RESTRICTED  
  
WT/DSB/M/443  
14 October  2020 
(20-7078) Page: 1/30 
Dispute Settlement Body  
29 July 2020   
 
  
MINUTES OF MEETING  
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD  
ON 29 JULY  2020 
Chairman : H.E.  Mr. Dacio Castillo  (Honduras ) 
Prior to the adoption of the Agenda1 
 
Table of Contents  
1   SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY 
THE DSB  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  3 
A. United  States – Anti-dump ing measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from 
Japan: Status report by the United States  ................................ ................................ ..............  3 
B. United  States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the 
United  States  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  4 
C. European  Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketin g of biotech 
products: Status report by the European Union ................................ ................................ ....... 4 
D. United  States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on large residential 
washers from Korea: Status report by the United States  ................................ ..........................  6 
E. United  States – Certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping 
proceedings involving China: Status report by the United States  ................................ ...............  7 
F. Indonesia – Importation of horticul tural products, animals and animal products: Status 
report by Indonesia  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............  7 
2   UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET A CT OF 
2000: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB  ................  8 
A. Statement by the European Union  ................................ ................................ .....................  8 
3   EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN MEMBER STATES – MEASURES 
AFFECTING TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DS B ................................ ................................ .... 9 
A. Statement by the United States  ................................ ................................ ........................  9 
4   INDIA – TARIFF TREATMENT ON CERTAIN GOODS  ................................ ....................  11 
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by Japan  ................................ ............................  11 
5   INDIA – TARIFF TREATMENT ON CERTAIN GOODS IN THE INFORMATION 
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY SECTOR  ................................ .............................  13 
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  ................................ ................................ ................................  13 
 
1 See page s 2 and 3  WT/DSB/M/443  
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  6   JAPAN – MEASURES  RELATED TO THE EXPORTATION OF PRODUCTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY TO KOREA  ................................ ................................ ................................  14 
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by the Republic of Korea  ................................ ...... 14 
7   EUROPEAN UNION – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING PALM OIL AND OIL 
PALM CROP -BASED BIOFUELS  ................................ ................................ ........................  15 
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by Indonesia  ................................ .......................  15 
8   EUROPEAN U NION – SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON CERTAIN STEEL PRODUCTS  ...........  16 
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by Turkey  ................................ ...........................  16 
9   STATEMENT BY QATAR REGARDING THE PANEL REPORT IN 
"SAUDI  ARABIA  – MEASURES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY R IGHTS"  ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 17 
10   THAILAND – CUSTOMS AND FISCAL MEASURES ON CIGARETTES FROM THE 
PHILIPPINES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  20 
A. Statement by the Chairman on consultations with Thailand and the Philippines with 
regard to the Recourse to Article  22.2 of the DSU (WT/DS371/32)  ................................ ..........  20 
B. Statement by the Philippines  ................................ ................................ ..........................  20 
C. Statement by Thailand  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 20 
11   PROPOSED NOMINATION FOR THE INDICATIVE LIST OF GOVERNMENTAL 
AND NON -GOVERNMENTAL PANELISTS  ................................ ................................ ..........  23 
12   APPELLATE BODY APPOINTMENTS: PROPOSAL BY AFGHANISTAN; ANGOLA; 
ARGENTINA; AUSTRALIA; BANGLADESH; BENIN; PLURINATIONAL STATE OF 
BOLIVIA; BOTSWANA; BRAZIL; BURKINA FASO; BURUNDI; CABO VERDE; 
CAMEROON; CANADA; CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC; CHAD; CHILE; CHINA; 
COLOMBIA; CONGO; CO STA RICA; CÔTE D'IVOIRE; CUBA; DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF CONGO; DJIBOUTI; DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC; ECUADOR; EGYPT; EL 
SALVADOR; ESWATINI; THE EUROPEAN UNION; GABON; THE GAMBIA; GHANA; 
GUATEMALA; GUINEA; GUINEA -BISSAU; HONDURAS; HONG KONG, CHINA; 
ICELAND; INDIA; IN DONESIA; ISRAEL; KAZAKHSTAN; KENYA; REPUBLIC OF 
KOREA; LESOTHO; LIECHTENSTEIN; MADAGASCAR; MALAWI; MALAYSIA; 
MALDIVES; MALI; MAURITANIA; MAURITIUS; MEXICO; REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA; 
MOROCCO; MOZAMBIQUE; NAMIBIA; NEPAL; NEW ZEALAND; NICARAGUA; 
NIGER; NIGERIA; NO RTH MACEDONIA; NORWAY; PAKISTAN; PANAMA; 
PARAGUAY; PERU; QATAR; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; RWANDA; SENEGAL; 
SEYCHELLES; SIERRA LEONE; SINGAPORE; SOUTH AFRICA; SWITZERLAND; THE 
SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU; 
TANZANIA; THAILAND; TOG O; TUNISIA; TURKEY; UGANDA; UKRAINE; UNITED 
KINGDOM; URUGUAY; THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA; VIET NAM; 
ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE (WT/DSB/W/609/REV.18)  ................................ ....................  23 
 
Prior to the adoption of the Agenda : (i) the Chairman  welcomed all delegations that were 
participating in person as well as those delegations that were listening -in remotely. He recalled that, 
as had been done at the 29  June 2020 DSB meeting, he would not be off ering the floor to delegations 
participating remotely ; (ii) the item concerning the adoption of the Panel Report in the dispute on: 
"Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights " (DS567) was 
removed from the proposed Ag enda following the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's decision to appeal the 
Panel Report ; and (iii) the representative of the United States  noted that item 11, entitled: 
"China  – Domestic Support for Agricultural Producers. Recourse to Article 22.2 of the DSU by the 
United States, may be removed from the Agenda pursuant to China's objection to that request. On 
16 July 2020, the United States had requested DSB authorization to take countermeasures in relation 
to the dispute "China – Agricultural Producers" (DS511).  On 27 July 2020, China had objected to 
the level of concessions and related obligations proposed by the United States, automatically 
referring the matter to arbitration under Article 22.6. As the DSB could not take action on the US 
request, and as previou sly discussed with China, the United States no longer proposed that the item 
be considered at the present meeting . The representative of China  took note of the US withdrawal 
of item 11 from the Agenda of the present meeting. That was without prejudice to C hina's position WT/DSB/M/443  
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  in relation to Article 22 of the DSU. China disagreed with the US allegation that China had failed to 
bring its measures into compliance with its WTO obligations. As detailed in its communication dated 
18 June 2020, China had brought its re levant measures into full compliance with the DSB's rulings 
and recommendations in this dispute. China maintained that any disagreement on the consistency 
of its measures taken to comply with the DSB's rulings and recommendations had to be resolved 
pursuan t to proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU before any level of suspension of concessions 
or obligations could be assessed under Article 22 of the DSU. Under these circumstances, and 
pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU, China had objected to the level o f suspension of concessions or 
related obligations under the GATT  1994 and other agreements listed in Annex 1A of the WTO 
Agreement as proposed by the United States in document WT/DS511/17. Accordingly, and pursuant 
to Article 22.6 of the DSU: "the matter shall be referred to arbitration" . The representative of Japan  
said that his country wished to make the following observations regarding the referral to arbitration 
under Article 22.6 of the DSU from a systemic point of view. As Japan had previously stated  on 
several occasions, the text of Article 22.6 of the DSU was crystal clear. If certain conditions were 
met, i.e., if the Member concerned objected to the proposed level of suspension or claimed that 
cross-retaliation rules were not followed, "the matter shall be referred to arbitration". In other words, 
if an objection to the level of suspension was made, the matter shall be automatically referred to 
arbitration. This was not subject to any action by the DSB.  
 
The DSB took note  of the statements and adopted  the Agenda, as amended.  
 
1  SURVEILLANCE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB  
A. United States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from Japan: Status 
report by the United States (WT/DS 184/15/ Add.206)  
B. United States – Section 110(5) of the US copyright act: Status report by the United  States 
(WT/DS160/24/ Add.181)  
C. European Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech products: 
Status report by the European Union ( WT/DS291/37/ Add.144)  
D. United States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on large residential washers from 
Korea: Status report by the United States (WT/DS464/17/ Add.28)  
E. United States – Certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping proceedings 
involving China: Status report by the United States ( WT/DS471/17/ Add.20)  
F. Indonesia – Importation of horticultural products, animals and a nimal products: Status report by 
Indonesia ( WT/DS477/21/ Add.15 – WT/DS478/22/ Add.15)  
1.1.  The Chairman  noted that there were six sub -items under this Agenda item concerning status 
reports submitted by delegations pursuant to Article 21.6 of the DSU . He recalled that Article 21.6 
required that : "[u]nless the DSB decides otherwise, the issue of implementation of the 
recommendations or rulings shall be placed on the Agenda of the DSB meeting after six months 
following the date of establishment of the reason able period of time and shall remain on the DSB's 
Agenda until the issue is resolved" . Under this Agenda item, he invited delegations to provide up to 
date information about their compliance efforts . He also reminded delegations that, as provided for 
in Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure for DSB meetings : "[r]epresentatives should make every effort 
to avoid the repetition of a full debate at each meeting on any issue that has already been fully 
debated in the past and on which there appears to have been no c hange in Members' positions 
already on record" . He then turned to the first status report under this Agenda item . 
A. United  States – Anti-dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from 
Japan : Status report by the United States (WT/DS184/15/Add. 206) 
1.2.  The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS184/15/Add.206, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning US anti -dumping measures on certain hot -rolled steel products from Japan . WT/DSB/M/443  
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  1.3.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States had provided a status report 
in this dispute on 16 July 2020, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. The United States had 
addressed the DSB's recomm endations and rulings with respect to the calculation of anti -dumping 
margins in the hot -rolled steel anti -dumping duty investigation at issue. With respect to the  
recommendations and rulings of the DSB that had yet to be addressed, the US Administration would 
work with the US Congress with respect to appropriate statutory measures that would resolve this 
matter . 
1.4.  The representative of Japan  said that his country wished to thank the United States for its most 
recent status report and for its statement made at the present meeting . Japan, once again, called 
on the United States to fully implement the DSB's recommendations and rulings so as to resolve this 
matter . 
1.5.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meetin g. 
B. United  States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act: Status report by the 
United  States (WT/DS160/24/Add.1 81) 
1.6.  The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS160/24/Add.181, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act . 
1.7.  The representative of the United States  said that the United States had provided a status report 
in this dispute on 16 July 2020, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU . The US Administration 
would continue to confer with the European Union, and to work closely with the US Congress, in 
order to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter . 
1.8.  The representative of the European Union  thank ed the United States for its status report and 
its statement made at the present meeting . His delegation wished to refer to the EU's  statements 
made at previous DSB meetings under this Agenda item . The EU wished t o resolve this case as soon 
as possible . 
1.9.  The representative of China  said that his country noted that the United States had provided 
182 status reports in this dispute . However, those reports were not different from one another and 
none of them indicated a ny progress on implementation . China expressed regret that nearly 
two decades after the DSB had adopted recommendations and rulings , this dispute remain ed 
unresolved . As a result of a lack  of concrete implementation  action , the United States continued to 
fail to accord the minimum standard of protection required by the TRIPS Agreement . The 
United  States  had become the only WTO Member who failed to implement the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings under the TRIPS Agreement . Article 21.1 of the DS U require d Members 
to promptly address its WTO -inconsistent measures so as "to ensure  effective resolution of disputes 
to the benefit of all Members ". Therefore, China urged the United States to  achieve  full compliance  
in this dispute without further delay.  
1.10.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
C. European  Communities – Measures affecting the approval and marketing of biotech 
products : Status report by the E uropean Union (WT/DS291/37/Add.14 4) 
1.11.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS291/37/Add.144, which contained the 
status report by the European Union on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning measures affectin g the approval and marketing of biotech 
products . 
1.12.   The representative of the European Union  said that his delegation continued to progress with 
the authorizations where the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) had finalized its scientific 
opinion and concluded that there were no safety concerns . The EU had a solid record on the 
authorization of GMO requests : In 2019 , 18 decisions had been adopted to authorize 65 new GMOs 
for feed and food, six GMOs had been renewed and one GM cut flower had been authorized . As WT/DSB/M/443  
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  repeatedly explained by the EU and confirmed by the US delegation duri ng the EU -US biannual 
consultations held on 1 2 June 2019, efforts to reduce delays in authorization procedures were 
constantly maintained at a high level at all stages of the authorization procedure . At previous DSB 
meetings, the United States had referred  to what was known as the EU "opt -out Directive" . The EU 
wished to reiterate that the DSB's recommendations and rulings did not cover that "opt -out 
Directive" . At the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting, the United States had claimed that 13 applications 
were awaitin g risk management decisions . This figure need ed to be put into perspective . With regard 
to three  of these applications , the EFSA ha d recently published opinions  which  were not fully 
conclusive . At the moment , no full scope authori zation c ould be granted  regarding these 
three  applications . More specifically, regarding  one of these application s, the European Commission 
intend ed to discuss further with member States the feasibility of implementation and controls in the 
event of a partial authori zation. Regarding  the second application , the applicant still h ad to provide 
a mandatory study that complie d with the relevant legal requirements . Regarding  the 
third application , the applicant ha d requested the European Commission to wait until the EFSA had 
finalized the risk assessment of the corresponding stack . Moreover , nine applications that had 
received  a positive opinion from the EFSA we re undergoing  internal procedures and w ould be 
presented for a vote as soon as these procedures were finali zed. The next Standing Committee on 
genetically modified food and feed w ould take place on 1 5 September  2020. The United States 
seem ed to refer to the cancellation of meetings of the Standing Committee as deliberate delays . 
Therefore, i t was important to un derstand that for logistical reasons meetings of the different 
sections of the Standing Committee were scheduled a year in advance . However, these meetings 
were confirmed only closer to the ir planned date s. The effect of C OVID -19 restrictions should not be  
underestimated . In spite of the current context and related priorities and of the challenging working 
conditions, the EU continue d working on authori zation files . The EU act ed in line with its WTO 
obligations . The EU  wished to recall that the EU approval system was not covered by the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings.  
1.13.   The representative of the United States  thanked the European Union (EU) for its status report 
and its statement made at the present meeting. The United States cont inued to see persistent delays 
that affected dozens of applications that had been awaiting approval for an extended period. The EU 
had previously suggested that the fault was with the applicants. The United States disagreed; the 
US concerns related to dela ys at every stage of the approval process resulting from the actions or 
inactions of the EU and its member States. Currently, 13 applications were pending risk management 
decisions in the standing committee on biotech and two awaited final approval by the European 
Commission. Two of these applications had been going through the EU approval system for over 10 
years. The EU also had suggested that the United States "appears" to acknowledge that there was 
no ban on genetically engineered products in the EU. Th e EU was incorrect. Rather, the EU had failed 
to lift all of the WTO -inconsistent member -State bans covered by the DSB recommendation. The 
DSB had adopted findings that, even where the EU had approved a particular product, in many 
instances EU member State s had banned those products for certain uses without a scientific basis . 
This included not only the two member States subject to panel findings – Austria and Italy . There 
were seven additional member States that previously maintained bans on cultivation an d had since 
opted out of cultivation under the EU's legislation : Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, and Poland. There were also eight member States that had not previously banned 
cultivation of MON -810 but had since opted out of cultiv ation under the EU's legislation : Croatia, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovenia. Further, Austria and Italy 
appeared to maintain bans on other products subject to specific panel findings . The EU's only 
response, which it  continued to repeat, was that the member States did not restrict marketing or 
free movement of MON -810 in the EU. As the United States had noted at the prior DSB meeting, 
this answer did nothing to address US concerns. The restrictions adopted by EU membe r States 
restricted international trade in these products, and had no scientific justification. Furthermore, 
despite the assertions of the EU during the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting, this situation existed 
regardless of whether or not the European Commission r eceived "complaints" from seed operators 
or stakeholders. Indeed, this was why the DSB had adopted findings that such restrictions on MON -
810 were in breach of the EU's WTO commitments. The United States urged the EU to ensure that 
all of its measures affe cting the approval of biotech products, including measures adopted by 
individual EU member States, were based on scientific principles, and that decisions were taken 
without undue delay . 
1.14.   The representative the European Union  said that the WTO Agreements di d not require full 
international harmonization and left some regulatory space or autonomy to individual WTO Members . 
The European Union had different regulatory approaches to non -GMOs and GMOs but, in all cases, WT/DSB/M/443  
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  such regulations did not discriminate betwee n imported and domestic like products . No EU member 
State had imposed any "ban" . Under the terms of Directive 2001/18/EC, an EU member State could 
adopt measures restricting or prohibiting cultivation only when such measures were in line with EU 
law and were reasoned, proportional, non -discriminatory and based on compelling grounds . The free 
movement of seeds was embedded in Article 22 of Directive 2001/18/EC : "[m]ember States may 
not prohibit, restrict or impede the placing on the market of GMOs, as or i n products, which comply 
with the requirements of this Directive" . The EU also noted that according to the provisions of the 
opt-out Directive (Article 26b, point 8) the measures adopted under the Directive "shall not affect 
the free circulation of authori sed GMOs" in the EU . Currently, the EU Common Catalogue of varieties 
of agricultural species included 150 varieties of maize MON -810, which were allowed to be marketed 
in the EU . As of the present meeting, the European Commission had never received any com plaint 
from seed operators or other stakeholders concerning the restriction of marketing of MON -810 seeds 
in the EU . This confirmed the smooth functioning of the internal market of MON -810 seeds . The EU 
invited the United States to provide any evidence it might have at its disposal that would substantiate 
the disruption of the free movement of MON -810 seeds in the EU . 
1.15.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
D. United  States – Anti-dumping and countervailing measures on large residential 
washers from Korea : Status report by the United States (WT/DS464/17/Add.2 8) 
1.16.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/D S464/17/Add.28, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning anti -dumping and countervailing measures on large residential washers from Korea . 
1.17.   The representativ e of the United States  said that the United States had provided a status 
report in this dispute on 16 July 2020, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. On 6 May 2019, 
the US Department of Commerce had published a notice in the US Federal Register anno uncing the 
revocation of the anti -dumping and countervailing duty orders on imports of large residential 
washers from Korea (84 Fed. Reg. 19,763 (6 May 2019)). With this action, the United States had 
completed implementation of the DSB recommendations conc erning those anti -dumping and 
countervailing duty orders. The United States continued to consult with interested parties on options 
to address the recommendations of the DSB relating to other measures challenged in this dispute . 
1.18.   The representative of Korea  said that his country wished to thank the United States for its 
status report . Once again, Korea urged the United States to take prompt and appropriate steps to 
implement the DSB's recommendations for the "as such" measure at issue in this dispute . 
1.19.   The representative of Canada  said that the United States continued to fail to comply with the 
DSB's ruling, arising out of the Appellate Body report in this dispute, that the "differential pricing 
methodology" (DPM) was "as such" WTO -inconsistent . The Unite d States had also ignored the DSB's 
recommendation that the United States bring itself into compliance with its obligations . Instead, the 
United States continued to apply the "as such" inconsistent differential pricing methodology in 
investigations with re spect to foreign companies and continued to collect cash deposits from foreign 
exporters based on its inconsistent methodology . The reasonable period of time to implement the 
recommendations relating to the "as such" WTO -inconsistency of the DPM had expire d more than 
two years ago . However, in its most recent status report, the United States stated that it continued 
to consult with interested parties . Moreover, the continued use by the United States of the DPM had 
forced Members to resort to several dispute  settlement proceedings concerning this measure . This 
was an inefficient and unnecessary use of WTO dispute settlement resources . Canada remained 
deeply concerned with the continued US failure to comply with the DSB's recommendations and 
rulings in this di spute . This failure seriously undermined the security and stability of the multilateral 
trading system . 
1.20.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  WT/DSB/M/443  
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  E. United  States – Certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping 
proceedings involving China : Status report by the United States (WT/DS471/17/Add. 20) 
1.21.   The Chairman  drew attention to docume nt WT/DS471/17/Add.20, which contained the status 
report by the United States on progress in the implementation of the DSB's recommendations in the 
case concerning certain methodologies and their application to anti -dumping proceedings involving 
China . 
1.22.   The representative of the United States  said that the United States had provided a status 
report in this dispute on 16 July 2020, in accordance with Article 21.6 of the DSU. As explained in 
that report, the United States continued to consult with interested parties on options to address the  
recommendations of the DSB . 
1.23.   The representative of China  said that on 2 2 May 2017, the DSB had adopted the Appellate 
Body report and the  Panel report , as modified by the Appellate Body,  in this dispute which , had 
found that certain measures taken by the Unite d States were inconsistent with the requirements of 
the Anti -Dumping Agreement, which included : (i) the use of zeroing under the W -T methodology 
was as such incompatible with Article 2.4.2 ; (ii) the so -called single rate presumption as such 
violated Articl es 6.10 and 9.2 ; and (iii) the adverse facts available was a norm of general and 
prospective application which could be subject to future "as such " challenges . On 19 June 2017, the 
United States had stated its intention to implement the DSB's recommendatio ns and rulings in this 
dispute . The arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3(c) of the DSU had decided that the reasonable 
period of time (RPT) would be 15 months, expiring on 2 2 August  2018. Given that  the United States 
had failed to bring its WTO -inconsistent measure into conformity, China had had no other choice but 
to pursue retaliation in accordance with Article 22.2 of the DSU . The United States had objected to 
China 's proposed level of suspension and the matter had therefore been referred to a rbitration  under 
Article 22.6 of the DSU . On 1 November  2019, the arbitrator had determined that the level of 
nullification or impairment incurred by China was US D 3.579  billion , the third largest retaliation 
amount in WTO history . Nearly two years after t he expiry of the RPT, the United States continue d 
to fail to implement the DSB's  recommendations and rulings in this dispute . None of the US  status 
reports provided thus far indicate d any concrete implementation action . What made it  worse was 
that implementation  of DSB recommendations and rulings by  the United States, especially in trade 
remedy disputes, h ad increasingly become a systemic problem over the past decade . More than half 
of the cases under the DSB's surveillance relate d to implementation  by the United States . Some of 
these disputes had remained under the DSB's surveillance  for more than 20 years . The US 
unwillingness to achieve compl iance had already seriously undermined the authority and 
effectiveness of the dispute settlement system . The Appellate Body paralysis would further worsen 
this problem . This should alert  the entire  Membership . The resolution of disputes d id not end with 
the DSB 's recommendation s and rulings . It was prompt implementation that kep t the rules -based 
multilateral trading system afloat . Article 21.1 of the DSU stated that : "[p]rompt compliance with 
recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes 
to the benefit of all Members" . Therefore, China urged  the United States to faithfully honour its 
implementation obligation and adopt concrete actions to achieve full compliance in this dispute . 
1.24.   The DSB took note  of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
F. Indonesia – Importation of horticultural products, animals and animal products : Status 
report by Indonesia (WT/DS477/21/Add.1 5 – WT/DS478/22/Add.1 5) 
1.25.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DS477/21/Add.15 – WT/DS478/22/Add.15, 
which contained the status report by Indonesia on progress in the implementation of the DSB's 
recommendations in the case concerning importation of horticultural products, animals and animal 
products . 
1.26.   The representative of Indonesia  said that his country had provided a status report  pursuant 
to Article 21.6 of the DSU . Indonesia w ished  to reiterate its commitment to implementing the  DSB's  
recommendations and rulings in these disputes . This commitment ha d been demonstrated by 
carrying out the necessary adjustments to its relevant Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)  and Ministry of 
Trade (MoT)  regulations . Indonesia had reported regularly on t hese adjustments to th e DSB . 
Indonesia note d the ongoing  concerns regarding specific measures that New Zealand and the WT/DSB/M/443  
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  United  States had r aised at  prior DSB meetings . Regarding Measure 18, as Indonesia had reported 
at prior DSB meetings, a draft amendment of the relevant laws had been transmitted by the 
Government to Parliament . Ongoing discussion s between the Government and Parliament ha d been 
taking place, despite the implementation of large -scale social restrictions due to the COVID –19 
pandemic . Indonesia w ould continue to engage with New Zealand and the United States regarding 
matters related to the  DSB's  recommendations and rulings  in these disputes . 
1.27.   The representative of New Zealand  said that his country wished  to thank Indonesia for its 
status report . New Ze aland acknowledged Indonesia's commitment to comply fully with the DSB's 
recommendations and rulings in this dispute, as well as the steps that Indonesia had taken towards 
compliance . It was disappointing that there continue d to be a need to have this item  on the Agenda  
of the present meeting . Both of the compliance deadlines that had been agreed between the parties 
had expired . As stated at previous DSB meetings,  New Zealand was concerned that a number of 
measures remain ed non-compliant . New Zealand was very concerned that difficulties continued to 
be experienced in obtaining import recommendations and approvals . There was a significant delay 
in the issuing of import recommendations this year and only a small fraction of the approvals applied 
for had been  issued . If this issue was not resolved promptly, it could undermine the progress made 
towards compliance . New Zealand strongly encouraged Indonesia to take appropriate steps, swiftly, 
to achieve full compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings i n this dispute . 
1.28.   The representative of the United States  said that Indonesia continued to fail to bring its 
measures into compliance with WTO rules. The United States and New Zealand agreed that 
significant concerns remained with the measures at issue, incl uding the continued imposition of:  
harvest period restrictions, import realization requirements, warehouse capacity requirements, 
limited application windows, limited validity periods, and fixed licensed terms. The United States 
remained willing to work wi th Indonesia to fully and meaningfully resolve this dispute. The United 
States understood that Indonesia claimed to have "completed its enactment process" of certain 
regulations, but the United States was still waiting to hear from Indonesia on whether and  how such 
action would bring its measures into full compliance. It also remained unclear how Indonesia's 
proposed legislative amendments would address Measure 18 and when Indonesia would complete 
its process. The United States looked forward to receiving f urther detail from Indonesia regarding 
the changes to its regulations and laws, especially with respect to Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 
46/2019 on Strategic Horticultural Commodities . 
1.29.   The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter at its next regular 
meeting.  
2  UNITED STATES – CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT OF 2000 : 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE DSB  
A. Statement by the European Union  
2.1.  The Chairman  said that this item was on the  Agenda of the present meeting at the request of 
the European Union . He then invited the representative of the European Union to speak . 
2.2.  The representative of the European Union  said that on 1 May 2020, the EU had adjusted the 
level of suspension to the nul lification or impairment caused by the Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA) to the EU . The adjustment maintained unchanged the list of products 
subjected to retaliation while increasing the rate of additional duty to which those product s were 
subjected to 0.012 % in order to adjust to the level of retaliation . The letter informing of the 
adjustment, together with the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/578 of 
21 February  2020, had been notified to the DSB on 2 6 June 2020. The EU requested, once again, 
that the United States stop transferring anti -dumping and countervailing duties to the US industry . 
Even if the amounts had considerably decreased, the latest CDSOA report from December  2018 
showed that amounts were still being disbu rsed in practice . Every disbursement that still took place 
was clearly an act of non -compliance with the DSB's recommendations and rulings in this dispute . 
As long as the United States did not fully stop transferring collected duties, this item was rightly  
under the DSB's surveillance . Due to the long -standing nature of this breach, the EU would continue 
to insist on placing this item on the Agenda of DSB meetings, as a matter of principle, and 
independently from the cost resulting from the application of s uch limited duties . The EU renewed 
its call on the United States to abide by its clear obligation under Article 21.6 of the DSU to submit WT/DSB/M/443  
- 9 - 
  implementation reports in this dispute . The EU would continue to place this item on the Agenda of 
DSB meetings as long  as the United States had not fully implemented the DSB's recommendations 
and rulings . Once the transfers of anti -dumping and countervailing duties cease d, so w ould the EU 
measures.  
2.3.  The representative of Canada  said that his country wished to thank the European Union for 
placing this item on the Agenda of the present meeting . Canada agreed with the European Union 
that the Byrd Amendment should remain subject to the surveillance of the DSB until the 
United  States ceased to administer it . 
2.4.  The representative of the United States  said that as the United States had noted at previous 
DSB meetings, the Deficit Reduction Act – which included a provision repealing the Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 – had been enacted into law 14 years ago in February 
2006. Accordingly, the United States had implemented the DSB's recommendations and rulings in 
these disputes. The United States recalled, furthermore, that the EU had acknowledged that the 
Deficit Reduction Act did not permit the dist ribution of duties collected on goods entered after 1 
October 2007, more than 12 years ago. Even aside from this, the United States questioned the trade 
rationale for inscribing this item on the DSB’s Agenda. On 26 June 2020, the EU had announced that 
it would apply an additional duty of 0.012  % on certain imports of the United States, which, 
remarkably, reflected an increase  in the additional duty of 0.001  %. These minuscule tariffs vividly 
demonstrated what had been evident for years – it was not common s ense that was driving the EU's 
approach to this Agenda item. The EU referred to the "clear obligation" under Article 21.6 for the 
United States to submit a status report in this dispute. As the United States had explained 
repeatedly, there was no obligatio n under the DSU for a Member to provide further status reports 
on the progress of its implementation once that Member announced that it has implemented  the 
DSB's recommendations. The widespread practice of Members – including the European Union as a 
respon ding party – confirmed this understanding of Article 21.6. Indeed, at recent meetings, two 
Members (Brazil and China) had informed the DSB that they had come into compliance with the DSB 
recommendations in three disputes (DS472, DS497, and DS517), and the complaining parties had 
not accepted the claims of compliance. Those Members had not provided a status report for the 
present meeting, consistent with the understanding that there was no obligation for a Member to 
provide further status reports once that M ember announced that it had implemented the DSB 
recommendations. The United States questioned whether the European Union believed that the 
"clear obligation" that existed under the EU's understanding of Article 21.6 to submit a status report 
applied to oth er Members, including itself. Since the United States had informed the DSB that it had 
come into compliance in this dispute, there was nothing more for the United States to report in a 
status report . 
2.5.  The DSB took note of the statements.  
3  EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN MEMBER STATES – MEASURES AFFECTING 
TRADE IN LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT : IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS 
ADOPTED BY THE DSB  
A. Statement by the United States  
3.1.  The Chairman  said that this item was on the Agenda of the present meeting a t the request of 
the United States . He then invited the representative of the United States to speak . 
3.2.  The representative of the United States  noted that once again the European Union had not 
provided Members with a status report concerning the "EC – Large Civil Aircraft" dispute (DS316). 
As the United States had noted at several recent DSB meetings, the EU had argued – under a 
different Agenda item – that where the EU as a complaining party did not agree with another 
responding party Member's " assertion  that it has implemented the DSB ruling", "the issue remains 
unresolved for the purposes of Article 21.6 DSU". Under this Agenda item, however, the EU argued 
that by submitting a compliance communication, the EU no longer needed to file a status report, 
even t hough the United States as the complaining party did not agree with the EU's assertion that 
it had complied. The EU's position appears to be premised on two unfounded assertions, neither of 
which was based on the text of the DSU. First, the EU had erroneou sly argued that where "a matter 
is with the adjudicators, it is temporarily taken out of the DSB's surveillance". There was nothing in 
the DSU text to support that argument, and the EU provided no explanation for how it read DSU WT/DSB/M/443  
- 10 - 
  Article 21.6 to contain this limitation. Second, the EU once again relied on its incorrect assertion that 
the EU's initiation of compliance panel proceedings meant that the DSB was somehow deprived of 
its authority to "maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings an d recommendations". Yet 
again, there was nothing in Article 2 of the DSU or elsewhere that limited the DSB's authority in this 
manner. It was another invention of the EU. The EU was not providing a status report because of its 
assertion that it had complie d, demonstrating that the EU's principles varied depending on its status 
as complaining or responding party. In sum, the US position on status reports had been consistent 
and clear: under Article 21.6 of the DSU, once a responding Member announced to the D SB that it 
had complied, there was no further "progress" on which it could report, and therefore no further 
obligation to provide a status report. But as the EU allegedly disagreed with this position, it should 
for future meetings provide status reports in  this "EC – Large Civil Aircraft "  dispute  (DS316) .  
3.3.  The representative of the European Union  said that, as during previous DSB meetings, the 
United States had again mentioned that the EU was taking inconsistent positions under Article 21.6 
of the DSU, dep ending on whether the EU was a complaining party or a defending party in a dispute . 
The United States had also referred to the EU's appeal filed against the report of the second 
compliance panel as an example of the EU's  "misguided " approach . Both US asser tions were without 
merit . As the EU had repeatedly explained at past DSB meetings, the crucial point for the defending 
party's obligation to provide status reports to the DSB was the stage of the dispute . In the "EC – 
Large Civil Aircraft" case (DS316) , the dispute was at a stage where the defending party did not 
have an obligation to submit status reports to the DSB . The EU recalled that in that case the EU had 
notified a new set of compliance measures to the DSB . That new set of compliance meas ures were 
a clear demonstration that the EU – contrary to the United States in the parallel "US — Large Civil 
Aircraft (2nd complaint)" case (DS353) – was serious about and committed to achieving compliance . 
That new set of compliance measures had been sub ject to an assessment by a compliance panel 
and that panel's report had been issued on 2 December  2019. As noted in the statement made by 
the EU at the 1 8 December  2019 DSB meeting, the EU believed that significant aspects of the 
compliance panel's report could not be regarded as legally correct and were very problematic from 
a systemic perspective when it came to assessing compliance with the subsidy disciplines of the 
WTO Agreements . It was in order to have these legal errors corrected, and not – as the U nited States 
seemed to imply – to continue litigation for the sake of litigation, that the EU had filed an appeal 
against the compliance panel's report on 6 December  2019. 
3.4.  The EU was concerned that with the current blockage of the two -step multilateral dis pute 
settlement system, the EU was losing the possibility of a proper appellate review of the serious flaws 
contained in the panel report . While the blockage continued, the EU stood ready to discuss with the 
United States alternative ways to deal with this  appeal . The EU was also committed to finding a 
balanced negotiated solution with the United States that would allow leaving both aircraft disputes 
behind . These considerations did not, however, alter the fact that the compliance proceeding in this 
dispute  had not been concluded . Whether or not the matter was "resolved" in the sense of 
Article  21.6 of the DSU remained the very subject matter of this ongoing litigation . The EU asked 
how it could be said that the defending party should submit "status reports" to the DSB in such 
circumstances . The EU would be very concerned with a reading of Article 21.6 of the DSU that would 
require the defending party to notify the purported "status of its implementation efforts" through 
the submission of status repor ts to the DSB, while dispute settlement proceedings on that precise 
issue were ongoing . The EU noted that its reading of the provision was supported by other WTO 
Members . The EU's view was further supported by Article 2 of the DSU on the administration of the 
dispute settlement rules and procedures : where, further to the disagreement between the parties 
on compliance, a matter was with the adjudicators, it was temporarily taken out of the DSB's 
surveillance . Pursuant to  Article 21.6 DSU, the issue of implem entation had to  remain on the Agenda 
of DSB meetings until the issue was resolved . In the "US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment)" case 
(DS217) , the EU d id not agree with the US assertion that it ha d implemented the DSB 's 
recommendations and rulings . This mean t that the issue remain ed unresolved for the purposes of 
Article 21.6 of the DSU. If the U nited States did not agree that the issue remain ed unresolved, 
nothing prevent ed it from seeking a multilateral determination through a compliance procedure, 
asking for a confirmation of its assertion that the CDSOA measure ha d been repealed in line with 
the relevant findings, just like the EU was doing in the "EC – Large Civil Aircra ft" case (DS316) . 
3.5.  The representative of the United States  said that the EU validated many criticisms of the WTO 
dispute settlement system with its assertion that the EU was serious about bringing its launch aid 
subsidies into WTO compliance, while the Unit ed States was not. The dispute settlement system had 
been turned into a tool to delay finding a solution between the parties. The EU's massive launch aid WT/DSB/M/443  
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  subsidies had been found to breach the EU's obligations in an uninterrupted string of reports going 
back a decade. At every turn, not only had the EU not made a serious attempt to withdraw these 
subsidies or remove their pernicious effects, it had made them worse – both by altering the terms 
of existing subsidies to make them larger and longer lasting, and  by providing still more and larger 
subsidies. No Member making a genuine effort to comply could get it so wrong, so frequently, and 
for so long. The EU had recently announced that France and Spain had agreed with Airbus to amend 
the terms of two launch ai d financing packages found to be WTO -inconsistent. The EU had publicly 
suggested that this action had brought the EU into compliance. But the EU had not provided any 
details of these supposed amendments to the WTO or directly to the United States. Normally , a party 
claiming compliance could and did explain why. Nor did the EU even address the remaining six 
WTO-inconsistent launch aid measures. With this new compliance announcement, the EU had 
effectively conceded that the United States had been correct that  the EU was out of compliance 
previously. And given the limited measures covered by the announcement, and the lack of any 
details on the supposed changes made, no one could take seriously that these changes actually 
addressed the full scope of massive, WTO -inconsistent subsidies and brought a resolution to this 
long-standing dispute. The contrast with US actions could not be any sharper. The United States had 
withdrawn the sole measure found to cause adverse effects in the adopted compliance reports – the 
Washington State B  & O tax rate reduction. The text of the measure was public, and its terms had 
been notified to the WTO and the EU. No one could deny that the Washington State tax break had 
ended. And yet, with no basis in reality, the EU suggested that i t was serious about compliance, 
while the United States was not. It was regrettable that the EU continued to refuse to 
seriously  address its massive, WTO -inconsistent subsidies and therefore appeared to want this 
dispute to go on . 
3.6.  The representative of the  European Union  said that his delegation did  not agree with the 
unilateral US assertion that it ha d fully implemented the DSB 's recommendations and rulings in the 
"US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint)" dispute  (DS353) . While it was still examining the impact 
of the legislative action concerning the Washington State B  & O tax, the EU note d that the rulings in 
that dispute cover ed a number of  additional measures in respect of which  the United States remain ed 
non-compliant (including NASA and  Department of Defense Research and Development measures , 
as well as certain State and local measures) . As already referred to in statements  made at previous 
DSB meetings on the matter, following the Appellate Body report on compliance in the "EC – Large 
Civil Aircraft" case (DS316) , the EU had notified a set of compliance measures to the WTO that had 
brought the EU  into compliance with the DSB's ruling . The United States had  disagreed . On the basis 
of its disagreement , the U nited States continue d to apply countermeasures against products from 
the EU . At the same time, the U nited States was  blocking the two -step multilateral dispute 
settlement system, thus preventing  the EU from seeking a multilateral determination of compliance 
regarding its measu res. 
3.7.  The DSB took note of the statements.  
4  INDIA – TARIFF TREATMENT ON CERTAIN GOODS  
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by Japan  (WT/DS58 4/9) 
4.1.  The Chairman  recall ed that the DSB had considered this matter at the 29 June 2020 DSB 
meeting and had agreed to revert to it, should a requesting Member wish to do so . He then drew 
attention to the communication from the Japan  contained in document WT/DS58 4/9 and invited the 
representative of Japan  to speak . 
4.2.  The representative of Japan  said that his country would  not repeat its position and claims in 
this dispute at the present meeting, as they were explained in detail in its panel request and in its 
statement made  at the 2 9 June 2020 DSB meeting . To summarize : India ha d raised its customs 
duties on certain products in the information and communications technology (ICT) sector since 
2014, in excess of the bound rates set forth in its Schedules of Concessions and Commitments 
annexed to the G ATT 1994. A s Japan had explain ed in its panel request, India 's measures were 
clearly inconsistent with India 's obligations under the G ATT 1994 and specifically Article II . Japan's  
panel request had appeared as an item on the Agenda of the 29  June 2020 DSB meeting . As Japan  
continued to see that the inconsistency was not being removed, Japan request ed, once again and 
pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, that a panel be established with standard terms of reference in 
accordance with Article 7.1 of the DSU  to examine the matter as set out in its panel request . Japan 
also request ed the establishment of a single panel pursuant to Article 9.1 of the DSU to examine the WT/DSB/M/443  
- 12 - 
  same matter raised in the DS582, DS584 and DS588  disputes  for the same reasons as the ones 
Japan had set forth at  the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting.  
4.3.  The representative of India said that his country  was deeply disappointed with Japan 's decision 
to move forward with its second request for the establishment of a panel in this dispute . As India 
had explai ned in its statement made at the  29 June 2020 DSB meeting , Japan essentially request ed 
that India implement a declaration made by select Members, namely,  the Declaration on the 
Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA -2), to which India was not a party . This 
dispute also sought  to take advantage of an inadvertent error in the transposition of HS2002 to 
HS2007, of a purely formal character, committed while transposing the tariff lines and the 
description of the products recommended by the World Customs Organization ( WCO). India 
reiterate d that the measures identified by Japan were consistent with India 's WTO obligations . India 
underst ood that a panel would be established at the present meeting . India st ood ready to defend  
its legitimate rights and interests in future proceedings . India note d that Japan ha d requested for 
the establishment of a single panel to examine its claims along with certain other matters that were 
on the Agenda of the present meeting . For a single pan el to be established to examine multiple 
complaints, the DSB had to  decide to establish a single panel . This would be a decision taken by the 
DSB by consensus pursuant to Article 9.1 of the DSU . India d id not agree with this request . India 
was of the prima facie  view that the panel requests d id not relate to the same matter . Consequently, 
in order to safeguard its procedural rights, India maintain ed that separate panels had to  be 
established at this stage.  
4.4.  The representative of Japan  said that  his country  regret ted that India had not agree d to the 
establishment of a single panel pursuant to Article 9.1 of the DSU in the DS582, DS584 and DS588  
disputes . Japan recall ed that a panel in DS582 had already been established at the 29 June 2020 
DSB mee ting, and Chinese Taipei would  request the establishment of a panel in the DS588 dispute 
for the second time at the present meeting . In these circumstances, and in light of Article 9.3 of the 
DSU, Japan request ed that to the greatest extent possible the same persons should serve as 
panelists on each of the separate panels in the DS582, DS584 and DS588  disputes , and that the 
time-tables for the panel proce edings in these disputes be harmonized.  
4.5.  The representative of European Union  said that his delegation wished  to support the proposal 
of establishing a single panel in respect of  the three  panel requests  filed by Japan, Chinese Taipei  
and the EU , as it had already done so  a the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting when a panel in the DS582  
dispute  had been  established . All three cases were "related to the same matter " pursuant to  
Article  9.1 of the DSU : (i) they identified the same tariff treatment by India of mostly identical ICT 
products, which were specified in the form of tariff lines in their respective panel requests, and 
(ii) they provided the same legal basis of complaint, i.e., a violation of tariff concessions that India 
had commi tted to within the legal framework of the WTO on these ICT products, under Article II of 
the G ATT 1994. The EU believe d that the establishment of a single panel to examine the complaints 
in these three cases was feasible, as consultation meetings ha d already taken place in the 
three  cases, and as it would in no way impair India 's rights under the DSU . Indeed, establishing a 
single panel would be desirable in these disputes as a way to organi ze the examination of this matter 
in an orderly and efficient manne r, since this would save both time and human resources for India 
and each complainant . Such consideration was more pertinent than ever in the current 
circumstances that the COVID -19 pandemic had brought upon Members . 
4.6.  The representative of India said that his country believed  that it was not feasible to have the 
same panel for the respective matters because India's rights that were normally available to every 
Member under the DSU would face  the real risk of being infringed based on the respective Membe rs' 
assertions at th e present m eeting . Moreov er, there were significant  differences between  the 
measures and claims identified by each of the three complainants  in their respective panel requests . 
For instance, Japan ha d identified 39 distinct measures at issue, whereas the EU and Chinese Taipei 
had merely identified six measures at issue . The differences between  the measures identified in their 
respective panel requests were significant  and reveal ed the distinct nature and scope of each 
complaint . Therefor e, India maintain ed that having a separate panel established in respect of  each 
panel request was appropriate at this stage.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 13 - 
  4.7.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference . 
4.8.  The representatives of Brazil, Canada , China , the European Union , Indonesia , Korea , Norway , 
Russia , Singapore , Chinese Taipei , Thailand , Turke y, the United Kingdom  and the United States  
reserved their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.  
5  INDIA – TARIFF TREATMENT ON CERTAIN GOODS IN THE INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY SECTOR  
A. Request for the establishment of a  panel by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (WT/DS588/7)  
5.1.  The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at the 29 June 2020 DSB 
meeting and had agreed to revert to it, should a requesting Member wish to do so. He then drew 
attention to the communication from Chinese Taipei contained in document WT/DS588/7 and invited 
the representative of Chinese Taipei to speak . 
5.2.  The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that his delegation  had already raised this issue at 
the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting . Chinese Taipei  recall ed that India ha d increased the rate of customs 
duties imposed on imports of certain goods in the information and communication s technology (ICT) 
sector . Some of these duties exceed ed the bound rates set fo rth in India 's Schedule of Concessions 
annexed to the G ATT 1994 and were therefore inconsistent with India 's obligations under 
Article  II:1(a) and (b) of the G ATT 1994. B y exceeding its bound rates, India accord ed to certain 
ICT goods coming from Chinese Taipei  treatment less favo urable than that provided for in India's 
WTO Schedule . On 2 September  2019, Chinese Taipei had requested consultations with India 
pursuant to Article 4 of the DSU . Bilateral consultations had been  held o n 21 November  2019. The 
consultations had served to clarify certain issues . However, they had failed to resolve the dispute . 
At the 2 9 June 2020 DSB meeting , Chinese Taipei  had requested the establishment of a panel 
pursuant to Article 7.1 of the DSU, with  standard terms of reference , to examine India's measures 
concerning certain ICT goods as described in its panel request contained in document WT/DS588/7 . 
India had opposed Chinese Taipei's  panel request at the 2 9 June 2020 DSB meeting . Thus, for the 
second time, Chinese Taipei was requesting  the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article 7.1 of 
the DSU to examine India's measures . Chinese Taipei  noted that at the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting , 
Chinese Taipei  had also requested that a single panel be established to jointly examine the 
complaints of Chinese Taipei , the European Union and Japan . This request had also been opposed 
by India . Once again, Chinese Taipei  request ed that a single panel be established to jointly examine 
the complaints o f Chinese Taipei , the European Union and Japan under Article 9.1 of the DSU . The 
three cases were "related to the same matter ", as they all relate d to India's  tariff treatment  of certain 
ICT products, and the establishment of a single panel would ensure th e efficiency of proceedings, 
saving resources for all parties involved.  
5.3.  The representative of India said that his country  was deeply disappointed with Chinese Taipei 's 
decision to move forward with its second request for the establishment of a panel in this dispute . As 
India had explained in its statement made at the 2 9 June 2020 DSB meeting,  this dispute sought to 
take advantage of an inadvertent error in the transposition of HS2002 to HS2007, of a purely formal 
character, committed while transposing th e tariff lines and the description of the products 
recommended by the World Customs Organization ( WCO) . The outcome desired by Chinese Taipei 
would force India to implement a declaration by select Members, namely, the Declaration on the 
Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA -2), to which India was not a party . 
India reiterate d that the measures identified by Chinese Taipei were consistent with India 's WTO 
obligations . India underst ood that a panel would be established at the present meet ing. India st ood 
ready to defend its legitimate rights and interests in future proceedings . India note d that 
Chinese  Taipei ha d requested the establishment of a single panel to examine its claims along with 
certain other matters that were on the  Agenda of the present meeting . For a single panel to be 
established to examine multiple complaints, the DSB had to decide to establish a single panel . This 
would be a decision taken by the DSB by consensus pursuant to Article 9.1 of the DSU . India did not 
agree with  this request . India was of the prima facie  view that the panel requests did not relate to 
the same matter . Consequently, in order to safeguard its procedural rights, India maintained that 
separate panels had to be established at this stage . WT/DSB/M/443  
- 14 - 
  5.4.  The representative of Japan  said that his country  share d Chinese Taipei's  concerns regarding 
the matter raised in its panel request , and that it support ed the establishment of a panel as 
requested by Chinese Taipei . Japan would  not repeat its position on t his matter and simply wished 
to refer to its statement made under Agenda item 4 at the present meeting . Chinese Taipei  request ed 
the establishment of a single panel pursuant to Article 9.1 of the DSU to examine the same matter 
raised by the complainants in  the DS582, DS584 and DS588  disputes . Japan support ed the 
establishment of a single panel for the reasons that Japan had set forth  under A genda item  4 of the 
present meeting . In this respect, Japan expressed regret that India had refused the establishment 
of a single panel , which would have benefit ted all. 
5.5.  The representative of European Union  said that his delegation  expressed  regret that India had 
not accept ed the establishment of a single panel and wished  to reiterate its support for the proposal 
to establish  a single panel in the three cases filed by Japan, Chinese Taipei  and the EU for the reasons 
mentioned under Agenda item 4 of the present meeting . 
5.6.  The representative of India said that his country beli eved that  it was not feasible  to have the 
same panel for the respective matters because India's rights that were normally available to every 
Member under the DSU would face the real risk of being infringed based on the respective Members' 
assertions at the  present meeting . Moreover, there were significant differences between the 
measures and claims identified by each of the three complainants in their respective panel requests . 
For instance, Japan had identified 39 distinct measures at issue, whereas the EU  and Chinese Taipei 
had merely identified six measures at issue . The differences between the measures identified in their 
respective panel requests were significant and revealed the distinct nature and scope of each 
complaint . Therefore, India maintained that having a separate panel established in respect of  each 
panel request was appropriate at this stage . 
5.7.  The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that his delegation regret ted that India had oppose d 
its request for the  establish ment of a single panel . Should  there be no single panel, Chinese Taipei  
agree d with Japan  that, to the greatest extent possible, the three cases (DS582, DS584 and DS588) 
should be served by the same panelists.  
5.8.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference . 
5.9.  The representatives of Brazil, Canada , China , the European Union , Indonesia , Japan , Korea , 
Norway , Russia , Singapore , Thailand , Turkey , the United  Kingdom  and the United States  reserved 
their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.  
6  JAPAN – MEASURES  RELATED TO THE EXPORTATION OF PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGY 
TO KOREA  
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by the Republic of  Korea  (WT/DS5 90/4) 
6.1.  The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at the 29 June 2020 DSB 
meeting and had agreed to revert to it, should a requesting Member wish to do so . He then drew 
attention to the communication from  the Republic of Korea contained in document WT/DS590/4 and 
invited the representative of Korea to speak.  
6.2.  The representative of Korea  said that a t the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting, his country had 
requested the establishment of a panel to examine Japan 's amendm ents to its export licensing 
requirements for the exports of fluorinated polyimide, resist polymers, and hydrogen fluoride, as 
well as related technologies, when destined for Korea (Amended Export Licensing Requirements) . 
Japan had not agree d to establish a panel at that meeting . However, Korea remain ed concerned 
about the Amended Export Licensing Requirements that relate d to essential inputs for its electronics 
industry . Korea had explained , at the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting , that exports of the th ree products 
to Korea were being seriously restricted as a result of the Amended Export Licensing Requirements . 
As stated in Korea 's panel request, Korea consider ed the imposition of such restrictions to be 
contrary to Japan 's WTO commitments under the G ATT 1994, the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, 
the TRIMs Agreement, the GATS  and the TRIPS Agreement . Therefore, pursuant to Article 6 of the 
DSU, Korea request ed that the DSB establish a panel with standard terms of reference to examine 
this matter.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 15 - 
  6.3.  The rep resentative of Japan  said that his country  was deeply disappointed that Korea ha d 
chosen to request for, the second time , the establishment of a panel at th e present  meeting . Japan's 
measures at issue we re in line with internationally established practices aimed at  enhancing 
appropriate export control s over dual -use items . WTO rules, including clauses  such as Article XXI of 
the GATT, fully recognize d WTO Members' right to adopt export control polic ies. Japan also wished 
to reiterate that it ha d granted and w ould grant export licenses for applications on the three items  
at issue , once it had been confirmed that the se goods and related technologies were exported for 
civilian use. Korea had stated on various occasions outside this forum that no direct damage to 
Korean companies, such as disruptions in production, ha d been caused . Yet, Korea was challenging 
the fundamental premises that underl ay the internationally established export control frameworks , 
as well  as international efforts on non-proliferation of weapons  and sensitive military technologies , 
including weapons of mass destruction . Japan expressed  regret  that Korea ha d not resumed the  
dialogue between the ir respective export control authorities, even though Japan ha d repeatedly 
called on Korea to do so at various levels , including at the m inister ial level, after the 29 June 2020 
DSB meeting . Japan was deeply concerned about the difficult ies that the establishment of a panel 
would impose on the dialogue between the ir respective  export control authorities . While Japan was 
fully prepared to defend the legitimacy of its measures before a panel, Japan believed that  dialogue , 
not WTO dispute settlement proceedings,  was the best and only way to resolve this matter . Japan 
continued to  hope that Korea would choose a path conducive to the  resolution of th is matter.  
6.4.  The representative of the United States  said that as the United States had explained at the 
29 June 2020 DSB meeting, and as it h ad consistently maintained for more than 70 years, national 
security matters were not to be judged under the WTO dispute settlement system. Every Member 
of the WTO retained the authority to determine for itself those matters that it considered necessary 
to the protection of its essential security interests. This was reflected in the text of GATT 1994 
Article  XXI,2 as well as in the GATS and the TRIP S Agreement. It was a key component of the 
agreement of Members to enter into the WTO. Therefore, if Japan fo rmally invoked an essential 
security exception in defence of the challenged measures, only Japan, and not the WTO, could judge 
for the Japanese people what was necessary to protect Japan's national security interests. 
Accordingly, a WTO panel would lack th e authority to review that invocation and to make findings 
on the claims raised in the dispute. The United States observed that since the erroneous panel 
findings in " Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit"  (DS512), several WTO Members had 
rushed to challenge national security measures. This surge in litigation posed serious risks to the 
WTO and threatened to enmesh this Organization in national security matters it had wisely avoided 
for over 70 years . 
6.5.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference . 
6.6.  The representatives of Brazil, Canada , China , the European Union , India, Norway , Russia , 
Singapore , Chinese Taipei , Turkey , Ukraine , the United  Kingdom  and the United States  reserved 
their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.  
7  EUROPEAN UNION – CERTAIN MEASURES CONCERNING PALM OIL AND OIL PALM 
CROP -BASED BIOFUELS  
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by Indonesi a (WT/DS593/9)  
7.1.  The Chairman  recalled that the DSB had considered this matter at the 29 June 2020 DSB 
meeting and had agreed to revert to it, should a requesting Member wish to do so . He then drew 
attention to the communication from  Indonesia contained in document WT/DS593/9  and invited  the 
representative of Indonesia to speak.  
7.2.  The representative of Indonesia  said that  at the  29 June 2020 DSB meeting , his country  had 
requested , for the first time , that the DSB establish a panel regarding certai n measures of the 
European Union and its member States affecting trade in palm oil and oil palm crop -based biofuels . 
At that meeting, the DSB had deferred the establishment of a panel  pursuant to the position taken 
by the European Union . The European Union had stated that it was not ready to accept Indonesia 's 
 
2 Article XXI(b) of the GATT 1994 : "[n] othing in this Agreement shall be construed … (b) to prevent any 
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary  for the protection of its essential security 
interests  …" (emphasis  added).  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 16 - 
  panel request , and that it was certain that its measures were fully justified under  WTO law . At the 
present meeting, Indonesia wished  to reiterate its clear position that not only d id the measures at 
issue discriminate against palm oil but also, more importantly, that they were inconsi stent with the 
European Union 's obligations under the G ATT 1994, the TBT Agreement and the SCM Agreement . 
Therefore, Indonesia requested, for the second time, that pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU the DSB  
establish a panel with standard terms of reference as set out in Article 7.1 of the DSU  to examine 
this matter . 
7.3.  The representative of European Union  said that his delegatio n regret ted that Indonesia had 
decided to request the establishment of a panel on certain measures imposed by the European Union 
and its member States concerning palm oil and oil palm crop -based biofuels from Indonesia . The EU 
respect ed the right of Indonesia to brin g this matter to WTO dispute settlement but firmly believe d 
that its measures were fully justified . For these reasons, the European Union was confident that it 
would prevail in this dispute, and  that its actions w ould be declared in line with WTO law . The EU 
also st ood ready to discuss with Indonesia reciprocal interim arrangements that would preserve the 
availability of appeal review in this and other disputes on the basis of Article 25 of the DSU, either 
through an arbitration agreement as set forth in An nex 1 of the Multi -Party Interim Appeal Arbitration 
Arrangement (MPIA) or through such an agreement concluded on an ad hoc  basis.  
7.4.  The representative of Malaysia  said that his country  strongly believed  that the E U's Delegated 
Regulation 2019/807 supplementing EU Directive 2018/2001 constitute d a prohibition  on imports of 
biofuels and bioliquids produced from palm oil . Malaysia  firmly believed that th is EU measure was 
an arbitrary prohibition on the international trad ing of palm oil and its products . Malaysia took  into 
consideration the fact that the EU Delegated Regulation create d unnecessary obstacles which were 
more trade restrictive than necessary and more burdensome for producers of palm oil -based biofuels 
and bio liquids . Malaysia  wished to reiterate its statement made at the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting . 
Malaysia  expressed  hope that a favourable solution would be  found before the EU 's Renewable 
Energy measures le ft an indelible mark on the global trade of palm oil . Malaysia firmly supported  
Indonesia in this dispute , as well as  its panel request . Malaysia look ed forward to participating  as a 
third party  in this dispute.  
7.5.  The DSB took note  of the statements and agreed  to establish a panel in accordance with the 
provisions of Article  6 of the DSU with standard terms of reference . 
7.6.  The representatives of Argentina , Brazil , Canada , China , Colombia , Costa Rica , Guatemala , 
Honduras , India, Japan , Korea , Malaysia , Norway , Russia, Singapore , Thailand , Turkey  and the 
United States  reserved their third -party rights to participate in the Panel's proceedings.  
8  EUROPEAN UNION – SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON CERTAIN STEEL PRODUCTS  
A. Request for the establishment of a panel by Turkey (WT/DS595/3)  
8.1.  The Chairman  drew attention to the communication from Turkey contained in document 
WT/DS595/3 and invite d the representative of Turkey to speak.  
8.2.  The representative of Turkey  said that o n 26 March  2018, the European Commission had 
initiated ex officio  an investigation with a view to impos ing safeguard measures on imports of certain 
steel products . The European Commission  had initially included 2 6 categories of products in its 
investigation . On 28 June 2018, the investigation had been expanded to include two additional 
product categories . The European Union had imposed provisional safeguard measures on 
17 July 2018 and definitive safeguard measures on 3 1 January  2019. The definitive safeguard 
measures had been imposed on 26 out of the 28 product categories . Those measures ha d since been 
reviewed several times, including recently through a Regulation published on 3 0 June 2020. As a 
result of th ese reviews, the safeguard measures had been made even more trad e restrictive . His 
country  wished to express  deep concern over the safeguard measures imposed by the 
European  Union on imports of certain steel products , as well as over  the underlying investigations 
that had led to the imposition of those measures . Accord ing to Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, a Member could  not take or seek a safeguard action unless such action conform ed with 
the provisions of Article XIX of the G ATT 1994 applied in accordance with the Agreement on 
Safeguards . The EU 's actions ha d failed to uphold its obligations in this regard . Specifically, the EU 
had not ma de reasoned and adequate determinations regarding the products under investigation , WT/DSB/M/443  
- 17 - 
  which it had failed to define in a consistent manner throughout the investigatio n. The EU had  also 
failed to make reasoned and adequate determinations regarding inter alia : (i) the existence of 
unforeseen developments and how they had resulted in increased imports of the products 
concerned ; (ii) the existence of an alleged threat of s erious injury to the domestic industry ; (iii) the 
causal relationship between the increased imports and the alleged threat of serious injury to the 
domestic industry;  (iv) the exclusion from the scope of the measures of certain countries with whom 
the EU  had concluded Free Trade Agreements ; and (v) the EU's reduction of the pace of liberalization 
of the definitive safeguard measures which ha d made the safeguard measures more trade restrictive 
over time . The EU measures at issue we re clearly inconsistent with several provisions of the 
GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards . Therefore, Turkey ha d initiated th ese dispute 
settlement proceedings . On 13 March  2020, Turkey had requested consultations with the EU. These 
consultations had been  held on 29 April 2020, but unfortunately had failed to resolve the dispute . 
For these reasons, Turkey request ed, pursuant to Article 6 of the DSU, that a panel be established 
with standard of terms of reference in accordance with Article 7.1 of the DSU to exam ine the matter 
as set out in its panel request.  
8.3.  The representative of European Union  said that his delegation  regret ted that the consultations 
held with Turkey in April 2020 ha d not led to the settlement of this dispute . The EU believe d that its 
safeguard measures on steel compl ied with WTO law . For this reason, the European Union did not 
agree to  the establish ment of  a panel in this dispute.  
8.4.  The DSB took note of the statements and agree d to revert to this matter, should a requesting 
Member wish to do so.  
9  STATEMENT BY QATAR REGARDING THE PANEL REPORT IN 
"SAUDI  ARABIA  – MEASURES CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS"  
9.1.  The Chairman  said that t his item was on the Agenda of the present  meeting at the request of 
Qatar . He then invite d the representative of Qatar to speak.  
9.2.  The representative of  Qatar  said that in its Report  in the " Saudi Arabia – Protection of IPRs " 
dispute (DS567) , the Panel  had found that Saudi Arabia ha d breached its o bligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement by failing to take action against, and instead actively promoting, Saudi -based broadcast 
pirate "beoutQ ". Therefore, t he Panel had called on Saudi Arabia to remedy the serious matters 
addressed in its Report . Saudi Arabia had indicate d that it had appeal ed the Panel  Report . However, 
as all Members knew, the Appellate Body currently c ould n ot hear any appeals . Qatar recall ed that 
the aim of the WTO dispute settlement system was the prompt and positive settlement of disputes . 
While Qatar recognize d the right to appeal a panel report, an appeal "into the void " would in no wa y 
facilitate the prompt settlement of this dispute . If Saudi Arabia genuinely sought  appellate review, 
it should, in good faith, explore alterna tive ways to submit its appeal to a mutually agreed 
adjudicator that was able to make binding decisions . Doing so would demonstrate that Saudi Arabia 
genuinely s ought  appellate review and was not, in reality, simply trying to delay the resolution of 
this dispute . Qatar was confident that any appellate review of the Panel Report would result only in 
further confirmation of the following : that Saudi Arabia ha d breached multiple obligations under the 
TRIPS Agreement ; that such violations were not shielded by t he security exception ; and that 
settlement of this dispute w ould require significant improvements to Saudi Arabia 's protection of 
intellectual property rights . Qatar recalled that in this dispute, Qatar had raised serious matters of 
concern to the WTO Membership  broadly . The dispute had arisen  against the backdrop of the worst 
case of broadcast piracy that the world ha d ever seen . The cynically named  "beoutQ " had, for several 
years, stolen and rebroadcast cop yrighted material owned by or licensed to Qatari -headquartered 
media company beIN Media Group, as well as content from other international right holders, 
including the world 's most famous sports leagues and organizations . Qatar wished to  take this 
opportun ity to briefly recall some of the Panel 's key factual findings . The Panel had found, at 
paragraph 7.155 of its Report, that : "beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities subject to the 
criminal jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia ". The Panel had also found, at paragraph 7.219  of its Report , 
that: "while taking no action to apply criminal procedures and penalties to beoutQ, Saudi authorities 
engaged in the promotion of public gatherings with screenings of beoutQ's unauthorized broadcasts 
of 2018 World Cup matches " (emphasis added) . In addition, the Panel had concluded, at 
paragraph  7.199  of its Report , that Saudi Arabia ha d taken measures that "have had the result of 
preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel to enforce its IP rights through civil enforcement 
procedures before Saudi courts and tribunals ". WT/DSB/M/443  
- 18 - 
  9.3.  Qatar said that t hese factual findings c ould not properly be appealed because appeals were 
limited to issues of law and legal interpretation . These findings had led the Panel to conclude – 
correctl y – that Saudi Arabia ha d violated Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement . The Panel had also 
found – again, correctly – that Saudi Arabia 's violation of Article 61 c ould not be excused by its 
invocation of certain security interests under Article 73(b) of the TRIPS Agreement . The Panel 's 
interpretation of Article 61 was of particular importance to any WTO Member with nationals that 
suffer ed from commercial scale copyright piracy or trademark counterfeiting while  government 
authorities of other WTO Members fail ed to initiate any criminal  action against those in their 
jurisdictions who were responsible . The Panel 's findings under Articles 41.1 and 42 of the TRIPS 
Agreement were likewise important for WTO Members with nationals facing obstacles to pursuing 
civil infringement actions in other WTO Members with respect to any type of intellectual property 
right covered by the TRIPS Agreement . Those findings evidence d that right ho lders ha d been denied 
access to Saudi courts or tribunals, solely on the ground that they were Qataris or associated with 
Qataris . Qatar consider ed, like most other Members, that the right to access independent and 
impartial judicial bodies, and equality b efore law, was important not just as a tool to protect 
intellectual property rights, but as a fundamental human right . As Qatar had noted in its statement 
made at the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting following the circulation of the Panel Report, Saudi Arabia, 
and individuals that spoke on its behalf , had made public statements that falsely assert ed that 
Saudi  Arabia 's position had been "fully vindicated " by the Panel . The truth was that Saudi Arabia 's 
measures had been  found to violate the TRIPS Agreement, and that Saudi Arabia s ought  to escape 
the consequences of that finding . That fact bec ame even more plainly visible following  Saudi Arabia 's 
appeal of the Panel Report "into the void ", despite its  claim  that the Panel Report had  "vindicated " 
its position . Saudi Arabia had lost this case not because of some legal error on the part of the Panel 
but because of its WTO -inconsistent conduct . Saudi Arabia should now take the responsibility for its 
mistakes and heed the Panel 's call to bring its mea sures into conformity with its obligations under 
the TRIPS  Agreement . 
9.4.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  said that f or several years, a sensitive 
national security situation ha d existed between several WTO Members , including Saudi Arabia, and 
Qatar due to that country 's support for terrorism and extremism . Since June 2017, Saudi Arabia and 
other Members ha d severed all diplomatic and consular relations with Qatar in response to t he 
Qatar 's continuing support for terrorism and extremism . In the "Saudi Arabia – Protection of IPRs " 
dispute (DS567) , the Panel had explicitly agreed with Saudi Arabia that a Member 's severance of all 
relations with another Member was "the ultimate State expression of the existence of an emergency 
in international relations ". Consistent with its approach throughout the proceedings in this dispute , 
Saudi Arabia w ould not engage with Qatar or respond to its provocations at the present meeting  or 
in any setti ng. For Saudi Arabia, protecting the security of its country and its citizens had been  the 
main goal in this dispute . His country wished  to recall that in its Report, the Panel  had ruled that  
Saudi Arabia 's severance of all diplomatic, consular and economic ties with Qatar, viewed in the 
context of similar actions taken by several other nations and the relevant history recounted in this 
Report, f ell into the category of cases in which such action c ould be characterized in terms of an 
exceptional and serious crisis in the relations between two or more States . The Panel had rejected 
Qatar 's attempts to down -play the seriousness of the situation  and had  ruled that: "in the light of 
the reasons advanced by Saudi Arabia for its actions, the Panel does not accept Qatar 's view that 
the events culminating in the severance of relations can be characterized as a 'mere political or 
economic ' dispute ". Based on the prevailing emergency in international relations, the Panel  had 
found that Saudi Arabia 's invocation of the security exception under Article 73 of the TRIPS 
Agreement in th is dispute had been  justified where it was invoked by Saudi Arabia . The Panel had 
clearly acknowledged Saudi Arabia 's confirmation that it had not invoke d the security exception with 
respect to its protection of intellectual property rights . To be clear, Saudi Arabia ha d not argued that 
violations of intellectual property rights should be justified under the security exception . Therefore, 
the Panel should not have ruled on whether  the non -application of criminal procedures and penalties 
by Saudi Arabia satisfie d the requirements for justification under the security exception . This issue 
was currently under appeal, therefore , Saudi Arabia wished to limit itself, as noted in its Notice of 
Appeal, to stating that Saudi Arabia consider ed that the appeal of this issue relating to the invocation 
of security exceptions under the WTO Agreements was of particular systemic importance in the 
context of this and other pending disputes . In particular, WTO panels ha d no basis to ignore 
Members ' explicit definition of their scope of invocation of WTO security exceptions . Saudi Arabia 
wished to  note, once  again , that the full background to the real dispute  could be found in  the 
Executive Summar y of its submissions, which was attached to the Panel Report  and was entirely 
dedicated to the defen ce of its national security interests . Paragraphs 1 through 48 of the Executive 
Summary provide d details of the national security situation that Saudi Arabi a had  summarized at WT/DSB/M/443  
- 19 - 
  the present meeting , including details on Qatar 's support for terrorism and extremism . 
Paragraphs  49 through 93 of the Executive Summary provide d information in response to questions 
from the Panel on Saudi Arabia 's good faith invocation of the security exception – but not to justify 
alleged violations of the TRIPS Agreement . Saudi Arabia wished to assure all Members that it 
remain ed committed to full compliance with WTO rules, and ha d held many bilateral discussion s with 
friendly WTO Members to discuss its WTO-consistent regime for protecting intellectual property . 
Although the restrictions on interactions with Qatar obviously limit ed its ability to respond and 
provide full information in this context, Saudi Arabia welcome d all opportunities for further bilateral 
discussion with friendly trading partners regarding the facts of th is dispute and the protection of 
intellectual property rights in Saudi Arabia.  
9.5.  The representative of the United States  said that as the Unit ed States had stated at previous 
DSB meetings, issues of national security were political in nature and were not matters appropriate 
for adjudication in the WTO dispute settlement system. Every Member of the WTO retained the 
authority to determine for itse lf those matters that it considered necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests, as was reflected in the text of GATT 1994 Article XXI, for example, and 
in TRIPS Article 73. The Panel in “Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protecti on of Intellectual 
Property Rights” had erred in assessing Saudi Arabia's invocation of its essential security interests. 
Saudi Arabia had invoked the essential security exception under TRIPS Article 73 in response to the 
claims raised by Qatar in this dis pute, and as the terms of Article 73 made clear, only Saudi Arabia 
could judge for itself what action was necessary for the protection of its essential security interests. 
The United States observed that, in assessing Saudi Arabia's invocation of its essen tial security 
interests in this dispute, the Panel had simply "transposed" the approach of the "Russia – Traffic in 
Transit" panel based on agreement of the parties (para. 7.243). Simply transposing the approach of 
a prior panel – even if based on the agre ement of the parties – was not consistent with the function 
of panels as set out in the DSU and made the approach of the Panel advisory. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the essential security exception in the "Russia – Traffic in Transit" panel's report was 
seriously flawed. As the United States had explained previously,3 that panel's interpretation of the 
essential security exception at Article XXI of the GATT 1994 was not consistent with the customary 
rules of interpretation set forth in the Vienna Conventi on. In addition to being inconsistent with the 
ordinary meaning of the terms of Article XXI, the panel had failed to interpret that provision as a 
whole. Furthermore, in its examination of the negotiating history of the treaty, the "Russia – Traffic 
in Tra nsit" panel had misconstrued certain statements by negotiating parties and had relied on 
materials not properly considered to be part of the negotiating history. WTO Members had 
understood, from the very beginning of the international trading system, that each Member could 
judge for itself what actions it considered necessary to protect its essential security interests. This 
had been the position of the United States for over 70 years, since the negotiation of the GATT. That 
position had been shared by ever y WTO Member whose national security action had previously been 
the subject of complaint, including the European Union, Australia, Canada, Russia, and others. And 
this was the position reflected in the text of Article XXI of the GATT 1994 and Article 73 of  the TRIPS 
Agreement. Consistent with a proper interpretation of these articles, therefore, any findings in the 
Panel's report should have been limited to a recognition that Article 73 had been invoked, as there 
were no other findings that could assist the  DSB in making the recommendations provided for in 
DSU Article 19.1.4 
9.6.  The representative of the United Arab Emirates  said that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
wishe d to comment briefly on the findings of the Panel in the " Saudi Arabia – Protection of IPRs " 
dispute (DS567) regarding the security exception . First, his delegation wished to  note that, in its 
analysis of the security exceptions in Article 73 of the TRIPS A greement, the Panel had adopted the 
legal framework that was developed by the Panel in the "Russia – Traffic in Transit" dispute (DS512) . 
The UAE agree d with this approach . The interpretation of the security exceptions that the UAE had 
put forward in the "UAE – Goods, Services and IP rights" dispute ( DS526 ) closely mirror ed the legal 
framework developed by the Panel in the "Russia – Traffic in Transit" dispute (DS512) . Second, the 
UAE welcome d the Panel 's finding that an "emergency in international relation s" existed in the Gulf 
region and that i t had persisted since at least 5 June 2017.5 As the Panel had found, the situation 
 
3 See Statements by the United States at the  Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, 
April 26, 2019, available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp -content/uploads/sites/290/Apr26.DSB_.Stmt_.as -
deliv.fin_.public.pdf.  
4 Article 19.1  of the DSU : "[w]here a panel or the Appellate Body conclud es that a measure is inconsistent 
with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity 
with that agreement ". 
5 Panel Report, para. 7.257.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 20 - 
  was one "of heightened tension or crisis " and it was related to "'defence or military interests, or 
maintenance of law and public order interests ' (i.e. essential security interests) ".6 The existence of 
an "emergency in international relations " was well documented and was confirmed by the fact that 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and several other countries had severed diplomatic rela tions with Qatar on 
5 June 2017, and had imposed comprehensive measures putting an end to all economic and trade 
relations between themselves and Qatar .7 The Panel had correctly considered that "Saudi Arabia's 
severance of all diplomatic, consular and economic ties with Qatar, viewed in the context of similar 
actions taken by several other nations and the relevant history … falls into the category of cases in 
which such action can be characterized in terms of an exceptional and serious crisis in the rel ations 
between two or more States ".8 The Panel had also correctly identified the context in which the 
severance of relations with Qatar had occurred . As the Panel had observed, Saudi Arabia had alleged 
that Qatar had, inter alia , repudiated the Riyadh Agr eements designed to address regional concerns 
of security and stability, supported terrorism and extremism, and interfered in the internal affairs of 
other countries .9 The UAE ha d the same concerns as Saudi Arabia about Qatar 's conduct, and it was 
those c oncerns that had compelled the UAE to sever diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar . 
The Panel had correctly found that the nature of the allegations against Qatar was evidence of 
"the grave and serious nature of the deterioration and rupture in relat ions between these Members ", 
and that it wa s also explicitly related to security interests . Moreover, the UAE share d the Panel 's 
view that : "when a group of States repeatedly accuses another of supporting terrorism and 
extremism  … that in and of itself reflects and contributes to a 'situation … of heightened tension or 
crisis' between them that relates to their security interests ".10 The Panel had thus correctly rejected 
"Qatar's view that the events culminating in the severance of relations can be characterized as a 
'mere political or economic ' dispute ".11 Finally, the Panel had correctly found that the so -called 
cooperation in international fora highlighted by Qatar had not call ed into question the fact that the 
"emergency in international relations " persist ed.12 For all of these reasons, the UAE agree d with the 
Panel 's analysis and its conclusion that an emergency in international relations exist ed in the 
Gulf region.  
9.7.  The DSB took note of the statements.  
10  THAILAND – CUSTOMS  AND FISCAL  MEASURES  ON CIGARETTES  FROM  THE 
PHILIPPINES  
A. Statement by the Chairman on consultations with Thailand and the Philippines with 
regard to the Recourse to Article  22.2 of the DSU (WT/DS371/32)  
B. Statement by the Philippines  
C. Statement  by Thailand  
10.1.   The Chairman  said that under the first sub -item, he wished to make a statement under his 
own responsibility in order to report to delegations on his consultations with Thailand and the 
Philippines in the "Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines)" dispute (DS371) following the 29 June 2020 
DSB meeting . His statement was without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the parties to this 
dispute or of any other Member . He recalled that these consultations had first been conducted by 
the previous DSB Chair, Amb.  Walker, prior to the 5 March  2020 DSB meet ing. At that meeting, the 
matter had been suspended in order to allow more time for consultations . Following his appointment 
as DSB Chair on 2 0 May 2020, the Chairman had been consulting with Thailand and the Philippines 
on this matter . He had held virtual  intensive consultations with the parties in preparation for the 
29 June 2020 DSB  meeting . Following the 29 June 2020 DSB  meeting, he had  continued his 
intensive consultations with the parties to this dispute and ha d held three meetings in the interim to 
 
6 Ibid. 
7 Panel Report, para. 7.258.  
8 Panel Report, para. 7.262.  
9 Panel Report, para. 7.264.  
10 Panel Report, para. 7.263.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Panel Report, para. 7.266.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 21 - 
  discuss this matter . Since his consultations were ongoing, it was not his intention to have a 
discussion on this matter at the present meeting . He hoped that this was agreeable to all Members . 
10.2.   The DSB took note of the statement.  
10.3.   The Chairman  invited the representative of the Philippines to speak . 
10.4.   The representative of the Philippines  said that a t the outset, his country wished  to thank the 
Chairman for his time and effort in holding, since the 2 9 June 2020 DSB meeting, three virtual 
meetings as part of Chair -led efforts to assist the Philippines and Thailand resolve these important 
and urgent concerns that ha d systemic implications for the rights of Members under the DSU . At the 
third such meeting which had  been held on  24 July 2020, and further to the Philippines' 
9 March  2020 letter, the Philippines had presented legal examples and a range of constructive 
options that could fill the void that ha d resulted from the Appellate Body' s formal letter advice of 
10 December  2019 on its cessation of operations . A copy of this letter was annexed for reference  to 
the Philippines'  statement , along with a non -exhaustive list of various alternative arrangements that 
WTO Members ha d used in the past, both very recent and not so recent . Thailand ha d not yet 
responded to the ideas contained in the Philippines'  9 March  2020 letter . The Philippines  underst ood 
from the 2 4 July 2020 meeting that Thailand was still reviewing the ideas contained in its 24 July 
and 9 March  2020 letters on potential ways forward . While the Philippines ha d always been open to 
a constructive solution to the issue at hand, the Philippines ha d been consistent in asserting that it 
was fully within its rights to seek recourse under Article 22.2 of the DSU . Article 22.6 of the DSU 
was clear: "[t]he DSB, upon request, shall grant authorization to suspend concessions or other 
obligations  … unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request "; and "[i]f the Member 
concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed  … the matter shall be referred to arbitration " 
(emphasis added) . Therefore, there were only two options under the reverse -consensus rule of 
Article  22.6 of the DSU : (i) the DSB granting authorization to suspend concessions ; or (ii) the DSB 
referring the matter to arbitration . At the present  meeting, the Philippines ask ed once again that the 
DSB grant the Philippines the authority it s ought . 
10.5.   The DSB took note of the statement  made by the Philippines . 
10.6.   The Chairman  invited the representative of Thailand to speak . 
10.7.   The representative of Thailand  said that her country wished to refer to its statements made 
at the 5 March  2020 and 29  June 2020 DSB meetings . The circumstances of this dispute ha d not 
changed since the 29 June 2020 DSB meeting . As previously explained by Thailand, the appeals filed 
by Thailand in the two compliance proceedings under Article 21.5 of the DSU ha d not been completed 
due to the Appellate Body impasse . Consequently, Thai land's position also remain ed the same as 
that expressed at previous DSB meetings, which was that any request for suspension of concessions 
under Article 22.2 of the DSU in this dispute would be improper as the two compliance proceedings 
under Article 21.5  of the DSU had not concluded . As these appeals were ongoing, the DSB ha d not 
adopted any panel or Appellate Body report that could serve as the basis for the Philippines' request 
for suspension of concessions . The Philippines' request for suspension of co ncessions was also 
contrary to the sequencing agreement  signed by the parties in this dispute . The sequencing 
agreement  stated that the Philippines could request retaliation only after  the completion of 
proceedings under Article 21.5  of the DSU , which incl uded proceedings before the Appellate Body in 
the event  of an appeal . Given that Thailand's appeals ha d not been completed, the Philippines c ould 
not, at this stage, request the suspension of concessions or other obligations under Article 22.2 of 
the DSU. Furthermore, should the Philippines, for whatever reason, take the position that the rules 
contained in the sequencing agreement  were no longer applicable, this would release Thailand from 
its commitment to not object to the Philippines' request as be ing outside the 30 -day deadline under 
Article 22.6 of the DSU . As acknowledged by the Philippines in its intervention at the 29 June 2020 
DSB meeting, it was clear from Article 22.6 of the DSU that any request for suspension of 
concessions had to  be author ized by the DSB "within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period 
of time" .13 As the reasonable period of time in this dispute had expired on 1 5 May 2012, the deadline 
under Article 22.6 for authorizing the suspension of concessions had expired on 1 5 June 2012. 
 
13 Communication from the Philippines, WT/DS371/38, dated 2 July 2020, paragraph 5.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 22 - 
  10.8.   As Thailand ha d also previously indicated, Thailand disagree d with the Philippines' opinion 
that the current Appellate Body crisis constitute d a "procedural aspect" related to the procedures 
established in the sequencing agreement . As the Philip pines itself ha d recognized, inter alia  in its 
communication contained in document WT/DS371/32 , dated  12 February  2020, the Appellate Body 
had suspended its work due to "institutional constraints" as a result of an insufficient number of 
Appellate Body members . Without prejudice to Thailand 's position, however, her delegation ha d 
entered into discussions in a constructive spirit as requested by t he Philippines in its letter dated 
9 March  2020. Thailand  stood ready to continue these discussions with the Chair man and the 
Philippines with the aim of finding a means of resolving these institutional constraints, including how 
to move forward with the AB selection process es. Thailand t ook this opportunity to remind WTO 
Members of the urgency of resolving the problems affecting the Appellate Body . The Appellate Body 
crisis ha d imposed significant challenges on the rules -based system, including with respec t to all 
pending appeals . Resolving the Appellate Body crisis was a matter of priority so as to avoid unilateral 
actions that were contrary to Article 23 of the DSU . Finally, as indicated during previous meetings  
with the Philippines, Thailand remain ed open to a bilateral dialogue with the aim of identify ing a 
possible solution to the substantive issues in this dispute that was acceptable to both parties.  
10.9.   The DSB took note  of the statement  made by Thailand . 
10.10.   The representative of the European Union  said that t his dispute illustrate d the disruptive 
effects of the paralysis of the Appellate Body on the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement 
system and on the rights of disputing  parties . On the one hand, the Philipp ines was entitled , under 
the DSU, to a binding resolution of th is dispute and it was also entitled to ultimately suspend 
concessions or other obligations if the inconsistency persist ed. On the other hand, Thailand was 
entitled, under the DSU, to an app ellate  review of compliance panel report s. In these extraordinary 
circumstances, his delegation called on the parties concerned to seek an agreed solution that would 
preserve the above rights for both parties in a balanced manner . The EU w ished to point ou t that 
the parties could decide to submit the suspended appeal for completion under an appeal arbitration 
procedure pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU . Such an appeal arbitration procedure could, for all 
practical purposes, replicate all substantive and pro cedural aspects of appellate review . The EU 
trusted that the Chair man could assist the parties in reaching such a solution.  
10.11.   The representative of Japan  said that his country  wished  to make the following observ ations  
regarding the sequencing issue . First, a  so-called "sequencing agreement " was not a covered 
agreement, and as such c ould not (and was not intended to) modify the provisions of the DSU . It 
was an expression of disputing Members ' joint commitment to cooperate for the exclusive purpose 
of a particular dispute between them and with a view to facilitating the resolution of that dispute 
and reducing the scope of procedural disputes . As such, it was not the DSB's role to decide what th e 
provisions of the sequencing agreement mean t and whether the request for authorization was made 
properly under the agreement . To Japan's  knowledge, disputing Members ha d always respected and 
abided by the terms of the agreement s they had concluded . Second, regarding the referral to 
arbitration under Article 22.6  of the DSU , the text was crystal clear . If certain conditions were met, 
i.e., if the Member concerned object ed to the proposed level of suspension, "the matter shall be 
referred to arbitration ". In other words, if an objection to the level of suspension wa s made, the 
matter shall be automatically referred to arbitration . This was not subject to any action by the DSB . 
Third, with respect to the 30 -day time period and its relationship with the DSB 's decision taking 
rules, Article 22.6 of the DSU could be read to mean that the negative consensus rule applie d only 
to authorization request s made within 30 days of the expiry of the reasonable period of time . WTO 
Members could  dispute  this reading . However, the uncertainty regarding the applicable decision 
taking rules exist ed and this uncertainty was exactly the reason why Members  had more than 
20 years of experience and practice conclud ing sequencing arrangement s. Indeed, the language of 
previous  sequen cing agreements reflect ed Members ' common understanding of this uncertainty . In 
other words, sequencing agreements were meant to avoid the situation that currently  existed . Under 
these circumstances, Japan strongly urge d the parties to cooperate and find a  pragmatic way forward 
to resolve their procedural difference.  
10.12.   The DSB took note of the statements.  
10.13.   The Chairman  said that  in light of the importance and the sensitivity of this matter, he would  
be calling for a meeting with the parties to this dispute as soon as possible  after the present meeting . 
10.14.   The DSB took note  of the statement.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 23 - 
  11  PROPOSED NOMINATION FOR THE INDICATIVE LIST OF GOVERNMENTAL AND 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL PANELISTS (WT/DSB/W/665)  
11.1.   The Chairman  drew attention to document WT/DSB/W/665 which contain ed an additional 
name proposed by Japan for inclusion on the Indicative List of Governmental and Non -Governmental 
Panelists, in accordance with Article  8.4 of the DSU . He propose d that the DSB approve the name 
contained in document WT/DSB/W/665.  
11.2.   The DSB so agreed . 
12  APPELLATE BODY APPOINTMENTS : PROPOSAL BY AFGHANISTAN ; ANGOLA ; 
ARGENTINA ; AUSTRALIA ; BANGLADESH ; BENIN ; PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA ; 
BOTSWANA ; BRAZIL ; BURKINA FASO ; BURUNDI ; CABO VERDE ; CAMEROON ; CANADA ; 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC ; CHAD; CHILE ; CHINA; COLOMBIA ; CONGO ; COSTA RICA ; 
CÔTE D'IVOIRE ; C UBA; D EMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ; D JIBOUTI ; 
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC ; ECUADOR ; EGYPT ; EL SALVADOR ; ESWATINI ; THE EUROPEAN 
UNION ; GABON ; THE GAMBIA ; GHANA ; GUATEMALA ; GUINEA ; GUINEA -BISSAU ; 
HONDURAS ; HONG KONG, CHINA ; ICELAND ; INDIA ; INDONESIA ; ISRAEL ; KAZAKHSTAN ; 
KENYA ; REPUBLIC OF KOREA ; LESOTHO ; LIECHTENSTEIN ; MADAGASCAR ; MALAWI ; 
MALAYSIA ; MALDIVES ; MALI; MAURITANIA ; MAURITIUS ; MEXICO ; REPUBLIC OF 
MOLDOVA ; MOROCCO ; MOZAMBIQUE ; NAMIBIA ; NEPAL ; NEW ZEALAND ; NICARAGUA ; 
NIGER ; NIGERIA ; NORTH MACEDONIA ; NORWAY ; PAKISTAN ; PANAMA ; PARAGUAY ; PERU; 
QATAR ; RUSSIAN FEDERATION ; RWANDA ; SENEGAL ; SEYCHELLES ; SIERRA LEONE ; 
SINGAPORE ; SOUTH AFRICA ; SWITZERLAND ; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF 
TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND  MATSU ; TANZANIA ; THAILAND ; TOGO; TUNISIA ; 
TURKEY ; UGANDA ; UKRAINE ; UNITED KINGDOM ; URUGUAY ; THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC 
OF VENEZUELA ; VIET NAM ; ZAMBIA AND ZIMBABWE (WT/DSB/W/609/REV.18)  
12.1.   The Chairman  said that this item was on the Agenda of the present meeting  at the request of 
Mexico, on behalf of a number of delegations . He then drew attention to the proposal contained in 
document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18 and invited the representative of Mexico to speak . 
12.2.   The representative of Mexico , speaking on behalf of the co-sponsors of the joint proposal 
contained  in document  WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18 , said that the delegations in question had agreed to 
submit the joint proposal dated  18 June 2020 to launch the AB selection processes . Her delegation, 
on behalf of these 121 Membe rs, wished to make the following statement . The extensive number of 
Members submitting this joint proposal reflected a common concern with the current situation of the 
Appellate Body that was seriously affecting its workings and the overall dispute settlement system 
against the best interest of WTO Members . Members had a responsibility to safeguard and preserve 
the Appellate Body, the dispute settlement system and the multilateral trading system . Thus, it was 
the Members' duty to launch the AB select ion processes without further delay as set out in the joint 
proposal, which sought to : (i) start six selection processes : one process to replace Mr Ricardo 
Ramírez -Hernández, whose second term had expired on 3 0 June 2017; a second process to fill the 
vacan cy that had occurred following the resignation of Mr Hyun Chong Kim with effect from 
1 August  2017; a third process to replace Mr Peter Van den Bossche, whose second term had expired 
on 11 December  2017; a fourth process to replace Mr Shree Baboo Chekitan Servansing, whose 
four-year term of office had expired on 3 0 September  2018; a fifth process to replace Mr Ujal Singh 
Bhatia, whose second term had expired on 1 0 December  2019; and a sixth process to replace 
Mr Thomas R.  Graham whose second term had expire d on 1 0 December  2019; (ii) to establish a 
Selection Committee ; (iii) to set a deadline of 30 days for the submission of candidacies ; and (iv) to 
request that the Selection Committee issue its recommendation within 60 days after the deadline 
for nomination s of candidates . The proponents were flexible regarding the deadlines for the AB 
selection processes . However, they believed that Members should consider the urgency of the 
situation . They continued to urge all Members to support this proposal in the inter est of the 
multilateral trading system and the dispute settlement system . 
12.3.   The representative of the United States  said that as the United States had explained at prior 
DSB meetings, the United States was not in a position to support the proposed decision. The systemic 
concerns that the United States had identified remained unaddressed. Instead, what Members 
should be considering was how to achieve a meaningful reform of the dispute settlement system. 
The US view across multiple US Administrations had been c lear and consistent: When the Appellate 
Body overreached and itself broke WTO rules, it undermined the rules -based trading system. The WT/DSB/M/443  
- 24 - 
  Appellate Body's abuse of the limited authority that Members had given it damaged the interests of 
all WTO Members who ca red about a WTO in which the agreements were respected as they had been 
negotiated and agreed. Earlier in 2020, the Office of the US Trade Representative had published a 
Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, detailing how the Appell ate Body had 
failed to apply WTO rules as agreed by WTO Members, imposing new obligations and violating 
Members' rights.14 The United States encouraged Members to review the Report. As the United 
States had explained repeatedly, the fundamental problem was that the Appellate Body had not 
respected the current, clear language of the DSU. Members could not find meaningful solut ions to 
this problem without understanding how they had arrived at this point. Without an accurate 
diagnosis, Members could not assess the likely effectiveness of any potential solution. The United 
States had actively sought engagement from Members on thes e issues. Yet, some Members had 
remained unwilling to admit that there was even a problem, much less engage in a deeper discussion 
of the Appellate Body's failures. And rather than seeking to understand why the Appellate Body had 
departed from what Members  had agreed, these Members and others had redirected the focus and 
energies of the Membership to pursue an arrangement that would, at best, perpetuate the failings 
of the Appellate Body.15 
12.4.   Nevertheless, the United States was determined to bring about real WTO reform. The 
representative of the United States said that Members must ensure that the WTO dispute settlement 
system reinforced the WTO's critical negotiating and monitoring functions, and did not undermine 
those functions by overreaching and gap -filling. As discussions among Members continued, the 
dispute settlement system continued to function. The central objective of that system remained 
unchanged: to assist the parties to find a solution to their dispute. As before, Members had many 
methods to reso lve a dispute, including through bilateral engagement, alternative dispute 
procedures, and third -party adjudication. Members were experimenting and deciding what made the 
most sense for their own disputes. For instance, in "Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain  Iron or Steel 
Products” (DS490, DS496), Chinese Taipei, Indonesia and Vietnam had reached a procedural 
understanding that included an agreement not to appeal any compliance panel report.16 Similarly, 
in the dispute "United States – Anti-Dumping Measures o n Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from 
Korea" (DS488), Korea and the United States had agreed not to appeal the report of any compliance 
panel.17 Australia and Indonesia had informed the DSB that they had agreed not to appeal the panel 
report in the disp ute "Australia – Anti-Dumping Measures on A4 Copy Paper " (DS529).18 And parties 
should make efforts to find a positive solution to their dispute, consistent with the aim of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. In this regard, the United States noted recent a nnouncements that 
Canada and Australia would notify a solution in the dispute " Canada – Measures Governing the Sale 
of Wine"  (DS537), without circulation of a panel report.19 This example illustrated that Members 
could and should continue to seek positive solutions to their disputes, and WTO dispute settlement 
 
14 US Trade Representative, Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (February 
2020), available at https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp -content/uploads/sites/290/AB -Report_02.11.20.pdf . 
15 See US Statement at the 29  June 2020  DSB m eeting, avail able at: https://geneva.usmission.gov/wp -
content/uploads/sites/290/Jun29.DSB_.Stmt_.as -deliv.fin_.public13218.pdf.  
16 "Understanding between Indonesia and Chinese Taipei regarding Procedures under Articles 21 and 22 
of the DSU ", (WT/DS490/3) ( 11 April 2019) , para. 7 ( "[t]he parties agree that if, on the date of the circulation 
of the panel report under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Appellate Body is composed of fewer than three Members 
available to serve on a division in an appeal in these proceedings, they w ill not appeal that report under Articles 
16.4 and 17 of the DSU ") and "Understanding between Indonesia and Viet Nam regarding Procedures under 
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU ", WT/DS496/14 (March 22, 2019), para. 7 ( "[t]he parties agree that if, on the 
date of the circulation of the panel report under Article 21.5 of the DSU, the Appellate Body is composed of fewer 
than three Members available to serve on a division in an appeal in these proceedings, they will not appeal that 
report under Articles 16.4 and 1 7 of the DSU "). 
17 "Understanding between the Republic of Korea and the United States regarding Procedures under 
Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU ", (WT/DS488/16) ( 6 February 2020), para. 4 ( "[f]ollowing circulation of the report 
of the Article 21.5 panel, eith er party may request adoption of the Article 21.5 panel report at a meeting of the 
DSB within 60 days of circulation of the report. Each party to the dispute agrees not to appeal the report of the 
Article 21.5 panel pursuant to Article 16.4 of the DSU "). 
18 Minutes of the 27 January 2020  DSB m eeting (WT/DSB/M/440), paras. 4.2 ( "Indonesia also wished to 
thank Australia for working together with Indonesia in a spirit of cooperation in order to reach an agreement not 
to appeal the Panel Report " and 4.3 ( "Austra lia and Indonesia had agreed not to appeal the Panel Report and to 
engage in good faith negotiations of a reasonable period of time for Australia to bring its measures into conformity 
with the DSB's recommendations and rulings, in accordance with Article 2 1.3(b) of the DSU "). 
19 See, e.g.,  Summary of understanding between Australia and Canada regarding certain measures related 
to the sale of wine maintained by the Government of Canada, available at https://www.canada.ca/en/global -
affairs/news/2020/07/summary -of-understanding -between -australia -and-canada -regarding -certain -measures -
related -to-the-sale-of-wine-maintained -by-the-government -of-canada.html.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 25 - 
  continued to function while discussions about WTO reform were ongoing. The United States would 
continue to insist that WTO rules be followed by the WTO dispute settlement system. The United 
States wou ld continue its efforts and its discussions with Members and with the Chairman to seek a 
solution on these important issues . 
12.5.   The representative of the European Union  said that his delegation wished to refer to the EU  
statements made on this issue made at p revious DSB meetings, starting in February  2017, as well 
as to its statements made at General Council meetings, including at the 9 December  2019 GC 
meeting . Since 1 1 December  2019, the WTO no longer guaranteed access to a binding, two -tier, 
independent and impartial resolution of trade disputes . This was in clear breach of the WTO 
Agreements . As the EU had stated repeatedly, Members had a shared responsibility to resolve this 
issue as soon as possible, and to fill the outstanding vacancies as  required by Article 17.2 of the 
DSU. The EU thanked all Members that had co -sponsored the proposal to launch the AB selection 
processes . The EU invited all other Members to endorse this proposal . The EU noted that t he 
United  States ha d referred  to the App ellate Body breaking the rules . The EU w ished  to reiterate that 
Members  should be having a forward -looking discussion and not continuously re -litigate their 
differences as to the reading of the current rules . The draft GC decision presented by Amb. Walker 
could have been the right basis for unblocking the appointments . However , it had  not been accepted 
by the United States who  had not made any proposal or counterproposals The EU st ood ready to 
continue a forward -looking discussion . On substance, the EU wished to  refer to its previous 
statements  on the respective issues . The EU's  views were well known, but the EU  would happy to  
explain its position again as appropriate . Finally,  the EU noted that the U nited States had referred 
to the MPIA. It was not clear on what basis the United States asserted that the MPIA at best 
perpetuate d the worst aspects of the Appellate Body 's practices, in particular at a time whe n not a 
single arbitration award ha d yet been issued under the MPIA . The EU  wished to make clear that that 
the MPIA was a stopgap interim arrangement and not a means to reform the dispute settlement 
process , something which the EU  had consistently tried to do over the past few years . Pending a 
multilaterally agreed reform of the dispute settlement system, the participants in the MPIA had 
devised this interim , stopgap  arrangement based on the core features of appellate review pursuant 
to Article 17 of the DSU . These features had been agr eed multilaterally by all WTO Members . In 
addition, the MPIA also contain ed a number of elements designed to enhance the procedural 
efficiency of appel late proceedings in the specific context of appeal arbitration under Article 25 of 
the DSU.  
12.6.   The represent ative of the United Kingdom  said that his country  continue d to support th e 
proposal for the launch of the AB selection process es. The United Kingdom  wished to refer to its 
statements made at previous DSB meetings under this Agenda item . The United Kingdom  also 
support ed the statement made by Mexico on behalf of all co -sponsors . The United Kingdom was a 
strong supporter of the WTO dispute settlement system as a central pillar of the rules -based 
multilateral trading system . An effective and binding di spute settlement mechanism ensure d that 
Members  could enforce the rules that they had  negotiated, preserving the rights and obligations of 
all Members . The United Kingdom  continue d to be concerned that the WTO Membership ha d not 
been able to launch the AB selection process es, with the result that the Appellate Body was unable 
to hear new appeals . At a time when the broader multilateral trading system  was under stain, 
Members  were starting to see the concrete impairments of rights arising from this situation . The 
United Kingdom remain ed committed to finding a permanent resolution to the impasse with the 
Appellate Body which carrie d the support of all WTO Members . A fully functioning,  two-stage dispute 
settlement system was key to providing the predic tability and stability that businesses need ed to 
trade internationally . The United Kingdom  underst ood the long -standing concerns that ha d been 
raised, and recognize d that in a consensus -based organization, any dispute resolution mechanism 
had to  carry the trust of all Members . The United Kingdom  stood ready to play a full role in future 
discussions on dispute settlement reform . However, finding a solution should not stand in the way 
of Members accessing their rights to two -stage dispute settlement under the  Agreements and the 
launch of the AB selection process es. Therefore , the United Kingdom  called on all Members to act 
urgently to restore the system to full functioning, while Members  prioritize d discussions on a 
permanent solution.  
12.7.   The representative of Korea  said that his country  support ed the statement made by Mexico 
regarding  the joint proposal  contained  in document  WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18 . Korea urge d all 
Members to engage constructively in the relevant discussions to resolve this important issue as soon 
as possible.  WT/DSB/M/443  
- 26 - 
  12.8.   The representative of Japan  said that his country  wished to refer to its statements made at 
previous DSB meetings  under this Agenda item . Japan support ed the proposal  contained  in 
document  WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18 . Japan fully share d the sense of urgency  of other WTO Members 
regarding the need for  expeditious WTO reform . However, beyond the current impasse, Japan's  
priority remain ed to reform the WTO dispute settlement system in a manner that would serve to 
achieve a long -lasting solu tion to the Appellate Body matter.  
12.9.   The representative  of Canada  said that his country  support ed the statement made by Mexico 
and share d the concerns expressed by other Members  at the present meeting . Canada  invite d WTO 
Members that ha d not yet sponsored the proposal  contained  in document  WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18  
to consider joining the 121 Members calling for the launch of the AB selection process es. The critical 
mass of WTO Members behind this proposal was a clear testimony to the importance that al l 
Members accorded to a fully functioning Appellate Body as an integral part of the dispute settlement 
system . Therefore , Canada  called on the United States to act in accordance with Article 17.2 of the 
DSU and unblock the AB selection  process es. The fact that the Appellate Body c ould not hear new 
appeals was of great concern . Canada reiterate d that it was fully committed to discussions on 
matters related to the functioning of the Appellate Body . Canada's  priority remain ed to find a 
long-lasting multilatera l resolution to the impasse that cover ed all Members, including the 
United  States . To that effect, Canada  called on the United States to engage, constructively, in 
solution -oriented discussions . In the meantime, Canada w ould continue its work on the Multi -Party 
Interim Appeal -Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) as a contingency measure . The MPIA was open to 
all WTO Members . Canada invite d all Members  to seriously consider joining . The MPIA provide d the 
opportunity for willing Memb ers to safeguard their right to binding, two -stage, dispute settlement in 
disputes amongst themselves . The MPIA w ould remain in place until a long -lasting multilateral 
solution was found.  
12.10.   The representative of China  said that his country  support ed the stat ement made  by Mexico 
on behalf of 121 co -sponsors on this important matter . That represented  approximately  three 
quarters of all WTO  Members . The paralysis of the Appellate Body pose d an existential threat to the 
two-tier, independent and effective dispute settlement system . Unblocking the AB selection 
process es should remain the top priority o f all WTO Members . Therefore , China  encourage d more 
Members to join the proposal and side with the majority of the Membership so as to show their 
support for and commitment to the rules -based multilateral trading system . Ensuring the functioning 
of a standing Appellate Body was a collective legal obligation b orne by the entire Membership . 
Article 17.2 of the DSU ma de it very clear that vacancies of the  Appellate Body had to  be filled as 
they ar ose. Regrettably, the United States , by blocking the launch of the AB selection process es, 
continue d to disregard  the clear text of the DSU . As China ha d stated on a number of occasions at 
previous DSB meetings, most of the so -called systemic concerns of the United States we re not 
warranted . Nevertheless, WTO Members ha d made tremendous efforts to try to accommodate US 
concerns o ver the functioning of the Appel late Body . However, the United States continue d to fail to 
constructively and meaningfully engage in any reform discussion . Although a convergence in reform 
efforts had been detected, Members were  still far from reaching a lasting solution to the crisis . Given 
the dire prospect of finding a  short-term reform solution, China believed  that it was time for Members 
to seriously consider join ing a stopgap solution before the Appellate Body could res ume its 
operation s. Currently, 23 WTO Members , including China , had agreed on the Multi -Party Interim 
Appeal Arbitration Arrangement based on Article 25 of the DSU . This interim arrangement was not 
aimed at replacing the  Appellate Body . Rather, it was  a contingent plan aim ed at maintain ing the 
binding nature of the dispute settlement system before convergence on Appellate Body reform could 
be reached . Therefore , China  encourag ed more Members to join  this arrangement and st ood ready 
to engage with other Members in further discussions o n Appellate Body reform.  
12.11.   The representative of Singapore  said that his country wished to  refer to its statements made 
at previous DSB meetings and reiterate d its strong systemic interest in the maintenance of the 
two-tier binding WTO dispute settlement mechanism  that was underpinned by negative consensus . 
The unblocking of the AB selection process es had to  remain the paramount priority for all Members . 
Singapore  urged all Members, including the United States, to constructively engage in finding a 
lasting multilat eral solution.  
12.12.   The representative of Indonesia  said that his country  wishe d to refer to its statements made  
at previous DSB meetings under this A genda  item. Indonesia also wished  to reiterate its serious 
concern over the inability of this Organization to launch the AB  selection process es. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the world demand ed that this Organization play a significant role and be more relevant WT/DSB/M/443  
- 27 - 
  in driving global economic stability amid this difficult situation, it was unfortunate that the entire 
Membership was entangled with this issue . Indonesia  believe d that sol ving this issue should be the 
utmost priority of the Membership . Therefore, Indonesia  called for all Members ' commitment and 
willingness to ward preserv ing the dispute settlement pillar of this Organization.  
12.13.   The representative of Brazil  said that his country wished  to thank Mexico for its statement 
made on behalf of the co-sponsors . Brazil wished to refer to its  statements made at previous DSB 
meetings under  this Agenda item . Brazil look ed forward to its continu ed engagement with all 
Members in order to find a long -term, multilateral solution to th e AB impasse.  
12.14.   The representative of Thailand  said that a s a co -spons or, her country  support ed Mexico 's 
proposal to fill the vacancies of the Appellate Body . Thailand concur red with other Members that the 
two-tier binding WTO dispute settlement system was an integral part of the core elements of the 
WTO. The current inability of the Appellate Body to function affect ed the ability of Members to secure 
a positive solution to their disputes . This kind of uncertainty in dispute settlement undermine d the 
security and predictability of the multilateral trading system . As one of the Members with pending 
appeals, Thailand's  rights under the DSU were at risk . Accordingly,  Thailand had  already felt the 
impact of this impasse . Thailand believe d that restoring a fully functioning dispute settlement system 
was a top priority f or Members . Indeed, the dispute settlement system guarantee d and preserve d 
the rights and obligations of all WTO Members . Thailand  strongly urge d all Members to show the 
needed flexibility to find a solution to the Appellate Body impasse expeditiously.  
12.15.   The representative of Hong Kong, China  said that his delegation  support ed the statement 
made  by Mexico on behalf of the co -sponsors . Hong Kong, China  wished to reiterate its concerns 
with the lack of progress in resolving the Appellate Body impasse . The AB selection process es should 
start without any delay . Hong Kong, China urged Members to continue with the ir efforts and to 
engage constructively until a solution was found.  
12.16.   The representative of New Zealand  reiterated his country's  support for the co -sponsored 
proposal contained  in document  WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18 . New Zealand also wished to refer to its 
statements  made at previous DSB meetings under this Agenda item . New Zealand continue d to urge 
all Members to engage  on the issues  constructively with a view to urgently addressing this serious 
situation.  
12.17.   The representative of India said that his country was  deeply disappointed with the state of 
affairs at the WTO with respect to the dysfunctional Appellate Body . Unfortunately, the Appellate 
Body was no longer available to review panel reports since 11 December  2019. The WTO dispute 
settlement system was a central el ement in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system as set out in Article 3.2 of the DSU . India ha d a strong interest in a stable and 
predictable dispute resolution system within the WTO . India was  committed to the preservation of a 
functioning , two-stage , binding adjudication system . India believe d that the Appellate Body was 
essential for the proper and effective functioning of the WTO. India expressed  deep regret that the 
DSB was unable to fulfil  its legal obligation to appoint Appellate Body members . India, once again , 
called upon all WTO Members to fulfil their treaty  obligations under Article s 17.1 and 17.2 of the 
DSU and to start the AB selection processes as a matter of priority.  
12.18.   The represen tative of Turkey  said that her country  support ed the statement made  by Mexico 
on behalf of the co-sponsors . As Turkey  had reiterat ed at previous DSB meetings , a functioning 
Appellate Body was at the core of a well-functioning dispute settlement mechanism . It provide d 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system . Therefore, it was important that the 
two-stage and binding nature of the dispute settlement system were safeguarded . To this end, 
Turkey was committed to doing  its part to resolve th is issue as soon as possible and stood ready to 
engage with Members to launch the AB selection process es. 
12.19.   The representative of Switzerland  said that her country  wished to refer to its statements 
made at previous DSB meetings under this Agenda  item. Once again , Switzerland  urged all Members 
to engage constructively in order to solve this impasse without further delay . The restoration of the 
Appellate Body remain ed Switzerland's  priority . Switzerland wished  to call on each Member to act in 
a matter conducive to the prompt and final settlement of disputes and to avoid so -called appeal s 
into the void.  WT/DSB/M/443  
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  12.20.   The representative of South Africa  said that his country thank ed Mexico for its statement 
that convey ed the views of 121 Members . South Africa support ed the call for a decision by the DSB 
in line with the proposal contained in document WT/DSB/609/Rev.18 . A functional dispute 
settlement mechanism was the cornerstone of the multilateral trading system and was essent ial for 
the functioning of the WTO . The immediate priority , as Members moved  towards MC12 , should be 
the resolution of the Appellate Body impasse and the restoration of a two-stage , binding dispute 
settlement system . South Africa wished  to emphasize that in the absence of an Appellate Body, 
Members were left with sub -optimal options , having to  give up the ir right o f appeal and having to 
be bound by outcomes of panel proceedings or having to pursue alternative mechanisms . The biggest 
risk of a dysfunctional Appellate Body was borne by smaller Members who were more likely to be 
subject to unilateral action . Clearly , however, this was but one of the consequences of a 
dysfunctional Appellate Body . A more general feature of the landscape going  forward was that 
Members we re likely to see that a country that los t a trade dispute c ould easily appeal a panel report 
into the void so as to block its adoption . The systemic blocking of adoption of panel reports was 
present in the pre -WTO era . The creat ion of the Appellate Body had been  meant to remedy this 
particular situation . Without the Appellate Body, the WTO dispute settlement system w ould lose 
much of its predictability and credibility and would eventually collapse . The pending cases awaiting 
appellate review ha d already created an incredible amount of pressure on Members , as was evident 
from items on the A genda  of the present meeting . This, in turn , also ha d serious consequences for 
future rule -making efforts in the WTO , as the value of negotiated outcomes depend ed on the ability 
of signatories to enforce them . The priority  must remain to find a multilateral solution that w ould 
facilitate the reactivation of the Appellate Body in a manner that addresse d all concerns of Members, 
includi ng the Africa n Group 's concerns about accessibility to the dispute settlement system . 
Therefore , South Africa called on all Members to ensure that they discharge d their collective duty to 
select and appoint AB members as soon as possible and in line with t his proposal . As an additional 
mechanism, Members  should use every opportunity to discuss the issues that ha d been raised by 
one Member . The informal " Walker process " on AB matters  had been invaluable as a mechanism to 
facilitate such discussion . In this respect, South Africa  would be in favour of a continuation of this 
process . South Africa  would welcome any consultation that the Chair man might  call on this matter 
on his own initiative or in consultation with the GC Chair . This would be without pre judice to the 
joint proposal contained in document WT/DSB/609/Rev.18 . 
12.21.   The representative of Nigeria , speaking on behalf of the African Group , thank ed Mexico for 
its statement regarding  the proposal  contained in document WT/DSB/609/Rev.18 . The African Group 
noted that  the DSB continued to  fail in its performance of its function under Article  17.2 of the DSU 
which clearly state d that: "[v]acancies shall be filled as they arise ". Nigeria  recognize d the fact that 
the WTO dispute settlement system was a central  element in providing security and predictability to 
the multilateral trading system . Therefore , Nigeria  underscore d the importance of tasking Members 
with guarantee ing and preserv ing the effective functioning of the Appellate Body , as it was the 
fundamental pillar of the WTO and the multilateral trading system . All Members recognize d its 
importance  and t his was evidenced by the undertaking under the DSU . The extensive number of 
Members that submitt ed this joint proposal reflect ed a common concern over the current Appellate 
Body impasse that was seriously affecting its functioning , as well as that of the  dispute settlement 
system , against the best interests of WTO Members . Members had a  responsibilit y to safeguard and 
preserve the Appellate Body, the dispute settlement system and the multilateral trading system . 
Thus, it was the  duty of Members to launch the AB selection processes without further delay as set 
out in the joint proposal which sought to: (i) start six selection processes ; (ii) establish a selection 
committee ; (iii) set a deadline of 30 days for the submission of candidates ; and (iv) to request that 
the selection committee issue its recommendation s within 60  days after the deadline for nom ination 
of candidates . At this point, there was a need for all Members to consider the urgency of th e situation 
in the interest of the multilateral trading system and the dispute settlement system . The WTO no 
longer guarantee d access to a binding two -tier, independent and impartial resolution of trade 
disputes . This was in clear breach of the WTO Agreemen ts. WTO Members ha d a shared responsibility 
to resolve this matter as soon as possible and to fill the outstanding vacancies as required by Article 
17.2 of the DSU . Nigeria  reaffirm ed the African Group 's proposals on DSU reform which s ought  to 
address the structural issues within the dispute settlement system that undermine d the participation 
of African countries . Therefore , Nigeria underscore d the need for any DSU reform to incorporate the 
developmental needs of developing countries in line with the D oha Development Agenda to address 
capacity and accessibility challenges faced by African countries . However, Nigeria  emphasize d that 
the priority was for the impasse to be resolved . Nigeria  urged the DSB to urgently adopt a decision 
that would  commence the AB selection process es in respect of  the six position s in the Appellate Body 
which remain ed vacant . The African Group wished to thank all Members that ha d co-sponsored this WT/DSB/M/443  
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  proposal to launch the AB  selection processes . Nigeria encourage d all other Members to endorse this 
proposal . The African Group urge d the DSB to fulfil its obligation under the DSU which was to fill 
vacancies as they ar ose so as to ensure that the Appellate Body and indeed the dispute settlement 
system d id not collapse permanently . Nigeria  remain ed concerned that this might  result in 
undesirable consequences for all Members within the multilateral trading system . The African Group 
stood ready to engage constructively with Members on this matter in order to find an amicab le 
solution while taking into consideration the va lid concerns raised by Members . However, Nigeria  
wished to reiterate that finding a solution should not stand in the way of launching the AB selection 
process es. 
12.22.   The representative of Norway  said that he wished to recall  a statement made at  the 
29 June 2020 DSB meeting  by Mexic o under this Agenda item  to the effect  that Members should  not 
get used to th e current  situation . His country believed that this  was an important  point. While Norway  
also agree d with the statement made by the European Union about the need to have a 
forward -looking discussion, however, it wished to underline that the United States c ould not 
deliberately bring down the Appellate Body and then expect the Membership to gradually and 
implicitly accept the status quo . Norway  wished to refer to its  statements made at previous DSB 
meetings . Norway urged the U nited States, once  again , to unblock the AB selection  process es. There 
was a danger of getting used to th e current situation . At every DSB meeting , Members knew what 
would  happen under this Agenda item . Previous statements would be repeated  until, inevitably, 
words would lose  their meaning . The ongoing repetition of previous statements , as well as the lack 
of substantial discussions or progress  were rather painful and at least below basic expectations . 
Members  were obviously bound by  strong national positions on such a sensitive issue . Nevertheless,  
great potential was going to be waste d. He believed that Members  could  do better . He, on his part,  
had tried, from time to time, to seek to inspire real conversations under this Agenda item . Real 
conversations, discussions and progress should be possible . The remarkable cooperation between 
Members participating in the Multi -Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Agreement  (MPIA) provided an 
example  of what was possible . MPIA participants were not Members involved in a fight against a 
common adversary . They held different views and expectations  and had had to give and take . They 
had be en willing to discuss and show considerable flexibility . At the same time,  they had also shown  
responsibility . Members  needed to solve the Appellate Body crisis . The spirit of the MPIA negotiations 
had provided positive energy and grounds for renewed trust in  international cooperation . 
12.23.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  said that his delegation  support ed Mexico's proposal 
and wished to refer to its statement s made at previous DSB meetings under this Agenda item . 
Chinese Taipei  urged Members to jointly overcome th e AB impasse and to find a long -term solution.  
12.24.   The representative of Mexico , speaking  on behalf of the 121 co -sponsors of the joint proposal  
contained  in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18 , regretted that for the thirty -fourth  occasion, 
Members had still not been able to launch the AB selection processes and had thus continuously 
failed to fulfil their duty as Members of this Organization . The fact that a Member might have 
concerns about certain aspects of the functioning of th e Appellate Body should not serve as a pretext 
to undermine and disrupt its work as well as the work of the dispute settlement system . There was 
no legal justification for the current blockage of the AB selection processes, which was causing 
concrete nulli fication and impairment for many Members . As Article 17.2 of the DSU clearly stated : 
"[v]acancies shall be filled as they arise" . No discussion should prevent the Appellate Body from 
continuing to operate fully and Members had to comply with their obligati on under the DSU to fill 
the AB vacancies . Mexico noted with deep concern that due to the continued failure to act at the 
present meeting, the Appellate Body would continue to be unable to perform its functions, against 
the best interest of all Members . 
12.25.   The representative of Mexico  said that  her country  wished to refer to its statements  made 
at previous DSB meetings under this Agenda item . Mexico expressed grave concern over the fact 
that Members were in an unprecedented situation whereby the Appellate Body was dysfunctional . 
All ongoing disputes were being affected by the lack of a fully functioning dispute settlement system . 
This undermine d the right of Members to appellate review  and imperilled the prompt issuance and 
adoption of panel reports . The proposal contained  in document WT/DSB/W/609/Rev.18 was 
supported by 121 Members . This was a clear demonstration of the shared  concern among Members 
of fulfilling their  obligation to fill AB vacancies as they ar ose in line with Article 17.2 of the DSU . As 
Mexico had stated  at previous  DSB meetings , and as Norway ha d stated under this Agenda item at 
the present meeting , Members  should not become accustomed  to the current  situation . Therefore, WT/DSB/M/443  
- 30 - 
  Mexico  called on all Members to support this proposal and to work constructively with concrete 
proposals aimed at finding a solution.  
12.26.   The Chairman  thanked all delegations for their statements . He said that, as in the past, the 
DSB would take note of the statements expressing the respective positions, which would be reflected 
in the minutes of the present meeting . 
12.27.   The DSB took note of the statements.  
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