RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/134  
 
24 July 2019 
(19-4913) Page: 1/75 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG OF THE COUNCIL FO R TRADE IN GOODS  
11 AND 1 2 APRIL  2019 
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/1 3; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/7 63. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREE MENTS  ................................ ....................  3 
2   STATUS OF NOTIFI CATIONS UNDER THE PR OVISIONS OF THE AGRE EMENTS IN 
ANNEX  IA OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/R EV.26)  ................................ .................  3 
3   APPOINTMENT OF O FFICERS TO THE SUBSI DIARY BODIES OF THE COUNCIL  
FOR TRADE IN GOODS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 5 
4   ACCESSION OF THE  REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA  AND THE KYRGYZ REPU BLIC TO THE 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UN ION: PROCEDURES UNDE R ARTICLE  XXVIII:3 O F 
GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM T HE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ......................  5 
5   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATI ON OF EU TRQ  COMMITM ENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA, B RAZIL, CANADA,  
CHINA, MEXICO, NEW Z EALAND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,  
THE UNITED STATES, A ND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ...............  6 
6   ENLARGEMENT OF T HE EUROPEAN UNION TO INCLUDE CRO ATIA: NEGOTIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6  OF THE GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON................................ ................................ ............................  11 
7   JORDAN – REQUEST  FOR A WAIVER RELATI NG TO THE TRANSITION AL PERIOD FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF T HE EXPORT SUBSIDY PR OGRAMME FOR JORDAN  
(G/C/W/705; G/C/W/70 5/CORR.1; G/C/W/705/ REV.1; AND G/C/W/705 /REV.2)  ..... 12 
8   MEASURES TO ALLO W GRADUATED LDCS, WI TH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMEN T ON SUBSIDIES AND  
COUNTERVAILING MEASU RES – COMMUNICATION FR OM THE CENTRAL AFRIC AN 
REPUBLIC ON BEHALF O F THE LDC  GROUP (WT/ GC/W/742 –G/C/W/752)  ...................  12 
9   PROCEDURES TO EN HANCE TRANSPARENCY AND STR ENGTHEN NOTIFICATION  
REQUIREMENTS UNDER W TO AGREEMENTS – COMM UNICATION FROM ARGEN TINA, 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, C OSTA RICA, THE EUROP EAN UNION, JAPAN, NE W ZEALAND,  
THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS  TERRITORY OF TAIWAN , PENGHU, KINMEN AND  MATSU,  
AND THE UN ITED STATES (JOB/GC/ 204/REV.1 –JOB/CTG/14 /REV.1)  ..........................  16 
10   KINGDOM OF SAUD I ARABIA, KINGDOM OF  BAHRAIN, AND THE UN ITED ARAB 
EMIRATES – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERT AIN IMPORTED PRODUCT S – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND THE  UNITED STATES  ...............................  35 
11   INDONESIA'S IMP ORT AND EXPORT RESTR ICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NORWAY AND THE UNITE D STATES  .... 37 
12   INDIA – CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON ICT PRODU CTS – REQUEST FROM C ANADA,  
CHINA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NORWAY , CHINESE TAIPEI, AN D 
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 39 
13   EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FO R AGRICULTURAL PRODU CTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REG ISTRATION OF CERTAIN  TERMS OF CHEESE AS  G/C/M/134  
 
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  GEOGRAPHICAL INDICAT IONS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA,  
THE UNITED STATES  AND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ..............  41 
14   EGYPT – MANUFAC TURE REGISTRATION SY STEM – REQUEST FROM  
THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 43 
15   MONGOLIA – QUAN TITATIVE RESTRICTION S AND PROHIBITIONS O N 
IMPORTATION OF CERTA IN AGRICULTURAL PROD UCTS – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON................................ ................................ ............................  45 
16   VIET NAM – DECR EE ON THE REGULATION  ON CONDITIONS FOR A UTOMOBILES 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEM BLING, IMPORTING, AN D AUTOMOTIVE WARRAN TY AND 
MAINTENANCE SERVICES  – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  ................................ . 46 
17   CHINA – MEASURE S RESTRICTING THE IM PORT OF SCRAP MATERI ALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STAT ES ................................ ................................ ............................  47 
18   INDIA – QUANTIT ATIVE RESTRICTIONS O N IMPORTS OF CERTAIN  PULSES –  
REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA, CANAD A, THE EUROPEAN UNIO N,  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON, AND THE UNITED S TATES  ................................ ..................  49 
19   CHINA – CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON CERTAIN I NTEGRATED CIRCUITS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND CHINESE TAIPEI  .........................  51 
20   EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGULAT IONS REGARDING  
PROTECTED DESIGNATIO NS OF ORIGIN AND GEO GRAPHICAL INDICATION S, 
TRADITIONAL TERMS, L ABELLING AND PRESENT ATION OF CERTAIN  
WINE SECTOR PRODUCTS  – REQUEST FROM ARGE NTINA AND THE UNITED  STATES  ..... 52 
21   CHINA – NEW EXP ORT CONTROL LAW IN D RAFT – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  .............  54 
22   UNITED STATES – PROHIBITIVE PROPOSA L ON COMMUNICATION  
EQUIPMENT OR SERVICE S RELEASED BY THE FC C – REQUEST FROM CHI NA ..................  55 
23   EUROPEAN UNION – SAFEGUARD MEASURES  ON INDICA RICE FROM   
CAMBODIA – REQUEST F ROM CAMBODIA  ................................ ................................ ....... 56 
24   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET A CCESS PROHIBITION ON   
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUE ST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 58 
25   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO. 1272/2008 (CLP REGUL ATION) –  
REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 59 
26   UNITED STATES – MEASURES ON AVIATIO N SECURITY EQUIPMENT  –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 62 
27   RUSSIAN FEDERAT ION – TRADE RESTRICT ING PRACTICES –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .........  63 
28   CROATIA – REGUL ATION OF IMPORT AND SALE OF CERTAIN OIL PRODUCTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 65 
29   JAMAICA – REGUL ATIONS NOS.  145 AND 146 BANNING SINGLE -USE PLASTIC 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM THE DOMINICAN RE PUBLIC  ................................ .............  66 
30   EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC , RENEWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM COLOMBIA  AND MALAYSIA  ................................  67 
31   TRINIDAD AND TO BAGO – ANNOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE BAN O N THE 
MARKETING AND IMPORT ATION OF POLYSTYRENE  PLASTICS – REQUEST FROM THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 71 
32   BETTER FUNCTION ING OF THE COUNCIL F OR TRADE IN GOODS AN D  
SUBSIDIARY COMMITTEE S – STATEMENT BY HON G KONG, CHINA  ................................  72 
33   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMER CE ................................ ...................  74 
34   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 75 
34.1   Switzerland's modification of Schedule of Concessions  LIX ................................ ............. 75 
34.2   Date of the next meeting  ................................ ................................ ........................... 75 G/C/M/134  
 
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  35   ELECTION OF CHA IRPERSON OF THE COUN CIL FOR TRADE IN GOO DS ....................  75 
 
Before the Agenda had been adopted, the delegation of Argentina requested to be added as a co-
sponsor of Agenda Items  13 ("European Union – Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and 
Foodstuffs – the Registration of Certain Terms of Cheese as Geographical Indications – Request from 
the United States and  Uruguay") and 20 ("European Union – Draft Implementing Regulations 
Regarding Protected Designations of Origin and Geographical Indications, Traditional Terms, 
Labelling and Presentation of Certain Wine Sector Products – Request from the United States") . The 
delegation of Mexico requested to be added as a co-sponsor of Agenda Item 5 ("European Union – 
Proposed Modification of EU  TRQ Commitments: Systemic Concerns – Request from Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, the Unite d States, and Uruguay"). The  
delegation of Colombia requested to be included as co -sponsor of Agenda Item 30 ("European Union 
– Amendments to the Directive 2009/28/EC, Renewable Energy Directive – Request from Malaysia") . 
The delegation of Switzerland indi cated that, under "Other Business", it intended to raise the issue 
of its negotiations under GATT  Article  XXVIII . 
 
The Chairperson  indicated that, under the same agenda item, he would raise the matter of the date 
of the Council's next meeting.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGI ONAL TRADE AGREEMENT S 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members ' notifications of new regio nal 
trade agreements (RTAs).1 He informed the CTG that the following three  RTAs had been notified to 
the CRTA , as followed : 
– Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans -Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)  
(WT/REG395/N/1 ); 
 
– Economic Partnership Agreement B etween the European Union and Japan  
(WT/REG39 6/N/1) ; and 
 
– Free Trade Agreement between Hong Kong , China and Georgia (WT/REG397/N/1).  
 
1.2.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the information provided.  
1.3.  The Council so agreed . 
2  STATUS OF NOTIFICATI ONS UNDER THE PROVIS IONS OF THE AGREEMEN TS IN 
ANNEX  IA OF THE WTO  AGREEMENT (G/L/223/R EV.26)  
2.1.  The Chairperso n drew Members' attention to document  G/L/223/Rev.26 , containing the status 
of notifications under the provisions of the Agreements in Annex  1A of the WTO  Agreement. He 
recalled that , at the March  2018 meeting of the CTG , it had been agreed that the Council would hold 
consultations with interested Members on how best to include the Agreement on Trade Facilitation 
(TFA) notifications in its Annual Report on the Status of Notifications , and that before the Council's 
first meeting of 2019, informal open -ended consultations on this issue  would be convened . Those 
consultations had taken  place on 4  March  2019, and Members had agreed , on that occasion,  that 
the Annual Report on Notifications should only contain information relative to particular provisions 
of Section  I of the TFA  (the so -called  "transparency notifications" ), as these were the notification 
requirements that applied to all Members , including  Article  1.4 (Publication and Availability of 
Information ), Article  10.4.3 (Single Window ), Article  10.6.2 (Customs Brokers ), and Article  12.2.2 
(Customs Cooperation). Consequently, as concerned the TFA, these were the notifications that had 
been included in the document currently before the Council, document  G/L/223/Rev.26; a detailed 
                                                
1 See documents  WT/REG16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  explanatio n to this effect had been provided on page 9 of the document's explanatory notes , and in 
its Annex  18 (English version).  
2.2.  The delegate of the European Union  thanked the Secretariat for its report and indicated that 
the submission of timely and complete noti fications  was a key issue  for the EU . Nevertheless, the 
EU acknowledged that the work that was necessary before a Member could submit a complete and 
timely notification was resource -intensive , especially for Members with fewer resources . The EU 
encourag ed Members to undertake individual efforts to close the se gaps. The EU also recalled the 
importance of transparency for economic operators and regretted the persistent gaps in notification 
compliance across the agreements listed in the different tables of th e report.  
2.3.  The EU expressed its particular concern over notification non-compliance in the areas of 
subsidies , state trading enterprises, import licensing regimes , and quantitative restrictions , where a 
significant number of notifications remained outstandi ng, including in relation to major trading 
partners and across several notification periods. The EU urged all Members to submit their missing 
notifications without further delay and in the future to meet all of the relevant deadlines.  
2.4.  With regard to TFA  notifications, the EU welcomed their inclusion in the Annual Report but 
noted that ideally all TFA  notifications  should be covered  to enhance overall transparency , as was 
the case with the TF  Committee's own matrix table of notifications . The report's TFA  table was useful 
in that it indicated what had been  notified  by which Member ; however, the current format also had 
its limitations . The information presented could be further refined to indicate,  for example , what a 
Member ha d committed to not ify, and if the Member in question ha d in fact done so by the cut -off 
date of 31 December  2018. For example, 17  Members, including several LDCs, had not committed 
to any of the  transparency provisions in their Category  A notifications; therefore , the transparency 
notifications were not yet applicable to them. The EU considered that the table should highlight  such 
a distinction , in conformity with the approach used in the TF Committee's own matrix table , as 
referenced  in the report  itself. The EU h ighlighted that, among those Members that had included all 
of the transparency obligations in their Category  A commitments , the vast majority (54  Members) 
had complied with their notification obligations, although notifications nevertheless did remain 
outstanding for 9  Members . As concerned  outstanding notifications on individual transparency 
obligations designated under Category  A, the EU noted that 30 Members had categori zed 
Article  1.4 (publication) as a Category  A commitment but  had nevertheless failed to notify ; and that 
46 Members had committed Article  12.2.2  (contact points for customs cooperation) as Category  A, 
but had likewise failed to notify. The EU called upon the Members concerned to submit these 
notification s without delay.  
2.5.  The delegate of China  thanked the Secretariat for its report and for includ ing the relevant 
TFA information. The report currently presented information on notifications in Section  I of the TFA , 
but China considered that there needed to be further discussion regarding the incorporation of 
notifications also under Articles  22.1 and 22.2 of the TFA. For China,  the notification obligation for 
donors under Article  22 was clear ly defined  and should not be the source of any misunderstanding. 
The text referred clearly to donor Members , and to developing country Members that had declared 
themselves to be in a position to provide assistance and support with regard to a capacity -building 
classification. Furthermore, a donor in the context of the TFA was defined in the same way as a 
donor in the context of the Official Development Assistance Programme (ODA) , which was a 
definition clear to all. In this context, China considered that , to fully reflect TFA notification 
performance, TFA obligations under  Article s 22.1 and 22.2 should also be included . 
2.6.  The delegate of Japan  thanked the Secretariat for compiling the report on notifications  and 
indicated that , although a consensus had already been reached at an earlier CTG informal meeting 
to includ e in the report only the transparency notifications, Japan nevertheless considered  that 
further discussion was necessary on how best to includ e in the report also category  A, B, and C  
notifications , as well as donor notifications. Japan  request ed the Chair t o hold additional informal 
consultation meetings to discuss th is issue further . 
2.7.  The delegate of Australia  thanked the Secretariat for the report , which made Members aware 
of their respective levels of notification compliance. Australia also encouraged Members to use this 
report as a reminder of any outstanding notifications that needed still to be addressed, and also as 
a way of encouraging and ensuring that  Members  compli ed fully with their obligations.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  2.8.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Coun cil take note of the statement s made and of 
document  G/L/223/Rev.26.  
2.9.  The Council so agreed . 
3  APPOINTMENT OF OFFIC ERS TO THE SUBSIDIAR Y BODIES OF THE COUN CIL FOR TRADE 
IN GOODS  
3.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that the Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers to W TO Bodies, 
contained in document  WT/L/510, adopted by the General Council on 10  December  2002, provided 
that the Chairperson of the CTG would conduct consultations on the appointment of the Chairpersons 
of the Council's subsidiary bodies. The Chairperson recalled that , on 1 March  2019, all Members and 
Group Coordinators had been informed that he would be accepting proposals for candidates to Chair 
the subsidiary bodies of the CTG. The consultations that he had carried out on this matter since 
March had consisted both of individual meetings with Group Coordinators and of bilateral 
consultations with those delegations that had expressed their interest in the consultation process. 
The following meetings had been held in this regard : two  initial consultations with Group 
Coordinators , on 7 and 18  March  2019; three  rounds of bilateral consultations with all interested 
delegations , on 25, 26 , and 27  March  2019; and two  further meetings with Group Coordinators , on 
4 and 8  April 2019. In accordance with the guidelines , the Chair had coordinated with the Services 
Council Chair  throughout this process . However, despite his best efforts , he was not yet in a position 
to submit a slate of names to Members for their consideration. He therefore proposed to suspend 
this agenda item in order to hold additional consultations on this issue, and to revert to it at the 
appropriate time.  
3.2.  The Council so agreed . 
4  ACCESS ION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA AND THE KYRGYZ REPUB LIC TO THE 
EURASIAN ECONOMIC UN ION: PROCEDURES UNDE R ARTICLE  XXVIII :3 OF GATT  1994  – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION  
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
European  Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the meeting's agenda.  
4.2.  The delegate of the European Union  said that her delegation had requested the inclusion of this 
item on the agenda in order to obtain an update from Armen ia and the Kyrgyz Republic on their 
GATT  Article  XXVIII compensation negotiations following their accession to the Eurasian Economic 
Union  (EAEU) . The EU welcomed the progress that had been achieved in the tariff negotiations for 
non-agricultural product s and looked forward to the formalization of such progress in the respective 
bound WTO schedules of the EAEU  countries. However, concern s remained over a lack of progress 
in the area of agriculture, where in principle the exercise should have been simpler, s ince only 
compensation had been requested from Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic;  nevertheless, after 
four years of negotiations, to date neither of the two  countries had tabled an offer on agricultural 
products. The EU called upon both countries to table th eir offers on agriculture without further delay.  
4.3.  The delegate of Ukraine  said that the participation of Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic 
simultaneously in the EAEU and in the free trade zones with Ukraine risked result ing in unpredictable 
consequences for Ukrainian exports . In this context, he reiterated Ukraine's concern regarding 
possible changes in access to EAEU  markets.  
4.4.  The delegate of China  welcomed the progress made on the NAMA  negotiation  and indicated 
that China had also submitted its claim of interest and had been working with Armenia and the 
Kyrgyz Republic on the se renegotiations . 
4.5.  The delegate of Chinese Taipei  recalled that Chinese Taipei had submitted a claim of interest 
to Armenia under GATT  Article  XXVIII more than four  years ago.  
4.6.  The delegate of Armenia  recalled that, after substantive discussion s with the E AEU member 
States , in 2017 Armenia had prepared a new compensation package on non -agricultural products , 
including a comprehensive list of goods for which Armenia was ready to consider further 
liberalization. Armenia also recalled that bilateral meetings on th is subject had taken place between G/C/M/134  
 
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  the EU  delegation and the EAEU  country representatives  in November  2018,  in Geneva. As a result, 
a new and updated compensation  offer to the EU on NAMA had been informally made , based on a 
previous proposal. This formal offer was submitted in March  2019, together with the compensation 
package , and including the list of tariff lines that had been approved by the Eurasian Economic 
Commission on 29  March  2019. Therefore, it could be considered that , in principle, an agreement 
had already been reached with the EU. Armenia also indicated that the conclusion of the Non-
Agricultural Market Access ( NAMA ) compensatory package was very close and that, once concluded, 
Armenia would concentrate more of its efforts and resources on the compensation package on 
agriculture. Armenia indicated  that it had also prepared a draft proposal to the EU on TRQs for 
agricultural products , and that this proposal had since been presented to its EAEU  partners. 
Discussion s within the various EAEU  institutions were currently ongoing,  and a new round of 
consultation s between EAEU  member states would be held  imminently . Armenia also hoped that the 
decision -making process within the EAEU would soon be finalized to enable Armenia to submit to 
the EU a comprehensive reply and compensation package on agricultural goods , as it had previously 
done for industrial goods.  
4.7.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republic  said that his authorities continue d to work on the 
negotiation process , including the assessment of the claims that they had received , in order to 
prepar e an appropriate  compensation  package . On behalf  of his authorities , he thanked the EU and 
other interested  Members  for their understanding with regard to the internal process , and for their 
readiness to cooperate further  with the Kyrgyz Republic . With regard to Ukraine's intervention, he 
noted that  trade with Ukraine was based on preferential treatment within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) , as provided for in the bilateral trade agreement and CIS Free Trade 
Agreement,  signed in 2011.  
4.8.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  indicated that his authorities recog nized the necessity 
for an expeditious conclusion to these compensatory adjustment negotiations and indicated that his 
authorities would continue to support Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic in their respective 
negotiation process es. 
4.9.  The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council take 
note of the statements made.  
4.10.   The Council so agreed . 
5  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION O F EU TRQ  COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMI C 
CONCERNS – REQUEST F ROM AUSTRALIA, BRAZI L, CANADA, CHINA, MEXICO, NEW 
ZEALAND, THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION, THE UNI TED STATES, AND URUG UAY 
5.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in communications dated 28 and 29  March  2019, the 
delegations of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, New Zealand, the Russian F ederation, the 
United  States, and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the  
agenda. He also recalled that , at the start of the meeting , Mexico had requested to be added as a 
co-sponsor of this agenda item.  
5.2.  The delegate of the United States  said that, while the United States was supportive of the UK 
establishing itself as an independent WTO Member , it would not accept an EU -UK approach to  tariff 
rate quotas ( TRQs) that was prejudicial to its WTO rights and trade interests , such as the approach 
chosen by the EU and the UK , which would reduce market access opportunities for U S exporters into 
both markets.  Indeed, any changes to EU  TRQ commit ments as a part of the UK's exit from the EU 
must be subject to negotiations with other WTO Members to ensure that their trade interests were 
maintained. Otherwise, the EU and the UK  would have to compensate any Member negatively 
affected by the approach eventually adopted . Consequently , the United States could not accept the 
EU and UK plan of proposed TRQ splits without there having first been substantive negotiations with 
all the relevant Members concerning their respective market access commitm ents. Apportionment 
of the EU TRQ quantities would reduce access into the UK or the EU -27 for any given TRQ  product. 
Other Members ha d had the opportunity to export the full TRQ  quantity into either the UK or the 
other EU -27 Member states during the quota year. However, u nder the EU -UK TRQ splitting plan, 
Members would  have the opportunity to export only a portion of that original TRQ  quantity to the 
UK or the EU -27. For certain TRQ  products, the proposed split would  result in no in -quota access to 
either t he UK or the EU -27; this would be an unjustifiable an d unacceptable outcome for other G/C/M/134  
 
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  Members . In this vein , the US highlighted that a number of the TRQs in the EU  schedule were 
unrelated to the UK and were instead the result of negotiations relative to EU  enlargement s; 
therefore, t hese EU  trade concessions represent ed compensation for the loss of Members' access in 
the markets of the acceding EU  members. Furthermore, t he US submitted that the UK's decision to 
leave the EU should not be used as a reason to diminish the EU 's market access commitments , and 
noted that neither  the EU nor the UK had provided reliable import data to inform Members of how 
much of a given TRQ product had been imported into the UK relative to the EU -27. Indeed, t he data 
that had been provided had not contain ed information on intra -EU trade flows after a product had 
enter ed the  EU's customs territory and , as such, the basis on which the EU and the UK had proposed 
to split their TRQs  was unreliable . Since formal discussions with the UK were less advanced than 
they were with the EU, the US expect ed to hold negotiations with the UK on any TRQ with in its claim 
to the EU. According to the US, the fact that the  UK was basing its analysis on claims on imports 
into the UK only was highly biased in favour of the apportionment approach that Members had 
declared  prejudicial. The US also noted that it had little trade in certain of the TRQ  products because 
of SPS  barriers. 
5.3.  The delegate of New Zealand  noted that the EU was both the world's largest agricultural 
importer and its largest agricultural exporter, and that a significant number of the EU's agricultural 
imports occurred  through TRQs.  Currently, the EU ha d 196 TRQ concessions , covering almost 
400 tariff lines , whose average value of imports in 2018 had totalled €28  billion. New Zealand 
recalled that a number  of Members had expressed concern over document  G/SECRET/42 , where the 
EU ha d proposed to reduce its TRQ  concessions in response to Brexit, including in room 
document  RD/CTG/5 , circulated at the previous CTG meeting . In her delegation 's view , the EU's 
proposal  disregarded TRQ commitments that represent ed minimum access commitments, current 
access commitments , or negotiated outcomes agreed with the EU during and subsequent to the 
Uruguay Round , thus undermining  the balance of outcomes that other Members had agreed to at 
that stage. Among New Zealand's specific concerns were the following : (1) the significant loss of 
access into the EU  market , which includ ed the complete elimination of a small number of EU TRQs,  
and a large-scale reduction of many more; (2)  the saturation of the remaining reduced TRQs by the 
significant level of bilateral EU -UK trade; and (3)  the loss of flexibility that would arise  from the 
implementation or reduction of these negotiated quotas , which constrain ed the ability of both 
exporters and markets to respond appropriately to fluctuations in demand in the current uncertain 
environment.  The proposal to reduce the EU  frozen beef quota by 69% in volume from 63,703 to 
19,676  metric tonnes  illustrated these concerns  as this would cut the quota back from 0.8% of 
consumption in the current EU -28 to 0.3% of consumption in the EU -27 member States  and, on 
current prices, this lost volume would be worth several hundred million euros. This was the case for 
just one of the 129 quota concessions  that the EU ha d proposed to reduce in its schedule.  
5.4.  New Zealand had previously indicated that there was no need for the EU to change its 
obligations in relation to third  countries in response  to Brexit , a conclusion to which the EU itself had 
arrived when it had indicated that there was no need to modify its GATS  schedule, nor to alter its 
bilatera l FTA commitments to third  parties. Brexit was rather a change in the EU -UK relationship 
that should not alter the EU's relationship to the rest of the world. In this vein , the EU's proposed 
reduced quota of 19,676  metric tonnes  was dwarfed by the EU27-UK beef trade of approximately 
350,000  metric tonnes , and  New Zealand had submitted that Members need ed to know what 
arrangements were intended for EU27 -UK trade to sit alongside the access originally negotiated with 
– and valued by – other Members.  There was nothing in the current EU  proposal that would address 
this problem. Moreover, many of the concerned Members had not been heard on this issue due to 
the process that the EU ha d followed . New Zealand had also indicated that Members stood  to lose a 
significant degree of flexibility under the EU  proposal , and that t his flexibility to address fluctuations 
in production, demand , and currency , was helpful to bot h EU consumers and exporters . Therefore, 
New Zealand urged the EU to make full and active use of the Brexit extension period it ha d agreed 
with the UK in order to work with concerned Members to find a mutually acceptable solution that 
would fully honour it s existing commitments.  
5.5.  The delegate of the Republic of Korea  echoed the systemic concerns voiced by other Members 
over the proposed modification of EU  TRQ commitments . Indeed,  the uncertainty surrounding Brexit 
was giving rise to substantive concerns over bilateral relations between the EU and the UK, and 
multilateral trade relations  more generally . Even if Korea had not claimed a substantial interest in 
the EU  TRQ negotiations, it remained very keen to follow the ongoing negotiations between the EU 
and other Members , given that the resulting modification s would bring about significant G/C/M/134  
 
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  consequences for the WTO  system. Korea believed that the se negotiation s should be conducted in a 
transparent and predictable manner.  
5.6.  The delegate of China  shared the concerns raised  by previous speakers , in particular regarding 
the arrangement s for future trade relationships between the EU and the UK , which had not yet been 
formally decided upon. Without a clear understanding o f this future relationship , it would be 
impossible for Members accurately to assess and analyse  the potential trade impact of Brexit in 
terms of any subsequent  uncertainty and unpredictability. China also reiterated its concern over the 
approach and data proposed by the EU and UK as these  would impair Members ' export interests. 
Members were currently entitled to use TRQs up to the full volume when exporting their goods to 
any EU  member State , including the UK ; however, the proposed TRQ apport ionment would result in  
a significant loss to Members of market access opportunity and flexibility in future EU and 
UK market s. There was also a risk of Members ' export s being crowded  out by EU -UK trade if the 
quotas between the EU and the UK were not set up appropriately. In addition , the data provided by 
the EU and the UK ha d failed to reflect actual trade patterns  in their entirety . China was also 
concern ed over the EU's intention to impose a unilateral TRQ apportionment in its 
Regulation  2019/216, published on 30  January  2019, in the event of a no -deal Brexit. China believed  
that this would seriously affect other Members' interests . Therefore , the EU and UK respectively 
should maintain the current EU -28 TRQ schedule until the necessary agreeme nts could be reached 
with other Members.  
5.7.  The delegate of Australia  expressed Australia's significant interest in this important issue given 
that Australia was an exporter of agricultural TRQ  products to the EU and the UK. Australia 
recognized the EU and UK 's legal right to modify their goods concessions provided that compensatory 
concessions were granted to the Members  affected by any such modification . However, Australia 
could not accept the EU's assertion that no compensation was required on the grounds that there 
had been no loss in value of the concessions  in question . The proposed TRQ modifications w ould 
lead to significant year-on-year economic loss by removing flexibility for exporters and by  making 
some TRQ  allocations too small to be commercially viable. The EU and UK must proceed with 
compensatory adjustments that factor ed in the significant resulting commercial losses and 
maintain ed the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous  concessions. Australia 
expect ed the EU to ensure that the "value" of existing market access would be maintained, and not 
just the total "volume" of existing TRQs. This could  only be achieved by the EU and UK considering 
product -by-product solutions , in light of the fact that the approach currently proposed would not 
address the concerns of affected Members. Australia echoed the strongly expressed concerns of 
others over the current uncertainty and need for clarity on the method of accounting for UK -EU trade 
post-Brexit. Australia welcomed the UK's publication of new autonomous quotas , which it had 
understood  were intended to accommodate intra -EU trade . However, Australia  await ed clarification 
from the EU on how it would account for imports from the UK post -Brexit. Australia believed that 
the future trading relationship between the EU and the UK needed to be clarified  in order to facilitate 
Members ' comprehen sion of  the market acc ess implications under the proposed TRQ  splits, in 
particular for erga omnes TRQs.  His delegation looked forward to working constructively with the EU 
to resolve its concerns and to ensure that the current quality and level of Australia's market access 
would be maintained  post-Brexit . 
5.8.  The delegate of Brazil  shared the concerns of other Members with regard to how the EU s ought  
to modify its TRQs, particularly as the significant reductions to its TRQ commitments proposed by 
the EU also involv ed an equally sig nificant upfront loss of market access opportunities for all 
Members exporting to the EU single market. Brazil considered that the negotiations initiated by the 
EU under Article  XXVIII  of the GATT  were fundamentally flawed . Brazil also expressed its concern 
over the lack of compensatory adjustment , as well as the insufficient and inadequate import data 
provided, which disregarded the specific trade composition of each TRQ.  Brazil was also concerned 
over the modifications sought by the EU and their uni lateral implementation , which would  prejudice 
Members' legitimate interests. Brazil urged the EU to engage  constructively  in these negotiations . 
5.9.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  reiterated his delegation's  concerns over the EU's 
approach to the se negotiations  under  GATT  Article  XXVIII. First, the Russian Federation indicated 
that the EU had accepted its Schedule of Tariff Concessions under  Article  XI of the Marrakesh  
Agreement as a single entity , and not partially.  GATT  Article  XXVIII permit ted a concession  to be 
modified  but also establishe d an obligation to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous concessions that were not less favourable to trade than those provided prior to any 
adjustment negotiations. However, the apportionment currently being proposed by the EU would G/C/M/134  
 
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  lead to a deterioration in market access conditions for exporters to the EU , and to trade distortions, 
which would have a negative effect on Members' exports to the EU. The Russian Federation believed 
that the EU should proceed with its compensatory adjustment  but expressed its concern over  the 
EU's intention  to hold negotiations based on the draft Schedule  CLXXV -European  Union  
(document  G/MA/TAR/RS/506 , of 17 October  2017) , which had not been certified, and which thus 
could not be properly used as the basis for these negotiations. Consequently, the Russian Federation 
emphasized the importance of finalizing the certification of the EU's draft schedule.  
5.10.   The delegate of Uruguay  reiterated Uruguay's pos ition, as already set out in 
document  RD/CTG/5 and in its comments at the Council's November  2018 meeting2, and 
emphasized the importance of resolving this matter through negotiation s between the parties 
concerned , and not unilaterally . Moreover, Uruguay believed that any agreement must be based on 
WTO rules and be in compliance with Members'  market access commitments so as to maintain and 
strengthen the Multilateral Trading System  (MTS) . 
5.11.   The delegate of Mexico  echoed the systemic and e conomic concerns voiced by previous 
speakers over the EU's intention to modify its TRQs as part of its schedule of concessions. In Mexico's 
view, the proposed methodology to split the current TRQs, and the proposed apportionment, would 
result not only in a reduction but also in an elimination of Members' market access opportunities. 
Mexico considered there to be a lack of clarity over the EU's future obligations with regard to  
WTO rules and the UK post-Brexit . 
5.12.   The delegate of Canada  joined other Members  in expressing Canada's concern over the 
approach that the EU ha d taken on modification of  its TRQ commitments , consisting in a reduction 
of available  TRQ volumes, in preparation for Brexit . This approach deviated from the original intent 
of TRQs, which was  to provide Members with substantive access to markets of export interest ; it 
also neglected the fact that final bound volumes were a result of negotiations that sought to establish 
a balance of concessions between Members.  The EU's apportionment of its quota volumes not only 
reduc ed the quality and level of access provided to Members, b ut also ignor ed the imbalance created 
between the EU's market access concessions and the concessions made by Canada, which were 
expected to remain the same. This would be particularly  true if the UK were to have the same access 
to these tariff rate quotas as any other Member. And if this were to be the case, Members would 
have to compete for a reduced amount of market access . This incongruency would also result in 
pragmatic and commercial implications , including cases where the apportionment could result in  
TRQ volumes that were not commercially viable, either in the EU or the UK, or where volumes were 
too low to provide the flexibility for exporters to adapt to the evolution of demand and supply 
conditions in both the EU and the UK markets. Without defining  the trade relationship between the 
EU and the UK, the relative value of the EU's market access concessions would be impossible to 
assess. Canada also expressed its concern over the EU's adoption of implementing 
regulations  2019/216 , of 30 January  2019, and 2019/386 , of 11 March  2019, which would apply the 
reduced volumes as from the day of the UK's withdrawal from the European Union , thus presenting  
Members with a fait accompli , without the necessary negotiations  having been completed, and with 
little flexibility for subsequent adjustments.  
5.13.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  shared the concerns  of other Members , in particular with 
regard to the uncertainty surrounding the process itself, which could result in unexpecte d disruption 
to trade. Chinese Taipei highlighted that its trade interests should be maintained.  
5.14.   The delegate of Paraguay  said that the EU decision to split its TRQs under the apportionment 
methodology would significantly limit opportunities to access the EU market  for the EU's trading 
partners . Paraguay shared New Zealand's view that the EU's proposal could  potential ly have a 
negative impact on the EU's trading partners , and therefore urged the EU to consider alternatives 
to the apportion ment method.  
5.15.   The delegate of Japan  also shared the concerns of other Members and highlighted the 
importance that Japan placed on swiftly establishing the WTO  bound schedules that would be 
applicable to the EU and the UK following the UK's departure from the EU . Japan also consider ed it 
important to maintain legal stability under the WTO  Agreement and to ensure clarity concerning the 
                                                
2 Document  G/C/M/133, paragraph  6.8. G/C/M/134  
 
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  EU and the UK's application of most-favoured -nation ( MFN) rates in accordance with their bound 
schedules.  
5.16.   The delegate of India echoed the concerns raised previously by other Members and thanked 
the EU for having provid ed its revised data for  erga omnes  TRQ reallocation and for the consultation s 
initiated under GATT  Article  XXVIII . India had already expressed its concerns both in writing and 
during the formal consultations that had taken place with the EU  delegation . Nevertheless, India 
reiterated its concern as to how the present methodology and the threshold years considered  for the 
TRQ apportionment by the EU affect ed Members ' rights under the EU's obligations undertaken on 
those specific tariff lines. India expected the EU to conduct these negotiations in full compliance with 
the WTO rules and to provide reasonable opportunities  to all Members, including India, to exercise 
their rights under the WTO  Agreement.  
5.17.   The delegate of Argentina  echoed the systemic concerns on this issue  voiced by other 
Members . 
5.18.   The delegate of Indonesia  also shared the concern s raised by other Members ove r the 
proposed modification of the EU's TRQs, in particular with regard to Indonesia's exports of manioc . 
In this regard, Indonesia  questioned the EU 's unwillingness, after several bilateral meetings, to 
accept the data it had provided when asserting that Indonesia's TRQ on cassava  should be 
maintained . Indonesia considered that this situation hindered the negotiation of  the EU's proposed 
modification  and requested the EU to resolve the matter by accepting the valid data provided to the 
EU by other Members.  
5.19.   The delegate of Costa Rica  reiterated the importance of a strong and effective international 
trading system and the need to maintain and promote certa inty in trade relations between Members. 
Costa Rica emphasized the importance of ensuring that Article  XXVIII negotiations were carried out 
in a transparent and inclusive manner so that Members could be sure that the guarantees established 
under the WTO  Agreements would not be impaired . If there were to be changes to the EU's and the 
UK's Schedule, then every Member should be afforded the possibility to assess meaningfully the 
effects of such changes on their international trade flows.  
5.20.   The delegate of Chile shared the systemic concerns of other Members, especially about  the 
conduct of the process itself. Chile had already expressed many of its concerns at previous CTG and 
bilateral meetings with the EU in the context of the EU's Article  XXVIII negotiations. Chile recognized 
that there  was no clear rule or precedent in the WTO for a case such as that of the UK leaving the 
EU; even so, Chile  had concern s regarding the EU's methodology of splitting its current TRQs  as it 
did not respect the balance of commitments initially agreed upon at the Uruguay Round  based on 
effective market access relative  to consumption. Chile hope d that the EU would meet this 
requirement by providing Members with the necessary compensation.  
5.21.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  expressed systemic concern over the quota reallocation and the 
methodology used by the EU and the UK , particularly regarding the rights of small suppliers , which 
were enshrined under GATT  Article s XXVIII and Article  XII. Sri Lanka noted that , even if small 
suppliers might not have initial negotiatin g rights (INRs) and could not  claim to have principal 
supplier rights , their specific situation should nevertheless be consider ed in this context when 
designing any formula or mechanism.  
5.22.   The delegate of Colombia  echoed the systemic concerns voiced by other Members regarding 
the apportionment of TRQs by the EU, and in particular the erga omnes  effect.  
5.23.   The delegate of Switzerland  noted that Switzerland was among those Members holding rights 
as principle supplier or Members with substantial interests regarding a part of the commitments 
affected by the EU's proposed apportionment of its TRQs . In general , Switzerland shared the 
concerns raised by other Members  at this meeting  and indicated that, as for other Members, it was 
also difficult for Switzerland to assess its interests based on the data currently provided by the EU. 
Switzerland also shared the view that the reallocation of appropriate TRQ  quantities to  the EU-27 
and the UK was highly relevant to many Members and therefore of systemic importance to the WTO  
as a whole . Switzerland hope d that the necessary processes would be completed promptly and on a 
consensus basis with all Members.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  5.24.   The delegate of Guatemala  echoed the systemic concerns that had been raised by previous 
speakers . 
5.25.   The delegate of the European  Union  appreciated Members' concerns over the current 
uncertainty surrounding the UK leaving the EU  and noted that this was why the EU and the UK had 
engaged jointly in discussions with Members , from as early as October  2017,  on the approach 
envisaged for the apportion ment of  the EU's bound TRQs. She reiterated that the EU's key principle 
and aim was to maintain the existing level of market access between the EU -27 and the UK , and 
indicated that the EU was a supporter of the rules -based multilateral trading system. The EU had 
followed all of the relevant WTO  procedures when launching its GATT  Article  XXVIII  negotiations and 
would continue to do so. Moreover, the EU  delegation had engaged with the relevant WTO  partners 
on a regular basis even before launching these  procedures , and would continue to do so , in good 
faith, as part of the procedures  themselves . Negotiations were currently ongoing with EU partners 
that had claimed  their rights  and the EU maintain ed its willingness to continue negotiations in an 
open and fair manner under GATT  Article  XXVIII , regardless of the scenario for the UK's withdrawal. 
The EU was of the view  that the WTO  provisions , namely the Interpretative Note to Article  XXVIII , 
provide d that these negotiations were to be conducted in "the greatest possible secrecy" ; therefore, 
it did not consider the CTG  to be the appropriate  forum  for a discuss ion of the  details of such 
negotiations . 
5.26.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions , and the EU for its response , 
and proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
5.27.   The Council so agreed . 
6  ENLARGEMENT OF THE E UROPEAN UNION TO INC LUDE CROATIA: NEGOTI ATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6  OF THE GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  
6.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  
6.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed Russia's deep concern ove r the EU's 
negotiations under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT  1994 in the framework of its enlargement to include 
Croatia. The EU had notified the WTO and its Members of the conclusion of these negotiations with 
all Members having principle supplying interest i n the affected products. However, the EU had failed 
to engage in negotiations with Russia, which had been recognized by the EU as holding  a principal 
or substantial supplying  interest based on its import statistics, in accordance with paragraph  4 of 
the Ad  Note to Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT. The EU was therefore ignoring its obligations under 
Article  XXVIII:1 of the GATT  1994 and paragraph  4 of the Ad Note to Article  XXVIII:1 of the 
GATT  1994 to negotiate with Members having a principal supplying interest . The Russian Federation 
had previously raised this issue both bilaterally and at the Council for Trade in Goods. Its concerns 
had also been directed to the EU in writing as well as circulated  among WTO  Members in 
document  G/SECRET/35/Add.4. The Russian  Federation  called  upon the EU to engage  with Russia in 
compensatory  adjustment negotiations . 
6.3.  The delegate of the European Union  recalled that Members had been informed of the conclusion 
and outcome of the negotiations following Croatia's accession to the EU on 26  July 2018 (in 
document  G/SECRET/35/Add.2) , and  at the meeting of the Council held in November  2018 
(document  G/C/M/133). The outcome of the Article  XXIV:6 process would be faithfully reflected in 
the EU -28 schedule, which was currently in the process of being certified. The EU had extensively 
and repeatedly explained its reasons for not having accepted the compensation claims of the Russian 
Federation in the context of the EU's latest enlargement. She wished to put on record that, in the 
EU's v iew, the indication of a WTO  Member as principal supplier in a 
GATT  Article  XXIV:6/XXVIII  negotiation did not constitute an automatic recognition of a right for 
that WTO  Member to obtain compensation. Some principal suppliers made a claim while others did 
not. The notifying Member then entered into negotiations or consultations with those Members that 
had submitted a claim, in conformity with the procedures and within the deadlines applicable under 
WTO rules, with a view to identifying if there were any ent itlement for compensation.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  6.4.  The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council take 
note of the statements made.  
6.5.  It was so agreed . 
7  JORDAN – REQUEST FOR  A WAIVER RELATING T O THE TRANSITIONAL P ERIOD FOR THE 
ELIMINATION O F THE EXPORT SUBSIDY  PROGRAMME FOR JORDA N (G/C/W/705; 
G/C/W/705/CORR.1; G/ C/W/705/REV.1; AND G /C/W/705/REV.2)  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that document  G/C/W/705/Rev.2 contained both the waiver request 
and a draft waiver decision submitted by Jordan in reques t of the transitional period for the 
elimination of the export subsidy program for Jordan. At the November  2018 meeting of this Council, 
it had been agreed that the CTG would revert to the matter at its next meeting, when Jordan would 
update Members on fur ther developments in this regard.  
7.2.  The delegate of Jordan  updated Members on the work accomplished regarding the development 
of a new WTO -compliant programme. Jordan had requested, in document  G/C/W/705/Rev.2, a 
3-year transitional period, until end -2018, f or the elimination of its export subsidy programme. It 
had also provided a timetable for the implementation of a new subsidy programme, which would 
take effect as of 1  January  2019. Jordan had fully complied with its commitments. Jordan had 
terminated the export subsidy programme as of 31  December  2018, in accordance with Regulation 
No. 106 of 2016. The new Income Tax Law No.  38 of 2018 had included a WTO -compliant 
replacement programme, which would reduce income tax for industrial activities for a 5 -year p eriod. 
The reduction was to support industrial activities and was not contingent on exports. Jordan wished 
again to thank Members for their cooperation and understanding of the challenges faced by the 
Jordanian economy. Jordan further wished to thank the U S for its support in designing a new 
WTO-compliant and compatible programme. Since the export subsidy had been terminated, Jordan 
requested that this item not reappear on the agenda of subsequent Council meetings.  
7.3.  The delegate of the United States  thanked Jordan for its comprehensive report on its reform 
efforts, and congratulated Jordan on the termination of the export subsidy programme at issue and 
the approval of the alternate support programme. The US wished to thank Jordan for coming into 
compliance in  this regard, and for the fully transparent manner in which it had taken action. The US 
had been actively involved in providing technical assistance (TA) to resolve the underlying issue. In 
her delegation's view, this process had been an excellent example of Members working together, 
cooperatively and creatively. The US looked forward to the termination of the support programme 
at issue, and to the implementation of the new programme, in accordance with the schedule that 
Jordan had reviewed with them.  
7.4.  The d elegate of New Zealand  thanked Jordan for its transparency and reform efforts. Their 
regular updates to the Council and their commitment to bringing their policies into conformity with 
WTO rules had been very much appreciated.  
7.5.  The delegate of Australia  welcomed Jordan's confirmation of the implementation of a new 
WTO-compliant programme, as of 1  January  2019. Jordan's open and constructive approach to this 
important issue had been much appreciated.  
7.6.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
7.7.  It was so agreed . 
8  MEASURES TO ALLOW GR ADUATED LDC s, WITH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEMEN T ON SUBSIDIES AND C OUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – COMMUNICA TION FROM THE CENTRA L AFRICAN REPUBLIC O N BEHALF OF 
THE LD C GROUP (WT/GC/W/742 –G/C/W/752)  
8.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 27  March  2019, the 
delegation of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, had requested the Secretariat again to include this 
item on the agenda, following discussions  at the November  2018 meeting of this Council.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  8.2.  The delegate of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, reiterated that the proposal had been 
submitted to the CTG in April  2018, and that ongoing consultations were taking place to reach 
consensus. However, LDCs we re still being asked by some Members to notify their subsidies, even 
though the LDC  proposal had not yet been fully considered.  
8.3.  The LDC  proposal, as contained in documents  WT/GC/W/742 and G/C/W/752, submitted on 
19 April 2018, had been intended, in relatio n to Annex  VII(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement), to enable LDCs that had graduated still to enjoy certain 
flexibilities under Article  27:2 of the SCM  Agreement, as long as the Member's GDP per capita was 
under US D 1,000, or for a limited period of time. The LDC  Group proposed that graduating LDCs 
should be entitled to be reclassified under Annex  VII(b) if their GDP were to fall below USD 1,000 
per capita for a period of three  consecutive years.  
8.4.  The Group also prop osed that LDCs that had graduated to developing country status but had 
a per capita GDP of less than USD 1000 should enjoy the same benefits as developing countries 
listed in Annex  VII(b). It was also the view of the LDC  Group that this proposal complied w ith the 
outcome of the 3rd UN Conference on LDCs, held in 2001, in relation to implementation issues.  
8.5.  The LDC  Group wished to thank Members that had expressed their flexibility and interest in 
this proposal and urged all Members to approve the draft decisi on proposed by the LDCs.  
8.6.  The delegate of Nepal  associated his delegation with the statement delivered by Chad as 
LDC Group Coordinator. He noted that there existed some momentum for the graduation of LDCs to 
developing country status. Some had already grad uated, some were in the process of doing so, and 
some were in the pipeline to do so. Even if it were the case that, to graduate, a country had to fulfil 
two of three  criteria, the socio -economic status of the general population of those countries might 
still need to be greatly improved through continuous socio -economic advancement. It could be a 
very challenging situation because graduating LDCs were required to relinquish a number of 
international support mechanisms, preferences, and special treatments, in cluding LDC -specific 
special and differential (S&D) treatment provisions, and Aid -for-Trade. The LDC  proposal aimed to 
correct the missing information and technical errors in the existing provisions of Annex  VII(b) of the 
SCM Agreement. Members would be do ing an injustice to graduating LDC  Members if they did not 
correct the pertinent missing information or technical oversights, since several developing countries 
were regularly invoking Annex  VII. 
8.7.  The concept of LDC  graduation had begun to gain momentum aft er the 3rd UN Conference on 
LDCs, held in Brussels in 2001. The 4th UN Conference on LDCs, held in Istanbul, Turkey, in 2011, 
had set the target of graduating half of LDCs by 2020. Similarly, the 2030  agenda for sustainable 
development had also endorsed th ese targets regarding LDC  graduation; that is, that only 
graduating  LDCs with GDP per capita of less than US D 1,000 in 1990  values would be entitled to the 
flexibilities established under Annex  7(b) of the SCM  Agreement. Nepal noted that the list of 
countr ies with a GDP  per capita of less than US D 1,000 in 1990  value was updated by the 
WTO Secretariat. Nepal invited Members to submit any queries and concerns they may have with 
regard to the LDC  proposal in written form. To conclude, Nepal thanked those Memb ers that had 
already indicated their support for the proposal.  
8.8.  The delegate of Senegal  echoed the statements made by previous speakers. The adoption of 
this draft decision could support a soft graduation process for LDCs towards developing country 
status. In Senegal's view, Members should be able to reach consensus to adopt the draft decision. 
The main concern previously expressed by Senegal, and LDCs in previous meetings, was that no 
Member had notified the implementation nor requested the implementation o f the provisions under 
Annex  VII. However, the provision was still applicable.  
8.9.  The delegate of Bangladesh  stated that Bangladesh associated itself with the statements made 
by previous speakers. The LDC  Coordinator had clearly elaborated the context in whic h the proposal 
had been made. Bangladesh requested the Council to recall that LDC  graduation had gained 
momentum since the adoption of the UN's Istanbul Plan of Action for LDCs, which had set a target 
of 50% of LDCs fulfilling the graduation criteria by 20 20. UNCTAD had projected that 16  LDCs were 
likely to graduate from LDC  status by 2024. The process of graduation was not easy and graduated 
LDCs would face multiple challenges, including in the area of trade. Therefore, international support 
was essential to retain the current momentum.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  8.10.   Under Article  27.2(a) of the SCM  Agreement, read alongside paragraph  10.1 of the Doha 
Ministerial Decision on Implementation -Related Issues and Concerns, LDCs and countries with per 
Capita GDP of US D 1,000 in constant 1990  dollars value listed in Annex  VII could benefit from 
flexibilities in providing export subsidies. However, it was not clear to Bangladesh if a graduated LDC 
with per capita GNI of below US D 1,000 in constant 1990  dollars value could also enjoy the same 
flexibilities as developing country Members with GNI per capita below US D 1,000 in 1990  US dollar 
terms under Annex  VII. LDC  graduation had not been envisaged at the time that the SCM  Agreement 
had been concluded. However, it was now appropriate to have a Gene ral Council Decision to address 
this omission in Annex  VII. The proposal called for the continuation of the same flexibility afforded 
under Annex  VII to graduated LDCs, which fell within the criteria agreed at the time of their 
graduation. LDCs that were e ligible for the flexibility under Article  VII would not be automatically 
entitled to the exemption and could only resort to it at a time of serious need. A General Council 
Decision would allow the Secretariat to calculate GNI per capita for graduated LDCs for the year 
following graduation while annually updating the Annex  VII list. The GNI per capita could only be 
calculated after graduation. At previous meetings of the CTG, many Members had seen the logic and 
merit of the proposal and had unequivocally sup ported it. A few other Members had sought for 
clarification on the impact of the proposal. Bangladesh requested Members to reflect upon whether 
or not there had been agreement on the following three  points: (i)  that the proposed decision 
intended to addres s an element that had not been anticipated at the conclusion of the 
SCM Agreement; (ii)  that the proposed decision would not create any new flexibility for any Member; 
and (iii)  that a graduated LDC deserved the same flexibility available to other developi ng countries 
with the same level of development. If Members answered these questions in the affirmative, then 
Bangladesh urged them to accept the proposal and to continue to engage in constructive discussions.  
8.11.   The delegate of Côte d'Ivoire  shared the views of previous speakers. The test used during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations had not provided for LDC  graduation; but now that LDCs could 
graduate, Members needed to ensure that the graduation process was properly supported. 
Accordingly, Côt e d'Ivoire considered that the LDC  proposal was relevant and useful.  
8.12.   The delegate of Chad thanked Members for their comments and invited them to review the 
answers and explanations provided by the previous speakers. The LDC  proposal, in the spirit of 
shared responsibility and mutual impartiality, provided the necessary concrete and substantive  
measures. LDC  graduation should be a means structurally to address the challenge of the elimination 
of poverty and to accelerate the achievement of the UN  development objectives. For these reasons, 
it was necessary gently to facilitate the graduation proc ess. Members should help LDCs to eliminate 
the obstacles preventing them from developing sufficiently in the way that they should. The 
LDC Group would continue to include their proposal on the CTG  agenda until Members agreed to 
adopt the draft decision.  
8.13.   The delegate of the United States  questioned the need to change the rules in this area. The 
UN process had already provided for a lengthy transition process out of the LDC  category, including 
possible extensions. Since there were no subsidy programmes in pla ce for which an extension might 
be needed, the specific need for the LDC  proposal remained unclear. The US was willing to discuss 
the issue further and noted that it would be helpful if the relevant Members would provide a subsidy 
notification to clarify t he issue. If technical assistance was the issue, the US would welcome the 
opportunity to share its experience and technical knowledge with the LDCs.  
8.14.   The delegate of India reiterated its agreement that the income threshold for graduation from 
Annex  VII shou ld also be extended to newly graduated LDC  Members. India welcomed the 
opportunity to discuss these aspects of Annex  VII interpretation with the LDC  Group and looked 
forward to extending its support in the finalization and adoption of the proposed decision . 
8.15.   The delegate of the European Union  stated that the EU was mindful of the challenges faced 
by graduating LDCs and was supportive of constructive initiatives to better integrate them into the 
multilateral trading system  (MTS) . The EU's general approach to new special and differential 
treatment provisions was that developing countries, and in particular LDCs, should have access to 
flexibilities that would genuinely help them to achieve their development objectives on a case -by-
case basis, and that these flex ibilities should be needs -driven and evidence -based. The EU 
encouraged Members to discuss the proposal and, as with any special and differential treatment 
proposal, to do so on the basis of analysis that indicated where there were specific problems, and 
what the basis of proposals was for well -justified solutions to those problems. With regard to the 
proposal under consideration, the conversation should start by assessing the actual use of export G/C/M/134  
 
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  subsidies by LDCs in order to establish the potential need fo r a transition period to allow continued 
use of export subsidies once an LDC had graduated. Unfortunately, at present, the EU had little 
knowledge of whether, and to what extent, LDCs used export subsidies (or any other subsidies), 
because LDCs had barely  submitted any notifications under Article  25 of the SCM  Agreement. The 
EU encouraged the LDC  Group to work with the Secretariat to improve the situation on notifications 
and to tap into the possibilities of accessing available technical assistance. Realizi ng that preparing 
first-time notifications could take time, the EU suggested that the LDC  Group move the debate 
forward by presenting anecdotal evidence of if and how LDCs made use of export subsidies, and how 
these contributed to their economic developmen t. The EU also suggested that the countries 
concerned should seek assistance for reshaping any export subsidies in place in order to make them 
WTO-compatible.  
8.16.   The delegate of Senegal  clarified that the proposal did not request to change the rules of 
Annex  VII(b). The current matter was not about notifications but about the existence of a provision 
that could be utilized even if it were not currently being applied. It was important to separate the 
strength of the provision from its use and the notifications that could be made on the basis of it. 
Nevertheless, if Members wished to link the notifications and the provision they could do so. 
However, the proposal amend ed the list of beneficiaries under Annex  VII to include LDCs graduating 
to developing country st atus. 
8.17.   The delegate of Turkey  reiterated Turkey's support for the proposal. Turkey believed that 
trade was the most effective tool for development and that it was the responsibility of WTO  Members 
to help LDCs in their efforts to integrate into the global e conomy. Members should continue to assist 
these countries to overcome the ir remaining challenges in order to ensure their full integration into 
the rules -based multilateral trading system. Graduated LDCs with a GNP of below US D 1,000 should 
be granted the same rights as the developing countries listed in Annex  VII(b) of the SCM  Agreement.  
8.18.   The delegate of Canada  said that Canada was mindful of the challenges faced by LDCs, and 
of the need for flexibilities in the rules, such as with regard to the SDT  provisi ons found in Annex  VII 
of the SCM  Agreement. The EU's intervention had been helpful in outlining certain questions and 
thoughts concerning possible ways forward, including the suggestion that the Secretariat assist LDCs 
with the preparation of their notifi cations under Article  25 of the SCM  Agreement. According to the 
WTO list, eight  LDCs had graduated since 1995; five of the eight were not WTO  Members; only one 
had provided a subsidy notification that had indicated that they did not provide any subsidies. 
Accordingly, Canada believed that the first  step should be to understand where the interest was in 
this proposal and to clarify the provisions in order to develop a clearer understanding of the facts on 
the ground. Senegal had said that, even though it had  not used export subsidies it would still like to 
have access to them, although Article  3 of the SCM  Agreement prohibited the use of export subsidies 
by Members because of their detrimental effect on international trade. Members had agreed to 
eliminate agr icultural subsidies in Nairobi for the same reason.  
8.19.   The delegate of Côte d'Ivoire  said that, as a member of a customs union that included 
seven  LDCs, it had concerns regarding the situation under discussion. Côte d'Ivoire believed that 
the proposed amendme nt to Annex  VII, as requested by LDCs, should be understood in the context 
of a trend towards greater predictability and transparency. LDCs in graduation should be 
appropriately  supported  and accompanied; in this regard, Côte d'Ivoire considered the propos al to 
be relevant  and useful , and that it  should be approved by Members.  
8.20.   The delegate of Chad thanked delegations for their comments, especially those Members that 
had expressed their support for the LDC  proposal. The LDC  Group remained open to bilateral 
discussions that would allow for further improvement and clarification of the proposal. He said that 
the LDC  Group remained open to dialogue with Members in this regard and  reiterated the LDCs' goal 
to have the decision adopted.  
8.21.   The Chairperson  proposed tha t the Council take note of the statements made.  
8.22.   It was so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  9  PROCEDURES TO ENHANC E TRANSPARENCY AND S TRENGTHEN NOTIFICATI ON 
REQUIREMENTS UNDER W TO AGREEMENTS – COMM UNICATION FROM ARGEN TINA, 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, C OSTA RICA, THE EUROP EAN UNION, JAPAN, NE W ZEALAND, THE 
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TER RITORY OF TAIWAN, PE NGHU, KINMEN AND MAT SU, AND THE 
UNITED STATES (JOB/G C/204/REV.1 –JOB/CTG/ 14/REV.1)  
9.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to document  JOB/GC/204/Rev.1 –
JOB/CTG/14/Rev.1, dated 19  March  2019, circulated a t the request of the delegations of Argentina, 
Australia, Canada, Costa  Rica, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Chinese Taipei, and the 
United States, containing a revised draft decision for the General Council's consideration on 
procedures to enhanc e transparency and strengthen notification requirements under the 
WTO Agreements. He also informed Members that, in communications dated 28 and 29  March  2019, 
the co -sponsors of the proposal had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda . 
9.2.  The representative of the United States  reminded delegations that the US had initially tabled 
this proposal at the November  2017 CTG  meeting with a view to improving Members' compliance 
with the notification requirements of the various WTO  Agreements.  
9.3.  The proposal that had been circulated for the current meeting was a culmination of 
improvements based on the work of its co -sponsors, extremely helpful Member feedback received 
during three  CTG meetings, and countless bilateral and small group meetings and d iscussions. The 
US considered this proposal to be an effort to address deficiencies and gaps in notifications and 
transparency and to put the WTO on a path towards a more successful and sustainable future.  
9.4.  The Secretariat's annual report on notifications p rovided to the CTG in document  G/L/223/ – 
and its revisions, highlighted that compliance with the notification requirements of the various 
WTO Agreements remained inadequate.  
9.5.  A lack of transparency was problematic for traders and undermined the proper funct ioning and 
operation of the WTO  Agreements. From a systemic perspective, it was also very difficult to develop, 
to evaluate, and to assess negotiating proposals to improve the operation of the various 
WTO Agreements without the information that should in a ny case have been provided under the 
existing WTO  notification obligations. A lack of compliance with basic notification obligations also 
undermined confidence in the MTS. If Members could not comply with their most basic obligations, 
what certainty could there be that they were complying with their more substantive obligations?  
9.6.  To encourage better compliance with notification obligations, two  incentives to seek improved 
performance had been considered, namely the ability to request technical assistance , and the ability 
to compile information through the TPR  process, as well as modest administrative measures that 
acknowledged that sustained problems in compliance should at least have some consequences. 
However, this proposal did not change Members' notific ation obligations under the WTO  Agreements; 
rather, it merely sought to encourage better compliance through various incentives and 
administrative measures. In order to explain the details and particularities of the proposal he then 
invited a colleague from  the US  delegation to take the floor.  
9.7.  The delegate of the United States highlighted the various revisions that had been made to the 
proposal. Throughout the document, references to "complete" notifications had been changed to 
"required" notifications, to b etter clarify that the proposal was seeking to capture those notifications 
that were required under the WTO  Agreements and Understandings under the remit of the CTG. The 
change had also clarified that the proposal was not seeking to address the quality of specific 
notifications, which was beyond the scope of this proposal. The quality or completeness of 
notifications could be something the Working Group on Notification Obligations and Procedures could 
consider in the future.  
9.8.  In response to Members' expresse d interest, the proposal now included the TFA, Section  I, in 
paragraph  1. However, the proposal had not included Section  II notifications given that such 
notifications had been provided as a flexibility, and that Members were not required to submit them. 
The US reminded Members wishing to avail themselves of the flexibilities provided therein that the 
last deadline for TFA  Section  II notifications for Developing Country Members was August  2019. 
Beyond that time, the US considered that any developing country  Members that had not submitted G/C/M/134  
 
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  the required notifications would no longer be eligible to receive the flexibility provided under 
Section  II. 
9.9.  The proposal had consolidated the projected work of the Working Group on Notification 
Obligations and Procedures in to a single paragraph, reflected in paragraph  2. 
9.10.   The proposal also recognized that some notification requirements were on an annual or 
biannual basis, with a certain date by when such notifications were due. Other notifications were 
required on an ad hoc b asis, when a new measure was proposed, as was the case for newly proposed 
regulations notified under the TBT or SPS  Agreements. This proposal to the General Council would 
apply to all notifications concerning the Agreements listed in paragraph  1, as there had been delays 
in the submission of each type of notification. However, the issue of developing a means to have the 
Decision cover such ad hoc notifications for the TBT and SPS  Agreements had been delegated to the 
respective Committees addressing those Ag reements in footnote  1 to paragraph  6. 
9.11.   In the previous version of the proposed Decision, the Agriculture Agreement notifications had 
been treated differently from other notifications, but the proposal had now limited the differentiated 
treatment to only th e Domestic Support Table  1 notification, referred to as DS:1, in paragraph  7. In 
reviewing the missing notifications covered by document  G/AG/2, it was discovered that there were 
over 800  missing DS:1  notifications. There had been fewer  than 100  missing no tifications for each 
of the other required agriculture notifications. Thus, until an update of document  G/AG/2 could be 
achieved, the proposal had limited the flexibility in this case to an additional two  years, until 
administrative measures could apply to  DS:1 only.  
9.12.   Also, in the previous version of the proposal, Members had been encouraged to submit an 
explanation for any delay, together with information on the anticipated time -frame for submitting 
the notification and any elements of a partial notificatio n. Paragraph  8 of the updated version had 
clarified that the explanation for the delay should be submitted to the relevant committee by 
six months after the relevant deadline – and two  years and six  months after the notification deadline 
for DS:1 – and sub sequently every six  months thereafter. This clarified the "x  dates" that had been 
included in paragraph  8 of the previous version.  
9.13.   The updated proposed Decision had further streamlined the special and differential treatment 
available to Members that had no t submitted a notification due to a lack of capacity, as outlined in 
paragraph  10. Those Members had been encouraged to request assistance and support for capacity -
building from the Secretariat. Those Members had also been encouraged to submit to the relev ant 
committee and to the Working Group, six  months after any relevant deadline, and every subsequent 
six months, any available information on these notifications that it had not yet submitted because 
of a lack of capacity. This information should include t he assistance and support for capacity -building 
that they required in order to submit complete notifications. This text had been modelled on 
provisions in Section  II of the TFA.  
9.14.   Paragraph  11(c) of the revised proposal stated that, if a Member had provided the information 
identified in paragraph  10, such Members would be eligible to have any administrative measures 
deferred by a year. Some Members had indicated that they might expe rience difficulties in identifying 
those notifications for which they needed assistance. Helpfully, some developing country Members 
had also indicated that the Secretariat provided an annual accounting to each Member of those 
notifications that were curren tly outstanding. Thus, rather than requiring each developing country 
Member to do an independent accounting, the Secretariat provided a list for each Member to review 
and subsequently to determine potential assistance needs. The US hoped that Members would  find 
this flexibility useful as its ultimate goal was to achieve timely notifications from all Members.  
9.15.    Turning to the administrative measures, she noted that flexibility alone would not be sufficient 
to encourage notifications from Members that, for wha tever reason, did not want to provide a 
notification. Therefore, according to paragraph  11 of the revised proposal, if after one  year a 
notification had still not been provided, administrative measures would then be applied to the 
Member concerned. The Sec retariat's annual reporting on outstanding notifications and the specific 
efforts of the standing Committees to discuss the challenge of these missing notifications had done 
little to resolve the problem. The administrative measures in the proposal would n ot go into effect 
until one  year after the deadlines established in the proposal. The deadlines established in the 
proposal were for the purposes of applying administrative measures, and for all Agreements and G/C/M/134  
 
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  Understandings under the remit of the CTG, the  relevant deadline would be the notification deadline 
established in the Agreements (as set out in paragraph  6). 
9.16.   Paragraph  11(a) clarified that, after one  year from the deadlines in paragraphs  6 and 7, 
specific administrative measures would apply. The key substantive change to the specific 
administrative measures was contained in paragraph  11(a)(iii), which clarified that any monetary 
assessment "may be used for the purpose of providing Members with technical assistance to fulfil 
notification obligations, i ncluding through the ITTC". Paragraph  11(b) clarified that a year after the 
administrative measures in paragraph  11(a) had been applied, additional administrative measures 
would also apply. The key substantive change to these administrative measures was to  replace the 
references to "Inactive Member", which was a term used by the Budget Committee (from where 
many of these administrative measures had originally derived), to "Member with notification delay".  
9.17.   Paragraph  11(c) had also been revised to close a loo phole through which a Member might 
never be subjected to any administrative measures if it had simply requested technical assistance 
but had never followed through with a notification. Paragraph  11(c) of the revised proposal now 
deferred the application of  administrative measures to allow time to submit a notification with the 
end goal to ensure that the technical assistance resulted in the submission of a notification.  
9.18.   Finally, Members had expressed concern over the inclusion of the paragraph encouraging t he 
development of enhanced fisheries subsidies notifications as part of the ongoing negotiations and, 
as a result, this paragraph had been removed. Nonetheless, the co -sponsors continued to support a 
strong outcome in the fisheries subsidies negotiations, including in the area of transparency and 
notifications.  
9.19.   The United States  believed that improving transparency through existing WTO  notification 
requirements was the kind of institutional reform required to facilitate future negotiations across 
negotiatin g topics, and that it was a worthy and desirable outcome in the short term. Accordingly, 
the US and other proponents planned to continue proponent -based discussions with all interested 
Members with a view to improving the proposal further.  
9.20.   The delegate of the European Union  said that the co -sponsors had worked hard to take into 
account Members' feedback on the proposal and expressed the hope that Members would see their 
respective input adequately reflected in the revisions, as summarized by the US.  
9.21.   The rev ised proposal had been streamlined and had greater clarity and objectivity, in 
particular regarding  the proposed timelines. Revisions had been made in response to requests from 
numerous Members to level the playing field between agricultural and non -agricu ltural notifications. 
The revised proposal contained a clearer description of the SDT  element as well as a conceptual 
improvement to two of the proposed administrative measures.  
9.22.   The Secretariat's annual report on compliance with notification obligations , falling under the 
remit of the CTG , illustrated Members'  persistent shortcomings in notification compliance. These 
were serious shortcomings given that notifications were basic obligations undertaken by all 
WTO Members, which were key to the WTO's deliberat ive and negotiating functions. The EU believed 
that Members agreed both with this diagnosis and with the need to take action. The proposal would 
contribute to making the WTO more useful to its stakeholders. The proposal aimed at providing the 
means to reme dy the problem of non -compliance, while taking into account the underlying reasons 
for it, hence the two  pillars: technical assistance, and eventual administrative measures in case of 
intentional and persistent lack of compliance. The EU urged Members to support the overall 
architecture of the draft decision and stood ready to discuss and refin e its components as necessary.  
9.23.   The representative of Japan  said that the revised proposal would play a critical role in 
strengthening transparency and notification compliance in the WTO in ways that would benefit the 
entire Membership. Significant modifica tions had been made to the substantial aspects of the 
proposal in response to Members' requests. In particular, a conceptual modification had been made 
regarding the financial assessment, in order to accommodate Members' concerns in that regard. 
Japan wish ed to emphasize that the purpose of the proposed measures was not to impose a penalty 
on Members that had failed to submit their notifications. Rather, it was to charge a modest fee to 
unwilful and non -compliant Members that would then be used to provide t echnical assistance to 
Members that lacked the capacity to fulfil their notification obligations. This element was clearly set G/C/M/134  
 
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  out in the proposal. The proposal did not create any new obligations but instead aimed to ensure 
the implementation of Members' existing WTO  obligations, thereby contributing to the enhancement 
of the WTO's functions.  
9.24.   Japan referred to the room document entitled "Timeframe of the Administrative Measures" to 
facilitate Members' understanding. The administrative measures stipulated in  paragraph  11(a) of the 
revised proposal would be applied after one  year had passed from the notification deadline. In like 
manner, paragraph  (b) would be applied two  years after the deadline. In the case of developing 
Members that had submitted informatio n on the assistance needs or made a request for technical 
assistance, the application of paragraphs  11(a) and (b) would be deferred by one  year, respectively. 
Members would enjoy two  years of flexibility with regard to DS :1 notification. Japan considered t hat 
this initiative was an important agenda item in terms of WTO  reform, which would be reviewed at 
the next G20  summit. As the holder of the 2019  G20 presidency, Japan was doing its utmost to 
ensure that the proposed decision would be an early outcome of the G20  summit. If nothing were 
done in this regard, Members' stakeholders would lose trust in the WTO. Japan encouraged Members 
to work on this issue with a sense of urgency, in a collaborative and constructive manner, and 
expressed its hope that all Memb ers would support the proposal.  
9.25.   The representative of Australia , as co -sponsor of the proposal, welcomed New Zealand and 
Canada as recent co -sponsors.  Australia viewed Members' compliance with notifications as vital for 
the good functioning of the WTO, and  the aim of this proposal was to encourage better compliance. 
As noted by previous speakers, the proposal was the culmination of various improvements on the 
earlier version. Australia wished to highlight one  change that was of great importance to Australia  – 
the treatment of agriculture notifications. Australia recalled that the earlier version of this proposal, 
presented in November  2018, had treated all agriculture notifications differently to other 
notifications in terms of longer time -frames. At that me eting, while Australia had been  pleased to 
announce its co -sponsorship of the proposal in light of the importance that Australia attributed to 
the issue of notifications, Australia had noted its strong concern regarding the differentiation 
between agricult ure and non -agriculture notifications – a concern that was clearly shared by a 
number of other Members.  
9.26.   Australia was pleased to note that, following the November  2018 meeting and further 
consultations on the issue, significant changes had subsequently been incorporated into the current 
proposal. Agriculture notifications were now treated on the same basis as other notifications. In the 
earlier version, paragraph  1 had divided the relevant agreements and understandings into the 
Agreements on Agriculture in subparagraph  1, and all other agreements and understandings in 
subparagraph  (b), with different time -frames allotted to each set. In this new version, this division 
had been removed and the Agreement on Agriculture was now included with all other Agreement s 
and Understandings.  
9.27.   Australia noted, as outlined by previous delegations, that there was one  exception to this 
equal treatment to agriculture, and that was known as DS:1, on domestic support, where an 
additional two  years had been allowed (paragraph  7 of the proposal). This allowance reflected a 
known and common difficulty that Members faced when submitting their DS:1  notifications within 
the current timelines provided for in document  G/AG/2. The need to review that time -frame as part 
of a review of docum ent G/AG/2 had been raised within the Committee on Agriculture. As provided 
for in paragraph  7 of the proposal, the exception for DS:1  notifications would cease once updates to 
document  G/AG/2 had been adopted; this update was encouraged to take place with in two  years.  
9.28.   Australia emphasized that nothing in the proposal changed Member s' existing notification 
obligations under the WTO  Agreements, including for agriculture. Indeed, the whole purpose of the 
proposal was to encourage and to assist Members to meet  their existing notification obligations. 
Compliance with the WTO's notification obligations was essential to ensur ing transparency in trade 
policies and it assisted in the identification of trade barriers, the effective implementation of the 
WTO Agreement s, and the predictable and smooth operation of the multilateral trading system. 
Australia urged Members to support improved compliance with notification obligations and to support 
this proposal as a way forward on this important issue.  
9.29.   The delegate of Argentina welcomed Canada and New Zealand as co-sponsors of the proposal . 
The changes in the revised proposal had been explained by the US , but Argentina wished to highlight 
that ma ny meetings and a great deal of effort had gone into reflecting Members' commen ts in it. 
Argentina was convinced that the best way to safeguard the relevance of the WTO, particularly in G/C/M/134  
 
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  this difficult time for the multilateral system, was by Members faithfully adhering to their obligations. 
Argentina submitted that improving notifica tions presented an excellent opportunity for improving 
the internal functioning and image of the WTO. Argentina noted that the co -sponsors of the proposal 
were looking forward to working closely with all interested Members to improving  the proposal still 
further. To ensure a successful and mutually beneficial proposal, Argentina called upon Members to 
put forward drafting recommendations, with concrete proposals and suggestions, in order to help 
the co -sponsors to better understand Members' concerns and obs ervations.  
9.30.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  said that her delegation associated itself fully with the 
US statement and welcomed the recent addition of both Canada and New Zealand as co -sponsors of 
the proposal . Transparency was one of the essential pillars o f the WTO and it was critical to the 
sustainability of the Organization. Chinese Taipei believed that all stakeholders benefited from a 
transparent system, and that all Members had to make the same efforts towards ensuring that the 
system worked. Members had highlighted the need for WTO  reforms and it was important that such 
reforms were achieved in the current year. The Secretariat's annual report on notifications showed 
that there was still great room for improvement. Accordingly, the co -proponen ts were trying to 
propose an effective way of strengthening the relevant notification requirements in order to improve 
on this situation. The main emphasis was on how to strengthen and reaffirm existing notification 
requirements, which was reflected in the  modest approach of the revised proposal, which was 
focused on enforcing and streamlining existing requirements rather than on any radical reform. While 
some Members had concerns regarding the proposal's adoption of the so -called "carrot and stick" 
approac h, this was not the intention of the draft decision. If and when a Member failed to make a 
notification, that Member could choose to seek assistance from the Secretariat by resorting to 
paragraph  10. The "stick" could be easily avoided if the Member took a ction under paragraph  10, 
which would then result in a notification being submitted within the required time -frame. Chinese 
Taipei noted that the proposal simply incorporated a few incentives and consequences that might 
encourage more Members to notify, as  this was its objective. Chinese Taipei submitted that Members 
did not have to agree completely with the proposal in order to support it, but needed only to agree 
with its general direction.  
9.31.   The representative of Costa Rica  said that Costa Rica was delight ed to be part of this proposal 
and welcomed New Zealand and Canada as co -sponsors of it. Costa Rica considered that 
transparency was a fundamental principal for meeting the obligations of the international trading 
system and the only way effectively to pro tect that principle was for every Member to meet its 
notification commitments. Notification was an individual responsibility and a collective commitment. 
Without timely access to accurate information the WTO  functions of surveillance and negotiation 
were w eakened, and the risk of trade friction increased.  
9.32.   Access to up -to-date information on Members' trade policies was vital to Members' work, 
particularly in the case of developing countries and small economies, which often lacked the means 
to maintain their own trade intelligence structures in the majority of their markets. In this regard, 
fulfilling transparency commitments in a timely manner was of great value.  
9.33.   Costa Rica recognized the challenge of having to coordinate between many different 
institutions w hen preparing notifications. However, the proposal would provide additional incentives 
for Members to prioritize their notification obligations  and to make available the necessary resources. 
The revised proposal also offered incentives for those Members th at were experiencing difficulties in 
meeting their notification obligations. The active engagement of Members within the Working Group 
would allow for a greater understanding of the nature and scope of the difficulties being faced by 
Members, and thereby t o identify solutions. Technical assistance from the Secretariat would help to 
improve Members' notification capacities and would put all Members on an equal footing with regard 
to their ability to make the required notifications. In this regard, the propos al offered opportunities 
for the Secretariat to enhance its role in providing efficient support assistance and capacity -building 
support to Members that required it. Every Member that received such assistance would have to 
ensure that the TA was result -oriented and offered solutions to deal with their particular notification 
problems, especially the most complex among them.  
9.34.   Costa Rica encouraged all Members to support the proposal and to contribute to its 
improvement so that it would become an effective mea ns of strengthening transparency at the WTO.  
9.35.   The representative of New Zealand  said that New Zealand had long been an advocate for 
improving compliance and transparency, which the Secretariat's earlier report had shown was an G/C/M/134  
 
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  area where there was a need st ill for significant improvement. Transparency was fundamental to 
knowing that Members were implementing their commitments, to understanding the potential 
impact of measures on the rights of others, and to informing Members' continuing negotiations. New 
Zealand had offered extensive feedback on the first  version of the proposal, particularly on including 
measures to assist those facing genuine technical difficulties in preparing their notifications, and also 
on removing differentiation with regard to the Agr eement on Agriculture. The redrafted proposal 
responded to a number of the concerns that had been raised and, considering the importance it 
attached to better notification performance, New  Zealand was pleased to join as a co -sponsor of the 
proposal. Member s benefitted from a transparent and rules -based system, and oversight committees 
such as the CTG would be better able to perform their monitoring function if information about 
Members' policies were available in a timely manner. New Zealand encouraged othe r Members to 
provide constructive feedback on the proposal.  
9.36.   The representative of Canada  said that, importantly, the updated proposal had taken into 
account many of the concerns expressed by Members in November  2018; prior to its revision, it had 
also been  the subject of substantive discussions. W hile the list of modest administrative measures 
still included a financial penalty, the updated proposal pointed to technical assistance as a possible 
use of funds collected from financial penalties. This was an im portant addition and further underlined 
that the main objective of the proposal was to signal that help was available to submit the 
notifications that were required, and that Members were encouraged to seek that assistance.  
9.37.   Supporting the proposal and prov iding added momentum for its adoption was consistent with 
Canada's WTO  reform efforts. As Canada had noted in its discussion paper , circulated to 
WTO Members in September  2018, action had to be taken to improve the notification record of 
Members as an esse ntial element to strengthening and modernizing the WTO. In providing 
notifications, Members were demonstrating their willingness and interest in fully participating in the 
multilateral trading system.  
9.38.   It was important to recall that the commitments being d iscussed in the proposal were not 
new, and that notifications served an essential role in the context of policy dialogues in WTO  Councils 
and Committees. Without this information being available, it was difficult to learn how Members 
were actually implemen ting their WTO  obligations, and Members would only be hurting themselves 
by not sharing the information that they had committed to provide to the Membership. At the CTG's 
previous formal meeting, a number of developing country Members had said that capacit y and 
institutional constraints had been preventing them from fulfilling their notification obligations, which 
was a fair comment. One of the key result targets of the WTO's 2018 -2019 Biennial Technical 
Assistance and Training Plan was a decrease in the nu mber of outstanding notifications. This was 
why the proposal encouraged Members to request help.  
9.39.   The representative of China  said that transparency was one of the WTO's basic values and 
tenets. China appreciated the proponents' efforts to enhance transpare ncy and to strengthen 
notification requirements in the WTO. China fully agreed, as stated in the proposal, that transparency 
and notification requirements were fundamental elements in many WTO  Agreements, and that 
compliance with existing notification requ irements was chronically low at present.  
9.40.   Therefore, China believed that enhancing transparency and notification compliance was 
relevant not only in the area of goods, but also services, TRIPs, and other areas under the 
WTO framework. A General Council Deci sion on transparency and notification compliance should 
therefore cover all of the relevant areas, given that transparency was an obligation for all 
WTO Members.  
9.41.   As China had mentioned at the CTG's previous formal meeting, no Member had fully fulfilled 
all of its required notification obligations. In particular, regarding trade in services, developed 
Members had set a very bad example by using the GATS ' vague notification requirements as an 
excuse. China submitted that all Members should make their own indi vidual contribution to 
improving the fulfilment of notification requirements. Developed Members, for their part, possessing 
adequate technical capacity and administrative resources, should demonstrate responsibility and 
leadership by fulfilling their own t ransparency obligations. Developing Members should also fulfil 
their obligations when their capabilities made  it possible.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  9.42.   China had made significant efforts to improve both the quantity and the quality of its 
notifications and would continue to do so. The Secretariat should also play a vital role in the process 
of improving transparency. A lack of capacity had always been a c hallenge for developing Members 
when it came to fulfilling their notification obligations, and especially for those Members that faced 
practical limitations in terms of administrative resources and technical conditions. For this reason, 
China supported the  proponents' suggestion on technical assistance. To ensure that such technical 
assistance achieve d its objectives, the Secretariat's technical assistance and capacity -building should 
be tailor -made and demand -driven.  
9.43.   China had never believed in punishment as an effective approach at the WTO and the 
proposed administrative measures would not be China's preference. Even if such measures were 
adopted, they should be limited to reminding and warning Members, with only minor reprimands. 
China did not support any  measure that would deprive Members of their legitimate rights as 
WTO Members. It also strongly objected to the financial punitive approach, which could result in 
negative incentives and lead Members that were facing practical difficulties to give up in de spair. 
China expressed its hope that the proponents would take Members' comments into account in order 
to allow for early agreement on the proposal.  
9.44.   The representative of Brazil  said that Brazil shared with co -sponsors the objective of 
enhancing transparen cy and strengthening notifications; and Brazil believed that timely notifications 
were an obligation, not an option. There was no reason for major economies to delay their 
notifications. Brazil believed that the  current  lack of transparency posed a systemi c threat to the 
WTO.  
9.45.   Brazil also shared the proponents' belief that there was a need to develop mechanisms to 
ensure the effective presentation of timely and complete notifications. While positive incentives and 
technical assistance should be an essential part of any such mechanism, Brazil was open to thinking 
creatively and to exploring all necessary means via which to ensure that Members fulfilled their 
obligations. Brazil recognized that the revised proposal contained positive improvements on the 
previou s version. Although Brazil still expressed certain doubts over the overall structure of the 
proposal, and also had some questions regarding specific paragraphs, it did recognize the value of 
an idea that it considered timely. Brazil stood ready to continue  to engage in bilateral technical 
discussions with the US and other Members to improve the ideas contained in the document and to 
explore alternative ways of addressing the common objective of developing a mechanism to 
encourage better notification complia nce. 
9.46.   The representative of El Salvador  noted that it had held bilateral meetings with some of the 
proponents, and that these meetings had been important to clarify certain details and dispel certain 
of El Salvador's doubts and concerns regarding the propos al. While El Salvador was committed  to 
the efforts being made to promote transparency, it still had  concerns over certain parts of the 
document, and especially over the administrative sanctions and other measures designed, in certain 
circumstances, to limi t the participation of Members in the activities of the Organization. El Salvador 
believed that it was important to pursue dialogue on the important implications that the sanctions 
could have for small er countries in particular . 
9.47.   The representative of Ecuador  supported the efforts of the proponents to find a solution to 
the real problems that many Members, including Ecuador, faced when attempting to meet their 
commitments on notifications . Ecuador thanked the proponents for their e fforts and for the meetings 
that they had held to hear Members' points of view. However, Ecuador believed that the proposal 
still had two  very problematic al elements that had already been signalled to the proponents at 
previous CTG and consultation meeting s. 
9.48.   Ecuador's two  main concerns were as followed: (1)  the absence of adequate special and 
differential treatment accompanied by provisions that could be considered as an inverse special and 
differential treatment in favour of developed Members (as in the ca se of DS:1  notifications); and 
(2) the inclusion of the possibility of counter -notifications, in particular for those cases not covered 
under the Agreements, and cases where there was no time -frame prescribed. Ecuador considered 
that special and differenti al treatment had been weakened in the new version compared to the 
original proposal, and that the sanctions were greater, affecting the rights and obligations of 
Members without considering the institutional difficulties facing developing countries. For th ese 
reasons, Ecuador could not support the proposal in its current form. Nevertheless, Ecuador remained G/C/M/134  
 
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  open to dialogue in order to reach a more constructive solution to the problem of transparency within 
the WTO.  
9.49.   The delegate of Chad stated that the LDC  Group understood the proponents' concerns and 
that it would continue to examine the implications of the proposal. A preliminary review of the 
proposal showed that it had not taken into consideration the constraints faced by LDCs in notifying 
their current obligations. The LDC  constraints went beyond technical assistance, and therefore, to 
ask them to undertake new notification obligations in order to fulfil existing obligations would only 
place an additional burden on them. There was also a high turnover of  Capital -based LDC  staff who 
had received WTO  training. Chad asked the proponents to explain in more detail how their proposal 
would increase the allocation of both human and financial resources to the Secretariat and to 
LDC Capitals. It was very important  for LDCs to receive more relevant and efficient assistance, rather 
than having a system of advanced sanctions in place. The proposal included certain sanctions, such 
as administrative measures and, in this regard, Chad noted that many LDCs already suffere d from 
administrative measures as a result of their economies' sometimes difficult financial situation, even 
as they tried to be as active as possible within the MTS and the WTO. Chad called upon Members 
not to take administrative measures against LDCs but  instead to propose a positive initiative that 
would include the LDCs. In this way, they would help LDCs to participate in the creation of a system 
that would make it easier for them to meet their obligations and that would comply with measures 
aimed at he lping graduating LDCs.  
9.50.   The delegate of Colombia  welcomed the positive revision of this proposal, which now reflected 
a balanced approach to address the need to strengthen the WTO's transparency mechanisms. 
Colombia was convinced that it was necessary to ad dress the challenges through an honest and 
constructive dialogue that enabled Members to improve the WTO as a public global good. Colombia 
was actively participating in the discussions on initiatives and proposals to strengthen the 
Organization, including transparency, and expressed its hope that the proposal would continue to 
evolve in a positive manner.  
9.51.   The delegate of India thanked the proponents for the revised proposal, which took into 
account a few of the concerns raised by Members at the CTG's previo us formal meeting and in 
subsequent bilateral discussions. The amendments, which replaced the words "complete 
notification", with "required notification", and which dropped the proposal on enhanced notification 
obligations under the ongoing fisheries subsi dies negotiations went in the right direction and broadly 
clarified the proposal's intention . 
9.52.   However, India expressed its surprise that there had been no substantial changes introduced 
with regard to India's major concerns, such as the proposed administra tive measures and the scope 
and the process of surveillance as envisaged in the revised proposal . India reiterated its strong belief 
in transparency as one of the pillars of the rules -based MTS, which provided Members with 
information and clarity on the la ws and regulations and facts and figures of other Members. It also 
provided information on the measures taken by Members that impacted on international trade.  
9.53.   Many Members, including India, had significantly improved their notification compliance 
despite t he difficulties they faced in collecting and collating information as per the notification 
requirements. There was room for further improvement, both in terms of coverage and quality of 
notifications. India believed that the proposal did not consider the d ifficulties faced by Members 
when trying to comply with the notification requirements. A number of developing countries were 
facing constraints in terms of human resources, institutional arrangements, infrastructure 
requirements, and financial requirements . These could all result in difficulties as well as delays in 
terms of collecting, collating, and preparing notifications. In addition, a number of notification 
requirements involved interpretational issues. Therefore, technical assistance provided by the 
Secretariat for a certain period of time would not suffice. Moreover, given the Secretariat's limited 
resources vis -à-vis the Members' requirements, the Secretariat would not be in a position to facilitate 
adherence to the strict notification timelines.  
9.54.   With regard to the revised proposal, India considered that it sought to address the issue of 
notification compliance by introducing two  different aspects: one for compliance with the existing 
notification obligations for goods and administrative actions for non-compliance thereof; and one 
relating to the need for expansion of the existing notification obligations. With regard to existing 
notification obligations, it was not at all clear whether or not the proponents also intended to make 
similar proposals for  improving compliance of the notification requirements under other G/C/M/134  
 
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  WTO Agreements, such as GATS and TRIPS. If this was not the intention, India requested the 
proponents to provide their specific reasons why not. India also noted that the proposal sought to  
cover the notification requirements for the whole time-period since the WTO's inception. Given the 
capacity constraints being faced by developing country Members, and the fact that past notifications 
would be of little relevance to trade today, any proces s of improving notification compliance should 
be restricted to present and future notifications.  
9.55.   India believed that the proposal was trying to bring in compliance for "required notifications" 
under the specified Agreements and Understandings. However, it was not clear why the proposal 
singled out only two  specific ad hoc notification requirements, those under the SPS and 
TBT Agreements, and left out a number of other Agreements where such ad hoc notifications also 
existed. Moreover, footnote  1 mandated fra ming required guidelines by the SPS and 
TBT Committees, without any discussion and consensus on the issue in the respective Committees 
themselves.  
9.56.   India opposed the proposed administrative measures as they went beyond what had been 
agreed under the WTO  commitments ; therefore , the question of accepting such onerous conditions 
did not even arise. India further noted that, although it was committed to improving its notification 
compliance, it could not take on any fresh obligations. India considered that it wa s difficult to agree 
to a proposal that provided for penalties and administrative actions in case of default, rather than 
making an effort to understand the capacity constraints and difficulties faced by a large number of 
developing country Members in rela tion to the breadth and length of notification requirements under 
the various WTO  Agreements. Members that had succeeded in updating their notifications, despite 
facing great difficulties  in doing so , should be recognized  for their success ; and Members tha t had 
not been able to notify because of various reasons, including capacity constraints, should be assisted 
in doing so . India strongly believed that, instead of administrative actions, appropriate support for 
making notifications should be provided, whic h would encourage Members to improve upon their 
internal capacity to notify on time.  
9.57.   The delegate of Chile thanked the proponents for the revised proposal and for incorporating 
Members' comments, which had resulted in two  new co -sponsors. Chile noted the v alue of this 
initiative and reiterated its view that transparency played a central role at the WTO, as well as noting 
the importance of notification obligations. Complying with the notification obligations of the 
Marrakesh Agreement was part of the pacta s unt servanda  that allowed Members to belong to the 
WTO. The obligation to notify derived from the commitments that Members had assumed voluntarily 
when they joined the WTO and there was no room to ignore these commitments.  
9.58.   The proposal had evolved in a pos itive manner and Chile appreciated proponents' openness 
to dialogue. The proposal had allowed Members to react to and to explore different ways to face the 
lack of compliance in notifications. Chile wished to raise a number of points while the proposal was  
being analysed in Capital. Chile, like other Members, favoured an incentive -based approach rather 
than a punitive approach, especially if the latter were linked to monetary sanctions. Additionally, 
some further clarification was needed with regard to "due  process" in the case of violation of the 
WTO obligations, particularly considering the effects of administrative sanctions. Chile believed that, 
while a lack of notifications should result in certain negative consequences, the proposed framework 
for sanct ions could still be improved. Chile also held the view that technical assistance played a 
central role in improving compliance with notification commitments.  
9.59.   The delegate of Singapore  said that his delegation supported the goal of improving 
transparency and strengthening compliance with notification requirements. Members' timely and 
complete notifications were crucial to the WTO's monitoring function and contributed to the 
predictabili ty of the international trading system. Singapore welcomed the revisions that had 
improved the proposal; in particular, the amendments aimed at facilitating access to technical 
assistance and assistance from the Secretariat would provide greater clarity to  the process. 
Singapore also welcomed the inclusion of the TFA in the scope of the proposal. Singapore further 
supported the general direction of the proposal and noted that it had been actively engaging with 
the proponents to broaden its appeal to the wid est possible range of Members. In particular, 
Singapore had highlighted that there were Members experiencing genuine difficulties in meeting 
their notification obligations due to capacity constraints, as Singapore itself had noticed from its own 
technical assistance, including notification workshops in the region. Singapore was ready to work 
with the co -sponsors to get a Working Group on Notification Obligation Procedures up and running. 
The working group could then instruct for work to be carried out on ho w technical assistance could G/C/M/134  
 
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  be improved in order to facilitate efforts by Members to meet their notification obligations and to 
update the technical cooperation handbook on notifications.  
9.60.   The delegate of Panama  stated that Panama supported transparency an d attached great 
importance to its notification commitment s and obligations. Since 2018, Panama had been 
discussing with the proponents the various possible ways to improve this proposal and , in general , 
to improve Members' work in this area. Panama was co ncerned by the fact that this proposal allowed, 
in paragraph  7, for special treatment to be given to Agricultural Domestic Support Notifications. The 
two-year time -period was a source of concern , especially  in light of  Japan's comment that 
paragraph  11(b) could be extended to five  years. The majority of WTO  Members saw agriculture as 
a high priority, and as a catalyst area where progress could lead to positive developments also in 
other areas. Therefore , Panama saw no need to extend the notification period in case this had  a 
knock -on effect. Instead, Members should rather be placing their attention on the issue of 
compliance with DS:1  commitments. Panama, as a small developing country, sought improvements 
in this area from all Members.  In conclusion, Panama remained actively interested in this initiative 
but wished to discuss how to improve it on the basis  not of penalties and punishments but  of 
incentives, perhaps linked to technical assistance.  
9.61.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  said that Korea recognize d that transparency and 
notification requirements constituted fundamental elements both in many WTO  Agreements and in 
a properly functioning WTO  system. In spite of the importance attached to notifications, the WTO 
experienced an imbalance in terms of the level of notifications submitted among its Members. At the 
same time, Korea acknowledged that some Members lacked the capacity fully to implement their 
obligations. Korea expressed its hope that these aspects would be considered in a balanced way. 
She note d that there were some improvements in the proposal compared to the previous version 
although certain elements still required further consideration. First, Korea noted the proposed 
expansion in the Secretariat's role. The revised version required the Secre tariat to assume various 
additional roles, such as in relation to proposed consultations with the Working Group on 
Notifications, and in terms of additional technical assistance provided to Members. However, in terms 
of the eventual implementation of this proposed new role, the budget and capacity constraints of 
the Secretariat would clearly need also to be considered. Second, with respect to the administrative 
measures in paragraph  11, Korea stated that there should be an in -depth evaluation of the 
effecti veness and feasibility of the proposed measures. In this regard, Korea posed two  questions: 
what concrete situation would trigger the measures and how could Members deal with the difference 
between a Member missing one  notification and a Member missing doz ens of notifications.  
9.62.   The delegate of Djibouti  aligned her delegation with the statements made by the LDC  Group 
and the ACP  Group. Djibouti emphasized the importance it attached to Members' respecting their 
WTO notification obligations. Djibouti noted that  it was necessary to find a way to facilitate 
notification procedures, particularly through the proposals in this area for technical assistance and 
capacity -building. However, Djibouti stated that at this stage it neither shared nor supported an 
approach b ased on administrative punitive measures against those countries that struggled due to 
real technical capacity constraints, and LDCs in particular. Djibouti stated that Members must avoid 
introducing punitive measures that would do nothing but broaden the divide that already separated 
Members. Djibouti submitted that the focus should rather be on addressing the failures in submitting 
notifications, and the late submission of notifications, and to try in that context to understand what 
the difficulties were that were causing these delays, which affected a number of countries, including 
LDCs. Therefore, she invited the proponents to focus their efforts on the elements in their proposal 
that addressed the reasons why a number of delegations either failed to sub mit their notifications 
or else were late in doing so. For certain countries, it was not because of a lack of will or commitment. 
What needed to be considered were rather the domestic constraints on the compilation and 
processing of data, which often requi red a technical expertise that was simply not available. Djibouti 
concluded that these were the real questions that needed to be addressed in order to remedy the 
issue of notification non -compliance.  
9.63.   The delegate of Pakistan  stated that, while Pakistan app reciated the efforts made towards 
improving this proposal, it was still apprehensive about its likely impact. Pakistan said that it would 
like to explore how the proposal aligned with the WTO  principle of special and differential treatment. 
With regard to the notification timelines newly proposed, Pakistan noted the extended timelines for 
all Members, including developed Members, which marginally extended those advanced to 
developing countries. Pakistan submitted that its evaluation of the empirical evidenc e suggested 
that the status of compliance with notification obligations did not offer a true reflection of the G/C/M/134  
 
- 26 - 
 
  Member, entirely, but rather provided only evidence that the notification process and requirements 
were too stringent and cumbersome, not only fo r developing countries, but also for many developed 
countries, too.  
9.64.   The problems for developing countries were compounded by severe capacity constraints in 
the form of a lack of technical training of staff, a lack of institutional capacity, and insufficien t human 
resources. Pakistan considered that the fact that even developed countries were demanding 
flexibility with regard to their notification obligations, and that no Member state had ever been fully 
compliant with its notification obligations at any giv en time, should make Members re -evaluate the 
process logistically with a view to developing a more sustainable solution to the problem of 
notification non -compliance. Pakistan reiterated its view that administrative measures would not 
lead to an optimal re solution and risked rather to be counter -productive because such an approach  
failed to address the root causes of notification non -compliance. A better approach might consist of 
reforming the notification process itself. Under this approach, Members would benefit from less 
stringent and less frequent notification obligations, simplified procedures, and forms with less 
detailed information required, in addition to guaranteed assistance for Members lacking the 
necessary capacity. Such an approach would also r ecognize the sheer lack of human and technical 
resources, institutional capacity, and overall capabilities of developing Members to meet their 
notification obligations and to address their notification needs.  
9.65.   The delegate of Thailand  supported efforts to e nhance transparency and notification 
performance and believed that improvement in this area was crucial to the WTO's work in general, 
as well as in general to its credibility and relevance in the area of international trade. Thailand stated 
its belief that  all Members would in principle be willing to reaffirm their commitments and obligations 
with regard to transparency and notifications. Nevertheless, while Thailand understood the 
proponents' logic behind punitive measures, it considered that this approach  could prove 
counterproductive as it risked to create divisions among Members and also a negative impression 
and sentiment that a vast number of developing Members with legitimate capacity constraints were 
being unfairly and inappropriately targeted. Thail and stated that Members needed to find a way to 
assess and to address these constraints. In addition, Thailand believed that developing strong 
incentives that encouraged timely and complete notifications would represent a better way forward 
since such stro ng incentives would reinforce trust among Members and enhance a positive attitude 
towards commitments undertaken in this area.  
9.66.   The delegate of Indonesia  reiterated Indonesia's support for strengthening the multilateral 
trading system but considered that th is proposal would alter the rights and obligation s of Members 
as set out in Annex  1A of the Marrakesh Agreement. Given that other covered Agreements were not 
included, Indonesia also questioned the proposal's intention. Indonesia noted, for example, that t he 
proposal did not include any intention to strengthen or establish transparency procedures in areas 
where Members' obligations had always been questioned, such as in relation to Article  66.2 of the 
TRIPS  Agreement. She stated that Members must also reali ze the fragile state that the WTO was 
currently in, and that gentle care rather than hasty moves were necessary to build bridges of 
understanding between Members. Indonesia believed that resolving the crisis in the dispute 
settlement mechanism should be Me mbers' primary objective.  
9.67.   The delegate of Paraguay  reiterated her delegation's concern with regard to the different 
elements proposed to enhance transparency notification compliance, and stated that the revised 
document was currently being reviewed in Capi tal. By way of preliminary response, Paraguay 
expressed concern with regard to the punitive measures that had been put forward by the 
proponents. She stated that the differential treatment given to agricultural notifications was also 
being carefully review ed in Capital.  
9.68.   The delegate of South Africa , on behalf of the African Group, reiterated that the concerns 
expressed at the CTG  meeting of November  2018 remained relevant in the context of the revised 
communication. The African Group continued to have diffi culty in accepting this kind of approach in 
the name of improving transparency in the WTO. If this proposal provided any indication of what 
some Members wanted the WTO to look like in the future, then the proponents needed to 
demonstrate the following: the  problem the co -proponents were seeking to address; the evidence 
and criteria used to choose the Agreements referenced in paragraph  1; and through a case -by-case 
approach, to substantiate the reason why every developing country should fall under arbitrary and 
strengthened oversight. Without this context and evidence, the proposal would not advance any 
further. The extremity of the proposal, which sought to regularize counter -notifications in G/C/M/134  
 
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  paragraph  5, and introduced administrative measures in paragraph  11, was reminiscent of an era 
best left in the past. There could be no support for a submission that would negatively impact upon 
all Members in the African Group. The obligations proposed exceeded existing commitments and 
were extreme in terms of the sever ity of punishment and by relegating non -complying Members to 
a humiliating exercise of naming and shaming. This was not the WTO that the African Group had 
signed up to , and nor was it the WTO that they wanted to see in the future.  
9.69.   Members should take caref ul note that the inability of many developing countries and LDCs 
to fulfil their notification obligations should not be translated into a wilful neglect and non -
compliance,  but rather that non -compliance was in these cases caused by other factors. For example, 
some notifications required detailed data, which exceeded the capabilities of Members due to the 
lack of central databases containing all the legislation, statistics, and data for different government 
agencies. The lack of proper institutional coo rdination was the primary reason why Members 
continued to struggle with non -compliance. This reality needed to be appreciated and understood. 
Another reason was the lack of institutional memory in Ministries. No matter how many workshops 
the WTO might prov ide, if there was not enough institutional memory, or succession planning, or 
sufficient qualified human resources trained to study and analyse data according to the requirements 
of the different notifications, a punitive measures approach would still not help the Members 
concerned to address these challenges. In fact, it would result in further marginalization of 
developing and least developed countries.  
9.70.   South Africa believed that a more cooperative approach was required, where Members were 
incentivized to comply with their notification obligations rather than punished for not doing so. This 
would go a long way to building a sense of trust, which the Organi zation much needed. The African 
Group was of the view that any potential reform in this  area should begin with a comprehensive 
review of notification requirements by the respective Committees to ensure that these were not 
unnecessarily complex, burdensome, or vague. South Africa sought clarification as to where each of 
these notifications we re to be submitted because there appeared to be a duplication of work between 
the various Committees. There also needed to be a comprehensive assessment of the current 
notifications relating to technical assistance and capacity -building programmes. A prope r 
comprehensive assessment would better inform discussions about how to improve Members' 
compliance with their notification obligations. The African Group concluded by clearly stating that it 
was not in a position to support any transparency and notificati on measures that went beyond 
existing obligations.  
9.71.   The delegate of Mexico  argued that it was through the timely presentation of notifications that 
Members showed that they honoured and respected their WTO  commitments, thus strengthening 
the Organization. S ince last year, Mexico had stayed in touch with the proponents of this proposal. 
Mexico considered that this new version was moving in the right direction by incorporating Members' 
comments. Mexico emphasized that the limitation in scope applied to existin g commitments, not to 
notifications relating to future commitments; there was also no explicit differentiation in the 
first article between the Agreement on Agriculture and other agreements. However, in paragraph  7, 
it was proposed  that, for notifications on internal agricultural support , a longer time -period would 
be allowed before administrative measures were taken. Mexico considered that there was still scope 
for improvement and that a specific date should be indicated in this paragraph for the entry int o 
force of such measures. Mexico was prepared to continue working constructively with the proponents 
on these issues.  
9.72.   The delegate of Switzerland  noted that the monitoring function of the WTO was a key pillar 
of the multilateral trading system. An effectiv e monitoring of WTO  Agreements required Members 
scrupulously to respect their notification obligations. In carrying out this monitoring function, the 
WTO bodies relied on information from Members, which made it essential that all Members submitted 
high-quality notifications. However, Switzerland noted that many notification obligations were 
currently not being met and that it was important to fill those gaps. Switzerland believed that the 
proposal offered ways to correct this situation. Therefore, Switzerla nd was supportive of the proposal 
and its objective to improve transparency. Switzerland noted that the proposal considered the 
complexity of some notifications as well as the burden that these could impose on countries with 
limited resources. However, Swi tzerland noted that some aspects of the proposal could also create 
difficulties. First, Switzerland expressed concern with regard to the possible application of sanctions, 
in particular relative to LDCs. Second, Switzerland stated its understanding that sa nctions would 
apply retroactively and without a grace period. In this regard, Switzerland said that it was unsure if 
such an approach were feasible.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  9.73.   The delegate of Senegal  thanked  the proponents for their revised submission  and for allowing 
Senegal an opp ortunity to indicate its views in bilateral consultations. Senegal considered that 
transparency in the implementation of Members' existing notification obligations was a fundamental 
pillar of the multilateral trading system and an essential component of th e WTO's negotiating 
function. Nevertheless, certain Members faced deep structural challenges when attempting to 
comply with their notification obligations, and these challenges would not be eliminated simply 
through technical assistance and capacity -buildi ng seminars. Beyond political will and capacity -
building, the pertinent internal structures and coordination mechanisms were also necessary. For 
these reasons, Senegal declared itself in favour of paragraph  2 of the revised submission, which 
aimed to prepa re recommendations in order to improve notification compliance under the 
agreements and understandings  mentioned under paragraph  1. Senegal believe d that specific 
systemic improvements could help Members better to comply with their notification obligations  under 
the relevant WTO  Agreements ; strengthening technical assistance could also be useful in this regard . 
Such an approach would help Members to establish a diagnosis before prescribing a cure. 
Regrettably, Senegal noted that, despite its many bilateral meetings with the proponents, as well as 
its statement at the CTG's meeting of 12 -13 November  20183, Senegal's concerns had not been 
taken into consideration in this revised proposal. In this regard, Senegal recalled that it had already 
indicated that it could not support those elements in the proposal that proposed to submit Members 
to punitive measures, administrative or financial, following notification  delay . In the name of 
transpar ency, proposals were now being put forward to submit Members to punitive administrative 
and financial measures. In the name of transparency, proposals  are being made to deny Members 
their right to sustainably support their fisheries sector . Senegal wondere d what the next stage in 
these punitive proposals in the name of transparency  would be , and how far they would go.  Senegal 
associated itself with the statements made by the ACP  Group, the African Group, and the LDC  Group, 
and stood ready to engage with Mem bers in constructive dialogue in the context of the different 
Committees, and the Working Group, with a view to finding positive solutions to the question of 
WTO notifications.  
9.74.   The delegate of Norway  shared the objective of improving transparency and notif ication 
practices in the WTO. Norway noted that the revised proposal had benefited from consultations 
among the proponents, which had moved the proposal in the right direction. Norway submitted that 
the major issue concerning transparency was how to improv e both the timeliness and the quality of 
notifications, bearing in mind that some notifications, such as annual tariff line nomenclature, were 
relatively easy to prepare while, for instance, subsidy notifications, or notifications of quantitative 
restricti ons, were more complicated and included a need for assessments. Norway believed that to 
solve the transparency and notification challenges in different WTO  Committees, Members must look 
into the specificities of each Committee. To improve compliance, Membe rs needed to be Committee -
specific and, at the same time, to learn from best practices across all Committees.  
9.75.   Furthermore, Norway submitted that Members should stimulate voluntary data exchange 
between the Secretariat and the relevant Member institutions. For instance, Norway had noted that 
the Secretariat had begun work to modernize the Integrated Database ( IDB)'s data collection 
methods. Members should support any such effort to modernize and facilitate the work of both 
Members and the Secretariat. Norway  said that to focus on missing notifications in TPR  Reports from 
the Secretariat, as proposed by the proponents, was only a first and descriptive step. The Secretariat 
should actively use the TPR  Reports to advise Members on how best to catch up with their  backlog. 
This would require that different parts of the Secretariat worked together and not in silos.  
9.76.   Finally, Norway mentioned two  reservations with regard to the revised proposal: (i)  the 
Secretariat should not notify on behalf of Members or judge sensi tive issues in notifications on behalf 
of Members since the responsibility for submitting timely and correct notifications rested solely with 
the Members themselves, even if the Secretariat could provide valuable advice and assistance in 
that context; and (ii) when introducing penalties for delayed notifications, there was an obvious risk 
that Members would increase the number of one -line notifications in order to avoid economic 
penalties, which would in turn be counterproductive to the objective of enhanci ng transparency.  
9.77.   In conclusion, Norway shared a sense of urgency with other Members over the need to 
improve notification and transparency performance in WTO  Committees. To reach this objective, 
Norway believed that it would be useful to prioritize ideas a nd proposals that might achieve the 
Membership's broad support. In this regard, Norway urged the co -sponsors to strengthen their 
                                                
3 Document  G/C/M/133, paragraphs  13.61 –13.66.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  informal contacts and to reach out to the Membership at large in order to obtain a broader support 
for the next version of the proposal.  
9.78.   The delegate of Jamaica , on behalf of the ACP  Group, agreed that transparency and 
compliance with notification obligations in the WTO were important; nevertheless, the proposal 
presented certain difficulties. It remained clear that many developin g country Members continued 
to be hampered by their capacity constraints. The gaps in fulfilling transparency and notification 
commitments were a symptom of the failure of the multilateral system to live up to its promises. In 
short, while the multilateral  trading system might have resulted in greater opportunities for welfare 
enhancement, the benefits of economic globalization had not been distributed equitably. The 
resultant inequity and concentration of wealth undermined any prospect of solidarity betwee n and 
among countries. Jamaica stated that it appeared that the "winners" in the system were seeking to 
impose new and more onerous obligations on those countries that were still grappling with their 
implementation -related obstacles.  
9.79.   With regard to the dra ft decision, Jamaica expressed its deep concern that the approach 
proposed would single out Members through the reporting function of Committees as well as through 
an ill -defined counter -notification procedure. A source of still more concern was that Membe rs 
identified via counter -notifications that were unable to justify their failure to notify would then be 
subject to administrative measures under paragraph  11. Moreover, Members unable to provide the 
required notification by the prescribed arbitrary deadl ine suggested in the communication would be 
subjected to an invasive procedure before the Committee. In addition, Jamaica noted that the draft 
proposed punitive measures fell outside the practice of the covered Agreements.  
9.80.   This irregularity was made even m ore glaring when compared to the functioning of the 
WTO dispute settlement system. Given that the DSU allowed counter -measures only as a temporary 
remedy for non -compliance with DSB  recommendations concerning violations of the covered 
Agreements, the punit ive measures proposed in the draft Decision constituted an unprecedented 
expansion of the power of Committees. This extraordinary latitude to impose measures outside of 
the aegis of the dispute settlement system represented a highly irregular application o f pressure. 
Further, Jamaica submitted that the proposed punitive measures for administrative non -compliance 
constituted a threat to the balance of rights and responsibilities enjoyed by all Members that would 
also increase penalties for non -compliance and  destabilize the acquis agreed by Members. Jamaica 
noted the commitment by the ACP  Group to find a solution to the question of compliance with 
transparency -related obligations in a context where many developed countries were also guilty of 
non-compliance. Jamaica submitted that the nature of the punitive measures proposed violated the 
principles of fairness and equity. The values espoused by this Organization should not include 
seeking to diminish Members that simply did not have the capacity to comply with  even sometimes 
basic obligations. This was not a direction that the ACP  Group would want the WTO to take. Finally, 
Jamaica noted that an assessment of the overarching variables relating to this issue was critical if 
Members were to arrive to an evidence -based approach.  
9.81.   The delegate of Egypt  shared the position of the African Group and many developing countries 
that the best way of improving transparency at the WTO was through a more cooperative approach. 
He noted that many developing countries struggled to  comply with their notification obligations due 
mainly to institutional challenges and capacity constraints relating to their levels of development. 
The proposed punitive measures approach would not help these Members in facing these challenges 
but would i nstead result in a further marginalization of developing and least developed countries 
within the Organization. Egypt submitted that the desired reforms in this area should begin with a 
comprehensive review of the notification requirements in all the WTO  Agreements by the respective 
Committees to ensure that these were not unnecessarily complex or burdensome. It was also 
necessary to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the current notification -related technical 
assistance and capacity -building schemes. Such an assessment would facilitate discussions on how 
best to improve the developing Members' compliance with their notification obligations. Based on 
such reviews, updates to the requirements or incentives could then be considered and more focused 
techni cal assistance and capacity -building schemes could be provided to developing countries that 
had fallen behind.  
9.82.   The delegate of  the Plurinational State of Bolivia  emphasized the importance of transparency 
and reiterated its commitment to giving visibility a nd predictability to Bolivia's trade practices. He 
expressed Bolivia's hope that all Members would do the same. He stated that transparency was the 
pillar not only of the rules -based trading system but also of the whole multilateral diplomatic and G/C/M/134  
 
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  trading  system. Bolivia reiterated that it did not believe that transparency was an issue that should 
be dealt with using punitive measures. Bolivia did not consider the administrative measures foreseen 
in paragraph  11, consisting in a list of sanctions against Me mbers, to be acceptable. Rather, Bolivia 
submitted that the proposal should focus on positive incentives since failures to notify were due to 
individual Member circumstances. Bolivia added that technical cooperation should not be imposed 
or be conditional on certain sanctions. S&D  provisions could be an incentive to be included in the 
proposal as a basis for negotiation. Bolivia concluded that the relationship between international 
organizations and States should be a horizontal relationship based on sovere ignty and mutual 
respect.  
9.83.   The delegate of Nigeria  echoed the statements by the African Group and the ACP  Group on 
this issue. Nigeria stated that, while the proposal was still being reviewed in Capital, it believed that 
transparency was an issue of critica l importance to the effective functioning of the Multilateral 
Trading System. However, Nigeria expressed its concern that a number of developing countries 
lacked the institutional capacity to comply with their notification obligations. These challenges wer e 
unlikely to be addressed by the S&D  provisions of paragraph  10 of the revised draft decision. In its 
view, the administrative measures under paragraph  11 of the proposal would place a burden on 
many developing countries. Nigeria reiterated that it was op en to further consultations on how to 
enhance transparency and strengthen notification requirements. In this regard, Nigeria believed that 
Members should be able to discuss this issue freely and to engage constructively and without 
prejudice to their respe ctive positions. Therefore, Nigeria emphasized again the need for a careful 
and balanced approach to ensure that Members, especially developing countries, were not punished 
because of onerous notification obligations.  
9.84.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  considered that strengthening and improving the 
WTO's functioning, including its monitoring mechanism, was of the utmost importance and was long 
overdue. The Russian Federation considered that enhancing transparency and improving the 
effectiveness of noti fication requirements were integral to WTO  reform. Therefore, it supported all 
efforts aimed at promoting transparency in the multilateral trading system, also through the 
improvement of the quality and timeliness of the information submitted by Members. W ith regard 
to the proposal for setting new time -frames for the submission of information by Members, the 
Russian Federation stated that the proposed initiative would enhance  the already  existing  obligations  
under  the WTO Agreements while maintaining a fair degree of flexibility for Members to comply with 
notification  commitments. In this regard, he stated that there had to be the right balance established 
between setting reasonably short timelines and providing Members with an adequate tim e period for 
compliance. Maintaining overly tight deadlines would not be feasible for technical reasons and 
because of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures in cases where different agencies were involved in 
the process of preparing notifications. The Russian  Federation stated that, in sum, it considered this 
proposal to be a timely document , and of essential importance ; it should be further discussed by the 
Membership. The Russian Federation indicated that it stood ready to engage constructively with 
Members to improve the existing WTO  notification procedures, in order to ensure the predictability 
and transparency of Members' trade regimes.  
9.85.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  stated that her delegation accorded a very high priority to 
the fulfilment of its notifi cation requirements as it believed that this was a fundamental obligation of 
Members and that transparency had a profound impact on the functioning of the multilateral trading 
system. Support and assistance should be provided to Members experiencing genuin e difficulties in 
meeting their notification obligations. Hong Kong, China, added that, at the same time, in a rules -
based system it would also expect to see active deterrents in place against non -compliance. She 
said that the proposal was a useful basis f or discussion. The objective of enhancing transparency 
through better notification performance was shared by all Members. With regard to the revised 
proposal itself, she welcomed changes made in order to address certain questions that had been 
raised by Me mbers, including in relation to the circulated time -frame. However, as there had not 
been significant changes introduced to the types of administrative measures set out in the proposal, 
Hong Kong, China, continued to question their effectiveness, particula rly when the same measures 
were applied in the same manner to different types and extents of non -compliance. She called upon 
Members and proponents to remain flexible and constructive and to work together towards making 
good progress on these issues. She s uggested that Members pursue a more open approach and 
process in order first to find common ground on certain building blocks. For example, there were 
elements in the proposal that could form the basis of a broad framework, such as the Working Group 
on Not ification Obligations, assistance provided to developing countries, possible measures, a 
workable and meaningful time -frame, and so on. If Members could agree on such a framework or G/C/M/134  
 
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  backbone, they could then leave it to the Working Group and respective Com mittees to draw up 
further technical details for implementation. In this way, the application of measures could take into 
consideration the nature, complexity, and challenges specific to each Agreement. It would also be 
helpful if proponents and Members co uld iron out their differences at informal and technical 
meetings.  
9.86.   The delegate of Ukraine  acknowledged the essential role of transparency in the process of 
implementation of the WTO  Agreements and considered notifications to be an important and 
indispensa ble instrument in assessing Members' compliance with their WTO  commitments . 
Transparency and notifications could also be tools to build or re -build trust between Members. 
Ukraine noted three  main features of the proposal: first, the establishment of non -compliance, 
administrative measures, and capacity -building. Ukraine welcomed the role given in this regard to 
the Trade Policy Review Mechanism and to the SPS and TBT  Committees; second, the charge of the 
contributions towards technical assistance rather tha n towards the WTO  budget; and third, the 
acknowledgement that notification failure could be caused by a lack of information or capacity. 
Members could request the Secretariat's assistance and even ask the Secretariat to submit 
notifications on a Member's b ehalf. Ukraine also considered that developing country Members with 
limited capacity and in need of assistance should not be subject to "administrative measures". A 
Working Group was tasked to "consider both systemic and specific improvements that can help  
Members to improve compliance with notification obligations". Ukraine agreed with the approach of 
"disclose and assist" rather than "litigate and sanction" as it could be a quicker and more efficient 
route to compliance. The proposed document was a good s tart for further discussion and 
consideration by Members with a view to enhancing transparency. It was also important for 
Committees and the Secretariat to try not only to note the number of missing notifications, but also 
the reasons that explained why no tifications had not been submitted, as well as why the deadlines 
were not being met, based on the explanations presented by the Member itself. Additionally, 
Members could decide to put on the list of the administrative measures a provision according to 
which Members that breached the ir WTO notification obligations or were late in submitting their 
notifications could not propose to host a Ministerial Conference.  
9.87.   The delegate of Uruguay  highlighted the systemic importance of tackling this issue, which 
guarant eed the application of the WTO  commitments that Members had undertaken. Uruguay stated 
that it aligned itself with the statements made by other Members about the need to improve the 
system of notifications and to fulfil notification obligations voluntarily  signed up to by Members. 
Uruguay noted that there seemed to be disagreement over certain parts of the proposal and that 
many Members had made reference to the administrative sanctions set out in the proposal. Uruguay 
submitted that it was nobody's intenti on to punish anyone; the purpose was rather to determine 
how to ensure the effective fulfilment of obligations undertaken by Members. Uruguay suggested 
that one way to do this could be to adopt a creative thinking approach towards how to improve the 
system . It was a system that needed of necessity  to be based on incentives to notify and to meet 
the obligations undertaken, but it should also have mechanisms to ensure compliance. There needed 
to be a balance struck between Members' various legitimate concerns , such as  in relation to the 
following : how to deal with the variety of different situations that could lead to a failure to notify in 
relation to the different kinds of notifications; how to tackle the possible negative effects that might 
be the consequen ce of some of the proposed measures; and how to strike a balance between these 
aspects and a mechanism that worked in practical terms. Uruguay stated that technical assistance 
and capacity -building should be respected and, with regard to the Secretariat's role, the Secretariat 
could help in seeking creative solutions to the issue of how best to encourage Members to fulfil their 
obligations. In addition, he stated that one of the elements needing improvement was in relation to 
coherence between the different  Agreements. For example, the exception for domestic support under 
the Agreement on Agriculture was not convenient since it would be better to have a systematic and 
coherent approach that covered all of the covered Agreements.  
9.88.   The delegate of Guatemala  reaffirmed that improving transparency at the WTO and in its 
Committees was important. She noted that Guatemala had been working with the Secretariat to 
improve its record on notifications across a range of committees and that some were now up -to-
date in comp arison to other countries . Guatemala highlighted the importance of technical assistance 
provided by the Secretariat, which had enabled Guatemala to tackle certain pending notifications. 
This was achieved in part through annual seminars organized by the Sec retariat, which trained the 
responsible officials in the relevant Ministries on how and where to notify the relevant policies. 
Guatemala noted that its Capital was reviewing the document, particularly as concerned the 
retroactive character of the administr ative measures, which would require government G/C/M/134  
 
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  authorization. Guatemala underlined the importance of addressing the different levels of Members' 
development in the negotiations, particularly with regard to time -periods and resource limitations.  
9.89.   The delegat e of Turkey  stated that the revised proposal was a constructive attempt to 
strengthen transparency and to improve the effectiveness of notification requirements. He welcomed 
the fact that the new proposal included notifications on the Trade Facilitation Ag reement, and also 
that it included notifications under the Agreement on Agriculture. However, although the proposal 
mitigated some of Turkey's concerns, Turkey considered that the paper still needed further 
modification. First, Turkey questioned the necess ity and function of counter -notifications. This 
practice would involve the question of how to test the validity and accuracy of the information 
provided by another Member. Second, it was not appropriate to empower the Secretariat to provide 
notifications o n behalf of Members, even with the consent or approval of the Member concerned. 
Third, Turkey sought clarification as to whether or not partial non -compliance and full non -
compliance would be treated in the same way. Fourth, Turkey's most significant conce rn was with 
regard to the proposed administrative measures. Non -compliance should result in some 
consequences, but the administrative or punitive measures proposed in the paper could result rather 
in pushing Members away from the system and discouraging th em from respecting their obligations. 
Budgetary measures, and putting an additional financial burden on Members, might only run the 
risk of further isolating them, especially least developed and developing Members. With regard to 
missing notifications, Tur key suggested that a periodic compliance report by the Director General be 
circulated to the Trade Ministers of those Members concerned, instead of sending a bill to those 
countries, as proposed in the current text. Turkey stated that developing Members fa ced several 
capacity challenges when preparing their notifications and that technical assistance in this regard 
would be beneficial, as suggested in the proposal. However, the notification process was not only a 
simple one -time action , consisting only of s ubmitting  existing or already "stored" data to the related 
Committees ; rather, it was an ongoing process, which included collection, analysis, and coordination 
of all the relevant national data. At a later stage, Members were also required to answer all the 
questions that arose from their notifications. In addition to this, de veloping countries did not always 
have the technical capacity to analyse the notifications received from other Members. In this context, 
developing Members might for many reasons require longer periods of time. Turkey concluded that 
it supported the genera l direction of the proposal and was interested in working with Members on 
these issues.  
9.90.   The delegate of Cuba informed the Council that the updated document was being reviewed in 
Capital but that her delegation wished to provide a couple of preliminary rema rks. She noted that 
there were a number of elements with which Cuba had already disagreed on previous occasions, but 
which had remained in the current proposal. Cuba submitted that this proposal intended to add to 
Members' existing notification obligations . In particular, it proposed to include an obligation on 
Members to explain the reasons why they could not comply with their notification obligations. Cuba 
submitted that this would add an extra administrative burden on Members, alongside the 
commitments a lready undertaken under the covered Agreements. Cuba noted that the proposal 
included administrative measures to punish those Members that did not comply with their notification 
obligations. In this regard, Cuba highlighted that developing country Members faced difficulties 
complying with their notification obligations. Cuba concluded that it could not support punishing 
those Members that already had only scarce resources available to meet their many notification 
obligations.  
9.91.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  recog nized the importance of the transparency pillar for the 
WTO system, and therefore considered that compliance with notification requirements was an 
essential element in the context of Members' discharging their WTO  obligations . Sri Lanka, after it 
had recog nized and acknowledged its own backlog of notifications, had made several genuine and 
best efforts to comply with its notification obligations by addressing the obstacles that had been 
hindering its compliance. Sri Lanka had subsequently succeeded in clear ing the backlog by increasing 
its notification compliance with regard to most of the WTO  Agreements. In the process of the 
preparation of these notifications, the obstacles faced by Sri Lank a were not only limited to a general 
lack of technical assistance,  but included also the following: (i)  institutional capacity to understand 
the technicalities behind the notification concepts and complex notification formats; (ii)  data 
gathering and data analysis; (iii)  a lack of staff within the institutions; and  (iv) a lack of institutional 
memory. Based on these experiences, Sri Lanka expressed concerns over the following dimensions 
of the proposal: (i)  the aim to impose additional burdens on small countries; (ii)  the creation of 
additional rights to be exercised by c ertain Members, particularly in relation to the right to make 
counter -notifications, which went beyond the current disciplines of the WTO  Agreements and altered  G/C/M/134  
 
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  the balance in Members' rights and obligations. She concluded that her delegation found it diff icult 
to agree with the current proposal as it prescribed penalties and administrative action in case of 
default, rather than making an effort to understand the difficulties facing developing countries and 
to provide them with the necessary resources to st rengthen their capacity and to overcome the 
obstacles  identified . 
9.92.   The delegate of the European Union  stated that the EU found it encouraging that many 
Members stood ready to engage constructively on this issue, and her delegation looked forward to 
continui ng the conversation in light of the fact that the co -sponsors were well aware that certain 
aspects of the proposal needed further reflection . Regarding the questions or comments on the scope 
of the proposal, notably in relation to Services, TRIPS, or even RTAs, the co -sponsors considered 
that the notification requirements under the CTG would be a good starting point because their 
compliance performance was well documented in the annual Secretariat report. In addition, the 
notification requirements of the GA TT were especially clear since Members did not have to judge for 
themselves what should or should not be notified; indeed, this could explain why Members' 
notification performance was in general terms better in this area. Regarding RTAs, the EU said that 
the co -sponsors were open to hearing Members' ideas. Regarding TRIPs, the EU recognized that 
certain countries had a heightened sensitivity; for this reason, the co -sponsors considered it 
preferable to begin with the Agreements falling under the purview of the CTG. If Members were 
interested in addressing their notification concerns under these various Agreements the co -sponsors 
would be willing to discuss and to consider the most efficient way to do so.  
9.93.   Regarding coverage and ad hoc notifications, the inten tion in the proposal was to apply the 
measures set out within it to all notifications for Agreements listed in paragraph  1, since there were 
delays in the submission of each type of notification. The EU stated that covering ad hoc notifications 
relating to  the TBT and SPS  Agreements in the proposal would have to be delegated to the respective 
Committees because those types of notifications were highly technical. Regarding administrative 
measures, the EU noted that Members had raised the issue of proportiona lity, or the fact that 
administrative measures would apply irrespective of how many deadlines had been missed. The 
objective behind the administrative measures was to send a strong message as soon as there was 
non-compliance. However, the measures would no t kick -in as soon as there was a delay but would 
be applied only when there had been a serious delay without progress. The EU added that the co -
sponsors were open to listening to Members' suggestions for a more gradual approach. Furthermore, 
the EU noted t hat there were also calls for flexibility for LDCs.  
9.94.   Compliance with WTO  obligations, including notification obligations, benefited all Members. 
The EU reiterated that the proposal included elements that related to technical assistance and to 
capacity -building, as well as additional time in cases where assistance was needed. The EU added 
that they were also open to reflecting further on how best to address the needs and constraints of 
LDCs more specifically, bearing in mind that the overall objective was to help them to notify. With 
regard to the questions concerning the quality of notifications, the EU recognized that the current 
proposal focused more on the issue of quantity rather than quality. The EU expressed an interest in 
discussing ways to improve thi s but stated that it would rather see this kind of conversation in the 
respective Committees based on the input of relevant experts. The EU noted that this was typically 
an issue that could feed into a discussion in the Working Group. The EU concluded by n oting that 
the comments that had been made had been very helpful and that these would certainly be 
considered when advancing the work on the proposal.  
9.95.   The delegate of the United States  stated that the US had found that counter -notifications did 
indeed prov ide important transparency, and that, while some Agreements specifically encouraged 
the practice of providing counter -notifications, others were silent; thus, there was nothing stopping 
a counter -notification from being made. With regard to the role of the  Secretariat, the US did not 
believe that the proposal would over -extend the Secretariat; in fact, it was already the case that 
any Member could seek technical assistance. In addition, any Member could also prioritize the full 
implementation of its WTO  commitments, to include notifications, in its development assistance 
plans. The US noted that, for a number of developing country Members, it was possible that the 
Secretariat's assistance would be a one -time occurrence in order simply to verify a notificatio n, as 
in the case, for example, of a Member that did not have any state -trading enterprises, or which did 
not provide agricultural or industrial subsidies. In practice, some Members, despite having a fully 
prepared notification, still did not submit it; a delegated authority might assist in such instances. 
With regard to the administrative measures and the budgetary assessment, the US stated that  it 
believed that the current abysmal record on notification compliance would continue unless there G/C/M/134  
 
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  were clear co nsequences to continued wilful non -compliance with long -standing notification 
obligations. In this context, the proponents wished to find ways to increase pressure on Members to 
notify , including by eliciting, if possible,  a whole Government response to th e issue of notification 
non-compliance; the US considered that the current proposal represented an effective approach in 
this regard. On the issue of the retrospective nature of the proposal, the US understood that this did 
raise questions for certain Memb ers over its implementation, an issue that the proposal's 
co-sponsors were continuing to discuss. In addition, the US and co -sponsors stood ready to listen 
to any additional concerns that Members had, as well as to hear any practical suggestions from 
Membe rs about how best to advance on this issue. Finally, the US addressed the suggestion from 
some Members that this proposal alter ed the balance of Members' rights and obligations, reiterating 
her Ambassador's earlier comments , when he stated that this proposal did not change the 
notification obligations required of any Member under the WTO  Agreements ; rather, i t merely 
sought, by means of various incentives and administrative measures, to encourage Members to 
comply with their notification obligations. The US stood ready to continue working with Members on 
this proposal with the aim of moving this important initiative  forward . 
9.96.   The delegate of Japan  noted that some Members  considered that the proponents could have 
better sequenced the work set out in the proposal ; for example, by beginning with a diagnosis of 
programmes and an assessment of the reasons behind non -compliance. However, Japan pointed out 
that there had already been much time and opportunity for such discussio ns; nevertheless, such 
discussions  had not resulted in any improvement.  The issue was now urgent, including for the 
WTO system itself; it now required Members to approve concrete measures. Japan had also heard 
it said that Members sometimes had specific co nstraints that technical assistance alone could not 
redress. In this regard, Japan found it useful to clarify the proposed general role of the Working 
Group , as set out in  paragraph  2. Japan considered that the Working Group would preside 
horizontally over  notification -related procedures. The Working Group was expected to play a 
coordinating role between the work of the Committees and the Secretariat ; it was also expected, 
with assistance from the Secretariat, to summarize the general notification situation  and to report 
back to the CTG accordingly. In addition, the Working Group was expected to work with other 
relevant  bodies in examining the challenges faced by Members and in providing  technical assistance 
to Members to improve  their levels of domestic coordination and compliance . Finally, it would share 
its best practices among Members , both at  Committee level and at especially designed workshops.  
Japan was also looking forward to further discussions on these issues with all Members.  
9.97.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  responded to the comments made on technical assistance and 
capacity -building. Chinese Taipei noted that the notification commitments of WTO  Members 
remained unchanged under the current proposal. Similarly, Members would still  have access to all 
the currently available tools, including access to the Secretariat's technical assistance, in case they 
faced challenges in fulfilling their notification commitments . Members would also enjoy the same 
opportunities as before to discuss their concerns and difficulties in the relevant Committees and 
Working Groups. Chinese Taipei also highlighted a number of positive additions in the proposal, 
which effectively enhanced the existing tools already available to Members. These additional tool s 
aimed to create a cost -effective incentive to address the various constraints that might currently be 
hampering Members' ability to comply with their notification commitments. First, the proposal 
contained elements that could help to address issues of in ternal cooperation and institutional 
capacity constraints at the domestic level; for example, government authorities, especially those 
involved in international trade, would have an additional tool with which to highlight the importance 
of transparency at the WTO, and thereby to encourage an appropriate reassignment of resources in 
order to strengthen national notification systems. Nevertheless, Chinese Taipei recognized that this 
was not a universal solution, and that it was up to Members to assess the uti lity of this tool with 
regard to its specific circumstances. Second, Chinese Taipei noted that, while Members could 
currently discuss their concerns and difficulties in the relevant Committees, the proposal also 
provided for a specific forum, in the contex t of the Working Group on Notification Obligations and 
Procedures, where Members could present their systemic difficulties and find technically driven 
solutions to their needs; at the same time, Members would benefit from the possibility of contributing 
to the development of recommendations to improve transparency performance in general.  
9.98.   The delegate of Argentina  noted that the different co -sponsors had coordinated closely in the 
proposal's development. Against this background, Argentina wished to highlight  several elements in 
addition to those already referred to by Chinese Taipei on technical assistance and capacity -building. 
Argentina stated that it remained convinced that the benefits of providing notifications far exceeded 
any attendant costs, and that this was even more the case for developing Members. The creation of G/C/M/134  
 
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  a notification system could certainly be resource -intensive in the short term, but this was only one 
aspect of the issue. Argentina considered that establishing  a national market intellige nce system like 
that provided by the WTO would otherwise be beyond the reach of most Members. Indeed, by 
providing one  notification, Members then had access to the information provided by the rest of the 
WTO, in a standardized manner, and translated into t he WTO's three  official languages. Argentina 
stated that this was therefore the most cost -efficient framework  and that,  over the long er term, it 
would also be reasonable to expect a more efficient use of available resources as activities  became 
more soluti on-oriented.  
9.99.   The delegate of Australia  responded to Members' comments regarding agriculture notifications 
by indicating that the Agreement on Agriculture had now been consolidated with the other 
Agreements' understandings in paragraph  1, and that, rather t han treating all of the relevant 
notifications differently, allowance had now been made for DS:1 for domestic support . Australia 
highlighted that the proposal did not change any of the notification obligations required by any 
Member under the WTO  Agreement s, including the DS:1  notification obligation. Paragraph  7 
proposed additional time for the submission of DS:1  notifications only, before administrative 
measures would then be applied. This proposal came from a review of missing notifications as found 
in document  G/AG/2, which noted that there were over 800  missing DS:1  notifications; however, 
there were fewer than a hundred missing notifications for each of the other required agriculture 
notifications. As concerned this specific situation, the proposal lim ited flexibility to an additional 
two years before timing began for administrative measures that would apply to DS:1  only, and only 
until document  G/AG/2 had been updated.  
9.100.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
9.101.   The Coun cil so agreed . 
10  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARA BIA, KINGDOM OF BAHR AIN, AND THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES – SELECTIVE  TAX ON CERTAIN IMPO RTED PRODUCTS – REQU EST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, SWIT ZERLAND, AND THE UNI TED STATES  
10.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communic ation dated 25  March  2019, the 
delegations of the European Union, Switzerland, and the United States, respectively, had requested 
the Secretariat to include this issue on the  agenda.  
10.2.   The delegate of Switzerland  recalled that the issue of the selective tax in question, which was 
being applied to energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks, had already appeared on the agenda of 
previous CTG  meetings. He indicated that, despite the various bilateral meetings on this issue that 
had taken place in the WTO since Nov ember  20018, the issue had remained unresolved. 
Nevertheless, Switzerland welcomed the fact that GCC  Members were giving their active 
consideration to possible reforms of their tax regime. A first  step, according to the information most 
recently available,  could be an extension of the tax base to other products. However, Switzerland 
requested to get more precise information on the products that would be subject to the tax in this 
regard. Switzerland also expressed the concern that this first step would not in fact solve the 
discriminatory treatment that currently existed between energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks, 
since these would still be subject to different ad valorem  excise tax rates. A second step, in 
Switzerland's understanding, was the replacem ent of the ad valorem  selective tax for a volume -
based tax. Switzerland reiterated its request for more information in this regard. Furthermore, 
Switzerland stated that it had received a note from the GCC  Secretariat that had emphasized the 
compliance of t he current measures with WTO  rules but did not answer to the outstanding additional 
written question sent last November regarding the scientific basis justifying the imposition of 
different tax rates on energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks. Switzerland  requested an answer  
also to this question.  
10.3.   With regard to the note, Switzerland understood  that it invited industry leaders to provide 
comments and suggestions on regulatory and legislative issues. In this regard, he repeated 
Switzerland's proposal from t he last CTG: (i)  an immediate reduction of the level of the tax on energy 
drinks and the application of the same level to energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks; 
(ii) consideration of enlargement of the tax base in order for all beverages subject to tax to face the 
same tax rate; and (iii)  replacement of the current ad valorem  selective tax base to a specific tax 
based on the volume of the sugar content. In the last reform, only the last two  elements had been G/C/M/134  
 
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  considered, Switzerland therefore requested th e immediate reduction of the tax rate on energy 
drinks to the rate applicable to carbonated soft drinks. In addition, Switzerland raised a new issue 
regarding sports drinks. These were not energy drinks and they did not contain any caffeine; 
nevertheless, they were currently being taxed in the Kingdom of Bahrain as energy drinks. The tax 
rates that were currently being applied to three  brands of sport drinks were different. Two  brands 
were subject to a tax rate of zero  per cent, whereas the third was subject to a tax rate of 100%. 
Switzerland asked the Kin gdom of Bahrain for its reasoning behind its treatment of sport drinks and 
asked  the Kingdom of  Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) if, in their countries, sports 
drinks brands were also subject to different selection tax rates.  
10.4.   The delegate of  the United States  reiterated US  concerns over the excise tax on carbonated 
soft drinks, malt beverages, and energy and sports drinks, which was currently being implemented 
by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the UAE, and that was a lso under 
consideration by other GCC  member States. The current implementation of the excise tax on these 
products had a discriminatory effect by singling out particular types of beverages produced by 
multinational companies, while excluding non -carbonated  sweetened beverages produced by 
domestic companies. She also noted, in the TBT  Committee, the introduction of additional draft 
measures by  the Kingdom of  Saudi  Arabia that sought to limit the caffeine levels of purchased 
beverages such as energy drinks to  levels that could be produced in beverages at home. She stated 
that, while the US supported efforts to prevent and control non -communicable diseases, the report 
of the High -Level Commission of the WHO on such diseases did not recommend the use of beverage  
taxes to advance public health outcomes. Given that the multinational producers of such beverages 
had publicly committed to working with GCC  member States through public/private partnerships in 
a voluntary effort to address health concerns, the US strongl y encouraged GCC  member States to 
engage private industry stakeholders on how to ensure that the excise tax would be applied in a 
transparent and non -discriminatory manner, and to address any remaining concerns.  In coordination 
with other Members, the US h ad also raised these concerns in the Capitals of the GCC  member 
States.  
10.5.   The delegate of the European  Union  expressed concern over the discriminatory aspect of the 
relevant excise tax on energy drinks and carbonated drinks, and over the scope of this tax, i ts 
calculation basis, as well as its compatibility with the WHO  recommendations, which had included 
the recommendation that there be a tax of not more than 20% on all sugar -sweetened beverages . 
She reiterated that concerns remained regarding the scientific  basis for taxing carbonated drinks, 
and regarding the conformity of these tax measures with the non -discrimination principle and 
obligation under GATT  Article  III:2. The EU invited the GCC to advance in its internal review of these 
measures, considering M embers' comments, and suggested establishing an interim solution during 
the scheme's review period that would reduce and equalize the current tax rates applied to energy 
drinks to those of soft drinks, meaning 50% as opposed to 100%. In addition, the EU in formed 
Members that it had sent a diplomatic note verbale to each GCC  country in June  2018 as well as 
sending letters at ministerial level in March  2019. The EU noted its expectation of formal, written 
responses to these submissions.  
10.6.   The delegate of Japan  noted that his delegation had not received any response to its written 
questions, but that it continued to be concerned over this issue.  
10.7.   The delegate of the Kingdom of Bahrain , on behalf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
and the Kingdom of Bahrain, informed Members that this matter was being handled at GCC  level, 
and assured them that their concerns were being taken into consideration. He noted that a response 
was being prepared by the GCC  Secretariat and thanked those delegations that had engaged in  
bilateral consultations on this issue. Finally, the Kingdom of Bahrain invited concerned Members to 
approach it if they had any further questions . 
10.8.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the s tatements made.  
10.9.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  11  INDONESIA'S IMPORT A ND EXPORT RESTRICTIN G POLICIES AND PRACT ICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NORWAY AND THE UNITE D STATES  
11.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 25 and 29  March 2019, 
the delegations of the European Union, Japan, Norway, and the United States, respectively, had 
requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda . 
11.2.   The delegate of the European Union  noted that this item had been on the CTG's agenda for 
over four  years, and that her delegation's concerns still remained. The EU noted that Indonesia had 
made some efforts to address its cumbersome measures, including a certain simplification of its 
import procedures; nevertheless, the EU remained concerned by  the persistently protectionist nature 
of Indonesia's trade policy, as well as by a climate of legal uncertainty, which saw frequent 
modifications to laws whose state of implementation  was likewise unclear . Among the measures of 
particular concern to the E U were the following: (i)  the use of local content requirements in a number 
of sectors; (ii)  complex and burdensome import requirements for a number of products, including 
for cosmetics which were recently subjected to increased, very high registration fee s; 
(iii) burdensome and non -transparent SPS  measures, including lack of feedback from Indonesia on 
market access applications - some of which were submitted in 2013 (on which the EU would welcome 
the SPS  approval procedures to be undertaken and completed w ithout undue delay); (iv)  QRs for 
meat, steel, and tyres; export restrictions for certain raw materials (on which the EU would especially 
appreciate receiving further information); and (v)  burdensome and discriminatory conformity 
assessment procedures and the growing proliferation of mandatory technical standards. In 
particular, with regard to the "Halal" Law  No. 33/2014 and its implementing regulations and 
procedures, the EU noted that it was still waiting for a precise and official overview o f the way in 
which Indonesia intended to implement its Halal-related rules, as well as of the scope, object and 
timing of the measures under preparation. The EU called upon Indonesia to notify them in 
accordance with WTO  rules and to keep Halal certification and labell ing voluntary, as a less trade -
restrictive measure. In addition, the EU requested a state of play regarding the rules and standards 
for milk, as well as the Ministerial Decree Nos.  82/2017 and 80/2018 on maritime transport and 
insurance. The EU urged Indon esia to eliminate its high number of trade barriers and to refrain from 
issuing new ones, in line with its commitments in the G20.  
11.3.   The delegate of Japan  reiterated its concern over Indonesia's restricting policies and practices , 
which had been brought to Members' attention before , at the TRIMs  Committee and at the CTG. 
Japan regretted that Indonesia had only replied that these measures were consistent with WTO  rules 
instead of providing  concrete answers. He requested Indonesia to provide the following infor mation: 
(i) how the measures to be introduced were consistent with the WTO  Agreement; (ii)   specific details 
of the approach to the reform that Indonesia was considering to adopt; and (iii)  an update on the 
latest situation of these series of measures.  
11.4.   The delegate of the United States  recalled that , in previous interventions in this body, it had 
reviewed in some detail the broad range of its concerns  under this agenda item,  including localization 
requirements, import licensing requirements, st andards requirements, pre -shipment inspection 
requirements, and export restrictions, including taxes and prohibitions, among others. These types 
of restrictions affected a broad range of sectors. The US had also expressed its concern over the 
general lack of transparency shown by Indonesia. In particular, the US highlighted its concern 
regarding the lack of clarity surrounding implementation of Indonesia's Halal Law. She urged 
Indonesia to notify any implementing regulations of this law to the TBT  Committee  prior to their 
finalization , and to provide time for comments from stakeholders.  
11.5.   In addition, the US stated that it remained deeply concerned by Indonesia's use of localization 
requirements across a broad and expanding range of sectors, including telecomm unications, mobile 
technology, energy, agriculture, retail, and franchising. Not only did these local content requirements 
raise questions about consistency with Indonesia's trade obligations, but they also acted as barriers 
to trade that potentially diver ted investment from other developing countries. In the 
US understanding, Indonesia was now considering expanding these requirements to the 
pharmaceutical and medical device sectors. The US was deeply concerned about this prospect and 
noted that it had already submitted questions to Indonesia on these potential new local content 
requirements. At the October  2018 TRIMs Committee meeting, the US had requested that Indonesia 
keep Members informed on any progress it was making in its ongoing comprehensive review  of 
localization measures, and to report on any meaningful milestones with regard to the eventual G/C/M/134  
 
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  elimination of these trade -distorting LCR  measures. The US expressed its hope to see this report at, 
or before, the upcoming June  2019 TRIMs  Committee meeting . 
11.6.   She expressed additional US  concern over the developments in the digital trade space, 
including Indonesia's creation of tariff lines for electronically transmitted software and digital 
products. She noted that any move to raise import duty rates on these  tariff lines would raise serious 
questions regarding Indonesia's compliance with the moratorium on customs duties on electronic 
transmissions. Finally, the US noted that it had already raised its concerns regarding these policies 
on numerous occasions at the CTG, and that it would continue to raise them bilaterally and in the 
appropriate WTO  Committees.  
11.7.   The delegate of Norway  brought to the Council's attention a concern regarding the export of 
seafood. Norway informed the Council that it had received infor mation from Norwegian seafood 
exporters that Indonesia no longer required third  party verifications of all consignments before 
shipping to Indonesia. Norway welcomed this change in practice. However, Norway noted that the 
Indonesian system of import quotas  for seafood still represented a restriction on exports of 
Norwegian seafood to Indonesia, and that a limited number of quotas and a lack of transparency in 
the process for granting them made the framework for trade in Indonesia unpredictable. Norway 
noted  that the new regulation, which had entered into force in 2018, may form only part of a larger 
overhaul of the Indonesian import regime for fishery products. Nevertheless, Norway would welcome 
more detailed information from Indonesia in this regard.  
11.8.   The de legate of China  shared the concerns expressed by other Members over Indonesia's 
import and export restrictions. China was also concerned over the pre -paid income tax on imported 
products under Article  22 of Indonesia's Income Tax Law and considered that th is mechanism placed 
a heavier tax burden on imported products, and in a discriminatory manner, as it required importers 
to pay 2.5 to 10% pre -paid income tax. China also noted that, on 30  September  2018, Indonesia 
had further raised the pre -paid income tax  rate for 1,174  products, thus limiting imported goods to 
a less favourable competitive position. China urged Indonesia to bring its measures into conformity 
with the WTO's rules as soon as possible.  
11.9.   The delegate of New Zealand  echoed the concerns raised b y other Members. As noted at 
previous CTG  meetings, New Zealand submitted that Indonesia's restrictions on agricultural imports 
undermined core WTO  principles and were inconsistent with key obligations in the WTO  Agreements. 
New Zealand welcomed Indonesia' s commitment to implementing the WTO decision and the steps 
that had been taken towards compliance to date. However, New Zealand continued to have 
significant concerns over several of Indonesia's import restrictions affecting trade across a range of 
agricu ltural products. In particular, New Zealand expressed concern over the two -month delay in 
issuing Import Approvals for New Zealand horticulture products earlier in 2019, especially as 
Indonesian Ministry of Trade Regulation  64/2018 had specified that these  would be issued within 
two working days, and with other restrictions that continued to be applied to horticulture and dairy 
products. New Zealand submitted that these issues reflected a lack of progress from Indonesia in 
removing restrictive trade practic es in accordance with the WTO  ruling. As previously indicated, 
Indonesia's restrictions not only hurt exporters; Indonesian consumers, processors, and producers 
had also been affected, as Indonesia's measures had contributed to rises in food prices in Indo nesia, 
including for basic foodstuffs and ingredients for the domestic manufacturing sector. Like other 
delegations, New Zealand hoped that Indonesia would implement its reform plans through policies 
that were consistent with its WTO  obligations.  
11.10.   The delegate of Brazil  shared the concerns of other Members, particularly with regard to  
undue delays in inspection and approval for Brazilian meat exporters, which Brazil submitted was a 
clear breach of Article  8 and Annex  C of the SPS  Agreement. Brazil n oted that these measures had 
been particularly harmful to Brazilian exports of poultry and beef.  
11.11.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  stated that, like other Members, the Russian 
Federation was seriously concerned over Indonesia's widespread trade -restri ctive practices, 
including measures applicable to a wide range of agricultural and industrial products. The complex, 
burdensome, and discriminatory measures applied by Indonesia were obstructing imports, among 
other products, of meat and meat products, mil k products, wheat, horticultural products, tyres, wood 
and forest products. The Russian Federation had noted a decrease in Indonesia's imports from the 
Russian Federation and other Members. The Russian Federation urged Indonesia to share a timeline G/C/M/134  
 
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  indicat ing when it planned to remove  its unnecessary obstacles to trade in order to bring  its 
measures into conformity with WTO  rules.  
11.12.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  shared the concerns expressed by other Members, and also 
noted that this item had been on the CTG 's agenda for four  years. In particular, she expressed 
concern over Indonesia's local content requirements for mobile phones and telecommunications 
equipment. Chinese Taipei submitted that this measure adversely affected trade and investment and 
urged Indo nesia to ensure its compliance with its WTO obligations.  
11.13.   The delegate of Indonesia  thanked those delegations that had taken the floor for their 
interest in the Indonesian market. Indonesia had carefully considered Members' concerns regarding 
several of its  policy measures that had been alleged to be trade restrictive. Indonesia indicated that 
its trade policies corresponded well to its WTO  commitments, and that Indonesia championed the 
free flow of trade in goods across, and within, its borders. Indonesia reiterated that, what certain 
Members perceived to be measures that were restrictive in nature might in fact be the result of its 
efforts to cope with certain outstanding problems or negative consequences that Indonesia was 
confronting in relation precisely to its openness to i nternational trade. Indonesia said that it would 
keep Members updated on these measures at the relevant Committee meetings where these issues 
were raised. Indonesia concluded by stating that this was a work in progress.  
11.14.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
11.15.   The Council so agreed . 
12  INDIA – CUSTOMS DUTI ES ON ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CANADA , CHINA, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, JAPA N, NORWAY, CHINESE T AIPEI, AND THE UNITE D STATES  
12.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 25 and 29  March  2019, 
the delegations of Canada, China, the European Union, Japan, Norway, Chinese Taipei, and the 
United States, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this is sue on the agenda . 
12.2.   The delegate of the European Union  recalled that her delegation had expressed its concerns 
on this matter at the CTG and in the Committees on Market Access and ITA for several years. She 
noted that the EU had requested consultations with  India on 2  April 2019. The EU challenged India's 
introduction of import duties on a wide range of ICT  products, despite India's commitments in the 
WTO not to charge any duties on these products. In light of this development, the EU stated that it 
would no t elaborate further on this occasion.  
12.3.   The delegate of the United States  said that it was unfortunate to have to raise the issue of 
India's tariff increases on telecommunications and ICT  products; however, rather than responding 
to the concerns raised by th e US and numerous other Members, India had undertaken additional 
concerning actions. She noted that, prior to the CTG's previous meeting, India had just announced 
another round of tariff increases on telecommunications equipment, further raising rates at t he 
border from 10 to 20%, including on products for which the US had understood that India had duty -
free binding commitments. Since that meeting, India's customs authorities had continued to issue 
notifications, such as Notification No.  02/2019, which rais ed additional questions about the precise 
scope of these recent increases. The US found these continuous tariff increases on ICT  products, 
and the lack of transparency with regard to the scope of the products covered by these increases, 
to be deeply troubl ing. She noted that, for far too long, the US and other Members had been 
discussing discrepancies between India's WTO  commitments to provide duty -free access to certain 
products, and the non -zero import duties that India was in fact charging imported produ cts. She 
further noted that the US had urged India, on multiple occasions, both bilaterally and in the relevant 
Committees, to address its actions and abide by its commitments; however, India's tariff increases 
had nevertheless continued. The US stated tha t its patience with India in this regard was running 
thin and noted with interest the request for consultations filed recently by the EU. The US concluded 
by calling upon India to provide duty -free access for ICT and telecommunications equipment 
products, as India had committed to do.  
12.4.   The delegate of Japan  recalled that his delegation had expressed its concerns on this issue at 
the CTG, the Market Access Committee, and the ITA  Committee, as well as at bilateral meetings at G/C/M/134  
 
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  different levels, including at Min ister level. Japan submitted that it was clear that India's measures 
were in violation of its tariff schedule. Therefore, Japan requested that India swiftly remove these 
measures, not only because of their commercial impact, but also because this issue had  the potential 
to become very serious also from a systemic perspective.  
12.5.   The delegate of China  recalled that her delegation had raised this issue several times at the 
CTG and in the relevant Committees. China noted that India had circulated 
document  G/MA/TA R/RS/572, requesting rectifications of its 2007  schedule on certain ICT  products, 
on 25  September  2018. China had registered its objection to India's proposed rectification pursuant 
to the 1980  procedures. China stated that the items concerned were mainly covered under ITA -1; 
as such, India's Schedule already included binding commitments to provide duty -free access on 
ICT products. China reiterated its position that India's measures, especially the increase in applied 
rates on mobile phones and accessories,  were inconsistent with its commitments undertaken under 
the ITA, and set out in its WTO  Schedule, and that they had severely impaired China's trade 
interests. China urged India promptly to withdraw the applied tax duty on the products concerned. 
Finally, China stated that it would closely follow any developments in relation to the consultations 
requested by the EU.  
12.6.   The delegate of Norway  reiterated that Norway still had commercial and systemic concerns 
regarding this issue. Norway took note of recent devel opments with the EU and would follow this 
item closely.  
12.7.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  shared the concerns raised by other Members. Chinese Taipei 
noted that , since 2014, India had raised tariffs on at least 33  ICT products through its Union Budget 
and the  publication of other government notifications. These products were subject to 
HS Chapters  70, 84, 85, and 90. Chinese Taipei submitted that the tariffs raised had surpassed 
India's zero  bound commitments and violated Article  II:1(a) and (b) of GATT  1994 w ith regard to 
tariff binding obligations. Therefore, Chinese Taipei requested India to abide by its commitments by 
restoring the original tariff rates. Chinese Taipei noted the request for consultations on this issue 
and stated that it was also considering  this option.  
12.8.   The delegate of Canada  stated that Canada continued to have both systemic and commercial 
concerns over India's application of tariffs on ICT  products in excess of its WTO  bound commitments. 
He indicated that, as noted in Canada's objection le tter provided to India on 20  December  2018, 
Canada did not accept India's attempt to address the situation via a rectifications and modification 
to its Schedule  XII, as any such changes would alter the scope of India's tariff commitments with 
regard to the se ICT  products. Canada once again called upon India immediately to rescind its tariff 
increases and to refrain from pursuing any further tariff increases above its WTO  commitments.  
12.9.   The delegate of Thailand  shared the concerns of other Members and urged In dia to bring its 
tariffs into line with its WTO  commitments.  
12.10.   The delegate of Singapore  stated that Singapore remained concerned by India's continuing 
imposition of tariffs on ICT  products covered by India's ITA  commitments. Singapore indicated that 
it woul d continue to follow this issue very closely. Singapore also noted that bilateral meetings with 
officials in New Delhi were ongoing. Singapore expressed its hope that this issue would be swiftly 
resolved, with a minimal negative impact on trade.  
12.11.   The delega te of the Republic of Korea  shared the concerns expressed by other Members and 
noted that this issue had been discussed already at previous CTG  meetings, as well as in the relevant 
Committee meetings. Korea requested India immediately to restore duty -free access to the 
ICT products in question. At the same time, and considering the theme of procedural transparency, 
Korea encouraged India to share with Members sufficient information on the regulations in question.  
12.12.   The delegate of Switzerland  also reiterated its serious concern over this issue. Since 2014, 
India had progressively increased its customs duties on ICT  products. These import duties 
constituted prima facie  violations of India's WTO  commitments  to the extent that the tariff lines in 
question were su bject to duty -free commitments in India's tariff schedule of concessions. 
Switzerland, as an exporter of these products to India, indicated that its industry had been affected 
in consequence. India had made a notification to the Market Access Committee in September  2018 
regarding 15  tariff positions for which India had wanted to change its bound level of duties to G/C/M/134  
 
- 41 - 
 
  unbound. Switzerland objected to the proposed rectification as the change seriously altered the 
balance of concessions among Members and thus cou ld not be considered as a chan ge of purely 
former character. Switzerland stated that it would closely follow the process of consultations that 
had been requested by the EU.  
12.13.   The delegate of New Zealand  shared the concerns raised by other delegations, partic ularly 
with regard to the systemic importance of applied tariffs not exceeding bound commitments.  
12.14.   The delegate of Australia  again expressed Australia's interest in this matter.  
12.15.   The delegate of India thanked previous speakers for their continued interest in India's raising 
of customs duties on certain telecommunications equipment and other products. On the duty 
imposed on certain products considered by some Members to be part of ITA -1, India had alrea dy 
made statements in this regard in various Committees and at the CTG, as well as in bilateral 
meetings with Members on the technicalities of the rectification sought by India.  India reiterated 
that it was fully aware of its obligations and commitments un der the ITA -1 and had been abiding by 
them. India had signed the ITA -1 in 1997 and had presented its Schedule of Concessions, which had 
been certified in document  WT/Let/181. India did not intend to make any commitment beyond the 
scope of its ITA -1 commitm ents. India reiterated that it had the right to revisit any errors or mistakes 
committed in assigning bound tariffs while transposing India's HS  schedule, and to place the 
necessary rectification request before the committee concerned. Accordingly, India h ad filed its 
rectification request to correct certain errors in its HS2007  Schedule, in accordance with "the 
Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff Concessions". India encouraged 
Members to go through its rectification request  and, in case a Member had any other views on the 
technical aspects of these products or their classification, to discuss these with India directly.  
12.16.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
12.17.   The Council so agreed . 
13  EUROPEAN UNION – QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGR ICULTURAL PRODUCTS A ND 
FOODSTUFFS – THE REG ISTRATION OF CERTAIN  TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUES T FROM ARGENTINA, TH E UNITED STATES AND URUGUAY  
13.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 28  March  2019, the 
delegations of the United States and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include 
this issue on the agenda . 
13.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  regretted to have to raise  this issue again at the CTG. Uruguay 
reiterated that it had begun producing Danbo cheese thanks to the very valuable technical 
cooperation that had been offered to Uruguay by Denmark in the 1960s. The Danish Government 
had itself been the main promoter an d driving force behind the spread of the savoir -faire of how to 
produce this kind of cheese around the world, notably in Uruguay and Argentina, two  WTO Members 
which, since then, had become the main producers of Danbo cheese outside the EU. Uruguay noted 
that the authorities in Denmark had changed their stance and had requested protection of the term 
in the EU, as a protected geographical indication, in 2012. Despite Uruguay's opposition and the 
opposition of other Members in the CTG and the TBT  Committee, the EU had responded that this 
was an ongoing matter. Subsequently, on 19  October  2017, and without any prior notice, Uruguay 
had noted the publication of the implementing regulation  2017/1901, in which the term "Danbo " 
was set out as an EU  geographical pr otected indication. Uruguay recalled that "Danbo" had its own 
Codex Standard , which set out its production and labelling requirements. Its standard, Codex 
Stan 264, had been adopted in 1966 and updated on a number of occasions with the participation 
and ap proval of the EU. The standard set out clearly that "Danbo" was a generic term that was used 
to refer to a kind of cheese that might be produced in different localities as long as it met the 
requirements of the standard. Uruguay recalled the importance of codex standards as the relevant 
international standards in this area, in keeping with Article  2.4 of the TBT  Agreement, which was 
recognized by the panel in European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines  (DS231) . Uruguay 
expressed its systemic concer n that a Member of the WTO as significant as the EU would choose not 
to give its consideration to this standard, thus harming the multilateral efforts under the Codex to 
harmonize rules in this area internationally. Uruguay stated that "Danbo" was a generi c term; G/C/M/134  
 
- 42 - 
 
  therefore, it could not be appropriated as a geographical indicator or be the reason for any other 
limitation. He indicated that these limitations not only affected trade but also set up a dangerous 
precedent. Commercially, Uruguay expressed its co ncern, as an important producer and exporter of 
Danbo cheese, over the obstacle to trade to the EU that this measure represented. Uruguay 
expressed its disagreement over the EU's answers on this issue to the CTG and the TBT  Committee, 
including the stateme nt that this issue related to intellectual property and, as such, should not be 
addressed at the CTG. Uruguay reminded the EU that the norm that grant ed these rights was notified 
to the TBT  Committee on 18  November  2013, as document  G/TBT/N/EU/139, includi ng elements 
relating to labelling. Therefore, Uruguay requested the EU to provide appropriate answers to 
Members and to reconsider the effects of its measure with a view to avoiding any unnecessary 
restrictions on trade.  
13.3.   The delegate of the United States  reiterated the Unites States' concern over the EU's process 
of registration of common cheese names for which there were international standards as protected 
geographical indications (PGI). She recalled that the US had repe atedly raised its concerns regarding 
the registration of the name "Danbo" as a PGI, with a complete disregard for the international 
standard in Codex. The US reiterated its view that the consultation process had been unsatisfactory 
and had lacked sufficien t transparency. The US stated that it had not yet received an explanation as 
to how the Commission had considered the existing Codex standard. In addition, the US expressed 
concern over many of the proposed amendments that the EU had made to the underlying  regulation, 
and which had been notified to the TBT  Committee in August  2018. The US stated that these 
amendments appeared to exacerbate rather than to alleviate its existing concerns. Shifting authority 
from the Commission to member States and providing m ember States with greater flexibilities and 
control over GI  applications could have a negative impact on existing applications and on member 
States' fulfilment of their WTO  commitments. The amendments would also sharply reduce the period 
for filing a reaso ned basis in support of an opposition to register a GI. The US requested an update 
from the EU regarding the status of these proposed amendments. In addition, the US urged the EU 
to rescind the elements of the Proposed Amendments. Furthermore, with regard to the term 
"Havarti", the US submitted that the application under consideration for this term also lacked 
transparency. The US noted its understanding that the application of Havarti was coming up for 
review and vote, and once again asked the EU for a sta tus update. The US – and other trading 
partners – registered its objection to the establishment of GI  protection for Havarti during the 
2014 opposition period, as well as in subsequent TBT  Committee meetings and in meetings of this 
Council. The US said tha t, given that Havarti was a commonly used cheese name worldwide, the 
proposed action appeared to be a transparent effort to advantage EU  cheesemakers. Any EU  decision 
to move forward would raise serious questions about the views of Denmark and the EU  Commi ssion 
regarding the legal relevance of Codex and the integrity of the international trading system. The US 
encouraged Denmark to uphold its TBT  obligations to follow international standards, withdraw the 
GI application, and find a different solution for pr otecting Havarti producers. With regard to the 
exchange at the previous CTG  meeting, where the EU had indicated a preference to discuss this in 
a GI focused forum, the US disagreed and noted that this was a TBT  matter. The EU had correctly 
notified its qua lity schemes regulations under the TBT  Agreement precisely because there were 
TBT implications  to them , such as the labelling elements and relevant international standards.  
13.4.   The delegate of Argentina  requested that Argentina be included as a co -sponsor of t his agenda 
item and reiterated that the registration of the term "Danbo", as a protected geographical indication 
in favour of Denmark, did not give due consider ation to  the Codex standards ; Argentina also 
submitted that the process of consultations and reg istration had not been especially transparent. 
The term "Danbo" was a generic term, in accordance with the agreed international standards to 
which Members had earlier referred ; therefore, it should not be possible to register "Danbo" as a 
geographical indi cation. Argentina also noted that there should not be any limitation to the use of 
the term in accordance with panel findings in European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines  
(DS231) . The Codex Standard was a relevant international standard under Article  2.4 of the 
TBT Agreement, in accordance with the WTO. Therefore, the use of "Danbo" as a geographical 
indication showed that the EU had not used Codex Standard  264 as the basis for Regulation 
(EU) 2017/1901. Argentina urged the EU to review t he measure.  
13.5.   The delegate of Australia  stated that his delegation would welcome an update on the status 
of the application for Havarti as a geographical indication in the EU, noting the commercial interests 
of Australian producers in the ongoing use of this  term.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  13.6.   The delegate of New Zealand  reiterated that it remained concerned that the EU had chosen 
to register the term "Danbo", despite having previously agreed to a Codex standard in which the 
European Commission and Denmark had both acknowledged that "the country of origin statement 
preserves its generic nature". Such actions would negatively affect producers outside Denmark who 
had invested in Danbo production with the legitimate expectation that they could use the Codex 
standard. New  Zealand submitted tha t these actions showed disregard for the integrity of the 
international standards setting system that promoted reliability and consistency in international 
trade rules, which New Zealand would have expected the EU to support. Additionally, New Zealand 
stated that any suggestion that the term "Havarti" should be registered only amplified its concern s 
by providing a further example of potential disregard for the integrity of the Codex standard.  
13.7.   The delegate of the European Union  responded that the procedure f or granting protection to 
the term "Danbo" as a geographical indication in the EU had been finalized, and that the Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU)2017/1901, of 18  October  2017, was publicly available. The 
Commission had always said that the fact th at a name ha d a specific Codex Alimentarius Standard, 
or that it was listed in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention, did not imply that the said name had 
become generic. Generic status in the EU could be assessed with regard to the perception of 
consumers in t he EU  territory. With regard to the EU internal procedures on the assessment of the 
application for granting protection to the term "Havarti" as a Geographical Indication, the EU had 
informed Members that these had not yet been finalized. Regulation (EU)11 51/2012 on geographical 
indications, as well as subsequent delegated and implementing regulations, were notified to the WTO 
under the TBT  Agreement. She explained that this was because they contained provisions relevant 
for the purpose s of the TBT  Agreemen t (for instance, provisions relating to technical standards, 
definitions, and labelling issues). Nevertheless, even if intellectual property rights issues (in 
particular, elements relating to the substantive protection of geographical indications) were par t of 
the notified measures, these were not relevant for TBT  purposes. The EU stated that any issues 
strictly concerning intellectual property rights, such as the registration of names as geographical 
indications, should not be discussed under the TBT  Commi ttee or through TBT  notification channels, 
but in the appropriate fora and, in particular, in the TRIPS  Council.  
13.8.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of all of the statements made on this 
issue.  
13.9.   The Council so agreed . 
14  EGYPT – MANUFACTURE REGISTRATION SYSTEM – REQUEST FROM THE EURO PEAN 
UNION  
14.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda . 
14.2.   The delegate of th e European Union  reiterated the EU's serious concerns over Egypt's 
procedure for compulsory registration of foreign companies. The EU noted that two  Egyptian 
Ministerial Decrees (No.  991/2015 and No.  43/2016) were continuing to create unnecessary 
obstacles  to trade despite numerous bilateral exchanges in the TBT  Committee and the CTG. The EU 
expressed its great concern over Egypt's decision to extend the mandatory registration requirements 
to new product categories via Decree No.  44/2019 of 15  January  2019.  The EU industry, in particular 
SMEs, continued to report serious difficulties with regard to the duplication of procedures and, in 
particular, long delays in the registration process. The process of registration was still not 
transparent. The EU urged Egy pt to suspend the application of the se measures and  to review them 
in full consideration of  the principles and obligations laid down under  WTO law. In addition, the EU 
enquired whether or not the Egyptian authorities had considered the improvements to the 
implementation of the decrees suggested in previous exchanges. The discussed improvements had 
covered the following: setting a strict deadline for the decision on registration requests; creating a 
publicly accessible database of registered companies; provi ding an opportunity of appeal to 
companies in case of refused registration; and registering without further delay all the companies 
that had submitted their complete documentation and that were currently waiting for ministerial 
approval of their registrati on. 
14.3.   The delegate of Thailand  registered Thailand's continued interest in this matter. Thailand 
recalled that it had raised this issue at the TBT  Committee, and had also sent the names of the Thai G/C/M/134  
 
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  companies pending approval, as Egypt had requested it to do.  Thailand stated that it would continue 
to monitor the situation closely, and to engage with Egypt and other concerned Members where 
necessary.  
14.4.   The delegate of Brazil  shared the concerns raised under this item by other Members, 
particularly with regard to the delays in the registration process and the renewal of previous 
registrations. Brazil submitted that these delays remained a source of uncertainty in its bilateral 
trade dialogues. He said that the manufacturer registration system had severely affected many 
Brazilian exporters, especially in the fields of ceramics, tableware, food, and cosmetics. Brazil 
recalled that it had repeatedly tried to engage with the Egyptian authorities, both in Geneva and in 
Capital, to convey the message that the measures est ablished by Decree No.  43/2016 not only 
represented unjustified hurdles to its bilateral trade but also failed to comply with Article  2.2 of the 
TBT Agreement. Brazil reported that its bilateral efforts had not yet yielded any results and urged 
Egypt to en gage with Brazil in good faith  in order  to find concrete solutions to this problem.  
14.5.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  shared the concerns raised by previous speakers . In 
particular, Korea expressed its concern over the delay in the registration procedu re under Decree 
No. 43/2016, under which several Korean companies (SMEs) were experiencing difficulties in 
exporting certain goods. Korea submitted that this was possibly inconsistent with WTO  rules, such 
as Articles  XI and X of the GATT as well as Article  1(b) of the Import Licensing Agreement. Korea 
urged Egypt actively to reconsider its trade restrictive policies and practices and to take measures, 
providing sufficient and transparent information, which were in line with the WTO's rules.  
14.6.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  shared the concerns raised by other Members and 
underlined the lack of transparency in the adoption and introduction of these measures. The Russian 
Federation submitted that these measures had created additional and u nnecessary obstacles to 
trade. The Russian Federation further stated that these measures were more trade restrictive in 
character than necessary in order to fulfil the legitimate objectives provided for in the 
TBT Agreement.  
14.7.   The delegate of Switzerland  shared the concerns raised by other Members.  
14.8.   The delegate of Egypt  referred Members to Egypt's interventions reported in the Minutes of 
previous meetings of the Council and TBT  Committee meetings.4 Egypt reiterated that Ministerial 
Decree No.  43/2016 had been  adopted as a tool for market surveillance without any intention to 
place restrictions on foreign trade. He indicated that its argument in this regard was strongly 
supported by the continuous increase in Egypt's imports since the adoption of the decree. Fo r 
example, Egypt's imports in 2018 had increased by more than 20% and had reached 
USD 80.4 billion, compared to US D 66.5 billion in 2017. Egypt also repeated that monitoring the 
Egyptian market through registration of credible suppliers was essential for t he protection of 
consumers from counterfeit products, and that it would also be of great benefit to all credible 
suppliers interested in doing business on the Egyptian market. Since the adoption of this decree, the 
Egyptian authorities were doing their bes t to improve and accelerate the process of registration. He 
noted that Egypt understood there were delays in dealing with some cases due to human resources 
limitations, but that Egypt was also willing to deal with this issue in order to accelerate the proc ess 
of registration.  Egypt stated that it had taken note of the concerns raised and confirmed its readiness 
to engage constructively with interested delegations and to provide assistance with regard to any 
implementation obstacles that their companies may be facing  in coordination with  Egypt's  authorities 
in Capital.  
14.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.10.   The Council so agreed . 
                                                
4 Document  G/C/M/133, paragraphs  23.7-23.8, and document  G/TBT/M/77, paragraph  3.187.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  15  MONGOLIA – QUANTITAT IVE RESTRICTIONS AND  PROHIBITIONS ON IMP ORTATION 
OF CERTAIN AGRICULTU RAL P RODUCTS – REQUEST FR OM THE RUSSIAN FEDER ATION  
15.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  
15.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  said that, in 2013, Mongolia had established a quota 
regime on the  importation of certain agricultural products, including wheat flour, wheat, milk, 
drinking water, and beef. According to Government Resolution No.  77, as of 2  March  2013,  the 
responsible authority would determine the volumes of corresponding quotas each year. Importation 
outside of those quotas was prohibited. Resolution No.  77 also set out basic criteria for determining 
quota volumes. The responsible authority calculated such volumes on the basis of the estimated 
annual necessity for importation and exportation of certain agricultural products. However, such a 
system of determining annual quota volumes resulted in uncertainty for Russian exporters. 
Moreover, in late  2016, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry of Mongolia had also 
established an import prohibition on wheat flour. In May  2018, Mongolia had introduced a quota on 
the import of wheat flour for the remainder of 2018. However, Russia submitted that  this declaration 
had remained a mere statement because the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry of 
Mongolia had never actually allocated the quota volume among importers of wheat flour. As a result, 
importers could not import within the quota  volume and a de facto import ban on wheat flour had 
therefore prevailed in 2018. In January  2019, Mongolia had announced the quota opening for wheat 
flour but then had not allocate d that quota either . The Russian Federation stated that it considered 
that the general elimination of quantitative restrictions was one of the core disciplines of the GATT 
and the WTO  legal systems, and that Mongolia's measures were inconsistent with its obligations 
under the WTO  Agreements, in particular, Article  XI of the GATT  1994 and Article  4.2 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture, as well as Mongolia's accession commitments under paragraph  20 of the 
Working Party Report. The Russian  Federation urged Mongolia to bring its legislation and measures 
into compliance with the relevant WTO provisions.  
15.3.   The delegate of Canada  reiterated Canada's systemic concerns over Mongolia's use of import 
prohibitions and quantitative restrictions . As a significant global exporter of wheat, Canada also had 
a commercial interest in the use of these meas ures that limited or restricted wheat imports. Canada 
encouraged Mongolia to reconsider this measure.  
15.4.   The delegate of Mongolia  requested the Russian Federation to provide its questions  in writing . 
Mongolia responded that it would provide an update to Members on recent developments of the 
issue and partial responses to the questions posed. Mongolia informed Members that, since the 
previous  meeting of the CTG, internal consultations had been reinfor ced following the restructuring 
of the respective ministries at the end of 2018. Following the recommendations of the National 
Security Council for Food Security, and the decision by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light 
Industry in January  2019 and the necessary procedures, on 8  April 2019, the quotas on imports of 
wheat flour had been allocated. Mongolia noted that the relevant bidding committee was in the 
process of formalizing the decision, which would be communicated to bidders and made publicly 
available. Mongolia informed Members that certain temporary measures had been taken with regard 
to strategically important food products for monitoring purposes. The Law on the Enrichment of Food 
Products was due to enter into force on 31  December  2019. Th e Law was adopted upon the 
recommendation of the WHO, which recommended to enrich food products with iron, zinc, vitamins  B 
and D. To prepare for the implementation of this law, monitoring had been undertaken, including on 
the imports of certain food produ cts, such as wheat flour. Mongolia stated that this monitoring 
through quota was only a temporary measure until the full implementation of the Enrichment Law 
itself. Mongolia concluded by stating its willingness to continue to engage bilaterally with the R ussian 
Federation and other interested Members.  
15.5.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
15.6.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  16  VIET NAM – DECREE ON  THE REGULATION ON C ONDITIONS FOR AUTOMO BILES 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEM BLING, IMPORTING, AN D A UTOMOTIVE WARRANTY A ND 
MAINTENANCE SERVICES  – REQUEST FROM THE UNITED STATES  
16.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on t he agenda.  
16.2.   The representative of the United States  said that they continued to have serious concerns 
over the disruption of market access for motor vehicles resulting from Viet Nam's Decree  No. 116 
and Circular  No. 3. It was unclear whether revisions to the lot-by-lot testing requirements, as 
announced by the Prime Minister in October  2018, had yet been drafted by the Ministry of Transport, 
or when they would enter into effect. Therefore, the US renewed its request to Viet Nam to provide 
any available updates  regarding the development of the new regulations, including a timeline and 
opportunities for consultations with stakeholders.  
16.3.   The representative of Thailand  reiterated Thailand's concerns on the matter and indicated that 
they would continue to monitor the  situation  closely . 
16.4.   The representative of the Russian Federation  shared the concerns raised by the United States  
and reminded Viet Nam that it was required to follow international best practices in adoption of 
conformity assessment procedures in order to m aintain stable trade flows with key trade partners.  
16.5.   The representative  of the  European Union  echoed the concerns voiced by other Members. The 
testing procedures and the request for a vehicle type approval certificate, imposed by the Decree , 
had created delays at customs, imposed additional costs on exporters , and harmed their 
competitiveness vis -à-vis locally -manufactured brands. The fall -off in car imports into Viet Nam since 
the implementation of the Decree in early 2018 demonstrated that  the measure constituted a barrier 
to trade ; at the same time, it did not bring any additional safety or other benefits to Vietnamese 
consumers. Conformity assessment procedures should avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to 
trade.  
16.6.   The EU reiterated that a ny implementing measure must be notified to the WTO while still in 
draft form, and that all stakeholders, including importers of foreign cars, should be included in 
consultations when developing further legislation. However, in this case, the notification 
requirements under the TBT  Agreement, allowing sufficient time for comments, had not been fully 
respected. In consequence, the EU requested Viet Nam to suspend the application of the Decree and 
to reconsider the comments made by WTO  Members in various fora . 
16.7.   The representative of Viet Nam  repeated that the intention behind Decree  No. 116 was to 
ensure human safety, to improve compliance, and to strengthen environmental protection, as well 
as to uphold consumers' rights on the basis of a healthy competition p rinciple. In this spirit, the 
requirements of the new measure, notably the lot -by-lot inspection and the Vehicle Type Approval, 
were included for legitimate public policy purposes and were not discriminatory.  
16.8.   Many meetings and consultations had been held a t the highest Government levels to consider 
importers' compliance difficulties, and to explain to them that it was simply a question of requiring 
more time to become fully acquainted with the new requirements and to adjust to them  successfully . 
According t o Viet Nam Customs' statistics, car imports had picked up in the second  half of 2018 
following lower than average year -on-year imports during the first  half of the year. In the 
first quarter of 2019, car imports had shown  a 48% growth , reaching a record 39 ,045 units, and 
surpassing the 26,369  units for the same period in 2017.  
16.9.   Finally, Viet Nam stood ready to engage constructively with any interested delegation and to 
provide any necessary support and assistance to trade partners' manufacturers or exporters . 
16.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
16.11.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  17  CHINA – MEASURES RES TRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STAT ES 
17.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
17.2.   The representative of the United States  reiterate d US concern s over China's measures 
banning or severely limiting the import of scrap materials. On 18  July 2017, China had notified to 
the TBT  Committee  its notifications  CHN 1211 and 1212, banning the import of scrap post -consumer 
plastics, mixed paper, and textiles; as well as setting new border inspection and identification rules 
for scrap materials that China qualified as 'waste'. China had implemented these measures on 
31 December  2017.  
17.3.   On 15  November  2017, China had notified CHN  1224 through CHN  1234, restricting the 
import of a variety  of scrap materials through revised quality parameters. The commodities affected 
included industrial plastics, paper and paperboard, non -ferrous scrap and wire, ferrous scrap and 
wire, and metal and electrical appliance scrap, among others; these new barri ers had entered into 
force on 1  March  2018. In many cases, the new quality parameters appeared to be excessively trade  
restrictive because they were technically infeasible and acted as a de facto  ban on the import of 
many scrap materials.  
17.4.   In April  2018, Ch ina had announced an expansion of its import ban to include most plastics 
and all wood, automotive, appliance, electric motor, and vessel scrap. China had noted that it did 
not intend to notify these new measures to the TBT  Committee. Furthermore, in May  2018, the day 
after they had been announced, China had implemented new border inspection rules requiring 
100%  inspection and lab testing at the border for all scrap commodities. That same day, China had 
arbitrarily halted its pre -shipment inspection in the US for a period of 30  days, leading to a complete 
halt in US  exports of recycled commodities to China. On 27  June 2018, China had issued a notice 
indicating that all scrap material imports would be restricted to a list of specified ports, effective 
January  2019. On 18  July 2018, China had issued the revised draft Law of the People's Republic of 
China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes, which defined "solid 
waste" to include all recyclable materials, and which had expres sly banned such imports. In totality, 
these measures outright banned or effectively banned imports of scrap materials that were destined 
for recycling and reuse in downstream manufacturing processes.  
17.5.   These new measures had entered into force without any re asonable interval for industry and 
recyclers to make the necessary adjustments to their supply chains or to develop new processing 
capacity. As the world's largest processor of scrap materials, China's implementation of these 
measures had had an immediate,  damaging, and potentially lasting impact upon global recycling 
networks. Indeed, the abrupt implementation of the measures had created a global shortfall in 
recycling capacity that had undermined the value of recycled commodities, forcing recyclers that 
could not locate alternative processing facilities simply to dispose of otherwise valuable recycled 
commodities.  
17.6.   While China had asserted that the solution to its import policies lay in affected countries 
adjusting their domestic recycling processes to meet  China's import parameters, for a vast number 
of materials outlined in China's ban and import control standards, China had no mandatory 
commensurate domestic standard or ban in place. The broadly trade -restrictive nature of the import 
control measures and the apparent ly fundamental differences between requirements for foreign and 
domestic commodities were cause for concern.  
17.7.   China had persisted in its refusal to notify its new technical measures in a manner consistent 
with its obligations under the TBT  Agree ment. China had also arbitrarily and abruptly halted pre -
shipment inspection in the US; these developments had heightened US  concerns over the purpose 
of these actions and their consistency with China's WTO  obligations. The US requested China 
immediately t o halt implementation of these measures and to revise them, for public comment, in 
a manner consistent with existing international standards for trade in scrap materials, which 
provided a global framework for a transparent and environmentally sound trade i n recycled 
commodities.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  17.8.   The representative of Australia  said that his authorities still had several concerns over China's 
measures on waste and scrap imports, which appeared to be more trade restrictive than necessary 
to achieve China's desired objectives.  A range of materials negatively affected by China's measures, 
rather than being 'rubbish', in fact comprised valuable inputs to recycling supply chains. Trade in 
these products allowed for the recovery of materials that might otherwise end in landfill.  
17.9.   Australia was concerned by the broad scope and lack of clarity around China's  definition of 
'solid waste', and urged China, in this context, to reconsider its measures in such a way as to 
facilitate global environmental outcomes by allowing for commercially meaningful trade in quality 
recyclable inputs. Australia also urged China to engage with its trading partners to develop measures 
that met its policy objectives while also allowing for an ongoing trade in recyclable materials to 
promote the recovery of res ources and global environmental outcomes.  
17.10.   The representative of Canada  aligned Canada with the concerns voiced by the US. While 
Canada did not dispute China's goal of limiting the harmful environmental impact resulting from 
contaminated waste material, it encouraged China to consider different and less trade -restrictive 
mechanisms to address this issue, while at the same time ensuring that the mutually beneficial trade 
in recycled products could continue in a predictable manner.  
17.11.   The representative of the Dominican Republic  echoed the concerns voiced by the US. It was 
important for the transparency of the multilateral trading system that Members follow ed notification 
procedures in a timely manner, particularly when those measures could have a considerable imp act 
on trade. Countries had the right to protect their environment, but they had also to respect the 
integrity of global standards and rules in doing so, especially with regard to non -discriminatory 
treatment between imported and domestic products.  
17.12.   The representative of  the Republic of Korea  shared the concerns expressed by previous 
speakers , and emphasized that China's measures should be implemented in a less trade -restrictive 
way. Korea looked forward to China sharing sufficient informati on on the relevant regulations and 
to cooperating  on the implementation of its measures.  
17.13.   The representative of the European Union  said that the European Union continued to wait 
for China's responses to its questions previously raised , and requested China t o provide its responses 
as soon as possible. The EU looked forward to working with China and all WTO  Members towards 
addressing the issue of trade in waste in the most environmentally and economically efficient way, 
and in full transparency.  
17.14.   The representa tive of New Zealand  reiterated his authorities' view that all WTO  Members 
had the right to regulate to protect their environments , and New Zealand welcomed China's 
objectives in relation to sustainable development. New Zealand had a domestic programme aime d 
at reducing the environmental impact of domestically produced solid waste through improved 
domestic treatment and processing of recyclable solid waste. New Zealand also supported and 
encouraged all WTO  Members to develop programmes that would contribute to safeguarding the 
global environment and was happy to share its knowledge  in that regard . 
17.15.   New Zealand continued to have a specific concern with regard to the inclusion of vanadium 
slag, a purposeful ly produced co -product with an end -use in the production  of specific forms of steel, 
in China's catalogue of banned imports. China was the largest global producer of vanadium slag, 
and New Zealand queried how China provided equal treatment to all vanadium slag (domestic and 
imported) in accordance with Article  2 of the TBT  Agreement. New Zealand questioned how an 
import ban on less than an annual 50,000  tonnes of vanadium slag from its country achieved China's 
environmental and health objectives when the ban did not apply to China's domestic production or 
proces sing; how China ensured that foreign products were treated no less favourably than domestic 
products; and how China ensured that the import ban on vanadium slag was not more trade 
restrictive than necessary to achieve its environmental and health protectio n objectives.  
17.16.   For the sake of the multilateral trading system, it was vital that all WTO  Members adhered 
to the agreed TBT  Committee procedures relating to the notification of new measures and to avoid 
a short comment time -frame and implementation period a s had occurred in this case.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  17.17.   The representative of China  said that solid waste had inherent pollutant attributes , which 
differentiated it from other goods. Huge quantities of solid wastes had been exported to China in 
past decades, and while enormous profits had been made from such exports, China had suffered a 
lot. For example, for a long time, more than 90% of annual global electronic wastes were exported 
to China. The pro cessing of waste had caused serious land and water pollution, and in some villages, 
almost every family had a family member suffering from pollution -related cancer.  
17.18.   China was seeking a path towards modernization that would not have a negative impact on 
its environment and human health. According to the Basel Convention and other internationally 
recognized principles, every Member was obliged properly to handle and to dispose of its 
domestically -produced solid wastes. China hoped that exporting countries cou ld also actively 
shoulder their international responsibilities  in this regard . 
17.19.   China, in adjusting its relevant policies, had taken all factors into consideration , including its 
WTO obligations. It had notified its quantitative restrictions for the period s 2016-2018 and 
2018-2020 under the Market Access Committee, for example, which included the updated Catalogue 
of Solid Wastes Prohibited from Import. It would also notify any other measures as required under 
the WTO Agreements.  China indicated that the EU's questions would be conveyed to Capital.  
17.20.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
17.21.   The Council so agreed . 
18  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS ON IMP ORTS OF CERTAIN PULS ES – REQUEST 
FROM AUSTRALIA, CANA DA, THE EUROPEA N UNION, THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION, AND THE  
UNITED STATES  
18.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 28  March  2019, the 
delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the United States, 
respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
18.2.   The representative of Australia  said that the Australian Government's concerns over India's 
quantitative restrictions on imports of certain pulses were strengthening due to new measures that 
had been announced by India on 29  March  2019,  which had restricted pulse imports into India for 
an additional year. Australia's co -sponsorship of the Canadian –US counter -notification 
(document  G/AG/W/193) at the 26 -27 February  2019 Committee on Agricultu re meeting 
demonstrated Australia's broader concerns, particularly with regard to India's Market Price Support 
(MPS) measures for pulses. In August  2017, India had applied QRs on an annual basis of 
150,000  tonnes for both Moong beans  (green gram) and Urad beans (black gram), and 
200,000  tonnes for Pigeon Peas. The QRs had been modified and expanded on 4  May 2018. On 
25 April 2018, India had applied a three -month 100,000  tonnes QR on the importation of peas, back -
dated to start on 1  April 2018. The QR had since been extended three  times, for three  months each, 
with no additional volume, with the last QR  extension having ended on 31  March  2019.  
18.3.   On 29  March  2019, India had notified that the existing QRs on Moong , Urad , and Pigeon Peas 
would continue to apply for the current fiscal year commencing 1  April 2019. The QRs on peas would 
extend for another full year, starting on 1  April 2019, limiting imports of peas, including yellow, 
green, dun , and kaspa peas, to 150,000  tonnes during that period.  
18.4.   This counter -notification clearly demonstrated how India was providing market price support 
(MPS) well in excess of its de minimis  limits for a range of pulses. This WTO -inconsistent MPS , 
combined with QRs and high tariffs, was having a detrimental impact on the global p ulses trade and 
on consumers in developing and developed countries alike.  
18.5.   The Australian Government requested explanations from India regarding  the following:  (i) the 
WTO basis of the application of India's quantitative restrictions on pulses imports; (ii)  how the 
measures could be understood to be 'temporary' since the QRs would restrict pulse imports for 
two years or more; (iii)  whether the QRs for Moong , Urad, and Pigeon Peas would continue in future 
fiscal years , until removed; (iv)  whether the QR for p eas would stop on 31  March  2020, unless 
removed; and (v) why the announcement of the measures had not been accompanied by information 
on licensing procedures to ensure traders could access the quotas  in question . G/C/M/134  
 
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  18.6.   The Australian Government also sought expla nation s on the following : (i) what measures the 
Indian Government was taking to address the WTO -inconsistency of its domestic support for pulses , 
as clearly demonstrated in the counter -notification; and (ii)  what measures India was taking to 
improve transp arency in its agriculture notifications.  
18.7.   The representative of the Russian Federation  expressed Russia's concern over India's policy 
on the import of yellow peas, and particularly the increase in import tariffs on yellow peas of up to 
50%. Between April an d December  2018, India had introduced a QR on the import of yellow peas 
(100,000  tonnes), from 1  April 2018 until 31  March  2019. In late March  2019, India had issued a 
notification establishing a new quota of 150 ,000 metric tonnes for the period from 1  April 2019 until 
31 March  2020. In late September  2018, India had issued a notification stating that the import of 
dry peas classified under Exim Code  0713 10 00 would be restricted until 31  December  2018.  
18.8.   The Russian Federation believed that the extension of the QR s until March  2020 made them 
in effect an import prohibition, which India had been unable to justify in any of the WTO 's bodies in 
either 2018 or 2019. The refore, the  Russian Federation requested India to bring its measures into 
conformi ty with the WTO  rules, since QRs and import prohibitions could not be applied by 
WTO Members without proper justification.  
18.9.   The representative of the United States  said that her authorities were significantly concerned 
by India's trade -distorting policies introduced since 2017 in relation to various pulses. These policies 
included, but were not limited to, multiple increases in tariff rates, the introduction of QRs , and 
import -limiting licensing arrangements.  
18.10.   Since August  2017, India had set annual import qu otas for several types of pulses, for which 
India's WTO  commitments had no allowance for a tariff -rate quota. Consequently, the product was 
effectively banned from entering India once annual import quotas had been met, as had happened 
in June  2018 when the  100,000  metric tonne (MT) quota limit for peas had been reached.  
18.11.   Indian imports of pulses classified under HS  0713 had fallen from USD 4.0 billion in 2016 to 
USD 1.1 billion in 2018, representing a 74% decrease in two  years. In addition, on 29  March  2019,  
India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry had issued notifications restricting imports of Moong 
beans, peas, black gram lentil s, and pigeon peas , in the Indian fiscal year 2019 -2020. Although 
India had stated that such QRs were temporary, restrictions on some products had been in effect 
for over one -and-a-half years , and US  authorities wanted to know when India planned to rescind 
these restrictions. The US  Government also sought information from India on whether or not it 
planned to institute more quantita tive restrictions on imports of agricultural products and , if so, for 
which products. In addition, the Government requested an explanation from India on its  use of QRs 
on pulse imports , and on how its measures complied with India's WTO  commitments.  
18.12.   The rep resentative of the European Union  expressed the EU's concern over India's 
management of its pulse crop markets in recent months, specifically with regard to India's QRs on 
pulses, and their conformity or otherwise with WTO  rules. As a consequence of India' s increased 
duties on pulses, EU  exports (mostly of peas) had come nearly to a standstill, and prices for pulses 
in the EU  market had also dropped. The EU was not convinced that the measures taken were in the 
long-term interest s of pulses producers, includ ing India's  own producers. It called on India to 
respond to the repeated calls from Members for its engagement on the issue.  
18.13.   The representative of Canada  said that, as the world's largest supplier of pulses to India, 
Canada had been the Member most negatively affected by India's recent measures. India's 
amendment to its import policy on 29  March  2019 to re -establish a QR on dry peas for an extra full 
year resulted in a restriction of imports to a level that represented only 5% of India's imports of dry 
peas in 2017. Together with India's QRs on additional pulses, these measures were contrary to the 
elimination of QRs under the GATT and WTO. Canada was very concerned over India's lack of 
transparency and the imposition of the se measures with no WTO  justification. Therefore, Canada 
called upon India to comply with its WTO  obligations and to repeal the QRs  in question . 
18.14.   The representative of Ukraine  echoed the c oncerns of previous speakers. It was important 
to get a clear understanding of the objectives of multiple increases in tariff rates, of QRs and import -
limiting licensing arrangement s that had been imposed by India. Ukraine called upon India to comply G/C/M/134  
 
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  with its transparency obligations and to bring its trade -distorting policies into conformity with 
WTO rules.  
18.15.   The representative of India said that India had notified its measures to the Committee on 
Import Licensing and the Committee on Market Access (document  G/LIC/N/1/IND/14/Add.1, dated 
20 June 2018, and document  G/MA/QR/N/IND/2, dated 21  June 2018), and had therefore informed 
these Committees, and the CTG, at that time. 
18.16.   As the largest producer and consumer of pulses, the decision to impose a quota had been 
based on domestic demand and supply and was intended to alleviate the distress caused to small 
and marginal farmers by an influx of cheap imported pulses and the consequent impact on their food 
and livelihood security. India was constantly reviewing the mea sures  at issue , which were temporary 
in nature and which would be extended or removed in accordance with the domestic demand and 
supply situations.  
18.17.   Despite the additional quota restrictions on imports of peas during the financial year 
2018-2019, imports ha d reached the level of 0.55  million metric tonnes between 1  April and 
31 December  2018. A DGFT  notification dated 29  March  2019 had announced new quotas for 
2019-2020 and the procedure for quota allocation would be issued in the near future.  
18.18.   India would revert to Members at the Council and in the relevant Committees regarding the 
matter of under which WTO  provision India had imposed its temporary measures. India had al ready 
responded to additional issues that had been raised during the last meeting of the Committee on 
Agriculture and it would address any further query on the issue in the appropriate committee.  
18.19.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the s tatements made.  
18.20.   The Council so agreed . 
19  CHINA – CUSTOMS DUTI ES ON CERTAIN INTEGR ATED CIRCUITS – REQU EST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, JAPA N, AND CHINESE TAIPE I 
19.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegations of the European Union, Japan, and Chinese Taipei had requested the Secretariat to 
include this issue on the agenda.  
19.2.   The representative of the European Union  thanked China fo r sharing with other Members, 
both bilaterally and in other contexts, an overview of its tariffs on MCOs following the transposition 
towards tariff heading  8542 under HS2017, as well as for sharing information on additional elements 
concerning the division  of MCOs into different categories and the respective allocation of the different 
duty rates. However, the information provided had still not allayed the EU's concerns.  
19.3.   According to WTO  Secretariat guidance regarding the new set of procedures for transposi ng 
Goods Schedules into HS2017  nomenclature, the concession elements of the new HS2017  tariff line 
had to reflect any differences from the HS2012  nomenclature and had to be broken down to a more 
detailed level so that the draft HS2017  file fully reflected the original concessions. Accordingly, China 
could have created additional national tariff lines to continue to apply a zero  duty on those products 
that had previously been duty-free, and in this way it would have maintained the value of its 
concessions , in keeping with the spirit of the ITA  Expansion.  
19.4.   The European Union  encouraged China to rectify the situation as soon as possible, especially 
in light of the advanced stage of tariff reductions on the products  in question . Alternatively, if China 
did not wish to modify its HS2017  classification right away, it would perhaps be willing instead to 
give a sign of its commitment to the ITA by accelerating the phasing in of tariff reduction s on the 
relevant products.  
19.5.   The representative of Japan  expressed his del egation's appreciation to China for their bilateral 
meetings, as well as for China's explanation of the HS  classification of IGBT  IPMs (semi -conductor 
products). Japan wish ed to continue its technical discussions with China following Capital's review 
of China's explanation. Japan was also closely monitoring China' s commitment to abolishing customs G/C/M/134  
 
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  duties , in July  2021, on all relevant items in line with the staging commitments set out under the 
ITA-2. 
19.6.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that Chinese T aipei was concerned by  China's 
imposition of tariffs, as of 1  January  2017, on previously duty -free HS  2017 lines 85423119, 
85423210, 85423310 , and 85423910 (multi -component integrated circuits (MCOs) products ). 
According to the General Council Decision of 7 December  2016, a Member's schedule of concessions 
and other commitments should remain unchanged after HS 2017 transposition. Therefore, Chinese 
Taipei called upon China immediately to eliminate its tariffs on the MCO  products at issue.  
19.7.   The representativ e of the Republic of Korea  said that Korea shared previous speakers' 
concerns, in particular regarding the tariff rates applied by China on imports of reclassified 
MCO products, which were incompatible with the ITA. Korea encouraged China to provide furthe r 
information on the relevant measures.  
19.8.   The representative of the United States  supported the statements and questions raised by 
previous speakers and reiterated US  concerns over changes in China's applied duty rates for 
semiconductor products, as they had  previously done not only at this Council, but also at the Market 
Access and ITA  Committee s. The US continued to assert, in line with the General Council's Decision 
on HS  transpositions, that the scope of China's concessions had changed substantially, and that their 
value had been impaired, in that semiconductor products that had been duty -free for over a decade 
were now again facing duties.  
19.9.   The representative of Switzerland  said that her authorities shared the concerns expressed by 
previous speakers. The HS  transposition was a technical process, which should not modify those 
concessions already granted. Switzerland invited China to remedy the current situation as soon as 
possible.  
19.10.   The representative of China  said that they had used the fo urth methodology set out in the 
WTO rules on HS2017  transposition, which was to apply the simple average of the previous rates of 
duty. She stated that her delegation had already responded to similar questions and comments in 
previous meetings of the Counc il, as well as at the Market Access  and ITA  Committee s. They had 
also conducted a number of bilateral consultations with interested Members and had clarified the 
technical reasons for China's approach. While Members  were happy with those products with lowe r 
tariff rates, they were complaining of the higher tariff rates resulting from the transposition.  
19.11.   The linear reduction of the duties on MCO  products would be implemented over a five -
year period , and in accordance with China's tariff reduction commitments under the ITA  Expansion, 
all duties on MCO  products would be eliminated by July  2021.  
19.12.   For technical reasons, China had used the fourth  methodology set out in the WTO  rules on 
HS2017  transposition. It had experienced practical difficulties in distinguish ing the referenced 
MCO products and had no t had any  intention purposefully to raise any tariff rate, nor to delay the 
implementation of China's ITA tariff reduction commitments. From 1  July 2019, the tariff rates on 
MCO products would be further reduced , to 1.3%, 1.4%, and 3.3% , respectively. All tariffs on 
MCO products would be eliminated by July  2021, as scheduled.  
19.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
19.14.   The Council so agreed . 
20  EUROPEAN UNION – DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGU LATIONS REGARDING PR OTECTED 
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIG IN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, TRADITI ONAL TERMS, 
LABELLING AND PRESEN TATION OF CERTAIN WI NE SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES  
20.1.   The Chairp erson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda. At 
the start of the currant meeting, Argentina had requested to be added as a co -sponsor.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  20.2.   The representative of the United States  reiterated her authorities' concerns over the EU's lack 
of transparency and action concerning applications made by US  producers to use certain traditional 
terms on their wine labels in the EU  market. Despite  having raised this issue repeatedly in the 
WTO TBT Committee, the EU had neither provided any satisfactory explanation for its eight -year 
delay, nor any information about when the applications would at last be processed. It would also be 
helpful if the EU  could provide some transparency on the status of other applications to compare 
with the US  applications.  
20.3.   The EU had recently issued draft revised regulations relating to traditional terms, yet they 
appeared to contain no changes that could explain or just ify the egregious delays. The US sought 
clarification as to why the EU had not made any effort to include precise timelines or transparency 
in the revised draft regulations to ensure that such delays would not continue.  
20.4.   The US  concerns regarding the revise d measures related to the EU's efforts to restrict the 
ability of US  producers to use common descriptive tools for the labelling and marketing of their 
products, such as restricting the use of the term "barrel aged" and certain bottle shapes to wines 
with geographical indications. Her delegation sought clarification on the status of the EU's written 
responses referred to by the EU at the previous Council meeting. The US would continue to call upon 
the EU to process the US  applications expeditiously and to p rovide full transparency on both their 
status and the rules that applied to them until this outcome was reached.  
20.5.   The representative of Argentina  reiterated Argentina's concerns over the unjustified delay on 
the part of the European Union for approving the registry of traditional terms "Reserva" and "Gran 
Reserva" for its use on the labelling of wines from Argentina sold on the EU  market, even though 
Argentina had concluded most of the required registry steps for the approval of both terms in 2012. 
Argentina  had been raising its concerns regarding Regulation Nos. 607/2009 and 479/2008 for more 
than ten  years, in particular with regard to EU  Regulation  No. 607/2009, which had been repealed 
by EU Regulation No.  2019/33.  
20.6.   The EU had concluded a "wine sector refor m" with the publication and entry into force of 
EU Regulation No.  2019/33 and the implementing Regulation No. 2019/34. Nevertheless, the 
processing of Argentina's registry requests remained  delayed as the result of a current freeze in the 
European Commission. The reform, which was undertaken above all in relation to  the internal 
workings of the Commission, did not justify the lack of treatment of pending requests from 
third countries. In add ition, having concluded its reform, it was surprising that the EU had still not 
implemented the corresponding procedures for requests from third  countries , in contrast to the 
treatment of requests from EU  member States.  
20.7.   According to the meetings of the win e subgroup of the Committee for the Common 
Organization of Agricultural Markets, in January and March  2019, progress was being made on the 
requests from Hung ary and Croatia for registering traditional terms, and these countries had been 
urged by the Commis sion to complete the registration process. Therefore, it was clear that the 
Commission considered certain cases to be urgent, to the detriment of others. Consequently, 
Argentina called upon the EU immediately to approve the traditional terms "Reserva" and "Gran 
Reserva". Argentina had also requested the inclusion of this item on the agenda of the next meeting 
of the EU  College of Commissioners, as well as in the publication of the Regulatory Act in the 
EU Official Diary.  
20.8.   The representative of the European U nion said that the EU had undertaken a revision of its 
legislation on wine, including on traditional terms, which they had notified to the TBT  Committee in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/571. The revision had resulted in the adoption of Commission Implementing 
Regula tion No. 2019/34 , of 17  October  2018, which, among other elements , had established  the 
rules regarding the procedures to be followed for the registration of traditional terms. The EU had 
replied to TBT  comments received from the US, China, Australia, and A rgentina on the relevant 
notification , and had also included clarifications regarding the definition of traditional terms. The 
pending applications were currently being processed and it was not yet possible to provide timelines.  
20.9.   The Chairperson  proposed th at the Council take note of the statements made.  
20.10.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  21  CHINA – NEW EXPORT C ONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
21.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29 March  2019, the 
delegation of Japan had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
21.2.   The representative of Japan  reiterated Japan's concerns , including  that the draft law included 
overly stringent export regulations that went beyond the scope of the international export 
management regime and were inconsistent with GATT  Article  11 on quantitative restrictions. Japan 
welcomed China's explanation at the Council's previous meeting that the draft law was limited in 
scope and that China had no intention to misuse countermeasure provisions that related to national 
security purposes. Japan would continue to closely monitor the situation in light of the detailed 
regulations that the law brought into force and how they would be administered. Japan reiterated 
its concern that China's provisions on countermeasures constituted unilateral export control 
measures, not national security measure s, and that, accordingly, th ey should be withdrawn . 
21.3.   Japan reiterated its request that China provide updates, in a transparent manner, detailing 
how it intended to reflect the comments that had been made on the draft law, as well as its plans 
for the draft law's review. It also reques ted to be provided with the implementation schedule of the 
law, including the schedule of the detailed enforcement regulations, that would ensure a sufficient 
grace period for the law's implementation.  
21.4.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  reiterated  Korea's concerns regarding China's 
draft new export control law, especially regarding Articles  1, 2, and 64 of the draft. According to 
Article  1, the purpose of the draft law extended to national security, development interests, and 
non-proliferation. How ever, the purpose lacked specificity, in particular with regard to  development 
interests. Export restrictions imposed for national security reasons  should , at a minimum, be taken 
in accordance with strict requirements.  
21.5.   The scope of the law's application , as described in Article  64, was uncertain and required 
concrete, detailed examples or lists of requirements necessary for its application. According to 
Article  64, the draft law would apply if the value of controlled items reached a certain proportion of 
foreign products, which could impose additional restrictive trade measures and was inappropriate in 
respect of other international laws. Korea would continue to monitor developments closely and urged 
China to abide by the relevant international rules and sta ndards, including by WTO rules.  
21.6.   The representative of the European Union  said that it had submitted the EU's written 
comments on China's draft law during the consultation period in July  2017 and it had been raising 
questions for a year since  then. The EU r ecognized that, while the draft law could work to consolidate 
China's export control system, strategic export controls were nevertheless derived from international 
obligations and commitments. Certain provisions in China's draft law required further clarif ication as 
concerned their alignment to international security standards, and their conformity with multilateral 
WTO trade rules. The EU reiterated its previous request for an explanation of the reference in 
Article  1 to the development interest s of the State, to the use of strategic export controls as 
retaliatory measures against discriminatory export control measures, as well as to the reference to 
the protection of important strategic rare materials. It also restated its concerns regarding the 
reference in Article  33 to the need to submit a technical description or testing report.  
21.7.   The EU requested further information from China, in particular concerning any changes that 
had been introduced to the draft law, as well as the timetable for it s final ization . 
21.8.   The representative of China  said that China had suffered a lot from other countries' export 
control measures, and that it would never use such measures to restrict normal trade. The purpose 
of the draft law was to consolidate various existing expo rt control provisions into a single draft export 
control law. The draft law had been published on the internet during 2017 and 252  comments had 
been received from the public. Reasonable comments had already been incorporated or would be 
incorporated in the  draft, and some others would be taken into account in the further supporting 
regulations and rules. The draft law was under legislative review by the State Council and currently 
there was no deadline on promulgation or implementation. The scope of the pro ducts and the 
measures covered in the draft law , as raised by other delegations , were much more moderate than 
those of other Members.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  21.9.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
21.10.   The Council so agreed . 
22  UNITED STATES – PROH IBITIVE PROPOSAL ON COM MUNICATION EQUIPMENT  OR 
SERVICES RELEASED BY  THE FCC – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  
22.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this item on t he agenda.  
22.2.   The representative of China  reiterated its concern regarding the US  Federal Communications 
Commission's (FCC) announcement on the Federal Register of 2  May 2018, which was intended to 
prohibit the use of Universal Service Funds to purchase equip ment or services from any 
communications equipment or service providers identified as posing a national security risk to the 
communications network or the communications supply chain. The FCC  proposal would restrict the 
commercial purchases of telephones, broadband services, and healthcare providers.  
22.3.   China had significant concerns regarding the US  invoking its national security exemption to 
introduce such a rule. Such a broad interpretation and arbitrary invocation of the national security 
exemption would d isrupt the normal IT  trade and supply chain all over the world. Following the 
closure of the comment period on 2  July 2018, China had requested an update on the proposal, 
including  with regard to  the comments received from both US  domestic and foreign industries 
expressing objections to the proposed rule. China hoped that the US would adhere to WTO  rules 
during the legislation process for these measures because any measures that caused nationality -
based discrimination treatment in law or in prac tice would violate the WTO's MFN  principle.  
22.4.   China urged the US to ensure the compliance of FCC  measures with WTO  rules and to keep 
the commitments made by both countries at the G20  meeting in 2016, as followed:  "consistent with 
WTO Agreements, commit that their respective generally -applicable information and communication 
technology [(ICT)] security -related measures in commercial sectors (1)  should treat technology in 
a non -discriminatory manner ; (2) are not to unnecessarily limit or prevent commercial sale s 
opportunities for foreign suppliers of ICT  products or services ; (3) should be narrowly tailored, take 
into account international norms, be non -discriminatory, and not impose nationality based conditions 
or restrictions, on the purchases, sales, or use o f ICT  products by commercial enterprises 
unnecessarily".  
22.5.   The representative of the United States  expressed the US  confusion as to why China continued 
to raise this proposed rule, since it dealt exclusively with matters of national security. If 
implemented,  the rule would prohibit the proceeds of the US  Government's Universal Service Fund 
from being used to purchase equipment or services from companies that posed a national security 
risk to communications networks or the communications supply chain. The draf t rule was explicitly 
addressed to national security threats. Such a rule fell squarely within the WTO  exception for 
essential security interests. The WTO would not expect any Member to procure goods or services 
from a Member that it determined would pose a national security threat.  
22.6.   The proposed rule -making had been conducted through a typically transparent and open 
process. The FCC had released a lengthy description of the proposed rule on its website and had 
welcomed comments from the public at any point up until the close of the comment period. In late 
2018, the FCC had sought additional comments on how the proposed rule might interact with 
recently  passed laws in the US. The FCC had continued to receive and accept ex parte  comments —
including by multiple Chinese firms.  
22.7.   The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking remained pending, and the FCC had not yet moved 
forward with the rule.  
22.8.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
22.9.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  23  EUROPEAN UNION – SAFEGUARD MEASURES O N INDICA RICE FROM C AMBODIA – 
REQUEST FROM CAMBODI A 
23.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of Cambodia had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda.  
23.2.   The representative of Cambod ia said that Cambodia was concerned about the introduction of 
EU Regulation  2019/67, adopted on 16 January  2019. Under the EU's "Everything But Arms (EBA) " 
scheme, which granted LDCs duty -free and quota -free access for all products except arms and 
armament s, Cambodia's exports of Indica Rice had benefited from duty -free access to the 
EU market. However, EU  Regulation  2019/67 withdrew "duty free" treatment for lndica rice and 
imposed a duty of 175  euros per tonne, which equalled the EU  bound and applied tariff rates for 
lndica rice.  
23.3.   The EU was Cambodia's largest trading partner, accounting for 45% of Cambodian exports in 
2018, and Cambodian authorities were concerned about the adverse impact on Cambodia's growth 
and development of EU  Regulation  2019/67. The imposition of the import duty was the result of a 
domestic safeguard proceeding in the EU to withdraw tariff preferences for products under the EU's 
GSP programme , and the reason for this was an ostensible surge in imports of lndica Rice from 
Cambodia onto the EU  market, which had allegedly caused injury to the EU's domestic industry.  
23.4.   However, the duty at issue did not meet the definition of a safeguard measure under the 
GATT  1994 and the Safeguards Agreement, and it also seemed to be inconsisten t with the 
MFN obligation under the GATT  1994. Since the import duty on Indica Rice had not been applied to 
other similarly -situated LDCs, the EU was effectively placing Cambodia's rice exports at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to other rice exports t hat would continue to enjoy duty -free access under 
the EU's Generalized System of Preferences ( GSP) scheme. This was at odds not only with the 
Enabling Clause requirement for non -discrimination in the granting of tariff preferences to developing 
and least developed countries, but also with the overall objectives of its GSP  programme and the 
Enabling Clause to facilitate the integration of developing and least developed countries in to 
international trade.  
23.5.   Contrary to the EU's policy, the imposition of this duty negatively affected Cambodia's efforts 
to graduate and to achieve the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals  (SDGs) . By eliminating their 
only source of income, the measure had had a severe impact upon the families of poor rice farmers 
who lived with debts  to financial institutions as a result of loans to support farm production. 
Therefore, the Cambodian Government called upon the EU to withdraw the imposition of the se import 
duties on Indica Rice from Cambodia.  
23.6.   His delegation wished to express their satisf action with the excellent relations and long -lasting 
cooperation between Cambodia and the EU despite their concerns over this  current issue.  
23.7.   The representative of Indonesia  supported Cambodia's intervention. It was important to 
ensure that developing Membe rs, especially least  developed countries (LDCs), could develop their 
economies through integration into global trade. Any measures taken with regard to LDCs should 
take into account their challenges and particular needs, and in particular with regard to achieving 
the overall SDGs.  
23.8.   The representative of Thailand  acknowledged the positive objectives of the EU's GSP and 
EBA schemes to promote susta inable development, good governance, and to contribute to poverty 
eradication through expanding exports from developing countries and LDCs. The EU needed to 
ensure that its stakeholders' economic interests were also safeguarded. Nevertheless, Thailand 
encouraged the EU to apply due care when implementing decisions relating to preferential treatment 
under the EBA  scheme.  
23.9.   The representative of Myanmar  said that the WTO Agreements, including the GATT  Enabling 
Clause, contained indispensable provisions for preferential treatment to enable developing Members, 
especially LDCs, to overcome structural and capacity constraints and to integrate into global trade 
in a way that would support their sustainable a nd inclusive economic growth. Myanmar always 
supported the ongoing efforts by WTO  Members to ensure that these objectives were achieved and G/C/M/134  
 
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  encouraged Members to take a constructive and pragmatic approach to maintaining preferential 
treatment in a non -discriminatory manner.  
23.10.   Accordingly, Myanmar would not accept any decision that was contrary to the overall 
objectives of preferential treatment . Instead, Myanmar called upon all Members to continue pursuing  
the current policies of encouraging LDCs to graduate and to achieve the 2030 SDGs.  
23.11.   The representative of China  said that China commended the EU's efforts to reduce  tariffs 
across a considerable range of LDC  products under its EBA  scheme. However, when measures were 
taken to withdraw such preferences, the fai rness and potential negative impact on relevant LDCs 
should be clearly taken into account. In addition, there should be consistency in the application of 
WTO principles and rules. While the proposed tariff level did not exceed the EU's bound rate, the 
withdrawal of preferential tariff treatment would seriously hurt vulnerable LDCs.  
23.12.   For example, in Cambodia's case, Indica rice was its most important agricultural export and 
the withdrawal of the EBA  preference treatment could disrupt its normal trade in this product. In 
addition, it would have a serious impact on the livelihood of a large number of small -scale rice 
farmers who relied on the export of Indica rice. Indica rice was a critical product that affected the 
national economy and livelihood of LDCs like Cambodia. For this reason , China hoped that the EU 
would reconsider its measure on Indica rice.  
23.13.   The representative of Lao People's Democratic Republic  associated Lao  PDR with the 
statement made by Cambodia. It also supported the ongoing efforts of WTO  Members to ensure that 
LDCs, including Lao  PDR, could successfully benefit from special and differential treatment in order 
to participate in international market s. LDCs required legal flexibility , including trade preferences , 
to benefit from trade liberal ization and integration, to overcome structural and capacity constraints, 
and to carry out trade integration in ways that supported sustainable and inclusive economic growth.  
23.14.   Lao PDR appreciated Members ' assistance in helping LDCs to overcome their challen ges and 
to address their particular needs , to promote their trade and development , and to achieve the SDGs 
2030 objectives.  
23.15.   The representative of the Philippines  expressed his delegation's sympathy for Cambodia's 
situation. The Philippines supported the st atements made by its Asian neighbours and hoped that a 
positive resolution to this issue would soon be found.  
23.16.   The representative of the European Union  said that the EU had adopted the safeguard 
measure in question within the framework of its GSP , and that it should not be confused with 
WTO safeguards. The measure was not discriminatory and was compatible with WTO  rules.  
23.17.   The EU was fully aware of the economic importance of rice exports for Cambodia. Cambodia 
had benefitted from the EBA  scheme, the EU's speci al arrangement for LDCs under the GSP, which 
unilaterally granted duty -free quota -free access to LDCs for all products  except arms , including rice.  
23.18.   The EU  GSP had foreseen the possibility of using safeguards to address a situation where 
increased imports u nder the preferences system had caused financial difficulties to EU  producers 
that would not have existed in the absence of those preferences. In such cases, safeguard measures 
could be adopted for a specific period. Accordingly, the EU's measure was tempo rary and would be 
progressively reduced over a three -year period . 
23.19.   There had been no breach of WTO  rules and the EU considered that the matter should be 
addressed bilaterally between Capitals . Indeed, it had already been the subject of bilateral 
exchanges between the EU and Cambodia on several occasions during the investigation procedure.  
23.20.   The representa tive of Cambodia  thanked Members for their comments and thanked the EU 
for its response. The EU provided duty -free access to Cambodia unilaterally, in accordance with the 
Enabling Clause, and Cambodia had concerns regarding the consistency of its measure w ith its 
obligation s under the GATT  1994, especially with regard to footnote  3 of paragraph  2(a) of the 
Enabling Clause, which constituted WTO  Law. 
23.21.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  23.22.   The Council so agreed . 
24  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MAR KET ACCESS PROHIBITI ON ON 5G EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
24.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
24.2.   The representative of China  said that China had raised concerns regarding Australia's 
prohibition on Chinese equipment in relation to Australia's 5G  rollout in previous Market Access 
Committee and Council meetings. Further to Australia's response, China had addressed follow -up 
questions to Australia and was looking forward to receiving Australia's further explanation and 
clarification in this regard . 
24.3.   During the Market Access Committee meeting that had been held in October  2018, Australia 
had "affirmed its com mitment to transparency, in the WTO especially, and in our international 
dealings generally". However, from August  2018 until now , the Australian Government had provided 
neither clear nor sufficient evidence in fact or in law for the exclusion of the Chine se equipment 
vendors from Australia's 5G  rollout.  
24.4.   China could not ascertain why Australia had implemented the measure. The Australian 
Government had not published any relevant official documents regarding the prohibition, nor notified 
it to the WTO. Neithe r the content nor the legal basis of the measure was transparent and only some 
indirect information could be found from the media and websites. China enquired whether Australia's 
decision, which had had a significant impact upon international trade, would be made publicly 
available and notified to the WTO, and if Australia would provide Members with the relevant 
documents relating to the decision.  
24.5.   China also wanted to know if Australia has excluded the 5G equipment of vendors from other 
WTO Members. It was also interested to learn on the basis of which  conditions and standards 
Australia had distinguished between 5G  equipment from vendors from China and vendors of like 
equipment from other Members.  
24.6.   Australia had stated that its Government's an nouncement on 23  August  2018 had been made 
on the basis of the Telecommunications Act  1997, as amended by Telecommunications and Other 
Legislation Amendment Act  2017, and had taken effect on 18  September  2018. It seemed that the 
decision on exclusion was m ade before its legal entry into force. China would like to know Australia's 
understanding of its transparency obligation s under the WTO and common international law.  
24.7.   Australia had pointed out in its announcement of 23  August  2018 that , with 5G networks, 
"the distinction between the core and the edge will disappear over time [...]  This shift introduces 
new challenges for carriers trying to maintain their customers' security." China wanted to know if it 
was Australia's position , as stated in its news release , that "the distinction between the core and the 
edge will disappear over time" , consistent with the technical characteristics of a 5G network as 
defined by 3GPP  relevant standards. China suspected that Australia's practice violated various 
WTO Agreements.  
24.8.   Firstly, the measure was inconsistent with the MFN  principle as set out in Article  1 and 
Article  11 of the GATT because it was discriminatory towards Chinese vendors and deprived them of 
market access to the Australian market. Secondly, Australia had faile d to promptly publish the laws, 
regulations , or administrative rulings affecting the sales of imported products in such a manner as 
to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them. It was inconsistent with 
Article  10 of the GATT. Thirdly , Australia's decision was not based on international standards. In 
China's view, as a next -generation communication technology, 5G was a global industry.  
24.9.   Cybersecurity was a global challenge for all countries and cybersecurity and 5G  security 
solutions depended on internationally  agreed standards and certification mechanisms and required 
international cooperation. Only through cooperation among equipment vendors, network service 
providers, and policy and law makers, could the challenges of global cy bersecurity be properly 
addressed. The cybersecurity concerns could not be addressed by country -specific and 
discriminatory restrictive measures , which would not protect anyone but only disrupt global G/C/M/134  
 
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  industrial chain s, isolating any country attempting to impose them from access to  more advanced 
technology.  
24.10.   China believed that any restrictive measures on 5G  cybersecurity should be implemented in 
a WTO-consistent manner ; should be open and transparent ; should be implemented in a manner 
that was least restric tive to trade  while meeting the intended policy objectives; and should be 
implemented on the basis of international standards and in a non -discriminatory manner.  
24.11.   China urged Australia to comply with its WTO  obligations.  
24.12.   The representative of Australia  said that China's detailed set of written questions had been 
received by Capital on 10  April 2019. Australia was in the process of consulting internally and would 
respond to China in due course.  
24.13.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statem ents made.  
24.14.   The Council so agreed . 
25  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO. 1272/ 2008 (CLP REGULATION ) – REQUEST 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FED ERATION  
25.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  
25.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  said that in document  G/TBT/N/EU/629  the EU 
had notified WTO  Members of a new classification of titanium dioxide as a category  2 carcinogen and 
cobalt as a category  1b carcinogen for all routes of exposure , and as reprotoxic category  1b. The 
amendments had been raised multiple times in the TBT  Committee since 2017.  
25.3.   The Russian Federation considered that the proposal, in particular regarding cobalt, could 
potentially disrupt trade in a wide variety of products containing even small amounts  of cobalt, such 
as stainless steel. The regulatio n could potentially disrupt trade also in nickel and nickel goods, such 
as nickel concentrates or mattes.  
25.4.   The EU had not taken into account the full range of studies or the possible impact of the 
proposed classification. In particular, the carcinogenicity classification for the inhalation routes of 
exposure was based on the results of a two -year carcinogenicity study by inhalation on mice and 
rats. The proposed classification would be unacceptable even if studies of thousands of workers with 
the highest rat e of exposure to cobalt had shown elevated cancer risks. However, there were no 
animal or human data to indicate any concerns regarding the oral ingestion of cobalt. The EU had 
not considered the lack of systemic tumours in human workers' data nor in patie nts with co -
containing alloy implants. Best international practice in the classification of chemicals stipulated that 
classification decisions should be based on risk rather than hazard.  
25.5.   The Russian Government was deeply concerned that the Commission had d ecided to rush 
through this classification proposal covering all possible means of exposure while lacking solid 
positive systemic carcinogenicity animal data and having thousands of human datapoints showing 
an absence of cancer. The only situation to justi fy such a course of action would be if there were 
reasonable grounds to suspect a serious and immediate threat to public health, which was not the 
case. There were no reasonable grounds for foregoing scientific research that would allow for sound 
decision -making based on hard data rather than pushing for a pre -emptive classification without 
data. 
25.6.   The classification of cobalt metal as a reprotoxic category  1b was considered to be 
precautionary and was not based on solid evidence. There were no definitive fir st-generation, 
second  generation, or extended first -generation studies on cobalt metal that demonstrated the 
reproductive effects of cobalt or that supported the proposed classification.  
25.7.   In accordance with the Decision of the General Court of 7  March  2019, "Kingdom of Sweden 
vs European Commission", the Commission was obliged to verify completeness, coherence, and G/C/M/134  
 
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  pertinence when it adopted the scientific or technical advice of a European Chemical Agency 
Committee. As there were clear gaps in the current ca se, the Commission should have addressed 
questions to the Committee so as to remedy these . 
25.8.   The Russian Federation questioned the EU's lack of consideration of the WTO  notification 
procedure since the Commission had organized a vote on the regulation only four days after the 
period for comments had closed. It was Russia's understanding that the European Commission had 
gone ahead without any meaningful consideration of the many comments received from 
WTO Members. Hence, Russia called on the EU to undertake a thorough review of the comments 
received. In Russia's view, the measure could be considered as lacking consistency with regard to 
several articles in the TBT  Agreement, namely: Article  2.2, because the measure would be more 
trade -restrictive than necessary ; Article  2.4, because the methodology was not based on 
international practices and recommendations; and Article  2.9.2, because no adaptation period had 
been provided.  
25.9.   The Russian Federation requested that the European Commission refrain from the adoption 
of amendments to the current CLP  Regulation on cobalt metal until further studies had clarified the 
classification needs. His authorities sought confirmation from the EU that the proposed classification 
was based on scientific data and the results of compr ehensive studies. They also sought clarification 
as to whether or not the proposed amendments had taken into consideration international practices, 
recommendations , and studies, and especially the study of the international agency for research on 
cancer under the auspices of the World Health Organization. His Capital also enquired whether the 
European Commission had conducted a socio -economic assessment of the decision to add cobalt to 
the list of hazardous substances; and what were the grounds for  attributing cobalt as a hazardous 
substance for all routes of exposure.  
25.10.   The representative of the United States  thanked the Russian Federation for raising this item 
on the agenda. The US was also concerned regarding the process whereby the EU  had harmoniz ed 
substance classifications via the CLP  regulation (Classification, Labelling , and Packaging of Chemical 
Substances and Mixtures).  
25.11.   The US had concerns regarding the proposed update to the CLP, which had been notified to 
the TBT  Committee in December  2018,  and which would update the classifications of a number of 
substances, including titanium dioxide and cobalt, and could have an impact of billions of dollars in 
US–EU trade.  
25.12.   The US had previously raised its concerns at the TBT  Committee, as well as with wr itten 
comments on the transparency of the process, the use of international standards, and the scientific 
basis of many of the chemical classifications. They had also raised questions regarding the 
EU observance of its TBT  obligations. The US had also rais ed questions about the timing of the EU's 
WTO notifications and called upon the EU to notify in a more frequent and timely manner. The US 
had requested that the EU  list which products and articles , in addition to chemicals , would be 
impacted by its TBT  notifications. Their current CLP  notifications only listed chemicals, although the 
EU already knew many of the products that would be impacted. For example, the titanium dioxide 
classification could result in the reformulation or labelling of a number of prod ucts, including paint, 
toys, cosmetics , and plastics.  
25.13.   The US written submission also included comments specific to titanium dioxide and cobalt. 
For both substances, the EU was proposing harmonized carcinogen classifications that would impact 
upon a wide ra nge of products, despite having scientific evidence and the means via the 
CLP regulation to make more targeted classifications with regard to specific forms or uses of the 
substances. For example, in the case of cobalt, the EU, by its own admission , in the  text of the 
notified draft regulation, had noted that it had not yet completed its scientific assessment of cobalt 
in metal compounds. However, instead of issuing an exemption for metal compounds until an 
assessment could be completed, the European Commis sion was moving forward with a classification 
that would impact upon innumerable products that used metals, such as stainless steel.  
25.14.   For titanium dioxide, the US, in both the TBT  Committee and in its written comments, had 
asked the Commission to clarify ho w the titanium dioxide draft classification aligned with the 
international standard for the labelling and classification of chemicals, the UN  Globally Harmonized 
System (GHS). The US understood that votes on the proposals had been delayed in both February G/C/M/134  
 
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  and March of 2019, and would appreciate an update on the status for the potential harmonized 
classification of titanium dioxide and cobalt. They also requested an update on the status of a 
response to their written comments.  
25.15.   Given these concerns, the US ca lled upon the EU to postpone a vote on the proposed 
classification and labelling proposals on the two  substances until it could meaningfully consider the 
comments received as well as considering less trade -disruptive alternatives.  
25.16.   The representative of Canada said that Canada shared the concerns raised by Russia and 
the United States over the EU's proposed changes to its CLP  Regulations. In particular, Canada was 
concerned about the potential impact on trade in products that contained cobalt and titanium di oxide 
and the process that the EU had followed to arrive at the proposed amendments to the 
CLP Regulations. Changing the classification of cobalt and titanium dioxide under those regulations 
could result in stricter requirements under other regulations, be yond simple labelling requirements, 
which could in turn have a significant impact on trade from Canada.  
25.17.   Cobalt was present in small amounts in nickel. Canada had exported USD 1.1 billion in 
various types of nickel to the EU in 2017, much of which had been used in the production of stainless 
steel. Canada requested the EU to provide information on the next steps in its process to consider 
the proposed changes, including any relevant timelines. Canada also requested information on how 
products that contained cobalt and titanium dioxide would be treated under the entire EU  regulatory 
framework as a result of the proposal. In particular, given the wide range of products that included 
stainless steel, such as medical devices and cooking implements, Canada sought an explanation of 
how the new regulation would affect those products.  
25.18.   The EU had not completed a scientific assessment of cobalt in metal compounds. Canada 
therefore called upon the EU to explain why they were proposing such an accelerated timeline for 
the decision. In that context, Canada suggested that the EU  conduct a Better Regulation Impact 
Assessment in order to ascertain the full range of economic, health and safety impacts that might 
result from the proposal.  
25.19.   The representative of Mexico  thanked the  Russian Federation for putting this item on the 
agenda. Mexico shared the concerns of the US, Russia,  and Canada,  with regard to the lack of 
consideration by the EU of the results of international studies, and the overall process followed by 
the EU , which  was characterized by a very short time between notifications, introduction, 
assessment, comments, and final decisions.  
25.20.   Mexico had previously expressed its concerns at the TBT  Committee meeting of March  2019 
with regard to the EU's proposal for harmonized regulations in terms of CLP for titanium dioxide 
through the CLP  regulation of the European Union, as notified in document  G/TBT/N/EU/629, dated 
12 December  2018. The proposed classification of titanium dioxide as a possible category  2 
carcinogen would hav e implications in various Mexican industrial sectors and could restrict 
international trade more than necessary.  
25.21.   Mexico reiterated its concerns , as set out in document  G/TBT/W/619 , with regard to any 
scientific justification for the contradiction between i nternational standards. Mexico also called for 
an update of the status of the proposal within the EU. Lastly, Mexico also urged the EU to give due 
consideration to the observations made by all of its trading partners and Members of the WTO.  
25.22.   The representative of Australia  said that Australia recognized the EU's right to regulate for 
public and occupational health and saf ety. It also recognized that appropriate classification and 
labelling for hazardous substances and mixtures could address legitimate public and occupational 
health concerns. However, Australia was concerned that the EU's proposed changes to its 
CLP Regulat ion could create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. There were alternative 
regulatory measures available to address the EU's concerns, including measures more directly to 
address the potential health hazards of substances, without unnecessarily affecting trade. Australia 
looked forward to working with the EU to address it s concerns in the TBT  Committee.  
25.23.   The representative of the Philippines  thanked the Russian Federation for placing this issue  
on the agenda. The Philippines also had concerns over  the regulation as it affected food and 
cosmetics and other industries in the Philippines that used titanium oxide. The Philippines was also G/C/M/134  
 
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  concerned regarding cobalt as the Philippines was a large producer of nickel. The issue had been 
discussed in the T BT Committee since 2017, and the Philippines called on the EU to reconsider the 
measure and suspend its implementation until a more in-depth study of the issue  had been carried 
out, including science -based data. The Philippines had capacity constraints and  was not in a position 
to comment on the changes to the regulation within the short time period given by the EU. The 
Philippines also looked forward to receiving a reply to its request for clarification addressed to the 
EU TBT enquiry point.  
25.24.   The representa tive of the European Union  said that the classification of cobalt as a 
carcinogen for all routes of exposure had been based on the scientific opinion of the Risk Assessment 
Committee (RAC) of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). This had been in line with  the 
CLP Regulation as well as the UN  Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of 
Chemicals. The opinion and the background document s containing all the relevant scientific 
information on which the opinion had been based were available to  all WTO  Members and 
stakeholders on the website of the European Chemicals Agency.  
25.25.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
25.26.   The Council so agreed . 
26  UNITED STATES – MEAS URES ON AVIATION SEC URITY EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
26.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Committee that , in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue  on the agenda.  
26.2.   The representative of China  reiterated its concern regarding the  refusal by the  
US Transportation Security Administratio n (TSA) of applications by Chinese enterprises for 
TSA certification. Their concerns had not been addressed and no convincing reply had been received 
to date. China believed that the US  refusal was inconsistent with the relevant rules of the 
TBT Agreement, such as the conformity assessment procedures of central government agencies and 
transparency principles, which imposed unnecessary obst acles to trade.  
26.3.   China urged the US to follow the relevant provisions and principles of the WTO  Agreements, 
treating Chinese companies and products in an equal manner, including granting national and 
MFN treatment in order to eliminate technical barriers to  trade.  
26.4.   At the Council meeting in November  2018, the US had responded that the issue was one of 
security. China could not agree. It was clear that every Member had security issue s, but these should 
not be used as trade barrier s. Furthermore, China's aviati on security equipment had been recognized 
worldwide and ha d been used by many other countries. The equipment had met the most stringent 
safety technical standards and requirements. Therefore, China believed that the security issue 
should not be used as a r eason to restrict normal trade, and urged the US to give a positive response 
to Chinese applicants.  
26.5.   The representative of the United States  reiterated the US  response s given  at the Council 
meeting in November  2018. The measures on aviation security equipme nt that China continued to 
raise in this Council dealt with matters of national security, and airplane security in particular. The 
Council had no mandate to attempt to discuss or solve matters specific to national security and 
airplane security and the US assume d that all Members would agree.  
26.6.   The United States once again referred China to the U S TSA , which had competency over the 
relevant measures. The US urged China and other Members that had concerns to discuss these with 
the TSA and to refrain from placi ng measures on the agenda of the Council's meetings for which the 
Council had no mandate.  
26.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
26.8.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  27  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRADE RESTRICTING P RACTICES – REQUEST F ROM THE  
EUROPEAN UNION  
27.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
27.2.   The representative of the European Union  said that the EU and other WTO  Members continued 
to be confronted with numerous measures that had been introduced  by Russia with the apparent 
intention to disadvantage the market access of foreign products into the Russian market. This had 
raised significant qu estions with regard to the consistency of Russia's measures with the WTO rules.  
27.3.   The EU reiterated its concern with regard to the introduction by Russia in March  2016 of a 
GOST  standard on cement certification. At the meeting of the Council in November  2018, Russia had 
indicated that the standard was being revised and that testing at the border would be eliminated. 
The EU called for an update on the situation. They also called upon Russia to modify the technical 
regulation and standard and to rely on proport ionate, non -discriminatory requirements  in future . 
They also called upon Russia and the other four Members of the Eurasian Economic Union not to 
replicate the discriminatory character of the measure in the Technical Regulation that was under 
preparation at  the EAEU  level.  
27.4.   The requirement of "good manufacturing practice" (GMP) certificates for pharmaceuticals had 
not yet been notified to the WTO and had a discriminatory dimension. Foreign pharmaceutical 
manufacturers were handicapped by long delays relating to the limited capacity for inspection and 
other inefficiencies. Moreover, 40% of foreign sites had their application for GMP  certification 
rejected. Importing companies were clearly at a disadvantage. The EU requested a general revision 
of GMP  certificati on schemes so as to remove any legal or factual discrimination against foreign 
products.  
27.5.   The EU also remained concerned about the SPS  ban on fishery products, particularly affecting 
processed fish products from Estonia, which was not properly justified. At  the Council meeting of 
November  2018, Russia had referred to the resumption of trade. However, the resumption 
concerned less than 5% of the establishments exporting processed fish products to Russia before 
June 2015. The EU requested a general lift of this unjustified ban.  
27.6.   Regarding the taxation regime on wine that had been established in 2018 and which was still 
in place, the EU welcomed Russia's proposed modifications , as submitted to the Duma , which would 
address the discriminatory element in the regime . The EU called for an update on the proposal and 
for information regarding when the new rules would enter into force.  
27.7.   The EU then turned  to the issue of the increasing difficulty faced by importing companies (for 
goods) and foreign companies (for services ) in participating in Russian SOEs' purchases. Recently, 
Law 44/2013 -FZ on Government Procurement had been amended by Law  174-FZ of June  2018, 
apparently in a way that further limited national treatment of foreign products. The EU sought an 
explanation as to whether or not the amendment implied that Law  44, which did not provide for the 
application of national treatment, now covered investments made by SOEs where fixed capital 
investments using state subsidies had been made.  
27.8.   The EU then raised the issue of Russia's renewal , under Decree No.  194 of 27  February  2019, 
of the 2014 so -called temporary export ban on raw hides and skins , until June  2019. The EU sought 
an explanation from Russia in light of its statement at the November  2018 Council meeting that the 
ban would expire in December  2018 and that it would not be reintroduced. In the current 
circumstances, the ban could not be considered temporary.  
27.9.   The Russian Government had introduced temporary quantitative restrictions on the export of 
birch logs from January  to June  2019. In view of the precedent with the four-year ban on exports of 
raw hides and skins, the EU would like to receive confirmation th at the measure would not be 
extended beyond 30  June 2019.  
27.10.   The representative of the United States  said that the United States shared the EU's concerns 
regarding Russia's "good manufacturing practice" certificates for pharmaceuticals.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  27.11.   The US recognized that  Russia had made minimal improvements to the practice, but that 
the system overall continued to raise concerns. The discrepancy in approval numbers, the long 
delays due to limited capacity, and the inefficiencies caused by product -specific inspections all 
appeared to be yet more tools to discriminate against imports. The US requested Russia to revise 
its GMP  certification regime in order to remove all discriminatory practices , whether created by law 
or in practice. The US also shared concerns over Russia's discriminatory excise tax regime on wine , 
which applied a lower excise tax to wines that carried a geographical indication , although  only 
Russian wines could carry a geographical indication.  
27.12.   The US expected Russia to meet its obligations under the WTO  fundamental principle of 
National Treatment and it looked forward to receiving updates from Russia regarding the measure, 
including on the date of its abolition.  
27.13.   The US had also raised concerns in this Council and at other WTO  Committees about 
restrictions and  obligations applied to Russia's SOEs purchasing decisions. The US was still reviewing 
amendments to Federal Law No.  44 but were very concerned that these were yet another example 
of Russia's rejection of the open trading system of the WTO in favour of the discredited policies of 
import substitution. The US would welcome any explanation that Russia could provide on this issue.  
27.14.   Regarding the ban on exports of raw hides, the US had been intereste d in Russia's 
explanation of how a measure that had been in place since 2014 could be considered "temporary." 
They reiterated their concern that the ban was in fact yet another manifestation of Russia's 
increasing reliance on import -substitution policies a nd of its rejection of the core market -opening 
principles of the WTO.  
27.15.   Finally, the US echoed the EU's request for assurances from the Russian Federation that the 
so-called "temporary" ban on the export of birch logs would indeed be lifted on 30  June 2019, and 
that it would not follow the example of the so-called "temporary" ban on raw hides and skins.  
27.16.   The representative of Sri Lanka  thanked the EU and other speakers for raising this issue. Sri 
Lanka had worked very closely with the Russian Federation's  authorities, submitting various 
applications and data, as well as allowing inspection of Sri Lanka's fishery processing establishments, 
in order to gain market access in the product areas concerned. However, Sri Lanka had still not been 
able to break the marke t access impasse. Fisheries and fish processing were very important to the 
Sri Lankan economy . For this reason, Sri Lanka  request ed Russia to give an adequate hearing to 
their concerns and to help Sri Lanka to overcome the se obstacles in the very near futu re. 
27.17.   The representative of Ukraine  said that Ukraine shared the concerns raised by the EU, the 
US, and Sri Lanka. Ukraine reiterated its concerns regarding new transit restrictions that had been 
imposed by Russia and that had been raised by Ukraine at the F ebruary  2019 meeting of the 
Committee on Trade Facilitation.  
27.18.   Russia's Resolution No.  1716-83 of 29  December  2018 prohibited, inter alia , the importation 
into the Russian Federation of certain agricultural and industrial goods, if such goods had been in 
transit through the territory of Ukraine. The list of banned products included a wide range of goods, 
including beer, chocolates, wheat, wallpaper, machinery , and equipment. According to 
2018 statistics, the volume of exports of the aforementioned products to  Russia transiting via 
Ukraine was 11  times greater than Ukrainian exports to Russia of the same products. Therefore, the 
restrictions seemed primarily to target products originating in other WTO  Members. Ukraine 
requested Russia fully to comply with its W TO commitments in order to ensure predictable trade 
conditions.  
27.19.   The representative of the Russian Federation  said that, with regard  to cement certification, 
the Russian Federation would like to reiterate its statements from the meeting of the Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade. The relevant amendments abolishing additional border inspections were 
being elaborated and discussed a mong the relevant Ministries and Agencies involved in the technical 
regulation. It was not possible at that time to provide a precise timeline for the outcome of those 
discussions. The Russian Federation would notify its decision to the WTO when it had bee n approved.  
27.20.   Regarding the EU's concerns on Russia's GMP certification of medicines, he reiterated the 
statement made by his delegation during the previous meeting of the Committee on Technical G/C/M/134  
 
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  Barriers to Trade. Russia insisted that the Russian GMP  rules a nd procedures had been fully based 
on the relevant international standards and recommendations in that area.  
27.21.   With regard to Members' concerns over the lack of inspection capacity in the Russian 
Federation, he said that Russian inspection capacities had qua drupled in the period covering 2016 
to 2018. It was currently the case that  85% of Russian inspectors were responsible for conducting 
inspections abroad. The inspectors regularly participated in experience -sharing activities with their 
foreign counterparts , and also participated in advanced training courses, including some that had 
been approved by the World Health Organization. From 2016 to 2018, a total of 2,110  applications 
for GMP  certification had been received from foreign entities ; of those applicati ons, 1,452  inspections 
had been carried out , with the result that 1 ,007 foreign entities had been certified and 
410 applications had been declined. In that context, he requested the EU to disclose the source and 
calculation methodology of the statistics it  had provided on the number of applications from foreign 
entities that had been rejected.  
27.22.   Addressing the SPS  ban on fish products from Estonia, Russia had informed Members during 
the previous meeting of the SPS  Committee that the inspection would take plac e in late April  2019. 
It had taken some time to agree on new dates due to scheduling conflicts and other inspection 
commitments as well as budgetary issues. The Estonian authorities had agreed to the re -inspections 
to demonstrate that all of the relevant corrective measures had been taken and that the 
SPS requirements of the Eurasian Economic Union were now being fully met and implemented. The 
Russian Federation confirmed its readiness to settle the issue and to continue with the resumption 
of fishery expor ts. 
27.23.   With regard to wine taxation, the Ministry of Finance had prepared the amendments to the 
Tax Code of the Russian Federation, which had aligned excise rates for imported wines and wines 
produced in the territory of the Russian Federation,  and which had abolished the definitions "the 
wine with the appellation of origin" and "the wine with geographical indication". The draft was 
currently being discussed by  the responsible Ministries of the Russian Federation. WTO  Members 
would be notified by his delegation once the relevant amendments had been approved.  
27.24.   With regard to the EU and US  concerns in respect of export restrictions on raw hides and 
skins, Russia would like to emphasize that this measure had been introduced  with the purpose of 
assuring state defence procurement needs.  
27.25.   Addressing the quantitative restrictions on export s of birch logs, the Russian Federation 
believed that , in exceptional cases , the WTO  rules allowed Members to establish quantitative 
restrictio ns on exports. Imports of plywood materials into Russia were practically nil. Taking into 
account the lack of other sources of plywood raw material s in Russia , the Russian Federation 
considered that the measure was justified.  
27.26.   In any case, the concerns expr essed by Members would be transmitted  to Capital. He 
refrained from commenting on the issue raised by Ukraine regarding transit restrictions as this was 
an issue that remained under the consideration of the DSB.  
27.27.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council ta ke note of the statements made.  
27.28.   The Council so agreed . 
28  CROATIA – REGULATION  OF IMPORT AND SALE OF CERTAIN OIL PRODU CTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  
28.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation o f the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  
28.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  expressed concern over the discriminatory 
character of Croatia's policies against certain imported oil products from the  Russia n Federation.  
28.3.   Under Croatia's 2014 Regulation "On conditions for wholesale trading and trading with 
third countries applied to certain goods" , the minimum volume of container s for trade in oil products G/C/M/134  
 
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  and biofuel s had been fixed at 300 and 100  cubic meters, respectively. Such treatment was not 
being applied to imports from EU  member States, states of the European Economic Area, plus the 
Republic of Turkey. The Regulation had been in effect since 2014 , and despite the Russian Federation 
having systematically raised its concerns over it, the measure had not been withdrawn by Croatia 
and nor had it been brought in to compliance with WTO rules.  
28.4.   As a result, the Russian oil industry was suffering heavy losse s. In Russia's view, Croatia's 
trade regime was inconsistent with its obligations undertaken upon WTO  accession, and 
GATT  Articles  I and III , in particular . The Russian Federation requested the delegations of Croatia 
and the European Union to provide the r elevant information regarding the current situation in Croatia 
concerning abolishment of discriminative practices with regard to products originating in the Russian 
Federation.  
28.5.   The representative of the European Union  confirmed that the revision process of  the measure 
was ongoing and that the revised measure would be fully consistent with WTO  rules. The EU would 
inform the Council once the revised measure was available.  
28.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
28.7.   The Council so agreed . 
29  JAMAICA – REGULATION S NOs. 145 AND 146 BANNING SINGLE -USE PLASTIC 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM THE DOMINICAN RE PUBLIC  
29.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 22  March  2019, the 
delegation of the Dominican Republic had requ ested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  
29.2.   The representative of the Dominican Republic  said that Regulation  Nos. 145 and 146, 
respectively, of 24  December  2018, which had been published in the Jamaican official journal 
supplement, under the  authority of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Agriculture, and Fisheries, 
had prohibited the importation of single -use plastic products.  
29.3.   This regulation was a cause for concern to the Dominican Republic because of its trade -
restrictive impact. The Dominican Republic also questioned  the consistency of the measure with 
regard to Jamaica's WTO  commitments. The Jamaican measure provided discretional powers to the 
Ministry to provide authorizations to national manufactures of single -use plastic products,  yet the 
exception was not available for imports of the same products, which was a violation of 
MFN treatment for plastic products.  
29.4.   Under the regulation, the exception was being provided only to domestic producers of the 
goods, which would be a violation o f the MFN  provisions under Article  3.4 of GATT  1994. The 
regulation could not be justified under Article  XX of GATT  1994 either, because the restrictions were 
applied to the same products in certain circumstances , while those same products were considered 
safe in other circumstances. The measures were technical regulations because they provided 
compulsorily characteristics for plastic products to be marketed in Jamaica . For these reasons, the 
Dominican Republic  had submitted its trade concern in the TBT  Committee meeting that had taken  
place in March  2019.  
29.5.   The Dominican Republic was concerned over  the consistency of the Jamaican measures with 
the non -discrimination obligation under Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement. It was also concerned that 
the regulations would be trade -distorting and more restrictive than necessary, which would also 
make them inconsistent with Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement. The Dominican Republic doubted  
that the restrictive measures were completely necessary , or that Jamaica did not ha ve other 
measures or possibilities  available to help it to meet its objectives  in this area . 
29.6.   The Jamaican Government had not informed WTO  Members of the measure in advance , had 
not asked for comments from Members , and had not notified the regulations to th e Dominican 
Republic or to the WTO. Jamaica's regulations seemed to be in violation of the transparency 
provisions contained in the TBT  Agreement and required clarification. He also called upon Jamaica 
to submit a notification to the WTO under the relevant agreement. The Dominican Republic requested G/C/M/134  
 
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  Jamaica to suspend implementation of the measure during consultations with interested Members 
in order to ensure that WTO  rules were being respected by all Members. The Dominican Republic 
was fully prepared to continue to discuss this matter with Jamaica with a view to trying to resolve 
the issue and they looked forward to receiving a response to their concerns as raised in 
December  2018.  
29.7.   The representative of the United States  said that the United States shared the concerns raised 
by the Dominican Republic. The US recognized the unique set of waste management challenges that 
island nations faced but believed  that environmental objectives were best served through upholding  
national treatment obligations. If local capacity to recycle single -use plastics was unavailable and 
the goal of such prohibitions had been to prevent plastic leakage into the environment, then meeting 
that goal should be contingent upon the equal applica tion of the relevant policies both to foreign and 
domestic products. The refore, the  United States encouraged Jamaica to revise the measures in a 
manner such that the same treatment would then be applied to both foreign and domestic plastic 
products.  
29.8.   The re presentative of Guatemala  said that Guatemala also held systemic concerns with regard 
to Jamaica's measure . It called upon Members to meet the commitments that they had undertaken 
in the WTO  framework.  
29.9.   The representative of Jamaica  advised the Council that  the observations raised by the 
Dominican Republic had been duly noted in Capital and that Jamaica would revert back to the Council  
on this issue at a later date . 
29.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
29.11.   The Council so agreed . 
30  EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIREC TIVE 2009/28/EC, REN EWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM COLOMBIA  AND MALAYSIA  
30.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a com munication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of Malaysia had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda. Colombia 
had requested to be added as a co -sponsor after the agenda had closed.  
30.2.   The representative of Malaysia  said that Malaysia h ad concerns over Directive (EU)  2018/2001 
of the European Parliament and of the Council , of 11 December  2018, on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources (or RED  II), which had entered into force on 24  December  2018.  
30.3.   On 13  March  2019, in accordance with Article s 26(2)  and 35 of the Directive, the European 
Commission had adopted a Delegated Act , , supplement ing the Directive and setting out the criteria 
for certification of low indirect land use change (ILUC) risk biofuels, bioliquids , and biomass fuels , 
and for determining the high ILU risk feedstock for which a significant expansion of the production 
area into land with high carbon stock had been observed.  
30.4.   The Delegated Act had significant negative implications for the development of the o il palm 
industry globally , and lacked scientific data and reliable information to determine high and low 
indirect land use change risk biofuels and bioliquids , which resulted in disinformation and misleading 
interpretation s of the production of palm oil wo rldwide. Malaysia believed that this created an 
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination and constituted a disguised restriction on the international 
trade in palm oil and palm oil products.  
30.5.   Malaysia considered that, contrary to the EU's assertion that t he delegated resolution served 
to count the extent to which certain biofuels could be considered to meet the EU's renewable energy 
targets, the adopted delegated regulation was tantamount to a ban on biofuels and bioliquids 
produced from palm oil. Therefor e, Malaysia urged the EU to provide equitable treatment across all 
oil crops' biofuels and bioliquids , in line with the WTO  principle of non -discrimination between "like" 
products from different trading partners.  
30.6.   Malaysia considered that the methodology used for the calculation of the share of land 
expansion used in the delegated regulation was not a recognized international standard. Accordingly, G/C/M/134  
 
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  Malaysia requested the EU to provide scientific evidence and clarifi cation with regard to the formula 
that it had used to determine the share of land expansion and the productivity factor , as well as the 
literature that had been used to determine the deforestation and wetlands land expansion for all oil 
crops.  
30.7.   Scientific e vidence had proven that palm oil was the most productive of the annual oil -bearing 
crops. A single hectare of cultivated palm oil could supply between five to ten times more oil 
compared to rapeseed and soybean respectively. Malaysia reiterated that the us e of biofuels as well 
as bioliquids from other oil crops would create a greater risk of deforestation and land -use changes.  
30.8.   Malaysia's bilateral engagement with the EU, which had resulted in an open exchange of views 
and information, had not led to a fair treatment for palm oil. The previous Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED  I) had already required that biofuels and bioliquids be certified under voluntary 
schemes to demonstrate their compliance with the stipulated sustainability and greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emiss ion-saving criteria. The additional criteria for certification of ILUC under RED  II would 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade in biofuels and bioliquids with the EU. The Delegated Act of 
the RED  II was more trade restrictive than necessary and more burde nsome for producers of palm 
oil biofuels and bioliquids , including for Malaysia n producers . 
30.9.   Malaysia  emphasize d that its palm oil was produced in a sustainable manner. Malaysian palm 
oil industry was committed to following sustainable practices and criteri a, in accordance with the 
Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) certification scheme, which would be implemented on a 
mandatory basis by 31  December  2019. Accordingly, Malaysia urged the EU to accept and recognize 
the MSPO  certification scheme as one of th e voluntary schemes under the "Directive for the 
Certification of Low Indirect Land Use Change Risk Biofuels and Bioliquids". Malaysia was open to 
further discussions with the EU on this matter.  
30.10.   Malaysia recognized the importance of protecting the environm ent and had put a policy 
framework in place that implemented sustainable practices and measures to ensure the protection 
of the environment. The policy framework included the reduction of greenhouse gas emission s, the 
prevention of pollution and environmen tal degradation, and the efficient management of resources 
and wastes.  
30.11.   Malaysia was also committed to maintaining at least 50% of its land under forest as pledged 
in the 1992  Rio Earth Summit and as reiterated at the following subsequent conferences: the U nited 
Nations Climate Change Conference ; the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP  15), 
Copenhagen , in 2009 ; and the twenty -first session of the Conference of the Parties (COP  21), in 
Paris, in 2015. Malaysia was proud that 55.3% of its land was currently under afforestation. Malaysia 
was also committed to protecting and conserving the country's rich biodiversity. It was serious in 
combating climate change. Under the Paris Agreement, Malaysia  had made an ambitious Nationally 
Determined Commitment (NDC) to reduce the emissions intensity of its gross domestic product 
(GDP) by 45% by 2030 relative to its emission s intensity of GDP in 2005, and it was on track to 
meet its commitment. In that conte xt, Malaysia requested the EU to take into consideration 
Malaysia's continuous efforts to mitigate climate change.  
30.12.   Malaysia remained fully committed to negotiating with the EU in a frank and constructive 
manner to ensure non -discriminatory treatment for pa lm products and to prevent an unnecessary 
barrier to access of palm products into the EU  market. Malaysia  looked forward to receiving a positive 
response from the EU.  
30.13.   The representative of Colombia  appreciated the EU's intention to adopt a public policy to  
protect the environment through promoting the use of renewable energies. Nevertheless, Colombia 
shared Malaysia's concern that the measure should be applied in a non -discriminatory way, that it 
should not be more trade restrictive than necessary, and that  it should not become an unnecessary 
obstacle or a disguised  barrier to trade  that affected the population and economic activities reliant 
on these agricultural activities.  
30.14.   According to the Directive 2018/2001 of the EU Parliament and Council, as from 2021, 
biofuels of the first generation  could be computed as a renewable energy in the transport sector, up 
to a quota  of 7%. Moreover, the EU Directive also established that the quota of renewable energy 
for biofuels of the first generation, which ha d a large ILUC potential, w ould be gradually reduced to G/C/M/134  
 
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  0% by 2030. Colombia considered that these provisions were incompatible with national treatment  
obligations , the MFN  clause , and GATT Article  III. 
30.15.   Likewise, Colombia was  concerned over the EU Commission D elegated Act through which it 
had already established criteria to identify biofuels with high ILUC  risk, as well as the criteria to 
certify low ILUC  risk. 
30.16.   Colombia drew attention to the ILUC  methodology that was being used in the current case  
as, in its view, it was not based on  a sound or internationally recognized  scientific basis to calculat e 
the environmental impact of productive activities. Nor were there calculations for the expected 
reduction of greenhouse gases . Moreover, t he Commission  had not considered other methodologies, 
such as Life Cycle Assessment or Carbon Footprint, which had already been validated and proven 
internationally.  
30.17.   Concerning the classification of certain biofuels with high ILUC  risk, the considerations were 
not techn ically appropriate since  the deforestation associated with these products was not high in 
all of the producing countries , and, countries like Colombia had lands available to increase the arable 
land without deforesting.  
30.18.   Moreover, other products that led to greater deforestation according to the international 
studies were not considered to be high risk under the ILUC, such as soy and c olza. Despite the fact 
that the Delegated Act established criteria to measure risks on a crop -by-crop basis, it also contained  
various  references from which it could be inferred that in the future the production of palm oil would 
be excluded because of "exaggerated growing  of the palm oil crops"  but without specifying clear 
indicators as to how to make the process more e fficient and equally applicable to other crops relating 
to the production of biofuel s. Therefore, Colombia  believed that the Dedicated Act and its 
implementation might even go against the objectives of the EU-RED, since oils , coming from other 
crops that c reated or required greater areas for volume production,  might then be used  in the 
production of biofuels . 
30.19.   The dedicated Act also point ed out that biofuels , bioliquids and biomass biofuels, could only 
be certified as having low risk if they met a series of criteria . This was of great concern, especially 
because of the definition used for small producers, which were identified as farmers that carry out 
agriculture activities independently using an area of less than two  hectares  and having a real estate 
title or land lease contracts. Colombia believe d that this classification ha d no technical or scientific 
basis and that it did not follow the standards set  out by the main international organizations.  In this 
vein, Colombia pointe d out that the classification of a small producer, a small farmer, changed from 
country to country, hence the certification set out in th e new directive,  could lead to unjustified costs 
for producers , particularly since the criteria d id not meet any intern ationally recognized standard , 
and that the methodology used was not used globally.  
30.20.   Colombia believed that this was a de facto  discriminatory  and trade restrictive  measure , 
particularly when it compared like products from different countries and like products of national 
and foreign origin . Colombia also pointed out that there existed an economic and technical 
substitution between  different types of vegetable oils. In this vein, Colombia indicated that the 
Directive and the Delegate Act, established th at a raw material c ould be high risk under ILUC when 
using indicators, criteria, and definition, which, de facto , were discriminatory for palm oil, but at the 
same time exclude d other similar raw materials.  In this regard, Colombia referred to the conclusi on 
of the Panel report in Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retrea ded Tyres  (DS332) concerning 
GATT  Article  XX(b) and the existence of risks not only for the environment in general but also the 
direct risks on human, animal , and plant health.  
30.21.   Colombia  believed that t he measures adopted by the EU did not stimulate the use of biofuels 
produced from palm oil sustainable crops and would have a disproportionate ly negative impact on 
Colombia as a n environmentally responsible producer of this product. Colombia therefore requested  
the European Union to clarify how it reconcile d this discriminatory treatment to palm -oil producing 
countries and its WTO  national treatment obligations and MFN  commitments . 
30.22.   Colombia, as had been recognized by the EU, had zero per cent deforestation associated 
with palm oil production , although its palm oil fuels  still did not have  access to the renewable energy 
market in the EU. Despite the fact that, globally speaking, pal m oil met the criteria established in G/C/M/134  
 
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  the Delegated Act to be considered as a high-risk raw material for ILUC, there were significant 
regional differences concerning the impact of expansion of this product  in deforestation processes . 
Indeed, s ome recent sc ientific evidence had shown , for example,  that only three  countries had 
significant deforestation  related to palm oil production . For the rest of the producing palm oil regions, 
deforestation was under 10%. Colombia wished  very much to hear the EU 's respon se in this regard .5 
30.23.   The representative of Indonesia  thanked Malaysia for putting the issue on the agenda . 
Indonesia continued to have serious concerns about the EU  Amendment to its Directive  2009/28/EC. 
Indonesia had made previous statements on this issue, in documents  G/TBT/W/651 and 
G/TBT/W/615. Time and again  the EU had insisted that the issue was not covered under the 
TBT Agreement, even though the shape and features of the measures clearl y indicated otherwise. 
The EU  position, that the measure did not create a ban or otherwise single out any specific biofuel s, 
did not mean that the measure could not be qualified under the TBT  Agreement.  
30.24.   Moreover, the EU's ILUC  criteria, which would be forc ed through by means of  the Delegated 
Act of the RED  II, were unilateral and scientifically flawed. The EU was basically attempting to justify 
the illegitimate objectives of the measures, including discrimination and market access limitation of 
palm oil -based biofuels. These regulations undermined, even ignored, Indonesia's ongoing efforts to 
meet the objective s of the Sustainable Development Goals  2030, through Indonesia's national 
commitment toward s forest preservation, its sustainable palm oil production , and particularly its 
efforts toward s poverty alleviation guaranteed by the Marrakesh Agreement, as well as the 
SDGs  themselves . 
30.25.   Indonesia reiterated its strong opposition to RED  II and its Delegated Act and urged the EU 
not to enact any delegated measures  that were not constructive to trade and development, nor 
supportive of Members' efforts to achieve the ultimate objective s of the Sustainable Development 
Goals.  
30.26.   The representative of Thailand  thanked Malaysia and Colombia for raising this issue. Thailand 
reiterated its interest in the matter and encouraged a treatment of palm oil that would be equitable 
with products from other oil crops. Thailand looked forward to receiving an update from the EU as 
well as further clarification with regard to all the other concerns that Members had raised over this 
issue. 
30.27.   The representative of Honduras  shared t he concerns of previous speakers. Palm oil was a 
very important industry for Honduras.  It was an industry that created thousands of jobs on a 
permanent basis and also sustained a large number of small -scale farmers. Honduras carried out 
controlled producti on under its Tropical Forest Protection Act and there was a minimal, or marginal , 
impact on the environment. Honduras would appreciate receiving updated information from the EU  
in this regard . 
30.28.   The representative of Guatemala  said that Guatemala also shared  the same concerns as 
those that had been raised by previous speakers. The measure would have a negative impact on 
Guatemala's production of palm oil. While it did not restrict imports of oils, it would be prejudicial to 
palm oil in relation to other oils.  Guatemala's Ambassador in Brussels had requested that a global 
discussion take place on the issue of palm oil.  
30.29.   The representative of Costa Rica  joined other speakers in expressing concerns over the policy 
of promoting renewable energy sources in the EU. C osta Rica was following th is issue very closely 
and hoped that the EU would take into account the impact that such a policy would have on the 
biofuel s market and on the people whose livelihoods depended on it, especially in developing 
countries already inv esting in sustainable production practices.  
30.30.   The representative of the European Union  said that the revision of the Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED) had been discussed at a number of bilateral meetings among experts and at higher 
level. The EU was aware of the position s expressed on the recast Directive and on the identification 
of biofuels at "high risk" of contributing to Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC). The purpose of the 
Directive was not to introduce import restrictions, but rather to promote sustainabl e renewable 
energies and to reduce  the carbon footprint of the transport sector. In particular, the Directive did 
                                                
5 See also Colombia's statement delivered in full at the CTG  meeting of 23 and 26  March  2018, as 
recorded in document  G/C/M/131, paragraphs  20.8-20.10.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  not set a ban on any specific biofuel. It established rules for the calculations used to achieve the 
EU renewable energy targets, including in  the transport sector. The EU  market remained open to 
palm oil, in the biofuel sector as in other sectors. EU  imports of palm oil had increased in volume in 
2018, and no specific restriction was in place. The EU remained available for further discussions o n 
this issue.  
30.31.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
30.32.   The Council so agreed . 
31  TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO – ANNOUNCEMENT CONCE RNING THE BAN ON THE  
MARKETING AND IMPORT ATION OF POLYSTYRENE  PLASTICS – REQUEST FROM THE 
DOMINICAN REP UBLIC  
31.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 22  March  2019, the 
delegation of the Dominican Republic had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  
31.2.   The delegate of the Dominican Republic  stated that Trinidad and Tobago's Ministry of Planning 
and Development had announced, on 27  July 2018, an import and marketing ban on polystyrene 
plastic. The prohibition had included glasses and food containers, dishes, cups, and other utensils, 
which we re to be eliminated by 2019. The Dominican Republic expressed its concern over the 
measure's restrictive nature on imports of polystyrene products. If the measure were to be adopted, 
it would be detrimental to the conditions of import competition, in contr adiction to GATT  Article  III. 
The Dominican Republic further submitted that the measure would be a covert restriction on 
international trade, which could not be accepted under GATT Article  XX. The Dominican Republic had 
expressed its concerns already in th e March  2019 meeting of the TBT  Committee. This measure had 
been described as a "technical regulation" under Article  11 of the TBT  Agreement because plastic 
products should not be able to be produced using polystyrene for export. However, the measure was 
more restrictive than necessary, thus also contravening GATT  Article  II.2. It would also be contrary 
to GATT  Article  II.1, since it had a prejudicial effect on the imports of polystyrene products. 
Furthermore, the measure had not been notified to the TBT  Committee, thus contravening the 
transparency provisions of the TBT  Agreement. He requested Trinidad and Tobago to inform 
Members about the evolution of this legislation and to consider its WTO  obligations before 
implementing the measure.  
31.3.   The representative of the United States  expressed its concern over the proposed measure; 
before it was finalized, they wished to discuss the measure's objectives with Trinidad and Tobago in 
order to identify possible solutions that would not overly burden trade.  
31.4.   The represen tative of Honduras  shared the previous systemic concerns and noted that 
Honduras would appreciate receiving additional information from Trinidad and Tobago in this regard.  
31.5.   The representative of Guatemala  shared the concerns of other Members and requested 
Trinidad and Tobago to respect its WTO  obligations.  
31.6.   The representative of Trinidad and Tobago  informed Members that the legislation was not yet 
in force and that its details were being finalized, including with regard to the scope of the ban. 
Trinidad and T obago intended to notify the WTO of the proposed measure once its details had been 
finalized, and would do so via both its official TBT  Contact Point and this Council. Its notification 
would also include the measure's proposed date of entry into force. Tri nidad and Tobago intended 
to provide its trading partners with all the relevant information once the measure had been finalized.  
31.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
31.8.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/134  
 
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  32  BETTER FUNCTIONING O F THE CO UNCIL FOR TRADE IN G OODS AND SUBSIDIARY 
COMMITTEES – STATEME NT BY HONG KONG, CHI NA 
32.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 29  March  2019, the 
delegation of Hong Kong, China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda 
and recalled that, at the November  2018 meeting, he had invited delegations to reflect on how best 
to improve the work of the Goods Council, and how to make its work more efficient, in particular 
with regard to specific trade concerns (STCs). To  this end, at an informal meeting of the Council that 
had taken  place on 4  March  2019, Members had presented various suggestions and identified 
various areas where the Council's work and the work of its subsidiary bodies could be improved. 
Among the issues  mentioned by delegations had been  the following: (i)  insufficient preparation when 
a trade concern was brought to the CTG or other bodies for the first time; (ii)  differing expectations 
from Members as to how trade concerns would be considered, including the different practices across 
different WTO  bodies; (iii)  a systematic lack of substantive responses to questions posed at 
meetings; and (iv)  the repetition of statements at CTG  meetings and across Committees. Members 
also mentioned some ideas to remedy t hese issues, including the following: (i)  developing a set of 
rules, by identifying the good practices of other WTO  bodies, which would encourage meaningful 
dialogue between Members and that could be applied through different bodies; (ii)  creating an 
integrated management system to keep track of trade concerns across different bodies; 
(iii) encouraging Members to consult bilaterally with one another in order to make better use of the 
time available between meetings to resolve their STCs; (iv)  focusing only on developments since 
the previous meeting when turning to recurring trade concerns, rather than always repeating the 
same statements on the same issues; and (v)  providing a role for the Chair to assist in resolving 
trade concerns. In addition, some Member s identified the relationship and coordination between the 
CTG and its subsidiary bodies as another area where there was need for improvement. In this regard, 
two ideas were proposed, as followed: (i)  to promote regular meetings between the CTG  Chair and 
the Officers of the CTG's subsidiary bodies in order to maximize opportunities to work together more 
efficiently; and (ii)  to address all issues first and foremost in the relevant Committees, and not at 
the CTG.  
32.2.   The representative of Hong Kong, China , said that her delegation considered it important not 
only to have the CTG and its subsidiary Committees functioning well individually, but also to establish 
a framework for the Council and its subsidiary bodies to work together in an effective, coherent, and 
results-oriented manner. This was pertinent to ensuring the WTO's continued relevance in a fast -
evolving trading environment. There was no perfect organization, but good organizations continually 
reviewed the ways in which they operated and coordinated with relevant parties. Hong Kong, China, 
appreciated the Chair's foresight in initiating a timely discussion and mentioned that the ideas raised 
by Members could make a big difference to the effectiveness of the WTO and to better preparing the 
Organization for reform. Hong Kong, China stated that, although informal discussions were useful, 
in addition, in this Member -driven process, it was time for Members to express their interest in this 
issue and to take ownership of it by placing it clearly on the agenda. Sh e noted that the agenda item 
included by her delegation did not include a proposal because this was not a matter only for Hong 
Kong, China but for all Members. Hong Kong, China expressed its hope that Members could work 
together to develop the ideas initia lly set out in the CTG's informal meeting of 4  March, or else to 
explore new ideas.  
32.3.   The representative of Costa Rica  stated that her delegation would be happy to work with other 
interested Members on improving the work of this Council and its subsidiary bo dies. She stated that 
Costa Rica would keep a close watch on developments in this discussion.  
32.4.   The representative of China  said that her delegation saw the value of Hong Kong, China's 
room document and the importance of improving the overall functioning and  efficiency of the CTG 
and its subsidiary Committees.  
32.5.   The representative of Singapore  said that her delegation was supportive of this work and 
would continue to participate in it. She recalled that Singapore had been working on a discussion 
paper identifyi ng good practices in the TBT  Committee. In this regard, she expressed Singapore's 
hope that the paper would spark discussions on how some of the tools developed for the 
TBT Committee could also be useful to facilitate the work of other WTO  Committees under  the CTG. 
Singapore noted that it had started to reach out to delegations bilaterally and was available to 
interested delegations to discuss this matter further.  G/C/M/134  
 
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  32.6.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  stated that it was also ready to participate activ ely 
in these discussions. He noted that critics were questioning the relevance of the multilateral trading 
system and that, against such a backdrop, it was essential to prove the WTO's concrete and ongoing 
progress through the active engagement of all its Members.  
32.7.   The representative of Argentina  welcomed this initiative and indeed any idea that could 
improve the work of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. Argentina noted that the communication had 
included suggestions on how the CTG's work could be improved.  Argentina supported the suggestion 
that the Secretariat circulat e reminders of the dates of the CTG's meetings, with a deadline for 
inclusion of items on the agenda, as indeed was done already in certain of the CTG's subsidiary 
bodies.  
32.8.   The representative of Guatemala  stated that her delegation also supported improving the 
work of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. Guatemala emphasized that Members should first 
determine the details of a proposal in order to facilitate a real discussion of the issues raised . 
32.9.   The representative of the United States  found that the contents of the document provided by 
Hong Kong, China were basic common sense and stood ready to continue the conversation with 
interested Members. The United States emphasized that any proposals on how to reform and 
improve the WTO  Committees, including this Council, must be Member -proposed and driven.  
32.10.   The representative of Switzerland  also found that the ideas contained in the document made 
common sense. He noted his delegation's interest in continu ing the discussions, and also that the 
meeting's agenda was once again very long, containing 35  items. Switzerland believed that this 
suggested a need for improvement; for example, among the 35  items on the agenda, 22 were trade 
concerns that had already b een raised at previous CTG  meetings or in Committees. Switzerland 
submitted that this proliferation of concerns could be the result of two  things: an environment of 
enhanced global trade tensions, which Switzerland believed to be the case; and also, beyond  the 
CTG, the risk that certain trade concerns would escalate and become subject to dispute settlement, 
which was an area already under pressure. Thus, Switzerland stated that there was additional room 
for intermediary solutions between Committee work, CTG  work, and the DSB, to support Members 
in finding mutually agreeable solutions to their trade concerns so that these did not remain forever 
at the CTG in an "in between" zone. One possible track to explore would be the development of a 
mediation framework,  which could be at once pragmatic, efficient, and accessible, to complement 
existing WTO  tools, with a view to resolving trade concerns more efficiently.  
32.11.   The representative of Canada  also supported dialogue in this area. He noted that there was 
room for im provement and that looking at ways to improve the functioning of the CTG and its 
Committees was not something done often enough. Canada agreed with Guatemala that Members 
should take time before the CTG's next meeting to go further into these conversations  in informal 
mode. Canada encouraged engagement from all Members and noted that Members received back 
from the WTO what they put into it. Canada highlighted the usefulness of policy and experience -
sharing discussions. For example, the SPS  Committee had agr eed on a catalogue of instruments to 
be available to Members to assist them in resolving their SPS  issues. This catalogue had been 
developed from discussions of resources already available to officials working on particular 
SPS-related tasks or issues.  
32.12.   The representative of New Zealand  supported Members' continued efforts to work together 
constructively to achieve continuing and concrete improvements to the functioning of the CTG and 
its subsidiary bodies.  
32.13.   The representative of Paraguay  agreed that this was a useful debate but cautioned that any 
process adopted in this regard should not limit the ability of Members to tackle their specific trade 
problems and concerns.  
32.14.   The representative of the European Union  appreciated this initiative to improve the 
functioning of the CTG. She agreed that the current meeting's long agenda illustrated once again 
that Members put a lot of effort into raising trade concerns even if progress in resolving them was 
often slow. At the Chair's consultations in early March, the EU  had shared its ideas on how better to 
equip the CTG, as well as other Councils and Committees, to deal with their trade concerns in the 
context of an overall reflection on how to strengthen regular WTO  work. The EU believed that G/C/M/134  
 
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  developing a set of horizo ntal procedural guidelines would help to better equip Councils and 
Committees to support Members in their efforts to resolve their trade concerns. The EU submitted 
that ideas to be considered included the following: improved meeting arrangements, such as 
systematically informing partners in advance when raising a concern, circulating agendas earlier and 
with more information, and the swifter circulation of minutes; a requirement that Members respond 
also in writing to written questions; to record all releva nt information on a trade concern in a 
Secretariat database, as was already current practice in  the Ag -IMS database in the Committee on 
Agriculture; and encouraging Members to hold more bilateral consultations, and to give the 
Secretariat and the Chair gre ater opportunity to help Members to resolve their persistent trade 
concerns by organizing, upon request, a dedicated informal conversation in this regard, and by 
reporting back to Members on its outcome.  
32.15.   The representative of Mexico  stated that his delegation was committed to improving the 
effectiveness of the work carried out at the WTO, and in particular in relation to the work of the CTG. 
He noted that the contributions that had been discussed under this item, and the ideas that h ad 
emerged during consultations, clearly indicated that there remained scope for this work to continue. 
Mexico also considered that informal consultations were useful in this regard.  
32.16.   The representative of Japan  welcomed the initiative and shared the views expressed in the 
document.  
32.17.   The representative of Australia  also supported this initiative. He recalled that valuable ideas 
were raised at the consultations already in March.  
32.18.   The representative of Colombia  stated that her delegation considered Hong Kong, Ch ina's 
document to be constructive and that certain of its ideas could be positive for all Members. Colombia 
noted that it was willing to work further on this initiative since it would strengthen the multilateral 
trading  system and could also contribute tow ards resolving Members' trade concerns.  
32.19.   The Chairperson  stated that this had been a useful discussion in which delegations had 
expressed interesting ideas requiring further discussion, clarification, and elaboration. The 
Chairperson proposed that his succe ssor continue this process in informal mode.  
32.20.   The Council so agreed . 
33  WORK PROGRAMME ON EL ECTRONIC COMMERCE  
33.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that a Ministerial Decision had been adopted at MC11 in Buenos 
Aires in which Ministers had agreed to maintain the existing W ork Programme on E -Commerce, and 
to endeavour to reinvigorate the WTO's work on E -Commerce. The Ministerial Decision had also 
instructed the General Council to hold periodic reviews in its sessions of July and December  2018, 
and July  2019, based on the rep orts submitted by the relevant bodies, among them the Goods 
Council; and to maintain the current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic 
transmissions. Therefore, this Council was again tasked to discuss the E -Commerce aspects relating 
to tra de in goods, and in order to fulfil its mandate, the E -Commerce issue was a standalone agenda 
item. The Chairperson invited delegations to continue expressing their opinions and to make 
suggestions as to how to work on the preparation of the periodic revie w to be held in the General 
Council at its session of July  2019.  
33.2.   The representative of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, invited the four  WTO bodies 
entrusted with the implementation of the WPEC to intensify their work, prior to the expiration of the 
Ministerial Decision on the WPEC by end -2019, by considering the benefits and costs of E -Commerce 
for LDCs.  Indeed, the LDCs were very interested in exploring and benefitting from the opportunities 
presented by E -Commerce as these would be beneficial to compani es, consumers, and the economy. 
However, the LDC  Group had identified certain difficulties affecting LDCs in terms of the actual use 
of E-Commerce that should be borne in mind when setting up the Work Programme on E -Commerce. 
The issues highlighted by the LDCs that made it difficult for them to engage in and benefit from 
E-Commerce included the following: limited knowledge of the digital market and E -Commerce 
platforms; difficulties in creating an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework; absence of 
enterprise development mechanisms to encourage the creation and growth of E -Commerce -based 
businesses; difficulty in identifying and resolving the challenges and possible negative impact of G/C/M/134  
 
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  E-Commerce; lack of infrastructure and technology, with limited  access to relevant information and 
technology equipment; limited use of credit cards that could be used for e -payments; logistics 
constraints when delivering goods; and consumer protection. To consider how best to address these 
challenges the LDC  Group in tended to hold a dedicated internal workshop  on these issues . 
33.3.   The Chairperson  encouraged delegations to continue their dialogue on this issue and proposed 
that the Council take note of the statement made.  
33.4.   The Council so agreed . 
34  OTHER BUSINESS  
34.1  Switzerland's  modification of Schedule of Concessions  LIX 
34.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that Switzerland had indicated that, under agenda item "Other 
Business", it would make an announcement concerning the extension of the period for Members' 
withdrawal of substantially equ ivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3, following its request to 
modify its Schedule of Concessions, Switzerland -Liechtenstein  LIX, communicated on 4  April 2018, 
in document  G/SECRET/40.  
34.2.   The representative of Switzerland  informed Members that 4  April 2019 was the date on which 
had expired the first extension of the period during which substantially equivalent concessions could 
be withdrawn by those Members having submitted a claim of interest following the modification of 
the tariff concession for "meat  not further prepared than seasoned". Switzerland had subsequently 
requested , in document  G/L/1262/Add.1, dated 1  April 2019, for a further 12-month extension of 
such period. Considering the significant progress that had taken place under GATT  Article  XXVIII 
negotiations, Switzerland expressed its hope promptly to conclude this process.  
34.3.   The Chairperson  encouraged delegations to continue their dialogue on this issue and proposed 
that the Council take note of the statement made.  
34.4.   The Council so agreed . 
34.2  Date of the next meeting  
34.5.   The Chairperson  informed delegations  that the next meeting of the Council was scheduled to 
take place on Monday, 8  July, a nd Tuesday, 9  July 2019. The Agenda would close at 4:30  p.m. on 
Thursday, 27  June 2019.  
34.6.   Regarding closure  of the agenda, he reminded delegations that, according to the Rules of 
Procedure, meetings of WTO  bodies were convened by a meeting notice issued not less than 
ten calendar days prior to the date set for the meeting. Therefore, the agenda closed one working 
day prior to the circulation of the meeting notice; that is, 11  calendar days before the date set for 
the meeting (or, if the date fell on a weekend , the previous Friday).  
35  ELECTION OF CHAIRPER SON OF THE COUNCIL F OR TRADE IN GOODS  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the Chairman of the General Council had carried out 
consultations on a slate of names for Chairpersons to the different WTO  standing bodies in 
accordance with the established Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers. These proposed 
nominations had been approved by the General Council at its last meeting. In line with the 
nominations, he proposed that the CTG elect Ambassador José Luis Cancela Gó mez from Uruguay 
as Chairperson of the Council by acclamation.  
35.2.   The Council so agreed . 
35.3.   The meeting was closed . 
__________