JOB/AG/192  
 
6 April 2021  
(21-2825) Page: 1/12 
Committee on Agriculture  
Special Session  Original: English  
 
TARIFF IMPL EMENTATION ISSUES – ISSUES WITH  
SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL SAFEGUARDS  
COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES  
The following communication , received on 31 March 2021, is being circulated at the request of the 
Delegation of the United States . 
 
_______________  
 
 
1.1.  In July 2018, the United States submitted a communication to the World Trade Organization 
(JOB/AG/141 ) noting the need for more trade to improve global welfare, help producers, and address 
the challenges of sustainably feeding a growing world population.  The communication also noted 
that tariffs re main much higher in the agricultural sector than in other sectors, tariff reductions have 
contributed to the welfare gains from trade, and locking in tariff reductions can contribute further to 
global welfare.   
1.2.  The US communication identified six areas of the market access pillar where further analysis 
of Members' current implementation of tariffs should be considered by Members in order to better 
understand Members' current tariff regimes.  The areas included: (i) bound versus applied tariffs, 
(ii) complex tariffs, (iii) high tariffs (e.g., tariff peaks), (iv) issues with tariff rate quotas (TRQs), 
(v) special agricultural safeguards (SSGs), and (vi) regional/preferential trade agreements.  The 
United States has since provided a detailed analysis on tariff tr eatment as it relates to bound versus 
applied tariffs ( JOB/AG/147 ), complex tariffs ( JOB/AG/164 ), tariff peaks ( JOB/AG/167 ), and TRQs 
(JOB/AG/169 ). 
1.3.  While Memb ers have generally provided greater transparency on agricultural tariffs and SSGs 
than on other agriculture -related issues, a number of problems related to the transparency of 
agricultural tariffs remain, including:  
• Bound tariff schedules that are provided in outdated HS nomenclature;  
• Bound tariff schedules using nomenclature that does not correspond to the 
nomenclature in the Member 's most recent tariff schedule;  
• Applied tariff schedules submitted to the WTO that are out of date;  
• Applied tariff rat es submitted that are in a different tariff format than the bound rate 
(e.g., ad valorem vs. specific ); 
• Absence of tariff concordance information for Members ' tariff schedules;  
• Lack of ad valorem equivalent (AVE) data for non -ad valorem  tariffs, including 
complex tariffs;  
• Tariffs and TRQs applied and notified at different (HS) line levels for each Member;  
• Use of arbitrary letters or symbols to denote a tariff without clear explanation;   
• Tariff schedules on the WTO Tariff Analysis Online database containing rates different 
than corresponding schedules available on Members ' official publication website(s).  
 
1.4.  In this communication, the United States analyzes 33 Members ' administration of special 
agricultural safeguards (SSGs), specifically, Members1 who have de signated SSGs as part of their 
WTO schedule of commitments.  The analysis used past Member and Secretariat reports, Members ' 
submitted tariff schedules, Member submitted notifications, and WTO tariff profiles to consider the 
 
1 For the purpose of this communication, member States of the European Union (including Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic) are referred to as a single WTO Member.   JOB/AG/192  
 
- 2 - 
 
  prevalence of SSGs2 by Member, product group3, and development status4 with particular focus on 
the level of additional duties triggered by SSGs.   
1.5.  The United States continues to urge Members to ensure that all WTO notifications are up to 
date and accurate.  This includes notifications made through the Integrated Data Base (IDB), as well 
as notifications of regional trade agreements.  Increased transparency will facilitate even greater 
Member understanding of agricultural tariffs and safeguards.  
Background:  Special Agricultural Safeguard  
1.6.  According to the WTO, a safeguard is a contingency restriction on imports taken temporarily 
to deal with special circumstances such as a sudden surge in imports.  Unlike other safeguards 
defined in the Agreement on Safeguards, Article  5 of the Agreement on Agriculture  (AoA)  provides 
an alternative agricultural safeguard that does not require a Member to demonstrate that serious 
injury is being caused to the domestic industry.5 
1.7.  The special agricultural safeguard provisions of Article 5  of the AoA allow the imposition of an 
additional tariff where certain criteria are met.  The criteria involve either a specified surge in imports 
(volume trigger), or, on a shipment by shipment basis, a fall of the import price below a specified 
reference price (price trigger).  The additional duties cannot be applied to imports taking place within 
tariff quotas.6  
1.8.  Under the volume -based SSG, any additional duty shall only be maintained until the end of the 
year in which it has been imposed, and may only be  levied at a level which shall not exceed one  third 
of the level of the ordinary customs duty in effect in the year in which the action is taken . The 
volume -based SSG contains three trigger formulas, depending on the import penetration of the 
domestic mark et (the average volume of imports over the previous three years as a percentage of 
average consumption over the same time period); the larger the import penetration is, the smaller 
the import volume that needs to be surpassed in order to trigger a safeguar d (also known as a 
trigger level).  To determine the actual trigger, Members may also take the change in consumption 
into account.  The trigger level can be as low as 105 % of the previous three -year average volume of 
imports (for the average volume of import s in the last three years that are greater than 30 % of 
domestic consumption) and as high as 125 % of the three -year average volume of imports (for the 
average volume of imports in the last three years less than or equal to 10 % of domestic 
consumption).  If no consumption data are provided, a Member implementing the safeguard may 
only use the 125 % trigger (Table 1) . 
Table 1: Volume -Based SSG Trigger Calculation for a Product7 
Import Penetration  
(Three -year-average volume of 
imports as % of the three -year-
average volume of consumption)  Trigger Base  Trigger  
(Actual volume of imports needed to be surpassed in 
order to trigger a safeguard ) 
Consumption Data Not Provided  125% 1.25 x previous three -year average import volume  
Less than or equal to 10 % 125% 1.25 x previous three -year average import volume + 
change in consumption from previous year, if negative.  
The resulting trigger cannot be lower than 105% of the 
average imports.  
Greater than 10 % but less than 
or equal to 30 % 110% 1.1  x previous three -year average import volume + 
change in consumption from previous year.  The resulting 
trigger cannot be lower than 105% of the average imports 
or greater than 125% of the average imports.  
Greater th an 30 % 105% 1.05 x previous three -year average import volume + 
change in consumption from previous year (if positive)  
 
2 Of particular note for analysis of SSGs is the lack of ability to compare additional duties across 
different types of complex tariffs due to the difficulties and complexities associated with calculating AVEs.   
3 This communication uses product categories first defined in the Tokyo Round and adapted for the 
Harmonized System in the Uruguay Round.  The product group breakdown in this publication is provided in the 
2019 WTO World Tariff Profiles (page 40).   
4 Development status is based on self -designation.  Use of a Member's self -designated development 
status should not be taken as agreement with the self -designation.  
5 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11 _ssg_e.htm . 
6 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro02_access_e.htm . 
7 See Paragraph 4 of Article 5 of the AoA. JOB/AG/192  
 
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  1.9.  Under the price -based SSG, the trigger price is defined as the average unit value (inclusive of 
cost of insurance and freight, or c.i.f.)  during the 1986 -88 base period, expressed in domestic 
currency.  The permitted level of the additional duty depends upon the degree to which the import 
price falls below this trigger level.  The difference between the most recent c.i.f.  import price of the 
shipment and the trigger price must be greater than 10 % of the trigger price, in order for the 
safeguard to become operational.  In general, the greater the decline in the import price below the 
trigger level, the higher the duty.  However, the additional du ty does not completely offset the fall in 
the import price  (Table 2) .8 
Table 2: Price -Based SSG Trigger Calculation for a Product9 
Trigger Level  
(Difference between the c.i.f.  import price of the shipment 
and the trigger price as a % of the trigger price)  Additional Duty  
Greater than 10 % but less than or equal to 40 % of the 
trigger price  30% of the amount by which the difference 
exceeds 10 % 
Greater than 40 % but less than or eq ual to 60 % of the 
trigger price  50% of the amount by which the difference 
exceeds 40 %, plus the additional duty specified 
above  
Greater than 60 % but less than or equal to 75 % 70% of the amount by which the difference 
exceeds 60 %of the trigger price, plus the 
additional duties specified above  
Greater than 75 % 90% of the amount by which the difference 
exceeds 75 %, plus the additional duties specified 
above  
 
1.10.   As is the case with TRQs, SSGs are a compromise policy instrument created in the Uruguay 
Round as part of the "tariffication " package to provide Members that "tariffied " their agricultural 
products certain temporary protections against import surges.  The s afeguard can only be used if a 
Member reserved the right to do so in its schedule of commitments on agriculture, and the volume -
based or price -based versions of the safeguard cannot be used concurrently for a product.  It is also 
important to note that SSGs  cannot be used on imports entering within a TRQ.10 
Analysis: SSG Coverage  
1.11.   Currently, 33 WTO Members reserve the right in their Goods Schedules to have recourse to 
the SSG with respect to designated products, subject to the relevant conditions being met.11 Of 
those Members, 24 are self -designated as developing and the remaining nine are developed.  On 
average, SSGs cover 16 % of these WTO Members ' bound agricultural schedules.12 However, there 
are several examples in which SSGs cover more than one -third of a Members ' agricultural schedule.  
SSGs cover 48 % of Norway 's bound agricultural schedule and 42 % of Iceland 's bound agricultural 
schedule.  Botswana, Eswatini, Namibia, South Africa, Switzerland and Mexico, are other Members 
for which the SSG coverage is grea ter than one -third of their bound agricultural schedules.13 SSGs 
account for less than 1% of respective bound agricultural schedules for Australia, Indonesia, 
Ecuador, New Zealand, Panama and Uruguay (Figure 1) . The average share of SSGs in Members ' 
bound agricultural schedules is slightly higher for developed Members than developing Members (i.e. 
18.2% versus 15.4 %).   
 
8 Paragraph 5 of Article 5 of the AoA. 
9 Ibid. 
10 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_ssg_e.htm . 
11 Members are Australia; Barbados; Botswana; Canada; Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador; El Salvador;  
Eswatini; the European Union; Guatemala; Iceland; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Korea, Republic of; Malaysia; 
Mexico; Morocco; Namibia;  New Zealand;  Nicaragua;  Norway;  Panama;  Philippines;  South Africa;  Switzerland;  
Chinese Taipei ; Thailand; Tunisia; the United States;  Uruguay and Venezuela,  Bolivarian Republic of . 
12 2019 World Tariff Profiles . 
13 Percent of HS six -digit subheadings in the schedule of agricultural concessions with at least one tariff 
line subject to Special Safeguar ds (SSG).  Partial coverage is taken into account on a pro rata  basis.  JOB/AG/192  
 
- 4 - 
 
  Figure 1: Scheduled SSGs  
(HS-6 Lines as % of Bound Agricultural Tariff Schedule), 2017  
 
 
1.12.   Members have recourse to SSGs for a wide variety of products with the "animal products ", 
"oilseeds, fats, and oils ", and "cereals and preparations " product groups having the greatest number 
of lines (at the HS -6 level) with SSG recourse.14 "Cotton " product s have the least number of lines 
with SSG recourse, followed by "coffee and tea ", and "other agricultural products " (Figure 2) . In 
relative terms (as percentage of the total number of HS -6 lines in a product group), "dairy products " 
have the most concentra tion of lines (58 %) subject to an SSG recourse.  "Sugar and confectionery " 
products also have a large share of SSG lines (41 %). "Other agricultural products " and "fruits, 
vegetables, and plants " have the lowest share of scheduled SSGs relative to the number  of product 
group lines (Figure 3) . 
 
14 While some Members have reserved, in their Schedules, the right to apply the special safeguard 
provisions for products not covered by the AoA, in particular fish products, for purposes  of this paper, only 
those products included in Annex 1 to the Agreement are considered.  
0102030405060(%)
Member All Member Average
 Developing Member Average Developed Member AverageJOB/AG/192  
 
- 5 - 
 
  Figure 2: Scheduled SSGs  
(Average Number of  HS-6 SSG Lines Per Product Group, 2017)  
 
Figure 3: Scheduled SSGs  
(Average HS -6 SSG Lines as % of Product Group Lines), 2017  
 
 
  
051015202530354045
Animal
ProductsOilseeds, Fats
& OilsCereals and
PreparationsFruit,
Vegetables,
PlantsProduct
Group
AverageDairy
ProductsBeverages
and TobaccoSugars and
ConfectioneryOther
agricultural
productsCoffee, Tea Cotton
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%JOB/AG/192  
 
- 6 - 
 
  Analysis: SSG Application  
1.13.   In line with the "Notification Requirements and Formats " adopted by the Committee on 
Agriculture ( G/AG/2 ), all Members having reserved the right in their S chedules to use the SSG are 
notifying Members. Notification frequency and format are specified as follows:  
• in the case of the "volume -based" special safeguard, a notification in the form of Table MA:3 
should be made as far as practicable before taking such  action for the first time in any year 
in respect of each product, and in any event within 10 days of the implementation of such 
action;  
 
• in the case of the "price -based" special safeguard, a notification in the form of Table MA:4 
should be submitted.   Table MA:4 can be used either to provide an "up -front" notification of 
trigger prices or to notify, on a case -by-case basis, the first use of the price -based special 
safeguard for any particular product;  
 
• an annual notification in the form of Table MA:5 should be made indicating the use of the 
special safeguard provisions in any year.  This notification should be submitted no later than 
30 days following the year in question.  Where the special safeguard provisions have not 
been invoked in any year, a statement to such effect must be made.  
 
1.14.   The United States used analysis provided by the Secretariat ( TN/AG/S/29/Rev.1 ) and Member 
notifications up to August 2020 to analyze SSG notification over the last decade.  While 33 Members 
have scheduled the use of an SSG in the last 10 years (2009 -2018), only eight Members have 
notified the WTO that they have taken recourse and used the safeguard.  Six Members used the 
volume -based safeguard and seven Members used price -based safeguard  (Figures 4 and 5).15 
Members that continue utilizing SSGs have also triggered a smaller number of HS -6 lines than to 
what those Members have recourse.  Over the 2009 -2018 period, o n average, applicable Members 
have taken SSG action on 38 % of the lines for which an SSG is scheduled  (Figure 6) . 
Figure 4: Volume -Based Safeguards per Member  
Number of HS -6 Lines Triggered  
 
 
 
15 Japan;  the Philippines;  Korea, Republic of;  Chinese Taipei  and the United States have utilized both 
volume -based and price -based SSGs in the 2009 -2018 period.  
05101520253035404550
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Chinese Taipei Japan
Republic of Korea United States
Costa Rica PhilippinesJOB/AG/192  
 
- 7 - 
 
  Figure 5: Price -Based Safeguards per Member  
Number of HS -6 Line s Triggered  
 
* Barbados has not submitted any MA:5 notification for 2010 -2012 and 2017 -2018 periods.  
Figure 6: SSGs  
(Triggered HS -6 Lines as % of Scheduled HS -6 SSG Lines), 2009 -2018  
 
1.15.   Each year, Members notify more price -based SSG actions than volume -based SSG actions.16 
While the number of Members notifying the use of price -based SSGs has stayed the same, the 
number of Members notifying volume -based SSG and the number of HS -6 lines triggered has 
increased over the last few years (Table 3) . Developing Members have taken an average of 51 price -
based and 31 volume -based actions (HS -6 line level) per year from 2009 to 2018.  Developed 
 
16 For the purposes of this submission, an "action " is defined as the number of lines, at the HS -6 level, 
triggered during a year.  An HS -6 line triggered several times during a year will be counted as one action.    
0102030405060
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Barbados* United States Chinese Taipei
European Union Japan Philippines
Republic of Korea
0102030405060708090100
Chinese Taipei United States Japan Barbados Applicable
Member
AverageRepublic of
KoreaPhilippines European Union Costa Rica(%)JOB/AG/192  
 
- 8 - 
 
  Members have taken an average of 46 price -based and 4 volume -based actions per year over the 
same time frame.  Based o n the total number of SSG actions, the Members notifying the most SSGs 
over the 2009 -2018 period, were Barbados , Chinese Taipei  and the United States (Figure 7) . 
Table 3: Total Number of Actions (HS -6 lines)  
 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  
Volume -
Based 
Safeguards  26 40 24 25 19 29 58 45 38 47 
Price -
Based 
Safeguards  99 60 61 58 143 127 148 114 87 72 
1. The table only includes data from WTO notifications that were made public prior to August 2020.  
Notifications from the Philippines for 2018, and Barbados for 2010 -2012, 2017 -2018 were not 
available for analysis.   
2. Years refer to calendar years except for the EU (marketing year) and for Japan (fiscal year).  In the 
case of the EU, for 2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, 2012/201 3, 2013/2014, 2014/2015, 
2015/2016, 2016/2017, 2017/2018, and 2018/2019 the relevant notifications state that the volume -
based special safeguard was "made operational" for some products in the fruit and vegetables sector 
but was not "invoked".  
Figure 7: SS G Actions by Member  
(Number of HS -6 Lines for each Product Group), 2009 -2018  
 
* Barbados has not submitted any MA:5 notification for 2010 -2012 and 2017 -2018 periods.  For 2018, 
MA:4 notification was used for the Philippines as an MA:5 notification was not submitted at the time 
of this analysis.  
1.16.   While Members have recourse to the SSG for a wide variety of products, between 2009 and 
2018 period, "dairy products " had the highest number of safeguard actions followed by "animal 
products ". Together these two product groups accounted for over half of al l safeguard actions.  
"Cotton " products had no safeguard actions during the period and "beverages and tobacco " products 
accounted for less than a percentage point of all the actions taken in the last 10 years  (Figure 8) . 
0100200300400500600700800900
Chinese Taipei United States Barbados* Japan European Union Philippines* Republic of Korea Costa Rica
Animal Products Dairy Products Cereals and Preparations Fruit, Vegetables, Plants Coffee, Tea
Oilseeds, Fats & Oils Sugars and Confectionery Other agricultural products Beverages and Tobacco Cotton
 
  JOB/AG/192  
 
- 9 - 
 
  Figure 8: SSG Actions by Pr oduct Group  
(Number of HS -6 Lines for each Member), 2009 -2018  
 
* Barbados has not submitted any MA:5 notification for 2010 -2012 and 2017 -2018 periods.  For 2018, 
MA:4 notification was used for the Philippines as an MA:5 notification was not submitted at t he time 
of this analysis.  
 
Analysis: SSG Trade Analysis  
1.17.   While the purpose of the SSG is to temporarily deal with special circumstances such as a 
sudden surge in imports, not all actions taken by Members in the last 10 years were directly caused 
by an import surge  (Figure 9) . As previously described, Members have the option to utilize import 
penetration (the three -year-average volume of imports as percent age of the  three -year-average 
volume of consumption) to trigger the safeguard.  Higher import penetra tion increases the likelihood 
an SSG may be triggered because the trigger level is lower.  As import data and domestic 
consumption both have a role in the calculation of import penetration, the SSG could be triggered 
by either an increased volume of imports  and/or a decline in domestic consumption.   
1.18.   Analysis of MA:3 notifications and respective calculations supplied by Members have shown 
that out of the 375 actions during the 2009 -2018 period (at the HS -6 level), one -third of the actions 
occurred when domest ic consumption decreased and import volume increased year -over-year. 
Another 6% of the 375 actions17 occurred when both domestic consumption and import volumes 
decreased year -over-year.18 Altogether, almost 40 % (148) of the actions occurred when domestic 
consumption of respective products decreased.19 Another 30 % of the actions occurred when both 
domestic consumption and import volumes increased and 15 % of the actions occurred when 
domestic consumption increased but import volume decreased year -over-year. The remaining 16 % 
of the actions were triggered without the calculation of import penetration  (Figure 9) .20  
1.19.   Out of the 375 actions during the period, there were 155 instances (41 %) where the import 
volume, as a percent age of the  average imports in the past  three -year period, was less than 125 %. 
Since the means to trigger a volume -based SSG, without import penetration, is for import volume 
to exceed the preceding three -year average import volume by 125 % or more, one can infer that 
 
17 There were 23 instances of HS -6 product lines that had both increased and decreased consumption 
and/or increased and decreased import volume during a notified year.  For the purposes of this analysis, each 
of these lines were counted as unique thus overstating the actua l number of actions.  
18 Import volume decrease is determined if the import volume entering during the notification period is 
lower than the import volume of the preceding year (Year 3).    
19 Domestic consumption decrease is determined if consumption in Year 3 of the three preceding years 
is lower than consumption in Year 2.  
20 This includes an action by Costa Rica that provided consumption data that differs from its previous 
notification.  The problem is further described in the following section.   
050100150200250300350400450500
Dairy Products Animal
ProductsCereals and
PreparationsFruit,
Vegetables,
PlantsCoffee, Tea Sugars and
ConfectioneryOilseeds, Fats
& OilsOther
agricultural
productsBeverages and
TobaccoCotton
Chinese Taipei United States Barbados* Japan European Union Philippines* Republic of Korea Costa RicaJOB/AG/192  
 
- 10 - 
 
  domestic consumption used i n the calculation was the direct cause of the products (at the HS -6 
level) being triggered.  It is worth pointing out that the average trigger for a volume -based SSG over 
the 10-year period was approximately 117 %, meaning that the SSG became operational, on  
average, after imports surpassed 117 % of the previous three -year average import volume of their 
respective products. Of all the triggers used during the 10 -year period in question, the base trigger 
of 125 % was used more often (58 % of the time) than any ot her trigger base.  
1.20.   Unlike data provided in volume -based safeguard notifications, data provided by the majority 
of Members in their respective price -based notifications lack information that would allow Members 
to analyze important trends and effect on trade.  One Member, the United States, provides 
notifications which include the volume of trade affected per each safeguard in the MA:5 summary.  
Analysis of all price -based safeguards applied by the United States between 2012 and 2018 
respective to imports of the same products coming into the country has shown that, at the HS -8 
level (the level at which the United States applies its SSGs),  US price-based safeguards affected an 
average of 5 % of the imports coming into respective lines.21 Analysis at t he HS -6 level indicates that 
quantities affected by the price -based SSG accounted for less than a tenth of a percentage point of 
import volume between 2012 and 2018 when also considering similar or identical products entering 
in-quota.  
Figure 9: Trends in  Consumption and Import Volumes for Volume -Based SSG Actions by 
Member, Number of Actions (HS -6, 2009 -2018) and Corresponding % of All Notified 
Volume -Based SSG Actions  
 
 
Note:  The consumption and import volume s for the previous and most recent year provi ded were used to 
place the actions in the quadrants. For example, if imports during the year of the notification were 
greater than the previous year, the action would fall into "Increase in Import Volume " quadrants. If 
consumption volume was provided by a Member, and the volume was greater in Year 3 than Year 2, 
the action would fall into "Increase in Domestic Consumption " quadrants.  
 
21 US SSG lin es are comprised of non -quota and out -of-quota lines.  
JOB/AG/192  
 
- 11 - 
 
  SSG Transparency Issues  
1.21.   The United States encountered several additional transparency issues around the utilization 
and admi nistration of SSGs.  First and foremost, only 23 of the 33 Members with recourse to an SSG 
have submitted either an annual notification in the form of MA:5 or a statement indicating non -use 
of the special safeguard provisions for the 2009 -2018 period as set  out in G/AG/2 . The other 
10 Members have not provided a notification or statement of non -use for at least one of the years 
analyzed.  Eswatini and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have not provided any notification or 
statement for that time period and Namibia has only provided one notification for 2009.  Only 284 
notifications of the 330 (or 86 % of) MA:5 notifications (or statements of non -use) that were to be 
submitted to the WTO Committee on Agriculture were provided.22  
1.22.   Another issue is the persistent delay Members take notifying SSG use or non -use. Over the 
2009-2018 period, only 10 % of the required MA:5 notifications were provided within the "30 days 
following the year in question " timeframe specified in G/AG/2 . Thirty per cent of the required 
notifications had a delay of six months or less from th e timeframe specified in G/AG/2 . Another 46 % 
of the required notifications were delayed by more than six months  (Figure 10) . Ten Members 
provided a timely MA:5 notification at least once over the period.23 However, only one Member, 
Japan, managed to provide MA:5 notification within the required timeframe for each of the 10 years 
analyzed.  The delay is also persistent in both MA:3 and MA:4 notifications with Members failing to 
provide notification of safeguard implementation "as far as in advance as may be practicable and in 
any event within 10 days of the implementation of such action ".24 
Figure 10: MA:5 Notification Submission Time Frame  
(% of all SSG submis sions that were to be notified)  
 
1.23.   There has also been at least one instance between 2009 and 2018 of a Member providing an 
MA:5 notification summarizing a volume -based safeguard action but failing to provide an MA:3 
notification outlining import details, i ncluding data on import volume, the trigger level, and the 
calculations that determined the safeguard trigger.  The Philippines, in its MA:5 submission dated 
22 March 2016 ( G/AG/N/PHL/44 ), notified Members of a volume -based action on chicken meat and 
offal, prepared or preserved in airtight containers (HS  Code: 16023210) fr om February to 
 
22 33 Members each having to provide 1 MA:5 notification or statement of non -use each year over the 
10-year period examined totals 330 notifications.   
23 Members are Australia ; Botswana ; Canada ; Costa Ric a; El Salvador ; European Union ; Japan ; Korea, 
Republic of;  Norway and Switzerland.  
24 Paragraph 7 of Article 5 of the AoA. 
9%6% 6%12%9% 9% 9% 9%15% 15%27%
21%33%24%33%27%42%36%30%27%18%
15%15%
3%9%
12%12%
3%6%15%39%
45%33%
48%39%42%24%
36%27%12%6%12% 12% 12%9% 9%12%15%21%
30%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Calendar, Fiscal, Financial, or Marketing Year of Notification
On Time Less than 6 Month Delay
Between 6  to 12 Month Delay More than 12 Months Delay
Not Submitted (as of the date of this submission)JOB/AG/192  
 
- 12 - 
 
  December  2015.  However, the United States is not aware of any MA:3 submission by the Philippines 
for the 2009 -2018 timeframe.  
1.24.   In addition to the issue of timely notifications, the United States also notes some 
inconsistencies in Members ' notifications.  Certain Members notify SSG actions at a level broader 
than HS -6 (e.g. HS -4 level) and it is difficult to understand the scope of these SSGs, including, what 
lines (at HS -6 or national tariff level) were part of these Members recourse.25 There a re also 
inconsistencies in Member 's notification format and calculations.   For example, Chinese Taipei used 
2015, 2016, 2017 as the reference period for "imports in the 3 preceding years " to calculate the 
2019 MA:3 volume -based trigger while Japan used 201 6, 2017 and 2018 data for their 2019 MA:3 
trigger calculations.26  
1.25.   Members have also not been consistent in regard to the quantities of goods affected.  
Currently, of the eight Members that utilize SSGs, the United States is the only Member that provides 
actual volumes of shipments affected in its MA:5 summary for both price and volume -based 
safeguards.  Chinese Taipei  and Barbados provide the number of shipments affected for price -based 
safeguards.  However, the size or volume of the shipments is not disclose d nor defined.  In the case 
of Chinese Taipei, which also utilizes volume -based SSGs, affected shipments or quantities are not 
provided for the volume -based SSG MA:5 summary.  The Republic of Korea provides the number of 
"cases " affected by the price -based S SG and volume for the volume -based SSG.  However, as with 
the term "shipments ", the volume in a "case" is undefined in the notification.27  
1.26.   Examination of Member notifications also show that there are inconsistencies in the reporting 
of the domestic consump tion data.  Costa Rica has indicated in their 2018 MA:3 notification that 
consumption of husked (brown) rice (HS  Code: 10062000) was 500 MT for each of the three 
preceding years (2015, 2016, 2017).  In their notification a year prior for the same product, th e 
consumption values for 2015 and 2016 were 473.83 MT and 489.6 MT , respectively.28 There was 
also at least one instance of an incorrect tariff line description provided by a Member in the 
notification.29  
Conclusion  
1.27.   The United States aims to share this analysis to deepen Members' understanding of SSG 
utilization and notification.  In its analysis, the United States has found that 33 Members have 
recourse to the SSG, both developing and developed Members alike, covering on average, 16 % of 
their respec tive bound tariff schedules.  However, less than one -third of the Members have actually 
taken recourse of SSGs in the last 10 years, applying the safeguard to, on average, 40 % of the 
scheduled SSG lines.  Those lines are largely made up of "animal products ", "dairy products " and 
"cereals and preparations ". Over the last 10 years, developing Members have utilized SSGs to a 
greater degree than developed Members.  
1.28.   In its assessment of Member notifications, the United States has also encountered issues with 
Member s either failing to notify SSG use or non -use, or not notifying within the timeframe specified 
in G/AG/2 . In addition, Members that notify SSG usage lack c onsistency in reporting the information.  
These issues may cause confusion for importers and exporters of concerned products and reduces 
transparency for the WTO Members in reviewing utilization of the SSG in the context of the A oA. 
Therefore the United Sta tes encourages Members to examine these issues and discuss approaches 
to strengthen compliance with requirements and improve notification practices related to the SSG.  
1.29.   The United States also requests that the Secretariat continue to compile and publish 
information on SSGs, akin to the note from January 2017 ( TN/AG/S/29 /Rev.1 ), with a focus on 
deeper analysis of the issues identified in this submissio n. Likewise, the United States requests that 
Members ensure that all WTO notifications relevant to SSGs are up -to-date and notified.  
1.30.   The United States will continue its own analysis of the areas specified in the July 2018 
submission ( JOB/AG/141 ) and looks forward to constructive engagement from other Members.  
__________  
 
25 Barbados summary notification consists of HS -4 lines (0203, 0207) . 
26 G/AG/N/TPKM/186  and G/AG/N/JPN/244 . 
27 Japan , the European Union, the Philippines and Costa Rica do not provide any data on the quantity 
affected in their most recent MA:5 notifications.  
28 G/AG/ N/CRI/60  and G/AG/N/CRI/68 . 
29 2015 MA:5 notification from Barbados contains incorrect description for tariff line HS Code: 2009299.