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S/C/M/148  
 
 14 April 2022 
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Council for Trade in Services    
 
 
REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 11 MARCH 2022 
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1 
The Council for Trade in Services held a meeting on 11 March 2022, chaired by Ambassador Villalobos 
(Mexico) . The agenda was contained in document WTO/AIR/CTS/ 29. 
The Chairman said that, under Other Business, he would make a statement on the status of his 
consultations on the appointment of Chairpersons to the subsidiary bodies of the Council for 2022.   
The agenda was a dopted  as modified . 
The representative  of Ukraine  said that, before Members began the meeting, she wished to make a 
statement with regard to the current situation in her country  and its effect on Ukraine 's participation 
in the Council.  
 
The representative of the Russian Federati on raised a point of order.  
 
The Chairman  said that he would allow Ukraine to continue.  
 
The representative of Ukraine  said that  Ukraine ha d always been a strong supporter of the 
multilateral system, it had  engaged with Members on various topics of intere st, contributed to 
discussions and shared its expertise on a variety  of topics in th at very C ouncil as well as in other 
WTO bodies.  
 
On 24 February , the circumstances had drastically changed . On the day of that meeting , it was 
already 16 days that the Russian Federation continue d to commit a blatant act of aggression against 
Ukraine through its unprovoked and unjustified military invasion and attack  on the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Ukraine,  in a brutal violation of basic norms and principles of international law , 
as well as of the purpose and principle of the WTO . As the representative was speaking, many of 
her colleagues in K yiv, as well as their families,  were either hiding from attacks in bomb  shelter s or 
were forced to flee their homes  along with more than two million  other Ukrainians.  
 
The humanitarian consequences of the Russian Federation 's war were so grave and appalling  that 
on 28 February the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the Hague had announced an 
investigation of possible war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine.  
 
The military aggression defe ated the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement s to promote trade 
and peace among WTO Members. The deep connection  between trade and p eace was also not simply 
a matter of practical impossibility of trading when one Member was fighting for its existence as a 
country. Ukraine recalled  that the very fi rst objective listed in the Havana Charter for  an International 
Trade Organization was to create conditions of stability and wellbeing , which were necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations.   
 
The Russian Federation had called on Members to ref rain from politici zing the WTO and  propose d 
that Members , instea d, adhered  to their commitment s to multilateralism and the global trade 
agenda.  
 
 
1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice 
to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  Ukraine was convinced that the military aggression of one WTO Member to wards  another WTO 
Member put the multilateral trading system in an unprecedent ed situation that could  not allow 
Members  to conduct business  as usual. Effect s on trade, prices and the global flow of goods and 
services could already  be observed. The global economy  that had just started to stabilize after 
COVID -19 had been  shaken again. The f ull-scale w ar launched by Russia w ould have strong and 
long-term economic and trade consequences , that the WTO, as  a forum for negotiations and 
multilateralism , needed to acknowledge and address.   
 
Bearing in mind the above -mentioned, at that juncture  Ukraine could n ot guarantee the necessary 
level of implementation of its commitments under GATS with regard to all modes of services supply 
and the large scope of services subsectors , if not for the whole services sector classification  list - to 
name a few , transport ser vices, health -related and social services, environmental services, 
educational services, business services , etc. In the current situation , Ukraine was not in a position  
to provide the usual business conditions for services consumer s and services suppliers of other WTO 
Members.  
 
That unprecedented situation was already  impact ing global trade in services,  and it w ould have 
further implications which c ould not even be estimated at that moment. However, Ukraine and other 
WTO Members were not helpless in th at situation. Her delegation was very grateful  to all Members 
that ha d stood with Ukraine in th ose terrifying times and  had adopted or were in the process of 
adopti ng strong economic sanctions against the Russian Federation. Ukraine  called on other 
Members not to remain indifferent in the face of th at unprecedented and illegal aggression by the 
Russian Federation.  
 
Even though the Russian Federation ha d clearly abandoned the basic principles and values of the 
GATS and WTO , that the WTO ha d promoted for almost 80 years since the end of the Second World 
War, Ukraine urged Members to consider whether the Russian Federation 's continued participation 
in the WTO, including that and other WTO meetings , was consistent with the object and purpose of 
the WTO. By its actions against a neighbouring countr y, the Russian Federation was proving that it 
could not  be regarded as a reliable Member, neither in the functioni ng of the WTO  nor in multilateral 
trade negotiations.  
 
Ukraine did not see  how Members could conduct economic relations with the Russian Federation 
within the WTO on a business -as-usual  basis in the presen t, awful  circumstances. Ukraine  was 
grateful for the widespread support from WTO Members and hope d that join t effort s would help to 
restore peace in Ukraine as soon as possible.  
 
The representative  of the United States  thanked  the representative of  Ukraine for her statement and 
reiterate d the United States'  strong support for Ukraine during th at unimaginably difficult time. The 
United States  wished to pay tribute to the heroism of the Ukrainian people, their armed forces, and 
their leaders.  
 
His delegation also  expres sed its  appreciation to the many Members around the globe that were 
taking action  in cooperation and coordination with the United States. Their important work together 
would continue.  
 
The United States condemn ed Russia 's premeditated and unprovoked attack on Ukraine, and equally  
condemn ed Belarus ' regime for aiding Russia 's war of aggression. President Putin 's premeditated 
war ha d brought catastrophic loss of life and human suffering. Russia was  solely responsible for th at 
death and destruction and the world must h old Russia accountable.  
 
Russia 's actions constitute d a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which 
stated that all member states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial in tegrity or political independence of any state.  
 
The United States  called  upon Russia to immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and 
refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any UN member state.  
 
The United States was united with its allies and partners in  their commitment to ensur ing the Russian 
Government paid a severe economic and diplomatic price for its further invasion of Ukraine.   
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  Work at the WTO focuse d on trade, but the WTO  could not  be neut ral toward the struggle at hand . 
The WTO was predicated on certain values, among th ose that a fair and just international order was 
one built on rules, not power ; on reciprocity, not predation;  and on transparency, not perfidy.  
 
The actions of Russia were incompatible with the rules -based system that Members  had built and 
worked to improve.   
 
The representative  of the United Kingdom  thank ed Ukraine for its statement.  Russia 's assault on 
Ukraine was an unprovoked, premeditated attack on the sovereign democratic state and fellow 
Member of the WTO . The United Kingdom and its international partners st ood united in condemning 
the Russian  Government's reprehensible actions, which  were an egregious violati on of international 
law and the UN Charter.  
 
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia  had a particular responsibility to uphold 
international peace and security. Instead,  it was violating  the borders of another country and its 
actions were causing widespread suffering.  
 
The Russian  Government ha d shown that it was never serious about engaging in diplomacy – it had 
deliberately worked to mislead the world, in order to mask its carefully planned aggression.  
 
As the UN Secretary -General ha d said, such unilateral measures conflict ed directly with the United 
Nations Charter - the use of force by one country against another was the repudiation of the 
principles that every country ha d committed to uphold.  
 
Russia  must urgently de -escalate and wi thdraw its troops. It must be held accountable and must 
stop undermining democracy, global stability, and international law.  
 
The representative  of Japan  said that his delegation was  deeply concern ed with the situation in 
Ukraine.  Russia 's unprovoked and u njustifiable military assault on Ukraine was an act that 
undermine d the very foundation of the international order. It constitute d the infringement o f one of 
WTO Members ' sovereign right s and territorial integrity and a clear violation of international law . 
Japan condemn ed it in the strongest terms. Japan  stood in solidarity with Ukraine and its people , 
together with the international community . 
 
The representative  of the European Union  thank ed Ukraine for its statement and express ed the full  
solidarity of the European Union and its member states for Ukraine and its people.  
 
Russia 's military attack , and the involvement of Belarus,  in the aggression against Ukraine , an 
independent and sovereign state , was a flagrant violation of international  law and the core principles 
on which international rule s-based order was built.  
 
The European Union, together with its like-minded  partners , had been united in making 
unprecedented efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution to the security cris is caused by  Russia. Russia 
had not reciprocated that effort and instead  had opted unilaterally for a grave and premeditated 
escalation.  
 
That continued act of aggression that was ongoing already for the third week ha d enormous 
implications on all possible spheres  of policy and economy , including trade and the international 
rules-based system.  
 
The European Union stood with Ukraine . Russia  must stop th at attack and withdraw its military, and 
fully respect Ukraine 's territorial integrity. The European Union called upon the international 
community to demand from Russia  the immediate end of that aggression , which endanger ed 
international peace and security on a global scale.   
 
The representative  of Norway  thanked Ukraine for its statement. Norway c ondemn ed, in the 
strongest possible terms , the unprecedented military aggression of the Russian Federation against 
Ukraine. She express ed Norway 's concern for the severe destruction and human suffering  that that 
illegal act of aggression  was causing .  
 
By its unprovoked, unjustified , and premeditated military actions, the Russian Federation was 
grossly violating international law, the core principles on which the international rule s-based order S/C/M/148  
 
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  was built and the f undamental principles of the UN Charter that ha d prevailed since the Second 
World War. It was an attack on what the UN, the WTO and Geneva , as capital of multilateralism, 
stood for. Norway  expressed  its full solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people . 
 
The representative  of Australia  joined other  Members  in thanking Ukraine for its statement. Australia 
condemned Russia 's unprovoked and unjustified attack on Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. 
Russia 's actions breached international law, the UN Charter and the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of a neighbouring state.  
 
Australia strongly supported Ukraine in opposing Russia 's hostilities  and called on Russia  to withdraw 
its forces from Ukrainian t erritory and seek a diplomatic solution. Australia supported collective 
action by the international community to impose costs and increase d leverage on Russia  and those 
in Russia  who b ore responsibility. Australia had imposed significant economic sanctions  on Russia 
and Belarus and  would continue to support international measures to sanction Russia 's behaviour.  
 
The representative  of Switzerland  condemn ed the Russian military attack on Ukraine in the strongest 
possible terms.  That attack constitute d a viola tion of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
Ukraine and  was thus a clear violation of international law, in particular of the UN Charter.  
 
Switzerland call ed on the Russian Federation to respect its international obligations and to reverse 
its act ions, as well as to withdraw its troops and contribute to de -escalation.  Switzerland call ed on 
all actors to respect international law, including international humanitarian law.  
 
The representative  of the Republic of K orea thanked Ukraine and other Members and wished to echo 
the previous speakers on the situation in Ukraine. The Korean Government also strongly condemned 
Russia 's armed invasion of Ukraine as a violation of the principles of the UN Charter. The use of force 
that cause d innocent casualties c ould not  be justified under any circumstances. Ukraine 's 
sovereignty, territorial integrity , and political independence must be respected.  
 
The representative  of Georgia  joined the previous speakers in thanking Ukraine for its statement. 
Two weeks earlier, the Russian Federation had unleash ed a devastating full -scale military aggression 
against Ukraine leading to  death, destruction, and humanitarian disaster. Fundamental human rights 
of Ukrainians , first and foremost the right to life , were being  massively violated.  
 
Russia 's unprovoked and unjustified military attacks against Ukraine, attacks on civilian 
infrastr ucture , including kindergartens and  hospitals , were an assault o n the key principles of  the 
UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter.  
 
Georgia  called on the Russian Federation to immediately , and without any precondition s, cease its 
military activities and withdraw its military forces from the territory of Ukraine. Georgia  reiterated 
its unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty , and territorial integrity of Ukraine within 
its international ly recognised borders.   
 
The representa tive of  the Russian Federation  said that, over the period of the previous few days, 
some Members, including the European Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain  and Northern Ireland, had  embarked on the path of economic blackmail putting at risk 
the viability of the multilateral trading system and damag ing the  interests of its participants.  
 
Instead of the warmup of international trade , so much needed to achieve post -pandemic global 
economic recovery, those governments had chose n the path of unilateral and unfounded trade 
measures, with the  aim to  restrict Russia 's and its neighbours ' ability to secure peaceful and safe 
developments in the region and to undermine its economy and put severe pressure on international 
supply chains  yet so fragile.  
 
She drew Members'  attention to the inconsistency of th ose measures wi th the WTO rules, and the 
terrifying economic consequences that accompan ied their introduction .  
 
Withdrawal of MFN treatment from Russian goods and services , or even considerations to revoke 
that status , severely defied  the fundamental WTO principle of non -discrimination. If applied, it 
opened a Pandora 's box dooming WTO Members to get stuck into a vicious circle of introducing 
mutual ly retaliatory  measures of a systemic nature, thereby risking making the application of WTO 
Agreements largely sporadic and therefore, de facto  deficient.  S/C/M/148  
 
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The blockade of Russian financial institutions, substantial part s of its currency reserves and 
transportation services companies neglect ed certain WTO Members ' commitments under the GATT 
and the GATS and sabotage d all the progress in  the post-pandemic restoration of international supply 
chains.  
 
The WTO as the centrepiece  of the multilateral trading system had been  created to raise standards 
of living, with an objective of sustainable devel opment. The WTO ha d proved to be an organization 
that was primarily guided  by economic considerations and solid legal norms . Lamentably, the 
increasing pressure for its politi cization ha d already brought inefficiencies to the WTO operations.  
 
The represen tative  was convinced that the only way of dealing with the current  crisis was to talk 
economics, not politics, and preven t the violations of multilaterally agreed and adopted trade rules. 
Otherwise, world markets and the economies of many Members would continue to suffer.  
 
Russia  expect ed effective and immediate measures to be taken in order to make the  dispute 
settlement sys tem operational to enable  the protection of  the interests of those Members who 
suffer ed from unjustified and unlawful violations of WTO rules.  
 
The representative asked the C hairman to confirm that the agenda  of that meeting  was reflected in 
document WTO/A IR/CTS/29 circulated on 1 March 2022 and had been agreed by all Members at the 
beginning of the meeting. Unfortunately, her delegation had not found an item under which previous 
speakers had made their interventions. She asked  the Chair man to help her delegation  to identify 
that item, saying that maybe a new item had appeared, for instance item Z, on the events in Ukraine . 
 
The Chairman  confirmed that the meeting was proceeding with the agenda as adopted.  
 
The representative of the Russian Federation  thanked the Chairman for the clear answer. She 
requested the Secretariat to exclude comments that were not related to that day's agenda and that 
went beyond the mandate of the Council from the report of the meeting.  
 
The Chairman  said that that was a formal meeting and that the Rules of Procedure stated that 
"records of the discussions of the CTS shall be in the form of minutes". He then asked other Members 
if they agreed with the proposal for removal.  
 
The representative  of the United States  did not agree with Russia 's proposal to amend the minutes . 
In fact, it was very important that the statement the Russian Federation  had just delivered be 
reflected in the minutes , to show the world how little Russia comprehend ed the severity of th e crisis 
it had created , and how tone-deaf Russia was with respect to the horrors being committed by them.  
 
The representative  of the European Union  fully suppor ted the statement of the United State s. Her 
delegation insisted that every statement made in th e Council b e fully reflected in the minutes.  
 
The representative  of the United Kingdom  support ed the United States and the E uropean Union that 
all statements made during th at formal meeting be reflected in the minutes.  
 
The representative  of Japan  also support ed the statements by the United States, the European Union  
and the U nited Kingdom . Japan  believe d that all the statements made in the meeting needed to  be 
reflected in the minutes.  
 
The representative  of Australia  wished  to echo the comments made b y the United States, the 
European Union and other Members. It was entirely appropriate that all the statements made in the 
meeting  be reflected in the minutes of th e meeting.  
 
The representative  of Norway  also suppor ted that all statements be reflected in the minutes of the 
meeting.  
 
The representative  of Ukraine  supported  the position of previous speakers  that all the statements 
be reflected in the minutes. And to Russia, she wished to  remind that Russia could never put  out of 
the record the death of thousands  of innocent people including children , the murders of ordinary 
civilian people who were trying to escape from their homes for security  and the bombing of children 's S/C/M/148  
 
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  and maternity hospitals in Ukraine and  destroying  the lives of millions of Ukrainians. Russia  could 
never put th at out of the record.   
 
The representative  of Georgia  supported  the statements made by the  United States, the European 
Union,  Ukraine, and others  and said  that the statements made by delegatio ns should be reflecte d in 
the minutes of the meeting.  
 
The representative  of the Republic of K orea echoed the statements by the United States  and other 
Members and  said that all statements needed to be reflected in the minutes.  
 
The representative  of Switzerland  said that, like other delegations, all statements, from the 
beginning of th e meeting , needed to be reflected  in the minutes.  
 
The representative of  the Russia n Federation  noted that her delegation did not  support the proposal  
of the U nited States, the European Union, Australia and others to ignore  the Russian  request 
concerning the report of the meeting. She clarified that her delegation had not made a proposal ; it 
had made its legitimate  request . Russia was  surprised to see such a terminological inaccuracy, 
especially  from native speakers.  
 
Russia had  made its request on the basis that Members had spoke n out of the agenda , and had gone  
beyond the competence of th e Council , which, in accordance with Ar ticle XXIV of the GATS "shall 
carry out such functions as may be assigned to it to facilitate the operation of this Agreement and 
further its objectives ". 
 
Russia  encourage d all Members to respect the rules and procedures of the WTO . If someone d id not  
agree wit h the fundamental principles regarding the requirement to comply with the agenda and 
would like to change something in those , then th at must be done in accordance with the regulations 
for changing such procedures.  
 
The WTO  was a consensus -based  organizatio n and any modifications to the rules of procedure c ould 
only be made by consensus. Members could not rewrite the  rules every day by request s from certain 
delegations. The rules regarding the agenda of a meeting of an organization were the ABC of 
diplomacy. That was what characterize d the legitimacy of the activities of any international 
institution. Rules of procedure must be strictly observed , regardless of what the Chairman of th at or 
that other  body want ed. 
 
The previous day, her de legation  had already witnessed a dramatic meeting of a subsidiary body of 
the CTS, during which the Chairman, being of course under political pressure, forgot about his duty, 
professional approach  and impartiality , gave subjective assessments of what was h appening, 
interfered  in the discussion between Members, and thus grossly violated the order of the meeting. 
Of course, th e delegate in question had completely lost Russia 's confidence because he had not met 
the basic requirements that applied to a chairper son. 
 
Summing up, Members  had the Rules of Procedures and the mandate of th e Council. Russia insist ed 
and w ould insist on their implementation. Russia  did not support the proposal of individual Members  
to make changes to the rules for setting the agenda of meetings. Any modifications to the procedures 
require d consensus. All remarks, comments, and alarmist statements that were not part of the 
agenda should not be reflected in the meeting reports.  
 
Her d elegation  was still waiting for the answer  to its question  under what agenda item the Council 
kept the discussion on the events in Ukraine.  
 
The Chairman  said that he had given the opportunity to all Members  to express themselves and 
what had been expresse d at the meeting would be recorded in the minutes of the meeting.  
 
The representative of the Russian Federation  said that her delegation strongly condemn ed the 
violation of the rules of the Organization . Russia , as a disciplined Member, d id not agree that the 
Chairman encourage d violations of the rules of procedure, either on the agenda or on any other 
issue. If the Chair man was going  to include all Members ' comments anyway, Russia asked that all 
of her delegation's  comments regarding the disregard of the r ules of procedure be included in th at 
document.  
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  The Chairman  said that a ll the statements made  that day  would be reflected in the record of the 
meeting.  
 
After apologizing for taking the floor at that late stage due to the technical issues  encountered  with 
the remote  connecti on to the meeting , the representative  of Canada  wished to firmly condemn the 
unjustifiable and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by President Putin. President Putin had ordered the 
biggest military invasion of a European c ountry since the Second World War and ha d broken peace 
and compromised security in Europe. The whole international community had to  address th at matter. 
The consequence s of those acts would be felt well beyond the borders of Ukraine. Th at was a blatant 
violation of the UN Charter, trying to re define the principles underlying the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of States, including their sovereign equality . Canada wished to join all other Members  who 
had made statements in th at regard.    
 
1  ITEM A: NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE S III:3  AND V:7 OF THE GATS  
1.1.  With regard to the notifications made pursuant to GATS Article III:3 (Transparency), the 
Chairman  drew the Council 's attention to the communicatio ns received from  Switzerland 
(S/C/N/1074) , the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu (S/C/N/1075) , 
and Albania (S/C/N/1079 to S/C/N/ 1098).  
1.2.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the notifications  made .  
1.3.  It was s o agreed . 
1.4.  Concerning the notification s made pursuant to Article V:7 (Economic Integration), the 
Chairman  drew the Council 's attention to the communication s received from: the United Kingdom 
and Norway (S/C/N/107 2); ASEAN member States (S/C/N/463/A DD.1); Turk ey and the EFTA States 
(S/C/N/1076); Ecuador, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein (S/C/N/1077); and the 
Republic of Korea and Turkey (S/C/N/1078).  
1.5.  He suggested that the Council take note of the notification s made  and that the agreements 
notified  be referred to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) for consideration.   
1.6.  It was so agreed . 
1.7.  While on the subject of the CRTA , the Chairman  drew delegations ' attention to the fact that, at 
its meeting scheduled for 28 and 29 March , the CRTA would  be considering t wo regional trade 
agreements that cover ed services trade. The agreements in question were: the Free Trade 
Agreement between China and Mauritius; and th e Free Trade Agreement between the Gulf 
Cooperation Council member States and Singapore. He trusted that th at information w ould be of 
interest to delegations  and suggest ed that the Council take note of the statement  he had  made.  
1.8.  It was so agreed . 
1.9.  The Chairman drew Members' attention to  the Note by the Secretariat containing an "Overview 
of notifications made under relevant GATS provisions", which Members had agreed would be updated 
annually. The Note ha d been circulated as document JOB(09)/10/Rev.12 . 
1.10.  A repr esentative of the  Secretariat  said that the Note provide d a statistical account of the 
notifications made by Members under relevant GATS provisions , updated to include the notifications 
submitted between January and December 2021 . For ease of reference , the Note list ed all GATS 
notifications requirements applicable to Members , irrespective of whether any notifications had been  
submitted under those Articles during the year in question.  
1.11.  As indicated in the Note, during 2021, 21 notifications  had been  made pursuant to Article  III:3 
on transparency, 25 Economic Integration Agreements had been  notified under Article V:7, and a 
further two notifications had been  submitted pursuant to Article VII:4 on recognition.  
1.12.  Three observations  could be made  based on the recent update of the Note. First, the number 
of notifications pursuant to Article III:3 in 2021 had been  nearly the same as in the previous year, 
but they were  significantly lower than in 2019. Second, after several years during  which one could S/C/M/148  
 
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  observe a relative slowdown in the notification s received under Article V:7 , the number of Economic 
Integration Agreements notified  had increased substantially in 2021 and was the highest ever 
recorded. This was largely accounted for by the 19 Economic Integration Agreements , out of a total 
of 25,  that had been  notified by the United Kingdom and its trading partners. Third, whereas the 
notifications received under Article VII:4  had increased markedly  during the year s 2018 to 2020 in 
comparison to the previous two decades, 2021 ha d not witnessed a continu ation of that trend.  
1.13.  The representative  of India thanked the  Secretariat for its Note and drew Members' attention 
to the submi ssion her delegation , the African Group and Cuba had made  in February 2022  on 
'Strengthening the WTO to promote development and inclusivity  - Communication from the African 
group, Cuba and India'  (WT/GC/W/778/Rev.4).  
1.14.  GATS Art icle III:3 require d Members to "promptly and at least annually inform the Council for 
Trade in Services of the introduction of any new, or any changes to existing , laws, regulations or 
administrative guidelines which significantly affect  trade in services covered by its specific 
commitm ents under this Agreement ". Similarly , regular notification of entry -related measures 
affecting existing mode 4 commitments of Members were required in order to understand the full 
implications of the commitments that had been made.  
1.15.  However, as the Note illustrated, some prominent developed Members, who also held top 
ranks in global commercial services trade , had a dismal record in notifications under  the GATS, with 
as low as 2 notifications in the previous  26 years . Also o verall, the number of notifications by 
developed Members was low. She requested that developed Members lead by example in submitting 
comprehensive, timely and accurate notifications.  
1.16.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statement s made.  
1.17.  It was so agreed . 
2  ITEM B: OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE LDC SERVICES WAIVER  
2.1.  The Chairman  recall ed that, at the October  meeting, the LDC Group had informed Members 
that LDC Trade Ministers had adopted a Declaration outlining their priorities for MC12. Amongst the 
areas o f special interest mentioned in the Declaration were a number of elements related to the LDC 
Services Waiver, aimed at improving the implementation of relevant Decisions and the preferences 
notified to date.  
2.2.  The representative of Chad, speaking on behalf of the LDC Group , said that Members who had 
grant ed preferences under the Waiver had attempted to offer  concrete preferences to LDC service 
suppliers. Many sectors and modes of supply had been included in those preferences , but he note d 
that Section B of the LDC Collective  Request included further areas. There were additional measures 
that preference -granting  Members could take to complement  their preferences, including measures 
that lifted certain barriers, as India had done by setting  up a special quota for LDCs ' visas and 
waiving associated fees.  
2.3.  In addition, consideration could be given to lifting constrain ts, such as waiving residency 
requirements , when an LDC supplier had been chosen for an assignment by a supplier  in a 
preference -granting Member . During  the pandemic, barriers to the recognition of certain equivalent 
qualifications had been eased,  given that home -based work and training had become  widespread . 
As the health situation improv ed, more should be done to stimulate LDC travel and tourism services, 
as well as mobile banking services for LDCs'  transactions. LDC s wished  to work in partnership with 
preference -granting Members  and other Members to explore ways to raise awareness and to propose 
concrete results.  
2.4.  The representative highlighted that , since the start of the COVID -19 pandemic, certain  service 
sectors had considerably developed, such as ICT, financial services, maritime transport , and 
entertainment services. LDCs had therefore  invited their trading partners to support them in 
strengthening their capacity to integrate value chains related to those sectors, in order to diversify 
their services exports, given that LDCs' exports were concentrated in certain sectors , such as 
tourism , which had been terribly affected by COVID -19. Support could entail helping LDCs to develop  
their infrastructure and skills.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  2.5.  During several seminars and webinars, the WTO Secretariat had improved data collection to 
provide  a better overview of LDCs ' expor ts and imports . It had also incorporated data from LDC 
suppliers and consumers of services in preference -granting  countries. In two webinars  that the LDC 
Group  had organized in 2019 and 2021  with the Secretariat  and the Council for Trade in Services, 
LDCs had highlighted different actors in that regard , to give a sense of what was actually happening 
on the ground . Delegations had  heard from LDCs providing ICT services and had witnessed the 
example of a Nepalese film production company and their client in the U nited States .   
2.6.  The G roup also recalled that LDC Trade Ministers had highlighted , in the ir Ministerial Statement 
for MC12,  a certain number of recommendations to support the growth  of LDCs ' services exports. 
In particular, they  had called on Members to make  the Waiver permanent , because of the varying  
capacity of LDCs and the challenge s posed by the  availability of data to  follow -up on preferences 
utilization . LDC Ministers had also asked  preference -granting Members to introduce program mes to 
orient LD C service suppliers , and consumers of LDC services, to the Waiver notifications, so  as to 
better utilize  the preferences granted . 
2.7.  The LDC Group also reaffirmed its request to the Council for Trade in Services, as indicated in 
the draft outcome document for MC12 , to examine and promote the operationalization of the Waiver, 
including explor ing improvements in LDC services export data . 
2.8.  All of th ose elements were still on the table of the General Council as part of the work on a n 
outcome document for MC12 . The LDC Group looked  forward to constructive discussions in that 
context to finalize the text they had submitted.  
2.9.  The representative of  India thanked Chad for its statement on behalf of the LDC Group and for 
the acknowledgement of India 's efforts in respect of the LDC Services Waiver.  She reiterate d that 
India attache d utmost importance to the meaningful implementation of the preferences granted 
under the LDC Ser vices Waiver by all preference -granting Members with the ultimate objective of 
increasing the LDCs ' share in global services export s. 
2.10.  During the workshop on the Waiver held on 2 -3 June  2021, India had  provided specific 
information regarding  the utilization of the preferences  it had  granted  in the three areas of visa -
related preferences, technical assistance and capacity building , and market access. India had  also 
provided some suggestions on  future  better utili zation of th ose preferences by the LDCs. India had 
heard and noted some of the suggestions made by C had on behalf of the LDC Group. 
2.11.  India looked  forward to further meaningful engagement with all Members on th at important 
issue in the run up  to MC12.  
2.12.  The representative of China  thanked  Chad for the statement on behalf of  the LDC Group . As 
always, his delegation  attache d great importance to the LDC Services Waiver, and support ed the 
increa sed participation of LDC  Members in the multilateral trading system.  
2.13.  In January, the WTO Secretariat  had organized the 10th China Round Table. At the high -level 
opening session, participants had  celebrated the ten years ' achievements of the "China Program me" 
and reflected on the future of LDC accessions. China w ould continuously promote South -South 
cooperation in the WTO framework to help strengthen the economic resilience of LDC s, in pursuit of 
a community of shared future for mankind.  
2.14.  China highly appreciate d Members ' contributions to LDC development under the WTO 
framework  and believe d that further efforts in t hat regard w ould make capacity building and 
technical assistance more targeted. China would  continue to actively engage in relevant discussions 
and encourage more information sharing on  the Waiver.  
2.15.  The representative of South Africa  welcome d and suppor ted the statement made by Chad on 
behalf of the LDC Group. Her delegation concurred  that an accelerated implementation of the Waiver 
and innovating better support that substantively increase d the participation of LDC s in services trade 
had to  be supported by all Members  and prioritised. That mattered immensely for monitoring the 
performance of the Waiver and also identifying improvements in future . S/C/M/148  
 
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  2.16.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements  made and said that it 
would revert to that item at its next meeting.  
2.17.  It was so agreed . 
3  ITEM C: WOR K PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE  
3.1.  The Chairman  said that, at the previous  meeting, a couple of delegations  had recalled  the 
contributions they had made to the Council 's deliberations under the Work Programme.  
3.2.  Regarding the exploratory discussion on supporting the digital capability of businesses and 
consumers, the representative of  the Republic of K orea wished to address  three aspects , namely , 
Korea 's statistics on e -commerce activity, an update on domestic pro grammes related to digital 
capability, and digital ODA program mes. 
3.3.  First, the representative presented an update  on Korea 's online shopping trend following  the 
COVID -19 outbreak. Prior to the pandemic, the proportion of online shopping o f goods in total re tail 
sales was around 21.5%. Th at share  had skyrocketed to 26.3% in 2020 and it  had continued to 
increase , to 27.5% , in 2021. Despite some fluctuations, the overall social distanc ing policy adopted 
in Korea over the course of the previous  year had been  similar to that in 2020.  
3.4.  That statistic reflect ed an ongoing upward trend and consumer behaviour  in favour  of e-
commerce in the course of coping with  the pandemic. The representative  cautiously expect ed that 
the heavy dependence on online transactions o n the part o f Korean consumers w ould continue in 
the following  years and would not return to pre -pandemic levels because consumers  had become  
accustomed to the efficiency and convenience of digital shopping. Theref ore, it was even more 
important for governments to focus on nurturing the digital capability of businesses and consumers, 
and also to narrow the gaps among them.  
3.5.  Second, at previous Council  meetings Korea had presented in -depth information about 
domestic p rogram mes, such as its online business support program me. Through those programmes , 
the Korean Government  had been  trying to help MSMEs be equipped with digital capability, especially 
during  the period of tightened social distancing. Under the online busin ess support program me, 
MSMEs in Korea had been able to receive voucher -based services such as virtual communication, 
working from home , and cyber security. Interestingly, the implementation activities of th at 
program me, such as application, selection, cont racting, and settlement , had also been processed 
electronically, which ha d also contributed to the digital literacy of MSMEs. The number of 
beneficiaries of that programme had been  around 78 '000 in 2020 and around 67 '000 in 2021. 
Considering the expected d ecrease of marginal effects, in 2022  Korea would  start phasing out th e 
programme.  
3.6.  Lastly, the representative addressed Korea's digital ODA program me. Korea was firmly 
determined to contribute to closing the global digital gap  and was involved  in various progra mmes, 
ranging from general digital literacy to special areas such as education, healthcare, and government -
related public services.  He provided the  example  of the program me of the Information Access 
Centres . It was noteworthy that more than a third of the world 's population ha d never used the 
internet , according to the United Nations. For the purpose of facilitating the internet access of 
developing countrie s and LDCs , the Korean Government  had contributed to  establishing  around 60 
Information Access Centres  in over 40 countries. An Information Access Centre  usually consist ed of 
a digital literacy education space, an internet lounge, and a seminar room. Korea  looked  forward to 
those Centres  playing a part in substantially narrowing down the digital divide within the beneficiary 
countries.  
3.7.  The representative of China  thanked  Korea for  sharing  its experience. He also encourage d other 
Members to continue the inf ormation exchange and join  WTO discussions on e -commerce issues. In 
previous  years, China had actively participated in e-commerce  discussions and shared its experience 
with domestic  e-commerce development.  
3.8.  He indicated that China was developing the " Silk Road E-commerce " as part of its efforts to 
strengthen the bilateral cooperation at different levels, following the principle of consultation and 
cooperation for shared benefits. China ha d established an e -commerce bilateral cooperation S/C/M/148  
 
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  mechanism with 23 countries in five different continents. Silk Road E-commerce was a new channel 
and new engine of economic and trade cooperation. Since 2020, China and its partners ha d organized 
a series of activities to cope with the COVID -19 crisis. Activities such as  "Silk Road E-commerce 
Capacity Building Online Lectures ", and "Brand and Quality Online Shopping Festival " had both 
boosted the international trade of China's  trading partners and enriched the choices of Chinese 
consumers.  
3.9.  Last but not least, China encou raged all Members to continue the work towards a multilateral 
Ministerial Decision to reinvigorate the Work Program me on Electronic C ommerce and extend the 
Moratorium. China believe d that that outcome at MC12 w ould help the WTO respond to the needs 
of the times and would ensure a stable business environment for global e -commerce.  
3.10.  After thanking Korea and China  for sharing very informative and valuable experiences, t he 
representative of Chinese Taipei  wished to present  its experience on how to cope with the challenges 
of cybersecurity and personal data protection.  
3.11.  Due to the C OVID -19 pandemic, business activities and consumer behaviours  had largely 
switched to online channels and portals. Th at trend of switch ing had generat ed not only enormous 
opportunities for online services, but also new challenges in terms of cybersecurity and personal 
data protection.  
3.12.  In response to the emerging risks associated with the accelerated development of e -
commerce as a result of the pandemic , the relevant authorities of the Separate Customs  Territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu had undertaken some strategies and measures to support 
and enhance online retail firms ' capacity for protecting personal data and safeguarding 
cybersecurity. T he following were some examples of concrete strategies and measures  taken.  
3.13.  First, it had provided consultation services to assist online retailers on how to establish 
personal information management systems and strengthen their information security , including 
establishment of incident/situation response mechanism s and strengthening supervision of 
outsourced companies . Second, it had enhanced investigations into suspected personal information 
leakages and reinforced administrative actions aimed at legal com pliance by online retailers and 
reducing the risks of information leakages. Lastly, it had  formulated reference guidelines on 
information security for  the online retail industry, provided training courses and encourag ed 
information/experience sharing among  online retail operators. It had also encouraged online 
businesses to join the joint defence  system  for information security in order to take advantage of 
the joint actions against cyber risks.  
3.14.  His delegation would continue to support th e information and experience sharing exercise 
under  the Council  and would continue to share its experiences at the appropriate time.  
3.15.  The representative of India thanked the previous delegations for their presentations . She 
recalled that her delegation had consistently been a proponent for strengthening the multilateral 
work under the non -negotiating and exploratory 1998 Work Programme on Electronic C ommerce. 
That was  all the more important in the context of the pandemi c, which ha d exposed the existing and 
widening digital divide.  
3.16.  She recalled  that, in November 2021,  her delegation , South Africa and Indonesia had 
presented a communication , contained in document  WT/GC/W/838/Rev.2 , on the need to re juvenate  
the Work Progra mme on e-commerce , which  acknowledged the importance of work under the Work 
Programme in examining trade -related issues relating to global electronic commerce, taking into 
account the economic, financial, and development needs of developing countries.  
3.17.  She noted  that developing countries , including LDCs , faced challenges in the formulation of 
national policy and regulatory responses to support their increasing participation in the digital 
economy. Th ose challenges  include d, inter alia, the harmful behaviour of digital corporations , 
particularly anti -competitive business practices and oligopolistic market structures, the digital divide 
and concerns about data sovereignty and data ownership.  
3.18.  She underlined the usefulness of having deliberations on those and ot her challenged faced by 
developing Members , including LDCs , to build a more inclusive digital economy.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  3.19.  Her delegation remain ed open and eager to work on the rejuvenation of the Work Programme 
and work with all like -minded Members to drive a constructive o utcome in a space which w ould 
fundamentally influence how the world would operate  in the times to come. She urged all Members 
for their  support.  
3.20.  After welcoming and supporting the statement by India, t he representative of  South Africa  
said that, as  it was the week of International Women 's Day and th at was the first Council meeting 
of 2022, it was an opportune time to reflect on the on-going e -commerce discussions in the CTS, 
especially with respect to incr eased  participation of developing countries , and women in developing 
countries , in e-commerce and the platform economy .  
3.21.  For the many conveniences  that women (and men) who were participating in th at Council 
meeting  that day took for granted , like internet banking, studying online, buying food online, 
accessing medical services , there were millions of women and girls in developing countries who ha d 
no access to such  conveniences .  
3.22.  The digital gender gap in developing countries carrie d through into the platform economy. 
There was no e-commerce inclusivity as low -income earning women had limited access to technology 
and ICT services, ICT skills and financial services, all transformational enablers for their 
empowerment.  
3.23.  She said that  even the e -commerce JSI was somewhat gender blind, with only two weak non -
impactful gender -inclusive provisions advanced under the Preamble and the subsection on protecting 
personal information. Such gender -convenient provisions w ould not fundamentally addre ss the 
accessibility and participation challenges facing developing countries  she had mentioned earlier . 
3.24.  Therefore, it was really up to the 1998 Work Programme  to be allowed to do its part in 
increasing the  participation of developing countries, and switch  on the connectivity for women in 
developing countries currently marginalized from the platform economy.  
3.25.  Realising the ambition for the GATS to facilitate the increasing participation of developing 
countries in trade in services included  strengthening digi tal capacity for marginalized women and 
girls, and that require d that Members  distinguish  the benefits for women in e -commerce from the 
barriers that exclude d women from e -commerce.   
3.26.  To conclude, she note d that  there was deficit in taking action on the ba rriers facing developing 
countries ' participation in the platform economy so that benefits c ould be shared more widely , which  
remain ed elusive from a trade in services perspective, including leveraging the positive forces in 
technology and e -commerce to di srupt both gender inequality  and low participation of developing 
countries in e -commerce . 
3.27.  The representative  of Chad, speaking on behalf of the LDC Group, thanked the Chairman and 
commend ed the efforts of  Members in engaging in  rich and constructive discussions on digital 
capacity building . Those were  very relevant in the current context and would pave the way for 
concrete measures to sustain further digitalisation . Chad also thanked the authors of the 
communication in document JOB/SERV/296/Rev.4 for contributing to the substance of the 
discussions.  
3.28.  The LDC Group supported the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce,  and in particular  
exploring , in the Council for Trade in Services, relevant cooperati on activities that could contri bute 
to bridging the digital divide.  
3.29.  Despite the challenges posed by COVID -19, the number of Internet users had increased by 
20% in LDCs, reaching 27% of the population in 2021, up from 21% in 2019 . But there was still 
much progress to be made , given that  in 2021 the divide  between LDCs and developed countries in 
terms of the percentage of the population with Internet access was 63%.   
3.30.  At the occasion of the webinar the Council had held in June 2021, a number of challenges and 
opportunities had been  identif ied with regard to the ability of LDCs to make use of  the advantages  
of e-commerce. In particular, the unequal bargaining power of platforms had been  highlighted  as a 
problem faced by LDC service suppliers  in terms of negotiating rates. Another dimension that had S/C/M/148  
 
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  been underline d was the difficulty of complying with digital rules and legislation s. In terms of 
opportunities, e -commerce had been viewed  as enabling services to be provided 24 hours a day  and 
encouraging teleworking and self -employment. Another opportunity involved provid ing LDCs with 
assistance to create  platforms and acqu ire knowledge in the intellectual property  area to avoid  
potential copyright infringements, for example . 
3.31.   Overall, electronic commerce could contribute to t he diversification of different types of 
economic activities , especially in niche sectors with higher added value . In addition, e -commerce 
could facilitate the diversification of export markets. According to an ITC report , for example, 
Bangladesh had been  able to reduce its dependence on its top ten export markets from 69% to 59% 
thanks to e-commerce , Nepal had cut  its reliance  from 91% to 65%, and Cambodia had been  able 
to reduce its dependence even further, from 91% to 48%.  That showed the major role that  
digitization and e -commerce had played.  
3.32.  In light of those considerations, LDCs were grateful for  the support of trading partners with 
the construction of  their infrastructure and the development of their legal frameworks , with the aim 
of facilitat ing the inte gration  and participation  of LDC service suppliers  through online platforms.  
This could  also help LDCs overcome  the COVID -19 crisis which, along with the geopolitical situation,  
had hit their economies  so drastically . 
3.33.  The representative of the United States  said that he had not intended to take the floor on that 
agenda  item but  wanted  to take the opportunity to thank Korea and China for their information 
sharing. He also wished to  indicate his delegation's  support for what China had suggested in terms 
of reinvigorating  the Work Programme and exten ding the Moratorium ; the United States  saw those 
two elements as  linked together , and as two very important parts of the overall e -commer ce 
discussion.  
3.34.  He had also noted  the interesting ideas  put forward by  South Africa,  indicated his delegation's  
readiness to look at issues related to inclusivity and  looked forward  to continuing th at conversation.  
3.35.  The representative  of Indonesia  began by supporting the statement delivered by the 
delegation s of India and South Africa on the reinvigorati on of the Work Programme on Electronic 
Commerce.  He noted that  it was  unfortunate that even though  the digital sector ha d experience d 
growth in a r apid manner, a wide gap on the level of benefits that could be reaped  from digitalisation , 
particularly between developed and developing countries , remain ed. It also  needed to  be taken into 
consideration  that while digitalization had also affected trade, d evelopment, distribution,  and access 
to technology remain ed uneven between Members.  
3.36.  Hence, his delegation  believe d that proper attention should be provided to the surrounding 
elements arising from the development of digital trade , such as  the digital divi de. In that regard , 
bearing in mind that Members ha d agreed to establish a comprehensive Work Programme  to examine 
all trade related issues arising from global e -commerce in 1998 , Indonesia,  as one of the co-sponsors  
of document WT/GC/ W/838/Rev.2, along with India and South Africa,  remain ed convinced that 
reinvigoration  of the work under th at mandate , including in the Council for Trade in Services , needed 
to continue to  be carried out. 
3.37.  The representative of Singapore  had taken note of the interventions made and welcome d the 
information sharing  exercise . His delegation wished to share  updates on how Singapore  had been 
enhancing digital inclusion  in two dimensions , domestically and internationally.  
3.38.  First, domestically Singapore ha d taken concrete efforts to support SMEs  in the retail sector  
that had been  badly hit by the pandemic. Measures , including  a "booster  package " to aid such 
compan ies in setting up online sales channels , had been put in place for the e-commerce sector. 
These were useful in helping small companies to build  up e-commerce capabilities and diversify their 
revenue streams .  
3.39.  Second , on the external front Singapore ha d also launched "FOSS for good " technical 
assistance package a t the 76th UNGA  on 6 September 2021. The package w ould run from 2022 to 
2023 under the Singapore Cooperation Programme  and would  provid e a peer-learning platform for 
FOSS states  to share experiences,  best practices  and solutions to tackle the unique development 
needs and ch allenges for small countries in areas including digital transformation.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  3.40.  The representative of the Kingdom of S audi Arabia  thank ed all Members who had shared their 
experiences and the progress in their practices with regard to e -commerce. Her delegation  also 
wished to share some of the Kingdom's  experiences in the field of  digital trade.  
3.41.  The COVID -19 cris is had made  the digital industry in Saudi Arabia become central to every 
interaction in people's  lives, forcing both business and consumers further up the adoption curve 
almost overnight.  
3.42.  Saudi Arabia 's investments in technology ha d paid off in its fight against the pan demic. With 
Vision 2030 , Saudi Arabia had initiated a national transformation strategy to shift from an oil-
dependent  economy to  a digitally empowered one. The Kingdom had introduced legislation and 
frameworks, created institutions, formed international partnership s, and focused on introducing 
digital solutions in priority services sector s – justice, health, electricity, culture  and tourism - with a 
clear goal of becoming the region 's tech nology leader.  
3.43.  The Saudi prioritisation of digital transformation had resulted in the gradual deployment of 
commercial 5G networks in 2019 in more than 20 cities. The launch of 5G had also helped to boost 
the Kingdom 's technological  credentials among investors who were keen to invest in industries that 
would benefit from 5 G capabilities, such as tec hnology , finance, education,  and the public sector. In 
addition,  the Government ha d introduced a host of smart tools that had proved effective and  had 
gained the public 's trust.  
3.44.  Saudi SMEs were already on the road to higher cloud ad option, and the COVID -19 cris is would 
further accelerate th at trend. More than 25 % of enterprises  in the Kingdom  had plans in place to 
deploy a mix of on-premise s/dedicated private cloud s, multiple public clouds and legacy platforms 
to meet their infrastructure needs.  
3.45.  The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had advocated for digital response and recovery  and had 
promoted collaboration with international organizations and  the private secto r, marking a shift in 
Saudi priorities.  
3.46.  The representative of Switzerland  thank ed the previous speakers  and note d with interest the 
initiatives  and activities presented at that meeting to support digital capacity building . 
3.47.  His delegation  had taken  note of the instructive  exchanges that had taken  place since the 
latest extension of the Work Programme and the Moratorium . The pandemic had revealed both the 
usefulness of e -commerce and its major economic potential , for all Members .  
3.48.  His delegation was conscious of the existence of digital divides and  the difficulties faced by a 
large number of  developing Members, especially  LDCs. In that sense , Switzerland support ed the 
exten sion of  the Work Programme  and making t he Moratorium permanent , or at least  prolong ing it.  
3.49.  As such, Switzerland believe d that the most realistic way forward  for MC12 was to maintain 
the long -standing practice of extending both the Work Programme and the Moratorium up until 
MC13. In that regard, his delegation was pleased with the broad support that the draft Decision 
contai ned in document WT/GC/W/831 had received until then. Sixty-three WTO Members had co -
sponsored that draft and several other delegations were engaged in internal consultations. 
Switzerland invite d those Members that ha d not yet done so to join the draft Mini sterial Decision.  
3.50.  The representative of t he European Union  thank ed those  Members who continued to  provid e 
update s in the Council on their domestic programmes related to the digital econom y and 
inclusiveness.  
3.51.  The e-commerce Work Programme  provided a very useful forum to discuss and address issues 
of interest to Members related to digital trade  and the  digital economy . The European Union was 
open to continue engaging in any discussions within the Work Programme, in line with Members ' 
interest s and submissions, and in particular on the challenges faced by developing countries and 
LDCs as well as issues related to gender inclusiveness , among others.  
3.52.  The Work Programme  would have to be extended at MC12 but her delegation would also be 
seeking an extension of the Moratorium. Both had been  extended as part of the same M inisterial  S/C/M/148  
 
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  Decision  in the past and she hoped that the same practice would continue. He r delegation fully 
supported the draft Decision that Switzerland had referred to in it s intervention  and also urged other 
Members to co -sponsor it. 
3.53.  The representative  of Barbados , speaking on behalf of the ACP Group , thank ed Members  for 
their constructive contribution s and potential possibilities for future work under th at agenda item, 
particularly in light of the challenges faced by developing countries and LDCs with regard to e -
commerce.  
3.54.  The ACP Group ha d consistently reiterated that the 1998 e -commerce Work Programm e was 
a critical aspect of the WTO 's regular work and  an essential fixture w ith regard to the way forward 
for the WTO. Notwithstanding strides that had  been made in the area of ICT, the Group continued 
to see a significant digital divide within and among  countr ies; that issue had to  be addressed with 
urgency . That also highlighted the role that the WTO could play  in that regard through the 1998 e -
commerce Work P rogramme and particularly through structured discussions . The ACP Group w ould 
play its part in en suring that the Work Programme , including in the Council for Trade in Services , 
continue d to remain relevant and address ed the issue of social and economic interest to ACP 
countries.  
3.55.  The representative  of Australia  thanked Korea, China, Chinese Taipei, Singapore and Saudi 
Arabia for the very helpful information -sharing they had provided on their e -commerce policies and 
practices, and recent developments  in that regard .  
3.56.  In terms of discussions that day , she echoed t he comments made by other Members that 
Australia remained committed to advancing the Work Program me, including to further discuss  the 
impact s of the digital economy  for developing and least-developed countries, but that work  needed 
to move in tandem with w ork on the Moratorium. In her delegation's view, b oth outcomes needed 
to be deliverables at MC12.   
3.57.  The representative had noted comments from South Africa on issues faced by women from 
developing countries in participating in the digital economy. E-commer ce was a tool with significant 
potential for empowering women economic ally, provid ing flexibility in structuring participation in 
trade, new markets for employment and creating pathways to control online resources that may be 
cheaper than  through  traditional business  models . The potential of e -commerce as a tool for 
women 's economic empowerment was an important conversation, and she thanked South Africa for 
raising the issue and looked forward to continuing th at discussion in future.  
3.58.  The represent ative also  thanked Switzerland for the update it had provided on the draft 
Decision  on the Moratorium and the Work Programme . Australia  fully supported th e draft D ecision 
and urged other Members to support it  and extend the two -decade -old Moratorium as a c ritical 
outcome of MC12.  
3.59.  The representative of Japan  said that t he Moratorium ha d provided certainty and predictability 
in digital trade for both consumers and businesses, including MSMEs. It ha d also secured better 
access to digital products. Under the COVID-19 pandemic, the Moratorium had been  essential to 
ensure safe economic activities.  
3.60.  Japan strongly believed that Members  should maintain their current multilateral practice of 
the Moratorium at MC12 . His delegation echoe d statements by Switzerland and fully support ed the  
draft Decision to extend the Moratorium and the Work Program me, calling upon Members to  co-
sponsor it .  
3.61.  The representative of Colombia  thanked M embers for their contribution and support ed the 
continuation of  that discussion under the Work Programme.  He reiterated Colombia's support for the 
continuation of the Work Programme as well as the extension of the Moratorium  at MC12 . He thank ed 
the delegation of Switzerland for its statement and  expressed his delegation' s readiness  to continue 
that dialogue.  
3.62.  The representative of United Kingdom  also thanked the Members who ha d provided useful 
and interesting updates th at morning.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  3.63.  The COVID -19 pandemic had increased the shift of economic activity from physical to virtual 
spaces, accelerat ing existing trends towards digitalisation. The rise in e -commerce, and its growing 
significance for business and consumers, underlined the importance of discussing e -commerce issues 
at the WTO.  
3.64.  The Work Programme provided Members  with an important forum for that discussion and 
offered the opportunity to better understand the views of other Members, as the Council had already 
seen that morning. The United Kingdom wished to see solutions to e -commerce issues that were 
supported by a ll Members, which was why  it was important that th ose discussions should continue 
in a constructive and open manner.  
3.65.  His delegation was a  strong  support er of the Moratorium and making it permanent. In his 
delegations ' view, imposing customs duties on elect ronic transmissions would harm digital trade, 
economic recovery from COVID -19, and business and consumer welfare.  
3.66.  The representative of  Norway  also thanked Members who had shared updates at that meeting. 
Her delegation aligned itself with  the statement mad e by Switzerland and strongly support ed the 
continuation of the Work Programme and the Moratorium, as well as the draft Ministerial Decision.  
3.67.  The representative of Chinese Taipei  supported the r einvigora tion of the Work Programme 
and at least extending the Moratorium . He thank ed Switzerland for raising the draft Decision a t that 
meeting , noted that his delegation had  already co-sponsored it and urge d other Members to consider 
joining it . 
3.68.  The representative of Hong Kong, China  thanked  Members who ha d shared their experiences 
in the latest developments in e-commerce  in their home countr ies and their work to help other 
developing countries to narrow the digital divide.   
3.69.  His delegation expressed its support for continu ing the discussions in th at Council under the 
auspices of the Work Programme  and also associated itself with the statement made by Switzerland 
regarding the draft Ministerial Decision to continue with the Work Programme and to extend the 
Moratorium at MC12.   
3.70.  His delegation  believed  that allowing the Moratorium to lapse after MC12 would not help clarify 
the relevant issues, nor would it narrow the gaps among Members. It would therefore be more 
pragmatic and reasonable to extend the Moratorium to at least MC13,  to maintain a stable and 
enabling environment for e -commerce.   
3.71.  After apologizing for joining the meeting late due to another  meeting, the representative  of 
Sri Lanka  wished to express  her delegation's position  on the Work Programme  in general , and 
partic ularly for its rele vance  in relation to the activities of the Council  for Trade in Services .  
3.72.  Her delegation attach ed the great est importance  to the continuation of the Work Programme . 
There was still a lot of work that c ould be done under the Work Programme to understand and 
contextualize how the WTO could  respond to the developmental needs of countries in the digital 
economy , particularly fr om the services Council's  point of view , where there were still a lot of issues 
that needed to be discussed and understood, p articularly  when Members were confronted  with a 
decision to extend the existing Moratorium.  
3.73.  With that in mind , the way  forward presented by  several  delegations , laying  down a certain 
formulation for the Ministerial Decision , particularly o n the reinvigoration of the Work Programme 
with specific time issues to be covered in a timely fashion , receive d Sri Lanka 's fullest support. The 
Work Programme could continue to serve as an  important basis to discuss mandated issues among 
all Members , in particular the classification of services, the scope of electronic transmission s, the 
deep technological divide affecting developing countries and LDCs and the inequitable gains  arising 
from the highly concentrated e -commerce sector.  
3.74.  Once such clarifications had been achieved within the various  committees , including in the 
Council  for Trade in Services , this would pro vide some guidance on where her delegation stood  vis-
à-vis the extension of the M oratorium.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  3.75.  The Chairman  said that the discussion had been interesting, with generous participation by 
delegations on that important item, with informative, very constructive and some provocative 
interventions. He suggested that the Council take note of the statements made and sai d that the 
Council would revert to this item at its next meeting.  
3.76.  It was s o agreed . 
4  ITEM D: DATE OF THE NEXT REVIEW OF MFN EXEMPTIONS  
4.1.  The Chairman  recalled that the fourth review of the MFN exemptions had been held from 2016 
to 2017. At the end of those d iscussions, Members could not agree on when to hold "any further 
review". Rather, at its meeting held on 16 June 2017, the Council had agreed, and he quoted from 
the minutes in document S/C/M/132, that it would "reconvene to decide on the date of the next 
review at its first meeting of 2022".  
4.2.  Before opening the floor, he recalled what the GATS Annex on Article II Exemptions instructed 
the Council to do.  The Annex stipulated that the Council "shall review all exemptions granted for a 
period of more than five years" and, "in a review shall: (a) examine whether the conditions which 
created the need for the exemption still prevail; and (b) determine the date of any further review". 
The Council had held a first review in 2000, as provided for in the Annex, and su bsequent ones in 
2004, 2010 and 2016.  
4.3.  The Chairman then invited Members to express their views about what the Council should 
decide with regard to the date of the next review.  
4.4.  The representative of Hong Kong, China  appreciate d the opportunity to resume dis cussion s on 
the MFN exemption review , subsequent to the fourth review completed in 2017. As the Chairman 
had just recapped , Members had agreed to decide on the date of the first review at the first  Council  
meeting of 2022.  
4.5.  Hong Kong, China believed that t he MFN principle was the cornerstone of the multilateral 
trading system. Specifically, paragraphs 3 and 6 of the GATS Annex  on Article II (MFN) Exemptions  
mandate d that "The Council for Trade in Services  shall review all exemptions  granted for a period of 
more than five years "; and  "In principle , such exemptions should not exceed a period of ten years ". 
Those two elements illustrate d a clear goal that all MFN exemptions were transitional and should be 
abolished in the interest of trade liberali sation.  
4.6.  The review  exercise  provide d the Council with the opportunity to review Members ' exemptions 
on a regular basis  and, in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Annex on Article  II Exe mptions,  to 
examine whether the conditions which had created the need for the exemption still prevail ed. 
4.7.  Hong Kong, China  noted that many of the exemptions had been kept in place for decades. A 
number of "new" exemptions , from eleven  Members that had acced ed to the WTO after 2011, which 
represent ed over 10% of all the existing exemption s at the time of the last review, had also reached 
the five-year timeline for review . 
4.8.  Hong Kong, China,  therefore , believe d that it was an opportune time to commence the fift h 
review in 2022, having regard to the Council 's past practice of conducting a review every five years. 
Taking into account other competing priorities, including the preparations for the 12th Ministerial 
Conference in June, his delegation  was flexible on t he timing. For the procedural arrangements, he 
propose d to revisit the issue later , when the review had been  launched formally. Hong Kong, China 
looked forward to other Members ' views or preference s and indicated his delegation's readiness to  
go along with the consensus . 
4.9.  The representative of the Republic of Korea  echoed Hong Kong, China's position and expressed 
his delegation's continued support for a periodic review of MFN exemptions. The MFN principle was 
the cornerstone of the multilateral  trading system  and MFN exemptions should be exceptional and 
transitional. A regular review would  help Members to understand other Members ' positions and also 
check the status  of their own exemptions .  S/C/M/148  
 
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  4.10.  On that basis , the Republic of Korea  support ed a periodic and regular review process but was  
flexible about the timing of the next review. The degree of the Secretariat's  preparation for the next 
review, the planned MC12  and other elements could  be considered in that process.  
4.11.  The representative of Japan  said that the MFN treatment was a fundamental principle  of the 
WTO system, and his delegation  placed high importance on the review of MFN exemption s. Five 
years had passed since the last review  and Japan believed that it was valuable to conduct a review, 
taking  into account the changes since then.  It would  contribute to improving the transparency and 
soundness of the global services trade.  
4.12.  Japan  expect ed to have the next review in the not -too-distan t future but had flexibility with 
regard to its  timing, conside ring the current situations and the upcoming MC12, and looked forward 
to hearing other Members' views.  
4.13.  The representative of Australia  said that her delegation continued to see value in Members 
conducting a review of their MFN exemptions. The MFN treatment was an important principle of the 
WTO, and MFN exemptions were only intended to be temporary. Australia believed that a review 
would be a valuable transparency exercise for Members, similar to the useful transparency work that 
had been done in other subsidiary bodies of the Council.  
4.14.  As other Members had mentioned, Australia could be flexible on timing. In light of current 
priorities, including preparations for MC12, it could be appropriate to start that exercise later on in 
2022, but Australia was open to discussing a specific timing,  taking into account the views of other 
Members. In terms of process, the Question & Answer approach used in the past was a useful way 
of exchanging information on the need for MFN exemptions, but Australia was open to exploring 
other models if Members had  better ideas.  
4.15.  The Chairman  indicated that, from what he had heard, there seemed to be convergence 
amongst delegations on having the review begin at the end of 2022. He therefore suggested that 
the Council start its next review of MFN exemptions at the las t Council meeting of the of 2022.  
4.16.  It was so agreed . 
5  ITEM E: UPDATE OF THE SECRETARIAT BACKGROUND NOTE ON MODE 4 – REQUESTED 
BY INDIA  
5.1.  The Chairman  indicated that that item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of India . 
5.2.  As had been emphasi sed by her delegation on several previous occasions, the representative 
of India reiterated its request for an update of the Secretariat Background Notes on all four modes 
of supply and also supported  Secretariat work on inter -modal li nkages. Specifically  for mode 4, India 
had identified some of the possible areas for updates in the 2009 Note, which it had presented in 
recent Council meetings.  
5.3.  She reiterated that, while India welcomed the proposal by the United States on the issue of 
inter-modal linkages, that should not substitute the request to update the separate modal 
Background Notes . India was of the view that having an inter -model linkage Note made no sense 
without first updating the modal Notes.  
5.4.  India urged those delegations who  did not see value -added in updating the mode 4 Note that 
they should not stand in the way of analytical work that other delegations found useful for promoting 
knowledge -building. That exercise should be seen as a technical support initiative. India would be 
happy to engage with other interested Members on their views and suggestions on its proposal to 
update the mode 4 Note.  
5.5.  The representative  of Bangladesh  thank ed India for that proposal. His delegation support ed 
the proposal for update d Notes  by the Secr etariat to better understand the current situation and 
commitments by Members. Bangladesh  also support ed the suggestion from the delegation of the 
United States on the preparation of a separate Note by the Secretariat on the interlinkages among 
the modes of supply.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  5.6.  The representative of the United States  said that his delegation's position on that matter had 
not changed. The United States continued to see  little to no value in updating the Secretariat 
document on mode 4 . The issue was well documented , and the United States had asked delegations 
to take a more pragmatic look at services trade, and support a more productive use of Secretariat 
resources , such as examining the interlinkages between modes of supply, or cross -linkages between 
them. Neverthe less, his delegation would be willing to consult intersessionally with India to see if 
they could resolve that impasse and move forward, and to land on something acceptable.  
5.7.  The representative of India thanked the United States  and appreciated its offer t o consult and 
discuss that issue intersessionally in order to find a solution to that impasse.  
5.8.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
5.9.  It was so agreed . 
6  ITEM F: CYBERSECURITY MEASURES OF CHINA AND VIET NAM – REQUESTED BY J APAN 
AND THE UNITED STATES  
6.1.   The Chairman  indicated that the item ha d been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegations of Japan and the United States.  
6.2.  The representative of Japan  said that China's cybersecurity -related laws and regulations, such 
as the Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law, which had come into effect 
in 2021, had been developed without addressing the concerns expressed by Members, including  
Japan.  
6.3.  How those laws and regulations related to other laws and regulations was also unclear in many 
respects. Those could be inconsistent with the GATS and China's specific commitments under the 
Agreement, including its National Treatment obligation und er GATS Article XVII if measures imposed 
excessive burdens on foreign operators. At that meeting, Japan wished to express the following 
concerns and requested a clear response and improvements  from China.  
6.4.  The Japanese Government had submitted public comments on the Measures for the Safe 
Management of Data in the Field of Industrial Informatization in October 2021 and that February. 
Article 21 of the Measures required "critical data" and "core data" to be st ored in China when required 
by the Law or administrative regulations, but there was a concern that foreign businesses might be 
effectively placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to domestic businesses. Japan requested 
the removal of mandatory domest ic storage obligations, regardless of whether they were mandated 
by the Law or administrative regulations.  
6.5.  In addition, while Article 21 required a security assessment for cross -border data transfers, it 
did not specify objective and specific criteria to allow cross -border transfers. Japan requested that 
the criteria for a security assessment be made fair and clear and that operational transparency be 
ensured so that foreign operators were not subject to disadvantageous treatment.  
6.6.  The Japanese Government h ad submitted public comments on the Measures for the Security 
Assessment of Cross -Border Data Transfer last November. Article 4 of the Measures stipulated that 
cross-border data transfers of "critical data" or "personal information" were subject to a secur ity 
assessment, but the definition of "critical data" was unclear. Neither was it clear to what extent the 
collection and retention of "critical data" or "personal information" were subject to a security 
assessment.  
6.7.  Article 8 stipulated the criteria for a  security assessment, but the criteria were extremely vague, 
including the one on whether or not cross -border data transfers were allowed. Further, the draft 
Guidelines for Identification of Critical Data had been released recently for public comments, but  the 
identification factors for critical data were extremely broad and abstract.  
6.8.  The Japanese Government had submitted comments on the Network Security Ordinance in 
December 2021. Article 35 of that Law, which regulated cross -border transfers of all types of data, 
was overly broad in scope. There were no specific provisions on the requirements that data 
processors had to meet for cross -border data transfers. Furthermore, the Law required data S/C/M/148  
 
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  processors to apply for a network security review (Article 13) an d conduct a data security assessment 
(Article 32), but the scope and review criteria were unclear.  
6.9.  In addition, Article 39 stipulated the obligation to suspend cross -border data transfers, when 
certified by the National Internet Information Agency, as wel l as the obligation to take effective 
remedial measures for the safety of data already transferred out of China. However, there was a 
risk of arbitrary certification. Japan requested that transparency in operation be ensured so as not 
to impose excessive b urdens on foreign operators, such as requiring them to revert data that had 
already been transferred out of the country as a remedy, and that it be consistent with the WTO 
Agreement.  
6.10.  With regard to Viet Nam's cybersecurity measures, Japan had expressed its  concerns about 
the draft Decree on the Protection of Personal Information in the previous CTS meetings. Japan 
continued to request that measures that restricted data distribution be implemented only to the 
extent necessary to achieve legitimate objectives  in a manner that was not overly trade -restrictive 
and consistent with the GATS.  
6.11.   The representative of the United States  recalled that his delegation had raised concerns in 
the Council that various Chinese measures, initially in connection with China's Cy bersecurity Law 
but more recently also in connection with China's Data Security Law and Personal Information 
Protection Law, restricted cross -border data flows and require d localisation of data.  
6.12.  China's Data Security Law had entered into force on 1 Septemb er 2021. China's Personal 
Information Protection Law had entered into force on 1 November 2021. China had now begun 
issuing draft implementing measures relating to the Data Security Law and the Personal Information 
Protection Law , and also with some connec tion to the Cybersecurity Law , in regard to the regulation 
of cross -border data  flows.  
6.13.  On 29 October 2021, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) had published the draft 
"Security Assessment Measures for Cross -Border Transfer of Data" for public comm ents. The October 
draft Measures would require a Chinese Government security assessment as a condition for 
transferring across borders "important data" and "personal information that is subject to a security 
assessment under China's laws".  
6.14.  On 14 November 2 021, the CAC had also published the draft "Administrative Regulations for 
Network Data Security" for public comments. The November draft Regulations would "apply to data 
processing activities conducted by using a network and subject to the supervision of n etwork data 
security" within China and required regional -level Government officials in China to develop 
catalogues of "important data" and "core data" in their own regions and submit that information to 
the CAC.  
6.15.  Data processors would need to submit a gove rnment security assessment before transferring 
any "important data" overseas, and the transfer of "core data" seemed to be prohibited. Any data 
processor who sought  to transfer personal information overseas would need to meet one of four 
conditions, one of  which included undergoing a government security assessment of the data.  
6.16.  The United States had serious concerns regarding those two draft implementing measures 
that flowed  from concerns it recently had expressed regarding China's Data Security Law and 
Personal Information Protection Law, and it had previously expressed regarding China 's 
Cybersecurity Law.  
6.17.  Firstly, the United States did not believe that China should seek to require any Chinese 
Government security assessment for transfers of "important data" , however that term would be 
understood and defined. The United States continued to have serious concerns that China's focus on 
"important data" would result in new restrictions and burdens on a broad range of companies, 
including with regard to the proces sing of commercial data that those companies sought to use in 
the ordinary course of business.  
6.18.  The United States had similar concerns regarding China's additional focus on "core data" in 
the November 2021 draft Regulations.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  6.19.  Secondly, regarding the transfe r of personal information, the United States recognised that 
governments had a legitimate interest in ensuring the protection of that information. However, 
comparable privacy laws implemented in other jurisdictions generally included various mechanisms 
for transferring that type of data across borders in a safe and secure manner. China's objective to 
impose additional requirements on transfers of personal information simply because they were cross -
border unfairly disadvantaged foreign suppliers and did not enhance protections for personal 
information.  
6.20.  Similar to the Personal Information Protection Law, the October 2021 draft Measures set forth 
four circumstances in which personal information processors were permitted to transfer personal 
information overseas . As the United States had raised before, some of those circumstances (i.e., the 
use of contracts and the use  of certifications by professional organizations as the basis for cross -
border transfers), if appropriately elaborated, might provide a step forwar d. 
6.21.  Along those lines, it would be helpful for China to clearly allow for the use of cross -border 
data transfer mechanisms such as the APEC Cross -Border Privacy Rules. However, at the same time, 
one of the four circumstances was an outright requirement for companies wishing to transfer 
personal information to undergo a security assessment. That of course was very concerning because 
it was not clear whether and how it might override the other circumstances.  
6.22.  Furthermore, the United States was very concerned t hat the draft November 2021 Regulations 
would require data processors who "process the personal information of one million or more people", 
which was a very low threshold, to also comply with the provisions that pertained  to processors of 
"important data".  
6.23.  In conclusion, the United States would welcome any further information China could provide 
regarding how it planned to adjust its draft implementing measures to take into account those 
concerns. It would also welcome any information China could share rega rding whether it was 
planning to issue additional implementing measures relating to the Data Security Law and the 
Personal Information Protection Law.  
6.24.  Regarding Viet Nam's cybersecurity measures, the United States continued to raise concerns 
about Viet Nam 's data localisation and local presence requirements in its Cybersecurity Law and its 
draft implementing Decree, particularly as they related to many foundational services of the digital 
economy, which were frequently provided on a cross -border basis.  
6.25.  Since the previous meeting, there had been no updates on the status of the draft Decree. The 
United States would welcome any updates from Viet Nam on the status of those measures.  
6.26.  The representative of Australia  said that the pandemic had underscored the importance of 
digital trade and technologies in supporting and enhancing business operations across every sector. 
However, the benefits of digital trade could not be fully realised or shared by businesses without  the 
cross-border flow of data.  
6.27.  The free flow of data was essential for global trade. It underpinned almost every international 
transaction and was vital to ensuring that businesses could make the most of the digital economy. 
Because of that, it was impor tant that permissive rules apply to cross -border data flows but those 
had to strike the right balance with other legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of 
privacy, data, and consumers.  
6.28.  Australia continued to have concerns regarding China's Cy bersecurity Law and reiterated the 
previous statement it had made at the meeting of the Council for Trade in Services of October 2021.  
6.29.  Australia had been pleased to make submissions to the Chinese Government as part of public 
consultations on its cybersec urity framework, including the Personal Information Protection Law and 
the Data Security Law, passed in 2021. As set out in its submissions, Australia welcomed a number 
of revisions to both those draft Laws. Nonetheless, Australia still had concerns with the final 
legislation, particularly around extra -territoriality, trade retaliation measures, compliance costs for 
firms and the overall scope.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  6.30.  Australia remained concerned that provisions in those Laws had the potential to create 
inconsistenc ies with WTO rules. The representative noted that any measure or countermeasure 
taken under those Laws should only be applied consistently with China's WTO obligations.  
6.31.  Australia also continued to remain concerned about the lack of clarity when it came to  
definitions, jurisdiction and a number of other fundamental elements, to enable businesses operating 
in China to fully understand and implement their new obligations.  
6.32.  Australia continued to urge China to take into account the concerns of businesses and 
Members in the implementation of those measures and development of future measures. Australia 
looked forward to continuing to work closely with China on those matters.  
6.33.  In relation to Viet Nam, Australia was encouraged by Viet Nam's interest in developing 
regulation s to protect personal information and to support the development of the digital economy 
more broadly. However, the representative  reemphasised the concerns that her delegation had 
previously raised in the Council about elements of the draft Decree on Personal Data Protection  and 
would welcome an update on those developments . Australia  looked forward to continuing to work 
with Viet Nam on that Law and related measures and ensuring that any new rules were business -
friendly and consistent with the shar ed commitments on digital trade.  
6.34.  The representative of the European Union  said that her delegation continued to  raise its 
concerns about the cybersecurity measures in China and their implementation.  
6.35.  China's Cybersecurity Law included, amongst others, a se ries of compliance requirements for 
network operators and imposed special obligations. Those concerned critical information 
infrastructure protection, as well as data localisation and a cross -border data transfer security 
assessment, a classified cybersecu rity protection scheme, and a comprehensive certification and 
testing scheme for critical network equipment and specialised network security products.  
6.36.  Data localisation requirements were imposed not only for personal data but also for a wide 
range of "impo rtant data", including data generated by any critical information infrastructure 
operator. That category of "critical information operators" was defined too broadly and included large 
parts of the economy , such as telecommunication and information services , banking, energy, and 
transport, but also "any other important facility or system", which was yet another very broad 
category.  
6.37.  Although new regulations on critical infrastructure security protection had come into force in 
September 2021, providing additio nal details on how critical infrastructure operators would be 
designated, they did not resolve the overlap with pre -existing rules.  
6.38.  Data localisation requirements prevented companies from transferring outside China much of 
the data collected or generated d uring their operations in China. They seemed to act as a strong 
deterrent to data transfers, as shown by a string of decisions by foreign investors to over -comply 
and localise all data in China. Moreover, the Cybersecurity Law was accompanied by a large nu mber 
of supporting laws, regulations and standards, most of which applied across all sectors.  
6.39.  For example, the Laws on cryptography, data security, personal information protection and 
the provisions on critical information infrastructure had entered into f orce but left considerable room 
for regulatory discretion and tasked a range of administrations with further rulemaking. That created 
a labyrinth of unclear and, from a WTO compliance perspective, questionable requirements that 
foreign companies were asked  to fulfil.  
6.40.  The representative asked China to address the concerns that her delegation and other 
Members had raised and to explain how those laws tallied with its WTO commitments, for example 
on data processing services.  
6.41.  As regarded the Vietnamese cybersec urity measures, the Law had entered into force in 2019 
but there was still no clarity on many important aspects due to the lack of its implementing Decree. 
The European Union reiterated its request for transparency and invited Viet Nam to inform Members 
of the state of play and the planned date for adoption, as well as to share the draft Decree for 
consultation before its adoption.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  6.42.  The European Union stressed again its concerns regarding what seemed to be data localisation 
and local presence requirements i mposed by the Law and the draft implementing Decree and 
questioned their compatibility with Viet Nam's GATS commitments.  
6.43.  The representative of China  thanked Japan, the United States, Australia and the European 
Union for their continued attention to China's  cybersecurity -related legislation. China  had already 
responded to Members' remarks and questions at several previous meetings. In addition, some 
Members had also raised similar questions during China's eighth Trade Policy Review, to which his 
delegation h ad submitted written responses.  
6.44.  He said that the Internet was becoming a new living and working space and a vital economic 
engine in a deeply integrated world, but it was  raising  a series of new challenges at the same time. 
The improvement of the regulator y system in that field was a crucial issue for all Members , including 
China.  
6.45.  The relevant laws in China were based on national conditions and had taken into account  
various international practices. The legal authorities had widely solicited public opinions and advice 
in the process. Relevant laws and regulations were aimed at guarantee ing cybersecurity, data 
security and protection of personal information, as well as  addressing the development needs of the 
digital economy.  
6.46.  The representative noted that the legislation was not intended to hinder cross -border data 
flows, nor to restrict international trade , but to support and encourage the improvement of data 
flows.  
6.47.  China had always abided by international rules and earnestly fulfilled its WTO commitments. 
However, China noticed that some Members had adopted restrictive measures to limit normal trade 
with t he excuse of cybersecurity or national security , but that was not the case for China. There was 
a Chinese saying that one s hould not make subjective guesses about others ' intentions. Finally, 
China reiterate d its willingness to work closely with other Members to facilitate the global digital 
economy.  
6.48.  The representative of Viet Nam  thanked the United States and the European Union for their 
continued interest in Viet Nam's Cybersecurity Law and the legislative drafting process for the Decree 
to implement that  Law. As his delegation had explained in previous meetings of the Council, Viet 
Nam's process for the Decree had been transparent, and all stakeholders' comments had been 
reviewed by the Drafting Committee and submitted to the Government for consideration.  The 
consideration continued.  
6.49.  Nevertheless, detailed explanations of certain provisions in the draft Decree had been 
provided in writing to all interested Members on the occasion of Viet Nam's second Trade Policy 
Review in April last year.  
6.50.  Concerning the d raft Decree on Personal Data Protection mentioned by Japan and Australia, 
Viet Nam shared the same objective that many other Members also pursued of protecting personal 
data in the current context of digital transformation. Viet Nam's legislative process w as open and 
transparent.  
6.51.  At that time, the Drafting Committee and the Ministry of Public Security were still carefully 
reviewing all comments from both domestic and foreign stakeholders and would update the draft as 
deemed appropriate.  
6.52.  The Chairman  sugges ted that the Council take note of the statements made.  
6.53.  It was so agreed . 
7  ITEM G: 5G-RELATED MEASURES OF AUSTRALIA – REQUESTED BY CHINA  
7.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of Chin a. S/C/M/148  
 
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  7.2.  The representative of China  recalled that his delegation had raised strong concerns regarding 
Australia's 5G -related measures at  several previous CTS meetings, but the related issues had yet to 
be effectively addressed. At that meeting, in the interest of time, his delegation would not repeat its 
specific questions and concerns.  
7.3.  China again urged Australia to rectify the discriminatory practices as soon as possible and 
provide further clarifications on the relevant restrictive measures, which were incon sistent with the 
provisions of Articles II, VI, XVI and XVII of the GATS, as well as the provisions of paragraph 5 of 
the GATS Annex on Telecommunications, and paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Reference Paper on Basic 
Telecommunications. China hoped that Australi a would live up to its WTO obligations and create a 
fair, just and predictable business environment for all enterprises , including Chinese ones.   
7.4.  The representative of Australia  noted China's statement. China had first raised that issue 
elsewhere in the WTO in late 2018. Since that time, Australia had engaged constructively and in 
good faith with China to explain the rationale for those measures . Australia reiterated that its pos ition 
on 5G networks was country -agnostic, transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory and fully WTO 
consistent.  
7.5.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
7.6.  It was so  agreed . 
8  ITEM H: MEASURES OF THE UNITED STATES RESTRICTING T RADE IN SERVICES – 
REQUESTED BY CHINA  
8.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of China.  
8.2.  The representative of China  said that his delegation had noted the revoking of relevant 
Executive Orders by the previous US administration on TikTok, WeChat and other Chinese 
applications, which was a positive step in the right direction. However, China had also noted that 
the US Go vernment still required a security risk review on Chinese apps and services and that the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) investigation on TikTok was still 
ongoing.  
8.3.  The representative recalled that his delegation had expressed its concerns about the US trade -
restrictive measures at previous Council meetings. However, unfortunately, the US Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) had recently decided to revoke both China Telecom's and China 
Unicom's domestic and international auth ority in the United States pursuant to Section 214 of its 
Communications Act, citing national security concerns.  
8.4.  Through the above -mentioned measures, the United States had time and again  abused the 
concept of national security, misused national power and suppressed particular Chinese companies 
without any factual basis. Those measures had an obviously restrictive impact on trade in services 
and were not consistent with the WTO principle of trade liberalisation.  
8.5.  Meanwhile, those measures had adversely affe cted the business operations and investment 
activities of Chinese enterprises in the United States. They had also undermined the legitimate rights 
and interests of Chinese enterprises as well as consumers, including the US users. Those measures 
had disrupt ed the normal market order and violated international trade rules.  
8.6.  China hoped that the United States would comply with the WTO rules and fulfil its GATS 
commitments, stop its unreasonable suppression of Chinese enterprises, treat Chinese enterprises 
in a fair and just manner, and avoid politicizing economic and trade issues. China urged the United 
States to create a fair and competitive business environment for services suppliers from all WTO 
Members, including Chinese ones.  
8.7.  The representative of the United States  stressed that the United States had one of the most 
open services markets in the world. His delegation would review China's comments. He recalled that 
the United States had stated  in previous  meetings of the Council  that the actions cited by Chin a had 
been taken by the United States to protect the US  national security.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  8.8.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
8.9.  It was so agreed . 
9  ITEM I: MEASURES OF INDIA RESTRICTING TRADE IN SERVICES – REQUESTED BY 
CHINA  
9.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at the 
request of the delegation of China.  
9.2.  The representative of China  said that, since  June 2020, India had banned many applications  
with a Chinese background in the name of nati onal security. He recalled that his delegation  had 
expressed strong concerns about  that issue at previous CTS meetings. However,  unfortunately, India 
had added more apps to the ban list, instead of correcting its measures. So far, more than 200 
Chinese apps had been banned.  
9.3.  Those  measures had a seriously adverse impact on Chinese enterprises ' business activities in 
India. They had undermined the legitimate interests of Chinese enterprises and violated the basic 
principles of the WTO as well as India 's GATS  commitments. China expressed its serious concerns 
again and urged India to stop its discriminatory measures against Chinese enterprises, and create 
an open, fair and non -discriminatory business environment for services suppliers from all WTO 
Members, incl uding Chinese ones.  
9.4.  The representative of India said that, as underscored at previous Council  meetings, India was 
committed to upholding its obligations at the WTO. India valued, and was committed to protecting, 
the democratic rights of its citizens, inclu ding access to goods and services , while reserving the right 
to take measures to ensure the protection of privacy, data security and national security. India firmly 
believed that the measures raised under that agenda item were fully consistent with its GAT S 
commitments.  
9.5.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
9.6.  It was so agreed . 
10  ITEM J: KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA MINISTER OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT DECISION 112203 REGARDING LOCALIZATION OF CUSTOMER SERVICES – 
REQUESTED BY THE UNITED STATES  
10.1.  The Chairman  indicated that the item had been added to the agenda of the Council at t he 
request of the delegation of the United States.  
10.2.  The representative of t he United States  recalled that his delegation had raised that matter  in 
previous  meetings of the Council. He informed the Council that his delegation had been working 
intersessionally with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  and appreciated all the information that the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  had share d.  
10.3.  The United States was still gaining an understanding of how the  measure was operating in 
practice, and whether a need for further clarification exist ed, including whether a public clarification 
was needed.  However, the United States was and appreciated working very closely with the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia to resolve t hat issue.   
10.4.  The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  thanked the United States for its 
statement. She reiterated her delegation's statements on 1 July and 22 October 2021 in the CTS 
meetings which should clarify all concerns regarding the Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Development Decision No. 112203 for the "Tawtin" of "Tele -Working" in Customer Services within 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  
10.5.  In the previous CTS meeting, it was clarified that the term "Tawtin" in Arabic was defined in  
the Decision as a synonym for "Saudization of workforce" and thus, it had nothing to do with 
localisation.  S/C/M/148  
 
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  10.6.  In addition, various bilateral meetings were held between both capital -based officials and 
WTO delegations from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States. During those meetings, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had confirmed to the US colleagues that both the Decision and its 
Procedural Guide contained enough clarifications that provided the necessary assurances to the US 
stakeholders.  
10.7.  Moreover, si nce the entry into force of the Decision, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had not 
received any official complaints regarding its implementation from any private sector company 
operating in the Kingdom. Therefore, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia kindly requested th e United States 
to reconsider its position on that issue and withdraw its concern.  
10.8.  The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
10.9.  It was so agreed . 
11  ITEM K: OTHER BUSINESS  
11.1.  The Chairman  provided a quick account of the status of his  consultations on the appointment 
of Chairpersons to the subsidiary bodies of the Council for 2022.  
11.2.  In accordance with the Guidelines for the Appointment of Officers to the WTO Bodies in 
document WT/L/510, and following the consultations held by the Chair man of the General Council 
on the overall process of appointment of officers to WTO bodies, he had begun the consultation 
process earlier than usual that year, on 26 January.  
11.3.  He had started off by inviting Group Coordinators, and any delegation wishing to make 
proposals on that matter, to meet with him on 2 February. The objective of his consultations was to 
arrive at a proposed slate of names of Chairpersons that enjoyed the wide support of the Membership 
and on the basis of which elections would take plac e in each of the CTS subsidiary bodies.  
11.4.  In order to ensure the balance of the slate, as mentioned in the Guidelines, he had coordinated 
closely with the Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods, and they had also been holding joint 
consultations. At tha t point, he was not yet in a position to suggest a definitive slate of names, but 
he would continue to make sufficient time available and trust that he could rely on Members' 
cooperation and constructive engagement to bring that process to a swift and succ essful conclusion.  
11.5.   The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statement he had made.  
11.6.  It was so agreed . 
12  ITEM L: ELECTION OF THE NEW CHAIRPERSON  
12.1.  The Chairman  said that, based on the consensus reached in the General Council, he was very 
pleased to pass on the Chairmanship of the Council for Trade in Services to Ambassador Long of 
Cambodia. He was confident that, with his vast experience, knowledge and wisdom, Ambassador 
Long would guide the future work of the Council capably and efficiently.  
12.2.  As the outgoing chairperson of the Council during the past year, he had enjoyed working with 
all delegations and had truly appreciated their cooperative and constructive spirit in fulfilling the 
mandate of the Council. He also expressed his appreciation an d gratitude to the Secretariat for being 
remarkably efficient and professional. He also thanked the interpreters for their important work. He 
then proposed that the Council elect Ambassador Long by acclamation.  
12.3.  It was so agreed . 
12.4.  The new Chairman , Ambassador Long, thanked Ambassador Villalobos for his kind words and 
hard work during the previous year. He commended him for his efforts, vision and guidance in 
serving the Council.  
12.5.  He thanked all delegations for their trust and support and assured Me mbers that he would do 
his best to chair the Council for Trade in Services in the most efficient way possible with his utmost S/C/M/148  
 
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  dedication and commitment. He was confident that with delegations' cooperation, and the 
Secretariat's assistance, the work would m ove forward smoothly and fruitfully.  
12.6.  The representative of Chad, on behalf of the LDC Group , thanked the outgoing Chairman, 
Ambassador Villalobos for the great contribution, efficiency, and wisdom with which he had led the 
work of the Council. The delibera tions had been very rich, and it had been possible to better 
understand the challenges of LDCs to increase and strengthen their participation in world services 
trade. The representative wished Ambassador Villalobos full success in his upcoming activities.  
12.7.   The LDC Group congratulated and welcomed Ambassador Long as  the new  Chairman of the 
Council and wished him a successful chairmanship. The LDC Group was convinced that Ambassador 
Long would demonstrate strong leadership for the Council, especially in those  difficult times of 
turbulence. He emphasised the support of the LDC Group to the work of the Council and wished the 
new Chairman full success in his new endeavour.  
12.8.  The representative of India thanked the outgoing Chair man, Ambassador Villalobos,  for his 
rich contribution to the Council and wished him success in all future endeavours. She also 
congratulated the new Chairman, Ambassador Long, for his appointment and wished him the best 
for his responsibilities as the Chairman of the Council.  
12.9.  The representat ive of Indonesia  congratulated the new Chairman, Ambassador Long, for his 
appointment as the Chairperson of the Council in 2022. His delegation was convinced that the Council 
was in good hands, given the Chairman's expertise and wisdom, looked forward to w orking closely 
with him, and stood ready to engage constructively in the Council. He also conveyed Indonesia's 
deepest appreciation for the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Villalobos, for his exceptional 
leadership and guidance of the Council in 2021. He wis hed him success in his new role as Chairman 
of the Trade Policy Review Body.  
12.10.   The representative of China  thanked Ambassador Villalobos for his efforts and contributions 
to the Council's work in the past year. He also congratulated Ambassador Long on his n ew position 
and looked forward to working closely with him in the new year.  
12.11.   The Chairman  suggested that the Council take note of the statements made.  
12.12.   The meeting  was adjourned . 
__________