WT/L/1157  
1 November  2022 
(22-8191) Page: 1/5 
General Council  
19 and 20 December 2022  Original:  Spanish  
 
  
CUBA - ARTICLE XV:6  
REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA UNDER THE DECISION OF 23 NOVEMBER  2021 
(WT/L/1128)  
The following communication, dated 2 7 October  2022, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of Cuba.  
 
_______________  
 
 
I have the honour to inform you, in your capacity as Chair of the Council for Trade in Goods, that 
Cuba wishes to request the inclusion of an item on the agenda of the next Council meeting, regarding 
the continued existence of the circums tances that gave rise to the approval of the extension, until 
31 December  2026, of the waiver concerning Article XV:6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) 1994.  
 
1  PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE REQUEST  
1.1.  Pursuant to Article IX:4 of the Agreemen t Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Government of the Republic of Cuba hereby submits the first annual report on the waiver 
extension granted under the Decision of 2 3 November  2021 (WT/L/1128) . This waiver extension  
was initially granted  to Cuba under the Decision of 14  October  1996 (WT/L/182) in relation to 
Article  XV:6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (G ATT 1994). 
1.2.  The waiver providing relief from the provisions of paragraph 6 of the above -mentioned Article 
was granted to the Government of Cuba by Decision of 7  August  1964, and successively extended 
on 18  October  19961, 20 December  20012, 15 December  20063, 14 December  20124, 
7 December  20165, and 2 3 November  2021.6 
1.3.  The circumstances that justified the waiver extension granted in 2021 not only remain virtually 
unchanged, but have also worsened . This applies, in particular, to the economic, trade and financial 
blockade measures that the Government of the United States of America is continuing to impose on 
Cuba, which have been aggravated by the impact of the SARS CoV -2 (COVID -19) pandemic and the 
global economic and financial crisis caused by this disease.  
1.4.  The new Democrat administration that entered the White House in January  2021 has continued 
to apply the 243 measures imposed by the previous administration . In May 2022, a series of actions 
were announced, which, while welcomed as positive, are of very limited benefit to the Cuban people . 
The country's economic and social conditions have therefore continued to w orsen, and no 
consideration at all has been given to the efforts and sacrifice made by the country to tackle 
COVID -19 in 2021, or indeed the efforts and sacrifice we continue to make, including the solidarity 
we have shown with the rest of the world.  
 
1 WT/L/182.  
2 WT/L/440.  
3 WT/L/678.  
4 WT/L/850.  
5 WT/L/1003.  
6 WT/L/1128.  WT/L/1157  
- 2 - 
  1.5.  The following set of existing measures continue to form the basis for the hostilities, and their 
impact at the international level acts as a deterrent to relations with Cuba:  
• On 17  April 2019, the Secretary of State issued a statement announcing the full activa tion of 
Title III of the Helms -Burton Act as of 2 May 2019. 
 
• On 4 June 2019, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a policy of refusing 
travel licences for passenger transport (cruise ships), recreational vessels and private aircraft.  
 
• On 23 October  2020, OFAC banned persons under US jurisdiction from processing remittances 
to and from Cuba that involve entities included on the Department of State's Cuba Restricted 
List, thereby directly impacting remittances sent through FINCIMEX and AIS.  
 
• On 1 January  2021, the Department of State added the Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. 
to the Cuba Restricted List.  
 
• On 11  January  2021, Cuba was added to the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.  
1.6.  The policy of economic and financial persecution has continue d to intensify against 
third-country banks and firms, thus generating greater obstacles for the Cuban bank in its 
international operations . The central aspects of this situation are the considerable fines imposed on 
major European Banks, the implementation  of Title III of the Helms -Burton Act and Cuba's inclusion, 
once again, on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list . This last measure, as well as being illegal and 
unjustified, has been widely criticized and rejected by the international community, as reflect ed in 
the UN's overwhelming vote against the blockade policy in June  2021. Furthermore, the Government 
of Colombia recently told the Government of the United States that it was unfair to have put Cuba 
back on the list, and requested that the country be rem oved therefrom.7 
1.7.  The use of US currency continues to be banned in the country's external commercial and 
financial operations, which generates substantial losses on account of changes in the exchange rates 
between the US dollar and the currencies of third countries in which receipts and payments are 
executed, as well as other additional costs.  
1.8.  In 2021, the tightening of the blockade in the financ ial sphere  involved more than 260 actions 
relating to more than 100 foreign banks . The most significant of these actions, in terms of impact 
and frequency, include the refusal to open bank accounts and close existing ones ; the returning of 
transfers and the cancellation of other banking operations ; the cancellation of SWIFT Relationship 
Management Application (RMA) k eys; the cancellation of correspondent agreements ; and the refusal 
to open and notify letters of credit.  
1.9.  Despite Cuba having been put back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, the country 
continues to fulfil its obligations as part of the Financial Act ion Task Force of Latin America 
(GAFILAT), where the results achieved show that, to date, Cuba is among the countries that have 
obtained the best results at global level, reflecting its context and actual situation . Cuba's  aim to 
become fully integrated in to the international network of countries seeking  to combat money 
laundering, the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has thus 
been achieved.  
2  JUSTIFICATION  
2.1.  The rigid and hostile blockade policy against Cuba continues  to be the main impediment to the 
country's economic development, by hampering the performance of all sectors of its domestic 
economy, by substantially increasing financial costs and impeding access to external financial flows, 
and by obstructing essential  imports, mainly food, medicines and fuel.  
 
7 The Donald Trump administration used as an argument for putting Cuba back on the State Sponsors of 
Terrorism list, the request that the Colombian Government had made to the Cuban Government for the 
extradition of various members o f the National Liberation Army (ELN) living in Cuba, which did not correspond 
to Cuba's commitments as a guarantor of these negotiations.  WT/L/1157  
- 3 - 
  2.2.  Consequently, the country's efforts to integrate into the world trading system are being made 
under particularly difficult conditions , as a result of a policy that contradicts the principle of free 
trade.  
2.3.  The blockade legislation also prohibits loans to Cuba by multilateral and regional financial 
organizations, thereby denying the country access to sources of long -term financing under 
favourable conditions and forcing it to resort to short -term loans with high interest rates and supplier 
financing on a much less flexible basis than credit from financial institutions and official sources.  
2.4.  The blockade is a blatant violation of international law and the principles of free trade and 
navigation enshrined in numerous  international legal instruments, including the rules of the WTO . It 
runs counter to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, while constituting an 
infringement of a sovereign State's right to peace, development and security.  
2.5.  The main law s that remain in force and allow the blockade to continue are the following:  
• The Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) , originally enacted as a wartime measure in 1917 to 
restrict trade with nations that were considered hostile . It was on this law that the fir st 
regulations of the 1962 blockade against Cuba were based . In September  2015, arguing 
foreign policy interests, President Obama renewed this Act, which constitutes the cornerstone 
of the laws and regulations governing the blockade, for one more year.  
 
• The Foreign Assistance Act, enacted by the United States Congress in September  1961, 
authorizing the President of the United States to establish and maintain "a total embargo on 
trade between the United States and Cuba" . It also prohibits the granting of any  aid to the 
Government of Cuba.  
 
• The Export Administration Act (EAA), adopted in 1979, which empowers the President to 
control, in general, exports and re -exports of goods and technology, in particular those that 
are considered detrimental to the national security of the United States.  
 
• The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), better known as the "Torricelli Act", signed by President 
Bush Senior in October  1992, reinforcing the economic measures against Cuba and providing 
a legal basis for the extraterritoriality of the blockade . Among other restrictions, it prohibits 
subsidiaries of North American companies in third countries from doing business with Cuba or 
Cuban nationals, and prohibits the entry into North  American territory, for a period of 
180 days, of ships fro m third countries that have touched port in Cuba.  
 
• The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, commonly known as the 
"Helms -Burton Act", approved by President Clinton in March  1996. Its essential aim is to 
impede and discourage foreign inve stment and to internationalize the blockade against Cuba . 
It codifies the provisions of the blockade, limiting the President's prerogatives to suspend the 
policy and broadening its extraterritorial scope . It denies entry into the United States of 
directors  of foreign companies (and their family members) that invest in "confiscated" 
property in Cuba and provides for the possibility of filing legal action against them in 
the US courts.  
 
• The Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which regulate the exception s to the Export 
Administration Act or those that are authorized under licences issued by the Bureau of Industry 
and Security of the Department of Commerce . They come under the Trading With the Enemy 
Act and the Export Administration Act.  
2.6.  This body of legis lation, applied over six decades, has caused the Cuban nation severe economic 
damage estimated at 153,197  million dollars at current prices, and amounting to 1,391,111,000 
dollars by the end of February  2022, taking into account the depreciation of the dol lar against the 
value of gold in the international market.  
2.7.  Moreover, the economic, commercial and financial siege that has been kept in place unchanged 
by all the US  administrations since 1961 imposes extraterritorial restrictions on Cuba that also affect 
other WTO Members.  WT/L/1157  
- 4 - 
  2.8.  For Cuba, 2021 was a very difficult and complex year characterized by severe economic and 
financial tensions stemming from the US blockade, monetary instability, price volatility in the 
international market, and the effects of the global  financial crisis . The SARS CoV -2 (COVID -19) 
pandemic generated and continues to generate additional costs for the country because of the need 
to maintain disease  control levels . 
2.9.  The host of difficulties mentioned above prevent the signing of a special exc hange agreement 
with WTO  Members.  
2.10.   In the midst of this adverse scenario, the Cuban economy began to experience a new phase 
of growth in 2021, recording an annual increase in GDP of 1.3 %, which reversed the decline recorded 
in 2019 and 2020 ( -0.2% and -10.9%, respectively) . This result was underpinned by the positive 
performance of the tertiary sector, which experienced growth of 4.0 % and accounted for 87.4 % of 
total GDP.  
2.11.   One of the things to have most severely impacted the country's economy was the COVID -19 
pandemic, which brought about huge losses due to the expenditure  incurred in preventing and 
containing the disease ; the closing of borders to international tourism, which is the main driving 
force of the economy and the principal source of foreign  exchange earnings ; and the halting of 
non-essential economic activities, with the country having to redirect resources intended for 
production activities to address the health crisis.  
2.12.   On 1 January  2021, the Government embarked on the biggest changes since  the process of 
updating the Cuban economic model began, through a process referred to as "monetary ordering" 
(Ordenamiento Monetario ), the main aims of which are as follows:  
• Monetary unification : withdrawal of the convertible peso as a means of payment in  the 
monetary circuit and in inter -enterprise relations, and establishment of the Cuban peso as the 
sole currency of payment.  
 
• Exchange rate unification : currency devaluation in the business sector, thereby unifying the 
rate of exchange for the general pop ulation with that for businesses  (24 Cuban pesos to 
one US dollar).  
 
• Reform of the distribution system : resetting of social and personal consumption patterns by 
reducing free items, raising the prices of standard consumer basket products and public rates 
and charges, and replacing universal consumption subsidies with family -focused subsidies . In 
addition to these measures, changes were made to the population's income through wage 
reform in the state sector and an increase in retirement payments, pens ions and social security 
benefits.  
 
• Institutional changes : changes in the institutional planning and macroeconomic policy 
framework, new regulations promoting local and business decentralization, greater 
productivity and competitiveness incentives, and the  fostering of inter -agency market 
relations as a means of reducing segmentation.  
2.13.   In 2021, the country made progress regarding the following economic and social aspects:  
• In 2021, the creation of micro, small and medium -sized enterprises (MSMEs) led to new a ctors 
entering the economy . Such enterprises are wealth -generating sources that can help increase 
production and services . By the end of 2021, 270 entities of this kind (state and non -state) 
were operating in the country . This number has risen very quickly , and a total of 5,302 MSMEs 
have now been approved.  
 
• The average worker's wage has tripled since 2020 as a result of wage increases in the state 
sector that were introduced to ensure workers were not affected by the devaluation of the 
national currency.  
 
• Life expectancy at birth is 78.9 years, a level only exceeded by some countries in Europe and 
a small  number in Asia, according to World Health Organization (WHO) records at the end 
of 2020.  WT/L/1157  
- 5 - 
  • At the end of the year, there were 105 inhabitants per doctor and 535 per dentist, which is 
higher than the average for countries in the region.  
 
• While the infant mortality rate at birth and the under -five mortality rate per 1,000 live births 
rose in 2021 due to the effects and complexity of COVID -19, which un fortunately also affected 
the paediatric population, these rates remain low compared to those of other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries.  
 
• In 2021, the population was vaccinated with three of the five vaccine candidates developed 
by Cuba in 2020 (Abda la, Soberana 1, Soberana 2, Soberana Plus and Mambisa) . Cuba was 
the first Latin American country to develop its own vaccines.  
 
• For several years now, the Cuban nation has benefited from a vaccination programme covering 
13 diseases . This programme, under w hich almost 100 % of children are vaccinated, has 
helped to eradicate and control various preventable diseases . The country also has a universal 
health system, which the entire population can access free of charge.  
 
• Total registration at the start of the 20 20/2021 academic year stood at 2,017,019 students 
for all types of education (pre -school, primary and secondary education, special education, 
higher education, vocational and skills training and adult education) - a drop of 0.1 % from the 
previous year . In higher education, registration increased by 12 % in relation to  the previous 
year. 
2.14.   Economic measures continued to be taken to promote work in the non -state sector . By the 
end of the year, 1,498,600 people were involved in this type of work, a drop of 3.3 % compared 
to 2020. This activity was affected by the closure of many private businesses following the 
introduction of health and hygiene measures to tackle  a new outbreak of COVID -19. Work in this 
sphere is expected to continue to increase as activities incl uded in the new forms of non -state 
management expand.  
2.15.   All the above factors show that the particular circumstances that gave rise to the extension 
approved on 2 3 November  2021 of the waiver extension granted to Cuba under the Decision of 
7 December  2016 co ntinue to exist . Cuba confirms its willingness to comply with the principles laid 
down in the General  Agreement.  
__________