WT/GC/W/778  
 
11 July 2019  
(19-4623) Page: 1/5 
General Council  Original: English  
 
STRENGTHENING THE WT O TO PROMOTE DEVELOP MENT AND INCLUSIVITY  
COMMUNICATION FROM PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA, CUBA, ECUADOR, INDIA, MALAWI, 
SOUTH AFRICA, TUNISI A, UGANDA AND ZIMBAB WE 
The following communication, dated 11 July 2019  is being circulated at the request of the delegations 
of Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Malawi, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe.  
 
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1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO  recognizes that international 
trade is not an end in itself, but a means towards 'raising standards of living and ensuring full 
employment '. More importantly, it recogni zes that 'there is a need for positive efforts designed to 
ensure that developing coun tries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share 
in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development '.  
1.2.  For the fulfilment of these founding objectives of the WTO, all Members, no matter their trade 
share, must have an equal say in decision -making.  The credibility and continued relevance of the 
multilateral trading system is premised on two essential features – mutual benefit from the system, 
as perceived by its Members, and mutual trust.  
1.3.  Howeve r, throughout its history, the World Trade Organi zation (WTO) has experienced a 
number of challenges. Recently, some of these relate to a wider 'crisis of multilateralism ', but others 
can be understood as the result of a confluence of factors rooted in the  legal commitments that WTO 
Members undertook at the establishment of the Organi zation in 1995. Specifically, inequities and 
imbalances in some of the existing multilateral trade rules have provided an inherent advantage 
mainly to the developed Members. Thus, whilst WTO rules such as  those  on border trade measures 
have helped developing countries by providing certainty to trade, more often than not, developing 
Members found themselves constrained from pursuing their development and industriali zation 
objectives due to other rules which have been overly intrusive or imbalanced.  TRIPS rules, for 
instance, have facilitated monopoly rents, and diminished the possibility for technology transfer. The 
TRIMS Agreement has disallowed Members to use local co ntent requirements. The Subsidies 
Agreement constrains the policy space developing countries need to nurture their industries. 
However, it allows advanced economies that have the financial means to provide substantial support 
to their high -tech, knowledge -intensive industries deemed critical to their future prosperity. The 
Agreement  on Agriculture  has allowed developed countries to continue their high subsidies on 
agriculture products, including those exported to developing countries, impacting their small 
farmers ' livelihoods and food security. This has been compounded by the lack of inclusiveness and 
transparency in the process of WTO negotiations.  
1.4.  Developing Members have called for certain reforms in the WTO since 1996 in an effort to 
address asymmetries  and bring balance to the WTO rules, as well as create more policy space for 
themselves to pursue development and to use the same policy tools as developed countries to 
industriali ze. The reform agenda put forth by developing Members was incorporated into the Doha 
Development Agenda in 2001. This included the strengthening of Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions, Implementation Issues, addressing the existing asymmetries in the WTO Agreements, 
particularly in Agriculture with a view to facilitating  the realization of the SDGs on food security and WT/GC/W/778  
 
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  alleviation of rural poverty.  However, increasingly the WTO is moving away from the principles 
entailed in the Marrakesh Agreement and the negotiations mandate contained in the Doha 
Development Agenda which  sought to place the needs and interests of developing countries at the 
heart of the Work Programme.  
1.5.  In recent months, some Members have suggested a broad range of reforms at the WTO 
including a slate of new rules, even though existing mandates from the DD A remain unaddressed. 
'WTO reform ' does not mean accepting either inherited inequities or new proposals that would 
worsen imbalances. Reforms must be premised on the principles of inclusivity and development and 
respond to the underlying causes of the curr ent backlash against trade and the difficulties that 
developing Members continue to face vis-à-vis their industriali zation challenges.   
1.6.  In addition to these challenges, the WTO is now confronting immediate existential crises: The 
resort to unilateral measu res and the impasse in the Appellate Body (AB). Clearly reform is needed 
in these areas.  
1.7.  Through this concept paper, we seek to identify the issues that must be addressed if the WTO 
is to be strengthened in a balanced manner.  A sine qua non  for strengthen ing the system is 
unblocking the vacancies in the Appellate Body. This is an urgent priority since in the absence of a 
functional, effective and independent mechanism for enforcing rules, negotiating new rules in any 
area makes no sense.  
2  PRESERVING CORE P RINCIPLES OF THE MUL TILATERAL TRADING SY STEM  
2.1.  Recent actions by some WTO Members indicate a weakening of commitment to the multilateral 
trading system. Preserving and strengthening the WTO must include:  
2.2.  First, laws and regulations of WTO Members which mandate unilateral action on trade issues 
that are inconsistent with WTO rules would need to be amended. This will ensure that WTO Members 
are not perpetually under threat of unilateral action on trade issues by some Members.  
2.3.  Second , the foll owing rules in the Marrakesh Agreement are fundamental and must be 
respected:  
a. Articles II and III on the multilateral functions of the WTO ; 
b. Article IX on the continuation of the practice of decision -making by consensus ; 
c. Article X – when there are amendment s (additions or changes) to WTO rules, there must 
be consensus, followed by ratification by Members. New rules enter into force only when 
the ratification numbers required have been attained.  
2.4.  Third, multilateral avenues, based on consensus, remain the most  effective means to achieve 
inclusive development -oriented outcomes. In the post -MC 11 phase, many Members have evinced 
interest in pursuing outcomes in some areas through joint statement initiatives (JSIs). Provisions 
governing plurilateral agreements in the Marrakesh Agreement must be adhered to. If they are to 
be multilateral agreements, the outcomes of these initiatives, by way of new rules, can be introduced 
into the WTO when there is consensus; and Art . X of the Marrakesh Agreement on amendments 
must govern any changes or additions to the WTO Agreement. The JSIs should not change the 
fundamental multilateral architecture of WTO.  
2.5.  Fourth, there is a need to address the implementation issues (correcting the imbalances in 
WTO Agreements) as mandated in the  Doha Round and also build on the work done so far in 
negotiations, in accordance with existing mandates as elaborated in Section 4.   
3  RESOLVING THE DISPUT E SETTLEMENT ISSUES  
3.1.  A functioning, independent and effective dispute settlement system is indispensable for 
preserving the rights and obligations of all WTO Members and for ensuring that the rules are enforced 
in a fair and even -handed manner. Without such a system there woul d be no incentive to negotiate WT/GC/W/778  
 
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  new rules or to undertake reforms. Therefore, resolution of the Appellate Body (AB) impasse needs 
to precede other reforms.  
3.2.  As per Articles 17.1 and 17.2 of the DSU, all WTO Members have a collective duty to ensure 
the maint enance of a standing Appellate Body comprising of seven members. It would be 
disingenuous to use the pretext of the Appellate Body 's alleged digression from the clear mandate 
of the DSU to justify wilful non -compliance with the same by the Membership . 
3.3.  Attempts at addressing the crisis in the dispute settlement system must preserve its essential 
features namely an independent, two -tier dispute settlement system, automaticity in the launch of 
proceedings and  decision -making by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB ) by negative consensus, 
where provided. Developing Members ' concerns about affordability and equitable access to the use 
of the dispute settlement system are also very important.  
4  SAFEGUARDING DEVELOP MENT CONCERNS  
4.1.  Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) is a treaty -embedded and non -negotiable right for all 
developing Members. The available data indicates that the gap in the standards of living between 
developing and developed countries has not narrowed to any significant extent since the 
establishment of WTO.1 This necessitates the preservation and strengthening of the S&D provisions 
in both current and future WTO agreements, with priority to outstanding LDC issues.  
4.2.  The multilateral trading system must give policy space for developing Members to fulfil the ir 
development goals including industrialization . Developing Members continue to confront many 
formidable challenges, which underscores the continued relevance of S&DT provisions in their favour.  
The long -awaited outstanding 'development ' issues from the D oha Round continue to be paramount 
and include:  
• Implementation Issues2 – aimed at rebalancing the imbalanced rules from the Uruguay Round 
such as in the areas of agriculture, TRIMS (Trade Related Investment Measures), TRIPS (Trade 
Related Intellectual Prop erty Rights), Subsidies Agreement3 etc.  
• Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) – strengthening and making effective and 
operational the S&D provisions in WTO Agreements, in accordance with para graph 44 of the 
Doha Declaration.  
• Cotton – the imbalances in Agriculture Domestic Support due to AMS beyond de minimis  
leading to subsidized exports by some, show up clearly in the area of cotton, where cotton 
prices have been depressed. This has impacted negatively on rural livelihoods an d 
employment across many developing countries including the C4 Members.  
• Public Stockholding (PSH)  – a permanent solution must be agreed upon and adopted. The 
General Council Decision of 27 November 2014 (WT/L/939) says that 'If a permanent solution 
for th e issue of PSH is not agreed and adopted by the 11th Ministerial Conference, the 
mechanism… shall continue to be in place until a permanent solution is agreed and adopted '.  
• Special Safeguard Mechanism – Ministers in Nairobi (MC10, 2015) mandated Members 'To 
pursue negotiations on an SSM for developing country Members in dedicated sessions of the 
Committee on Agriculture in Special Session '. 
• Agriculture Domestic Supports – to rectify the imbalances in the existing rules due to some 
Members having Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS) entitlements whilst others do not. 
High per farmer subsidies by OECD countries, with huge flexibility  continue to have serious 
implications on food insecurity and rural poverty in developing countries.4 
                                                
1 See WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2 . 
2 Developing countries' requests are contained in the Implementation issues agenda or Para . 12 of the 
Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 . 
3 See Para . 5.8 of the developing country submission WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2 . 
4 See Graph 5 of WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2 for a compar ison of agriculture subsidies between some developed 
and developing Members.  WT/GC/W/778  
 
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  4.3.  In addition to the issues m entioned above, work should also continue on the following issues 
emphasizing the development components and in accordance with existing mandates:  
• Fisheries Subsidies – in accordance with the Doha, Hong Kong and MC11 Ministerial 
Declarations. All of these emphasize the importance of S&D in the outcome of these 
negotiations because of the 'importance of this sector to development priorities, poverty 
reduction, and livelihood and food security concerns.5 SDG 14.6 also reinforces S&D.  
• Discussions under the 199 8 E-Commerce Work Programme in the relevant WTO bodies.6 
4.4.  Another issue that must be addressed in any reform process relates to  the alleged theft of 
traditional knowledge that is held, preserved and developed by traditional communities/indigenous 
people.  The rules of the multilateral trading system must also support developing countries in 
building their technological capacities, and their access to affordable medicines and medical 
technologies.  
4.5. The SDGs articulate important development challenges still  confronting developing countries, 
including overcoming poverty and hunger. WTO rules must be supportive, rather than a constraint 
to these efforts.  
5  TRANSPARENCY AND NOT IFICATIONS  
5.1.  Developing countries face challenges in complying with all their notification obligations due to 
human resource and institutional capacity constraints. Any non -compliance is not willful. Treaty 
obligations must be performed in good faith. Yet despite the best of intentions, the ability to fulfill 
all notification obliga tions inevitably depends on capacities that are commensurate with a Member 's 
level of development and resources available. In light of these difficulties, we do not agree to 
additional transparency obligations. Any work in this area must be in the provisio n of capacity 
building to developing countries.  Developed Members should also lead by example in submitting 
comprehensive, timely and accurate notifications.  
5.2.  Some Members have found innovative ways to undermine their WTO commitments, or not 
implement the s pirit of those commitments. If the discussion on Transparency goes beyond 
addressing capacity issues, the first step must tackle the undermining of WTO commitments 
through:  
• Regular notification of entry -related measures affecting existing Mode 4 commitment s of 
Members ; 
• Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. Developed countries have a legal obligation in the area 
of technology transfer towards LDCs.  More transparency would be supportive of LDCs ' efforts 
to build a viable technological base ; 
• Disclosure of origi n of traditional knowledge and genetic resources in patent applications ; 
• Transparency in tariffs – non-ad valorem tariffs should be notified in ad  valorem terms or 
converted to ad  valorem tariffs.  
5.3.  Transparency must also permeate the entire functioning of the WTO including:  
• Taking note of the resource constraints of small delegations and thus rationalizing meetings 
at the WTO so that there are no overlaps. In areas where there are active negotiations for 
outcomes, these meetings should as far  as possible take place in formal mode. They should 
always be open, inclusive and transparent and take seriously the resource constraints of 
developing countries.  
                                                
5 WT/MIN(05)/DEC 2005  'Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration', Annex D para . 9.   
6 WT/L/274 1998 'Work Programme on Electronic Commerce' adopted by the General Council on 
25 Septembe r 1998.  WT/GC/W/778  
 
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  • Ministerial Conferences (MCs) and the processes preceding them in Geneva. The basic 
principl es and procedures for this Member -driven organization need to be agreed upon. For 
instance, all meetings in the MC, which is the body for decision -making, should be open to all 
Members without restricting the decision -making process to smaller Green Rooms.  
6  IN CONCLUSION  
6.1.   The immediate priorities for reform at the WTO must include : 
• Resolving the crisis in the Appellate Body ; 
• Addressing the unilateral actions taken by some Members . 
6.2.  Any reforms must:  
• Keep development at its core through delivering on the long -promised development concerns, 
in particular the outstanding development issues of the DDA; as well as address the 
asymmetries in WTO Agreements such as those in Agriculture and other areas ; 
• Stren gthen the multilateral character of the WTO, especially preservation of consensus 
decision -making and respecting Art . X of the Marrakesh Agreement on Amendments ; 
• Continue with the on -going multilaterally mandated negotiations ; 
• Last but most importantly, re form must reaffirm the principle of Special and Differential 
Treatment, which is a treaty -embedded, non -negotiable right for all developing countries in 
the WTO; and promote inclusive growth, widening spaces for states to pursue national 
development strate gies in the broad framework and principles of a rules -based system.  
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