WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
29 April 2022 
(22-3369) Page: 1/107 
  Original: English  
 
  
EUROPEAN UNION – SAFEGUARD MEASURES  
ON CERTAIN STEEL PRODUCTS  
REPORT OF THE PANEL  
Addendum  
This addendum  contains Annexes A to C to the Report of the Panel to be found in document  
WT/DS595/R . 
 
 
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 WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  LIST OF ANNEXES  
ANNEX  A 
PANEL DOCUMENTS  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel  4 
Annex  A-2 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel for the first substantive meeting  11 
Annex  A-3 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel for the second substantive meeting  15 
Annex  A-4 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel 18 
Annex  A-5 Interim Review  19 
ANNEX B  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Turkey  39 
Annex  B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European  Union  57 
ANNEX  C 
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Argentina  78 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil  81 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada  84 
Annex  C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  86 
Annex  C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Republic of Korea  90 
Annex  C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Switzerland  95 
Annex  C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine  100 
Annex  C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United Kingdom  102 
Annex  C-9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States  105 
 
 
 WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX  A 
PANEL DOCUMENTS  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel  4 
Annex  A-2 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel for the first substantive meeting  11 
Annex  A-3 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel for the second substantive meeting  15 
Annex  A-4 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel 18 
Annex  A-5 Interim Review  19 
 
 WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX  A-1 
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL  
Adopted on 26 October 2020  
General  
1. (1) In this proceeding, the Panel shall follow the relevant provisions of the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ( "DSU"). In addition, the 
following Working Procedures appl y.  
(2) The Panel reserves the right to modify these procedures as necessary, after consultation 
with the parties.  
Confidentiality  
2. (1) The deliberations of the Panel and the documents submitted to it shall be kept 
confidential. Members shall treat as co nfidential information that is submitted to the Panel 
which the submitting Member has designated as confidential.  
(2) In accordance with the DSU, nothing in these Working Procedures shall preclude a party 
or third party from disclosing statements of its o wn positions to the public.  
(3) If a party submits a confidential version of its written submissions to the Panel, it shall 
also, upon request of a Member, provide a non -confidential summary of the information 
contained in its submissions that could be di sclosed to the public. The Panel may, upon 
request, fix a time -limit within which the party should endeavour to provide such summary.  
(4) Upon request, the Panel may adopt appropriate additional procedures for the treatment 
and handling of confidential inf ormation after consultation with the parties.  
Submissions  
3. (1) Before the first substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties, each party shall 
transmit to the Panel, in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel:  
a. a first written submissi on, in which it presents the facts of the case and its arguments; 
and 
b. a written rebuttal.  
(2) Each third party that chooses to make a written submission before the first substantive 
meeting of the Panel with the parties shall do so in accordance with th e timetable adopted by 
the Panel.  
(3) The Panel may invite the parties or third parties to make  additional submissions during 
the proceeding, including with respect to requests for preliminary rulings in accordance with 
paragraph 4 below.  
Preliminary rulings  
4. (1) If the European Union considers that the Panel should make a ruling before the issua nce 
of the Report that certain measures or claims in the panel request or the complainant 's first 
written submission are not properly before the Panel, the following procedure applies. 
Exceptions to this procedure shall be granted upon a showing of good ca use.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  a. The European Union shall submit any such request for a preliminary ruling at the earliest 
possible opportunity and in any event no later than in its first written submission to the 
Panel and shall identify clearly that it seeks a ruling pursuant t o the present procedure. 
Turkey shall submit its response to the request before the first substantive meeting of the 
Panel, at a time to be determined by the Panel in light of the request.  
b. The Panel may issue a preliminary ruling on the issues raised in  such a preliminary ruling 
request before, during or after the first substantive meeting, or the Panel may defer a 
ruling on the issues raised by a preliminary ruling request until it issues its Report to the 
parties.  
c. If the Panel finds it appropriate to issue a preliminary ruling before the issuance of its 
Report, the Panel may provide reasons for the ruling at the time that the ruling is made, 
or subsequently in its Report.  
d. Any request for such a preliminary ruling by the European Union before the  first meeting, 
and any subsequent submissions of the parties in relation thereto before the first meeting, 
shall be served on all third parties. The Panel shall provide all third parties with an 
opportunity to provide comments on any such request, either in their submissions as 
provided for in the timetable or separately. Any preliminary ruling issued by the Panel 
before the first substantive meeting on whether certain measures or claims are properly 
before the Panel shall be shared with all third parties.   
(2) This procedure is without prejudice to the parties ' right to request other types of 
preliminary or procedural rulings during the proceeding, and to the procedures that the Panel 
may follow with respect to such requests.  
Evidence  
5. (1) Each party sha ll submit all evidence to the Panel with its first written submission, except 
evidence necessary for purposes of rebuttal, or evidence necessary for answers to questions 
or comments on answers provided by the other party. Additional exceptions may be grant ed 
upon a showing of good cause.  
(2) If any new evidence has been admitted upon a showing of good cause, the Panel shall 
accord the other party an appropriate period of time to comment on the new evidence 
submitted.  
6. (1) If the original language of an e xhibit or portion thereof is not a WTO working language, 
the submitting party or third party shall simultaneously submit a translation of the exhibit or 
relevant portion into the WTO working language of the submission. The Panel may grant 
reasonable extens ions of time for the translation of exhibits upon a showing of good cause.  
(2) Any objection as to the accuracy of a translation should be raised promptly in writing, 
preferably no later than the next submission or meeting (whichever occurs earlier) follo wing 
the submission which contains the translation in question, exceptions being permissible upon 
a showing of good cause. Any objection shall be accompanied by an explanation of the grounds 
for the objection and an alternative translation.  
7. (1) To faci litate the maintenance of the record of the dispute and maximize the clarity of 
submissions, each party and third party shall sequentially number its exhibits throughout the 
course of the dispute, indicating the submitting Member and the number of each exh ibit on its 
cover page. Exhibits submitted by the European Union should be numbered EU -1, EU -2, etc. 
Exhibits submitted by Turkey should be numbered TUR -1, TUR -2, etc. If the last exhibit in 
connection with the first submission was numbered TUR -5, the firs t exhibit in connection with 
the next submission thus would be numbered TUR -6. If a party withdraws an exhibit or leaves 
one or more exhibits intentionally blank, it should indicate this on the cover page that provides 
the number of the blank exhibit.  
(2) Each party shall provide an updated list of exhibits (in Word or Excel format) together 
with each of its submissions, oral statements, and responses to questions.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  (3) If a party submits a document that has already been submitted as an exhibit by the 
other  party, it should explain why it is submitting that document again.  
(4) If a party includes a hyperlink to the content of a website in a submission, and intends 
that the cited content form part of the official record, the cited content of the website shall  be 
provided in the form of an exhibit along with an indication of the date that it was accessed.  
Editorial Guide  
8. In order to facilitate the work of the Panel, each party and third party is invited to make its 
submissions in accordance with the WTO Edit orial Guide for Panel Submissions (electronic copy 
provided).  
Questions  
9. (1) In accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel,  following the parties ' first 
written submissions and the third parties ' written submissions : 
a. The Panel may pose questions in writing to the parties and the third parties, to which 
the parties and third parties shall respond within the set time -frame.  
b. A party may pose questions to the other party, to which the other party shall respond 
within the set time -frame.  
(2) The Panel may pose questions to the parties and third parties at any other time, 
including:  
a. Before any meeting, the Panel may send written questions, or a list of topics it intends 
to pursue in questioning orally during a meeting. The Panel may ask d ifferent or 
additional questions at the meeting.  
b. The Panel may put questions to the parties and third parties orally during a meeting, 
and in writing following the meeting, as provided for in paragraphs 15 and 21 below.  
Substantive meetings  
10. The Pan el shall meet in closed session.  
11. The parties shall be present at the meetings only when invited by the Panel to appear before it.  
12. (1) Each party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when 
meeting with the Panel.  
(2) Each party shall have the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall 
ensure that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these 
Working  Procedures, particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceeding and t he 
submissions of the parties and third parties.  
13. Each party shall provide to the Panel the list of members of its delegation no later 
than 5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) three working days before the first day of each meeting with the 
Panel.  
14. A request for  interpretation by any party should be made to the Panel as early as possible, 
preferably at the organizational stage, to allow sufficient time to ensure availability of interpreters.  
15. The Panel shall hold at least one substantive meeting with the parti es. Upon request by either 
party, the Panel may hold a second substantive meeting with the parties. The first and 
second  substantive meetings of the Panel with the parties shall be conducted as follows:  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  a. The Panel shall invite Turkey to make an opening statement to present its case first. 
Subsequently, the Panel shall invite the European Union to present its point of view. 
Before each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at 
the meeting with a provisional written versio n of its statement. If interpretation is 
needed, each party shall provide additional copies for the interpreters before taking the 
floor. 
b. Each party should avoid lengthy repetition of the arguments in its submissions. Each 
party is invited to limit the duration of its opening statement according to the Panel 's 
instructions issued prior to the meeting. If either party considers that it requires more 
time for its opening statement, it should inform the Panel and the other party at least 
7 days before the m eeting, together with an estimate of the expected duration of its 
statement. The Panel will accord equal time to the other party.  
c. After the conclusion of the opening statements, the Panel shall give each party the 
opportunity to make comments or ask the  other party questions.  
d. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to the parties.  
e. Once the questioning has concluded, the Panel shall afford each party an opportunity to 
present a brief closing statement, with Turkey presenting its statement first. Before 
each party takes the floor, it shall provide the Panel and other participants at the 
meeting with a provisional written version of its closing statement, if available.  
f. Following the meeting:  
i. Each party shall submit a final wri tten version of its opening statement no later than 
5.00 p.m. (Geneva time) on the first working day following the meeting. At the same 
time, each party should also submit a final written version of any prepared closing 
statement that it delivered at the m eeting.  
ii. Each party shall send in writing, within the timeframe established by the Panel before 
the end of the meeting, any questions to the other party to which it wishes to receive 
a response in writing.  
iii. The Panel shall send in writing, within th e timeframe established by the Panel before 
the end of the meeting, any questions to the parties to which it wishes to receive a 
response in writing.  
iv. Each party shall respond in writing to the questions from the Panel, and to any 
questions posed by the  other party, within the time -frame established by the Panel 
before the end of the meeting.  
Third party session  
16. Each third party may present its views orally during a session of the first substantive meeting 
with the parties set aside for that purpose.  
17. Each third party shall indicate to the Panel whether it intends to make an oral statement during 
the third -party session, along with the list of members of its delegation, in advance of this session 
and no later than 5.00  p.m. (Geneva time) three work ing days before the third -party session of the 
meeting with the Panel.  
18. Each third party has the right to determine the composition of its own delegation when 
meeting with the Panel.  
19. Each third party shall have the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall ensure 
that each member of its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and these Working Procedures, 
particularly with regard to the confidentiality of the proceeding and the submissions of the parties 
and third parties.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  20. A request for interpretation by any third party should be made to the Panel as early as 
possible, preferably upon receiving the working procedures and timetable for the proceeding, to 
allow sufficient time to ensure availability of interpreters.  
21. The third -party session shall be conducted as follows:  
a. All parties and third parties may be present during the entirety of this session.  
b. The Panel shall first hear the oral statements of the third parties. Each third party making 
an oral statement at the thi rd-party session shall provide the Panel and other participants 
with a provisional written version of its statement before it takes the floor. If interpretation 
of a third party 's oral statement is needed, that third party shall provide additional copies 
for the interpreters before taking the floor.  
c. Each third party should limit the duration of its statement according to the Panel 's 
instructions issued prior to the session and avoid repetition of the arguments already in 
its submission. If a third party  considers that it requires more time for its opening 
statement, it should inform the Panel and the parties at least 7  days before the meeting, 
together with an estimate of the expected duration of its statement. The Panel will accord 
equal time to all thi rd parties for their statements.  
d. After the third parties have made their statements, the parties shall be given the 
opportunity to pose questions to any third party for clarification on any matter raised in 
that third party 's submission or statement.  
e. The Panel may subsequently pose questions to any third party.  
f. Following the third -party session:  
i. Each third party shall submit the final written version of its oral statement, no later 
than 5.00  p.m. (Geneva time) on the first working day following the meeting.  
ii. Each party may send in writing, within the timeframe to be established by the Panel 
before the end of the meeting, any questions to one or more third parties to which it 
wishes to receive a response in writing.  
iii. The Panel may send in writing, within the timeframe to be established by the Panel 
before the end of the meeting, any questio ns to one or more third parties to which it 
wishes to receive a response in writing.  
iv. Each third party choosing to do so shall respond in writing to written questions from 
the Panel or a party, within a timeframe established by the Panel before the end  of the 
meeting.  
Descriptive part and executive summaries  
22. The description of the arguments of the parties and third parties in the descriptive part of the 
Panel report shall consist of executive summaries provided by the parties and third parties, whic h 
shall be annexed as addenda to the report. These executive summaries shall not in any way serve 
as a substitute for the submissions of the parties and third parties in the Panel 's examination of the 
case.  
23. Each party shall submit a single integrated executive summary of the facts and arguments as 
presented to the Panel in its written submissions and oral statement(s), in accordance with the 
timetable adopted by the Panel.  
24. The integrated executive summary shall not exceed 30 pages.  
25. The Panel ma y request the parties and third parties to provide executive summaries of facts 
and arguments presented in any other submissions to the Panel for which a deadline may not be 
specified in the timetable.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  26. Each third party shall submit an integrated execut ive summary of its arguments as presented 
in its written submission and statement in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel. This 
integrated executive summary may also include a summary of responses to questions, if relevant. 
The executive summ ary to be provided by each third party shall not exceed six  pages. If the 
document(s) comprising a third -party submission and/or oral statement does not exceed six pages 
in total, this will serve as the executive summary of that third party 's arguments unl ess the 
third party submits a separate integrated executive summary or otherwise indicates that it does not 
wish those document(s) to serve as its executive summary.  
Interim review  
27. Following issuance of the interim report, each party may submit a written request to review 
precise aspects of the interim report and request a further meeting with the Panel, in accordance 
with the timetable adopted by the Panel. The right to request such  a meeting shall be exercised no 
later than at the time the written request for review is submitted.  
28. Each party may submit written comments on the other party 's written request for review. 
Such written comments shall be limited to the other party 's written request for review and shall be 
submitted in accordance with the timetable adopted by the Panel.  
Interim and Final Report  
29. The interim report, as well as the final report before its official circulation, shall be kept strictly 
confidential and sh all not be disclosed.  
Service of documents  
30. The following procedures regarding service of documents apply to all documents submitted by 
parties and third parties during the proceeding:  
a. Each party and third  party shall send an email to the DS Registry  attaching an electronic 
copy of all documents that it submits to the Panel, preferably in both Microsoft Word and 
PDF format. All such emails to the Panel shall be addressed to DSRegistry@wto.org and 
copied to other WTO Secretariat staff whose email addre sses have been provided to the 
parties during the proceeding. If it is not possible to attach all the exhibits to one email, 
the submitting party or third party may send separate emails. If the number of emails 
necessary to transmit the exhibits would exce ed 5 or any one exhibit is too large to be 
transmitted via email, the party shall upload the relevant exhibits to the Disputes On -line 
Registry Application (DORA). The email version sent to the DS Registry shall constitute 
the official version for the purp oses of submission deadlines and the record of the dispute, 
and shall, with respect to the due dates established by the Panel, be sent by 5.00  p.m. 
(Geneva time).  
b. In addition, each party is invited to submit all documents through DORA within 24  hours 
following the deadline for the submission of the paper versions. If the parties or 
third parties have any questions or technical difficulties relating to DORA, they are invited 
to consult the User Guide available in the "Help" section of DORA and if necessar y contact 
the DS Registry ( DSRegistry@wto.org ). 
c. Following email submission, each party and third party shall submit two paper copies of 
all documents it submits to the Panel, including the exhibits, with the DS Registry 
(office  No. 2047) by 5:00 p.m. (Geneva time) the next business day. If, for any reason, 
the WTO building is extraordinarily closed, the "next business day " will mean the day that 
the Panel determines for such filings once normal operations have re sumed. If the Member 
does not have a mission or representative in Geneva the submissions may be sent by post 
or courier and must have a postmark or proof that they were sent the next business day 
after the submission was due. The DS Registrar shall stamp t he documents with the date 
and time of receipt. If an exhibit is in a format that is impractical to submit as a paper 
copy, then the party may submit such exhibit in electronic format (e.g. USB key). In this 
case, the cover page of the exhibit should indic ate that the exhibit is only available in 
electronic format.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  d. The receipt of the email by the DS Registry shall constitute service on the Panel. Each 
party shall serve any document submitted to the Panel directly on the other party. A party 
shall submit its documents to the other party by email. Each party shall confirm, in writing, 
that it has served on the other party, as appropriate, at the same time it provides each 
document to the Panel, a copy of such documents. Each party shall, in addition, serve any 
document submitted in advance of the first substantive meeting with the Panel directly on 
the third parties. The receipt of the email by the other party and the third  parties (where 
relevant) shall constitute service.  
e. As a general rule, all communic ations from the Panel to the parties and third  parties will 
be via email. In addition to transmitting them to the parties by email, the Panel shall 
provide the parties with a paper copy of the Interim Report and the Final Report upon 
request.  
Correction of clerical errors in submissions  
31. The Panel may grant leave to a party or third  party to correct clerical errors in any of its 
submissions (including paragraph numbering and typographical mistakes). Any such request should 
identify the natur e of the errors to be corrected, and should be made promptly following the filing 
of the submission in question.  
Developments in circumstances  
32. The Panel will conduct the proceedings and apply the present procedures in such a way as to 
mitigate circums tances arising from the COVID -19 pandemic. The Panel may provide further 
guidance in that regard as any such circumstances develop. If the Panel considers that the present 
Working Procedures cannot be applied effectively because of the COVID -19 pandemic, t he Panel 
may modify these Procedures after consultation with the parties.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX A -2 
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL FOR  
THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING  
Adopted on 31  March  2021  
General  
1. The first substantive meeting with the Panel will be conducted via remote participation through 
Cisco WebEx Meetings.  
Definitions  
2. For the p urposes of these additional Working Procedures:  
"DORA"  means the Disputes Online Registry Application.  
"Host"  means the designated person within the WTO Secretariat responsible for the 
management of the platform for remote participants to participate in the meeting with the 
Panel.  
"Participant"  means any authorized person attending the meeting including the membe rs of 
the Panel, the WTO Secretariat staff involved in the dispute and the organization of the 
meeting, members of the parties ' and third parties ' delegations, and interpreters.  
"Platform"  means the Cisco Webex Meetings platform.  
Equipment and technical requirements  
3. Each party and third party shall be responsible for ensuring that the members of its delegation 
participating in the meeting with the Panel remotely join the hearing using the designated platform, 
and meet the minimum equipment and technica l requirements set out by the platform provider for 
the effective conduct of the meeting.  
4. Any technical questions that the participants may have, including the minimum equipment 
and technical requirements for the usage of the platform, will be addressed  in the advance testing 
sessions provided for in paragraph  7 below.  
Technical support  
5. (1) The host will provide participants with technical support pertaining to the platform and its 
functionality in preparation for, and during the course of, the meeting with the Panel.  
(2) The host will prioritize assisting those participants designated as main speakers on the 
delegations ' list in accordance with paragraph  6 below.  
(3) Each party and third party shall be responsible for its own technical support p ertaining to 
issues not related to the platform.  
Pre-meeting  
Registration  
6. Each party and third party shall provide to the Panel, on a dedicated form to be provided by 
the Panel Secretary, the list of the members of its delegation no later than 5:00 p.m.  (Geneva time) 
on Tuesday 20  April 2021, to allow for advance testing as provided in paragraph  7, below. Such list WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  shall include all members of each party 's and third party 's delegation. Each party or third party shall 
indicate who among their participants  will be their main speaker(s).  
Advance testing  
7. On dates to be determined in due course, the Secretariat will hold (a) a separate test session 
for each party and third party; and (b) a joint session with all participants (including all parties, 
third parties, and the panelists). Such sessions will seek to reflect, as far as possible, the conditions 
of the proposed meeting. All participants should make themselves available for the test sessions.  
Advance questions  
8. At the time specified in the Panel 's timetable, the Panel will send parties and third parties an 
advance copy of questions it intends to pose during the meeting. By that same time, the parties 
may also send each other an advance copy of questions they intend to pose to each other or to 
third parties during the meeting. This is without prejudice to the possibility for the Panel and the 
parties to pose additional questions during the meeting. This is also without prejudice to 
paragraphs  15(f)(ii) -(iv) and 21(f)(ii) -(iv) of the Working Procedures o f the Panel adopted on 
26 October  2020.  
Confidentiality and security  
9. As set out in paragraph  12(2) of the Working Procedures of the Panel, each party shall have 
the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall ensure that each member of 
its delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and the Panel 's Working Procedures with regard to 
the confidentiality of the proceeding.  
10. The remote participants shall connect to the meeting through a secure internet connection 
and shall avoid the use of an open or public internet connection.  
Conduct of the meeting  
Recording  
11. The meeting will be recorded in its entirety via the platform.  The recording of the meeting will 
form part of the Panel record.  
12. The parties and third  parties are strictly prohibited from:  
(1) Recording, via audio, video, screenshot, or otherwise, the meeting or any part thereof; 
and  
(2) Permitting any non -author ized person to record, via audio, video, screenshot, or 
otherwise, the meeting or any part thereof.  
Access to the virtual meeting room  
13. The participants shall access the virtual meeting room in accordance with these 
Additional  Working Procedures.  
14. (1) The host will invite remote participants via email to join the virtual meeting room.  
(2) For security reasons, access to the virtual meeting will be password -protected and limited 
to participants. Participants shall not forward or share  the virtual meeting link or password 
with unauthorized persons.  
(3) Each party and third  party shall ensure that only participants from its delegation join the 
virtual meeting room.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  Advance log -on 
15. (1) The virtual meeting room will be accessible 60  minutes in advance of the scheduled start 
time of each session of the meeting with the Panel.  
(2) Remote participants shall log on to the platform at least 30  minutes in advance of the 
scheduled start time of each session of the meeting with the Panel.  
(3) Remote p articipants will be placed in a virtual lobby where they will remain until the Panel 
is ready to start the meeting, at which time the host will admit them to the meeting.  
Document sharing  
16. (1) Before each party or third party takes the floor to  deliver its opening statement, it shall 
provide the Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of 
the statement through DORA, clearly marking it "check against delivery".  
(2) Before each party takes the floor to delive r its closing statement, it shall provide the Panel 
and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of the statement, if 
available, through DORA, clearly marking it "check against delivery".  
(3) Any participant wishing to share a d ocument with the other participants during the meeting 
will do so through DORA.  
(4) Parties and third  parties shall then submit the final written version of their opening and 
closing statements, and copies of any other documents shared with the other part icipants 
during the meeting, by the deadline set forth in paragraph 21(f)(i) of the Working Procedures 
adopted on 26  October  2020, and in accordance with the rules for service of documents in 
paragraph 30 of the same Working Procedures.  
Communication breakdown  
17. Each party and third  party will designate a contact person who can liaise with the host during 
the course of the me eting to report any technical issues that arise with respect to the platform. 
The parties and third  parties shall immediately notify the Panel of any technical or connectivity issues 
affecting the participation of their delegation, or a member of their del egation, in the meeting. To 
do so, the party or third party that experiences the technical or connectivity issue shall:  
(1) If possible, immediately intervene at the meeting and briefly state the nature of the issue 
experienced; or  
(2) If doing so is not  possible, immediately contact the host and explain the nature of the 
issue experienced. The host can be contacted via the platform, by sending an email to 
olga.falguerasalamo@wto.org , or by calling at +41  22 739 67  46. 
18. After consulting the parties and the third  parties as appropriate, the Panel may postpone the 
proceedings until the technical issue is resolved or continue the proceedings with those that continue 
to be connected.  
Length of opening statements  
19. Each party is requested to limit the length of its opening statement to 45  minutes.  
20. Each third party is requested to limit the length of its opening statement to 15  minutes.  
Interventions  
21. If a participant wishes to take the f loor, the participant should use the "raise a hand" function 
in the platform, so that the Panel can give the floor to the participant and allow the participant to 
unmute their microphone and turn their camera on.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  22. The Panel may briefly pause a session a t any time, at its own initiative or upon request by a 
party, to enable any necessary internal coordination and consultation within a party 's delegation 
and/or among the panelists.  
Interpretation  
23. With current technical means, simultaneous interpretatio n on the platform is not possible. If 
requested, consecutive interpretation of interventions from an official WTO language to the language 
of the proceedings is possible. Such a request shall be made no later than Tuesday 20  April 2021.  
Relationship with t he Working Procedures of the Panel adopted on 26  October  2020  
24. These additional Working Procedures complement the Working Procedures of the Panel 
adopted on 26  October  2020, and prevail over the latter to the extent of a conflict.  
 WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX A -3 
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL FOR 
THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE MEETING  
Adopted on 2  June  2021  
General  
1. The second substantive meeting with the Panel will be conducted via remote participation 
through Cisco WebEx Meetings.  
Definitions  
2. For the purposes of these additional Working Procedures:  
"DORA" means the Disputes Online Registry Application.  
"Host"  means the designated person within the WTO Secretariat responsible for the 
management of the platform for remote participants to participate in the meeting with the 
Panel.  
"Participant"  means any authorized person attending the meeting including the membe rs of 
the Panel, the WTO Secretariat staff involved in the dispute and the organization of the 
meeting, members of the parties' delegations, and interpreters.  
"Platform"  means the Cisco Webex Meetings platform.  
Equipment and technical requirements  
3. Each party shall be responsible for ensuring that the members of its delegation participating 
in the meeting with the Panel remotely join the hearing using the designated platform, and meet 
the minimum equipment and technical requirements set out by the platfor m provider for the effective 
conduct of the meeting.  
4. Any technical questions that the participants may have, including the minimum equipment 
and technical requirements for the usage of the platform, will be addressed in the advance testing 
sessions prov ided for in paragraph  7 below.  
Technical support  
5. (1) The host will provide participants with technical support pertaining to the platform and its 
functionality in preparation for, and during the course of, the meeting with the Panel.  
(2) The host will p rioritize assisting those participants designated as main speakers on the 
delegations' list in accordance with paragraph  6 below.  
(3) Each party shall be responsible for its own technical support pertaining to issues not related 
to the platform.  
Pre-meetin g 
Registration  
6. Each party shall provide to the Panel, on a dedicated form to be provided by the Panel 
Secretary, the list of the members of its delegation no later than 5  p.m. (Geneva time) on 
Tuesday  15 June 2021, to allow for advance testing as provid ed in paragraph  7, below. Such list WT/DS595/R/Add. 1 
 
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  shall include all members of each party's  delegation. Each party shall indicate who among their 
participants will be their main speaker(s).  
Advance testing  
7. On a date to be determined in due course, the Secretariat wil l hold a joint session with all 
participants (including all parties and the panelists). This session will seek to reflect, as far as 
possible, the conditions of the proposed meeting. All participants should make themselves available 
for the test session.  
Confidentiality and security  
8. As set out in paragraph  12(2) of the Working Procedures of the Panel, each party shall have 
the responsibility for all members of its delegation and shall ensure that each member of its 
delegation acts in accordance with the DSU and the Panel's Working Procedures with regard to the 
confidentiality of the proceeding.  
9. The remote participants shall connect to the meeting through a secure internet connection 
and shall avoid the use of an open or public internet connection.  
Conduct of the meeting  
Recording  
10. The meeting will be recorded in its entirety via the platform. The recording of the meeting will 
form part of the Panel record.  
11. The parties are strictly prohibited from:  
(1) Recording, via audio, video, screenshot, or otherwise, the meeting or any part thereof; 
and 
(2) Permitting any non -authorized person to record, via audio, video, screenshot, or 
otherwise, the meeting or any part thereof.  
Access to the virtual meeting room  
12. The participants shall ac cess the virtual meeting room in accordance with these 
Additional  Working Procedures.  
13. (1) The host will invite remote participants via email to join the virtual meeting room.  
(2) For security reasons, access to the virtual meeting will be password -protected and limited 
to participants. Participants shall not forward or share the virtual meeting link or password 
with unauthorized persons.  
(3) Each party shall ensure that only participants from its delegation join the virtual meeting 
room.  
Advance log -on 
14. (1) The virtual meeting room will be accessible 60  minutes in advance of the scheduled start 
time of each session of the meeting with the Panel.  
(2) Remote participants shall log on to the platform at least 30  minutes in advance of the 
scheduled start time of each session of the meeting with the Panel.  
(3) Remote p articipants will be placed in a virtual lobby where they will remain until the Panel 
is ready to start the meeting, at which time the host will admit them to the meeting.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  Document sharing  
15. (1) Before each party takes the floor to deliver its opening statement, it shall provide the 
Panel and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of the statement 
through DORA, clearly marking it "check against delivery".  
(2) Befo re each party takes the floor to deliver its closing statement, it shall provide the Panel 
and other participants at the meeting with a provisional written version of the statement, if 
available, through DORA, clearly marking it "check against delivery".  
(3) Any participant wishing to share a document with the other participants during the meeting 
will do so through DORA.  
(4) Parties shall then submit the final written version of their opening and closing statements, 
and copies of any other documents shared  with the other participants during the meeting, by 
the deadline set forth in paragraph  21(f)(i) of the Working Procedures adopted on 
26 October  2020, and in accordance with the rules for service of documents in paragraph  30 
of the same Working Procedures.  
Communication breakdown  
16. Each party will designate a contact person who can liaise with the host during the course of 
the meeting to report any technical issues that arise with respect to the platform. The parties shall 
immediately notify the Panel of any technical or connectivity issues affecting the participation of 
their delegation, or a member of their delegation, in the meeting. To do so, the party that 
experiences the technical or connectivity issue shall:  
(1) If possible, immediately intervene at  the meeting and briefly state the nature of the issue 
experienced; or  
(2) If doing so is not possible, immediately contact the host and explain the nature of the 
issue experienced. The host can be contacted via the platform, by sending an email to 
olga.falguerasalamo@wto.org , or by calling at +41 22 739 67  46. 
17. After consulting the parties as appropriate, the Panel may postpone the proceedings until the 
technical issue is resolved or continue the p roceedings with those that continue to be connected.  
Length of opening statements  
18. Each party is requested to limit the length of its opening statement to two  hours.  
Interventions  
19. If a participant wishes to take the floor, the participant should use the "raise a hand" function 
in the platform, so that the Panel can give the floor to the participant and allow the participant to 
unmute their microphone and turn their camera on.  
20. The Panel may briefly pause a session at any time, at its own  initiative or upon request by a 
party, to enable any necessary internal coordination and consultation within a party’s  delegation 
and/or among the panelists.  
Relationship with the Working Procedures of the Panel adopted on 26  October  2020  
21. These additional Working Procedures complement the Working Procedures of the Panel 
adopted on 26  October  2020, and prevail over the latter to the extent of a conflict.WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX A -4 
ADDITIONAL WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL  
Adopted on 1 April  2022  
Whereas on 22 March 2022 the parties notified the Panel of agreed procedures for arbitration under 
Article 25 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) 
in dispute DS5951 (Agreed Procedures), and  
Whereas , through those Agreed Procedures, the parties request the Panel to take certain steps 
relating to the report of the Panel a nd to the record of the Panel proceedings,  
After consulting the parties, the Panel has adopted the following Additional Working Procedures 
reflecting the parties' requests:  
1. Within two working days of adoption of these Additional Working Procedures, the  Panel will 
transmit to the parties and third parties the text of the final panel report in the three WTO official 
languages (the "Translated Report"); it is understood that transmission of this text will not 
amount to circulation of the report of the Pane l within the meaning of Article 16 of the DSU. 
Transmission of the Translated Report to the parties will take place through the WTO Disputes 
On-Line Registry Application (DORA).  
2. Once transmitted to the parties and third parties as per paragraph 1 above,  the Translated 
Report remains confidential. In the event of the filing of a Notice of Appeal under the Agreed 
Procedures, confidentiality is hereby entirely lifted on the Translated Report. For greater 
certainty, as per the parties' request, this means th at the Translated Report can be shared with 
the arbitrators, the WTO Membership and the public. The Panel takes note that according to 
paragraph 5 of the Agreed Procedures, the Notice of Appeal would include the Translated Report.  
3. If a Notice of Appeal  is filed under the Agreed Procedures, as soon as the arbitrators are 
appointed the Panel will transmit the record of the Panel proceedings to the arbitrators, including, 
after consulting the third parties concerned, the third party submissions, third part y oral 
statements and third party responses to questions. Transmission of the record of the Panel 
proceedings to the arbitrators will take place through DORA.  
 
 
 
1 See WT/DS595/10.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX A -5 
INTERIM REVIEW  
1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1. We set out below a "discussion of the arguments made at the interim review stage" as required 
by Article  15.3 of the DSU, including an overview of each party's  specific review requests, the other 
party's  position on those requests, and our evaluation. We have revised certain aspects of the 
Interim Report in the light of these requests. In addition, we have made certain changes to improve 
the clarity and a ccuracy of the Final Report and to correct typographical and non -substantive errors.  
1.2. Some of the paragraph and footnote numbers in the Final Report have changed due to these 
revisions. The numbering of paragraphs and footnotes referred to below is th e numbering used in 
the Interim Report unless otherwise indicated, and differences vis-à-vis the Final Report are 
indicated in parentheses where appropriate.  
2 REQUESTS CONCERNING SECTION  7.2 (PRODUCT SCOPE)  
2.1 Paragraphs  7.12, 7.13 , and 7.15  
2.1. At paragraphs  7.12, 7.13, and 7.15, Turkey requests the addition of fuller references to the 
submissions where the relevant arguments are made.1 The European  Union does not object, and 
suggests referring in particular to section  2.2 of its first written submission.2  
2.2. We note that paragraphs  7.12, 7.13, and 7.15 provide a general introduction to the entire group 
of claims and arguments presented by the parties in relation to product scope. In that context, we 
had only provided references to w here Turkey had indicated the universe of claims in support of 
which it was making those arguments. We then set out those same arguments in more detail at 
paragraphs  7.38-7.41, 7.67 -7.68, and 7.71, and in that context, we provided references to relevant 
passages of both parties'  written submissions. Nonetheless, we have also added the references to 
the parties'  first and second written submissions requested by Turkey in the footnotes to 
paragraphs  7.12, 7.13, and 7.15.  
2.2 Paragraph  7.38 
2.3. Turkey asks u s to provide a more detailed description of its arguments in paragraph  7.38, by 
specifying three grounds on the basis of which Turkey argued that the European  Union had imposed 
a separate safeguard on each product category.3  
2.4. First, Turkey asks us to  identify in paragraph  7.38 its argument that the fact that the 
European  Commission calculated the size of the TRQ at the level of individual product categories 
demonstrates that the European  Union applied distinct safeguards on these product categories. 
We note that this argument was reflected in paragraph  7.57, with the underlying facts set out in 
paragraphs  7.51 and 7.56. In light of Turkey's  comment, we have expanded paragraph  7.57 
(paragraphs 7.57 -7.59 of the Final Report) to specify that the argument we address there has been 
made by Turkey. For consistency, we have also expressly mentioned the European Union's  response 
in a footnote (footnote  107 of the Final Report); this response was also reflected in our disposition 
of this argument in paragraph  7.57 (paragraph 7.59 of the Final Report) ("to better match traditional 
trade flows").  
2.5. Second, Turkey asks us to identify in paragraph  7.38 its argument that the fact that the 
European  Union excluded developing country Members with de minimis  exports at  the level of each 
product category also demonstrated that the European Union applied distinct safeguards on the 
 
1 Turkey's  request for interim review, paras.  1-3. 
2 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  2. Section  2.2 corresponds 
to paragraphs  25-58 of the European Union's  first written submission.  
3 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  4. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  various product categories. We note that this argument was reflected in paragraph  7.57 (paragraph 
7.59 of the Final Report)  in almost the same terms as requested by Turkey, and we therefore make 
no change to our report.  
2.6. Third, Turkey asks us to identify in paragraph  7.38 its argument that the fact that the 
European  Commission (also) assessed the increase in imports at the  level of product categories 
supports the view that the European Union applied a distinct safeguard on each product category. 
In full, Turkey's  argument was in fact that this, and the resulting exclusion of certain product 
categories from the application o f measures, supported the view that there were distinct safeguards 
on the various product categories.4 This argument and the European Union's  response were partly 
reflected in paragraph  7.40, with the underlying facts set out in paragraphs  7.48-7.50(a).5 In light 
of Turkey's  comment, we have added a new paragraph  (7.58) to clarify our view regarding this 
argument.  
2.3 Paragraph  7.38, footnote  63 (footnote  65 of the Final Report)  
2.7. Turkey asks us to include a reference to paragraphs  42-48 of its first w ritten submission, 
bearing Turkey's  description of the facts.6 We have included this reference. In light of this request 
together with Turkey's  request concerning paragraph  7.12 of the Interim Report, we have also 
included in the same footnote a fuller re ference to Turkey's  second written submission.  
2.4 Paragraph  7.44 
2.8. Turkey asks that we clarify the basis for our finding, at paragraph  7.44, that the notice of 
initiation "specified that there was sufficient evidence to initiate the investigation both  for the product 
concerned as a whole and for some or all product categories". Turkey notes that the notice does not 
use the terms "product concerned as a whole".7 
2.9. The European Union objects to Turkey's  comment, and points out that "[t]he Panel is not 
quoting the notice of initiation … otherwise it would have put inverted commas ". Instead, the 
European Union notes, the Panel is using its own words for "the distinction made by the EU between 
the product concerned (all categories together) and individ ual product categories". The 
European  Union recalls its answer to Panel question No.  3, noting that the notice of initiation and 
the amended notice of initiation provided data on the increase in imports for the product concerned 
as a whole.8 
2.10. We note  that in footnote  67 to paragraph  7.44 of our Interim Report (footnote  74 of the 
Final Report) we specified that our finding was based on the "notice of initiation, p.  29 [of the 
relevant issue of the Official Journal of the European Union] and annex". As explained at 
paragraph  7.44 of our Interim Report, the notice described the "products" subject to the 
investigation as "certain steel products (the 'products concerned') … listed in Annex I", and "used 
interchangeably the phrases 'products' and 'product ca tegories'". As also explicitly explained in our 
Interim Report, the European  Commission used the two phrases interchangeably not just in the 
notice of initiation but more broadly during the investigation, and for the reasons set out in our 
report "we do no t consider that that the use of either of these phrases decides the outcome of 
Turkey's  claims".9 With this background in mind, we note that the page of the notice we cited 
describes evidence for the "products concerned" taken  collectively (e.g. "total im ports of the 
products concerned increased from  17,8 million tonnes to  29,3 million tonnes in the 
period  2013-2017"), as well as evidence at the level of product categories (or "products"). From 
 
4 Turkey' s first written submission, para.  57; second written submission, paras.  32 and 44 -45; and 
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  12. 
5 In addition, at paras.  7.60, 7.62, and 7.66, and section  7.2.2.2 of the Interim Report, we explained 
why we did not consider that the choice not to apply the safeguard to certain product categories gave rise to 
the inconsistencies claimed by Turkey.  
6 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  5. 
7 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  6. 
8 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  3. 
9 Paras.  7.37 and 7.53 of the Interim Report.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  that, on the following page, the notice concludes that "there is sufficient evidence to justify the 
initiation of an investigation".10  
2.11. We therefore do not consider that an addition or change to our report is warranted.  
2.5 Paragraph  7.45  
2.12. Both parties make several requests for changes to paragraph  7.45. 
2.13. The European Union asks us to reflect, in our findings of fact, certain contents of two  notes to 
the file prepared by the European  Commission and made available to the parties shortly after issuing 
the notice of initiation and its ame ndment, respectively.11 Turkey objects to this request, noting that 
the addition does not relate to the questionnaires, which are the subject of this paragraph.12 
2.14. We note that the approach taken in these two  notes to the file is akin to that taken by  the 
European  Commission in the record documents we had described in our Interim Report, and we had 
chosen not to reflect these two  additional documents, which make no difference to our analysis. 
Nonetheless, in light of the European Union's  request, we have now reflected these two  notes to the 
file in footnote  68 (footnote  75 of the Final Report), although with wording different from that 
requested by the European Union.  
2.15. The European Union also asks us to reflect, in our findings of fac t, that the cover letter 
accompanying the questionnaire for domestic producers "referred to 'global data'".13 Turkey 
considers that the language proposed by the European Union is not accurate and suggests alternative 
language.14 
2.16. We have reflected the  point requested by the European Union in new footnote  78 with 
language reflecting more closely the cover letter at issue rather than the text proposed by either the 
European Union or Turkey.  
2.17. Turkey asks us to modify the description of the facts in p aragraph  7.45 in three  ways.15  
2.18. At paragraph  7.45 we find that the European Union's  questionnaires required respondents to 
"provide certain data 'separately for each of the products concerned'". First, Turkey asks us to modify 
"certain data" to read "the relevant data regarding import volume and injury factors". The 
European  Union comments that the notice of initiation provided figures  on the evolution of imports 
only for the product as a whole, and that the cover letter accompanying the questionnaire  for 
domestic producers referred to "global data".16 We have added a footnote to this paragraph listing 
the items on which the questionnaires requested data by product category.  
2.19. Second, Turkey asks us to add that "[i]nterested parties thus provided their comments on the 
criteria for the imposition of safeguard measures for each of the products concerned separately", 
and to cite in support of this statement the European Commission's  questionnaires. We have added 
a new footnote  77 indicating that Turke y has submitted to us a questionnaire response showing that 
a responding domestic producer provided data on injury factors at the level of product categories .  
 
10 As we also explained, the notice indicated that "[t]he investigation [would] examine the situation of 
the products concerned, inclu ding the situation of each of the product categories individually" . (Interim Report, 
para. 7.44 (referring to Notice of initiation, (Exhibit TUR -1), p.  29)). 
11 European Union's  request for interim review, p.  1 (referring to Note to the file (11  April 2018) , 
(Exhibit TUR -18); and Updated note to the file (2  July 2018) , (Exhibit TUR -19)). 
12 Turkey's  comments on European Union's  request for interim review, para.  1. 
13 European Union's  request for interim review, p.  1 (referring to Cover letter (11  April 2018), 
(Exhibit  EU-10)). The European Union asks us to cite the phrase "global data", which is taken from the 
following sentence: "[i]n order [ sic] assist the Commission in establishing global data relating to the Union 
steel industry, you are requested to provide the information requested in the questionnaire" . (Cover letter 
(11 April 2018), (Exhibit EU -10), p.  1). 
14 Turkey's  comments on European Union's  request for interim review, para.  1. 
15 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  7. 
16 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  4. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  2.20. Third, Turkey asks that we add the following language:  
Turkey noted that in its previous s afeguard investigation on imports of certain steel 
products in 2002, the European Union analysed the criteria for the imposition of a 
safeguard measure for each product category separately (Turkey's  second written 
submission, para.  27; Commission Regulatio n (EC) No  1694/2002 of 
27 September  2002 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain 
steel products, Official Journal of the European Union, L  261, 28  September  2002, 
pp 1-123, Exhibit  TUR-39). 
2.21. The European Union responds that the "2002 investigation is … irrelevant in the present 
proceedings".17  
2.22. Turkey's  argument was that "[t]he understanding that there were  26/28 products concerned 
was further informed by the European Union's  previous safeguard investigati on on imports of certain 
steel products in  2002, where the European Commission correctly analysed the criteria for the 
imposition of a safeguard measure for each product category separately" .18 We do not see what this 
reference to the approach taken by the  European Union in a separate domestic proceeding 
establishes regarding the consistency with WTO rules of the measure before us. Starting at 
paragraph  7.43 of the Interim Report, we review the notice of initiation, its amendment, the 
questionnaires, and th e published determinations in the proceedings that led to the measure before 
us, in order to assess the parties'  arguments on the consistency of that measure with WTO rules. In 
that context, the approach to product scope taken by the European Union in a se parate investigation 
is irrelevant. We therefore decline to make the suggested addition.  
2.6 Paragraph  7.49 
2.23. The European Union asks us to refer to a "group of product categories" rather than a "collection 
of product categories".19 We see this change  as of no substance but we have no objections to making 
it, and we have therefore edited the paragraph accordingly.  
2.7 Paragraph  7.51  
2.24. Turkey asks us not to refer to the elements enumerated at paragraph  7.51 as the "form" that 
the safeguard takes.20 We have edited that paragraph accordingly.  
2.8 Paragraph  7.53 
2.25. At paragraph  7.53 of our Interim Report, we explained that an authority is not barred from 
choosing to investigate and apply a safeguard on a range of products, taken together, and that as 
a result, the mere fact that domestic determinations or other record documents m ight refer to 
"products" or "product categories" is not dispositive of the question whether there was one or 
multiple safeguards.  
2.26. Turkey appears to think that we have misunderstood its argument, which, Turkey reiterates, 
was that the European Commis sion repeatedly referred to "product s" in the plural.21 That was 
precisely the argument that we addressed in paragraph  7.53, as reflected by our explanation that 
Article  XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards do not bar an authority from investigating and app lying 
measures on a range of product s taken together. Nonetheless, for greater clarity, we have made 
some limited adjustments to the wording of paragraph  7.53. 
2.27. Turkey also asks us to reflect its argument that the references in the provisional and 
definitive  determinations to safeguard "measures", in the plural, further supports the conclusion that 
the European Commission was imposing multiple safeguards.22 It is not unusual to describe a single 
 
17 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  4. 
18 Turkey's  second written submission, para.  21. See also ibid. para.  27. 
19 European Union's  request for interim review, p . 1. 
20 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  8. 
21 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  9. 
22 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  9; first written submission, para.  58. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  safeguard as "safeguard measures", and Turkey's  argument elevates form over substance.23 In 
assessing Turkey's  contention that there were  26 distinct safeguards, we  have reviewed the 
approach taken by the European Commission throughout the investigation and adoption of the 
challenged measures, and it is on that basis that we have made our assessment. The use of the 
wording "safeguard measures", in record documents that document the conduct of a single 
investigation into a group of products taken together and the adoption of a system of tariff -rate 
quotas based on  historical trade by product categories and a single out -of-quota tariff, is immaterial. 
Nonetheless, given Turkey's  request, we have added a footnote to paragraph  7.53 reflecting this 
point (footnote  98 of the Final Report).  
2.9 Paragraph  7.56  
2.28. First, Turkey asks that we specify which data the European Commission collected for all 
product categories taken together.  
2.29. The European Union observes that sections  C, D, E.11, E.12, and F of the questionnaire for 
domestic producers (Exhibit TUR -15) "a ddress general/global data, i.e. not related to product 
categories", and adds that "the objective of collecting data individually for product categories had 
the purpose of being able to properly consolidate it to reach findings at the level of the product 
concerned (i.e. all product categories together)".24 The European Union also refers to the language 
of the cover letter accompanying the questionnaire for domestic producers, which indicated that the 
purpose of the questionnaire was to " assist the Commission in establishing global data relating to 
the Union  steel industry".25 
2.30. We have modified the footnote to this paragraph in response to Turkey's  request for review.  
2.31. Second, Turkey asks us to add, at paragraph  7.56 or in a separate paragraph, that the 
European Commission excluded from the scope o f the definitive safeguard the product categories 
for which it had found no increase in imports between  2013 and June  2018.26  
2.32. The European Union comments that this addition is not necessary because the point is already 
discussed at paragraph  7.68 (p aragraph  7.70 of the Final Report).27 
2.33. As the particular fact that Turkey is asking us to reference in paragraph  7.56 has been included 
in paragraphs  7.49 and 7.50(a) of our Interim Report, we decline Turkey's  request.  
2.10 Paragraph  7.67 (paragraph  7.69 of the Final Report)  
2.34. Turkey takes issue with the followings statement28, at the end of paragraph  7.67 
(paragraph  7.69 of the Final Report), and asks us to delete it:  
As for the claims under Article  XIX:1(a) and Articles  2.1, 4.1(c), and 4.2(b), Turkey has 
not explained in which way its arguments on "consistency" differ from its arguments on 
the alleged mismatch between the products subject to measures and the investigated 
products. We have examined and rejected the latter in the previous section,  and 
therefore, in this section, we do not further consider the claims under Article  XIX:1(a) 
and Articles  2.1, 4.1(c), and 4.2(b).  
 
23 We note for example that the definitive safeguard is entitled "Commis sion implementing regulation 
(EU) 2019/159 of 31  January  2019 imposing definitive safeguard measure s against imports of certain steel 
product s" (emphasis added), and yet its section  2.1, entitled "A single group definition", responds to 
comments according to which there were several "products" concerned and explains that "the reference to 
'products concerned' should be understood as the product categories examined together as part of a single 
product concerned". (Definitive determination, (Exhibit TUR -5), title and section  2.1).  
24 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  5. 
25 European Union's  comments on Turkey's request for interim review, para.  5 (referring to ibid. para.  4, 
in turn referring to Cover letter (11 April 2018), (Exhibit EU -10)). 
26 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  10. 
27 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  5. 
28 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  11. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  2.35. In its review request, Turkey explains to us how its mismatch argument, in general  
(i.e. without reference to each of Turkey's  particular claims), differs from its consistency argument, 
in general . We have understood this distinction and have explained it at paragraphs  7.36, 7.38, and 
7.67 (7.69 of the Final Report).  
2.36. The point we make at the end of paragraph  7.67 (7.69 of the Final Report) is that with respect 
of four of the seven claims that Turkey wishes to support with this argument , Turkey has given no 
explanation as to how the consistency argument supports these claims in a manner different from 
the mismatch argument, which we have rejected.  
2.37. Turkey makes a blanket argument in support of seven claims. For three of these claims 
(Articles  3.1, 4.2(a), and 4.2(c)) it provides some – limited – articulation of why it considers that 
the alleged lack of consistency leads to the claimed violations. For the other four claims, nothing is 
offered, and the ultimate premise of the claims is that the European Commission set out to 
investigate  26 products separately29 and that it was not acceptable for the European Commission to 
investigate certain conditions at the level of product categories or families in addition to the 
examination for all product categories taken together.30 This is the same premise that we have 
rejected in examining the mismatch argument.  
2.38. We therefore decline Turkey's  request to delete the last two sentences of paragraph  7.67 
(paragraph  7.69 of the Final Report).  
2.11 Paragraph  7.69 (paragraph  7.71 of the Final Report)  
2.39. At paragraph  7.69 (paragraph  7.71 of the Final Report), we describe how we consider that "in 
essence", Turkey's  contention that the European Commission acted inconsistently with Articles  3.1, 
4.2(a), and 4.2(c) "differs from" its mismatch argument. Turkey asks that we add six  lines to our 
description of that "essence" in order "to more accurately reflect its arguments".31 The requested 
six additional lines would indicate in particular that the Eur opean Commission set out to investigate 
28 products separately, and that it  should have therefore investigated the conditions for imposing a 
safeguard for the 28  products separately.  
2.40. We do not consider that the suggested addition of six lines helps b etter capture "the essence" 
of the difference between the consistency argument and the mismatch argument. Further, the points 
that Turkey asks us to add are already reflected in our report. We therefore decline Turkey's  request.  
2.12 Paragraph  7.71 (parag raph  7.73 of the Final Report)  
2.41. The European Union asks us to add, at the end of paragraph  7.71 of our Interim  Report 
(paragraph  7.73 of the Final Report), that not excluding product categories that do not meet a 
particular condition would lead to more restrictive  measures.32 Turkey objects to the 
European  Union's  request.33 
2.42. This observation is not necessary for our disposition of the matter and we therefore decline to 
add it.  
2.13 Paragraph  7.72 (paragraphs  7.74 and 7.75 of the Final Report)  
2.43. Both parties request us to review elements of this paragraph.  
2.44. We begin with the European Union's  review request. At paragraph  7.72 (paragraphs  7.74 and 
7.75 of the Final Report), we observe that "that the European Commission … explained its ap proach 
to the product under investigation in some detail". The European Union asks us to delete the 
 
29 See e.g. Turkey's  first written submission, paras.  70 and 73.  
30 See e.g. Turkey's  first written submission, paras.  71-72 and 74.  
31 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  12. 
32 European Union's  request for interim review, pp.  1-2. 
33 Turkey's  comments on European Union's  request for interim review , para.  2. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  adjective "some".34 The current text accurately describes our appreciation of the facts and we decline 
to change it.  
2.45. Turning to Turkey's  review reque st, we recall that among the claims that Turkey brings on the 
basis of its consistency argument are claims under Articles  3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, which require the authority to publish "reasoned conclusions" and a "detailed analysis" , 
respectively. Therefore, before reaching our ultimate conclusion on this group of claims – which, 
based on our analysis up to then, would have been a rejection of the claims35 – we also examined 
whether the European Commission had failed to provide an ex planation for its approach to the 
product scope. We observed that that was not the case. Turkey asks us to reflect that, in answer to 
a question from us, it had indicated that it did not agree with the merits  of one element36 of the 
explanation provided by  the European Union.  
2.46. We have added a new footnote  133 reflecting that answer provided by Turkey.  
2.47. In light of that addition, we consider it important to make it clear that Turkey's  consistency 
argument was not based on the merits of the reasoni ng provided by the European Union when 
explaining why it considered it appropriate to investigate the various product categories taken 
together.37 When we asked Turkey for its views on this reasoning, Turkey answered that it had not 
expressed a view on it because: " these findings are irrelevant in the context of Turkey's  claims ".38 
Turkey added that "in any event", it did not agree that there were a n important interrelation and 
strong competition between product categories39, i.e. it did not agree with the merits of the 
European  Commission's  reasoning. Thus, Turkey disagreed with the merits of the reasoning of the 
European Commission but that was not the basis on which Turkey was arguing that the 
definitive  safeguard was inconsistent with the Agreement on Safeguards.  
2.48. For clarity, we hav e also separated paragraph  7.72 into two  paragraphs (new paragraphs  7.74 
and 7.75), and we have inverted the order of two sentences in the new paragraph  7.75 to reflect 
the order of our analysis.  
3 REQUESTS CONCERNING SECTION  7.3 (UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS)  
3.1 Paragraph  7.73 (paragraph  7.76 of the Final Report)  
3.1. In this paragraph, we give a brief statement of the various arguments that Turkey makes on 
unforeseen developments. The purpose of this statement is to introduce the subsequent discussion. 
We then describe Turkey's  arguments in more detail in the remainder of the section.  
3.2. In this brief statement, we identified Turkey's  first group of arguments as being that 
"the European Commission did not identify unforeseen developments".  Turkey suggests that we 
change this to "the European [ sic] failed to identify the events which constituted the 
'unforeseen  developments' and their timing" .40 We note, first, that our short statement of the 
argument is not inaccurate and, second, that at p aragraph  7.85 we spell out the points that Turkey 
would like us to add at paragraph  7.73 (paragraph  7.76 of the Final Report). We therefore decline 
to make the requested change.  
3.3. Turkey makes the same request for heading  7.3.2.1, and for the same reaso ns we decline to 
make the requested change to that heading.  
 
34 European Union's  request for interim review, p.  2. 
35 Interim Report, para.  7.67 (for Article  XIX:1(a) and Articles  2.1, 4.1(c), and 4.2(b)) and 
paras.  7.70-7.71 (for Articles  3.1, 4.2(a), and 4.2(c)).  
36 This is the element reflected in the following language of para.  7.72 of the Interim Report: "the 
European Commission explained why it considered it appropriate to examine the product categories concerned 
taken together". The merits of that explanation ar e reflected at paras.  7.46-7.47 of the Interim Report.  
37 Turkey mentions the reasoning at issue but does not argue that it gives rise to the "consistency" 
violations. (See in particular Turkey's  first written submission, paras.  47, 71, and 73 -75). 
38 Turkey's  response to Panel question No.  8, para.  27. (emphasis added)  
39 Turkey's  response to Panel question No.  8, para.  28. 
40 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  14. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  3.2 Paragraph  7.91 (paragraph  7.94 of the Final Report)  
3.4. The European Union requested that we add that its determinations indicated that the increase 
of trade restrictive measures not only too k place "since  2014/2015" (as indicated in the 
Interim  Report) but continued "throughout  2017".41 We are making the requested adjustment but 
as a result, we must now address trade defence measures in a separate sentence, to which we have 
moved material tha t was previously in footnote  158 (footnote  174 of the Final Report).  
3.3 Paragraph  7.94 (paragraph 7.97 of the Final Report)  
3.5. In this paragraph, we wrote:  
Turkey submits that steel overcapacity existed for decades and predated the 
Uruguay  Round, and  therefore was not unforeseen.  
3.6. Turkey asks us to replace this with the following language:  
Turkey submits that steel overcapacity existed for decades and predated the 
Uruguay  Round. Turkey thus submits that periods of global overcapacity in commodities 
cannot be characterised as an unexpected development that was unforeseen by the 
European Union during the Uruguay Round.42 
3.7. We note that the substance of the two  formulations is almost identical, with the formulation 
proposed by Turkey bein g longer. The difference is the explicit reference to " periods of  overcapacity", 
which however is implicit in the statement that "overcapacity existed for decades". We therefore do 
not consider that the change would be helpful in the body of the text, but we have included the 
additional text in footnote  160 of the Interim Report (footnote  175 of the Final Report).  
3.4 Paragraph  7.96 (paragraph  7.99 of the Final Report)  
3.8. Turkey has asked us to add the following at paragraph  7.96 of the Interim Report 
(paragraph  7.99 of the Final Report):  
According to Turkey, the European Commission's  findings and explanations that 
"[post -2011] it was expected that total crude steel capacity would decrease or at least 
remain stable", do not constitute such a reasonable an d detailed explanation, as this 
statement is provided without evidence.43 
3.9. The European Union has expressly stated that it does not object to this addition, provided that 
it does not go beyond the content of Turkey's  submission44 (which it does not).  
3.10. We have made the requested addition.  
3.5 Paragraph  7.98 (paragraph  7.101 of the Final Report)  
3.11. Turkey makes two requests  for review of paragraph  7.98 (paragraph  7.101 of the 
Final Report).  
3.12. First, Turkey asks that we add certain language to a sentence of that paragraph, as follows:  
Turkey relies on the fact that overcapacity in the steel sector has existed for a long time 
and, on that basis, submits that periods of global overcapacity in commodities cannot 
be characterised as an u nexpected development that was unforeseen by the 
European  Union during the Uruguay Round .45 
 
41 European Union's  request for interim review, p.  2. 
42 Turkey's  request for inter im review, para.  15. 
43 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  16. 
44 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  6. 
45 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  17. The requested addition is underlined.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  3.13. The European Union has expressly stated that it does not object to the proposed addition but 
notes that the point is reflected elsewhere in the report.46  
3.14. We have included this language in full in a footnote to paragraph  7.94 (paragraph  7.97 of the 
Final Report).47 In paragraph  7.98 ( paragraph  7.101 of the Final  Report ), whose focus is our 
assessment of the published determinations, we have made a shorter  addition ("and argues that 
therefore periods of overcapacity were not unforeseen when concluding the Uruguay Round").  
3.15. Second, Turkey asks us to review the sentence stating that "Turkey has not directly contested 
the European  Commission's  assertions that overcapacity had continued to increase, with capacity 
having more than doubled since  2000, and that it was contrary to economic logic for it to continue 
to increase ".48 Turkey notes that it has contested the European Commission's  reasoning relating to  
the relevance of the decrease in overcapacity in 2009 -2011.49  
3.16. The European Union objects that Turkey's  review request essentially "substitutes Turkey's  own 
views for the Panel finding over the continued increase in overcapacity … and … is not borne  out by 
the record" because Turkey merely stated that steel overcapacity had "reverted to its previous, 
predictable upward trend after the 2009 -2011 corrective period".50 
3.17. At paragraph  7.98 ( paragraph  7.101 of the Final  Report) , we find that in its 
published  determinations, the European Commission did not assert that overcapacity per se  was 
unexpected. Instead, the European Commission explained that what was unexpected was that 
"overcapacity would continue to increase, reaching 'unprecedented' levels, contrary to 
economic  logic and efforts to contain the increase".51 Turkey did not conte st that overcapacity had 
greatly increased, more than doubling since  2000, and thus reaching unprecedented levels.52 
Turkey  did not contest that the increase took place despite measures taken to contain it.53 
Turkey  also did not contest that overcapacity w as already excessive in 2011 and that not increasing 
capacity further would "improve capacity utilization and cost efficiency".54 As reflected in 
paragraph  7.96 of our Interim Report (paragraph  7.99 of the Final Report), Turkey took issue with 
the signific ance of overcapacity decreasing from  2009 to 2011 before increasing again after  2011. 
Turkey noted that the financial crisis had caused a steep decline in production and consumption from 
2007 to 2009, leading to a rapid increase in overcapacity, and as pro duction and consumption 
recovered in  2009-2011, there had been a dip in overcapacity. Turkey therefore argued that by 
increasing again after  2011, overcapacity was merely resuming its previous upward trend.55 We do 
not view this as "directly contest[ing]" that the continued increase in overcapacity was contrary to 
economic logic. However, in light of Turkey's  review request, we have revised paragraph  7.98 
(paragraph  7.101 of the Final Report) for greater clarity.  
3.6 Paragraph  7.101 (paragraph  7.104 of the  Final Report)  
3.18. Turkey asks that we make certain additions to paragraph  7.101 (paragraph  7.104 of the 
Final Report), shown as underlined text below.56 We have marked the requested additions with "i" 
to "iv" for ease of reference.  
Turkey responds to th e European Union that the data it has provided are intended to 
show that the use of trade defence measures [i] in general, and for the "steel -related" 
sector,  "follows cycles of varying intensity" and has done so both before and after the 
 
46 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  7. 
47 See para.  3.7 above.  
48 Emphasis added.  
49 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  18 (referring to Turkey' s first written submission, 
paras.  95-96; second written submission, paras.  66-67; and response to Panel question No.  9). 
50 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, paras.  8-9. 
51 Interim Report, para.  7.98 (referring to Provisional determination, (Exhibit TUR -3), recital  31; and 
Definitive determination, (Exhibit TUR -5), recitals  49 and 52).  
52 Provisional determination, (Exhibit TUR -3), recital  31. 
53 Provisional determination, (Exhibit TUR -3), recital  31; Definitive deter mination, (Exhibit TUR -5), 
recital  49. 
54 Definitive determination, (Exhibit TUR -5), recital  52. 
55 Interim Report, para.  7.96; Turkey's  first written submission, paras.  95-96; second written 
submission, paras.  66-67; and request for interim review, para.  18. 
56 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  19. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  Uruguay Round.[173] [ii] Turkey explains that this is confirmed by the data it submitted 
in Figure  4 which demonstrate that the number of anti -dumping initiations rose sharply 
several times after the Uruguay Round. *1 [iii] Those data also demonstrate that there 
has been a decrease in the number of anti -dumping investigations initiated in  2014 and 
again in  2017 and thus that there has been no "steady" increase between 2011 and 
2016 as asserted by the European Commission .*2 [iv] Turkey also argues that 
European  Commission's  analysis fails to address the substantial decrease in the number 
of anti -dumping and countervailing initiations in  2017 and fails to explain how a "slight 
increase" in the number of trade defence initiations, when comparing the number of 
initiations in  2017-2018 with the number in  2011-2013, amounts to an "unforeseen 
development". *3  
173 Turkey's  second written submission, paras.  68-75. Turkey also reiterates its earlier arguments 
and notes that reliance by the European  Union on an OECD presentation is an ex post explanation. 
(Ibid. para.  75). 
*1 Turkey's  second written submission, para.  69. 
*2 Turkey's  second written submission, para.  70. 
*3 Turkey's  second written submission, para.  71. 
3.19. The European Union has indicated that it does not object but that if we make the 
requested  additions, we should then also refer to the corresponding EU  arguments set out in 
paragraphs  95-96 of the European Union's  first written submission.57 
3.20. We have made addition "i" ("in general, and for the 'steel -related' sector").  
3.21. Addition "ii" would read: "Turkey explains that this [i.e. that the use of trade defence measures 
follows cycles of varying intensity] is confirmed by the data it submitted in Figure  4 [of the first 
written submission] which demonstrate that the number of anti -dumping initiations rose sharply 
several times after t he Uruguay Round". We note that this point is already reflected in  
paragraph  7.99 (paragraph  7.102 of the Final Report), where, with reference to the first written 
submission, we explained that Turkey  had argued that data on the use of anti -dumping measure s 
since 1995 "also show that there are periodic peaks in the number of anti -dumping investigations, 
both generally and for 'base metals and articles'".58 To reflect the fact that the second written 
submission repeats certain arguments made in the first wri tten submission, such as this one, we 
also specified in a footnote to paragraph  7.101 of the Interim Report ( paragraph  7.104 of the 
Final Report ) that "Turkey also reiterates its earlier arguments".59 We therefore do not consider that 
addition "ii" is nece ssary.  
3.22. Addition "iii" would read: "[t]hose data also demonstrate that there has been a decrease in 
the number of anti -dumping investigations initiated in  2014 and again in  2017 and thus that there 
has been no 'steady' increase between 2011 and 2016 as asserted by the European Commission" . 
This refers to a point first made in Turkey's  first written submission in the context of its arguments 
to the effect that the increase in trade defence measures was not unforeseen. Specifically, Turkey  
noted that in  comparing the number of initiations in  2015-2016 to the number of initiations in 
2011-2013, the European Commission had not mentioned the fact that the number of anti -dumping 
initiations had decreased in  2014 as compared to  2013, and had also decreased in 2017 -2018 as 
compared to 2015 -2016, so that the number initiations in  2017-2018 was only slightly higher than 
in 2011-2013.60 We note that Turkey did not contest that from  2015 to 2016 there had been an 
average of 117  steel-related anti -dumpin g initiations per year whereas there had been, on average, 
77 initiations per year from  2011 to 2013.  
 
57 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  10. 
58 Figure  4 of the first written submission, which addition "ii" refers to, relates to base metals and 
articles.  
59 Interim Repor t, fn 173. 
60 Turkey's  first written submission, para.  105; second written submission, paras.  70-71; and request 
for interim review, para.  19. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  3.23. To this, the European Union responded that the slight decrease of anti -dumping initiations in  
2014 as compared to  2013 was immaterial because the n umber of anti -dumping initiations had 
increased again in  2015 and the slight decrease in anti -dumping initiations in  2014 had been 
compensated by an increase in countervailing initiations the same year.61 Regarding the decrease in 
the number of initiations  in 2017-2018, the European Union responded that it did not call into 
question the unforeseen nature "of the overall significant increase of the use of trade defence 
instruments"; the European Union added that even in  2017-2018, the number of anti -dumping and 
countervailing duty initiations was still slightly higher than in  2011-2013.62  
3.24. We have found that the European Commission "did not assert that any uptick in trade defence 
measures would constitute an unforeseen development", and that instead:  
[T]he published determinations place the increase in trade defence measures in the 
broader context of increased overcapacity and the US Section  232 measures, and cite 
an increase in steel -related investigations from 77 in 2011 -2013 to 117 in 2015 -2016 
and th e fact that the United States had, in February  2018, 169  anti-dumping and 
countervailing (AD/CV) orders in place on steel and 25  ongoing investigations.63 
3.25. Thus, the basis for the European Commission's  determination was not whether anti -dumping 
initiations for base metals and articles were slightly higher or slightly lower in an individual year, but 
the situation of an overall increase in trade defence and other restrictive measures on steel, in the 
broader context of increased overcapacity and the US  Section  232 measures. The fact that the peak 
of initiations of anti -dumping investigations of base metals and articles took place in  2015-2016 
does not call into question the European Commission's  assessment that there was an overall increase 
in trade defe nce and trade restrictive measures on steel, in the broader context of overcapacity and 
US Section  232 measures, that was unforeseen at the time of concluding the Uruguay Round.  
3.26. In light of Turkey's  comment, we have included an explicit description and discussion of the 
relevant arguments, as new paragraphs  7.105 and 7.111. Following the same logic, we have also 
explicitly discussed the parties'  exchange regarding the number of anti -dumping orders in place on 
steel in the United States, at new paragr aphs 7.106 and 7.111, respectively. As a result, we have 
also made certain other additions, for clarity, to paragraphs  7.99-7.103 of the Interim Report 
(paragraphs  7.102 -7.112 of the Final Report).  
3.27. Addition "iv" would read: "Turkey also argues that European Commission's  analysis fails to 
address the substantial decrease in the number of anti -dumping and countervailing initiations in  
2017 and fails to explain how a 'slight increase' in the number of trade defence initiations, when 
comparing the number  of initiations in  2017-2018 with the number in  2011-2013, amounts to an 
'unforeseen development'". We have already discussed this point as part of addition "iii" and we 
make no further addition.  
3.7 Paragraph  7.103 (paragraph  7.108 of the Final Report)  
3.28. In paragraph  7.103 of the Interim Report (paragraph  7.108 of the Final Report) we consider 
Turkey's  argument that an increase in trade defence measures cannot be unforeseen because the 
use of trade defence measures follows cycles. In that con text, we point out that the 
European  Commission " did not assert that any uptick in trade defence measures would constitute 
an unforeseen development ". Turkey asks that we add the following text to that paragraph:  
Turkey submitted that the data demonstrate s that the number of anti -dumping 
initiations with regard to "base metals and articles" rose sharply  several times after the 
Uruguay Round and this confirms that the use of trade defence instruments follows 
cycles or varying intensity. Turkey further noted  that the 
European  Commission's  statement that recourse to trade defence instruments has 
steadily increased based on an average of 77 in 2011 -2013 to 117 in 2015 -2016 is 
misleading. When the data are examined in context, they demonstrate that there has 
been a decrease in the number of anti -dumping investigations initiated in  2014 and 
again in 2017, thereby showing that there has been no "steady" increase between 2011 
 
61 European Union's  first written submission, para.  95. 
62 European Union's  first written submission, para.  96. 
63 Interim Report, para.  7.103.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  and 2016. Finally, Turkey submitted that the European Commission's  analysis fails to 
addres s the substantial decrease in the number of anti -dumping and countervailing 
initiations in 2017, noting that the European Union itself noted that the number of 
anti-dumping and countervailing initiations in 2017 -2018 are only "slightly higher" than 
in the period  2011-2013.*1 
*1 Turkey's  second written submission, paras.  69-71.64 
3.29. These points are reflected at new paragraphs  7.105 -7.106 and 7.110.  
3.8 Paragraph  7.114 (paragraph  7.123 of the Final Report)  
3.30. Turkey asks that we add in paragraph  7.114 (paragraph  7.123 of the Final Report) that 
Turkey  argued that the European  Union 's references to record evidence were biased, because the 
European  Union  did not refer to the 22nd Global Trade Alert Report, which stated that the 
trade  effect s of overcapacity were systemically unimportant.65 
3.31. The European Union indicates that it does not object but that if we make this addition, we 
should also refer to its response provided in answer to our question No.  9.66 
3.32. We have accordingly refl ected both parties'  positions.67  
3.9 Paragraph  7.130 (paragraph  7.139 of the Final Report), footnote  238 (footnote  269 
of the Final Report)  
3.33. Turkey requests additional references to its relevant submissions, namely answers and 
comments on answers.68 We have added those references.  
3.10 Paragraph  7.135 (paragraph  7.144 of the Final Report)  
3.34. At paragraph  7.135 (paragraph  7.144 of the Final Report), we wrote that data on monthly 
imports into the United States and the European Union following the introduction of the Section  232 
measures on steel "showed some negative correlation between trends in imports into the 
European  Union and the United States, although not for all months". The European Union asks us to 
specify that "not for all  months" means not in April  2018.69  
3.35. April 2018 is the only month during which there was an increase in both US and EU  imports. 
However, during the other months, the difference between the amount of the decreases in imports 
into the United States and  the amount of the increases in imports into the European Union varied 
considerably.70 As an alternative to the requested adjustment, we have therefore modified the 
sentence in question as follows:  
[T]he European Commission relied … on six months of data …  that showed some 
negative correlation s between trends in imports into the European Union and the 
United  States , although not for all months .  
3.11 Sections  7.3.2.3.2 and 7.3.2.3.3  
3.36. Turkey argued on a number of grounds that the European Commission had  not established 
that the increase in imports occurred "as a result of" unforeseen developments. Based on some of 
 
64 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  20. (emphasis original)  
65 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  21 (referring to Turkey's  second written submission, 
para. 85). 
66 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  12 (referring to 
European  Union's  response to Panel question No.  9, paras.  26-36). 
67 We note that Turkey's  reference to the statement in the 22nd Global Trade Alert Report that the trade 
effects of overcapacity are systemi cally unimportant was already reflected in the previous paragraph  (7.113) of 
the Interim Report, as was a reference to the European Union's  response to Panel question No.  9. 
68 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  22. 
69 European Union's  request for in terim review, p.  2. 
70 Definitive determination, (Exhibit TUR -5), tables  12 and 14.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  those grounds, we found that Turkey had indeed established that the definitive safeguard was 
inconsistent with Article  XIX:1(a) because the Eu ropean Commission had not established that the 
unforeseen developments had resulted in the increase in imports. We then declined to examine 
certain further arguments of Turkey, i.e. that the unforeseen developments related to steel in 
general and therefore  could not result in the increase in imports of the product concerned into the 
European Union, and that the US  Section  232 measures had been introduced after the increase in 
imports had been observed and therefore could not have resulted in that increase.  
3.37. Turkey asks us to reconsider our choice and examine all of its arguments, with a view to 
implementation as well as the possibility of an appeal.71 Turkey points out that the two  arguments 
that we chose not to decide upon had not been presented as con ditional or alternative. Turkey argues 
that "the failure to address these two arguments in this case would fail to constitute an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered 
agreements".72 The European Union argues that the choice we made falls within our discretion.73 
3.38. We recall that subject to certain conditions, panels are not required to examine every 
argument put before them. In particular, if a panel has already found in favour of the complainant 
under a particular claim based upon certain arguments, it is not required also to examine every 
other argument of the complainant under the same claim. We therefore decline to modify our 
decision as requested by Turkey.  
4 REQUESTS CONCERNING SECTION 7.5 (INCREASE IN IMPORTS)  
4.1 Paragraph  7.171 (paragraph  7.180 of the Final Report)  
4.1. The European Union requests the Panel to revise paragraph  7.171 of the Interim Report 
(paragraph  7.180 of the Final Report) such that the reference to "between 2013 and 2016" is 
replaced with "between 2013 and 2017".74 According to the E uropean Union, the peak of imports for 
flat products and tubes occurred in 2017, not in 2016. Turkey requests the Panel to decline the 
European Union's  request on the basis that paragraph  7.171 (paragraph  7.180 of the Final Report) 
correctly refers to 2016  as the relevant year.75 
4.2. We have decided not to grant the European Union's  request. The passage of the 
European  Commission's  determination cited in paragraph  7.171 of the Interim Report 
(paragraph  7.180 of the Final Report) refers explicitly to "the p eriod 2013 -2016" as when "the most 
significant increase took place" with respect to flat products and long products.76 The main point for 
the European Commission was that subsequent decreases or decelerations in the import levels of 
these product families did not negate the fact that imports continued to be present at elevated levels 
(and, for long products, subsequently increased again in the MRP). The relevant sentence in 
paragraph  7.171 (paragraph  7.180 of the Final Report) accurately reflects this aspec t of the 
European Commission's  determination.  
4.2 Paragraph 7.177 and 7.179 (paragraphs 7.186 and 7.188 of the Final Report)  
4.3. Turkey requests the Panel to reflect, in paragraphs  7.177 and 7.179 of the Interim Report 
(paragraphs  7.186 and 7.188 of the Final Report), its argument that the bulk of the increase in 
imports took place at the beginning of the POI and subsequently decelerated, and that this kind of 
increase in imports could not lead to a situation of threat of serious injury.77 The Europea n Union 
requests the Panel to decline Turkey's  request because Turkey simply seeks to substitute the 
Panel's  finding with its own views.78 
4.4. We have decided to grant Turkey's  request by including an additional sentence in 
paragraph  7.179 (paragraph  7.188 of the Final Report) reflecting Turkey's  argument that "the bulk 
 
71 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  26. 
72 Turkey's  request for interim review, paras.  23-26. 
73 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, par a. 13. 
74 European Union's  request for interim review, p.  2. 
75 Turkey's  comments on European Union's  request for interim review, para.  3. 
76 Definitive determination, (Exhibit TUR -5), recital  36. 
77 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  28. 
78 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  14. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  of the increase in imports found by the European Commission took place at the beginning of the 
period of investigation and subsequently decelerated".79 We note that this adjustment does not  
affect our reasoning or findings in section  7.5.2.2 of the Report.  
5 REQUESTS CONCERNING SECTION  7.6 (THREAT OF SERIOUS INJURY)  
5.1 Section  7.6 as a whole  
5.1. Turkey requests the Panel to make findings under Article  4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguard s 
in addition to Article  4.1(b) in section  7.6 of the Interim Report. Turkey argues that its claim was 
"based on Article  4.2(a) which must be read together with Article  4.1(b) which provides further 
details to the meaning of 'threat of serious injury' for the purposes of the determination to be made 
pursuant to Article  4.2(a)".80 For Turkey, Article  4.1(b) is a definitional provision and thus "require[s] 
findings to be made under the other provisions, in particular under Article  4.2(a)".81 The 
European  Union requests the Panel to decline Turkey's  request because the Panel has discretion to 
determine the claims it needs to address to resolve the dispute.82 
5.2. We have decided not to grant Turkey's  request. Turkey's  request is based on an 
incorrec t premise. Article  4.1(b) is not merely a definitional provision that is incapable of alone 
sustaining a finding of inconsistency under the Agreement on Safeguards. Rather, its plain text 
makes provision for how "threat" determinations are to be reached:  
"[T]hreat of serious injury" shall be understood to mean serious injury that is clearly 
imminent, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph  2. A determination of the 
existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts and not merely on 
allegation, conjecture or remote possibility[.]  
5.3. As Turkey notes, other provisions in the Agreement on Safeguards such as Article  4.2(a) 
likewise make provision for certain procedural or substantive aspects of "threat" determinations. 
However, the presenc e of such provisions does not render Article  4.1(b) incapable of alone 
sustaining a finding of inconsistency.  
5.4. The aspects of Turkey's  claim that we evaluate in section  7.6 fall squarely within the subject 
matter of Article  4.1(b). Indeed, in its firs t and second written submissions, Turkey framed its case 
on these aspects through the lens of Article  4.1(b).83 We note that Turkey made other arguments 
that were more clearly connected to Article  4.2(a)84, but we considered it unnecessary to consider 
those arguments to resolve the present dispute.85 For the foregoing reasons, we have not modified 
section  7.6 in response to Turkey's  request to reach findings under Article  4.2(a) regarding the 
European Commission's  "threat" determination.  
5.2 Paragraph  7.192 (paragraph  7.201 of the Final Report)  
5.5. Turkey requests the Panel to include additional recitations of its arguments in 
paragraph  7.192  of the Interim Report (paragraph 7 .201 of the Final Report).86 Turkey states that 
these additions woul d "accurately reflect [its] arguments". The European Union requests that, if the 
Panel grants Turkey's  request, it should likewise include elaborations of the corresponding 
arguments made by the European Union in paragraph  7.193 of the Interim Report (paragraph  7.202 
of the Final Report).87 
 
79 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  28. 
80 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  30. 
81 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  29. 
82 European Union's  comments on Tu rkey's  request for interim review, para.  15. 
83 Turkey's first written submission, paras.  230-231, 244 -245, 248, and 251 -253; second written 
submission, para.  187. 
84 Turkey's  first written submission, paras.  249-250 and 254; second written submission, 
paras . 188-190. 
85 Interim Report, fns  315 and 424. See also ibid. para.  7.223.  
86 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  32. 
87 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, paras.  16-17. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  5.6. We have decided not to grant Turkey's  request. The two  aspects of paragraph  7.192 
(paragraph  7.201 of the Final Report) that Turkey proposes to delete and replace with other 
language are as follows (underlined) : "Turkey claims that the European Commission failed to provide 
a reasoned and adequate explanation for its finding that the domestic industry was 'in a fragile and 
vulnerable position', given that the data indicate that the industry's  performance had impr oved 
towards the end of the POI "; and "Turkey argues that the very fact of this improved performance 
precludes a 'threat of serious injury' determination ". Turkey has not explained how these aspects do 
not accurately reflect its case, nor is this self -evident from the revisions proposed by Turkey. Given 
that section  7.6.2.1 provides only a brief overview of the parties'  main arguments, we do not 
consider it appropriate or necessary to recite these arguments at length in this section.  
5.3 Paragraph  7.196 (pa ragraph  7.205 of the Final Report)  
5.7. Turkey requests the Panel to include additional recitations of its arguments in paragraph  7.196 
of the Interim Report (paragraph  7.205 of the Final Report) "in order to accurately reflect 
Turkey's  argument regarding the existence of serious injury that is clearly imminent".88 The 
European Union requests that, if the Panel grants Turkey's  request, it should likewise include 
elaborations of the corresponding arguments of the European Union in paragraph  7.196 of the 
Interim Report (paragraph  7.205 of the Final Report).89 
5.8. We have decided not to grant Turkey's  request. The aspect of paragraph  7.196 
(paragraph  7.205 of the Final Report) that Turkey proposes to delete and replace with other 
language is as follows (underl ined): "Turkey argues that the fact that the domestic industry improved 
towards the end of the POI demonstrates that serious injury was not 'clearly imminent' , irrespective 
of the reasons underlying the improvement" . Turkey has not explained how this aspec t of 
paragraph  7.196 (paragraph  7.205 of the Final Report) does not accurately reflect its position, nor 
is this self -evident from the revisions proposed by Turkey. Section  7.6.2.1.1 addresses the 
general  position advanced by Turkey that "improvements in t he situation of the domestic industry 
towards the end of the investigation period should make a finding of threat of serious injury unlikely, 
regardless of the reasons therefor"90, whereas the replacement language proposed by Turkey relates 
to the particul ar facts and circumstances of the European Commission's  determination.91 
5.4 Footnote  332 to paragraph  7.200 (footnote  365 to paragraph  7.209 of the 
Final  Report)  
5.9. Turkey requests the Panel to include certain additional citations to Turkey's  submissions during 
the proceedings in the footnote appended to the sentence of paragraph  7.200 of the Interim Report 
(paragraph  7.209 of the Final Report) that states: "[t]he determination also sets out data indicating 
that the domestic industry improved i ts position relative to imports from 2016 to 2017 in terms of 
the respective rates at which it captured new demand and stemmed the loss of market share to 
imports".92 The European Union did not comment on Turkey's  request.  
5.10. We have decided not to gran t Turkey's  request. Our review of the additional citations that 
Turkey requests be included in footnote  332 (footnote  365 of the Final Report) do not reveal why 
those additional citations would be useful or necessary in relation to the corresponding senten ce in 
paragraph  7.200 (paragraph  7.209 of the Final Report). The proposed citations reference certain 
data but do not specifically link this data to the matters being addressed in paragraph  7.200 
(paragraph  7.209 of the Final Report).  
5.5 Paragraph  7.209 ( paragraph  7.218 of the Final Report)  
5.11. The European Union requests the addition of the following sentence to paragraph  7.209 of the 
Interim Report (paragraph  7.218 of the Final Report): "[t]he EU argues that the list of products with 
improved profitabi lity (product categories  1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 26) overlaps 
significantly with the list of products covered by recent trade defence measures (product 
 
88 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  33. 
89 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, paras.  18-19. 
90 Turkey's  response to Panel question No.  26, para.  13. 
91 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  33. 
92 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  34. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  categories  1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 24)" .93 Turkey requests the Panel to decline the 
European  Union's  request because it relates to matters that are absent from the 
European  Commission's  determination.94 
5.12. We have decided not to grant the European Union's  request. Paragraph  7.209 
(paragraph  7.218 of the Final Report) primarily recounts certain findings, observations, and 
inferences of the European Commission. By contrast, the European Union's  proposed addition would 
introduce substantive reasoning that is not found in the European Commission's  determination. 
Accepting the European Union's  proposed addition would thus risk giving the impression that this 
substantive reasoning was somehow implicitly part of the European Commission's  determination. As 
we observe in paragraph  7.208 of the Interim Rep ort (paragraph  7.217 of the Final Report), "the 
[European Commission's]  analysis does not provide any information about the product coverage of 
a given AD/CV measure, the proportion of a given category that was impacted by that measure, the 
point in time a t which that measure was imposed, and the subsequent improvements in trends for 
that category".  
5.6 Paragraph  7.210 (paragraph  7.219 of the Final Report)  
5.13. The European Union requests the inclusion of a clarification that only one of the ten CN codes 
included in product category  6 was covered by the adoption of anti -dumping measures in 2016.95 
Turkey requests the Panel to decline the European Union's  request on the basis that this point was 
not raised during the proceedings by either party.96 
5.14. We have decided not to grant the European Union's  request. We agree with Turkey that the 
European Union did not explicitly raise this point before its comments on the Interim Report. Rather, 
as we explain in footnote  360 the Interim Report ( footnote  392 of the Final Report), Turkey provided 
a table setting out the AD/CV measures applied by the European Commission and "[i]n the absence 
of any objections by the European  Union as to its accuracy, we are guided by the contents of that 
table in understandin g which product categories were affected by these measures, and when" . 
The European Union has now asserted, at the interim  review stage, that a particular anti -dumping 
measure applied only partially to category  6 because it covered only one of the ten CN c odes which 
comprise that category. However, this fact alone does not in and of itself warrant any further 
inference. Specifically, in the absence of any information on the volume of imports under 
product  category  6 that were subject to the relevant anti-dumping measure, and given the late stage 
at which this issue is being raised, we do not consider that the change proposed by the 
European  Union to paragraph  7.210 (paragraph  7.219 of the Final Report) is justified.  
5.7 Footnotes  401, 402, and 403 to paragraph  7.224 (footnotes  433, 434, and 43 5 to 
paragraph  7.233 of the Final Report)  
5.15. Turkey requests the Panel to include certain additional citations to Turkey's  submissions during 
the proceedings in footnotes  401, 402, and 403 (footnotes  433, 434, and 43 5 of the Final  Report) 
that are appended to a series of sentences in paragraph  7.224 of the Interim Report 
(paragraph  7.233 of the Final Report).97 The European Union did not comment on Turkey's  request.  
5.16. We have decided not to grant Turkey's  request. Paragraphs  249-250 of Turkey's  first written 
submission, which Turkey seeks to be added to footnotes  401, 402, and 403 (footnotes  433, 434, 
and 43 5 of the Final  Report), appear to contend that it is impermissible for "threat" determinations 
to consi der future import increases (see also Turkey's  first written submission, para.  301). This is 
not a matter dealt with in section  7.6.2.2. Rather, at footnote  411 (footnote  443 of the Final Report), 
we take note of Turkey's  clarification that, in its view, "the competent authorities are permitted to, 
and actually should, consider the expected rate and amount of the increase in import levels as part 
of the threat and/or causation  analysis".98 In the absence of any substantiation for its review request 
 
93 European Union's  request for interim review, p.  3. 
94 Turkey's  comments on European Union's  request for interim review, para.  4. 
95 European Union's  request for interim review, p.  3. 
96 Turkey's  comments on European Union's  request for interim review, para.  5. 
97 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  35. 
98 Interim Report, fn  441 (quoting Turkey's  response to Panel question No.  39, para.  64). WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  on this point, we see no basis for making Turkey's  requested revisions to footnotes  401, 402, and 
403 (footnotes  433, 434, and 4 35 of the Final  Report).  
6 REQUESTS CONCERNING SECTION  7.7 (CAUSATION)  
6.1. Turkey requests the Panel to reconsider its decision to decline to address 
Turkey's  causation -related claims.99 Turkey contends that the Panel's  findings of inconsistency in 
relation to the European Commission's  "threat" determinatio n do not provide a basis for declining to 
address Turkey's  causation -related claims. This is because the European Commission could 
conceivably comply with the findings of inconsistency relating to the "threat" determination in a way 
which does not remedy t he inconsistencies arising from the European Commission's  "causation" 
determination.100 Turkey also contends that findings on its causation -related claims are necessary 
to enable the Appellate Body to complete the analysis in the event that it overturned th e 
Panel's  findings of inconsistency relating to the "threat" determination.101 The European Union 
requests the Panel to decline Turkey's  request on the basis that panels enjoy discretion to make the 
findings necessary to resolve a dispute and to decline to address claims for which findings are 
unnecessary.102 
6.2. We have decided not to grant Turkey's  request. Having found that the European Commission 
did not properly establish a threat of serious injury, it would be illogical for us to continue and 
consider whether it demonstrated a causal link between a threat of serious injury not demonstrated 
to exist and increased imports.103 
7 REQUESTS CONCERNING SECTION  7.8 (EXTENT NECESSARY TO PREVENT INJURY)  
7.1 Paragraph  7.247 and footnote  449 (paragraph  7.256 and footnote  482 of the 
Final  Report)  
7.1. Turkey requests the Panel to amend the language of paragraph  7.247 and footnote  449 
(paragraph  7.256 and footnote  482 of the Final Report) to reflect that (a)  the focus of 
Turkey's  argument was no t on the European Union's  assessment concerning a sudden, sharp, and 
significant increase in imports, but was instead on the European  Commission's  conclusion that there 
was a threat of serious injury that was based, among other things, on a further increas e in imports 
during the first six  months of 2018; and (b)  Turkey  did not mention in its submissions that the 
European Commission should have determined the applicable safeguard based on data from the 
period from January  2013 to June  2018, but only argued that the period used for this purpose should 
also have included data from the first six  months of 2018.104 
7.2. The European Union did not comment on Turkey's  request.  
7.3. We have modified the language of paragraph  7.247 and footnote  449 (paragraph  7.256 and 
footnote  482 of the Final Report) to account for Turkey's  comments.  
7.2 Paragraph  7.250 (paragraph  7.259 of the Final Report)  
7.4. Turkey makes one explicit and one implicit request concerning this paragraph. First, 
Turkey  requests the Panel to m odify certain language in paragraph  7.250 (paragraph  7.259 of the 
Final Report) to reflect that Turkey did not mention in its submissions that the European Commission 
should have determined the applicable safeguard based on data from the period from Januar y 2013 
to June  2018, but only argued that the period used for this purpose should also have included data 
from the first six  months of 2018.105 Second, Turkey suggests that while the Panel found that 
Turkey  did not explain why TRQs established based on a pe riod that included the first six  months of 
2018 would be connected to a state of the domestic industry below which the industry will experience 
 
99 Turkey's  request for interim review, paras.  37-38. 
100 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  37. 
101 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  38. 
102 European Union's  comments on Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  20. 
103 Panel Report, Argentina – Preserved Peaches , para.  7.135.  
104 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  39. 
105 Turkey's  request fo r interim review, para.  40. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  serious injury but TRQs based on the period used by the European Commission are not, Turkey did 
provide such exp lanation in paragraph  330 of its first written submission.106  
7.5. The European Union did not comment on Turkey's  request.  
7.6. We have modified the language of paragraph  7.250 (paragraph  7.259 of the Final Report), to 
account for Turkey's  first request. However, we have not further modified paragraph  7.250 
(paragraph  7.259 of the Final Report) to account for Turkey's  implicit suggestion that paragraph  330 
of Turkey's  first written submission directly contradicts the "explanation -related" finding that the 
Panel makes in paragraph  7.250 (paragraph  7.259 of the Final Report). The sentences that 
Turkey  references in paragraph  330 do not constitute an explanation of the sort that we noted was 
not provided by Turkey. We also note that the argument that is raised in the two sentences in 
paragraph  330 to which Turkey draws our attention is addressed in paragraphs  7.248 and 7.249 of 
the Interim Report (paragraphs  7.257 and 7.258 of the Final Report).  
7.3 Paragraph  7.261 (paragraph  7.270 of the Final Report)  
7.7. Turkey comments that the Panel's  statement that Turkey's  position is "internally contradictory" 
is not explained and requests the Panel to explain that statement.107  
7.8. The European Union did not comment on Turkey's  request.  
7.9. We consider paragr aph 7.261 (paragraph  7.270 of the Final Report) to be sufficiently clear 
about the nature of the internal contradiction that the Panel points to, namely that on the one hand 
Turkey suggests that the application of the full amount of the pre -existing AD/CV duties may not be 
inconsistent with Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, but on the other hand contends that 
the partial suspension of those duties was inconsistent with that provision. We therefore have not 
modified paragraph  7.261 (paragraph  7.270  of the Final Report) to account for Turkey's  request.  
8 REQUEST CONCERNING SECTION  7.10 (RESTRICTIVENESS OF THE MEASURE)  
8.1 Paragraph  7.321 (paragraph  7.330 of the Final Report)  
8.1. Turkey suggests that the Panel incorrectly concluded that Turkey did not explain how the 
modifications that were made to the definitive safeguard made as part of the first and the second 
review regulations made the safeguard more restrictive. Turkey as serts that it did, in fact, explain 
the introduction of "quantitative caps on the volume of the TRQs" at paragraph  366 of its first written 
submission and paragraphs  260 to 264 of its second written submission. Turkey therefore requests 
the Panel to refer to and address this explanation.108 
8.2. The European Union did not comment on Turkey's  request.  
8.3. Paragraph  366 of Turkey's  first written submission states:  
[T]he European Union also violated Article  7.4 since it modified the definitive safeguard 
measu res so as to make them more trade restrictive than originally determined. Indeed, 
among others, the European Union imposed quantitative caps on the use of the global 
and residual TRQs for certain product categories, and restricted imports under product 
category  4.B to those exporters that could demonstrate an end -use in the automotive 
sector. Through those modifications, the European Union made the applied 
definitive  safeguard measures stricter, in violation of Article  7.4 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.  
8.4. A portion of the second  sentence of this paragraph alludes to the imposition of "quantitative 
caps on the use of the global and residual TRQs for certain product categories". However, the 
paragraph does not shed light on the manner in which these "quant itative caps" made the 
definitive  safeguard more restrictive in a manner inconsistent with Article  7.4 of the Agreement on 
 
106 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  41. 
107 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  42. 
108 Turkey's  request for interim review, para.  43. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  Safeguards. The paragraph also does not identify the product categories on which the 
European  Commission applied the "quantitative ca ps" pursuant to the first and the second review 
regulations. The modifications to the definitive safeguard that the first and the second review 
regulations made in respect of various product categories differed factually from one another. Given 
this, the g eneral and unsubstantiated assertion that Turkey makes in paragraph  366 related to 
"quantitative caps" does not constitute an explanation sufficient to establish a prima facie  case that 
any of the specific modifications of the definitive safeguard that for m the basis of Turkey's  claim 
were inconsistent with Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
8.5. We note that in paragraphs  361 and 363 of its first written submission, Turkey lists certain 
modifications that the first and the second review regulations made to the definitive safeguard. 
However, we also note that Turkey acknowledges that these lists "merely described the various 
changes brought pursuant to the two review", not all of which were included within the scope of 
Turkey's  claim under  Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards.109 Therefore, notwithstanding 
such lists in paragraphs  361 and 363 of its first written submission, Turkey's  first written submission 
did not explain how the "quantitative caps" that Turkey referred to in paragra ph 366 of its first 
written submission made the definitive safeguard more restrictive in a manner inconsistent with 
Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
8.6. Paragraph  260 of the second written submission repeats the assertion that Turkey makes in 
paragraph  366 of its first written submission that "the European Union imposed quantitative caps on 
the use of the global and residual TRQs for certain product categories". Paragraph  261 of 
Turkey's  second written submission further states that "by making t his adjustment, which further 
restricts access to the relevant TRQs, the European Union increased the restrictiveness of the 
challenged measures in violation of Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards". Nothing in either 
paragraph  260 or 261 of Turkey's  second written submission explains the manner in which the 
"quantitative caps" made the definitive safeguard more restrictive in a manner inconsistent with 
Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards. The paragraphs also do not identify the product 
categor ies on which the European Commission applied the "quantitative caps" pursuant to the first 
and the second review regulations. Therefore, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph  8.4 
above, we consider that paragraphs  260 and 261 do not constitute an explanation sufficient to 
establish a prima facie  case that any of the specific modifications of the definitive safeguard that 
form the basis of Turkey's  claim we re inconsistent with Article  7.4 of the Agreement  on 
Safeguards'  claim. Paragraphs  262 to 264 of Turkey's  second written submission do not speak to 
"quantitative caps".  
8.7. We therefore have not modified paragraph  7.321 (paragraph  7.330 of the Final Repo rt) in 
response to Turkey's  request . 
 
_______________
 
109 Turkey's  closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  8. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX B  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Turkey  39 
Annex  B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European  Union  57 
 
 WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX  B-1 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF TURKEY  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. Turkey challenges the provisional and definitive safeguard measures imposed by the 
European  Union on certain steel products.  
2. On 26 March  2018, the European  Commission published a "Notice of initiation of a safeguard 
investigation concerning imports of steel products".1 In its Notice of Initiation, the 
European  Commission identified 26 product categories of steel that were listed t ogether with their 
relevant tariff codes in Annex I to the Notice. On 28  June 2018, the European  Commission published 
a Notice whereby it extended the scope of the investigation by including two additional product 
categories.2 
3. On 17  July 2018, the Euro pean Union adopted a regulation imposing provisional safeguard 
measures ("EU Provisional Measures Regulation") on the imports of 23 out of the 28  product 
categories concerned.3 No provisional measures were imposed on product categories  10, 11, 19, 24 
and 27 given that, according to the European Commission's  preliminary analysis, no absolute 
increase in imports could be observed over the period considered (i.e. 2013 -2017) for those 
five product categories.  
4. For the injury analysis, the European Commission  examined the situation of the Union steel 
industry for all product categories together but also reported the data for each of the 23  product 
categories. The European Commission concluded that, although the Union steel industry had partially 
recovered for some product categories, the Union steel industry was in a situation of threat of serious 
injury and that the situation was likely to develop into actual serious injury in the foreseeable future. 
Given the critical circumstances, the European Commission co nsidered that provisional safeguard 
measures should be taken.  
5. A distinct safeguard measure in the form of a tariff -rate quota (" TRQ") was imposed on each 
of the 23 product categories. The TRQ for each product category was calculated on the basis of the 
average of the annual level of imports in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. In the event that a quota 
in a given product category would become exhausted, an additional duty of 25% on imports of that 
product category had to be paid. The provisional safeguard m easures were applied for a duration of 
200 days from the date of their entry into force.  
6. On 31  January  2019, the European  Union adopted a regulation imposing definitive safeguard 
measures for a period of three  years , including the period of imposition o f the provisional measures 
(the "EU Definitive Measures Regulation"). The measures were therefore set to expire on 
30 June 2021.4 
7. A definitive safeguard measure was imposed on 26 out of the 28 product categories, product 
categories 11 and 23 being excl uded from the scope of the measures due to the 
European  Commission's  finding that imports of these two product categories had decreased in 
absolute terms from 2013 to the most recent period ("MRP"), i.e. July 2017 – June 2018.  
 
1 Notice of initiation of a safeguard investigation concerning imports of steel products, Official Journal of 
the European  Union, C 111, 26  March  2018, pp.  29-35 ("Notice of Initiation "). 
2 Notice amending the Notice of initiation of a safeguard investigation concerning the imports of steel 
products, Official Journal of the European  Union, C 225, 28  June 2018, pp.  54-56 ("Amended Notice of 
Initiation "). 
3 Commission Implementing Regulation ( EU) 2018/1013 of 17  July 2018 imposing provisional safeguard 
measures with regard to imports of certain steel products, Official Journal of the European  Union, L 181, 
18 July 2018, pp.  39-83. 
4 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31  January  2019 imposing definitive 
safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products, Official Journal of the European  Union, L 31, 
1 February  2019, pp.  27-74. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  8. The serious injury analysi s was made by the European Commission on a combined basis as 
well as at the level of three product families, namely flat products, long products and tubes, for the 
period 2013 - 2017. The European  Commission concluded that the Union industry was in a situa tion 
of threat of serious injury and that the situation was likely to develop into actual serious injury in 
the foreseeable future, in the absence of safeguard measures.  
9. A distinct safeguard measure in the form of a TRQ was imposed on each of the 26 pro duct 
categories. The TRQ for each product category was calculated on the basis of the average of the 
annual level of imports in the years 2015, 2016 and 2017 plus 5%.  
10. The European Union provided for a progressive liberalisation of the definitive measures, by 
providing for an increase in the level of the TRQs by 5% after each year of application of the 
measures.  
11. On 3 September  2019, the European Commission published a regulation so as to put in place 
measures to prevent the concurrent application with the safeguard measures of existing 
anti-dumping and/or countervailing measures.5 Finally, the European  Union adopted, pursuant to 
two reviews, two regulations adjusting  the definitive measures in a number of respects: the first one 
was adopted on 26  September  2019 ("EU First Reviewed Definitive Measures Regulation") and the 
second one was adopted on 29  June 2020 ("EU Second Reviewed Definitive Measures Regulation").6 
Among others, the European  Union decided that the liberalisation rate of the TRQs would be 
decreased from 5% to 3%.  
II. THE MEASURES AT ISSUE  
12. The measures at issue in this dispute are the provisional and definitive safeguard measures 
imposed by the Europ ean Union on the imports of certain steel products and the investigation leading 
to the imposition of those measures. They include any amendments, supplements, reviews, 
replacements, renewals, extensions, implementing measures and any other related measure s taken 
by the European  Union in relation to the investigation and/or the safeguard measures at issue.  
III. THE MEASURES AT ISSUE ARE INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE  XIX:1(A) OF 
THE GATT  1994 AND THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS  
A. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 
and the Agreement on Safeguards in relation to its determination and analysis of 
the products under investigation and for the purposes of the imposition of the 
safeguard measures  
1. The European  Union f ailed to examine the circumstances and conditions for the imposition of 
a safeguard measure for each individual product category while a distinct safeguard measure was 
imposed on the imports of each different product category.  
 
5 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1382 of 2  September  2019 amending certain 
Regul ations imposing anti -dumping or anti -subsidy measures on certain steel products subject to safeguard 
measures, Official Journal of the European  Union, L 227, 3  September  2019 ( "EU Double Remedy Regulation "), 
pp. 1-25. 
6 Commission Implementing Regulation ( EU) 2019/1590 of 26  September  2019 amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products, 
Official Journal of the European  Union, L 248, 27  September  2019, pp.  28-64 and Commission Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2020/894 of 29  June 2020 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 imposing 
definitive safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products, Official Journal of the European  Union, 
L 206, 30  June 2020, p p. 27-62. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  13. In providing that a Membe r may apply a safeguard measure "to a product" only if it has 
determined that the conditions to impose a safeguard measure are met for "such product", 
Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 require that the 
product  on which the safeguard measure is applied is the same as the product with respect to which 
the competent authorities have determined that it is imported in such increased quantities and under 
such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury  to the domestic industry. Thus, where 
safeguard measures are applied on distinct products, competent authorities must demonstrate that 
the circumstances and conditions set out in Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and the Agreement  on 
Safeguards are met fo r each product  subject to a safeguard measure.  
14. In the present case, the European  Union imposed, at the provisional and definitive stages, 
distinct safeguard measures on the imports of each product category. More specifically, the 
European  Union imposed  a specific TRQ on each product category, the level of the TRQ being 
determined specifically for each product category on the basis of the average of imports of that 
product category during the period 2015 -2017. The TRQs were allocated to Members having a 
substantial interest determined on a product -specific category basis. The fact that the 
European  Union imposed distinct safeguard measures on each product category is supported by the 
fact that developing country Members were excluded from the scope of the  safeguard measures per 
product category and by the fact that the European Commission analysed whether there had been 
an increase in imports for each product category separately.  
15. Given that the European  Union did not examine the circumstances and condi tions for the 
imposition of a safeguard measure for each product category – something which the European  Union 
acknowledges – it therefore acted in violation of its obligations under the  GATT  1994 and the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  
16. The European  Union cla ims that there was only one product under investigation. However, 
this argument is contradicted by the facts and evidence on the record.  
17. At the initiation of the investigation, the European Commission itself determined the scope of 
the investigation as  including 26 (and later on 28) distinct products under investigation. It repeatedly 
referred to the "products concerned" in the plural throughout the Notice of Initiation and added 
two product categories to "the list of products subject of that investigat ion" in the Amended Notice 
of Initiation. The European  Union's  argument that the references to the "product s concerned" in the 
Notice of Initiation and in the questionnaires were terminology errors amounts to an ex post  
explanation which must be rejected b y the Panel.  
18. Furthermore, the European Commission requested interested parties to respond to 
questionnaires by distinguishing "between the different 'products concerned'", defined as each 
product category. Thus, the way in which the European  Union soug ht and received the data from 
the interested parties confirms that there were 28 distinct products under investigation.  
19. The fact that the European  Commission intended to conduct its analysis for 28  products under 
investigation is further supported by t he explanation provided in the EU Provisional Measures 
Regulation in which the European Commission justified why an analysis for all the product categories 
together was necessary. Such justification would have been unnecessary if the investigation had 
been initiated for a single product in the first place.  
20. As the European  Union imposed different safeguard measures on individual product 
categories, it should have determined that each of the conditions and circumstances to impose a 
safeguard measure was m et for each product category. However, the European  Union did not assess 
whether, as a result of unforeseen developments, each product category  subject to a safeguard 
measure was being imported into its territory in such increased quantities and under such  conditions 
as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to the Union industry.  
21. By failing to assess whether the conditions and circumstances to impose a safeguard measure 
as laid down in Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and in the Agreement on S afeguards were met 
for each of the product categories on which it imposed a distinct provisional and a definitive 
safeguard measure, the European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 
and Articles  2.1, 4.1(c), 4.2(a), 4.2(b) and  6 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  2. The European  Union failed to examine the products under investigation in a consistent manner 
throughout the investigation  
22. Competent authorities must examine the products under investigation in a consistent manner 
throughout the investigation. In particular, where a safeguard investigation includes different 
products, those products cannot be grouped together differently for the purposes of examining 
certain circumstances or conditions and for the purposes of the application of the measures. This 
consistency requirement also follows from the requirement of "objectivity" which can be found in 
Article  4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards and the need to provide reasoned conclusions with 
regard to the  determinations being made, in accordance with Articles  3.1 and 4.2(c) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  
23. The European  Union erred by failing to examine the products under investigation in a 
consistent manner throughout the investigation.  
24. Having deter mined in its Notice of Initiation that the investigation covered "certain steel 
products" (i.e. the "products concerned") identified in Annex I as 26 (and later 28) product 
categories, the Commission was required to keep this definition of the products und er consideration 
throughout its investigation. The European  Commission should therefore have analysed, consistently 
with that definition of the products under investigation, whether the conditions for the imposition of 
a safeguard measure were met for each  product category individually.  
25. However, the European  Commission failed to examine the products under investigation in a 
consistent manner. Indeed, sometimes it examined all product categories together; sometimes it 
examined each of the product categor ies separately, and sometimes it followed a mixed approach. 
It did not provide any compelling explanation as to why adopting such inconsistent methodology 
was reliable.  
26. Furthermore, the European  Union acted in a biased manner. At both the provisional a nd 
definitive stages, the European Commission analysed the volume of imports per product category 
and excluded the product categories for which it had found no increase in absolute terms. It then 
examined the level of imports for the product categories (fo r which it had found an increase) taken 
together. For the injury analysis, it also excluded the data concerning the product categories which 
it had found no increase in imports. This approach led to a biased evaluation as it is more likely to 
find an incre ase in imports and a threat of serious injury.  
27. In conclusion, by failing to examine the products under investigation in a consistent manner 
throughout the investigation, the European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT  1994 and  Articles  2.1, 3.1, 4.1(c), 4.2(a), 4.2(b), 4.2(c) and 6 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.  
B. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 
with respect to its determinations on unforeseen developments  
1. The European  Union f ailed to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments  
28. Turkey submits that the European  Union erred in its determination of unforeseen 
developments because: (i)  it failed to identify the events which constituted the "unforeseen 
developments" and  their timing; and (ii)  the elements it identified do not constitute "unforeseen 
developments" within the meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
29. Pursuant to Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994, competent authorities must identify the 
"unforeseen d evelopments" that resulted in the increase in imports causing or threatening to cause 
serious injury to domestic producers. Although the EU Provisional Measures Regulation and the 
EU Definitive Measures Regulation include a section entitled "unforeseen dev elopments", the 
European  Union failed in those sections to clearly and precisely identify which events constituted the 
"unforeseen developments".  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
- 43 - 
 
  30. The European Commission identified the steel making overcapacity, the increased use of trade 
restrictive p ractices and trade defence  instruments as well as the US Section  232 measures as 
"factors" constituting "the sources" of the "unforeseen developments". If those elements are factors 
which constitute the "sources" of the unforeseen developments, it is uncle ar which events constitute 
the unforeseen developments themselves. The failure to clearly identify the events constituting the 
unforeseen developments allegedly resulting in the increase in imports is compounded by the failure 
to clearly state when or duri ng which period of time the factors identified would have occurred.  
31. Moreover, the elements identified by the European  Union do not constitute "unforeseen 
developments".  
32. First, global overcapacity in the steel sector is far from being a recent issue . Overcapacity is 
a structural and cyclical problem in the steel industry which was already present before the 
Uruguay  Round. Therefore, periods of global overcapacity in commodities cannot be characterised 
as an unexpected development that was unforeseen by European  Union during the Uruguay Round. 
Furthermore, while the extent and timing of changes in production and demand and their impact on 
the competitive situation in a particular market can be unforeseen, any determination by the 
competent authorities regarding fluctuations in production, stocks and prices must be accompanied 
by a reasonable and detailed explanation  regarding exactly how such changes, including their extent 
and timing, are "unforeseen". The European  Union has failed to provide such a re asonable and 
detailed  explanation. The European  Union claims that the already existing overcapacity in the steel 
sector became "unforeseen " when it continued increasing after 2011, despite being already 
excessive, and continued persisting, despite the impo rtant number of measures taken to reduce it. 
The European Union in particular refers to the fact that after 2011 "it was expected that total crude 
steel capacity would decrease or at least remain stable".7 There is, however, no evidence supporting 
that statement and, thus, no basis to conclude that a continued  increase in overcapacity was 
unforeseen.  
33. Second, the European Commission also referred to the increased use of restrictive trade 
practices and tr ade defence instruments in the steel sector. The number of trade defence measures 
that have been imposed or that may be imposed by other WTO  Members does not constitute an 
"unforeseen development" within the meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994. In deed, the 
adoption of trade defence measures is contemplated by WTO rules. Moreover, increases in the use 
of trade defence instruments did take place prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1995. 
The use of trade defence measures follows cycles of varying intensity and an increase in the use of 
trade defence measures can therefore not be considered as an "unforeseen" event. Even if it could, 
there is no evidence supporting the European Commission's  conclusion that there is an "overall 
significant in crease" of trade defence measures or alleged increase in "steel -related" trade defence 
measures, especially given the decrease  in the number of investigations initiated in 2017 -2018, 
which the European  Union attempts to ignore.  
34. The European Commission also refers to certain restrictive trade practices by some 
WTO Members without, however, identifying the measures it refers to. It is difficult to understand 
how – and the European  Union has failed to show that – an increase in tariffs whether adopted as a  
trade defence measure or as an increase of the country's  MFN import duty, can constitute an 
unforeseen development. The European  Union has failed to point to any explanation of how the 
allegedly increasing use of trade -restrictive practices by certain Mem bers has "exacerbated" the 
effects of the alleged increased use of trade defence instruments.  
35. Third, the European Commission refers to the Section  232 measures adopted by the 
United  States claiming that "given their level and scope, [those] are likely to cause substantial trade 
diversion of steel products into the Union" .8 The European  Union fails to explain how the imposition 
of a duty through the Section  232 measures constitutes an unexpected development taking into 
account that Section  232 existed i n US legislation long before the Uruguay Round. In particular, the 
European  Union failed to substantiate how the imposition of a duty constitutes a development that 
was unexpected within the meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
 
7 EU Definitive Measures Regulation, recital 52.  
8 EU Provisional Measures Regulation, recital 35.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  36. It follows that  the alleged overcapacity in the steel sector, the increased use of trade defence 
measures and trade restrictive practices by other countries, and the adoption by the United States 
of the Section  232 measures on imports of steel and aluminium do not consti tute "unforeseen 
developments" within the meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
2. The European  Union failed to demonstrate a logical connection between the unforeseen 
developments and the increase in imports  
37. The European Union has failed to de monstrate a "logical connection" between the alleged 
unforeseen developments and the alleged increase in imports because (i) the European Commission 
failed to explain how the alleged unforeseen developments resulted in increases in imports into the 
Europea n Union; (ii) the European Commission failed to explain the result that the unforeseen 
developments had on the specific products concerned (iii) the Section  232 measures taken by the 
US could not have resulted in the increase in imports since they have bee n adopted after the alleged 
increases in imports.  
a. The European Commission failed to explain how the alleged unforeseen 
developments resulted in increases in imports into the European  Union  
38. As the panel noted in US – Steel Safeguards , while, in some cases, the explanation of how 
the unforeseen developments resulted in the increase in imports "may be as simple as bringing 
two sets of facts together", in other situations, it may "require much more detailed analysis in order 
to make clear the relati onship that exists between the unforeseen developments and the increased 
imports that are causing or threatening to cause serious injury" .9 The extent of the explanation that 
is necessary depends on the nature of the facts, including their complexity.  
39.  The facts of the present case are complex. Indeed, they concerned 28 distinct categories of 
steel products which included various types and grades of steel products with very different prices 
and end -uses. The volume of imports and the number of exportin g countries and producers subject 
to the measures are also considerable. Moreover, the European Commission's  reference to different 
alleged unforeseen developments (or factors leading to unforeseen developments), over a number 
of years, adds further comple xity to the facts.  
40. In light of the complexity of the facts and the complexities deriving from the confluence of 
unforeseen developments, the European Commission should have provided a detailed explanation 
of how the alleged unforeseen developments resu lted in increases in imports. However, the 
European Commission has failed to do so.  
b. The European Union failed to explain the impact of the unforeseen developments on 
the specific products concerned  
41.  The European  Union failed to explain the impacts o f the events referred to in the 
EU Provisional Measures Regulation and in the EU Definitive Measures Regulation had on the specific  
products concerned. Indeed, the European Commission referred to events concerning "steel" in 
general but failed to consider how those events were related to the specific products at issue.  
42. By referring to unforeseen developments concerning "steel" in general, the European  Union 
could not establish the necessary link between those alleged unforeseen developments and the 
increase in imports of the specific products at issue which did not cover all steel products.  
c. The Section  232 measures taken by the United  States could not have resulted  in the 
increase in imports since they have been adopted after the alleged increase in i mports  
43. For an increase in imports to have occurred as a result of  unforeseen developments, the 
unforeseen developments must have occurred prior to  the start of the increase in imports.  
 
9 Panel Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para. 10.115.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  44. In the present case, the European Commission referred to the Section  232 measures adopted 
by the United  States, by stating that "given their level and scope, [they] are likely to cause 
substantial trade diversion  of steel products into the Union".10 Thereby, the European Commission 
acknowledged that they did not and  could not have any impact on imports of steel products for the 
period before the adoption of the provisional measures. The European Commission, however, 
claimed that "the mere initiation of the investigation did undoubtedly create uncertainty on the 
marke t and caused effects on steel trade flows" .11 It failed, however, to specify what these "effects 
on steel trade flows" constituted or to present any evidence of such effects. The European  Union 
failed to specify how or why these alleged effects would have led to an increase in imports into the 
European  Union. The European  Union should have demonstrated that imports into the 
European  Union increased from countries  whose exports to the United States fell as a consequence  
of the Section  232 measures. It failed  to do so.  
45. The European  Union also referred to the attractiveness of its market without substantiating in 
any way such assertion, and in any event did not do so in the published report. Moreover, the ex post 
evidence provided by the European  Union duri ng these Panel proceedings does not demonstrate that 
the EU market is an attractive market. In any case, even if the EU market is an attractive market, 
this is not in itself sufficient to establish a "logical connection" between unforeseen developments 
and the alleged increased imports into the European  Union.  
46. On the basis of the above, the European  Union has failed to provide a reasoned and adequate 
explanation of how the unforeseen developments resulted in an increase in imports for each of the 
concer ned product categories, and therefore acted inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT  1994.  
C. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 
with respect to its determinations as to the effect of the obligations incu rred under 
the GATT  1994  
47. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 as it failed to 
demonstrate the effect of the obligations incurred under the  GATT  1994 and to establish a logical 
connection between the effect of t he GATT obligations and the increase in imports threatening to 
cause serious injury to the domestic industry.  
48. Indeed, the European Commission did not identify in the EU Provisional Measures Regulation 
nor in the EU Definitive Measures Regulation the ob ligations the European  Union incurred under 
the GATT  1994 with respect to the products concerned nor the effects of such obligation(s). In 
particular, the European  Union did not identify the tariff bindings regarding the products concerned 
that it has unde rtaken under the  GATT  1994, nor the effects of such obligations.  
49. The European Commission also (and a fortiori ) did not explain, in its published report, how 
the effect of the obligation(s) it has incurred under the  GATT  1994 constrained its ability to react to 
the import surge causing or threatening to cause serious injury to its domestic industry.  
50. The European  Union's  argument that, since the rates imposed are above its tariff bindings, 
there is no requirement to demonstrate the existence of the ef fect of the relevant GATT obligations 
is inapposite and must be rejected. Competent authorities must adequately identify in the published 
report the applicable GATT obligations and their effects. By failing to do so, the European  Union 
violated Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
 
10 EU Provisional Measures Regulation, recital  35. 
11 EU Definitive Measures Regulation, recital  58. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
- 46 - 
 
  D. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Articles  2.1 and 4.2(a) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 with respect to 
its determination of increase in imports  
51. The European  Union failed to m ake a determination regarding the increase in imports which 
is consistent with Articles  2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT  1994 because (i)  it failed to examine the imports in relation to each product category; 
(ii) it erroneously made an end -point-to-end-point analysis and failed to make a trend analysis; 
(iii) it failed to make a reasoned and adequate explanation of its finding of "increased imports" in 
light of the decrease observed in the most recent past; (iv ) it failed to demonstrate an increase in 
imports that is sharp enough, significant enough, sudden enough and recent enough.  
1. The European  Union failed to examine the imports in relation to each product category  
52. The European  Union, both at the provisional and definitive stages, acknowledged the 
importance of making a determination of the increase in imports at the level of product categories 
since, as a first step of its analysis, it examined whether there had been an absolute increase in 
import s for each product category. However, the European Commission did not stop its analysis 
there. Instead, it excluded from the scope of the investigation the product categories for which it 
found no increase during the period examined. It then examined the i mports of the remaining 
product categories taken together and, at the definitive stage, at the level of product families.  
53. Thereby, the European  Union failed to make an appropriate analysis of the imports. Having 
identified 28 distinct product categorie s, the European  Union was required to examine the import 
data for each product category separately and to end its analysis there.  
54. The European  Union claims that there is a single product under investigation ("meaning all 
28 product categories taken tog ether") and that "it followed a consistent approach between the 
definition of the product concerned and the analysis of the increase in imports". This defence must 
be rejected. First, there is not a "single product under investigation", but 28 distinct pro ducts under 
investigation. Second, the European  Union erroneously argues that it followed a consistent 
approach. Indeed, to the extent that it made a determination for all product categories taken 
together, it did not do so for the single product "meaning all 28 product categories taken together", 
as the alleged "single product" examined in the context of that analysis only included 23 and 
26 product categories respectively at the provisional and definitive stages.  
2. The European  Union erroneously made an end-point-to-end-point analysis and failed to make 
a trend analysis over the period of investigation  
55. The European  Union failed to examine the trends  in imports over the period of investigation 
as it made an end -point-to-end-point analysis. Indeed, in i ts analysis per product category, the 
European Commission merely compared the figure of the first year of the period (i.e. 2013) with the 
figure of the last year of the period (i.e. 2017 at the provisional stage and the MRP at the definitive 
stage). The Eu ropean Commission did not examine the trends during the period of investigation, 
that is how imports evolved throughout the period of investigation.  
56. By merely comparing the end -points of the period and by failing to analyse the trends in 
imports over t he period of investigation, the European Commission failed to make a determination 
concerning imports which is consistent with the requirements of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 
and Articles  2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
3. The European  Union failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of its finding of 
"increase in imports" in light of the decrease observed in the most recent past  
57. The European  Union failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of its finding of 
increase in imports in light of the decrease observed in the most recent past with regard to certain 
product families and with regard to a number of product categories.  
58. With regard to the product families , the European Commission failed to explain why it  could 
make a finding of "increased imports" despite the decreases observed between 2017 and the MRP 
for flat products and tubes (product families 1 and 3). For long products (product family 2), the 
European Commission did not address the decrease in impor ts that occurred between 2016 and 
2017.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
- 47 - 
 
  59. With regard to the individual product categories , the European Commission failed to provide 
a reasoned and adequate explanation of its finding of "increased imports" in view of the decrease 
observed in the most r ecent past for a large number of the product categories concerned. In light of 
this decrease, the European Commission was required to provide a reasoned and adequate  
explanation as to why, notwithstanding the decrease, it could make a finding of "increased  imports". 
Thereby, the European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
4. The European  Union failed to demonstrate an increase in imports that is sharp enough, sudden 
enough, signi ficant enough and recent enough  
60. The European Commission failed to demonstrate an increase in imports that is sharp enough, 
sudden enough, significant enough and recent enough, at all levels (the products taken together, 
per product family and per produ ct category).  
61. At the level of the product categories taken together, while the European Commission asserts 
that "the increase in imports was sharp and sudden", it did not provide any explanation as to how it 
reached that finding. In this regard, by mak ing an end -point-to-end-point analysis (comparing 2013 
with the MRP) and by failing to examine the trends over the period of investigation, the 
European  Commission ignored the fact that increase in imports was gradual throughout the period 
of investigation . In addition, the Commission failed to provide in its published report an explanation 
why, despite the fact that the increase in imports essentially took place during the first two years of 
the period of investigation, it could reach a finding that the in crease in imports was recent enough. 
It should have explained how it could reach a finding that the increase in imports was sharp enough, 
sudden enough and recent enough while the data shows that imports increased continuously 
throughout the period of inve stigation with the most substantial increase taking place during the 
first years of the period of investigation.  
62. With regard to the product families, the European Commission only refers to the end -point-
to-end-point increase between 2013 and the MRP wh ich was "between 60% and 97% when grouped 
into product families". This does not, however, constitute a reasoned and adequate explanation of 
its determination of increased imports for  the three product families, taking into account that for the 
first produc t family, imports substantially increased between 2013 and 2016, but did not increase 
further since then, for the second product family, imports decreased between 2016 and 2017 and 
for the third product family, imports fluctuated throughout the period of i nvestigation with a decrease 
in the period 2017 -MRP. 
63. With regard to the product categories, the European Commission failed to explain for each of 
the product categories, how the alleged increase in imports was sudden enough, sharp enough and 
recent enough, taking into account that imports for most of these p roduct categories fluctuated from 
2013 to the MRP and that, for a majority of them, imports even showed a decrease from 2017 to 
the MRP.  
64. By failing to demonstrate increases in imports that are sharp enough, sudden enough, 
significant enough and recent enough at all levels (all products together, per product family or per 
product category), the European  Union failed to make a determination of "increased imports" that 
is consistent with Articles  2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT  1994.  
E. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Articles  2.1, 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 
4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 with 
respect to its determination of a threat of serious injury to the dom estic industry  
1. The European  Union failed to make a threat of serious injury analysis with respect to each 
product category  
65. At the provisional stage, the European Commission provided the data concerning the injury 
factors for each product category in dividually, thereby acknowledging the importance of making 
such a determination at the level of the individual product categories.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
- 48 - 
 
  66.  However, when conducting its serious injury analysis at the definitive stage, the 
European  Commission did not carry out its analysis for each product category individually. Instead, 
the European Commission conducted its analysis for all product categories taken together, 
supplemented by an analysis for each of the three product families.  
67. The European Commission should h ave determined that each of the conditions to impose a 
safeguard measure was met for each product category separately. Accordingly, the European  Union 
was required to determine that a threat of serious injury was present for each of the 28 different 
produc t categories. By failing to make such an analysis, the European  Union acted inconsistently 
with Articles  2.1, 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, and Article  XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT  1994.  
2. The European  Union failed to provide a reasone d and adequate explanation of its 
determination of threat of serious injury  
68. The European  Union failed to demonstrate the existence of a significant overall impairment 
that is clearly imminent. In particular, the European  Union failed to provide a reaso ned and adequate 
explanation of its determination that the industry was "in a fragile and vulnerable position". 
Moreover, the European  Union's  determination is not based on the "recent past".  
a. The European  Union does not provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of its 
determination that the industry was in a "fragile and vulnerable position"  
69. The European  Union does not explain how it could conclude, at the level of the product 
categories taken together, that while most of the relevant inj ury factors analysed recorded their best 
level of performance for the whole period of investigation in 2017, the industry was in a fragile or 
vulnerable position. In fact, the improvements in 2017 which continued into the first semester of 
2018 indicate a full recovery of the industry. While three injury indicators show a decrease in 2017, 
these are the only factors for which the Union industry did not outperform in 2017.  
70. The European  Union's  argument regarding the alleged delicate situation of the Unio n industry 
appears to focus mainly – if not solely – on the increase in imports in the first semester of 2018. 
However, evidence of an increase in imports cannot, in itself, prove that the Union industry was in 
a fragile and vulnerable situation. Moreover,  the European  Union's  argument that even though some 
factors improved in 2017, the 2013 -2016 period indicates that the Union industry is vulnerable to 
an increase in imports must be rejected. Indeed, the fact that imports increased between 2016 and 
2017 wh ile most injury factors substantially improved over the same period clearly invalidates that 
argument.  
71. Regarding the analysis made at the level of the product families, many injury factors for each 
product family saw their best performance in 2017, a y ear in which imports increased. The 
European  Union claims that certain factors did not improve in 2017 for some of the product families. 
Turkey notes that the European Commission itself noted at the definitive stage that "the Union 
industry – both globally  and for each of the three product families  … partially recovered in 2017" .12 
While the European  Union attempts to focus on certain factors which did not improve in 2017, this 
ignores, and does not give proper weight to, all of the factors which did show i mprovement in 2017.  
72. At the level of product categories, the evaluation of the relevant injury factors also shows that 
the situation of the Union industry substantially improved during the period of investigation, in 
particular in 2017.  
 
12 EU Definitive Measures Regulation, recital  87. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
- 49 - 
 
  73. Furthermore,  the European  Union does not take into account or explain the factors which 
account for the domestic industry's  improved performance in 2017. In this regard, Turkey notes that 
the significant increase in the costs of production between 2016 and 2017 invali dates the 
European  Union's  assertion that a decrease in such costs between 2013 and 2017 explained the 
improvement of the situation of the Union industry. Turkey further notes that this cost increase was 
fully compensated by an increase in sales prices of 18%. This trend clearly illustrates the Union 
industry's  improved ability to deal with increased costs and to pass any increase onto its customers. 
Regarding trade defence instruments, the recently imposed anti -dumping and countervailing 
measures cannot ex plain by themselves the improvement of the situation of the Union industry as 
an improvement in the situation of the Union industry can also be noticed for product categories not 
recently made subject to anti -dumping and countervailing measures. Moreover, to the extent that 
the recovery of the Union industry in 2017 is due to the imposition of trade defence measures, this 
indicates that the alleged negative situation of the Union industry prior to that was in fact caused by 
dumped or subsidies imports, and that the alleged serious injury or threat thereof suffered by the 
Union industry has been dealt with successfully through the adoption of anti -dumping and  
anti-subsidy measures.  
b. The European  Union failed to make a determination that is based on the "mos t 
recent past"  
74. Importantly for this dispute, "data relating to the most recent past will provide competent 
authorities with an essential, and, usually, the most reliable, basis for a determination of a threat of 
serious injury".13 Thus, "within the per iod of investigation as a whole, evidence from the most recent 
past will provide the strongest indication of the likely future state of the domestic industry".14 
75. In the present case, the data concerning most injury factors show a clear positive trend o ver 
the period of investigation and the data concerning 2017 demonstrate, in fact, the best performance 
for the entire period of investigation. The European Commission itself acknowledged the 
improvement of the situation of the domestic industry in 2017, w hen stating that the Union industry 
"was in a difficult economic situation until 2016" but "recovered in 2017".15 The 
European  Commission further noted that the data concerning the first semester of 2018 "confirmed" 
the trend of 2017 showing a recovery of the Union industry.16 
76. If the data of the most recent past provide the strongest indication of the likely future state 
of the domestic industry and that such data are clearly good, in particular when examining those 
data in light of the data of the enti re period of investigation, they do not support a finding of "threat 
of serious injury".  
77. While the European  Union seems to suggest that Turkey places too much  emphasis on the 
recent past, Turkey in fact submitted and demonstrated that when the data of 2017 is assessed in 
the light of the longer -term trends for the whole period of investigation, they show a substantial 
improvement. Indeed, the data from 2017 demonstrates, for a number of factors, the Union 
industry's  best performance over the entire peri od of investigation. Turkey notes that two out of the 
five factors which, according to the European  Union, supposedly show a decline between 2013 and 
2017, in fact indicate a recovery  in 2017: prices and profitability. The fact that both price and 
profitab ility increased markedly in the second half of the period of investigation is a strong indicator 
of the positive situation of the Union industry. Thus, only three injury indicators show a decrease at 
the end of the period of investigation.  
78. The relevant  question for this Panel is whether the European Commission could find that " a 
significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic industry" was "on the very verge of 
occurring", on the basis of the facts on the record. When viewed in light of the  long-term data trends 
over the whole period of investigation, the data regarding the different injury indicators from the 
most recent past demonstrates a recovery of the industry, and thus does not support a finding of 
threat of serious injury.  
 
13 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  137. 
14 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  137. 
15 EU Definitive Measures Regulation, recital  87. 
16 EU Definitive Measures Regulation, recital  89. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  3. The Eur opean  Union failed to establish, on the basis of facts, that there is a high degree of 
likelihood of serious injury to its domestic industry in the very near future  
79. The European  Union failed to demonstrate, on the basis of facts, that there is a high d egree 
of likelihood of serious injury to the Union industry in the very near future. The 
European  Union's  determination of threat of serious injury is not based on "facts" but on conjecture. 
In fact, the European  Union did not establish the existence of a threat of serious injury, but rather 
of a possible threat of serious injury that "might" occur in the future.  
80. The language in Article  4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards is clear: it must be established 
that increased imports have caused or " are thre atening to cause " serious injury. Thus, the effects of 
the imports must be noticeable on the situation of the domestic industry during the period of 
investigation, creating a situation of "threat of serious injury" during that period, even if it is not yet  
possible to conclude that the domestic industry is suffering from serious injury. However, the 
European Commission established a possible threat of serious injury in the future "if imports continue 
to increase". This finding of "threat of serious injury" is not actual but relates to the future if and to 
the extent that imports continue to increase.  
81. The European  Union seems to conflate the fact that imports into the European  Union may 
increase in the future with the notion of threat of serious injury. E ven if imports were set to increase 
in 2018, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that there is a significant overall 
impairment in the position of the domestic industry which is clearly imminent.  
82. Furthermore, the argument that the fact t hat the Union industry will be in a vulnerable 
situation if imports continue to increase "simply reflects that a threat determination is by definition 
'future -oriented' and whose actual materialization cannot, in fact, be assured with certainty", must 
be rejected. Indeed, what must be likely to materialise is not the "threat of serious injury", but the 
"serious injury". T he threat of serious injury must exist at the time the determination is made and 
must be caused by imports which have increased . By concluding that it has established "a threat of 
serious injury if imports continue to increase", the European  Union failed to demonstrate that the 
Union industry suffers from a threat of serious injury. At best, the European  Union may have 
established  that there is a possibility that, in the future, there might  be a threat of serious injury to 
the Union industry.  
83. Finally, even assuming that the European  Union has made a determination of actual threat of 
serious injury, such a determination has been  established on the basis of conjecture or a remote 
possibility, as such a finding is conditional upon imports continuing to increase. Even to the extent 
that its determination would be based on increased imports in 2018, the European  Union has not 
elabora ted on the impact of those imports on the relevant injury indicators. The 
European  Commission provides no projection as to the likely developments in the relevant injury 
factors in the very near future. Even if it did so, these projections would need to be  supported by 
evidence, which it has not provided.  
84. Thus, the  European  Union established that there was a threat of serious injury to its domestic 
industry only on the basis of conjecture and remote possibility rather than facts, in violation of 
Article 4.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards . 
4. The European  Union failed to analyse each of the injury factors listed in Article  4.2(a) for the 
product categories  
85. In making a determination of threat of serious injury, competent authorities must examine 
"at a minimum" each of the factors listed in Article  4.2(a). The European  Union failed to do so.  
86. First, in the EU Provisional Measures Regulation, the European Commission provided the data 
per product category regarding the situation of the Uni on industry for the following factors: level of 
imports in absolute and relative terms, capacity utilisation, production, sales volume, market, unit 
sales price, profitability, employment, stock, cash flow and return on capital employed, but only for 
the p roduct categories on which it imposed provisional safeguard measures, that is all product 
categories except product categories 10, 11, 19, 24 and 27. The definitive safeguard measures, 
however, were also imposed on product categories 10, 19, 24 and 27 (whi ch had been excluded 
from the scope of the provisional measures). The European Commission, however, did not provide  – 
and a fortiori  failed to analyse ‒ the data regarding the situation of the Union industry for these 
4 product categories which were not in cluded in the scope of the provisional safeguard measures.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  87. Second, although the European Commission provided the data relating to the different injury 
factors in the EU Provisional Measures Regulation, it did not analyse them per product category, but 
at an aggregate level. Thereby, the European Commission failed to evaluate the overall position  of 
the domestic industry per product category, in light of all the relevant factors having a bearing on a 
situation of that industry.  
88. For the foregoing reas ons, the European  Union violated Articles  2.1, 4.1(a), 4.1(b) and 4.2(a) 
of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
F. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Articles  2.1 and 4.2(b) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and Articl e XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994, with respect to 
its determination of the causal link between the increase in imports and the threat 
of serious injury to the domestic industry  
1. The European  Union failed to establish the existence of a causal link between the  increased 
imports and the threat of serious injury  
89. The European  Union failed to establish a causal link between the alleged increased imports 
and the alleged threat of serious injury because (i) there was no coincidence in time between the 
movements i n imports and the movements in injury factors; (ii) the European Commission did not 
provide a compelling explanation as to why, notwithstanding the lack of such a coincidence, a causal 
link nonetheless existed; and (iii) the European Commission established  that a risk of further 
increase in imports threatens to cause serious injury to the Union industry.  
90. The causal link must be established by reference to the period of investigation, even in the 
case of a threat of serious injury. In other words, the co mpetent authorities must establish that 
there is a causal link between imports which are increasing over the period of investigation and a 
domestic industry which is in a situation of threat of serious injury during the period of investigation. 
It cannot b e established by reference to the remote possibility that imports will increase in the future 
and that such a potential increase may lead to a situation of threat of serious injury.  
91. Turkey submits that the European Commission's  findings do not establis h a coincidence in 
time between movements in imports and movements in injury factors. In that regard, the 
European  Union erred in focusing on the period 2013 -2016 while data from the most recent past 
"provide the strongest indication of the likely future s tate of the domestic industry". Thus, the 
European Commission should have focused its analysis of causation on data relating to 2017. The 
analysis of the data of imports on the one hand and of the injury factors on the other hand shows a 
lack of coincidenc e between an alleged upward trend in imports and alleged downward trends in the 
injury factors.  
92. The European Commission did not examine the overall  trends in serious injury factors 
pertaining to the overall  situation since its causation analysis focus ed on only three injury factors, 
namely market share, prices and profitability. Moreover, even when focusing on the trends in market 
share, prices and profits, there is no coincidence in time between the upward trend in the imports 
and the trends in those three injury factors over the period of investigation, at the level of the 
product categories taken together, at the level of the product families and at the level of the product 
categories.  
93. In the absence of a coincidence in time between the alleged i ncrease in imports and the alleged 
threat of serious injury, the European Commission should have provided a compelling analysis as to 
why causation is still present. In particular, it did not explain why, despite increasing imports, the 
Union industry's  sales prices and profitability increased and why, despite increasing costs of 
production, the Union industry was in a position to raise prices without suffering from price 
suppression from imports. Turkey notes that the European Commission did not identify a ny factor 
affecting the conditions of competition between imports and domestic products which would explain 
how the lack of coincidence in time did not negate a causal link.  
94. Finally, the European Commission did not conclude that the increased imports h ave caused or 
are threatening to cause serious injury to the Union industry but instead reasoned that a possible 
further increase of imports might threaten to cause serious injury to the Union industry. However, 
the causal link must be established by refer ence to the period of investigation between imports 
which have increased over the period of investigation and a domestic industry which is in a situation 
of serious injury or threat thereof.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  95. Accordingly, the European Union failed to establish the exist ence of a causal link between the 
alleged increased imports and the alleged threat of serious injury in accordance with Articles  2.1 and 
4.2(b) the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 
2. The European  Union failed to demonstrate th at the alleged threat of serious injury to the 
domestic industry caused by factors other than the increased imports, was not attributed to 
increased imports  
96. The European  Union also violated Article  4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards since it failed 
to ensure that the alleged serious injury or threat thereof caused by factors other than the increased 
imports was not attributed to the increased imports.  
97. First, various interested parties claimed during the investigation that the injury had been 
caused by dumped and/or subsidized imports concerning the same products. The 
European  Commission rejected that claim, stating that anti -dumping and anti -subsidy measures on 
the one hand and safeguard measures on the other hand "do not follow the same logic" an d have 
"different objectives".  
98. However, after the entry into force of the definitive safeguard measures, the European  Union 
adopted the EU Double Remedy Regulation. In that Regulation, the European Commission noted 
that "the effect of safeguard measure s arise only once the relevant level of the tariff -rate quota is 
exhausted (specific or erga omnes ) and the applicable above -quota tariff duty is imposed" and that 
"[u]ntil that moment, the Commission considers that the full level of the applicable 
anti-dumping/anti -subsidy measures continues to be necessary and justified, in order to remedy the 
effect of unfairly dumped/subsidized imports".17 
99. Although safeguard measures and anti -dumping/countervailing measures have different 
objectives and address different types of actions ("fair" trade actions versus  "unfair" trade actions), 
they all address actions which are causing or threatening to cause m aterial/serious injury.  The nature 
of safeguard measures "were intended by the drafters of the GATT to be matters out of the ordinary, 
to be matters of urgency, to be, in short, 'emergency act ions'".18 They should not be used to address 
"events in routine commerce" since they are "clearly, and in every way, an extraordinary remedy".19 
100. The injurious effects of dumped/subsidised imports must be distinguished from those of the 
increased imports resulting from the unforeseen developments and obligations in curred under the 
GATT. However, the European  Union erred as it failed to identify the nature and extent of the 
injurious effects of that factor and since it failed to distinguish those effects from the injurious effects 
of the increased imports.  
101. The o bligation to distinguish the injurious effects from dumped or subsidized imports is 
particularly important in the present dispute where several anti -dumping and anti -subsidy 
investigations were carried out by the European  Union during the period of investi gation of the 
safeguard investigation. Many of these investigations examined the existence of material injury 
during an identical or overlapping period.  
102. Thus, the European  Union, in its non -attribution analysis, should have distinguished the 
injurious effects of imports resulting from dumping/subsidisation from those of the increased 
imports.  
 
17 EU Double Remedy Regulation, recital  11. 
18 Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , paras.  93-95; Appellate  Body Report, Korea – 
Dairy , paras.  86-88. 
19 Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , paras.  93-95; Appellate Body Report, Korea – 
Dairy , paras.  86-88. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  103. Second, with regard to the export performance of the Union industry, the 
European  Commission concluded that it was not "a major threat of serious in jury to the 
Union  industry"20 as export prices remained at the same level during the period of investigation and 
that the exports represent only a limited share of the Union industry's  sales volume.21 The 
European  Union failed to provide a reasoned and ade quate explanation for its conclusion, taking into 
account the continuous decrease in the volume of exports from 2014 to 2017. In fact, exports 
decreased between 2014 and 2017 by 11%. Furthermore, by noting that it was not a "major threat", 
the European Com mission acknowledged the injurious effects caused by the export performance but 
failed to explain how it separated those injurious effects from those of the increased imports.  
104. Third, while the European Commission claimed that there was no legal requir ement to exclude 
imports made by Union producers or their related traders, Turkey submits that the European  Union 
failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation that those imports did not have injurious 
effects, and merely stated that they were low.  The mere fact that the imports by Union industry 
were between 0.3% and 0.7% of total imports does not mean that the imports cannot have had 
injurious effects, and the European  Union has failed to establish this as a matter of fact.  
105. The European  Union  did not clearly indicate that there were no other factors causing injury to 
the Union industry but found, instead, that these factors were not as such as to "weaken" or "break" 
the causal link. Having established that other factors affected the situation of the Union industry, 
the European  Union should have distinguished their effects from those of the increased imports. It 
should also have assessed how these other factors would affect the situation of the Union industry 
in the near future. The European  Union failed to do so.  
106. Thus, by failing to carry out a proper non -attribution analysis, the European  Union acted 
inconsistently with Article  2.1, Article  4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) 
of the  GATT  1994.  
G. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Articles  5.1 and 7.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 in its application 
of the safeguard measures  
107. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  5.1, first sentence, and Article  7.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 as it applied safeguard measures 
beyond the extent and duration necessary to prevent serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.  
108. First, the European  Union set the safeguard measures  in the form of TRQs, the imports being 
subject to a duty of 25% when exceeding a quota. The quotas have been calculated for each 
safeguard measure on the basis of the import volumes of each relevant product category for the 
period 2015 -2017 plus 5%. Turke y submits that the TRQs are not applied "only to the extent 
necessary to prevent serious injury" as they lack the required rational connection22 with the objective 
of preventing serious injury, given that the European Commission's  analysis was partly based  on 
data relating to 2018. The European  Union should have determined the applicable safeguard 
measures on the basis of the import volumes including the first six months of 2018.  
109. Second, the requirement that the safeguard measure must be limited "to th e extent necessary 
to prevent or remedy serious injury" is to be read as requiring that safeguard measures be applied 
only to the extent that they address serious injury attributed  to increased imports. It follows that 
the violation of Article  4.2(b) const itutes a sufficient basis for a prima facie  case that the safeguard 
measures have not been applied "only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury" 
as required by Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. Given that the European  Union f ailed to 
conduct a proper causation analysis as required by Article  4.2(b) in two respects, the 
European  Union therefore also acted inconsistently with Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards . 
 
20 EU Definitive Measures Regulation, recital  123. 
21 EU Definitive Measures Regulation, recital  123. 
22 Panel Report, Chile – Price Band , para.  7.183.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  110. Turkey submits that for the same reasons, the European  Union also violated Article  7.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994. Since the European  Union failed 
to make a proper causation analysis in accordance with Article  4.2(b), it was unable to ensure that 
the safeguard measures  were applied only for such a period of time necessary to address the serious 
injury attributed to increased imports. Consequently, the period of 3 years does not represent the 
period of time necessary to address the serious injury caused by increased impo rts. 
111. Third, the European  Union applied the definitive safeguard measures beyond the extent 
necessary to prevent serious injury and to facilitate adjustment because the safeguard measures 
address the serious injury caused by dumped and subsidized imports. The Eu ropean  Union's  Double 
Remedy Regulation provided that, for products subject to anti -dumping or countervailing duties, the 
part of the anti -dumping and countervailing duties on the products concerned that overlaps with the 
safeguard out -of-quota duty should  be suspended once the TRQs are exhausted.  
112. Turkey submits that regardless of the reasons that motivated the European  Union to suspend 
the part of anti -dumping and countervailing duties overlapping with the safeguard measures at issue, 
the result of th is action is that the safeguard measures address the injury caused by dumping and 
subsidisation. It follows from Article  5.1 that safeguard measures can only be applied to the extent 
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury caused by the increased imp orts, not injury caused 
by dumping and/or subsidisation. This is confirmed by Article  18.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement 
and Article  32.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.  
H. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIII:2 chapeau and 
paragraph  (d) of the  GATT  1994 as well as with Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards  
113. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  XIII:2(d) of the  GATT  1994 since it failed 
to allocate the country -specific quotas to Mem bers having a substantial interest in supplying the 
product based upon the proportions, supplied by such Members during a previous representative 
period, due account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting 
the trade i n the product.  
114. For the purposes of the definitive measures, the European  Union allocated the shares of the 
TRQs for all product categories except product category 1 to the countries having a substantial 
interest in supplying the product concerned (mor e than 5%) on the basis of their imports during the 
period 2015 -2017. Turkey submits that the European  Union should have used for that purpose, data 
from the most recent period, i.e. including the first six months of 2018. The use of those data was 
necessa ry since a number of trade remedies had gradually been imposed by the European  Union on 
imports from several exporting countries and this resulted in a significant change in the shares of 
imports from a number of countries. In particular, imports from coun tries not being subject to  
anti-dumping and countervailing measures increased to the detriment of imports from countries 
subject to such measures. In order to allocate the TRQs in accordance with Article  XIII:2(d), the 
European  Union was required to use th e "most recent period not distorted by restrictions", which in 
the present case includes the first six months of 2018.  
115. Furthermore, only by taking into account the data relating to the first six months of 2018 
would TRQs have been allocated such as to  serve the aim of a distribution of trade approaching "as 
closely as possible " the shares that various Members may be expected to obtain in the absence of 
the tariff rate quotas, pursuant to Article  XIII:2 chapeau of the  GATT  1994.  
116. Moreover, even if i t were to be concluded that there was no obligation for the European  Union 
to have included the first six months of 2018 into the representative period, the European  Union 
should have taken into account the change in the share of imports from the exporting  countries 
following the newly imposed trade defence measures observed during the first half of 2018 as a 
"special factor" that justified adjustments of the tariff -rate quotas allocation.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  117. Turkey submits that the European  Union acted inconsistently wit h Article  5.2 of the Agreement 
on Safeguards for the same reasons it acted inconsistently with Article  XIII:2 of the  GATT  1994. The 
text of Article  5.2(a) is to a large extent identical to the text of Article  XIII:2(d). In Turkey's  view, 
while Article  5.2(a) refers to "quotas", its application to, not only quotas in the narrow sense, but 
also to TRQs, makes sense, in the same way as Article  XIII:2(d) also applies to tariff quotas. Indeed, 
the rule laid down in Article  5.2(a) relates to the allocation of a q uota, meaning a quantitative limit. 
That quantitative limit also exists in a "tariff quota" which constitutes a quantitative limit on the 
availability of a specific tariff rate. Therefore, Article  5.2(a) is to be applied to "tariff quotas".  
I. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Articles  7.4 and 5.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards by reducing the pace of liberalization and by making the 
safeguard measures more trade restrictive  
118. The European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  7.4 and Articl e 5.1, first sentence, of the 
Agreement on Safeguards since it made the safeguard measures more trade restrictive following the 
first and the second reviews of the measures and since it reduced the pace of liberalization of the 
measures.  
119. First, it fol lows from Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards that, once the progressive 
liberalization is set, there is no possibility for the Member imposing the safeguard measure to reduce 
the pace of the progressive liberalization.  
120. By reducing the pace of liberalization of the TRQs from 5% to 3%, the European  Union thus 
violated Article  7.4 of the Agreement on Safeguards. To "progressively liberalize" a safeguard 
measure means that such measure must become less restrictive by stages or, in other words, must  
be gradually relaxed and this must take place at uniform intervals. This means that, once the 
competent authorities have determined a schedule of liberalization, it cannot decrease the pace of 
liberalization. Turkey's  interpretation of Article  7.4, pursua nt to customary rules of interpretation, 
guarantees that Members continue to progressively liberalize their safeguard measures, as required 
by that provision. The interpretation proposed by the European  Union would allow for a degressive  
liberalization not  apt to facilitate adjustment of the domestic industry by increasing its exposure to 
foreign competition.  
121. Second, the European  Union also violated Article  7.4 since it modified the definitive safeguard 
measures so as to make them more trade restrictiv e than originally determined. Indeed, among 
others, the European  Union imposed quantitative caps on the use of the global and residual TRQs 
for certain product categories, and restricted imports under product category 4.B to those exporters 
that could demo nstrate an end -use in the automotive sector. Through those modifications, the 
European  Union made the applied definitive safeguard measures stricter, in violation of Article  7.4 
of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
122. Turkey submits that because the adjustments to the challenged safeguard measures, following 
the review investigations, rendered those measures more trade restrictive, by making those 
adjustments the European  Union acted inconsistently with Article  7.4 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.  
123. Thereby, the European  Union also acted inconsistently with Article  5.1 since the amended 
definitive measures are not applied so as "to facilitate adjustment". Indeed, by making the measures 
more restrictive and by reducing their pace of progressive libera lization, the amended measures are 
not applied only to the extent necessary to facilitate the adjustment of the domestic industry by 
exposing it to greater foreign competition. Instead, the modifications to the safeguard measures 
create a disincentive for the domestic industry to undertake appropriate efforts at adjustment. 
Furthermore, the amended definitive measures are also not applied only to the extent necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury. Indeed, the assessment of serious injury or threat the reof having 
not changed, there is no basis to justify that the amended measures are applied only to the extent 
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury.  
J. The European  Union imposes other duties or charges in excess of those provided 
in its Schedule contrary to the second sentence of Article  II:1(b) of the  GATT  1994  
124. Through the measures at issue, the European  Union imposes other duties or charges in 
violation of Article  II:1(b), second sentence, of the  GATT  1994.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
- 56 - 
 
  125. The 25% out -of-quota duties imposed on imports exceeding the quotas constitute "other 
duties or charges" within the meaning of Article  II:1(b) of the  GATT  1994.  
126. The duties of 25% are not recorded in the European Union's  Schedule of Concessions as other 
duties or charges for any of the products concerned, that were applied on the date of entry into 
force of the  GATT  1994 or which had to be applied directly and mandatorily under legislation in force 
on that date.  
127. Therefore, by applying on imports of the products concerned duti es of 25% which constitute 
"other duties or charges", the European  Union is acting inconsistently with its obligations under the 
second sentence of Article  II:1(b) of the  GATT  1994.  
128. Given that the measures at issue are inconsistent with the European U nion's  obligations under 
Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, they did not result in any valid 
suspension of the European Union's  obligation under Article  II:1(b), second sentence. It follows that 
the European  Union violates Articl e II:1(b) of the  GATT  1994.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX B -2 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS  
OF THE EUROPEAN  UNION  
1. INTRODUCTION  
1. Turkey challenges the provisional and definitive safeguard measures imposed by the 
European  Union on the product defined as certain steel products belonging to over 20 steel 
product categories. Turkey alleges that these safeguard measures a re inconsistent with 
several obligations of the European  Union  under the  GATT  1994 and the Agreement on 
Safeguards.  
2. First, Turkey digs into a terminology issue, attempting to show that the definitive safeguard 
measure is in fact a group of distinct safe guard measures and that the product concerned is 
in fact a multitude of products concerned. The European  Union  vigorously rebuts this claim, 
which the Panel should clearly reject. There is only one product concerned on which a single 
definitive safeguard m easure was applied. The competent authority examined the product 
under investigation in an objective and unbiased manner.  
3. Then, Turkey takes issue with the existence of unforeseen developments and the identification 
of the obligations it has incurred un der the  GATT  1994. The European  Union  explains why 
these claims should fail, as it duly complied with the respective obligations in Article  XIX:1(a) 
of the  GATT  1994.  
4. Third, Turkey alleges that the European  Union  erred in its determinations concerning t he 
increase in imports, threat of serious injury and causal link between the two. The 
European  Union  explains how the evidence on the record and the applicable case law 
overwhelmingly support the conclusion that the legal conditions are met with respect to  each 
of the three mentioned issues. The competent authority offered a reasoned and adequate 
explanation in each instance.  
5. Turkey then contends that the European  Union  applied the safeguard measure beyond the 
extent and time necessary to prevent serious  injury and to facilitate adjustment, and that it 
failed to progressively liberalize it. The European  Union  explains why Turkey 's claim must fail, 
as it complied with its respective obligations.  
6. Fifth, contrary to what Turkey alleges, the safeguard meas ure applied by the European  Union  
in the form of tariff rate quotas is consistent with Article  XIII:2 of the  GATT  1994 and 
Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, as the tariff rate quotas have been allocated 
using a previous representative period.  
7. Finally, as the safeguard measure at issue validly suspends the European  Union' s obligations, 
the out -of-quota duty it is not a violation of Article  II:1(b) of the  GATT  1994.  
8. For all the reasons explained through the European  Union's submissions, Turkey 's claims 
must be rejected by the Panel in their entirety.  
2. THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLE  XIX:1(A) OF 
THE GATT  1994 AND THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS IN RELATION TO ITS 
DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUC T UNDER INVESTIGATION  
2.1 There is only one product concerned on which the safeguard measure was applied. 
The European  Union  was not required to examine the circumstances and conditions 
for the imposition of a safeguard measure for each individual product category  
9. Turkey 's underlying premise is flawed, because it claims that there are different steel products 
subject to the EU measures. This is not correct. There is only one product at issue (the product WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  concerned). Thus, the European  Union  was not oblig ed to conduct separate assessments of 
the circumstances and conditions for the imposition of a safeguard measure for each individual 
product category.  
10. Indeed, the product concerned, on which the safeguard measure is applied, is the same as 
the product with respect to which the competent authority has determined that it is imported 
in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to the domestic industry, consistently with Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994 and the 
Agreement on Safeguards. It is the same specific product with respect to which the 
investigation is initiated, the investigation is carried out and the safeguard measure is 
imposed: the scope is the same.  
11. In answering the Panel 's questions, the European  Union  provided a table indicating, for every 
step undertaken by the competent authority (including initiation, fact -gathering, each step in 
the analysis of the conditions for imposing safeguard measures, and the 
measure's  applicatio n) that (a) the step was undertaken for a single product concerned; and 
(b) the specific evidence supporting the respective affirmations.  
12. The fact that the Notice of Initiation refers to 26 product categories in the plural has no bearing 
on the legalit y of the definitive safeguards measure. Once having a better understanding of 
the specific terminology, the competent authority confirmed its approach from the Notice of 
Initiation and defined the product concerned, which is not different from the sum of t he 
product categories from the Notice of Initiation. Thus, Turkey cannot be right for several 
reasons.  
13. First, the dictionary definition of the term "product" is rather flexible and depends on the 
context. It can apply to one particular item sold, to a group of items, or to a class of items. In 
almost every situation in which items may be referred to as a "product", it is possible to 
discern both a broader "product" of which that product is a subset, and a subset of that product 
that itself may be referr ed to as a "product".  
14. Second, the Agreement on Safeguards does not impose any specific obligations with respect 
to the definition or the scope of the product under investigation and does not contain any 
guidelines with respect to this matter, as confir med by the panel in Dominican Republic  – 
Safeguard Measures . Indeed, a safeguard measure may be applied to a product, imports of 
which have increased; however, a disaggregated analysis for all cases in which the definition 
of the product under investigatio n comprises more than one product is not required. 
Accordingly, it is the competent authority that defines the product under investigation, as well 
as the way in which the relevant data should be analysed in the investigation. In whichever 
product under in vestigation, there may be multiple subcategories, even within the same 
CN code.  
15. Third, as it is only one product concerned, the competent authority was not under an obligation 
to determine that each of the conditions and circumstances to impose a safeg uard measure 
was met for each product category. The European  Union  did not impose different safeguard 
measures on individual product categories, but one comprehensive safeguard measure on all 
product categories, grouped as the product concerned.  
16. Fourth , Turkey claims that "the present case is similar to the US – Steel Safeguards  case 
where the US competent authorities had imposed distinct safeguard measures on distinct steel 
products ". 
17. This is not true. In US – Steel Safeguards  the United  States offered two contradictory 
responses to what constituted the "imported products" or the "subject imports". First, the 
United States admitted that the USITC did not identify the specific imported product concerned 
and denied such a legal obligation. T hen, the United States subsequently attempted "to sell 
the USITC's  domestic industry definition as identification of the specific imported product ". 
18. To recall, in the present case, the European  Union  clearly defined the product concerned as 
"the 28 pro duct categories ", "certain steel products belonging to the 28 steel product 
categories ". WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  19. The European  Union  reiterates its position that, "although WTO Members are not obliged to 
regulate the scope of complaints or requests to start a safeguard investi gation, they must 
ensure that their competent authorities identify the imported product concerned for the 
purpose of the determination ". The European  Union  has precisely done so.  
20. Indeed, the European  Union  notes that initially Turkey did not take issue  with the competent 
authority 's findings on the important interrelation and strong competition between products 
classified in different product categories. The competent authority provided concrete examples 
of such interrelations. It also pointed out that many Union producers were active on the 
production of most of the product categories (showing that steel makers could adapt their 
production to various types of product categories). The authority further took into account the 
fact that the US Section  232 m easures applied to all steel products "without distinction of their 
shape, size or composition ", so that the authority 's analysis was carried out both globally for 
all 28 product categories, as the product concerned (i.e. steel in various shapes and forms)  
and also at individual level for each product category.  
21. This latter point is important because in the EU Provisional Measure Regulation the authority 
examined the increase in imports globally but also having regard to the product categories 
individual ly. The authority had made clear that: "In addition to the global analysis of the 
situation for the product concerned overall, which the Commission considers to be the 
appropriate standpoint for the appraisal of the necessity of safeguard measures in this 
investigation, the Commission has also assessed the situation at the level of the individual 
product categories in order to confirm the above trends at a disaggregated level ". In fact, the 
authority excluded five product categories (categories 10, 11, 19, 24 and 27) from the 
application of the EU Provisional Measure Regulation and two product categories 
(categories  11 and 23) from the application of the EU Definitive Measure Regulation because 
the import data showed that there were no absolute increases dur ing the period considered 
(this did not change the overall conclusions, as the quantities were very small). When 
examining the situation of the Union industry, the Commission also examined the global 
situation of the Union steel industry, as well as the si tuation at the level of the individual 
product categories.  
22. If anything, the supplementary analysis of the individual 28 product categories (treated as a 
single group throughout the investigation) and of the "three steel product families " (flat 
products , long products and tubes) at definitive stage confirmed the soundness of the 
competent authority 's conclusions on increased imports and threat of serious injury. In fact, 
the authority conducted such a complementary assessment precisely in order to addres s the 
comments made by interested parties against the global approach followed at the provisional 
stage.  
23. With regard to the increase in imports, in the EU Definitive Measure Regulation the competent 
authority confirmed the absolute and relative increas es during the period of analysis having 
regard to the "26 remaining product categories under assessment " as well as the three product 
families.  
24. With respect to the threat of serious injury, in the EU Definitive Measure Regulation the 
competent authorit y conducted an examination on a global basis, namely for the product 
concerned (thereby including the 26 product categories where it was found an increase in 
imports). The competent authority supplemented its analysis with an assessment for each of 
the thr ee product families. The above analysis showed that the Union industry – both globally 
and for each of the three product families – was in a difficult economic situation until 2016, 
and only partially recovered in 2017. The competent authority considered t hat the Union 
industry, despite the temporary improvement, was still in a fragile situation and under the 
threat of serious injury if the increasing trend in imports continued with the ensuing price 
depression and profitability drop below sustainable level s. 
25. The causation analysis also took into account the global approach (because of the strong 
interrelation between the product categories that make up the product concerned) and also 
considered the effects of the increased imports at the level of the th ree product families.  WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  26. The European  Union  was not required to assess whether, as a result of unforeseen 
developments, each product category subject to a safeguard measure was being imported 
into its territory in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause, or threaten 
to cause, serious injury to the Union industry. Its global analysis addressed this issue, as 
explained in this submission.  
27. Turkey 's concern as expressed by its reference to the Appellate Body Report in US – Steel 
Safeguards  (the risk is that a Member "make a determination and apply a safeguard measure 
to a broad category of products even if imports of one or more of those products did not 
increase ") was addressed by the analysis for each product category, and by exclu ding certain 
product categories.  
28. Thus, in order to impose a safeguard measure on the product concerned, the competent 
authority has established that the substantive conditions to impose that measure on that 
product are met with regard to that specific product.  
29. In light of the above, Turkey 's claims must be dismissed, as the European  Union  acted 
consistently with Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and Articles  2.1, 4.1(c), 4.2(a), 4.2(b) 
and 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
2.2 The competent authority examined the product under investigation in an objective 
and unbiased manner  
30. Turkey submits that "the competent authorities cannot group together different products or 
product categories for the purpose of examining certain aspects in a safeg uard investigation 
while grouping them differently for the purpose of examining other aspects and/or imposing 
the measures ". 
31. Turkey places the weight of its argument on the fact that the Notice of Initiation referred to 
"products concerned " in the plur al, while the provisional and definitive measures address a 
product concerned.  
32. The European  Union  has already explained that the product categories have remained the 
same throughout the investigation. Some long products were not mixed with certain flat  
products and some tubes in the middle of the investigation. Each product category guarded 
its specificity.  
33. In light of those findings, the product concerned, in the singular, was defined as the totality 
of the product categories. This is logical and f ollows from the understanding of the specificities 
of the steel sector and of the product at issue throughout the investigation.  
34. To recall, the competent authority supplemented its examination by an analysis per product 
category regarding the imports. In the Definitive Regulation, the analysis was further 
supplemented by an assessment of three "product families " (flat products, long products and 
tubes).  
35. Turkey points to the fact that in Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures  the panel 
considered that the definition adopted by the competent authority was that which governed 
the definition of the product under investigation. If anything, the statement Turkey refers to 
supports the European  Union' s position. It confirms the marg in enjoyed by the competent 
authority in defining the product concerned. Differently from other cases, in the present case 
the competent authority has defined the product concerned. Can an investigating authority be 
faulted for the mere fact that some term inology used in the Notice of Initiation did not 
accurately reflect its content, as long as throughout the whole investigation the definition of 
the product concerned was reasonably clear? A rational and reasonable answer can be only in 
the negative.  
36. What is the "consistency requirement " that Turkey relies on? If we have a closer look at the 
construction of its legal arguments, all that Turkey says is that:  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  (i) "[a]lthough Article  4.2(a) does not provide any guidance regarding the methodology for 
evalua ting the increase in imports, the evaluation made by the competent authorities must 
be objective and unbiased " and 
(ii) Article  3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards requires the competent authorities to "publish 
a report setting forth their findings and reas oned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues 
of fact and law ". 
37. The European  Union  could not agree more.  
38. However, Turkey infers from those provisions and case law statements that they "support " its 
idea of a "consistency requirement ". 
39. The so -called "consistency requirement " is not treaty language. It is a self -serving Turkish 
construction, as applied by Turkey to the facts of this case.  
40. The European  Union  agrees with the principle that the methodology used by the competent 
authorities mus t lead to an evaluation that is objective and unbiased. Indeed, for all the 
reasons explained in detail above, the application of the chosen methodology in the present 
case permits an adequate, reasoned and reasonable explanation of how the facts on the re cord 
support the determination made.  
41. In conclusion, Tu rkey's claims must be rejected, as the European  Union  acted consistently 
with Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and Articles  2.1, 3.1, 4.1(c), 4.2(a), (b), (c) and 6 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards b y examining in an objective and unbiased manner the product 
concerned and its constituent categories of products.  
3 THE EFFECT OF THE OBLIGATIONS INCURRED UNDER THE  GATT  1994  
42. The circumstance "of the effect of the obligations " means in this case that the obligation under 
the GATT  1994 to not impose any tariffs above 0% (or quantitative restrictions) constrained 
the European  Union' s freedom of action to prevent the threat of serious injury caused by the 
increase in imports. Thes e obligations are self -evident, go beyond the European  Union' s tariff 
bindings and do not require any additional explanation in the published report.  
43. By contrast, the measures in India – Iron and Steel Products and Dominican Republic – 
Safeguard Measur es cases required further explanations because the safeguard rates were 
below those Members ' respective tariff bindings.  
4 THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLE  XIX:1(A) OF 
THE GATT  1994 WITH RESPECT TO ITS DETERMINATION ON UNFORESEEN 
DEVELOPM ENTS  
4.1 The existence of unforeseen developments  
44. The EU Definitive and Provisional Measure Regulations found that three factors constitute 
unforeseen developments within the meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
45. First, the steel sector is facing a persisting and unprecedented overcapacity leading many 
steel producers to flood third country markets, such as the EU, with their products. This 
increasing and persistent overcapacity was unforeseen because it continued increasing after 
2011 despite being already excessive and despite the important number of measures taken 
to reduce it. It must be noted that the panel in India – Iron and Steel Products also found that 
a significant increase in global production capacity f or steel constitutes an unforeseen 
development.  
46. Second, the recourse to trade restrictive and trade defence instruments has steadily increased.  
Data shows a significant increase of steel related investigations compared to 2011 -2013 and 
amounts to an un foreseen development.  Statistics show a significant increase in the number 
of antidumping and countervailing investigations in the steel sector in the US starting with WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  2013. The EU adopted or was targeted by a small number of trade defence measures 
compare d to the worldwide increased use of trade defence measures in the steel sector.  
47. Third, the competent authority found that, amid the persistent worldwide overcapacity, the 
US Section  232 measures, given their level and scope, were likely to cause substa ntial trade 
diversion of steel products into the Union.  
48. Generally, even though changes in production capacity or demand are not necessarily 
extraordinary circumstances, and can occur as part of normal business cycles, the extent and 
timing of such chan ges as well as the degree of their impact on the competitive situation in a 
particular market can be unforeseen. The same applies to the use of trade defence 
instruments. The jurisprudence established that a competent authority must consider was not 
actual ly "foreseen", rather than what might or might not have been theoretically 
"foreseeable ". Well -known prior facts, such as the possibility to use trade defence instruments, 
may develop into a situation initially unforeseen. While it is theoretically foresee able that 
Members would use trade defence measures, the specific increase and persistence of such 
measures after 2011 was not foreseen when the EU negotiated its tariff concessions.  
49. The unforeseen developments overlap in time. Global overcapacity doubl ed since 2000 and 
remained at a very high level in 2017. The use of trade defence instruments increased since 
2014/2015 and continued throughout 2017. The investigation that led to the adoption of the 
US Section  232 measures was already initiated in April 2017 and the underlying report was 
issued in January  2018.  
  4.2 The European  Union  demonstrated the existence of a logical connection between 
the unforeseen developments and the increase in imports  
50. According to WTO jurisprudence, in some cases,  the logical connection between the alleged 
unforeseen developments and the alleged increa se in import may be as simple as bringing 
two sets of facts together.  
51. In this case, the competent authority found that in situations where spare capacity is available 
after supplying their domestic market, steel producers will seek other business oppor tunities 
on export markets and thus generate an increase in import volumes on such markets. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to put together the persistent global overcapacity, compounded by 
the increase in trade defence and trade restrictive measures, with the  increase of imports in 
the EU, an attractive market by size and prices and also the world 's largest, to show the 
existence of a logical connection between them. Import prices that have in general undercut 
Union industry prices in 2017 and the existence of  EU trade defence measures against dumped 
or subsidized exports in the context of global overcapacity confirm, inter alia , the 
attractiveness of the EU market.  
52. The US Section  232 measure has sped up the increase in imports by adding further trade 
diversion flows to the prevailing prior increasing trend. Some of the main exporters to the 
US are also traditional steel suppliers to the Union and it is certain that the countries 
concerned, as well as others whose exports and production will be affected by t he 
US measures, will redirect their exports to the Union. The EU Definitive Measure Regulation 
explained that, except for April  2018, monthly imports of steel into the US became consistently 
lower than their corresponding months in 2017. The Section  232 me asure had also an impact 
on trade flows even before its adoption in March  2018 as shown by the significant decrease of 
monthly imports of steel into the U.S. in 2018 compared to their corresponding volume in 
2017. The imports of steel products into the US continued to decrease after the EU opened its 
own investigation.  
53. The imports from the countries exempted from the US Section  232 measures are too small to 
affect the findings of the competent authority. In addition, US authorities started granting 
product exclusions to certain importers only after the adoption of the challenge d measures 
and, in any event, Turkey failed to show any quantitative extent of any product exclusions 
granted.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  54. The existence of several overlapping unforeseen developments rein forces the likelihood of an 
increase in imports into the EU.  
55. The jurisprudence has established that a competent authority is required to analyse only the 
product under investigation that it had defined and not the individual products included in the 
former. Therefore, in this case, the competent authority correctly analysed the existence of 
unforeseen development in relation to the single product concerned.  
56. The unforeseen developments regarding the steel market in general are relevant for the single  
product concerned. The latter includes a wide range of steel product categories ranging 
between 69,22 and 75,64% of all (finished and semi -finished) steel products imported into 
the EU. The evidence underlying the persistent global overcapacity in the ste el sector does 
not reveal any product unaffected by overcapacity while the U.S. Section  232 measures cover 
all the products included in the single product concerned.  
57. Finally, the European  Union  considers that if the Panel finds that the existence of on e of the 
unforeseen developments was insufficiently proven, this does not necessarily give rise to an 
inconsistency with Article  XIX:1(a) because the determination of unforeseen developments is 
sufficiently established by the other factors.  
5 THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLES  2.1 AND 4.2(A) OF 
THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND ARTICLE  XIX:1(A) OF THE  GATT  1994 WITH 
RESPECT TO ITS DETERMINATION OF INCREASE IN IMPORTS  
58. The GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards do not require co mpetent authorities to 
analyse separately each product category composing the product concerned. The competent 
authority 's definition of the product under investigation, unchallenged by Turkey, governs the 
determination of the increase in imports. Since, i n this case, the European Commission has 
competence to define the product concerned, it also entitled to analyse whether to exclude 
certain product categories from the scope of the single product concerned.  
59. While Turkey claims that the European  Union  failed to provide a reasoned and adequate 
explanation of its finding of increase in imports in light of the most recent past with regard to 
certain product families and with regard to a number of product categories, it fails to criticise 
the relevant determ ination, namely the one concerning the product concerned. The 
European  Commission 's determinations about the three product families were made only for 
completeness of the main analysis regarding the single product concerned.  
60. In any event, while data fr om the most recent past regarding the increase in imports has 
special importance, it should not be considered in isolation from the data pertaining to the 
entire period of investigation. The real significance of the short -term trends in the most recent 
data, evident at the end of the period of investigation, may only emerge when those 
short-term trends are assessed in the light of the longer -term trends in the data for the whole 
period of investigation. There is nothing in the text of Article  XIX:1(a) of th e GATT  1994 or 
the Agreement on Safeguards to indicate that the rate of the increase in imports must 
accelerate (or be positive) at every moment of the period of investigation or that it is rising 
and positive only if every percentage increase is greater t han the preceding increase.  
61. The European  Union  took into account the recent past when analysing the increase in imports 
for each product families. There were very small decrease in imports between 2017 and the 
most recent period (MRP) for flat products  and tubes and between 2016 and 2017 for long 
products. When examined in the context of the entire period of investigation, these small 
decreases cannot undermine the determination that imports increased for the three product 
families and also, importantly , cannot detract from the conclusion of the global analysis on 
increased imports with regard to the single product concerned.  
62. Further, the European  Union  demonstrated, on the basis of an end -point to end -point and a 
comprehensive trends analysis across  the period of investigation, an increase in imports that 
is sharp enough, sudden enough, significant enough and recent enough to cause the threat of 
serious injury. Imports increased in absolute terms by 71% during the period of analysis, and 
in relative terms with market shares increasing from 12,7% to 18,8%. The valid determination WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  of the existence of a threat of serious injury and of a causal link demonstrate that the increase 
in imports was recent enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and significant eno ugh to cause 
the threat of serious injury.  
63. The sharp increase in imports by 59% between 2013 and 2016 to reach 71% overall until the 
MRP qualifies as "is being imported in … increased quantities ". This increase is steep and 
unexpected enough to meet th e requirements of Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. 
Imports followed an uninterrupted upward trend, increasing every year both in absolute and 
relative terms. While the rate of imports continued to increase at a slower pace after 2016 
before pick ing up again in the MRP, this does not undermine this determination.  
64. The same applies to the three product families. The increase in imports was also recent 
enough, sudden enough, sharp enough and significant enough to cause the threat of serious 
injury with respect to product families. For flat products, the increase in imports after 2016 
remained stable but at a much higher level than the 2013 -2015 period. For long products and 
tubes, the slight decreases in certain years do not undermine the final co nclusion given the 
constant upward trend of imports and the steeper increase at the end of the period of 
investigation.  
6 THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLES  2.1, 4.1(A), 4.1(B) 
AND 4.2(A) OF THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND ARTICLE  XIX:1(A)  OF 
THE GATT  1994 WITH RESPECT TO ITS DETERMINATION OF A THREAT OF SERIOUS 
INJURY TO THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY  
65. The European  Union  found that although the domestic industry partially recovered in 2017 it 
was still in a fragile situation and under threat of serious injury.  
66. Turkey 's emphasis on the developments in 2017 fails to consider the significant deterioration 
during 2013 -2016, the vulnerable situation of  the Union industry in 2017 that was partially 
recovering after significant deterioration, the most  recent developments in the MRP and the 
threat of serious injury caused by the most recent increase in imports.  
67. While some factors improved in 2017, a number of injury factors were in a poor state: there 
was significant price depression on the Union market until 2016, prices recovering to their 
2013 level only in 2017; the Union producers lost 5.4 percentage points in market shares from 
2013 to 2017; profitability decreased during 2013 -2015 and the industry "achieved a marginal 
profit level in 2016 and increase it to a more sustainable level in 2017 (5,6%) "; stocks grew 
by 19%; employment which decreased by 4%.  
68. The significant deterioration during the period 2013 -2016 indicates that the Union industry is 
vulnerable to an increase in imports: unit sales prices decreased by 15% and profitability 
overall remained at a very low level during the period 2013 -2016 (betwe en -1,0% and 2.2%). 
The improvement in 2017 could rapidly be reversed if imports would continue to increase (or 
surge, as a result of inter alia , the US Section  232 measures).  
69. Turkey incorrectly claims that unfair trade practices have caused injury to the EU industry and 
that any injurious effects have been eliminated by EU 's AD/CV measures. The European  Union  
acknowledged the extent to which the EU 's recent trade defence measures eliminated 
injurious effects. However, the recovery of the EU industry wa s only partial, several injury 
factors being in poor state and the EU industry was still in a vulnerable situation.  
70. The profitability improvement of several product categories not subject to AD/CV measures 
does not contradict the European  Union' s position. This improvement is explained, inter alia , 
by the general recovery of the industry, lower raw material prices and the recent trade defence 
measures adopted during 2016 -2017.  Out of these factors, the European  Union  considers that 
its recent trade defe nce measures benefitted only to domestic products. The product 
categories not subject to EU 's trade defence measures still had low levels of profitability, below 
what is generally considered as a healthy level in the steel sector.  
71. The factors behind th e partial improvement of the EU domestic industry were not capable of 
tackling a further increase in imports: products subject to recent AD/CV measures were being WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  replaced by imports from other origins/exporters; the raw material prices have actually 
increased at the end of the investigation period; the increase of the Union consumption has 
already slowed down at the end of the period of investigation. Moreover, the increase in 
EU prices in 2017 also fuelled further imports into the European  Union  in 2018.  
72. Turkey incorrectly asserts that the competent authority found a mere threat of increased 
imports. The competent authority found a threat of serious injury as the vulnerable state of 
the Union industry shows. The evidence set out in the challenged measu res shows that the 
future increase in import is established and not mere conjecture.  
73. Imports remained at high levels in 2017. In 2018, for each month, import volumes into the 
Union were higher than import volumes in the corresponding months of 2017. Th e further 
increase in imports in 2018 – in particular from those countries or exporters not subject to 
trade defence measures – was likely to prevent the industry from a full recovery and from 
benefiting from these measures. This further increase was cause d by the increasing EU prices 
in 2017 and the increasing EU consumption, the global and persistent overcapacity, the 
dramatic increase of global exports, the unprecedented wave of unfair trading practices and 
the effects of the US Section  232 measure.  
74. The wide -reaching US Section  232 measure has caused a clear and steady trend of a decrease 
in imports into the US. This progressive decrease is already causing and was going to further 
generate trade diversion that is liable to speed up the increase trend of imports into the 
European  Union . Some of the main exporters to the US are also traditional steel suppliers to 
the European  Union . The European  Union  itself was not exempted from the Section  232 
measure. It is more than likely that these countries, as we ll as others, will to a large extent 
be willing to redirect their exports to the Union. The EU market is indeed generally an attractive 
market for steel products both in terms of demand and prices. The European  Union  is, after 
China, but before the US, one  of the main markets for steel, where demand has increased in 
the last years and prices have also now recovered. According to the economic model proposed 
by the Union industry, 72% of current US imports of steel would be diverted to the EU market, 
which co rresponds to 55% of total Union imports of steel in 2017.  
75. Moreover, prices were declining in the third quarter of 2018.  
76. The European  Union  considers that the determination of the threat of serious injury does not 
require providing a detailed correlation between the products covered by EU 's trade defence 
measures and those included in the single product concerned. Only some product categories  
were subject to recent AD/CV measures covering certain origins/exporters. These products 
were replaced by imports from other origins and exporters. Imports into the EU actually 
reached the highest absolute levels in the MRP and increased even in the remai nder of 2018. 
In addition, steel prices in the Union started to follow a declining trend as of the third quarter 
of 2018. Several injury factors were in a continuous poor situation, despite the recent AD/CV 
measures, while the increase in imports continued  to rise. It follows that the effects of the 
recent AD/CV measures were already reflected in the still vulnerable state of the EU industry.  
77. Contrary to Turkeys ' claims, the alleged lingering effects of past dumped or subsidised imports 
fail to explain the still vulnerable state of the EU industry. First, the recent AD/CV measures 
had a limited scope: they concern only a few origins/exporters for a few product categories. 
Second, the imports of products/origins/exporters not subject to recent AD/CV measu res were 
replacing those subject to such measures also because of the trade diversion cause d by the 
US Section  232 measure.  
78. Finally, the  GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards do not require analysing likely 
developments in the very near future with  respect to each relevant factor. Such analysis would 
not be of "an objective and quantifiable nature " as prescribed by Article  4.2(a) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and, as WTO jurisprudence under the AD and SCM Agreements 
found, "might result in a degree  of speculation in the decision –making process, which is not 
consistent with the requirement of the Agreements ". In this case, in line with the findings of 
the Appellate  Body in US – Lamb , the competent authority analysed the "overall state of the 
domestic  industry " and pointed out in particular at likely drops in price depression and 
profitability.  WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  7 THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLES  2.1 AND 4.2(B) THE 
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND ARTICLE  XIX:1(A) OF THE  GATT  1994, WITH 
RESPECT TO ITS DETE RMINATION OF THE CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN THE INCREASE 
IN IMPORTS AND THE THREAT OF SERIOUS INJURY TO THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY  
79. Turkey failed to demonstrate that the European  Union  acted inconsistently with  Articles  2.1 
and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994, since the 
competent authority demonstrated the existence of a causal link between  the increased 
imports and the threat of serious injury to the domestic industry as required by those 
provisions.  
80. Turkey wrongly alleges that the European  Union  acted inconsistently with Articles  2.1 and 
4.2(b) the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994, as it failed to 
establish the existence of a causal link between the increased imports and the thre at of serious 
injury to the domestic industry. It also contends that the European  Union  failed to ensure that 
injury caused by factors other than imports had not been attributed to imports.  
7.1 The European  Union  established the existence of a causal link between the 
increased imports and the threat of serious injury  
81. The European  Union  starts by noting that the competent authority "has established a threat 
of serious injury if imports continue to increase. It has not established injury during the 
invest igation due to the increase of imports over the period considered ". The meaning of this 
particular recital seems to be distorted by Turkey. The recital does not say that the causal link 
between increased imports and the threat of serious injury is establis hed by reference to a 
different period than the period considered. All it says is that serious injury was not established 
during the period considered, so it follows that it is the same period that served as benchmark 
for the threat of serious injury. At t he same time, an evaluation of whether serious injury is 
clearly imminent requires fact -based projections, a future -oriented analysis.  
82. The primary objective of the process of establishing the causal link is to determine whether 
there is a genuine and s ubstantial relationship of cause and effect between the increased 
imports and the threat of serious injury. It is a projection of what is rational and reasonable 
to expect if increased imports continue to pour in a similar manner.  
83. Throughout the causal ity part of its submission, Turkey seems to assimilate serious injury to 
threat of serious injury. This is not a reasonable approach. While serious injury is already 
materialized, a threat of injury is only about to materialize, it is clearly imminent, and  the very 
purpose of a safeguard measure is to avoid that happening.  
84. Thus, when Turkey paints the graphs juxtaposing increased imports and certain injury 
indicators (e.g. profitability), it must be borne in mind that the situation is one of threat of 
injury.  
85. Turkey 's claims with regard to the lack of correlation between the increased imports and 
different injury factors have to be rejected, as there is a coincidence in time between the 
upward trend in the imports and the trends in those injury facto rs over the period of 
investigation.  
86. First, with regard to market share, the competent authority found that imports of the product 
concerned increased significantly during the period 2013 -2017, taking away Union market 
shares because of price levels lo wer than those of the EU steel producers. Importantly, the 
market share of imports grew overall from 12,2% to 17,6% and import prices remained almost 
systematically lower than the Union sales prices for each individual product.  
87. Turkey does not seem to dispute this finding in its submission. Instead, it attempts to 
downplay its importance and to emphasize alleged mismatches with regard to trends in 
profitability and prices.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  88. Second, with regard to profitability and prices, the Appellate Body found that short -term 
trends in the data could possibly be a misleading indicator of the likely future state of the 
domestic industry, when viewed in the context of the data for the entire period of investigation.  
89. With that consideration in mind, when lookin g at the increase in imports and the evolution of 
the injury factors, the European  Union  recalls that even if some factors improved in 2017, the 
period 2013 -2016 indicates that the Union industry is vulnerable to an increase in imports.  
90. In particular, during the period 2013 -2016 there was a significant price depression on the 
Union market: for example, unit sales prices decreased by 15% and profitability overall 
remained at a very low level during the period 2013 -2016 (between -1,0% and 2.2%).  
91. For a ll product categories, there was significant price depression on the Union market until 
2016. Prices recovered to their 2013 level afterwards. The Union steel industry could reduce 
its cost of production to achieve a marginal profit level in 2016 and incre ase it to a more 
sustainable level in 2017 (5,6%).  
92. However, the improvement in 2017 could rapidly be reversed if imports would continue to 
increase (or surge, as a result of inter alia , the US Section  232 measures).  
93. With regard to the three product  families, certain factors did not improve in 2017, when unit 
sales prices decreased during 2013 -2017 for long products ( -4%) and tubes ( -13%).  
94. Finally, even if some factors improved in 2017 for each product family, the difficult economic 
situation dur ing the period 2013 -2016 indicates that the Union industry is vulnerable to an 
increase in imports in relation to each product family.  
95. Thus, the record shows that (i)  the Union producers suffered loss of market share and 
unsustainable levels of profit;  (ii) the link between increased imports and the Union situation 
was especially marked during the interval 2013 – 2016, while imports remained high and 
undercut Union prices in 2017; and (iii)  the economic situation of the Union industry was still 
vulnerab le, even if profits recovered.  
96. All these explanations, substantiated by tables and figures, meet the required standard of 
causality in light of the relevant case -law. 
97. Thus, to sum up: at this stage of the legal analysis, Turkey does not seek to tak e issue with 
an important injury factor, namely the loss of market share, while it has difficulties in 
demonstrating its thesis with regard to profitability and prices, as it fails to take into account 
important evolutions during the whole period of invest igation.  
98. In any event, as Turkey admits, a competent authority may make a compelling analysis 
without showing a correlation between the increase in imports and the evolution of certain 
injury factors.  
99. Indeed, the case law confirms the flexibility e njoyed by a competent authority, as long as it is 
unbiased and objective in its assessment.  
100. For instance, even in the case of serious injury, a correlation is not dispositive in a causation 
analysis. In Argentina – Footwear (EC) , the Appellate Body ma de clear that "the existence of 
correlation, though indicative, is by no means dispositive of the existence of a causal link. 
Indeed, the Appellate  Body considered that the lack of correlation does not preclude a finding 
that a causal link exists, provided  that a very compelling analysis is provided ". 
101. With these considerations in mind, the European  Union  recalls that the competent authority 
explained that "In the period 2013 -2016 there was a significant price depression on the Union 
market: Unit sales prices decreased by 15%. It should be recalled that imports also increased 
significantly during this period. The average unit sales price recovered however in 2017 and 
reached a level comparable to 2013. Profitability overall remained at a very low level d uring 
the period 2013 -2016. Despite a significant decrease in prices, the Union industry could 
nevertheless reduce its cost of production in 2016 to such an extent that it managed to make WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  a small level of profit of 2,2%. The situation temporarily recovered  in 2017. Sales prices 
increased by almost 20% between 2016 and 2017 and reached their 2013 level. The Union 
industry achieved a level of profit of 6,2% since cost of production (raw material), even if 
increasing, remained lower than in 2013. The overall c ash flow position of the Union industry 
increased by approximately 60% ". 
102. Thus, when looking at the totality of the analysis with regard to the relationship between 
increased imports and the evolution of market shares, profitability and prices, as alre ady 
explained, it follows that the competent authority provided reasoned and adequate 
explanations that meet the legal standard required by Articles  2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement 
on Safeguards.  
103. In light of the above, Turkey failed to demonstrate tha t the competent authority did not prove 
the required causality between increased imports and the threat of serious injury.  
7.2 With regard to the non -attribution analysis  
104. The competent authority examined relevant factors other than increased imports, ensuring 
that the injury caused by such other factors was not attributed to the increased imports. 
Following this analysis, it has not identified other factors that would weaken the causal link 
between the increase in imports and the serious injury to the Union producers.  
105. The "other factors " the competent authority has considered in its analysis of possible factors 
causing injury to the domestic industry are described in the EU Provisional Measure Regulation 
and in the EU Definitive Measure Regulation.  
106. In particular, at the provisional stage the competent authority analyzed the effects of the 
global overcapacity and found that, albeit facilitating cheap imports it was not of a kind to 
break the causal link.  
107. Similarly, the imports from the EEA countries were not sufficient to affect the situation of the 
Union industry.  
108. At that stage no other factors were identified that could have weakened the causal link 
between the increased imports and the threat of serious injury.  
109. At the definitive  stage, the competent authority confirmed the causal link between the increase 
in imports and a threat of serious injury to the Union industry. On the same occasion, it 
analysed several possible "other factors ". 
110. With respect to the development of raw material costs, the competent authority noted that 
the cost of production trend is similar to the trend in sales prices, with the exception of 2017, 
when sales prices were exceptionally favourable as compared to costs. It thus concluded that 
it does not re veal any particular link between raw material cost and profitability development.  
111. As to the export performance of the Union steel industry, it was noted that the volumes 
exported by the Union industry throughout the period considered are relatively small as 
compared to the volumes sold on the Union market. At the same time, the export price 
development was rather flat over the period considered, with the exception of 2016 when 
export prices were overall significantly lower than in the othe r years.  
112. With regard to the role of imports made by Union producers or related traders/distributors, it 
was noted that those imports were marginal and relatively stable over the period considered, 
representing 0,3% to 0,7% of total imports depending o n the year.  
113. On the basis of all this data before it, the competent authority concluded that no other factor 
was capable of breaking the established causal link between the increased imports and the 
threat of serious injury.  
114. Contrary to what Turke y alleges, dumped/subsidised imports should not be part of the  
non-attribution analysis.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  115. Anti-dumping duties address the injury caused by the dumped imports from a given origin on 
a given product category. The same idea applies for countervailing duti es. 
116. A safeguard measure is in place to prevent the injury that resulted from the accumulation of 
all imports, including those found to be dumped/subsidised at some point and which, as a 
result of the imposition of the ADDs/CVDs, enter the importing co untry subject to the payment 
of an additional duty. Those continuing imports are still imports, and the ADDs/CVDs will 
presumably make them fewer in number and less injurious in effect than they would have 
continued to be in the absence of ADDs/CVDs.  
117. Only when a tariff -rate quota (TRQ) is exceeded, the out of quota duty applies, and for that, 
the European  Union  has the Double Remedy Regulation, which prevents cumulating duties.  
118. In order to avoid a double remedy in terms of duties, for the out -of-quota volumes it was 
decided that only the out -of-quota safeguard tariff applies and not also the ADDs and CVDs. 
It is precisely this aspect that Turkey seems to be concerned with.  
119. A safeguard investigation must take into account, for the purposes of m easuring "increased 
imports ", also imports which are subject to anti -dumping and subsidy measures or ongoing 
investigations. There is no legal basis for their exclusion. On the contrary, if the imports from 
a country were excluded, then this would result i n a breach of parallelism under Article  2 in 
the event that the exclusion is not carried also into the measures. Until the  
anti-dumping/subsidy investigations reach the provisional, and then the definitive stage, a 
competent authority cannot know whether t hose imports fulfil the conditions in the  
Anti-Dumping and SCM Agreements.  
120. Then, if and when a determination of injurious dumping or subsidisation is made and measures 
applied (ADDs, CVDs), the effect of dumping/subsidisation is thereby addressed. Thi s 
normally, although not always, results in trade volumes dropping, and entering the market at 
higher prices. The actual, often diminished, and more expensive imports coming to the 
EU market after payment of these duties are still imports and part of the o verall imports that 
may have increased, for the purposes of a safeguard investigation and later of the application 
of the safeguard measures. In other words, they are a part of the (increased) imports which 
affect the EU industry. Thus, it would be wrong t o not consider these volumes as part of the 
"increased imports ". 
121. In conclusion, the fact that certain imports of certain product categories from certain sources 
are subject to ADDs/CVDs does not make them unqualifiable for being counted as increased 
imports.  
122. In the case of the investigation subject to these proceedings, dumped/subsidised imports fall 
within the scope of the "increased imports". They are not "factors other than increased 
imports" within the meaning of Article  4.2(b) of the Agreemen t on Safeguards. There is no 
obligation to conduct a non -attribution analysis with respect to such imports, because these 
imports are actually part of "the 'increased imports '" that have caused threat of serious injury 
to the EU industry.  
123. The measures  at issue do not determine that the EU industry was injured in 2015 or 2016. 
Those years were used in order to assess a trend. The focus for determining the threat of 
serious injury is on the last year (2017). By then, most of the ADDs/CVDs were already in  
place.  
124. For the purpose of a safeguard investigation, what matters are the trade volumes. Safeguard 
measures concern fair trade. In contrast, anti -dumping and countervailing measures concern 
trade considered unfair.  
125. Articles  18.1 of the Anti -Dump ing Agreement and Article  32.1 of the SCM Agreement ( "no 
specific action against dumping/a subsidy  …") are not contradicted by this approach.  
Anti-dumping duties are imposed only on those imports from those sources which resulted in 
injurious dumping. Simi larly, CVDs are also imposed only to those imports meeting the 
conditions of the SCM  Agreement.  WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  126. In other words, ADDs deal with injury caused by dumping and CVDs deal with injury caused 
by subsidization.  
127. The European  Union  considers that dumped im ports could be a genuine and substantial cause 
of the injury to the domestic industry in the context of the anti -dumping investigation.  
128. At the same time, the subsidised imports could also be a genuine and substantial cause of the 
injury to the domesti c industry (thus making this also at the same time injury caused by the 
subsidised imports).  
129. One can have two causes at the same time, both of which are genuine and substantial causes 
of a particular situation (here, injury to the domestic industry).  
130. This is subject to the observation that one cannot double count ADDs and CVDs. So, if a 
subsidy of 100 finances dumping by a margin of 100, such that the AD margin and subsidy 
margin are both 100, only one duty of 100 can be imposed. At the same time,  the injury that 
we see resulting is attributable to both the subsidy and the dumping (they are both genuine 
and substantial causes).  
131. When one adds the safeguard perspective, the European  Union  notes that there is no express 
rule against double counti ng (like Article  VI:5 of the  GATT  1994), but it is important to bear 
in mind that safeguard measures may be applied only "to the extent necessary to prevent 
serious injury and to facilitate adjustment ", as per Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
132. An imported product can cause injury because it is being dumped (addressed via ADDs) and 
because it is taking place in large and increased volumes (although in the latter case, it will 
have to be assessed together with the evolution of other origins). I n that case, the design of 
the safeguard measure, in line with Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, will take 
account of the fact that (1) dumped/subsidised imports are not, in volume and price, what 
they would have been had anti -dumping measures no t been imposed and thereby 
automatically also of the fact that (2) the safeguard measure needs only remedy/prevent the 
serious injury which increased imports are causing/threatening to cause for the domestic 
industry even after applying the ADDs/CVDs. In t he causation analysis, the imports subject to 
ADDs/CVDs therefore contribute to the threat of serious injury only in the nature and volume 
in which they exist after the imposition of ADDs/CVDs. To that extent, they are however part 
of the increased imports  and thus not "factors other than increased imports [that] are causing 
serious injury to the domestic industry at the same time " which under Article  4.2(b) are 
subject to the non -attribution obligation.  
133. What would be wrong, but did not happen in this investigation, would be if the competent 
authority considered, for the purposes of designing the necessary extent of the safeguard 
measure (i.e. the necessary restrictiveness) under Article  5.1, the injurious nature of 
dumped/subsidised imports, as if thes e were not subject to ADDs/CVDs.  
134. It bears reminding that the imposition of ADDs and CVDs is a right of WTO Members under 
certain conditions, but not their obligation (under the WTO Agreement). A WTO Member is 
therefore entitled not to impose ADDs/CVDs . That WTO Member would presumably not 
conduct AD/CV investigations and therefore not even know and certainly not have determined, 
in accordance with the WTO Agreement, that certain imports are being dumped or subsidised. 
That WTO Member is still allowed t o impose safeguard measures – under the (stricter) 
conditions of the Agreement on Safeguards. That Member, too, is not obliged, within the 
safeguards investigation, to enquire whether some of the increased imports are also dumped 
or subsidised – such an ob ligation does not exist in the Agreement on Safeguards.  
135. It remains thus the situation where there is dumping/subsidisation, investigations are under 
way, but AD/CV measures not yet imposed. In that case, as also follows from the above, there 
is again nothing that needs to be conducted in any particular way when the safeguards 
investigation enquires into the increase, injury and causation. However, when it comes to the 
design of the safeguard remedy, the question of the parallel investigations must not be 
ignored. If the AD/CV measures come after the imposition of the safeguard measure, this may 
mean that the safeguard measure, after its imposition, needs to be adjusted.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  136. In the measure subject to this dispute, it is important to recall from a factua l point of view, 
that the vast majority of ADDs/CVDs against product categories belonging to the product 
concerned were already in place by 2017 (in some cases they had been imposed even before). 
Therefore, in the increase in imports that took place in 201 7 and in the Most Recent Period 
(July 2017 – June 2018), dumped/subsidised imports not yet covered by measures would 
have, at best, played a negligible role. Furthermore, in the European  Union' s view, the imports 
made from a country under ADDs/CVDs should be treated no differently than those made from 
a country that was never found to be incurring those unfair trading practices. In fact, by 
exporting under ADDs/CVDs, imports from that origin are placed at the same level than those 
imports (fairly traded) fr om other origins. Treating them differently simply because one is 
paying a duty (despite contributing to an increase of imported volumes) would be clear 
discrimination, not grounded on the relevant agreements.  
137. Let's now take the following example: dumping from country X is offset with an ADD. But if, 
despite the ADD, country X increases its sales further, coupled with an overall increase when 
seen together with all other origins, does that mean that a competent authority cannot address 
the injury caused by those volumes subject to the ADD under a safeguard investigation?  
138. Thus, dumped and subsidised imports can be part of the increased imports for safeguards 
purposes.  
139. In the present case, the competent authority was restrained and reasonable, because even 
absent any express rule, it applied the ADDs and CVDs only up to a certain volume within the 
TRQ, while beyond that it applied exclusively the safeguard measure even t o the dumped 
imports. In conclusion, the competent authority did not address the injurious effects of certain 
imports caused by dumping and subsidisation through a safeguard measure. The approach of 
the competent authority is consistent with both Article  4.2(b) and Article  5.1 of the Agreement 
on Safeguards.  
140. In light of all the above considerations, Turkey failed to show that the European  Union  acted 
inconsistently with Articles  2.1 and 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards and 
Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and its claims with regard to causality must be rejected.  
8 THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLES  5.1 AND 7.1 OF THE 
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND ARTICLE  XIX:1(A) OF THE  GATT  1994 IN ITS 
APPLICATION OF THE SAFEGUARD MEASURES  
141. Turkey alleges that the European  Union  acted inconsistently with Article  5.1, first sentence, 
and Article  7.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 as it 
applied safeguard measures beyond the extent and duration necessary to pre vent serious 
injury and to facilitate adjustment.  
142. The European  Union  disagrees.  
143. Indeed, the approach adopted by the competent authority was such as "to ensure  that the 
measure applied is commensurate with the goals of preventing or remedying seri ous injury 
and to facilitating adjustment ". 
144. To recall, at the provisional stage the competent authority considered that the "openness of 
the Union market should be preserved and the traditional flow of imports should be 
maintained ". That was a major c onsideration for the choice of tariff rate quotas.  
145. That was confirmed at the definitive stage, as "a tariff -rate quota is indeed the best form of 
measure to balance the various interests at stake, namely preventing serious injury and 
ensuring that tra ditional trade flows are maintained ". 
146. Thus, the safeguard measure at issue took the form of tariff rate quotas, imports being subject 
to a duty of 25% when exceeding a quota. The tariff rate quotas have been calculated for 
each product category, as th e average import volumes during the period 2015 -2017, plus 5%.  WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  147. What Tu rkey seems to take issue with within this claim is not the within -the-quota 
determination, but the out -of-quota 25% duty, which it separates from the former element of 
the tariff rate quota.  
148. The competent authority duly explained with regard to the setting of the level of the  
out-of-quota 25% duty that "unless the Union imposes an above quota tariff on the relevant 
steel import of an amount at least equal to the tariff applied by the US, the exporter to the 
US will gain extra margin or minimise the loss thereof by redirecting sales to the EU ". 
149. The different elements of the tariff rate quota have to be taken together so as to understand 
its design and operation. A th reat of injury situation by definition involves certain projections. 
These projections have to meet a stringent legal standard, but their essence remains. Against 
this background, the competent authority has transparently explained how in an objective and 
unbiased way, it designed the tariff rate quotas (both the within -the-quota and out -of-quota 
components), precisely to cater for the various competing interests, and in particular having 
in mind the requirement that a safeguard measure has to be applied on ly to the extent 
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.  
150. Then, as a consequential claim, Turkey contends that "it follows that the violation of 
Article  4.2(b) constitutes a sufficient basis for a prima facie  case th at the safeguard measures 
have not been applied 'only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury ' as 
required by Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards ". As the European  Union  has already 
explained, the competent authority established the existence of a causal link between the 
increased in imports and the threat of serious injury. Thus, this sub -claim should be dismissed.  
151. For the same  reasons, Turkey alleges that the European  Union  also violated Article  7.1 of the 
Agreement on Safe guards and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
152. This contention must similarly be rejected. An initial duration of 3 years, as opposed to a 
longer period of time, was precisely designed, in an objective and unbiased manner, so as to 
apply the safeguard measure only for such period of time as may be necessary to prevent or 
remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.  
153. Finally, a third direction of Turkish critiques comes from the fact that European  Union  applied 
the definitive safeguard measure  allegedly to "address the serious injury caused by dumped 
and subsidized imports ". 
154. As the competent authority explained, "in order to avoid the imposition of 'double remedies ', 
whenever the tariff quota is exceeded, the level of the existing anti -dumping and 
countervailing will be suspended or reduced to ensure that the combined effect of these 
measures does not exceed the highest level of the safeguard or anti -dumping/countervailing 
duties in place ". 
155. Indeed, the rationale of this approach is the  avoidance of double remedies for those steel 
product categories concerned originating from some countries also subject to anti -dumping 
and/or countervailing duties. As explained by the competent authority , "a cumulation of  
anti-dumping/anti -subsidy measures with safeguards may lead to a greater effect than 
desirable " and the "issue of cumulation would only potentially arise once tariff -rate quota 
ceilings are reached ". This cannot be legally characterized as a failure to apply th e measure 
only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment. 
The within -the-quota figures were precisely designed in order to satisfy the very logic of 
safeguard measures and the legal requirement in Article  5.1. 
156. In light of the above, Turkey failed to show that the European  Union  acted inconsistently with 
Article  5.1, first sentence, and Article  7.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards and 
Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and its claim should be rejected by the P anel. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  9 THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED CONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLE  XIII:2 CHAPEAU AND 
PARAGRAPH  (D) OF THE  GATT  1994, AS WELL AS WITH ARTICLE  5.2(A) OF THE 
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS  
157. Turkey claims that the European  Union  acted inconsistently with Article  XIII:2 chapeau, 
Article  XIII:2(d) of the  GATT  1994 and Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards as it 
failed to allocate the shares of the TRQs by taking into account  imports of a previous 
representative period, due account being taken of any special factors  affecting the trade in 
the product concerned. In particular, Turkey claims that the European  Union  should have used 
for the purpose of allocation of the shares of the TRQs  data of the most recent period, i.e. 
including the first six months of 2018.  
158. The European  Union  starts by recalling that Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards 
does not apply in this case because it does not apply to tariff rate quotas. This i s because a 
tariff-rate quota is the setting of a typically lower import duty that applies for a set quantity  
of imports after the importation  of which a higher import duty applies. In this sense, a  
tariff-rate quota is the combination of two tariff rates and the setting of a quantity of imports 
after which the lower duty switches to the higher one. Import duties are tariff measures and 
not "quantitative restrictions ", as confirmed by the panel in US – Line Pipe  (para.  7.69).  
159. This rationale is simple: a tariff rate quota is not a quantitative restriction because it imposes 
no quantitative limitation on imports, which are allowed subject to duties of different levels. 
In-quota imports come in at a lower duty, (e.g. zero), and out -of-quota imports come in  at a 
higher duty (e.g. 25%), to the extent this higher duty still makes trade profitable.  
160. In order to allocate country -specific tariff quota shares consistently with the requirements of 
Article  XIII of the  GATT  1994, a Member has to base such shares on an appropriate previous 
representative period and any special factors would have to be applied on a non -discriminatory 
basis.  
161. In the context of establishing which Members hold a substantial supplying interest, the panel 
in EU – Poultry Meat (China)  concluded that "there is no general rule always requiring the use 
of the most recent three -year period prior to the entry into force of a TRQ ". 
162. Although the European  Union  considers that a similar approach is warranted when considering 
the "previous representative pe riod" for the purpose of the second sentence of 
Article  XIII:2(d), which is not defined, it is also true that there is a widespread practice in 
the GATT  and WTO to resort to recent three -year periods as representative periods. Indeed, 
the treaty language o n the legal standard does not go further than referring to a "previous 
representative period ". 
163. The fact that the competent authority used an average of the imports during the period  
2015-2017 meets precisely this legal criterion of the "previous repre sentative period ". Of note, 
this period of three years is also a recent one, as the competent  authority did not include the 
year 2014 as part of that period, which would have resulted in different figures.  
164. Thus, the tariff rate quotas were distributed  in the least trade -distorting manner and in full 
conformity with the non -discrimination requirements of Article  XIII, so as to serve the aim of 
a distribution of trade approaching "as closely as possible " the shares that various Members 
may be expected to  obtain in the absence of the tariff rate quotas, as required by the chapeau 
of Article  XIII of the GATT  1994. The competent authority precisely achieved that, as the 
consideration of the average imports during the last three years prior to the initiation of the 
investigation reflect as closely as possible such historical share.  
165. Turkey claims that "the additional ad -hoc 12 -month period made of the last 6 months of 2017 
and the first 6 months of 2018 ( 'the most recent period ' or 'MRP')", which was considered  in 
order to assess the increase in imports, should also have been used for the purpose of the 
tariff rate quota calculations.  WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  166. The European  Union  disagrees. The treaty language is different with regard to increased  
imports and the previous repres entative period, and the approach adopted by the competent 
authority precisely caters for those differences.  
167. Safeguard measures  are permitted only when a product is being imported in increased 
quantities, i.e. the increase must still exist when the determination is made and in that sense 
must be recent. Also, the increase must be such that it caused the threat of serious injury. 
Indeed, as the very title of Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994 suggests, a safeguard measure is an 
"emergency action ". This is what requires an investigation period that focuses significantly on 
the recent past and why investigating authorities add to it months of an uncompleted year 
when the moment of the investigation warrants that.  
168. In contrast, for trade statistics it is important to use representative periods, which for reasons 
of seasonal variations requires the use of full years, for representativeness  purposes also 
several years (very often, as here, three), which in the averaging are of equal weight, i.e. 
without special focus on the most recent year.  
169. In light of the above, it becomes clear that the EU acted in full conformity with Article  XIII o f 
the GATT  1994. Accordingly, Turkey failed to demonstrate that the European  Union  acted 
inconsistently with Article  XIII of the  GATT  1994 and Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards and those claims have to be rejected . 
10 THE EUROPEAN  UNION  ACTED C ONSISTENTLY WITH ARTICLES  7.4 AND 5.1 OF THE 
AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS WITH REGARD TO THE PACE OF LIBERALIZATION  
170. Turkey alleges that the European  Union  acted inconsistently with Article  7.4 and Article  5.1, 
first sentence, of the Agreement on Safeguards  because the safeguard measure became more 
trade restrictive following the first and second reviews, as the pace of liberalization of the 
measure was reduced.  
171. As per the requirements of Article  7.4, the safeguard measure at issue, exceeding one year, 
was progressively liberalized, in order to facilitate adjustment of the domestic industry by 
increasing its exposure to foreign competition.  
172. The European  Union  reviewed the definitive safeguard measure in 2019. As part of that 
review, the liberalization rate was set at 3% during the second and third year of the application 
of the measure.  
173. This approach complies with the requirements in Article  7.4. In parti cular, this liberalization is 
progressive, set at 5% and then 3% and 3% respectively, and occurs at regular intervals of 
one year. This is a progressive liberalization of the kind of referred to in the Ukraine – 
Passenger Cars  panel report.  
174. The treaty  text does not establish any particular requirement as to the form or concrete pace 
of liberalisation, other than such liberalisation should occur progressively at regular intervals 
during the period of application.  
175. In this regard, we strongly disagre e with Turkey 's contention that this requirement implies 
"that once the competent authorities have determined a schedule of liberalization, it cannot 
decrease the pace of liberalization ". There is no support in the Agreement for this proposition. 
Moreover,  should this proposition be accepted, then a WTO Member that announced at the 
very beginning a certain pace of liberalization (5% + 5% liberalisation pace) and then revises 
it (3% and 3% liberalisation pace) would be found to have breached the Agreement wh ereas 
if the same WTO Member had not announced the pace of liberalization in advance but after 
one and two years liberalised it at the 3% and 3% liberalisation pace, it would not be found 
to have breached the Agreement. This would be a perverse incentive w hich would have the 
detrimental effect of encouraging an early announcement of low or minimal liberalisation 
degrees (to be subject to possible accelerations afterwards) and thus forestalling an early 
announcement that gives a more demanding signal to the domestic industry as regards how 
it is expected to adjust. Finally, the requirements of Article  7.4 are to "progressively liberalize " 
the safeguard measure, which the European  Union  did. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  176. With regard to the claim concerning quantitative caps on the use  of the global and residual 
TRQs for certain product categories, the competent authority explained that "the current 
annual administration of the country specific quotas would not be effective in preventing the 
disturbances on the Union steel market identi fied above, which would be exacerbated by the 
expected opportunistic behaviour of some exporters ". 
177. With respect to Turkey 's claim that imports were restricted under product category 4.B to 
those exporters that could demonstrate an end -use in the autom otive sector, it is worth noting 
that those exporting countries selling 4.B (non -automotive) could do it under that category 
because the relevant CN codes were transferred to category 4.A. So export could continue 
according to historical trade flows.  
178. It is also worth noting that first, this calibration was introduced at the specific request of the 
EU automotive industry and in consultation with the main automotive steel exporting 
countries; and second, these very same actors were unable to undertake th e necessary steps 
on their end to benefit from this mechanism which would have facilitated trade.  
179. Therefore, because of the inability of the said actors to make it work, what should have been 
an adjustment leading to a less restrictive measure ended u p being more restrictive. Indeed, 
this end -use mechanism was not supposed to be more trade restrictive. In order to remedy 
this shortcoming, the measure was adjusted by the amending regulation of 15  January  2020, 
which revoked the automotive end -use requir ement, with retroactive effect.  
180. The ameliorated administration of the tariff rate quotas and the specific adjustments to 
individual product categories, including with regard to category 4.B are not modifications that 
render the definitive safeguard me asure inconsistent with Article  7.4 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards. The definitive measure continued to be progressively liberalized at regular 
intervals and the modifications, taken together, are consistent with that requirement.  
181. In light of the abov e, Turkey 's claim under Articles  7.4 and 5.1 of the Agreement of Safeguards 
was not demonstrated and it has to be rejected.  
11 THE EUROPEAN  UNION' S MEASURES AT ISSUE ARE CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE  XIX 
OF THE  GATT  1994 AND THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS AND DO NO T AMOUNT 
TO A VIOLATION OF  THE SECOND SENTENCE OF ARTICLE  II:1(B) OF THE  GATT  1994  
182. Turkey has failed to demonstrate that the measures at issue are imposed in violation of the 
second sentence of Article  II:1(b) of the  GATT  1994.  
183. In fact, Turkey 's Article  II of the  GATT  1994 claim is consequential to its claims of violation of 
the Agreement on Safeguards.  
184. The European  Union  has adopted safeguard measures that are consistent with its obligations 
under Articles  II:1 and XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
185. Having complied with the relevant conditions, this is something that the European  Union  "shall 
be free to do". Once the European  Union  has suspended its obligations, it was entitled to apply 
duties of the kind of those at issue in the present case.  
186. There is no violation of Article  II:1(b) that is justified by Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 
and the Agreement on Safeguards. A suspension is not a violation in first place.  
187. As the European  Union  has demonstrated throughout the present submission, Turkey has 
failed to demonstrate that the measures at issue are inconsistent with the 
European  Union's obligations under Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994 and the Agreement on 
Safeguards. The measures at issue resulted in a valid suspension of the 
European  Union' s obligations under Article  II:1(b), second sentence, within the meaning of 
Article  XIX:1(a) of  the GATT  1994.  WT/DS595/ R/Add.1  
 
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  12 CONCLUSIONS  
188. Turkey has failed to make a prima facie  case on any of its claims. For the reasons set out in 
its submissions, the European  Union  respectfully requests that the Panel rejects all of 
Turkey 's claims that the European  Union' s provisional and definitive safeguard measures on 
steel products are inconsistent with the  GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
_______________  
 
 WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX  C 
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Argentina  78 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Brazil  81 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Canada  84 
Annex  C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  86 
Annex  C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Republic of Korea  90 
Annex  C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Switzerland  95 
Annex  C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine  100 
Annex  C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United Kingdom  102 
Annex  C-9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United States  105 
 
 
 WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -1 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF ARGENTINA* 
I. Turkey 's claim under Article  XIX:1(a ) of GATT  1994 and Articles  2.1, 3.1, 4.1(c), 4.2(a), 
4.2(b), 4.2(c ) and 6  of the  Agreement  on Safeguards regarding the determination and 
analysis of the "product under investigation".  
1. Argentina considers that, first, the Panel should examine the factual question contested by the 
parties; namely wh ether the EU analysed distinct products to which distinct safeguard measures 
were applied or whether, on the contrary, it examined a single product to which a single measure 
was applied.1 
2. Should the Panel find that the EU analysed distinct products and  applied distinct safeguard 
measures, the Panel should examine whether the competent authority verified the existence of the 
conditions listed in Article  2.1 of the  Agreement  on Safeguards for each of the products investigated. 
In that regard, Argentina un derstands that the "principle of parallelism" is particularly relevant and 
applicable to this case. By virtue of this principle, there should be a parallelism between the imports 
covered by the scope of a safeguard investigation and the imports subject to safeguard measures.  
3. On the other hand, in the event that the Panel finds the EU has investigated a single product that 
was subject to a single safeguard measure, the Panel should still examine whether the competent 
authority conducted the investigation in an objective and impartial manner, based on objective 
factors and evidence, in a ccordance with the provisions of Article  4.2(a ) and (b ) of the  Agreement  
on Safeguards.  
4. In this regard, Argentina considers that it is difficult to understand how the conditions laid down 
in Article  2.1 may be considered to exist with respect to the pro duct under investigation if the 
competent authority modifies the grouping of products or product categories, depending on the 
different aspects the authority wishes to analyse during the safeguards investigation.2 
5. Similarly, Argentina considers that, i f the investigating authority defines the product under 
investigation in a relatively broad manner, its analysis and examination must be conducted in line 
with the inherent complexities resulting from such broad coverage.3 In particular, in the event of 
different trends in distinct product categories, the investigating authority must justify and give a 
reasoned explanation why different trends do not affect the conclusions that underpin the decision 
to impose safeguard meas ures. In any case, the competent authority 's final conclusions must be 
properly substantiated, as required under Article  3.1 of the  Agreement  on Safeguards.  
II. Turkey's  claim under Article  7.4 of the  Agreement  on Safeguards.  
6. Turkey submits that the EU acted inconsistently with Article  7.4 because, following the first and 
second review, it made the safeguard measures more restrictive than those imposed after the 
original investigation, thereby reducing the pace of liberalization.4 
7. Turkey lists severa l changes that reduced the aforementioned pace of liberalization.5 Among the 
various facts cited, Turkey mentions that the EU amended the list of developing countries with de 
minimis  exports excluded from the scope of the original safeguard measures.6 
 
* Original in Spanish.  
1 Republic of Korea 's third-party written submission, para. 9. 
2 Switzerland 's third-party written submission, para. 11. 
3 Republic of Korea 's third-party written submission, para. 9. 
4 Turkey 's first written submission, paras.  354 and 380.  
5 Turkey 's first written submission, paras.  361 and 363.  
6 Turkey 's first written submission, para.  361, fifth bullet point, and para. 363, sixth bullet point.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  8. First, as regards the amendment of the list of developing countries, Argentina  considers that 
Article  7.4 of the  Agreement  of Safeguards should be read together and in a consistent manner with 
the provisions of Article  9.1. 
9. In this connection, Argentin a firmly believes that the review of the list of excluded developing 
countries is inconsistent with the progressive liberalization obligation in cases where countries that 
were originally exempted from the safeguard measures are then included in their scop e as a result 
of the subsequent review process .  
10. Second, Argentina recalls that the obligation set out in Article  7.4 means that, legally, the review 
process can only have two possible outcomes : the withdrawal of the safeguard measures or their 
progres sive liberalization. In other words, the measure can never, under any circumstances, be 
made more restrictive  (Argentina – Footwear (EC) , WT/DS121/R, para. 8.303) . 
11. For the reasons given it is clear that, once it has been verified that a developing coun try is 
subject to the special and differential treatment established in Article  9.1, that exemption must 
remain in place until the measure expires, even if that country 's share subsequently exceeds 3% of 
total imports. Otherwise, the competent authority would be able to convert the safeguard measure 
into a more restrictive measure following the review process, something that is manifestly prohibited 
by Article  7.4 of the  Agreement  on Safeguards.  
III. Argentina 's replies to the questions posed by the Panel to the third parties.  
• With regard to the question of whether a Member State may exclude a sub -group of products 
under investigation from the scope of provisional or defi nitive safeguard measures, Argentina 
replied that the  Agreement  on Safeguards does not contain any explicit legal provisions that 
restrict a Member State 's right to do so. However, it noted that, in the hypothetical case that 
the competent authority exclud es a certain sub -group of products from the scope of the 
safeguard measures, the excluded imports should be considered as "other factors" in the 
"non-attribution" analysis that must be carried out in accordance with Article  4.2(b ) of 
the Agreement  on Safeg uards. In short, Argentina understands that the principle of 
"parallelism" applies in this case.  
• Regarding the connection between "unforeseen developments" and the increase in imports 
in the steel production sector, Argentina replied that it is not enoug h for the competent 
authority to demonstrate the connection between "unforeseen developments" and imports 
of too broad a group of products, instead it must conduct individual analysis for each product 
involved ( US – Steel Safeguards , WT/DS248/R, p. 319).  
• With reference to whether the "attractiveness" of the market is sufficient to establish 
causation between the "unforeseen developments" and the increase in imports, Argentina 
understands that market "attractiveness" may, ultimately, offer a plausible expl anation for 
the casual link. However, a simple claim is not sufficient. It should be established on the 
basis of objective evidence that this characteristic (market "attractiveness" ) has triggered 
specific, observable facts (for example, deviation of trade ) that has led to an increase in 
imports. In addition , Argentina  reiterates that, as with any evidence of a causal link, it is 
particularly important that the elements to be linked together exist concurrently.  
• In response to the question on projections o f import increases in the future in the context of 
Articles  2.1 and 4.2 of the  Agreement  on Safeguards, Argentina said that the investigating 
authority may give weight to future import projections as the threat of injury analysis was, 
by nature, particular ly forward -looking. However, Argentina recalled that the standard for 
determining the threat of injury within the WTO framework is rigorous. Accordingly, 
Argentina highlighted the following criteria : (a) import projections must be based on the 
most recent information available; (b ) projections must be based on market forecasts and/or 
accredited statistical data, on the basis of proven objective empirical evidence; (c ) import 
projections must not be based on mere conjecture, possibilities, opinions or claims; 
(d) import projections must be duly linked to the imminence of injury to the industry 
concerned by a relationship of cause and effect. These criteria are supported by the 
panel 's ruling in US – Lamb , (WT/DS178/R, para. 7.129).  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  • Lastly, on the matt er of the safeguard investigation 's coverage of imports subject to 
anti-dumping and/or countervailing duties, Argentina replied that the injurious effects of 
imports subject to countervailing and/or anti -dumping duties must be examined by the 
investigating  authority during the "non -attribution" analysis to ensure that "other factors" 
(subsidized imports or dumping), which could cause injury to the industry (and has been 
offset by other trade defence measures), are not unduly attributed to the increase in im ports 
resulting from "unforeseen developments". It was also stressed that this analysis is 
necessary to ensure that any future safeguard measures do not exceed the level "necessary 
to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment" (Article  5.1 of 
the Agreement  on Safeguards). Argentina  specified that analysis of the possible separation 
of potentially injurious effects offset by countervailing and/or anti -dumping duties must be 
carried out in the framework of Article  4.2(b ) of the  Agreement  on Safeguards, which 
establishes the obligation to undertake non -attribution analysis.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -2 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF BRAZIL  
1  INTRODUCTION  
1. Brazil provides the following executive summary of its participation during the panel proceedings 
in this dispute.  
2  ARGUMENTS  
A. Article  XIX:1 (a) of the  GATT  1994 and the determination of unforeseen developments  
2. Brazil considers that Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 requires the investigating authority to 
explain carefully the logical nexus between an increase in imports and the unforeseen 
developments it had identified. Increased impor ts must be the effect of such unforeseen 
developments, and this nexus cannot be simply presumed or be a hypothetical outcome. It must 
be reasonably explained by the investigating authority through actual data.  
3. Additionally, Brazil sees with particular c aution the argument that the adoption of trade defense 
measures by WTO  Members could constitute an "unforeseen development" that would justify 
the imposition of safeguard measures. Accepting this possibility, without an adequate threshold, 
could entail ris ks of unwarranted escalation in trade restrictiveness worldwide. The mere 
possibility of trade diversion resulting from the use of legitimate trade remedies by other 
countries should not be enough to justify the imposition of safeguard measures.  
4. Brazil also considers that propositions like stating the "attractiveness" of a market is not 
sufficient to assess the causal link between an unforeseen development and the increase in 
imports. This correlation cannot be simply presumed due its likelihood, but it requires a 
demonstration of fact, on a case -by-case basis.  
5. Brazil considers that the investigating authority has some flexibility to define the scope of the 
product under investigation. Nevertheless, the authority must appropriately demonstrate the 
connection between the unforeseen development(s) and the increase in imports both in respect 
to the broader category and in relation to the specific products under investigation. If an 
unforeseen development affects the former, it will likely affect the latter . However, this 
connection must be demonstrated and cannot be simply presumed, since the supply and demand 
of certain subcategories of products could be affected differently by the same unforeseen 
development.  
6. Additionally, any exclusion of specific pro ducts from the broader category composing the product 
under investigation must be explained and conducted in an unbiased manner, to avoid distorting 
the assessment of injury and of the increase in imports. For example, if the investigating 
authority exclud es a certain subset of items at the beginning of an investigation, under the claim 
that they did not present an increase of imports, but later presents aggregated data regarding 
the reminiscent categories of products, this could make it more likely to find  a general increase 
of imports or a serious injury to the domestic industry. In such situations, a panel may have to 
analyze if that exclusion was properly assessed by the investigating authority and if the 
methodology adopted was conducted in an unbiased manner.  
B. Article  XIX:1 (a) of the  GATT  1994 and Articles  2.1 and 4.2(a) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards and the determination of increase in imports  
7. In the assessment of the increase in imports, investigating authorities must analyze trends over 
the en tire period of investigation with a particular focus on the most recent data in order to 
comply with the requirement expressed by the phrase "is being imported" present in Article  2.1 
of the Agreement on Safeguards. A panel should give thorough considerati on to the standards WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  set out by previous disputes, bearing in mind that safeguard measures are an exceptional 
remedy targeted at fair trade.  
C. Articles  2.1, 4.1 (a), 4.1 (b) and 4.2 (a) of the Agreement on Safeguards and the 
determination of a threat of se rious injury to the domestic industry and its causal link 
with the increase of imports  
8. Brazil sustains that the assessment of injury or threat of injury should be carried for each 
category of products targeted by safeguard measures. This methodology is fundamental to 
ascertain the causal nexus between injury or the threat of injury and the increase of imports, 
especially when the investigation targets several tariff lines, which can display different 
behaviors, oscillations, and trends during the period of investigation. The same causal link 
cannot be presumed for all categories involved, and, in some cases, the increase of imports may 
not lead to a finding regarding injury or threat of injury.  
9. A "threat of serious injury" contains a prospective elemen t that relates to the state of the 
domestic industry, not to the increase in imports. Brazil understands that the use of the present 
tense of the verb phrase "is being imported" in Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, as 
well as the use of the past tense "increased imports" in Article  4.2, together require that 
increased imports be already occurring during the period of investigation.  
10. Nowhere in Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994 nor in the Agreement on Safeguards is it possible to 
find any disposition  regarding the future likelihood of increased imports as a trigger for safeguard 
measures. Consequently, possible future import volumes are not determinant of a situation of 
threat of serious injury. Such emergency measures shall be applied based on the ac tual trend 
of imports that have experienced a recent, sharp, sudden, and significative increase and that 
are thus threatening the integrity of the domestic industry.  
11. Moreover, not every listed injury factor needs to show a declining tendency in the mos t recent 
period in order to justify the imposition of safeguard measures. The possibility that some 
important indicators show an upward trend at the end of the investigating period reinforces the 
need of a detailed and reasoned analysis by the investigatin g authority of the causal link between 
the threat of injury and the increase of imports. This is specially the case when the facts show 
an overall improvement of the situation of the industry in that period.  
D. Article  4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards  and non -attribution  
12. Brazil considers the investigating authority has the obligation to evaluate all issues of fact and 
law pertinent to the application of a safeguard measure. This requirement includes the evaluation 
of factors that, at a first glance , may be perceived as insignificant or negligible.  
13. Article  4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards presents a minimum standard of evaluation, and 
all factors listed therein must be properly assessed. Additionally, an investigating authority must 
give due  consideration to all other relevant factors concerning the product under investigation, 
going beyond the facts raised by the interested parties. This does not mean that an investigation 
is an endless collection of facts, but rather that an adequate invest igation must be sufficiently 
representative of the situation at hand. This may require, therefore, a proactive conduct of the 
investigating authority to engage several elements that could impact the determination of a 
safeguard measure.  
E. Article  4.2(b) o f the Agreement on Safeguards and the injury caused by dumped or 
subsidized imports  
14. Article  4.2(b) requires that "when factors other than increased imports are causing injury to the 
domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attribute d to increased imports". 
Therefore, Brazil understands that an investigating authority must separate the effects of 
subsidized or dumped imports from the effects of the recent, sharp, sudden, and significant 
increase of imports that justify the application  of safeguard measure.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  F. Article  XIII of the  GATT  1994 and tariff -rate quota safeguard measures  
15. Brazil considers that safeguard measures that adopt the form of a tariff -rate quota are subject 
to the requirements of Article  XIII of the  GATT  1994 and, t herefore, must be administered in a 
non-discriminatory form.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -3 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF CANADA  
I. DEMONSTRATING THE SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS FOR IMPOSING A SAFEGUARD  
ON A "PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION" THAT CONTAINS MULTIPLE PRODUCTS  
1. Nothing in the Agreement on Safeguards or the  GATT  1994 prohibits a Member from 
conducting a safeguard investigation on the basis of a broadly defined "product under investigation" . 
As such, an investigating authority may define the product under investigation such that it includes 
multiple products or product categories. The investigating authority may also determine the 
methodology used to assess that product.1 
2. However, as the subs tantive conditions for imposing a safeguard under Article  2.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994 relate to the specific product targeted 
by a measure, the investigating authority must clearly explain how each of the substantive  conditions 
has been met for that specific product, as defined.2 
3. Thus, the methodology selected must allow the investigating authority to demonstrate, on the 
basis of objective evidence and the consideration of relevant factors, that the substantive co nditions 
have been satisfied with regard to the product under investigation. In accordance with the standard 
of review in safeguard cases, a panel must assess whether the investigating authority examined all 
relevant factors and provided "a reasoned and ad equate explanation as to how the facts support 
their determination" .3 As noted by the Appellate  Body in US – Lamb , if a panel determines that a 
reasoned or adequate explanation was not provided, the relevant determination "is inconsistent with 
the specifi c requirements of [the relevant provision] of the Agreement on Safeguards" .4 
4. Given these requirements, Canada notes that while investigating authorities have discretion 
to define the product examined and the methodology used, an overly broad product de finition may 
create methodological difficulties. It may also affect the ability of an investigating authority to show 
that the requirements for imposing a safeguard have been satisfied.  
5. Finally, in Canada's  view, Members may exclude a subset of products  from the application of 
a safeguard measure so as long as the exclusions do not undermine the conclusions reached by their 
investigating authorities regarding the satisfaction of each condition for imposing a safeguard.  
6. Turning to the case at hand, whe re Turkey has challenged the appropriateness of a 
methodology that uses multiple levels of analysis and the European Commission's  exclusion of 
certain product categories, the Panel must assess whether the European Commission provided a 
reasoned and adequat e explanation of how the product under investigation, to which the 
European  Union imposed a safeguard measure, met each of the substantive conditions for imposing 
that safeguard measure.  
 
1 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  137. The Appellate  Body found that the Agreement on 
Safeguards "p rovides no particular methodology to be followed in making determinations of serious injury or 
threat thereof" . The Appellate  Body also noted that the Agreement on Safeguards did not prescribe a 
methodology for conducting a non -attribution analysis, howeve r, the Appellate  Body noted that "[w]hat the 
Agreement requires is simply that the obligations in Article  4.2 must be respected when a safeguard measure 
is applied" . See para.  181. Similarly, in India – Iron and Steel Products , the panel noted that "Articl e XIX:1(a) 
does not provide any methodology for examining the relationship between the unforeseen developments and 
the increase in imports. Even though a competent authority enjoys a certain latitude in choosing the 
appropriate method, it must provide a re asoned and adequate explanation of its findings" . See Panel  Report, 
India – Iron and Steel Products , para.  7.110.  
2 See Appellate  Body Reports , US – Lamb , para.  86 and US – Steel Safeguards , paras.  316-319. 
3 Appellate  Body Report , US – Lamb , para.  103. See also Appellate Body Reports, US – Line Pipe , 
para. 217 and US – Steel Safeguards , paras.  296 and 297.  
4 Appellate  Body Report , US – Lamb , para.  107. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  II. THE DEMONSTRATION OF UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR LOGICAL 
CONNECTION TO INCREASED IMPORTS  
7. Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 permits Members to impose safeguards where increased 
imports cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a Member's  domestic industry "as a result of 
unforeseen developments and of the eff ect of the obligations incurred" under the  GATT 1994.5 The 
Appellate  Body interpreted "unforeseen developments" in Korea – Dairy  and Argentina – Footwear 
(EC) to mean developments that are "unexpected" .6 The Appellate Body held that unforeseen 
developmen ts must be circumstances that occurred after the negotiation of the relevant obligations 
incurred and that could not reasonably have been foreseen, or expected, by the negotiators at the 
time when the obligations were negotiated.7 
8. As set out by the App ellate  Body in US – Steel Safeguards , with regard to any safeguard 
measure imposed, the investigating authority must explain how the unforeseen development(s) 
resulted in increased imports of the specific  product under investigation, which, as set out above, 
may include multiple products. Th e investigating authority need not show that the unforeseen 
development(s) also resulted in increased imports of a broader category of products simply because 
the product under investigation makes up a major proportion of that broader product.  
9. The Europ ean Union argues that situations such as systemic and growing global steel 
overcapacity and sweeping U.S. Section  232 measures on steel were unforeseen developments that 
led to increased imports of the product under investigation. In certain circumstances,  Canada agrees 
that global overcapacity and the imposition of sweeping trade restrictive measures in key markets, 
such as the Section  232 measures, may amount to unforeseen developments. However, given 
Turkey's  claims that the developments were not "unfore seen" and that the European Commission 
failed to explain how the unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports, the Panel must 
assess whether the European Commission provided a reasoned and adequate explanation identifying 
why the developments were  unforeseen in this case and how they led to  increased imports . 
III. application of Article  5.2(a) of the agreement on safeguards and Article  XIII:2(d) of 
the GATT  1994 to tariff rate quotas  
10. Canada considers that Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on Safe guards does not apply to tariff 
rate quotas but that Article  XIII:2(d) of the  GATT  1994 does.  
11. Article  XIII:5 of the  GATT  1994 explicitly extends the application of Article  XIII to tariff rate 
quotas. A similar provision does not appear in Article  5 of the Agreement on Safeguards, or anywhere 
else in that Agreement. As such, in line with previous panel and Appellate Body findings that a tariff 
rate quota is neither a quantitative restriction nor a quota,8 tariff rate quotas are not subject to the 
provis ions in Article  5 of the Agreement on Safeguards relating to quantitative restrictions and 
quotas.  
 
5 GATT  1994, Article  XIX 1(a).  
6 Appellate  Body Reports, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para.  91 and Korea – Dairy , para.  84. 
7 Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para.  96, referring to the GATT Working Party 
Report in the Hatters'  Fur case (Report of the Intersessional Working Party on the Complaint of Czechoslovakia 
Concerning the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession under the Terms of Article  XIX, 
(Hatters'  Fur), GATT/CP/106, adopted 22  October  1951).  
8 See, for example, Appellate  Body Reports, EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – 
Bananas  III (Artic le 21.5 – US), paras.  335-336 and US – Line Pipe , paras.  6 and 233 -235; and Panel Report, 
US – Line Pipe , paras.  7.69-7.75. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -4 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF JAPAN  
1. Japan raises three main arguments in its submissions. First, Japan submits that the investigating 
authority has an obligation to identify "unforeseen developments" that caused the injurious 
increase in imports triggering a safeguard measure, as required in Article  XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT  1994. Second, Japan submits that Article  XIX:1(a) also requires that the increase in 
imports occur as a result of the effect of the  GATT  1994 obligations. The " logical connection" 
between the relevant obligations and the injurious increase in imports justifying the safeguard 
measure must be clearly demonstrated by the investigating authority. Third, Japan submits that 
the investigating authority must provide suff icient information on the specific causes of the 
injurious imports to assess whether the measures were applied "only to the extent necessary to 
prevent or remedy serious injury", as required under Articles  5.1 and 7.1 of the 
Safeguards  Agreement and Articl e XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994. 
I. OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO "UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS " 
2. Japan's  first argument concerns the obligation to consider "unforeseen developments" resulting 
in increased quantities of imports causing or threatening to cause serious in jury to the domestic 
producers of the like or directly competitive products. This obligation is established in 
Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
3. Japan argues that the requirement to determine whether the increase in imports is the result 
of "unforeseen  developments" is an affirmative obligation that is based on the text of the first 
sentence of Article  XIX: 1(a)  of the  GATT  1994. Given the clarification made by t he 
Appellate  Body Report in Korea – Dairy , Japan considers that the phrase "as a result of 
unforeseen developments" indicate s that the existence of "unforeseen developments" is one of 
the express prerequisites imposed by Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 for a safeguard 
measure to be applied in accordance with the Safeguards  Agreement.  
4. In resp ect of the nature of the claimed " unforeseen developments ", Japan considers that the 
importing Member must demonstrate that it could not foresee the developments that gave rise 
to the increased quantity of imports at the time a concession was negotiated. A n importing 
Member that foresaw the relevant "developments" at the time of the tariff negotiations would 
have expected increased imports causing serious injury to the domestic industry. When the 
importing Member could not have foreseen them, only then is i t reasonable to allow it to 
withdraw or modify the relevant concessions.  
5. Japan recalls the finding of the Appellate  Body in US – Lamb  that competent authorities must 
make affirmative findings as to the existence of "unforeseen developments", based on 
Articles 3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Safeguards  Agreement and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994. 
Thus, they must discuss why the alleged "unforeseen developments" were "unexpected" at the 
time it negotiated the tariff concessions at issue. In particular, competent  authorities must 
provide a "reasoned and adequate explanation" of how the facts in a report  support its 
"unforeseen developments" determination.  
6. As explained by the Appellate  Body Report in US – Steel Safeguards , Japan also argues that the 
requirement for a "logical connection" between the "unforeseen developments" and the increase 
in imports means that investigating authorities must show how the unforeseen developments 
have resulted in the increased imports at issue. Only then is the Article  XIX:1(a) r equirement 
that "unforeseen developments" caused the increased imports satisfied in light of Article  4.2(c) 
of the Safeguards  Agreement.  
7. Japan also notes that the importing Member must define the increased imports causing or 
threatening to cause serious  injury to its "domestic industry". The standard of "serious injury" 
set forth in Article  4.1(a) is very high, as seen in the Appellate  Body Report for US – Lamb . 
Further, the "domestic industry" is defined in Article  4.1(c) as the domestic producers "of t he WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  like or directly competitive products". Therefore, competent authorities must show how 
"unforeseen developments" have modified the competitive relationship between the imported 
and "like or directly competitive" domestic products to the detriment of the  latter. They must 
also show how this has resulted in an increase in imports causing, or threatening to cause, 
serious injury to the domestic industry. Japan argues that where "unforeseen developments" 
have not modified this competitive relationship, incre ased imports will not have cause d serious  
injury to t he domestic industry as  imports will not have  replace d sales of the domestic like 
product in the market competition.  
8. Japan recalls that Members negotiating tariffs usually consider their tariff concessions on a 
product -by-product basis, assessing the international competitiveness of the domestic industry 
and possible future developments. However, it is impossible to forecast all future events 
influencing the domestic industry's  competitiveness. W ithout the availability of "emergency 
action" (Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994), it would be difficult for Members to persuade their 
domestic industries to support trade liberalization. Safeguard measures function as a "safety 
net" to convince interested part ies of "the need to enhance rather than limit competition in 
international markets" (Preamble of the Safeguards  Agreement).  
9. Concerning the application to the facts and issues before the Panel, Japan recalls the 
Appellate  Body Report in Argentina – Footw ear (EC) , which stated that the requirement of  
"unforeseen developments" d oes not set a separate "condition" for the imposition of safeguard  
measures, but describe s certain "circumstances". In the present case, the Panel should examine 
whether the EU provided "reasoned and adequate explanation s" of how factors cited qualify as 
unexpected "circumstances " leading to the increase in imports causing or threatening to cause 
serious injury to the domestic industry . 
10. As Turkey rebutted the EU's identification o f the "unforeseen developments", Japan recalls the 
Panel Report in US – Steel Safeguards , which concluded that the confluence of several events 
can form the basis for an "unforeseen development" when taken together. It follows that t he 
EU must demonstrate that the confluence of circumstances was unforeseen and unexpected 
when the concession was negotiated . Hence, the Panel should analyze  whether the 
EU's explanation in the published reports fulfilled this burden.  
11. Concerning Turkey's  argument on the appropriateness  of the broad  steel product  categor y 
subject to a safeguard measure , Japan recalls that it is not sufficient that "unforeseen 
developments" resulted in increased imports of a broad category of products that included the 
specific products, as det ermined by the Appellate Body in US – Steel Safeguards . As explained 
by Japan in response to Panel Question No.  4, it is necessary for competent authorities to 
demonstrate that "unforeseen developments" resulted in increased imports of " specific products 
subject to the respective determinations". Otherwise, products could be included the imports of 
which "did not increase and did not result from the 'unforeseen developments' at issue" . 
12. Japan maintains that the Panel should carefully examine whether the report of the competent  
authority explains the logical connection between "unforeseen  developments" and the increase 
in imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the domest ic industry. In other 
words, the Panel must be convinced that the alleged "unforeseen developments" resulted in the 
injurious increase in imports by modifying the competitive relationship between imported and 
domestic products  in the wide range of categori es specified by the EU. Japan notes that mere 
oversupply resulting from the foreclosure of a major foreign market, even if unforeseen, should 
not necessarily modify that competitive relationship.  
II. THE "EFFECT OF THE OBLIGATIONS"  
13. The second part of J apan's  argumentation relates to the Article  XIX:1(a) requirement that the 
increase in imports occur as a result of the effect of the  GATT  1994 obligations. According to 
this provision, as well as Articles  3.1 and 4.2(c) of the Safeguards Agreement, a Membe r must 
not only identify the specific GATT obligations it incurred. It must also explain how the "effect" 
of these obligations resulted in the product being imported in such increased quantities and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause se rious injury to its domestic industry.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  14. Japan considers that the "effect" of the GATT obligations should prevent the adoption of  
WTO-consistent measures to avoid the change in the competitive relationship resulting from 
the "unforeseen circumstances". I n other words, the "effects" of "unforeseen developments" 
and the obligations are complementary. "Unforeseen developments" must have resulted in the 
increase in imports. Obligations must prevent the importing Member from taking measures to 
address  increase d imports that resulted from those unforeseen developments.  
15. If the injurious increase in imports was the result of dumping or subsidization , the importing 
Member may address such injury by means of antidumping duties  or countervailing duties  on 
imports  from those sources. This is different from a situation where an increase in imports 
occur red "as a result […] of the effect" of the GATT obligations and, therefore, should not justify 
the imposition of a safeguard measures on imports irrespective of sourc es. 
16. Japan also notes that the identified GATT obligations that constrain the importing 
Member's  ability to react to the import surge must be those that needed to be modified or 
withdrawn to address the injurious increase in imports. Therefore, Japan su spects that the 
absence of explanation on this point would make it difficult to establish that the safeguard 
measures chosen are taken "only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury".  
17. In the present case, Turkey points out that the E uropean  Union did not identify the relevant 
obligations that it incurred  under the  GATT  1994, nor the effects of such obligations . Thus, the 
Panel must assess this issue. On this point, Japan underscores that when making tariff 
concessions, Members know th at they will be able to respond to dumping or subsidization 
through anti -dumping or countervailing duties under Article  VI of the  GATT  1994.  
18. The "obligations incurred", therefore, should limit the ability to respond adequately to the serious 
injury cau sed by increased imports due to "unforeseen developments". Unless the Member 
identifies and separates the relevant injury from aspects of injury arising from dumped or 
subsidized imports, imposing safeguard measures for the same products as those within th e 
scope of the ongoing anti -dumping or countervailing measures contradicts the "obligations 
incurred" and "effect" prerequisite. As explained by Japan in its answer to Panel Question No.  7, 
the injurious effects resulting from dumped or subsidized imports of the relevant products cannot 
be part of the injurious effects to justify a safeguard  measure . Such injurious effects must be 
differentiated. A safeguard measure intended to address the injurious effects of dumped or 
subsidized imports would apply beyond  what is necessary to prevent or remedy injury within the 
meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
III. "TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO PREVENT OR REMEDY SUCH INJURY"  
19. Finally, Japan comments on another issue raised by Turkey: whether the measures were applied 
beyond "the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury" under Articles  5.1 and 7.1 
of the Safeguards  Agreement and Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994. 
20. As seen in the Appellate  Body Reports for Korea – Dairy and US – Line Pipe, those provisions 
impose " an obligation  on a Member applying a safeguard measure to ensure that the measure 
applied is commensurate with the goals of preventing or remedying serious injury and of 
facilitating adjustment". Furthermore, "this obligation applies regardless of the particular form 
that a safeguard measure might take".  
21. The "serious injury" referred to in Article  5.1 is necessarily the same "that has been determined 
to exist by competent authorities of a WTO  Member pursuant to Article  4.2". Further, one of the 
objectives of "the no n-attribution language of the second sentence of Article  4.2(b)" is to 
establish "a benchmark for ensuring that only an appropriate share of the overall injury is 
attributed to increased imports", which "informs the permissible extent to which the safeguar d 
measure may be applied pursuant to Article  5.1, first sentence".  
22. Japan maintains that t his requirement should be understood in combination with the first clause 
of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 as well . As analyzed above, import increases address able 
through safeguard measures must be those arising from the "unforeseen developments". They 
must also be those against which the importing Member cannot take appropriate measures as 
a result of "obligations incurred" under the  GATT  1994. A safeguard mea sure against imports WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  of one or more products that did not increase and did not result from the "unforeseen 
developments" at issue would not meet the requirements of Article  XIX:1(a)  the GATT  1994.  
23. Japan submits that safeguard measure must not exceed wh at is necessary to remedy serious 
injury, under Article  5.1 of the Safeguards  Agreement. The "permissible extent" has to be 
analyzed on a case -by-case basis. The "injury" caused by the increased imports must be 
identified. Furthermore, how the increased im ports resulted from the "unforeseen 
developments" and how the Member in question had been prevented from taking actions by its 
GATT obligations must be considered.  
24. Additionally, Japan reiterates that the reasonable explanation of how certain GATT oblig ations 
including the applicable tariff concessions prevented the importing Member from taking 
appropriate measures will indicate that the relevant GATT obligations have been  modified or 
withdrawn "only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious i njury".  
25. Looking at the relevant facts and issues in this dispute, Japan considers that the Panel should 
analyze whether the EU's  complex approach to safeguards complies with the requirement of 
applying measures " only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury".  
26. In this regard, Japan wonders what kind of "injury" the EU has been trying to remedy though 
this approach, in particular, by the combination of tariff rate quotas . For safeguard measures  
to be justified , as discussed above, i t is necessary to distinguish the injurious effects of the 
increased imports from those caused by other factors . However, i n its non-attribution analysis,  
the EU did not go further than maintai ning that its competent authority had not "identified other 
factors that would weaken the causal link between the increase in imports and the serious injury 
to the Union producers" . 
27. The EU explains that the imposition of tariff rate quotas partly pursued the objective of "ensuring 
that traditional trade flows are maintained", as well as "preventing serious injury" . Looking at 
the country -specific quotas imposed, the use of the expression "traditional trade flows" appears 
to imply that the EU seeks to preserve import flows and volumes from each of the exporting 
countries. On this point, Japan reiterates that "injury" needed to justify safeguard measures 
must be  related to increased imports irrespective of their source (Article  2.2 of the 
Safeguards  Agreement). Neither injurious effects from dumped or subsidized impor ts nor 
hindrance to the maintenance or restoration of country -specific "traditional trade flows" may be 
understood as "injury" within the meaning of the Safeguard  Agreement.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -5 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. Korea participates in this dispute because of its systemic interests i n the proper interpretation 
and application of the legal disciplines applying to Members'  ability to adopt 
safeguard  measures under Article  XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT")  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
2. It is important to underscore at the outset that safeguard  measures are "extraordinary 
remedies" allowed by the WTO covered agreements in "emergency situations", as they restrict 
imports from other Members in the absence of any allegation of unfair trade practices.1 
Indeed, safeguard  measures are intended to provide temporary relief to industries suffering 
economic harm that has been caused by an unforeseen surge in imports. Safeguards are a 
form of insurance to Members if unexpected harm is caused by trade liberalization , in 
particular as a result of lowering import tariffs under the GATT  1994. The unforeseen nature 
of the developments that result in the increased imports is an essential condition for lawfully 
invoking this emergency insurance mechanism.  
3. Thus, safeguar ds are of a fundamentally different nature than the unfair trade -related forms 
of contingent trade protection ( i.e. anti-dumping and anti -subsidy/countervailing duty 
measures). This fundamental difference in nature is not to be ignored. Otherwise, safeguar ds 
would effectively become just an easier -to-use form of trade remedy because they would do 
away with complex dumping and subsidy calculations while allowing for the same remedy. 
Korea considers that safeguards are – and should remain – the exceptional, t emporary 
adjustment -related insurance remedy that they were intended to be by the drafters of the 
Uruguay Round.  
4. In this submission, Korea focuses on a number of the substantive issues raised in this dispute.  
II. DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE "PRODUCT CONCERNED" THROUGHOUT 
THE INVESTIGATION FOR IMPOSITION OF MEASURES  
5. Korea notes that Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that a 
safeguard  measure can be imposed on a specific "product" if certain conditions are met, 
including tha t "such product" must be imported in increased quantities causing injury to the 
domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products. This does not mean that 
only one product -type can be subject to an investigation. The Agreement is silent  on the 
definition of the product and does not determine how broadly or narrowly defined the product 
should be. There may even be several imported products covered by an investigation, 
including variations and sub -categories, as evidenced by the definition  of the term "product"2 
and that investigations may cover products falling under two or more HS  tariff codes. The 
main condition is that an imported product covered by an investigation must have injurious 
effects on "like or directly competitive" domestic  products.3 Put differently, a 
safeguard  measure shall not protect domestic producers of "unlike" products, such as those 
with "only a remote or tenuous competitive relationship with the imported products".4 
 
1 Appellate Body Reports, US – Line Pipe , para.  80; Korea – Dairy , para.  86; US – Steel Safeguards , 
para. 347; and Indonesia  – Iron or Steel Products , para.  5.53. 
2 EU's first written submission, para.  30. 
3 Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  86. 
4 Appellate Body Report, US – Cotton Yarn , para. 98. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  6. Of course, for the products covered by an i nvestigation, all legal conditions and factual 
circumstances must be satisfied before a safeguard  measure can be lawfully imposed. These 
are set forth in Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. For example, 
Article  XIX:1(a) requires, among others, that a safeguard remedy can only be applied to a 
product that "is being imported in such increased quantities", and that that increase in volume 
is "as a result" of "unforeseen developments". The Appellate Body has clarified that the 
increase d imports must be an "effect" or "outcome" of the unforeseen developments.5 
Moreover, the definition of the products under investigation must be such that it allows for a 
meaningful causation determination. In other words, the scope of the product concern ed 
cannot be overly broad since that would risk a non -meaningful analysis of the conditions of 
competition ( i.e. to understand if the imported products caused or threatened to cause injury 
to the domestic industry).6 
7. The central question to Korea in relation to Turkey's  claim is whether the EU ensured that 
each of the product categories covered by the investigation satisfied the required conditions 
under the WTO  Agreements. Korea considers that the first question is a factual one: did the 
EU impose 28  different safeguard  measures, as contended by Turkey or rather one measure 
covering several steel product categories with different applicable tariff -rate quotas ("TRQs")? 
The next question is a legal one: assuming the EU imposed a single measure, based o n an 
examination that covered a broad group of product categories, was the analysis of the 
requirements for the imposition of a safeguard measure such that a meaningful analysis and 
objective examination was undertaken that addressed the inevitable complex ities that result 
from having a broad product definition? The Agreement does not impose a specific 
methodology. Therefore, in Korea's  view, it is not because a measure covers 28  individually 
defined products that it must examine all of the conditions for t he imposition of a safeguard 
for each of the products. What is important, however, is that the authorities address plausible 
alternative explanations and that it examines trends for certain product types that point in a 
different direction in an objective manner and provides a reasoned and adequate explanation 
of how these trends do not detract from the conclusions reached.  
8. If an investigation is carried out based on a broad group of product categories, Korea considers 
that competent authorities should b e allowed to cumulate imports of various product 
categories to assess whether they satisfy the requirements for imposing a safeguard measure, 
provided the covered products are assessed against "like or directly competitive" domestic 
products and that an ob jective examination is ensured, such as that the cumulative 
assessment provides a meaningful basis to assess the conditions of competition. The 
cumulative assessment must be able to answer whether the products are imported under such 
conditions so as to ca use or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry.  
9. For example, Korea notes that the panel in Argentina – Footwear (EC)  found that 
Argentina  was not required to conduct its injury and causation analyses on a disaggregated 
basis in light o f the five  product groups used in the investigation, but could make the 
assessments for the footwear products as a whole.7 The panel noted that competent 
authorities could run the assessments based on data on a disaggregated basis, but that 
Argentina "was  not required to do so".8 Korea agrees that the Agreement on Safeguards does 
not necessarily oblige Members to perform injury and causation analyses per product 
category.  
10. While Korea does not intend to discuss the specific factual aspects of the 
EU safeguard  measure, it invites the Panel to examine the analysis of the EU's  competent 
authority with the above interpretative guidance in mind.  
III. EXISTENCE OF "UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS"  
11. Korea notes that establishing that the increased imports were the result of "unforeseen 
developments" is a fundamental element to justify the imposition of a safeguard  measure. 
This flows from the reference in Article  1 of the Agreement on Safeguards to Article  XIX of the 
 
5 Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards , para.  315. 
6 Panel Report, US – Steel Safeguards , para. 10.416.  
7 Panel Report, Argentina – Footwear  (EC), paras.  8.135, 8.137.  
8 Panel Report, Argentina – Footwear  (EC), para. 8.137.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  GATT  1994, which requires that "unforeseen develo pments" must be demonstrated as a 
matter of fact in order for a safeguard  measure to be applied.9 The demonstration of 
"unforeseen developments", therefore, is a prerequisite for the imposition of a 
safeguard  measure.10 
12. As noted by Turkey, the key con dition for a situation to constitute an "unforeseen" 
development is that it was unexpected  at the time the imposing Member incurred the relevant 
GATT obligation.11 It is particularly important to distinguish the unforeseen developments from 
the increased i mports, since a competent authority must establish that the increased imports 
are a result  of the unforeseen developments. Thus, an increase in imports in itself cannot, by 
definition, constitute the unforeseen developments under Article  XIX:1(a). That wou ld be 
circular and inconsistent with the legal disciplines.12 
13. Korea notes that the EU has identified three factors that are alleged to constitute the 
"unforeseen developments" that resulted in the increased imports. Korea considers that both 
the steel overcapacity issue and the increased use of government restrictions on imports of 
steel are not new, but are rather part of the market reality in the steel sector. In principle, 
therefore, Korea considers it doubtful that a prevalent industry problem such as overcapacity 
and the presumed lawful use of trade remedies to address unfair trade practices can fall within 
the meaning of "unforeseen developments" in the GATT  1994.  
14. Even the EU acknowledges that the three factors alleged to constitute the "unfore seen 
developments" were "not necessarily extraordinary circumstances".13 However, the very 
nature of the safeguard instrument has been described as imposing "extraordinary remedies" 
allowed by the WTO covered agreements in "emergency situations", as they r estrict imports 
from other Members in the absence of any allegation of unfair trade practices.14 Absent such 
circumstances, Korea does not consider that Members can have recourse to the safeguard 
instrument. Korea also notes that with respect to the Sectio n 232 measures, the EU states 
that "[e]ven though duties imposed by the United States on the basis of Section 232, and 
duties in general, are not necessarily extraordinary circumstances, the duties in the 
circumstances of this case gave rise to an 'unfores een development'".15 This suggests that the 
EU is of the view that the unforeseen development was not the Section 232 measures, but 
rather something that followed their imposition.  
15. In addition to examining whether the EU properly identified relevant "unforeseen  
developmen ts", the Panel is also to examine if the EU explained how these developments 
resulted in the relevant increase in imports. Indeed, Members are required to "link" the 
identified unforeseen developments with the increased imports.16 Korea notes that the EU h as 
provided an explanation in its determination of how the three factors allegedly resulted in the 
increased imports. The EU seems to suggest that not much of an explanation was required in 
this case and that it sufficed for the EU to simply put the two  sets of facts together ( i.e. 
unforeseen developments and increased imports).17 It points to the timing of the 
developments and refers to a number of exhibits corroborating the conclusion of the EU. Korea 
considers that the Panel should focus on the explanati on of the alleged link, as provided by 
the competent authority in the report and examine whether it is sufficiently adequate and 
reasoned to support the conclusion that the alleged increase in imports was the result of the 
identified unforeseen development s. Especially, Korea views that the Panel should fully 
consider the fundamental question whether complex phenomena can be reduced to a simple 
matter of "putting facts together" or pointing to a certain degree of coincidence in time.  
 
9 Appellate Body Reports, Korea – Dairy , para.  85; Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para. 92; and 
US – Lamb , para.  70. 
10 See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  72. 
11 Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para.  93; and Korea – Dairy , para.  86. 
12 Panel Reports, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.83; and Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , 
para. 7.51. 
13 EU's first written submission, paras.  89, 110.  
14 Appellate Body Reports, US – Line Pipe , para. 80; Korea – Dairy , para.  86; US – Steel Safeguards , 
para. 347; and Indonesia  – Iron or Steel Products , para.  5.53. 
15 EU's first written submission, para.  110. 
16 Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards , paras.  316, 318.  
17 EU's first written submission, paras.  115, 123.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  16. In sum, the Panel s hould focus its examination on the EU's  reasoning and explanation in the 
determination to confirm whether the three  factors were "unforeseen" or unexpected at the 
time the EU incurred the relevant GATT obligations. It should also closely examine the 
EU's explanation whether it is sufficiently adequate and reasoned to support the conclusion 
that the alleged increase in imports was the result of the identified unforeseen developments.  
IV. OBLIGATION TO APPLY MEASURES "ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY"  
17. Korea n otes that the requirements under Articles  5.1 and 7.1 set the maximum permissible 
extent and period for the application of a safeguard measure. They require that measures are 
applied only to the extent necessary and for the period necessary for addressing the serious 
injury attributed  to the increased imports, and not also to injury caused by other factors or 
for periods longer than necessary.18 For example, a  failure by the competent authority to 
properly separate and distinguish the injury caused by factors other than the imports, while 
imposing a remedy for all of the injury found to exist even when caused by such other factors 
would necessarily violate Arti cle 5.1 by going beyond what is necessary.  
18. However, in relation to Turkey's  argument that the EU violated this obligation by concurrently 
applying different types of trade remedy measures against the same imports, Korea considers 
that safeguard measure s and anti -dumping/countervailing duty measures are not mutually 
exclusive and may be applied in combination. In particular, they do not have the same scope 
of application as they seek to remedy different situations causing injury to a domestic industry. 
While anti -dumping and countervailing duty measures seek to remedy unfair  trade practices 
by imposing duties to neutralize dumping by foreign producers or the effects of foreign 
governments'  subsidization of foreign producers, safeguard measures provide tem porary relief 
against surges in imports under otherwise fair trading conditions.  
19. Therefore, even after measures have been imposed to remedy unfair trade practices, there 
could be a basis to apply a safeguard measure against rapidly increasing imports t hat is caused 
by "unforeseen developments" and is the effect of "obligations incurred" by the imposing 
Member under the GATT  1994. Korea does not consider there could be any violation of 
WTO obligations per se by concurrently applying two or more of these trade -remedy 
measures, as long as they are applied in a manner that is consistent with their respective 
requirements as specified in the relevant WTO agreements. There is nothing in the text of the 
relevant WTO Agreements that prevents the concurrent appli cation of these trade remedy 
measures.  
20. This being said, the presence of unfair trade practices – as addressed by anti -dumping or 
countervailing measures – is something that may need to be addressed, in particular in the 
related context of the causation  analysis. The question that a competent authority must 
examine is whether and how much of the injury is attributable to increased imports and how 
much is attributable to unfairly traded imports. While the presence of such other factors of 
injury does not prevent a conclusion of causation, the required action of separating and 
distinguishing these other factors of injury, including unfair trade, is necessary in order to 
determine the appropriate level of application of the safeguard measures. In that respec t, it 
is not so that the authorities can ignore the existence of anti -dumping or countervailing 
measures on similar products when additionally imposing safeguard measures.  
21. Korea notes that the EU appears to have considered the implication of whether it s 
safeguard  measure would remedy the same injury twice in relation to those products subject 
to an existing anti -dumping or countervailing duty measure and adjusted its measure 
accordingly. While not expressing a view on the specific facts in this dispute,  Korea invites the 
Panel to examine the matter closely in light of the interpretative guidance above.  
V. OBLIGATION TO "PROGRESSIVELY LIBERALIZE" THE MEASURE  
22. Korea notes that the obligation to "progressively liberalize … at regular intervals during the  
period of application" applies to safeguard measures applied for longer than one year. 
Article  7.4 requires that such measures be progressively liberalized at regular intervals, which 
 
18 See, e.g. Appellate Body Report, US – Line Pipe , paras.  245, 252 -260. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  has been interpreted to require liberalization at "uniform intervals" o ver the period of 
application.19 The provision does not, however, specify when  an imposing Member must 
commence the liberalization of the measure, nor at what speed  or amount  such liberalization 
must follow. In other words, Article  7.4 is largely silent on  how Members must ensure that 
their safeguard measures are progressively liberalized.  
23. This suggests to Korea that there are no specific WTO disciplines governing the degree of 
liberalization that imposing Members must implement. Thus, as long as a safe guard measure 
applied for longer than one year is liberalized at regular intervals, the degree of each 
liberalization could vary.  
24. Korea also notes that the panel in Ukraine – Passenger Cars  was of the view that a Member 
"can comply with its obligation in Article  7.4 even if it has not previously provided a timetable 
for progressive liberalization" because Article  7.4 is a "substantive provision that requires 
actual liberalization of the measure".20 If there is no obligation to provide a timetable, it se ems 
difficult to conclude that a change in the degree of liberalization, as set out in the timetable, 
would be a per se  violation of Article  7.1. 
25. Korea considers that the panel can start from the "objective and purpose" of Article  7.4. 
Korea  views that  "facilitation of the appropriate efforts of the domestic industry" is the key 
objective of Article  7.4 as is stipulated in this Article. Korea recalls the jurisprudence in 
Ukraine  – Passenger Cars , "[d]elaying liberalization in this way could create a dis incentive for 
the domestic industry to undertake appropriate efforts at adjustment from the outset of the 
period of application, thus providing increased protection and diminishing the impetus to 
adjust to competition from imports".21 
26. In sum, Korea con siders that the Panel's  examination of the EU's  reduction in the pace of 
liberalization of the TRQs from 5% to 3% should focus on whether the liberalization followed 
uniform intervals and whether it was not such as to create a disincentive for the industry  to 
undertake appropriate efforts at adjustment. Korea does not express a view on the specific 
facts of this case, but hopes the above guidance may be helpful for the Panel's  analysis.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
27. Korea reserves the right to further elaborate on the  above issues as well any other issues 
raised by the parties in its oral statement.  
 
 
 
 
19 Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.362.  
20 Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.360.  
21 Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.362.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -6 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF SWITZERLAND  
I. DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PRODUCTS UNDER INVESTIGATION  
1. Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that a safeguard measure may be applied 
to a product only if such product is being im ported in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry.  
2. In US – Steel Safeguards , the panel recalled that the requirement of parallelism, as developed 
by panels and the Appe llate Body, means that the competent authorities must explicitly establish 
that imports covered by a safeguard measure satisfy the conditions for its application. The 
methodology selected must be unbiased and objective, such that its application permits an  adequate, 
reasoned and reasonable explanation of how the facts support the determination made with respect 
to increased imports.1 
3. Switzerland wishes to emphasize the importance for the competent authorities to explicitly 
establish that products covere d by a safeguard measure satisfy the conditions for its application. 
The competent authorities must conduct an analysis that demonstrates that the conditions for 
applying the measures are satisfied for those products that are to be subject to the measure.2 
4. This implies that the same product must be used in the determination of each of the conditions 
that must be met before a safeguard may be applied and that the safeguard may only be imposed 
on imports of that product, i.e. imports of the product that w as used in the determination of each of 
the conditions for the application of the safeguard measure.3 
5. A Member can in Switzerland 's view exclude a subset of product(s) from the application of a 
safeguard measures. In that case, the corresponding imports should not be included in the 
"increased imports " examined for purposes of determining whether the criteria for applying a 
safeguard  measure are met.4 
6. If a Member modifies the grouping of the products depending on the aspects it wants to 
examine, or if it defines a product widely and then restricts the scope of the product under 
investigation, the conditions set out in the Agreemen t on Safeguards would in Switzerland 's opinion 
not be met. If a product is defined widely, including several subsets, the subsets must be included 
in the analysis throughout the investigation.  
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF "UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS" AND THE CONNEC TION 
BETWEEN UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS AND THE INCREASE OF IMPORTS  
a) Existence of unforeseen developments  
7. Unforeseen developments constitute circumstances which must be demonstrated as a matter 
of fact in order for a safeguard measure to be applied consi stently with the provisions of Article  XIX 
of the  GATT  1994.5 The Member taking a measure must thus explain why an event constitutes an 
"unforeseen development ". In order to satisfy the requirement to demonstrate the existence of 
"unforeseen developments ", the competent authorities need to provide, as a minimum, some 
discussion as to why such developments were unforeseen at the appropriate time.6 
 
1 Panel Reports, US – Steel Safeguards , paras.  10.594 -10.597.  
2 Appellate  Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten , paras.  96, 98. 
3 First Written Submission of the European  Union, para.  45. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para.  92. See also Appellate  Body Report, Korea – 
Dairy , para.  85. 
6 Panel Report, Argentina – Preserved Peaches , para. 7.23. WT/DS595/R /Add.1  
 
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  8. The ordinary meaning of the term "unforeseen" is synonymous with "unexpected", in particular 
when it relate s to the word "developments".7 The developments must have been unexpected at the 
time the relevant concessions or obligations have been undertaken, that is generally at the time the 
WTO Member concerned acceded to the WTO.8 
9. Whether an event is "unforeseen" must be determined on a c ase-by-case basis.9 However, an 
importing Member will have to demonstrate through a reasoned and adequate explanation that the 
development was unexpected for it.10 In addition, the standard for unforeseen developments cannot 
be purely subjective, and the Panel should focus on what should or could have been foreseen in light 
of the circumstances.11 
10. Switzerland is also of the view that the confluence of a number of developments can form the 
basis of "unforeseen developments" for the purposes of Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994, as long as 
these developments have a clear temporal connection12, and provided that the Member concerned 
demonstrates that the confluence of circumstances that it considers were unforeseen at the time it 
concluded its tariff negotiatio ns resulted in increased imports causing serious injury.13 
11. In Switzerland 's view, if the Member concerned demonstrates the existence of the 
circumstances, or the confluence of circumstances, and demonstrates through a reasoned and 
adequate explanation featuring in the published report of the competent authority  that these 
circumstances were unexpected for it, the fact that the Member uses different labels, such as 
"factors", in relation with the said circumstances should not be given excessive weight by  the Panel 
in its assessment.  
b) Increased use of trade defence instruments as an "unforeseen development"  
12. Regarding the question of whether the increased use of trade defence instruments could 
constitute an "unforeseen development" within the meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994, 
Switzerland considers that if the covered agreements expressly envisage the adoption of such 
measures, they could have been anticipated and cannot be considered as "unexpected".14 
13. In Switzerland 's view, this conclu sion is confirmed by the fact that the existence of trade 
defence measures may be taken into account in relation to the application of a safeguard measure. 
Switzerland notes that when a safeguard measure is taken in the form of a tariff rate quota (TRQ), 
based on Article  XIII:2(d) of the  GATT  1994, the Member concerned shall allot TRQs on the basis of 
a previous representative period, due account being taken of any special factors  which may have 
affected or may be affecting the trade in the product. Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards 
provides similar language if the safeguard measure is taken in the form of a quota. Switzerland 
notes that the existence of trade defence measures imposed on the product concerned could typically 
constitute such "spec ial factors". Switzerland notes that, when allocating the TRQs, the 
European  Commission considered as "special factors" affecting the trade in the products concerned 
the anti -dumping and countervailing duty measures imposed on certain exporting countries f or a 
number of products under investigation.15 If the use of trade defence measures could constitute an 
unforeseen development , it would be illogical for the same circumstance to be considered again as 
a special factor to be taken into account in the appli cation of a safeguard measure.  
14. Allowing the use of trade defence instruments to constitute "unforeseen developments" would 
also create a vicious circle in which trade -restrictive measures (e.g., anti -dumping and countervailing 
duties) lead to more trade -restrictive  measures (safeguards) – and ultimately distort markets even 
more.  
 
7 Appellate  Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para.  84. 
8 Appellate  Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para.  89, referring to GATT Working Party Report, US – Fur Felt 
Hats, adopted 22  October  1951.  
9 Panel Reports, US – Steel Safeguards , paras.  10.41 -10.42.  
10 Panel Reports, US – Steel Safeguards , paras.  10.42.  
11 Panel Reports, US – Steel Safeguards , para.  10.43.  
12 Panel Report, India – Iron and Steel Products , para.  7.114.  
13 Panel Reports, US – Steel Safeguards , para.  10.99.  
14 Panel Report , EC – Asbestos , para. 8.272 (footnote omitted).  
15 See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/159 of 31  January  2019 imposing definitive 
safeguard measures  against imports of certain steel products,  Exhibit  TUR-5, para.  146. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  c) Logical connection between the unforeseen developments and the increase in 
imports  
15. The increased imports to which this provision refers must be an effect or outcome of the 
"unforeseen developments ". The "unforeseen developments " must "result " in increased imports of 
the product that is subject to a safeguard measure.16 There should  be a logical connection between 
"unforeseen developments" and the conditions set forth in Article  XIX:1(a).17 
16. The logical connection between unforeseen developments and increased imports must be 
demonstrated. If the origin of the unforeseen developments differs from the origin of the increased 
imports, an explanation as to why the allege d increase in imports occurred due to the unforeseen 
developments (of different origin) is necessary.18 Switzerland considers that, at a minimum, the 
Member concerned should link the unforeseen developments to the specific increase of imports into 
its mark et and support its conclusions with evidence.19 Moreover, the competent authority must 
explain how unforeseen developments related to steel in general  resulted in an increase in imports 
of the specific product  at issue into the market concerned or, alterna tively, why such analysis was 
unnecessary.20 
17. Switzerland considers that, in order to demonstrate such a logical connection, it is not 
sufficient  to identify "on the one hand" unforeseen developments and "on the other hand" the 
increase in imports.21 Neither can the mere fact that the unforeseen developments and the increase 
in the import volumes took place "during the same period "22 be determinative. The Member 
concerned must provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the alleged unforeseen 
developments resulted in increases in imports. To do so, it must  demonstrate the existence of a link 
between the unforeseen circumstances  and the increase in imports of the specific products 
concerned, and support its conclusions with evidence.  
III. THE EXPECTED FUTURE IMPORT VOLUMES AND THE THREAT/CAUSATION ANALYSIS  
18.  As regards threat, Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards require s an actual increase in 
imports as a basic prerequisite for a finding of either a threat of serious injury or serious injury.23 
Expected future import volumes, however, may be a relevant factor for the competent authority to 
consider in determining whether  a "threat of serious injury " exists under Article  4.1(b).24 
19. Article  4.1(b) requires that "the existence of a threat of serious injury shall be based on facts 
and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility ". In order for a threat determ ination 
to be based on facts, the competent authority will need to examine information and data, which will 
primarily be drawn from the investigation period.25 
20. A projection of future increases in imports should not be equated with a "threat of serious 
injury ".26 Under Article  4.2(a), the competent authority shall evaluate all relevant factors of an 
objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry.  
21. As regards causation, Switzerland notes that Article  4.2(b) require s that the existence of the 
causal link between increased imports and the threat of serious injury be demonstrated "on the basis 
of objective evidence ", i.e there must be facts, which will need to be drawn from the investigation 
 
16 Appellate  Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards , para.  315. 
17 Appellate  Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards , para.  317, referring to Appellate  Body Report, 
Argentina – Footwear ( EC), para.  92 and Appellate  Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para.  85. 
18 Panel Report,  India – Iron and Steel Products , para.  7.110.  
19 Panel Report, India – Iron and Steel Products , para.  7.113.  
20 Panel Report, India – Iron and Steel Products , para.  7.112.  
21 See First Written Submission of the European Union, para.  116. 
22 See First Written Submission of the European Union, para.  117. 
23 Panel Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para.  8.284.  
24 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  125, Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.254.  
25 Panel Report, US – Lamb , para.  7.129. 
26 Panel Report, US – Lamb , para.  7.187 ("We agree in general with the complainants'  argument that a 
threat of increased imports  as such cannot be equated with threat of serious injury ".); Panel Report, 
Argentina  - Footwear (EC) , para.  8.284 (" A determi nation of the existence of a threat of serious injury  due to a 
threat of increased imports  would amount to a determination based on allegation or conjecture rather than one 
supported by facts as required by Article  4.1(b)" .). WT/DS595/R /Add.1  
 
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  period, showing that increa sed imports have a negative effect on the domestic industry. Without a 
factual predicate showing some sort of cause and effect between increased imports and injury, a 
finding that imports are likely to increase cannot show that the industry is likely to su ffer serious 
injury in the near future because of those imports.  
IV. THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN THE FORM OF TARIFF RATE QUOTAS  
22. Switzerland considers that the application of Article  XIII of the  GATT  1994 to safeguard 
measures taken in the form of tariff rate quotas does not imply that Article  5.2(a) of the 
Agreement  on Safeguards cannot apply to those measures.  
23. In US – Line Pipe , the panel came to the conclusion that Article  XIII:2(d) of the GATT applied 
to safeguard measures taken in the form of tariff rate quotas, but not Article  5.2(a) of the 
Agreement  on Safeguards, in particular because tariff rate quotas are not "quotas ", which constitute 
a subset of "quantitative restrictions ". In Switzerland 's view, the panel 's reasoning in US – Line Pipe  
is formalistic and disregards the fact that Article  5.1 and Article  5.2(a) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards establish distinct obligations. As confirmed by the Appellate  Body, Article  5.1 imposes a 
general substantive obligation, namely, to app ly safeguard measures only to the permissible extent, 
and also a particular procedural obligation in the case of quantitative restrictions. In turn,  
Article  5.2(a), like Article  XIII:2(d) of the  GATT  1994, provides for certain rules governing the 
allocatio n of shares in the quota in cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries.  
24. Moreover, in Switzerland 's opinion, in order to determine whether Article  5.2(a) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards applies to safeguard measures taken as tariff rat e quotas, the absence of 
an equivalent provision to Article  XIII:5 of the  GATT  1994 in the Agreement on Safeguards is not 
the only relevant factor.  
25. In this regard, Switzerland notes that the panel in US – Line Pipe  also stated that the fact that 
Article XIII of the  GATT  1994 applies in the context of safeguard measures does not "nullify any of 
the provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards ", and that "all of the provisions of the 
Safeguards  Agreement remain fully applicable ".27 
V. THE LIBERALIZATION OF S AFEGUARD MEASURES  
26. The purpose of progressive liberalization, as provided in article  7.4 of the Agreement on 
Safeguards, is to facilitate adjustment of the domestic industry, by increasing the exposure of the 
domestic industry to foreign competition28 and by creating an incentive for the domestic industry to 
adjust from the beginning of the application of the measure.  
27. Switzerland considers that the discretion of the Member applying the measure with regard to 
liberalization is not unfettered, since it  must ensure that progressive liberalization facilitates 
adjustment, i.e. adjustment to the "new competitive conditions caused by the increased imports ".29 
Consequently, t he reference period for determining the pace of liberalization must be the period of 
investigation, which served as a basis for applying safeguard measures. Adjusting the pace of 
liberalization based on developments taking place after the safeguard measure  has been applied, 
and which are independent from increased imports, such as general and industrial outlooks, would 
fail to achieve the purpose of facilitating adjustment to the new competitive conditions caused by 
the increased imports . 
28. Similarly, sin ce the purpose of progressive liberalization is to increase the exposure of the 
domestic industry to foreign competition from the beginning of the application of the measure, the 
fact that the imports would reach in the last year of application of a measur e a volume above a level 
considered as causing a threat of serious injury cannot be determinative for setting the pace of 
liberalization.30 
29. Moreover, the only review of a safeguard measure after its implementation that is 
contemplated in the Agreement on Safeguards is the "mid-term" review required under Article  7.4 
 
27 Panel Report, US – Line Pipe, para.  7.45. 
28 Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.362.  
29 Appellate  Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para.  87 (emphasis added).  
30 First Written Submission of the European Union, para.  299. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  for measures lasting more than three years. Based on that review, the Member a pplying the measure 
is to "withdraw it or increase the pace of liberalization " if appropriate. No provision is made for 
decreasing the pace of liberalization. This provides additional support that adjustments to the 
safeguard measure following the initial implementation of the measure should further increase the 
exposure of the domestic industry to imports, rather than shield the domestic industry from such 
competition.  
30. Switzerland notes that the review investigations performed by the European Union in the 
course of application of the safeguard measures are not envisaged by the Agreement on Safeguards.  
To the extent that the administration of the TRQ and specific adjustments are performed, they 
cannot make the measure more restrictive. The Panel should t herefore analyze whether the 
modifications introduced following the review investigations made the safeguard measure more 
restrictive and, if so, conclude that such modifications are inconsistent with Article  7.4 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -7 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF UKRAINE  
1. During the course of the present dispute Ukraine provided comments on certain legal issues 
relating to the interpretation and application of the provisions on "unforeseen developments" 
under the Article  XIX of the of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Tr ade 1994 
("GATT  1994") as well as the views concerning the approach of broad -based definition of the 
products in safeguard investigations.  
2. According to the Appellate Body in Korea – Dairy the ordinary meaning of the term 
"unforeseen" is synonymous with "unexpected", in particular when it relates to the word 
"developments". Therefore, the developments which led to a product being imported in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury 
to domestic pro ducers must have been "unexpected"1. At the same time, according to the 
Appellate  Body in US – Lamb  "unforeseen developments" must be demonstrated, as a matter 
of fact, for a safeguard measure to be applied, the existence of "unforeseen developments" 
is, in its view, a "pertinent issue[] of fact and law", under Article  3.1, for the application of a 
safeguard measure, and it follows that the published report of the competent authorities, 
under that Article, must contain a "finding" or "reasoned conclusion" on "unforeseen 
developments".2 
3. The Panel in Argentina – Preserved Peaches  stated that in order for "changes mentioned in 
these alleged developments could be regarded as "unforeseen developments" within the 
meaning of Article  XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 [ …] this requires, as a minimum, some discussion 
by the competent authorities as to why they were unforeseen at the appropriate time, and 
why conditions in the second clause of Article  XIX:1(a) occurred "as a result" of circumstances 
in the first clause".3 
4. The Appellate  Body in Korea – Dairy  concluded that safeguard measures were intended to be 
"matters out of the ordinary, and to be matters of urgency, to be, in short, 'emergency 
actions'".4 The Panel in Argentina – Preserved Peaches  also emphasized that i ncreased 
quantities of imports should not be equated with unforeseen developments.5 
5. Similarly, the Panel in Ukraine – Passenger Cars  concluded that "there is a clear distinction 
between the circumstances contained in the first clause of Article XIX:1(a) of the GATT 1994 
and the conditions contained in the second clause. The Panel concluded that Article XIX:1(a)  of 
the GATT 1994  refers to a product being imported in increased quantities "as a result of 
unforeseen developments". The phrase "as a result of" implies a relationship of cause and 
effect, indicating that unforeseen developments and increased imports cannot be one and the 
same t hing.6 
6. In Ukraine's  view, in order to meet the requirements of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 the 
competent authority must provide a reasoned finding as to what exactly it considers to be 
"unforeseen developments" in the given matter under this Arti cle. Consequently, the Panel 
should examine carefully whether stipulated factors constitute unforeseen developments 
taking into account that such event as global steel overcapacity is a challenge that steel 
industry has been facing for decades while trade measures adopted by a series of 
third countries including US tariffs under Section  232 have been in place and whether it could 
be considered as unforeseen.  
 
1 Appellate  Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para.  84. 
2 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  76. 
3 Panel Report, Argentina – Preserved Peaches , para.  7.23. 
4 Appellate  Body Report, Korea – Dairy , para.  86. 
5 Panel Report, Argentina – Preserved Peaches , para.  7.18. 
6 Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , paras.  7.83-7.84. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  7. Therefore, Ukraine is of the view that the Panel should examine whether the report of the 
compete nt authority demonstrates the consistent relationship between "unforeseen 
developments" and the increase in imports causing or threatening to cause serious injury to 
the domestic industry as well as whether the alleged "unforeseen developments" change 
comp etitive relationship between the imported and domestic products in the categories 
defined by the European  Union.  
8. Ukraine would also like to share its comments on the approach of broad -based definition of 
the products in safeguard investigations.  
9. Ukraine considers that  broad -based definition of the products under investigation may assume 
to include wide list of products, for instance, products with  different production technologies, 
range of sizes, surface treatment which results in both the general -use mass products as well 
as advanced complex products used in very specific and niche applications.  
10. Hence, the price of these categories of products may differ significantly. Indeed, general -use 
mass products with higher volume share and low price affec t the average price of the 
categories. Therefore, including a wide list of products may result in artificial and incorrect 
findings in the framework of such categories'  injury examination and, as a result, may lead to  
distorted findings of an investigation . 
11. Ukraine emphasizes that for appropriate estimation of "unforeseen developments" it makes 
sense for the Panel in this dispute to determine whether the Party to the dispute provided a 
proper explanation as to how such events actually resulted in increa sed imports causing 
serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry and whether the approach of  
broad -based definition of the products concerned in a safeguard investigation did not distort 
the results thereof.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -8 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. The United Kingdom welcomes the opportunity to participate as a third party in this dispute. 
The United Kingdom wishes to provide the Panel with its views on the relevant obligations of a 
Member when defining the product subject to a safeguard measure (the "product concerned"), as 
well as the obligatio n to progressively liberalise a safeguard measure during its period of application.  
II. THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT PROVIDES AN IMPORTING MEMBER WITH 
DISCRETION TO DEFINE THE PRODUCT CONCERNED  
2. The Safeguards Agreement  does not contain a definition of the p roduct that is subject to a 
safeguard investigation. Article  2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement  provides only that an importing 
Member may apply a safeguard measure to a "product" when the Member has determined, following 
an investigation and in accordance wi th the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement, that "such 
product"  is being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry.  
3. The absence of a definition of the "pro duct" indicates that a competent authority is permitted 
to define a product concerned as comprising more than one individual good or product, or more than 
one product category. The ordinary meaning of the term "product" is capable of being used either 
specifically to, for example, describe an individual good covered by a specific commodity code, or 
more generally to describe a wider set of goods.  
4. This interpretation is supported by the panel decision in Dominican Republic – Safeguard 
Measures , which foun d that there is "no provision in the Agreement on Safeguards that governs the 
selection, description and determination of [the] 'product'".1 That panel also concluded that there is  
nothing in the Safeguards Agreement that requires the competent authority to provide a detailed 
explanation of its definition of the product concerned.2 
5. Where a product concerned is defined by a competent authority as comprising multiple goods 
or products, the competent authority is required to make a single assessment of ea ch of the 
substantive conditions required for the imposition of a safeguard measure (i.e. increased imports, 
serious injury, causation) for the product concerned as a whole, and not in respect of its individual 
components. The panel in Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures explicitly stated, in the context 
of an assessment of increased imports, that Article  2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement  "does not 
require a disaggregated analysis for all cases in which the definition of the product under 
investigation  comprises more than one product".3 
6. The panel's  task, therefore, is to determine whether the Member's  competent authority 
properly assessed whether each of the conditions for imposing a safeguard measure were met with 
respect to the product concerned, as defined by the competent authority.  
7. To carry out this task, the Panel should, first, examine the evidence on record and make a 
factual determination of the product definition adopted by the competent authority during its 
investigation. The Panel should make this factual determination with particular caution so as to avoid 
substituting the actual  product definition adopted by the competent authority with a product 
definition that the complainant, or interested parties during the investigation, consider th at the 
authority should  have adopted.  
8. Next, the Panel should assess whether the competent authority made objective and unbiased 
determinations that the substantive conditions for imposing a safeguard measure have been met for 
 
1 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.177.  
2 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.177.  
3 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures , para.  7.237 (emphasis original).  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  the product concerned.4 The Safeguards Agreement does not require a competent authority to follow 
any specific methodology when analysing the relevant data during its investigation.5 However, the 
competent authority should provide a "reasoned and adequate" explanation of how the m ethodology 
used allowed it to make an objective determination.6 
9. In the present case, the Panel should therefore consider whether the 
European  Commission's  methodology – including its exclusion of two product categories that showed 
no increase in import s – could have  "affected the analysis  […] and resulted in an inadequate 
determination".7 The European Commission's  analysis could have been affected if, without the 
exclusion, it would not have been possible to find that the substantive conditions to impose a 
safeguard measure were met when assessing the product concerned. In the United Kingd om's view, 
evidence that the analysis would not have been affected would demonstrate that the methodology 
allowed an objective and unbiased determination to be made and did not result in an inadequate 
determination.  
10. In this case, the exclusion of a sub -part of the product concerned before conducting an overall 
assessment resulted in the application of a narrower safeguard measure  than the 
European  Commission would otherwise have been entitled to apply. If this approach were found in 
violation of the Saf eguards Agreement, Members would have an inappropriate incentive to apply 
only the widest permissible safeguard measures. The United Kingdom considers that such an 
interpretation would be contrary to the text, object and purpose of the Safeguards.  
III. THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IS NOT PRESCRIPTIVE AS TO HOW A MEMBER 
SHOULD PROGRESSIVELY LIBERALISE A MEASURE  
11. Beyond stating that liberalisation should facilitate adjustment and be carried out at regular 
intervals, and providing certain rules for reviews, Art icle 7.4 of the Safeguards Agreement imposes 
few requirements on how a Member should progressively liberalise a measure.  
12. When assessing whether a Member has complied with Article 7.4, the United Kingdom 
considers that the Panel should be guided by the panel decision in Ukraine – Passenger Cars . In that 
case, the panel rejected the argument that Article  7.4 contains various detailed obligations, such as 
a requirement to publish a liberalisation timetable and rules on the length of regular intervals of 
liberalisation. It found that Article  7.4 imposes an obligation to "actually progressively liberalize [a] 
safeguard measure".8 This "substantive" obligation is not prescriptive as to how the measure must 
be liberalised.9 The only constraint imposed is that  the liberalisation "be such as will 'facilitate 
adjustment' of the domestic industry".10 
13. The absence of prescriptive requirements in Article  7.4 means that Members are not prohibited 
from decreasing the pace of liberalisation once it has been set. A p anel instead should focus on 
whether the Member's  revised rate of liberalisation results in actual progressive liberalisation.  
14. Moreover, Article  7.4 does not require a competent authority to adopt any particular 
methodology when setting a pace of liber alisation. A panel should assess whether the pace of 
liberalisation is reasonable and sufficient to create an incentive for domestic industry "to undertake 
appropriate efforts at adjustment".11 While data from the original period of investigation is clearly a 
relevant and important consideration for a competent authority when setting the pace of 
liberalisation, it would not be appropriate to interpret the need to "facilitate adjustment" as 
precluding a competent authority from also considering other potentially relevant factors.12 
 
4 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , paras.  106 and 130; Appellate  Body Report, US – Steel 
Safeguards , para.  302. 
5 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  137. 
6 Appellate  Body Report, US – Lamb , para.  106; Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safe guards , 
para. 302. 
7 Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures , para.  7.237 (emphasis added).  
8 Panel report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.360.  
9 Panel report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , paras.  7.360 and 7.363.  
10 Panel report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.363.  
11 Panel Report, Ukraine – Passenger Cars , para.  7.362.  
12 See Turkey 's Second Written Submission, paras.  256-257; Switzerland Third Party Submission, 
paras.  26-28. WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  15. A panel's  task is, therefore, to assess whether a Member has actually liberalised  its safeguard 
measure at regular intervals in a way that is sufficient to facilita te adjustment  by domestic industry. 
There are a number of considerations that the United Kingdom considers should guide a 
panel's  substantive assessment of the WTO -consistency of amendments that a Member has made 
to a safeguard measure.  
16. First, the ordi nary meaning of the term "liberalisation" is the "removal or reduction of 
restrictions". Article  7.4 thus creates a requirement to remove or reduce restrictions on trade arising 
from the safeguard measure at regular intervals throughout its duration. Amend ments to a safeguard 
that add or increase restrictions on trade would not ordinarily be compatible with this requirement. 
In fact, the panel in Argentina – Footwear noted that the Safeguards Agreement  "does not 
contemplate modifications that increase the r estrictiveness of a measure".13 
17. Second, Articles  5.1 and 7.1 of the Safeguards Agreement  state that a Member should apply 
a safeguard measure only to the extent and for a duration as may be "necessary to prevent or 
remedy serious injury and to facilita te adjustment". Articles  7.2 and 7.4 of the 
Safeguards  Agreement  also envisage reviews of measures at the mid -point or expiry of the initial 
term to confirm whether the safeguard remains necessary or suited to fulfil these purposes. The 
underlying purpose of a safeguard measure, according to the Safeguards Agreement, is therefore to 
prevent or remedy serious injury to a domestic industry and to facilitate its adjustment. Members 
are able to make amendments to a safeguard measure that they deem necessary to ensure that it 
is able to prevent or remedy serious injury, provided that the core requirement of removing or 
reducing restrictions at regular intervals in order to facilitate adjustment is fulfilled.  
18. Third, various provisions in the  WTO agreements, su ch as Article  5.2(a) of the 
Safeguards  Agreement  and Article  XIII:2(d) of the  GATT  1994, place obligations on Members to, in 
certain circumstances, allocate quotas or TRQs in a way that reflects previous trade flows supplied 
by exporting countries. These p rovisions provide relevant context to the interpretation of Article  7.4 
of the Safeguards Agreement.  The progressive liberalisation requirement  should be interpreted 
harmoniously with those provisions, so as to not prohibit amendments to a safeguard measur e (e.g., 
the country allocations of TRQs) that are appropriate to ensure trade reflects prior trade flows.  
 
13 Panel report, Argentina – Footwear (EC) , para.  8.303.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  ANNEX C -9 
INTEGRATED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES  
I. INTRODUCTION  
1. The United States welcomes the opportunity to present its views as a third party in this 
dispute. The United States will address certain issues of systemic concern regard ing the 
interpretation and application of Article  XIX:1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade  1994 ("GATT 1994") and the Agreement on Safeguards  ("Safeguards Agreement").  
II. The framework under Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994 and the Safeguar ds 
Agreement Concerning Unforeseen Developments and Obligations Incurred  
2. Turkey (the complainant) asserts that the European Union (the respondent) acted 
inconsistently with Article  XIX:1(a) concerning the respondent's  determinations on "unforeseen 
developments" and on "the effect of the obligations incurred". The United States will address the 
complainant's  arguments with respect to each of these phrases in turn.  
a. "Unforeseen Developments " 
3. With respect  to unforeseen developments, the complainant first argues that the respondent 
"failed to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments" because the developments 
identified by the respondent in the EU Provisional Measures Regulation and the EU Defini tive 
Measures Regulation could  have been foreseen by the respondent's  negotiators during the 
Uruguay  Round. Thus, the complainant asserts that the developments identified by the respondent 
"cannot be regarded as 'unforeseen developments' within the meaning  of Article  XIX:1(a) of 
the GATT  1994" . 
4. As the United States explained in the U.S. third party written submission, u nforeseen 
developments are those that are unexpected or unanticipated at the time that the Member took on 
obligations, including concessi ons, with respect to the product that is subject to a safeguard 
measure. The phrase "unforeseen developments" appears only once in the covered agreements, in 
Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994.  
5. The ordinary meaning of the term "unforeseen" is "[t]hat has  not been foreseen". The phrase 
"[i]f, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effects of the obligations incurred" sets out 
a temporal and logical connection between the developments that were not foreseen and the 
"obligations incurred"1 by a M ember. This text thus acknowledges that, had the developments been 
anticipated or predicted, the Member might not have incurred the obligation.  
6. Accordingly, "unforeseen developments" are those that a Member did not foresee at the time 
of undertaking a c ommitment. In its first written submission, the complainant appears to agree with 
this interpretation of Article  XIX:1(a) of the  GATT  1994. In its written submissions, however, the 
complainant does not attempt to demonstrate whether the developments listed  in the EU Provisional 
Measures Regulation and the EU Definitive Measures Regulation were actually foreseen by the 
respondent's  negotiators. Instead, the complainant argues that the developments were foreseeable . 
These arguments err as a legal matter in fo cusing on whether the developments listed by the 
respondent were arguably foreseeable (rather than actually foreseen) by the 
respondent's  negotiators.  
7. Next, the complainant errs by asserting that a competent authority has to demonstrate the 
existence of  unforeseen developments before a Member implements a safeguard measure. The text 
of Article  XIX:1(a) differentiates between the factual circumstances in which a Member may take a 
safeguard measure (set out in the first clause of Article  XIX:1(a)) and the conditions that must be 
established before applying a safeguard measure (set out in the second clause of Article  XIX:1(a)). 
 
1 For purpo ses of this Integrated Executive Summary, the United States uses the phrase "obligations 
incurred" in the sense it is used in Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994, as "including tariff concessions".  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  In other words, the first clause of Article  XIX:1(a) does not create (to use the complainant's  term) 
a "prerequisite" coequal with t he conditions of the second clause. Rather, "as a result of unforeseen 
developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred" are circumstances that must be shown 
to exist, whereas "any product is being imported [ …] in such increased quantities and un der such 
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury" are "conditions" that must be met.  
8. The text of the Safeguards Agreement confirms this interpretation of Article  XIX:1(a). Article  1 
of that agreement "establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures, which shall be 
understood to mean those measures provided for in Article  XIX of GATT 1994" . And Article  11.1(a) 
states that a Member shall not take action under Article  XIX "unless such action conforms with the 
provisions  of that article applied in accordance with" the Safeguards Agreement. Thus, the 
Safeguards Agreement requires that a Member apply Article  XIX "in accordance with" the Safeguards 
Agreement, which provides rules for the application of a safeguard measure.  
9. Additionally, the United States observes that Article  2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement only 
includes the conditions referenced in the second clause of Article  XIX:1(a). Notably, Article  2.1 does 
not mention unforeseen developments nor obligations incurred . Instead, the only requirement in 
Article  2.1 is for a Member applying a safeguard measure to determine that a product is being 
imported in "such increased quantities" and "under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause 
serious injury".  
10. Finally, the complainant errs by asserting that a competent authority "must demonstrate" in 
its published report "that unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports causing or 
threatening to cause serious injury to the domestic industry of the products c oncerned" . As the 
United States demonstrated in the U.S. third party submission, the text of the Safeguards Agreement 
does not require a competent authority to demonstrate the existence of unforeseen developments 
in the report that contains its findings pu rsuant to a safeguards investigation. Instead, Articles  3.1 
and 4.2(a) of the Safeguards Agreement require only that the report of the competent authorities 
address whether increased imports have caused or are threatening to cause serious injury to a 
domes tic industry.  
b. "[T]he effect of the obligations incurred " 
11. Turning to obligations incurred, the United States recalls that Article  XIX:1(a) provides that 
the condition of the increase in imports set out in the second clause of Article  XIX:1(a) be a result 
of the "effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff 
concessions" . GATT 1994 uses the term "obligations" to refer to the substantive commitments that 
a Member undertakes with respect to the products of another Member under the provisions of the 
agreement. "Tariff concessions" refers to the Schedule of Concessions granted by a Member under 
Article  II of GATT  1994, and in particular to commitments not to impose ordinary customs d uties in 
excess of the amount set out in the schedule. The ordinary meaning of the term "effect" is 
"[s]omething accomplished, caused or produced; a result, a consequence" . Thus, the "effect of 
obligations incurred" refers to the consequences of a Member's  substantive commitments, including 
tariff bindings; namely, that the Member cannot take certain trade -restrictive measures.  
12. In Korea – Dairy , which the complainant cites in its first written submission with respect to 
obligations incurred, the Appella te Body expressed support for our analytical approach. In that 
dispute, the Appellate  Body reasoned that the phrase "the effect of the obligations incurred" simply 
means that "the importing Member has incurred obligations under the GATT 1994, including tar iff 
concessions" . Pursuant to paragraph  7 of Article  II of the GATT, a Schedule annexed to the GATT is 
an integral part of Part  I of that agreement. Thus, the Appellate  Body reasoned that a tariff 
concession or commitment in a "Member's  Schedule is subject  to the obligations contained in 
Article  II of the  GATT  1994" . 
13. In other words, WTO obligations in the form of tariff concessions bound in a 
Member's  Schedule under Article  II of the GATT 1994 represent "obligations incurred" for purposes 
of GATT Articl e XIX:1(a). Accordingly, a Member may establish that increased imports are the "effect 
of obligations incurred" by identifying a commitment, such as a tariff concession, that prevents it 
from raising duties on the imports in question.  WT/DS595/R/Add.1  
 
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  14. For these reasons , the United States disagrees with the complainant's  interpretation of the 
phrase "incurred obligations" in Article  XIX:1(a). The complainant's  interpretation is inconsistent 
with the framework above as it does not recognize that a Member may show that inc reased imports 
are the "effect of obligations incurred" by simply identifying a commitment that prevents that 
Member from raising duties on imports. Moreover, the text of Article  XIX:1(a) does not require that 
a Member establish a causal link, in the sense  of Article  4.2(a) of the Safeguards Agreement, with 
the "obligations incurred" and the increased imports.  
III. CONCLUSION  
15. The United States welcomes the opportunity to present its views in connection with this 
dispute on the proper interpretation of r elevant provisions of Article  XIX of the  GATT  1994 and the 
Safeguards Agreement.  
__________