WT/TPR/OV/M/ 21 
28 February 2024 
(24-1827) Page: 1/12 
Trade Policy Review Body   
 
  
OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE   
INTERNATIONA L TRADING ENVIRONMENT   
MINUTES  OF THE MEETING  
7 December  2023 
Chairperson: H.E. Mr Saqer Abdullah Almoqbel (Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia ) 
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON  
1. Welcome to this meeting of the TPRB which was convened by Airgram WTO/AIR/TPR/155  on 
23 November  2023. I am pleased to see so many of you attending in person as well as online.  
2. The purpose of this meeting is for Members and Observers to undertake t heir annual overview 
of developments in the international trading environment which are having an impact on the 
multilateral trading system, as provided for in Paragraph  G of Annex  3 of the Marrakesh Agreement.  
3. As mentioned in the Airgram, today's discuss ion is assisted by the Director -General's Annual 
Report which provides a comprehensive overview of the overall state of global trade, of significant 
developments in the implementation of trade policies by WTO  Member s and Observers, and an 
update on several  trade policy issues affecting the trading system for the period between 
mid-October  2022 and mid -October  2023. The Report was circulated in document WT/TPR/OV/26  
on 23  November  2023.  
4. The Trade Monitoring Report makes it very clear that the principal purpose of the exercise is 
to further enhance transparency. It is intended to be purely factual and has no legal effect on the 
rights and obligations of WTO  Members. Even though I know you are all very familiar with the 
monitoring exercise, I think it is important to emphasize this.  
5. Allow me also to take a moment to recognize the work all of you put into securing important 
outcomes of the 7th Appraisal of the  TPRM concerning Trade Monitoring. These included specific 
suggestions to facilitate Members' participation in the exercise through the use of IT and digital 
solutions, a call for a redoubling of efforts to increase engagement and participation in the exer cise 
through greater outreach, and the suggestion to reduce the frequency of the monitoring reports in 
normal times – an issue which I believe the Director -General will briefly address. Finally, you 
highlighted the need for the TPRB to serve as a forum for  information -sharing on trade policies and 
practices.  
6. These consensus outcomes, and the discussions that preceded them, not only recognize the 
value of the Trade Monitoring Exercise , but they demonstrate that Members place a premium on the 
ability of this  non-legal peer -review to contribute to transparency and predictability in the 
multilateral trading system. I congratulate you on delivering on these outcomes which will be before 
Ministers at MC13.  
7. Now, I do not wish to go into detail with respect to the  main substantive findings of the Report 
and the Director -General will shortly provide you with her main takeaways. However, I do believe it 
is important to highlight that the Report provides evidence that WTO  Members introduced more 
trade -facilitating tha n trade -restrictive measures during the review period, from mid -October  2022 WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  to mid -October  2023. During a period of great uncertainty for the world economy and global trade 
this is encouraging. At the same time, the Report reminds us that that several exp ort restrictions 
continue to be implemented and that many remain in place. Overall, the Report delivers a balanced 
message which is sensitive to real the risks and challenges faced by the world today.  
8. I will now give the floor to the Director -General to in troduce her Report. Following this, I will 
invite you to share your own views and comments.  
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE DIRECTOR -GENERAL  
9. Excellencies, ladies, and gentlemen. I am pleased to join you today to take stock of recent 
trade policy developments.  
10. Thank you, Ambassador Almoqbel  (Kingdom  of Saudi  Arabia) for your introductory remarks.  
11. You all will have seen my Report which was circulated to Members on 23  November, in 
document WT/TPR/OV/26  and its Addendum.  
12. Ambassador Almoqbel  has already described how the Report was prepared.  
13. Allow me to share with you a few key take -aways from the Report, and to point to a few issues 
we have  been watching closely since the mid -October close of the review period.  
14. The global economic environment continues to be buffeted by multiple crises: the continuing 
war in Ukraine, extreme weather linked to climate change, high food and energy prices, deb t distress 
and inflation, and lingering effects of the COVID -19 pandemic, with recent developments in the 
Middle  East adding new downside risks for the global economy.  
15. In October, our economists estimated merchandise trade volume growth of 0.8% in 2023 
(down from the April estimate of 1.7%) and 3.3% in 2024 (nearly unchanged from 3.2% previously). 
Risks to the forecast include a sharper than -expected slowing of the Chinese economy, resurgent 
inflation in many economies and rising geopolitical tensions.  
16. The Trade Monitoring Report shows that between mid -October  2022 and mid -October  2023, 
WTO Members introduced more new trade -facilitating measures than trade -restrictive measures on 
goods – 303 versus  193. Moreover, the value of trade covered by the facilitat ing measures was 
estimated at USD  977.2  billion, well in excess of that of the trade -restrictive measures, which was 
at USD  337.1  billion. (The previous year, the coverage of trade facilitating measures was higher, at 
USD 1.16 trillion, and that of trade r estrictive measures lower, at USD  278 billion) . 
17. The fact WTO  Members have been taking more practical steps to facilitate imports is welcome 
and illustrates how reducing trade barriers and delays is a valuable tool for pushing back against 
inflationary pres sures.  
18. That said, the pace of implementation of new export restrictions has  increased since 2020, 
first with regard to medical products in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic, and subsequently 
vis-à-vis food, animal feed, and fertilizer with the war in Ukraine.  
19. The Secretariat's ongoing monitoring shows that as of 1  December  2023, out of the 
127 export restrictive measures on food, feed, and fertilizers introduced since the start of the war 
in Ukraine i n late February  2022, 75 are still in place , covering roughly USD  29.6 billion of trade (up 
from USD  24.5 billion in mid -May 2023).  
20. This means 52  restrictions have been phased out, which is a welcome step in the right 
direction. But it also means that we still have quite a few remaining. Let me once again urge Members 
to re-examine and roll back these export restrictions, which contribute to making food prices more 
volatile – and therefore to making life harder for poor people around the world.  
21.  Going bac k to the Report, it also looked at new services trade measures. The 123  new 
measures introduced by WTO  Members, most of them trade -facilitating liberalization or regulatory 
reforms, were lower than the figures for the previous two  years.  WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  22. In addition, the review period saw governments introduce various new support measures, 
including programmes aimed at reducing negative environmental impacts, such as promoting 
decarbonization, energy efficiency, and renewable energy.  
23. Looking back at pandemic -related trade measures,  Members continued to phase them out, 
particularly the trade -restrictive ones. As of mid -October  2023, 29  pandemic -related trade 
restrictions remained in place, covering USD  15.6 billion (down from USD  134.6  billion in the 
previous annual Report).  Here too, I urge Members to end these remaining restrictions, as we work 
to make medical supplies more accessible – and to make medical supply chains more resilient – 
around the world.  
24. At a time when slow growth and persistent inflation are on the minds of policymakers just 
about everywhere, I would also like to call your attention to the stockpile of import restrictions  that 
have accumulated, slowly but steadily, since the Trade Monitor ing Exercise began in 2009. For 2023, 
the value of trade affected by import restrictions in force was estimated at USD  2.5 trillion 
(USD  2,480  billion), representing nearly 10% (9.9%) of total world imports. Rolling back these 
measures would reduce trade f rictions and contribute to the efficient functioning of global commerce. 
Members can act, individually and collectively, to reduce this stockpile.  
25. Looking back to over several decades, and more recently at the post -pandemic recovery, trade 
has been a stron g force for prosperity and resilience across the membership. We have a 
responsibility to ensure that this continues. At the same time, too many people and Members have 
not shared adequately in this prosperity. Bringing them from the margins to the mainstre am of 
global trade – what we are calling "re-globalization " – would make the world economy simultaneously 
more inclusive and more resilient. That is why we must keep working to reform and strengthen the 
multilateral trading system and the WTO. This means b uilding on our collective successes at MC12 
by delivering more results at MC13 in Abu  Dhabi in February, two working months from now.  
26. The Senior Officials' meeting in October provided an important opportunity to advance 
preparations ahead MC13. I hear a g enuine sense of determination from delegates here that all 
Members must work collectively to ensure the success of MC13. The challenge now is to put that 
sense into action.  
27. Before  closing, allow me to also address a couple of procedural issues in the conte xt of Trade 
Monitoring.  
28. First, let me reiterate that the Trade Monitoring Exercise is only as strong as Members want it 
to be. Participation is crucial and you recognized this at the 7th Appraisal of the TPRM in July. I thank 
all those that have participat ed and urge all delegations to help us strengthen this transparency 
exercise. As requested by you, the Secretariat will continue to develop a trade monitoring platform 
which places efficiency, inclusivity, and transparency at its core. In addition, we will  continue with 
the monitoring outreach program me and the information sessions on the new IT platform for 
submission and verification of measures.  
29. Second,  I have taken note of and discussed with my team the suggestion emanating from 
the 7th Appraisal of red ucing the "frequency of the Monitoring Report to an annual report in normal 
times, while maintaining flexibility to adjust their frequency in times of crisis, as appropriate".  
30. Crises have been all too frequent since I took office, but I believe that there is scope to 
experiment with replacing the current twice -yearly reports with one WTO -wide Monitoring Report at 
the end of the year. The Secretariat will have to keep asking Members to submit and verify trade 
measures throughout the year – you can't have con tinuous information gathering without that – and 
the new online platform will facilitate Members' efforts in that regard. This should, in turn, allow the 
Secretariat and Members to step up collaboration, and provide ad hoc updates or crisis monitoring, 
in line with changing circumstances.  
31. Unfortunately, I will not be able to stay with you this afternoon, but DDG  Paugam  will be here, 
and I look forward to hearing about your exchanges and suggestions.  WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  STATEMENT S BY THE MEMBERS  
SINGAPORE  
32. Thank you and good afternoon, Chair, Director -General Ngozi, and colleagues. Allow me to 
first commend the Chair and Members for successfully completing the 7th Appraisal of the TPRM, as 
well as the issuance of the Director -General 's Annual Report. Singapore appreciates the efforts 
placed into these exercises, which functions both as a pillar of transparency and a good barometer 
of the direction trade policies are taking. It provides Members with a broad overview of the state of 
affairs, and the outcome of the Trade Monitorin g Report are often a canary in a coal mine.  
33. Singapore supports the discussion to move the twice -yearly report to one WTO -wide 
monitoring report at the end of the year, in the spirit of improving efficiency; and note that it is also 
a common practice for o ther international organi zations such as WIPO 's Global Innovation Index, 
which become their flagship product. Changing it to an annual basis as well as employing more IT 
tools, will allow the Secretariat more time to conduct more in -depth analysis over iss ues such as key 
trends or even flag recommended areas for Members to pay more attention to.  
34. In closing, Singapore once again thanks the Secretariat for the efforts and insightful 
Annual  Report.  
UNITED  STATES  
35. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to the Director -General and the Secretariat for 
their hard work in producing the latest WTO Trade Monitoring Report. Thanks also to the Chair for 
convening today 's meeting and anticipated lively discussion.  
36. I am proud of this Committee 's efforts to recogni ze and implement IT  solutions to improve 
our efficiency. I  am glad to see the Secretariat take the lead in creating a user -friendly portal for 
verification this year, and Members are surely following suit to improve our TPR procedures as well.  
37. The United  States is supportive of the WTO 's efforts to utilize its deep and unique expertise 
on economic and trade issues to deliver analysis on global trade trends.  
38. The WTO is in a unique position to present and contextualize the activities each committee 
undergoe s over the course of one year. There is – quite literally – no other place that one could find 
such information . We encourage the Secretariat to continue this type of internal, cross -cutting 
committee reporting. We think it  is a very strong analysis that they do provide.  
39. Regarding the analysis itself, we were very glad to read this report and we note that overall 
Members did introduce more trade facilitating measures than restrictive measures. However, we did 
notice that trade restricting mea sures appeared to receive more attention in the Report itself and 
we would be interested to learn more about that choice in reporting , which could be misleading to a 
casual reader, and we are curious to understand the factors behind this decision.  
40. We welco me the Secretariat 's analysis that the review period saw new measures aimed at 
minimizing environmental harm. We appreciate inclusion of the OECD 's analysis that excess capacity 
and production in the steel and aluminium  sectors generates increased and unne cessary greenhouse 
gas emissions. We note that the removal of government support that drives excess capacity in large 
metals -producing Members would allow competitive and relatively clean producers elsewhere to 
meet market needs while minimizing harm to th e environment.  
41. I would also like to speak on the issue of transparency. We note with dismay that there has 
been a decline in notifications across WTO committees and bodies as an overall trend. That was a 
significant take away for us in this reporting. We s aw several examples of that : 
• In 2022, only 44  Members in the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises submitted the 
required new and full notifications.  WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  • In the Committee on Import Licensing, 13  Members haven 't submitted any notification since 
joining the  WTO, while 21  Members never replied to the Annual Questionnaire under 
Article  7.3.  
42. The United  States has been consistent in advocating that greater attention be given to 
notification compliance as a core obligation of WTO  Members. We acknowledge of The F riends of 
Transparency is continuing this work.  
43. We do recognize that a number of practical and technical fixes have recently been made , 
e.g., in the Committee on Agriculture, the use of making an oral announcement to fulfil an 
outstanding export subsidy notification has been incredibly helpful in achieving greater rate of 
submissions.  Clearly more work remains , and we are glad to see some reporting light shed  on this 
issue which we think is something we can all work on together and is an incredibl y core obligation 
of our WTO  membership.  
44. Again, we must repeat the same points that we made after the last Report was published - 
there seems to be some  bias in reporting  here if the largest takeaway on the global trade outlook 
from the Russian  Federation' s illegal and unprovoked war in Ukraine is a mention of trade restrictive 
measures. The cause of those trade restrictive measures is one WTO  Member 's violent and sustained 
assault on the sovereignty of another Member, directly restricting production in Ukr aine and trade 
between Ukraine and its trading partners. We think this is a skew of representation of historical 
facts.  
45. Finally, w e note with interest that only 55  Members participated in the preparation of this 
report , about one third of Membership. I rec all that this isn 't a large departure from last year 's 
participation rate.  
46. We would definitely agree that the Report relies on strong data, and it appears unfortunately 
the Secretariat has received incomplete data from Members.  
47. There are likely two signi ficant factors that limit the participation rate: the burden to 
participate, and the perceived value of the output. We applaud the Secretariat 's efforts to reduce 
the burden by implementing a simple and effective IT  solution  and reducing the frequency of 
reporting  to an annual  Report , and I  am sure we are not alone in welcoming these changes.  
48. We would say that there could be work done to improve rate of participation and perhaps 
addressing our second factor identified. Perhaps , the Secretariat may want to consider taking 
Member feedback into account when determining the content to be reported on, maybe considering 
what topics are important to Members ? What kinds of analysis is the WTO further in a unique position 
to provide ? Perhaps there could be some surveying work or further discussion with Members to work 
on improving that participation rate.  
49. But overall,  we are very glad to see this report. It  is an important work. I  would  like to again 
thank the Secretariat, the Chair , and other Members here for th eir contributions to this report and 
we look forward to the rest of today 's lively discussion.  
CHINA  
50. Let me start by thanking the Secretariat for the preparation of this comprehensive Report and 
the DG for your inspiring remarks.  
51. In this review period, world trade continues to suffer from multiple challenges. In its latest 
forecast, the WTO saw risks evenly balanced between the upside and the downside direction  for 
economic growth . The recovery of China 's economy is seen by the Report as one of the influencing 
factors and some positive signs have showed up. As China 's economy rebounded faster than 
expected in the third quarter, multiple international organizations and global financial in stitutions 
have raised up their outlook for the annual growth rate of China to above 5%, with the OECD at 
5.2% and IMF at 5.4 %. Under the downturn pressure of the global economy, China continues to 
promote greater opening -up of more market opportunities an d less restrictions for foreign 
investment. In this regard, China calls on Members to continue to adopt trade and investment WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  facilitating measures and refrain from imposing addition restrictive measures, making contributions 
to the world economic recovery and global development in a positive way.  
52. The Report for this review period points out two undesirable trends in global trade measures. 
First, trade covered by the stockpile of import restrictions in force since 2009 continued to grow . 
Second, the number of new export restrictions has for the third time outpaced that of import 
restrictions since the beginning of the Trade Monitoring Exercise . These two trends ring alarms to 
Members ' observance to the core value and basic principles of multilateralism. As t he DG mentioned 
on several occasions, trade shall be applied as a power for good. WTO Members should be cautious 
about making restrictive trade policies and measures, and remove the protectionist practices under 
the pretext of national security or global w arming as soon as possible.  Protectionist practices and 
measures do more harm than good to global economic recovery and sustainability and  would 
ultimately distort the supply chain and international trade.  
53. On transparency, the statistics in the Report rev eal a significant decline in the percentage of 
Members notifying subsidies. 64% members did not make any subsidy notification in 2023. Although 
the reasons for this decline still need more exploration, the capacity constraint of many Members, 
especially LDC Members could not be neglected. Targeted capacity -building activities conducted by 
the Secretariat and Members shall be encouraged. Reporting the outcome of such activities at WTO 
committee s and bodies  shall also be encouraged, which is written in the conclusion of the 
7th TPRM  Appraisal. In this way, Members could explore a more effective approach and mobilize 
more resources for the purpose of enha nced capacity -building and transparency function of the 
Organization.  
54. On the operation of the Trade Monitoring Mechanism , we commend the Secretariat for their 
consistent effort to improve the operation of the on -line reporting and verification platform. W e 
would love to hear the Secretariat to report that how many Members used the platform in this review 
period and beyond. We are also in the hope that the on -line reporting could be extended to service s 
measures and IP measures at an early date.  
55. The WTO is  an important stage for global economic governance. China is more resolute than 
ever for an in -depth participation in WTO reform in a manner that champions free trade and true 
multilateralism. In the running up to MC13, China will work with Members to make  the Conference 
a success . 
UKRAINE  
56. Ukraine commends the Members and WTO Secretariat for successful conduct of the 
7th Appraisal,  and we would like to use this opportunity to thank the WTO Secretariat for the annual 
overview of developments in the internati onal trading environment contained in document 
WT/TPR/OV/26 . This report confirms once again the negative impact of the Russia n Federation 's war 
in Ukraine on the international trade. We encourage the WTO Secretariat to further monitor impact 
of the Russia n Federation 's military aggression against Ukraine on international trade and 
particularly on food security.  
57. Ukraine would like to emphasize once a gain that the illegal, unprovoked and unjustifiable 
aggression against Ukraine by the Russia n Federation  is a blatant violation of international law and 
the rules -based international order. Sanctions applied by Ukraine's partners are the direct response 
to the Russia n Federation 's brutal war against my country. No manipulations or propaganda by the 
Russia n Federation  can substitute the legal concept of Article  XXI of the GATT. Nothing can prevent 
any WTO  Member  from taking action in pursuance of its obligat ions under the United Nations Charter 
for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Russia n Federation  is solely responsible 
for this war and continues to demonstrate its flagrant disregard for international law and rules -based 
multilateral trading system, including of this Organization, using, inter alia, food as the blackmailing 
tool. That  is a logical conclusion from the presented overview Report.  
58. The Russia n Federation  intentionally destroys the critical civilian infrastructure of Ukraine , 
thus endangering the international trade for my country and other countries, including in agricultural 
products. Overview Report elaborates several times about Russian fertilizers, but does not mention 
that at least 6  million tonnes of Ukrainian grain wa s stolen by the Russian  Federation during the WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  invasion. The use by the Russia n Federation  of food and even fertilizers , as far as it matters , as a 
blackmailing tool should be condemned.  
59. Armed aggression of the Russian  Federation deprives Ukraine of its rig hts within the WTO and 
does not allow us to implement properly our obligations before the WTO. Our trade partners also 
suffer from Russian reckless actions being unable to enjoy benefits from our bilateral and regional 
trade agreements.  Ukraine is grateful  to our partners for their strong and unwavering support in 
light of the Russian armed invasion.  
60. I also would like to put on record the following. We would like to draw the Members'  and 
Secretariat 's attention to the attempts to call Russian full -scale military invasion of Ukraine "a war 
in Ukraine " or "a conflict in Ukraine" , what several times also is mentioned in the o verview  Report . 
There is no any so called "war in Ukraine " and there is no any so  called "conflict in Ukraine ". Those 
are Russian narratives, which it actively exploit s and pushes through this Organization .  
61. We call upon all Members and the Secretariat to use the internationally recognized and 
adopted legal qualification of what the Russian Federation  is doing in Ukraine and I refer to the 
UNGA  Resolution A/RES/ ES-11/1 of 2  March  2022, which bears the name "Aggression against 
Ukraine " and in which the UN  General  Assembly as the most representative world body in para . 2 
"Deplores  in the strongest terms  the aggression by the Russian  Federation against Ukraine in 
violation of Article  2 (4) of the Charter ". As we previously requested, w e hope that the next annual 
overview Report will reflect correctly this fact . 
EUROPEAN  UNION  
62. Thank you very much Ambassador  Almoqbel , and thank you Director -General, for your 
introductory comments to the monitoring Report, which together with the World Trade Report is a 
sort of the two main products the WTO publishes about how the trading system is faring w ithin the 
wider global economy.  So, I want to thank the Secretariat first of all, because I know it is a lot of 
work to get the information from Members, and I also want to very much thank for the upgraded 
IT tools, which make the interaction between capit als and the Secretariat regarding the information 
that you need, a lot easier.  
63. I think when we read this report, the sort of sense that we get is a little bit steady as she goes 
for the world trading system and international trade flows. We are recovering from COVID, but 
clearly we are  not yet at full capacity in terms of making all of the benefits of the trading system, 
bringing them to fruition.  
64. I would like to just make a few factual comments which I hope are helpful to you.  
65. We support the transition to  once yearly Report, so I thank you very much, that came out of 
the TPR M appraisal  that we concluded successfully under your leadership in the summer, so thank 
you very much for that, we think that is very good, and there are a number of things which we do  
think come out of this report, which in a sense tries to balance factual descriptions of trade restrictive 
measures, trade facilitative measures, with analysis, which you have on certain discrete  subjects 
throughout the Report, and I think both are valuab le, so I want to commend you for that , but again, 
to request if we could have more metrics. I have asked this many times, to know how much these 
reports are used and referred to by others.  
66. I have to express my disappointment, this is my third time I am in  this room looking at a 
monitoring Report, and each time there are less Members in the room, so this is not by any stretch 
of the imagination a critique of the Secretariat for the very good work you do, but it is  concerning 
that there is hardly any develop ing countries present today. We are trying to discuss the trading 
system and the big changes that are affecting the world around us. I think we all agree that there 
is more government involvement in trade than there was maybe 10  years ago, 15  years ago, th at 
is worth a conversation, and part of the conversation is based on the information that you provide 
in your report, so again I want to commend you very much for that.  
67. I think we , as Europeans , always are of the view that export restrictions need more dis cipline 
in the WTO  system, so you have highlighted export restrictions, including in the field of agriculture, WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  and we believe that further commitments in that regard are appropriate and in keeping with the 
system.  
68. I would very much second the comments made  by the United  States about our disappointment 
regarding the notifications on subsidies. If you look at the trend of subsidy notifications over the last 
10-15 years, and certainly in view of the growing concern about a global subsidies race, and about 
the involvement of governments  in national economies, then the drop in notifications by Members 
is really a pity , and the fact that more than half of the Members don't notify anything, I think is a 
reason of concern for us all.  
69. I think we would encourage you, maybe in future also, to include information on the Global 
Trade Helpdesk,  maybe in the next iteration  of your report, again because it can help identify the 
benefits of the information provided therein for small companies, and for small companies especial ly 
in developing countries . 
70. We have also always encouraged this Body  to start discussions about overarching themes  that 
are impacting the global economy , so to the extent that we cannot often have those discussions in 
the General  Council, which has extremely long agendas, as we  have seen for next week, there are 
subjects which we think would be worth discussing in this particular Body, and we think that some 
of the highlights that you have  put in the monitoring Report are extremely useful. You have s ome 
descriptions of the concentration of production for certain products, and the vulnerabilities to the 
trading system.  You have a box about the sustainability of agricultural support schemes, which we 
think also is relevant for the WTO, and you have also  a very relevant number of boxes on the effects 
of climate change, notably for African countries, so again, as a consciousness -inducing Report, we 
think that is extremely helpful.   
71. I would like to echo also the thanks expressed before by the United  States for the work that 
the Secretariat has done here, and we look forward to  again  continuing the conversation both with 
the WTO staff  and with Members on the validity of restrictions as they are applied by Members, but 
also the main trends that are affecting t he global economy and trade policy.  
SWITZERLAND  
72. Thank you Chair. First, let me congratulate you for a successful conclusion of 
the 7th Trade  Policy Review Mechanism Appraisal, I think we have a number of very good conclusions 
in that document.  
73. Let me thank Director -General Okonjo -Iewala for her introductory remarks, and the 
Secretariat for having produced this new report on the developments  in the international trading 
environment.  
74. This outstanding monitoring report offers once again a comprehensive picture of the situation, 
problems and challenges we are currently facing in the area of international trade.  
75. Let me stress a few points  when it comes to the Report. First, on a very positive note, we 
know that the number of trade facilitatin g measures outweighs the number of trade restrictive 
measures but more importantly, the volume of trade that is covered by those trade facilitating 
measures is much higher than the volume of trade impacted by trade restrictive measures. I think 
this is a v ery good point that we should highlight.  
76. Now on another note, of course, there are some worrisome developments and the first one 
that comes to my mind is the one on export restrictions. There is an increasing pace since 2020, the 
beginning of the pandemic,  but the Report notes that many of those export restrictions have not 
been rolled back yet.  That leads me to raise two points of reflections. The First one is  that probably 
there is a gap in the WTO rules when it comes to export restrictions and that proba bly we should 
find a way to address. We tried to do that during the pandemic  with the WTO  response to the 
pandemic, but we somehow failed to do so. Now we have additional reasons to lean on that type of 
work. Although there are high political consideration s that may be the main drivers of the imposition 
of export restrictions, we have to raise serious concerns when these measures jeopardize food 
security and public health.  WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  77. Another source of concern is the number of trade concerns that is actually raising in  
WTO bodies. So , on the one hand, this is a good aspect because that means that Members use this 
international trade Body to raise concerns and to possibly deliberate on these concerns, but at the 
same time, we know that there is a growing number of trade concerns that are not getting resolved.  
Switzerland has always advocated for finding ways to solve more effectively and more efficiently 
those trade concerns , mediation procedures could be a way of conciliation. I guess the Report makes 
another case to sta rt talking about such aspects that are currently missing in the W TO. There is 
simply a need to improve or complement the W TO toolbox when it comes to the resolution of trade 
concerns.  
78. We also welcome the contributions by the OECD and other international or ganizations. 
I believe this amendment is beneficial for enhancing collaboration among the various organizations 
involved in the international trade sector.  We would encourage the Secretariat to continue down the 
road. 
79. The EU mentioned the Global Trade Helpdesk that is sheltered by the ITC. I would be happy 
to know more about the idea that they have in mind, but the Global Trade Helpdesk is certainly very 
useful when it comes to supporting M SMEs in their trade operations on a daily basis. I don 't know 
exactly how that would fit into this monitoring exercise, but I 'm curious and interested to have a 
talk on this.  
80. The last aspect is the one also raised by my colleague from the United  States, the participation  
of one third of the membership.  Unfortunately, this is still unsatisfactory , and we should find ways 
to improve that.  
81. The WTO has a central role to play in ensuring that supply chains are kept open and restrictive 
trade policies are avoided. Maintaining and enhancing transparency is key in contributing  to this 
objective. In that regard, I wish to recall the importance of the continuation and strengthening of 
this monitoring exercise.  
82. We believe that e mpowering the Secretariat in its monitoring role could benefit the whole 
membership. Let me emphasize th at transparency is a source of confidence and a matter for 
businesses, consumers , and policy makers. Therefore, we should not refrain from confirming the 
Secretariat 's requests for verification whenever the underlying measures are sourced in official 
websi tes. 
83. Finally, I would like to echo my colleagues from the United  States and the European  Union 
when it comes to notifications. Increasing transparency does not only mean to improve participation 
in this report or improving the quality of the monitoring rep orts. It is also a matter of respecting our 
notification obligations , and this very much applies to subsid ies notifications.  
JAPAN   
84. To begin with, we would like to express our appreciation to the Members involved and 
the WTO Secretariat for your contributi ons in compiling this report, which serves to further enhance 
the transparency of Members ' trade -related measures.  
85. Due to the recent rise in food and energy prices stemming from geopolitical factors as well as 
inflation and the increase of external debt fo r many Members, uncertainties surrounding the global 
economy have grown. In this context, the Report prepared by the Secretariat, which meticulously 
examines the trade -related measures of each Member and describes trends in the global economy 
using statist ical information, is a useful source of information.  
86. In this context, it is unfortunate that many Members did not participate in the preparation of 
this report. The involvement of more Members is essential to improve the completeness of this 
report. Japan hopes that more Members will be engaged with this practice from next year. And as 
previous speakers mentioned, Japan would like to contribute to find ways for more Members to join 
this important practice.  WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  87. This year, Japan took part in the TPRB through its own Review in Marc h, with 34  Members 
submitting over 700  written questions, and 56  Members making statements. Japan would like to 
express its appreciation once again to all those involved in our Review.  
88. With respect to the 7th TPRM Appraisal, we appreciate that Members reached consensus on 
the Report in July of this year. Japan again tha nks Ambassador Saqer  Abdullah  Almoqbel , and the 
Secretariat for their efforts to bring the discussions to a conclusion.  
89. Japan will implement the results achieved in the 7th Appraisal in its future TPR activities and 
operations, and will continue to activel y contribute to the various activities of the TPR.  
RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
90. Unfortunately, the Russian  Federation is disappointed with the recent Report of the 
WTO Secretariat and has to again express its concerns on the following issues.  
91. As far as we know, the WTO Trade Monitoring Report should be based on the information 
provided by the WTO  Members on measures taken by their governments. At the same time, the 
review of the economic situation and attempts to assess the causes of the crises as well as the 
analysi s of the measures taken by WTO  Members within the framework of these reports is the 
product of the Secretariat 's creativity.  
92. We believe that the purpose of this exercise should be to provide the objective and reasonable 
evaluation. Unfortunately, certain i nformation presented in the Report looks unreliable. A number of 
conclusions also seem biased and politicized.  
93. In particular, in the first sentences of the Report, the Secretariat highlights some 
circumstances, including inflation, situation in Ukraine, hi gh food and energy prices impacting the 
global economic environment. However, such important causes of the crises as unilateral restrictive 
measures, reckless monetary policies of some Members during the pandemic, imbalanced green 
policies, were given disp roportionately less consideration.  
94. Only one paragraph of the 94 -page report is devoted to the impact of the unilateral restrictive 
measures on the world economy. But unfortunately , the Secretariat just repeated what was stated 
in the previous reports that "the overwhelming majority of these measures were not specifically 
trade -related and applied to the financial, military, civil aviation, and energy sectors". It seems that 
the Secretariat increasingly departs from principles of objectivity and impartiality . 
95. We also would like to refer to para graph  3.108 where we see the reflection of position which 
has not been agreed within the WTO  Members. For example, the using term "environmentally 
harmful subsidies " was not accepted by all Members.  
96. In this report, the Secretariat states that "WTO Members must work collectively towards 
ensuring a successful and substantive outcome at MC13 ". Instead of use the one -sided approach 
and spreading such doubtful conclusions, the Secretariat could contribute to the de -politicization of 
the WTO by demonstrating its neutrality in the performance of its functions, including in the 
preparation of analytics.  
97. In addition, we would like to refer to the outcomes of the 7th Appraisal of the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanis m, where Members invited the Secretariat to reduce the frequency of its reports to 
an annual report in normal times, while maintaining flexibility to adjust their frequency in times of 
crisis, as appropriate. We fully support this idea.  
UNITED  KINGDOM  
98. The UK would like to thank the Secretariat for their efforts in preparing the Trade Monitoring 
Report. We have considered the insights it provides on trade related developments across the 
membership with great interest, and I wish to share a few observatio ns. 
99. The UK holds a firm and longstanding belief in the benefits of free and unrestricted trade. 
We were therefore pleased to read within the Report that the number of trade facilitating measures WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  identified over the current period considerably outweigh the number of trade restrictive measures. 
These figures represent welcome progress towards a more open international trade environment.  
100.  We are still concerned to note, however, that 2023 saw a relatively high number of recorded 
export and import restrictions. The Report also points out that the cumulative trade coverage of 
import restrictive measures on goods is now at a historical WTO high of 9.9% of total world imports.  
101.  Worryingly, many of these restrictive measures have been placed on food, feed, and fertili zers, 
with the WTO recording 75 such export measures still in force in October of this year. These export 
restrictions have a highly negative impact on food security, and therefore, on developing countries.  
102.  We urge all Members to engage constructively wit hin the upcoming MC13 to deliver an 
outcome which fully addresses food insecurity. This means beginning to address export restrictions 
within that full package. The UK has made proposals on this particular pillar of the agriculture 
negotiations, as have ot her Members, and we are working with them to combine the key elements. 
We urge others to engage positively and constructively to ensure MC13 can put us on the path to 
an outcome that meets all our ambitions.  
103.  We are disappointed that the Report fails to fu lly acknowledge the role that the 
Russia n Federation 's illegal invasion of Ukraine has had on global food security. There have been 
serious consequences to the Russia n Federation' s actions,  and we cannot pretend to ignore that.  
104.  Ukrainian grain exports are  crucial in ensuring global food security and the resilience of global 
grain markets. Before the Russia n Federation's  invasion Ukraine accounted for around 8 % to 10% 
of global wheat exports and 10 % to 12% of corn and barley exports.  
105.  The UK has been carefu l to ensure that none of our sanctions upon the Russia n Federation  
targeted food supplies. Instead, it is the Russia n Federation' s targeted and relentless attacks on 
Ukraine 's ports and grain infrastructure which have drastically limited Ukraine 's grain ex ports since 
early 2022, and we once again call on the Russia n Federation  to cease these attacks immediately 
and withdraw their forces.  
106.  I would now like to turn to one of the headline findings of the Report. Namely, the expectation 
that world merchandise v olume growth in 2023 will be lower, at 0.8%, than the WTO 's previous 
forecast of 1.7%.  
107.  We were pleased, however, to find some caveats to this concerning news. Firstly, LDCs appear 
to have outperformed the average in 2023, with provisional growth of 2.2% i n exports, and 1.2% 
in imports. Secondly, the forecast for 2024 looks much healthier for both world merchandise volume 
growth, at 3.3%, and LDC merchandise volume growth, at 5.6% for exports and 3.1% for imports.  
108.  The strong performance of LDCs within these  forecasts provides welcome evidence that 
the WTO is delivering for least developed countries. I hope that Members will make full use of the 
upcoming MC13 to further deliver for existing LDC Members, and that we will soon be able to 
welcome Comoros and Tim or Leste 's Accessions to this Organi zation.  
109.  I would like to conclude by noting that the Report highlights the continued issue of 
transparency across the WTO, which is acutely evident on the notification of subsidies.  
110.  The number of Members submitting subsid ies notifications has declined sharply since the WTO 
began, from 76% of Members submitting notifications in 1995 to now less than 50%, with only 31% 
of Members to date notifying subsidies as part of the most recent 2023 notification cycle.   
111.  Members fulfilling their notification obligations across all WTO  Agreement s is crucial to the 
proper functioning of this Organization and we would like to encourage any Members who are 
experiencing difficulties in fulfilling these obligations to seek hel p from Secretariat and from other 
Members.  WT/TPR/ OV/M/ 21 
 
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  DEPUTY DIRECTOR -GENERAL PAUGAM 'S CLOSING REMARKS  
112.  Allow me initially to thank delegations for having participated in the discussion and in the 
preparation of the Report. The active participation and the numerous co mments made reflect the 
importance that Members attach to this transparency exercise, especially at this very challenging 
time for the global economy and for global trade.  
113.  I also wish to assure you that I have taken good note of all the comments made and t hat I will 
convey them to the D irector -General . The Secretariat will build on all these valuable inputs and 
reflect on how to further improve the Trade Monitoring Exercise as we move forward.  
114.  I would like to emphasize the importance of Members' involvement  in the WTO Trade 
Monitoring Exercise , and I encourage all Members to further participate in it. Timely contributions to 
the Trade Monitoring Exercise are crucial to deliver factual and up -to-date reports and further 
strengthen the constructive stakeholder  relationship between Members and the Secretariat.  
115.  As for the Secretariat, I can assure you that it will continue to reach out to delegations – to 
further explain the exercise and to get your input on how to implement additional improvements to 
the Trade Monitoring Exercise.  
116.  Finally, I would like to echo what several delegations mentioned in terms of the value and 
usefulness of the Trade Monitoring Exercise and the importance of transparency for a healthy and 
well-functioning multilateral trading system.  
CHAIRPERSON'S CLOSING REMARKS  
117.  I think we have had a constructive meeting with substantial support for the Trade Monitoring 
Exercise  and the transparency platform it offers.  
118.  Before I conclude,  allow me just to make a brief remark on the participation in thi s report. 
The ability of the monitoring exercise to deliver factual and up -to-date information depends, to a 
very large extent, on the input of Members, in terms of providing and verifying information which 
can only be obtained from you, the Members. Overa ll, the Secretariat receive d a good cooperation 
from many Members. However, some regions remain underrepresented in the provision of requested 
information.  
119.  Actually, for the current Report, there was a participation rate of just under 50% of 
the membership, representing 93% of world imports.  
120.  In other words, there is still room for improvement. As mentioned earlier, with your support, 
the Secretariat has introduced a digital platform for the submission and verification of measures. 
I urge you to c ontinue to assist the Secretariat in ensuring the high quality and accuracy of the 
monitoring reports.  
121.  Before I close the meeting, I would like to remind you that the next TPRB meeting will take 
place tomorrow, 8  December  2023 with the second day of the TPR of Hong  Kong,  China. I look 
forward to seeing you again tomorrow and I wish you all a good evening.  
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