the early stage, General Aministration of Customs 
detected positive nucleic acid on Novel Coronavirus in food products, inner and outer packaging and  
container inner wall samples imported from some countries. On 17 October 2020, Chinese Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention announced that live viruses of COVID -19 were separated from 
the outer packaging of imported aquatic products, further confirmi ng that contact with the outer 
packaging contaminated by live viruses of COVID -19 can cause infection. China welcomes the export 
of high -quality and safe food to China, and our attitude of opening wider to the outside world and 
expanding imports is consist ent and clear. However, with the development of the global epidemic, 
consumers ' concerns the safety of the food supply chain have deepened. We believe that consumer 
confidence is the cornerstone of market, and there is no trade without market. Under the cu rrent 
epidemic situation, overseas countries (regions) hoping to export food to China are required to take 
various preventive management measures to ensure that food exported to China is not contaminated 
by COVID -19 according to the relevant guidelines iss ued by United  Nations  Food and Agriculture  
Organization  (FAO). China is willing to work with relevant parties to ensure the safety of food supply 
chain, respond and dispel consumers ' concern, ensure the safe supply of food and mai ntain market 
stability, so as to promote the healthy development of trade.  
 
7. Página 54, párrafo 3.12  
En relación con el número de operadores económicos autorizados en China. ¿Podría informarnos 
China los motivos por los cuáles sería muy bajo el nivel de operadores comerciales bajo su Programa WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  de OEAs? ¿Cuáles son los beneficios que reciben los operadores comerciales de los OEAs adicionales 
o distintos a los requisitos que debe cumplir un operador que no es parte de ese Programa?  
 
Reply:  According to the current international rules and the actual situation in China, China Customs 
has formulated the AEO certification standards of China Customs and made it public. Except for the 
released standards, there are no additional requirements and re strictions on AEO certification 
standards. Enterprises willing to become AEO can conduct self -assessment against AEO certification 
standards and apply to the Customs. Through on -the-spot investigation and certification, the 
Customs issues AEO certificates to certified enterprises and recognizes them as AEO enterprises.  
 
8. Página 54, párrafo 3.13  
Respecto del despacho de aduana para apoyar proyectos piloto de comercio electrónico. ¿Podría 
informarnos China si existe algún régimen aduanero especial para ese despacho? ¿Cómo administra 
China las importaciones bajo el concepto de comercio electrónico e n virtud de los ACRs suscritos 
que contienen disposiciones de envíos de entrega rápida?   
 
Reply : China continues to summarize the good experience and practices in the pilot free trade zone 
and promote it to a larger scale. In 2020, 37 pieces of pilot free  trade zone reform experience was 
promoted , including the "mode of central warehouses for purchase return of cross -border e -
commerce retail imports ". In 2018, 30 pieces of pilot free trade zone reform experience was 
promoted, including "paperless whole proc ess of enterprise registration and e -port network access 
in customs ". The above two pieces of experience have been promoted nationwide, further enhancing 
trade facilitation and optimizing the business environment.  
 
9. Página 55, párrafo 3.15  
Sobre el Acuerdo sobre Inspección Previa a la Expedición. ¿Podría informarnos China si esas 
regulaciones, la obligación de la inspección previa a la expedición se vinculan a medidas para 
verificar la clasificación arancelaria y la valoración en aduana?, de no ser a sí ¿Qué ámbitos se revisa 
con esa disposición y cómo se relaciona esa disposición con las obligaciones de los Acuerdos 
internacionales en materia de facilitación del comercio?  
 
Reply:  China Customs, in accordance with the requirements of the Import and Exp ort Commodity 
Inspection Law of the People 's Republic of China  and its implementing regulations, conducts pre -
shipment inspections of important imported commodities and large sets of equipment under the 
framework of the  Agreement on Pre -Shipment Inspection . In accordance with the principles of 
protecting human health and safety, protecting the environment, and preventing fraud, China 
Customs determines whether the quality and safety of such equipment meets China 's security access 
requirements. The aim is to  shorten the length of customs clearance and regulatory cycle through 
preliminary assessment. Currently, the objects involved are important imported goods and large 
sets of equipment that are important for national security and people 's livelihood, and con tain high 
value and complex technologies.  
 
10. Página 56, Recuadro 3.1  
Medidas de facilitación del comercio de la GACC. ¿Podría informarnos China cómo funciona la 
inspección en los carriles verdes para garantizar el despacho de aduana de los productos 
agroalimentarios extranjeros? ¿Qué requisitos deben cumplir los productos que se benefician de esta 
medida de facilitación del comercio, cómo se determina qué producto iría por el canal verde, dónde 
se puede verificar la lista de esos productos? En relación a l punto 9 -Intensificación de la coordinación 
internacional y adopción de medidas para hacer frente a las restricciones al comercio exterior. 
¿Podría informarnos China si estos servicios son de aplicación para las importaciones y cuáles serían 
los puntos de  contacto para ese caso, pensando en un cliente que exporte a China?   
 
Reply:  The "green lanes for agri -food products " are opened by China in consultation with relevant 
countries. The goods imported or exported through the "green lanes for agri -food produ cts" mainly 
include the agricultural and by -products that are fresh and live, perishable and therefore have 
relatively higher requirement for the timing of customs clearance. The customs of China and their 
foreign counterparts (including inspection and qua rantine authorities) jointly confirm and exchange 
the catalogue (HS codes) of goods to be imported or exported in such manner that comply with their 
respective requirements. With regard to the "green lanes for agri -products ", the port inspection 
authoritie s, including customs, on the two sides will take supervisory measures for such facilitated 
clearance within their terms of reference approved by state laws, regulations and policies.  
 WT/TPR/M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  11. Página 58, párrafo 3.23, nota al pie 36  
En relación con los tipos ar ancelarios provisionales, considerando que esos derechos se fijan 
anualmente por parte de la Comisión Arancelaria del Consejo de Estado ¿Podría indicarnos China 
cómo se definen los productos que se incluyen en esa categoría y qué variables se analizan? ¿Lo s 
define la Comisión de forma unilateral o se basa en alguna solicitud específica del importador o del 
sector comercial interesado en China? En virtud de que se aplican bajo régimen NMF ¿Cómo se 
asegura China que esos niveles arancelarios no erosionen las preferencias arancelarias otorgadas a 
los productos originarios de países con los cuales China mantiene ACRS?  
 
Reply:  China adjusts the provisional tax rate every year according to the actual situation. Detailed 
information, please refer to http ：//gss.mof.gov.cn/gzdt/zhengcefabu.  
 
12. Página 63, párrafo 3.37  
En relación con "Para apoyar la prevención y el control de la COVID -19, las sociedades y las 
empresas individuales están exentas del IVA y del impuesto sobre el consumo con respecto a las 
mercancías de producción propia, elaboradas por encargo, compradas, o donadas con el fin de frenar 
la propagación de la COVID -19". ¿Podría indicarnos China qué medidas adopta para cumplir con el 
principio de trato nacional?  
 
Reply:  In February 2020, the Announcement of the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation 
Administration on Relevant Donation Tax Policies Supporting the Prevention and Control of the 
COVID -19 Outbreak (Announcement No. 9 [2020] of the Ministry of Finance and the State Taxation 
Administration) was issued. Thereafter, the implementation period of the policy was extended to 
31 March 2021. To further facilitate donating enterprises, the supporting document Announcement 
of the State Taxation Administration on Matte rs concerning Tax Collection Administration Supporting 
the Prevention and Control of the COVID -19 Outbreak (Announcement No. 4 [2020] of the 
State  Taxation Administration) was issued. The above preferential policies and facilitation measures 
have not estab lished separate thresholds for foreign enterprises, and both eligible domestic and 
foreign enterprises can enjoy the treatment in accordance with the regulations.  
 
  WT/TPR /M/415/Add.1/Rev.1  
 
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  URUGUAY  
Preguntas de Uruguay  
 
• En el punto 3.1.3 del Informe de Gobierno, se indica que China ha establecido 105 zonas 
experimentales de comercio electrónico transfronterizo y ha ofrecido orientaciones a las autoridades 
locales para que construyan laboratorios de ensayo de nuevas ideas.  ¿Podría China comentar cómo 
fue su experiencia en el est ablecimiento de dichas zonas, en qué consiste los laboratorios de nuevas 
ideas y cuáles han sido los beneficios de su implementación?  
 
Reply:  Up to now, China has 105 comprehensive pilot zones for cross -border e -commerce 
(hereinafter referred to as Compreh ensive Pilot Zones). The local -level Comprehensive Pilot Zones 
have explored the construction of "six systems and two platforms ", The six systems refer to 
information sharing, financial services, intelligent logistics, e -commerce integrity, statistics 
monitoring, and risk prevention and control. The two platforms include the online comprehensive 
service platform and the offline industrial parks. Generally speaking, the trade policies implemented 
in the Comprehensive Pilot Zones are no different from other r egions. No pre -approval for new 
business models is required, such as cross -border e -commerce, which can be operated on a 
voluntary and market -oriented basis.  
 
• En el punto 4.37 del Informe de Gobierno, se informa que gracias a una mayor cooperación 
en mater ia de energías verdes, infraestructuras verdes y finanzas verdes, se está construyendo una 
Ruta Verde de la Seda.  ¿Podría China comentar cuáles son los objetivos de dicha estrategia?  
 
Reply:  Green is the color of the "Belt and Road ". The main goal of China 's Green Silk Road initiative 
is to help address climate change, maintain global ecological security, and thus promote the high -
quality development of the "Belt and Road " and building a shared community of human beings and 
nature.  
 
• En el Recuadro 3.1 del I nforme de la Secretaría se mencionan las medidas de facilitación del 
comercio de la GACC - indicándose que se prestará una asistencia más oportuna a las empresas con 
problemas de importación/exportación, especialmente a las microempresas y pequeñas y median as 
empresas (MIPYMES).  ¿Podría China comentar en qué consistiría esa asistencia a las MIPYMES para 
mejorar su participación en el comercio internacional?  
 
Reply:  Since 5 March 2020, China Customs has set up a nationwide team of 160 enterprise 
coordinators to answer online questions on the "China Customs Credit Management " WeChat 
platform for all registered enterprises, including small, medium and micro ones. The s ervice has 
been welcomed by enterprises. In 2020, a total of 1,946 enterprises have raised 1,946 questions 
through the WeChat platform, and the customs offices all over the country have made 3,181 replies. 
Among the 1,127 ratings given by the enterprises, 1,026 were very satisfied (five stars), 88 satisfied 
(four stars), and 6 were overall satisfied, with the satisfaction rate reaching 99.38%.  
 
• En el punto 4.209 del Informe de la Secretaría, se informa sobre la publicación del Plan para 
Impulsar el Programa  512 sobre Internet Industrial 5 Plus; y se indica que su objetivo es promover 
la utilización de las tecnologías 5G para modernizar cinco plataformas de servicios públicos de aquí 
al 2022.  ¿Podría China comentar en qué consistiría la modernización de plata formas de servicios 
públicos?  
 
Reply:  According to the Plan for Advancing the 512 Program on 5G Plus Industrial Internet, the 
five public service platforms refer to the five service platforms for transforming and promoting the 
internal 5G network of indust rial Internet enterprises by relying on the industrial Internet innovation 
and development program to build a network test environment that meets the needs of industrial 
enterprises to carry out 5G network application R&D and verification, provide small an d medium -
sized enterprises with a "5G+Industrial Internet " intranet construction and transformation template, 
carry out application consulting and R&D training, and improve public service capabilities.  
 
__________