G/SPS/GEN/1802  
 
2 July 2020 
(20-4584) Page: 1/3 
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  Original: English  
 
STC 448: EU MRLS FOR  BUPROFEZIN, CHLOROT HALONIL, DIFLUBENZUR ON, 
ETHOXYSULFURON, GLUF OSINATE, IMAZALIL, I OXYNIL, IPRODIONE,  
MOLINATE, PICOXYSTRO BIN AND TEPRALOXYDIM  
SUBMISSION  BY THE UNITED  STATES  
The following document , received on 26 June 2020, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the United Sta tes. 
 
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1.1.  The United States thanks the sponsoring Members  for continuing to support inclusion of this 
important issue  on the Committee 's agenda.  
1.2.  We remain deeply concerned over the European Union 's implementation of  pesticide policies 
that lower maximum residue levels (MRLs) to trade restrictive levels without clear scientific 
justification or measurable benefit to huma n health . The European Union's  codification of  a 
hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation and implementation of the so -called "precautionary 
principle " is adversely impacting global agricultural production and trade, particularly in developing 
countri es. 
1.3.  The E uropean Union has claimed that its pesticide and  MRL measures are transparent, science -
based, and non -discriminatory.  Unfortunately, we do not find the  EU claims about its  regulatory 
procedures or its "high level of protection " to comport with its  actions.  
1.4.  As the United States conveyed  in our November 2019 statements to the Committee  — 
circulated  as G/SPS/GEN/1749  and G/SPS/GEN/1750  — we continue to have  serious concerns about  
the scientific underpinnings, objectivity, and consistency in application of EU measures.  
1.5.  At the November 2019 meeting, the European Union  responded to our concerns only by saying 
that our statement was lengthy.  We agree.  Our itemiz ed account of concerns regarding the  scientific 
underpinnings, objectivity, and consistenc y of EU actions was lengthy.  Again, as one of our largest 
trading partners, w e invite the European Union  to respond in good faith to our concerns detailed in 
document s G/SPS/ GEN/1749 and G/SPS/ GEN/1750.  
1.6.  Beyond the concerns previously detailed, we are troubled by  additional actions taken by the 
European Union. We would like to bring the attention of the Committee to recent actions taken by 
the European Union that raise serious questions regarding its implementation of the SPS Agreement.  
1.7.  First, we recall the precedent set in March 2019, when the European Parliament blocked the 
implementation of an import MRL for clothianidin on potatoes , despite determinations  by the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) and European Commission that the proposed import MRL 
met all approval and safety criteria.  
1.8.  The European Commission 's subsequent withdrawal of the proposed import MRL, based on the 
Parliament 's objection s, appe ars to contradict the E uropean Union's repeated assurances to this 
Committee that EU MRLs will be established through an objective, risk -based process.  G/SPS/GEN/1802  
 
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  1.9.  In April 2020, the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety of the 
European Parliament passed a resolution to block the implementation of MRLs for a series of 
products, despite determinations by EFSA and the European Commission that the proposed MRLs 
met all approval and safety criteria.  
1.10.   In this case, we understand that a COVID -19-related suspension prevented the European 
Parliament from acting on the resolution within the established legislative timelines.  Will the 
European Commission r esubmit a draft Commission regulation to set these MRLs at the same level 
recommended in its original draft resolution?  If the European Commission is considering lowering 
these MRLs in a resubmission, we ask the E uropean Union to explain the basis for such  changes.  
1.11.   In addition to the Farm to Fork Strategy, the Commission released in May 2020 the Pesticide 
REFIT evaluating Regula tions 1107/2009 and 396/2005.  Recalling that over 40 Members have in 
this Committee raised concerns about these Regulations in the  last five years, we invite the E uropean 
Union to inform the Committee how it intends to implement several conclusions contained in the 
Pesticide REFIT in a manner consistent with its obligations under the SPS Agreement, including the 
obligation to base su ch measures on risk assessment.  
1.12.   The Pesticide REFIT calls for improved implementation of the "cut-off criteria " contained in 
Regulation 1107/2009, including:  (1) through increased certainty in the use of the cut -off criteria, 
and (2) by only continuing to  conduct a full risk assessment if either the active substances do not 
meet the cut -off criteria or a least one of the derogation possibilities is invoked.  
1.13.   In light of the many questions in our previous statements on: (1) how the E uropean Union is 
achievi ng consistency in the level of protection it considers appropriate with respect its actions on 
specific substances, (2) whether or not the E uropean Union applies a weight of evidence approach 
when considering, for example, genotoxicity data, and (3) the op eration of the derogation provisions, 
we invite the E uropean Union to explain how it will attain increased certainty going forward in the 
use of cut -off criteria and when it will invoke derogations.  
1.14.   If the E uropean Union will no longer conduct "full risk assessments " on substances meeting 
the "cut-off criteria ", we also ask the E uropean Union to explain the relationship of the assessments 
it will undertake to the elements established by Codex guidelines.  
1.15.   We are also inte rested in the E uropean Union's plans announced in the Pesticide REFIT, to 
use all of its "diplomacy, trade policy, and development support instruments " to promote adoption 
of its hazard -based approach to pesticides in third countries, as well as to encoura ge support of its 
approach in the WTO SPS Committee and the Codex Alimentarius.  The REFIT document makes clear 
that EU diplomatic, trade, and development policies are intended to "ensure a level -playing field for 
EU operators. "  
1.16.   Article 12 of the SPS Agree ment directs the Committee to carry out the functions necessary 
to implement its provisions and to further its objectives.  We welcome other Members ' views on  the 
European Union's intention to level the playing field for EU operators by , what would appear t o be, 
restricting market access on the basis of use of crop protection tools that are deemed safe through 
scientific evaluation by competent regulato ry authorities around the world , as well as to use th is 
Committee to advance these objectives.   
1.17.   With respec t to the REFIT reference to Codex, we note that last year, the E uropean Union 
requested that the Joint FAO/WHO Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) re-evaluat ed certain 
substances that are being banned in the E uropean Union. In September 2019, the JMPR eva luated 
the European Union's  concern forms for several such substances and disagreed with the EU findings.  
On the basis of risk assessments, JMPR reaffirmed the safety of existing Codex MRLs for these 
substances. Around the world, national regulators, JMPR,  and Codex are being compelled to divert 
limited resources to defend risk -based evaluations of substances already deemed safe for 
agricultural use and for consumers.  Meanwhile, the EU efforts are contributing to an erosion of public 
confidence in risk-based regulatory systems and casting unwarranted doubt in consumers ' minds 
about the safety of the global food supply.  We invite the E uropean Union to explain how its efforts 
advance implementation of the SPS Agreement and further its objectives.  G/SPS/GEN/1802  
 
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  1.18.   Lastly, our growers and processors are increasingly concerned that the E uropean Union 
continues to implement transition measures that do not provide adequate time for legally produced 
commodities to clear the channels of trade , and that appear to establish dif ferences in treatment 
between domestic and imported products.  
1.19.   If the European Union's  short transitional measures for imported products are based on health 
concerns, as the European Union  has claimed, then why are MRL changes only notified to the SPS 
Commi ttee after EU producers  have benefitted from grace periods that ensure their own treated 
products can clear the channels of trade?  Why has the European Union  not extended corresponding 
grace periods or transition measures to foreign producers?  
1.20.   In the European Union 's response to US comments on G/SPS/N/EU/248  — one of the first 
notified EU MRL measures to introduce the transition measures in question  — the European Union  
explicitly acknowledged that non -EU countries would have a  shorter time to comply with new MRLs 
compared to EU member States.  
1.21.   Although the European Union  indicated during our last meeting in November 2019 that it 
would begin notifying its pesticide non -renewal measures to the SPS Committee, it is not clear what 
steps the European Union  plans to take to ensure that its transition measures do not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate between its own territory and that of other Members.  
1.22.   As conveyed at the Council for Trade in Goods in November 2019  and June 2020 , and as 
emphasized in the joint statement found in document G/C/W/767/Rev.1 , farmers around the world 
rely on access to the full range of tools and technologies available for agricultural production , and 
these tools are essential to mitigate food security risks and to alleviate po verty.  
1.23.   This access  is facilitated by well -functioning, objective , and science -based regulatory systems 
that protect consumers and establish the basis for fair trade.  
1.24.   This access  is critical to protecting crops from pests and diseases, which are estimated t o 
cause annual losses of 20 to 40 %, and allows farmers to enhance yields and productivity while also 
limiting post -harvest losses and reducing unnecessary food waste, thus ensuring that the resources 
invested in producing food are being managed efficiently  and sustainably.  
1.25.   This access promotes an abundant supply of affordable , safe food to meet the growing 
demands of global consumers , many of whom rely directly or indirectly on agriculture to sustain 
their livelihoods.  
1.26.   And yet, despite the concerns express ed by an unprecedented number of Members in the SPS 
and TBT Committees over the past 4 years, the European Union  continues to implement measures 
that jeopardize this access , without clear scientific justification  or measurable health benefit , and 
without a pparent regard for the potential to undermine rural livelihoods and sustainable 
development .  
1.27.   For these reasons, we once again call on the European Union  to re-evaluate its approach to 
regulating pesticides ; to confirm that import MRLs will be established on the basis of science and 
internationally -accepted approaches to risk analysis; and to cease implementation of  those 
measures that unnecessarily restrict international trade.  
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