RESTRICTED  
  
G/MA/M/75  
 
25 March  2022 
(22-2536) Page: 1/59 
Committee on Market Access  
 Original: English  
 
  
MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON MARKET ACCESS  
11 OCTOBER  2021  
CHAIRPERSON: MR  CHAKARIN KOMOLSIRI  (THAILAND ) 
The Committee  on Market Access (CMA, or the Committee)  adopted  the agenda as reproduced in 
documents  WTO/AIR/MA/1 5/Rev.1 . An annotated agenda had been circulated in 
document  JOB/MA/1 50. 
 
1   INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF 
CONCESSIONS – STATUS REPORT (G/MA/W/158/REV.3)  ................................ ..............  3 
− HS1996 ( WT/L/6905)  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 3 
− HS2002 ( WT/L/605 and WT/L/807)  ................................ ................................ ..............  3 
− HS2007 (WT/L/673 and WT/L/830)  ................................ ................................ .............  3 
− HS2012 (WT/L/831)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 3 
− HS2017 (WT/L/995)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 4 
2   EXTENSION OF THE HS -RELATED WAIVERS  ................................ ...............................  4 
3   PROCEDURE FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM 2022  CHANGES  
TO SCHEDULES OF CONCESSIONS – DRAFT DECISION (JOB/MA/147/REV.2)  ................  4 
4   THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE  
ORGANIZATION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  5 
5   OPERATION OF THE INTEGRA TED DATABASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED  
TARIFF SCHEDULES (CTS) DATABASE  ................................ ................................ .............  8 
− STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2019  IDB DECISION (G/MA/367) ............................  8 
− STATUS OF IDB  NOTIFICATIONS (G/MA/IDB/2/REV.54)  ................................ ................  10 
− LIST OF MEMBERS' OFFICIAL WEBSITES WITH TARIFF INF ORMATION AND IMPORT 
STATISTICS (G/MA/IDB/W/13/REV.5)  ................................ ................................ .................  12 
− STATUS OF THE CTS DATABASE  ................................ ................................ ................  12 
6   NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES  
FOR QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS (G/L/59/REV.1)  ................................ ..................  13 
A. NOTIFICATIONS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 13 
B. REPORT FROM THE SECRETARIAT (G/MA/QR/11)  ................................ ........................  19 
C. REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE INFORMATION SESSION ON QUANTITATIVE 
RESTRICTIONS AND THEIR RELATION TO MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS  ....... 19 
7   TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  .....................  21 
8   PROPOSAL ON TRANSPARENCY IN APPLIED TARIFF RATE CHANGES –  
STATEMENT BY CANADA ................................ ................................ ................................  27 
9   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ........  30 G/MA/M/75  
 
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  10   CANADA – RESTRICTIONS ON THE COMMERCIAL IMPORTATION OF CANNABIS  
AND CANNABIS PRODUCTS FOR MEDICAL USE – STATEMENT BY COLOMBIA  ................  31 
11   CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – STATEMENT BY 
AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  32 
12   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM –  
STATEMENTS BY CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ .............  34 
13   KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES, THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON  
CERTAIN IMPORTED PRODUCTS (G/MA/W/169) – STATEMEN TS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ .........................  38 
14   INDIA – INDIAN STANDARDS AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IN THE AUTOMOTIV E 
SECTOR (QUALITY ORDERS): WHEEL RIMS, SAFETY CLASS, HELMETS – STATEMENT  
BY INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  40 
15   INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY OR DER 2020 – STATEMENT BY  
INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................  41 
16   INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – 
STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION, AND THE UNITE D STATES  ................................ ................................ ....... 41 
17   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN  
UNION AND INDONESIA  ................................ ................................ ...............................  43 
18   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – STATEMENT BY  
JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  45 
19   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES, TELEVISION SETS, AND AIR  
CONDITIONERS – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  ................................ ................................  46 
20   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  46 
21   INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION  
PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ........................  47 
22   MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE – STATEMENT BY THE  
UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  48 
23   NEPAL'S IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  ...............  49 
24   RUSSIAN FEDERATION – EXPORT PROHIBITION ON TIMBER PRODUCTS - 
STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .........  50 
25   RUSSIAN FEDERATION – DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF VALUE -ADDED  
TAXES – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ...............................  51 
26   RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRACK AND TRACE REGIME – STATEMENT BY THE 
UNITED  STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............  51 
27   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – STATEMENTS BY  
AUSTRALIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THAILAND  ................................ ...................  52 
28   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  ................  55 
29   UNITED KINGDOM – RENEGOTIATION OF TARIFF RATE QUOTAS UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII OF THE GATT  1994 – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ...... 56 
30   DRAFT REPORT (2021) OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE  
IN GOODS (G/MA/SPEC/61)  ................................ ................................ .........................  57 
31   ELECTION OF THE VICE -CHAIRPERSON  ................................ ................................ .. 57 
32   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 58 
32.1   Trainin g sessions for Geneva -based delegates  ................................ ............................  58 
32.2   Dates of next meetings ................................ ................................ ............................  59 G/MA/M/75  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF CONCESSIONS  
– STATUS REPORT (G/MA/W/158/REV. 3) 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that a full version of the Secretariat's reports regarding the various  
transposition s of Schedules had been made available as a room document and would be incorporated 
into the minutes of the meeting.1 
1.2.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) inform ed Members that a revised version of the report 
with the overall "Status of HS  Transpositions ", document  G/MA/W/158/Rev. 3, had been prepared 
by the Secretariat. The report sought to provide a n overview of the overall state of play of the 
different HS  transposition exercises , as of 27 September  2021, and had taken into account the 
results of the last HS  multilateral review , which had been held on 21 September  2021. 
− HS1996  (WT/L/ 6905 ) 
1.3.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that one  file had remained pending in HS1996 
since February  2009, which was the file of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.2 
1.4.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2002 ( WT/L/605 and WT/L/807)  
1.5.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that the last wr itten report on this issue had been 
issued as document  JOB/MA/42/Rev.26, dated 11  September  2019. The status of the 
HS2002  transposition files after the multilateral review of 21 September  2021 was as follows: 
116 files had been certified or were in the process of certification; and one  draft file had been 
completed and sent to the Member for its first  review. Finally, 18  Members had not been affected 
by the transposition, as eight  Members had acceded to the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in 
HS2002, a nother eight  Members in HS2007, and two  Members in HS2012.  
1.6.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2007 (WT/L/673 and WT/L/830)  
1.7.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/104/Rev.2 7, dated 13 September  2021. The status of the HS2007  transposition 
files after the multilateral review of  21 September  2021 was as follows: 11 1 files had been certified 
or were in the process of certification; one  file had been released for  multilateral review and had 
received comments from other Members ; five draft files had been completed and sent to Members 
for their first  review; and eight  draft files remained to be prepared. Finally, ten  Members had not 
been affected by the transpositio n as eight  Members had acceded to the WTO with a Schedule of 
concessions in HS2007, and two  Members in HS2012.  
1.8.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
− HS2012 (WT/L/831)  
1.9.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/129/Rev.13, dated 13  September  2021. The status of the HS2012  transposition 
files after the multilateral review of 21  September  2021 was as follows: 102  files h ad been certified 
or were in the process of certification; three  files had been released for multilateral review and had 
received comments from other Members; six  draft files had been completed and sent to Members 
for their first  review; and 2 2 draft files  remained to be prepared. Finally, two  Members had not been 
affected by the transposition as they had acceded to the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in 
HS2012.  
1.10.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
 
1 Document  RD/MA/91 . 
2 Ongoing separate procedures, GATT  document  L/6905.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  − HS2017 (WT/L/995)  
1.11.   The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report  had been issued 
as document  JOB/MA/143/Rev.4, dated 14 September  2021. The status of the HS2017  transposition 
files after the multilateral review of 21  September  2021 was as follows: 54  files had been c ertified 
or were in the process of certification; eleven  files had been released for multilateral review and had 
received comments from other Members; nineteen  draft files had been completed and sent to 
Members for their first  review  and 51  draft files rem ained to be prepared. Finally, she mentioned 
that the overall status of the different transposition exercises was reflected in slide  2 of the 
presentation .3 
1.12.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
2  EXTENSION OF THE HS -RELATED WAIVERS  
2.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that the General Council had agreed to extend the relevant waivers 
for the introduction of the H S changes into WTO  Schedules of concessions for a number of Members 
on the basis of a "collective decision ". The most recent waivers were: HS2002  (WT/L/1 104); HS2007 
(WT/L/1 105); HS2012 (WT/L/1 106); and HS2017 (WT/L/1 107). He noted that these waivers would 
expire on 31  December  2021 and that the Members concerned had yet to complete their relevant 
transposition procedures. Therefore, the Chai rperson proposed that the Committee extend all of 
these collective waivers until 31  December  2022. He proposed to the Committee to forward the draft 
collective waiver decisions granting such an extension, as contained in documents  G/C/W/7 96, 
G/C/W/7 97, G/C /W/798, and G/C/W/7 99, to the General Council, through the Council for Trade in 
Goods (CTG), for appropriate action .4 
2.2.  The Committee so agreed . 
3  PROCEDURE FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM 2022  CHANGES TO 
SCHEDULES OF CONCESSIONS – DRAFT DECISION (J OB/MA/147/REV.2)  
3.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that , at its formal meeting of 12  November  2020, the Committee had 
requested the Secretariat to prepare a draft procedure for the introduction of the HS2022  changes 
to Schedules of concessions using the CTS  databas e. A first  draft of the decision, which was based 
on the previously agreed HS2017  transposition procedures (WT/L/995), had been  circulated on 
10 December  2020 (JOB/MA/147) and discussed at the informal meeting of 28  January  2021. Based 
on Members' comments, the Secretariat had included the examples of tariff line conversion s in the 
annex to the document and the revised version  had been discussed again at the informal meeting 
on 26  May 2021. At that meeting, Members had requested additional time to r eview the document 
and had been able to provide comments in writing to the Secretariat until 31  August  2021. As had 
been reported at the informal meeting of the Committee on 21  September, the Secretariat had 
reflected the comments received by Members in th e second  revision of the document , and no further 
comments or changes had been raised at that meeting. Therefore, he proposed to the Committee 
to forward the draft decision  on the HS2022  transposition procedure, as contained in 
document  JOB/MA/147/Rev.2, to the General Council, through the C TG, for appropriate action .5 
3.2.  The Committee so agreed . 
3.3.  The Chairperson  also drew Members' attention to paragraph  2 of the draft decision , which 
stated that: "The Secretariat shall transpose the schedules of Members, except for those who 
undertake to prepare their own transposition and submit a notification to this effect no later than 
31 December  2021". In this regard, he invite d Members wishing to prepare the transposition of their 
WTO Schedule of concession s into HS2022 to contact the Secretariat  in writing 
(Alya.Belkhodja@wto.org  and Roberta.Lascari@wto.org ) before 31  December  2021. 
 
3 Document  RD/MA/92.  
4 The General Council Decisions were circulated in documents  WT/L/1124 (HS2002), WT/L/1125 
(HS2007), WT/L/1126 (HS2012) and WT/L/1127 (HS2017).  
5 The General Council Decision was circulated in document  WT/L/1123.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  3.4.  The Committee took note  of the st atement s made.  
4  THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
4.1.  The Chairperson  welcomed Ms  Gael Grooby, Deputy Director of Tariff and Trade Affairs at the 
World Customs Organization (WCO), who provided an update on the WCO 's Harmonized S ystem 
Committee work on the HS2022  implementation, and Mr  Roy Santana, from the Market Access 
Division of the WTO, who presented the document entitled "Joint Indicative List of Critical 
COVID -19 Vaccine Inputs ".6 
4.2.  The representative of the World Customs Organization  (Ms Gael Grooby) reported as follows:  
4.3.  The WCO appreciates the opportunity to share with the Committee some of the work that it 
has been doing in this regard. With regard to the Strategic Review, this is on t rack for acceptance 
and achieved approval of the finances at the June  WCO Council. However, as over the course of 
consideration of the proposal some of the focus ha s shifted, there is a need to update the business 
case to reflect this before final approval  at the June  2022 Council. One of the matters updated is 
actually the name. The name "Strategic Review " was inherited from the study done by the 
Harmonized System Committee (HSC) a decade ago , but the understanding of what is meant by 
"review " has changed oved the years. So it has been renamed as an "Exploratory Study on Feasible 
Options for a Possible Strategic Review ". This better reflects that it is intended to explore the current 
situation of the HS and its use , and that, where there are issues of conce rn identified , it is also 
intended to generate information on feasible options for addressing such concerns. This would allow 
the HSC and its members to consider both the concerns identified by the study and potential ways 
forward. At this stage, if it is approved by the June  2022 Council, we would be looking at its starting 
in the second  half of 2022.  
4.4.  Regarding the publication and timing of the HS2022  publications, the HS2022  itself is now 
published, as is the brochure on the Amendments to the HS. We have had some delays , 
unfortunately , with the Explanatory Notes, which we expected to be out last month, but we are now 
looking at November or December for the Explanatory Notes. As for the Compendium of 
Classification Opinions, we have received the publication  proofs , which have been checked and sent 
back for finalization, so it looks like it is on course to be finalized . The HS2022  Nomenclature itself 
has been uploaded and is available in the WCO  Trade Tools platform , and the Explanatory Notes and 
Classificati on Opinions would be upload ed as soon as they are published , and would also be available 
for those who have a subscription. The other issues for publications, such as the Alphabetical Index 
and the Chemical,  would be out in the first  quarter of 2022, the Customs Laboratory Guide in 
December  2021, and the Classification Handbook, that  we are in the process of preparing , will need 
more time as we have realized that the change s are extensive enough that we need to put it through 
the HSC. So the expected deadline is in December of this year, or next year , depending on whether 
it needs to go back to the  HSC at its  March  meeting . 
4.5.  The Secretariat  (Mr Roy Santana) reported that:  
4.6.  Today I would like to report on a statement that I delivered on 22  September  2021 on behalf 
of the WTO  Secretariat at a meeting of the Harmonized System Committee7, where one of the items 
was a discussion on the joint indicative list of critical inputs for COVID -19 vaccines  that was 
published on 7  July 2021. As you are probably aware, the Joint Indicative List includes very detailed 
product and tariff classification information in four  areas of interest: (i) the inputs needed for vaccine 
manufacturing; (ii) products needed f or vaccine storage and  distribution; (iii) vaccine 
administration; and (iv) other vaccine -related supplies and equipment. My statement to the HSC 
focused on four  questions, and I thought that three of them were also relevant to this Committee, 
so I will pr oceed to provide a brief overview of the following: (i) why was the Joint Indicative List 
produced in the first place; (ii) how was the list developed; and (iii) what is its current status?  
4.7.  The need for a joint effort in identifying the critical inputs for  vaccine manufacturing became 
apparent earlier this year as a result of different factors. First, the WTO  Secretariat had been invited 
to participate in different initiatives relating to the pandemic, including a subgroup of the 
COVAX  Manufacturing Task Fo rce. There, we received many questions on the exact inputs needed 
 
6 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/covid19_e/vaccine_inputs_report_e.pdf  
7 The full statement was circulated in document  RD/MA/90.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  to produce COVID -19 vaccines and the type of trade barriers their import was facing.  We knew from 
the outset that vaccines were manufactured through global supply chains, meaning that inputs  from 
different countries were required. Thus, it appeared obvious that scaling -up production of vaccines 
increasingly depended on international trade. And this dependency would increase as 
COVID  vaccines would start being manufactured in new countries. Then, the question was: how can 
we ensure that trade policy supports the scaling -up of COVID -19 vaccines and does not slow down 
their production?  Because of the way in which the information is captured in the different databases 
on tariff and no n-tariff measures, including those that the WTO  maintains, we had to find out not 
only the specific inputs, but also their tariff classification in the HS. But where do we start? We are 
neither vaccine nor tariff classification experts in the WTO  Secretari at and there was very little 
information available at the time. To make things worse, the demand for this type of information 
kept rising as other international organizations, which were also undertaking work in this area, 
turned to the WTO  Secretariat for  information. Second, some WTO  Members and other stakeholders 
were interested in identifying the specific products with a view to either eliminating or reducing 
tariffs on the relevant products , or facilitating their importation , in order to reduce the cos t and time 
needed to manufacture COVID  vaccines. To do this, very specific products had to be identified.  
4.8.  For example, the production of most vaccines requires special large -capacity plastic bags used 
to manufacture batches in bioreactors. While it would n ot make sense to include the importation of 
all plastic bags in the green channel for facilitated import procedures, this could be possible if the 
specific bags used for vaccine manufacturing are identified. Without the identification of these 
specific pro ducts, it is very likely that the import, export or transit of these inputs gets delayed or 
disrupted as a result of the business -as-usual procedures, without the customs officers ever knowing 
the critical importance that these bags had. And since vaccines  cannot be produced without them 
and inventories are so tight at the moment, any delay would directly affect the manufacturing 
process.  
4.9.  Dayong Yu and Eric Ng Shing, two  colleagues from the Economic Research and Statistics 
Division , who are also with us tod ay, tried to devise different ways to find this information very early 
on in the year. They found publicly available information on some of the specific inputs for the 
vaccines produced by Pfizer -BioNTech, Moderna, Janssen (J&J), and AstraZeneca, but we st ruggled 
to determine the HS  classification for many of them.  
4.10.   Finally, at some point , several researchers and organizations began publishing what they 
considered to be the vaccine inputs and their HS  classification, but we noticed that they were all 
includi ng different products in their lists and the information on the HS  classification was sometimes 
incomplete or even contradictory. Everybody seemed to have different pieces of the puzzle and it 
was not useful to have yet another incomplete list by the WTO i n the midst of a pandemic.  
4.11.   What were we to do? After reflecting on the different options, we thought that the most useful 
solution would be to work together with the relevant actors in order to share information and try to 
find solutions together.  
4.12.   How was the list developed?  We began approaching others in preparation for the 
WTO COVID -19 Vaccine Supply Chain and Regulatory Transparency Symposium  that took place on 
29 June 2021, and which included researchers, vaccine manufacturers, and organizations like the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), the Asian Developm ent Bank , and the W CO. Once the exchange began, 
we realized that we were all facing similar challenges and immediately saw the value of working 
together.  
4.13.   In this regard, I would like to highlight the critical role that some vaccine manufacturers 
played in opening up and providing very detailed information on the inputs used to produce their 
vaccines, many of which change from company to company. The involvement of the WCO  Secretariat 
was also crucial: it carefully reviewed this information and tried to dete rmine an indicative 
classification of the relevant products in the Harmonized System. I put the emphasis on the word 
"indicative " because we all know very well that it is the governments , the classification experts of 
each country represented in this meeti ng, who have the ultimate legal responsibility of determining 
the classification of these products when they are presented for importation. The list has prominent 
disclaimers in this respect. I would like to take advantage  of this opportunity to express ou r most 
sincere thanks to the WCO  Secretariat for the technical work they did in 2020 providing similar G/MA/M/75  
 
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  indicative information for other critical products to combat the pandemic , such as personal protective 
equipment (PPEs) , and other products.  
4.14.   What is the current status  of the list ? Since the first  version of the Joint Indicative List of 
vaccine inputs was published before the summer break, the Secretariat has been  trying to confirm 
the information contained in th is list . In another development, the heads o f the WTO, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank , and the World Health Organization , formed a 
Multilateral Leaders Taskforce for COVID -19 vaccines, thera peutics, and diagnostics , which seeks to 
increase vaccine manufacturing and promote vaccine equity. As part of these efforts, the 
WTO Secretariat has been in contact with ten of the major vaccine manufacturers . When asked if 
the list includes all the relev ant inputs to manufacture their vaccine, the representatives confirmed 
that it did. We are therefore confident that we have identified the right products in a comprehensive 
manner. On 8 October  2021, the Secretariat issued an information note on the tariff s applied on the 
vaccine inputs as defined in the Joint Indicative List. This document is to be presented during a 
session open to all Members on 12  October  2021. The Secretariat stands ready to provide more 
information on these information notes as requir ed by the Committee.  
4.15.   The representative of the World Customs Organization  (Ms Gael Grooby) reported as follows:  
4.16.   First, we would like to thank the WTO for collaborating with the WCO. We could not have done 
this on our own because we would not have had the same level of access to information from the 
manufacturers. This shows how important it is for the WTO/WCO  collaboratio n on such projects. It  
is understandable that multinational classification is not always without concerns. Sharing 
information with customs is different form sharing information with the WTO. In terms of the  way 
forward , one thing that we are very clear on  is that we need to be better prepared for future 
international health emergencies. When we looked at the classification of many of these goods , they 
are very much  in basket categories , so they  are mixed  in with a lot of goods that have no  relevance  
to hea lth, pandemics , or international emergencies. Ideally , we would have a great level of 
granularity  for goods that may need emergency facilitation , so this is the role of the HSC , including 
looking at how we might develop  for HS202 7 a better level of granula rity. But what I would say in 
this forum  is that the development of the HS is a whole of government issue. Customs will of course 
put forward proposals of interest to it, but it is really important for Members to look at the 
development of proposals for th e HSC across its agencies and administrations to ensure that issues 
of importance to health and other agencies within the government are actually reflected . For this 
reason, I would encourage everyone to talk to the ir customs administrations as they have proposals 
to better reflect the need s of the international community to be able to quickly identify goods that 
may need facilitation. One example that I mentioned to the Harmoniz ed System  Committee  relates 
indeed to th ose plastic bags that Mr  Santana discussed  earlier . There is a lot of equipment within 
the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry that used to be of glass or metal that is now made of 
plastics. These are often classified with general articles , often "other plastics " articles. There may be 
room for HS 2027 to identify plastic articles for pharmaceutical use . This is just one  example of a 
possible change. For this to happen, of course , we would need proposals from an interested member. 
Our thanks to the WTO for  inviting the WCO to collaborate on this. It  is an excellent tool and 
encourage s everyone to think in terms of a whole of government exercise regarding what might be 
needed for HS 2027. 
4.17.   The representative of the  European Union  indicated the following : 
4.18.   The European Union  will not comment on the substance but would like to note the relevance 
and the value of this technical work. It supports the joint efforts to fight the pandemic and to prepare 
for any future crisis , as noted. The EU  therefore very much encou rages the Secretariat to bring that 
work forward . The EU also  very much appreciate s being regularly informed as to how this work 
develops. The EU very much appreciate the update on this occasion, and the more detailed 
explanations to follow . The EU has also taken careful note of the issue of a whole-of-government 
approach , the issue of intergovernmental coordination , and the EU shall give this issue its further 
consideration.  
4.19.   The Chairperson  acknowledged Members ' interest  in the information notes prepared b y the 
Secretariat in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic  and recalled that , on 5 October  2021,  the 
Secretariat had sent out a communication to all delegations inviting them to a "Virtual Information 
Session on Access to COVID -19 Vaccines ", which was sched uled to take  place on 12 October , G/MA/M/75  
 
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  from 13:30 to 14:45 , on Zoom. All delegates were invited to participate in the information session  
and could contact the Secretariat for additional information.  
4.20.   In addition, the Chairperson  also informed the Committee that , on 7 October  2021,  the 
Secretariat had officially launched the HS  Tracker8, an application which had been developed in 
collaboration with the WCO. The main goal of the tracker was to allow users to track the changes in 
headings or subheadings across different versions of the Harmonized System, including the 
upcoming HS2022. He recalled that the Secretariat had presented the beta version of this tool to 
the Committee in January and June  2021, and thanked the Secretariat, i n particular the Market 
Access Intelligen ce Section, for its impressive work, as well as the WCO for its support.  
4.21.   The Committee took note  of the reports and statements made.  
5  OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATABASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED TARIFF 
SCHEDULES ( CTS) DATABASE  
5.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were four issues to discuss under this agenda item, 
namely: (i) the status of implementation of the IDB  Decision; (ii) the status of IDB  notifications; 
(iii) the document with the list of Members' official websites; and (iv) the status of the CTS  database.  
− STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2019  IDB DECISION (G/MA/367)  
5.2.  The Chairperson  recalled that a full version of the Secretariat's report and the presentation had 
been made available as a room document9 and would be incorporated into the minutes of the 
meeting.  
5.3.  The Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) reported that  additional projects ha d been undertaken 
relating  to the implementation of provisions indicated in document  G/MA/367:  
a.  A consultant is currently engaged in developing the interfaces for the new dissemination  
portal that would deliver a much better user experience and user interf ace (UX/UI) to 
the application ; 
b.  As reported at the last formal meeting of the Committee, a module that would facilitate 
processing and integration of preferential tariff data which could be in a different 
HS version and/or national nomenclature from the MFN has been developed. The data 
would be extremely useful for alignment to MFN  tariffs and imports at the HS  6-digit 
level and would add to the usefulness of the IDB for analytical purposes ; 
c.  In relation to paragraph  8 of the 2019  IDB Decision on the automatic submission of 
data, the Secretariat has engaged in exchange of information and the organization of 
virtual meetings at the request of delegations to explain in more detail how the process 
would work. The "Call to Notify " email a lso includes a reminder of the possible automatic 
data transmission. Meanwhile, the other concurrent project related to the automatic 
notification of IDB  data is being implemented in partnership with UNCTAD and involves 
customs offices of Members using ASY CUDA. Madagascar was the first  Member to sign 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Secretariat and the automatic 
transmission is already being implemented. The data extraction and submission module 
are already in place and the data is being verifie d to ensure accuracy and reliability. 
Another MoU was recently signed with Côte d'Ivoire and the implementation of the 
project has started ; 
d.  Additional processes related to the automatic transmission of data, like the automated 
recording in the IDB  Informa tion Management System, email notification to the 
designated contact person/s in the capital and WTO  Geneva mission, and full data 
integration, are planned for development soon ; 
 
8 https://hstracker.wto.org/  
9 Documents  RD/MA/91 and RD/MA/92 . G/MA/M/75  
 
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  e.  The Asian Development Bank (ADB) requested and was granted authorized user ac cess 
to the IDB and CTS  databases after it sent formal agreement to the new provisions on 
the dissemination policy described in Annex  4. Thus, currently, there are 
twelve  intergovernmental organizations10 authorized by the CMA that have already 
communicate d in writing their conformance to the new dissemination policy. The 
Secretariat is still awaiting the response on this subject from the other authorized users 
listed in paragraph  2.3(d) of Annex  4. The Secretariat has received positive replies from 
nine of  these organizations and is still awaiting replies from the rest.  
5.4.  The representative of  Uruguay  indicated  the following:  
5.5.  Uruguay is in the process of finalizing a voluntary agreement with the WTO  Secretariat for the 
automatic transmission of its tariff and import data to the IDB , as provided in paragraph  8 of the 
IDB Decision. Uruguay wishes to highlight the importance of the role of the WTO  Integrated 
Database as the official source of tariff and other trade -related information. It's important in ensuring 
transparency in the trade policy regime of Members , and is a fantastic tool to improve access for 
MSMEs to reliable official market access information. Uruguay recommend s that all Members explore 
the feasibility of entering such a voluntary agreement.  
5.6.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
5.7.  Canada wishes to note that t he updated decision on the Integrated Database in 2019  opened 
up new pathways for Members to voluntarily enhance the c omprehensiveness and completeness of 
the information the IDB  contains. As mentioned by Uruguay, one  element of the December  2020 
Declaration from the Informal Working Group on MSMEs highlighted the importan t role of the IDB 
and recommended that Members con sider taking advantage of these new pathways going forward. 
Canada also wishes to underline this recommendation and to encourage all WTO  Members to 
examine how the updated IDB  Decision could  help them to provide their applied tariff and trade data 
to the WTO.  
5.8.  The representative of  the United States  indicated  the following : 
5.9.  The United States  agree s that submitting IDB  notifications on time is a very important 
commitment. It provides transparency to ensure Members are adhering to their tariff commitments . 
For example, the United States has noticed that the Russian Federation has not submitted 
ad valorem  equivalent (AVE) data to the IDB. Submitting that AVE data was an important 
commitment that Russia undertook as part of its accession to provide transpare ncy into how it 
applies its compound duties, such as "5%, but no less than  2 €/kg". 
5.10.   The representative of  India indicated  the following : 
5.11.   In the last few days, India has made two  submissions to the IDB. The first submission is the 
utilization of its Duty-Free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme for LDCs.  This is currently under review 
by the Secretariat. The second  submission  is on the IDB  notifications for import statistics and tariff 
notification. This is also under review by t he Secretariat. With these submissions,  and once India 
has agreed the process with the Secretariat, it will be fully compliant with all of its notification 
obligations. India wishes to thank the Secretariat for its ongoing  help in this process.  
5.12.   The Chairpe rson recalled that Annex  4 of the IDB  decision spelled out the terms and 
conditions of the dissemination policy of the IDB and CTS  databases that must be accepted by all 
users of this data. According to paragraph  10 of Annex  4, the Secretariat would inform  the 
Committee of the users that receive authorization to re -disseminate IDB  data. In this respect, he 
informed the Committee that the Secretariat had received a request by HIS Markit, a private 
company offering services and solutions to business es and gov ernments, including on international 
trade research and analysis. HIS Markit had requested access to the IDB  data, pursuant to 
paragraphs  7 and 8 of Annex  4 of the IDB  Decision, with the objective to use such data, in particular  
on tariffs, to enhance global compliance with trade rules and support international trade businesses 
make informed decisions with additional trade intelligence. After accepting the terms and conditions 
 
10 In addition to the ADB, the other eleven  intergovernmental organizations that have positively replied 
to the communication on the new dissemination pol icy are: the Andean Community; EBRD ; EFTA; FAO; IGC; 
ITC; OECD ; South Center ; UN ESCAP ; UNCTAD ; and the World Bank Group.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  of the dissemination policy in Annex  4, HIS Markit had r eceived authorization to re -disseminate 
IDB data only with respect to approved and unrestricted data, as specified in Annex  4. 
5.13.   The Committee  took note  of the Secretariat's report and the statements made.  
− STATUS OF IDB  NOTIFICATIONS (G/MA/IDB/2/REV.5 4) 
5.14.   The Chairperson  recalled that a full version of the Secretariat's report and presentation had 
been made available as a room document11 and would be incorporated into the minutes of the 
meeting.  
5.15.   The Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) recalled that the report by t he Secretariat on the status 
of submissions to the IDB had been circulated in document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.54. The data cut -off 
date was 17 September  2021, which was almost a month and a half ahead of the deadline for 
2020 imports notification s, due by 31  October  2021. Thus, the latest dataset due from Members 
remained the 2021  applied tariffs. An electronic copy for all years from 1996 was also available for 
download from the site https://IDBFileEx change.wto.org . A call to notify had been sent to concerned 
Members in early September for outstanding 2020  import notifications , which were due by 
31 October  2021, and other data yet to be notified. For the statistics cited below, the cut -off date 
was 4 October  2021. 
5.16.   In 2021, the IDB  tariff notifications due by the 30  March deadline improved significantly and 
was the highest as compared to previous years. By the deadline, 34% of expected notifications 
(46 of 136  expected datasets) had already been received, as compared to 21% in 2020 , and 11% 
in 2019. Import data for 2019 received by the 31  October  2020 deadline was at 31%, the highest 
since 2014 , but lower than the 2013  rate of 36% by the regular imports deadline.  
5.17.   On the 2021 applied tariffs,  the IDB currently included data for 83  Members, as of the cut -off 
date of 4  October, which accounts for 61% (or 83  notifications) of the 136  expected notifications. 
Of those 83  files, 64  were official submissions , while the remaining 19  were colle cted by the 
Secretariat from approved "framework sources ". As to the inclusion of other applied tariffs, there 
were also 61  submissions (or 74% of received notifications) , which included non -MFN duty schemes. 
Further more, there were seven  notifications that contained the optional additional import taxes. 
Overall, 50  Members, representing 37% of notifying Members, have complete notification on 
MFN applied tariffs. However, there remain 40  Members (29%) with six or more years of outstanding 
applied tariff dat a. 
5.18.   The 2019 import data, due in October  2020,  was used as the basis for the statistics presented 
in this report. There were 66  available notifications, which represented 49% of the 135  expected 
notifications. Of those, 63  notifications (47%) had been submi tted by the 31  October  2020 deadline 
and three  datasets had been collected by the Secretariat from framework sources. Data on imports 
for 2018 stood at 59%  complete. For all import data due from 1996 to 2019, 42  Members, 
representing 31% of the Membership,  have complete data. The number of Members with outstanding 
data for six or more years is 48, representing 36% of the Membership. There were already 
24 Members that have notified 2020  import data ahead of the October  deadline.  
5.19.   The number of "recomposed " data, as provided in paragraph  22 of document  G/MA/367, 
remained at thirty -five country periods , with the latest recomposed year as 2015. The Secretariat 
would continue to examine previous years' notifications to see if additional notified impo rts could  be 
integrated with recomposed applied MFN  tariffs.  
5.20.   Overall, as of the same data cut -off date, IDB disseminated d ata consisted of 2,804  country 
periods of either applied tariffs with matched imports at the national tariff line level or else applie d 
tariffs only. The Secretariat estimated that IDB  notifications on MFN  applied tariffs were 
83% complete for the data expected until 2021, and 76%  complete for imports until 2019. All other 
Members, e xcept for Afghanistan  and six  acceding Members (Algeria , Bahamas, Belarus,  Comoros,  
Iran, and Serbia) , had notified their data to the IDB, as also disseminated in Tariff Analysis Online 
(TAO) , TDF, and WTODATA . 
 
11 Documents  RD/MA/91 and RD/MA/92.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  5.21.   Ms Mendoza  recalled that the submission of mandatory data for Members covered by the 
Preferential Trade Arrangements Transparency Mechanism (PTA -TM) should be notified in the 
context of IDB  notifications. Of the 24  notifying Members of the PTA12, seven had not yet notified 
their applied tariff s for 2021  (see Table  1). Of the 17  Members tha t had notified tariffs, one  had 
submitted only MFN  tariffs without including the mandatory non -reciprocal GSP/LDC  schemes . The 
PTA-TM required that import data be notified with the necessary breakdown, and in  17 of 
23 expected notifications for 2019 (count ing the EU -27 and UK as one until 2019  in terms of data 
on imports in the context of IDB  notification), four  Members had only submitted the regular data on 
imports, without including the breakdown by duty scheme, and six  Members had not yet submitted 
any o f their data on imports. As stipulated in paragraph  5 of the IDB  Decision, and to avoid multiple 
processing of data, the Secretariat would await the complete PTA -TM datasets (tariffs or imports) 
before integrating these notifications into the IDB.  
Table  1. Status of Notifications of Required PTA -TM data 
Data Notified   Number  Percent (%)  
Applied MFN Tariff + PTA Preferences  
2019  2020  2021a
 2019  2020  2021  
MFN Only  1 1 1 4 4 4 
MFN + GSP/LDC (incl. Other 
PTAs) + Other Duty Schemes  20 20 16 87 87 67 
No Notification  2 2 7 9 9 29 
 Imports by PTA Duty Scheme  
 2017  2018  2019  2017  2018  2019  
Regular Imports with No 
Breakdown by PTA Duty Scheme  7 5 4 30 22 17 
With PTA -TM Breakdown  14 15 13 61 65 57 
No Notification  2 3 6 9 13 26 
PTA Membersa
 23 23 23 100 100 100 
a EU tariff notifications until 2020 include its 27  member States and the UK. In 2021, UK tariffs were notified 
separately.  
 
5.22.   The following additional notifications had been received between 17 September and 
4 October  2021:  
• Argentina 2020  imports ; 
• Cuba 2020  imports ; 
• Israel 2018 and 2020  imports ; 
• Mongolia 2021 applied MFN and preferential tariffs, and 2019  imports ; 
• Panama 2019  imports; 
• Senegal 2020  imports ; 
• Ukraine 2020  imports ; 
• Uruguay 2021  applied MFN  tariffs and 2020  imports . 
 
5.23.   Since the Committee's previous meeting, in April  2021, the Secretariat had participated in the 
following online technical assistance activities concerning  the IDB/CTS  data and related tools:  
• Virtual workshop on Agriculture and WTO  Accession for Iraq (with ITC), 4  July; 
• Virtual workshop on bilateral market access negotiations for Timor -Leste, 16  July; 
• Virtual workshop on Article  28 renegotiation for Mali, 17  August ; 
 
12 The European Union and the United Kingdom are counted separately starting from 2021 for tariffs. 
Switzerland are Liechtenstein count as one.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  • E-RTPC Latin America (Mexico), 31  August ; 
• Virtual technical workshop for the Accession of the Union of the Comoros, 
21 September . 
5.24.   Finally, Ms Mendoza informed the Committee that t he 2021  edition of the World Tariff Profiles 
(WTP) had been  electronically launched in June  2021 and paper copies  of the publication  had been 
made available.  The WTP was among the most downloaded publications of the WTO. The number of 
downloads of the 2020 edition  was around 134,000 from July  2020 to June  2021.  
5.25.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report . 
− LIST OF MEMBERS' OFFICIAL WEBSITES WITH TARIFF INFORMATION AND IMPORT 
STATISTICS (G/MA/IDB/W/13/ REV.5) 
5.26.   The Chairperson  recalled that the 2019 IDB Decision required the Secretariat to prepare a list  
of Members' official websites containing tariff information and import statistics. A fifth revision of 
this document had been  prepared by the Secretariat . In this regard, the Secretariat had  consulted 
with Members informally  prior to circulating this fifth revision  in document  G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev. 5. 
5.27.   The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) reminded Members of the procedure for each revision 
of the document. The Secretariat checked that all weblinks were working and if a weblink was broken 
it was replaced with a  working link. The Secretariat would then share the draft revised document 
with Members for verification of the replaced links. For this revision, the draft document had been 
sent to Members for verification on 14  September  2021. He invited Members to proa ctively inform 
the Secretariat in case any new websites with respect to tariff information or import statistics became 
available.  
5.28.   The Chairperson  urged delegations to test the links in the document and to inform the 
Secretariat as soon as possible of any change so that th e document could be kept up to date. In 
addition, he informed the Committee that the Secretariat was exploring the possibility of makin g 
this information available online so that Members, and other users, c ould have easy and direct access 
to it. 
5.29.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat 's report.  
− STATUS OF THE CTS DATABASE  
5.30.   The Chairperson  drew the Committee's attention to the Secretariat report on the status of the 
CTS database. A full version of the Secretariat's report and presentation had been made available 
as a room document and would be incorporated into the minutes of the meeting.13 
5.31.   The Secretariat  (Ms Alya Belkhodja) reported that the Secretariat had made CTS  files 
available to all Members on the T AO.14 Out of the 135  CTS files: 54 had been made available in 
HS2017 , 47 in HS2012 , 18 in HS2007 , 14 in HS2002 , and two remained in HS96. All legal 
instruments were available through the Goods Schedule e -Library .15 
5.32.   In addition, at the end of June  2021, the Secretariat had published on TAO the complete 
CTS database in MS  Excel. Each Member's file reflected the latest inf ormation on bound 
commitments as included in the CTS  MS Access files. However, the  format of CTS  files in Excel 
followed the presentation used in the legal instruments  as, for example , the Uruguay Round Schedule 
of concessions. An updated version of the CT S Excel files would be posted to TAO by end-October.  
5.33.   The Chairperson  thanked the Secretariat for facilitating access to the information on 
Schedules of concessions through the CTS  files in Excel, which was of great help to Members.  
5.34.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
 
13 Documents  RD/MA/91 and RD/MA/92 . 
14 https://tao.wto.org   
15 https://goods -schedules.wto.org  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  6  NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS (G/L/59/REV.1)  
6.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to  the notifications  of quantitative restrictions (Q Rs) 
from 19 Members , of which three were notifying for the first  time. He noted that many of these 
notifications relate d to measures implemented in response to the COVID -19 pandemic  and, t o the 
extent possible , asked Members t o refer to them under agenda item 7. Finally, he recalled that, in 
the case of a connection problem preventing any Member from indicating that it wishe d to have 
more time to examine a notification,  and thus keep the notification on the Committee's agenda for 
its next formal meeting, th at Member would  have until 18 October  2021 to inform the Secretariat  
accordingly . 
A. NOTIFICATIONS  
− Argentina (G/MA/QR/N/ARG/2)  
6.2.  The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous  meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert to 
the notification by Argentina  that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/ARG/2 . Questions 
remained pending from the United States . 
6.3.  The representative of Argentina  indicated the following:  
6.4.  The non -automatic import licensing regime ap plied by Argentina, established by virtue of 
Resolution of the former Secretariat of Commerce N o. 523/2017 , and its complementary and 
amending rules, is not intended to administer import quotas nor to establish QRs on imports. In this 
regard, as long as th e importer complies with the requirements established in the aforementioned 
regulations, non -automatic licences are granted without QRs. The purpose of the non -automatic 
licensing regime implemented by Argentina is to verify compliance with the requirement s imposed 
by the applicable underlying technical standard , and the respective procedures are related, in terms 
of scope and duration, to the measure for which they are intended and do not entail any 
administrative burden other than that absolutely necessar y to administer the measure. In view of 
the above, and in response to the United States' question, it is Argentina's  understanding that the 
notification of the non -automatic licensing regime under the WTO  Decision on the Procedure for 
Notifications of Quantitative Restrictions is not appropriate.  
6.5.  The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Australia (G/MA/QR/N/AUS/5/Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/AUS/5/Add.2 and 
G/MA/QR/N/AUS/ 5/Add.2/Corr.1 ) 
6.6.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to two  new notifications from Australia that had been  
circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/AUS/5/Addendum  1 and Addendum  2, including 
one corrigendum . 
6.7.  The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Kingdom of Bahrain (G/M A/QR/N/BHR/1/Rev.1/Corr.1, G/MA/QR/N/BHR/1/Rev .1/Add.2)  
6.8.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to two  new notifications from the Kingdom of 
Bahrain. The first  notification  was a correction to document  G/MA/QR/N/BHR/1/ Rev.1. The 
second  notification, which had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/BHR/1/R ev.1/Addendum  2, 
relate d to the elimination of temporary measures introduced by Bahrain in response to COVID -19. 
6.9.  The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
6.10.   Switzerland thanks the Kingdom of Bahrain f or its new notification and has no additional 
question.  
6.11.   The Committee  took note  of these notifications.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  − Cambodia  (G/MA/QR/N /KHM/1 ) 
6.12.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification by Cambodia that had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/ KHM/ 1, and which relate d to measures introduced in response 
to COVID -19. On behalf of the Committee, he thanked Cambodia for complying with this important 
transparency obligation . 
6.13.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− China (G/MA/QR/N/CHN/4/Rev.1, G/MA /QR/N/CHN/5/Rev.1)  
6.14.   The Chairperson  recalled that , at its previous meeting, the  Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by China that had been  circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/CHN/4/Rev.1 and 
G/MA/QR/N/CHN/5/Rev.1. Questions remained pending from the United States . 
6.15.   The representative of  China  indicated  the following:  
6.16.   China has provided its responses to this concern several times in various WTO  bodies. To save 
everyone 's time, China wishes to refer to its previous statements made at this Committee and other 
WTO bodies. China wishes to reiterate that, as the most populated economy in the world, prohibiting 
the import of solid waste is an inevitable choice for it effective ly to safeguard public health and 
ecosystem safety . Also, the relevant measures taken by China are fully in line with its circular 
economy policy. These measures not only support environmental protection in developing the 
circular economy, but also promote  the utilization of domestic and transborder recycling materials. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the general principles recognized all around the world, no one can 
be exempted from the obligation to dispose of the solid waste it generates. China once agai n urges 
those major solid waste exporting Members to reduce the solid waste at source and to shoulder their 
responsibilities in handling their own solid waste.  
6.17.   The Committee took note  of these  notifications.  
− Ecuador (G/MA/QR/N /ECU/1/Add.1)  
6.18.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification by  Ecuador that relate d to the 
elimination of temporary measures introduced by Ecuador in response to COVID -19. 
6.19.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
6.20.   Switzerland  thank s Ecuador for the answers provided and the revised notification that 
addresses its concern and its questions.  
6.21.   The Committee took note  of the notification.  
− El Salvador (G/MA/Q R/N/SLV/1)  
6.22.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification by El Salvador, which relate d 
to measures introduced in response to COVID -19. On behalf of the Committee, he thank ed 
El Salvador  for complying with this important transparency obligation, in particular because the 
notified measure ha d already been terminated prior to the notification.  
6.23.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− The Gambia (G/MA/QR/N/ GMB/1) 
6.24.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification by the Gambia, which related 
to measures introduced in response to COVID -19. On behalf of the Committee, he thanked the 
Gambia for complying with this important transparency obligation, in particular because t he notified 
measure had already been terminated prior to the notification.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  6.25.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− European Union (G/MA/QR/N/EU/5/Add.4, G/MA/QR/N/EU/5/Add.5, G/MA/QR/N/EU/5/Add.6)  
6.26.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to three  new notifications by the European Union , 
which relate d to measures introduced in response to the COVID -19 pandemic . He also inform ed the 
Committee that the European Union ha d submitted another notification , on 7 October , which was 
also related to COVID -19. However, t his notification w ould be on the agenda of the next formal 
meeting of the Committee.  
6.27.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
6.28.   Switzerland thank s the European Union for its notification. Regarding 
notification  G/MA/QR/N/EU/5/Add.5,  Switzerland wishes to know the expected duration of the 
temporary measures implemented by some EU  member States , namely  QR n.1 to QR  n.4. 
6.29.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.30.   The European Union has taken note of the questions received from Switzerland a few days 
previously . The EU is currently in the process of internal consultations. The EU  can already clarify 
that Hungary's measures have been terminated , in June  2021. As stated bilaterally, the EU will 
revert to Switzerland as soon as possible in response to the questions raised  about the expiration 
dates of other measures.  
6.31.   The Chairperson  asked Switzerland whether the Committee could take note of these 
notifications or whether it would need to revert to them at the next meeting.  
6.32.   The representative of Switzerland  replied that the Committee could take note of the 
notification s and they would  wait for the answer from the EU.  
6.33.   The Committee took note  of these notifications.  
− India (G/MA/QR/N/IND/2,  G/MA/QR/N/IND/2/Add.1 , G/MA/QR/N/IND/ 3) 
6.34.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by India in documents  G/MA/QR/N/IND/2 and G/MA/QR/N/IND/2/Add.1. 
Questions remained pending from the Un ited States. Since then, a new complete notification had 
been submitted by India that had been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/IND/3 , and which 
contained measures introduced in response to COVID -19. 
6.35.   The representative of the United States  indicated the fo llowing:  
6.36.   The United States is disappointed that India 's latest notification , issued on 
29 September  2021, once again did not include the import restrictions India applies on certain 
pulses —a long -standing issue that will be addressed later in the agenda. In the past , India has 
implied that it did not need to notify this restriction because it was "temporary ". However, the 
QR Decision of 2012 does not differentiate between temporary or more permanent quantitative 
restrictions. Members are required to "make complete notifications of all quantitative restrictions in 
force. " Furthermore, a measure in place for more than three  years can hardly be considered 
"temporary ". 
6.37.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the  following:  
6.38.   The European Union notes that it has been almost three  years since India submitted its 
biennial  QR notification. Several of the topics on the agenda today, such as India 's import restrictions 
on pulses , as well as trade restricting measures tak en by Members in response to the 
COVID -19 crisis, should be notified. The EU  therefore urges India to bring its notification record up 
to date as soon as possible.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  6.39.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
6.40.   The last 18  months have been difficult for all of us around the world. Unprecedented measures 
had to be taken to ensure a strong response to the pandemic. India has submitted its notification 
on QRs imposed in the pandemic period. On the specific issue of pulses , India will cover it under the 
appropriate agenda  item. 
6.41.   The Committee took note  of the statements made and agreed to revert to the notifications at 
its next meeting.  
− Kazakhstan (G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3 , G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3 /Rev.1, G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3 /Rev.2 ) 
6.42.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous meeting,  the Committee had a greed to revert 
to two  notifications by Kazakhstan  that had been circulated  in document s G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3 and 
G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3/Rev .1. Questions remained pending from Switzerland. Since then, Kazakhstan 
had submitted a second  revision of its notification , in document  G/MA/QR/N/KAZ/3/R ev.2. 
6.43.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
6.44.   Switzerland  thank s Kazakhstan for its revised notification , which cl arifies and answers the 
questions that Switzerland had  raised at the Committee's previous  meeting.  
6.45.   The Committee took note  of these notifications.  
− Kyrgyz Republic (G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.7, G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.8, 
G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add.9 and G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add. 10) 
6.46.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to four new notifications by the Kyrgyz Republic in 
documents  G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add. 7 to G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add. 10. Addenda  7 and 9 contain ed 
measures introduced in response to COVID -19. 
6.47.   The Committee took note  of the se notifications.  
− Malaysia (G/MA/QR/N/MYS/1/Ad d.1) 
6.48.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification by Malaysia,  which had been 
circulated in G/MA/QR/N/MYS/1/Ad d.1, and which relate d to the introduction of a temporary 
measure in response to COVID -19. 
6.49.   The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Norway (G/MA/QR/N/ NOR/ 2, G/MA/QR/N/NOR/2/Add.1 ) 
6.50.   The Chairperson  recalled that, a t its previous meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notification by Norway  that had been circulated  in G/MA/QR/N /NOR/2.  Questions remained 
pending from Switzerland. Since then, Norway ha d submitted an addendum to its notification  that 
had been circulated  in document  G/MA/QR/N/NOR/2/A dd.1. 
6.51.   The represent ative of  Switzerland  indicated  the following:  
6.52.   Switzerland  thank s Norway for its revised notification , and has no additional questions or 
comments . 
6.53.   The Committee took note  of the se notification s. 
− Philippines (G/MA/QR/N/PHL/2 , G/MA/QR/N/PHL/ 2/Corr.1 ) G/MA/M/75  
 
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  6.54.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at  its previous  meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notification by the Philippines  that had been circulated  in document  G/MA/QR/N/PHL/2. 
Questions remained pending from Switzerland. Since then, the Philippines  had submitted a 
corrigendum to its notification in document  G/MA/QR/N/PHL/2/C orr.1. 
6.55.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
6.56.   Switzerland  thank s the Philippines for its revised notification , which answers its questions. 
Switzerland has no additional questions.  
6.57.   The Committee took note  of these notifications . 
− Thailand (G/MA/QR/N/THA/2, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.2 , 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.3 , G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add. 4) 
6.58.   The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous  meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by Thailand that had been circulated  in document  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2  and its 
addenda  1, 2, and 3. Questions remained pending from the European Union. Since then, T hailand 
had submitted a fourth  addendum , which had been  circulated in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/A dd.4. Addenda  2, 3, and 4 contain ed measures introduced in 
response to COVID -19. 
6.59.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.60.   As noted in previous meetings, Thailand's import licensing requirements for feed wheat should 
have been included in Thailand's QR  notification, given that they are non -automatic licensing 
requirements. The European Union  encourage s Thailand to provide its next biannual QR  notification 
as soon as possible. The EU also expressed its concerns on the import procedures for feed wheat 
numerous times in the Committee on Import Licensing and the Committee on Agriculture. The EU 
would like to again urge Thailand to provide written replies to its questions submitted in the 
WTO Committee on Import Licensing in 2017 and 2018. The EU reiterates its interest in 
understanding on what basis the measure, announced as temporary, can be maintained sin ce 
January  2017, and when it will cease to apply. The EU is also strongly concerned about the 
WTO compatibility of Thailand's import licens ing regime for feed wheat. Further, given market and 
policy developments relating  to corn, the EU  sees no economic re asons to keep the measure in place. 
The EU would also like to understand whether, pending the removal of the licensing regime, Thailand 
intends to notify the scheme in accordance with Articles  1.4 and 5 of the Import Licensing 
Agreement , and add the measur es to its notification on QRs. The EU notes that the price support 
programme for corn has been extended until October  2021, with a likely further extension until 
October  2022, in parallel to additional measures to support corn farmers. The EU would like to seek 
an update on the implementation of the price support programme and request s Thailand to notify it 
to the WTO  Committee on Agriculture.  
6.61.   The Committee took note  of the statement made and agreed to revert to the se notifications 
at its next meetin g. 
− Tonga (G/MA/QR/N/TON /1/Add.1)  
6.62.   The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a notification by Tonga  that had been circulated 
in document  G/MA/QR/N/TON/1/A dd.1. 
6.63.   The Committee  took note  of the notification.  
− Ukraine (G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/Add.1)  
6.64.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification by Ukraine  that had been 
circulated  in document  G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/A dd.1. 
6.65.   The Committee took note  of the notification.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  − United States (G/MA/QR/N/USA/2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/3, G/MA/QR/N/USA/4, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/ Add.1, G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/Add.2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5,  
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5 /Add.1,  G/MA/W/116, G/MA/W/127)  
6.66.   The Chairperson  recalled that , at its previous  meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by the United States  as there remained  question s pending  from the European 
Union , which had been circulated in documents  G/MA/W/116 and G/MA/W/127 , and China . Since 
then, the United States ha d submitted one  new notification , which had been circulated  in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add .2, on the termination o f measures introduced in response to the 
COVID -19 pandemic . 
6.67.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
6.68.   China has concerns about US import quotas on steel and alumin ium products under 
Section  232, as reflected in the US  notification circulated as document s G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 and 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5. As this Committee is aware, China has raised this issue at several of its previous 
meetings, requesting the United States to provide detailed information  on, and clarification of, its 
measures. U nfortunately, the United States has yet to provide detailed information about its 
measures sufficient to alleviate China's concerns. China  reiterate s its prior request that the United 
States provide the details of its import quota measures, such as the spe cific quantities and 
requirements of the quotas, and that it clarify how these measures are consistent with WTO  rules 
and regulations, in particular, Article  XI of the GATT, on the "General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions ", and Article  XXI of the GATT, on "Security Exceptions ". 
6.69.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
6.70.   The European Union  has been raising its concerns regarding US  trade prohibitions on sturgeon 
products in this Committee since 2015. In the latest US  biannual  notification 
(document  G/MA/QR/N/USA/5), the restrictions pursuant to the Endangered Species Act are listed 
in measures No. 11 and No. 12. As previously explained, the EU 's main concern is that the US does 
not consider wild and farmed sturgeons and their products as separate categories. Consequently, 
the US applies the same conservation measures to both, in a more restrictive way than the 
international environmental legislation (CITES) recommends. Any updates on this issue would be 
very much appreciated. A t a bilateral meeting between the relevant authorities in Brussels and 
Washington, at the end of April, the EU was able to explain its concerns in more detail. The EU also 
appreciated receiving updates about the ongoing review being carried out by the US  Fish and Wildlife 
Service on the listing of sturgeon species as endangered. The EU will continue its dialogue with the 
US on this matter and engage on the findings of the review, as appropriate. For this purpose, 
continuous updates on the roadmap and calend ar for the whole review process would  be very useful. 
The EU would also appreciate receiving further information in this Committee. The EU would like to 
confirm with the United States whether it would be possible, in the case of endangered farmed 
species, to obtain an E ndangered Species Act (ESA)  permit to avoid the ban. If so, an explanation 
of the procedure to get such a permit would be welcome.  
6.71.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
6.72.   The United States  takes note of the comments a nd questions raised by China regarding the 
WTO consistency of its Section  232 quotas. The United States has invoked Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 and the actions are therefore wholly WTO-consistent. Regarding questions related to the 
operation of the Sec tion 232 quotas, the United States  refers Members to the relevant proclamations 
issued under Section  232, and to quota implementation information published on the website of 
US Customs and Border Protection.  
6.73.   The United States  appreciate s the EU 's continued interest in sturgeon and also appreciate s 
the recent opportunity that the US and the EU  had in April  2021 to bring its respective experts 
together to discuss this issue. As of May  2021, there are now six  foreign species of sturgeon listed 
as endangered under the US  ESA. The ESA applies to not only wild animals, but those in captivity 
as well. When a species is listed under the ESA, the listed entity includes both captive animals and 
wild animals. In April  2021, the US  Fish and Wildlife Service ( USFWS)  published a final rule 
announcing the determination of endangered species status of the Yangtze River sturgeon under the 
ESA, which became effective on 26 May 2021. There are nine  additional species of sturgeon under G/MA/M/75  
 
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  review by the USFWS. In August  2021, the USFWS determined that the Amur sturgeon warrants 
listing under the ESA and proposed to list it as an endangered species. A notice reflecting this 
proposal and a request for comments was published in the Federal Register  on 25 August. The 
Service will accept comments on the proposed listing received or postmarked on or before 
25 October  2021. With respect to the current status of the eight  other species under review, the 
USFWS is conducting a 12 -month status review on the petiti on to list those species of sturgeon 
under the E SA. The Service is collecting and evaluating information and has not made a 
determination regarding the listing of these species.  A listing determination will be made on the best 
scientific and commercial inf ormation available.  More specifically, the Service is currently reviewing 
the Caspian and Siberian sturgeon.  The Caspian sturgeon review includes Russian, Persian, ship, 
and stellate sturgeon.  At any time during the Service 's review, the EU may provide add itional 
information to help us make this determination. Once the status review is completed, if the Service 
finds that listing is warranted, the Service will prepare a proposed rule. At that point, the public will 
be given 60  days to comment on the propose d listing. This will give the EU another opportunity to 
provide the Service with information. The United States is happy to facilitate a continued discussion 
among the relevant authorities , as appropriate.  
6.74.   The Committee took note  of the statements made and  agreed to revert to these notifications 
at its next meeting.  
B. REPORT FROM THE SECRETARIAT ( G/MA/QR/11 ) 
6.75.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to document  G/MA/QR/11 , entitled "Status of 
Notifications under the Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions ". In this 
document, the Secretariat summarize d the status of QR  notifications as of 4  October  2021. He 
observed that, according to this document,  the situation ha d slightly improved with respect to 
previous years, i n particular for the biennial periods 2018 -2020 and 2020 -2022. The submission of 
notifications relating to COVID -19 restrictions partly explain ed this increase. However, the overall 
compliance with the QR  notification requirement remain ed relatively low.  
6.76.   He reminded  Members that the Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative 
Restrictions , in document  G/L/59/Rev.1 , provide d that: "Members shall make complete notifications 
of all quantitative restrictions in force by 30  September  2012 and at two-yearly intervals thereafter. " 
Even though the number and quality of notifications ha d improved over past years, the vast majority 
of Members ha d not yet  provided any information on the full list of QRs that they maintain ed. There 
were also several Members th at had notified measures introduced in response to  the 
COVID -19 pandemic , and had indicated that they would submit a complete notification with all 
measures at a later date, but ha d not yet done so. He encourage d Members to contact the Secretariat 
in case they need ed technical assistance to comply with this important transparency provision. In 
his view, a dditional tools and resources, such as the QR  database16, or the organization of training 
sessions like the session organized in September  2021 (see item  C, below) , also pla yed an important 
role in improving notification compliance.  
6.77.   The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
C. REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON  ON THE INFORMATION SESSION ON QUANTITATIVE 
RESTRICTI ONS AND THEIR RELATION TO MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS  
6.78.   The Chairperson  reported on the information session on QRs and the ir relation to the 
multilateral environmental agreements , which had taken place on 21  September  2021.17 He recalled 
that, at the formal meeting of the Committee in April  2021, some delegations had expressed their 
interest in a capacity -building workshop on QRs, building on the positive experience of a previous 
workshop that had taken place in 2018. This ide a had been further discussed at the Committee's 
informal meeting in May  2021, where some Members had reiterated their support and noted that 
the notification of trade measures taken pursuant to other international conventions, such as the 
multilateral envi ronmental agreements, could provide a good starting point for those Members that 
had not yet submitted a QR  notification to the Committee. However, it was also recognized that , due 
to the COVID -19 pandemic and ongoing travel restrictions, as well as the pr eparations for the 
Ministerial Conference, it was not possible to organize an in -person event like that held in 2018. As 
 
16 https://qr.wto.org/en#/home  
17 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/qr_sept21_e.htm  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  a result, it had been proposed to organize a half -day information session in hybrid mode, and 
capital -based officials responsible for t he notification of QRs were invited to participate through the 
Zoom platform. The programme of the information session had been emailed by the Secretariat to 
delegations on 5  July 2021 and, given that the topic of the information session was the link betwe en 
QRs and trade -related environmental measures, capital -based officials working on issues relating to 
the environment had also been also invited. More than 80  participants had joined the information 
session via Zoom , representing a variety of institutions  dealing with trade.  
6.79.   The information session had revolved around five  sessions. Session  1 had provided an 
introduction of the main rules and procedures relating to QRs, in particular Article  XI of the 
GATT  1994 and the notification requirements under the 2 012 Decision. Information collected from 
these notifications and disseminated through the QR  database had been shown to help Members 
better understand what needed to be notified and how other Members had done so. Session  2 was 
about two  additional tools th at were available from the WTO  Secretariat , with information on QRs 
and trade -related environmental measures. These were the WTO  Environmental Database18 and the 
document entitled "Multilateral Environmental Agreements Matrix ".19 These two  tools were managed 
by the WTO's Trade and Environment Division but provided relevant information that could be of 
help for Members when preparing their QR  notification s. In Session  3, the speaker from the United 
Nations Environmental Programme had talked a bout the Basel, Rotterdam , and Stockholm 
Conventions, including what these conventions covered , what their latest amendments contained, 
and how they linked to trade. In Session  4, the speaker from the W CO had explained how products 
covered by these environ mental agreements were classified according to the Harmonized System , 
and what changes would be implemented in the HS2022  nomenclature to take account of latest 
developments in environmental conventions. Finally, in Session  5, the representatives of Canada , 
Colombia, Georgia,  and Mauritius, had  shared their experience of preparing their QR notifications , 
and had provided concrete examples of how they had overcome some of the main hurdles in doing 
so. All of them pointed out that inputs by the Secretariat on  their draft notifications had been very 
helpful.  
6.80.   In the Chairperson's view, the information session had been very informative. It had been 
evident from the presentations and information shared by participants that WTO  Members 
implement ed trade restriction s or prohibitions to pursue a number of different policy objectives, such 
as the protection of the environment. Therefore, it was key that Members were able to ensure 
transparency about these measures by notifying them to the WTO. The information session h ad 
provided a number of instruments and elements that could help Members to notify. First and 
foremost, the existing information in the QR  database, which was based on notifications by 
WTO Members, could be of great help to other Members. He encouraged Mem bers to use this tool 
and to inform the Secretariat of any possible improvements that could be made to the website. 
However, it was also recognized that the information in the QR  database was not complete, and that 
this was a consequence of Members' low co mpliance with the ir notification obligation s, as well as 
the quality of notifications. Where possible, information in the QR  database should be complemented 
by measures notified to other WTO Committees or WTO  bodies. For example, as discussed at the 
session, information collected in the WTO  Environmental Database constituted an important source 
of information, among others. In this respect, the Secretariat was exploring the possibility of linking 
the relevant information in the Environmental Database to include it in the QR  database. This would 
allow Members to have a broader understanding of the measures that qualified as QRs , and hence 
which must be notified to the Committee.  
6.81.   Similarly, many Members had observed that it was difficult to obtain inform ation on HS  codes 
related to QRs , and reported that this represented one of the main hurdles in the preparation of 
QR notifications. In this respect, the WCO  "interconnection tables ", with information on HS  codes 
covered by various international convention s, could be an invaluable tool for Members wishing to 
notify QRs in relation to these conventions , and these could also be linked in the QR  database. This 
would allow Members to search directly the products and tariff codes that were covered under each 
convention , and include them in the QR  notification format. The Secretariat was also exploring the 
possibility of including this function in the QR  database.  
 
18 https://edb.wto.org/  
19 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_matrix_e.htm  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  6.82.   In conclusion, the Chairperson expressed his appreciation to the speakers and panellists for 
their va luable contributions to making the information session a successful event, and to the 
colleagues in the Market Access Division for having organized it.  
6.83.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.84.   Canada wishes to take this opportunity to provide three  reflections on this agenda item. First, 
Canada wishes to thank all the Members that had provided notifications, especially those that had 
provided their first  notification under the QR  Decision. Canada considers that providing additional 
information to this Committee is something important because it allows Members to discuss the 
trade policy measures that they are taking. As the Chairperson had  previous ly mentioned , this is 
one of the most important WTO notification obligations. Second, Canada wishe s to express its 
disappointment that the percentage of Members that have submitted at least one  QR notification  
remain s low, although Canada is heartened that the situation is getting better. One  proposal that 
Canada is a co -sponsor of is about the procedures to enhance transparency and improve compliance 
notification requirements, and it actually provides the means to help Members to come forward and 
make their notifications to this Committee. Members have introduced improvements in the past, 
such as the QR  notification decision of ten years ago , to help Members to provide that information - 
and Canada considers that Members need to make another and stronger effort to make their 
notifications , and to make them e very two  years , as is required under that Decision. The 
third reflection that Canada wishes to make is to thank the Secretariat for putting together the 
Workshop concerning which the Secretariat has just provide d its report. It contained much great 
informa tion, and Canada hopes that Members can harness that information going forward and that 
Members will refer to the different tools that are available, have access to them , and continue to be 
support ed through such interactive workshops, seminars, or webinars , all enabling Members to 
submit their first  notifications. And once a first notification has been submitted, it becomes much 
easier to submit others because a Member then has something to build upon, and is simply updating 
something as opposed to creating something new . The first time is the hardest , although I know 
that the Secretariat is also very capable at helping all Members to get across that first  finish line.  
6.85.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
6.86.   Colombia wishes to thank t he Secretariat for having prepared and organi zed the 
QR information session , which in its view was productive and addressed topics of interest to 
Colombia. Regarding the Chairperson's report , Colombia wishes to highlight tw o aspects. First , 
Colombia thinks that linking the measures with the Environmental Database  is a positive 
development, as these measures could feed into the QR  database and improve the information that 
is available in it. Second, s omething important for Colombia is that t he Secretariat prepare a 
document listing  the main agreements or international conventions that are notified in the 
QR notification s, providing also the list of HS codes  and tariff lines, with the description, that are 
covered by each of them . This would be a guiding document for Members, with extremely useful 
information, which could facilitate the process of putting together a notification . This document could 
be based on common factors that are found in QR  notifications , but also  take into account the  work 
that has already been carried out by other international organizations , such as  the WCO  and its 
interconnecti on tables.  Colombia considers that this is a tool that the Secretariat could have at its 
disposal , either as a document or as information availabl e in the QR  database itself, and to which all 
Members  could  have access.  
6.87.   The Committee took note  of the report and the statement s made.  
7  TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were three  issues listed under this agenda item. The 
first issue concerned the updated list of all notifications and communications relating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic, which had been submitted by Members to the Committee as of 
4 October  2021, and as contained in document  G/MA/W/157/Rev. 3. The second  item concerned the 
summary report on export restrictions and trade -facilitating measures relating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic, which had been prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Co mmittee , 
and which had been updated with information compiled in the context of the WTO  Trade Monitoring 
Exercise , as circ ulated in document  G/MA/W/168 /Rev.1 . The third  item related to communication s 
submitted by Australia and India concerning unilateral m easures aimed at facilitating trade for G/MA/M/75  
 
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  essential products to combat the COVID -19 pandemic (document  G/MA/W/165/Add.1 and 
document  G/MA/W /171). He thank ed the Members that ha d informed the Committee of these 
measures despite the fact that no obligation exi sted in the WTO  Agreements in this respect , as well 
as those Members that had submitted QR  notifications on trade measures relating  to COVID -19 since 
the Committee's previous  formal meeting , all of which provided the Committee with a more  accurate 
picture of the situation . 
7.2.  The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) reported the following20: 
7.3.  Since the beginning of the COVID -19 crisis, trade has played a major role in the response to 
the pandemic , both on the side of facilitating imports and , at the same time , restricting exports of 
essential goods. This is a revision to the document and includes an additional 160  measures when 
compared to the first  version that was presented at the Committee 's previous formal meeting, on 
29-30 April 2021.  At the Committee 's request , the revision of the note now contains not only notified 
measures, but also measures from the WTO Trade Monitoring Exercise, which led to the large 
increase in reported measures.  In order to have a more complete picture, in particular with respect 
to export restrictions, the Secretariat  reached out this summer to 15  delegations to notify measures 
that were already part of the list of trade monitoring measures. As a result, four  Members notified 
COVID -19-related export restrictions.  
7.4.  Let us begin by considering export restrictions. These restrictions come in many forms, ranging 
from full prohibitions to licensing requirements for statistical purposes , and cover a wide range of 
product s, from PPEs to vaccines and food products. To date , 34 Members have notified export 
restrictions in relation to COVID -19, across 60 measures. That is, many Members wished  to provide 
additional transparency by notifying all modifications to a measure over time, and also by notifying 
the termination of a given measure. Moreover, according to document  G/L/59/Rev.1, Members are 
required to notify all QRs, as well as changes to QRs. Nonetheless, according to the WTO's Trade 
Monitoring Report , there are an addit ional 11  Members with 17  measures that have not yet been 
notified. All the m easures in question are summarized in Appendix Table 1 of the report.  
7.5.  When considering all measures, both notified and not notified, we see that the most popular 
measure seems to b e full prohibition, followed by non -automatic export licences and prohibitions , 
except under certain defined conditions. 21% of measures have not been notified and hence do not 
contain standardized information on the type of measure. Some measures also changed type over 
time; for example , a full prohibition on all face masks  that evolved into a non -automatic licensing 
scheme for N95  masks  only. There was one very brief  export quota for food products that remained 
in place  for under a month . When looking at when the measures have been introduced, we clearly 
see that in March  2020 many Members considered it necessary to introduce export restrictions. Over 
the northern hemisphere's summer months, almost no additional measures had been notified, and 
new measu res only began again to be introduced in the beginning of 2021. In five  cases , it cannot 
easily be determined  when a given measure had entered into force. Almost all export restrictions 
that entered into force in relation to COVID -19 mention ed that they were "temporary ". Given the 
lack of a precise definition of what "temporary " means, we can at least see what the actual duration 
of the notified measures is. For these categories, we consider the total duration of a measure, 
meaning that if a measure was fir st introduced for 90  days and then extended by a further  90 days, 
it would be counted as a 180 -day measure. We see that 16  measures were in place for under 
three  months, an additional ten measures were in place for under six  months, and 18 additional 
measures for under one year, while two  measures remained in place for over one year. However, 
29 measures do not have a clearly indicated duration, despite being notified as "temporary " in many 
cases , as often occurs when they have not been noti fied as QRs, but rather form part of a trade 
monitoring exercise. When the current status of measures is considered, we see that at end-April, 
during the first  big wave of the COVID -19 pandemic, the highest number of export restrictions were 
in force , name ly around 55  measures. Since then, the number of measures has dropped and then 
plateaued in recent months.  Currently there seem to be 29  measures still in force.  
7.6.  In order to make the measures comparable, product categories have been defined according 
to Annex Table  4. The majority of the export restrictions relate to face masks and protective 
garments, such as medical gowns and gloves, or what is commonly referred to as PPEs. Other 
important categories are sanitizers, pharmaceuticals, other medical supplies, such as syringes , 
medical equipment , such as ventilators , and foodstuffs. Only four  export restrictions relate directly 
 
20 Document  RD/MA/93.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  to vaccines, but other measure s might cover vaccine inputs.  The vast majority of the measures r efer 
to Article  XI:2(a) , which states that:  "The provisions of paragraph  1 of Article  XI shall not extend to 
the following:  (a) Export  prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or other products  essential to the exporting contracting party . In addition, 
many of the export restrictions refer to Article  XX(b), that is , measures that are necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health . A considerable number of measures do not make explici t 
reference to a WTO  provision or do not contain any information, in the case of measures that have 
not been notified as quantitative restrictions . To date , more than 40% of the measures remain in 
force, whereas the rest either expired or their termination  has been explicitly notified.  
7.7.  In addition to the export prohibitions and restrictions, the Secretariat also summarized and 
prepared a short description of other measures that could  be characteri zed as facilitating trade. 
Before I begin describing the cont ents, there are a few things that I would like to stress , namely : 
these are communications where 12 Members voluntarily provided, for transparency, 
23 communications , with 36  trade -related measures that were implemented in response to 
COVID -19. What is peculiar about these communications is that there is no notification requirement 
to provide this information ; nevertheless, Members still considered important to share this 
information.  58 Members provided similar information to the Trade Monitoring Report , on 
129 additional measures. 19  of these additional measures have been notified to other 
WTO Committees, in particular to the TF  Committee, and to a lesser extent to the Committee on 
Anti-Dumping Practices , the Committee on Import Licensing , and the Commi ttee on Agriculture. In 
the report we talk about "trade facilitating " measures because the measures in question seek to 
make it easier to import, export , or transit through a nother  Member 's territory . However, this does 
not mean that these measures are cov ered by the Agreement on Trade Facilitation. For the handful 
of measures that seemed to be covered by the TFA, we aggregated them under a single succinct 
measure in the summary of measures to avoid duplicating ongoing work in the Committee on Trade 
Facilit ation. The summary of these measures can be found in Annex  2 of 
document  G/MA/W/168/Rev.1 . As we only have notified information from 12  Members  in this case,  
compared to the information presented earlier, from 58  Members, the analysis that I will be 
presenting now is somewhat less representative than that on export prohibitions and restrictions, 
where there is a much higher share of notifying Members.  
7.8.  Finally, I would like to note that we tried to follow the same a pproach  in each case , using 
variables and categories to describe the information on export prohibitions and restrictions. And 
while there are many similarities, you will notice that there are also certain  differences in the results. 
The tree map here prese nts the composition of the types of measures. The first  thing that became 
apparent from the analysis is that the majority of measures are tax -related measures (green area 
in the chart), which seems to be explained by two  different types of motivation.  A first motivation 
was to try to reduce the price of products that were considered to be essential to combat the 
COVID -19 pandemic. But some of the measures applied rather to all the products, not only to those 
used to combat the pandemic. This suggests that a  second  motivation was a desire to provide 
liquidity and improve the cash flow of traders, who were disproportionately impacted in the early 
phase of the pandemic.  These tax -related measures were mostly related to the elimination, 
suspension , or waiver of tariffs (that is, import duties), amounting to more than 50% of all these 
measures, followed by the elimination , suspension , or waiver of other internal taxes, fees, and other 
duties and charges. In most cases, these tariff or tax eliminations were qualifi ed as temporary and 
focused on a narrow list of products. Finally, some Members did not eliminate the obligation to pay, 
but rather provided for a deferral that allowed importers to extend the period in which they had to 
pay the import duties or other taxe s due. The second  major category of measures relate s to different 
types of customs procedures (blue area of the chart), including expedited or simplified clearance 
procedures, as well as the simplification of other customs procedures. It is here that many measures, 
although  not all, seem to relate to provisions covered by the TFA.  Finally , there is  a third  category 
of measures that we included in a residual category (area in grey in the chart). These include, for 
example, the establishment of procedures for  donated goods in a state of emergency (relief goods). 
Most of these measures were qualified by the Members as "temporary " in nature.  
7.9.  In terms of their duration, there was no information on 80  of the measures  because the Member 
may have indicated either th e date on which the measured entered into force , or when it ended, but 
not both. For those measures for which there is such information, the majority were put in place for 
a period of between six months and one  year. It is also worth noting that five of the measures were 
described as permanent changes.  In terms of the types of products, the majority of Members seem 
to have focused on facilitating the imports of P PE, which includes face and eye protection , protective G/MA/M/75  
 
- 24 - 
 
  garments , and protective gloves.  What is most interesting in this chart is that the PPEs are also the 
products with the highest number of export prohibitions or restrictions, which shows the importance 
that Members attached to sourcing these products from th e international market, and particular ly 
during the first  phase of the pandemic.  We can also see that 14  Members facilitate d trade in 
vaccines, showing the importance of vaccines as a solution to end ing the pandemic , especially in its 
current phase . For th e remaining products, there are other similarities between  the export 
restrictions, such as the importance given to sanitizers and disinfectants, as well as to medical 
devices and equipment. Looking at the  measures that have been notified as part of the WTO Trade 
Monitoring Report , we see that only 16% seem still to be in force, while 40% expired, and we have 
insufficient information on 44% of the measures to know whether  or not  they are in force or expired. 
This is in contrast to our knowledge of export re strictions, where we have a much better 
understanding of how many measures remain in force.  
7.10.   Before concluding, I would like to note that we have done our best to summarize the 
information in a factual way, and to provide a brief statistical overview based on the most evident 
dimensions of the data. Given the importance of the issue, we would encourage those  Members that 
submitted QR  notifications or informa tion on trade facilitating measures to carefully review the 
summary of their information, and to let us know in case of any error. We will be happy to correct 
any inaccuracy and to include the adjustments in the revision that we are planning to issue. Fina lly, 
I would like to reiterate that the Secretariat stands ready to adjust or update the report as necessary 
in order to respond to Members needs in this respect. The CMA  Team is happy to answer any 
question you may have on the report.  
7.11.   The representative o f Turkey  indicated the following:  
7.12.    As a general remark , Turkey notes that ensuring transparency is one of the most important 
tasks that the WTO is undertaking in the scope of its response to the COVID -19 pandemic. Turkey 
believe s that the WTO provides to Members a valuable toolbox for keeping track of trade -related 
measures taken as a response to the pandemic , and this report prepared by the Secretariat fulfilled 
a significant mission, not only to show where we stand, but also to steer the way forward. Turk ey 
wishes to inform Members of the termination , as of 6  August  2021, of all its temporary export 
authori zation measures introduced in response to the COVID -19 pandemic. Turkey notified the 
Committee to that effect on 6  October  2021, in document  G/MA/QR/N/TUR/2/Add.3. Turkey  
understand s that this notification will be included on the agenda of the Committee's next meeting , 
it having been circulated too late to be included on this occasion,  and likewise that the amendment 
will be reflected in the re levant report prepared by the Secretariat . 
7.13.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
7.14.   Canada wishes to begin by supporting the initial comments from Turkey around the 
importance of transparency , and appreciates the work that has been put in to this report. In relation 
to Article  XI of the GATT, the Secretariat indicated that most of the notifications concerning 
COVID -related measures were QRs under Article  XI:2(a)  of the GATT . 
7.15.   As Canada has argued since the beginning of the year, this GATT  rule on  export restrictions 
and prohibitions was originally designed to give individual contracting parties the right to restrict the 
export of their scarce domestic raw materials and commodities. The COVID -19 global crisis has 
exposed a gap that was first  recogn ized in the late 1970s , when a Contracting Party described the 
application of this GATT  provision in this area as "minimal and ineffective ". That same Contracting 
Party also noted that the export restrictions and prohibition rules were "less complete as compared 
to import restrictions " and "subject to major exceptions ". In that same time-period, certain 
delegations acknowledged that "the abse nce of established guidelines and procedures for taking 
export control actions permitted under GATT  provisions has, at times, contributed to instability and 
uncertainty in international trading conditions and could do so in the future. " As Canada has obser ved 
during the Trade and Health Facilitator process, not much has changed since the 1970s, save for 
some additional transparency obligations in the Agreement on Agriculture and the updated decision , 
here in this Committee , on the notification procedures fo r these measures. As was foreshadowed 
forty years ago, the Article  XI rules on export restrictions were not well -suited to the situation the 
world faced over the past year. This is why Canada believe s that the current rules on export 
restrictions and prohi bitions do not provide appropriate guidance to Members when facing a global 
health emergency.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  7.16.   It is not enough for each Member 's individual actions to be consistent with WTO  rules.  The 
impact of the COVID -19 pandemic was not restricted to any one or group of Members, and the trade 
policy reactions stemming from the pandemic were neither coordinated nor guided by a multilateral 
agreement.  In that regard, Canada sees the Declaration on Trade and Health , set out in 
document  WT/GC/W/823 , as providing a good bas e for Members to work from to consider how best 
to improve these rules . The current rules did not support a coordinated response to the pandemic 
precisely because they were not drafted nor designed for a global emergency.  A future crisis like 
this one will  demand more coordination between Members; not one of individual action, but one that 
considers the global situation and provides the means for Members to act collectively, in support of 
a global response.  Canada looks forward to substantive, problem -solving engagement as a result of 
a multilateral Ministerial statement at MC12 on Trade and Health.  WTO Members need to reflect on 
the lessons learnt during the COVID -19 crisis, prepare guidelines or codes of best practices on the 
use of export restrictions or prohibitions, and consider if additional commitments can help Members 
collectively enhance their preparedness and crisis resilience.  
7.17.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
7.18.   The European Union thanks the  Secretariat  for its report. This analysis of Members ' 
notifications and communications, as well as the link with the WTO  Trade Monitoring Exercise , 
effectively increases transparency concerning  COVID -19-related  trade measures. It also allows 
Members to get a better s ense of how transparency could be further improved. The EU would like to 
share a few observations  in this regard . 
7.19.   The report presents important findings. As of 4  October  2021, a total of 77  measures that 
prohibit or restrict exports as a result of the COVI D-19 pandemic have been adopted by Members. 
Of these, 60  measures have been notified by 34  Members to the Committee. According to the 
WTO Trade Monitoring Exercise, 17  additional measures have been introduced by 11  Members. To 
the date of this report, thes e measures have not been notified under the QR  Decision. The previous 
report , discussed in April , also noted that 10  Members have not notified their measures. Considering 
how Members , but also stakeholders , have emphasi zed how transparency matters to foster 
resilience, the European Union  believe s that Members would all collectively benefit from an effort by 
all to promptly notify the relevant measures to the WTO.  
7.20.   The European Union  also note s that a large proportion of the e xport restricting measures (29) 
give no indication of the ir planned duration , or information about the expiry date. On top of this , "as 
of October  2021, one and a half years after the peak was reached, 29  export restricting measures 
by 19  WTO Members appea r to continue to be in force ". This means that more than half of the 
measures introduced during the peak in April  2020 (55  according to the report) are still in place. 
Moreover, for 22% of the measures introduced since the beginning of the pandemic, no jus tification 
has been provided. The fact that a large share of them (38%) are export bans and prohibitions, and 
that the majority of measures concern PPE  products, begs the question whether, one year and a half 
since the beginning of the pandemic, and with i ncreased global production of such products, such 
measures are justified. As the EU has stated on numerous occasions, while such measures may be 
justified and necessary in a situation of a critical shortage of essential products, they should always 
be prop ortionate, targeted , and time -bound. If a Member considers that a situation of critical 
shortage exists, and provides explanations, as a community we should consider how we can assist 
that Member in reducing that critical shortage. The findings of the repo rt suggest that , in terms of 
transparency, there is still a significant  margin for improvement. The EU invite s the entire 
Membership to engage further on this issue by and beyond MC12. The European Union  expect s that 
the upcoming MC12 will provide addition al impetus for such work to take place in this Committee.  
7.21.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
7.22.   Colombia thanks the Secretariat for its report and the update s to 
documents  G/MA/W/157/Rev.3 and G/MA/W/168/Rev.1, which list the notifications and 
communications presented to the Committee  relating to measures adopted to address the 
COVID -19 pandemic. Colombia wishes to take this opportunity to consider the elements presented 
in both documents, and to make a series of comments on the restrictions, prohibitions , and 
limitations on exports of vaccines and different medical technologies to treat COVID -19. Colombia 
wishes to express its serious concern about the trends registered with  the restrictions on exports of 
these goods. In spite of the calls that Colombia has made , together with a group of six Latin 
American countries, from its perspective, as of now, there is no solution to the current situation in G/MA/M/75  
 
- 26 - 
 
  the global trade of vaccines . Members  have discussed the problem of vaccine production , and this 
is very important ; therefore , Colombia congratulate s the Secretariat on its work in the reports just 
presented. However, Colombia  cannot overlook the fact that, once produced, vaccines ar e not being 
adequately traded under basic free market conditions. Several Members have put in place multiple 
export restrictions and there is little effort made to be transparent about these restrictions.  
7.23.   As Members  saw in the S ecretariat 's report, there a re only four  notifications of export 
restrictions on vaccines. Proof of this is that vaccines have remained to an enormous degree in the 
countries where they are produced. To some this seems intuitive, but in reality it represents a 
frustration of the promise of free trade. This Organization , and the agreements on which it is based , 
is based on the fundamental understanding that it is not necessary to produce all goods, since some 
countries may be more effective or competitive in thei r production  than others , in which case we all 
stand to gain.  Some of these restrictive measures and bans have  at least  been notified, which is 
positive. However, many others have not been notified and are hidden among rules, requirements , 
and regulations that we are not aware of and cannot feasibly understand. Colombia  sees, however, 
that some producing countries have not exported a single vaccine commercially. Article  XI:2 of the 
GATT, used to justify these measures, effectively gives Members the possibil ity to impose temporary 
restrictions in case of critical shortages. However, this provision is just an exception ; it is a flexibility. 
The general rule indicates that restrictions of this type should not be maintained or applied. 
Exceptions and flexibiliti es should be used in critical circumstances , and at critical times, and before 
resorting to them, the comprehensiveness of the objectives pursued , and the consequences that 
these measures may have on all Members , should be reviewed.  
7.24.   The exception in Articl e XI:2 of the GATT should not be used without giving due consideration 
to other elements that are unrelated to it. In addition to the principles of non -discrimination and 
transparency, before resorting to flexibilities, it is necessary to analyse  how they impact upon other 
Members , and how they correspond to the central objectives of the trading system. It is worth 
questioning whether several of these measures currently respect the founding principles of the GATT 
and the Marrakesh Agreement , one of them bei ng precisely that Members participating in multilateral 
agreements do so with a desire for reciprocity , and with the objective of achieving mutual 
advantages through the elimination of trade barriers. Colombia reiterates the call to strengthen 
world trade as part of the solution to the global health crisis. The basic principles of free trade that 
have been so strongly advocated in this house must continue to guide us. As Colombia has stated 
from the beginning of the pandemic, the global health crisis requir es a coordinated multilateral 
solution. The Market Access Committee is certainly a suitable body for frank discussions on these 
issues. In this regard , Colombia also support s the comments made by Canada on the need to have 
a discussion on what the elements and conditions are under which a Member  could use Article  XI of 
the GATT . In this context , Colombia also requests the Secretariat to continue its work of analysing 
trade -related measures introduced to address the pandemic . In particular, Colombia request s that 
future versions of the analysed  documents include figures on exports and imports of goods critical 
to address ing the pandemic. This would also help Members to get a muc h clearer picture of the 
impact that these restrictive and facilitating measures are having on global trade in goods.  
7.25.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
7.26.   India considers that it  is not just a matter of the QRs but also of the several trade  facilitating  
measures that were undertaken to ensure that lives and livelihood s could be protected during the 
pandemic. Often the focus on these positive steps is not high, so India wishes to speak about that  
aspect first . Indeed, the  Government of India has undertaken a series of substantial, proactive , and 
impactful measures through the COVID -19 pandemic to facilitate trade. These measures are 
documented in the unilateral submission contained in document  G/MA/W/171, along with the 
hyperlinks to the  relevant official government notifications and documents. In the interest s of time, 
India will not reiterate the list. However, India welcome s Australia 's unilateral submission and urge s 
all Members likewise to proactively communicate their facilitation m easures.  
7.27.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
7.28.   Australia greatly welcomes the Secretariat 's analysis and ongoing work. The WTO 's 
transparency function has proven to be invaluable throughout the COVID -19 pandemic. A strong, 
shared, transp arent information base is critical in underpinning sound national policy responses and 
the international cooperation necessary to keep trade flowing. Ensuring that there is transparency 
in trade-related measures introduced by Members in response to the pan demic must be a priority , G/MA/M/75  
 
- 27 - 
 
  either through the fulfilment of notification obligations , or through timely contributions to the 
Secretariat 's monitoring work.  It is important that Members  are able to share their experiences and 
to learn from one another in order to develop best practices and facilitate trade. Greater 
transparency helps all of us to understand and learn from one another's ' successful initiatives  to 
facilitate access and trade in essential COVID -19 products.  Unfortunately, the reports  highlight that 
a large number of measures introduced by Members due to COVID -19 that prohibit or restrict exports 
remain in place. It has become evident over the course of the COVID -19 pandemic that export 
restrictions can lead to negative impacts on glob al markets, food security , and health. Members  
need to avoid making this health crisis worse, through unnecessary export restrictions and other 
trade barriers. COVID -19 is a global health crisis that needs a global solution and international 
cooperation is  essential to keep ing trade flowing. While the motivation to implement export 
restrictions is understandable, such an approach is ultimately likely to be self -defeating. For these 
reasons, Australia  calls for all trade restricting measures implemented as a  result of the 
COVID -19 pandemic  to be transparent, proportionate, and temporary.  
7.29.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
7.30.   Ecuador  thank s the Secretariat for the submission of its report and echo es the points made 
by the delegation of Colombi a. Ecuador has, on several occasions, joined the call s of others for 
restrictions on the export of vaccines and other inputs against COVID -19 to be avoided . Ecuador is 
in favour of consolidating universal access to vaccines and, therefore , to removing any obstacles 
that limit it. Ecuador is certain that this approach, in accordance with the rules governing 
international trade, is the most reasonable and huma ne under current conditions. Ecuador  insists 
that global problems require global solutions. However, Ecuador  again note s with dismay the 
concentration of vaccine supply in a few Members , which remains a challenge for the entire 
international community. The refore, once again, Ecuador  encourage s the WTO to promote a spirit 
of transparency, cooperation , and international solidarity, not only from Members themselves  but 
also from pharmaceutical companies and vaccine distributors, so that access to vaccines is u niversal 
and guaranteed by collective action. For the sake of transparency, Ecuador notes that it has reported 
the lifting of all measures adopted in the framework of the pandemic, by notifications of 14  April and 
19 July 2021.  
7.31.   The Committee took note  of the report by the Secretariat , the four  documents, and the 
statements made.  
8  PROPOSAL ON TRANSPARENCY IN APPLIED TARIFF RATE CHANGES – STATEMENT BY 
CANADA  
8.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Canada.  
8.2.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
8.3.  Canada, on behalf of the co-sponsors of document  JOB/AG/212/Rev.1, which was circulated 
earlier that day , wishes to provide the Committee with an update on work related to MFN  applied 
tariffs in the Committee on Agriculture, Special Session.  Canada and co -sponsors  provided a similar 
update a little over a year ago , at the Committee's meeting in the spring of 2020 , and wishes to do 
so again on this occasion . Canada also takes the opportunity to welcome the European Union as a 
new co -sponsor.  
8.4.  The issue of MFN  applied tariff transparency and the treatment of shipments en route is an 
area where there is a growing interest ac ross the Membership. Unexpected increases in MFN  applied 
tariffs by Members can create uncertainty for exporters, importers, farmers, and consumers.  
Members expressed interest in exploring ways to enhance predictability and transparency in 
international ag ricultural trade. Starting in November  2019, Members , in the context of the 
WTO Committee on Agriculture, Special Session, started discussing their current practices on how 
MFN applied tariff changes occur within their own domestic regulatory frameworks.  Canada, 
Australia, Brazil, and Ukraine compiled these practices from across a range of Members into a 
discussion document ( document  JOB/AG/185/Rev.2), which was subsequently put forward as a 
proposal for MC12 ( document  JOB/AG/212 , and its revision circulate d earlier that day ). This proposal 
takes steps to increase transparency and predictability in international trade and is not making new 
rules. In addition, it does not employ a one  size fits all approach to increasing transparency in applied G/MA/M/75  
 
- 28 - 
 
  tariffs . The pr oposal has been incorporated as a Draft Ministerial Decision into the Chair person  of 
the CoA  Special Session 's draft text on potential agriculture outcomes at the 12th WTO Ministerial 
Conference.  
8.5.  The Guidelines to Enhance Transparency in Applied Tariff Rate Changes, as previously 
mentioned, reflects current practices of Members and encourages Members to notify their practice 
to the Committee to improve predictability and transparency in market acce ss. Current practices 
include  the following : an approach for shipments en route  to be eligible for tariff treatment 
pre-change;  provide guidance on tariff changes resulting from defined factors;  ability to pre -pay 
customs duties consistent with domestic la ws; and to provide advance public notice of a change in 
a tariff.  The proposal recognizes that there may be additional practices other than those identified , 
and encourages Members to provide the relevant information. As the Committee on Agriculture in 
Special Session continues to meet and review the Chair person 's draft text, there may be some small 
changes to the text, but the substance will remain the same.  Just to note again, in this context, that 
Members are being encouraged to notify their current/exis ting practices related to MFN  applied 
tariffs. Canada encourages Members to reflect on the proposal and to support the proposed 
improvements in predictability and transparency.  
8.6.  The representative of Brazil  indicated  the following:  
8.7.  Brazil has decided to eng age in negotiations for document  JOB/AG/185 and, later, to sponsor 
document  JOB/AG/212, currently in its first revision , and did so thanks to the very constructive work 
dynamic proposed by Canada and Australia when they first  raised the initiative in the C ommittee on 
Agriculture.  On the one hand, the document had a clearly defined goal: to increase transparency 
and predictability for the private sector as to applied tariffs. But on the other hand, as Canada 
mentioned, instead of defining an exclusive way of  achieving that goal, the proposal offers a range 
of options, without prescribing that every one of them need s to be incorporated internally by 
Members.  Brazil believes that this open, evolving , approach is what made it possible for the proposal 
to gather support from Ukraine, as a sponsor, and now for the European Union to also join the 
initiative.  Brazil remains open to learn about Members ' practices and policies regarding transparency 
and predictability , and support s including more examples of bes t practices in the proposal . Finally, 
Members must bear in mind that the proposal 's goal is one that benefits all Members, by fostering 
business activity. In this way Brazil believe s that there is, in this sense, an opportunity for systemic 
gains.  
8.8.  The repr esentative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
8.9.  The European Union wishes to thank Canada for the update and situation report. The EU is 
pleased to inform Members that it has joined this proposal as co -sponsor. The EU  hopes that an 
outcome can be  achieved at MC12 on the basis of this proposal so as to improve transparency in 
changes to applied tariffs. The EU stands ready and keen to continue work in that direction.  One key 
feature of the proposal , and which convinced the EU to join as a co-sponsor , is that it stays away 
from a one  size fits all approach. On the contrary, according to the proposal, Members are free to 
choose one  practice that corresponds to their customs systems and procedures. Such an approach 
is constructive and flexible , in the EU's view,  and should facilitate further support for this proposal.  
8.10.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
8.11.   Australia thanks Canada for its statement updating Members on the Draft Ministerial Decision 
on Transparency in Applied Tarif f Rate Changes. Australia is a co -sponsor of the Draft Ministerial 
Decision because it consider s greater certainty and transparency to be important elements of a 
stable international trading system. Unexpected increases in MFN  applied tariff rates foster 
unpredictability for traders, as well as additional costs, and can be a significant disincentive to trade, 
particularly for SMEs. The Draft Ministerial Decision attempts to resolve some of the se issues by 
setting out best practices in the notification and a pplication of changes to MFN  applied tariffs. 
Importantly, the proposal does not restrict Members ' ability to adjust MFN  applied tariffs. In addition, 
as Canada outlined, the draft Decision does not set out a single, prescriptive approach. This means 
that there is in -built flexibility to cater for different domestic frameworks and customs administration 
practices. Australia consider s this proposed Decision to be a viable and achievable outcome for 
MC12, noting that it will have a tangible benefit for all tr aders. Australia encourage s all Members to 
seriously consider the proposed Ministerial Decision.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  8.12.   The representative of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
8.13.   Ukraine wishes to thank Canada for its presentation and welcome s the European Union's  
decision to join the proposal. As a co -sponsor of the document , Ukraine believes that improving 
predictability for business es is very important. Many Members have stressed the importance of 
taking action to ensure that international trade remains open and  predictable, especially in an 
attempt to mitigate the economic costs of the COVID -19 pandemic. Therefore, Ukraine considers 
that the proposal on transparency in applied tariff rate changes has a role to play in this regard. The 
best practices offered as o ptions will contribute to Members' common goal of creating a predictable 
trading system. The proposal has the potential to significantly improve Members' awareness about 
existing domestic frameworks and the situation regarding the customs administration pr actices of 
any Member. The choice of options available to Members will not prevent them from further 
exercising their right to adjust the ir current tariffs within their WTO  bindings. Ukraine wishes to 
stress that the list of such best practices is no t exhaustive and was based on the information on 
current practices received in the course of consultations. If adopted, the proposal would provide for 
a review mechanism and the possibility to add new best practices.  
8.14.   The representative of India indicated the fol lowing:  
8.15.   India places  all of its notifications affecting tariff changes in to the  public domain immediately , 
on the same day, and the details of the same can be obtained from the websites notified under the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement.  
8.16.   India also annually notifies change s in its applied MFN  tariff to the IDB  database. Such 
changes  are also reflected in the WTO  Trade Monitoring Report on a regular basis.  India finds that, 
despite such information being already available, proponents still consider that additional notification 
obligations relating to the changes in the applied MFN  tariffs are required.  In this cont ext, India 
believes that a Member is entitled to change its applied tariffs to address domestic compulsions, as 
long as those tariffs are within its bound tariff commitments.  India does not support such additions 
to an ever -growing list of obligations that  seek to circumscribe Members' negotiated rights under 
the WTO  Agreements . Transparency must also permeate the entire functioning of the WTO. Often, 
India sees that this is not the case. For example , in the area of Agriculture, developed Members, as 
they have Final Bound Aggregate Measure ment of Support entitlements, should submit their 
notifications within three  months after the end of the year (calendar, marketing , or fiscal year). 
Many Members have  taken up to two  years or more to do so. In the area of Services, Art icle III.3 of 
the GATS requires Members to promptly , and at least annually , to inform the Council for Trade in 
Services of the introduction of any new  law, or any changes to existing laws , regulations , or 
administrative guidelines which significantly affect trade in services covered by its specific 
commitments under this Agreement. Some Members have not been implementing this. Developed 
Members themselves should lead by example in submitti ng comprehensive, timely , and accurate 
notifications. India notes with disappointment that they have not always done so. Let transparency 
in notifications be a collective responsibility across various parts of the WTO.  
8.17.   The representative of Canada  indicate d the following:  
8.18.   Canada wishes to close this conversation by reiterating that there actually are no new 
obligations being created by this proposed declaration, it is entirely open and an evolving approach, 
as Brazil previously mentioned. As a number of the co -sponsors said, it is open to additions with 
regard to how Members approach changing the tariffs in their domestic system s. The proposal is  
really about  ensuring that Members, the private sector, and the traders of the world , know what 
they are getting into , and that they are made aware of potenti al tariff changes , or that they are able 
to mitigate the risks of a potential tariff change , by taking different steps to finalize their contracts . 
For example, one of the examples set out in the proposal  is that of traders paying their tariffs upfront 
before the ir shipment arrives at port. Canada wishes to really encourage Members to look again at 
this proposal . In addition, Canada and the co -sponsors will continue to keep the Committee updated 
to the extent possible given that it is only a couple of month s until MC12.  
8.19.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  9  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the Russian 
Federation and the United States . 
9.2.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
9.3.  As it has expressed previously , in this and other WTO committees , the United States remains 
concerned that this decree appears aimed at restricting Angola 's imports.  The United States 
appreciate s Angola 's engagement on this issue with the US  Embassy in Luanda. However, as the 
United States seeks to resolve its concerns, that engage ment is not a substitute for addressing the 
issue in this or other WTO committees . The United States continue s to hear reports of confusion 
over how the decree is being enforced , and of delays facing goods at the border. In particular, 
US agricultural exporters remain concerned over delays that perishable goods face amidst all this 
uncertainty.  The United States urges Angola to revise this decree to address US concerns , and to 
ensure that its measures with respect to imports are in complian ce with WTO  rules.  
9.4.  The representative of the Russian Federatio n indicated the following:  
9.5.  The Russian Federation remains concerned over Angola 's import restrictions on certain 
agricultural and industrial products introduced under the Presidential Decree No. 23/19 to protect 
domestic industries. This measure seems not to be in conformity  with WTO  rules. Russia's concern 
has been raised multiple ti mes in this Committee as well as in the C TG. Russia wishes to thank 
Angola for the fruitful consultations held earlier in the year. Nevertheless, Russia does not see any 
developments relating to the elimination of the trade -restricting measures  in question . Therefore, 
Russia urges Angola to bring its measures into conformity with WTO  rules. In this regard, the Russian 
Federation remains open to further bilateral discussions with Angola.  
9.6.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
9.7.  The European Union maintains its deep concern over Presidential Decree No. 23/19 , which aims  
to protect domestic industries in a manner that is , in the EU's view, incompatible with WTO  rules. 
This Presidential Decree could prove d etrimental to foreign investments in Angola.  The EU recalls 
that, since 2019, these concerns have already been raised in various WTO  bodies, notably the CTG, 
the Committee on Agriculture, and the Import Licensing  Committee. To date , Angola has not 
provided  any substantive reply or explanations on how it intends to bring this Decree into conformity 
with WTO law. The EU remains supportive of Angola 's intention to diversify its economy and to 
develop its domestic industry. Nonetheless, the EU once more urge s Angola to review the relevant 
measures in order to ensure their compliance with WTO  rules.  The Decree is also unclear because it 
does not provide information on how the relevant restrictions are implemented. Notably , it is unclear 
if licences are to be used  to manage these restrictions. The EU asks Angola to clarify this question. 
The EU also remind s Angola of its obligation under the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedure s 
to notify the measure, should licences be involved  in the implementation of this Presidential Decree.  
Irrespective of the issue of conformity with WTO  rules, the EU reiterates its request for Angola to 
provide clarification of its process regarding this decree, including any changes it wishes to introduce , 
and in which areas.  The European Union  looks forward to Angola 's replies to these various issues , 
as previously raised in various WTO  bodies.  
9.8.  The representative of Angola  indicated the following:  
9.9.  Angola considers its previous statements made in this and other WTO committees [still to be] 
valid; however, since Angola has received excellent contributions from interested Members , it has 
begun, and continues , to work towards adjusting and making the decree more comprehensive , to 
which end Angola  will certainly be count ing on the technical assistance of interested Members . It 
should be noted that imports into Angola continue to develop normal ly. In this sense, Angola accept s 
that certain terminologies in the provisions are out of order . For this r eason, the diploma is under 
review in order to harmonize it with the rules and regulations of the WTO . To this end, all 
inconsistencies are being analysed , and revised , and will be duly notified. Furthermore, Angola  
inform s Members that the decree in quest ion does not in any way prohibit the import ation of any 
product similar to the national product originating from any other country or Member.  The decree G/MA/M/75  
 
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  also indicates  that the application of any temporary QR measure will depend on the validation , by 
the E xecutive , of the effective existence, in 2022, of internal capacity to replace the imports  in 
question , as well as the ongoing stability and regularity in the supply of the respective goods to final 
consumers . Therefore , in 2022, an analysis of the interna l market will be carried out to substantiate 
the existence of real internal capacity at the level of national production.  
9.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
10  CANADA – RESTRICTIONS ON THE COMMERCIAL IMPORTATION OF CANNABIS AND 
CANNABIS PRODUCTS FOR MEDICAL USE – STATEMENT BY COLOMBIA  
10.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of Colombia.  
10.2.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
10.3.   Colombia wishes to raise its concerns about the restrictio ns that Canada has adopted on the 
importation of cannabis and cannabis products for medical use. Colombia  appreciate s the willingness 
of the Canadian authorities to address its doubts and concerns in bilateral dialogues in Bogota, 
Ottawa , and Geneva. Canad a is a leader in progressive regulations for the use of cannabis for 
medicinal purposes. Canadian companies globally stand out as the most promising to serve this 
growing and evolving market. Indeed, Canada has one of the most developed and largest medical  
cannabis markets in the world ; furthermore, i t is a recognized exporter of medical cannabis products . 
For example , in 2019 , Canada  exported an estimated 5,300  litres of cannabis oil  to at least 
17 countries . On the other hand, Canada is also an important investor in this sector, with Colombia 
being one of the countries where important investments have been registered for the development 
of this medical industry. Indeed, an important and growing part of Canada 's Foreign Direct 
Investment in Colombia is link ed to projects for the cultivation and processing of cannabis for 
medicinal use. In this regard, Canada and Colombia have generally shared a good business model.  
10.4.   However, Colombian companies exporting to Canada have for several months been 
experiencing dif ficulties in exporting cannabis and cannabis -containing products for medical , 
non-recreational , use. Colombia recogni zes and respects the policies adopted by WTO  Members to 
protect human life and health. However, such policies  should be adopted in a non -discriminatory 
manner , and without limiting trade beyond what is necessary. It is important to note that , under 
Canada 's domestic rules, the import and export of medical cannabis is permitted ; specifically, it is 
in accordance with Section  62 of the Cannab is Act of Canada, and in accordance with Section  139 of 
the Regulations. These rules are accompanied by a strict regulatory framework to control the 
production, distribution , and sale of cannabis for medical and scientific purposes. These rules have 
allowe d for massive exports of medical cannabis from Canada, as well as its controlled use on 
Canada's territory. Despite this, the Canadian authorities have restricted or prohibited commercial 
imports of medical cannabis from Colombia , allowing imports , in smal l quantities, of raw materials 
used for scientific and analytical purposes only. In this context, applications for permits to import 
medical cannabis for commercial purposes are not considered.  In addition, the Canadian authorities 
have indicated that expo rts from Colombia do not comply with their own "Good Manufacturing 
Practices ", which are only enforceable in Canada; furthermore, Colombian exporters have been 
denied access  to any information on these practices . 
10.5.   To date , the Canadian authorities have not presented the ir reasons for not allowing imports 
of cannabis and cannabidiol products for medical purposes, while domestic production and exports 
of the same products are allowed. In this regard, Colombia requests Canada to allow the commercial 
importation  of cannabis and cannabis products for medical purposes , in accordance with domestic 
law and multilateral trade rules. In addition, Canada  reiterate s the importance of avoiding any 
unjustified trade restrictions and the need for non -discriminatory treatment between domestic 
producers and imported products . 
10.6.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
10.7.   The Cannabis Act and it s regulations set ou t the restrictions pertaining to the import and 
export of cannabis.  Only holders of licences issued by Health Canada under the Cannabis Regulations 
may import or export cannabis, and only for medical or scientific purposes.  Under the Cannabis Act 
and its r egulations, the import and export of cannabis for any other purpose (such as distribution or G/MA/M/75  
 
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  sale for non -medical purposes) is strictly prohibited.  As outlined in Canada 's Cannabis Import/Export 
Bulletin, authorization of the import or export of cannabis f or medical or scientific purposes is only 
granted in very limited circumstances, in a manner that is consistent with the public health and 
public safety objectives of the Cannabis Act, and Canada 's obligations under international drug 
control treaties to w hich Canada is a party.  Before issuing an import permit, Health Canada considers 
whether there are risks to public health and public safety.  More information on importation of 
cannabis and cannabis products for medical use is available on Health Canada 's website . Canada will 
continue to engage with Colombia on this issue.  
10.8.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
11  CHINA – TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES – STATEMENT BY 
AUSTRALIA  
11.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Australia.  
11.2.   The representative of  Australia  indicated the following:  
11.3.   Australia and China have enjoyed a strong trading relationship, built over decades, which has 
created mutual economic benefits. However, Members will recall  that Australia has raised China 's 
implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures at re cent meetings of th is Committee 
and the CTG. Australia remains deeply concerned that China continues to apply trade disruptive and 
restrictive measures on a range of Australian products that have directly affected its market access 
into China. Australia is  further concerned by official Chinese statements and articles in state media 
linking China 's trade actions to unrelated issues in Australia and China's  bilateral relationship.  In this 
Committee, Australia again wishes to raise its concerns about a series of QRs, or de facto  import 
bans, which appear to be inconsistent with China 's WTO  commitments. In 2020 and 2021, Australia 
received multiple credible reports, including from Chinese industry, that Chinese authorities have 
informally instructed importers no t to purchase Australian barley, coal, copper ores and 
concentrates, cotton, lobster, logs, sugar, and wine. These actions are in addition to China 's formal 
actions against Australian barley, lobsters, logs, and wine, which Australia has raised in other 
relevant committees, and which  have effectively stopped trade in these products. Australia further 
notes that Chinese trade data shows virtually no Chinese imports of Australian coal and copper ores 
and concentrates since December  2020, despite no formal mea sures being implemented by China 
on these goods. However, imports of these products from other countries appear to have continued 
and, in some cases, increased.  
11.4.   Australia  consider s any instruction by Chinese authorities, whether formal or informal, not to 
purchase Australian products to be inconsistent with China 's WTO  obligations, including under 
Article  XI of the GATT (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) and Article  XIII of the GATT 
(Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions), and the fundamental WTO  principle 
of non -discrimination. Australia further notes that China has not notified these measures to the WTO , 
and request s China to do so promptly.  Australia has made a number of requests for advice and  
assurances from China in this and other committees , but has received no substantive or satisfactory 
response. Australia is ready and willing to meet bilaterally with China – in Geneva, Beijing, or 
Canberra – to discuss these  issues.  In conclusion, Austral ia underlines its expectation that all 
WTO Members, including China, will conduct their trade in accordance with their WTO commitments 
and the fundamental WTO  principle  of non -discrimination . 
11.5.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following : 
11.6.   The European Union is not directly involved in the issues that Australia is currently raising in 
this Committee, after having already raised similar matters in the July  meeting of the C TG, where 
the EU delivered  a statement. As in July, the EU wishes to raise questions of principle and law, not 
of facts. The EU is concerned, first, by the sheer number of different measures and the cumulative 
trade value affected. Second, the EU is concerned by the form that these measures apparently take. 
The EU agrees with Australia that the GATT  rules cover also informal measures, and it would point 
out, in addition , that informal, unpublici zed, and non -transparent trade regulations are at odds with 
the WTO 's rules and spirit. Th e EU agrees that Members ' compliance with WTO  obligations is key for 
the security  and predictability of the international trading system.  It is also key for the reliability of 
trading opportunities in the interest s of growth, efficiency , and welfare.  And it reflects on a Member 's G/MA/M/75  
 
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  reputation. The EU trusts that all Members share the commitment to safeguard and nurture this 
Organization.  Third, the EU is concerned by the apparent purpose of the measures in question. If 
the true underlying reason for the resor t to these  measures is an intention to punish, put pressure 
on, or coerce another  Member  because of a policy choice that lies within its rights, then these 
measures reach beyond the field of trade and become a problem also under general international 
law. Within the European Union, growing concern is being expressed as to the practices of certain 
Members  seeking to coerce other Members to take or withdraw particular policy measures.  
11.7.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
11.8.   The United States wishes  again to register its systemic concern over the information provided 
by Australia.  China appears to have implemented a broad range of restrictive measures against 
certain Australian goods, and official Chi nese statements have linked these actions to unrelated 
bilateral matters.  China's  restrictive measures include suspension of imports, increased inspection 
and testing at the border,  delays in granting import permits, delays in registration of export 
establ ishments, and imposition of anti -dumping and countervailing duties.  The United States  also 
register s its systemic concern over reports that Chinese authorities have informally instructed 
importers not to purchase certain Australian goods.  The United States  is concerned that, more 
broadly, China 's actions are not isolated to Australia. In fact, there are many instances of China 
using these non -market policies and practices against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation for 
unconnected bilateral issues. For seve ral years, China has asserted that it firmly upholds the 
"rules-based multilateral trading system ". But this claim seems inconsistent with China 's actions.  
China 's failure to adhere to global trade norms and WTO  principles challenges the prosperity, 
security, and values not just of the United States, but also of many other Members of this institution.  
11.9.   The representative of United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
11.10.   The United Kingdom would like to express its support for Australia 's concern a bout trade 
restrictive measures taken by China against Australian products. The UK  urges China to ensure that 
its trade measures are applied in a non -discriminatory, predictable manner, and with the necessary 
transparency around decision -making and adminis trative procedures, as required by the relevant 
WTO Agreements . This is important to ensure that, as Members, we are adhering to the fundamental 
principles and objectives of free and fair trade underpinning the rules -based multilateral trading 
system. Unfa ir and market -distorting trade practices risk undermining the integrity of, and trust in, 
the multilateral trading system, and lead to direct consequences for business and citizens worldwide. 
The United Kingdom  would welcome China's  clarifications of the p oints raised by Australia,  and 
encourage s China to engage in good faith and in a timely and responsive manner.  
11.11.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
11.12.   Japan shares the view , expressed by Australia,  that anti -dumping measures should  be 
implemented within the framework of the WTO  Agreements, and that China should comply with the 
Anti-dumping Agreement not only for the investigation procedures themselves , but also for 
fact-finding and analysis in conducting an investigation. Japan  also share s the concerns expressed 
by Australia that every necessary  measure should be transparent and secured.  
11.13.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
11.14.   Canada shares the systemic concerns raised by Australia.  Canada  encourage s all 
WTO Members, in cluding China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  
11.15.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
11.16.   New Zealand shares a systemic interest in the concerns expressed on this topic. As 
New Zealand has repeatedly noted in a number of fora, the multil ateral rules-based  trading system 
provides that all Members, regardless of their size or trading capacity, are subject to the same rights 
and obligations.  This provides the predictability and certainty necessary to ensure that trade can 
take place efficien tly and with the least friction possible.  Given the challenges all Members are facing 
as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic, the certainty provided by the multilateral trading system is 
more important than ever.  If Members step away from their commitments, or adopt remedies 
provided for under the WTO  Agreements for other  purposes, this will undermine the predictability G/MA/M/75  
 
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  and certainty on which the system rests.  New Zealand encourages Members to comply fully with 
their WTO  obligations, including in  the application of trade remedies.  
11.17.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
11.18.   China  takes note of the concerns raised once again by Australia,  and also thank s the 
European Union , the United States , the United Kingdom , Japan, Canada,  and N ew Zealand. Since 
China has  provided responses to this issue several times before, it would  like to refer to its previous 
statements made at this Committee and other WTO  bodies.21 On this occasion, China wishes to 
emphasize that these measures are consistent with  WTO rules, Chinese laws and regulations, 
international practices, and the provisions of the China -Australia Free Trade Agreement.  
11.19.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
12  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM – STATEMENTS BY 
CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION  
12.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of China and 
the Russian Federation.  On 7 October  2021, at the request of t he Russian Federation, the Secretariat 
had circulated written questions in document  G/MA/W/172.  
12.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
12.3.   On 14  July 2021, the European Union published its draft proposal on the Carbon Boarder 
Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). This mechanism will be applied in respect of imports of iron and 
steel, cement, fertilizers and chemical products, aluminium and electricity.  The Russian Federation  
continue s to analyse  this proposal. Many of its elements have not  yet been developed and will be 
presented in separate acts.  However, Russia already has many questions regarding certain elements 
of the proposed mechanism and its relationship to international agreements, including the 
WTO Agreement s. For example, according to this proposal , starting from 2023, the products 
concerned  shall only be imported into the customs territory of the European Union  by a declarant 
that is authori zed by the competent authority. Russia  also has certain questions with respect to the 
methods to be used for calculating embedded emissions , and the price of the CBAM  certificates , and 
in particular, their relationship and consistency with the relevant methods applied under the 
EU Emission Trading System (ETS) . Russia  cannot avoid questi oning the exclusions and exemptions  
of goods originating in certain WTO  Members  from the CBAM, as well as the  adaptations of default 
value based on various factors, including  natural resources , and specific market conditions.  These 
and other questions were circulated in documents  G/MA/W/172 and G/C/W/800 . The Russian 
Federation  urges the European Union to consider these questions and provide its responses.  
12.4.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
12.5.   China has closely followed the deve lopment of the proposed CBAM. We would like to reiterate 
that the UN  Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the most important international 
treaty tackling global climate change.  The UNFCCC has confirmed the "Common but Differentiated 
Responsi bilities " as one of the core principles for international cooperation on climate change. This 
principle should be fully respected.  We encourage EU to enhance transparency and ensure the 
proposed CBAM is compatible with WTO  rules and regulations. We are wil ling to strengthen 
communication and coordination with all parties include EU, promote the liberalization and facilitation 
of green related trade and investment, and jointly address the challenges of climate change. China 
will continue to follow this issue . 
12.6.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
12.7.   The Republic of Korea appreciates the European Union's  efforts to tackle ongoing climate 
change. With a view to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, the EU revealed , in July of this year,  a 
framework of its CBAM to address the issue of possible carbon leakage. In this regard, Korea wishes 
to reiterate that tra de-related measures, such as the CBAM, should be consistent with WTO  rules 
and not constitute a disguised or unnecessary barrier  to trade . At the same time, companies affected 
 
21 See, for example, document  G/MA/M/74, paragraphs  11.8-11.9. G/MA/M/75  
 
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  by the CBAM should be taken into due consideration, including through the possib ility to submit their 
opinions , and by receiving sufficient information about the scheme. Korea hopes that the CBAM will 
be implemented in a way that fulfils the WTO's objectives of ensuring sustainable development and 
facilitating free trade. Korea  will continue to look closely at the process of introducing the CBAM , 
and suggest s having further discussions among WTO  Members to ensure its transparency and 
predictability.  
12.8.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
12.9.   The Kingdom of Bahrain shares similar concerns to those raised by the Russian Federation , 
China,  and other proponents that have raised this subject matter , and wishes to recall , in this regard,  
its statement s made at previous Committee meetings.22 
12.10.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
12.11.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thank s the proponents for raising the subject of the European 
Union's CBAM. From Saudi Arabia's  perspective , while the EU stated that the proposed mechanism 
would  conform to WTO rules and its other international obligations , the EU has yet to provide any 
explanation s of how it will do so. W hile the EU 's intention  is to address the risk of investment leakage  
from the EU to other countries , in reality its  main o bjective is to maintain the competitiveness of 
EU industries . Saudi Arabia's  preliminary review indicate s that the proposed mechanism raise s a 
very serious concern due to its potential long-term negative implications on global trade , and that it 
will distort the full value chain of trade , including goods , service s, and jobs. Saudi Arabia urge s the 
EU to further engage in consultations with Members in order to  ensure the full compliance of its 
CBAM with the WTO rules and the WTO  Agreements , and to ensur e that the proposed mechanism 
will not create any unnecessary barrier s to trade or be applied in a manner that constitutes protection 
to the EU  domestic industry. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  looks forward to receiving further details 
and reflections from t he EU on this proposed mechanism , and stands ready to engage on this subject 
with the European Union and other interested Members.  
12.12.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
12.13.   Paraguay  notes that, since the Committee's previous meeting , the European Union has 
published its proposal  regarding a CBAM , which seeks to avoid carbon leakage as part of the EU's 
ambitious  implementation of the Paris Agreement . However, the EU's justification  seems to be 
problematic al because it assumes  that all Membe rs have the same ambition , although the P aris 
Agreement itself is based on the principle of "common  but differentiated responsibilities ". Paraguay , 
for example , does not have the  same national objectives as other Members because it is not 
responsible for c urrent  or historical d amage to the environment. Therefore , Paraguay  believe s that 
this "level playing field " approach , which does not take into  account the  existing  differences in terms 
of economic development or fiscal policies among Members , and which as sumes that there exists 
one single approach  for all Member s, is a major problem. Finally, Paraguay requests the European 
Union to provide information on the compensation programme  for third  countries  so that Members 
can be sure that the system  is fair . 
12.14.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
12.15.   India echoes the concern s raised by several Members on this issue. India believes that a 
thorough legal examination will be required of various elements of the European Green Deal, 
including th e CBAM,  to ascertain their conformity with the relevant WTO  rules. India would reiterate 
that any such mechanism as the CBAM must take into consideration the principle of "common but 
differentiated responsibilities " and respective capabilities of different  Members , in light of different 
national circumstances, fisca l conditions , and development levels.  India also believes  that the 
Multilateral Environment Agreements are the right forum to discuss and solve issues pertaining  to 
the environment and the climate.  
12.16.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
 
22 See, for example, document  G/MA/M/74, paragraph  12.14.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  12.17.   Canada is carefully reviewing the European Commission 's draft legislation and  will continue 
its discussions with the EU to ensure that the design of the CBAM fully account s for Canada 's carbon 
pricing policies.  Canada expects that the CBAM and its administration will respect the EU 's 
international trade obligations, including under the Canada -EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) . More broadly, Canada looks for ward to collaborating with the EU on how border 
carbon adjustments could fit into a broader strategy t hat meets climate targets while addressing 
potential carbon leakage risks.  
12.18.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
12.19.   Chinese Taipei  again register s its interest in this subject and will closely follow development s 
in it. Chinese Taipei would also welcome any update from the EU  side. 
12.20.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
12.21.   Japan considers that trade  policies and measures to a ddress climate change need to be 
mutually complementary and consistent.  For example , on the problem of carbon leakage , Members 
must prevent it, but at the same time, when it comes to designing specific policies to address  it, 
such as the CBAM, these need to be put in place appropriately , based on discussion s that consider 
the relevant international frameworks.  As Japan has pointed out in the Trade and Environmental 
Sustainability Structured Discussions  (TESSD)  in September, it is a prerequisite that the CBAM be 
designed to be consistent with WTO  rules. In addition, Japan  believes that there will be challenges 
to address.  For example, un der the Paris Agreement, the Members have been working toward s 
reducing carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutral ity by implementing various policies , such 
as carbon taxes, obligatory emissions trading systems, and other tax regimes and regulations 
intended to encourage companies to implement relevant measures  of their own accord. Bearing 
these efforts in mind, the CBAM should be designed to achieve its objective of preventing carbon 
leakage with the least possible negative effect on trade.  In this rega rd, Japan believe s that it is 
important to consider measurement or evaluation methods for carbon emissions per product unit 
that are internationally reliable. It is also important to consider the actual verification of carbon 
costs, including any costs tha t, in effect, are borne by the product in proportion to carbon emissions.  
It will be necessary to continue conducting sufficient discussions internationally on this issue, 
including on these technical matters, and to proceed with institutionalization based  on those  
discussion s. 
12.22.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
12.23.   Australia welcomes the consultative approach that the European Union  has taken in relation 
to its CBAM. However , Australia  notes that many aspects of the policy still remain unclear, despite 
the release of the draft CBAM  regulation on 14  July. Australia encourages the EU to continue shar ing, 
to the maximum extent possible, details of its policy deliberations and any updates on the likely 
form this CBAM might take, consistent with the central WTO  principle of transparency. Australia  
appreciate s the EU 's advice that it is committed to ensuring the consistency of its eventual measure 
with its WTO  obligations. Further detail and clarity  on how the EU will address the issue of 
WTO consistency would be helpful for Members , including Australia,  that have questions and 
concerns about the possible protectionism impacts of such policies.  Australia is strongly committed 
to addressing climate ch ange and believes  that international trade can contribute to th at objective. 
In particular, Australia believes that policies that facilitate increased trade in environmental goods 
and services, and related investment, can make a strong contribution in supp ort of international 
climate policy. Australia encourages the EU to clarify how it will ensure that its  CBAM  policy will 
consider alternative measures to explicit carbon pricing , such as higher standards or Australia 's 
technology -led approach, which can be  equally if not more effective in reducing emissions.  
12.24.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
12.25.   New Zealand is a strong advocate for coherent and mutually supportive trade and climate 
policy responses. New Zealand is forward leaning when i t comes to the opportunity to contribute 
meaningful and positive climate mitigation efforts through trade policy . A good example is what New 
Zealand is trying to do in the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability, a plurilateral 
effort that ai ms to bring together some of the inter -related elements of the climate change, trade , 
and sustainable development agendas.  New Zealand recogni zes the potential value of a CBAM as a G/MA/M/75  
 
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  tool to contribute to climate change mitigation goals, while also acknowledging challenges in 
implementation. New Zealand believe s that, for such a mechanism to be effective , it must be 
environmentally effective, WTO-compatible, and scientifically robust.  Furthermore, its design  should 
include meaningful consultation with trading partners.  
12.26.   The representative of Egypt  indicated the following:  
12.27.   This agenda item is of great importance to Egypt because the European Union comes first 
on the list of its main trading partners . Egypt  continue s to have concerns over the impact of the 
proposed CBAM on Egypt's exports to the EU. Egypt also share s the concerns raised by other 
Members regarding the proposed mechanism 's potential long -term nega tive implications on global 
trade, its compliance with WTO  rules and the WTO  Agreements, and the need to guarantee that it 
would not create unnecessary barriers to trade.  Egypt would also like to echo the call by other 
Members that the proposed mechanism m ust take into consideration the principle of "common but 
differentiated responsibilities " and the respective capabilities of different countries in light of their 
different national circumstances and levels of development. It is well known that the develop ing 
countries are those hardest hit by the negative impact of the pandemic , for which reason, all 
Members need to ensure that the proposed mechanism will not deepen the economic crisis in those  
countries.  
12.28.   The representative of Brazil  indicated the following:  
12.29.   Brazil continue s attentively to follow the debate about the EU  CBAM  mechanism , and awaits 
the EU's further explanations to be come  available regarding the methodology  to be adopted and the 
mechanism 's compatibility with the EU's WTO obligations. Brazil also echo es some of the concerns 
raised by Paraguay, especially the fact that the principle of "common but  differen tiated 
responsibilities " implies recognition of different historic responsibility , and also the concern on 
national cap acity, which should be applied in a manner consistent with current multilateral debates.  
12.30.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
12.31.   The European Union  appreciates the interest of its partners in this important issue. The EU 
has stepped up its climate ambition, fully translating the implementation of the Paris Agreement into 
legislation , and invites its partners to share a comparable level of ambition.  The introduction of a 
CBAM to address the risk of carbon leakage is an integral  part of that implementation and ambition, 
as reflected in the European Green Deal, to avoid EU  climate action being undermined.  The CBAM is 
a purely climate -oriented, environmental policy tool  that will be applied in a non -discriminatory and 
even-handed m anner, in full compliance with WTO  rules and other international obligations.  The 
CBAM does not target third  countries but applies to goods of certain carbon -intensive sectors. It 
takes into consideration the application of carbon pricing systems by third  countries , opening 
possibilities for reduction or non -payment of the CBAM  charge , as well as  the carbon footprint of 
individual producers , meaning that the CBAM will be charged according to the actual emissions of 
imported goods.  To provide third  countries  with legal certainty and stability, a monitoring and 
reporting system will apply from 2023 until end -2025, allowing time for the final system to be put 
in place. This transitional period will also allow  trading partners sufficient preparation time. 
12.32.   The CB AM will start applying , with revenue collection , in 2026. As of 2026, the CBAM will 
start applying gradually to the products covered , and in direct proportion to the reduction of free 
allowances allocated under the EU  ETS for those sectors. Over time, the CBAM will replace the free 
allocation of allowances.  The EU is ready to engage with its trading  partners and international 
organi zations to inform and , where possible , to assist with the implementation of the measure.  There 
is an urgency to tackling climate change and it can only be achieved by scaling up our levels of 
global ambition ; and only by taking ambitious action, will it be pos sible to halt global warming and 
keep the 1.5°C Paris Agreement  goal in reach, while limiting the economic, social , and environmental 
impact of climate change. At present, limiting temperature increase s to below 1.5°C is still within 
reach if  countries sca le up the levels of their global ambition.  To this end, the  CBAM  proposal, as 
part of the "Fit for 55 " package of proposals, is currently before the EU  co-legislators  and going 
through  the relevant legislative procedure. The EU co-legislators will analyse the package in depth 
and come to a joint agreement in order to adopt the different proposals, including the CBAM.  In 
addition, the  EU notes that it will revert to Russia regarding the written  questions it recently 
submitted. The EU  also wishes to draw Members' attention to a presentation on its CBAM that the G/MA/M/75  
 
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  EU will make at the Committee on Trade and Environment 's meeting of  11 October  2021. On that 
occasion, the  European Commission , or more specifically , the Department for Trade an d the 
Department for Taxation and Customs , will present an update of the trade -relevant aspects of the 
European Green Deal, including the CBAM.  
12.33.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
13  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM  OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS (G/MA/W/169) – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
13.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had b een included at the request of the 
European Union, Switzerland , and the United States.  Written questions had been circulated in 
document  G/MA/W/169.  
13.2.   The representative of  Switzerland  indicated the following:  
13.3.   Since the Committee's previous meeting, Switzerl and has been in contact with the 
GCC member States  to seek clarification regarding the state of play of the planned reform.  As the 
representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain indicated , during the Committee's April meeting , that "the 
objective was to switch t o a graduated tax base as soon as the GCC  member States complete the 
review ", Switzerland wishes to know whether the review has now been completed. Switzerland  also 
seeks information concerning the steps to be taken before the end of the year.  Referring to the 
statement made last April by the delegate from Bahrain, Switzerland recall s that fruit juices and 
dairy products will be subject to the selective tax. Once implemented, this modification will increase 
the tax base and the source of revenue s. As the market share of energy drinks in the GCC is very 
small (less than 5%), Switzerland  again repeat s its long-standing  request that the GCC equalizes 
the tax rate at 50% for all sugar -containing beverages , and implements this change until the end of 
2021. This will have no negative impact on the revenue and the health objectives of the GCC. In 
fact, analysis performed by the competent authorities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have confirmed 
the conclusions of the European Food Safety Authority  (EFSA)  that the health problems associated 
with beverages consumption relate to the sugar content of the beverages. The EFSA  provisional 
assessment of the safety of dietary sugars, opened for public comment until 30  September  2021, 
confirms the link between the intake of different categories of sugars and the risk of developing 
metabolic diseases, such as  obesity and diabetes.  Finally, Switzerland is in contact with the GCC to 
discuss holding a capital representatives meeting and look s forward to receiving confirmation of the 
proposed date as soon as possible.  
13.4.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
13.5.   The delegation of the United States, as well as those from the European Union, Japan,  and 
Switzerland, circulated questions on  12 April 2021 to each of the member State governments of the 
Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) , regarding their implementation of the 
selective tax on carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sports drinks , and other 
sweetened beverages.  The United States has not yet received written responses to those questions 
and ask s these Members to indicate at this meeting  when those responses will be provided.  The 
United States looks forward to receiving their written responses and request s a substantive update 
on revisions to the GCC  excise tax model and its implementation plan under the GCC  Unified Excise 
Tax Agreement . In particular, the United States  looks forward to hearing from GCC  member State 
governments on  the following : the current status of these revisions;  the timeline for completing 
these revisions by the end of 2021;  the timeline for engagement with interested trading partner 
governments and private industry stakeholders; and  details on the planned rev isions, including how 
the revisions will ensure application to all beverages in which the total sugar content exceeds a 
minimum threshold , exemption of beverages with no added sugar and low caloric beverages , and 
application of the same tax rate for all co vered beverages that have similar amounts of sugar, 
including energy drinks.  Timely engagement with interested trading partner governments and 
private sector stakeholders on the concerns noted is critical.  
13.6.   The representative of the European Union  indicated  the following:  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  13.7.   The European Union likewise maintains its serious concerns , voiced in various WTO Councils 
and Committees , as well as in bilateral contacts with the GCC  countries , in relation to the GCC 
"Treaty on Excise Tax " of December  2016.  The EU wishe s to reiterate the importance of harmonizing 
the implementation of the Excise Tax Law and the need for close engagement with private industry 
stakeholders on the process for its revision . The EU welcomes the GCC 's willingness to consult with 
trading partne rs and industry stakeholders before a revised system is put in place. In this regard , 
the EU call s upon the GCC to share its study on proposed tax rates and their expected impact with 
interested stakeholders for consultation prior to adopting a revised taxation model.  The EU also 
seeks GCC confirmation that , in the revised tax system, the energy drinks will fall within the scope 
of a sweetened beverage tax, and be taxed according to the same criteria as other sweetened 
beverages, namely , solely o n the basis of their sugar content . The EU would also welcome 
information on the envisaged timeline for the change to the volumetric tax and an acceleration of 
the implementation of the new tax regime.  The EU would also like to underline the call to provid e 
immediate relief for industry until the ongoing GCC  excise taxation revision takes effect, by 
exempting all zero  sugar beverages from the tax , and by harmonizing the tax rate at 50 % for energy 
drinks and all other categories of sugar -sweetened beverages subject to the tax.  In addition , the EU 
echoes the request to the GCC  member State governments to provide written replies to the 
questions circulated in the Committee . Finally, the  European Union stands ready to continue 
engaging with the GCC on this issue  in order to have this trade barrier solved in the near future.  
13.8.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
13.9.   On the issue of the selective tax on carbonated soft drinks adopted by certain GCC  Members, 
Japan recognizes that the classification of Jap anese soft drinks has been optimized in the United 
Arab Emirates, and appreciate s the action taken by the UAE on this matter.  At the same time , and 
while it recognize s that the GCC  member States are currently conducting a study on a new excise 
tax model, Japan is still interested in this regime from the perspective of taking a systemic approach 
to taxation. Therefore, Japan looks forward to seeing relevant information on this study shared in 
advance , and to the  GCC member States providing WTO Members with written answers to the ir 
previously circulated questions.  
13.10.   The representative of the Kingdom of Bahrain  indicated the following:  
13.11.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saud i Arabia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar,  and the State of Kuwait, Bahrain thank s the delegations 
of the European Union, Japan, Switzerland,  and the United States,  for the interest  that they attach 
to the GCC  excise tax regime and for their comm unication on the application of the excise tax on 
carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other sweetened 
beverages , contained in document  G/MA/W/169 , dated 12  April 2021, and submitted to the 
Committee under this agenda it em. In this regard, Bahrain recall s that the application of the excise 
tax regime remains a common exercise that is coordinated between the GCC  member States , from 
the beginning of designing the common law or agreement , to its implementation at national level. 
In other words, the GCC  member States prefer to discuss the issue of the GCC  excise tax in this 
Committee , and to answer the questions and concerns of interested WTO  Members in a coordinated 
manner , through one  common voice. That said, Bahrain wishes to try to answer some of the 
questions put by the interested delegations of the GCC  member States ' trading partners.  
13.12.   On the updated timeline of the ongoing st udy on a new GCC  excise tax model and its 
implementation, Bahrain recall s that the revision of a tax regime , such as the excise tax on 
beverages , is a complex exercise that requires  big effort, extensive coordination , and comprehensive 
studies. Therefore , it is a time and resource -consuming exercise , which necessitate s a lengthy period 
of long-standing effort and patience. The GCC  Working Group on Tax is sparing no effort to the end 
of complet ing this exercise , and to submit ting to the GCC  member States the appropriate results 
and a high standards excise tax model. For this reason, Bahrain requests trading partners to 
demonstrate additional patience , and to allow the GCC  competent authorities the time to complete 
their hard work on the excise tax r egime. At this stage, Bahrain assure s Members  that their concerns 
are being taken into account and treated with consideration. As for the consultation of the 
GCC member States with private industry, trading partner governments , and other interested 
parties , the GCC  member States have their own informal and formal mechanism , and are open , and 
stand ready , to respond to any demand for consultations that could contribute to improvements in 
the required equilibrium between the right to regulate and the interest s of private industry. This is G/MA/M/75  
 
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  naturally in addition to the consultation s with their trading partner governments , at GCC  level, to 
which the GCC  Member States , collectively , are open . 
13.13.   On the issue of possible differences in the implementation of the selective tax across 
GCC member States, Bahrain wishes to confirm that these differences must be consistent with the 
GCC Unified Excise Tax Agreement , which constitutes the legal framework for the application of the 
excise tax in all GCC  member States. This Agreement requires,  under  its Article  29, that 
GCC member States undertake the necessary internal procedures, including through their national 
laws and regulation s, to implement the provisions of the GCC  Unified Excise Tax Agreement. 
Therefore, any inconsistency, if it exists, will be addressed within the GCC  relevant working groups, 
committees , and other administrative mechanisms.  As for the legal de finition of the different types 
of beverages , the scope of coverage of the excise tax , and the expected exemptions, Bahrain has 
little information on these aspects at this stage , and the aforementioned study , which could clarify 
all these topics and make any appropriate recommendations and suggestions , is not yet completed. 
Therefore , Bahrain  hopes that the GCC 's trading partner governments could demonstrate , at this 
stage , patience, indulgence , and understanding , because of the complexity of the issue and of the 
need for GCC  member States to establish for themselves a high-standard excise tax model that 
meets their needs and specificities while being adapted to an equilibrium between the right to 
regulate and the interest s of private industry.  
13.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
14  INDIA – INDIAN STANDARDS AND IMPORT RESTRICTIONS IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SECTOR (QUALITY ORDERS): WHEEL RIMS, SAFETY CLASS, HELMETS  – STATEMENT BY 
INDONESIA  
14.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia.  
14.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
14.3.   Indonesia thanks India for notifying the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT Committee ), on 25  May 2020, of the draft Automobile Wheel Rims (Quality Control), 
Order  2020 (document  G/TBT/N/IND/147) . Based on these criteria, wheel rim products must 
conform to IS  16192 and bear the Indian Standard Mark, which is licensed by the Bureau of Indian 
Standards (BIS).  Accordi ng to the notification, this order shall come into force with effect from 
1 October  2020, yet India has not made any addendum to the notification regarding the stipulation 
of the regulation. Indonesia seeks clarification regarding the status of the impleme ntation of the 
regulation. Indonesia is of the view that the regulation has impacted upon exporters, and has 
become for them a trade barrier , as there is no clarity regarding the mechanism of the regulation. 
Therefore, Indonesia requests that India either postpone the regulation or allow sufficient transition 
time for industry to comply with it. Indonesia remains concerned that the conformity assessment 
procedure , as set out in the document , is more restrictive than necessary.  Indonesia  is also aware 
that, before the mandatory implementation of IS  16192, India required all car wheel manufacturers 
to apply the ICAT (International Center for Automotive Technology) Standard before entering the 
Indian market. Therefore, Indonesia requests further clarification f rom India regarding the 
differences in terms and procedures regulated in the new IS  standard compared to the previous 
ICAT standards.  At the same time, Indonesia thanks India for the discussion s held in the context of 
the virtual bilateral meeting on the side -lines of the  TBT meeting , and at the Working Group of Trade 
and Investment meeting of 5 August  2021. Indonesia has requested further clarification from India 
in relation to this matter, but unfortunately , to date, Indonesia has not received any substantive 
responses from India regarding Indonesia's concern.  
14.4.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
14.5.   India considers that it  is not a mandatory obligation under the WTO Agreement on Technical  
Barriers to Trade to notify the final measure to the WTO. However, the same is published in the 
Gazette. As also mentioned on the B IS website, the implementation date for the said regulation has 
been postponed to 2 1 March  2022. The same has been published i n the Gazette .23 The Quality 
Control Order has listed the mandated standard and the conformity assessment procedures required.  
 
23 https://www.bis.gov.in/wp -content/uploads/2021/06/Automobile -Wheel -Rim-Component -Quality -
Control -Amendment -Order -2021.pdf   G/MA/M/75  
 
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  There is no provision in BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulations  2018 for remote assessment or 
any other means for inspection. The Government is considering alternatives for in -person 
inspections. The discussion is in its initial stages.  
14.6.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
15  INDIA – PLAIN COPIER PAPER QUALITY ORDER 2020  – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
15.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia.  
15.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
15.3.   Indonesia remains concerned about the provisions set out in India's Plain Copier Paper 
(Quality Control) Order  2020, which stipulate that  the certification shall be carried out only by the 
BIS, based on the Conformity Assessment Regulation  2018, through the Scheme  1 of Schedule -II, 
which shall require a factory visit, sampling , and testing of the product , as well as licensi ng 
procedures. Indonesia regrets that India is ignoring the current pandemic situation, which prevents 
factory visits due to travel bans and social distancing policies. Therefore, Indonesia urges India to 
consider the use of remote assessment in conducting  factory visit s, or any other relaxation of its 
policy , as a mean s to facilitate trade and minimize technical barrier s to trade, particularly at this 
time. Indonesia wishes to reiterate its previous statement , namely that the regulation in question 
has had a negative impact and become a trade barrier for exporters , in particular  as there is no 
clarity regarding the mechanism of the regulation. Therefore, Indonesia requests India to postpone 
or provide a sufficient tran sition time to allow industries to comply with the regulation. Indonesia 
also requests  India to adopt the available International Standard as a basis for its testing method. 
Indonesia appreciates India's  discussion of this issue in the virtual  bilateral me eting during the 
meeting of the TBT  Committee, and at the Working Group of Trade and Investment meeting , on 
5 August  2021. Indonesia has sent enquiries and requested further clarification from India regarding 
this matter . However, Indonesia regrets to note  that India has not yet provide d any substantive 
response to its concern.  
15.4.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
15.5.   There is no provision in the BIS Regulation s 2018 for remote assessment or any other means 
for inspection. The Government of India is considering alternatives for in -person inspections. The 
Quality  Control Order has listed the mandated standard and the conformity assessment procedures 
required. On the standards, India wishes to clarify that international standards are indeed adopted 
unless specified otherwise.  India will contact Indonesia bilaterally in order to discuss this issue 
further.  
15.6.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
16  INDIA – QUANTI TATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – 
STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE EUROPEAN  UNION, THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
16.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of Australia, 
Canada, the European Union, the Russian Federation,  and the United States.  
16.2.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
16.3.   Australia 's concerns with India 's restrictive  measures on pulses imports are well known to all 
Members, particularly  its concerns over India's QRs. While Australia has previously welcomed India 's 
temporary suspension of the renewed QRs for mung beans (Moong), pigeon peas (Tur) , and black 
gram (Urad) , until 31  October  2021, this does not address Australia 's underlying concerns and its 
continued request that India's QRs be permanently removed. Australia has previously said , in this 
Committee and other relevant WTO  bodies , that it believe s that India is using these 
WTO-inconsistent measures as an ongoing means to flexibly manage imports in response to 
changing domestic circumstances. Australia  understand s that the temporary suspension of QRs and 
the imposition of domestic stock limits for all pul ses, until 31  October  2021, is to address concerns 
about inflation in pulse prices, which reinforces Australia's  concerns about how India is using the G/MA/M/75  
 
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  QRs. Australia also notes that , at the same time , India recently continued to increase the minimum 
suppor t prices for a range of pulses. Pulses are not a "small" commodity for India, neither by tonnage 
nor the value produced and consumed, nor with respect to trade.  Therefore, India 's measures matter 
in the global pulses market. India 's current suite of measur es on pulses, including significant and 
increasing levels of market price support, high tariffs , and QRs, continue to negatively impact upon 
the stability and predictability of the global pulses market, to the detriment of all producers and 
consumers, incl uding those in India.  
16.4.   Australia and the co -sponsors of this agenda item have submitted numerous formal questions 
to India in various WTO  fora, including the C TG and the Committee on Agriculture. Unfortunately, 
India has not answered all of Australia's  questions or addressed its concerns. It is important that 
India provides detailed answers to explain the market and other conditions behind its decisions, 
including  the temporary suspension, and explain how they are WTO -consistent. While the 
WTO Agreements contain exceptions, the onus is on the Member implementing the measure to 
explain how such exceptions may apply.  Australia  asks India to clearly explain the status  of all of its 
quantitative restrictions on pulses, in particular whether the temporary suspensions will continue 
beyond 31  October , and the status of the QR on yellow peas for the fiscal year 2021 -2022. Australia 
also request s India to explain the policy rationale for the minimum import price requirement and 
port restrictions for yellow peas. India needs to provide certainty and stability to exporters, traders , 
and the global pulses market, which will not be achieved by continu ing to implement potential 
"temporary suspensions " to what were claimed to be "temporary measures " that have now been in 
place since August  2017. Australia  request s that India respond to its questions and permanently 
remove the QRs.  
16.5.   The representative of t he United States  indicated the following:  
16.6.   As has been previously stated , in this and other WTO  committee  meetings, the United States 
remains concerned about  India's use of domestic support policies, multiple increases in tariff rates, 
and the application o f import restrictions for pulses , including pigeon peas, mung beans, black gram 
lentils, and peas.  The United States  repeat s its previous requests for information on how the 
measures reflect India 's WTO  commitments, and when and how the measures will be lifted. 
16.7.   The representative of  Ukraine  indicated the following:  
16.8.   Ukraine wishes to reiterate  its position on India 's policy  on pulses , which it has already voiced 
on several previous occasions. India has imposed  QRs on import s of various pulses for about 
40 years . As such , India's restriction measures are neither  temporary nor transparent , therefore 
violating the requirements of Article  XI of the GATT  1994 and Art icle 4 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture . Ukraine hopes that India will comply with its WTO  commitments and eliminate its import 
restriction s. 
16.9.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
16.10.   As a high -quality, reliable supplier, Canada has been the Member most negatively affected 
by India 's measures to limit the imp ort of pulses and is disappointed that pulses continue to be listed 
as an import restricted product under India 's book of ITC  (HS) Classifications of Export and Import. 
For dried peas, no quota volume has been announced by India for the fiscal year  2021. Canada 
therefore understands that the import of dried peas is banned. Continuous QRs and import bans on 
dried peas and other pulses have been in place for the last three  years.  Consequently, it is difficult 
for Canada to understand why India continues to claim that these measures are "temporary ". Canada 
asks that India promptly clarify the situation as to why dried peas are still restr icted from import, 
why no quota on dried peas has been available since 31 March  2021, and when imports of Canadian 
dried peas can resume.  Canada continues to question the legal interpretation provided by India to 
justify its trade restrictive measures on d ried peas.  To conclude, Canada calls upon India to 
immediately and expeditiously review its trade restrictive measures put in place on dried peas and 
other pulses, and to implement alternative, WTO -consistent policy options that promote a  
predictable and t ransparent import regime for pulses . 
16.11.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  16.12.   The Russian Federation reiterates its long -standing concern over India's pulses import policy 
and calls upon India to stop applying restrictive measures on import s of yellow peas that are 
inconsistent with WTO  rules. During the period of application of restrictive measures , from 2018 to 
2021, India still has not provided sound reasoning for the introduction of measures that hinder the 
import of pulses into India. Import quotas, an import ban, minimum import price requirement s, and 
ports of entry restriction s have led to a situation where  import volumes of yellow peas from Russia 
plunge d almost to zero for the first half of 2021. India r epeatedly declares its justification for its 
measures on imported pulses by recourse to Article  XX(a) and (b) of the GATT. Russia  urges India 
once again to explain the causal link between the protection of public morals, human, plant or animal 
life or heal th and import restrictions and import prohibition on yellow peas. To date , India has failed 
to provide such a link.  Moreover, Russia wishes to clarify when India is going to introduce the details 
of its import policy on yellow peas for the 2021 -2022 fiscal year, given that, as of 8 October  2021, 
the information on the import conditions on yellow peas on the site of the Directorate General of 
Foreign Trade of India is still absent, meaning that  India has delayed the publication of such 
information for half a year already.  The Russian Federation urges India to abandon  its minimum 
import price requirement, to lift its ports of entry restriction , and to allow unhindered import of 
yellow peas into India 's market , as it is prescribed to do under its WTO  obligations. The Russian 
Federation calls upon India to publish the in formation concerning its import conditions on time.  
16.13.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
16.14.   This supposedly temporary measure has been in place for over four years. The European 
Union therefore  reiterate s its concerns expressed at the previous  formal meeting of this Committee  
and in other WTO  bodies . The EU fully supports the comments and questions raised  by other 
Members,  in particular those of  Australia and Canada.  
16.15.   The representative of India indicated the fo llowing:  
16.16.   India wishes to reiterate that the objective of this measure is to cater to the food and 
livelihood security of small and marginal farmers. India has been regularly reviewing this measure 
based on the market situation of pulses, owing to which the  quota of pulses has been increased from 
time to time. In this regard, apart from quota increases from time to time, the Government of India 
has further relaxed its import measures through the D irectorate General of Foreign Trade 
(DGFT)  Notification , dated  15 May 2021, wherein restrictions on the import of Tur/Pigeon Peas 
(Cajanus Cajan) , Moong , and Urad have been withdrawn by revising their import policy from 
"Restricted " to "Free", with effect from 15  May 2021, and which will remain in effect until 
31 October  2021. India continue s to review the situation . 
16.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
17  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND 
INDONESIA  
17.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union and Indonesia.  
17.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.3.   The European Union wishes to reiterate the concerns it previously raised  in the Committee 
regarding India's  licensing regime for importation of pneumatic tyres under Notification 
No. 12/2015 -2020.  The EU welcomes India's  belated WTO  notification of this measure.  However, 
the EU continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure on the import of tyres. Tyre 
imports have becom e highly restricted since June  2020, and only a limited number of licences have 
been granted to EU  tyre manufacturers. These licences are limited in terms of duration, quantity,  
and type of tyres. No licences have yet been granted to bus or truck tyres.  The EU would urge India 
to increase its level of transparency with respect to the applicable requirements and procedural steps 
to be follow ed by tyre importers , as well as to reconsider and eliminate any implicit or explicit 
quantitative or other restrictions on the import of replacement tyres that could run contrary to 
WTO requirements.  
17.4.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  17.5.   India has imposed loyalty or marking fees for tyre products with an IS marking. Indonesia 
remains concerned that the imposition of marking fees is burdensome and has become an 
unnecessary obstacle to trade. The imposition of marking fees has no legitimate justification , and 
there is no clear relation between marking fees and the protection of human health, safety , or 
prevention from deceptive practice s. Based on a report that Indonesia  received from business 
representative s, technically, India 's import s of Indonesian tyre s have been hampered since early 
2020. This occurred  because the Government of India unilaterally stopped importing tyres from 
Indonesian exporters. In 2020, the Government of India issued a new import policy ( Notification 
No. 12/2015-2020, dated 12  June 2020, regarding "Amendment in Import Policy of Tyres"), which 
changed the import criterion for tyres from "free" to "restricted ". It is for this reason that there have 
been no tyre imports from Indonesia to India during the period  in question , namely that no import 
licences have been issued by the Government of India. Indonesia is of the view that t he 
aforementioned arrangement s are inconsistent with GATT  provisions on national treatment , given 
that they are discriminatory and favour local tyre manufacturers. Indonesia looks forward to hearing 
India's response on this issue and request s India to review the policy to ensure its compliance with 
the principle  of non -discrimination . At the same time, Indonesia thanks India for the discussion that 
took place in the virtual meeting of the Working Group on Trade and Investment , on 5 August  2021. 
Indonesia has also requested India to provide its further clarification of this matter . 
17.6.   The representative of Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
17.7.   Chinese Taipei share s the concern s of the European Union and Indonesia regarding this 
agenda item. The situation has been ongoing for more than a year since India announced its 
restrictive import measure on new pneumatic tyres , in June 2020. Chinese Taipei already flagged its 
concern at the Committee 's previous  meeting , and it is regrettable that this concern remains 
unchanged.  The D GFT of the Indian Ministry of Commerce and Industry announced on 12  June 2020 
that a restrictive import measure had been imposed on new pneumatic tyres, meaning that importers 
must apply to the DGFT for a licence or special approval before importing those items.  Since then, 
Chinese Taipei has noticed that only about 40% of its application cases have been approved 
compared to the average figures of the past three  years.  The delay in issuing import licences has 
severely affected Chinese Taipei's exports to India, resulting in a sharp 70%  decrease  in trade in 
2020 compared to the s ame period in 2019.  To Chinese Taipei's  understanding, India issue s import 
licences only for a limited number of those kind s of pneumatic tyres that are not produced 
domestically, which constitutes a ban on tyre imports. Chinese Taipei question s how this measure 
could be compatible with WTO  rules concerning QRs. As such, Chinese Taipei  urges India to comply 
with the regulations set out under the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. In particular, 
Chinese Taipei notes that non-automatic licensing procedures should be implemented in a 
transparent and predictable manner and should  not have trade -restrictive or trade -distortive effects 
on imports additional to those caused by the imposition of the restrictions.  Chinese Taipei reque sts 
India to provide the rationale that led it to implement this new measure, which by  its nature is 
restrictive and discriminatory. Chinese Taipei  also kindly request s India to provide details of its  
domestic practices for granting licences to Indonesia's  references. Chinese Taipei  once again urge s 
India to take immediate measure s to ensure that its import licences can be issued in a timely, 
transparent, non -discriminatory , and predictable manner.  
17.8.   The representative of  the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
17.9.   The Republic of Korea has expressed its concern s about India 's import policy for tyres in 
previous meetings . However, India 's import policy for tyres continues to create trade barriers to 
foreign companies , and this concern remain s unchanged. In this regard, India's non -automatic 
licensing is substantially banning imports  of tyres, which is inconsistent with WTO  rules, including 
Article  3.2 of the Agreement of Import Licensing Procedures . Korea  once again  urges India to make 
improvements in its operation of  this policy so that it does not constitute a barrier to free trade.  
17.10.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.11.   The United States  thank s the European Union and Indonesia for raising  this issue again on 
this meeting's  agenda, and continue s to share the ir concerns.  The United States also thank s Japan 
and Thailand, in advance , for raising the following two agenda items. The United States  continue s 
to monitor all of these issues and is interested to hear India 's response to the concerns raised.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  17.12.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
17.13.   India thank s delegations for their interest in this issue. India considers that its  non-automatic 
licensing requirements are administered in a manner that is fair, equitable, and consistent with the 
rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, including with respect to the 
time-frames for the grant ing of import licences . India a lso notes that  a number of licences have 
been granted, following  approval by the Exim Facilitation Committee (EFC).  India's  measure has 
been taken in view, in particular , of quality issues. In pursuance of non -automatic licensing, the 
procedure examines th e applications received and grants licences based on the comments of the 
concerned administrative Ministries or based on the criteria laid down for the purpose. In the case 
of tyre import s, the EFC has granted licences, after examination of the applications , in almost all 
cases.  Specifically,  on Indonesia 's points , it may be clarified that the fee is not termed as a "royalty 
fee on tyres ", but as a "Marking Fee ". The BIS operates a Product Certification Scheme as per the 
Scheme -1 of the BIS  Conformity Assessment Regulation  2018, under the BIS Act, 20 16. Under the 
scheme, the BIS grants Product Certification licence s to domestic or foreign manufacturers as per 
the Conformity Assessment Regulation  2018.  The manufacturer is required to pay BIS the necessary 
fee, as notified in Scheme -I of this Regulation , which includes a marking fee for each product. T he 
marking  fee for a product is specified as : (a) the Minimum Marking fee per annum ; and (b)  the Unit 
and Unit rate . The manufacturer is required to pay a minimum marking fee in advance for the v alidity 
period of the licence  and the actual marking fee for each year is calculated by multiplying the unit 
rate with the quantity or units marked with an ISI mark by the manufacturer during the year. The 
actual marking fee thus arrived at , or the minimum  marking fee for the year, whichever is higher , 
is payable by the manufacturer.  The marking fee , as per the process described above , is the same 
for domestic and foreign manufacturers , as the marking fee is chargeable on all production of tyres 
carrying an ISI mark.  
17.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
18  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
18.1.   The Chairperson  noted that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Japan.  
18.2.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
18.3.   As Japan mentioned at the TRIMs Committee in March , and at the CTG in July, Japan consider s 
that India 's import ban on air conditio ners, including refrigerants, introduced last year by Notification 
No. 41/2015 -2020, is a measure that unreasonably imposes a restructuring of corporate supply 
chains. Japan is highly  concerned that this measure is likely to be an import ban that is incons istent 
with Article  XI:1 of the GATT . To date , India has explained , in its written answers in the context of 
its TPR, and at the CTG , that the measure is consistent with its obligations under the Montreal 
Protocol , and with the regulations on  hydrofluorocarbons , which are ozone -depleting substances.  
However, Japan considers that this import ban is still superfluous and irrational in that it covers a 
wide range of air conditioners that use refrigerants. Furthermore, these air conditioners are sub ject 
neither to India's reduction and elimination obligation s under the Montreal Protocol , nor to the 
regulation for freon gas causing ozone layer depletion under India 's domestic regulation s. In this 
respect, after considering India's  previous answers, Ja pan submitted written questions to the 
TRIMs Committee in September to request from India more detailed further elaboration. In this 
regard, Japan expects India to provide prompt answers to its questions.  In addition, air conditioners 
and their related par ts are going to be mandated under the B IS ISI Mark certification in 
January  2022, based on India's Quality Control Orders. However, while it is necessary to obtain a 
BIS licence for these products through the conformity procedure required of manufacturers, the 
factory testing for foreign manufacturers has been suspended due to the COVID -19 pandemic. As 
such, Japan is concerned that the current approach of postponing the implementation date and 
factory testing for foreign manufacturers could lead to imports being restricted in the foreseeable 
future. Therefore , Japan  calls upon India to consider introducing some alternative procedures that 
would make it possible for foreign manufacturers to obtain a BIS  licence. 
18.4.   The representative  of India indicated the following:  
18.5.   This issue was raised at the CTG's meeting of 31 March and 1 April 2021, where  India had 
explained its rationale for the measure . India would like  once again  to inform Members that the G/MA/M/75  
 
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  measure was necessary for the application of standards and regulations for the marketing of the 
item in question , besides reducing risks to human, animal and plant life and health . The measure  is 
also consistent with India 's commitment s to the Montreal Pro tocol. Further more, as per the Ozone 
Depleting Substances Regulation and Control Amendment Rules, 2014, import s of air conditioners 
containing Group  VI substances ( hydrochlorofluorocarbons ) is prohibited since 1  July 2015.  In 
August  2021, the Government of  India ratified the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer for the purpose of phasing down h ydrofluorocarbons in 
India. This amendment was adopted by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol in October  2016, at the 
28th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol , held in Kigali, Rwanda. India will complete its 
phasing  down of hydrofluorocarbons in four steps , from 2032 onwa rds, with a cumulative reduction 
of 10% in 2032, 20% in 2037, 30% in 2042 , and 85% in 2047.  India has  a consistent policy in this 
regard and remain s open to discussing this issue bilaterally  with the delegation  of Japan . 
18.6.   The C ommittee took note  of the stat ements made.  
19  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES, TELEVISION SETS, AND AIR CONDITIONERS – 
STATEMENT BY THAILAND  
19.1.   The Chairperson  noted that this agenda item had been included at the request of Thailand . 
19.2.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
19.3.   Thailand wishes to reiterate the concern that it raised at the Committee's meetings of 
November  2020 and April  2021 regarding India 's import policies for tyres, television sets, and air 
conditioners. According to Notifications No.  12/2015 -2020, 22/2015 -2020, and 41/2015 -2020, India 
has changed the import conditions for tyres and television sets from "Free" to "Restricted ", and 
changed the import condition for air conditioners from "Free" to "Prohibited ". Since Thailand has not 
received any response from India, it wishes once again to request India to provide detailed 
clarifications regarding  the three notificati ons in question , as well as notifying the amendments to 
India's import policies to the WTO at the earliest  opportunity . India 's import measures on tyres, 
television sets , and air conditioners have adverse ly affected  Thailand's  exporters. For this reason , 
Thailand requests India to give its attention to this matter , including  by exploring a less trade 
restrictive alternative and by sharing the relevant information with other WTO Members . Thailand  
stand s ready to meet with India bilaterally with a view to ach ieving a mutually satisfactory solution 
to these issues.  
19.4.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
19.5.   India thank s Thailand  for its interest. India covered the issue of tyres under agenda item  17, 
and air conditioners under agenda item  18, and refers to its responses under those items . For the 
comment s on television sets, India has filed a notification  to the Committee on  Import  Licensing 
clarifying its position  (document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/15 , of 28 May 2021) . India continue s to discuss this 
issue w ith its capital  and remain s open to discuss ing the issue  with Thailand  bilaterally . 
19.6.   The C ommittee took note  of the statements made.  
20  INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
20.1.   The Chairperson  noted that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European  Union . 
20.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.3.   Indonesia's i mport restricting  policies and practices are a long -standing item in several 
WTO bodies. The European Union is deeply concerned in this regard, especially as the number and 
scope of Indonesia's  restrictions seem to have further expanded over time. These restrictions have 
a negative  and increasing  impact on trade flows at a time when gr owth and economic development 
are under major stress due to the pandemic.  On this occasion,  the EU wishes to draw attention to 
some worrying recent developments with regard to Indonesia 's increased focus on import 
substitution.  Notably, the EU has serious concerns over reported plans by the Indonesian Ministry G/MA/M/75  
 
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  of Industry to achieve , by 2022 , a reduction in imports equivalent to 35% of the value of its 
2019 import potential through a range of measures that include  expanding local content 
requirements and th e mandatory use of Indonesian National Standards ( "SNI"), as well as the further 
promulgation of cumbersome import licensing procedures.  Implementation of this approach appears 
to be already under  way with the adoption , for example,  of import restrictions on medical devices 
through the "freezing " of several foreign devices in the Indonesian e -catalogue for public 
procurement, preventing government health institutions from purchasing them.  The many import 
restricting  measures implemen ted by Indonesia have already negatively affected EU  operators 
across a variety of sectors. Beyond such impact, these measures will also hamper the post -pandemic 
economic recovery of the country, which cannot be achieved through export promotion alone.  The 
EU would therefore like to ask Indonesia for clarification of its reported plans for an import 
substitution programme , as well as its underlying rationale. The European Union  would also welcome 
Indonesia's clarification of the implementing measures that it intends to undertake , including how 
Indonesia will ensure their compliance with its WTO  obligations.  
20.4.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
20.5.   The United States  share s the European Union's concerns regarding the Indonesian 
government 's recent statements that it will suppress imports with the goal of "substituting 35 % of 
imported products " by 2022. The United States  urges Indonesia to share further information on 
these statements and to rethink this trade -disruptiv e goal.  
20.6.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
20.7.   Indonesia  explain ed previously that, in principle, the use of Indonesian National Standards  is 
not intended to create import substitution program mes, nor to hamper imports . Rather, their aim is 
consumer protection , including safety, security, and health, regardless of whether the product is 
domestic ally produced  or imported. Indonesia always reports to the WTO on any mandatory 
SNI implementation , and is transparent and clear in providing information on technical provisions.  
Furthermore, Indonesia's import licensing measures are also not intended to be an import 
substitution program me, but serve , rather,  as a protection from legal disputes and financial losses 
for businesses that engage in i nternational trade.  
20.8.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
21  INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS – 
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  
21.1.   The Chairperson  noted that this agenda item had been included at the request of the United  
States . 
21.2.   The representative  of the United States  indicated the following:  
21.3.   The United States  continue s to be disappointed that Indonesia has not responded to its 
questions, nor otherwise addressed its concerns, with respect to applying tariffs at the border on a 
category of ICT  products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments.  The United 
States has been raising this issue repeatedly with Indonesia for almost two  years, along with other 
Members, including in the C TG and the Market Access and ITA  Committees, as well as bilaterally.  
The United States has been patient and constructive , providing concrete examples that clearly 
illustrate US concerns multiple times, as well as preparing several specific questions that were 
circulated in the ITA  Committee , in document  G/IT/Q/1 , on 14  April 2021. Unfortunately, Indonesia 
has yet to provide a substantive response to the repeated attempts by the United States at 
engagement. In addition, the costs of Indonesia 's policies in this space are not insigni ficant, 
practically speaking.  Indonesia 's tariffs not only impose an unfair financial burden on foreign firms, 
but they also limit access for Indonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech products. 
US traders have also been actively noting the disi ncentives to investment in Indonesia that result 
from these tariffs.  Stakeholders have stressed the importance of addressing the integrity of market 
access commitments. This Committee provides the forum to do so; however, it requires the 
cooperation of eac h participant to be proactive in not only identifying, but also addressing , the 
concerns that are raised.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  21.4.   The representative  of Japan  indicated the following:  
21.5.   Japan appreciates the United States ' inclusion of this item.  Regarding the imposition of 
10% customs duties on certain telecommunications products, Japan notes that, in June  2020,  in this 
Committee, Indonesia explained that "certain products may have been affected by the splitting and 
merging process during the transposition. " Subsequently, in thi s Committee , in November  2020,  
and in the ITA  Committee , in April  2021, Indonesia stated that it "did not intend to take action 
beyond its commitments or obligations under the ITA  Agreement ". Japan urges Indonesia to provide 
further details on the aforemen tioned customs duties, including information on possible next steps, 
to allow it to scrutinize the facts in depth.  
21.6.   The representative  of Canada  indicated the following : 
21.7.   Canada views Indonesia 's application of tariffs above its bound rates on ICT  products as 
inconsistent with Indonesia 's WTO  commitments and contrary to the objectives of multilateral tariff 
liberalization.  In addition to these systemic concerns, Canada also has commercial concerns with 
regard to Indonesia 's application of tariffs on ICT  products, which have impacted at least 
CAD 1.8 million  in Indonesian imports from Canada in 2020 (a decrease of 29% compare d to 2019).  
Canada calls upon Indonesia to eliminate its tariffs on ICT  products in a way consistent with its 
WTO commitments.  
21.8.   The representative  of the European Union  indicated the following:  
21.9.   Despite the European Union's  requests and calls for Indonesia t o align the tariff treatment of 
certain ICT  products classified under subheading  8517.62 with Indonesia 's WTO  commitments, it 
appears that Indonesia continues to charge a significant tariff (10%) on products classified under 
tariff line  8517.62.49. The Eur opean Union has not yet heard any explanation from Indonesia, 
although it had raised the issue at both the Market Access and ITA  Committee s. In this particular 
category of products (tariff item  8517.62.49) the EU has recorded a significant drop in its exports 
to Indonesia. The EU has observed a 60%  drop in the value of EU  exports in 2020 compared to 
2019, and a 21%  drop in 2020 compared to 2018.  The EU  therefore reiterate s its call for the tariff s 
in tariff subheading  8517.62 to be brought down to zero.  The European Union  seeks further 
clarification from Indonesia as to why it continues to apply tariffs that are not in line with its 
WTO bound commitments.  
21.10.   The representative  of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
21.11.   Indonesia is giving its  close attention  to the imposition of import duty tariffs on several 
IT products, as raised by several Members earlier in the meeting . Indonesia had previously reiterated  
its statement at the ITA Committee and the CTG , namely that the Government of Indonesia 
continues to be committed to complying with , and respecting , every WTO  Agreement , including 
Indonesia 's commitment to the ITA  Agreement. Indonesia has no intention of taking any action 
beyond its obligations under the ITA  Agreement. Indonesia stands ready to continue communicating 
with those  WTO Members that have expressed their concern . 
21.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
22  MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  
22.1.   The Chairperson  noted that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
United  States.  
22.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
22.3.   The United States would like to reiterate its concern with the 4 April announcement by 
Mexico 's National Council for Science and Technology (CONACYT) recommending an import quota 
on glyphosate and glyphosate -containing products.  US industry estimates that the announced quota 
represents a 20 % reduction from the Mexican market 's annual need for glyphosate. The 
announcement of this import quota comes 18  months after Mexico implemented a de facto  import 
ban on glyphosate -containing products by rejecting all applications for import permits for those 
goods. During that time, Mexico has not provided an opportunity for public comment, submitted G/MA/M/75  
 
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  notification to the WTO of these QRs, or provided scientific evidence for the rejec tions.  How does 
Mexico justify these measures in light of its GATT  obligations, including Article  XI of GATT  1994?  
Does Mexico intend to notify this import quota to the WTO?  Can Mexico explain how the quota level 
was determined? Did Mexico solicit and cons ider public input when making its determination?  When 
does Mexico intend to provide additional information to traders on how this quota will be 
administered? What HS  codes are affected? How will the quota be allocated?  Furthermore, 
CONACYT 's announcement i ndicates different quota volumes for formulated glyphosate and for 
technical glyphosate, which is then further processed within Mexico into formulated glyphosate. How 
does Mexico justify such differential treatment under Article  III of the GATT ? 
22.4.   The repres entative of Canada  indicated the following:  
22.5.   Canada notes that Article  XI of the GATT prevents Members from imposing QRs. While 
paragraph  2 provides carve -outs for very specific circumstances under which Members may impose 
certain import or export restricti ons, these do not appear to be relevant in the context of Mexico 's 
measure limiting imports of glyphosate.  Canada requests Mexico to provide its justification for the 
imposition of this measure.  
22.6.   The representative of Mexico  indicated the following:  
22.7.   Regarding the Decree published in the Official Journal of the Federation on 
31 December  2020, and as Mexico has indicated on previous occasions , the work of the agencies 
responsible for the Decree 's implementation has not been completed and is s till ongoing. Mexico  
reiterate s the commitment of the Federal Government and the agencies involved in the 
implementation of the Decree to ensure that the execution of this instrument will be carried out in 
terms of its provisions, and taking into considera tion Mexico's  international obligations and 
commitments.  
22.8.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
23  NEPAL 'S IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  
23.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of Thailand . 
23.2.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
23.3.   The Government of Thailand has been informed by Thai exporters , since 2019 , that they have 
been unable to export caffeinated mixed energy drinks to Nepal due to the implementation of the 
Nepali government 's measure on import prohibition of caffeinated mixed energy drinks and flavoured  
synthetic drinks , which Nepal has not  official ly notified  or justified under WTO  rules and regulation s. 
Thailand is deeply concerned about the measure as it seriously affects exports of Thailand 's energy 
drinks to Nepal.  Thailand would like to recall Nepal 's statement delivered at the meeting of the 
Committee of 29 -30 April 2021, regarding Nepal 's import prohibition measure on energy drinks , in 
which Nepal justified its action on the grounds of a balance -of-payments  problem and the need to 
reduce Nepal 's foreign exchange reserves. Moreover, Nepal informed the Committee on that 
occasion that it would provide the official notification to further clarify the precise legal basis under 
the WTO Agreements justify ing Nepal 's temporary adoption of an import prohibition on energy 
drinks . In addition, Nepal had indicated that it would discus s implementation of the measure with 
the organization s concerned . Therefore,  Thailand request s Nepal to share  an update on the progress 
of its official notification to WTO  Members , and of its consideration s concerning the elimination of 
the said measure. L astly, Thailand would welcome holding bilateral consultation s with Nepal with a 
view to find ing a mutually acceptable solution  to this issue . 
23.4.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
23.5.   The United States supports Thailand 's concern over Nepal 's ban on the import of certain 
energy drinks. In January  2020, the United States requested Nepal to notify this measure through 
the WTO  TBT Inquiry Point but has not yet received a response. The United States  urges Nepal to 
notify the me asure to the TBT  Committee and suspend it until WTO  Members have had an 
opportunity to review and comment  on it. G/MA/M/75  
 
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  23.6.   The representative of Nepal  indicated the following:  
23.7.   Nepal  wishes to refer to its statements delivered at the Committee's meetings of June and 
November  2020, and April  2021, and reiterates all of its justifications presented on those occasions, 
and requests that they be considered positively. The aforementioned statements indicated that 
Nepal 's export -import ratio of trade in  goods reached to 1:15.3 in the fiscal year 2017/2018 , from 
1:2.5 in the fiscal year 2004/2005 , after its accession to the WTO , resulting in a huge trade gap. 
Such a surge in import s posed severe challenges to Nepal's entire economic development process. 
The main legal basis of the measure is Section  3(1) of the Export and Import Control Act  1957, 
which allows the Government of Nepal to take necessary measures if conditions  are appropriate  to 
do so , such as to safeguard the external financial position and balance of payments , and to stop a 
serious decline in foreign currency reserves. This Act was implemented during the period of Nepal's 
accession , and had been notified to the WTO at that time. The measure is neither concentrated to 
any specifi c area and issue , nor focused on the trade restriction of only a few products; rather , the 
measure  broadly covers trade regulation and facilitation aspects of Nepal 's international trade with 
a view to making it standard ized and smooth.  The measure has bee n applied as part of the Export 
and Import Control Act  1957 on a temporary basis ; furthermore, the measure fully complies with 
WTO laws and is applied on an MFN  basis to all WTO  Members.  Nepal is working on the measure and 
may review it periodically, revising it based on the review's findings and consultations. However, the 
process of assessment and consultation may take some time because the entire state mechanism is 
fully engaged in the fight against the COVID -19 pandemic . Regarding the  notification  itself, and 
based on the notification sent by the Permanent Mission of Nepal in Geneva in January  2020, Nepal 
is working closely with the WTO  Secretariat in order to revise  the document such that it meets the 
proper format , and this revised v ersion  is currently in the final stage of its verification in capital. 
Nepal extends its sincere appreciation to the Secretariat in this regard . 
23.8.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
24  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – EXPORT PROHIBITION ON TIMBER PRODUCTS - STATEMENT 
BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
24.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union.  
24.2.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.3.   The European Union  reiterates its concern ab out the Russian Federation's announced 
introduction of an export ban on certain categories of wood, starting from 1  January  2022, following 
a presidential instruction.  First, Resolution  No. 396/2021 , of 18 March  2021, limits to 2021 the scope 
of tariff -rate quotas for the export of coniferous wood, including EU -specific TRQs , which form part 
of Russia 's WTO  Schedule of concessions and a bilateral agreement with the EU on their 
operationali zation. The EU wishes to ask the Russian Federation how it intends  to comply with its 
commitment to effectively apply these TRQs for the export of coniferous wood.  Second, Resolution  
No. 1225, of 20  July 2021, has reduced from four to one the number of railway border crossing 
points with the EU for export s of round wood.  Moreover, the chosen crossing point has practically 
no infrastructure to handle wood trade, making exports of wood to the EU all but impossible. The 
EU wishes once again to ask the Russian Federation how this measure, which amounts to a de facto  
ban on ex ports of wood, could comply with the prohibition of QRs set out in Article  XI of the GATT. 
Third, the EU kindly asks if the Russian Federation is planning to adopt further measures 
implementing the presidential instruction.  The European Union looks forward  to receiving responses 
to these questions.  
24.4.   The representative of the United States indicated the following:  
24.5.   The United States continues to echo the European Union's  concerns about the Russian 
Federation's  proposal to ban exports of certain unprocessed coniferous round -wood. While the United 
States  support s efforts to fight illegal logging, it is concerned that this measure may have trade 
distorting effects.  Moreover, based on the history of Russia 's "temporary " measures with regard to 
raw hi des and birch logs, the United States  will monitor closely both the measure itself, if it is 
enacted, as well as any renewals.  The United States  encourage s Russia to be mindful of its 
WTO obligations with respect to this proposal.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  24.6.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
24.7.   The Russian Federation wishes to note that there is no export prohibition in force on the 
export of timber products from Russia.  All measures that Russia introduces in the sphere of 
regulation of export of timbe r products, including the reduction of railway border crossing points, 
are in the context of measures aimed to combat criminal activities in the field of illegal logging and 
illegal export of these products.  
24.8.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
25  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – DISCRIMINATORY APPLICATION OF VALUE -ADDED TAXES – 
STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  
25.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
United  States.  
25.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated t he following:  
25.3.   The United States wishes to register its concerns that the Russian Federation appears to apply 
its value -added tax in a manner that discriminates against imported films. The United States  
understand s that Russia imposes an 18 % VAT on the sale s of most goods, works, and services 
supplied in Russia, whether imported or domestically sourced.  However, the United States  also 
understand s that Russia exempts from that 18 % VAT the distribution of films that obtain a "national 
film certificate ", a desi gnation which is nearly impossible for foreign films to obtain.  The United 
States  would appreciate if the Russian Federation could  explain the exemption from the 18%  VAT 
for domestic films in light of its WTO  obligations, in particular with respect to non -discrimination.  
25.4.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
25.5.   The Russian Federation  will transmit the questions from the United States to its capital , and 
stands ready to engage bilaterally on this matter.  
25.6.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
26  RUSSIAN FEDERATION – TRACK AND TRACE REGIME – STATEMENT BY THE 
UNITED  STATES  
26.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
United  States.  
26.2.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
26.3.   As the United States has done in past meetings, it must register its continued concern about 
Russia 's mandatory labelling  regime – or "track and trace ", as it is sometimes called. The United 
States  will continue to watch  carefully the implementation of the regime to prevent it from becoming, 
intentionally or unintentionally, a non -tariff barrier. In addition, the United States  echoes concerns 
previously expressed by the EU about the potential overreach of the labelling  mandate , and ask s the 
Russian Federation to consider limiting the requirement to those products that are prone to 
counterfeiting or to tax evasion. In addition to its previously expressed concerns about the 
mandatory labelling  regime, the United States would like to raise a new issue: the newly introduced 
Traceability Regime. The United States understand s that the Traceability Regime system was 
recently changed from voluntary to mandatory, that it does not appear for the moment to cover 
products subject to the mandatory labelling  regime, that labels are applied to consignment of goods , 
not individual products, and that the reports are provided to the Tax Service , not the Chestnyznak 
company. But many questions remain, most prominently: how does the Traceability Regime differ  
from the labelling  regime, now and in the future? The Government of Russia has stated that it plans 
to extend the labelling  regime to all products. When that goal is reached, does the Government of 
Russia anticipate that some or all products would then be  subject to both the labelling  and 
traceability regimes? If the labels are applied to a consignment, what happens when the consignment 
is broken up and delivered to different wholesalers?  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  26.4.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
26.5.   The European Union  shares the concern of the United States with regard to this measure's  
negative impact upon trade, which is a concern that the EU has consistently raised at the 
TBT Committee , as the EU consider s that the measure  falls within the scope of the TBT  Agreement 
and its notification requirements.  The EU genuinely understands and supports the necessity to fight 
counterfeit and illegal imports , but considers that individual tracking and tracing is a particularly 
demanding  requirement, which may be justified for those goods of higher value , where evidence of 
counterfeit or tax avoidance is clear, but which is  otherwise disproportionate. The measure may thus 
be justified for tobacco or furs, and we recall  that the EU also has a system of individual tracking for 
tobacco products and for medicinal products. However, the scope of the Russian Federation's 
measure  also includes tyres, bed and kitchen linen, footwear, and other products , to which the 
conditions which would warrant its proportionality hardly apply, and the measure therefore 
constitutes a n unjustified trade barrier  for these goods . Moreover, the Russian Federation has 
announced plans to extend the scope  of the measure  to all goods placed on the Russian market by 
2024.  The European Union thus calls upon the Russian Federation to revise the current scope of the 
measure , and the plans to extend it , so as to apply the labelling and tracking scheme in a highly 
selective and targeted manner.  
26.6.   The representative of  the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
26.7.   The Russia n Federation  wishes to stress that the track and trace system is fully compliant 
with WTO  rules and applies to both national and  imported products. The measure is intended to 
protect against counterfeiting and  smuggling , as well as tax evasion.  Currently, the system applies 
to dairy products, bottled mineral water, pharmaceuticals , tobacco product s, textiles, shoes, 
perfumes, tyres , and cameras. As previously stated, the system is non -discriminatory , as both 
manufacturers in the territory of Russia and importers have equal access to the technical matters 
related to obtaining a data matrix code. The  operator of the system and the Government regularly 
provide information support to operators.  As for statistics of data matrix codes obtained, one can 
see that the number of codes issued is large. For example , for dairy products , the number of codes 
obtained is approximately 8,5  billion codes, for bottled mineral water it is 105,4  million codes, f or 
pharmaceuticals  about 11  billion codes, for tobacco 25  billion codes, for textiles about 1,8  billion 
codes, for shoes 2,9  billion codes, and so on . The comprehensive information on the measure is 
regularly published on the official website of the operator or Government institutions. Taking this 
information into account , one can conclude that the measure cannot be considered as trade 
restrictive or n on-transparent.  In case delegations have questions, the Russian Federation is always 
open to discuss ing them, both bilaterally and during the working meetings of WTO  bodies.  
26.8.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
27  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – STATEMENTS BY AUSTRALIA, 
THE EUROPEAN UNION , AND THAILAND  
27.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of Australia, 
the European Union,  and Thailand . 
27.2.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
27.3.   Australia welcomed the update by Sri Lanka on its series of import restrictions provided at 
the CTG and the CMA meetings earlier this year. Despite these updates, Australia continues to share 
the concerns of other WTO  Members with  respect to the evolving nature of Sri Lanka 's measures. 
The range of import measures currently being implemented , and their cumulative impact, appear to 
be overly trade  restrictive and do not have a clear end -date. Australia appreciates the difficult 
circumstances that Sri Lanka continues to face as a result of the impacts of COVID -19 on its economy 
and trade. Nevertheless, a well -functioning, transparent, predictable and stable global trading 
system is , and will remain , fundamental to global economic stab ility during the pandemic , and 
economic recovery post -pandemic. This is true for Sri Lanka and all other WTO  Members. In 
April 2021, Sri Lanka provided an update regarding its work with the Secretariat to appropriately 
notify  its measures to  the WTO ; howev er, this notification has not yet been released. Australia again 
reiterates its request for Sri Lanka to notify the WTO of these measures as soon as possible, and in 
particular to provide the WTO  basis of these measures and to indicate when they will be li fted. The 
lack of certainty has been disruptive of trade and has impacted Australia's exporters ' ability to G/MA/M/75  
 
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  provide staple foodstuffs to Sri Lankan consumers. Finally, Australia would appreciate if Sri Lanka 
could reassure Members that the measures are bei ng implemented in a manner consistent with 
Sri Lanka 's WTO  obligations.  Australia  remain s interested in engaging further with Sri Lanka on this 
matter, including through the suggested consultations in Geneva.  
27.4.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
27.5.   The European Union  continue s to have serious concerns with regard to the broad import 
restrictions imposed by Sri Lanka, in various forms, since April  2020. In terms of trade, over 2020 , 
EU exports to Sri Lanka decreased by 27% ,which was  way beyond the average decline in exports 
(of 9%) that it had noted in total EU  exports. These figures show that these measures are causing 
real damage to the EU's commercial and economic interests. The EU  does not dispute that Members 
can take imp ort restrictions in case of a critical Balance -of-Payments (BOP)  situation. However, when 
doing so, a WTO  Member has to comply with its main WTO  obligations under the GATT , specifically , 
the Understanding on the Balance -of-Payments Provisions of the GATT  1994, and also the GATS, in 
particular: (i) the obligation to notify the import restriction to the General Council and to enter into 
consultations with other WTO  Members; (ii) the need for the measures to be temporary in nature , 
as the measures have no expi ration date and apply "until further notice "; (iii) the obligation to 
present timetables for progressive relaxation and phasing out until final elimination of the measures; 
and (iv)  the need to administer the import restrictions in a transparent manner.  
27.6.   Since the initial measure of April  2020, Sri Lanka has repeatedly modified the regulations, 
gradually moving products from the banned category into the category where imports are subject 
to a 90 or 180-day credit facility. However, the EU notice s with concern that , in July  2021, items 
have again been moved back to the banned category , and other new restrictions h ave been imposed , 
namely the 100%  cash margin deposit . The measures remain heavy, complex , and non -transparent , 
despite a relaxation  in a very few  cases . Also, on a select number of tariff lines, such as cars and 
tyres, or the import of certain  textiles, a  full import ban remains in place. This seems clearly targeted 
to protect a particular domestic industry. According to the EU's  information , imports of nearly 
650 product lines remain banned, while 1 ,300 product lines can enter, but only under credit 
provisions.  The EU  acknowledge s that Sri Lanka has contacted the WTO  Secretariat and shared an 
overview of the measures in force with the aim of seeking its advice and information on the 
notification format and procedure. This is a very positive first step, but surely not sufficient. 
Furthermore, there is no clarity on the temporary nature of the measures imposed , and the EU would 
welcome an update by Sri Lanka in this regard. The EU also urge s Sri Lanka to provide indications 
regarding  the temporary nature  of the ban . Specifically , the EU seeks clarification as to when 
Sri Lanka is going to remove the ban, especially as the ban has now been in place for over one and 
a half years.  The European Union stands ready to continue working with Sri Lanka, in a constructive 
manner, to get a clearer picture of the measures currently in force with the objective of further 
liberalizing and eventually removing the m. 
27.7.   The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
27.8.   Thailand wishes to reiterate its concern as raised in the Committee's meeting in 
December  2020 regarding Sri Lanka 's import measures , which came into effect in May 2020. 
According to Notification  No. 108-003/2020, Sri Lanka changed import conditions on numerous 
products, including automotive and auto parts, whereby Sri Lanka has imposed measures such as a 
temporary suspension of imports, imports on a credit basis, import control licences, and import ban s. 
Thailand has been particularly concerned about the effect of the suspension of import s of automoti ve 
products, which has barred exports from Thailand since June  2020, and the credit basis measure for 
the importation of auto parts , which allows Sri Lankan importers to make a payment to overseas 
exporters within 180  days instead of 30  days. At the Committee's previous meeting, Thailand 
requested Sri Lanka to clarify such import measures , as well as the rationale behind these particular 
policies. Thailand  also stressed that these measures have hindered bilateral trade between Thailand 
and Sri Lanka.  To date, Thailand has not yet received any responses from Sri Lanka. Hence, Thailand 
once again request s Sri Lanka  to provide its detailed clarifications on the Notification, as well as 
notifying the amendments of Sri Lanka 's import policies to the WTO as soon as possible . Thailand 
stand s ready to meet bilaterally with Sri Lanka with a view to achieving a mutually satisfactory 
solution to this issue.  
27.9.   The representative of  the United States  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  27.10.   As it has previously expressed in this Comm ittee, the United States remains concerned that 
Sri Lanka is continuing to restrict imports of a variety of goods.  One of the latest group of goods to 
be impacted by these measures is agricultural chemicals and fertilizers.  There has been some 
confusion on  the reasons for its ban on the import of agricultural chemicals. Could the Government 
of Sri Lanka provide more information on this measure?  
27.11.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
27.12.   Japan echoes the concern expressed by Australia and the European Union  regarding the 
possibility of inconsistency with Article  XI:1 of the GATT.  Japan  understand s that Sri Lanka advocates 
the need for this measure because of difficulties with its balance of payments (BOP). At the same 
time, such an import restr iction due to BOP should not be introduced unless it is carried out with 
utmost caution and due consideration for the substantive and procedural requirements set out in 
the WTO  Agreement.  Japan requests Sri Lanka to explain how this measure meets those 
requirements , and the reason why it considered the measure to be justified. Also, considering 
Sri Lanka 's explanation that this measure is to be applied temporarily, Japan  calls upon Sri Lanka to 
proceed with its early withdrawal.  
27.13.   The representative of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
27.14.   At the outset, Sri Lanka appreciate s the interest shown by delegations in its trade policy 
measures introduced to curb the economic impact of the COVID -19 pandemic in the island. On the 
pertinent iss ues raised, Sri Lanka recalls that it had already made statements at previous meetings 
of various WTO  bodies , including in this Committee and the CTG. For the sake of saving time, Sri 
Lanka will not repeat those statements. However, Sri Lanka would like to reiterate that it has been 
fully abiding by its obligations and commitments under the respective WTO  Agreements, as the 
measures are targeted and temporary in nature, and have been subjected to periodical reviews with 
a view to regulat ing and monit oring imports that place a significant burden on the scarcity of foreign 
exchange during the current pandemic, which was the main rationale of Sri Lanka's measures.  
During the process of containing the spread of many variants of the COVID -19 virus, the Government 
of Sri Lanka has given priority to the importation of vaccines and related medicines, products and 
devices over other non -essential items using the scarce foreign exchange, permitting only 
importation of certain basic food items to ensure the food security of its population as an exception. 
As a result of the flexible measures introduced on importation of essential items, to which  many 
countries have resorted, Sri Lanka also did not offer flexible measures in relation to the importation 
of non -essen tial items into the country. When one looks at the global trade patterns of non -essential 
commodities over the last two  years, it is evident that global demand for non -essential goods, 
including automobiles and their parts and accessories, have significant ly shrunk , indicating that such 
downwards trends in demand and exports are not solely due to the measures imposed by the 
countries, but because of consumer preferences that are contributing to a significant decline in 
exports of non -essential goods around the world.  
27.15.   Sri Lanka has been continuously examining existing restrictions on foreign exchange and 
making informed decisions to liberalize these measures at regular intervals. Sri Lanka wishes to 
share key aspects of the developments that have taken place since June  2021. Accordingly, t he 
previous Import and Export Control Regulations issued since April  2020, which imposed restrictions  
on imports , have been repealed. First, the requirement to obtain import licences has been removed 
and for those products no prior approval is required as the temporary suspension is no longer 
applied.  Second, those items that were subject to importation only on a 90 or 180-days credit basis 
are no longer subject to such requirements. Third, those goods, which were s ubject to temporary 
suspension, are now allowed to be imported, except  automotive vehicles and plastic goods. In 
addition, c ertain fertilizer varieties have been brought under Special Import Licences . These 
measures on imports, which still continue to exis t on plastic goods and certain kinds of fertilizer, are 
justified under Article  XX of the GATT  1994, as they have been introduced on a non-discriminatory 
basis to limit the use of certain plastic and chemical fertilizer s domestically for environmental 
reasons. While noting the concerns expressed by many delegations, Sri Lanka wishes to inform 
Members that it does allow certain types of motor vehicles falling under HS  8705, relaxing their 
importation as part of its COVID -19 economic revival plan. In addition, special attention is being 
paid to the importation of eco -friendly vehicles, as the flood of motor vehicles over the past decade 
has been identified as one of the main causes for Sri Lanka 's poor air quality. Apart from the above 
justifications, Sri Lanka also notes that its passenger car imports from the European Union had been 
on a declining trend. Compared to 2018, Sri Lanka 's imports of passenger car s from the EU had G/MA/M/75  
 
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  declined by 41% in 2019. In addition , Sri Lanka considers that, although its imports from the EU 
had declined by 73% in 2020 compared to 2019, this cannot be solely attributed to its import 
restrictions , since imports of passenger car s from the EU were anyway on a declining trend before 
the pandemic , and  even without any restrictio ns. Further more, Sri Lanka also wishes to flag that 
imports of motor vehicles have been volatile during the 2017 to 2019 period due to Sri Lanka 's 
decision to periodically relax or suspend its duty-free car permits. These duty waivers and suspension 
of cus toms duties, Import Cess and excise duties in the case of duty-free car permits cannot be 
considered as commercial activities that take place "under the normal course of trade " (within the 
meaning of the WTO  rules) ; accordingly , Sri Lanka's  trading partners cannot presume that the trade 
flows taking place under "non-normal course of trade " are the general norm , and claim that Sri 
Lanka 's imports of motor vehicles from EU  member countries and Japan have been affected due to 
the trade restricti ng measures imposed by Sri Lanka. Due to the comparatively high c.i.f. prices of 
European and Japanese made motor vehicles, in the absence of duty -free car permits, the demand 
for such vehicles is not expected to surge.  
27.16.   Regard ing transparency requirements,  the principal set of procedures, based on which the 
existing measures on imports have been formulated by Sri Lanka , had already been notified to the 
WTO in 2014. This is the Regulation on the Payment Terms and Methods Prescribed under 
regulations  3 to 16 of the Regulation , published in Extraordinary Gazette No.  1739/03 of 
2 January  2012. Members with concerns may kindly refer to this Notification made by Sri Lanka in  
2014. Further more,  on the question of transparency obligations, and as informed during pre vious 
meetings, Sri Lanka , in consultation with the Secretariat, prepared the first  draft of the notification, 
which is still being analysed and finalized in capital . As Members know, Sri Lanka had a long -term 
lockdown , lasting for months , in view of the series of severe waves of the COVID -19 pandemic , 
which posed an unprecedented level of threat to the Sri Lankan economy and entire health sector. 
Although Sri Lanka does not wish to quote this situation as an excuse for not fulfilling its transparency 
obligations, Sri Lanka has been compelled to face the bitter reality of the country with regard to the 
pandemic. Sri Lanka was fully closed for a long period , during which time  only essential services 
were delivered with a skeleton staff. Sri Lanka will continue s to make its best effort to secure and 
submit its final draft notification as expeditiously as possible.  
27.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
28  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON PALM OIL – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
28.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of Indonesia . 
28.2.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
28.3.   Indonesia has previously raised its concerns regarding Sri Lanka 's actions to impose a policy 
of prohibiting the importation of palm oil (CPO, palm stearin, and refined, bleached , and deodorized  
(RBD) olein). Sri Lanka 's Department of Export and Import Control has issued an Operational 
Instruction on the policy of prohi biting the import of palm oil, which basically instructs that the 
import of palm oil with HS  code 15.11 is temporarily suspended , from 5 April 2021 until further 
notice.  Therefore, Indonesia wishes to ask for clarification and a response from Sri Lanka reg arding 
the purpose and/or rationale for its Palm Oil Import Ban. Although it is claimed that the ban on 
imports of palm oil is temporary, the policy does not specifically mention the period for which the 
import ban will apply. The aforementioned policy cou ld have systemic implications for global trade 
in palm oil. In this regard, Indonesia considers that the prohibition on imports of palm oil by Sri  Lanka 
is inconsistent with several WTO  rules, especially Article  XI of the GATT, Article  4.2 of the Agreement  
on Agriculture, and Article  3.2 of the Import Licensing Agreement.  Indonesia  has found that , since 
the regulation was enacted , a number of exports of palm oil and its derivatives have been facing  
obstacles. Indonesia's  data shows that there was a very significant decline in exports of some of our 
palm oil derivative products, but that there was also an increase in exports of crude palm oil , which 
had higher MFN  tariffs (import duties increased by approximately 4%). In ad dition, Indonesia  also 
found that the Government of Sri Lanka imposes an additional levy on palm oil imports of 0.4% of 
the c.i.f. value.  Indonesia requests the Government of Sri Lanka to resolve the aforementioned 
matters and to ensure that normal trade can be restored.  
28.4.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  28.5.   Colombia express es its interest and concern regarding Sri Lanka 's measures to restrict palm 
oil imports.  Colombia is a producer and exporter of palm oil, palm oil products , and palm oi l biofuels. 
The dynamics in the global market for these products, as well as the restrictions or limitations on 
their commerciali zation in various jurisdictions, directly affect our exports and market trends. Of 
particular concern in this specific matter a re the "Operating Instructions " issued by the Sri Lankan 
government , through which imports of palm oil have been suspended or restricted. Colombia notes  
that Sri Lanka has not submitted notifications of these measures, which limits Members ' knowledge 
of its policy objectives, the procedures for marketing palm oil and its derivatives, and the duration  
of the application of the restrictions. In this regard, Colombia  seeks Sri Lanka's clarification  of the 
measures adopted, the period of their application, its justification for the measures, and details of 
the authorities responsible for their administration.  
28.6.   The representative of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
28.7.   Sri Lanka notes that this issue has also been  very recently raised in the Committee on Import 
Licensing, where Sri Lanka responded to these queries. In this context, Sri Lanka notes that it has 
not changed its import policy in respect of the importation of palm oil , and that the process of 
implementa tion of import authorizations through import licences by Sri Lanka is fully transparent 
and predictable. As Sri Lanka informed Members at the recent meeting of the Committee on Import 
Licensing , and also at this Committee's  previous meetings, it has compli ed with the due procedures 
with regard to provisions under the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures , and the Agreements 
on Technical Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. First, through its 
Notification to the TBT  Committee ( document  G/TBT/N/LKA/36 , dated 28 May 2018), Sri Lanka has 
notified Imports (Standardization and Quality Control) Regulations of 2017 – Gazette Extraordinary 
of Sri Lanka No.  2064/34 , dated 29  March  2018. This regulation governs the Compulsory Import 
Inspe ction Scheme of Sri Lanka, which is  operated by Sri Lanka Standards Institution.  
28.8.   Under the Compulsory Import Inspection Scheme , importers are not permitted to import into 
Sri Lanka the specified 122  items listed in Schedule  I of this regulation, including palm oil , unless 
they conform to the relevant Sri Lanka n Standards. At various meetings  of the Committee , Sri Lanka 
has already explained its reasons for including all palm oil, palm olein , and palm stearin varieties 
under the Compulsory Import Inspection Scheme. It is purely due to the SPS  measures relating  to 
aflatoxin and mycotoxin , which are carcinogenic materials. As stated above, the two TBT and 
SPS enquiry/ focal points in Sri Lanka, namely, Sri Lanka Standard Institute (SLSI) , and the Ministry 
of He alth, respectively , had already notified to the WTO the standards adopted for the 122 items  in 
question , including palm oil products. As notified, there are three SLSI  Standards in relation to palm 
oil (SLS 720), palm olein (SLS 961) , and palm stearin (SLS 960). Out of all palm oil, palm olein , and 
palm stearin varieties, the specific products falling under HS  codes  1511.10.00 (crude palm oil) , 
1511.90.20 (other palm oil – not refined) , and 1511.90.90 (other palm olein, not Refined Ble ached 
and Deodorized (RBD) Palm Olein) appeared to have been additionally contaminating with aflatoxin 
and mycotoxin, prompting  Sri Lanka to impose much stricter measures on their importation. Second, 
the principal set of procedures that relate to automati c and non -automatic licences are stipulated in 
the Regulation published in the Extraordinary Gazette No.  1739/03 , dated 2 January  2012. Sri Lanka 
had also already notified this Regulation to the WTO in 2014. The Members that are having concerns 
may kindly refer to this notification made by Sri Lanka to understand the import authorization under 
non-automatic licences, which is available in the public domain and can be accessed at the website 
of the Department of Import and Export Control. Accordingly, palm o il products , namely falling under 
HS codes  1511.90.10, 1511.90.30 , and 1511.90.90 , can be imported into Sri Lanka by obtaining an 
import licence from the Department of Import and Export Control , with a fee of 0.4% of c.i.f. Value.  
28.9.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
29  UNITED KINGDOM – RENEGOTIATION OF TARIFF RATE QUOTAS UNDER 
ARTICLE  XXVIII OF THE GATT  1994 – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
29.1.   The Chairperson  recalled  that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
Russian Federation . 
29.2.   The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
29.3.   The Russian Federation continues to have a significant concern regarding the United 
Kingdom's  approach to the renegotiations  of TRQs . The Russian Federation  stress es the impo ssibility G/MA/M/75  
 
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  of concluding negotiations without an agreement on compensation from the UK. The Russian 
Federation urges the UK to provide its compensatory proposal.  
29.4.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
29.5.   New Zealand wishes to indicate its interest in this issue . New Zealand, too, is concern ed about 
the United Kingdom's  treatment of TRQs and other issues , including its AMS  claim and SSG and its 
proposed goods Schedule. However, New Zealand is continuing to work with the UK to achieve a 
satisfactory resolution on TRQs, and hope s to reach an agreement soon.  
29.6.   The representative of Mexico  indicated the following:  
29.7.   Mexico reiterate s its interest and systemic concern regarding this item . To save time , Mexico 
request s that its intervention from the Committee 's previous meeting  be reflected in the record .24 
29.8.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
29.9.   India continues to discuss this issue with the United Kingdom  and shares the concerns raised 
by other  Members . India hopes to find a solution amicably , but also express es its interest in this 
matter.  
29.10.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the followi ng: 
29.11.   The U nited Kingdom  thanks the R ussian Federation , New Zealand , Mexico,  and India for their 
statements on the United Kingdom's  Article XXVIII  negotiations on bound TRQ  commitments . As the 
UK has expressed on numerous occasions , at WTO Committees and in negotiations , its objective has 
always been , and remains , to maintain the existing  balance of rights and obligations between the 
UK and its trading partners upon its withdrawal from the European Union . The UK has engaged with 
Members on this issue since 2018 , undertaking several rounds of negotiations , and continues to 
actively engage with those Members that remain concerned with the UK 's approach to the TRQs. 
The UK wishes to thank the relevant Members for their continued engagement. The UK's  TRQs were 
apportion ed in a fair and transparent manner , and through constructive discussions and dat a-led 
propositions  the UK has seen that outcomes can be reached that are mutually agreeable between 
the UK and the relevant Members. The UK  welcome s the increasi ng number of Members that have 
now formulized the agreed arrangements. Regarding the UK 's Aggregated Measurement of Support  
entitlements  and Special Agricultural Safeguards, the UK has set out its rational e and reasoning for 
its approach on these two  issues in previous Committee meetings. The United Kingdom wishes to 
refer Members to those statements.  
29.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
30  DRAFT REPORT (2021) OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS 
(G/MA/SPEC/61)  
30.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that the Committee was required to annually submit a report on its 
activities to the C TG. The draft report covering the activities of the Committee during the review 
period had been circulated in document  G/MA/SPEC/61. He proposed that the Committee requested 
the Secretariat to finalize the report and to email it to delegations on 13  October  2021. In the 
absence of any objections by Members by 15  October  2021, the report would be considered to have 
been approved by the Committee and would be submitted  to the CTG for appropriate action .25 
30.2.   The Committee so agreed . 
31  ELECTION OF THE VICE -CHAIRPERSON  
31.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Committee that consultations on the  position of  
vice-chairperson were still ongoing.  
 
24 See document  G/MA/M/73 para 14.12 . 
25 See document  G/L/1407 of 18  October  2021.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  31.2.   The representative of China  indicated the following:  
31.3.   China opposes the creation of the position of vice -chairperson in the Committee on Market 
Access for the follow ing reasons . First, China  does not see that there is a need to have a 
vice-chairperson  for this committee . With one  chairperson,  and assistance from Secretariat, the 
existing structure can ensure the full function ing of this committee . China does not see that a 
vice-chairperson  will add any value to this committee . Second, the term of the chairperson  is only 
one year. If a potential candidate sees that there would be no certainty for him or her fully to play 
the chairperson 's role in the coming year, such person may give up the ir candidacy. For exceptional 
cases , if a chair person  cannot continue in the role, the CTG  Chairperson  could be invited to chair a 
meeting , either in -person  or virtually. More than that, China wishes to encourage candidate s to take 
their candidacy very seriously , rather than provid ing an extra tyre , with a vice-chairperson,  as a 
negative signal to the candidate of chair.  Third, in recent years, sometimes , the process of electing 
the chairpersons  of the subsidiary committees of the CTG has been very tough . If there is a 
vice-chairperson that  can play the chair person 's role, people will have less pressure to show flexibility 
to conclude the selection of the chair person,  and then the vice -chairperson  selection would also 
become complicated.  Last but not least, in the GC  Chairperson 's report from the previous week's 
GC meeting o n his consultation on the selection of chair person s of subsidiary bodies, he mentioned 
that one Member had suggested to establish a vice-chairperson  position , but that there had also 
been strong objections  to that suggestion . Clearly it is a pending issue , and no decision has yet been 
taken . 
31.4.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
31.5.   Canada wishes to reflect on the statement from China , and wonder s if this is s omething  that 
the Chairperson  might wish to take up  for further discussion  in a future formal setting. Speaking in 
my own capacity, from my own experience as a Canadian delegate who was the Vice -Chairperson , 
my role was to be there just in case I was needed in order to allow for the Committee 's work to 
continue. Also speak ing from my past experience , the possibility to elect v ice-chairperson s exists in 
the Rules of Procedures of many WTO Committees , and it  is an important flexibility that allows for 
committees to plan and prepare for worst -case scenario s, where the Chairperson is no longer in a 
position to continue in that  role. Members  saw an example of this earlier in the year, in the T rade 
Facilitation Committee,  where the Ambassador had to return to capital , leaving the Committee 
without an actual chairperson for six to eight  weeks , and this did, in part, impede  the Committee's 
ability to continue its work. If it is agreeable for the Committee , Canada considers that it would be 
useful for us to have informal consultations on this specific issue , not the  selection process itself , 
but the role of the Vice -Chairperson  in the Committee . The Committee has  always had a tradition of 
having a vice-chairperson , and it currently has a Vice -Chairperson  from Mexico,  who was elected by 
the Committee  in 2020 . Accordingly, Canada propose s that the Committee takes this upon itself in 
the coming weeks  or months , and that Members in the Committee discuss how best to understand 
the purpose of the vice-chairperson,  the role within each of the individual committees , and its 
separation from the larger discussion that  is ongoing in the G eneral Council . 
31.6.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
31.7.   The European Union adds its voice to the fact that it has found the fact of having a 
Vice-Chairperson useful in this Committee . At this point in time , the EU would encourage the 
Chairperson to hold further consultations to deal with this issue.  
31.8.   The Committee  took note  of the statements made .26 
32  OTHER BUSINESS  
32.1  Training sessions for Geneva -based delegates  
32.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that , at the Committee 's informal meeting of 21  September  2021, 
the Secretariat had extended the deadline to participate in the online survey on the indicative list of 
topics for trainin g sessions for Geneva -based delegates until 7  October  2021. The purpose of these 
sessions was to provide Geneva -based delegates with specialized training on the rules and 
procedures, including for notifications, in the different areas of the Committee 's work. I have been 
 
26 On 11  November  2021, the Committee on Market Access had elected Mr  Don Spedding (Australia) as 
Vice-Chairperson for the period 2021 -2022 through written procedures.  G/MA/M/75  
 
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  informed by the Secretariat that 26 submissions had been received , indicating that there was a 
particular interest among delegates to receive training on the following two  topics: (i) "Introduction 
to Market Access: Main Rules and Procedures , Including Notifications , Under the Agreements 
Covered by the Market Access Committee "; and (2) "Main Concepts Relating to Tariffs: 
GATT  Principles on Tariffs and Tariff Negotiations , Including Plurilateral Agreements ". Based on this 
result, he instructed the Secretariat to begin  preparing the first  training session on the topic 
"Introduction to Market Access " for next year , and to inform delegations of all the details regarding 
this activity in due c ourse.  
32.2.   The Committee took note  of the statement.  
32.2  Dates of next meetings  
32.3.   The Chairperson  asked the Committee to take note of the following arrangements. The last 
informal meeting  of 2021 would take place on 9 December . Regarding the meeting dates for 2022, 
the formal meeting s of the Committee had been scheduled for 30-31 March  and 
18-19 October  2022. The informal meetings had been scheduled for 1  February , 27 June, and 
23 November  2022. Additional informal meetings may be convened if necessary. The proposed 
CMA dates took into account the tentative schedule of meetings of other CTG  subsidiary bodies, and 
the meeting dates of the CTG  itself, in an effort to avoid possible overlaps and facilitate the work of 
delegates.  
32.4.   Finally, the Chair person reminded delegations that this was the second  time that the 
Committee had used the eAgenda. He hoped that Members continued to find the system useful and 
reminded them that they could upload or modify their statements in eAgenda until 18  October  2021. 
In addition, as requested at the informal meeting of 26  May 2021, the Secretariat was going to 
prepare a document explaining the main functions of eAgenda for the CMA , and how to use it. This 
document would be circulated to Members for comments and disc ussed at the Committee's next 
informal meeting , on 9 December  2021.  
32.5.   The Committee took note  of the statemen t. 
32.6.   The meeting was adjourned . 
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