RESTRICTED  
  
WT/TPR/G/451  
16 October  2023 
(23-6927) Page: 1/27 
Trade Policy Review Body  Original:  Spanish  
 
  
TRADE POLICY REVIEW  
REPORT BY  
CHILE 
Pursuant to the Agreement Establishing the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (Annex 3 of the 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization), the policy statement by Chile 
is attached.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This report is subject to restricted circulation and press embargo until the end of the 
first session of the meeting of the Trade Policy Review Body on Chile.  
 WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  Table of Contents  
1  MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  ................................ ................................ ...............  3 
1.1   External situation  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 3 
1.2  Monetary and exchange rate policies  ................................ ................................ .............  4 
1.3  Fiscal policy  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  4 
1.4  Outlook  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  5 
2  TRADE POLICY  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  6 
2.1  Overview  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  6 
2.2  Chile and its bilateral relations  ................................ ................................ ......................  8 
2.2.1  Bilateral investment agreements  ................................ ................................ ................  8 
2.2.2  Regional trade agreements  ................................ ................................ .......................  8 
2.3  Chile in the multilateral setting  ................................ ................................ ....................  10 
2.3.1  Participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO)  ................................ ....................  10 
2.3.2  Participation in the Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development (OECD)  ...... 11 
2.3.3  Participation in the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum  ..............................  11 
2.3.4  Participation in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)  ...............................  12 
2.4  Notable regional, plurilateral and bilateral initiatives  ................................ .......................  13 
2.4.1  Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)  ............  13 
2.4.2  Pacific Alliance (PA)  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 13 
2.4.3  Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)  ................................ ..........................  15 
2.4.4  Inclusive Trade Action Group and Global Trade and Gender Arrangement  ........................  15 
2.4.5  Modernization of the EU -Chile Association Agreement  ................................ ..................  16 
2.5  MSMEs and their involvement in international trade  ................................ ........................  17 
2.6  Diversification and export structure  ................................ ................................ ..............  18 
2.7  Labour issues in trade policy  ................................ ................................ .......................  19 
2.8  Environmental issues in trade policy  ................................ ................................ .............  19 
2.9  Gender in trade policy  ................................ ................................ ................................  20 
2.10  Digital economy ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 20 
2.11  National policy on migration and foreign nationals  ................................ ........................  21 
3  DOMESTIC INITIATIVES  ................................ ................................ .............................  21 
3.1  Constitutional Context  ................................ ................................ ................................  21 
3.2  Sustainable development and growth agenda  ................................ ................................  22 
3.3  Social and economic security  ................................ ................................ .......................  25 
 
 
  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  1  MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT  
1.1.  Chile's macroeconomic policy rests on : (i) a monetary policy managed by an autonomous 
Central Bank, geared towards achieving inflation targets ; (ii) a floating exchange rate regime ; 
(iii) responsible and predictable tax policy design, based on the structural balance  rule; (iv) an 
adequate regulatory and supervisory framework for the financial system ; and (v) integration with 
international markets, through open trade and free m ovement of capital.  
1.2.  Between 2015 and 2022, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (at 2011 constant 
international prices) rose from USD 24,465 to USD 25,886, a slight increase . Productivity and equity 
challenges persist.  
1.3.  Inflation followed  a stable trajec tory between 2015 and 2020, with ranges from 4.4 % to 3%. 
Starting in 2021 and through  a combination of external and internal factors (including pressures on 
global supply chains ; rising energy and food prices ; the Russian invasion of Ukraine ; and a strong 
boost to consumptio n from th e various household liquidity injection measures) , inflation rose above 
the Central Bank of Chile's target to reach a peak of 14.1 % in August  2022. The correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances generated when exiting the pandemic  and the fall in international raw 
material prices brought  inflation t o the level of  6.5% in July 2023. 
1.4.  Following consecutive years with fiscal deficits, the public accounts showed a surplus of 1.1 % 
of GDP in 2022, while public debt stood at  38% of GDP in the same year.  
1.5.  During 2023, the Chilean economy has continued rebalancing , and average annual growth is 
expected to be close to zero . Inflation has been falling  during the year thanks to the macroec onomic 
measures adopted in recent years . This is  mainly due to the performance of monetary policy and 
fiscal adjustment, in addition to the gradual resolution of global supply difficulties and the 
moderation of raw material prices since their peak in 2022.  
1.6.  For 2024, the Central Bank of Chile's Monetary Policy Report of June 2023 projects GDP growth 
of between 1.25 % and 2.25 %, while for 2025 the estimate is between 2 % and 3 %. Inflation is also 
expected to reach  2.9% and 3.0 % at end-2024 and end -2025, respect ively.  
1.1  External situation  
1.7.  According to World Bank figures, global GDP growth between 2015 and 2018 increased from 
3.1% to 3.3 % per year . During 2019, global output declined to 2.6 %, then contracted sharply in 
2020 by an annualized  3.1%, as a result  of the crisis caused by the COVID -19 pandemic . In 2021, 
global GDP consolidated a strong recovery, reaching 6.0 % growth per year, driven chiefly  by high 
household spending and a rebound in investment , along side trade in goods that exceeded 
pre-pandemic le vels. Lastly, in 2022, output growth was 3.1 %. 
1.8.  In terms of prices, global inflation reached at least 1.4 % per year  in 2015 , an unprecedented 
figure . Between 2016 and 2018, the figure increased from 1.6 % to 2.4 %. During 2019 and 2020, 
inflation fell from 2. 2% to 1.9 %. The inflationary consequences of the health and economic crisis 
caused by the COVID -19 pandemic led to a 3.5 % increase in prices in 2021 and an 8.3% increase 
in 2022 . The increase in this period was caused both  by domestic factors in each count ry and by 
external shocks , mainly related to international food and energy price  rises stemming  from 
bottlenecks in the global supply chain, generated in turn by lockdowns and the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine , thus eroding the real growth of the economy . During the first half of 2023, the increase in 
international prices , mainly for energy and food , has slowed . 
1.9.  The foregoing  obliged  central banks in the United States , the European Union  (EU), and a 
number of Latin American and other countries , to conduct tight monetary and credit policies, 
including interest rate rises . In the meantime, higher inflation has also entailed the shrinking of  fiscal 
space, affecting future global economic growth.  
1.10.  Today, uncertainty persists in the global economy, given the effect s of the Russian invasion 
of Ukraine  and high global  inflation, together with countries' macroeconomic fiscal and monetary 
policies . Overall, developed countries maintain a contractionary  policy and there is uncertainty about 
their future decisions . On the other hand, emerging economies have already started to reduce rates.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  1.2  Monetary and exchange rate policies  
1.11.  The monetary policy of the Central Bank of Chile , an autonomous body, provides for  an 
inflation target of 3 % over two years, supplemented  by a floating exchange rate . The Bank's 
autonomy has been a factor contributing to the credibility of inflation control and ensuring the 
stability of the payment s system . The development of a mature and stable financial system is key 
to the effective use of monetary and exchange rate policy . Its existence allows adjustments to be 
made to monetary conditions or exchange rate policies without jeopardizing  the solvency of the 
financial system.  
1.12.  Between 2015 and 2017, inflation fell from 4.4 % to 2.3%. In 2018, the index remained slightly 
below  the Central Bank of Chile's target for inflation, then returned to around 3 % per year by the 
end of 2019, values which were sustained  until 2020 . During 2021, inflation increased rapidly to 
7.2% due to the in crease in liquidity in the economy, higher oil and food prices, and international 
supply chain  issues. In August  2022, inflation reached its peak for the period, 14.1 % per year, 
closing said year at 12.8%, as a result of external and internal factors . During 2023, the inflation 
rate has been declining moderat ely, reaching  6.5% per year in July. 
1.13.  Between 2015 and August  2019, the monetary policy rate remained between 2.5 % and 3.5 %. 
In the last quarter of 2019, the rate began to be reduced,  from 2.5 % in September  2019 to its 
technical minimum of 0.5 % in April 2020, with the objective of implementing measures to maintain 
the proper functioning of markets and boost credit, against the background of  the arrival of the 
COVID -19 virus in  the country  and the an nouncement of various measures for its containment .1 This 
level was maintained until July 2021. Subsequently, with the objective of reducing inflation, the 
monetary policy rate was increased  to 11.25 % in October  2022, and remain ed at that level until 
July 2023, when the Central Bank of Chile reduced it by 100 basis points to 10.25 %. 
1.14.  In addition, the country has a floating exchange rate regime . In July 2022, the exchange rate 
presented unusually high fluctuations, with a marked divergence in its external determinants, 
resulting in distortions in the functioning of markets and leading  the Board  of the Central Bank of 
Chile to announce a programme of foreig n exchange intervention and precautionary provision of 
liquidity in dollars . This programme was launched on 1 8 July 2022, for an amount  of up to 
USD 25 billion , and ended on 3 0 September  2022.2 
1.3  Fiscal policy  
1.15.  Fiscal policy in Chile follows what is known as  the rule of structural balance or cyclically 
adjusted balance . This rule makes fiscal expenditure conditional on the trend  of structural fiscal 
revenue . In practice, it results  from estimating  the central government budget balance that would 
be obtained i n a given  year if the copper price was at its medium -term level and economic activity 
(measured through GDP , excluding mining) was at its trend  level. This has made it possible to 
implement a fiscal policy independent from the cycle and to maintain sustain able public spending 
over time.3 4 
1.16.  Chile's fiscal accounts have deteriorated in recent years, with increases in government 
spending and lower copper revenues as a percentage of GDP, which has been reflected in continuous 
fiscal deficits since 2013 and an increase in public debt . More recently, this deterioration was 
exacerbated by  fiscal policy management in 2021 as a reaction to the COVID -19 health and economic 
 
1 One of the most important measures was the launch of the Conditional Credit  Facility for Increased 
Loans (FCIC), which, together with the Small Business Guarantee Fund (FOGAPE -COVID -19), allowed credit to 
flow to businesses and act countercyclically during the COVID -19 pandemic.  
2 Intervention in the foreign exchange market took into consideration, in particular: (a) spot sales of 
dollars up to USD 10 billion and, (b) the sale of exchange rate hedging instruments of up to USD 10 billion.  
3 Further information can be viewed at: https://www.dipres.gob.cl/598/w3 -propertyvalue -16156.html . 
4 Currently, a Draft Law on Fiscal Accountability (Bulletin No. 14,615 -05) is in the second stage of the 
constitutional procedure; it seeks to strengthen the fiscal rule and promote its countercyclical nature. The draft 
law envisages a dual rule, where fiscal policy must provide for a decision and commitment on the level of 
medium -term debt, measured in terms of gross central government debt as a  percentage of GDP.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  crisis5, leading to  a fiscal deficit of 7.7 % of GDP . During the year 2022, the effective ba lance of the 
Central Government recorded a surplus of 1.1 % of GDP, the first positive balance since 2012.  
1.17.  Regarding Chile's  gross public  debt level, the recent stabilization  stands out  after a decade of 
sustained increase, with sovereign debt rising from 1 2% to 38% of GDP between 2012 and 2022.  
1.18.  The health, economic and social impact of COVID -19 called for  unprecedented fiscal measures  
in Chile, with the largest expenditure being committed at the end of 2021 . The transitional fiscal 
expenditure between 2020  and 2021 associated with COVID -19 measures amounted to nearly 
USD 40 billion , of which massive transfers to households ( vouchers and subsidies) accounted for 
almost  USD 35 billion .6 
1.19.  The year 2021 saw the biggest historical expansion of central government  fiscal expenditure 
with annual real growth of 33.4 %, reaching an amount equivalent to 31.5 % of GDP .7 Higher 
expenditure led to a decline  in the fiscal accounts, with a deterioration in the Central Government's 
effective and cyclically adjusted fiscal def icit, which , respectively , reached 7.7 % of GDP and 10.8 % 
of GDP in 2021.  
1.4  Outlook  
1.20.  The global economy still faces  uncertainty . This is due to adverse shocks in recent years 
caused by COVID -19, the Russian invasion of Ukraine , and energy price  shocks . The slo wdown in 
global economic growth, high inflationary pressures, tight monetary policies, and reduced 
investment are conditions that are leaving their mark on the international context . 
1.21.  According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), based on  the update o f the World 
Economic Outlook in July, global GDP growth is expected to fall to 3.0 % for 2023 and 2024 . On 
prices , global  inflation is expected to drop to 7.0 % in 2023 . However, underlying inflation will decline 
more slowly.8 
1.22.  This context of uncertainty, the greater weakness of the global economy and our main trading 
partners, alongside  lower domestic activity and high inflation, ha ve been affecting the pace of Chile's 
economic growth, as has the additional factor of  economic ad justment following the overheating of 
the Chilean economy at the end of 2021 and in early 2022.  
1.23.  According to the Monetary Policy Report of the Central Bank of Chile for June 2023, GDP 
growth of between -0.5% and 0.25 % is projected for 2023 . GDP growth is e xpected to lie between 
1.25% and 2.25 % in 2024  and between 2.0 % and 3.0% in 2025 .9 
1.24.  On the other hand, regarding  prices of raw materials important  to the Chilean economy, the 
price of copper is projected to be situated at USD 3.85/lb in 2023, below the 2022 average of 
USD 4/lb. 
1.25.  For the remainder of 2023, exports of goods and services are expected to increase  by 2.4 % 
in real terms , while imports are projected to record an annual contraction of 8.3 % due to lower 
Chilean domestic de mand . As a result of  lower domestic spending in relation to  product (income), 
the lower volume of imports is expected to  reduce the current account deficit to 3.7 % of GDP.  
 
5 Ministry of Finance, Estado de la Hacienda Pública  2022. Viewed at: https://www.hacienda.cl/areas -
de-trabajo/presupuesto -naciona l/estado -de-la-hacienda -publica . 
6 Ministry of Finance, Estado de la Hacienda Pública  2022. Viewed at: https://www .hacienda.cl/areas -
de-trabajo/presupuesto -nacional/estado -de-la-hacienda -publica . 
7 Ministry of Finance, Estado de la Hacienda Pública  2022. Viewed at: https://www.hacienda.cl/areas -
de-trabajo/presupuesto -nacional/estado -de-la-hacienda -publica . 
8 IMF, World Economic O utlook Update: A Near -Term Resilience, Persistent Challenges, July 2023. 
Viewed at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/07/10/wo rld-economic -outlook -update -july-
2023. 
9 Central Bank of Chile, Monetary Policy Report, July 2023. Viewed at: 
https://www.bcentral.cl/web/banco -central/areas/politica -monetaria/informe -de-politica -monetaria . WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  1.26.  For 2024, a larger increase is projected for exports of goods and services, at 4.4 %, while the 
trajectory of imports will show a strong recover y compared to 2023, expanding by 2.2 %. The current 
account should  close out 2024 with a deficit of 4 % of GDP.  
Table 1.1 Chile's economic forecasts , annual percentage change  
 
2022  2023 (f)  2024 (f)  2025 (f)  
GDP 2.4 -0.5/0.25  1.25/2.25  2.0/3.0  
National income  1.5 1.1 1.5 2.4 
Domestic demand  2.3 -4.2 1.0 2.0 
Exports of goods and services  1.4 2.4 4.4 2.5 
Imports of goods and services  0.9 -8.3 2.2 0.6 
Current account (% of GDP)  -9.0 -3.7 -4.0 -3.9 
Source:  Monetary Policy Report, June 2023. Central Bank of Chile.  
1.27.  Inflation is projected to  moderate to 4.2 % per year by December  2023, while underlying 
inflation will be 6.5 %. Total inflation and underlying inflation are expected to converge  to the 3 % 
target in the second half of 2024, and remain at that level going forward.  
1.28.  The monetary policy rate has been kept at contractionary  levels for several quarters . It is 
however expected that, if current trends in the economy are sustained, the monetary policy rate will 
continue its downward  process in the short term, while its magnitude and timing will be  affected by 
trends  in the macro economic scenario and their implications for the inflation trajectory.  
1.29.  With respect to the country's fiscal policy, in the Public Finance Report for the second quarter 
of 2023, the Ministry of Finance estimates that there will be an effective deficit of 1. 9% of GD P for 
2023. In line with  the structural balance rule, whe n the cyclica l adjustments  are made to eff ective 
income , a cyclically adjusted deficit of 2.1 % of GDP is projected.  
1.30.  The projected fiscal balance levels are in line with the path of convergence of the structural 
balance , with a target of -0.3% in 2026 established by decree . Thereafter, a fiscal consolidation is 
projected , leading to an effective balance consistent with the target of -1.9% in 2024, -1.1% 
in 2025, and -0.2% in 2026.  
1.31.  Gross debt is projected to reach 38.1 % of GDP by 2023, and in the medium term, debt will 
reach 42 % of GDP, keeping  the level of Chilean debt below the prudent debt level of 45% of GDP. 
2  TRADE POLICY  
2.1  Overview  
2.1.  Since the late 1990s, the evolution of Chile's trade  (exports plus imports) as a percentage of 
GDP has been very similar to the world average, albeit at higher rates. In 1990, trade in Chile 
amounted to 62 %, while worldwide it was 38 %. In 2015 -22, trade rose from 59 % to 75 % as a 
percentage of GDP. Trade has therefore come to play an increasing role since 2008 -09 following the 
global financial crisis, and has recovered since 2016, despite the COVID -19 pandemic.  
2.2.  Chile's trade policy forms part of its foreign policy and contain s both longer -term elements of 
continuity, although they are constantly being updated, and elements of change, which are usually 
linked to the priorities of the respective governments.  
2.3.  The immutable principles of Chile's foreign policy include respect for international law, 
promotion of democracy and respect for human rights; and a responsibility to cooperate at the 
international level. The Government's foreign policy priorities are: strengthening multilateralism, 
feminist foreign policy, promoting and defe nding human rights, and developing an environmental 
and climate agenda including measures to protect the biodiversity of oceans and forests.  
2.4.  Meanwhile, over the last 50 years, the permanent objectives of Chile's trade policy have 
focused on trade liberaliz ation and activities to promote Chilean exports and to attract foreign direct 
investment  (FDI) . The Government aims to align trade policy with the national development strategy WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  by attracting foreign investment that creates value added, and diversifying the  export basket in a 
regionally relevant way ; developing inclusive trade through the empowerment of women in 
international trade (the feminist foreign policy), increased participation of SMEs in global value 
chains  and responsible business conduct ; and cons istently moving forward with environmentally and 
socially sustainable development.  
2.5.  Chile's trade policy was initially characterized by the adoption of unilateral measures aimed at 
promoting foreign trade. Since the 1990s, Chile has signed numerous investme nt protection and 
promotion agreements and economic complementarity agreements with the aim of attracting foreign 
capital and promoting trade, especially within the region. More recently, Chile has furthered the 
negotiation and signing of free trade agreem ents, which has resulted in Chile now being one of the 
countries most open to international trade.  
2.6.  For example, with regard to tariffs, from 1973 to 1990, trade policy was based on rapid 
unilateral liberalization. The average tariff fell from 105 % to 11 % between 1973 and 1979. 
Adjustments following the 1982 crisis raised the average tariff rate temporarily, but it then continued 
to fall progressively, and the period ended with an average tariff of 15 % in 1989. Since 1990, Chile 
has reduced its general tarif f, which currently stands at 6 %. Moreover, the impact of the trade 
agreements led, inter alia , in 2022, to an effective tariff of 0.71 % and an average effective 
ad valorem  tariff of 0.77 %.10 
2.7.  In recent years, Chile's international trade policy efforts have focused to a great extent on 
modernizing existing trade agreements. Agreements in force since the mid -1990s or the beginning 
of the century that focus on trade in goods and services and other related disciplines have been 
subject to review and new negotiat ions, in line with World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements.11 
This process of modernization has deepened the country's trade commitments to promote 
sustainable and inclusive development. As a result, chapters have been included that grant greater 
partici pation to SMEs12; others address environmental and sustainability concerns; while yet others 
cover gender equality and inclusion matters. Ultimately, this modernization process has sought to 
deploy third -generation agreements, thereby strengthening ties wi th major trading partners, and at 
the same time responding to the challenges of sustainability in its three dimensions.  
2.8.  At the multilateral level, Chile is a member of and plays an active role at the WTO, the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum,  the Organisation for Economic Co -operation and 
Development (OECD), the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI) and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), among others. Chile's involvement in these forums is 
intended to promote po licies, together with other members, that will lead to greater social and 
economic well -being for citizens. Chile also aims to foster international cooperation on economic, 
social, environmental and good governance matters, thereby promoting regional and g lobal 
integration.13 
2.9.  In today's globalized economy, where international interaction is becoming more dynamic, 
multilateral economic forums play a key role. These forums allow Chile to address challenges and 
harness new opportunities. This contributes to ra ising standards and developing policies that 
promote greater economic and social well -being.14 
2.10.  Given the growing role of international trade policy in our country, there was a need to reform 
the public institutions responsible for international trade polic y in 2018, with the enactment of 
Law No. 21.080. The law created the Under -Secretariat for International Economic Relations 
(SUBREI) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Policy Council and the General Directorate 
for Export Promotion (ProChil e). SUBREI became the under -secretariat of state in charge of 
 
10 For details of import tariffs by use of trade agreements, see: https://www.aduana.cl/acuerdos -
comerciales -y-advalorem -efectivo/aduana/2022 -06-28/110649.html . 
11 For more information, see SUBREI,  Impacto de los Tratados de Libre Come rcio. Viewed at: 
https://www.subrei.gob.cl/docs/default -source/estudios -y-documentos/otros -documentos/impacto -
tlc.pdf?sfvrs n=e17e5997_1 . 
12 For more information, see SUBREI , Balance de Gestión Integral 2021 . Viewed at: 
https://www.dipres.gob.cl/597/articles -279789_doc_pdf.pdf . 
13 For more information, see SUBREI's website. Viewed at: 
https://www.subrei.gob.cl/en/nosotros/institucional . 
14 For more information, see SUBREI's website. Viewed at: 
https://www. subrei.gob.cl/en/nosotros/institucional . WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  developing the country's economic relations policy with the help of other public services and bodies. 
SUBREI's functions include proposing policies related to Chile's participation in bilateral and 
multilateral spaces, as well as coordinating and implementing such policies; proposing actions for 
the drafting, implementation and evaluation of international treaties and agreements, as well as 
administering them; collaborating in the promotion and n egotiation of international treaties and 
agreements; providing guidance to ProChile in matters within its competence; coordinating and 
chairing Chile's participation in international organizations and forums, including economic 
integration processes; and p roviding guidance to our diplomatic, trade and international organization 
representatives in the field of international economic relations. The Foreign Policy Council was 
created as a body responsible for advising the President of the Republic on such matt ers. 
2.2  Chile and its bilateral relations  
2.11.  Chile has traditionally maintained an open policy on both FDI and trade . The policy is based 
on agreements that incorporate clear rules, guarantee predictability and transparency in trade 
relations, take an approach t hat is in line with the WTO rules framework, and establish 
non-discriminatory treatment.  
2.2.1   Bilateral investment agreements  
2.12.  From the 1990s until the middle of the last decade, Chile was one of the main recipients of 
FDI flows in the region. This position was based fundamentally on its strong political and institutional 
framework, a positive perception of the macroeconomic environment, and its clear strategy of 
openness and trade integration with the rest of the world. Against this backdrop, part of Chile's 
strategy was the signing of investment promotion and protection agreements (IPPAs). However, 
in 2003, Chile adopted a moratorium on the negotiation of first -generation IPPAs, and instead 
decided to negotiate these types of agreements in the context of free tr ade agreements, aiming to 
establish a framework for investor protection, while at the same time safeguarding the regulatory 
powers of the State appropriately. This approach also allows for better alignment with other matters 
addressed in the agreements, su ch as trade in services, financial services and exceptions.  
2.13.  A recent example of this is the Advanced Framework Agreement (AFA) with the EU, with its 
investment chapter reflecting recent trends in investment, which is intended to balance investment 
protecti on with the right of States to pursue legitimate public policy objectives. The provisions on 
investment protection are based on clear and precise rules. Furthermore, following Chile's recent 
practice, a provision on responsible business conduct was incorpo rated to promote sustainable 
practices that address both environmental and social risks by encouraging companies to make a 
positive impact in the communities in which they operate. This is the first agreement negotiated by 
Chile that adopts a revised appro ach to investor -State dispute resolution by establishing a 
permanent bilateral tribunal. It is made up of a tribunal of first instance and an appeal tribunal, 
composed of permanent judges, and applies strict ethical rules.  
2.14.  As regards the mechanisms for resolving disputes between investors and States, recent 
agreements have included improvements in rules of procedure that provide for more transparent 
arbitration and better tools for the State's defence. Furthermore, recently, alternative me chanisms 
for investor -State dispute resolution have been explored to replace ad hoc  tribunals. One of them is 
the negotiation of a permanent bilateral court within the framework of the AFA, as discussed above. 
Another alternative is Chile's agreement with New Zealand in 2022, through an exchange of notes 
under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which 
supersedes the investor -State dispute resolution mechanism of the CPTPP between the 
two countries.  
2.2.2   Bilateral  trade agreements  
2.15.  Chile currently has 33 active trade agreements with 65 economies, covering approximately 
88% of the world's GDP and approximately 96 % of our foreign trade. Of these, 25 are agreements 
with individual economies15, while the others are agreements with economic blocs or groups, 
 
15 Argentina; Australia; Bolivia, Plurinational State of; Brazil; Canada; China; Colombia; Cuba; Ecuador; 
Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; M exico; Panama; Peru; Thailand; 
Türkiye; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of; and Viet Nam.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  including Mercosur, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Central America, the EU and the 
Pacific Alliance (PA). 
2.16.  During the period 2015 -22, a set of agreements came into effect: in 2015, the Free Trade 
Agreement with Thailand; in 2016, the Trade Protocol within the framework of the PA; in 2018, the 
Free Trade Agreement with Uruguay; in 2019, the Comprehensive E conomic Partnership Agreement 
with Indonesia and the Trade Agreement with Argentina; in 2021, an agreement with the 
United  Kingdom, and the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with Singapore and 
New Zealand; in 2022, the Free Trade Agreement with Brazil, together with the Trade Integration 
Agreement with Ecuador. Finally, in 2023, the CPTPP also entered into force for Chile, and specific 
commitments in services and financial services were updated under the Free Trade Agreement with 
Hong Kong, China . 
2.17.  Likewise, during the same period, Chile signed the Free Trade Agreement with Paraguay 
(2022) and modernized the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement with Indonesia (2022). 
Moreover, the Free Trade Agreement between the PA and Singapore (2022) was  also signed.  
2.18.  These agreements have traditionally focused on deepening tariff reductions. However, Chile 
has also sought to expand the benefits of these agreements to new trade disciplines in order to 
facilitate and promote cross -border trade and make it m ore transparent. This has included areas 
such as trade in services, investments, telecommunications, government procurement, intellectual 
property and competition policies.  
2.19.  Bilateral trade agreements that encompass services -related disciplines account for 81% of all 
existing agreements. The inclusion of disciplines regulating this sector has been made a priority 
because exports from the sector have increased in recent years and accounted for 10.6 % of GDP 
in 2022. They therefore play an important role in eco nomic and social development and make a 
significant contribution to national employment.  
2.20.  In 1997, Chile began the process of negotiating other types of bilateral agreements to avoid 
double taxation and promote cooperation between tax authorities. Chile cur rently has 35 treaties in 
force aimed at preventing double taxation. Chile is also in the process of ratifying agreements signed 
with the United States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and those States that are part of the 
PA Framework Agreement.  
2.21.  In the are a of air transport, in addition to the trade agreements that cover the sector, Chile 
has negotiated and currently has 39 active bilateral air services agreements, with an additional 
nine signed agreements. All these agreements fit within the framework of t he "open skies" aviation 
policy that Chile has adopted over the last three decades. The aim of the policy is to promote 
better -quality, more efficient and cost -effective air services.  
2.22.  Of the 33 trade agreements entered into by Chile that are currently in f orce, 21 include 
environmental provisions and 20 include labour provisions. These agreements also incorporate 
provisions on commitments to effectively apply the respective environmental and labour regulations, 
and to promote legislation with high standards  of protection of the environment and of workers' 
labour rights. These clauses are expected to facilitate commercial relationships within a framework 
of sustainable development. Since negotiating the CPTPP, Chile has started incorporating specific 
clauses on both environmental and labour issues. Examples of such provisions include those on 
fisheries, forests, wild flora and fauna, biodiversity, forced labour and responsible business conduct.  
2.23.  In this regard, it is worth noting that between 2015 and 2022, the  following trade agreements 
entered into force: (a) Free Trade Agreement with Thailand, (b) Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement with Indonesia, both of which include cooperation articles on environmental 
and labour issues; (c) Free Trade Agreement  with Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay 
(not yet in force) and the CPTPP, which include chapters on environmental and labour issues; and 
(d) trade agreements with Brazil, Ecuador and the CPTPP, which include chapters on environmental 
and labour  issues.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 10 - 
  2.3  Chile in the multilateral setting  
2.3.1   Participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO)  
2.24.  As one of the founding Members of the WTO, Chile reaffirms its commitment to the 
Organization and its principles, and views it as a central pillar of support for  the multilateral trading 
system. The WTO establishes binding disciplines through its multilateral agreements, which are 
monitored by its permanent bodies (Councils and Committees). Trade measures adopted by 
Members are subject to the scrutiny of these bod ies, thereby strengthening the principle of 
transparency, which is vital for trade relations.  
2.25.  During the period 2015 -22, through its participation in WTO bodies, Chile has reaffirmed the 
importance of a robust, reliable multilateral trading system. as mult ilateralism and global 
governance are guarantees of peace, development and cooperation. The great majority of the 
provisions and disciplines agreed upon in Chile's trade agreements are derived directly from 
WTO rules.  
2.26.  Since its last review, Chile has parti cipated actively in the WTO. On 21  November  2016, Chile 
ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) by depositing its corresponding instrument of 
acceptance with the Organization. Chile also participated in the Twelfth Ministerial Conference 
(MC12), an d joined with other WTO Members in adopting the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies. This 
instrument marks a major step forward for ocean sustainability. The Agreement made it possible to 
fully implement target 14.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals throug h a binding multilateral 
agreement within the WTO. Since then, in addition to initiating the internal procedures for ratification 
and subsequent deposit of the instrument, Chile has also been actively involved in the negotiations.  
2.27.  Chile has also continued to participate in joint initiatives involving negotiations among groups 
of Members, such as e -commerce, investment facilitation for development, and domestic regulation 
in the services sector. It is worth noting that Chile co -coordinated negotiations on in vestment 
facilitation for development with the Republic of Korea. In addition, Chile actively engages in 
initiatives relating to trade and environment, such as the Trade and Environmental Sustainability 
Structured Discussions, the Informal Dialogue on Plas tics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable 
Plastics Trade, and the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform.  
2.28.  In 2017, at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference (MC11), 118 Members, including Chile, 
endorsed the Buenos Aires Declaration on Trade and Women's Economic Emp owerment at the WTO. 
Chile is actively involved in the Informal Working Group on Trade and Gender, and participates in 
WTO discussions on gender and trade. In 2022, Chile also participated in the first World Trade 
Congress on Gender at the WTO.  
2.29.  In May  2017, the Friends of MSMEs group was created at the WTO for the purpose of 
promoting informal discussions on the challenges faced by micro -, small and medium -sized 
enterprises (MSMEs). Chile took the initial leadership of this group and played a crucial role i n 
preparing discussions that led to the statement presented at MC11 in 2017. Chile actively 
participated in the pilot project of the Trade4MSMES platform, launched in December  2021, which 
aimed to provide trade information to foster internationalization an d expansion capacities of MSMEs. 
In addition, Chile became the first country to receive training on the platform in 2022, in a 
collaboration with the International Trade Centre and the WTO.  
2.30.  Chile has actively participated in various groups within the WTO, in particular the 
Ottawa  Group, the Cairns  Group, the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), and the 
Friends of the System group.  
2.31.  Lastly, in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic, Chile, like other Members, actively 
participated in coordinating a resp onse to the pandemic from the WTO, supporting the agreement 
reached at MC12 on the TRIPS Waiver, and promptly notifying pandemic -related trade measures 
that have been adopted.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 11 - 
  2.3.2   Participation in the Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development 
(OEC D) 
2.32.  In 2020, Chile marked its tenth year as a full member of the OECD. In this capacity, Chile 
regularly participates in many of the OECD's committees and working groups, and is regularly 
evaluated in various areas, such as the economy, the environment and governance. These 
evaluations have enabled Chile to identify areas for improvement in public policies, while recognizing 
the country's achievements and strengths.  
2.33.  The OECD has developed innovative approaches and robust metrics, based on comparative 
experie nce and empirical evidence, to assess how public policies contribute to improving people's 
well-being. Its work focuses on areas such as agriculture, taxation, fiscal and monetary policy, 
education, international trade, gender inclusivity and environmental  sustainability.  
2.34.  Chile's accession to the OECD Convention was a significant milestone, both from a national 
and a regional perspective, positioning Chile as the second Latin American country and the first 
South American country to join the organization. Th e accession process also led to reforms in some 
public policies16 aimed at aligning them with the high standards and best practices of the OECD. 
Today, Chile makes regular use of the OECD's wide range of tools and experience to complement 
the policy design  phases in several priority areas on the national agenda.  
2.35.  Since 2015, key milestones and legal amendments relating to Chile's participation in the OECD 
include the creation of the Financial Stability Council and the implementation of loans from the 
Chilean  Economic Development Agency (CORFO) for projects to diversify energy sources. Chile also 
introduced a new framework law for FDI and created the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency 
(InvestChile). In 2016, Chile chaired the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting.  Additionally, reforms 
were introduced that granted greater powers to the National Economic Prosecutor's Office, and the 
Ministry of Women and Gender Equality was created. In 2017, Chile adopted a law that amended 
the corporate governance of the National P etroleum Company, created the Financial Market 
Commission and inaugurated the OECD parliamentary antenna office in the Chamber of Deputies. 
In 2018, a law was adopted to amend the Criminal Code for the prevention, detection, and 
prosecution of corruption, and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation was 
established. Subsequently, in 2019, the Law on Digital Transformation of the State was adopted, 
and the Autonomous Fiscal Council was created. In 2020, Chile co -chaired the OECD Minister ial 
Council Meeting. In the same year, the National Rural Development Policy was published. In 2021, 
the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) entered into force and the Regulati ons on the Classification, Labelling and 
Notification of Hazardous Chemicals were published.  
2.36.  In addition to the above, it is worth highlighting that Chile has maintained its status as a 
developing country with the OECD, aiming to represent the reality of a Latin American nation with 
middle -income status that is different from that of most OECD members. Chile has expressed its 
support for the accession processes of other Latin American countries that are in the process of 
joining the OECD, such a s Peru and Brazil, in pursuit of greater regional balance within the 
organization.  
2.3.3   Participation in the Asia -Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum  
2.37.  Chile joined APEC in 1994 and has hosted the event on two occasions: in 2004 and 2019. 
Despite global tra de tensions, in particular the lack of consensus in ministerial and leaders' 
statements since 2015, APEC Chile 2019 was an opportunity seized by Chile to lead, promote 
dialogue and seek consensus among member economies. Under the theme "Connecting People, 
Building the Future", APEC Chile 2019 focused on four priorities17 with the aim of reinforcing APEC's 
original role as an incubator of ideas, prioritizing common objectives, building consensus and 
enhancing collaboration among members.  
2.38.  Chile's efforts at A PEC 2019 resulted in the first joint statement at the Meeting of Ministers 
Responsible for Trade (MRT) since 2015. Additionally, three initiatives were approved at the 
 
16 Notable examples include the work done in the environmental sector, which included the creation of 
the Ministry of Environmen t, the Supervisory Authority and the Environmental Assessment Service.  
17 Digital Society; Integration 4.0; Women, SMEs and Inclusive Growth; and Sustainable Growth.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 12 - 
  ministerial level: the La Serena Roadmap for Women and Inclusive Growth; the Roadmap on Marine 
Debris; and the Roadmap on Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing. While 
Leaders'  Week in 2019 was cancelled due to national circumstances, substantive work was 
completed, and the rest of the year's meetings were successfully he ld, including more than 200  APEC 
meetings and more than 50 initiatives led by Chile.  
2.39.  Since 2019, Chile has played a key role in the APEC forum, addressing current challenges 
comprehensively, such as combating climate change, building sustainable societies and economies, 
and empowering women, SMEs, and vulnerable groups.18 The success and achievements of the MRT 
Declaration in 2019 strengthened Chile's image as a pragmatic and reliable economy that is capable 
of building consensus.  
2.40.  In this context, Chile led  the APEC Trade and Investment Committee (TIC) for the first time 
in 2020 -2119, facing the challenge of the global COVID -19 pandemic. During this period, the focus 
was on strengthening trade facilitation, resilience of global value chains, economic recover y, trade 
facilitation of vaccines and other essential goods and services to combat the pandemic, digital 
economy, sustainability and trade, etc. Virtual dialogues were conducted on promoting transparency 
in notifications of technical barriers to trade (TBT ), policies for trade in carbon -neutral goods and 
technologies, and the role of government procurement during the COVID -19 pandemic. In addition, 
it should be noted that, in 2018, Chile chaired the APEC Senior Officials' Meeting Steering Committee 
on Econo mic and Technical Cooperation (SCE), which addressed issues of development and 
integration of remote areas, as well as issues such as food security, human resources in the digital 
era, gender inclusion, MSMEs20 and sustainable tourism.  
2.41.  In 2022, Chile promo ted a roadmap on artisanal fishing and aquaculture, facilitated 
discussions on State -State dispute settlement mechanisms in economic trade agreements, and 
presented projects on women and services, sustainable investment and trade facilitation. In addition,  
Chile worked on collaboration between various APEC committees and groups to promote more 
inclusive trade in gender and trade -related issues.  
2.42.  In 2023, with the United States hosting APEC, Chile has participated and will continue to 
participate in the vario us APEC forums, seeking to be represented at the highest level as is 
customary, in order to further deepen our country's integration into the Asia -Pacific region. Chile will 
also seek to support the implementation of the Putrajaya Vision 2040 and the Aotea roa Action Plan, 
as well as the road maps and Chilean initiatives in the forum. Chile will continue to present 
APEC projects in areas of national interest.21 It is worth noting that in 2023 with the support of Japan 
and the APEC Policy Support Unit, Chile participated in a peer review of quality infrastructure, 
contributing to capacity building for Chilean officials.  
2.3.4   Participation in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)  
2.43.  As part of its commitment to multilateralism, Chile participates  in the W orld Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) by following and participating in the various committees and initiatives 
within the organization.  
2.44.  Since the last trade policy review, three WIPO -administered treaties have entered into force: 
the Marrakesh Tre aty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, which entered into force on 30  September  2016; the Beijing 
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances, which completed its parliamentary approval process in 
March  2015, and entered into force on 28  April 2020; and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid 
 
18 APEC, Report on the Outcomes of APEC Chile 2019. Viewed at: https://www.apec.org/docs/default -
source/LeadersDeclarations/2019/Report -on-the-Outcomes -of-APEC-
Chile.pdf?la=en &hash=DCDD5101EDC9B939A791219CEE0ED2E1976F08C5 . 
19 In 2020, the APEC Putrajaya Vision 2040 was approved: https://www.apec.org/meeting -
papers/leaders -declarations/2020/2020_aelm/annex -a; while in 2021, the implementation plan for this  Vision, 
known as the Aotearoa Action Plan, was approved: https://www.apec.org/meeting -papers/leaders -
declarations/2021/2021 -leaders -declaration/annex -aotearoa -plan-of-action . 
20 On the topic of SMEs in the APEC forum, our country also participates in meetings of the APEC Small 
and Medium Enterprises Working Group (SMEWG) and APEC Small and Med ium-sized Enterprises Ministerial 
Meetings (SMEMM).  
21 Chile secured 33 APEC projects between 2006 and 2017 and 59 APEC projects between 2018 and 
2023, with funds totalling USD  7,019,538.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, for which Chile deposited its 
instrument of accession on 4  April 2022, and which entered i nto force on 4  July 2022.22 
2.4  Notable regional, plurilateral and bilateral initiatives  
2.4.1   Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)  
2.45.  The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a 
plurilateral economic integration agreement in the Asia -Pacific region.23 It covers various aspects 
related to trade policy, including market access in goods, trade facilitation, government 
procurement, intellectual property, services, e -commerce, investment, en vironment, and labour 
matters. Currently, 12 countries participate in this trade agreement: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United Kingdom, and 
Viet Nam. The objectives of the CPTPP includ e promoting economic integration, establishing 
predictable legal frameworks for trade, facilitating regional trade, and promoting sustainable growth.  
2.46.  The agreement entered into force for Chile on 21  February  2023. It marked an important 
milestone for our c ountry's international trade policy, not only because of involvement in some of 
the most important international trade blocs, but also because it promotes common rules between 
like-minded economies.  
2.47.  The CPTPP calls for a clear commitment to the liberalizat ion of international trade through 
major tariff reductions in productive sectors of interest to Chile, such as agriculture and forestry, as 
well as through the incorporation of rules that promote global value chains by opening up the 
possibility of cumulat ion of origin. This would create an incentive for the production of goods with 
higher added value in Chile or increased demand for inputs produced in Chile, linking us productively 
with the other CPTPP countries. Furthermore, the CPTPP contains ambitious c ommitments to 
liberalize trade in services, financial services, and investment within the bloc, whilst also promoting 
high standards for investment protection, together with the recognition of States' regulatory powers 
to pursue legitimate public policy ob jectives . Even so, high -level environmental and labour 
disciplines were added to promote sustainable trade relations among signatories.  
2.48.  The agreement is currently in force for the original signatory countries to this agreement, 
namely: Australia, Brunei Da russalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore and Viet Nam; these represent a market of around 498  million consumers, 11.2 % of 
global GDP, and 15.4 % of global trade.24 Chilean exports to bloc members account for 13.91 % of 
total exports to the world and 10.3 % of total imports.25 In the area of investment, CPTPP members 
account for 17 % of Chile's FDI stock and 10 % of foreign investment abroad.26 
2.49.  The bloc is open to new ac cessions, provided the economy concerned complies with its 
provisions and standards. At the 7th Commission Meeting of the CPTPP in Auckland, New Zealand, 
on 16  July 2023, the Protocol for the Accession of the United Kingdom was signed after it had 
complied  with the corresponding accession formalities, pending completion of the respective internal 
procedures for its entry into force.  
2.4.2   Pacific Alliance (PA)  
2.50.  The PA is a regional integration initiative consisting of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, 
established on 6  June 2012 during the Fourth Presidential Summit in Antofagasta, Chile, where the 
Presidents signed the Framework Agreement establishing the PA, which entered into force on 
20 July 2015. It currently has 63 Observer States.27 
 
22 For more information, see WIPO -Administered Treaties. Viewed at: 
https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/es/treaties/parties/remarks/CL/8 . 
23 For more information, see: https://www.subrei.gob.cl/acuerdos -comerciales/acuerdos -comerciales -
vigentes/cptpp . 
24 Source: IMF and TradeMap . 
25 Source: IMF and TradeMap . 
26 Source: Central Bank of Chile.  
27 Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, China, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 14 - 
  2.51.  This regional integration mechanism is articulated in international agreements, inter -agency 
memorandums of understanding (MoUs), and cooperation projects. This is in order to achieve the 
objectives set out in the Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance, its foundin g text, namely: 
(i) building in a participatory and consensual way an area of deep integration to move progressively 
towards the free movement of goods, services, resources and people; (ii) driving further growth, 
development and competitiveness of the eco nomies of its members, focused on achieving greater 
well-being, overcoming socioeconomic inequality and promoting the social inclusion of its 
inhabitants; and (iii) becoming a platform of political articulation, economic and commercial 
integration and proj ection to the world, with emphasis on the Asia -Pacific region.  
2.52.  The Council of Finance Ministers was created in 2015 under the auspices of the PA, as an 
institution for deep economic and financial integration. This body is composed of the finance 
ministers of the respective PA members. Since its inception, it has been instrumental in conducting 
initiatives through technical groups on matters related to cybersecurity, infrastructure and 
investment, financial integration, innovation and digitization, finance a nd sustainable development, 
and tax treatment.  
2.53.  The PA is governed by the Framework Agreement signed by its members in 2015, the 
Agreement for the Establishment of the 2019 PA Cooperation Council, and the Additional Protocol to 
the Framework Agreement of th e Pacific Alliance (Protocol), agreed in 2016 and subsequently 
amended twice in 2020 to deepen the bloc's trade integration. It is important to highlight the 
commitments made through this Protocol, which encompasses trade and investment matters. From 
a trade perspective, it is important to emphasize that the Protocol has made it possible to strengthen 
relations between PA member States, as the commitments reached therein have in many cases 
deepened the bilateral commitments that existed between its members.  
2.54.  The States parties to the PA Framework Agreement have signed the following international 
agreements: Pacific Alliance -Singapore Free Trade Agreement (PASFTA) (signed in January  2022 
and ratified, to date, by Singapore and Peru); and Third Protocol Amendin g the Additional Protocol 
to the Framework Agreement (signed in November  2022), which will allow for the complete 
implementation of extended cumulation with Associated States and which is provided for in the 
PASFTA. It should be added that the PA member co untries and Singapore completed the negotiation 
of the PA -Singapore Agreement on the Verification of Origin of Materials.  
2.55.  Together with the foregoing, Chile's pro tempore  presidencies of the PA have been marked by 
the following major achievements:  
• Gender a nd trade: The Declaration of the Pacific Alliance on Gender Equality as well as the 
Roadmap for the Autonomy and Economic Empowerment of Women of the Pacific Alliance 
were signed at the Presidential Summit in Santiago, Chile, on 11  December  2020. The 
Gende r Technical Group has convened the various Technical Groups, Committees and 
Sub-Committees of the PA, involving them in the development of an Implementation Plan 
that now has almost 40 specific actions in the various priority areas of the roadmap 
mentioned  above.  
• Plastic -free region and against climate change: The Roadmap for the Sustainable 
Management of Plastics was adopted at the Santiago Presidential Summit in 
December  2020, with the aim of implementing the PA Presidential Declaration on 
Sustainable Pla stic Management signed in Lima in July  2019.  
• Regional Digital Market: The Presidential Declaration on the Development of the Regional 
Digital Market, signed at the Santiago Summit in December  2020, seeks to enable trade 
between member countries in digital products, goods and services traded online, and in 
capital linked to the digital market. The Regional Digital Market is expected to have an 
 
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hondur as, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Lithuania, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, S lovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay. Canada, Japan, Singapore and Spain have also signed 
declarations of cooperation with the PA.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  economic impact of USD  21.330  billion in the bloc in five years and to generate positive 
externalities that should r esult in higher added value, as well as more and better jobs.28 
2.56.  Chile participates in the PA SME Technical Group, which it coordinated in 2022 and continues 
coordinating in 2023. This technical group addresses the issues of promotion, encouragement, and 
inclusion of SMEs, establishing support mechanisms to ensure that smaller companies benefit from 
regional Alliance opportunities through the exchange of best practices and the strengthening of 
public policies of member countries.  
2.57.  On 28  June 2023, Chile took over the pro tempore  presidency (PTP) of the PA on a transitional 
basis, thus completing the transfer suspended since 25  November  2022. Chile acted as a facilitator 
between PA member countries through the efforts of our authorities to restart dialogue. In this 
regard, the PA member States agreed that Chile should hold the PTP from 28  June to 1  August  2023, 
when Peru was to take over the presidency until the first quarter of 2024. Subsequently, Chile will 
assume the PTP from April  2024, continuing the rotati on in alphabetical order, in accordance with 
the Framework Agreement of this regional integration mechanism.  
2.4.3   Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)  
2.58.  The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) was signed by Chile, New Zealand and 
Singapore on 11  June 2020 and entered into force in Chile on 23  November  2021.  
2.59.  This Agreement provides a legal framework for companies to export digital services and 
products, providing certainty and predictability to their business operations as well as opportunities 
to include women and SMEs in the global economy. The agreement includes disciplines that are 
fundamental pillars of a modern digital trade policy, such as: free flow of data, non -discrimination 
of digital products and non -taxation of forced localization for c omputer equipment, among others.  
2.60.  The Agreement constitutes a modernizing milestone in Chile's trade policy, being the 
first agreement dealing exclusively with digital economy matters. As such, it also seeks to support 
the existence of an open, global and n on-discriminatory Internet that acts as a catalyst for creativity, 
innovation, and democratization, especially with the inclusion of women and SMEs in digital 
international trade.  
2.61.  DEPA is open to new members, provided the economy concerned can comply with the rules 
set out in DEPA and completes the corresponding accession process. In this context, the negotiations 
for the accession of the Republic of Korea have been concluded and working parties have now been 
established for the accession of China and Canad a. 
2.4.4   Inclusive Trade Action Group and Global Trade and Gender Arrangement  
2.62.  During the year 2018, Canada, Chile and New Zealand engaged in dialogue for the 
development of a progressive and inclusive trade agenda, with a view to ensuring that trade benefits 
reach all citizens; the upshot was the Inclusive Trade Action Group (ITAG).  
2.63.  The three countries agreed on a declaration signed on 8  March  2018 in Santiago, Chile, which 
reaffirms previously adopted international commitments, including the Paris Agreement, the  
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Agenda 2030 and its 
objectives. In addition, the declaration stipulates that the three countries will work on matters such 
as climate change, women and trade, trade and indigenous  peoples, and an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the CPTPP three years following its entry into force. The Declaration was signed in 
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, in November  2018. From that date, members have met regularly 
at both technical and minis terial level.  
2.64.  In August  2020, the three countries signed the Global Trade and Gender Arrangement 
(GTAGA), which aims at improving women's access to economic opportunities and removing barriers 
to their participation in international trade. With this instru ment, the Parties commit to promoting 
 
28 Calderón and others,  Hacia una estrategia de mercado digital regional en la Alianza del 
Pacífico,  Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe , 2021. Viewed at: 
https://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/47354 -estrategia -mercado -digital -regional -la-alianza -pacifico . WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 16 - 
  mutually supportive trade and gender policies; additionally, they recognize the role of trade in 
promoting gender equality and women's economic empowerment. They also recognize the 
importance of not weakening or reduci ng the protection afforded in their respective gender equality 
laws and regulations for trade and investment. This Arrangement, like the ITAG, is open to the 
accession of new participants.  
2.65.  In October  2021, on the margins of the OECD Ministerial, Mexico joi ned ITAG and the GTAGA. 
In June  2022, Colombia and Peru joined the GTAGA. In May  2023, Costa Rica and Ecuador joined 
ITAG and the GTAGA. With them, ITAG now has six members and the GTAGA eight members.  
2.66.  Through ITAG and the GTAGA, Chile has promoted the imp ortance of developing and 
deepening inclusive trade. This has been done through a variety of cooperative activities that have 
been developed under the auspices of the GTAGA and taking into consideration the participation of 
women entrepreneurs and trade ex perts to facilitate the GTAGA's objectives.  
2.67.  In addition, Chile appreciates the work that has been done within the GTAGA in pursuit of 
methodologies that incorporate an assessment with a more sustainable and inclusive perspective on 
trade agreements, as pro posed within the group with the review three years after the CPTPP's entry 
into force.  
2.4.5   Modernization of the EU -Chile Association Agreement  
2.68.  The signing of the EU -Chile Association Agreement in 2002 was an important step in the 
country's international integration strategy, opening numerous economic development 
opportunities. This partnership has been shaped not only by close trade ties, but also by shared 
values covering the strengthening of democracy, global peace, human rights, free trad e, and 
multilateral cooperation. In 2017, a modernization process for the agreement was initiated, with the 
aim of expanding access to the markets of the parties' economies, updating relevant disciplines in 
the light of current trends and incorporating the matic developments to address the overall challenges 
of the 21st century. Negotiations were concluded in December  2022, reaching an agreement in 
principle. The legal review of the instrument is currently under way.  
2.69.  This new agreement marks a significant st ep in deepening and strengthening various trade 
disciplines between the parties. This is the most sustainability -oriented agreement that Chile has 
signed to date. Through the Trade and Sustainable Development chapter, Chile and the EU agree on 
binding comm itments, common aspirations and objectives to foster a trade relationship that 
enhances sustainable development as an economic driver. They undertake, inter alia , to effectively 
implement the core labour standards of the International Labour Organization ( ILO), make efforts 
to combat climate change and promote the transition to a low -emission economy, enhance the 
mutually supportive relationship between certain trade and environmental agendas, particularly in 
the areas of biodiversity, sustainable forest an d fisheries management, and promotion of low -carbon 
technologies. There is also a chapter on Trade and Gender Equality, promoting equality of 
opportunity and treatment between men and women. The agreement also recognizes the importance 
of small and medium -sized enterprises (SMEs), addressing their various needs and challenges in the 
field of international trade. In addition, this modernization introduces a new chapter on digital trade 
with three main objectives: removing unjustified barriers to digital trad e, ensuring legal certainty 
for businesses, and ensuring a secure online environment for consumers.  
2.70.  The Advanced Framework Agreement goes beyond the provisions of the current Agreement 
by providing even wider access to the respective markets. The liberaliz ation of industrial products 
and certain fishery and agricultural products maintains duty -free treatment. This instrument will 
result in 95 % of trade between the two parties being duty -free. In addition, rules of origin have 
been modernized according to th e latest standards, taking into account the use of global value chains 
and reducing the administrative burden of origin procedures by transitioning to self -certification. 
Furthermore, and based on the WTO TFA, an ambitious chapter was elaborated, providing  improved 
governance standards for customs procedures. This involves the simplification and improved 
efficiency of processes, leading in turn to time and resource savings for all the companies involved.  
2.71.  The Advanced Framework Agreement includes an Investme nt Chapter that focuses on 
investment liberalization and protection between the two parties, facilitating the establishment and 
operation of enterprises, prohibiting performance requirements, and safeguarding the right to WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  regulate. On services, the agreeme nt establishes a specific chapter that facilitates the cross -border 
supply of services between Chile and the EU. Through comprehensive commitments, discrimination 
is avoided, transparency in licences and authorizations is improved, and clear rules are laid  down 
for the temporary entry of business persons. The Advanced Agreement implements an innovative 
approach to the resolution of investment disputes through the establishment of a permanent, 
independent, impartial and transparent tribunal to decide on disp utes between a foreign investor 
and the State receiving its investment. It also addresses novel aspects, such as multiple and 
unfounded claims, and the ability of the respondent State to counterclaim against non -compliance 
by a foreign investor with an int ernational obligation applicable in the territories of both parties.  
2.5  MSMEs and their involvement in international trade  
2.72.  One of the challenges that Chile has addressed in recent years concerns facilitating the access 
of smaller enterprises to the opportuni ty to export, by adding greater value to their products and 
diversifying their markets. The tools available under Chile's economic and trade agreements, the 
trade promotion bodies instituted by ProChile and those created by multilateral economic forums 
have been important resources in achieving these goals.  
2.73.  Furthermore, as a strategy to promote and diversify production, especially for manufacturing 
MSMEs, Chile is implementing government policies that contribute to the participation of MSMEs and 
their tradi ng partners in global and regional value chains, thereby promoting productive integration 
and FDI as tools to increase the benefits of the network of Chile's trade agreements. The growth 
and advancement of MSMEs in international trade are thus bolstered by  improving their access to 
global trade opportunities. The goal is to broaden their involvement in both the domestic and 
international economies and capitalize on the advantages deriving from the respective agreements 
and integration bodies.29 
2.74.  In this conn ection, the development of inclusive trade provisions in trade agreements has 
been an important factor in integrating MSMEs into international trade. Initially, there were 
provisions on MSMEs in chapters on cooperation in certain agreements, such as those with Australia, 
Colombia, China, the EU, Indonesia, Thailand, Türkiye and Viet Nam.  
2.75.  The next step was the inclusion of MSME -specific chapters in trade agreements, representing 
a major advance in the cross -cutting treatment of MSME -related issues in such ag reements.  
2.76.  More specifically, these chapters offer benefits that involve collaborative activities of interest 
to MSMEs, covering their internationalization, together with commitments geared to reaffirming the 
importance of incorporating the MSME perspective  in economic and trade affairs; identifying and 
assessing projects to strengthen institutional support; fostering entrepreneurship and 
entrepreneurial and innovative ecosystems at national level; promoting the transparency of rights 
and obligations in agre ements relevant to smaller enterprises; establishing a committee to deal with 
MSME -related matters; and exchanging best practices on public policies, experiences and technical 
know -how in MSME assistance programmes.  
2.77.  In addition to the provisions covered by  these chapters, there are other chapters dealing with 
benefits for smaller enterprises, particularly in the areas of intellectual property, government 
procurement, trade facilitation, TBT, regional and global value chains, and electronic commerce.  
2.78.  Chile has played a leading role in incorporating chapters on MSMEs into its trade agreements 
with other countries in the region, such as Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and within the 
CPTPP . These chapters underscore Chile's commitment to improving MS MEs' access to existing trade 
opportunities and expanding their participation in international trade.  
2.79.  The classification of enterprises by size is provided for in Law  No. 20.416 and is based on 
annual sales of enterprises registered with the Internal Reven ue Service (SII). The breakdown of 
the five bands is detailed below (in Chilean units of account (UF)):  
 
29 To this end, in the process of modernizing its trade agreements with Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay 
(not yet in force), chapters on global and regional value chains and direct investment linked to global value 
chains have been included. In the agreements with Argentina, the People's Republic of China and Indonesia, 
provisions on these matters ha ve also been included in the area of cooperation.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 18 - 
  • Microenterprises: annual sales from 0.01  UF to 2,400  UF; 
• Small enterprises: annual sales from 2,400.01  UF to 25,000  UF; 
• Medium enterprises: annua l sales from 25,000.01  UF to 100,000  UF; 
• Large enterprises: annual sales above 100,000.01  UF. 
2.80.  MSMEs are pivotal in driving economic activity and employment opportunities within the 
country. For example, there are 1,393,949  enterprises in Chile, of which 1,104,412 are MSMEs, 
accounting for 44% of the country's direct employment and offering job prospects for men and 
women in all regions. Nevertheless, a majority of these enterprises operate solely within Chile and 
therefore do not regard the international market as a viable area of expansion for their operations.  
2.81.  Chile has a total of 7,781 exporting enterprises. Of these, 4,001 (51%) are MSMEs. However, 
the value of their shipments amounts to 1.9% of total exports. In contrast, large enterprises account 
for 39% of the country's exporters and 97.9% of the value exported.  
2.82.  Those MSMEs that decided to export were able to reach 144 destination markets with a total 
of 2,981 different products and services. Of the total number of exporting MSMEs, 2,178 (54%) 
opera te in the manufacturing sector, 893 (22%) in the agricultural sector and 426 (11%) are 
services exporters. However, only 1.3% of Chile's MSMEs recorded exports. Furthermore, 63% of 
Chilean MSMEs export to only one destination and 52% of them export only on e product or service.  
2.83.  The internationalization of smaller enterprises should also serve as a means to ensure that 
export opportunities are equally advantageous for both men and women. Of the 4,001 MSMEs 
engaged in exporting, only 23% are led by women (907) . 
2.6  Diversification and export structure  
2.84.  Despite agreements and the growth in trade value, the Chilean export sector continues to 
face challenges. These challenges concern, on the one hand, the diversification of export markets 
and the basket of exported pro ducts, and on the other, the complexity and technological content of 
the export structure.  
2.85.  In 2000, the three primary export markets accounted for 36.9% of total exports, a figure that 
increased to 45.2% and 61% for 2010 and 2020, respectively. When the to p five export markets 
are examined, the percentages are 47.3%, 57.2% and 71%, respectively.30 
2.86.  As regards the concentration of exports at the product level, the five most exported products 
accounted for 48.1%, 59% and 55.9% for 2000, 2010 and 2020, respectively. In terms of 
enterprises, 1% of enterprises accounted for 65%, 78.8% and 73.8% of exports during those 
years.31 
2.87.  Regarding the export structure, in 2000, Chile was ranked 66th out of 133 countries based on 
the Economic Complexity Index.32 In 2010, it slipped to 75th in the ranking, and in 2020, it remained 
in the same position.  
2.88.  When analysing Chilean exports through the lens of "technological intensity"33, we can classify 
exported goods under the categories of primary products, natural resource -based manufactures, 
low-tech manufactures, medium -tech manufactures and high -tech manufactures.  
 
30 Directorate of Studies, SUBREI, based on figures from the Central Bank of Chile.  
31 Directorate of Studies, SUBREI, based on figures from the Central Bank of Chile.  
32 For more information, see Harvard Univ ersity's Growth Lab. Viewed at: 
https://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/rankings . 
33 Graphic System for International Trade Data, Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC), United Nations.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  2.89.  In 2020, the percentage share of primary products in total exports was 52.5%, while for 2000 
and 2010 the shares were 34.3% and 35.7%, respectively. In contras t, natural resource -based 
manufactures decreased from 51.7% and 54.7% in 2000 and 2010 to 39.7% in 2020.  
2.90.  The combined share of medium and high -tech manufactures was 6.6% and 5.7% in 2000 and 
2010, which then decreased to 5% in 2020.  
2.7  Labour issues in trad e policy  
2.91.  Chile's Free Trade Agreement with Canada (1997)  was the first to include labour -related 
matters. Since then, there has been a specific focus on including such matters. At present, Chile has 
20 trade agreements that incorporate labour standards.  
2.92.  The labour provisions recognize the significance of upholding fundamental labour rights and 
ensuring that the labour laws of the parties take account of such rights. The agreements incorporate 
commitments to uphold and enforce labour legislation, while ackno wledging the right of the parties 
to set their own standards for labour protection. Another important commitment is to refrain from 
waiving or offering to waive labour legislation in order to promote trade or investment between the 
two countries. In this w ay, international trade is promoted in conjunction with decent work.  
2.93.  Chile has also embraced more contemporary issues, such as provisions on responsible 
business conduct, business and human rights, youth engagement, transparency and involvement of 
civil so ciety, all with a focus on labour cooperation, facilitating the implementation of projects in 
these areas and the exchange of best practices and relevant knowledge on labour issues of common 
interest.  
2.94.  During the period 2015 -22, the following trade agreeme nts with labour cooperation articles 
entered into force: (a) the Free Trade Agreement with Thailand and (b) the Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement with Indonesia. The following agreements contain comprehensive labour 
chapters: the Free Trade Agre ements with Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay (not 
yet in force), and with the CPTPP.  
2.8  Environmental issues in trade policy  
2.95.  As regards environmental matters, Chile's commitments date back to 1997 with the Free 
Trade Agreement with Canada. As with its approach to labour matters, Chile has consistently sought 
to include environmental commitments in trade agreements, recognizing the role that trade can play 
in sustainable development.  
2.96.  The environmental chapters contain provisions such as the commitment of the parties to 
effectively implement their respective environmental laws, to promote legislation with high 
standards of environmental protection and not to repeal environmental legislation. These clauses 
serve to bolster trade relation s in alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals.  
2.97.  From the time of the negotiation with the CPTPP, Chile began incorporating specific clauses 
on environmental matters, including first -time articles on fisheries, forestry, wild flora and fauna, 
biodiv ersity, and environmental goods and services. Such matters have become a feature of 
subsequent trade agreements. Cooperation remains an important component of these chapters, as 
it allows for dialogue and exchange of experiences to tackle the global enviro nmental challenges of 
climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution.  
2.98.  Currently, 21 of the 33 active trade agreements entered into by Chile include environmental 
provisions. During this trade policy review period, the following trade agreements entered in to force: 
(a) the Free Trade Agreement with Thailand and (b) the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement with Indonesia, both featuring cooperation provisions on environmental issues; (c) the 
Free Trade Agreements with Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Ecua dor, and Paraguay (not yet in force), 
and with the CPTPP, which include chapters on environmental issues.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 20 - 
  2.9  Gender in trade policy  
2.99.  Chile is pursuing a more progressive and inclusive international trade policy, with the aim of 
incentivizing the widespread sha ring of trade and investment benefits, driving positive economic 
growth and reducing inequalities.  
2.100.   During the period 2015 -22, special attention was given to developing gender -related 
provisions in trade agreements, and their use has been promoted in bilate ral, regional and 
multilateral discussions.  
2.101.   Chile's pioneering efforts to integrate gender and trade chapters into its trade agreements 
are exemplified by its eight Free Trade Agreements with Uruguay, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Singapor e (as a Pacific Alliance Associate State) and the EU, in addition to a 
Digital Inclusion chapter in the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement. These chapters underscore 
Chile's commitment to enhance the visibility and relevance of women's inclusion in inte rnational 
trade, while recognizing and highlighting the international commitments made by the parties on 
women's and girls' rights.  
2.102.   The cooperation activities agreed upon in these chapters involve, inter alia , capacity building, 
financial inclusion, women' s leadership, developing women's networks, bridging the digital divide, 
promoting women's entrepreneurship and the importance of collecting gender -based statistical data.  
2.103.   In June 2023, Chile's Ministry of Foreign Affairs unveiled its Feminist Foreign Polic y. This 
policy recognizes that gender disparities and barriers are an obstacle to the full exercise of human 
rights, democracy, sustainable development and the nation's well -being. At the same time, it is 
understood that progress towards substantive equali ty stems from the international treaties that 
Chile has signed. The Feminist Foreign Policy sets gender equality as a strategic objective and a 
cross-cutting priority, seeking to influence multilateral and bilateral bodies to bolster global and 
regional go vernance in a way that safeguards and promotes the dignity and autonomy of women 
and girls in all their diversity.  
2.104.   In terms of international economic and trade relations, the Feminist Foreign Policy seeks to 
remove barriers to the full integration of women  into the economy and to promote economic recovery 
with gender equality. At the individual level, this involves focusing on integrating women into the 
formal economy and foreign trade, whether as workers or entrepreneurs. At the societal level, it 
recogniz es that the increased participation of women in the labour force and the reduction of gaps 
between men and women in the employed population contribute positively to greater economic 
growth. The policy commits to strengthening these agendas by expanding inc lusive trade provisions 
in economic and/or trade agreements, championing the principles of inclusive trade in multilateral 
economic forums and developing cooperation initiatives to enhance evidence -based 
decision -making, institutional strengthening and the  visibility of opportunities to include this 
perspective in international economic relations.  
2.10  Digital economy  
2.105.   The expansion of digital trade has reduced the costs of participating in international trade, 
facilitated integration into global value chains and  connected more enterprises and consumers 
worldwide. Notably, it has created opportunities for MSMEs to overcome the challenges of scale and 
geographical distance by enabling direct marketing of their products to online consumers and 
facilitating business -to-business transactions.  
2.106.   In this regard, support is given to the adoption of digital topics and the negotiation of trade 
agreements that reflect the fundamental principles of the digital economy. Progress has been 
achieved in the area of international roa ming with Argentina and Brazil, and digital signature 
interoperability is being implemented between Chile and Argentina. These developments are 
reflected in Chile's advocacy for numerous multilateral initiatives relating to the digital economy. 
One of them  is the DEPA involving New Zealand and Singapore. In addition, during the Santiago 
Presidential Summit in 2020, the presidents of the PA signed a presidential declaration to advance 
the development of the regional digital market. This initiative has the po tential to foster cross -border 
trade among member countries and eliminate barriers to cross -border transactions.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  2.107.   Of particular note is the CPTPP, one of its central commitments regarding e -commerce being 
non-discrimination in respect of digital products (e.g. software, music, video and e -books).  
2.108.   Chile also participates in and supports the negotiations under the Joint Initiative on 
E-Commerce at the WTO, with a focus on supporting SMEs and reducing the digital divide. Its active 
involvement, under  the Work Programme on E -Commerce, is geared in particular to supporting work 
to identify the impact of the moratorium on the application of duties on electronic transmissions, 
with a focus also on SMEs.  
2.11  National policy on migration and foreign nationals  
2.109.   After more than 40 years of application, a consensus was achieved on the need to modernize 
the legislation on migration and foreign nationals, and to strengthen the institutional framework. 
The aim was to proactively address the complex contemporary realiti es linked to migration. This 
milestone was reached on 20 April 2021 with the enactment of Law  No. 21.325 on Migration and 
Foreign Nationals. The new legal framework provided for the establishment of the National Migration 
Service – a decentralized public s ervice with legal identity and its own assets – to replace the former 
Department of Foreigners. Up to this year, the regulatory landscape governing the movement of 
persons in Chile has been strengthened and now comprises Law No.  21.325 on Migration and For eign 
Nationals, Regulatory Decree No.  296, Decree No.  177 establishing the Migratory Subcategories of 
Temporary Residence, and Exempt Decree No. 4236.  
2.110.   In July  2023, the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, through the National Migration 
Service, i ntroduced the National Policy on Migration and Foreign Nationals (PNME). The primary 
objective of the PNME is to advocate for orderly, safe and lawful migration that contributes to the 
nation's development, while taking into account the special features of  the various regions and 
promoting the harmonious integration of migrants.  
2.111.   The PNME focuses on two main areas: internal management through the National Migration 
Service, and border control. Moreover, its structure comprises 10 thematic areas of work cover ing 
28 measures for immediate implementation, as well as a set of draft laws aimed at reforming the 
Law on Migration and Foreign Nationals and other bodies of law.  
2.112.   It is important to note that the new legislation establishes a visa deriving from the 
imple mentation of international agreements like the Mode 4 commitments under Chile's schedule of 
specific commitments and Free Trade Agreements.  
3  DOMESTIC INITIATIVES  
3.1  Constitutional Context  
3.1.  The Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile was enacted in 198 0, during a period of 
military dictatorship. Following the transition to democracy, in 2005, a total of 58 constitutional 
reforms were undertaken through Law No. 20,050 to strengthen Chile's democratic system. 
Subsequently, in 2015, the Government announce d that a new Constitution would be drawn up, 
thereby initiating a process of open citizens' dialogue with the aim of setting the stage for the drafting 
of a new text. As a result of this process, in early 2018, the Government sent a draft new Constitution 
to the National Congress, but it was not passed.  
3.2.  In November 2019, the majority of the political parties represented in the National Congress 
acceded to the Agreement for Social Peace and a New Constitution in order to embark on drafting a 
new magna carta.  As a result of this agreement, in December 2019, the Congress passed 
Law No. 21,200, which established the procedure for drawing up a New Political Constitution of the 
Republic of Chile. Following this, in a national referendum in October 2020, 78.27% of voters 
expressed support for the initiation of a process to draft a new Political Constitution for the country. 
This process would be carried out by a Constitutional Convention made up entirely of Convention 
members elected in ballots overseen by the Elect oral Service. After a new draft Constitution was 
drawn up and proposed by the Convention, it was rejected by 61.89% of voters in an "exit plebiscite" 
(plebiscito de salida ) held on 4 September 2022.  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 22 - 
  3.3.  To give renewed impetus to the constitutional debate alre ady under way in Chile, and following 
the will of the Chilean people expressed in the 2020 plebiscite, various political forces and parties in 
the country endorsed the so -called Agreement for Chile in order to establish an institutional 
framework for the o ngoing constituent process.  
3.4.  As a result, between March and May 2023, an Expert Committee made up of 24 members 
chosen by the Legislature prepared a preliminary draft which has served as a basis for discussing 
and drawing up the new draft Constitution. A Co nstitutional Council, composed of 50 members 
democratically elected by citizens in elections held in May 2023, is now responsible for carrying out 
this process. The Council is tasked with drawing up a draft Constitution, based on the draft proposed 
by the Expert Committee. This document is to be submitted by November 2023 and will be put to 
the vote in an exit plebiscite on 17 December 2023.  
3.5.  It should be noted that the current constitutional process has been undertaken under the 
country's legal and institut ional framework. For the process under way, the Legislature approved 
Law No. 201,533, which amended the existing constitutional text, with the aim of establishing the 
procedure for drawing up and adopting a new Political Constitution of the Republic of Chi le. This law 
establishes 12 institutional bases that delimit the regulatory framework in which both the Expert 
Committee and the Constitutional Council carry out their work. These bases include aspects such as 
the country 's republican and democratic struct ure; respect for human dignity and human rights; 
recognition of indigenous peoples as part of the Chilean nation; the development of a social and 
democratic State subject to the rule of law, which also promotes the common good; the principle of 
fiscal resp onsibility; the separation of powers; the autonomy of the Central Bank; and respect for 
and conservation of nature and the country 's biodiversity.  
3.2  Sustainable development and growth agenda  
3.6.  Economic productivity34 in Chile has stagnated over the last 15 to 20 years.35 Between 2015 
and 2020, average annual growth stood at -0.7%. In 2020 and 2021, during the pandemic, average 
annual growth stood at 2.0%, but, during 2022, the productivity gains were reversed, with a 3.4% 
downturn.36 In order to address this situation, the Government developed a Productivity Agenda, 
which aims to substantially upgrade the way in which public and private resources are used, by 
improving companies' day -to-day business operations, making their processes more efficient and 
driving both innovation and economic growth. One of the key measures is the digitization of 
foreign -trade and logistics processes, with the aim of expanding the scope of export VAT refunds to 
more of the country's ports, as well as other objectives37. The agenda also includes measures such 
as eliminating notarization requirements for some legal and administrative procedures, creating a 
venture capital fund for innovative companies and incorporating digital skills in employ ee training, 
as far as labour adjustment is concerned.  
3.7.  One of the challenges faced by the Government is for smaller companies to improve their 
performance in international trade activities and increase their exports. Therefore, through the 
Under -Secretaria t for International Economic Relations (SUBREI), a study is being conducted that 
focuses on MSMEs' access to export logistics, which has become a challenge for them in recent 
years. It has been observed that this is due to the limited space on vessels, the  shortage of 
containers, the lack of digitization in a range of processes and high transportation costs, among 
other factors.  
 
34 Productivity may be measured on the basis of capital intensity. One measure considers the ratio of 
salaried employees to the total workforce and the other looks at the actual and natural unemployment rate. In 
this case, productivity is reported with a sal aried employee adjustment, as this is the measure proposed by the 
National Evaluation and Productivity Commission (CNEP).  
35 Annual growth in total factor productivity averaged 1% between 1995 and 2000, as well as between 
2000 and 2005. It averaged 0.6% bet ween 2005 and 2010, and 0.4% between 2010 and 2015.  
36 For more information, see the Informe Anual 2022 de Productividad  from the National Evaluation and 
Productivity Commission (CNEP). Viewed at: https://cnep.cl/informe -anual -de-productividad -2022-2/.  
37 The digitization measures also include bringing all import transactions into the Integrated Foreign 
Trade System (SICEX); broadening the electronic exch ange of documents which are currently sent and 
received between foreign trade windows or systems of Pacific Alliance countries; expanding SICEX's integration 
with the Maritime Single Window (VUMAR), by incorporating it into the National Customs Service; an d 
automatically approving modifications to customs documents for duty drawbacks for transactions processed by 
Authorized Economic Operators (AEOs).  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 23 - 
  3.8.  Promoting and developing MSMEs forms part of the inclusive trade agenda that Chile is 
committed to advancing, as it is one of SUBR EI's strategic objectives for 2023. The Government is 
also seeking to diversify and fundamentally complexify the export matrix in order to increase the 
country's productivity. To this end, ProChile, is running working group sessions to boost 
MSME  participa tion in foreign trade.  
3.9.  At the same time, during April 2023, the Government introduced its National Lithium Strategy. 
This initiative aims to spur the development of the lithium industry in order to dovetail Chile's 
economic progress into the energy transit ion. It also aims to generate added value through 
innovation and technology, and to promote productive linkages. This is all geared towards promoting 
a sustainable economy, by diversifying away from extraction and promoting a more complex 
economic structur e. Incorporating capital, technology, sustainability (in both social and 
environmental terms) and value addition in harmony with communities will be crucial to achieving 
this objective.38 
3.10.  The National Lithium Strategy encompasses the creation of a Lithium and Salt Flats 
Committee; initiation of a participatory dialogue process; establishment of a National Lithium 
Company; a network of protected salt flats; a Lithium and Salt Flats Technology and Research 
Institute; prospection in other salt flats; moderniza tion of the institutional framework; and state 
involvement in production activities on the Atacama Salt Flat. The country is aiming to develop a 
long-term strategic vision covering the entire lithium production cycle, from exploration to value 
addition, wi th clear regulations to ensure the sustainability and development of investments. The 
implementation of this strategy is expected to support the global energy transition and to help 
improve people's lives.  
3.11.  The State will take the lead in conducting the Nat ional Lithium Strategy, with the active 
involvement of the private enterprise sector across the entire production process. Public -private 
sector synergy is seen as key to seizing this historic opportunity. Accordingly, the cabinet -level 
Lithium and Salt Fl ats Committee will be chaired by the Ministry of Mining. This Committee will be 
responsible, inter alia , for driving productive transformation and proposing scientific -technological 
and industrial development policies that facilitate new upstream and downs tream production 
activities in the lithium cycle. It must also identify and seize opportunities for linkages and value 
addition locally within the industry.39 The diversification of industry players contributes not only to 
technological and process improve ments for the development of operations, but also to the 
generation of supply chains. This also promotes value addition across the entire production chain, 
fosters local and regional relationships based on value generation, and establishes strong 
commitmen ts to the communities surrounding the lithium deposits.  
3.12.  This industry's contribution to the country's productive diversification and, in turn, to the 
promotion of the associated economic growth potential, has also been identified by the Government 
as one o f the priority objectives of the National Lithium Strategy. This focus, coupled with the aim 
of creating productive links through strengthening the lithium value chain, ensures that the industry 
will grow, improving Chile's participation in global value ch ains. 
3.13.  In 2021, at the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) - COP25 - Chile presented its Long -term Climate Strategy, 
which includes a commitment to becoming and remaining carbon neutral by 2050 at the latest. This 
objective was subsequently reflected in the Framework Law on Climate Change, which was enacted 
in June 2022, making Chile the first developing country to establish carbon neutrality by law. The 
key objectives include red ucing greenhouse gas emissions, adapting to their resulting environmental 
impacts, enhancing food security, increasing water availability and reducing pollution and health 
risks.  
3.14.  In accordance with the Framework Law on Climate Change, government authoritie s must 
integrate mitigation and adaptation criteria into the processes for formulating and implementing the 
policies, programmes, plans, rules and tools that they develop. Within the energy sector, this has 
 
38 To access the official National Lithium Strategy document, go to: https://www.gob.cl/litioporchile/en/ . 
39 For more information on the establishment of the Lithium and Salt Flats Committee, see Resolution 
2023/62 of the Chilean Economic Development Agency (CORFO), implementin g Council Agreement 
No. 3.135/2023, which establishes the Lithium and Salt Flats Committee, sets the rules governing its operation 
and approves its regulations. Viewed at: https://www.bcn.cl/leych ile/navegar?i=1193984 . WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
- 24 - 
  led to the stepping up of efforts to decarbonize the domestic economy and create a sustainable 
industry that positions Chile competitively on international markets. Thus, the following strategic 
actions for successfully decarbonizing the economy  have been identified: (i) promote more 
renewable and clean energies in electricity generation, together with electrification of the domestic 
energy matrix; (ii) establish energy efficiency actions and measures; (iii) promote a technological 
shift in transport towards e -mobility and clean -fuel vehicles; (iv) develo p the green -hydrogen and 
green -hydrogen -derivative industry; and (v) promote restoration and reforestation of native 
woodland and other sinks, such as peat bogs, recognizing their ecosystem services and their 
importance as carbon sinks.  
3.15.  Along with increasi ng the share of renewable energies in the energy matrix, government 
authorities have sought to cut emissions by phasing out and converting carbon units within the 
national territory through public -private agreements which have helped companies that own 
coal-fired plants to make headway in decommissioning those plants one by one. At the same time, 
the Just Energy  Transition Strategy, adopted in December 2021, and the institutions created to deal 
comprehensively with the Just Socio -Ecological Transition have also provided a framework for the 
process of decommissioning coal -fired plants, with an intersectoral approach based on two  broad 
areas: repair and remediation on the one hand, and productive restructuring that spurs local 
development towards cleaner and b etter-aligned industries, on the other. Therefore, the potential 
impact of closing the units on the labour market, on communities and on the territories concerned 
has also been considered. Finally, the Government is developing a Decarbonization Plan, as a public 
policy instrument that will be used to define a short -term and medium -term road map with 
regulatory, technical and social enabling conditions. This will advance the country's accelerated 
decarbonization process, which is driven by the phasing out of  coal, but anchored in the National 
Energy Policy's goals: at least 80% of electricity generation from renewable energies by 2030 and 
carbon -neutral electricity generation by 2050. This Plan is based on three main pillars: 
(i) modernizing the network and t he market and infrastructure; (ii) thermoelectric conversion and 
transition fuels; and (iii) just energy transition and communities.  
3.16.  In April 2023, the Government presented the Initial Agenda for the Second Phase of the 
Energy Transition, which, inter alia , aims to firm up short -term commitments in the electricity sector, 
in line with the 2022 updated National Energy Policy , which has a long -term vision. In this 
"second  phase", renewable and clean sources will move from playing a key auxiliary role within the 
electricity system to standing as the main generation source, with the aim of achieving an electricity 
mix featuring 100% clean energy sources before 2050. To that end, in November 2022, the Law on 
Electric Energy Storage and Electromobility (La w No. 21,505) was enacted, which will pave the way 
for stand -alone storage projects, i.e., systems which are not linked to generation plants, to receive 
remuneration for supplying power into the electricity system and for having available capacity at 
peak times. In the same vein, and as an additional measure under the Initial Agenda for the 
Second  Phase, the draft law on energy transition was introduced as a necessary and urgent step in 
securing Chile's energy transition and the economic and local developme nt linked to this process.40 
The draft law establishes a legal link between the General Law on Electrical Services and the 
Framework Law on Climate Change, with a focus on the electrical infrastructure required to meet 
the legal target of becoming carbon n eutral and resilient by 2050.  
3.17.  In addition, to supplement the just transition agenda and the Framework Law on Climate 
Change, the Government is preparing a draft "green" fiscal reform. The "green" corrective taxes do 
not necessarily aim to increase tax reve nue, but instead to influence decision -making by individuals 
and companies through relative price adjustments. This is therefore expected to promote the 
adoption of sustainable technologies within companies, not only to reduce CO2 emissions and local 
pollutants, but also to boost their competitiveness, by enabling them to thrive on international 
markets.  
3.18.  Investments in the energy sector are anticipated to be a major driver of sustainable productive 
development in the country in the coming years. Chile has e normous renewable potential and can 
produce renewable hydrogen (known as "green" hydrogen) at low cost, in order to become a key 
player in the global supply of hydrogen and by -products (including ammonia, methanol and synthetic 
fuels). Apart from contribut ing to the decarbonization of the economy, green hydrogen provides a 
major economic development opportunity for the country and is therefore regarded as having 
 
40 Draft law on Energy Transition - Electricity Transmission as an Enabling Sector for Carbon Neutrality, 
Bulletin No. 16078 -08. WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  strategic significance for the coming years. Accordingly, in 2020, the Government adopted a Nati onal 
Green Hydrogen Strategy and is currently developing a 2023 -2030 Green Hydrogen Action Plan. 
This plan seeks to establish clear lines of action and to define commitments between the different 
parts of society, which includes the State, territories and civil society, academic and industrial 
organizations. Its development is based on three main lines of action: (i) investments and 
institutions; (ii) sustainability and local value; and (iii) infrastructure and territorial organization. 
The plan features a robust strategic participatory space, based on inter -agency forums involving a 
range of bodies, public engagement workshops, a Consultative Council and a Strategic Committee.  
3.19.  Given how closely environmental and economic matters are linked, Chile has sought  to further 
strengthen its environmental institutions, and on 24 January 2023 the National Congress adopted 
the draft law41 creating the Biodiversity and Protected Areas Service (SBAP), which seeks to conserve 
the country's biological biodiversity by prese rving, restoring and sustainably using species and 
ecosystems, with an emphasis on ecosystems and species of high environmental value or which 
require conservation measures because they are threatened or declining.  
3.20.  Similarly, on 13 June 2022, Chile deposit ed its instrument of accession to the Regional 
Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Escazú Agreement, with the Secretary -General of 
the United Nations .42 This international treaty primarily seeks to ensure the full and effective 
implementation,  in Latin America and the Caribbean, of the rights of access to environmental 
information, public participation in environmental decision -making processes and acc ess to justice 
in environmental matters. The Agreement also deals with the need to create a safe environment 
favouring those who seek to exercise their access rights (environmental defenders) and the 
importance of contributing to capacity building and coop eration, and of helping to protect the right 
of every person, of both the present and future generations, to live in a healthy environment.  
3.21.  The Government is focused on furthering decentralization, in order to achieve equitable 
territorial development whic h recognizes the country's diversity and the fact that the State is taking 
action with public policies well suited to local specificities. It is also advancing an administrative 
decentralization agenda, which provides for the transfer of powers from centra l government 
ministries and services to regional governments, in order to strengthen their ability to respond to 
regional public challenges; and the establishment of metropolitan areas in order to allocate functions 
and powers for the planning of services and infrastructure in urban functional spaces, enhancing 
their role in areas such as transport and waste management.  
3.22.  As regards tax matters, the Draft Law on Regional Financing, Decentralization and Regional 
Fiscal Responsibility, based on autonomy, fiscal  responsibility, sufficiency, territorial equity and 
balance, and transparency and accountability, was introduced in the Congress of the Republic. The 
draft rests on three pillars: (i) generation of new sources of own revenue; (ii) establishment of a 
new s ystem for regulating regional governments' budgets, thereby improving financial management, 
and (iii) promotion of fiscal responsibility with transparency and citizen participation. In addition, 
during 2023, a new budget structure was implemented, which in cludes a new budget appropriation 
for regional governments with budgetary programmes (one for regional operations and another for 
regional investment).  
3.3  Social and economic security  
3.23.  Chile has experienced significant economic growth, with a considerable redu ction in poverty 
in recent decades. However, the country has not succeeded in overcoming the major inequalities 
affecting the population in a range of areas. Citizens have high expectations for continued progress 
in achieving better conditions for developm ent and inclusiveness.  
3.24.  To tackle the inequality gaps, which quite apart from serious social problems can lead to 
significant falls in per capita GDP, the Government has backed reforms and programmes that 
 
41 Draft Law Creating the Biodiversity Service, Protected Areas, and t he National Protected Areas 
System. Bulletin No. 9404 -12. Online information. Viewed at: 
https://www.senado.cl/appsenado/templates/tramitacion/index.php?bolet in_ini=9404 -12. 
42 Decree No. 209 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Viewed at: 
https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1183363&tipoVersion=0 . WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  simultaneously aim to improve the quality of life an d security of the population and enhance socio -
economic development.  
3.25.  In the area of job security and work -life balance measures, in April 2023, Law No. 21,561, or 
the 40 -Hour Law, was enacted, which reduces the length of the working day. The measure will b e 
implemented gradually, over a maximum period of five years. Moreover, as a policy for boosting 
employment, subsidies have been established for hiring and retaining workers from 2022, targeted 
at groups like women and young people.  
3.26.  In addition, the 2023 B udget Law provides for an 8% sustained increase in the resources for 
pensions, health care, education and children. Its noteworthy initiatives include increased financing 
for the Universal Guaranteed Pension (PGU); for the surgery waiting list reduction pl an; for 
programmes to protect the rights of children and adolescents; for the Public Education Support Fund, 
the institutional contribution to state universities and state vocational training centres,  among 
others.  
3.27.  Social security presupposes a pension sys tem that will ensure that older citizens lead dignified 
lives. There are areas for improvement in the current system. Therefore, the "Solidarity Pillar", made 
up of the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS) and the Pension Solidarity Supplement (APS), was set up in 
2008. The Solidarity Pillar was subsequently replaced, through Law No. 21,419, in January  2022, by 
the PGU, which guarantees a minimum pension for the most vulnerable segments of the population, 
even if they have never contributed, and a supplementary p ayment to self -funded pensions up to a 
specific maximum amount.  
3.28.  The Government submitted a draft law to the Congress of the Republic, which primarily sought 
to increase pensions for current and future retirees, with a particular emphasis on women, through 
three mechanisms: increasing the PGU, providing a new social security pension, and improving the 
individual savings component.  
3.29.  The proposed reform included, among other documents, a system sustainability report. The 
report assessed the Integrated Pension F und, measuring the inflows and outflows in the system, and 
determined that it is sustainable over time. A Regulatory Impact Report was also included. This 
document, based on a Central Bank of Chile model, determined that increased contributions from 
employ ers would not result in long -term job losses. It was also found that, as the funds will be 
largely invested in capital markets, the depth of the labour market will be considerably increased 
compared to the situation without reform.  
3.30.  Such is the scale of bot h this task and other programmes that aim to achieve greater equality, 
that they have necessitated reform of the tax system. These and other reforms proposed by the 
Government require greater fiscal resources to make these changes a reality. For this reaso n, the 
Government has called for a fiscal pact to be drawn up, which, in addition to raising resources, 
promotes development and social justice. Two proposals to this effect have been put forward: the 
Mining Royalty, which is already law, and the other tax ation measures associated with corporate and 
individual income taxes, tax evasion and avoidance measures, and public spending efficiency.  
3.31.  As a result, during 2022 and 2023, the draft large -scale mining royalty law, which had been 
submitted in 2018, was ame nded jointly by the Senate of the Republic and the Government. The 
new version of the draft law, which was passed in May 2023, is a specific tax on large mining 
companies.43 The Law aims to deliver more tax revenue, without affecting mining investment. In 
addition, it strives to enhance the benefits for the regions, in particular for areas which are suffering 
negative externalities from mining.  
3.32.  The higher tax revenue from private large -scale mining will be 0.45% of GDP when it comes 
into effect. This will m ake possible the creation of a Regional Productivity and Development Fund, 
directing resources towards the funding of productive investment in the broad sense of the term, 
such as projects, plans and programmes aimed at promoting productive activities, reg ional 
development and scientific and technological research. The Support Fund for Territorial Equity is also 
being created, which distributes additional funds for the country's 302 most vulnerable 
municipalities. Finally, the Royalty is creating a Fund for  Mining Municipalities, which, through 
 
43 Large -scale copper mining refers to mining which produces more than the e quivalent of 50,000 tonnes 
of refined copper (TRC).  WT/TPR/G/ 451 • Chile  
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  additional monetary support, aims to offset the negative externalities caused by the extraction of 
raw materials in the country's 32 mining municipalities.  
3.33.  In July 2022, the Government submitted a draft law on taxation measures associated with 
corporate and individual income taxes, tax evasion and avoidance measures, and public spending 
efficiency, which was rejected on first reading by the Chamber of Deputies in March 2023. Since 
then, efforts have been made to  redraft the fiscal pact by initiating a process of consultation and 
dialogue with various political, social and economic figures, in order to find common ground for 
creating a desirable tax system.  
3.34.  The Government is proposing a fiscal pact that goes beyon d a tax reform, based on six main 
pillars: (i) principles for a modern taxation system; (ii) spending needs and priorities; (iii) state 
commitments, such as austerity, transparency and efficiency; (iv) tax finance; (v) growth and 
formalization; and (vi) co nsolidation, monitoring and impact assessment.  
3.35.  The scale of the demand for social and economic security requires a multidimensional 
response, which combines economic growth, efficient public management and tax revenue. More tax 
revenue is essential for res ponding to society's demands with the urgency required. This response 
must be delivered in a series of measures to adjust the tax structure, increase the tax yield, close 
tax loopholes and eliminate means of circumvention. These measures may also provide f or 
mechanisms to incentivize investment, productivity and formalization, but their revenue -raising 
effect must be calibrated and counterbalanced.  
 
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