RESTRICTED  
  
G/MA/M/77  
 
28 March  2023 
(23-2199) Page: 1/89 
Committee on Market Access  Original: English  
 
MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE ON MARKET ACCESS  
18 AND 19  OCTOBER  2022  
CHAIRPERSON:  MR KENYA UEHARA  (JAPAN)  
The Committee on Market Access (CMA, or the Committee) adopted the agenda as reproduced in 
document  WTO/AIR/MA/17/Rev.1 , with the inclusion of the following item under Other Business: 
"United States – Trade-Distorting Export Control Measures on Semiconductor  Equipment and the 
Global Supply Chain". An annotated agenda had been circulated in document  JOB/M A/156.  
 
1   INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF 
CONCESSIONS – STATUS REPORT  ................................ ................................ ................ 4 
- HS96 (WT/L/6905)  ................................ ................................ ................................  4 
- HS2002 ( WT/L/605 AND WT/L/807)  ................................ ................................ .........  4 
- HS2007 (WT/L/673 AND WT/L/830)  ................................ ................................ .........  4 
- HS2012 (WT/L/831)  ................................ ................................ ..............................  4 
- HS2017 ( WT/L/995)  ................................ ................................ ..............................  5 
2   HS-RELATED WAIVERS  ................................ ................................ ........................... 5 
2.1   EXTENSION OF THE HS -RELATED WAIVERS  ................................ ................................  5 
2.2   HS2022  WAIVER – DRAFT DECISION (G/MA/W/180/REV.1)  ................................ ...........  5 
3   THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  6 
4   REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON ITEM  IX:9 (CMA  LETTER) OF THE 70TH SESSION 
OF THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM COMMITTEE OF THE WCO  ................................ ............  10 
5   REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE EXPERIENCE -SHARING SESSIONS IN 
RELATION TO TRADE IN COVID -19 RELATED GOODS  ................................ ..................  11 
6   OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATA BASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED 
TARIFF SCHEDULES (CTS) DATABASE  ................................ ................................ ........  15 
6.1   Status of implementation of the 2019  IDB Decision  ................................ ....................  15 
6.2   Status of IDB  notifications ................................ ................................ ......................  16 
6.3   List of Members' official websites with tariff informati on and import statistics  ..................  19 
6.4   Status of the CTS  database  ................................ ................................ ....................  20 
7   DERESTRICTION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATING MATERIALS – DRAFT 
DECISION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  20 
8   NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
FOR QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS  ................................ ................................ ..........  22 
8.1   Notifications  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  22 
8.2   Report from the Secretariat  ................................ ................................ ....................  31 
9   TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  ....................  32 G/MA/M/77  
 
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  10   ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ..............  34 
11   AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASURES AGAINST RUSSIA – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................  35 
12   AUSTRALIA – INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES ON 
A4 COPY PAPER – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  ................................ ...........................  41 
13   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 
5G EQUIPMENT - STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ .... 42 
14   CANADA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ..............................  43 
15   CHINA — DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES) — STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ................................ ........................  43 
16   CHINA — DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW - 
STATEMENT BY JAPAN  ................................ ................................ ..............................  44 
17   CHINA — TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES — STATEMENT BY 
AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...............  45 
18   DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – DISCRIMI NATORY TAXATION ON SOME FOOD IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION ................................ ..................  48 
19   EGYPT – MANDATORY USE OF A LETTER OF CREDIT AS PRIOR CONDITION FOR 
IMPORTS - STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORWAY  ............................  49 
20   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUST MENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ........  50 
21   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSAL  FOR A REGULATION ON DEFORESTATION -FREE 
PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ...........  52 
22   EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM – STATEMENT BY 
CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................  53 
23   EUROPEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (EGD): CARBON BORDER 
ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (CBAM) AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES (DFC) – 
STATEMENT BY INDONESIA ................................ ................................ .......................  55 
24   EUROPEAN UNION – MRL REDUCT ION OF CERTAIN SUBSTANCES TO MEET 
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN THIRD COUNTRIES – STATEMENT BY PARAGUAY  .... 59 
25   KINGDOM OF SAUDI AR ABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES, THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN 
IMPORTED PRODUCTS – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND, AND 
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ . 66 
26   INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION; 
INDONESIA; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND 
MATSU; AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ............................  67 
27   INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – STATEMENTS BY JAPAN 
AND THAILAND  ................................ ................................ ................................ .........  69 
28   INDIA – BASIC CUSTOMS DUTY (BCD) ON SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND 
MODULES – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ............  71 
29   INDIA – APPROVED LIST OF MODELS AND MANUFACTURERS (ALMM) OF SOLAR 
PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULES – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ...................  71 
30   INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – 
STATEMENTS BY CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE UNITED STATES  .............  72 
31   INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS – 
STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ............................  73 G/MA/M/77  
 
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  32   INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 74 
33   MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE – STATEMENT BY UNITED STATES  .... 75 
34   NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  ..............  76 
35   PERU – TAX TREA TMENT OF PISCO – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM  .......  77 
36   THE PHILIPPINES – SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – STATEMENT BY 
INDO NESIA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  78 
37   SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 79 
38   THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU – 
DISCRIMINATORY TARIFFS FAVOURING CHAMPAGNE OVER OTHE R SPARKLING WINE – 
STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIA  ................................ ................................ .......................  80 
39   UNITED STATES -DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL 
AND/OR ALUMINUM IMPORTS – STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ .............  82 
40   UNITED STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA – 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  ................................ ................................ ..............................  83 
41   UNITED STATES – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF STURGEON – 
STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ ...... 84 
42   VIET NAM – ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION DUTY ON SUGAR – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA
 ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................  86 
43   ELECTION OF VICE -CHAIRPERSON  ................................ ................................ ...... 87 
44   DRAFT REP ORT (2022) OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN 
GOODS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .....................  87 
45   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ...............................  88 
45.1   United States – Trade Distortive Export Control Measures on Semiconductor Equipment 
and the Global Supply Chain – Statement by China  ................................ ...........................  88 
45.2   Follow -up to the CTG informal meeting on MC12 implementation matters  .....................  88 
45.3   Dates of next meetings  ................................ ................................ ........................  89 
 
1.1.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
1.2.  The United States would like to raise a systemic concern with several items on the meeting's 
agenda. There appear to be a number of items, specifically Items  12, 16 , 24, and 42 that more 
appropriately belong in other committees , where the substantive exper tise on these issues reside s. 
Therefore, the US urges Members to take greater care in evaluating where substantive issues should 
be taken up so that committees with the appropriate terms of reference address the issues for which 
they have been created.  
1.3.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
1.4.  Canada would like to add its voice to the concern expressed by the United States. In reviewing 
the agenda there seem to be trade concerns which, at first  glance, do not seem to fall within the 
terms of ref erence of the Committee on Market Access, that is , "market access issues not covered 
by any other WTO  body". This is only an observation, as Canada is not yet familiar with the substance 
of these concerns . Canada wishes simply to mention here that the Comm ittee has a terms of 
reference, contained in document  WT/L/47 , which was decided by the General Council  in 1995 . G/MA/M/77  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION OF HARMONIZED SYSTEM CHANGES TO SCHEDULES OF CONCESSIONS 
– STATUS REPORT  
1.5.  The Chairperson  recalled that the full version s of the Secretariat's reports  and presentation  
regarding the various transpositions of Schedules had been made available as room document s1 and 
on eAgenda2; these documents would also be incorporated into the meeting's minutes.  
1.6.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) informed Members that a revised version of the report on 
the overall "Status of HS  Transpositions", document  G/MA/W/158/Rev.5, had been prepared by the 
Secretariat. The report sought to provide an overview of the overall state of play of the dif ferent 
HS transposition exercises, as of 3  October  2022, and had taken into account the results of the most 
recent HS multilateral review, which had been held on 27 June 2022.  
- HS96  (WT/L/6905)  
1.7.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that one  file had remained pending in HS1996 
since February  2009, which was the file of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.3 
1.8.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
- HS2002 (WT/L/605 AND WT/L/807)  
1.9.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued as 
document  JOB/MA/42/Rev.26, dated 11  September  2019. The status of the HS2002  transposition 
files after the multilateral review of 27  June 2022 was as follows: 116  files had been certified or 
were in the process of certification; one  draft file had been completed and sent to the Member for 
its first  review. Finally, 18  Members had not been affected by the transposition, as eight  Members 
had acceded to the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in HS2002, another eight  Members in 
HS2007, and two  Members in HS2012.  
1.10.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
- HS2007  (WT/L/673 AND WT/L/830)  
1.11.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued 
as document  JOB/MA/104/Rev.30, dat ed 24  June 2022. The status of the HS2007  transposition files 
after the multilateral review of 27  June 2022 was as follows: 112  files had been certified or were in 
the process of certification; four  draft files had been completed and sent to Members for their 
first review; two  files had been released for multilateral review but would be examined at the next 
meeting; and seven  draft files remained to be prepared. Finally, 10  Members had not been affected  
by the transposition as eight  Members had acceded to  the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in 
HS2007 and two  Members in HS2012.  
1.12.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
- HS2012  (WT/L/831)  
1.13.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued 
as document  JOB/MA/129/Rev.16, dated 24  June 2022. The status of the HS2012  transposition files 
after the multilateral review of 27  June 2022 was as follows: 103  files had been certified or were in 
the process of certification; two  files had been released for multilater al review and had received 
comments from other Members; six  draft files had been completed and sent to Members for their 
first review; and 22  draft files remained to be prepared. Finally, two  Members had not been affected 
by the transposition as they had a cceded to the WTO with a Schedule of concessions in HS2012.  
1.14.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
 
1 Document s RD/MA/104  and RD/MA/106 . 
2 https://agenda.wto.org/en/cma  
3 Ongoing separate procedures, GATT  document  L/6905.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  - HS2017 (WT/L/995)  
1.15.  The Secretariat  (Mrs Alya Belkhodja) recalled that a revised written report had been issued 
as document  JOB/MA/143/Rev.7, dated 24  June 2022. The status of the HS2017  transposition files 
after the multilateral review of 27  June 2022 was as follows: 76  files had been certified or were in 
the process of certification; four  files had been released for multilate ral review and had received 
comments from other Members; thirteen  files had been released for multilateral review; three  draft 
files had been completed and sent to Members for their first  review ; and 39  draft files remained to 
be prepared.  
1.16.  The Committee took note  of the Secretariat's report.  
2  HS-RELATED WAIVERS  
2.1  EXTENSION OF THE HS -RELATED WAIVERS  
2.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that the General Council had agreed to extend the relevant waivers 
for the introduction of the HS  changes into WTO  Schedules of concessions  for a number of Members 
on the basis of a "collective decision". The most recent waivers were: HS2002 ( WT/L/ 1124); HS2007 
(WT/L/1125 ); HS2012 ( WT/L/1126 ); and HS2017 ( WT/L/1127 ). He noted that these waivers would 
expire on 31  December  2022 and that the Members concerned had yet to complete their relevant 
transposition procedures. Therefore, the Chairperson proposed that the Committee extend all of 
these collective waivers until 31  December  2023. He proposed to the Committee to forward the draft 
collective waiver decisions granting such an extension, as contained in documents  G/C/W/ 815, 
G/C/W/ 816, G/C/W/ 817, and G/C/W/ 818, to the General Council, through the Council for Trade in 
Goods (CTG), for appropriate action.4 
2.2.  It was so agreed . 
2.2  HS2022  WAIVER – DRAFT DECISION (G/MA/W/180/REV.1)  
2.3.  The Chairperson  recall ed that, on 12  September  2022, the Secretariat had circulated the draft 
waiver decision for the " Introduction of the HS2022  Changes into WTO  Schedules of Concessions " 
(hereinafter the "HS2022  waiver decision") . The draft HS2022  waiver d ecision closely follow ed the 
waivers that ha d been used for previous HS  amendments.  He informed the Committee that , following 
the circulation of the draft waiver decision, Members had  had until 7  October  2022 to contact the 
Secretariat to provide comments on the document and request to be included in the draft waiver. 
By that deadline, 14 Members had requested to be cove red by the draft HS2022  waiver decision  and 
a revised version of the draft decision , listing in the annex all the  Members that had requested  to be 
covered and the ir respective  dates of implementation of the HS2022  amendments, had been  
circulated in documen t G/MA/W/180/Rev.1.  
2.4.  The Chairperson announced that , since the circulation of the revised  HS2022  draft decision, 
four additional Members had contacted the Secretariat to be included in the waiver. He also clarified 
that, as provided in the draft waiver deci sion, any Member that was not listed in the Annex could be 
included at any time by making a request to the Committee through the Secretariat and indicating 
the date of domestic implementation of the HS  amendments.  
2.5.  The representative of Paraguay  indicated t he following : 
2.6.  Paraguay requests to be included in the HS2022  draft waiver.  
2.7.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Committee proceed with the adoption of the draft 
HS2022  waiver  decision , as contained in document  G/MA/W/180/Rev.1 . The Secretariat w ould 
prepare a second  revision to add the names of those Members that ha d requested to be included in 
 
4 The General Council Decisions were adopted on 20  December  2022 and circulated in documents : 
WT/L/1160 (HS20 02); WT/L/1161 (HS20 07); WT/L/1162 (HS2012); and WT /L/1163 (HS2017) . G/MA/M/77  
 
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  it5. The draft HS2022  waiver decision would then be forward ed to the General Council, through the 
Council for Trade in Goods, for appropriate action .6 
2.8.  It was so agreed . 
3  THE HARMONIZED SYSTEM AND THE WORK OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION  
3.1.  The Chairperson  welcomed Ms Gael G rooby , Deputy Director of Tariff and Trade Affairs at the 
World Customs Organization  (WCO) , and Mr  Álvaro Fernandez Ácebes , Chairperson of the 
Harmonized System Committee  (HSC)  of the WCO, and then invited them to present their report on 
the meeting of the Harmonized System Committee  that had been held on 19 September  2022. 
3.2.  The representative of the WCO Secretariat  (Ms Gael Gro oby) indicated the following:  
3.3.  Thank you for welcoming us again to th e Committee  on Market Access . We really do appreciate 
the cooperation that has emerged so well between the CMA and the HSC. At the last HSC  meeting, 
the CMA  Chairperson  spoke to the WCO  delegates about the letter that was sent from this body to 
the HSC. He also noted that the HS was a powerful tool to facilitate trade and collect statistics and 
hence that it was of great importance to both bodies.  
3.4.  There was a high level of willingness  among the HSC  delegates  to look at the CMA  proposals 
or suggestions within the letter ; as a result , there will be ongoing discussion at the next meeting of 
the HSC on issues such as possible  ways to look at how we can organize work in the circu mstances 
of a pandemic, or other ways to address the concerns raised by this Committee about 
decision -making in global emergencies . This is a difficult topic, which the HSC is willing to reflect  
upon to see if there is some method whereby,  we could take so me additional action. It would be a 
difficult issue for many reasons, primarily around ensuring the status of any decisions that came out 
because the HSC needs  a quorum for any meeting to make an official decision, and it is not 
something that we would nor mally do outside of an official meeting . But we are certainly going to 
take the comments on board and see what can be done.  
3.5.  In terms of the practical ideas around COVID -19-related goods, we have already drafted 
documents for the next HS  Review Sub-Committe e with respect to ambulances, mobile clinics , and 
face masks. We have also undertaken to continue looking at the remaining proposals and at other 
goods that have been highlighted in the work of the WCO and the WTO as being of interest in relation 
to the COVID -19 pandemic and any similar future events. This will now form part of our ongoing 
work within this review cycle , including taking these proposals to the HS Review Sub-Committee for 
members' consideration.  
3.6.  Overall, the HSC responded  to the CMA  communication  in a spirit of openness . The HSC  
recognized that the WTO did not have the mandate to make proposals through the CMA . However, 
the natural interest it takes in the HSC  was certainly understood  given that it forms the basis of the 
bound tariffs and therefore of the work of the CMA  itself to a large extent . For this reason, the HSC 
looks forward to receiving updates  from the CMA whenever there is a relevant issue on its agenda . 
And the HSC certainly look s forward to greater activity between the two  organizations to ensure that 
there is an understanding of the ir respective  roles and what is needed on both sides.  
3.7.  The representative of the WCO Secretariat  (Mr Alvaro Acebes)  indicated the following : 
3.8.  First, I wish to thank the CMA Chair and the Secretariat  for inviting me here as the Chair person  
of the HSC to present the most significant outcomes of the 70th Session of the Harmonized System 
Committee, which took place on 12 -23 September  2022. Allow me first of all to say that, like other 
sessions, WCO  Council members that are Contracting Parties to the Convention , and that have a 
voice and a vote , are invited  to the HSC . Council members that are not Contracting Parties and that 
 
5 The representative of Colombia included a statement on eAgenda to request to be covered by the 
HS2022 waiver, as per document G/MA/W/180/Rev.1, and indicated that the dates of entry into force of the 
three  WCO decisions would be communicated to the Secretariat in writing.  
6 The General Council Decision w as adopted on 20  December  2022 and circulated in 
document  WT/L/1164.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  have observer status, international organizations , and the private sector represented by the 
International Chamber of Commerce , are also invited.  
3.9.  In this session , 101 members (100  countries plus t he European Union) participated, along with 
the following international organizations:  International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) ; Organisation 
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) ; Secretariat of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
Conventions ; United Nations Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) ; 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) ; and the WTO. 
3.10.  I would like to recall that the HSC is assisted by the following three sub-committees  or working 
parties that support the work o f the Committee, despite having no decision -making power since they 
do not take votes and work based on consensus  to submit proposals to the HSC : (i) the pre-sessional 
Working Party, which is responsible for refining the texts of the Classification Opinion s and ensuring 
that the two  official languages of the Convention, English and French, are properly aligned ; (ii) the 
Review Sub -Committee, which usually meets twice a year and prepares proposed amendments to 
HS texts and consequential amendments to the Explanatory Notes ; and (iii)  the Scientific 
Sub-Committee, which assists the Committee with biological, chemical and pharmaceutical matters 
and meets once a year . 
3.11.  During the 70th Session of the HSC, numerous proposals were discussed that had been 
prepared by the Review Sub -Committee and, conversely, questions and clarifications were sent from 
the Committee to the Review and Scientific Sub -Committees.  At the HSC meeting, the Secretariat 
invited delegates to take note of the many capacity -building activities carried out in countries that 
had requested the WCO Secretariat's assistance, mainly in the field of tariff classification, customs 
laboratories , and binding tariff information programmes.  Information was provided about the 
WCO Secretariat's cooperation wi th numerous international organizations, including the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the INCB , and, of course, the WTO, and about the positive results 
obtained in the past.  Topics such as the WCO  Green Customs Initiative and how the Harmonized 
System (H S) can be an instrument to help members establish policies to protect the environment 
and combat climate change were also covered. In this regard, an overview was given of a series of 
conferences and symposia that the WCO Secretariat has been organizing wi th the leading experts in 
the field.  
3.12.  The HSC approved two  new non -binding recommendations by the WCO  Secretariat to open, 
at the national or regional level, subheadings beyond the six -digit HS  level for certain products 
controlled under the Basel Conventio n for waste oils containing polychlorinated biphenyls and under 
the Rotterdam Convention for waste.  An OPCW  recommendation was also discussed but, before it 
was adopted, it was decided to refer the matter to the next session of the Scientific Sub -Committee  
for analysis, given its complexity. In any case, the Council is expected to approve the 
three recommendations in its June  session.  The rationale behind the recommendations is for 
countries to have an instrument for controlling these products from now unti l the HS  amendment 
enters into force on 1  January  2027, when there will be subheadings for these products at HS  level. 
As I have said, these are non -binding recommendations since the WCO  mandate does not extend 
beyond the six -digit level.  
3.13.  Six classificatio n opinions, which had previously been agreed by the HSC and drafted by the 
pre-sessional Working Party, were approved. Without mentioning all of them, these opinions referred 
to products as varied as cough lozenges, bamboo panels , and edible collagen mater ials used for 
making foodstuff s. Thirteen  reservations, which are issues that had already been voted on and 
provisionally agreed in previous HSC sessions but that were subject to reservations by one or more 
countries, were re -examined. Reservations are an instrument for Contracting Parties to request 
re-examination of the Committee's provisional decision on a matter. There is a two -month time-limit 
in which to enter a reservation, and the number of reservations that can be entered for ea ch decision 
has been limited to two.  There was no limit in the past, which led to major delays in the adoption of 
classification decisions. The products subject to these reservations have included smartwatches, 
rooibos tea, coffee machines for industrial u se, food in liquid form , and vehicles for the transport of 
goods, to mention but a few.  
3.14.  The HSC has also discussed and occasionally  reached agreement on the classification of new 
products or the amendment of Explanatory Notes. There are approximately 40  agenda items for a 
very wide range of products, such as nicotine -free vaping devices, steam stones for water pipes, 
instant beverages , and LED  strip lights.  The discussed amendments to the Explanatory Notes were G/MA/M/77  
 
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  intended either to provide additional clarific ation, such as regarding immunological products , for 
example, or simply to correct linguistic misalignment between the English and French versions. It is 
important to remember that the two  official languages of the HS are English and French, and that it 
is essential for there to be perfect linguistic alignment. Otherwise, any misalignment would be 
transferred to the other language versions around the world, which would lead to different 
interpretations of the HS and, subsequently, divergences in tariff clas sification.  
3.15.  At the proposal of the Review Sub -Committee, the HSC provisionally adopted amendments to 
HS 2027 for certain products, such as the creation of new provisions (specific headings/subheadings) 
for self -tapping screws under heading  7318, portable s olar lamps under heading  8513, new headings 
for fresh and frozen cranberries, illuminated bands under heading  9405, and pesticides controlled 
under the Rotterdam Convention.  It should be noted that these decisions were taken unanimously 
by the HSC and votes were not required. Should votes have been held, a two -thirds majority would 
have been needed, unlike classification decisions which require only a simple majority.  It shoul d also 
be pointed out that provisionally adopted decisions must be approved again by the Committee in its 
last session before the end of the review cycle , in March  2024, and then by the Council of Customs 
Directors in June  2024, and finally go through the six-month reservation period, in which all 
Contracting Parties have a veto. In other words, the amendment could not be considered definitively 
adopted until January  2025. The Committee also noted that the Sub -Committee would continue 
discussions on other d raft amendments to the legal texts, which are expected to be presented to 
the Committee for approval in future sessions. Some examples include the creation of headings or 
subheadings for equipment for the manufacture of illegal drugs, potential dual -use pr oducts for the 
preparation of chemical weapons, certain sub -species of shrimp, bamboo products, non -germinating  
seeds, plastic waste controlled under the Basel Convention , and baby corn cobs.  
3.16.  Lastly, the HSC addressed several  general items . An amendment to  the Rules of Procedure to 
make them more gender -inclusive, by using the term "Chairperson" instead of "Chairman" , for 
example, was discussed and referred to the Contracting Parties for approval.  Discussions were held 
on what the threshold should be, expre ssed in  millions of dollars per year in trade volume, for trade 
under a heading or subheading to be considered low  volume.  Currently, these thresholds are 
USD 100 million per year for total world trade under a heading and USD 50 million per year for world 
trade under a sub -heading.  In each review cycle, the WCO  Secretariat and the Committee conduct 
a study with a view to potentially deleting headings or subheadings that fall short of that threshold. 
This does not mean that they are deleted automatically bec ause, regardless of trade volume, there 
are sensitive products that must not be deleted. It was agreed to maintain the current thresholds 
for the 2027  review cycle and continue the study on potential increases of these thresholds in future 
review cycles  (that is,  starting in HS  2032) . Aside from the amendments that are regularly made to 
the Convention, generally every five  years, the Secretariat has embarked upon an ambitious 
long-term project to revise the Harmonized System to make it a more modern and versatile 
instrument with a great er capacity to adapt to changes in trade. This process has just begun.  
3.17.  With respect to the p otential amendments to the HS with respect to certain medical products 
contained in the communication by the Committee on Market Access , according to  both the 
comme nts published in the forum set up by the WCO  Secretariat before the Committee's session , 
and the session itself,  there was unanimous support  in the HSC to collaborate with the CMA on 
certain medical products of particular importance in times of emergency. The delegates who took 
the floor stressed the need for detailed and specific information on the products to be discussed for 
the classification. The topic is interesting and worthy of discussion, but it must be a fact-based  
discussion . 
3.18.  The HSC therefore gave the WCO Secretariat a mandate:  (i) to include the mechanism for 
organizing ad hoc meetings in cases of emergency as an agenda item ; (ii) to consider the CMA's 
proposals and submit specific proposals to the Review Sub -Committee for examination ; and (iii) to 
find further examples of medical products to refer to the HSC for examination . The latter  will be 
discussed again in the upcoming sessions of the Review Sub -Committee and the HSC.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  3.19.  The Chairperson  thanked the WCO  representatives for informing the Co mmittee  of the 
discussions that had taken place at the last meeting of the HSC in relation to the 
CMA communication , and for outlining the expected next steps .7 
3.20.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
3.21.  I just want to thank the WCO for its continued participation and collaboration in this 
Committee. I think this specific instance here has actually allowed me to build my rolodex of contacts 
within the Canadian government  as we have now established contacts with our border services 
agencies wh o sit on the HSC and the subcommittee itself, and actually I have a call planned with 
them in the coming week to have some further discussion on how the HSC meeting went. I will 
certainly share the reports provided here today and speak to them about how we  can collaborate 
and coordinate ourselves in the Canadian government in terms of our interventions and contributions 
to the work at the WCO and here at the WTO.  
3.22.  I would also like to point out that this is really helpful, and I know it will be going forward  as 
we continue our informal conversations about the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic , including on 
the measures that Members took in terms of our efforts to address the crisis, and any improvements 
that we can envisage , even if these are simply observation s about good practices and ways to 
approach things, and if there are any further exchanges that we can have with the WCO in terms of 
what would help us in the future should we be faced with a similar such crisis.  
3.23.  The representative of Ecuador  indicated the  following : 
3.24.  First of all, I would like to  thank the representatives from the WCO for their reports. I 
recogni ze the work that they are doing and the possibility of collaboration between the CMA and the 
HSC. As mentioned by the HSC  Chair, v ery often the problem is not a lack of specific positions in 
the HS, but the lack of information or detailed descriptions of products. Who has responsibility for 
providing the information that could facilitate  the work of the WCO ? 
3.25.  The representative of the  WCO Secretariat  (Mr Alvaro Acebes)  indicated the following : 
3.26.  I am grateful  to Ecuador  for this importan t question. It is important to stress that , in 99% of 
cases, the problem is not that we do not have a position in the HS to classify a product, as a prod uct 
can be classif ied in a specific or under a more general heading, but rather it is the lack of information  
about the given product , as was the case for some COVID -19-related products . On the question of 
who is responsible for providing that information, if it is an issue presented by a country that has 
difficulties classifying a product, then the information needs to come from the source of that problem, 
namely the country that is contacting the committee , which should be providing all of the information 
that it can. O f course, the WCO Secretariat can also make additional efforts to try to find information 
on the internet or the archives, but the main responsibility lies with the country that is submitting  
the request. However, if it is a conflict on classification that has arisen between different countries,  
then it would be up to the countries party to the dispute  to provide  the information . 
3.27.  The representative of the WCO Secretariat  (Ms Gael Grooby)  indicated the following : 
3.28.  As our  Chairperson  has explained, for  some of these proposals the WCO Secretariat has taken 
on the responsibility of finding examples in order to move these ideas along and put them as concrete 
proposals to the HSC . But these were general proposals . At the same time, the WCO  Secretariat is 
currently working on the proposals from the CMA. Certainly, on everyday work for customs 
administrations, it is the responsibility of the importer or their broker to provide information ; 
likewise,  as our chairperson  explained, proposals coming to the WCO are generally the responsibility 
of the proposing country.  
3.29.  I would just like to stress that every good already does have a classification. There is no such 
thing as a good that does not have a posi tion in the H S, even if it is in the "Other -Other -Other " 
 
7 The Chairperson's report on item  IX:9 (CMA  letter) of the 70th Session of the  Harmoni zed System 
Committee of the WCO is reproduced in item  4 below  and was circulated in document  JOB/MA/155 . G/MA/M/77  
 
- 10 - 
 
  position . But to determine the correct position requires a thorough understanding of the goods so 
that Members can make a clear decision on classification.  
3.30.  The Chairperson  looked forward to continuing and strengthening the collaboration between 
the two  organizations and Committees. He propose d that the Committee take note of the reports 
and the statements made.  
3.31.  The Committee took note  of the WCO reports and statements made.8 
4  REPO RT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON ITEM  IX:9 (CMA  LETTER) OF THE 70TH SESSION OF 
THE HARMONI ZED SYSTEM COMMITTEE OF THE WCO   
4.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that,  on 30  May 2022, the former Chairperson had  sent a written 
communication, on behalf of the Committee, to the WCO  Harmonized System Committee, which had 
been circulated in document  G/MA/406. The communication had highlighted some of the pressing 
issues that had been  raised by  certain Members during the first and second  experience -sharing 
sessions organized by the CMA on trade in COVID -19 goods in relation to the customs classification 
of those medical goods that were considered to be essential to combat ting the pandemic .9 
4.2.  As the Chairperson had indi cated in his  communicat ion of 27 June 2022, the CMA  letter had 
been included on the agenda of the 70th Session of the WCO  Harmonized System Committee , under 
Agenda item  IX.9 – "New Questions" , and a s Chair of the Committee,  he had been  invited, together 
with the Secretariat, to attend that meeting . The Chairperson had thanked the HSC  Chair and the 
WCO Secretariat for having invited the WTO to attend the HSC  meeting , and for the opportunity to 
address that important audience on behalf of  the Committee . The Chair person 's intervention at the 
HSC had been reproduced and circulated to Members in document  JOB/MA/155.  
4.3.  The Chairperson noted that the CMA  communication  had highlighted that, while the HS was 
considered to be a powerful tool for fac ilitating international trade and collect ing trade statistics, it 
had not always been an easy tool for Members to use when consider ing the products that had been 
of critical  importance  in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic,  including in relation to how t o 
identify and classify those products in the corresponding commodity codes. For many WTO  Members, 
this still represent ed a challenge in terms of the formulation of trade policy measures as part of the 
pandemic response ; more importantly , this challenge might prove to be even more relevant to future 
crises.  As indicated in the HSC  Chair's reply  (document  G/MA/406/Add.1), divergences or 
misclassifications in the HS were very often a consequence of the absence of information about the 
products under consideration , rather than because the HS  lacked clarity . He stressed that i t was for 
these reasons that the CMA had turned to the WCO and, in particular, the HSC, to seek guidance 
about how to improve the classification of COVID -19 essential goods, especi ally as the CMA  had 
recognize d that the HSC  was the body with the relevant knowledge and expertise on these issues.  
4.4.  As indicated in his statement to the HSC, the Chairperson consider ed it important that the WTO 
and the WCO, through their respective members hips, f ound ways to work together to build resilience 
and improve preparedness for future crises. In his view, it  was therefore encouraging to see that 
there was a general willingness in the HSC to cooperate with the CMA on the improved classification 
of certain medical goods of special importance in times of emergency. Since the CMA d id not have 
the mandate or expertise to submit concrete classification proposals, it had been  a positive outcome 
that the HSC had given a mandate to the WCO  Secretariat to fur ther study the suggestions included 
in the CMA  communication and to present specific proposals for examination to the Sub -Review 
Committee 's next meeting . 
4.5.  The Chairperson stressed that such cooperation between the CMA and the HSC did not in any 
way prejudg e Members from submitting proposals to the HSC directly through their representations 
to the WCO. On the contrary, this was an additional contribution to the discussions . For this reason, 
he invite d CMA delegates to keep coordinating with their customs off icials in view of the upcoming 
meetings at the WCO.  The Chairperson also noted that i t was encouraging to see that the HSC had 
shown flexibility in accepting the CMA  suggestion to explore the possibility of creating a mechanism 
where by the WCO  Secretariat c ould hold ad hoc consultations with the HSC to issue , in collaboration 
with other relevant international organizations, such as the WTO, classification guidelines in 
 
8 The European Union addressed this item in its intervention under Agenda Item  5. 
9 Documents  JOB/MA/152 and JOB/MA/152/Add.1.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  emergency situations. As indicated in the CMA  letter, while WTO  Members had benefitted from 
non-binding guidance for the HS  classification of these products by the WCO and other international 
organizations, there were limitations as to the type of assistance that could be provided by the WCO 
due to the absence of specific processes  or procedures for such guidance, especially in emergency 
situations.  
4.6.  The Chairperson observed that one of main lessons  learned from th e COVID -19 pandemic  was 
that the international community could not  rely on a "business as usual" approach in times of 
emergency ; for this reason, it was of the outmost importance to strengthen the dialogue between 
the WTO and the WCO . He urged the HSC and the WCO  Secretariat to continue informing th e 
Committee of any new development . To this end, he invited  the WCO to contin ue regularly  report ing 
to the Committee on its activities .10 
4.7.  The Committee took note of the report . 
5  REPORT BY THE CHAIRPERSON ON THE EXPERIENCE -SHARING SESSIONS IN RELATION 
TO TRADE IN COVID -19 RELATED GOODS  
5.1.  The Chairperson  reported to the Committee on the experience -sharing sessions on trade in 
COVID -19 related goods that the Committee had organi zed in 2022 . He recalled that the first such 
report had been made by the Committee's previous Chairperson at the Committee's March  formal 
meeting following its first experience -sharing session on this theme, which had taken place on 
4 March  2022.11 
5.2.  The Chairperson reported that , since March  2022, the Committee ha d held three  additional 
experience -sharing sessions  based on the topics identified by Members at the beginning of 2022.  
The dates of these sessions were as followed: 26 April; 18 July; and 16  September  2022. For each 
of the se session s the Secretariat ha d prepared a summary report circulated under the docum ent 
series  JOB/MA/152.  
5.3.  Regarding the second  experience -sharing session, which  took place on 26  April, Members 
shared their practices on monitoring and measuring trade in goods essential to combat ting the 
COVID -19 pandemic, and on improving data collection.  The discussions focused on the challenges 
relating to trade data monitoring and data collection faced by Members , and lessons learned. During 
the session, representatives from the following five Members participated as speakers : China ; 
European Union ; India; Thailand;  and the United Kingdom. A WCO representative also participated 
in the session and provided written contributions. The Secretariat provided a summary of the 
discussions, including a compilation of all the documents and presentations relatin g to the session , 
in a report circulated in document  JOB/MA/152/Rev.1.  
5.4.  Following the first and second  experience -sharing sessions, and based on the discussions held 
by Members in relation to classification and trade monitoring of COVID -19-related goods, on  
12 May 2022 an email  was sent to Members proposing to address a written communication to the 
WCO's Harmonized System Committee to bring its attention to issues raised by Members in relation 
to the HS  classification of COVID -19-related goods , and to sugges t certain improvement s in that 
regard . As reported under the Committee's previous two agenda item s, the CMA  communication , 
circulated in document  G/MA/406 , had been  sent to the WCO on 30  May 2022. The written reply 
from the Chairperson of the Harmonized System Committee was circulated in 
document  G/MA/406/Add.1.  
5.5.  The third  experience -sharing session took place on 18  July 2022. This session focused on 
Members' practices regarding  measures aimed at easing trade in COVID -19-related goods. 
Specifica lly, Members discussed various tax -related measures, including the following: reductions, 
suspensions , or elimination of customs duties and internal taxes; waivers and deferrals of payments 
and refunds; and non -tariff measures, such as streamlined customs procedures. Finally, Members 
shared their lessons learned from this experience. Australia and the Dominican Republic participated 
as speakers , while nine other Members took the floor to share their practices. Among the  latter, 
Uruguay provided an overview of the work carried out  on measures aimed at easing trade in 
COVID -19-related  goods  by the Committee on Agriculture , Cameroon did so for the Committee on 
 
10 The European Un ion addressed this item in its intervention under Agenda Item  5. 
11 Document  G/MA/M/76, item  8. G/MA/M/77  
 
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  Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and Canada  did so  for the Committee on Trade Facilitation 
with respect to. The Secretariat  provided a summary of the discussions, including a compilation of 
all the documents and presentations relating to the session , in a report circulated in 
document  JOB/MA/152/Add.2.  
5.6.  Finally, the fourth -experience -sharing session, that took place on 16  September, focused on 
Members ' practices and experiences with respect to export restrictions during the pandemic. 
Members shared their views on different types of measures used to restrict trade in "essential" 
goods.  The discussions also focused on the rationale behind those measures , and on the specific 
factors that determined the termination or non -renewal of certain measures. Also, some Members 
shared their views on the effectiveness of these measures. Finally, Mem bers drew some conclusions 
and lessons learned. At this session, Canada, Colombia, the European Union, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
the United Kingdom,  and the United States participated as speakers to exchange their practices on 
this topic , and six  additional Mem bers took the floor to share their views and experiences. The 
Secretariat report summarizing the discussions held at this session , including all the relevant 
documents and presentations , will be circulated in document  JOB/MA/152/Add.3.  
5.7.  The Chairperson than ked Members for their active engagement and for sharing their valuable 
experiences during the four  experience -sharing  sessions. The Chairperson also thanked the 
CMA team for the extra work and effort that they had put in to organizing the sessions.  
5.8.  The exercise had been launched at the beginning of the year because Members had expressed 
an interest in receiving information and updates about any COVID -19-related work being undertaken 
that was of relevance to the Committee. Members also called on the Committee to provide a forum 
to exchange views and experiences at the technical level in relation to these issues . 
5.9.  The Chairperson stated that , based on  his personal assessment , the series of 
experience -sharing sessions ha d been extremely useful: (i)  to improve Members' understanding of 
the main challenges faced during the pandemic; (ii)  to share information about how those  challenges 
had been addressed in practice by Members, including what specific actions or measures had been  
taken; and (iii)  to share kn owledge about which  solutions had worked well , and what lessons had 
been learnt  that could help Members to be better prepared for any future crisis. 
5.10.  The Chairperson informed Members that , given the comments and suggestions heard at the 
last experience -sharing session regarding the importance of ongoing technical discussions and 
information sharing in the Committee, he had sent to Members , on 19  September  2022,  an email 
summarizing the two  main concrete suggestions on how best to move forward that had been raised 
at the meeting. These were: (i)  to organize a fifth  session , focusing mainly on the lessons learnt 
across each topic identified during previous sessions. Some delegations also expressed an interest 
in hearing the views of other stakeholders  impacted by the pandemic , including those of the private 
sector, academia, other international organi zations , and NGOs; and (ii)  to task the Secretariat to 
prepare a compilation of the main practices and lessons learnt during the pandemic, based on the 
information provided by Members during the experience -sharing sessions.  
5.11.  As the Chairperson had communicated in his email of 28  September  2022, no delegation had 
opposed the proposed way forward. Accordingly, the Chairperson informed Members that the 
fifth experience -sharing session , focusing on lessons learnt , was to  take place on 
21 November  2022, from 12:00 to 15:00 , in a hybrid format, in order to allow for participation from 
Capital s. In preparation for the session, the Secretariat had prepare d a compilat ion of the main 
lessons learnt under each of the topics discussed, which would subsequently be integrated into the 
discussions held at the fifth  session. As pointed out by several  Members, the participation of the 
private sector , and other stakeholders affected by the pandemic , would  provide substantia additional 
input into the work of the Committee , affording it a global  and holistic picture of the overall situation.  
5.12.  Therefore, the Chairperson  encourage d Members  to think about potential speakers  for the 
fifth experience -sharing session , both from the public and private sector s, including other non -state 
actors , such as NGOs or academia, and enquire whether they would be willing to contribute to the 
session. The p articipation of various stakeholders offering diverse perspectives and backgrounds 
would be of great benefit to the activity. The deadline to propose speakers was set as 
7 November  2022. The Chairperson requested  Members  already to take note of th is date , although  
the Secretariat would  follow -up with a written communication to confirm it . G/MA/M/77  
 
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  5.13.  The representative from the European Union , addressing Agenda Items  3, 4, and 5,  indicated 
the following:  
5.14.  The European Union thanks the colleagues from the WCO  Secretariat for the ir update on the 
activities of the HS  Committee. The EU agrees that such updates are very useful in order for 
Members to be kept abreast of what is happening at the WCO. In addition , as Canada mentioned, 
such updates also increase WTO  Members' internal discussions and coordination. The refore, the EU  
thank s the WCO for its update on its ongoing work on COVID -19. The EU is also very encouraged 
by the positive feedback to the Committee 's letter, both on the issue of classification and that of 
closer cooperation in the case of emergency situations. The EU looks forward to an update of the 
thinking and the work going forward on this issue . At the same time , the EU has taken the point 
that this needs to be a two -way process between the Committee  on Market Access and the 
HS Committee , with the support of the ir respective Secretariat s. 
5.15.  On Agenda I tem 5, the European Union  thank s the Secretariat  and Chairperson  for all the ir 
work thus far, including on the very comprehensive report of the various experience -sharing sessions 
that the Committee had held in relation to the COVID -19 pandemic . The EU very much agreed with 
the Chairperson that these session s had been informative , and very useful , to better understand 
Members' challenges and responses when confronted with the need to facilitate the movement of 
essential goods across borders.  
5.16.  The European Union fully recognize s the importance of easing trade in essential 
COVID -19-related goods to combat the pandemic. The EU has heard that Members have done so 
through different channels, notably through reducing, suspending, or eliminating customs duties and 
taxes, waiving or deferring payments, and simplifying customs procedures and processes. The EU  
definitely  sees value in continuing these discussions. Indeed, the EU is supportive of the next steps 
as outlined  by the Chairperson , including a fifth information -sharing  session engaging more closely 
with stakeholders , and circulation  of a report containing all the technical sessions in to a single 
document , thereby helping to capture the main lessons learned.  
5.17.  The European Union  stressed that , unfortunately, one could not rule out a ny future pandemic 
or crisis, and that shortages might then concern different types of goods. In this regard, the EU 
considered that Members should reflect on how they could best use the existing WTO  mechanisms 
in order to be able to quickly react to, and engage with , other Members in response to any future 
crisis. 
5.18.  The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
5.19.  The United Kingdom welcomes the Chairperson's summary, together with the report on the 
latest information -sharing session. The UK has found the presentations shared by Members at these 
sessions to be really stimulating , and these, together with the Secretariat reports, have been useful 
as the UK has continued to reflect, alongside other Members, on its own trade responses to the 
COVID -19 pandemic. The breadth of engagement and input through this process has really 
underlined its value to the UK, including the importance of information sharing as a key pillar of this 
Organization . The UK thanks the Secretariat for its efforts to provide opportunities for all Members 
to feed in through the trad e policy survey, and encourage s other Members to complete it as the UK 
finds analysing it very helpful.  
5.20.  The United Kingdom also welcomes the Secretariat's work taking forward issues that have 
emerged during these sessions, especially in writing to the WCO on classification issues , as we have 
heard about earlier . It has been promising to see the positive reaction to the letter at the HSC, 
including the pragmatic next steps to consider possible HS  reform for critical medical goods that 
have been difficult to distinguish in the HS. The UK thanks the Chairperson of the HSC for being here 
at the meeting , and for the pragmatic link being formed between the Committees on technical issues . 
The UK hopes that this work can become a template for future collaboration.  
5.21.  The United Kingdom also looks forward to the fifth  information session in November. This can 
be an opportunity to reflect on the lessons learned and how momentum can be maintained in 2023. 
In the UK 's view, there are further areas for exploration, includin g how policy makers  have taken 
account of developing country interests in trade policy design , and how we can work effectively 
across supply chains. The UK also welcomes an opportunity to hear from stakeholders, who will have G/MA/M/77  
 
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  wider perspectives. A further session could be used to explore the nature and scope of such 
engagement. The UK looks forward to working closely with all Members and the Secretariat as this 
process continues to evolve into 2023.  
5.22.  The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
5.23.  Colombia wishes to thank past and current Committee Chairpersons, interested Members , 
and the Secretariat , for their efforts in organizing experience -sharing sessions until now. It has been 
a constructive exercise , which  has allowed Members to learn from one  another about their practices 
and policies in the context of a crisis. Colombia had an opportunity to present its own experience at 
the last session , when it discussed the overall framework of its adopted trade measures, trade 
facilitation measures , and e xport-restricting measures. Colombia is of the view that there are 
important conclusions and lessons learned from all the sessions, which can benefit all Members in a 
cross-cutting way. Regarding the Chairperson's report, Colombia supports holding a fifth  session, 
with the participation of interested parties who can assist us with the analysis , especially  as Members 
will benefit from a plurality of views. In this regard, Colombia will propose the names of certain 
organizations that could provide inputs. Col ombia supports the proposal for the Secretariat to 
prepare a document compiling the main practices, policies , and lessons learned in response to the 
pandemic. The documents containing the conclusions of each experience -sharing session could serve 
as a basi s for such a compendium. Colombia considers it important for this document to be practical 
in nature , and to include recommendations with which Members  can easily identify. In Colombia's 
opinion, the document should serve as a reference for policymakers in  addressing future or potential 
crisis situations. For example , the document could underscore the importance of voluntary 
notifications of trade facilitation measures , and indicate the procedure to be followed to implement 
such notifications. It could also stress the importance of maintaining channels of communication 
among Members' authorities , and to identify successful mechanisms. In Colombia's view, this need 
not be  a binding or prescriptive document , but more of a roadmap to help Members better address 
any crisis that may arise in future.  
5.24.  The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
5.25.  Ecuador welcomes the report that has been submitted  on the exchange of exp eriences in the 
face of the COVID -19 pandemic. Ecuador  sees great value in the analysis  carried out so far, in which 
Ecuador has actively participated, as well as in the next steps proposed by the Chairperson, such as 
the fifth  session , and the document on  lessons learned . It is important to highlight that one of the 
results of this exercise was precisely the letter sent to the WCO, to which we have received very 
positive feedback at the current meeting . 
5.26.  Ecuador  looks forward to an exchange with other relev ant actors that will allow us to have a 
clearer idea of the overall impact of the measures adopted . This will also contribute to our objective 
of having a practical guide to be better prepared for future crises.  
5.27.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the  following:  
5.28.  Thailand wishes to thank the Chairperson  and the Secretariat for the  comprehensive  report 
on the experience -sharing sessions , and for having organized the four  experience -sharing sessions , 
which have set a good example for other Committees to follow , and that were, of course , the origin 
of the proposal to the WCO that we were discussing earlier . In this regard, Thailand  wishes to thank  
its colleagues from the WCO for providing us with their update s. Thailand  would also like to thank 
the Chairperson  for giving us an opportunity to make a presentation in the second 
experience -sharing session.  
5.29.  At the same time , Thailand  believe s that Members  have not yet reached the stage where a 
concrete outco me has been achieved based on the four  experience -sharing sessions. Therefore, it is 
important for the Membership to continue to work together. Thailand is looking forward to 
participating in the fifth  experience -sharing session.  
5.30.  The representative of the Kyrgyz Rep ublic indicated the following : 
5.31.  The Kyrgyz Republic wishes to thank the Chairperson  for his report and summary on the 
experience -sharing sessions on trade in COVID -19 related goods. The Kyrgyz Republic very much G/MA/M/77  
 
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  agree s with the Chairperson's statement that these experience -sharing sessions have been 
informative and useful for WTO  Members. The Kyrgyz Republic also thank s all those Members that 
have shared their valuable experience in trade measures adopted as a response to the pandemic. 
Indeed, it has been an efficient platform for sharing and exchanging information and views on this 
matter. As noted by the Chairperson , this in turn contributes to countries be ing better prepared for 
any future crisis. The Kyrgyz Republic also appreciate s all of the Secretariat's effort s in organizing 
the last four  sessions. The Kyrgyz Republic support s the involvement of other stakeholders in the 
next session, the  fifth session, and very much look s forward to participat ing in it.  
5.32.  The Committee took note  of the reports and the statements made.  
6  OPERATION OF THE INTEGRATED DATA BASE (IDB) AND THE CONSOLIDATED TARIFF 
SCHEDULES (CTS) DATABASE  
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were four  issues to discuss under this agenda it em, 
namely: (i)  the status of implementation of the IDB  Decision; (ii)  the status of IDB  notifications; 
(iii) the document with the list of Members' official websites; and (iv)  the status of the CTS  database.  
He recalled that a full version of the Secretar iat's report and the presentation had been made 
available as room documents12 and in the eAgenda and would be incorporated into the minutes of 
the meeting.  
6.1  Status of implementation of the 2019  IDB Decision  
6.2.  The Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) reported that additional projects had been undertaken 
relating to the implementation of provisions indicated in document  G/MA/367. Based on the 
user-interface consultant's final report, a prototype with sample web pages was under development. 
Further more, another consultant would begin the calculation of indicators that would be published 
in the new portal.  
6.3.  On the automatic transmission of data (paragraph  8 of document  G/MA/67), an agreement had 
been finalized with Mauritius and initial meetings/consultatio ns had taken place with other Members . 
The current status of ongoing engagements with Members was as follows: (1)  for Norway, an 
API-based data extraction for MFN and other applied tariffs was planned by Capital ; (2) for Mexico, 
some issues with the data on imports were being sorted out; (3)  for Paraguay, a follow -up meeting 
with technical, capital -based officials would be scheduled; (4)  for Singapore, an initial meeting had 
been held with Ministry of Trade and Geneva delegates. Meanwhile, the other paralle l project related 
to ADN for members using ASYCUDA was progressing. The projects were already ongoing with Côte 
d'Ivoire, Madagascar,  and Togo,  as reported in previous meetings. Discussions also continued with 
Uganda. Development of the module to automate some of the tasks relating to data receipt, 
validation, integration, updating of the information system, data transformation , and  final 
dissemination of data , was continuing.  
6.4.  The representative of Mauritius  indicated the following:  
6.5.  Mauritius is pleased to inform Members that it has recently entered into an agreement with the 
WTO Secretariat for the automatic trans mission  of data to the IDB. Since such agreements are being 
made on a case -by-case basis , and include terms and conditions in which the required data will be 
obtained  from Members, Mauritius has been working with the WTO  Secretariat since the beginning 
of the year to finalize the agreement. Mauritius takes this opportunity to thank the WTO  Secretariat, 
in particular the IDB Unit, for the successful completion of this agreement.  Mauritius' capital -based 
officials will automatically upload applied tariff data and import statistics directly , as per the agreed 
timeline , onto the cloud server of the  WTO.  Mauritius is confident that the automatic transmission 
of data to the IDB will lessen the notification burden on Members and reduce bureaucracy . 
6.6.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.7.  Canada thank s Mauritius for taking this voluntary s tep. Canada has  spoken a lot about this 
process in the Committee , and the rich information that Mauritius is providing , on a voluntary basis, 
is great, and to be applauded. Such information helps to maintain the various databases, the 
 
12 Documents  RD/MA/104 and RD/MA /106.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  IDB itself, and also helps the rest of the business world  to understand the prevailing business 
conditions , including the sizable sector of our economies comprising MSMEs. Canada continue s to 
encourage Members to reach out to the Secretariat to discuss and determine if a voluntary process 
to upload tariff and trade data to the IDB would be of use to them, especially in terms of lessen ing 
their notification  burden.  
6.8.  The Committee took note of the Secretariat's report and the statements made.  
6.2  Status of IDB  notific ations  
6.9.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to the Secretariat's report on tariffs and imports of 
Members  that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.56.  
6.10.  The Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) recalled that the cut-off date used in the report had 
been 28 September  2022, more than one  month ahead of the deadline for 2021  imports notification , 
which falls on 31  October  2022. Hence, the latest datasets due from Members are 2022  tariffs , for 
which the deadline was 30  March  2022 while for imp orts, the latest outstanding year remains 2020 , 
the datasets for which were due on 31  October  2021. The electronic copy of 
document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.56 , for all years from 1996 , was also available for download from the 
site https://IDBFileExchange.wto.org . A "call to notify" email for 2021  imports , with a 
comprehensive list of all outstanding data , was sent to the M embers concerned in early 
September  2022. For the statistics cited below, the cut -off date was 7  October  2022.  
6.11.  For 2022 applied tariffs , 55% (75 of 136  expected notifications) are already available. Based 
on all expected yearly notifications of Members from 1996, applied tariffs data are 82%  complete.  
Of the 75  notifications for 2022 applied tariffs , 58 were official submissions , while the other 17  had 
been collected by the Secretariat from approved "framework sources". As to the inclusion of other 
applied tariffs, notably preferential rates, 52  submissions (or 69% of received notifications) i ncluded 
non-MFN duty schemes. Further more, four notifications had contained the optional additional import 
taxes. Overall, 50  Members , representing 37% of all notifying Members , now had a complete 
notification record on MFN  applied tariffs. However, there remain ed 45 Members (33%) with six or 
more years of outstanding applied tariff data.  
6.12.  The 2021  imports were not yet due , hence the statistics below were still based on the 
notification of 2020 imports , due in October  2021. There were 61 notifications available , which 
represent ed 45% of the 136  expected notifications. All of these were notified as no framework 
dataset for 2020 was collected yet. Of these datasets, 41 of the expected 30% had been submitted 
by the 31  October  2021 deadline . Of the  data on imports required for submission from notifying 
Members for the years 1996 to 2020 , 75% were complete. For all data on imports due for those 
years, 47  Members , or 35% of notifying Members , had submitted their complete data. The number 
of Members with six or more years of data which were yet to be submitted was 52, representing 
38% of notifying Members. On a positive note, there were already 28  Members that had  notified 
their 2021 imports ahead of the deadline.  
6.13.  The number of recomposed tariffs , as provided for in paragraph  22 of document  G/MA/367, 
which referred  to "estimated" MFN  tariffs when a single year historical tariff dataset was outstanding 
but the tariffs for adjacent years and imports for the correspond ing year had been notified, remained 
at 35 country periods , with the latest recomposed year as 2015. The IDB would send out a 
notification reminder email to all Members with outstanding data after the 30  March  2022 tariff 
deadline to determine if missing h istorical tariffs could still be collected. Further more, the Secretariat 
would examine existing notifications to see if additional notified imports could be integrated with 
recomposed applied MFN  tariffs which had been outstanding for at least five years ( 2017 or earlier).  
6.14.  Overall, as of the same data cut -off point, the IDB disseminated data consist ed of 
2,858  country periods of either applied tariffs with matched imports at the national tariff line level , 
or either of the required notifications. All WTO  Members, except for Afghanistan , and eight  acceding 
countries  (Algeria, Bahamas, Belarus,  Bhutan, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea,  Iran, and Serbia) have 
notified their data in the IDB , and this data has been disseminated via the online portals TAO and 
WTODATA . G/MA/M/77  
 
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  6.15.  The Automatic Data Notification Agreement with WTO Members is expected not only to lessen 
Member's notification burden , but also, simultaneously , to improve the timeliness and completeness 
of the IDB data. Furthermore, the Secretariat's data integration process can also be made more 
efficient through streamlined processes. The ASYCUDA  modules on data extraction and integration 
are versatile enough and can easily be adapted for use in the customs office s of other WTO Members 
using ASYCUDA. The Secretariat would welcome discussion of this ADN -ASYCUDA  model , which is 
already operational in a few countries , with other interested Members using ASYCUDA.  
6.16.  On PTA -TM data (Table  1), which are considered as requir ed IDB  notification , based on 
document  G/MA/367, the 24  notifying Members (the EU-27 and the UK are counted separately from 
2021 for tariffs , and Switzerland and Liechtenstein count as one) of the PTA, 17  Members have 
notified the required applied tariffs (MFN plus the PTA  preferences), one  Member notified only MFN 
without the preferential tariffs , and six Members have no applied tariff notification yet for 2022. On 
imports data with breakdown by the PTA -TM required duty scheme, there were 15  received out o f 
24 expected for 2020 (UK notifies imports separately from 2020) of which 2  Members had submitted 
just the regular imports data without the breakdown by PTA -TM duty scheme , and 7  Members had 
not yet submitted any of their data on imports . As stipulated in paragraph  5 of the new IDB  decision , 
and to avoid multiple processing of data, the Secretariat will await the complete PTA -TM datasets 
(tariffs or imports) before integrating the notifications.  
Table 1. Status of Notifications of Require d PTA -TM data  
Data Notified  Number  Per cent (%)  
Applied MFN Tariff + PTA Preferences  
2020  2021  2022  2020  2021  2022  
MFN Only  0 2 1 0 8 4 
MFN + GSP/LDC (incl. Other PTAs) + 
Other Duty Schemes  21 18 17 91 75 71 
No Notification  2 4 6 9 17 25 
Expected PTA Tariff Notificationsa
 23 24 24 100 100 100 
 Imports by PTA Duty Scheme  
 2018  2019  2020  2018  2019  2020  
Regular imports with no breakdown by 
PTA duty scheme  5 4 2 22 17 8 
With PTA -TM breakdown  17 16 15 74 70 63 
No notification  1 3 7 4 13 29 
Expected PTA Import Notificationsa
 23 23 24 100 100 100 
 a  EU tariff notifications until 2020 include its 27  member States and the UK. From 2021, UK tariffs were 
notified separately. The UK also made its own submission for its 2020 imports.  
6.17.  After the data cut -off point for document  G/MA/IDB/2/Rev.56 on 28  September  2022, the 
following additional notifications had been received until 7  October  2022, excluding those indicated 
as preliminary , and when annual values could not  be calculated from the data submitted : Nicaragua 
(2021 imports ); and Panama (2022 MFN tariffs ). One important information on the statistics 
calculated from data on imports published in the related IDB  dissemination portals  is that trade 
notified with invalid HS  codes, specifically those starting with HS  98 or 99, are not included in the 
calculation of disseminated totals. Each country/year dataset is coherent and complete, in terms of 
the HS  classification for both tariffs and imports if the latter is available. It has been noted that , for 
a few cases, the share of total trade for these HS  codes outside of the standard HS  chapters can be 
substantial , and at least 30%. Another related issue is when the partner economy or the source of 
the imported products is unidentified. For these cases, the totals include the imports from these 
unknown partners , although doing market access analysis on the main supp liers would pose G/MA/M/77  
 
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  problems. A few of the Members with whom this issue has been raised have claimed national data 
secrecy laws (new or existing) that prohibit them from notifying data for eventual publication for 
which the individual enterprise engaged in im porting the product could  be identified.  
6.18.  Since the last meeting of the Market Access Committee , on 30  March  2022, the Secretariat 
had participated in the following technical assistance activities (regional and national) concerning 
the IDB/CTS  data and rela ted topics:  
• eRTPC for Asia-Pacific Region on 16  June; 
• ATPC – English (in -person) on 20 -23 June; 
• Programme du Cours d'introduction à la politique commerciale de l'OMC pour les 
PMA – French on 23  September ; 
• Paraguay on the HS20 07 transposition file  on 11  March ; 
• Cuba on the  HS2017 transposition file on 16  May; 
• Ecuador on tariff quotas in their CTS  file on 25  May; and 
• Sri Lanka  – 2 meetings with  Ambassador and capital experts on the  HS2017 
transposition file  on 17 and 23  August . 
 
6.19.  The 2022  edition of the World Tariff Profiles was launched in July  2022, with special topics on 
preferential rules of origin in international trade and the use of NTMs on "green " and "brown " energy 
products. The number of downloads for the last two  months since it was launched on 29 July is more 
than 43,600. The previous year' s edition, WTP  2021, had been downloaded close to 178,000  times.  
6.20.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
6.21.  Canada has a question relating to Section  8 of the IDB  decision , which is the framework for 
overcoming significant gaps in information. Is there any context or background that could be 
provide d for the number of Members that have not submitted information in six years or more 
(e.g.,  the 45  number and 52  number  in the chart) , and any sort of effort that you have undertaken 
to try to close  this gap ? Canada assumes that six  years would be a significant gap, but perhaps not 
for all. Canada would appreciate receiving any updates in this regard . 
6.22.  The representative of the WTO Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza)  replied that t he Secretariat  
sent a "call to notify" to Members  at least twice per year, including a list of their outstanding 
notification s. In addition , the Secretariat  also looked at other available  sources, such as the  United 
Nations  Comtrade Database. If data was available from that s ource , the Secretariat  informed the 
Members concerned and requested their authorization to use it. If the Member agree d, the 
Secretariat could then source the data from such a "framework source" . If Members did not reply, 
the Secretariat could not reproduce the data that was available in C omtrade and use it as the 
Member's official notification  to the IDB . Indeed, the Secretariat had concluded certain framework 
agreements  with Members whereby , once data was available  from a framework sourc e, it could be 
used by the Secretariat as an official IDB  notification . The problem  with significant gaps was that 
some  of the data was not recent  (i.e. "historical " data) , and Members  had already informed the 
Secretariat that they could not complete their  notification. In these cases, while the data remained 
part of the statistics , the Secretariat removed it from the "call to notify " letter because Members 
were not able to provide the data . 
6.23.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
6.24.  Canada appreciate s the Secretariat's efforts to identify sources of information. Canada also 
wonders if this is another example for Members that seem to have difficulties in submitting data. 
Maybe there is a way for further d iscussions to come back to the IDB  decision about voluntarily 
having the Secretariat get the data via the internet. Canada has seen presentations about  
paragraph  8 of the Decision , and the way that the Secretariat is able to "scrape " the information 
from Member s' available data sources to help them to produce the information required by the 
IDB decision. Canada encourage s Members to reach out to the Secretariat, especially those that are 
having trouble in submitting their information, and those with six or more missing  years . Again, this 
information is highly useful to all Members in terms of our analysis of trading patterns , to our own 
stakeholders, and to MSMEs in terms of the market access requirements that they may face in other 
markets , including that of  your neighbours . The Secretariat is a great source of support for help ing 
Members to access this information, And Canada encourage s the Members concerned to reach out G/MA/M/77  
 
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  to see if there are ways that they can be supported , especially with regard to the IDB data, which is 
essential to  us all. 
6.25.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following : 
6.26.  The United States echoes the comments that Canada has made , and wonders, in terms of 
context , if the Secretariat would comment on the rep orting, including how it change s, and how 
compliance  has changed  since the more recent IDB  decision versus the prior decision . The US' 
recollection is that the Decision was intended to help to facilitate improvements in reporting , and 
wonders about how this is going . 
6.27.  The representative of the WTO Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) replied that , indeed , 
compliance with the IDB  notification  had really improved  under the 2019  Decision, especially for the 
most recent years. As  mentioned previously, the big data gap was for th e earlier years that were 
still included in the notification requirement. The Secretariat needed help to look up or complet e the 
historical data from certain Members , as at that point, they probably had no technical capaci ty to 
look for their ancient data and notify them to the IDB. For the next meeting, the Secretariat might 
consider showing a  reduced data period  from, for example, 2008, or 1996 , to have a better 
understanding of how the notification  compliance  had really improved , even if this also formed part 
of the trade policy report for which the Secretariat and Members had yearly data from 1996.  
6.28.  The representative of Namibia  indicated the following : 
6.29.  Namibia's comment , or question , is more closely aligned  to that raised earlier by Canada, 
specifically on the frequency in terms of the notification reminders that the Secretariat has to make 
to member States. Namibia considers that it is very important that this be done in order to remind 
Members to submit their outst anding notification s. Namibia wished also to comment on the 
Comtrade . In this regard, Namibia's worry  is that there are institutions that are mandated to supply 
statistics ; for example , Namibia has the Namibia Statistics Agency, with the ma ndate to supply data 
both on import/ export as well as other economic  figure s or indicators. Namibia wishes to know to 
what extent the Secretariat normally use s the Comtrade data. In Namibia's view, this data is mostly 
mirrored  and does not represent the actual import figu res for member States . For this reason, 
Namibia wished to seek the Secretariat's clarification on this point . 
6.30.  The representative of the WTO Secretariat  (Ms Adelina Mendoza) clarified that , whatever data 
was included in the IDB was official ly approved by the Member concerned . In other words, even if 
the source was Comtrade , the Secretariat  did not include any data that had not been officially 
approved by the Member itself . If the data was from Comtrade , the Secretariat  still sent out a letter 
to the Capital, through the mission in Geneva, inform ing them that th e data had been sourced  from 
Comtrade , that it mostly reflected imports, and if the Member wished to comment. In fact, the 
Secretariat  did not include anything that the Member had indicat ed was not representative , or that 
did not reflect the import data  of that Member . Therefore , everything that was in the IDB had been 
officially  approved by the Member  insofar as no  comment had been received by the Secretariat 
within 30  days of it having sent out its letter . After this deadline, the data became public  and was 
disseminated . She also mentioned that the  automatic data notifications  pursuant to paragraph  8 of 
the IDB  Decision had proven to be quite successful for those Members that had  agreed it , and it had 
really lessen ed the burden on Capitals , as well as ensuring the timely availability of data. 
Furthermore, it added significant value to the IDB , as well as to  other stakeholders that depend ed 
on the database for their analytical need s. 
6.31.  The Committee took note of the Secretariat's report and the statements made.  
6.3  List of Members' official websites with tariff information and import statistics  
6.32.  The Chairperson  recalled that the 2019  IDB Decision required the Secretariat to prepare a list 
of Members' official websites containing tariff information and import statistics. A seventh  revision 
of this document had been prepared by the Secretariat. In this regard, the Secretariat had consulted G/MA/M/77  
 
- 20 - 
 
  with Members informally prior to circulating thi s seventh  revision , in 
document  G/MA/IDB/W/13/Rev.7 , which was also available on the WTO  website .13 
6.33.  The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) thanked Members for providing updates to the 
document. This information was also included in the WTO  webpage and could easily be found and 
accessed by everybody. He encouraged Members to inform the Secretariat of any change so that 
this information could be kept up to date.  
6.34.  The Chairperson  reminded  delegations to test the links and inform the Secretariat as soon as 
possib le of any change , in particular where information was missing,  so that the information could 
be kept up to date.  
6.35.  The Committee took note of the Secretariat's report . 
6.4  Status of the CTS  database  
6.36.  The Chairperson  drew the Committee's attention to the Secretariat 's report on the status of 
the CTS  database. A full version of the Secretariat's report and presentation had been made available 
as room documents14 and on eAgenda and would be incorporated into the minutes  of the meeting.  
6.37.  The Secretariat  (Ms Alya Belkhodja) reported that the Secretariat had made CTS  files 
available to all Members on the TAO.15 Out of the 135  CTS files, 62 had been made available in 
HS2017 , 41 in HS2012 , 17 in HS2007 , 13 in HS2002 , and two  remained in HS96. All legal 
instruments were available through the Goods Schedule e -Library  (https://goods -
schedules.wto.org/ ). 
6.38.  In addition, the Secretariat ha d published on TAO the complete CTS  database in MS  Excel in 
June 2021. Each Member's file reflect ed the latest information on bound commitments as included 
in the CTS  MS Access files. However, the  CTS files in Excel follow ed the presentation used in the 
legal instruments, as for example the Uruguay Round Schedule of concessions. An updated version 
of the CTS  Excel files had been  posted to TAO on 4  October  2022.  
6.39.  The Chairperson  thank ed the Secretariat for facilitating access to the information on 
Schedules of  concessions through the CTS  files in Excel , as this was of great help to Members.  
6.40.  The Committee took note of the Secretariat report.  
7  DERESTRICTION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATING MATERIALS – DRAFT 
DECISION  
7.1.  The Chairperso n remind ed Members that the Committee had started discussing the possible 
derestriction of the Uruguay Round bilateral negotiating material in January  2021. The documents 
proposed for derestriction had been  circulated by the Secretariat on 26  April 2021, and Members  
had originally been given until 31  October  2021 to review the documents before the Committee 
could take a decision regarding their derestriction.  
7.2.  At the Committee's informal meeting of 27  June 2022, Members had indicated that they were 
in favour of the ov erall derestriction and had agreed to proceed on the basis of the "Procedures for 
the Uruguay Round Derestriction process" , circulated in document  G/MA/W/176/Rev.1. Based on 
these procedures, Members had  been given until 23  September  2022 to review the doc uments and 
inform the Secretariat of which documents, if any, should remain restricted . After the deadline, the 
Secretariat had updated the draft Decision to reflect in the Annex only the documents that Members 
had authorized for derestriction. The revised  draft decision with the final list of documents proposed 
for derestriction had been  circulated in document  G/MA/W/177/Rev.1 . 
7.3.  The Chairperson noted that , after circulation of the revised draft decision, the Secretariat had 
been contacted by one delegation that requested that certain documents remained restricted. The 
 
13 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/markacc_e/tariffandimpofwebsites_e.htm   
14 Documents  RD/MA/104 and RD/MA/106.  
15 https://tao. wto.org  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  Secretariat w ould therefore proceed to issue a second  revision of the draft decision befor e it was 
sent to the General Council, through the Council for Trade in Goods, for appropriate action. He 
clarified  that no document w ould be derestricted before the General Council had adopt ed the draft  
decision.  
7.4.  The Chairperson  therefore proposed that the  Committee adopt the draft decision on the 
derestriction of the Uruguay Round negotiating materials on the basis of 
document  G/MA/W/177/ Rev.1. After the meeting, the Secretariat w ould prepare a second  revision 
to remove the documents of the concerned  deleg ation and w ould send it by email to all Members , 
indicating a time-period  in which Members could review the document and submit their comments . 
In the absence of any comments from Members within the deadline indicated by the Secretariat in 
its communicatio n, the revised decision w ould be circulated as document  G/MA/W/177/R ev.2 and 
forwarded to the General Council, through the Council for Trade in Goods , for appropriate action.  
7.5.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
7.6.  Yes, it can be agreed from Canada's perspective . Nevertheless,  Canada will probably join that 
other delegation in requesting a document or two to be removed from the list of those documents 
to be included . Canada will communicate this to the Secretariat  separately . 
7.7.  The representative of South Africa  indicated the following : 
7.8.  Along the same lines as Canada, South Africa requests the Chairperson to make a slight 
amendment to his conclusion by saying that any Member may submit any request prior to the 
GC meeting , and that such request would also be taken into account in the final version.  
7.9.  The WTO Secretariat  (Ms Roberta Lascari)  clarified that , before going to the G eneral Council , 
the draft  decision , if approved by the CMA , would then go to the C ouncil for Trade in Goods for 
appropriate action. As the CTG was scheduled to meet on 24 -25 November  2022, she requested 
Members to send any request for modification of the document s listed in the Annex  of the draft 
decision to the Secretariat  by 23  November  2022. 
7.10.  The WTO Secretariat  (Mr Roy Santana)  reminded Members that GC meeting s were very 
complicated and encouraged them not to leave such requests  up to that moment  because  it became 
very difficult to handle  them at that point , and ran the risk of actually prolong ing the meeting 
scheduled to take place on 19 and 20  December. But if it could be agree d before then it would be 
easier to handle for everyone.  
7.11.  The representative of India indicated the following : 
7.12.  India has confirmed that it does not have any objections to the derestriction of the Uruguay 
Round negotiating materials and the process adopted for this draft decision.  
7.13.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following : 
7.14.  Indonesia wishes to join the decision  but express es its suppo rt to the document being open 
for endorsement at later stage by Members who may still need more time to conduct their internal 
consultation s on this matter . 
7.15.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Committee adopt t he decision as reproduced in 
document  G/MA/W/177 /Rev.1.  
7.16.  It was so agreed .16 
 
16 The General Council Decision w as adopted on 20  December  2022 and circulated in 
document  WT/L/1159.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  8  NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO THE DECISION ON NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR 
QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS  
8.1.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to the notifications of quantitative restrictions (QRs) 
from 20 Members , of which two were first -time notifications , and noted that many of these 
notifications related to full notifications for the biennial period 2022 -2024. He tha nked those 
delegations that had sent their notifications by the deadline of 30  September  2022, as well as those 
that had sent their notifications after the agenda of the meeting had closed, for complying with this 
important transparency obligation. Finally , he recalled that, in the case of a connection problem 
preventing any Member from indicating that it wished to have more time to examine a notification, 
and thus keep the notification on the Committee's agenda for its next formal meeting, that Member 
would have until 26 October  2022 to inform the Secretariat accordingly.  
8.1  Notifications  
− Argentina  (G/MA/QR/N/ARG/3 ) 
8.2.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Argentina for 
the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated i n document  G/MA/QR/N/ARG/3. The 
notification contain ed information on a temporary suspension of a measure introduced in response 
to COVID -19. 
8.3.  The Committee took note of this notification . 
− Australia (G/MA/QR/N/AUS/ 5/ADD.4,  G/MA/QR/N/AUS/6)  
8.4.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to two new notifications from Australia that had been  
circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/AUS/5/ Add.4 and G/MA/QR/N/AUS/6. The latter notification 
was Australia's complete notification for the biennial period 2022 -2024.  
8.5.  The Committee took note  of these notification s. 
− Cambodia  (G/MA/QR/N/KHM/1/ADD.1)  
8.6.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification from Cambodi a that had been 
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/KHM/1/Ad d.1 and relate d to the termination of measures 
introduced in response to COVID -19. 
8.7.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
8.8.  Canada thank s Cambodia for providing this notification of their termination of measures. That 
is one of the discussions that we have been having over the past years about the use of export 
restrictions, in this context  regarding  the use of QRs, and the importance not only just of notifying 
them when they are put  into effect , but also providing information when they are rescinded or taken 
out. It is a very good practice.  
8.9.  The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Canada  (G/MA/QR/N/CAN/4/ADD.3, G/MA/QR/N/CAN/5)  
8.10.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to two new notifications from Canada that had been  
circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/CAN/4/Add.3 and G/MA/QR/N/CAN/5. The second  notification 
was Canada's complete notification for the biennial period 2022 -2024.  
8.11.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
8.12.  Canada is a strong advocate for enhancing transparency by improving notification compliance. 
As such, I would like to share with the Committee Canada 's experience in updating its quantitative 
restriction notification for the 2022  cycle.  Our objective conti nues to be to provide the most useful 
information possible for Members and other users of the notifications.  In that respect, I would like G/MA/M/77  
 
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  to thank the Secretariat for  its ongoing support, including  the tools and databases it presented to 
Committee delegat es during the workshop in September  2021. My colleagues in Ottawa used them 
extensively as they worked with a number of other Canadian Ministries on an extensive exercise to 
improve Canada's QR  notification.  
8.13.  This work included:  Using the QR and multilatera l environmental agreement (MEA)  databases 
provided by the WTO, we compared Canada's prior notification to those submitted by other Members, 
such as New Zealand, Australia, Singapore,  and the EU, with an eye to copy ing the best practices 
from each.  This pro cess guided some of our decisions to separate or consolidate certain items, and 
to remove SPS -based restrictions that were previously included as QRs.  In the first  instance, 
following the practice of other Members, Canada combined into one  item restriction s on: the 
exportation of certain industrial chemicals ; the importation of certain toxic substances ; and the 
importation of unapproved pest control products. For this, we also considered that the 
three measures had the same WTO  justification , and that there was a significant overlap of HS  codes 
for products subject to restriction.  In the second  example, we deleted references to restrictions on 
human pathogens and on food for human consumption because they are SPS  restrictions that we 
did not believe should b e considered as QRs and therefore should not be part of this notification.  
8.14.  The second  part of this work included u sing the WCO  Interconnection Table to identify items 
within the scope of MEAs like the Rotterdam, Stockholm, and Basel Conventions , as well as  the 
Montreal Protocol.  This database helped Canada to identify and list all affected HS  codes, improving 
transparency as opposed to simply indicating "various " as is a common practice that many Members, 
including Canada, have used in the past.  This process also led us to include in the notification several 
new measures based on international agreements and MEAs , such as the three  individual 
UN Conventions on Narcotics , Psychotropics , and Precursors; the Convention for the Conservation 
of Anadromous F ish Stocks; the Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna and Swordfish ; 
and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.  
8.15.  Lastly, Canada conducted e xtensive consultation s with relevant departments in the 
government . Following the initial work to update and improve Canada's QR  notification, Global 
Affairs Canada used its interdepartmental network to share the notification broadly asking for review 
and further input.  This coordination with other departments brought several new and necessary 
changes to light that otherwise would not have been identified. For example , we deleted the 
reference to Canadian steel safeguards , and we were able to provide additional detail on the 
supporting domestic legislation for certain restricti ons, and clarified the scope of several other 
restrictions , including those on diamonds, industrial chemicals, hazardous waste, ozone depleting 
substances , and mercury compounds.  
8.16.  Canada looks forward to continuing to engage on this initiative and encourage s Members to 
review, improve , and submit their quantitative restrictions notification in a timely manner.  The 
process to review and update the notification was challenging and took almost a year and a half to 
complete. But we are convinced that this effort  was worth it.  We believe it has resulted in an 
improvement in both the quality and the comprehensiveness of the information Canada provides.  A 
number of c hallenges ranged from the identification of relevant officials in the various government 
ministries t hat needed to be engaged, to explain what was required to be done , and why, and to 
convincing them to make our requests a priority . We recognize that preparing notifications requires 
time and a significant effort from a number of ministries and agencies.  In the end, however, it is 
clear that the coordination required within and across organizations contributes to better information 
sharing and can increase policy coherence.  Even in submitting our fifth  full notification, we are aware 
of a few areas where fu rther improvements can be made and will be working on them before 
submitting our sixth  full notification.  We will also continue to consider how best to keep our domestic 
contact lists up to date and ensure we notify all new restrictions  as well within the six-month period 
as provided in the QR  Decision . 
8.17.  The Committee took note  of these notification s. 
− China  (G/MA/QR/N/CHN/6)  
8.18.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from China for the 
biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/CHN/6.  G/MA/M/77  
 
- 24 - 
 
  8.19.  The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− European Union  (G/MA/QR/N/EU/6)  
8.20.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from the European 
Union for the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had  been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/EU/6.  
8.21.  The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Hong Kong, China  (G/MA/QR/N/HKG/5/ADD.1)  
8.22.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification from Hong Kong, China that 
had been circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/HKG/5/A dd.1. 
8.23.  The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Israel  (G/MA/QR/N/ISR/2)  
8.24.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Israel for the 
biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/ISR/2.  
8.25.  The Committee took note  of this notification . 
− Korea, Republic of (G/MA/QR/N/KOR/3/ADD.3, G/MA/QR/N/KOR/4)  
8.26.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to two  new notifications from the Republic of Korea 
in documents  G/MA/QR/N/KOR/3/Add.3 and G/MA/QR/N/KOR/4. The second  notification was 
Korea's complete notification for the biennial period 2022 -2024.  
8.27.  The Committee took note  of these notification s. 
− Kyrgyz Republic  (G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/ADD.16, G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/ADD.17)  
8.28.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to two new notifications from the Kyrgyz Republic  
that had been circulated  in documents  G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add .16 and G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/Add. 17. 
8.29.  The representative of the Kyrgyz Republic  indicated the following : 
8.30.  The Kyrgyz Rep ublic wishes to inform the Secretariat that the QR  measures contained in  
notification  G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/A dd.16 on certain types of agricultural products outside of the 
customs territory of the Eurasian Economic Union  and outside the territory of the Kyrgyz R epublic 
expired on 19  September  2022, after being in force for six months , in accordance with the decree 
of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 140. 
8.31.  The Committee took note  of these notification s. 
− Macao , China  (G/MA/QR/N/MAC/6)  
8.32.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Macao, China 
for the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/MAC/6.  
8.33.  The Committee took note  of this notification.  
− Mali (G/MA/QR/N/MLI/2)  
8.34.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new notification from Mali that had been  
circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/MLI/2. On behalf of the Committee, he congratulated Mali for its 
efforts to provide a comprehensive and improved notif ication as compared to its first QR notification 
circulated in 2013.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  8.35.  The representative of the  European Union  indicated the following : 
8.36.  The European Union thanks all Members that have submitted both ad hoc notifications and 
their biennial notification for 2022 -2024.  Many thanks to Canada for sharing its experience, 
acknowledging both the challenges in preparing a QR  notification , but also highlighting the benefits 
associated with that.  We would like to expr ess particular appreciation to Mali and Nepal,  who have 
provided a notification for 2022 -2024 which also includes information covering prior biennial periods. 
Acknowledging their status as LDCs , we are particularly grateful for this transparency effort.  Lastly, 
we would like to thank the Secretariat as the team has been helpful to the EU as it prepares its own 
notification for 2022 -2024. The EU would encourage Members with questions , or who need 
assistance , to prepare their notification  and to contact the S ecretariat as the Secretariat team is a 
very useful source of advice and support.  
8.37.  The Committee took note of this notification  and the statement made . 
− Mauritius  (G/MA/QR/N/MUS/6)  
8.38.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to a new complete notification from Mauritius for 
the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/MUS/6 , and which 
contain ed measures introduced in response to COVID -19. 
8.39.  The Committee took note of this notification . 
− Moldova, Republic of (G/MA/QR/N/MDA/2/ADD.3)  
8.40.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification by the Republic of Moldova  
that had been c irculated in document  G/MA/QR/N/MDA/2/Ad d.3, and which relate d to the 
termination of measures introduced in response to COVID -19. 
8.41.  The Committee took note of this notification . 
− Nepal  (G/MA/QR/N/NPL/1)  
8.42.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new notification from Nepal in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/NPL/1. On behalf of the  Committee, he thanked Nepal  for its  first notification 
and for complying with this important transparency obligation.  
8.43.  The Committee took note of this notification . 
− The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen  and Matsu  (G/MA/QR/N/TPKM/5)  
8.44.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to a new complete notification from Chinese Taipei 
for the biennial period 2022 -2024 that had been  circulated in document  G/MA/QR/N/TPKM/5.  
8.45.  The Committee took note of this notification . 
− Thailan d (G/MA/QR/N/THA/2, G/M A/QR/N/THA/2/ADD.1, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ADD.2, 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ADD.3, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ADD.4, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ADD.5, 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ADD.6, G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/ADD.7)  
8.46.  The Chairperson  recalled that, at its previous  meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications by Thailand in document s G/MA/QR/N/THA/2  and 
G/MA/QR/N/THA/2 /Add.1 - G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add. 4. Questions remained pending from the 
European Union. Since then, Thailand ha d submitted three  new notifications , which had been  
circulated in  documents  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add .5- G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add. 7. Addend um 6 
contain ed measures introduced in response to COVID -19. 
8.47.  The representative of the  European Union  indicated the following : G/MA/M/77  
 
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  8.48.  As noted in previous meetings, Thailand's import lice nsing requirements for feed wheat should 
have been included in Thailand's QR  notification. In the EU's  view, these requirements are indeed 
non-automatic licensing requirements. The EU encourages Thailand to provide its next biennial  
QR notification as soon  as possible.  
8.49.  The European Union  also reiterates its long -standing deep concerns on the import procedures 
for feed wheat, including the local corn purchase requirement, introduced by Thailand in 2016. These 
have been in place for more than six  years , although they are presented as being of "temporary 
nature ", and remain despite the increase in average domestic corn prices over recent years. The EU 
refers to the detailed points raised in the last meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing  and 
encoura ges Thailand to address the concerns that the EU has repeatedly expressed.  
8.50.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the following : 
8.51.  Thailand thank s the European Union for its continued interest in Thailand's import policies on 
feed wheat. Thailand takes goo d note of the concerns raised by the EU  today, as well as those raised 
in the last meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing , of 7 October  2022, which have already 
been conveyed to Capital . Thailand wishes to refer to its statement delivered at the most recent 
meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing, and reiterate s that the reviews on feed wheat import 
measures are still ongoing. Thailand would also like to take this opportunity to inform Members, and 
the Secretariat , that it submitted its biennial QR notification for 2022 -2024 on 30  September  2022, 
which also covers the previous biennial period . Thailand requests the Secretariat to reflect this under 
this agenda item.  
8.52.  The Chairperson  asked the European Union to clarify whether  it had comments on the most 
recent addenda submitted by Thailand, which had been circulated in 
documents  G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add.5 -G/MA/QR/N/THA/2/Add. 7, and if the Committee could  take 
note of them at its present meeting,  or if it should revert to  them at  the next  meeting.  
8.53.  The representative of the Europe an Union  indicated the following : 
8.54.  The European Union will discuss these issues with the Secretariat.  
8.55.  The Committee took note  of the statements made and agreed to revert to these notifications 
at its next meeting.  
− Ukraine  (G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.2, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.3, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.4, 
G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.5, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.6, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.7, 
G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.8, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/ADD.9, G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6)  
8.56.  The Chairperson  drew Members' attention to nine  new notifications from Ukraine,  which had 
been circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/Add .2- G/MA/QR/N/UKR/5/Add. 9, and 
document  G/MA/QR/N/UKR/6. The latter  notification was Ukraine's  complete notification for the 
biennial period 2022 -2024. 
8.57.  The representative of Ukraine  indicated the following : 
8.58.  Ukraine would like to inform Members of its activity on these issues.  Ukraine remains 
transparent on its measures through the WTO.  Despite Russia's ongoing war of aggression against 
Ukraine, our co untry continues to fulfil its notification obligations to demonstrate its commitment to 
the fundamental rules of this Organization and to ensure the transparency of measures adopted by 
the Government of Ukraine under martial law.  
8.59.  The introduction of restri ctions on export s of certain agricultural and other products was a 
step necessary to ensure national food and economic security.  At the same time, such export 
restricting measures are regularly reviewed and, to the extent possible, replaced by less restric tive 
ones, or abolished altogether.  At present , there are no quantitative restrictions on major items of 
Ukraine's agricultural exports , such as sunflower oil, corn, rape, wheat, sunflower seeds, poultry, 
soybeans , and barley.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  8.60.  The "grain corridor" establis hed by the Black Sea Grain Initiative allowed Ukraine to resume 
sea grain exports. Since its launch in August  2022, 350  vessels , with almost 7.8  million tonnes of 
food onboard , left Ukrainian seaports destined for Asia, Europe,  and Africa.  Ukraine continues 
working with the UN  World Food Program me, and other partners , to increase the amount of food 
sent to those countries  that need it most. Ukraine has also decided to provide humanitarian aid to 
Ethiopia and Somalia, sending them an additional amoun t of grain . Ukraine believe s that the 
extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative will contribute to the stabilization of food prices , thereby  
counteract ing the threat of global hunger.  
8.61.  Ukraine is grateful to the 143 states that supported the UN  General As sembly Resolution that 
condemns Russia 's annexation of four  regions of Ukraine,  for the overwhelming and unwavering 
support for Ukraine at the UN and beyond, and for the strong solidarity in resolute opposition to 
Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine and i ts people.  Ukraine is also very grateful to all Members 
that stand with it in this most distressing time , and  for the comprehensive economic, military, 
humanitarian , and financial support  it has received  in countering the Russian military invasion and 
contributing to the efforts to end this war.  
8.62.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following : 
8.63.  The United States reiterates its condemnation of Russia's brutal, unprovoked , and unjustified 
war of aggression against Ukraine. In particular, we condemn Russia's most recent horrific strikes 
against Ukrainian civilian targets. Russia has specifically targeted playgrounds, universities, and 
apartment buildings, intending to destro y Ukraine's power grids and heating infrastructure.  
8.64.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
8.65.  The Russia n Federation  wishes to raise a point of order  because, in its view, the US 
delegation's remarks have nothing to do with both  the Terms of Reference of the present Committee , 
and nor with the meeting 's agenda.  
8.66.  The Chairperson  explained that it was not possible to ask a Member to stop their intervention, 
and requested the United States to continue.  
8.67.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
8.68.  The Russia n Federation  wishes to ask the Chairperson if he then agree s that the US 
delegation 's remarks fall under the Terms of Reference of the Committee on Market Access . As 
Russia has stated numerous times , discussions on the situation in Ukraine, security concerns, and 
UN Charter enforcement or compliance , evidently go beyond the Terms of Reference of the 
Committee on Market Access. And Canada's delegate reminded us earlier today that there is such a 
docume nt called the "Terms of Reference of the Committee ", and that we need to be mindful of it. 
I think that we need to be mindful of this document not just at the beginning of the meeting , but 
also through out the meeting itself.  
8.69.  The Chairperson  explained that the United States had requested the floor under Agenda 
Item 8 in respect of the QR  notifications of Ukraine.  The Russian Federation had taken  the floor to 
recall the terms of reference of the Committee.  In this respect, he recalled that the Committee's 
terms of reference include d "conducting the updating and analysis of the documentation on 
quantitative restrictions".  For this reason , he returned the floor to the U nited States to hear if they 
had comments with respect to the notifications of Ukraine.  
8.70.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
8.71.  The United States would like to commend Ukraine on its QR  notification s. We applaud  Ukraine 
for the transparency that is provided through these notifications as a result of the measu res it was  
forced to  impose in response to Russia's brutal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against 
Ukraine  and d espite the horrific barrage of Russian missiles raining down on civilian infrastructure , 
far from the front lines of that war. Rus sia is solely responsible for the catastrophic loss of life and 
human suffering in Ukraine, and for raising threats to food security around the world, particularly in 
developing countries. Russia is responsible for the measures that Ukraine notified in the se 
QR notifications. The United States will continue to support Ukraine's courageous effort to defend G/MA/M/77  
 
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  itself, uphold  its territorial integrity , and protect its population, and we applaud Ukraine for its 
commitment to transparency in this body, in light of all that it faces.  
8.72.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following : 
8.73.  The European Union also acknowledge s and commend s Ukraine for its effort and commitment 
to transparency, including through submitting several ad hoc notifications, and submitting its latest 
biennial notification. This, even at a time when the country continues to suffer daily from Russia's 
unprovoked and  unjustified aggression.  We would like to express again the full solidarity of the EU 
and its member States with Ukraine and its people.  This commitment to transparency and  to 
following the WTO's rules, even in these extremely difficult circumstances , also highlights  the 
continued and fundamental importance of the rules -based international trading system , based on 
the international law , which Russia continues to undermine every day with its war of aggression.  
8.74.  The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following : 
8.75.  New Zealand acknowledges the points made on keeping in mind the relevance of the 
discussion to the work of this committee. We do believe it is in the rights of Members to respond to 
this agenda item and express solidarity for Ukraine in view of the current circumstances that they 
face in meeting their WTO  obligations.  We cannot ignore the impact of Russia 's invasion on Ukraine 's 
ability to participate in global trade, nor can we exclude this fact in assessing Members ' trade 
notifications and policies here at the WTO. It is relevant that we can acknowledge the context in 
which Members are notifying their trade measures.  
8.76.  In this regard, New Zealand would like to thank Ukraine for its recent QR  notifications, and  
its efforts to maintain its WTO  obligations, despite the devastating impacts and ongoing disruptions 
from Russia 's illegal war in Ukraine, which N ew Zealand  continues to condemn in the strongest 
possible terms.  It is important to hear here Ukraine's  endeavours to refrain from imposing 
restrictions on necessary commodities such as agricultural goods, and efforts to regain access to 
ports to ensure necessary goods are able to get to places where they are needed the most.  We 
continue to call on Russia to do their part and uphold international obligations by ceasing its invasion 
of Ukraine, withdrawing its troops , and return ing to diplomatic negotiations as a pathway to a 
resolution of the conflict.  
8.77.  The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following : 
8.78.  The United Kingdom would like to commend and thank Ukraine for its continued efforts to 
notify its quantitative restrictions to this Committee, especially given the incredibly difficult and 
challenging circumstances of the last eight  months, since Russia's  illegal invasion and more recently 
annexation of parts of Ukrainian territory. We would like to highlight the impact for market access 
for Ukraine, and for the rest of the world, resulting from these illegal actions. We will revert with 
further comments o n this under another agenda item.  
8.79.  Given the important transparency element of QR  notifications that we have been discussing, 
we do feel that it is important and relevant to commend Ukraine's submission, which we welcome. 
The United Kingdom will continue to  support Ukraine to counter this invasion, and work with other 
like-minded countries on this. We thank Ukraine again for its adherence to transparency.  
8.80.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
8.81.  Canada thanks Ukraine for its updated quantitative  restriction notification and the report on 
the circumstances affecting its participation in the multilateral trading system.  In this regard, Canada 
condemns Russia's most recent missile strikes against civilian infrastructure and cities across Ukraine 
in the strongest possible terms.  Russia's unprovoked and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine is not only 
a blatant violation of international law and the rules -based international system, it  is a constant 
threat to Ukraine's participation at the WTO and is ther efore germane to any discussion regarding 
Ukraine.  Canada stands in our unwavering support for Ukraine's right to defend itself against Russia's 
war of aggression . 
8.82.  The representative of Norway  indicated the following : G/MA/M/77  
 
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  8.83.  Norway would also like to thank Ukrain e and commend them for fulfilling their notification 
obligation s despite the very difficult circumstances creat ed by Russia's ongoing aggressive military 
annexation. Norway continues to condemn Russia's miliary aggression against Ukraine in the 
strongest possible terms. I reiterate Norway's unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.  
8.84.  The represen tative of Switzerland  indicated the following : 
8.85.  First of all, the statement of my delegation is in accordance with the mandate of this 
committee  and linked to Ukraine's notifications . Some measures of Ukraine have been liberalized 
and many countries had to receive agricultural products that they depend on. We thank Ukraine for 
its transparency efforts with its recent notification despite current difficulties. Similar to other 
delegations, we condemn the illegal military aggression of Russia against Ukraine i n a very firm 
manner. This military attack is a violation of international law, in particular, the ban on using force 
and the principle of the territo rial integrity of states.  
8.86.  Switzerland calls upon Russia to take military de -escalation measures to cease h ostilities and 
to immediately withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory. In addition, Switzerland calls on all 
parties to abide by international law, in particular, international humanitarian law. Attacks against 
civilians or civilian infrastructure are  banned and must cease immediately. Lastly, Switzerland will 
in no case acknowledge  the illegal referendums that were recently organized . These referendums 
are a violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity.  
8.87.  The representative of Japan  indicated the follow ing: 
8.88.  Japan thanks Ukraine for its notification and for sharing its information. Given that this effort 
is relevant to the work of this committee, we appreciate Ukraine 's commitment to transparency 
despite the current circumstances. We would like to echo our colleagues in condemning Russia . 
Japan has condemned Russia 's aggression against Ukraine in the strongest terms, as it clearly 
infringes upon Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity, constitutes a serious violation of 
international law prohibiting the use of force, and is a grave breach of the United Nations Charter. 
Japan has also strongly urged Russia to cease the attack and withdraw its forces back to Russian 
territory immediately. Together with the international community, Japan stan ds in solidarity with 
Ukraine and its people.  
8.89.  The representative of Australia  indicated the following : 
8.90.  Australia would like to thank Ukraine for its notification and its update to the Committee.  We 
acknowledge the challenging and difficult circumstances in  which Ukraine has submitted its 
notification s and shown its commitment to WTO  transparency. We also want to  note, in particular , 
of Ukraine 's update  on its engagement with the World Food Program me, and its aid to Somalia and 
Ethiopia.  
8.91.  In this broader cont ext, Australia would like to echo others and reiterate our condemnation 
of Russia 's illegal invasion of Ukraine, which is a gross violation of international law, including the 
Charter of the United Nations.  Australia strongly supports Ukraine 's sovereignty  and territorial 
integrity, and again  calls on Russia to cease its attacks . Russia 's war on Ukraine is exacting a 
catastrophic humanitarian toll , in addition to the food crisis . Australia also  joins other Members in  
condemn ing Russia 's illegal annexation o f the regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and 
Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine.  
8.92.  The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
8.93.  The Republic of Korea thanks Ukraine for its QR  notifications and its statements today. In 
particular, Korea would like to commend Ukraine for making its upmost effort to enhance 
transparency by submitting its notifications under a devastating situation. Korea also wishes to echo 
several previous speake rs. Russia's invasion of Ukraine aggravates the global supply chain situation 
in many areas, posing a significant threat  to the rules-based global trade order under the WTO. The 
way to end all of this is obvious, namely for Russia to stop its military acti on in Ukraine.  
8.94.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following : G/MA/M/77  
 
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  8.95.  It is symptomatic that delegations that have just taken the floor once again decided to violate 
the Rules of Procedure and the Terms of Reference of the present Committee to remind the 
membership that the WTO is a rules-based  system and about their position on the special military 
operation in Ukraine.  
8.96.  In this regard I kindly remind you, Mr  Chairman, about your right – that you keep ignoring – 
stipulated by Rule 17 of the R ules of Procedure to call the speaker to order if their remarks are not 
relevant for the meeting.  I would also like to recall that Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure prescribes 
that delegates should avoid repetition of statements on issues that have already  been raised before. 
The p ositions of the delegations on the situation in Ukraine have been voiced multiple times and 
have not changed. Repe ating them over and over again in this body detract s from our joint work.  
Once again, discussions on the situation in Russia , security concerns, UN  Charter enforcement or 
compliance evidently goes beyond the Terms of Reference of the present Committee.  Russia is ready 
to discuss , and is discussing , issues around its special mili tary operation in Ukraine in the specialized 
UN bodies and agencies.  
8.97.  Regarding the allegation on food, fertilizer , and the energy crisis, as Russia stated numerous 
times on various occasions , the significant contributing factor to the current global price level is 
unilateral trade restrictive measures introduced against Russia.  Contrary to the regional security 
situation, unilateral trade restrictive measures fall under the Terms of Reference of the Committee 
on Market Access. This is why we decided to intr oduce a dedicated agenda item on this issue. We 
will explain this in more detail under the dedicated item that Russia placed on the agenda of our 
current CMA  meeting.  On the issue of referenda , we expressed our position clearly during the recent 
meeting of  the General Council.  
8.98.  The Committee took note of the notifications and  the statements  made . 
− United Kingdom  (G/MA/QR/N/GBR/1/ADD.2, G/MA/QR/N/GBR/1/ADD.3, G/MA/QR/N/GBR/2)  
8.99.  The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to three  new notifications from the United Kingdom  
that had been circulated in documents  G/MA/QR/N/GBR/1/Add .2-G/MA/QR/N/GBR/1/Add. 3 and 
G/MA/QR/N/GBR/2. The second  notification was the UK's complete notification for the biennial period 
2022-2024. Both notifications contain ed informatio n on a modified measure in relation to COVID -19. 
8.100.   The Committee took note  of the notifications.  
− United States  (G/MA/QR/N/USA/2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/3, G/MA/QR/N/USA/4, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/ADD.1, G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/ADD.2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/ADD.1, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/ADD.2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/ADD.3, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/6, G/MA/W/116, G/MA/W/127)  
8.101.   The Chairperson  recalled that, a t its previous  meeting, the Committee had agreed to revert 
to the notifications from the United States, which had been circulated in 
documents  G/MA/QR/N/USA/2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/3, G/MA/QR/N/USA/4, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/Add .1-G/MA/QR/N/USA/4/Add. 2, G/MA/QR/N/USA/5, 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add .1-G/MA/QR/N/USA/5/Add. 3. Since then, the United States ha d submitted 
its complete notification  for the biennial period 2022 -2024, which had been circulated  in 
document  G/MA/QR/N/USA/6. Questions remained pending from the European Union, which had 
been circulated in documents  G/MA/W/116 and G/MA/W/127, and from China.  
8.102.   The representative of China  indicated the following : 
8.103.   As mentioned in previous CMA  formal meetings, China has concerns about the import quotas 
on steel and aluminium  products under Section  232 which has been reflected in the notification 
circulated as docum ents G/MA/QR/N/USA/4 and G/MA/QR/N/USA/5. China believes that such 
measures are inconsistent with the provisions of Article  XI and Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. China 
had requested the US to provide detailed information and clarification of these measures,  but there 
has been no substantial response from the US.  
8.104.   Even more regrettable, such measures also appeared in the latest notification 
document  G/MA/QR/N/USA/6. We  would  like to reiterate our prior request that the US provide details G/MA/M/77  
 
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  on the import quota me asures, including the volume of quotas received by Members such as the 
Republic of Korea, Argentina, and Brazil, as well as the conditions for obtaining quotas. We also want 
the US to explain how quotas can address the so -called "national security " concern s. 
8.105.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following : 
8.106.   We take note of the comments and questions raised by China  regarding the WTO  consistency 
of the Section  232 quotas on steel and aluminium. The United States has been evoking Article  XXI(b) 
of the GATT  1994, and the actions are therefore wholly consistent with the WTO. Regarding the 
questions related to the operations of the quotas, we refer Members to the re levant proclamations 
issued under Section  232 and to the quota implementation information published on the website of 
US Customs and Border Protection.  Further more,  we note that China has raised this issue separately 
on the agenda, where we can provide a f urther statement.  
8.107.   The Committee  took note  of the statements made and agreed to  revert to th ese notification s 
at its next meeting.  
8.2  Report from the Secretariat  
8.108.   The Chairperson  drew Members'  attention to document  G/MA/QR/12 entitled "Status of 
Notifications u nder the Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions" , where the 
Secretariat had summarize d the status of QR  notifications as of 13  October  2022. The document 
showed that the situation ha d slightly improved with respect to previous years, in particular for the 
biennial periods 2018 -2020 and 2020 -2022. The submission of notifications relating to 
COVID -19 restrictions partly explained this increase. However, he observed that  the overall 
compl iance with the QR  notification requirement remain ed relatively low.  
8.109.   Even though the number and quality of notifications ha d improved over the past years, the 
vast majority of Members h ad not yet, or had never, provided information on the different trade 
restrictions that they maintain ed. There were also several Members that had notified measures 
introduced in response to the COVID -19 pandemic , and which had indicated that they would submit 
a complete notification with all measures at a later date, although many of them ha d not yet done 
so. 
8.110.   Given the benefit of enhanced transparency in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic , and 
how the information provided under the QR  decision c ould help Members to have a clearer 
understanding of the related trade,  he encoura ged Members to comply with the QR  Decision and 
contact the Secretariat in case they need ed technical assistance to do so. Additional tools and 
resources, such as the QR  database, the Secretariat reports , or training options , also play ed an 
important role in improving the notification compliance.  
8.111.   The representative of Hong Kong, China  indicated the following : 
8.112.   We have submitted our QR  notification for the biennial period of 2022 -2024 but this is not 
reflected in the report. We w ill follow up with the Secretariat  after the meeting to see if the report 
will be update d. 
8.113.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
8.114.   Please take these comments in the context of my delegation's sincere and thankful  
appreciation for the e fforts that the Se cretariat and all its employees do to provide these reports 
and do the work, day to day, that keep us informed, and help us to do our job. I know that there is 
a lot going on these days. This is one of a few reports on the agenda today that were issued 
yesterday. I am not looking to lay any fault or blame here because, as I just said, I know that there 
is a lot going on and a lot of Members have a lot of other work going on. I just want to raise it as a 
point of systemic concern , and it applies to Members a s well because they are not always timely in 
terms of submitting their documentation in advance of meetings. I raise it today to call attention to 
a discussion that is starting in the Council for Trade in Goods. This is one of those items that I 
suspect we  will hear about during that discussio n in terms of h elping and empowering delegates to 
do the best that they can in terms of their work and the continuum of their work to contribute to 
substantive discussion in these committees. I don 't have any specific comments, I have not read G/MA/M/77  
 
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  the document, but I did want to mention this, more to raise it as a concern, but also to highlight the 
need for Members to participate in that CTG  process and speak and think of ways that we can all 
improve, Members and the Secret ariat, in terms of providing information in time so that delegates 
have a chance to examine it, consult with capital , and provide substantive comments here , as 
appropriate. Again, I share my great appreciation of the work that the Secretariat do es, helping us 
delegates here to do our work. I do not want it to be taken in any other light.  
8.115.   The Committee took note of the Secretariat's report and the statements m ade. 
9  TRADE -RELATED MEASURES RELATING TO THE COVID -19 PANDEMIC  
9.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that there were three issues listed under this agenda item. The 
first issue concerned the updated list of all notifications and communications relating to the 
COVID -19 pandemic , which had been submitted by Members to this Committee as of 
12 October  2022, and as contained in document  G/MA/W/157/Rev.5 . The second  item concerned 
the revised summary report on export restrictions and prohibitions and trade easing measures 
relating to the COVID -19 pandemic, which had been circulated in document  G/MA/W/168/Rev.3 . 
The third  item related to two  communications submitted by Canada,  which had been circulated in 
documents  G/MA/W/178  and G/MA/W/179 . 
9.2.  The Secretariat  (Mr Simon Neumueller) indicated t he following:  
9.3.  The latest revision of the document only contained very few changes when compared to the 
previous version. Since the Committee's previous formal meeting , in the spring of 2022, four export 
restrictions had been phased out. The Secretariat tha nked those Members that had taken the time 
to review the information provided in the annex , and for the updates  that they had communicated  
to the Secretariat . In addition, information on 14  additional trade-easing measures was contained 
in this revision. T hese measures were not necessarily new, they simply had not been monitored in 
the past. On export restrictions, it seemed that there were still 27  measures in force as of 
12 October  2022. The Secretariat encouraged Members to verify this information and to  notify any 
changes through a QR notification. In terms of the type of products subject to export restrictions, 
PPE seemed to remain less of a restricted category, while pharmaceuticals, medical devices and 
equipment , and vaccines had seen smaller changes since the start of the pandemic. The report noted 
that the percentage of measures currently "in force" had been reduced from 41% in October  2021 
to 27% in October  2022.  
9.4.  In terms of trade easing measures, the report contained information on 182  measures. One 
additional communication by Canada ( G/MA/W/178 ), which had announced the termination of some 
measures, had been circulated since the spring meeting in 2022. The vast majority of these 
measures had been communicated through the trade monitoring exercise, although structured 
information was not available in many cases. As a result, information on the duration of the measure 
was missing for 88 of the measures , and for almost 50% of the measures it was not known whether 
the measure was still in force. In total, only 13% seemed to be still in force in October  2022.  
9.5.  The Secretariat also gave an update about the work it had presented at the previous formal 
meeting , in March  2022, on the preliminary analysis on the impact of export restrictions on trade 
values. At this point, no substanti ve advances had been made in this workstream, mainly due to 
data availability regarding these measures in the Committee , and because of the resource 
constraints of the Secretariat team.  
9.6.  The Chairperson  thanked those Members that had contacted the Secretari at about updating 
the information contained in the document in order to provide an accurate picture of the current 
situation. The slides of the presentation were available in document  RD/MA/107 . 
9.7.  The delegate of the Kyrgyz Republi c indicated the following:  
9.8.  The report noted that the export restriction measures on medicines and medical products 
adopted by notification  G/MA/QR/N/KGZ/1/A dd.14 are still in force. We would like to inform the 
Secretariat that the measures remained in forc e for six months, in accordance with Government 
Decree No.  14, adopted on 14  January  2022, and that they expired on 9  August  2022. G/MA/M/77  
 
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  9.9.  The delegate of the European Union  indicated the following:  
9.10.  The European Union  thank s the Secretariat for the updates. The va rious reports (G/MA/W/168 
and its revisions) have made  an important contribution to the effort of enhancing transparency 
around  COVID -19 trade measures. They are also useful to inform Members' consideration of how 
transparency could be improved. As the lat est report ( G/MA/W/168/ Rev.3) was circulated very 
recently, we will analyse it in detail. We reiterate that G/MA/W/168/ Rev.2 presented important 
findings. According to the report, as of 25  March  2022, 98  measures that prohibit or restrict exports 
as a result of the COVID -19 pandemic have been adopted by Members. It is also unfortunate that 
30 out of the 98  measures have not been notified under the QR  Decision. We note that more than a 
third of these measures have taken the form of full bans or prohibiti ons. Most of the measures were 
introduced at the beginning of the pandemic in 2020 , but for a large number of them, the envisaged 
duration of the measures is unclear. Although Members do not provide underlying reasons for the 
maintenance of the measures, t he report assumes that this may be an indication of global shortages 
of pharmaceuticals, medical products , or COVID -test kits. Yet, without an appropriate analysis of 
demand and supply, which is beyond the scope of the report, one cannot conclude with cert ainty 
that the form of the measures (e.g. full ban) is chosen in proportion to the seriousness of the 
experienced shortages. The report states that 35  Members have provided notifications related to the 
imposition of export restrictions during the pandemic.  The pandemic has been with us already for 
two years – considering the current situation one would expect that export restrictions would be 
withdrawn or at least considered for withdrawal by Members . It would be interesting to hear from 
Members who maintai n the restrictions, even in the most extreme form , such as prohibitions, why 
they consider such measures necessary. As we have stated on numerous occasions before, while 
such measures may be justified and necessary in a situation of a critical shortage of essential 
products, the measures should always be proportionate, targeted , and time bound. If a Member 
considers that a situation of critical shortage exists, and provides explanations, as a community we 
should consider how we can assist the relevant Membe r in reducing that critical shortage. The 
findings of the report suggest that , in terms of transparency, there is still a great margin for 
improvement. We welcome the efforts of other Members to voluntarily notify measures that facilitate 
trade during the pandemic. We invite the Membership to engage further on the work on this issue.  
We also thank the Secretariat for the update today on the analysis on the impact of measures and 
invite the Secretariat to keep Members abreast of the thinking and work on this  issue.  
9.11.  The delegate of Thailand  indicated the following : 
9.12.  Thailand  would like to join the European Union in commending the Secretariat for compiling 
such a comprehensive and detailed report. This exercise , which has been conducted since April last 
year, has shed light on the evolution of trade measures related to the COVID -19 pandemic in a way 
that I personally never imagined. The report is comprehensive , as it takes into account all the 
available information on the relevant measures. However, having read the report with great interest, 
I would like to point out that there is actually an information gap between the QR  notifications under 
the 2012  QR Decision and the measures collected as part of the WTO's Trade Monitoring Exercise 
and listed under the heading "COVID -19: Measures affecting trade in goods". According to the 
current report, 30  measures introduced by 19  Members and collected through the WTO's Trade 
Monitoring Exercise have not been notified under the QR  decision and, therefore, did not cite  any 
WTO justification. Moreover, 88  measures have no information about duration, as was mentioned 
by the Secretariat. In addition, measures collected through the Trade Monitoring Exercise are not in 
a standardized format , and thus are not directly compara ble. 
9.13.  If there is just one thing that could be reported to the Council for Trade in Goods about this 
exercise as part of the MC12  mandate on the response to the pandemic, we would propose to include 
this information gap in the report and a suggestion to imp rove data collection in the Trade Monitoring 
Exercise so that the collected trade measures relating  to COVID -19, or any future pandemic , can be 
compared directly.  
9.14.  The Chairperson  suggested that , based on the comments made, and given that some of the 
measur es seemed to be still in force, the Secretariat could be requested to continue updating this 
report based on the inputs received by Members , as well as on additional information coming from 
the Trade Monitoring Exercise. In this regard, he encouraged deleg ations to verify the information 
provided in Annex  1 of the Secretariat report, specifically in the column "current status", and to 
inform the Secretariat about whether these measures were still in force , or if they had been 
terminated, and if so, to indic ate the relevant dates. This was particularly important for those G/MA/M/77  
 
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  measures for which there was no information about their duration, and it would help the Secretariat 
to prepare a more accurate analysis of these measures in the future.  
9.15.  The delegate of Canad a indicated the following:  
9.16.  We wanted to provide an update on Canada's actions related to the importation of medical 
supplies , including personal protective equipment , in the context of the COVID -19 pandemic. We 
believe that , in a time of crisis, enhanced transparency is an important contribution to our collective 
understanding of the ongoing situation we face in relation to addressing that crisis. As Canada has 
shared with the Committee in early 2020 information on the tariff  easing measures taken to support 
efforts to address the situation, we have shared in document  G/MA/W/158 information regarding 
the decision to end that tariff relief as of 7  May 2022. The second  document on the agenda is a 
contribution to the COVID -19 exp erience sharing sessions, which was discussed at the 
16 September  meeting, and I suspect will be reported on in document  JOB/MA/152/Add.3. While 
Canada did not impose any COVID -19 related export restrictions, we thought it useful to support 
the Committee's  work by sharing some background research we have been doing on Article  XI of 
the GATT and the different ways Members have examined its use since 1947. Much of it builds on 
the interventions Canada made at the CMA and CTG  meetings in 2021. One aspect of pa rticular 
interest is from the 1970s , which indicated, and considering the concerns of some Members that the 
rules were "less complete as compared to import restrictions", and here I am speaking of export 
restrictions, Members came to a point where a Draft Understanding on the use of export control 
measures was discussed, but was eventually not adopted. As the informal work of the Committee 
continues, and you foreshadowed that this morning, Chair, we continue to be interested in hearing 
from Members who did decide to implement export restrictions during the COVID -19 pandemic. 
Similar to the comments from the European Union just a moment ago, we are particularly interested 
in why they chose a specific measure over another, the ways in which they implemented th e 
restriction, the effectiveness of the measures, at least to the extent they've examined that, what 
factors they considered before its removal, and finally any lessons learned that they can share. I 
think that this whole process that we are undertaking is a really important contribution from us here 
in the CMA to preparing for, if it happens, hopefully not, another crisis like the one  we seem to be 
going through.  
9.17.  The Committee took note  of the report by the Secretariat, the four  documents , and the 
statemen ts made.  
10  ANGOLA – IMPORT RESTRICTING PRACTICES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
10.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
European Union and the United States . 
10.2.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
10.3.  As we have expressed previously in this and other Committees, the United States c ontinues 
to have significant concerns with Presidential Decree No. 32/19 which appears aimed at restricting 
Angola's imports. The United States understands that Angola is a developing country with a reliance 
on imports and is looking to promote domestic pr oduction and diversify its economy. However, the 
measure counters the objectives of the WTO to reduce obstacles to international trade and ensure 
stability and fair conditions of competition among Members, thereby ensuring Angola's economic 
development. We  understand that Angola is working to address issues raised by Members, including 
with respect to WTO  rules. Further, we understand that Angola is undertaking an analysis of its 
internal market this year. The United States ask s if Angola can provide any up dates . 
10.4.  The representative of the  European Union  indicated the following:  
10.5.   This issue has been raised in this Committee, the Committee on Agriculture and the Council 
for Trade in Goods multiple times. The European Union  remains concerned about the compatibi lity 
of Presidential Decree No. 23/19 with the WTO's rules.  We would welcome more information and 
substantive engagement, which would be determinant  to inform ing our further approach. We would 
also like to understand better whether licences will be require d in the implementation of this 
Presidential Decree; if this were the case , we would recall the notification requirements under the G/MA/M/77  
 
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  Import Licensing Procedures Agreement.  The EU also invites  Angola to provide clarifications on the 
process related to this decree, as well as whether any changes - and, if so, which ones – are planned. 
The EU strongly urges Angola once again to review the relevant measures in order to ensure their 
compliance with  WTO rules.  
10.6.  The representative of Angola  indicated the following:  
10.7.  Angola thanks the European Union and the United States for the issues raised and maintains 
the same position as in the Committee on Import Licensing . More than declaring that the country 
does not apply restrictive measures, we affirm that the objective of the Angolan State with the 
implementation of this Decree is to diversify exports. We know that it is a long -term process, 
however, we have been working to gradually change the paradigm by pr omoting the increase in 
domestic production, stimulating the consumption of national products, without forgetting that 
Angola is firmly committed in a transparent way to the commitments it assumed within the scope of 
the WTO  Agreements . More than simply ma king a statement, relevant statistical data were 
presented at the recent meeting of the Committee on Import Licensing, on 7 October  2022, on 
imports from the member States of the European Union and the United States.  
10.8.  We would like to underscore that Angola  is a country with great potential, namely: arable 
land, rich in mineral resources , and with a young population. It is a fact that we face several social 
challenges, such as the need to qualify human resources. More than importing, we count on the 
support of other Member s for Angola's development. For this reason, we appeal to the Members 
present in this session to look at Angola, on the one hand, as a strategic partner , and, on the other 
hand, as a destination for investment in the agricultural, economic, educational, industrial, health, 
mining , and technology  sectors . 
10.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
11  AUSTRALIA, CANADA, EUROPEAN UNION, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, SWITZERLAND, 
UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES – UNILATERAL TRADE RESTRICTIVE 
MEASUR ES AGAINST RUSSIA – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
11.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of the 
Russian Federation.  
11.2.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
11.3.  Today we wish to reiterate deep concern regarding the illegal and unjustified trade restrictive 
measures imposed by certain WTO  Members in respect of Russia.  These measures include, but are 
not limited to , the following restrictio ns on  the trade in goods : 
• By Australia: import ban on Russian oil, oil products, coal, gas, additional tariff of 35 % for 
all imports from Russia, prohibition on export of aluminium ores and concentrates . 
• By Canada: import ban on petroleum originating from Russia; additional tariff of 35 % for all 
imports from Russia; export ban on goods used for oil exploration and production . 
• By the E uropean Union: import ban on Russian crude oil and petroleum products, prohibition 
on transfer or transport to third  countrie s of Russian crude oil and petroleum products 
obtained from Russian crude oil, or sales to purchasers in third  countries, prohibition on 
technical assistance, brokering services or financing or financial assistance, related to the 
transport to third  countr ies of crude oil or petroleum products which originate in Russia, or 
which have been exported from Russia . 
• By Japan: import ban on certain alcohol products, wood and wood products, electric 
machines; export ban on semiconductors, integral circuits, analog -to-digital converters, 
solar cells, resistors, marine and aviation safety equipment, diesel engines, computers and 
their parts, oil refining equipment, navigation equipment and others . 
• By New Zealand: announced application of additional  35% tariffs to all imports from Russia, 
export prohibition on industrial products such as ICT  equipment and engines . G/MA/M/77  
 
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  • By Switzerland: import ban on coal, oil and petroleum products, as well as quantitative 
restrictions on imports of fertilizers, prohibition to provide technic al assistance, brokering 
services or financial assistance in connection with the transportation outside Switzerland and 
the European Union of crude oil or petroleum products originating in or coming from Russia . 
• By the U nited Kingdom : prohibition on export  of oil refining goods and technology, iron and 
steel products; an import ban on cement, wood and articles of wood, mineral or chemical 
fertilizers, as well as application of additional import duty of 35% for cereals, oil seeds, meat, 
products of the milli ng industry, soybean oil . 
• By the United States: imposition of additional import duty of 35% for certain chemical 
products; wood and wood products, iron and steel, tractors and other products.  
11.4.  This is just a fraction of the measures adopted and enumerated by those WTO Members  
named in the agenda item . For the sake of time, we are not specifying all the restrictions. However, 
these measures have already immensely impacted trade in goods.  Moreover, these measures are 
coupled with restrictions on t rade in goods, restrictive measures imposed on the Russian largest 
banks, as well as on insurance agencies, transportation companies, export support agencies, 
industrial companies, Russian seaports, and legal and natural persons, including top management 
and owners of the largest Russian companies , provoking global economic, energy , and food crises.  
11.5.  We would like to note that Russia is the third  largest oil, and second  largest natural gas 
producer in the world , and the world 's largest oil and gas exporter. Unilateral measures against 
Russian oil, petroleum products and gas producers, financial sector, as well as pressure on 
international transportation, trading companies, foreign governments not to work with Russian oil 
and gas sector , have led to the increa sed oil and gas prices on the international market. The c ost of 
these arbitrary decisions is paid for by the whole world, including developing and least developed 
countries.  High energy prices translate into higher consumer prices across the full board of products, 
including food, fuelling inflation and slowing global economic growth.  
11.6.  As for food crises, we underline that Russia is one of the major producer s and exporter s of 
wheat and fertilizers.  Despite the exclusion of these products from direct restrict ions, Russian 
shipments of these  most essential goods are facing indirect measures, including bans on the use of 
foreign seaports, restrictions on payments, and measures against companies and individuals , 
including asset freeze s and prohibition to deal wit h such persons.  Taking into account current as well 
as plan ned restrictions against Russia , international transportation, trading companies, foreign 
banks and insurance companies are coerced to refuse to work with Russian exporters, including 
those of food , energy , and fertilizers. Foreign governments are also coerced to drop their dealing s 
with Russia, including buying energy resources.  
11.7.  All these measures not only contradict the WTO  rules, but they also disrupt international trade 
flows, break global supply chains , and lead to increasing energy costs and spikes in  food prices.  
Such a vast and outright violation of WTO  rules is a massive blow to the WTO system. It undermines 
the role of the WTO as a guarantor of international trade rules , and shows that  no Member is safe 
from such unjustified and unlawful vast measures in future.  
11.8.  The Russian Federation expresses its concern over the attempt to replace the system of global 
economic governance with unilateral restrictive measures of extraterritorial scope.  Despite different 
pretexts for such destructive policies, they in fact put at serious risk the prospects for global 
economic growth and disproportionally hit developing countries. Being of a complex nature, they 
already have systemic negative implications  on global value chains, international markets , and the 
stability of price level s. In this context, the Russian Federation calls for a restoration of the smooth 
functioning of the WTO , and urge s the WTO Members in question to immediately lift their unilate ral 
trade restrictive measures, including those with extraterritorial implications, and to stop their 
coercive actions aimed at forcing other WTO  Members to follow suit.  
11.9.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
11.10.   The European Union i s committed to supporting the multilateral trading system , also because 
we believe that a rules -based international order best serves the interest s of all countries, including 
the smaller and more vulnerable ones.  The EU therefore continues to condemn Russ ia's unprovoked G/MA/M/77  
 
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  and unjustified act of aggression against Ukraine, which grossly violates international law and the 
UN Charter, and undermines international security and stability. We do not recogni ze Russia 's illegal 
annexation of territory that does not belong to Russia, in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia , and 
Kherson Oblasts.  And we  cannot forget the death and suffering the war continues to bring to 
thousands of innocent Ukrainians.  
11.11.   The European Union also condemns , in the strongest possible terms , the continued heinous 
attacks on the civilians and civilian infrastructure. This goes against international humanitarian law. 
This indiscriminate targeting of civilians amounts to a war crime.  Russia's illegal, barbaric , and 
unprovoked war against Ukrain e also continues to cause immense economic harm to Ukraine. The 
effects of the war are felt around the globe, with 1.7  billion people in over 100  countries now facing 
severe food, energy , and commodity supply issues and price rises.  
11.12.   The E uropean Union would like to underline once again that the EU 's sanctions against Russia 
neither target trade in agricultural, food or medical products, nor the trade of the Russian Federation 
with third  countries.  The EU considers these measures fully consistent with its WT O rights and 
obligations as actions necessary to protect its essential security interests. The measures include 
export and import restrictions targeting Russia 's ability to finance this reprehensible war.  
11.13.   The European Union  has taken all its measures in a fully transparent manner. All relevant 
EU measures are publicly accessible, including in our recent quantitative restriction notification. We 
closely monitor their implementation in order to ensure that the measures achieve their objective , 
namely  to hampe r the ability of the Russian government and military machine to sustain this illegal 
war. The EU calls on Russia to immediately cease its military actions, withdraw all its troops from 
the entire territory of Ukraine,  and fully respect Ukraine 's territoria l integrity, sovereignty, and 
independence within its internationally recogni zed borders.  
11.14.   The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
11.15.   The United Kingdom welcome s the opportunity to correct the disinformation from the 
Russian Federatio n as regards the consequences of its own illegal actions by invading another 
sovereign Member. Because Putin's illegal annexation of regions of Ukraine constitutes a new low 
point in Russia's blatant flouting of international law. The UN  Secretary -General has spelled out that 
Russia’s attempts to change Ukraine’s borders by force are an unacceptable breach of the 
UN Charter. Russia's illegal war continues to affect market access and commodity prices for Members 
across the world, with Russia’s unilat eral decisions to manipulate energy supplies as the most 
significant factor inflating prices across the globe. Chair, to be clear, lower income countries remain 
the most exposed to the consequences of Russia’s aggression. But, as we have just heard, none o f 
the facts stop Russia from leading a disinformation campaign, seeking to deflect from the 
responsibility they should be taking for their chosen war which then impacts the whole world.  
11.16.   Firstly, Chair, the UK does not target its sanctions on food or fertilizer exports from Russia 
to third  countries. Furthermore, UK  sanctions against Russia include clear mitigations to prevent 
impact on Russian food exports – to ensure no indirect impact. Secondly more broadly, in terms of 
quantitative restrictions, the UK h as no export measures on food. In comparison, let us now consider 
what export restrictions the Russian Federation has chosen to implement. Because, to clarify, since 
illegally invading Ukraine, the Russian Federation has unilaterally introduced numerous me asures 
on the export of agricultural and fertilizer products. Those have included export measures and bans 
on white sugar, raw cane sugar, wheat, rye, meslin, barley, corn and rice. They have also introduced 
export measures against sunflower oil and rapese ed oil, and sunflower seeds and rapeseed seeds. 
We note that Russia’s export quotas on certain mineral fertilizers have the potential to remove 15% 
of global fertilizer supply, further driving -up prices. Compounding its own restrictions on food and 
fertilizers, the Russian Federation has unilaterally cut the global supply of food through illegally 
invading Ukraine and collapsing its exports.  
11.17.   Previously, Ukraine was one of the largest exporters of grains, meeting the needs of 
hundreds of millions of people w orldwide. That changed 237  days ago, when Russia illegally invaded 
– and Russian bombing continues to destroy crops and infrastructure, impeding Ukrainian grain from 
accessing world markets. As it stands, a further 50% fall in Ukraine’s export capabilities  is expected, 
as solely attributed to Russia’s invasion. In short, Putin is weaponizing fuel and food by reducing 
Russia's own exports – while simultaneously collapsing Ukraine’s production and export capabilities G/MA/M/77  
 
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  also spikes global prices. Putin can allev iate the global crises by immediately ending his war in 
Ukraine and lifting the Russian export measures that are further driving up the price increases 
stemming from his own illegal invasion.  
11.18.   In responding to the food crises spurred by Putin’s invasion, th e UK welcomes and supports 
the multilateral development banks in stepping -up their support for food insecurity. As a leading 
shareholder and donor, we have pledged input, contributing to the World Bank Group making 
USD 36 billion available and the African Development Bank making USD  1.5 billion available. 
Additionally, the UK recently announced over USD  20 million to improve the effective use of fertilizer 
and increase food production in vulnerable countries. We will allocate approximately USD  178 million 
towards humanitarian crises in East Africa.  
11.19.   To conclude, Chair, the UK and the international community have made it clear to Putin and 
to Russia that his attack on the Ukrainian people must stop. The United Kingdom will continue to 
stand with Ukraine, in th e face of violations against their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
international law.  
11.20.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
11.21.   New Zealand also condemns and refutes the harmful and inaccurate narratives Russia has 
been communicati ng. Let us be clear: it is Russia's invasion of Ukraine that has created serious 
implications for global peace, security, and economic stability. Russia has also placed restrictions on 
its own exports, such as for grain, adding yet another level of volatil ity to world food prices.  
11.22.   New Zealand has joined the international community in applying sanctions in a transparent 
manner to severely limit the Putin regime's ability to finance and equip the war in Ukraine, as well 
as to influence people with power in Russia to break their support for the war. New Zealand passed 
the Russian Sanctions Act on 8  March  2022, which is publicly available on the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs website. Sanctions under the Act are a direct response to Russia's illegal act of aggre ssion 
and are not intended to disrupt trade in essential goods. They include asset freezes and prohibitions 
on dealing in services on individuals and entities; tariff increases on the imports of Russian origin; 
prohibitions on the import of certain goods a nd products from Russia, and strategic goods intended 
for use by military or security forces from being exported to Russia and Belarus.  
11.23.   New Zealand remains united with the international community to maintain pressure on 
Russia and hold those responsible fo r violations of humanitarian and international law to account. 
Imposing sanctions on Russia is a means to bring an end to this war. New Zealand continues to 
condemn Russia’s acts of aggression, including its attempts to illegally annex parts of Ukraine. Th e 
actions of President Putin are a grave breach of international rules and the use of force to change 
borders is strictly prohibited under international law, as is targeting of civilians. We are appalled by 
reports of the devastating and indiscriminate att acks on Ukraine’s population by Russian troops, 
including evidence of crimes against humanity and war crimes, as well as the destruction of civilian 
infrastructure including hospitals, schools, and homes. We will support and spare no effort in holding 
those responsible for this aggression to account. We stand in full solidarity with Ukraine and its 
people and reaffirm our unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity of Ukraine.  
11.24.   The representative of Canada  indicated the fo llowing:  
11.25.   Canada stands in solidarity with the people of Ukraine and strongly condemns President 
Putin's unjustified invasion of Ukraine. This illegal and unprovoked war has had catastrophic effects 
on Ukraine, its neighbours, and people across the globe, e xacerbating the already rising food and 
energy prices worldwide, affecting economic stability across all regions. Canada does not, and will 
never, recognize Russia's attempted illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories. These actions, based 
on sham refere ndums with predetermined results, have no legitimacy and constitute a flagrant 
violation of international law. The proof is in last week's UN  General Assembly resolution, in which 
143 countries voted to declare the attempted annexations unlawful and reaffi rm Ukraine's 
sovereignty. This is territory on which Ukraine's trade policies should apply.  
11.26.   No amount of misinformation can hide Russia's culpability; Russia is solely responsible for 
this crisis, not Western sanctions, which are only designed to stop Russ ia's unjust and brutal war in G/MA/M/77  
 
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  Ukraine. Russia's efforts to blame Western sanctions for the cause of these crises are simply 
attempts to re -direct the narrative away from its own actions. It is Russia that has cut itself off from 
the global trading system. The UN  Black Sea Grain Initiative agreements between the UN and 
Türkiye with Russia and Ukraine have successfully allowed over 7  million tonnes of grain and other 
foodstuffs to be exported from Ukrainian ports. It is vital that this agreement be renewed to  avoid 
aggravating the food crisis and throwing more people into hunger.  
11.27.   Canada will continue to take actions that we consider necessary to protect our essential 
security interests, and we will work closely with like -minded partners to promote peace and se curity 
for all states and their citizens. More needs to be done to address weaknesses in our global food 
system, which have been exacerbated by Russia's illegal actions. Canada continues to develop all 
our responses with a focus on climate -smart agricultur e, sustainable agri -food value -chains, 
inclusive food system governance , and nutritious and food safety nets to help vulnerable, 
import -dependent countries.  
11.28.   Canada will continue to support humanitarian partners, such as the World Food Programme, 
to help me et the emergency food and nutrition needs of the growing number of acutely food insecure 
people. Canada's support for Ukraine and its people is unwavering, and we will work to find ways to 
use trade to support Ukraine rebuild its economy and its society.  
11.29.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
11.30.   Russia again raises its flag to complain about a situation that it has created, and to try and 
shift the blame for the death and destruction that it has created. Those complaints and efforts a t 
deflection are disingenuous, to say the least. This war, this invasion, has one  aggressor, one  source: 
Russia. Russia invaded Ukraine, a sovereign nation, with no provocation and no justification. Russia 
continues to destroy Ukraine's agricultural land, resources, and facilities, disrupting trade and 
exacerbating a perilous food security situation. Russia continues to destroy Ukraine's industrial 
infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, and energy infrastructure, interrupting trad e and 
undermining economic growth. Russia continues to commit horrific war crimes against women and 
children, as well as against civilian targets, including hospitals, schools, and food supplies. Russia 
continues to restrict exports of critical food stuffs , and agricultural inputs critical to the cultivation 
of agricultural necessities.  
11.31.   The United States continues to condemn Russia's illegal, unprovoked and horrific invasion of 
Ukraine. The most recent attacks on civilians, and civilian infrastructure are p articularly awful. The 
United States rejects Russia's fraudulent attempt to illegally annex sovereign Ukrainian territory. I 
could go on, but we are all familiar with, and appalled by, Russia's transgressions; just as we are 
familiar with Ukraine's fortitu de and courage. As President Biden has made patently clear: "the 
United States will always honour Ukraine's internationally recognized borders".  
11.32.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following : 
11.33.   In the interests of time, I would like to recall Austr alia's intervention at the Council for Trade 
in Goods meeting  in July  202217, and my intervention under  Agenda Item 8 earlier today.  Australia 
reiterates its condemnation of Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine. Australia supports the collective 
action by the international community and has imposed a range of sanctions to inflict costs on Russia 
and those responsible.  Australia has notified trade measures imposed in response to Russia 's 
invasion of Ukraine to the WTO  General Council and the Committee on Mar ket Access, in accordance 
with our transparency obligations.  These measures are justified given Russia 's unprecedented 
attack, and are also justified under WTO  rules, in particular Article  XXI of the GATT . Russia n actions 
violate Ukraine 's sovereignty and territorial integrity and undermine the rules -based international 
order. Australia is committed to upholding the rule s-based order and the principles  that underpin it , 
which are essential to international, regional , and domestic stability and security.  
11.34.   The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
11.35.   Switzerland will not repeat what the E uropean Union just said but share s its statement fully. 
Switzerland also echoes the position of previous speakers who strongly condemn Russia's  war 
 
17 See document  G/C/M/143 , paragraphs  6.67-6.72.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  against Ukrain e. Our measures are in line with international law, in particular Article  XXI of the GATT. 
Like the EU , the Swiss measures do not target food and fertilizers exports to third  countries. All our 
measures are publicly available. Switzerland is preparing its notification  and it will be submitted in 
due course.  
11.36.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following : 
11.37.   Japan condemns Russia's aggression against Ukraine in the strongest terms. We believe that 
the significance of the Market Access Committ ee lies in its capacity to maintain and develop a 
rules-based international order which is the foundation of the multilateral trading system, with the 
WTO at its core. However, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia is an act that undermines the very 
foundation  of the international order and the multilateral trading system. We would like to echo the 
colleagues condemning Russia, including for its  recent announcement of the "incorporation" of 
four states in Ukraine by the Russian Federation. The purported "incorp oration" of the areas that 
have been forcibly put under Russia's temporary control by Russia's aggression are nothing but 
attempts to acquire territory by force and go against international law, including the United Nations 
Charter. Such attempts are inval id and go diametrically against the principle of the rule of law in the 
international community. Japan also condemns the most recent missile attacks by Russia against 
civilian infrastructure and cities across Ukraine.  
11.38.   Japan strongly urges Russia once again  to stop the aggression and withdraw its forces from 
the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders immediately. Japan will also 
continue to work firmly on the two  pillars of imposing strong sanctions against Russia and supporting 
Ukraine in cooperation with the international community.  
11.39.   The representative of Norway  indicated the following : 
11.40.   Norway implements restrictive measures as other Members mentioned under Agenda 
Item 11. The measures a re fully consistent with our WTO  rights and obligations, and they have been 
taken as a reaction to Russia's unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine, and also recent illegal 
attempts to annex Ukrainian territory, which Norway condemns in the strongest possible terms. For 
the sake of brevity, let me c onclude by echoing statements by previous speakers, and again 
reiterating that Norway stands in solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people.  
11.41.   The representative of Nicaragua  indicated the following : 
11.42.   The delegation of Nicaragua presents its compliments to all the Committee participants. 
Regarding this agenda item, the delegation of Nicaragua urges Members to reconsider taking these 
unilateral trade -distorting measures which run counter to the fundamental principles of this 
Organization.  
11.43.   These measures no t only affect the Member against whom they are directly applied; they 
also affect other Members, mainly developing country Members with small and vulnerable economies 
such as ours, that experience the inflationary effects of international markets. These ac tions affect 
and undermine the efforts deployed by governments to achieve development and food security 
objectives, to the detriment of the most vulnerable populations. We appreciate the opportunity to 
address this situation from a trade and development pe rspective, putting aside differences that are 
not within the remit of the WTO.  
11.44.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following:  
11.45.   The Republic of Korea has been strongly condemning Russia's armed invasion against 
Ukraine. Regarding the cu rrent agenda  item, Korea believe s that it is essential to focus on the very 
origin of the sharply aggravating, exacerbating situation on the global supply chain in various areas, 
inflicting significant damage to the rules -based global trade order. As we ha ve mentioned, the way 
to end all of this is obvious, that is , for Russia  to stop its military action in Ukraine.  
11.46.   The representative of Ukraine  indicated the following:  
11.47.   First of all, Ukraine would like to express its sincerest gratitude to all the WTO Membe rs 
mentioned in Russia's request , and to other Members that stand with Ukraine in these dreadful times G/MA/M/77  
 
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  and continue to provide comprehensive economic and other support to end the Russian aggression. 
We appreciate all the support, including sanctions impose d in response to Russia's unilateral invasion 
of Ukraine,  which is a gross violation of international law and the rules-based international order.  
11.48.   Russia's war has not only seriously undermined Ukraine's ability to participate in global 
trade, and to benef it from the rules -based multilateral trading system, but it has also caused trade 
disruptions and aggravated food insecurity in the world. Russia alone is responsible for the war 
launched against Ukraine and its repercussions for the world. Escalation brou ght by Russia's 
attempted annexation of parts of Ukraine's territory deserves a proper response: restrictive 
measures on Russia must be significantly increased. Ukraine has always been a strong supporter of 
the multilateral trading system and continues to stand by its WTO  commitments.  
11.49.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
12  AUSTRALIA – INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF ANTI -DUMPING DUTIES ON A4  COPY 
PAPER – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
12.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Indonesia . 
12.2.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following : 
12.3.  Indonesia thanks Australia for reaching out to us before the meeting and for providing 
responses under similar agenda it ems in the last CTG  meeting held in early July this year.  Given 
new development s, Indonesia would like to raise again our concerns on two of Australia 's current 
anti-dumping investigations and imposition on A4  copy paper from Indonesia,  namely : (i) origina l 
anti-dumping investigation targeting one  company from Indonesia that had been exempted 
previously from anti -dumping duty known as case No.  583; and  (ii) sunset review of existing 
anti-dumping dumping imposition known as case No.  588. 
12.4.  With regard to the f ormer case (No.  583), the investigation has resulted in the imposition of 
provisional duty at a rate of 25.5% since 28  July 2022. In the latter case (No.  588), Indonesian 
A4 copy paper products are subject to a higher rate of anti -dumping duty of 59.7% than the original 
one of 13.8%.  These anti -dumping measures will not only decrease our export s to Australia ; instead , 
Indonesia will also lose its access and share of A4  copy paper products in Australia 's market.  
Indonesia is aware that Members are a llowed to apply any anti -dumping duty. However, this duty 
should be applied consistently with the provisions of Article  VI of the GATT  1994, and the Agreement 
on Anti -Dumping. Otherwise, duty applied at a higher rate than Australia's bound rate  in the WTO 
could be inconsistent with Article  II of the GATT  1994.  
12.5.  On this note, based on reports of these anti -dumping investigations, Indonesia questions  if 
the measures are in compliance with Article  VI of the GATT  1994, and the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
due to certain reasons, including inter alia, that the loss of domestic industry is not merely because 
of Indonesia n imports, but  rather because of other factors , such as the COVID -19 pandemic , as 
clearly stated in the reports. In addition, imports  from Indonesia showed a significant decline since 
the anti -dumping application, from around 28 ,000 tonnes in 2017 , to only about 7 ,800 tonnes in 
2021.  Hence, without fulfilling the legal and procedural requiremen ts of the relevant articles and 
agreements, additional duty disguised as an anti-dumping duty would be inconsistent with 
Australia 's tariff commitment.  In this regard, Indonesia hopes Australia will reconsider the imposition 
of anti -dumping on A4  copy pape r products from Indonesia.  
12.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
12.7.  With regard to this agenda item, and Agenda Item  42 raised against Viet Nam, we are 
confused and concerned as to why Indonesia chose to raise these issues within th is Committee. 
Normally, such matters are raised before the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices, and we would 
suggest that Indonesia do so there, as that is where it systemically belongs and the substantive 
expertise on these issues resides.  
12.8.  The representat ive of Australia  indicated the following : G/MA/M/77  
 
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  12.9.  Australia  thank s Indonesia  and the United States for their statements . Australia also  notes 
that this matter more appropriately relates to the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices, but we are 
happy to update this Co mmittee on the issues raised by Indonesia at the July Council for Trade in 
Goods.  
12.10.   The investigation that Indonesia references was a fresh, original anti -dumping investigation 
into A4  copy paper imported from Indonesia and specifically related to one Indone sian exporter that 
was not subject to an existing anti -dumping measure. This investigation (known as Case No.  583) 
was initiated on 2  June 2021 following receipt of a duly documented application from Australian 
industry. A recommendation report to the Minister for Industry and Science was made by the 
previously publicly notified date of 26  September. The Minister is currently considering the report 
and his decision will be published on the Anti -Dumping Commission 's website once made.  
12.11.   The Government of I ndonesia and the exporter made submissions to the investigation which 
were considered in preparing the recommendations report to the Minister.  In conducting Case 
No. 583, Australia 's approach took account of the findings of the WTO  dispute settlement panel  in 
DS529 and was conducted in strict conformity with Australia 's WTO  obligations.  Separately, there 
was a merits review by Australia 's independent Anti -Dumping Review Panel of a decision to continue 
anti-dumping measures on imports of A4  copy paper, inclu ding from Indonesia from 19  April 2022. 
This merits review does not relate to the Indonesian exporter that is the subject of the current 
anti-dumping investigation in Case No.  583. The Review Panel considered submissions from the 
Government of Indonesia an d an Indonesian exporter. On 29  July 2022, the Minister for Industry 
and Science accepted the Review Panel 's recommendation, which affirmed the decision to continue 
the anti -dumping measures on A4  copy paper exported from Indonesia. Interested parties were  able 
to seek judicial review within 28  days of the publi cation  of this decision.  
12.12.   Australia 's anti -dumping system is transparent, independent , and non -discriminatory. 
Australia is committed to ensuring that its anti -dumping system , and any measures imposed , are 
consistent with the rules of the WTO.  Australia remains willing to meet separately with Indonesia 
and provide further information on the ongoing processes , as appropriate , and will certainly be 
looking to do so next week during the trade remedies com mittees week.  
12.13.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following : 
12.14.   Indonesia would like to address the concerns raised by the United States just now. Indonesia 
does not understand why the US considers that Indonesia's statement is not relevant with in this 
committee, even before Indonesia delivered its statement. Indonesia has , however , demonstrated 
the existence of the relationship between Article  II of the GATT  1994, and Article  VI of the 
GATT  1994, as well as the Anti -Dumping Agreement.  
12.15.   The Committe e took note  of the statements made.  
13  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT - 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  
13.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  China.  
13.2.  The representative of China  indicated th e following : 
13.3.  The Australian government restricts Chinese enterprises from providing relevant equipment 
in Australia without any evidence, which seriously violates the WTO 's basic principles of both the 
MFN treatment and the general elimination of quantitat ive restrictions, badly affects the normal 
business activities of Chinese enterprises in Australia,  and undermines China 's legitimate rights and 
interests under the WTO.  
13.4.  China hopes that Australia correct s its practice of violating the WTO  rules and discri minating 
against Chinese enterprises as soon as possible , and instead create s a fair, just, and predictable 
business environment for all enterprises.  
13.5.  The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  13.6.  Australia notes China 's statement. China first raised this issue elsewhere in the WTO in late 
2018. Since that time , Australia has engaged constructively and in good faith with China to explain 
the rationale for its position.  Australia reiterates that its position on 5G  networks is country agnost ic, 
transparent, risk -based, non -discriminatory , and fully WTO  consistent.  
13.7.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
14  CANADA – DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  
14.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item  had been included at the request of  China . 
14.2.  The representative of China  indicated the following : 
14.3.  Without any evidence, Canada imposed a ban on Chinese communications equipment 
enterprises and prohibited the purchase of relevant Chinese products, which seriously violates the 
WTO's basic principles of both the MFN  treatment and the general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions.  Canada 's move is detrimental to the commercial interests of both Chinese and Canadian 
enterprises and undermines China 's legit imate rights and interests under the WTO.  
14.4.  China hopes that Canada correct s its practice of violating the WTO  rules and discriminating 
against Chinese enterprises as soon as possible , and instead create s a fair, just, and predictable 
business environment for all enterprises.  
14.5.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
14.6.  Canada's critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly interconnected, interdependent, and 
integrated with cyber systems, part icularly with the emergence of new technologies such as 5G. 
That is why the Government of Canada is taking important steps to further protect Canada's critical 
infrastructure systems.  
14.7.  The Government of Canada takes the security of Canada's telecommunicatio ns system very 
seriously and will continue to promote the security of Canadian networks in a way that is consistent 
with Canada's WTO  commitments, while championing emerging technologies, such as 5G.  
14.8.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
15  CHINA — DRAFT OF CHINESE RECOMMENDED NATIONAL STANDARD (GB/T) FOR 
OFFICE DEVICES (INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGY -SECURITY SPECIFICATION 
FOR OFFICE DEVICES) — STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
15.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Japan. 
15.2.  The representative of Japan  indicated the following : 
15.3.  Japan has concerns with regard to the possible amendment of the Recommended National 
Standards of China (GB/T) for office devices such as multifunction peripherals and printers. On office 
devices , including multifunction peripherals and printers , that are procured by the operators of 
critical information infrastructure, Japan has learnt that the draft amendment of the Recommended 
National Standards in China requires the following : (i) office devices s uch as multifunction 
peripherals and printers , including their components , are required to be developed, designed , and 
produced in China; and (ii ) to disclose Information to prove that office devices and/or their 
components are developed, designed , and pro duced in China.  
15.4.  If the Recommended National Standards including such requirements are introduced, it is 
highly likely that they would generally be adopted, considering that the application of these National 
Standards is recommended by the government. There  is also a concern that the National Standards 
would be practically enforced as mandatory. In such a case, imports of finished products, such as 
multifunction peripherals and printers, will not be permitted. Furthermore, the use of imported 
components will  not be permitted, but the use of the components made in China will be forced. Thus, 
it will be inevitable that foreign products, including Japanese imports, will be treated in a G/MA/M/77  
 
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  discriminatory manner compared with domestic products. This would be inconsis tent with 
Article  III:4 of the GATT . In addition, from the perspective of domestic and international 
discrimination, there is a possible violation of Articles  2.1 and 2.2, and Article  5.1.2 of the 
TBT Agreement, and Article  2.1 of the TRIMs  Agreement.  
15.5.  Although certain obligations do not apply to standards for government -procured products 
under Article  1.4 of the TBT  Agreement, Article  III.8 (a) of the GATT, and Article  3 of the 
TRIMs  Agreement , Japan has learnt that the description of the scope of the amendment to the 
National Standards is not limited to government -procured products. Therefore, Japan recognizes 
that it cannot be justified by the government -procured exceptions under these agreements.  
15.6.  Japan strongly hopes that the amendment of these Natio nal Standards, and any systems 
and/or guidelines related to these National Standards, which include content that discriminates 
against foreign and domestic products or producers, and effectively forces technology transfer, will 
not be realized in their cur rent form.  
15.7.  The representative of China  indicated the following : 
15.8.  China  thank s Japan for its interest in this issue.  As confirmed with Capital , China has no plans 
to revise the recommended national standards related to printers and copiers in the near future . The 
Standardization Administration of China has not received any application for the revision of national 
standards from the relevant technical committees. If there are subsequent revision plans for relevant 
standards, China will solicit public opinion t hrough open channels.  
15.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
16  CHINA — DRAFT REVISION OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT LAW - 
STATEMENT BY JAPAN  
16.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Japan.  
16.2.  The representa tive of Japan  indicated the following : 
16.3.  In July of this year, China published a draft for revision of the Government Procurement Law.  
With regard to the scope of the revised law, in addition to "state agencies, business units and 
organizations " in the curre nt Article  2, "other procurement entities " has been added in Article  2 and 
Article  12. With consideration to this "other procurement entities", Article  12 of the revised bill refers 
to "public interest state -owned enterprises that engage in public works and operate public 
infrastructure or public service networks to realize public purposes" and adds "other procurement 
entities to which this Law applies, and their specific scope of procurement shall be determined by 
the State Council."  
16.4.  If the scope o f application of the Government Procurement Law expands to include even 
procurement beyond "procurement by governmental agencies ", as stipulated in Article  III:8(a) of 
the GATT, and Local Content Requirement (LCR) is made based on Article  23 of the revised  law, this 
may violate Article  III:4 of the GATT . In light of this, Japan requests China that its State Council's 
definition of "other procurement entities " under Article  12 of the revised bill should not be expanded 
without limit.  
16.5.  In addition to the exist ing local content requirements regulation, Article  23 of the revised bill, 
which clearly includes "support for domestic industries ", adds a new local content requirement that 
gives preferential treatment in government procurement for products with a high a dded value ratio 
within China. Japan would like to point out that this cannot be permitted either under the government 
procurement exception of Article  III:8(a) of the GATT , unless if it truly falls under government 
procurement, and this local content requ irement may also violate TRIMs Agreement Article  2.1 and 
Article  3:4 of the GATT . In this regard, Japan intends to keep an eye on the scope of this Article.  
16.6.  These new provisions in the draft amendments do not meet the standards required by the 
WTO Governme nt Procurement Agreement (GPA), which China has already been negotiating to join 
for many years, and these new provisions, in fact, represent a move in the opposite direction. G/MA/M/77  
 
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  Therefore, we must question whether China is willing to meet the standards of th e GPA and other 
high-standard agreements to which it has applied for membership.  
16.7.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
16.8.  It is a common international practice to support domestic products in government 
procurement, and China 's draft amendment refers to the practices of relevant Members . China is 
willing to strengthen communication with all parties to promote the completion of China 's accession 
to the GPA as soon as possible. China is also willing to communicate with Japan on r elated issues 
within the framework of accession negotiation to the GPA to promote international cooperation in 
the field of government procurement.  
16.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
17  CHINA — TRADE DISRUPTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE MEASURES — STATEMEN T BY 
AUSTRALIA  
17.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Australia.  
17.2.  The representative of Australia  indicated the following : 
17.3.  Australia continues to have a strong trading relationship with China. Our economies are highly 
complementary and sustained and strong bilateral trade flows continue to be mutually beneficial. 
Australia welcomes China 's signalled readiness to work toward stabili zing the relationship, including 
under our Comprehensive Strategic Pa rtnership.  Notwithstanding  this, Australia again wishes to 
register its concerns regarding a series of disruptive and restrictive measures that China continues 
to apply to a wide range of Australian exports which appear inconsistent with China 's 
WTO commit ments. These trade disruptive and restrictive measures have directly impacted 
Australia's market access into China 's market . 
17.4.  To remind Members, no less than nine  commodities, ranging from coal to copper ores and 
concentrates, to rock lobsters, to barley, h ave been variously subject to the following measures:  
quantitative restrictions such as de facto import bans;  unjustified anti -dumping and countervailing 
duties;  increased and arbitrary border testing and inspections, including delays, applied without prio r 
notification; or  unwarranted delays in listing and re -listing export establishments, and issuing import 
licences.  To further remind Members, some of these measures have been taken through formal 
actions, while others have been taken by direction or instruction of Chinese authorities to not 
purchase certain Australian commodities. Reports of such informal measures are supported by the 
facts on the ground. For instance, Chinese trade data continues to show virtually no Chinese imports 
of Australian coa l and copper ores and concentrates since December  2020, despite the  pre-existing  
historically consistent and high level of trade in these products.  
17.5.  To date, China 's authorities have not notified the WTO of these measures or provided clear 
guidance or advic e on pathways for these trade disruptive and restrictive measures to be lifted or 
resolved. So that we may work toward a solution, Australia again asks China to notify these to the 
WTO and explain how these measures are consistent with its WTO  commitments and obligations. Up 
until now, there has been no adequate response from China. Australia remains open to dialogue to 
resolve these trade issues. Australia  looks forward to receiving a substantive response from China  
and stands ready and willing to engage s ubstantively with China to discuss these issues.  
17.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
17.7.  The United States shares Australia's concerns and remains deeply troubled by the information 
provided by Australia and that we have heard from  other, credible sources. We again register 
systemic concern with the broad range of restrictive measures, both formal and informal, that China 
has imposed on certain Australian goods in an abusive, arbitrary, and pretextual manner. In 
connection, we are c oncerned by reports that Chinese authorities have informally instructed 
importers not to purchase certain goods.  
17.8.  As noted previously, China's actions are not isolated to Australia. There are many instances 
of China using these harmful non -market practices against WTO  Members in apparent retaliation for G/MA/M/77  
 
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  unconnected bilateral issues, including China's discrimination against Lithuanian goods and 
EU products with Lithuanian content. It is important to identify similarly coercive actions taken by 
China against o ther Members, as they demonstrate a broader pattern of behaviour. Specifically, 
China uses, or threatens to use, arbitrary or unjustifiable trade actions to pressure or influence the 
legitimate decision -making of sovereign governments.  
17.9.  China claims to upho ld the "rules -based multilateral trading system", but its actions speak for 
themselves. China continues to exploit the rules -based system to its advantage, ignoring or breaking 
rules and exploiting grey zones in order to inflict harm on others to advance i ts geopolitical and 
economic ends.  
17.10.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
17.11.   The European Union continues to share Australia's serious concerns with regard to the 
matters Australia is today again raising in this Committee, as alread y in past meetings of the Council 
for Trade in Goods and the Committee on Market Access. On each of these occasions, the European 
Union made a statement in support of Australia. The EU maintains its serious concerns of principle 
and of law. The large numbe r of Chinese measures affect a wide product range and a large trade 
value. Some of these measures seem to be informal but are nevertheless covered by the GATT  rules 
on import restrictions, as well as those requiring the publication and the uniform, reasona ble, and 
non-discriminatory administration of trade regulations.  
17.12.   As a separate matter, the European Union is concerned about the apparent purpose of the 
measures in question. An intention to punish, put pressure on , or coerce another Member because 
of a po licy choice which lies within the rights of that Member places these measures at variance with 
general international law. That is a separate legal angle from the one under the WTO  Agreement.  
17.13.   In the European Union, growing concerns as to coercive practices have led to a legislative 
proposal for a so -called anti -coercion instrument. This proposal is presently progressing within the 
European Union's legislature. Also, the European Union this year initiated a WTO  dispute vis-à-vis 
China in relation to a range o f measures negatively affecting its trade with China where there also 
appears to be such a coercive intention.  
17.14.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
17.15.   Japan shares the concerns expressed by Australia that China's trade measures, including 
trade remedy measures, should be implemented within the framework of the WTO  Agreements , and 
that China's measures should comply with the relevant WTO  agreements in the procedures and fact -
finding. In addition, as was pointed out by Members in the TPR of China  last year, opaque measures 
taken by China in an unofficial or unpublished manner are problematic from the perspective of 
China's accession protocol and the transparency rules in the GATT.  
17.16.   Therefore, we urge China to ensure transparency in its trade measur es. If China is 
implementing its trade measures in an arbitrary manner , as reported, that runs counter to a free, 
fair, and rules -based international trading system. We expect China to respond to Australia's 
concerns in good faith and in a timely manner.  
17.17.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
17.18.   Canada continues to share the systemic concerns raised by Australia and other 
WTO Members regarding trade disruptive and restrictive measures adopted by China. I refer to 
Canada's previous intervention s on this item in the councils, which remains valid .18 
17.19.   China's repeated use of trade restrictions that are inconsistent with established international 
practices negatively impacts Canada's agricultural and non -agricultural exports. In relation to 
agricultur al trade, China's lack of transparency and predictability with its application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS)  measures continue to restrict Canada's exports of food, plant , and animal 
products, which continue to experience significant undue delays in China's approval procedures.  
 
18 See, for example , document  G/C/M/143 , paragraphs  24.20 -24.24.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  17.20.   Canada remains concerned with the trade disruptive impact of China's COVID -19 measures 
on food imports. WHO/FAO  guidance has reconfirmed that neither food nor food packaging is a 
pathway for the spread of viruses causing respir atory illnesses, including COVID -19. With no 
scientific evidence to support these measures, the continued suspension of Canadian meat 
establishments can only be viewed now as a tool to block trade.  
17.21.   Canada also remains concerned about the potential trade di sruptions as a result of China's 
administrative measures for the registration of overseas manufacturers of imported food, and the 
continuing challenges and delays with the registration approval process for foreign establishments 
in the online China Import Food Enterprise Registration (CIFER) system. The world is facing rising 
food prices and disruptions to global supply chains impacting food security. It is critical for all 
WTO Members, including China, to take a science -based approach to their decisions an d measures.  
17.22.   In non -agricultural trade, Canada continues to note new significant barriers to trade related 
to product certification requirements, such as expanding the scope of review to the point where 
product certifications that used to take several month s now take several years for the same product 
types, as well as for modifications of existing and previously certified products. The use of trade 
disruptive and coercive measures also challenge and destabilize the rules -based international trading 
system f rom which China, Canada,  and all WTO  Members have benefited.  
17.23.   Canada encourages all WTO  Members, including China, to abide by their WTO  commitments.  
17.24.   The representative of New Zealand  indicated the following:  
17.25.   New Zealand continues to share a systemic interes t in the concerns expressed on this topic. 
In the interest of time, we also refer to our statement made at the last CMA19 and other fora, 
including on the importance of the multilateral rules -based trading system and the predictability and 
certainty that i t provides for Members, regardless of their size or trading capacity.  
17.26.   The adoption of measures by WTO  Members that cause widespread disruption to trade and 
lack transparency cause serious concern to New Zealand, including actions undertaken against a 
range  of exports from Australia and other WTO  Members. New Zealand encourages Members to 
comply fully with their WTO  obligations, including in the application of trade remedies and the 
obligation to apply them in good faith.  
17.27.   The representative of  the United Kin gdom  indicated the following:  
17.28.   The United Kingdom wishes to reiterate its support for Australia’s concerns over restrictive 
trade measures adopted by China. We continue to call on China to ensure that its trade measures 
are applied in a non -discriminatory, predictable manner, and with the necessary transparency 
around decision -making and administrative procedures, as required by the relevant 
WTO agreements. As WTO  Members, we must all adhere to the fundamental principles and 
objectives of fre e and fair trade underpinning the rules -based multilateral trading system.  
17.29.   The United Kingdom continues to closely monitor reports of China's trade actions deliberately 
targeting exports from other countries for political reasons. As we have noted before, unfair and 
market -distorting trade practices can undermine both the integrity of, as well as the trust in, the 
multilateral trading system, and could directly harm business and citizens worldwide. We continue 
to urge China to engage in good faith and in a timely and responsive manner, providing clarifications 
to the points raised by Australia and the EU.  
17.30.   The representative of  Chinese Taipei  indicated the following:  
17.31.   My delegation wishes to support the concerns raised by Australia regarding China 's 
implementation of trade disruptive and restrictive measures targeting a broad range of Australian 
goods.  China 's trade measures to hamper certain Members ' trade interests, whether imposed 
formally or taken by direction or instruction of its authorities, se em to be based on unrelated bilateral 
issues. These measures systemically undermine the rule s-based multilateral trading system and 
create a negative trade impact not only to Australia,  but also to all other Members.  We therefore call 
 
19 See document  G/MA/M/76 , paragraphs  11.25 -11.28.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  upon China to engage in dialogue with relevant Members in a good faith and constructive manner 
to solve their legitimate trade concerns, and  for China  to uphold its commitments to the principles 
and obligations of the WTO  rules.  
17.32.   The representative of China  indicated the follow ing: 
17.33.   China has provided explanations on this issue raised by Australia in previous meetings at 
various WTO  committees many times.  China has always kept its promises by actively fulfilling its 
WTO commitments and its obligations under the China -Australia Fr ee Trade Agreement and reducing 
tariffs on imported products from Australia for six consecutive years from 2015 to 2020. Currently, 
about 95% of imported products from Australia enjoy the zero -tariff treatment.  
17.34.   The relevant measures taken by the competent Chinese authorities in response to some 
Australian products exported to China are in line with Chinese laws and regulations, international 
practices, and the WTO  rules, as well as the relevant provisions of the China -Australia  FTA. China 
has also notified Australia promptly.  It is not appropriate for Australia to make groundless 
speculation on the normal inspection and quarantine measures taken by China and the business 
decisions made by Chinese enterprises based on market demand. China has always believed that 
trade and investment cooperation between Members , based on equality and mutual benefit, and 
following the WTO  rules and market principles, is conducive to improving the well -being of people 
around the world.  
17.35.   The Committee took note  of the statements m ade. 
18  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION ON SOME FOOD IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
18.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  the 
European Union.  
18.2.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following : 
18.3.  As this is the first time that the European Union  raises this issue in the Committee, we will 
briefly set out the facts. The Dominican Republic applies a special VAT  tax (called ITBIS) of 18% on 
imported products, mo stly on imported cheeses, hams , and some other food products. The tax does 
not apply to the same domestic products, resulting in a discriminatory treatment of imported 
products.  
18.4.  The European Union has been raising the issue with the authorities of the Domi nican Republic 
since 2015. Numerous contacts have been taken since then, including after the change of 
government in August  2020. We also thank the Delegation of the Dominican Republic in Geneva  for 
the informal exchange held prior to this meeting.  Althoug h the authorities from the Dominican 
Republic have indicated that measures would be taken to eliminate the discrimination, there has 
been no progress in resolving the matter.  EU operators are negatively affected by this discriminatory 
taxation.  
18.5.  The Europea n Union  request s the Dominican Republic to resolve the matter promptly. We 
would welcome clarifications as to what steps the Dominican Republic intends to take to that end, 
and within which timelines. We remain ready to engage with a view to making progres s on this issue.  
18.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following : 
18.7.  The United States shares the concerns raised today by the European Union.  We seek 
clarification from the Dominican Republic on the taxes applied to some food products and ans wers 
to the questions raised today.  
18.8.  The representative of the Dominican Republic  indicated the following : 
18.9.  The Dominican Republic's legal system contains no discriminatory measures in any area. The 
Dominican Republic's taxation system provides for the Tax o n the Transfer of Industrialized Goods 
and Services (ITBIS), which is levied on the transfer of industrialized goods within the domestic G/MA/M/77  
 
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  market, the importation of these goods, and the provision or leasing of services, at rates of 18% 
and, for a small numb er of goods, at a rate of 16%. The Tax Code of the Dominican Republic 
establishes a list of goods that are exempt, with this exemption applying indistinctly to goods 
produced in the domestic market and to those that are imported, thereby complying with the  
principle of non -discrimination enshrined in the WTO.  
18.10.   The European Union notified the Dominican Government that there were differences between 
how the exemption for certain food products was being applied to goods transferred within the 
domestic market an d how it was being applied to imports. The relevant authority therefore conducted 
an assessment to identify what gave rise to this declaration. As a result, it was found that local 
producers were declaring products that had undergone maturation as "fresh c heese". These 
producers therefore received a warning from the Tax Administration, were told to apply the tax in 
the manner established by law , and were informed of the consequences that they could face in the 
event of a breach of tax provisions. This actio n reaffirms the Dominican Republic's dedication to 
fulfilling the commitments made in the international agreements that it has signed and its legislation.  
18.11.   Given that the European Union received timely notification of the resolution of this matter, 
as is do cumented in various communications, we are surprised that the situation is being presented 
in this scenario as a potential breach. Nonetheless, we reiterate our readiness to address any concern 
of the European Union, a leading partner for our country, or a ny other WTO  Member that identifies 
any practice that could affect the development of international trade based on the principles to which 
we have committed before this multilateral Organization . 
18.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
19  EGYPT – MANDATORY USE OF A LETTER OF CREDIT AS PRIOR CONDITION FOR 
IMPORTS - STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORWAY  
19.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  the 
European Union and Norw ay. 
19.2.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following : 
19.3.  The European Union  is concerned by the recent mandatory requirement to use a Letter of 
Credit as payment condition for imports in to Egypt, which seems to be out of step with Egypt 's 
comm itments under the WTO  Agreements.  We understand that, since February  2022, imports in 
Egypt can be authorized by the Customs Authority only after a Letter of Credit is opened by the 
Egyptian banks. That has led to a de facto blockage of EU  trade at ports a nd customs points. This 
situation is amplified by the lack of transparency and predictability regarding the introduction and 
implementation of the measure. The measure was adopted without prior warning to the economic 
operators and without a prior WTO  notification. As far as the EU is aware, there is so far no official 
legal act made publicly available enacting the measure and harmonizing its implementation details.  
19.4.  We find it difficult to see how this measure, as currently designed and applied, could be in  
line with Egypt 's commitments under the WTO  Agreements, as it seems to restrict both imports and 
payments for imports into Egypt.  The measure has been in place for several months. The EU is highly 
concerned by the horizontal disruptive effects this measur e has on the activities of economic 
operators across EU  industries. We therefore invite Egypt to reconsider the measure in order to 
address the serious concerns it has raised with respect to imports into Egypt.  
19.5.  The representative of Norway  indicated the following : 
19.6.  Norway  would like to express our concern about restrictions regarding payments for imports 
into Egypt. Norway agrees with the European Union  that the mandatory requirement to use a Letter 
of Credit as payment, implemented earlier t his year, seems to be inconsistent with Egypt 's 
commitments under the WTO  Agreements, restricting both imports and payments for imports into 
Egypt.  
19.7.  As also indicated by the EU, these restrictions are amplified by the lack of transparency and 
predictability regarding the introduction and implementation of the requirement.  As far as we have 
understood the Egyptian requirements, certain goods , such as fish, are exempted from the G/MA/M/77  
 
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  requirement. However, the requirements are also causing challenges f or the trade in seafood, 
leading to increased administrative burden and delays for important food products. Egypt is an 
important market for Norwegian seafood, and seafood represents an important share of the bilateral 
trade between our two  countries.  We invite Egypt to reconsider the measure in order to address the 
serious concerns it has raised with respect to imports into Egypt.  
19.8.  The representative of Egypt  indicated the following : 
19.9.  Egypt thank s the European Union and Norway for their concerns regarding th e mandatory use 
of a letter of credit as a means of payment  for imports  into Egypt. At the outset, it is important to 
note that letters of credit are one of the well acknowledged methods of payment, and in many cases, 
required by the exporters given the fa ct that it provides a high level of reassurance to the exporter.  
19.10.   Letters of credit do not create import blockages. In case delay occurs, it is important to note 
that the current unprecedented global challenges have put the monetary reserves of food importi ng 
countries like Egypt under pressure. This, in turn, may cause a delay and affect the ability to finance 
imports, including those of goods essential for the livelihood of our people. Concerning the 
availability and publication of information since the in troduction of mandatory use of letter of credit 
in February  2022, the Central Bank of Egypt has ensured transparency for issuance of a number of 
circulars, the latest being in June  2022, to clarify the scope in terms of entities, products, and trade 
regime s, of the requirements and the relevant administrative procedures. The link to these circulars 
is found on the  website of the  Central Bank of Egypt.  
19.11.   Furthermore, letters of credit are not the only payment method. There are also other 
accepted payment metho ds, as explained on the above -mentioned website. Our circular explains 
that there are many products that do not fall within the product coverage, including inter alia 
medicines, vaccines and relevant chemicals, medical supplies and their input, supplies for medical 
testing laboratories, tea, meat, poultry, fish, wheat, oil, powdered milk, infant milk, beans, lentils, 
butter and corn, live cattle and poultry, in additio n to veterinary medicines and their relevant 
chemicals, raw materials and production inputs including seeds, chemicals used in agricultural 
activities , and raw cocoa powder. Finally, to ensure that no shipment of perishable goods such as 
agricultural and f ood products face any delay in Egyptian ports, our country is currently instructing 
that all perishable shipments be cleared by customs provided that the importer pledge to finalize 
the administrative procedures with a bank within a maximum of one  year. 
19.12.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
20  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM (THE EUROPEAN 
GREEN DEAL OF DECEMBER  2019) – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
20.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the reque st of the 
Russian Federation. Written questions had been  circulated in documents  G/C/W/800 and 
G/MA/W/172.  
20.2.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following : 
20.3.  The Russian Federation raises its deep concern in respect of the Carbon Border Adjustment 
Mechanism (CBAM), which is now being finalized by the European Union. The Russian Federation 
reiterates its statements made during the previous meetings of the CMA and the CTG.  
20.4.  We consider the CBAM as a protectionist measure aimed at improving the business 
environment for domestic industries. First, one of the objectives of the CBAM is to address the risk 
of carbon leakage. It is clearly stated in paragraph  1 of Article  1 of the EU's draft regulation 
establishing a CBAM. According to the Explanat ory Memorandum to this draft regulation "carbon 
leakage occurs if, for reasons of different ambitions related to climate policies, businesses in certain 
industry sectors or subsectors were to transfer production to other countries with less stringent 
emiss ion constraints or imports from these countries would replace equivalent but less 
GHG emissions intensive products due to the difference in climate policy". The whole concept of 
prevention of the so -called carbon leakage is an intention to localize industrial capacities on the 
territory of the EU, especially the ones that previously left the Union.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  20.5.  We would like to recall that the UNFCCC, as well as the Paris Agreement, allow their Parties 
to decide on their own way of achieving climate goals that ar e most effective for them. According to 
Article  3 of the UNFCCC , "policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost -effective 
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost. To achieve this, such policies and 
measures should tak e into account different socio -economic contexts, be comprehensive, cover all 
relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation, and comprise all 
economic sectors ". 
20.6.  In addition, Article  5 of the UNFCCC provides for the cooperation o f its Parties in order "to 
promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable 
economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus 
enabling them better to address the problems  of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate 
change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade ". 
20.7.  The Russian Federation  notes that the maj or principles of the Paris Agreement are (i) common 
but differentiated responsibility; (ii) an independent choice when determining the measures to 
address climate change ; and (iii) cooperation. The CBAM neglects all these principles and does not 
absolutely  meet the terms of the multilateral arrangements concluded at the global level on how to 
address the problem of climate change.  Despite all these provisions, the EU has decided to punish 
all countries that have applied climate policies different from its own. 
20.8.  Second, it is no secret that the EU 's institutions make their proposals to amend the initial 
draft regulation. These proposals include:  (i) extension of the product scope subjected to the CBAM;  
(ii) non-recognition of alternative to carbon pricing inte rnal measures aimed at decarbonization 
applied by exporting to the EU  countries as effective when calculating the CBAM rate;  (iii) de facto 
no mutual recognition of the verification results; and  (iv) provision of export rebates for so-called 
most effective installations, according to the EU-ETS regulation, involved in export activity.  
Additionally, the CBAM should mirror the EU-ETS for importers of the covered products. However, 
the EU-ETS implies fina ncial contribution measures. The EU  State Aid Guidelines provide 
compensation for the reduction of indirect GHG  emissions. In other words, the national authorities 
provide financial support for companies if they consume alternative energy sources produced within 
the EU. Besides, the participants of the EU-ETS have free allocations within this system and do not 
purchase any allowances.  
20.9.  Due to a time-limit, I cannot list all the provisions, which will lead to restrictions in trade with 
the EU caused by the CB AM. The Russian Federation has already circulated questions to the EU in 
documents  G/MA/W/172 and G/C/W/800. However, the EU has failed to provide answers. We urge 
the EU to consider these questions and provide us with responses in accordance with the 
WTO procedures.  We also expect that the EU will fully respect current trade rules and international 
climate agreements.  
20.10.   The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
20.11.   Paraguay's intervention relates to Agenda Items  20, 22 , and in part, 23, as all of t hese items 
are closely linked to the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.  
20.12.   Paraguay thanks the delegations that added this item to the agenda and stresses that these 
types of measures would probably have little or no impact on reducing emissions, but ra ther seem 
to be protectionist measures aimed at levelling the playing field between EU  domestic producers and 
their international competitors. Most, if not all, developed countries, including the EU  member 
States , have achieved their economic development u sing the highly polluting methods that they wish 
to prohibit today, providing them with all these extra monetary resources  that are used to subsidize 
production in order to comply with the measures that they are imposing on their trading partners.  
20.13.   Demandin g from developing countries, that do not count on the same resources, to comply 
with measures that cannot be financed without the same level of domestic support does not aim at 
levelling the playing field ; it makes the situation even worse. Even proving compliance , and the 
administrative costs of such mea sures , are too high for small and developing countries like Paraguay.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  20.14.   The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities " must be taken into account not 
only on the basis of historical contributions but also on current policies, such as the envir onmentally 
harmful subsidies that the same European Union is seeking to implement on developing countries 
and that allow the implementation of carbon border adjustment measures. Paraguay, which 
produces only 0.02% of total GHG  emissions globally, has contr ibuted very little or nothing to the 
current climate change crisis and yet is severely affected by it due to its high dependence on 
agriculture production and trade.  
20.15.   Since all Members  must play their part and we reaffirm our commitment to doing so, we 
have to create the right conditions so that developing countries are able to do so and, in reality, we 
are playing our part. We do not use subsidies that are harmful to trade for either fossil fuels or 
agriculture, and we contribute through largely unpaid ecos ystem services. Other political approaches 
and domestic conditions must be taken into account when analysing and implementing these types 
of measures. Paraguay does not use carbon price measures but is probably a carbon sink through 
sustainable farming pra ctices and unpaid ecosystem services.  
20.16.   The industrial sector in Paraguay and in many other developing countries is very small. 
Measures such as carbon pricing at the border will not further green industrialization without other 
elements and policies, they w ill rather prevent it. And what is worse, if these measures are extended 
to agricultural products with a certain level of industrialization, profit margins will be reduced even 
more, which in turn will affect exports, production , and our economies in gener al at the expense not 
only of the required adjustment, but also of our ability to move towards even more environmentally 
sustainable production systems.  
20.17.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
20.18.   The European Union has taken note of Paraguay 's intervention and will reply under Agenda 
Items 22 and 23.  
20.19.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
21   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSAL FOR A REGULATION ON DEFORESTATION -FREE 
PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
21.1.  The Chairperson  recalled t hat this agenda item had been included at the request of  the 
Russian Federation.  
21.2.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following : 
21.3.  The Russian Federation is deeply concerned with the measures developed and adopted by the 
European Union  in the framework of the European Green Deal. In our view, such measures aim to 
impose trade restrictions  in order to improve the EU's business environment and to ensure 
compulsory localization in its territory.  
21.4.  One of the examples is a proposal of the Euro pean Commission on deforestation -free products 
which implies the import authorization procedure in respect of certain categories of goods such as 
cattle, cocoa, oil palm, soya, wood and products derived from them.  According to the draft 
Regulation , permits  on import of such goods are supposed to be issued in case:  (i) the production 
of supplied products has not caused deforestation and forest degradation;  (ii) production has been 
carried out in accordance with the national legislation of the country of orig in; and (iii) due diligence 
expertise by the importer has been conducted.  At the same time, this proposal neither set s out any 
relevant specific provisions nor any quality or quantity criteria for the implementation of this 
approach and compliance therewit h. The draft regulation imposes benchmarks for risks depending 
on the product 's country of origin. If the country of origin falls under the high -level risk group, the 
imports from this territory are prohibited.  It seems like another unilateral measure whic h could not 
be in accordance with WTO  rules and the main principles of the global arrangements relating to the 
issue of combating climate change.  
21.5.  Moreover, the European Union's  institutions within the framework of the trialogue go further 
and propose to ex tend the scope of products subject to deforestation -free regulation, as well as to 
add new vague conditions for import authorization , which are:  (i) the absence of a compulsory labo ur G/MA/M/77  
 
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  force in the manufacturing process of products exported to the EU ; and (ii) compliance with the 
international standards despite the existence of the technical regulation system in the EU, and 
others.  There is no doubt that all these requirements , together with the initial proposals of the 
Commission , will create additional administrative obstacles for international trade that do not serve 
the interests of the multilateral trading  system.  
21.6.  The Russian Federation u rges the European Union  to fully respect current trade rules and 
international climate agre ements.  
21.7.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
22  EUROPEAN UNION – CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT MECHANISM – STATEMENT BY 
CHINA  
22.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  China . 
22.2.  The representative of China  indicated  the following : 
22.3.  China believes that actively addressing climate change, strictly implementing the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement, lowering 
tariffs and non -tariff barriers, and liberalizing trade and i nvestment are important safeguards for 
building a community with a shared future for human beings and promoting global sustainable 
development.  
22.4.  The unilateral CBAM is based on the concept of "Carbon Leakage ", which is questionable in 
theory and practice, d isregards the differences in development stages and historical carbon emission 
responsibilities of different Members, deviates from the basic principles of the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement , such as "common but differentiated responsibilities and respecti ve capabilities " and "the 
institutions according to which every member determines its contribution ", and inconsistent with the 
WTO basic principle of non -discrimination. The implementation of the CBAM will exacerbate 
international trade tensions, damage mu tual trust among the international community and the 
prospects for economic growth, and be detrimental to the post -pandemic recovery of the global 
economy.  
22.5.  China is willing to strengthen communication and coordination with the EU and other Members 
to promote the liberalization of trade and investment in the green sector and address climate change 
jointly. China hopes that the EU will fully communicate with al l stakeholders during the legislative 
process to ensure that the relevant measures comply with the requirements of the GATT, the 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, and the TBT  Agreement , and to avoid the formation of 
new trade barriers.  
22.6.  The represen tative of the Republic of Korea  indicated the following : 
22.7.  The Republic of Korea recognizes that climate change is one of the significant issues that all 
Members should continue to jointly focus on, with a view to finding effective ways to tackle this 
global  challenge. Whilst having initiated its nation -wide emissions trading scheme since 2015, Korea 
has spared no effort to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, actively participating in international efforts 
to fight against climate change. Yet trade matters targe ted for this purpose , such as the EU's Carbon 
Border A djustment Mechanism , ought to be consistent with the WTO  rules and be carefully designed 
so as not to function as an unnecessary trade barrier. Further, it should take into full consideration 
trading pa rtners' individual efforts in addressing the issue of climate change.  
22.8.  The Republic of Korea will continue to closely follow the CBAM 's latest process, whilst 
encouraging the EU to provide those that are subject to the measure with sufficient information an d 
opportunity to comment. Furthermore, Korea looks forward to advancing the multilateral 
conversation on trade measures aimed at climate change.  
22.9.  The representative of Japan  indicated the following : 
22.10.   Climate change is one of the most important issues. Countr ies must raise their ambitions 
and policy efforts to achieve carbon neutrality worldwide by 2050, while at the same time ensuring G/MA/M/77  
 
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  a level  playing field and preventing carbon leakage. Therefore, policy coordination is important for 
the production and introd uction of products with low carbon intensity.  
22.11.   When discussing policy coordination, each country has been making reduction efforts in the 
past according to their own circumstances, such as energy source constraints and the industrial 
environment, and in pri nciple, the focus should be on "carbon intensity" as the "result" of such 
reduction efforts.  
22.12.   As far as we understand, the CBAM was approved for re -amendment at the European 
Parliament's plenary session of 22  June, and trialogue discussions are under  way be tween the 
European Council, the European Parliament , and the European Commission. Meanwhile, the 
European Parliament 's amendment  includes the refund of emission credits at the time of export from 
the EU, and there are more issues, such as subsidies agreeme nts, that need to be considered. It is 
necessary for the EU to continue to avoid rushed and arbitrary decisions regarding this matter and 
continue to fully discuss this matter internationally.  
22.13.   The representative of Türkiye  indicated the following : 
22.14.   Combatti ng climate change and achieving green transition are objectives that Türkiye shares 
with the European Union . On Türkiye's side, we are committed to playing our part in fighting climate 
change and meeting our net -zero emissions target by 2053.  
22.15.   Türkiye is closely following the EU's Green Deal, and the CBAM  regulation in particular , due 
not only to its significant effects on our trade with the EU, which is a major trading partner for 
Türkiye, but also because this measure, as a first example of its kind, has t he possibility to set a 
precedent for upcoming trade-related climate measures based on carbon pricing. In this sense, not 
only at this Committee, but also at others , such as the CTE  yesterday , and the Council for Trade and 
Goods, we have been voicing our expectations from the EU on the drafting and future im plementation 
of the CBAM.  
22.16.   Let me reiterate here that some of the issues that are related to the technicalities of the 
CBAM are in fact central to our debate here at the Market Access Committee so as to ensure that 
measures shall be applied in a manner that  least disturb s trade and do es not constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade. These are, among others, the issue of carbon measurement 
methodology adopted by the EU; specifically with regards to using widely accepted standards as the 
basis, and whether the methodology regarding the calculation of carbon content of products is too 
complex and costly to be implemented for developing countries. Another issue of importance is 
whether the implicit carbon pricing , or other climate mitigation metho ds of countries , will be 
considered within the CBAM in order to make a transparent comparison with the policies of other 
countries and to prevent double counting.  
22.17.   On the other hand, while deliberations are still ongoing within the European Union , we have 
been hearing of some possible additions to the design of the CBAM with regard to the product scope ; 
the emissions coverage of the charge also to include indirect emissions; and possible support to 
EU exports to countries without similar carbon pricing , all of which might give rise to concerns with 
regards to the additional burden and barriers these will create for the manufacturers of other 
countries , as well as the measure's compliance with the WTO  rules and principles.  
22.18.   For these reasons, Türkiye  believe s that the measures targeted for tackling climate change 
should pass the necessity test, prioritize international cooperation and collective action, take into 
account different circumstances and historical responsibilities of countries, respect the social and  
economic development needs of others , and not constitute an arbitrary or disguised restriction and 
unjustifiable discrimination on international trade. In this sense, we would expect such a measure 
of transboundary application and implication in the nexus  of trade and environment to be in line not 
only with WTO rules, but also with the responsibilities arising from Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements.  
22.19.   Türkiye looks forward to receiving further update s from the European Union on this issue 
and remains, as  always, ready to cooperate for an inclusive and just green transition.  
22.20.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  22.21.   The European Union  takes due note of the interest of our partners in this important issue. 
During previous meetings, we had the opportunity to provide Members with an outline of the 
proposal, its objectives , and its interaction with other EU  policies targeted at achieving 
environmental sustainability and carbon neutrality.  During this week 's Committee on Trade and 
Environment, WTO  Members had the opportunity to exchange with the EU 's representative who 
updated Members on the state of the CBAM  proposal, which is currently under negotiation by the 
co-legislators, namely the Council of the EU and the European Parli ament.  
22.22.   Negotiations started in July  2022 and have been taking place regularly since then. The 
co-legislators are currently analysing the proposal in  depth. An agreement on the final text is 
expected by the end of the year.  It is useful to recall that the introduction of a CBAM seeks to address 
the risk of carbon leakage and thereby avoid that the EU climate action is undermined. The CBAM is 
only one of many components of the European Green Deal, which sets out a path towards  achieving 
the EU's climate targets. It aims to provide market incentives to the private sector to green their 
production.  The CBAM is a purely climate -oriented, environmental policy tool and it will be applied 
in a non -discriminatory and even -handed manne r in full compliance with the WTO rules and other 
international obligations. The proposal is based on the actual carbon content of a product , and by 
mirroring the existing EU  Emissions Trading System (ETS), it ensures that foreign and domestic 
producers ar e treated equally.  
22.23.   The CBAM does not target third  countries. It is addressed to companies as it applies to goods 
of certain carbon -intensive sectors and takes into consideration the application of carbon pricing 
systems by third  countries opening possibili ties for reduction or non -payment of the CBAM  charge. 
It also takes into consideration the carbon footprint of individual producers , meaning that the CBAM 
will be charged according to the actual emissions of imported goods.  The impact of CBAM on 
third countries will be limited. The EU has been in contact  with the most affected companies and 
governments.  
22.24.   The European Union  stands  ready to further engage with its trade partners and international 
organi zations to inform  them about,  and where possible to assist them with, the implementation of 
the measure.  
22.25.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
23  EUROPEAN UNION – EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL (EGD): CARBON BORDER ADJUSTMENT 
MECHANISM (CBAM) AND DEFORESTATION FREE COMMODITIES (DFC) – STATEMENT BY 
INDONESIA  
23.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Indonesia . 
23.2.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
23.3.  Indonesia has raised its concern in the meetings of other WTO  committees regarding  the 
European Union's C arbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (or CBAM) and Deforestation -Free 
Commodities (or DFC) proposals under the framework of the European Green Deal policies. Despite 
these efforts, no substantial responses from the EU have been provided.  At the outset, Indonesia 
wishes to register again its concerns on the proposed CBAM and DFC in this committee meeting.  
23.4.  Regarding the proposed CBAM, Indonesia has heard from the EU that the CBAM is an 
environmental policy tool, and that it will be  applied in a non -discriminatory manner, in full 
compliance with the WTO  rules and other international obligations. The EU further said that they 
have fully translated the implementation of the Paris Agreement into legislation.  Indonesia 
acknowledges that one of the important basic principles enshrined in the Paris Agreement and 
UNFCCC is "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities ". We believe 
that each Member has undertaken policies to address climate issues. Given that the pro posed CBAM 
is unilateral and extra -territorial in nature, we are eager to hear more about  how the EU incorporates 
this fundamental principle into the proposed CBAM.  Furthermore, Indonesia is deeply concerned with 
the unclear methodology used under the CBAM , including, inter alia, to calculate carbon footprint , 
and its charges , as well as to determine when a product is incorporate d into the list. Hence , in the 
absence of an international standard, Indonesia is concerned  that the proposed CBAM will use a G/MA/M/77  
 
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  biased standard and/or methodology that could create unnecessary trade barriers and result in a 
discriminatory treatment.  
23.5.  Turning to the proposed DFC, Indonesia takes note that the proposal will cover selected 
commodities such as palm oil, soy, cattle, cocoa, coffee and some derived products (for example 
leather, chocolate, furniture). Some important features under  the proposed DFC are mandatory due 
diligence rules for all operators , and a benchmarking system.  As with the  CBAM, Indonesia has 
significant concern s over the  unclear methodology used by the EU in determining a list of product s 
and a country 's risk level of deforestation.  Taking into account the product scope , the proposed 
measures certainly will negatively affe ct developing countries ' interests , including our farmers and 
other smallholders who depend on agricultural products for their living.  
23.6.  In this regard, we ask the EU to provide detail ed explanation s of whether or not it has taken 
into account the needs of d eveloping and LDC  Members , as well as the different challenges faced by 
Members . Indonesia would also like to know how the proposed CBAM and DFC will be applied 
consistently with the WTO  rules, such as non -discriminatory provisions.  
23.7.  The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
23.8.  Paraguay's statement refers to Agenda Items  21 and 23. Paraguay reiterates the importance 
of taking into account the economic, social , and environmental dimensions of sustainability and 
ensuring that measures are implemente d in accordance with international principles and standards, 
especially those of the WTO regarding measures which have a trade impact. The transition towards 
sustainability in productive systems needs to be gradual and determined by the countries 
themselve s, according to their economic and social development needs. Local circumstances in 
different regions and their production characteristics must also be respected. A combination of 
penalties as well as incentives must be put in place so that Members are abl e to achieve their 
common objectives in the fight against global environmental challenges, such as climate change, 
biodiversity loss , and pollution.  
23.9.  However, while European Union producers benefit from significant subsidies, to directly or 
indirectly compl y with these measures , but that certainly reduce their costs by doing so, producers 
from countries such as Paraguay that provide free ecosystem and environmental services and 
produce without subsidies are being penalized by having to comply with the same m easures. For 
Paraguayan producers, the costs of complying with these measures come out of their profits, as 
opposed to being a small fraction of the domestic support they receive. It should be recalled that 
Paraguay, like many developing countries, has a l arge area of forests, with minimum forest 
conservation requirements ranging from 20 and up to 40% per agricultural establishment, showing 
our commitment to sustainability.  
23.10.   While some Members and continents, including the European Union, have industrialized  and 
achieved their current level of development through highly polluting and environmentally damaging 
methods and are responsible for climate change, other Members that have only marginally 
contributed to climate change are being penalized and forced to c omply with the same measures 
without the same level of support. This clearly disregards the principle enshrined in international 
environmental law of common but differentiated responsibilities.  
23.11.   Paraguay therefore reiterates the request that it has made to the European Union, in other 
committees and in the Council for Trade in Goods, to explain how these measures are consistent 
with the principle of non -discrimination and how the elements of sustainability and the principle of 
common but differentiated respo nsibilities can be reconciled, bearing in mind that the countries that 
contribute the least to climate change are the most affected by it and, at the same time, are the 
main targets of measures such as deforestation given the choice of commodities that is included in 
the EU draft legislation.  
23.12.   The representative of  Guatemala  indicated the following:  
23.13.   Guatemala is  concerned by the application of these measures and the negative impact that 
they will have domestically, such as the adverse effects on rural development. Countries' 
sustainability is managed on an individual basis, in line with the needs and resources of  each G/MA/M/77  
 
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  Member. Developing countries like Guatemala have limited resources compared to the European 
Union and the support it provides.  
23.14.   With regard to the proposal for a regulation on certain commodities and products associated 
with deforestation and forest d egradation, we are unsure of the criteria that have been used to select 
the commodities that will be covered by the regulation. The EU has said in this Organization that it 
used the measure's impact assessment. In this study, the "product scope" section on ly refers to 
commodities imported into the EU. No studies that considered commodities produced within the EU 
were used. We therefore have doubts regarding the scope of this measure.  
23.15.   Turning to the categorization of risk by country and risk sectors for thir d countries, the 
criteria used and the scientific basis for this categorization are also unclear to us. Guatemala  
reiterate s the importance of having rules that adhere to WTO  principles , such as 
most-favoured -nation treatment and national treatment.  
23.16.   The re presentative of Brazil  indicated the following:  
23.17.   Brazil refers to its previous statements on this topic, especially the details made during the 
last meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods in July .20 Therefore, I would like to make a brief 
statement today . CBAM represents an attempt by the European Union to shift the burden of 
adjustment cost s to other countries. At the same time, it seems to be weakening some of its own 
commitments. Furthermore, it is in clear violation of principles, rules , and commitmen ts undertaken 
by the EU in international agreements. Main stakeholders have called for trade negotiators to work 
closely with environmental experts as these topics cannot be addressed in isolation.  The EU will find 
a strong partner in Brazil to promote sus tainable development. We have much to contribute in terms 
of how to bridge divergences and build consensus on this measure.  
23.18.   On deforestation -free commodities (DFC), Brazil believes it establishes illegitimate obstacles  
to international trade. It is of a st rong discriminatory nature and has little if any impact on its alleged 
goal of reducing deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation is a multivariable problem that 
should be addressed through comprehensive public policies in the short , medium . and long-term. 
Illegal activities linked to deforestation must be halted. Alternative means of livelihood must be 
made available to the millions of people that live near forests. Sustainable production practices must 
be fostered and scaled up. Trade restrictio ns are in that sense a very limited instrument. They 
unfairly punish 99.1% of rural producers and do not provide any other remedy for the direct and 
indirect drivers of deforestation. By acting as an obstacle to economic development, trade 
restrictions act ually reinforce some of the dynamics that led to the deforestation and reduce 
government capacity to deal with this issue.  
23.19.   Brazil has a legacy of constructive effort and building bridges in both the trade and 
environment regimes, making meaningful and sizeable contributions to achieving outcomes that 
balance the interests of all Members, and that put us on a proper path to address ing our common 
challenges. We therefore reiterate that the EU will find in Brazil a strong and committed partner in 
the promotion of sustainable development, and we urge the EU to duly consider the many concerns 
that we have expressed and adopt a constructive  approach to the benefit of both regimes, trade and 
environmental, and especially to small producers in the developing world.  
23.20.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following : 
23.21.   Firstly, my delegation takes note of , and welcomes , the inclusion of this t rade concern on 
the agenda of this meeting. Ecuador is concerned by the development of policies under the Green 
Deal and rules on deforestation -free commodities, since they are unilateral decisions that have 
international ramifications and may affect third  countries. Decisions that affect other States must 
take into account the views that other countries may have on a particular environmental matter. 
Moreover, unilaterally imposing environmental standards that have economic and trade implications 
for third  parties is inconsistent with the spirit, rules , and procedures of the multilateral trading 
system.  
 
20 See document  G/C/M/143 , paragraphs  41.2-41.22.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  23.22.   Ecuador recognizes, supports , and promotes compliance with countries' international 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gases. It is important to recall that, u nder the Paris Agreement, 
each country establishes its own targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through nationally 
determined contributions. As such, each country, while retaining its sovereignty and observing the 
principle of common but differentiat ed responsibilities in line with its development capacities, 
establishes its own system for controlling the expansion of crops at the expense of forests, forage 
or vegetation with high carbon stock. Accordingly, pursuant to the Paris Agreement, any standar d 
that is adopted in relation to the control of greenhouse gases and deforestation cannot be imposed 
on a specific country or established unilaterally with effects on third  parties.  
23.23.   Ecuador would be grateful if the European Union could provide information in response to 
the comments made at this meeting of the Committee, and asks that, when adopting and 
implementing environmental decisions that have an impact on multilateral trade, account be taken 
of their consistency not only with internationa l environmental law but also with the commitments 
taken under the multilateral trading system.  
23.24.   The representative of  the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
23.25.   The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thank s the proponents for raising the subject matter of th e 
CBAM. From our perspective, while the EU stated that the proposed mechanism will be in conformity 
with the WTO  rules and other international obligations, the EU is yet to expla in how it aims to achieve 
this. While the EU 's stated intention  is to address the risk of investment leakage from the EU to 
other countries , the main objective is in fact to maintain the competitiveness of the EU  industries. 
Our very preliminary review indicates that the proposed mechanism raises very serious concerns 
due to its pot ential medium and long -term negative implications on global trade, which we believe 
are unilateral trade protectionist in nature and provide specific protection to the EU's domestic 
industry.  
23.26.   The consistency of the CBAM with the fundamental rules of the WT O is questionable. 
Therefore, the burden of proof to confirm that this mechanism is consistent with the EU  obligations 
and commitments regarding MFN, national treatment, rules of origin , and NTBs lies on the EU.  
Furthermore, monitoring and calculating the carbon emissions embedded in the products covered 
by the CBAM is not a straightforward task , and many details of the calculation methodology are not 
yet clear. As far as we understand  it, the EU  ETS implies effective financial contribution measures, 
while the EU  State Aid Guidelines provide compensation for the reduction of indirect GHG  emissions. 
This scheme looks like a specific import  substitution subsidy , which is prohibited under  the 
WTO Agreement s. Therefore, we request the EU to provide further clarification on this matter.  
23.27.   In addition, the  Kingdom of Saudi Arabia kindly requests the European Union  to specify the 
articles in the WTO  Agreements that allow it to adopt this unnecessary and complicated mechanism. 
We also urge the EU to fur ther engage in consultations with Members, in order to ensure the full 
compliance of the CBAM with the WTO rules and Agreements , and to ensure that the proposed 
mechanism would not create unnecessary barriers to trade, or be used as a means of arbitrary or  
unjustifiable discrimination , or as a disguised restriction , on international trade, or be applied in a 
manner that constitutes protection to the EU  domestic industries.  Finally, we look forward to 
receiving  further details and reflections from the EU on this proposed mechanism , and the Kingdom  
of Saudi Arabia stands ready to engage with the EU and interested Members  on this issue . 
23.28.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
23.29.   Sustainable development and environment protection and to enhance the mea ns for doing 
so in a manner consistent with the respective needs and concerns of countries at different levels of 
economic development are critical concerns for each country. There are however serious concerns 
as regards the trends and manner on the increa sing use of unilateral measures, such as the European 
Green Deal, impacting trade, which are sought to be justified as environmental measures.  
23.30.   The implications of such measures for the rules of the WTO need to be reflected on. The 
UNFCCC  functions on the b asis of the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility and 
respective capabilities". The principle of "differentiated responsibilities" recognizes that the largest 
share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has origina ted in developed 
countries; while "respective capabilities" recognizes the different socio -economic status of countries ; G/MA/M/77  
 
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  and the rules of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) need to be reflected on. The 
underlying concern is that of systemic implications for international law as a whole, and the impact 
that any unilateralism would have on the multilaterally negotiated rights and  obligations of countries.  
23.31.   In conclusion , India remains concerned that the measures proposed in the European Green 
Deal do not respect the well laid out principles in the Multilateral Environmental Agreements, seek 
to promote trade protectionism , and sever ely limit consumer choice. We remain opposed to these 
measures and request the European Union to revisit this approach in its totality.  
23.32.   The representative of Kazakhstan  indicated the following : 
23.33.   Kazakhstan reiterates its p osition as expressed at the last me eting of the CTG and continues 
to follow developments around the EU  Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. Kazakhstan urges the 
EU to fully consider the CBAM's compatibility with WTO  rules and regulations, and to ensure that 
any such mechanism does not create  obstacles to trade.  
23.34.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
23.35.   On the CBAM , the European Union refers to its statement under Agenda Item  22 above. The 
EU appreciates the interest of partners also on the issue of deforestation -free c ommodities.  We all 
agree that deforestation and forest degradation are taking place at an alarming speed. Ten million 
hectares of forests disappear every year, mainly due to human activities , with disastrous impacts 
on climate, biodiversity, livelihoods , and the economy.  SDG15  commits countries around the world 
to halt deforestation by 2020. Despite progress, deforestation continues at an alarming rate. One of 
the main outcomes of the recent COP26 has been an agreement to halt and reverse deforestation 
by 2030. Deforestation is a main driver of climate change and biodiversity loss. The EU contributes 
to it by consuming a significant share of products associated with deforestation. The EU, therefore, 
has the responsibility to contribute to ending it.  
23.36.   The European Union  has been working on combatting deforestation for a long time through 
its nature and biodiversity policies, the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan 
and the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation initiati ve. The proposed 
Regulation is only one of the elements in the toolbox. It will ensure that the products that EU  citizens 
buy, use and consume on the EU  market, do not contribute to global deforestation and forest 
degradation.  The Regulation is not a trade  tool. It is there to help fight climate change and 
biodiversity loss linked to global deforestation by addressing the role of EU  consumption.  No 
commodities or countries will be subject to discrimination. The proposed rules will apply equally to 
commoditi es and products produced inside and outside the EU.  The regulation will enhance trade in 
products from "deforestation -free" supply chains. It is the opportunity, together with our trade 
partners, to create more sustainable supply chains.  
23.37.   The European Union  will continue to consult with our trade partners through bilateral and 
multilateral dialogues to support the ability of pr oducers and operators globally to comply with the 
requirements of the future Regulation.  
23.38.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
24  EUROPEAN UNION – MRL REDUCTION OF CERTAIN SUBSTANCES TO MEET 
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN THIRD COUNTRIES – STATEMENT BY  PARAGUAY  
24.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been included at the request of  Paraguay.  
24.2.  The representative of Paraguay  indicated the following:  
24.3.  On 6 July 2022, the European Union notified its reduction of maximum residue levels (MRLs) 
for th e active substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam at the limit of quantification to address "an 
environmental concern of global nature, that is the decline of pollinators worldwide".  Paraguay notes 
that the EU intends to use the MRLs for clothianidin and t hiamethoxam not to protect European 
consumers, but as a mean s to regulate the use of neonicotinoids in processes and production 
methods in third  countries . Paraguay is of the view that the TBT  Agreement was not conceived to 
accommodate measures with clearly extraterritorial objectives.  Moreover, Paraguay has serious G/MA/M/77  
 
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  concerns as to the compatibility of the measure notified by the EU with the market access and 
non-discrimination obligations provided for in Articles  XI and III of the GATT  1994, and that is why  
this concern has been raised in this Committee.  
24.4.  Clothianidin and thiamethoxam are registered in Paraguay and are used in high impact field 
crops at the national and export levels, such as peanuts, soybean, maize, wheat, sesame and mate. 
They not onl y have a wide range of uses and are highly effective, particularly against homopteran, 
tisanopteran, lepidopteran, coleopteran and other pests, but were also assessed and deemed safe 
for human health within the MRLs established by the CODEX  Alimentarius.  
24.5.  Paraguay shares a genuine interest in environmental conservation and biodiversity and 
prioritizes the protection of human, animal and plant health, including the protection of pollinators, 
which play a key role in global food production and biodiversity and  also boost yields of agronomically 
important crops.  But each country, like Paraguay, has specific needs and challenges in its agricultural 
production, according to its geography, ecosystem and scientific local capacities, in seeking and 
maintaining sustai nability in agriculture. This situation is reflected in the regulatory frameworks, 
which are based on solid scientific evidence and applied to registration processes to assess the risks 
of pesticides and their uses with risk assessments based on scientific  information such as risk 
assessments for the environme nt and pollinators.  
24.6.  The European Union's proposal disregards and discredits these local regulatory policies, 
including regional ones, which establish conditions for food production and agricultural act ivity in 
their jurisdictions in a manner that is safe and adapted to the climatic conditions and pest pressures 
in each country and region.  MRLs are not an appropriate tool for addressing environmental 
challenges in other countries , for which  there are oth er appropriate regulatory frameworks and 
multilateral discussion and negotiation forums for that.  There are also different mitigation options 
to manage the potential risks to pollinators arising from the use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam, 
ranging from c lear and specific instructions on labels to the implementation of good agricultural 
practices in all processes. These types of practices , which include for example  the timing of 
application (e.g. early in the morning or late in the afternoon, when pollinators are less prevalent), 
the non -use of substances when crops are blooming, the removal of flowering weeds from fields, 
and the reduction of dust when planting tre ated seeds, are effective means of risk mitigation given 
that they limit pollinators'  exposure  to the production processes of these substances . 
24.7.  Various independent studies by scientific regulatory authorities around the world agree that 
neonicotinoid insec ticides can be used responsibly without causing unacceptable risks to bees or 
other pollinator species in the field. Several specific studies were included in the many comments 
submitted by WTO  Members in relation to the EU  notification  G/TBT/N/EU/908.21 Imposing 
restrictions on international trade will effectively make farmers in Paraguay and the region less 
competitive than farmers in Europe, who do not have to deal with the same pests and climatic 
conditions when pro ducing food and can also benefit from numerous emergency authorizations to 
continue using these substances  despite the fact that the EU has banned them since 2018 . 
24.8.  Paraguay and several other Members submitted, within the established deadline, comments 
on notification  G/TBT/N/EU/908. However, a ccording to our information, on 27  September  2022, 
only 23  days after the deadline for submitting comments, the EU Standing Committee on Plants, 
Animals, Food and Feed approved the proposal to reduce the MRLs for these substances without any 
amendments22, which once again leads us to believe that the notifications and comment periods are 
only formal procedures without the intention to take any comment into account.  Paraguay therefore 
decided to also present this trade concern in the CMA because of the afore mentioned concerns 
regarding the compatibility of the measure with the obligations under Articles  XI and III of the 
GATT  1994. And while  Paraguay is  trying to avoid, as much as possible, repeating the same 
statement made in the TBT  Comm ittee, we need to provide a general introduction to the measure 
and Paraguay's concerns about it. Moreover, as some questions that were raised in Paraguay's 
 
21 https://ec.europa.e u/growth/tools -
databases/tbt/en/search/?tbtaction=search.detail&Country_ID=EU&num=908&dspLang=en&basdatedeb=&bas
datefin=&baspays=EU&basnotifnum=908&basnotifnum2=&baskeywords=&bastypepays=ANY&baskeywords=  
22 https://france.representation.ec.europa.eu/informations/les -etats-membres -approuvent -la-
proposition -de-la-commission -dabaisser -le-seuil-de-residus -de-2022-09-27_fr  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  comments on  the notification and in other committees such as the SPS and TBT  Committees remain 
unanswered, they need to be included here.  
24.9.  With respect to the inconsistency regarding Article  III of the GATT  1994, the EU has said that 
it will not authorize import tolerance for reduced MRLs due to global concerns, while it allows the 
EU member States to grant emergency authorizations for the use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam.  
In this regard, thiamethoxam  has received 49 emergency authorizations for various crops since the 
ban and the end of the grace period for the substance in the EU on 30  April 2019 (Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, L atvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Spain), including the most recent authorization for the period from 
February to May  2023, which is after the modification of the reduced MRL applied to third  countries. 
With respect to clothianidin,  20 emerge ncy authorizations for various crops  have been granted  since 
the ban and the end of the grace period for the substance in the EU on 31  January  2019 (Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Romania and Spain), including the most 
recent authorization also for the period from February to May  2023. These are the countries that 
were authorized when the grace period ended. There are even more that were authorized to use 
these substances after the grace period, given that some emergency aut horizations were granted 
prior to 31  January  2019 permitting their use after this date.  
24.10.   While EU  member States are responsible for emergency authorizations, which is why we do 
not receive information on the costs and average delay for their approval, the E uropean Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) assesses authorizations when it considers that they are not duly justified.  The EFSA 
reviewed several emergency authorizations for these substances for the following EU member  
States : (i) Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Fin land; France; Germany; Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; 
Poland; Romania; and Slovakia for Thiamethoxam ; and (ii)  Spain ; Belgium; Poland, Finland; Latvia; 
Lithuania; Bulgaria; Hungary; and Romania for Clothianidin . The EFSA considers that emergency 
authorization s are justified when the need to avoid pest resistance is proven, and if there are no 
chemical alternatives to control a particular pest.  
24.11.   These are the same arguments used by Paraguay and other Members who do not have 
recourse to emergency authorizations. Even in cases where the EFSA  considers that the emergency 
authorization granted is not duly justified, there are no restrictions on new emergency 
authorizations, which continue to be approved by the same members  States  to control the same 
pests on the same crops for which the EFSA has concluded that the use of the substance and the 
authorization granted was not duly justified.  For example, this was the case of authorizations granted 
in Romania.  
24.12.   How are these emergency authorizations consiste nt with the obligation of non -discrimination 
under Article  III of the GATT  1994?  How long does it take on average to approve an emergency 
authorization?  What is the average cost of the emergency authorization approval process?  These 
questions have been rep eatedly asked in other committees, but the EU  response has merely 
mentioned that emergency authorizations are issued by EU  member States and that each member 
State determines the length of the evaluation process. We look forward to receiving answers to 
these questions, especially as EU  member  States  are also WTO  Members in their own right , and it 
may be necessary to ask questions to each of them separately  in the absence of concrete answers 
from the EU . 
24.13.   The representative of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
24.14.   Uruguay wishes to thank the delegation of Paraguay for including this item on the agenda. 
Uruguay has submitted comments and questions to the European Union regarding the planned 
reduction of MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam due to "environmental co ncerns of a global 
nature" at recent meetings of the SPS and TBT  Committees, as well as bilaterally , as part of the 
international public consultation process opened by the EU in notification  G/TBT/N/EU/908. We look 
forward to receiving a reply to these com ments and hope, above all, that they will be duly taken 
into account in the regulatory process. In this connection, Uruguay is  concerned by the comments 
made by the delegation of Paraguay indicating that the proposal was already approved, without any 
modif ications, on 27  September  2022, at the EU's Standing Committee on Plants, Animals, Food and 
Feed.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  24.15.   As regards this Committee's scope of action, Uruguay understand s that there are arguments 
that the measure concerned could contravene the provisions of Articl e XI of the GATT  1994, which 
forbids the introduction  of import prohibitions or restrictions made effective through quotas, import 
licences or other measures.  In addition to this, aspects such as those indicated by the delegation of 
Paraguay in relation to the institution of emergency authorizations, which a re available for producers 
from European countries without a similar mechanism being in place for producers from 
third countries, and their link to the principle of non -discrimination laid down in Article  III of the 
GATT  1994, merit further consideration.  
24.16.   In view of the foregoing and without prejudice to the elements that have been addressed in 
other WTO  bodies, Uruguay would appreciate hearing the EU's comments or observations regarding 
the consistency of the proposed draft measure and its justification un der the provisions of the 
GATT  1994.  Uruguay shares the interest in promoting the protection of pollinators, in harmony with 
the protection of the environment and biodiversity, and supports the existence of regulatory 
environments based on scientific crite ria, so as to avoid compromising food security and constituting 
barriers to trade. In this connection, Uruguay reiterates its willingness to cooperate with other 
Members to find mechanisms that enable these objectives to be achieved without unnecessarily 
restricting trade, while also ensuring the conservation of the environment.  
24.17.   The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
24.18.   Australia shares Paraguay 's concerns about the EU 's use of MRLs to implement 
environmental objectives in third  countries and  the impact that TBT  notification  G/TBT/N/EU/908 
will have on market access for agricultural products to the EU.  Australia notes that it will be raising 
these concerns within the TBT and SPS  Committee meetings in November.  
24.19.   The representative of Ecuador  indicated the following:  
24.20.   Ecuador takes note of and thanks Paraguay for including this concern on the agenda of this 
meeting.  Ecuador  would like to reiterate its concern in relation to this matter, in line with what we 
have already expressed at the Committee o n Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.  It would appear 
that the technical determination, adoption procedures , and implementation of regulations on MRLs 
by the European Union seem  not to be appropriately aligned with the rules of this Organization , or 
with the phytosanitary standards agreed upon in other multilateral bodies. Moreover, they do not 
take full account of the national legislation of the European Union's various trading partners, their 
production systems , or the climatic conditions that they face, in addition to other specific situations 
that call into question the appropriateness and even the efficacy of measures to reduce residue 
levels.  
24.21.   We have found the European Union to be receptive to opening a dialo gue with countries 
concerned by the above -mentioned approach.  Ecuador  welcome s this openness and hope s that these 
discussions will pay special attention to the following elements:  (i) the impact of the new regulations 
on production and marketing and, there fore, on market access for agricultural products from 
third countries ; (ii) the impact that limiting the use of substances as a tool for crop protection would 
have on farmers from third  countries ; and (iii)  the fact that the draft European regulation recog nizes 
that both the current European MRLs and those of the Codex Alimentarius are safe for consumers 
and, therefore, that the multilateral Codex standard must not be overlooked.  
24.22.   Sustainability rests on three  pillars: social ; economic ; and environmental. It  is crucial not to 
lose sight of the convergence of these three  aspects. In this connection, when adopting measures 
on MRLs, consideration must also be given to trading partners' legal regime s and efforts for the 
protection of, for example, pollinators. Mo reover, account must be taken when adopting such 
measures of the negative effects that they will have on the other sustainability pillars in the European 
Union's trading partners, particularly if they are developing countries.  When it comes to its member 
States, even the European Union itself is no stranger to this flexibility. As has been mentioned, 
where necessary, European producers are able to make emergency use of substances that are 
officially "unauthorized".  In this regard, we  consider that there are  sufficient grounds for the 
European Union to maintain the current maximum levels for third  countries, as import tolerances.  
24.23.   The representative of Brazil  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  24.24.   Brazil was one of the Members that expressed serious concerns about this meas ure at the 
TBT Committee  in July 2022. Brazil shares the EU 's legitimate objective of environmental protection. 
However, the measure at issue is more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil the EU's objective 
both in terms of the TBT  Agreement and of the GATT  1994. As far as the TBT  Agreement is 
concerned , in Sep tember , Brazil stated in the comments  submitted to the EU's regulatory process 
that the measure was inconsistent with Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement, and did not consider the 
Codex  Alimentarius' recommendations for clothianidin and thiamethoxam maximum r esidual limits 
(MRLs). Moreover, the measure is not supported by any evidence that the use of those substances 
in the production of agricultural products in other territories pose s a risk to the population of 
pollinators within the EU. Apart from the TBT  clauses, while we plainly respect the EU's authority to 
regulate the use of neonicotinoid substances  within its territory, it has no such authority over 
third country jurisdictions.  
24.25.   The measure seems to attempt to give extra territorial effect to EU  product ion standards 
and/or  environmental policy choices by imposing them on agricultural activities in third  countries 
which have very different conditions of weather, pest control , and production. It also ignores 
potential risk management mitigation measures by  exporting countries.  In Brazil, for instance, the 
State of San Paolo is the main citrus juice producer , a sector which relies on the use of those 
insecticides. It is also where 84% of honey production is concentrated. In that State , there is no 
evidence o f a decline in the number of pollinators. On the contrary, honey production in that region 
has increased by about 136% in the last 15  years. Paraguay provided some examples of very simple 
and effective migration measures.  
24.26.   In conclusion, Brazil  support s Paraguay's claim that the measure at issue goes beyond the 
provisions of the TBT  Agreement, and also merits escalation in this Committee.  We are currently 
accessing its potential inconsistences with Articles  III, XI , and XX  of the GATT  1994. 
24.27.   The representative of Colombia  indicated the following:  
24.28.   Colombia supports this trade concern, as we have indicated in other WTO  bodies on this 
particular issue and similar policies. In the context of the Committee  on Market Access, Colombia 
draws attention to the inconsistencies between the EU  system of non -approval of use or residue 
limits related to certain substances and the principles of non -discrimination of the GATT  1994. These 
inconsistencies are registered in the so -called "emergency authorizations " which allow EU  member 
States to continue to use plant protection substances on their crops, despite the fact that the use of 
such substances is prohibited. Third  countries have no possibility to use such authorizations . 
24.29.   Equally worrying is the unilateral appl ication of EU  environmental and sanitary standards to 
imported agricultural and agri -food products, which assumes an extraterritorial application of the 
rules regulating the production methods of countries, which in our view is contrary to the principles 
of the GATT . 
24.30.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
24.31.   Canada would like to thank Paraguay for bringing this issue to the Committee  on Market 
Access. Canada shares the concerns raised by a number of other Members and is following this issue 
very closely. We look forward to further engagement with the EU on this matter, including in other 
WTO Committees.  
24.32.   The representative of Argentina  indicated the following:  
24.33.   Argentina would like to thank Paraguay for having included this item on the agenda. Firs tly, 
we would point out that Argentina fully shares the EU 's genuine interest in, and the strategic 
importance of , pollinators for the environment. However, we have recently raised a number of 
questions regarding notification  G/TBT/N/EU/908 to which we are  awaiting response s. 
24.34.   In line with this, and in line with what we have heard from other delegations today, Argentina 
would like to express its concern given that all would seem to indicate that the EU's notified measure , 
rather than protecting the environment or pollinators, would rather create an unnecessary obstacle 
to trade, which would impact third  countries and producers' ability to export to the EU.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  24.35.   The representative of India indicated the following : 
24.36.   India sent a f ormal communication detailing our concerns on G/TBT/N/EU/908 via the 
TBT Enquiry Point mechanism on 3  September  2022. The same was also forwarded to the 
EU mission in Geneva on 4  September. The issue has also been taken up bilaterally in Brussels. In 
our letter, we have indicated that in several countries, the MRL on the two  chemicals covered under 
the notification is at the level of Codex or above Codex. The EU is requested to share the risk 
assessment being done to fix the MRL of these two  pesticides at the level of determination , and the 
EU is also requested to share the less trade restrictive approaches considered in this context.  
24.37.   The European Union is seeking to apply its domestic environmental policy choices in a 
trans-boundary fashion. We also request  the EU to notify this measure to the SPS  Committee, as 
the eventual purpose of this notification is to protect animal health, a n SPS subject matter.  
24.38.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
24.39.   Indonesia would like to thank Paraguay for including  this agenda item. Indonesia wishes to 
register its interest in this agenda item and will monitor the development of discussions on these 
matters.  
24.40.   The representative of South Africa  indicated the followin g: 
24.41.   South Africa wishes to thank Paraguay for raising the matter related to EU  regulations 
notified to the TBT  Committee in document  G/TBT/N/EU/908. South Africa would at this point also 
like to register its interest in this measure, which will lead us to a nother consideration, and in this 
regard, we seek to clarify the timelines and process that the EU intends following  regarding the 
adoption of the final measure and its entry into force. We did submit our comments to the enquiry 
point under notified measures on 2  September, prior to the close of the comment period , and we 
look forward to receiving feedback on the elements that we raised there. We also look forward to 
engaging with the EU to further elaborate on our submissions and seek furthe r clarity on their 
measures, hopefully prior to the upcoming TBT  meeting.  
24.42.   The representative of  Guatemala  indicated the following:  
24.43.   Guatemala  thank s Paraguay for including this item on the agenda, and support s what it said 
with regard to the extraterritoria lity of the level of application of the measure.  Guatemala  reiterate s 
its concern about this matter, following  what has been discussed for a number of years at the 
SPS Committee. There are concerns relating to the application of MRLs and the failure to con sider 
production levels, geographical location , and production systems.  
24.44.   Guatemala  would be grateful if the European Union could indicate how it considers that the 
measures and conditions applied to European producers may be the same as those applied to tro pical 
countries, such as Guatemal a, and those that have different climatic conditions. It would appear that 
these measures seek to create an unnecessary obstacle to trade. Guatemala has submitted 
comments through the official channel s and is awaiting  a reply. 
24.45.   Moreover, it is important for European producers and those from third  countries to be subject 
to the same conditions and to respect the WTO  principles of non-discrimination and national 
treatment. This is why we are concerned about the issue of emergen cy authorizations.  We hope that 
the discussions held will identify solutions to the real concerns.  
24.46.   The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
24.47.   The European Union takes note of the interest by Paraguay and other Members on this issue. 
We also take note of the statements by the US and Canada at the beginning of this meeting.  The EU 
informed WTO  Members for the first  time about its intentions in November  2020 in the 
SPS Committee , in d ocument  G/SPS/GEN/1868.  The draft Regulation on lowering the maximum 
reside levels for the two  neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam was notified to the 
TBT Committee on 6  July 2022 (G/TBT/N/EU/908). The comments received were discussed in a 
meeting with the EU  member States. The EU wou ld like to thank Paraguay  and other Members  for 
providing comments. Since the lowering of MRLs in this particular case is not linked to consumer G/MA/M/77  
 
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  health issues, the draft measure was notified under the TBT  Agreement and not under the 
SPS Agreement. It shoul d be noted, however, that a communication for information was also 
submitted to the SPS  Committee.  
24.48.   This draft Regulation is the first one implementing the new policy announced in the European 
Green Deal and – more specifically – the Farm to Fork Strategy o n imported food in relation to 
pesticides residues. The environmental aspects that this Regulation targets are those related to the 
protection of pollinators. This is an issue of global concern, which goes beyond national boundaries 
and cannot be solved th rough actions at EU  level alone. The Regulation is lowering the MRLs for the 
two neonicotinoid substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam, that are known to contribute 
significantly to the decline of pollinator populations because of their intrinsic properti es that lead to 
adverse effects on pollinators independent of where they are used geographically.  
24.49.   The European Union  would like to clarify that the draft Regulation is not requiring 
third countries to ban the use of clothianidin and thiamethoxam in their o wn territory. It is therefore 
not undermining the decisions of the regulatory bodies of Paraguay or of other Members. The EU is 
bound by the WTO  rules and is acting accordingly. The WTO  rules allow Members to adopt measures 
necessary to achieve a legitimat e objective, which in this case is the protection of pollinators, a 
global environmental concern.  
24.50.   With regard to possible trade impacts, firstly, the draft Regulation includes trade facilitating 
provisions, mainly to defer the application date of the Regul ation to 36  months after entry into force 
(instead of six months, which is the standard period foreseen by WTO  rules) and to allow products 
placed on the market before the application date to remain on the market until the end of their shelf 
life. Secondly , the EU acknowledges that third  countries may face production conditions and pest 
pressures different from those in mainland Europe. Therefore, import tolerances can be granted to 
active substances not authori zed in the European Union provided that the su bmitted information 
demonstrates that the use is safe to pollinators.  
24.51.   The European Union  considers that currently there is no alternative to the lowering of the 
MRLs of clothianidin and thiamethoxam which would be less trade restrictive and would equally 
contribute to the objective of protecting pollinators. Based on the current knowledge, reducing the 
use of neonicotinoids is an effective and preventable action to tackle pollinators decline. A clear 
consensus exists regarding the fact that both wild and ma naged bees are exposed to pesticides and 
that the range of sub -lethal effects is quite broad. There is significant evidence and rather high 
agreement on the highly negative impacts of sub -lethal effects.  The EU remains available to further 
discuss this mat ter with any interested Member.  
24.52.   Regarding emergency authori zations , there is no discrimination of third  countries. In special 
circumstances , emergency authori zations are issued by EU  member States for limited period s of 
time, not exceeding 120  days, and controlled use on specific crops. These emergency authori zations 
are issued with the aim of containing a danger that cannot be contained by any other reasonable 
means. But these emergency authori zations by member States only apply to their own territo ry (not 
EU-wide) and by definition do not apply to imports and are not meant to facilitate trade. In case the 
use of the authori zed product results in residues in food and feed above the MRLs established at 
Union level, the authori zing member State may exc eptionally allow the placing on the market in its 
own territory provided that the food or feed does not constitute an unacceptable risk. The authori zing 
Member should inform the other member States, the Commission , and the European Food Safety 
Authority. F ood containing residues of substances authori zed under the emergency authori zation 
above the EU  MRL must stay on the territory of the member State having granted such an 
authori zation. The Commission has taken action and will continue to do so to reduce th e number of 
such emergency authori zations . Some of these actions focus on promoting the generation and 
implementation of more sustainable alternatives to promote the transition towards sustainable 
production.  
24.53.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  25  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, 
THE STATE OF KUWAIT, OMAN, AND QATAR – SELECTIVE TAX ON CERTAIN IMPORTED 
PRODUCTS – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION, SWITZERLAND,  AND THE UNITED 
STATES  
25.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union, Switzerland,  and the United States. Written questions had been  circulated in 
document s G/MA/W/140 and G/MA/W/169.  
25.2.  The representative of Switzerland  indicated the following:  
25.3.   Switzerland thank s the Gulf Cooperation Council  (GCC) for the video  conference that took 
place in May 2022. During that meeting, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – the GCC  coordinator – 
indicated that the study on the selective tax re form would be shared as soon as possible.  Switzerland 
would like to kindly reiterate its interest in the study and on the possible outcome of the 
GCC domestic consultations. In addition, the GCC informed us  that their recommendations on the 
new tax system were in the process of elaboration and that the GCC  Ministers of Finance would 
decide on it during their meeting in the autumn . Therefore, we kindly ask the GCC if information is 
available on the state of play of the reform process, and in particular , if a timeline for the reform is 
known.  If a decision has been taken, we would welcome a comprehensive update on the elements 
contained in it. As this reform process has been ongoing for quite a long time , we urge the GCC to 
implement the changes , as planned , without further delay.  
25.4.  Switzerland  also want s to underscore the need to receive comprehensive, regular , and 
transparent information from our GCC  partners. According to the information  available , the GCC is 
contemplating implement ing a new tax regime similar to the tiered volumetric tax structure of the 
UK. This is very welcome news.  Until the new tax regime enters into force, we once again request 
the harmonization of the tax rate at 50% for all sweetened beverages. The current discrim ination 
between energy drinks and other sweetened beverages has been in place since several years ago. 
We urge the GCC not to wait until the reform is implemented to address our concern.  
25.5.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
25.6.  The United States, along with Switzerland, the European Union,  and Japan, circulated 
questions in April  2021 to GCC  member State governments regarding the status of the selective tax 
on beverages. While we appreciate the information provided during the last Co mmittee meeting – 
as well as during separate discussions with member State officials since then – we note that we still 
have yet to receive written responses to the questions from April  2021, and ask these Members to 
update us as to when such responses to those questions will be provided. As we have conveyed 
before, we request a substantive update on revisions to the GCC  excise tax model and its 
implementation plan under the GCC Unified  Excise Tax Agreement , and note the importance of 
timely engagement with  interested parties regarding this issue.  
25.7.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
25.8.  The European Union takes note that t he present GCC  excise tax system is under review  and 
that a volumetric tax model based on international best pra ctice is being considered based on a "Tax 
Reform Study ". We consider it important that the reform equalize the tax rates for energy drinks 
with the tax rates applied on other soft drinks.  The EU would be interested to learn more about the 
timetable for the  revision of the tax rates.  The EU understands that the "Tax Reform Study " 
commissioned by the GCC  countries on the future GCC  excise tax reform is expected to be finalized 
very soon , and if the GCC could share the study with the EU , this would be welcome . 
25.9.  In addition, we stress again the importance of a robust stakeholder consultation process with 
respect to forthcoming GCC  proposals on the excise tax reform.  The EU considers that the taxation 
of energy drinks at 100% under the present GCC  excise t ax regime is discriminatory and not in 
accordance with international legal obligations. We reiterate that it is important that any transition 
from the present to a new tax regime include a provision to equalize the tax rate of energy drinks 
with other soft  drinks with an immediate effect.  The EU will continue engaging with the GCC on this 
important issue.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  25.10.   The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  indicated the following:  
25.11.   On behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of S audi Arabia, 
the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait, I would like to thank the 
delegations of the European Union, Switzerland,  and the United States for the interest they attach 
to the GCC  excise tax regime and for their communic ation on the application of the excise tax on 
carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, energy drinks, sport drinks, and other sweetened 
beverages.  
25.12.   As for the timeline of the ongoing process of the new GCC  excise tax model and its 
implementation, let me recall, once again, that the revision of the excise tax on beverages is a 
complex exercise that requires significant efforts, extensive coordination , and comprehensive 
studies. The GCC  Working Group on Tax is sues is sparing no effort to complete this exercise in order 
to submit to the GCC  member States appropriate results and a high standard excise tax model.  In 
conclusion, an appropriate procedures and timeline will be  adopted by the GCC  member States for 
the revision of their excise tax regime. Once the process is completed , the relevant  information will 
immediately be shared with WTO  Members.  
25.13.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
26  INDIA – IMPORT POLICIES ON TYRES – STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION ; 
INDONESIA ; THE SEPARATE CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND 
MATSU ; AND THAILAND  
26.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union ; Indonesia ; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu,  Kinmen and Matsu ; 
and Thailand.  
26.2.  The representative of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  
indicated the following : 
26.3.  The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu would like to register, 
once again, our co ncerns regarding India 's licensing regime on the importation of pneumatic tyres 
under Notification No.  12/2015 -2020 on "Amendment in Import Policy on Tyres" of 12  June 2020. 
We appreciate the information provided by India in July  2022 on the import licences granted to our 
exporters in the last two  years. These figures have been in the process of internal verification in 
Capital . However, if we look at the tyre trade in terms of volume, the fact is that from 2020 to the 
first half of 2022, India's tyre impor ts from us plummeted by more than 50% compared to 2019. 
And, clearly, this is not just a problem for us alone.  
26.4.  A measure like this clearly impedes Members ' access to India's  market. We continue to 
question how the said licensing measure and its practice would be consistent with WTO  rules 
concerning quantitative restrictions. We hereby urge India to please ensure that all applications of 
import licences that are in full compli ance with the quality of tyre products should be granted without 
hindrance or undue delay. We call on India to review its current practices and to engage in good -faith 
discussions with those Members concerned with a view to resolving the issue in a timely and 
constructive manner.  
26.5.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
26.6.  Thailand would like to reiterate the concern that we have raised numerous times in past 
meetings of the Committee on Market Access, the Committee on Import Licensing , and the Council 
for Trade in Goods , regarding India 's import policies on tyres . These policies still considerably affect 
Thailand 's exports of tyre products to India which, in 2021, declined 40.23% in value , or 45.23% in 
volume , relative to 2019 before this measur e was implemented. Moreover, for the first seven  months 
of 2022, the exports of tyres from Thailand to India fell 54.91% compared to the same period of 
2019.  
26.7.  Moreover, Thailand would like to reiterate its concern that the issuance of import licences for 
tyres by the Indian authority has still been subject to considerable delay s, and the various aspects 
of the administration of the procedure for granting licences is still un clear.  In this connect ion, G/MA/M/77  
 
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  Thailand request s that India provide the following informa tion: (i) the administration of the 
restrictions, including the time-frame or period for processing application s; (ii) the import licences 
granted to Thailand over the most recent period ; and (iii) the distribution of such licences among 
supplying countries.  
26.8.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following : 
26.9.  The European Union  would like to reiterate the concerns that it has been raising in this 
Committee since 2020 regarding India's  licensing regime for importation of pneumatic tyres  under 
Notification N o. 12/2015 -2020, on "Amendment in Import Policy of Tyres " of 12 June 2020.  Despite 
having raised this issue on multiple occasions in this and other WTO  Committees ( including the 
Import Licensing and TRIMs Committee s) there has been no progress made towards finding a 
possible solution.  The EU continues to be concerned about the effect of this measure on the import 
of tyres. Only a limited number of licences have been granted to EU  tyres manufacturers , and even 
these licences are limited in duration, quantity,  and type of tyres.  After two years, no licences have 
yet been granted to bus and truck tyres. This is blatant discrimination against EU bus and tyre 
manufacturers.  
26.10.   The European Union  therefore urges India to reconsider an d eliminate any implicit or explicit 
quantitative or other restrictions on the import of replacement tyres that could go contrary to 
WTO requirements.  We invite India to engage in a constructive dialogue with EU  member States and 
the EU  Delegation in Delhi . Solving such trade irritants is critical to facilitat ing EU-India trade, 
especially taking account of the current trade negotiations between our two  parties.  
26.11.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
26.12.   Indonesia shares the concerns raised by  previous speakers over India's import policies on 
tyres. Indonesia would like to stress that the measures imposed by India on t yres have been 
effectively restrict ing the exportation of t yres from Indonesia.  These measures include import 
restriction s on ce rtain categories of t yres, a requirement for importers to make separate statement s 
through electronic mail, and product marking requirements.  We observed that the application of 
these measures constitutes discriminatory treatment and restriction or prohibition.  Therefore, 
Indonesia is of the view that the measures might not be in compliance with certain  WTO rules, such 
as Article  III and Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.  As such, Indonesia requests India to reconsider its 
import policies on t yres. 
26.13.   Indon esia would like to thank India for providing information in response to Indonesia's 
concerns over India's import policy restrictions on tyre products at the previous CTG and 
TBT Committee meetings . However, Indonesia is disappointed that India has not pres ented an 
adequate solution to overcome this issue. Indonesia is fully aware that India has imposed import 
restrictions for tyre products of certain types and size categories  corresponding to tyres produced 
by India's domestic tyre manufacturers.  
26.14.   This polic y was implemented shortly after India imposed a temporary import ban on tyre 
products , for a period of six months, as stated in Notification No. 12/2015 -2020, dated 
12 June 2020, "Changes in Tyre Import Policy ". The implementation of this policy has the po tential 
to hamper tyre exports to India considering that the choice of tyre products that can be exported is 
very limited ; indeed, it even has the potential to eliminate market access for imported tyre products, 
given the various types and sizes of tyres p roduced by India as one of the world's main producers 
of tyres. Although there are no official provisions governing the restrictions on the import s of these 
tyres, importers are required to make a separate statement , via email , regarding import restriction s 
for certain types and size categories of tyres that could be produced domestically, and where 
violations would result in criminal sanctions based on the FTDR  Act 1992. In addition, Indonesia is 
of the view that discriminatory treatment in the implementation of the aforementioned policy, where 
the policy is applied selectively by targeting certain Members that have the potential to become 
India's competitors , and hamper s market access for domestic tyre products, will de facto also have 
hampered the export of Indonesia's tyre products.  
26.15.   Moreover, Indonesia also intend s to ask for further clarification regarding the implementation 
of marking fee s on tyre products that are using the IS  Mark. Indonesia is of the view that the 
imposition of the IS  Mark marking fee on tyre products has the potential to burden business actors G/MA/M/77  
 
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  and create unnecessary trade barriers to international trade. The imposition of such marking fees 
does not have a valid justification and has no relation to the protection of human h ealth, safety, or 
prevention of fraudulent practices.  
26.16.   In conclusion , Indonesia request s that the Government of India immediately review the 
two restrictive import policies on tyres to ensure that the policies in question are in accordance with 
WTO principl es and regulations, in particular the national treatment principle, the non-discriminat ion 
principle, and the QR  elimination obligation under Article  I:1, Article  III:4; and Article  XI:1 of the 
GATT  1994, and Article  2.1 and Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement.  
26.17.   The representative of Canada  indicated the following : 
26.18.   Canada is intervening on this item for the first time in support of the concerns expressed by 
the European Union , Indonesia, Chinese Taipei and Thailand with India's import policies on tyres.  In 
April 2022, Canadian stakeholders, including tyre manufacturers and exporters, informed the 
Government of Canada of their concerns with India's import policies on tyres, particularly India's 
non-automatic import licensing system , which has been in plac e since 2020. Based on the 
information provided by Canadian stakeholders, India's non -automatic import licensing system 
effectively imposes a quota on imports of tyres. This quota represents a fraction of imports during 
previous years.  
26.19.   Further, the quota a llocated to importers over the 2021 -2022 period has decreased 
compared to the quota amount over the preceding period. An application to import quantities over 
the quota was denied by India on the explicit basis that "the allocated quota is already approved  for 
the current year". Importers were informed that the quotas to be allocated for 2023 would be further 
reduced. Based on this information, India's non -automatic import licensing system is effectively a 
quantitative restriction designed to limit imports of tyres into India.  
26.20.   Canada calls on India to eliminate this quantitative import restriction in accordance with its 
WTO commitments.  
26.21.   The representative of India indicated the following:  
26.22.   India w ould like to thank the delegations of Canada, the European Unio n, Thailand, 
Indonesia, and Chinese Taipei  for their interest in this issue. We would also like to refer to our 
response provided in the previous meetings of the Council for Trade in Goods, the Committee on 
Market Access , and the Committee on Import Licens ing. My delegation would like to reiterate that 
the non -automatic licensing requirements for tyres are administered in a manner consistent with the 
rules of the WTO  Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures , including with respect to the 
time-frames for the  grant ing of import licences. The specific questions raised , and the data provided  
by the delegations of Thailand , the European Union, and Indonesia in the Committee on Import 
Licensing meeting earlier this month and today have been forwarded to Capital for due consideration.  
26.23.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
27  INDIA – IMPORT RESTRICTION ON AIR CONDITIONERS – STATEMENTS BY JAPAN AND 
THAILAND  
27.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of  Japan and 
Thailand . 
27.2.  The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
27.3.  Japan again reiterates its concerns regarding India's import ban on air conditioners , including 
refrigerants, introduced by Notification No.  41/2015 -2020. This is a measure that unreasonably 
imposes a restructuring of corporate supply chains. Japan is strongly concerned that this measure 
is likely to be inconsistent with Article  XI.1 of th e GATT  1994, and Article  2.1 of the 
TRIMs  Agreement . Thus far, India has explained that the measure is consistent both with India's  
obligations under the Montreal Protocol and with regulations on HCFCs.  However, this import ban is 
still thought to be super fluous and irrational in that it covers a wide range of air conditioners that 
use refrigerants. Furthermore, we reiterate that these air conditioners are subject to neither India's G/MA/M/77  
 
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  reduction and elimination obligation under the Montreal Protocol nor India' s domestic regulations for 
freon gas.  In this respect, Japan expects India to provide prompt responses to the written questions 
it submitted to the TRIMs Committee last September.  
27.4.  With regard to the IS  Mark certification based on the Quality Control Orders for air 
conditioners and their related parts, Japan  acknowledge s that the scheduled implementation date 
has been extended from January  2022 to January  2023. We welcome this extension. However, we 
would  like to request India to ensure that the factory testing for foreign manufacturers is conducted 
smoothly by the Bureau of Indian Standards. Otherwise, we call on India to consider introducing 
some alternative procedures in the case that its officials face  difficulty in traveling overseas.  
27.5.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
27.6.  Thailand would like to join Japan to express our grave concern , which we have raised several 
times , regarding India's import prohibition of air conditioners with ref rigerant. We regret to say that , 
unfortunately , no progress has been made so far. First of all, Thailand's exports of air  conditioners 
to India continues to suffer from this highly restrictive import measure. For the first  eight months of 
2022, the exports  of air conditioners from Thailand to India fell 31.41% compared to the same period 
of 2019, which is the greatest fall in the exports of air  conditioners among Thailand's top  10 export 
destinations of such products worldwide.  
27.7.  Thailand respects India 's ded ication to protecting the stratospheric ozone layer. However, we 
believe that this highly restrictive measure has several serious flaws that violate the GATT  1994 and 
must be discontinued immediately.  First of all, such outright import prohibitions are inc onsistent 
with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, unless they are based on a legitimate public policy exception, 
for instance, those in Article  XX of the GATT  1994.  Unfortunately, this import prohibition does not 
fulfil the conditions of Article  XX either. Par ticularly, there is no clear connection between these 
measures and any public policy exception. Notification No.  41/2015 -2020 itself merely lists 
two HS codes of air  conditioners that are subject to India's import prohibition if they contain 
refrigerant , and neither specifies the types of prohibited refrigerants , nor refers to India's legislation 
on the protection of human, animal, or plant lives or health , nor to the protection of the stratospheric 
ozone layer , nor to the Montreal Protocol.  
27.8.  Moreover, the Ozone Depleting Substances Rules  2000, read together with its Amendment in 
2014, contain many exceptions for domestic products containing Group I and VI substances that 
suggest that not all such products are prohibited on India's domestic mark et, and that the Indian 
authorities do not apply the same rules to imported and domestic air conditioners that contain ozone 
depleting substances. In some instances, the exceptions from India 's general prohibition on these 
substances appear to be based on "commercial " rather than environmental reasons. Notable 
examples of such exceptions are  the following.  First, Rule 6(1) of the Ozone Depleting Substances 
(Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000 reads "No person shall either himself or by any other persons 
on his behalf or enterprise sell, stock, or exhibit for sale or distribute any ozone depleting substance 
after the date specified in column  5 of schedule  5, unless he is registered with the authority specified 
in column  4 of that schedule ". This suggests that , based on certain commercial considerations, the 
Indian authorities have some discretion to register a domestic producer of certain products 
containing Group I and VI substances (potentially including air conditioners), and in this way allow 
India's domes tic producers to place these products on India's market.  Second, Rule  6(1) also 
contains a proviso stipulating the ultimate phase -out date for the placement of air  conditioners on 
India's market , namely 1 January  2025, whereas the importation of similar pr oducts has already 
been prohibited. This  also suggests that the Indian authorities do not apply the same strict 
requirements to imported and domestic air conditioners containing Group VI substances.  In addition, 
Rule 3(a)(2C) of the 2014  Amendment also confirms that Indian producers are allowed to sell certain 
Group VI substances in excess of the quota orders issued by the Ozone Cell, Ministry of Environment 
and Forests to cover the entire domestic requirement of HCFC -22 for non -feedstock application.  
27.9.  All of the above exceptions are just some of the indicators indicating  that the Indian 
authorities do not apply these measures "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption" within the meaning of Article  XX(g) of the GATT  1994, and that they apply these rules 
in a manner that constitutes "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail" in the sense of the chapeau  of Article  XX of the GATT  1994.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  27.10.   Last but not leas t, these measures do not comply with the Montreal Protocol which, as India 
claims, lies at the heart of this highly restrictive measure. According to the Montreal Protocol, any 
measure that reduces the use of Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) shall be announced in  advance and 
provide a sufficient transition period for affected member countries. Moreover, the measure should 
be applied to domestic producers before it can be applied to foreign producers. Also, for Article  5 
Parties Group  2, of which India is a part, t here are clearly determined reduction steps on the use of 
HFCs that India should follow. However, although India can apply shorter  time-frame for such a 
reduction, it must be done in a non -discriminatory manner between domestic and foreign producers.  
For the simple reason of the outright violations of Article s XI:1, XX(b), XX(g), and the chapeau of 
Article  XX of GATT  1994, and the non-compliance with the Montreal Protocol, Thailand insists that 
India's import prohibitions on air -conditioners that have been implemented for two  years and 
three days must be immediately amended or fully terminated.  
27.11.   The representative of  India indicated the following:  
27.12.   India would like to thank the delegations of Japan and Thailand for their continued interest 
in this issue. Since the last CTG  meeting, my delegation shared details of these measures, including 
their intent ion and the ongoing developments , with the delegation of Japan. We also thank the 
delegation of Thailand for sharing relevant data in the last CTG  meeting and  also today. This data 
has been transmitted to Capital for due consideration . It is currently being examined.  
27.13.   My delegation would also like to draw attention to India's notification  in 
document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/21 to the Import Licensing Committee under Artic le 5.1-5.4. This 
notification clearly spells out the details of the restricted import policy for hydrofluorocarbons, which 
are relevant to this agenda  item. On Japan's specific comments on standards and conformity 
procedures, India will respond at the next  meeting of the TBT Committee.  
27.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
28  INDIA – BASIC CUSTOMS DUTY (BCD) ON SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC CELLS AND 
MODULES – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
28.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of China.  
28.2.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
28.3.  China notes that the Indian government has recently significantly increased the basic customs 
duties on solar photovoltaic (PV) cells and modules, exceeding the bound rates committed by India 
in the ITA. The implementation of such measures has already disrupted the international trade order 
of solar PV  products . In addition, it is not conducive to the development of the domestic solar 
PV industry in India and the achievement of emission reduction targets.  China urges India 
immediately to correct its wrongful practices in this regard, which are in violation of the WTO  rules, 
and to revoke the basic customs duties imposed on solar PV  cells and modules.  
28.4.  The representative of India indicated the following:  
28.5.  India thank s China for informing India bilaterally about its intention to raise this issue in the 
CMA. The details provided today by China on this trade concern will be share d with Capital for due 
consideration. We will seek to provide a res ponse once our Capital has examined this matter.  
28.6.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
29  INDIA – APPROVED LIST OF MODELS AND MANUFACTURERS (ALMM) OF SOLAR 
PHOTOVOLTAIC MODULES – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
29.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
29.2.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
29.3.  China notes that the Indian government has recently promoted the implementation of the 
approved list of models and manufacturers (ALMM) of solar PV  modules, which C hina believes G/MA/M/77  
 
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  violates the principle of national treatment in GATT and imposes unnecessary burdens on solar 
PV enterprises. The implementation of such measures will disrupt the international trade order of 
solar PV  products . In addition, it is not conduciv e to the development of the domestic solar 
PV industry in India and the achievement of emission reduction targets.  
29.4.  China urges India to implement the relevant measures in a fair, transparent, and 
non-discriminatory manner, to actively consider replacing on -site factory inspections with video or 
third-party factory inspections , and to levy relevant fees reasonably to avoid unnecessary obstacles 
to international trade.  
29.5.  The representative of India indicated the following:  
29.6.  India thank s China for inf orming India bilaterally about  its intention to raise  this issue in the 
CMA. The details provided today by China on this trade concern will be shared with Capital for due 
consideration. We will seek to provide a response once our Capital has examined this matter.  On 
the specific comment on standards and conformity procedures, we will respond at next month's 
meeting of the TBT Committee.  
29.7.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
30  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – 
STATEMENTS BY CANADA, THE EUROPEAN UNION,  AND THE UNITED STATES  
30.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this  agenda item had been  included at the request of Canada, 
the European Union,  and the United States.  
30.2.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
30.3.  As noted in this and other committees, Canada continues to be concerned with India's use of 
trade restrictive measures , including quantitative restrictions, minimum import prices, restricting 
imports to one seaport , and uncertainty created by constant changes to tariffs on imports of pulses, 
in particular for dried peas.  Canada continues to question India's justifications for these trade 
restrictive measures , and calls upon India immediately to implement alternative, trade facilitative 
measures for the import of pulses.  
30.4.  The representative of  the European Union  indicated the following:  
30.5.  The European Union  has raised its conce rns with India 's import restrictions for certain varieties 
of pulses many times , and fully supports the intervention by Canada and those of the co -sponsors 
of this item. We urge India to provide predictability and stability concerning its import regime for  
pulses.  
30.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
30.7.  The United States support s the other statements made today; the United States remains 
concerned with India's use of domestic support policies, multiple increases in tariff rates, an d the 
application of import restrictions for pulses including pigeon peas, mung beans, black gram lentils, 
and peas. We repeat our previous requests for information on how the measures reflect India's 
WTO commitments, and when and how the measures will be ended.  
30.8.  The representative of Australia  indicated the following:  
30.9.  Australia  thanks the delegations that included this item on the agenda and  appreciates the 
clarification provided by India at the last Committee on Market Access meeting regarding the status 
of its treatment of pulses. Australia notes India 's advice in its response that its process for reviewing 
its import restrictions on pulses is "agile, dynamic, and continuous ". In this context, Australia 
requests India to provide answers to the following questions:  (i) does India intend to use these 
measures on an ongoing basis, especially when the free import policy on some pulses has been 
extended to 2023 , (ii) what are India's objectives and rationale for using these measures?  Is the 
intent, for example, to manage imports in response to changing domestic circumstances ; (iii) given 
that Quantitative Restrictions are highly trade restrictive, what reasonably available less  trade G/MA/M/77  
 
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  restrictive alternatives have India considered?  Could India please indicate why those alternatives 
were rejected?  
30.10.   India's measures matter in the global pulses market. India 's current suite of measures on 
pulses, including significant levels of market price  support, high tariffs , and quantitative restrictions, 
continue to negatively impact the stability and predictability of the global pulses market, to the 
detriment of all producers and consumers, including those in India, as well as exporters and traders.  
30.11.   The representative of Argentina  indicated the following:  
30.12.   Argentina thanks Canada, th e European Union, and the United States for having raised this 
agenda item once more. As we have said on previous occasions, and in other meetings, this measure 
is affectin g a series of exports to India, in particular the mung bean. Argentina reiterates its previous 
statements and the concern that we have in regard to the uncertainty that this is causing to our 
exporters , and request that India review the measure.  
30.13.   The repres entative of India indicated the following:  
30.14.   India thank s the delegations of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the European Union and the 
United States for their continued interest in this issue. As addressed in the previous meetings of the 
Council for Trade in Goods , as well as the Committee on Market Access, the m easures adopted by 
India remain temporary and are undertaken for the purpose of maintaining food and nutritional 
security. This is an area of great importance to our economy and the policies on imports are regularly 
reviewed and updated.  
30.15.   Notification No.  63/2015 -2020, made by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade on 
29 March  2022, states that the free import policy of urad (HS  code 0713.31.10) and pigeon peas 
(HS code 0713.60.00) has been extended until 31 March  2023. The notification on the import 
measu re of moong has already been notified to the Committee on Import Licensing under 
Article  5.1-5.4 notifications , and the reference for the same is document  G/LIC/N/2/IND/22.  
30.16.   In conclusion , India is fully compliant with the notification obligations for this specific trade 
concern . In fact, some products being referred to in the specific trade concern are not restricted for 
import at all. As such, my delegation will urge the proponents of this agenda to specifically state 
what problems their exporters are faci ng, and the quantification thereof. In the absence of this 
information, it would be unfortunate if this specific trade concern were still carried forward to other 
meetings of WTO  regular bodies.  
30.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
31  INDONESIA – CUSTOMS DUTIES ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATION PRODUCTS – 
STATEMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
31.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union and the United States.  
31.2.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
31.3.  The United States  notes our ongoing concerns with Indonesia's continued application of tariffs 
at the border on select IC T products that appear to exceed its WTO  bound tariff commitments.  
Multiple Members have been raising this issue with Indonesia repeatedly across multiple 
WTO Committees for over two  years. We have also raised our concerns bilaterally, including at senior 
levels.  
31.4.  The United States  believe s these import restricting practices are to Indonesia's own detriment, 
as they limit access for Indonesian consumers and firms to important high -tech products that form 
the backbone of the digital economy. Our traders have also been actively noting the disincentives 
to investment in Indonesia that result from these tariffs , and from other import restricting policies 
in the ICT  sector that Indonesia is implementing.  We urge Indonesia to engage constructively on 
this issue , to finally address these long -standing concerns , and to ensure the integrity of its market 
access commitments.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  31.5.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
31.6.  The European Union recalls that , despite our requests and calls for aligning the tariff treatment 
of certain ICT  products classified under subheading  8517.62 with Indonesia 's WTO  commitments, it 
appears that Indonesia continues to charge a significant tariff (10%) on products classified under 
tariff line  8517.62.49 , including under the new 2022  Customs Tariff Book. We have not heard any 
satisfactory explanation from Indonesia yet, although we had raised this issue  both in the Market 
Access and the ITA Committee.  
31.7.  In this particular category of products (tariff item 85 17.62.49) the EU has recorded a 
significant drop in exports to Indonesia. We have observed a 60% drop in value of EU  exports in 
2020 compared to 2019, and a 21% drop in 2020 compared to 2018.  We therefore reiterate our 
calls to bring the tariffs in tariff subheading  8517.62 down to zero. We seek further clarification as 
to why Indonesia continues to apply tariffs that are not in line with its WTO  bound commitments.  
31.8.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
31.9.  As stated in the most recent meeting of the ITA  Committee, Canada adds it voice to those 
with a systemic and commercial concern regarding  Indonesia's application of tariffs above its bound 
rates on ICT  products. Canada calls on Indonesia to eliminate its tariffs on ICT  products in a w ay 
that is consistent with its WTO  commitments.  
31.10.   The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
31.11.   Japan appreciates the European Union and the United States' inclusion of this item on the 
agenda. Regarding the imposition of 10% customs duties on certain  telecommunications products, 
previously in this Committee and in the ITA  Committee, Indonesia had explained that "certain 
products may have been affected by the splitting and merging process during the transposition" . 
Indonesia also explained that it "did  not intend to take action beyond its commitments or obligations 
under the ITA  Agreement" . To facilitate careful consideration of the facts, Japan urges Indonesia to 
provide further details on the aforementioned customs duties, including information on a p ossible 
way forward.  
31.12.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
31.13.   Indonesia would like to thank the United States , the European Union , Canada, and Japan for 
their interest in this matter relating to import duties on certain telecommunication products. On this 
note, domestic consultations between related Ministries or institutions and other relevant 
stakeholders to review this specific issue are being conducted. We will keep the interested Members 
updated. We wish to reiterate that Indonesia will continue to strive to comply with the 
WTO Agreements , including Indonesia's commitment under the ITA  Agreement.  
31.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
32  INDONESIA – IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMME – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
32.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union.  
32.2.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
32.3.  Import restrictive policies and practices by Indonesia are  a long -standing item that the 
European Union  has raised in several WTO  Committees. The EU is deeply concerned by the fact that 
the number and scope of Indonesian restrictions keeps expanding over time, with negative impacts 
on trade flows.  The EU has long -standing serious concerns over Indonesia 's objective to achieve by 
2022 a reduction of imports equivalent to 35% of the value of its 2019  import potential.  The 
implementation of this approach seems to be already well under  way, with the adoption of a broa d 
range of measures , including expanding local content requirements and the mandatory use of 
national "SNI" standards, as well as the further promulgation of cumbersome import licensing 
procedures.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  32.4.  A recent development of specific concern is the introducti on of a commodity balance 
mechanism, under which import licences will only be granted if domestic demand cannot be met by 
domestic supply. We welcome efforts to ensure a coordinated and streamlined approach on the 
management of import and export licences. But the mechanism raises concerns that it might result 
in further possibly unintended restrictions to trade flows , while in turn raising questions concerning  
its WTO  compatibility.  EU operators across a variety of sectors are already negatively affected by  
the many import -restrictive measures implemented by Indonesia.  
32.5.  The European Union  would welcome clarification from Indonesia as to how it would ensure 
that measures put in place under its import substitution programme, including the commodity 
balance mech anism, will be compliant with its WTO  obligations.  We look forward to further 
engagement with Indonesia on these issues.  
32.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
32.7.  The United States continue s to share the E uropean Union's concerns reg arding the Indonesian 
government's recent statements that it will suppress imports with the goal of "substituting 
35 percent of imported products" in 2022. Does Indonesia have any updates on this item? If 
Indonesia is proceeding with an import substitution  program me, will it make the draft measures that 
it is developing publicly available , and hold a notice and comment period to ensure affected parties 
have the opportunity to provide input? We urge Indonesia to share further information on its recent 
statem ents, and we strongly urge Indonesia to rethink this counter -productive and trade -disruptive 
goal. 
32.8.  The representative of India indicated the following:  
32.9.  India remains concerned with the Indonesian import substitution program me, import policies 
and exports policies, which aim to reduce access to the Indonesian market. Indonesia is maintaining 
a number of restrictions on its imports, which is affecting Indian businesses, both in terms of exports 
as well as supply chain disruption s. We request Indonesia to promptly notify the changes in their 
import policies to the WTO.  
32.10.   The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
32.11.   Indonesia  thanks the European Union, India and the United States , for their continue d 
interest in our polic y on importation and exportation.  As we have conveyed in previous meetings, 
Indonesia wishes to reiterate that the measures identified by the EU in today 's meeting , and in 
previous Committee meetings , such as the import substitution program me, the Indonesi an National 
Standard , and the commodity balance mechanism , were never intended to impede importation.  
Rather, Indonesia wants to clarify that the program me's objective is to improve our participation by 
having better global trade governance. For example, o ur National Standard in intended to protect 
consumer s from unsafe products.  
32.12.   Moreover, on the commodity balance, we do not consider this as an additional burden in our 
importation regime. In fact, it intends to create and facilitate a better business enviro nment , to 
ensure business certainty , and to facilitate trade flows.  In conclusion, Indonesia would like to 
emphasize that the substitution program me, the commodity balance mechanism , and Indonesia's 
other measures , do not correlate to a process of import l icensing issuance.  
32.13.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
33  MEXICO – IMPORT QUOTA ON GLYPHOSATE – STATEMENT BY UNITED STATES  
33.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the United 
States.  
33.2.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
33.3.  The United States would like to reiterate its concern with the 2021  announcement by Mexico's 
National Council for Science and Technology (or CON ACYT) recommending an import quota on 
glyphosate and glyphosate -containing products, as well as the January  2022 statement by CONACYT G/MA/M/77  
 
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  recommending quota quantities. Since CONACYT issued these recommendations, Mexico has not 
provided an opportunity for publ ic comment, submitted notification to the WTO of these quantitative 
restrictions, or provided scientific evidence for the import quotas.  
33.4.  We understand that , in January  2022, CONACYT recommended an import quota of 
8.26 million kilograms (kg) for glyphosate -containing products , and 628,616  kg for glyphosate. Can 
Mexico confirm that these are the quota levels for 2022? If not, can Mexico provide the quota levels 
for 2022? Can Mexico explain how the quota levels were determined? If the quota levels were 
reduced  from 2021, on what basis were they reduced? Did Mexico solicit and consider public input 
when making its determination? What information has Mexico provided to traders on how the quotas 
are administered? What HS  codes are affected? How are the quotas allo cated? How does Mexico 
justify these measures in light of its GATT  obligations, including Article  XI of GATT  1994?  
33.5.  The representative of Canada  indicated the following:  
33.6.  Article  XI of the GATT prevents Members from imposing quantitative restrictions. While 
paragraph  2 of this Article provides carve -outs for very specific circumstances under which Members 
may impose certain import or export restrictions, these do not appear to be relevant in the context 
of Mexico's measure limiting imports of glyphosate. We w ould appreciate if Mexico could provide a 
justification for the imposition of this measure, including in its notification to which the US has 
referred.  
33.7.  The representative of Mexico  indicated the following:  
33.8.  Mexico appreciates the comments submitted by the United States and Canada and has taken 
note of them. With regard to the Decree published in the Federation Official Journal on 
31 December  2020, and as Mexico indicated on previous occasions, the work of the agencies 
responsible for its implementation has not been completed and is still in progress. We are aware of 
the concerns of the United States, as this is an issue on which we have maintained constant dialogue 
in various fora, such as the SPS  Committee of the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement , and 
the Working Group for Cooperation on Agricultural Biotechnology  of the same Agreement.  
33.9.  Mexico reiterates the commitment of the Federal Government and the agencies involved in 
the implementation of the Decree to ensure that the execution of t his instrument will be carried out 
in terms of its provisions, and taking into consideration our international obligations and 
commitments. Any updates on this issue will be made known to the United States through the 
channels established in this Committee , as well as through the dialogue mechanisms provided for in 
the United States -Mexico -Canada Agreement . 
33.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
34  NEPAL – IMPORT BAN ON ENERGY DRINKS – STATEMENT BY THAILAND  
34.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda it em had been  included at the request of Thailand.  
34.2.  The representative of Thailand  indicated the following:  
34.3.  Thailand would like to reiterate its concern over the Nepali government's measure that has 
prohibited the imports of caffeinated mixed energy drinks an d flavoured synthetic drinks from 
Thailand since 2019. Having said that, Thailand would also like to convey its sympathy to the people 
of Nepal given Nepal's most difficult economic hardships , which have understandably forced the 
government of Nepal to ado pt certain trade-restrictive measures in a bid to prevent the country's 
foreign exchange reserves from further depleting.  
34.4.  Thailand would like to remind Nepal that WTO  Members facing balance -of-payment s 
difficulties may apply import restrictions , subject to  the provisions under Article  XII of the 
GATT  1994, provided that they do not exceed those necessary, that they are progressively relaxed, 
and that they are maintained only to the extent that the conditions still justify their application. In 
light of this, Thailand would also urge Nepal to provide an update on the country's 
balance -of-payments situation , and on how such trade -restrictive measures could he lp alleviate the G/MA/M/77  
 
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  problem. We would also like to encourage Nepal to provide an official notification to further clarify 
the precise WTO legal basis justify ing to WTO  Members its  temporary adoption of such measure s. 
34.5.  The representative of Nepal  indicated the following:  
34.6.  Nepal thank s Thailand for its statement and continued interest in Nepal 's trade policy 
measures.  My delegation wishes to refer to the statements delivered by Nepal at earlier meetings of 
this Committee , and reiterates all the justifications pres ented during those meetings.  Nepal 's 
export -import ratio of trade in goods reached 1:15.3 in 2017/2018 , from 1:2.5 in 2004/2005 , after 
its accession to the WTO , resulting in a huge trade gap.  Such an import surge posed severe 
challenges to the entire econo mic development process of the country.  The measure in question was 
applied to address such a severe situation and was not focused on any specific area and the trade 
restriction of only a few products; rather , it broadly cover ed the trade regulation and fa cilitation 
aspects of Nepal 's international trade.  
34.7.  The Government of Nepal is assessing the measure  and may review it periodically, and revise 
it based on its study findings and consultations.  However, the situation of foreign currency reserve 
since August  2021 has become additionally  challenging , and I appreciate the statement by Thailand 
in this regard . In this context, the assessment may take some time due to the COVID -19 pandemic 
and other global crises that we have been facing.  Regarding the noti fication, my delegation is pleased 
to inform Members that an official notification has been circulated through 
document  G/MA/QR/N/NPL/1 on 11  October  2022.  I extend Nepal's sincere appreciation to the 
Secretariat  for the notification's finalization,  especi ally to those colleague s directly involved.  
34.8.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
35  PERU  – TAX TREATMENT OF PISCO – STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM  
35.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the United 
Kingdom.  
35.2.  The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
35.3.  Recognizing the strong trading relationship between Peru and the United Kingdom , and noting 
previous efforts from both sides for positive enga gement on the issue, the UK reiterates its concern 
that Peru's tax exemption for Pisco creates a discriminatory environment for trade, protecting and 
promoting Peru's domestic production of Pisco at the expense of other domestically produced and 
imported s pirits, in violation of Peru's National Treatment obligations. The UK requests that Peru 
provide a response to the questions submitted bilaterally in May  2022. First, can Peru clarify what 
are the criteria for applying different tax rates on Pisco and othe r spirits, and what rationale was 
used to justify such a differentiation? Second, how is the different tax treatment of Pisco and other 
spirits compatible with Peru's National Treatment commitments at the WTO, more specifically 
Article  III of the GATT? Thi rd, following the legislative modifications in 2018, there was a drop in 
imports of competitor products in HS  heading  2208. Can Peru provide the data on the sales of 
competitor products covered by HS  heading  2208 relative to Pisco, both in the three  years leading 
up to this change (2015 -2017) , and in the three years after this change (2018 -2020). Fo urth, are 
there any plans to remove the different tax treatment of Pisco relative to other spirits? If so, what 
is the timeline for such a removal , and what oppo rtunity will industry have to comment on the 
changes?  
35.4.  The United Kingdom wants to work with Peru to find a solution that ensures that its trade in 
spirits is facilitated in a non -discriminatory fashion and would welcome a response to our questions 
in order  to find a way forward.  
35.5.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
35.6.  The United States supports the United Kingdom's intervention on Peru's excise taxes for 
distilled spirits, specifically the "Impuesto Selectivo al Consumo". The United  States remains 
concerned with the discrepancy in the rates applied to pisco versus all other distilled spirits. We look 
forward to receiving answers to the questions raised today.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  35.7.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
35.8.  The Europ ean Union would like to join the United Kingdom in its concerns around Peru's tax 
discrimination in favour of Pisco. The existing tax regime prevents EU  spirits from competing on a 
level playing field in the Peruvian market. In the Committee 's last meeting , the EU asked Peru to 
clarify how the excise tax (Impuesto Selectivo al Consumo) that is higher for spirits other than Pisco, 
is in compliance with Peru's international obligations. We look forward to engaging with Peru to make 
progress on this issue.  
35.9.  The representative of Mexico  indicated the following:  
35.10.   Mexico would l ike to register its interest and concern over this measure, and we hope to 
hear news from Peru soon in the context of our bilateral dialogue.  
35.11.   The representative of Peru indicated the followin g: 
35.12.   With regard t o the United Kingdom and other Members' statements and their questions, Peru 
reiterates that the selective tax on consumption is applied to distilled spirits and does not establish 
any distinction based on origin. Therefore, there is no distinction affecting WTO  Members , and no 
treatment which would seek to provide protection for national products.  
35.13.   On the question referring to future modifications to existing legislation, this is currently under 
internal and domestic consultation. The Per uvian government works in collaboration with industry 
and other interested groups in the development of its national legislation. It is worth mentioning 
that any change on the selective tax on consumption would require a modification by law. Peru takes 
note of the statements of the European Union, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
in this regard, and would encourage bilateral conversations on the technical aspects of this 
discussion.  
35.14.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
36  THE PHILIP PINES – SPECIAL SAFEGUARD ON INSTANT COFFEE – STATEMENT BY 
INDONESIA  
36.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of Indonesia.  
36.2.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
36.3.  Under this agenda item, Indonesia would like to recall its full statement delivered in the 
previous CMA  meeting and requests that this earlier statement also be recorded in the minutes of 
today's meeting.23 Hence, we will only highlight key issues in relat ion to the special safeguard on 
instant coffee applied by the Philippines for four years from 2018. Since then, Indonesia's export s 
of instant coffee to the Philippines have fallen significantly , as has  the price of Indonesia's products 
in the market  of the Philippines . 
36.4.  Indonesia is of the view that , for transparency purposes, an update of the operation of the 
special safeguard should be provided by the Philippines,  taking into account the changes in the 
market situation. Hence , Indonesia believes that, whenever the import volume of the products 
concerned is declining, the Philippines should refrain from undertaking the special safeguard , as 
indicated in Article  5.7 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Furthermore, we believe that a special 
safeguard measure should be temporary in nature. Having said that, Indonesia do es not consider 
that the measure is in compliance with substantive aspect s of Article  5 of the Agreement  on 
Agriculture . On top of this, Indonesia is of the view that th e applied tariff imposed as a result of this 
special safeguard might also be inconsistent with the tariff commitment s undertaken by the 
Philippines . 
36.5.  To conclude, Indonesia hopes that the Philippines could immediately withdraw the application 
of its SSG to Indonesian instant coffee.  
 
23 Document  G/MA/M/76, paragraphs  25.2-25.6.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  36.6.  The representative of the Philippines  indicated the following:  
36.7.  The Philippines thanks the delegation of Indonesia for its continued interest in the Philippines' 
Special Safeguard on Instant Coffee. We note that Indonesia has also  raised this matter in the 
previous Committee on Agriculture and Committee on Market Access meetings, to which we have 
provided our responses.  We have already conveyed to Indonesia that , in accordance with Article  5.1 
of the Agreement on Agriculture, Speci al Safeguards may be invoked on an SSG -eligible product if 
its c.i.f. import price falls below the trigger price. The trigger price for instant coffee was among 
those provided in the Philippines' up -front notification in document  G/AG/PHL/27 , in 2002, whic h is 
the basis for the imposition of the price-based SSG  at issue . 
36.8.  The price -based SSG on instant coffee was imposed in August  2018. Its imposition remained 
as reflected in the Philippines'  MA:5 notifications for 2019 and 2020. The application of SSG on th is 
product continued in 2021 , as notified in document  G/AG/N/PHL/81. For as long as imported instant 
coffee arrives in the Philippines at a price lower than the trigger price, the SSG will continue to be 
applied on the product in accordance with the rules of the Agreement on Agriculture.  Our delegation 
continues to coordinate this matter with Manila, and the Philippines remains  ready to further discuss 
this issue with Indonesia.  The Philippines  remain s committed to addressing this matter in the 
approp riate forum.  
36.9.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
37  SRI LANKA – IMPORT BAN ON VARIOUS PRODUCTS – STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN 
UNION  
37.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of the 
European Union.  
37.2.  The representat ive of the European Union  indicated the following:  
37.3.  The European Union  has consistently expressed its serious concerns with regard to the import 
restrictions imposed by Sri Lanka, in various forms, since April  2020. Despite several promises made 
by Sri  Lanka, we have witnessed a flurry of measures that have created additional uncertainties in 
an extremely difficult economic environment.  All these selective import restrictions have not solved 
Sri Lanka 's current account difficulties, lack of foreign curre ncy, or the challenges to secure 
long-term sustainable financing and pursue debt restructuring.  
37.4.  The European Union  welcome s the recent staff -level agreement reached with the IMF and the 
adoption of an interim budget. While acknowledging Sri Lanka 's major e conomic challenges, we 
encourage Sri  Lanka to focus on macroeconomic structural reforms and policy measures to ease its 
long-standing external pressures instead of banning imports. We stand ready to continue working  
with Sri Lanka. We call for a clear time table of progressive and irreversible steps to remove these 
restrictions.  
37.5.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
37.6.  The United States reiterates its concerns over the import restrictions Sri Lanka introduced in 
March  2022 on what it deemed to be "non -essential goods" . These include apples, grapes, butter 
and other dairy items. The new regulations establish a licensing process by which the government 
may allow some traders to continue importing the items, which delays imports.  
37.7.  This act ion is the latest in a series of import restrictions. While we understand Sri Lanka's 
balance of payment concerns, we are concerned about the lack of transparency, consultation, and 
notifications with respect to these measures. Additionally, when does Sri Lanka plan on reversing 
these restrictions?  
37.8.  The representative of Japan  indicated the following:  
37.9.  Japan echoes the concern s expressed by the European Union and the United States. We 
understand that Sri Lanka advocates the need for this measure because of di fficulties with its balance 
of payments (BOP). At the same time, such an import restriction due to the BOP should not be G/MA/M/77  
 
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  introduced unless it is carried out with utmost caution and due consideration for the substantive and 
procedural requirements in the WT O Agreement . 
37.10.   At the last meeting, Sri Lanka mentioned that even prior to the introduction of this measure, 
the importation of automobiles in Sri Lanka was not in a normal state of trade, as there had been 
fluctuations in import volumes due to the relaxatio n or suspension of duty exemption, and therefore, 
it could not be said that imports were affected by this measure. However, as a matter of fact, this 
measure restricts import opportunities and could constitute a violation of Article  XI:1 of the GATT . 
37.11.   Japan  understands the domestic situation in Sri Lanka, such as the economic crisis and 
political instability, and is aware that Sri Lanka has repeatedly explained the need to continue 
measures due to the COVID -19 infection rates. On the other hand, given the fa ct that the 
COVID -19 situation appears to be improving, Japan requests that Sri Lanka withdraw this measure 
at the earliest possible date.  
37.12.   The representative of Sri Lanka  indicated the following:  
37.13.   Sri Lanka would like to thank the delegations of the European Union, the United States and 
Japan for their continuous interest in Sri Lanka 's trade policy measures introduced to curb the 
adverse impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on its economy.  As my delegat ion informed Members at 
the CMA  meeting held in March , and the CTG  meetings held in April and July  2022, Sri Lanka had 
taken several positive steps to relax most of the import measures imposed to curb the impact of the 
pandemic in a progressive manner. In fact, the plan was to do away with all restrictions completely 
as early as possible.  However, the situation that developed in my country, especially after the 
first quarter of this year , has not warranted the Government of Sri Lanka to remove import 
restrictions as per its initial plans. Dire scarcity of foreign currency has now taken a heavy toll on 
almost all aspects of the economy.  
37.14.   The Government has now been compelled to take additional care in releasing foreign 
currency in order to ensure that at least  the basic needs , which include food, medicines, and fuel 
are supplied to its people , who are suffering enormously after the pandemic and economic crisis. 
Accordingly, the Government will arrange to withdraw the import measures gradually once the 
foreign c urrency situation improves.  
37.15.   With regard to importation of motor cars, my delegation would like to draw the attention of 
Members to Sri Lanka 's statements made at recent CMA and CTG  meetings. As my delegation 
explained at those meetings, importation of auto mobiles into Sri Lanka is highly dependent on the 
duty-free car permits issued to Government officials from time to time. It is presumed that car 
importation will take place as usual once the economy returns to normal.  
37.16.   As informed previously, Sri Lanka has  been negotiating with the International Monetary Fund 
to get assistance to address its economic crisis, including the BOP  issues that the country is 
encountering at the moment. My delegation is happy to inform Members that the technical level 
negotiations  with the IMF have been successful to a great extent.  Sri Lanka well understands the 
concerns th at Members have been raising relating to the notification of Sri Lanka 's measures to the 
WTO. My delegation has been coordinating with the relevant Capital -based authorities in order to 
notify Sri Lanka 's import measures to the WTO. Accordingly, my delegation will make arrangements 
to notify the measures to the WTO as expeditiously as possible.  My delegation will coordinate with 
our Capital with regard to the specific concerns raised by several Members today , and will arrange 
to keep this Committee informed of the responses.  
37.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
38  THE SEPARATE  CUSTOMS TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, PENGHU, KINMEN AND MATSU – 
DISCRIMINATORY TARIFFS FAVOURING CHAMPAGNE OVER OTHER SPARKLING WINE – 
STATEMENT BY AUSTRALIA  
38.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of Australia.  
38.2.  The represe ntative of Australia  indicated the following:  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  38.3.  The delegation of Australia noted that this was a new item raised at the Committee. On 
26 April 2022, the Chinese Taipei Legislature passed an amendment bill to halve the import tariff on 
champagne to 10%. Tariffs on all other sparkling wine remained at 20 %. Australia questioned this 
tariff reduction during the Committee on Agriculture meeting held on 14 -15 September  2022, asking 
how a reduction to a single tariff line which only applies to products made in a ce rtain region of a 
country could not be interpreted as discriminatory, when the rest of the world regards sparkling 
wine, which is produced globally, as a "like product ". 
38.4.  Australia questions Chinese Taipei 's response at that Committee meeting that champagne 
and other sparkling wines are different products, as Chinese Taipei continues to reflect in its tariff 
classification. Champagne is produced in the Champagne region of France. The wine itself is made 
using a combination of grapes, most commonly C hardonnay, Pinot Noir , and Pinot Meunier. However, 
we note that these grapes are grown in many  wine-producing regions globally. To make champagne, 
French wine makers follow  la Méthode Traditionnelle , a method that originated in France but is 
followed by wi ne makers globally who all seek to produce high quality sparkling wine.  
38.5.  Australia,  and most other wine -producing countries believe that, by following la Méthode 
Traditionnelle  and using the same grape varieties as those used in the Champagne region of Fran ce, 
sparkling wine and champagne are "like products " and should receive equivalent tariff treatment. 
By providing lower tariffs to a single product originating from a specific region of a country restricts 
market access not only for like products originati ng from other countries but also for like products 
originating from other regions of France.  
38.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
38.7.  The United States shares the concerns raised today by Australia. The United States requests 
Chines e Taipei to explain the basis for the difference in the tariff on Champagne from the Champagne 
region of France and the tariff on other sparkling wine.  
38.8.  The representative of the United Kingdom  indicated the following:  
38.9.  The United Kingdom thanks Australia fo r putting this item on the agenda. The United Kingdom 
shares the concerns raised by Australia and the United States regarding Chinese Taipei's differential 
treatment in the tariff applied to Champagne and the tariff applied to all other sparkling wines. Th e 
United Kingdom would like to ask Chinese Taipei to clarify how this differential treatment is 
consistent with its existing WTO  obligations, specifically its obligation not to discriminate against like 
products. The United Kingdom looks forward to hearing  Chinese Taipei 's thoughts on this matter and 
stands ready to work with partners to find a solution to this issue.  
38.10.   The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
38.11.   The European Union would like to first of all thank Chinese Taipei for redu cing the import 
tariff for Champagne (tariff line  2204.10.10), which helpfully aligns the tariff rate with the other 
non-sparkling wine. We would , however , support Australia's call that Chinese Taipei would indeed 
move to extend the same tariff treatment, aligning the tariff rate to non -sparkling wines, to other 
sparkling wines as well.  
38.12.   The representative of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu  
indicated the following:  
38.13.   We thank delegation of Australia, the United State s, the European Union, and the United 
Kingdom for their interest in our tariffs between Champa gne and the sparkling wines.  In our current 
tariff schedule, the tariff subheading  2204.10 of sparkling wines is further divided into 
two categories. T he tariff line of Champagne is 2204.10.10, while other sparkling wines belong to 
tariff line  2204.10.90. The classification remains exactly the same as at the time of our accession to 
the WTO in 2002.  The two  tariff-lines, with different tariff rates for Champagne and spark ling wines , 
are not only shown in our tariff schedule , and we are not unique in imposing different tariffs on 
Champagne and on other sparkling wines.  
38.14.   In addition, Champagne has its distinctiveness in the product's properties, nature , and 
quality, which als o lead to consumers' tastes and habits of Champagne being different from those G/MA/M/77  
 
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  of sparkling wine. The imposition of different tariffs on these two  different types of products should 
not be considered as a discriminatory measure. My delegation wishes to rea ssure Members that we 
attach great value to upholding the fundamental principles of WTO  rules in any trade measures we 
take. 
38.15.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
39  UNITED  STATES -DISCRIMINATORY QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION ON STEEL AND/OR 
ALUMINUM IMPO RTS – STATEMENT BY CHINA  
39.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been included at the request of China.  
39.2.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
39.3.  China notes that the United States  has imposed tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on products 
previously covered by Section  232 tariff s from the EU, Japan, and the UK.  China would like to know 
if and when the US intends to notify the WTO  Market Access Committee of these measures. China 
would also like to know what the legal basis is, under  the WTO  rules, for these trade measures.  
39.4.  On top of that, China would like to raise the following concerns . First, any measures that bring 
in new quotas, maintain tariffs above the ceiling binding, or discriminate between WTO  Members 
seem difficult to reco ncile with the WTO  rules, including Article  I, Article  XI, and Article  XIII of the 
GATT . Indeed, for the one  Member that had concluded such an arrangement with the US, it issued 
a separate statement, calling "these duties incompatible with World Trade Orga nization rules ". 
Second, raising tariffs on dubious national security grounds , and then reducing them for selected 
trading partners, constitutes a dangerous precedent. Such arbitrary and discriminatory trade policies 
are contrary to the relevant WTO  rules and principles, as well as to the spirit of the WTO. Indeed, 
the arbitrariness and discrimination of such arrangements are of such a nature that even the 
signatories to such arrangements are treated differently, for example, in terms of the base periods.  
39.5.  Last but not least, the fact that these trade -restrictive and discriminatory arrangements were 
concluded between major Members of the WTO, and that an ongoing WTO  dispute case regarding 
the legality of such tariffs had been suspended as part of the arrangem ent, are deeply worrisome. 
It says a lot, among other  things, about who is practicing coercive trade policies, who acquiesced to 
such policies, who is conducting unfair trade, and who is undermining the authority and effectiveness 
of the WTO  rules.  It has been almost five years since the US implemented its Section  232 tariffs on 
aluminium and steel. Steel prices remained elevated, and trade was disrupted. Instead of selectively 
removing tariffs with certain trading partners, the US should  correct its practices and completely 
remove the relevant Section  232 tariffs and quota measures following the letter and the spirit of the 
WTO.  
39.6.  The representative of Türkiye  indicated the following:  
39.7.  With reference to the statement that we made at the previ ous Council for Trade in Goods 
meeting, Türkiye would like to put on record our concerns as regards certain measures applied by 
the United States in the form of quantitative restrictions and additional duties with respect to the 
trade of steel and aluminiu m products. As previously noted by Türkiye, these measures applied by 
the United States on imports of steel and aluminium products, constitute a material breach WTO  law. 
Furthermore , there exists no convincing reason for lifting the so -called measures for some Member 
countries , while excluding others and undermining the very basis of the multilateral trading system. 
The measures being applied continue to be a source of concern for the smooth functioning of this 
system. Given the way that they have been appl ied, quantitative restrictions go against the letter 
and spirit of the core WTO  principles by favouring some as opposed to other s. Once again, we would 
like to note that this is a violation of the core WTO  provisions. Türkiye would like to reiterate the 
urgent need totally to eliminate all of the additional duties and quantitative restrictions , without 
further loss of time, in order to ensure that the multilateral trading system operates in an effective 
manner.  
39.8.  The representative of the United States  indica ted the following:  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  39.9.  The United States takes note of the comments by China and Türkiye regarding the TRQs put 
in place by the United States. The national legal basis for these TRQs is the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962, Section  232 (19 U.S.C. 1862) and the Pres idential determinations, pursuant to that statute, 
that Sec tion 232 tariffs are necessary to adjust imports of steel and aluminium articles so that such 
imports will not threaten or impair the national security of the United States.  
39.10.   The proclamations impos ing the Sec tion 232 tariffs recognize "shared concern about global 
excess capacity, a circumstance that is contributing to the threatened impairment of the national 
security", and provide that "[a]ny country with which we have a security relationship is we lcome to 
discuss with the United States alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national 
security."  
39.11.   In Proclamation  10328, recalling those statements, President Biden stated that "[t]he United 
States has successfully concluded discussi ons with the EU […] on satisfactory alternative means to 
address the threatened impairment of the national security." He stated that "[t]he United States will 
implement a number of actions, including a tariff -rate quota." Similar statements are included in  
Proclamation  10327 adjusting imports of aluminium from the EU, as well in Proclamation  10356 
adjusting imports of steel from Japan; Proclamation  10405 adjusting imports of aluminium from the 
UK; and proclamation 10406 adjusting imports of steel from the U K. 
39.12.   The WTO  justification and grounds for the TRQs is Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. Information 
regarding these TRQs is available on US  Government websites, including those of the Office of the 
US Trade Representative and the US  Department of Commerce.  
39.13.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
40  UNITED  STATES – SECTION  301 TARIFFS ON CERTAIN GOODS FROM CHINA – 
STATEMENT BY CHINA  
40.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that this agenda item had been  included at the request of China.  
40.2.  The representative of China indicated the following:  
40.3.  Ignoring the WTO  rules, the United States  launched Section  301 investigations against China 
under its domestic law and imposed Section  301 tariffs on China 's exports worth about 
USD 360 billion in four  batches without the auth orization of the WTO. The measures in question 
have been maintained for more than four years and were recently extended again. China notes that 
the Office of the US  Trade Representative issued a notice clearly stating that the tariff measures 
would allow t he relevant domestic industries to compete against Chinese imports, invest in new 
technologies, expand domestic production , and hire additional workers.  Admittedly, these goals are 
noble and worth pursuing, but they can be achieved using fair competition i n compliance with the 
WTO rules. If not, they are essentially protectionist actions that violate the obligations of the U nited 
States under international law and undermine China 's legitimate rights and interests in the WTO. 
The WTO  panel on this matter has also ruled that the US  measures violate the WTO  rules.  
40.4.  The Section  301 tariffs imposed on China by the US not only seriously violate the WTO  rules, 
but also badly harm the interests of enterprises and people in both China and the US, und ermining 
the stability and security of global supply chains, and aggravating inflation . Furthermore , they are 
opposed by all parties , including lots of enterprises and consumers in the US.  
40.5.  China urges the US to correct its wrongdoing and remove all Section  301 tariffs on China as 
soon as possible to create favourable conditions for safeguarding the rules -based multilateral trading 
system, promoting Sino -US economic and trade relations , getting those relations  back on track, and 
promoting global economic rec overy.  
40.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
40.7.  China's decision to continue to raise this matter in this and other WTO  committees has been 
a pointless waste of WTO  resources, given that China has already unilaterally imposed the on ly 
remedy that the WTO  Dispute Settlement Body could potentially authorize: the suspension of 
WTO concessions. China has already applied tariff measures to imports from the United States in G/MA/M/77  
 
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  excess of its WTO  commitments for the explicit purpose of retaliat ing against the measures for which 
it now seeks legal findings. We understand that , from July  2018 to September  2019, China imposed 
four rounds of tariffs , ranging from 2.5% to 30% in retaliation against US  Section  301 tariffs, which 
covered approximately 71% (USD  109 billion) of Chinese imports into the United States in 2017.  
40.8.  China, of course, did so without obtaining the authorization from the DSB pursuant to the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding. China does not dispute the fact that it has already imposed  
retaliatory tariff measures in response to the US  measures at issue. Nor does China dispute that 
these retaliatory measures remain in effect. We urge China to be mindful of the Committee's and 
Members' time and resources when raising matters in Committee meetings in the future. Regarding 
the US  tariff measures on certain goods from China (DS543), it is a matter before the Dispute 
Settlement Body and the United Stated has already provided its views there. For awareness, the 
United States has appealed issues of laws covered in the Panel report and legal interpretations 
developed by the Panel. At this time, no division of the Appellate Body can be established to hear 
this appeal in accordance with DSU  Article  17.1. 
40.9.  The United States noted that i ts Section  301 investigation found serious concerns over China's 
acts, policies , and practices on forced technology transfer and intellectual property protection. 
Recent evidence suggests that China continues , or at least attempts , to force US  companies to  
transfer technology in exchange for market access. Therefore, the US had a stark choice: either take 
actions to protect its citizens, innovators , and businesses against a serious ongoing harm from 
China's policies and practices or simply accept that this harm would continue because the WTO does 
not provide the necessary discipline remedies. The view of the United States administration is clear: 
we will not passively accept unfair and harmful practices that cause real-world harm to US  workers 
and businesses  just because the WTO does not provide effective remedy for those practices.  
40.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
41  UNITED  STATES – QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF STURGEON – 
STATEMENT BY THE EUROPEAN UNION  
41.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that th is agenda item  had been  included at the request of the 
European Union.  
41.2.  The representative of the European Union  indicated the following:  
41.3.  The European Union  has been raising its concerns regarding US  trade prohibitions on sturgeon 
products in this Committee since 2015. This trade prohibition has been reflected in various 
US QR biennial notifications , including the most recent  one. We used to comment under these 
QR notifications but have also decided to raise a standalone item as our concerns have ke pt growing.  
As a reminder regarding the facts: in 2014, the US listed five species of sturgeon as "endangered " 
under the US  Endangered Species Act (ESA). The listing as "endangered " implies that trade in the 
relevant products is prohibited.  
41.4.  The US  Fish and  Wildlife Service (USFWS) has been conducting a status review on a petition 
to list ten  additional species of sturgeon as "endangered " under the Act. One was listed as 
endangered in May  2021. There are nine  additional species of sturgeon under review by th e US Fish 
and Wildlife Service. Of these, one – the Amur sturgeon – was proposed for listing in 2021 , and the 
proposal to add four additional sturgeon was released for public consultation in May  2022.  
41.5.  Coming now to the EU 's concerns, these trade bans cover  both wild and farmed sturgeon. As 
previously explained, the EU 's main concern is that the US does not consider wild and farmed 
sturgeons and their products as separate categories. The US consequently applies the same 
conservation measures to both. This go es beyond the requirements of the relevant international 
environmental legislation, namely the CITES  Convention. Any updates on this issue would be very 
much appreciated.  The CITES  convention considers that international trade in farmed specimen or 
produce  of these species is not detrimental to the survival of the wild stocks. Currently, the 
international trade of sturgeons and their produce is only allowed with farmed specimens raised in 
captivity. The species of sturgeon that are exported to the US have b een bred in captivity for decades 
with no impact on the wild animal stock. Commercial aquaculture can actually be considered an 
effective tool to conserve these species and ensure the survival of wild stocks.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  41.6.  In addition to raising the issue in the CMA, we  have repeatedly conveyed our position in many 
bilateral contacts, including participating in public hearings or submitting written comments , namely 
during this summer  of 2022 on the recent US  listing proposal of four additional species. Despite all 
our ef forts, the US  position remains unchanged.  The US is a very important market, representing 
15% of the global caviar market , and 23% of EU caviar exports. In addition to the halt of EU  exports 
to the US, the ban risks putting the EU  market under pressure in case of a sudden and significant 
increase of imports from other countries that can no longer export to the US. The recent US  proposal 
to list the four species of sturgeon as endangered under the ESA is a serious concern for the EU 
given that th e number of sturgeon species already listed or proposed to be listed as endangered is 
growing, and as such its potential impact on EU  producers  also increases . 
41.7.  The European Union  will continue its dialogue with the US on this matter and engage on the 
findings of the review.  The EU looks forward to further engagement with the US with a view to 
finding a mutually acceptable way forward on this issue.  
41.8.  The representative of Uruguay  indicated the following:  
41.9.  Uruguay has been following with concern the proposed ru le to list four  species of Eurasian 
sturgeon as endangered species under the United States' Endangered Species Act of 1973. The 
approval of the Act would result in a ban on the importation of the listed species, which include 
Russian sturgeon (Acipenser gu eldenstaedtii) produced sustainably by Uruguayan companies that 
send a significant share of their exports to the United States.  
41.10.   While Uruguay understands and supports the aim of protecting endangered sturgeon species 
in natural habitats, we are of the view  that the proposed rule, as currently drafted, would not only 
be counter -productive for the conservation of species in range areas, but would also have a negative 
impact on the sustainable sturgeon aquaculture industry, which currently supports the continu ation 
of the species with viable captive breeding alternatives that have no direct connection to the 
degradation of sturgeon habitats and the poaching that threatens the Ponto -Caspian species in the 
native range states. We believe that this rule change und erestimates the positive impact of 
aquaculture on the global industry, given that the overwhelming majority of world trade in Acipenser 
gueldenstaedtii comes from legal farming.  
41.11.   The sturgeon aquaculture industry outside of the range area has little or no i nfluence on the 
outcomes of the restoration of the habitat in the Caspian Sea. However, the rule change proposed 
by the US  Fish and Wildlife Service will be more punitive for the aquaculture industry than for the 
offending range states. We consider that th e preservation of the Ponto -Caspian species can be 
guaranteed through the implementation of a comprehensive approach that involves active 
cooperation with sustainable sturgeon aquaculture farms in order to protect the species through 
continued breeding and  regulated trade. Uruguay would like to be informed of the status of the 
proposed rule and call s for a solution to be found that allows for the protection of wild species while 
avoiding barriers to trade for those bred in captivity.  
41.12.   The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
41.13.   The United States  appreciate s the European Union's and Uruguay 's interest in this matter.  
As we have communicated previously, the US  Endangered Species Act does not allow for 
captive -bred populations to be assigned separate legal status from their wild counterparts on the 
basis of their captive state, including through designation as a separate distinct population. It is also 
not possible to separate out captive -bred populations for different legal status un der the Act by other 
approaches.  
41.14.   The United States  would be happy to provide the EU and Uruguay with additional information 
on the legal analysis the US  Fish and Wildlife Services undertook to make that determination.  In 
terms of an update, t here are nine  additional species of sturgeon under review by the US and Fish 
and Wildlife Service (USFWS , or "The Service "). In August  2021, the USFWS determined that the 
Amur sturgeon (Acipenser schrenckii) warrants listing under the ESA and proposed to list it as an 
endangered species. A notice reflecting this proposal and a request for comments was published in 
the Federal Register on  25 August  2021. During the comment period on the proposed listing, the 
Service received a request to hold a public hearing. As a result , the Service reopened the public 
comment period for an additional 30  days and held a public hearing on 19 April 2022.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  41.15.   In May  2022, the USFW determined that four  species of sturgeon from the Ponto -Caspian 
region warrant listing under the ESA and proposed to list them as endangered species. The 
four species of Ponto -Caspian sturgeon include the Russian (Acipenser gueldenstaedtii), Persian 
(A. persicus), ship (A. nudiventris), and stellate (A. stellatus) sturgeon. A notice reflecting this 
proposal a nd a request for comments was published in the Federal Register on 25 May 2022. During 
the comment period on the proposed listing, the Service received a request to a hold a public 
hearing. As a result, the Service extended the comment period and held a pu blic hearing on 
11 August  2022. The notice of comment period extension and announcement of the public hearing 
was published in the Federal Register on 20 July 2022.  
41.16.   With respect to the current status of the four  other species under review, the USFWS is 
conducting a 12 -month status review on the petition to list those species of sturgeon as endangered 
under the Endangered Species Act. The Service is collecting and evaluating information and has not 
made a determination regarding the listing of these species.  A listing determination will be made on 
the best scientific and commercial information available.  At any time during the Service 's review,  
any interested Member may provide additional information to help us make the determination. Once 
the status review is completed, if the Service finds that a listing is warranted, the Service will prepare 
a proposed rule. At that point, the public will be given 60  days to comment on the proposed listing. 
This will give interested Members another opportunity to pr ovide information.  Finally, we are happy 
to facilitate continued discussion among the relevant authorities as appropriate.  
41.17.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
42  VIET  NAM – ANTI -CIRCUMVENTION DUTY ON SUGAR – STATEMENT BY INDONESIA  
42.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that t his agenda item had been  included at the request of Indonesia.  
42.2.  The representative of Indonesia  indicated the following:  
42.3.  Indonesia wishes to draw Members ' attention to the application of additional duty by Viet  Nam 
on imported sugar from Indo nesia. The application of this additional duty was based on the allegation 
that sugar exported to Viet Nam by Indonesia and some other Members in the region is to circumvent 
the application of anti -dumping and countervailing duties on sugar from Thailand. Following the 
anti-circumvention investigation, Viet Nam decided to impose additional duty on Indonesian sugar 
with a rate that is equal to an anti-dumping duty rate of 42.99% and a countervailing duty rate of 
4.65% , which were imposed on imported sugar fr om Thailand. This imposition has been applied 
since 8  August  2022 through the Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade of Viet Nam 
No. 1514/QD -BCT. 
42.4.  Indonesia has concern s over the imposition of additional duty because  it has already hindered 
our sugar export s to Viet Nam. We also wish to inform the Committee that there has recently been 
a significant decrease in Indonesia's sugar imports from Thailand in 2020 compared to the previous 
year. Moreover, Indonesia imports raw sugar not only from Thailand but also from other countries 
such as  Brazil and Australia who have greater import shares in Indonesia's market. In this regard, 
Indonesia would like to seek clarification  and answers  from Viet Nam to the three following 
questions. First, what is the rationale behind the application of this a dditional duty? Second, what 
are the applicable national legislation and WTO  rules for the measure? Third, provided Indonesian 
sugar product s use raw sugar of different origins, how has Viet Nam determined that Indonesian 
sugar products have not met Indone sia's origin  requirements ? 
42.5.  Indonesia stands ready to discuss this issue further with Viet Nam bilaterally.  
42.6.  The representative of Viet Nam  indicated the following:  
42.7.  Under this agenda item, Viet Nam takes note of Indonesia's three questions and would like 
firstly to respond as follows. Viet Nam conducted anti -circumvention investigations in an effective 
and transparent manner, in compliance with domestic law as well as its international commitments , 
including the WTO  provisions. In particular, Viet Nam informe d WTO  Members of the investigation 
concerning this case, in full compliance with Article  16.4 of the Agreement on Anti -Dumping, and 
Article  25.11 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures , in the relevant G/MA/M/77  
 
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  semi-annual reports to the Committe e on Anti -Dumping Practices and Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures . 
42.8.  The investigation was to determine whether there was circumvention of existing anti -dumping 
and countervailing duties. Only the use of sugar materials imported from Thailan d, which are 
currently subject to anti -dumping and countervailing duties for refining in a third  country, and then 
exporting into Viet Nam,  constitutes a circumventing act. The use of sugarcane by that country to 
produce and export sugar to Viet Nam does n ot constitute a circumventing act. Findings from the 
investigation led to the final determination that a number of exports and produce exporters, one of 
which is an Indonesia n company, were eligible for exclusion from the imposition of anti -dumping 
circumventing measures. Other Indonesian produce exporters  were not eligible due to significant 
discrepancies or inconsistences and misleading information in the questionnaire responses.  
42.9.  The final determination of this case includes detailed analysis of ea ch participating Indonesian 
produce exporters. The Ministry of Industry and Trade of Viet Nam has already duly noted, analysed , 
and responded to submissions from Indonesian produce exporters in the final determination. 
However, Viet Nam is open to further bilateral exchange s with Indonesia for any clarifications , as 
necessary , regarding this case.  
42.10.   The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
43  ELECTION  OF VICE -CHAIRPERSON  
43.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that Rule  12 of the Rules of Procedure of this Committee all owed it 
to elect a Vice -Chairperson, and the long -standing practice had been to elect a Vice -Chairperson 
during the autumn meeting. Based on his consultations, he proposed that the Committee elect 
Ms. Lorena Rivera (Colombia) as Vice -Chair of the Committee  on Market Access by acclamation.  
43.2.  The representative of the Russian Federation  indicated the following:  
43.3.  On the nomination of vice -chairperson of the Committee, Russia is still consulting with Capital. 
Currently, we cannot join the consensus on the proposed  nomination.  In the meantime, we would 
like to draw the Committee 's attention that a number of concerns that have been raised previously 
in the context of General Council Chair consultations on the procedural aspects of elections of officers 
to WTO  bodies remain valid. These concerns involve , among other things , considerations on 
transparency of the process and applicability of the whole procedure set by  the Guidelines in 
document  WT/L/510 to the appointment of vice -chairpersons.  
43.4.  Additionally, Rule 12 of th e Rules of Procedure for meetings of the Committee on Market 
Access provides that the Committee shall elect a chairperson and may elect a vice -chairperson. The 
election shall take place at the first meeting of the year and shall take effect at the end of t he 
meeting. This language suggests that the election of both a chairperson and a vice -chairperson shall 
take place simultaneously during the spring Committee meeting. In this regard, the Committee ha s 
already missed the deadline stipulated by the Rules of Procedure for the election of a 
vice-chairperson.  
43.5.  As we understand that present chairperson is not necessarily leav ing Geneva any time before 
the end of the chairperson 's term, we believe that currently there is no urgent need to elect an 
officer who can take over. Should such a need arise, the new chairperson would be appointed as 
required by the Guidelines for appointment of officers to WTO  bodies adopted by the General Council 
on 11  December  2002. 
43.6.  The Chairperson  took note of the statement made  and proposed to continue his consultation 
in a transparent manner, and to keep the Committee informed.  
43.7.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
44  DRAFT  REPORT (2022) OF THE C OMMITTEE TO THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS  
44.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that the Committee was required to annually submit a report o f its 
activities to the C TG. The draft report covering the activities of the Committee in 2022  had been G/MA/M/77  
 
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  circulated in document  G/MA/SPEC/6 2. He proposed that the Committee request the Secretariat to 
finalize the report and to email it to delegations on 21 October  2022. In the absence of  objections 
by Members by 28 October  2022, the report would be considered to have been approved by the 
Committee and would be submitted to the CTG for appropriate action .24 
44.2.  The Committee so agreed . 
45  OTHER BUSINESS  
45.1  United States – Trade Distortive Export Control Measures on Semiconductor 
Equipment  and the Global Supply Chain  – Statement by China  
45.1.  The representative of China  indicated the following:  
45.2.  Recently, the US  government announced a series of further measures imposing export 
controls on China, specifically targeting the areas of advanced computing chips, development and 
maintenance of supercomputers, and manufacturing of advanced semiconductors, and has applied 
so-called Foreign -Direct Product Rules to 28  Chinese entities. China has serious concerns about 
these measures.  
45.3.  The relevant measures of the US  side are suspected o f violating the WTO 's non -discriminatory 
provisions , such as the MFN  treatment principle, general elimination of quantitative restrictions,  and 
so on . No doubt, these are typically bullying acts, reflecting the Cold War mentality of the US  side. 
These meas ures have seriously blocked the normal economic and trade exchanges globally. They 
not only affect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises but definitely also damage 
the legitimate business interests of US  enterprises and harm the intere sts of businesses in other 
relevant Members.  
45.4.  As the semiconductor industry has always been a globally connected industry, such measures 
will cause serious consequences to the global supply chain. They are purely government 
interventions, which can never be  market -oriented as the US always touts. These actions seriously 
threaten the sound development of the global semiconductor industry and damage the rules of the 
market and the international economic and trade order. Furthermore, these actions also disrupt the 
stability of the global industrial chains and supply chains and seriously undermine the collective 
efforts of all WTO  Members to jointly promote global economic recovery and tackle global challenges.  
45.5.  China hereby urges the US to immediately terminate i ts harmful practices and calls upon the 
US side to play its leading role to make positive contributions, rather than vice -versa, to build global 
industrial chains and supply chains, which are safe and stable, smooth and efficient, open and 
inclusive, and b eneficial to all stakeholders and to the global economy , especially when the world is 
facing multiple challenges.  
45.6.  The representative of the United States  indicated the following:  
45.7.  Because China did not inscribe this item on the agenda, but is raising it under other business, 
the United States will not comment on China's intervention in substance or detail today.  
45.8.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
45.2  Follow -up to the CTG informal meeting on MC12 implementation matters  
45.9.  The Chairperson  recalled tha t, on 14  October  2022, the CTG  Chairperson had convened an 
informal meeting to present and discuss his report concerning MC12  Implementation Matters, 
specifically on: (i)  the Work Programme on E -Commerce; (ii)  the Ministerial Declaration on the 
WTO Respons e to the COVID -19 Pandemic and Preparedness for Future Pandemics; and 
(iii) WTO Reform. Following that meeting, the CTG  Chairperson had sent a communication to the 
Chairpersons and the Secretaries of the CTG  subsidiary bodies inviting them to another meeti ng on 
20 October  2022 with the aim of sharing views on these issues.  
 
24 See document  G/L/1439 of 1  November  2022.  G/MA/M/77  
 
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  45.10.   He reminded Members that the Committee on Market Access had already tested and 
implemented most of the practical ideas indic ated in the Annex to the CTG  Chair's report to improve 
the way in which Committees worked. This Committee had also been conducting technical work, for 
instance through the series of experience -sharing sessions, in relation to the response to the 
COVID -19 Pandemic and the lessons learned. The Chairperson would keep the  Committee informed 
of any development regarding these discussions and seek Members' inputs, as appropriate, in case 
of an eventual report to the CTG.  
45.11.   The Committee took note  of the statement made.  
45.3  Dates of next meetings  
45.12.   The Chairperson  asked the Committee  to take note of the following arrangements. The last 
informal meeting of the Committee would take place on 23  November  2022 and its informal 
convening notice would be circulated in due course. Before the informal meeting, he recalled that 
the fifth  sessio n on lessons learned from the COVID -19 pandemic would be held on 
21 November  2022. He invited Members to contact the Secretariat by 7  November  2022 to propose 
speakers for the session.  
45.13.   Regarding the meeting dates for 2023, the formal meetings of the Commit tee had been 
scheduled for 8 -9 May and 17 -18 October  2023. The informal meetings of the Committee had been 
scheduled to take place on 21  February; 13  June; and 21  November  2023. Additional informal 
meetings could be convened if necessary. The proposed date s took into account the tentative 
schedule of meetings of other CTG  subsidiary bodies, and the meeting dates of the CTG itself, in an 
effort to avoid possible overlaps and facilitate the work of delegates.  
45.14.   Finally, the Chairperson  reminded delegations that  they could upload the statements 
delivered at the meeting onto the eAgenda  platform . As requested by Members, the Secretariat had 
extended the time-period to upload statements or make them available to Members until 
4 November  2022, should Members so wish. 
45.15.   The Committee took note  of the statement . 
45.16.   The meeting was adjourned . 
__________