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WT/DSB/M/4 50 
17 May 2021 
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Dispute Settlement Body  
26 March  2021   
 
  
MINUTES OF MEETING  
HELD IN THE CENTRE WILLIAM RAPPARD  
ON 26 MARCH 20211 
Chairman : H.E.  Mr Dacio Castillo  (Honduras ) 
1.1.  Prior to the adoption of the Agenda , the Chairman welcome d all delegations participating in  the 
virtual meeting of the DSB and said that he wished to recall a  few technical instructions regarding 
this virtual meeting. He noted that i f a Member was unable to take the floor during the meeting 
because of a technical issue, the delegation c ould inform himself or the Secretariat and that Agenda 
item would remain open until the delegation c ould take the floor. In the alternative, the item would 
remain open temporarily, the meeting would proceed to the next Agen da item, and the DSB would 
revert to the open item after the technical issue ha d been resolved. If a technical issue remain ed 
unresolved, the delegation ha d the option to send the statement to the Secretariat with the request 
that it be read out by the Sec retariat on behalf of that delegation during the meeting so that the 
statement could be reflected in the minutes of the meeting . He then drew attention to the proposed 
Agenda contained in document WT/DSB/W/67 9 and invited the United States to speak.  
1.2.  The representative of the United States  said that, pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure 
for Meetings of the General Coun cil, as agreed by the DSB, the United States propose d an 
amendment to the proposed Agenda.  The United States propose d to remove item 4, referred to as 
"Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Venezuela. " The United States said that item 4 of the 
proposed agenda contained an item that had been submitted by purported representatives of the 
government of Venezuela. This  was not the case. The purported representatives  of the Government 
of Venezuela attempted to place a similar item on the Agenda of the DSB meeting in March 2019. 
At that time, the US position was that the item had not been requested by the legitimate gover nment 
of Venezuela and therefore could not be placed on the Agenda. The basis for the US position was 
straightforward: the United States – along with more than 50 other  WTO Members – did not 
recognize the Maduro regime as legitimate. Instead, the United St ates recognized Juan Guaidó as 
the legitimate President of Venezuela. In the two years since the Maduro regime's last attempt to 
add its request to the DSB agenda, the US position had not changed. Now, the United States 
– as well as many other WTO Members – continued to not recognize the legitimacy of the Maduro 
regime. For that reason , the United States said that it must object to the adoption of a proposed 
agenda that included item 4, because that item had been requested, not on behalf of the legitimate 
government of Venezuela, but by individuals acting on behalf of the illegitimate Maduro regime. 
Those representatives did not have the right to place an item on the agenda of a DSB meeting on 
behalf of the government of Venezuela. The United States instead proposed that the DSB amend 
the proposed Agenda to remove item 4, such that the Agenda would contain only those items 
properly requested to be included by Members of the WTO. The United States invited all Members 
to join in adopting an amended Agenda . 
1.3.  The Chairman  said that, i n light of the US objection to the proposed Agenda, he wished to ask 
if Venezuela was in a position to withdraw its panel request from the proposed Agenda.  
 
1 The proceedings of this meeting were held in a virtual format only following the latest amendments to 
the COVID -19 related safety measures circulated by the WTO Health Task Force.  WT/DSB/M/4 50 
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  1.4.  The representative of Venezuela  said that in response to the question posed by  the Chairman, 
Venezuela  deeply regret ted that it was, unfortunately,  under the obligation to respond to the 
statement made by United States, which, under the influence of intolerance and repeating unusual 
and somewhat fragile arguments about the alleged legitimacy of Venezuela's  Government, s ought 
to paralyze the work of this important  Body. It was reprehensible and inappropriate  that one 
delegation sought  to multi-lateralize its bilateral position and impose its confrontational agenda in a 
forum  that ha d been established  to settle disputes in an impartial and objective  manner , in 
accordance with  legal rules.  Venezuela regret ted that the United States ha d decided to block the 
Agenda of th e present  meeting, in response to the legitimate right of Venezuela  to include on the 
Agenda of th e present  meeting the request for the establishment of a panel , submitted  by Venezuela  
and containe d in document WT/DS574/2/Rev.1 , which had been circulated on 16 March 2021.  
Venezuela  had a sense of déjà vu , since it had  tried to include its panel  request pertaining to this 
matter in 2019, with the same response from the United States. Venezuela  believed , perhaps 
naively, that the new US government would open the door to respectful dialogue and ensure 
observance of public international law. Venezuela saw  that this was not the case and that the w ords 
and actions  continue d to lack consistency.  
1.5.  Venezuela  said that it could not  withdraw its Agenda item  since this would violate  the sovereign 
rights of the Venezuela n people  who were currently  suffering an onslaught of illegal unilateral 
coercive measures imposed by the United States , which  were at the root of Venezuela's panel 
request.  In its panel request, Venezuela referred to certain coercive and trade -restrictive measures. 
He said that Venezuela's  panel request, which ha d been circulated to all delegations  in a timely 
manner , listed ten measures, including statutes, regulations, and executive orders, applied by the 
United States to Venezuela inconsistent ly with U S obligations under the GATT 1994 and US 
commitments under the GATS . Those measures were as follows:  (i) discriminatory measures 
regarding goods of Venezuelan origin ; (ii) discriminatory measures regarding Venezuelan gold, 
established in Executive Order 13850 ; (iii) discriminatory trade -restrictive coercive measures on 
Venezuelan debt liquidity adopted under Executive Orders 13808, 13827, and 13835 ; 
(iv) discriminatory trade -restrictive coercive measures regarding transactions in Venezuelan digital 
currency adopted under Executive O rders 13808, 13827, and 13835 ; and (v) discriminatory coercive 
measures that restrict ed trade with certain Venezuelan persons and prohibit ed the provision and 
receipt of services by such persons . 
1.6.  Without going into detail  regarding  all the arguments for ea ch violation, Venezuela  wished to 
highligh t some of those arguments in order to  justify  why it was requesting the establishment of a 
panel. Article I of the GATT 1994 wa s one of the key features  of the multilateral trade system , 
because it support ed the Most -Favored -Nation (MFN) principle . Venezuela  believed  that the United 
States violate d this Article because it grant ed Venezuelan products less favorable treatment than 
that given to products from WTO Member s that were not subjec t to the coercive and trade -restrictive 
measures.  In addition , Venezuela  emphasize d that the US measures violate d Article III, concerning  
the National Treatment principle,  because they grant ed products of  Venezuelan origin less favorable 
treatment than tha t given to products from WTO Member s that were not subject to the coercive and 
trade -restrictive measures.  With regard to  services, since the United States ha d committed to 
liberalizing the financial services sector in its Schedule, it c ould not maintain o r adopt the measures 
described in Article XVI:2(a) through (f) of the GATS , concerning financial services, unless it ha d 
reserved the right to do so in its Schedule.  
1.7.  It was Venezuela 's intention to use all existing legal mechanisms to raise its voice and make 
itself understood. As it had been denounced on multiple occasions before th e WTO , the negative 
impact of the illegal unilateral coercive measures imposed by the United States and its allies w idely 
reduce d financial resources  of Venezuela , prevent ed supply of medicines and medical equipment, 
and affect ed the human rights and the self -determination of peoples . This was  in violation of 
international law, the Charter of the United Nations, the rul es contained in the WTO Agreements , 
and the principles governing peaceful relations between States.  Through  the US misnamed and 
illegal sanctions, Venezuela ha d been deprived of at least USD 30 billion in  cash, which formed part 
of Venezuela's a ssets abroa d, resources that should have been used to take care of  the health, 
nutrition  and integral rights of its people. Th ose who had confiscated  Venezuela's assets and 
resources had shown great cruelty, even in the circumstances of a pandemic, disregarding the calls 
of the UN Secretary -General and High Commissioner for Human Rights and especially of the 
Venezuelan people . They had stepped up the ir economic warfare  seeking  to use the media  in a 
deliberate and premedit ated manner  to fuel a disastrous  situation in order to misrepresent Venezuela  
in all multilateral for a. WT/DSB/M/4 50 
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  1.8.  It was worth highlighting the preliminary report prepared by the UN Special Rapporteur , 
Ms Alena Douhan, on the negative impact of unilateral coercive m easures on the enjoyment of 
human rights,  during  her visit to Venezuela  between 1 and 12 February 2021. The conclusions of 
her preliminary report were compelling.  Just by way of example, the report state d as follows:  
"Impediments  to food imports, which acc ount for more than 50 % of food consumption, have led to 
the sustained growth of malnutrition over the past six years." It also state d that the impact of trade 
sanctions was particularly  felt in the Venezuelan countryside, where agricultural activities ha d almost 
come to a halt since diesel imports were exhausted.  Venezuela c ould still refine limited quantities of 
regular petrol, but it could not refine diesel used in heavy trucks and agricultural machinery. Many 
farmers ha d been obliged  to leave their fields unattended while their machinery remain ed at a 
standstill.  Ms Douhan was also critical of the sanctions imposed on Venezuela's oil exports . Since 
Venezuela was  dependent on oil export s, the US embargo ha d strangled the whole  economy.  The 
Special Rapporteur agree d with Venezuela's complaint  to the WTO , calling for  the lifting of sanctions 
against Venezuela, the re stitution  of its assets, and guarantees of access for Venezuela  to its 
resources that ha d been illegally frozen, as well as access to the global financial system. Venezuela  
invite d Members  to read th e preliminary report carefully. Venezuela appreciated the understanding 
and solidarity of WTO Members in denounc ing the unilater al coercive measures as a criminal practice 
that violated  public international law.   
1.9.  Even in th ose hostile circumstances, Venezuela  had made great efforts to guarantee the 
Bolivarian Social Welfare State, which ha d been seriously  undermined by the unilater al coercive  and 
illegal sanctions. However,  Venezuela would  be ready to take any available action, within the 
framework of multilateral agreements, to denounce th ose measures against Venezuela.  Venezuela's  
channels of communication would remain  open for respectful dialogue based on tolerance and the 
search for solutions. Venezuela  asked the United States to reflect on whether, in more than 60 years, 
those types of measures used against  other countries ha d achieved  desired result s. Venezuela  also 
asked the United States t o reflect on whether Venezuela was  a threat to their national security. 
Venezuela asked the United States  to look beyond the surface, to review the statistics, to ask itself 
if it underst ood the particular situation  of the Venezue lan people, and, above all, if the  United States  
wanted to continue to be directly responsible for the suffering of those  people. Venezuela  reiterate d 
its call for respect for peoples' self -determination and join t efforts to strengthen multilateralism and 
the concept of a multipolar world without hegemony. Venezuela strongly call ed on the United States 
to stop making excuses and allow the establishment of th e panel, in accordance with the DSU 
provisions.  From the technical and legal point of view, Venezuela was submitting a file  before the 
WTO that merit ed its consideration. Finally, Venezuela  thank ed the Chairman and WTO Members for 
their understanding and suppor t of Venezuela's legitimate  claim in order to take ad vantage of the 
circumstances provided under the WTO, i n defense of law and multilateralism.   
1.10.   The representative of Peru said that Peru support ed the US objection regarding  the inclusion 
of item 4 on the proposed Agenda by the Madur o regime of Venezuela.   
1.11.   The representative of Brazil  said that , in Brazil's , view the  representatives of the Maduro 
regime d id not have the legitimacy to speak on behalf of Venezuela at the WTO. Therefore, those 
representatives could n ot request the establishment of a panel in the DSB . Brazil hope d that every 
effort w ould be made to avoid paralysis of the regular work of the DSB. Brazil  support ed the 
amendment proposed by the United States to the Agenda of  this meeting . 
1.12.   The representative of Colombia  said that  Colombia echo ed and support ed the concerns 
expressed by the United States. Colombia also support ed the US proposal to amend the proposed 
Agenda by removing item 4. In Colombia's view only those  items that ha d been properly requested 
to be placed on the Ag enda should remain thereon.  
1.13.   The representative of the European Union  said that, i f the EU underst ood correctly, the U nited 
States was not ready to accept th e panel request by Venezuela as being valid, as it was submitted 
by a government which the United S tates no longer recogni zed as the legitimate government 
representing Venezuela.  In that case, the E uropean Union would have expected the U nited States 
to rely on the security exceptions under  Article XXI  of the GATT  1994 and Article XIV  bis of the GATS 
to justify any departures from basic GATT and GATS provisions that may exist with regard to  the 
measures taken against Venezuela.  The EU  noted that the US measures at issue appear ed justified 
by the security exceptions, so the challenge at iss ue could not, in any event , succeed.  All that being 
said, the EU ha d to react for systemic reasons and express its concern at the prospect of the DSB 
being prevented from proceeding with th e present  meeting with all the items on the  proposed WT/DSB/M/4 50 
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  Agenda simply because that Agenda could  not be adopted.  There was a long -standing and widely 
recognised principle that DSB Agendas c ould not be blocked to the extent that they include d items 
governed by negative consensus. Th at include d first panel requests (governed by consensus), since 
they were a necessary precondition to second panel request s. That principle was of utmost 
importance because the binding nature of WTO dispute settlement rest ed on it.  That said, the EU 
expect ed that the meeting be suspended, as a result of the US objection to the  adoption of the  
proposed A genda. Th at would allow the Chairperson and the WTO Members  directly involved to 
consult in an effort to find a solution. The EU hope d that these efforts w ould rapidly yield a solution, 
so that th e meeting c ould proceed to enable the DSB to discharge its important duties with which it 
was entrusted  
1.14.   The representative of Cuba said that Cuba recognized the legitimately elected government in 
Venezuela of Nicolás Maduro as w ell as the legitimate right of the delegation led by its Ambassador 
to request that this item be included on the proposed Agenda of the present meeting. Cuba said that 
Members should consider  who was trying to paralyse the work of the DSB regarding  this ma tter. 
1.15.   The representative of the Russian Federation  stated that the Russian Federation wished to 
refer to its previous statement made at the DSB meeting on 26 April 2019 in support of  the legitimate 
delegates of the government of Venezuela and wished  to reiterate its principal position that the WTO 
was not an appropriate forum for political discussion s. The Russian Federation was greatly concerned 
with the disruption of the normal function ing of the DSB due to political controversies between WTO 
Members, especially under the  present  challenging times for the dispute settlement system caused 
by the Appellate Body crisis. The Russian Federation expresse d its hope for the  quick  resolution of 
this matter on mutually acceptable terms.  
1.16.   The Chairman  said that, s ince Venezuela was not a position to withdraw its panel request 
under item 4 of the proposed Agenda, he would suspend the meeting in order to allow time for 
consultations. He thanked Members  for their understanding  regarding this matter.  
1.17.   The DSB took note  of the statements and, as proposed by the Chairman, the meeting was 
suspended to allow time for consultations . 
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