RESTRICTED  
  
G/SCM/M/109  
 
11 September 2019  
(19-5844) Page: 1/22 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures    
 
MINUTES OF THE REGUL AR MEETING  
HELD ON 30 APRIL 2019  
CHAIR: LUIS ADOLFO F ERNÁNDEZ (COSTA RICA ) 
1. The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("Committee") held a regular 
meeting on 30 April 2019 , convened in WTO/AIR/SCM/2 7 dated 18 April 2019 . 
2. Canada  requested to be included as a co -sponsor for the agenda item 5. 
3. Costa Rica  requested to be included as a co -sponsor for the agenda item 9. 
4. The Committee adopted  the following agenda:  
1   NATIONAL LEGISLA TION ................................ ................................ .............................  2 
1.1   Review of notifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously reviewed 
by the Committee (including Supplemental Notifications of existing provisions not previously 
reviewed)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..........................  2 
1.1.1    Angola (G/SCM/N/1/AGO/1)  ................................ ................................ .......................  2 
1.1.2    Brazil (G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.10 – G/SCM/N/1/BRA/2/Suppl.13 – 
G/SG/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.4) and (G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.11 – G/SCM/N/1/BRA/2/Suppl.14 – 
G/SG/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.5)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 3 
1.1.3    Madagascar (G/ADP/N/1/MDG/2 – G/SCM/N/1/MDG/1 – G/SG/N/1/MDG/2)  ....................  3 
1.1.4    United Arab Emirates (G/ADP/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1 – G/SCM/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1 – 
G/SG/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 3 
1.1.5    Uruguay  (G/SCM/N/1/URY/2)  ................................ ................................ .....................  3 
1.1.6    Viet Nam (G/ADP/N/1/VNM/2 – G/SCM/N/1/VNM/1 – G/SG/N/1/VNM/2) and  Corr.1  .........  3 
1.2   REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS OF NEW OR AMENDED LEGISLATION OR REGULATIONS WITH 
OUTSTANDING WRITTEN QUESTIONS  ................................ ................................ ...................  4 
1.2.1    Cambodia  (G/ADP/N/1/KHM/2 – G/SCM/N/1/KHM/2 – G/SG/N/1/KHM/2)  ........................  4 
1.2.2    Cameroon (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 – G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1 – 
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 4 
1.2.3    El Salvador (G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 – G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1 – 
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 4 
1.2.4    Liberia (G/SCM/N/1/LBR and G/SCM/N/1/LBR/Corr.1)  ................................ ...................  4 
2   SEMI -ANNUAL REPO RTS OF COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTIONS (ARTICLE  25.11) – 
G/SCM/N/342 AND G/SC M/N/342/SUPPL.1  ................................ ................................ ... 5 
3   PRELIMINARY AND FINAL COUNTERVAILING  DUTY AC TIONS: NOTIFICATIONS  
(ARTICLE 25.11)  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..............  6 
4   PROCEDURES FOR R EVIEW OF 2019 NEW AN D FULL SUBSIDY NOTIF ICATIONS  .........  6 G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  5   SUBSIDIES AND OV ERCAPACITY – ITEM RE QUESTED BY CANADA, T HE EUROPEAN 
UNION, JAPAN AND THE  UNITED STATES ................................ ................................ .........  6 
6   ARTICLE 27.4 EXT ENSIONS OF THE TRANS ITION PERIOD FOR THE  ELIMINATION  
OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 9 
7   IMPROVING THE TI MELINESS AND COMPLET ENESS OF NOTIFICATIO NS AND  
OTHER INFORMATION FL OWS ON TRADE MEASURE S UNDER THE SCM AGRE EMENT  ...... 11 
8   CONSTANT DOLLAR METHODOLOGY FOR GRAD UATION FROM SCM ANNE X VII(B)  .... 15 
9   IMPLEMENTATION O F PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE  MINISTERIAL DECISIO N ON FISHERIES 
SUBSIDIES (WT/MIN(17 )/64; 13 DECEMBER 20 17) – ITEM REQUESTED  BY ARGENTINA, 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, C OSTA RICA, THE EUROP EAN UNION, ICELAND, JAPAN, THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, N EW ZEALAND, NORWAY, CHINESE TAIPEI AND T HE UNITED 
STATES ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  15 
10   ARTICLE 25.8 QU ESTIONS TO C HINA ON POTENTIAL ST EEL SUBSIDIES – ITEM  
REQUESTED BY THE EUR OPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  ................................ . 18 
11   PERMANENT GROUP  OF EXPERTS  ................................ ................................ ............  20 
12   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .... 21 
13   DATE OF NEXT RE GULAR MEETING  ................................ ................................ ..........  22 
14   ELECTION OF OFF ICERS  ................................ ................................ ..........................  22 
 
 
1  NATIONAL LEGISLATION  
1.1  Review of n otifications of new or amended legislation or regulations not previously 
reviewed by the Committee ( including Supplemental Notifications of existing provis ions 
not previously reviewed)  
5. The Chair noted that, in accordance with the Committee's procedures (G/SCM/W/293/Rev.1), 
the new legislative notifications on the agenda were those that had been circulated in all three 
languages not less than six weeks before the meeting. The deadline for written questions on these 
notifications was 8 April 2019. In accordance with the review procedures, legislative notifications of 
Cambodia, Cameroon, El Salvador, and Liberia were taken up under this item due to outstanding 
written questions about them.  
6. Oral quest ions could be asked at the meeting, and any Member wishing to receive a written 
answer to any such question would have to submit its question in writing to the Member concerned 
and to the Secretariat not later than 20 May 2019. Written answers were due not  later than 
11 June 2019.1 
7. The primary review of these notifications was held in the Committee on Anti -Dumping 
Practices. Members were thus requested to limit their questions to issues specifically related to 
countervailing measures, and to save horizontal  and anti -dumping -specific questions for the 
Anti-Dumping Committee.  
1.1.1   Angola (G/SCM/N/1/AGO/1)  
8. No written questions were posed with respect to this notification.  
9. The Committee took note  of the notification.  
                                                
1 Relevant deadlines for written follow -up questions and written answers in May and June 2019, 
respectively, can be found in section 1 of document G/ADP/W/50 3/Rev.1 – G/SCM/W/57 8/Rev.1 – 
G/SG/W/24 5/Rev.1 . G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  1.1.2   Brazil (G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.10  – G/SCM/N/1/BRA/2/Suppl.13 – 
G/SG/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.4) and (G/ADP/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.11 – 
G/SCM/N/1/BRA/2/Suppl.14 – G/SG/N/1/BRA/3/Suppl.5)  
10. Written questions and responses regarding the first notification contained in 
G/SCM/N/1/BRA/2/ Suppl.13 can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/39 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/39 – G/SG/Q1/BRA/8 – Questions from Ukraine  
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/40 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/40 – G/SG/Q1/BRA/9 – Questions from the 
United  States  
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/43 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/43 – G/SG/Q1/BRA/12 – Replies to Ukrain e 
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/44 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/44 - G/SG/Q1/BRA/13 – Replies to the 
United  States  
11. Written questions and responses regarding the second notification contained in 
G/SCM/N/1/BRA/2/Suppl.14 can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/41 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/41 – G/SG/Q1/BRA/10 – Questions from the United 
States  
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/42 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/42 – G/SG/Q1/BRA/11 – Questions from the 
Dominican Republic  
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/45 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/45 – G/SG/Q1/BRA/14 – Replies to the United 
States  
• G/ADP/Q1/BRA/46 – G/SCM/Q1/BRA/46  – G/SG/Q1/BRA/15 – Replies to the 
Dominican  Republic  
12. The Committee took note  of the notifications, questions and answers.  
1.1.3   Madagascar (G/ADP/N/1/MDG/2 – G/SCM/N/1/MDG/1 – G/SG/N/1/MDG/2)  
13. Written questions and responses with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/MDG/1 – G/SCM/Q1/MDG/1 – G/SG/Q1/MDG/1 – Questions from the 
United  States  
• G/ADP/Q1/MDG/2 – G/SCM/Q1/MDG/2 – G/SG/Q1/MDG/2 – Replies to the United States  
14. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and answe rs. 
1.1.4   United Arab Emirates (G/ADP/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1 – G/SCM/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1 
– G/SG/N/1/ARE/2/Suppl.1)  
15. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/ARE/3  – G/SCM/Q1/ARE/3  - G/SG/Q1/ARE/3 – Questions from the 
United  States  
16. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
1.1.5   Uruguay  (G/SCM/N/1/URY/2)  
17. No written questions were posed with respect to this notification.  
18. The Committee took note  of the notification.  
1.1.6   Viet Nam ( G/ADP/N/1/VNM/2  – G/SCM/N/1/VNM/1  – G/SG/N/1/VNM/2) 
and Corr.1  
19. Written questions and responses with respect to this notification can be found in:  G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  • G/ADP/Q1/VNM/3 – G/SCM/Q1/VNM/3 – G/SG/Q1/VNM/3 – Questions from the 
United  States  
• G/ADP/Q1/VNM/4 – G/SCM/Q1/VNM/4 – G/SG/Q1/VNM/4 – Replies to the United States  
• G/ADP/Q1/VNM/5 – G/SCM/Q1/VNM/5 – G/SG/Q1/VNM/5 – Questions from the 
European  Union2 
20. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and answers.  
1.2  REVIEW OF NOTIFICATIONS OF NEW OR AMENDED LEGISLATION OR REGULATIONS 
WITH OUTSTANDING WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
1.2.1   Cambodia  (G/ADP/N/1/KHM/2  – G/SCM/N/1/KHM/2  – G/SG/N/1/KHM/2)  
21. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/KHM/1  – G/SCM/Q1/KHM/1  – G/SG/Q1/KHM/1G/SCM/Q1/KHM/1 – questions 
from the United States  
22. Cambodia  stated that it was still in the process of preparing the responses which will be 
submitted in due course.  
23. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and statements.  
1.2.2   Cameroo n (G/ADP/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1  – G/SCM/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1  – 
G/SG/N/1/CMR/1/Suppl.1)  
24. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/CMR/3  – G/SCM/Q1/CMR/3  – G/SG/Q1/CMR/3 – questions from the 
United  States  
25. The Committee took note  of the notification and questions.  
1.2.3   El Salvador (G/ADP/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1  – G/SCM/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1  – 
G/SG/N/1/SLV/3/Suppl.1)  
26. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/ADP/Q1/SLV/8  – G/SCM/Q1/SLV/8  – G/SG/Q1/SLV/7 – questions from the 
United  States  
• G/ADP/Q1/SLV/9  – G/SCM/Q1/SLV/9  – G/SG/Q1/SLV/8  – questions from Mexico  
27. Mexico  noted that it awaited El Salvador's response to its questions.  
28. El Salvador  stated that the responses would be submitted as soon as possible.  
29. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and the statements made.  
1.2.4   Liberia (G/SCM/N/1/LBR and G/SCM/N/1/LBR/Corr.1)  
30. Written questions with respect to this notification can be found in:  
• G/SCM/Q1/LBR/1  – questions from the United States  
31. Liberia  noted that it was working on the responses which would be submitted as soon as 
possible.  
                                                
2 Circulated on 2 May 2019.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  32. The Committee took note  of the notification, questions and the statements.  
33. The Chair , recalling the Committee's agreed procedures, informed Members that for new 
legisla tive notifications to be placed on the agenda of the fall 2019 meeting, they would have to be 
circulated in all three languages not later than six weeks before the meeting. Shortly after that date, 
the Secretariat would circulate a document informing Membe rs of all legislative notifications to be 
reviewed at the next autumn meeting. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of document G/SCM/W/293/Rev.1, 
all unanswered written questions pertaining to new legislative notifications reviewed at the meeting, 
as well as the subje ct notifications, shall automatically be retained on the agenda of the next 
Committee meeting and on the agendas of subsequent Committee meetings until written answers 
are submitted.  
34. The Chair also noted that in order to place previously -reviewed legislati on on the agenda of 
the autumn meeting for further review, written questions must be submitted to the Member 
concerned and the Secretariat, not less than six weeks before the meeting; and written answers to 
such questions must be submitted to the Member co ncerned and the Secretariat, not less than two 
weeks before the meeting. The Secretariat would circulate the usual triple -symbolled document 
containing these and the other deadlines shortly after the meeting.3 
35. Some Members had yet to submit any notificatio n concerning legislations. The Chair 
underlined the importance of these notifications in terms of transparency, and recalled that for many 
Members all that would be required was a single nil notification. For any Members that conducted 
countervailing duty investigations but had not yet notified their legislation, it was all the more 
important for the Committee to have the opportunity to review and ask questions about that 
legislation. Therefore, the Chair encouraged all Members that had not yet made a legis lative 
notification to do so as promptly as possible.  
36. The Chair referred to the document G/SCM/N/18/Add.47 which contained the latest revision 
of the list of authorities competent to initiate and conduct investigations within the meaning of 
Article  25.12 o f the SCM Agreement and invited all Members with such an authority to submit the 
required notification pursuant to Article 25.12 of the SCM Agreement, or to review and update as 
necessary their previously -submitted notifications.  
37. The Committee took note  of the Chair's statement.  
2  SEMI -ANNUAL REPORTS OF COUNTERVAILING DU TY ACTIONS (ARTICLE  25.11) – 
G/SCM/N/342 AND G/SC M/N/342/S UPPL .1 
38. The Chair recalled that document G/SCM/N/342 and G/SCM/N/342/Suppl.1 had invited all 
Members to submit no later than 15 February 2019, their semi -annual reports under Article 25.11 
of the SCM  Agreement of countervailing duty actions taken during the period 1 July t hrough 31 
December  2018. Document G/SCM/N/342/Add.1 provided the current status of Members' reporting 
for that period. Paragraph 1 of the document listed those Members reporting countervailing duty 
actions during the period. Paragraph 2 listed Members that  had notified having taken no 
countervailing duty action during the period. Paragraph 5 of the document listed the 40  Members 
that had submitted a one -time notification that they had no investigating authority, had taken no 
countervailing actions to date, and did not anticipate taking any such actions in the foreseeable 
future.  
39. One-time notifications served a useful transparency function, as they assisted non -active 
Members to meet their notification requirements in a streamlined way. Any eligible Member th at had 
not already done so thus was urged to submit a one -time notification. The Secretariat was ready to 
assist any Member in this regard.  
40. Unfortunately, as listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the document, 39 Members had not 
submitted a semi -annual report fo r July -December 2018. The Chair urged those Members to submit 
their reports as soon as possible.  
                                                
3 G/ADP/W/503/Rev.1  – G/SCM/W/578/Rev.1  – G/SG/W/245/Rev.1.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  41. No comments or questions were raised concerning the semi -annual reports of Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, European Union, India, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, and 
Ukraine.  
42. Regarding the semi -annual report of the United States , Korea  raised concerns over the 
investigations against cold -rolled steel flat products and hot -rolled steel flat products. In 
October  2018, the US Department of Comm erce had preliminarily determined that Korean steel 
producers had received countervailable subsidies which, according to Korea, was not justifiable. 
Korea noted that the Demand Response Resource Program was not a countervailable subsidy, as it 
did not invo lve a financial contribution by the government, and therefore would not meet the 
conditions under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. The US had deemed certain tax credit programs 
such as Korea 's Restriction of Special Taxation Act to be countervailable subs idies although the 
eligibility and amount of those credits were determined through objective criteria that were clearly 
spelled out in the relevant regulations. Therefore, the program would not meet the conditions of 
specificity prescribed in Article 2.1 o f the SCM Agreement.  
43. Korea also noted that in February 2019, the US Department of Commerce had determined 
that countervailable subsidies were being provided to Korean producers of large diameter welded 
pipe. For similar reasons with the case of cold -rolled  and hot -rolled steel flat products, Korea found 
the imposition of those measures inconsistent with the relevant WTO rules.  
44. With respect to the demand resource programme, the United States  indicated that the 
Commerce Department had appropriately found that  both the KPX and KEPCO are public bodies and 
therefore, provided a financial contribution under the programme. Regarding the tax credit 
programme, the United States noted that de facto specificity had been determined looking at actual 
recipients of the su bsidy which were limited in number. Similar determinations had been made for 
the large diameter welded pipe from Korea. The United States asked Korea to provide written 
questions on those issues.  
45. The Committee took note  of all semi -annual reports submitted  as well as the statements 
made.  
3  PRELIMINARY AND FINA L COUNTERVAILING DUT Y ACTIONS: NOTIFICAT IONS 
(ARTICLE 25.11)  
46. The Chair reported that since the Committee's October 2018 regular meeting, notifications 
under Article 25.11 of the SCM Agreement with respec t to preliminary and final countervailing duty 
actions had been received from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Mexico, Peru, Turkey, Ukraine, and 
the United States. Those notifications were listed in documents G/SCM/N/340 and Corr.1, 
G/SCM/N/341, G/SCM/N/ 345, G/SCM/N/346, and G/SCM/N/347.  
47. No Member took the floor regarding those notifications.  
48. The Committee took note  of the notifications.  
4  PROCEDURES FOR REVIE W OF 2019 NEW AND FU LL SUBSIDY NOTIFICAT IONS  
49. The Chair recalled that the 2019 new and full notifications were due on 30 June, and thus would 
be subject to review in special meetings beginning with the one in fall 2019. The Committee thus 
needed to decide on procedures for reviewing those notifications. During the last six notification 
cycles, th e new and full notifications had been reviewed on the basis of the procedures set forth in 
G/SCM/117, first adopted in 2005. The Chair proposed that the Committee agree to conduct the 
review of the 2019 new and full notifications on the basis of the same p rocedures.  
50. The Committee so decided . 
5  SUBSIDIES AND OVERCA PACITY – ITEM REQUES TED BY CANADA, THE E UROPEAN 
UNION, JAPAN AND THE  UNITED STATES  
51. The United States  indicated that the OECD had recently completed a report entitled "Measuring 
Distortions in Interna tional Markets, The Aluminium Value Chain", which supported its more general G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  work of measuring government support in different industries in order to ensure fair competition in 
the global economy.  
52. The report used the OECD 's matrix of government support mea sures and focused on individual 
firms throughout the stages of the aluminium value chain in order to assess government support 
within the aluminium industry. The support measures examined were wide -ranging and included 
everything from grants, to state -owne d bank lending, to debt -forgiveness, to under -pricing of 
natural resources. The report focused on the largest seventeen firms from aluminium producing 
countries who worked along the value chain, and together made up more than half of global smelting 
capaci ty. All those firms were found to have received some form of government financial assistance, 
estimated at USD70 billion between 2013 and 2017. One finding was particularly noteworthy: 85  % 
of all support is provided to five firms at the smelting stage of production. At least four of these 
firms appeared to be in China.  
53. Support for China 's industry was found to be provided predominantly through financial 
subsidies – via bank lending – provid ed to both SOEs and private firms by state -owned banks. The 
pairing of production subsidies and export restrictions on primary aluminium in China was found to 
support downstream producers of aluminium products, although the precise level of support was too  
difficult to quantify. In contrast, the majority of support to firms outside of China came through 
relatively smaller non -financial support channels, such as energy subsidies.  
54. The report 's method of examining value chains shed light on the need for trade rules to be 
revisited as the financial support of one primary factor, such as coal, could lead to downstream 
benefits through cheaper electricity, cheaper primary aluminium, to more competitive downstream 
aluminium products.  
55. Another important finding of th e study was that government ownership and management of 
input prices in China and certain countries in the Middle East resulted in significant state influence 
of commercial decision -making.  
56. Given the importance of transparency, the report outlined the need  to improve the disclosure 
of government support – both to, and by state enterprises, at a more meaningful level of detail.  
57. The report suggested that improving information on subsidies might need to draw upon the 
estimation of price gaps, derived from a co mparison of domestic prices to world reference prices. 
This approach was used by several international organizations, such as the International Energy 
Administration and International Monetary Fund. Such an approach was seen as useful in important 
areas su ch as energy inputs and concessional finance.  
58. Overall, the report rightly pointed to the need to strengthen the current rules when it came 
to, for example, enhancing transparency and the need to better capture state influence in the 
economy, particularly t hrough SOEs that were both grantors and recipients of subsidies. Those 
deficiencies in the global rulebook had to be addressed to get at the root cause of the overcapacity 
problem.  
59. The United States encouraged all Members to read the report and consider ho w the subsidy 
rules might be changed to address the government support issues that the OECD raised.  
60. The European Union  endorsed the statement made by the United States. The OECD report 
provided a useful and profound understanding of the most relevant disto rtions across the whole 
aluminium value chain. It also highlighted the subsidies were the most relevant distortion in that 
sector. Based on the robust methodology the report clearly showed that most of the subsidies were 
in the form of financial support pr ovided by China's state -owned banks which predominantly 
benefited Chinese producers. The EU welcomed the empirical analysis in the report and called on 
other Members to carefully study the report and to take its conclusions into account when crafting 
future government policies. The EU also highlighted the conclusion of the report that rules on 
subsidies needed to be revisited.  
61. Japan  echoed the statements made by the EU and the US. The OECD analysis was useful for 
deepening the discussion of that agenda. Acc ording to the report,  there was a significant increase in 
capacity in the aluminium sector which has led to the depression of price and lowered the profit G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  margin of the companies around the world.  The report also showed various types of government 
support for aluminium sectors and it also pointed out the issue of transparency. It was noteworthy 
that the relevant subsidy information was gathered from companies ' financial reports rather than 
the governments which implied that the current transparency rules mi ght not work well. Japan 
highlighted the importance of having further discussions on the issue in the Committee. Japan 
expected to be able to remove market -distorting subsidies which were not necessarily covered by 
the current SCM Agreement in order to hel p establishing a free and fair market.  
62. Canada  remained concerned with the role of government interventions with respect to the 
global excess capacity found in certain sectors which resulted in trade and market distortions 
affecting all manufacturing econom ies. The OECD report showed that financial support provided by 
governments was responsible for at least part of the recent increase in aluminium capacity. The 
report also made useful suggestions with respect to the improvements to the design of the WTO 
rules to better address the distortion resulting from the subsidies and to better account the dual role 
of the SOEs as both important recipients and providers of support. Those suggestions could benefit 
from being discussed in the Committee. The WTO and the C ommittee in particular, were uniquely 
situated to support discussions on the role subsidies play in contributing to global overcapacity as 
well as how to address them. Canada urged Members to engage constructively in those discussions 
and to make full use of the WTO forum to have a long -term solution to overcapacity.  
63. China  recalled that the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity had been established under 
G20 system, where the discussion had been carried out on topics like production capacity and 
demand, str engthening policy coordination, resolving overcapacity, etc. Several Ministerial reports 
had been proposed based on the discussion. Overcapacity was not an issue relating to the operation 
of the Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives as referred in  Article 24.1 of the Agreement. 
Therefore, the issue of overcapacity was not in the terms of reference of the Committee and it was 
not an appropriate forum for the discussion of that issue. To take such topics into the agenda was 
not helpful for an overall  and exact understanding of the problem.  
64. According to China, overcapacity was a universal, periodic and structural problem. The causes 
for overcapacity were complicated, including slow economic recovery, low market demand, 
macroeconomic policies by governm ent, trade protectionism. All the factors above might influence 
capacity. Therefore, it was a prejudiced conclusion to take subsidy as the predominant factor that 
resulted in overcapacity. China worried that the increasing measures of trade protectionism w ould 
hinder Members ' positive responses against overcapacity, which tended to shake the confidence of 
Members all over the world to cope with overcapacity and increase the difficulty in solving the 
problem.  
65. Regarding the independence of commercial banks, C hina noted that in China, SOEs, private 
enterprises and foreign -invested enterprises were all clients of commercial banks which 
independently choose their clients and issue loans according to their business planning, development 
orientation, and risk prefe rence and management ability. Decision -making of the commercial banks 
was a market -oriented choice made based on their own development which was a market -oriented 
behaviour.  
66. China indicated that according to the US notification, the Regional Revolving Loan  Funds 
programme offered interest rate below prime. In the Cohesion Fund programme of the EU China 
noted that the body that implements the financial instrument or the fund of funds (e.g. banks) is 
considered to be the beneficiary of the financial instrumen t. The beneficiary is distinct from the final 
recipients which can be public or private bodies, including individuals. China also referred to Japan's 
"Subsidy for Loans to Purchase Petroleum and LPG to be Stored" which was described as an interest 
rate sub sidy. 
67. Mexico  reiterated the urgency of developing effective solutions to combat distortions in 
international markets caused by overcapacity in various sectors. Mexico demonstrated its 
commitment in national legislation and other international commercial in struments to maintain legal 
frameworks that prohibit anti -competitive business practices and to ensure equal conditions. It is 
necessary that all Members commit themselves to develop the best solutions to combat that problem 
and take the necessary measures  to eliminate subsidies that distort the market, and other types of 
support from governments that maintain or create overcapacity. Members had to strengthen 
cooperation, improve the exchange of information and find collective solutions in the development 
of solutions focused on reducing and avoiding overcapacity.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
- 9 - 
 
  68. Norway  was of the view that the description of the aluminum value chain as well as the analysis 
of the market provided by the OECD report were correct. Although the analysis was a case study of 
only 17 companies, it covered the majority of the market. The OECD had gone into great detail on 
each company to make the evidence robust. The table with the description of types of subsidies was 
an important tool to analyze and understand government support to and through both private and 
government owned companies.  
69. According to Norway, subsidies in a value chain could have effects on different parts of the 
cost structure that all add up in a downward pressure on prices. A very important result of the report 
was the description of the importance of financial support f or many companies.  On SOEs, what came 
out of the report was the different roles SOEs could have as well as how little transparency there 
was regarding both activities and ownership. Norway indicated, however, that it was not ownership 
in itself, but how ow nership was implemented that created support and subsidization. Norway was 
of the view that a "level playing field ", meant no "special treatment " of state -owned enterprises  – 
the companies shall not have any advantage nor disadvantage from having the state  as an owner. 
The report should be a major input to Members ' reflections here at the WTO on the Agreement, and 
on whether the Agreement sufficiently covers the world of subsidies.  
70. According to Chinese Taipei , overcapacity was an issue affecting all Members; however, the 
Agreement could not sufficiently address that issue which requires further discussions and exploring 
possible ways of addressing overcapacity and market distortions. Therefore, Chinese Taipei expected 
to have further discussions on th at issue in the Committee.  
71. Australia  noted the report's conclusions: (i) government support needed to be understood in 
the context of global value chains, as upstream support had the effect of supporting downstream 
production; (ii) subsidy rules needed to better account for the influence of government; and (iii) the 
dual role of SOEs as recipients and providers of support. Australia also indicated that current subsidy 
rules were insufficient which needed to be further clarified.  
72. Another important conclusion  in the report was that transparency of government support 
policies was fundamental in order to understand impacts of those policies. Australia remained 
supportive of clarifying and improving subsidy rules indicating that it was a strong supporter of new, 
well-crafted rules on state -owned enterprises. SOEs should not be given advantages that were not 
available to private enterprises competing in the same market and they should act in accordance 
with commercial considerations. Australia remained willing to b e involved in further work in the 
Committee which was the appropriate forum to discuss development and updating the rulebook on 
subsidies.  
73. The Russian Federation  reiterated its readiness for further search of ways to overcome 
overcapacity. Need for coopera tion in this sphere was obvious to ensure healthy international trade 
and greater economic stability. In order to succeed, the Membership should approach the excess 
capacity challenge from all possible avenues. Tangible results would be unlikely if Members  face only 
one factor contributing to it in isolation. The Russian Federation also reiterated its warning against 
imposition of trade barriers to mitigate the effects of overcapacity which would ultimately prove to 
be moving along a blind alley. If there w as a need for new disciplines, it should be evaluated from 
all angles. It might be not only subsidies, but also other spheres where amendment of rules would 
benefit the struggle with overcapacity. Joint effort would enable to choose the best solutions. The  
Russian Federation remained ready for further discussion on that issue.  
74. The Committee took note  of the statements.  
6  ARTICLE  27.4 EXTENSIONS OF THE TRANSITION PERIO D FOR THE ELIMINATIO N OF 
EXPORT SUBSIDIES  
75. The Chair recalled that Members that had been grant ed extensions under Article 27.4 pursuant 
to the procedures in WT/L/691 were required, under paragraph 2(c) of the procedures, to submit 
transparency notifications in respect of each year of the final two -year phase -out period, i.e. calendar 
years 2014 and  2015. The deadline for the notification pertaining to 2014 was 30  June 2015. A 
reminder to this effect had been circulated in document G/SCM/N/290/INF.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
- 10 - 
 
  76. Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Jamaica,  Jordan, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had submitted these notifications, which had been circulated in 
the G/SCM/N/290 series.  
77. Furthermore, given that 2015 was the final year of the tw o-year phase -out period pursuant 
to the previously mentioned procedures, the Members with extensions needed to have completed 
the elimination of their export subsidies by 31 December 2015. They also had to provide a final 
transparency notification in respe ct of calendar year 2015 not later than 30 June 2016. A reminder 
concerning that final round of Article 27.4 –related notifications had been circulated in document 
G/SCM/N/299. For the information of Members, the Chair  had asked Secretariat to prepare a roo m 
document indicating the current status of notifications and of actions reported by Members with 
extensions under Article  27.4.4 
78. To date, fourteen of the beneficiary Members – Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salva dor, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Papua 
New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Navis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - had submitted those 
final notifications. The Chair reminded other Members with extensions to submit their final 
transparenc y notifications as soon as possible. The deadline for the elimination of the export 
subsidies had been three years earlier while for submitting the final notification had been more than 
two years earlier. He emphasized the importance for the system that bo th the Members benefit from 
extensions complete their compliance with the corresponding substantive and transparency 
obligations.  
79. Saint Lucia  took the floor indicating that it would address the Committee on behalf of the 
member states of the Organization o f Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Antigua and Barbuda, 
Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had submitted their 
final transparency notifications and Saint Lucia was actively working to fulfil that obligation. Anti gua 
and Barbuda and Grenada had become fully compliant with their obligations as they had eliminated 
the existing export subsidy programmes and repealed the related legislations. Dominica, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had all  notified that the authorities were reviewing 
their respective national legislation containing provisions that fall within the scope of that obligation.  
80. Saint Lucia was yet to submit its final transparency notification, but it had previously notified 
that there were no beneficiaries of export subsidies within the meaning of Article 3.1 of the 
Agreement in relation to its Fiscal Incentives Act and the Micro and Small -Scale Business Enterprises 
Act. Nonetheless, Saint Lucia remained committed to fulfilling it s obligations with respect to 
Article  27.4 of the Agreement. To this end, Saint Lucia had commenced the process of reviewing the 
legislation, with a view to repealing and replacing all non -conforming provisions that fulfil the 
legitimate policy objectives of the authorities, while complying with existing WTO commitments. It 
would submit its outstanding notifications in short order.  
81. Barbados  updated the Committee about the action plan notified in G/SCM/N/275/BRB. The 
action plan had identified a number of su bsidy programmes and a process to amend them. In line 
with the action plan, the Government of Barbados had completed (i) repealing the Fiscal Incentives 
Act; (ii) making required amendments to the Societies with Restricted Liability Act; (iii) repealing 
the International Business Companies Act; and (iv) removing the Export Allowance Programme. The 
detailed notification would be submitted to the Committee in due course. Barbados reiterated its 
continued commitment to the multilateral process.  
82. New Zealand  noted that this agenda item had been before the Committee for a couple of years 
and that there were still outstanding notifications from several Members. New Zealand noted that 
for many of them it might be an administrative matter given almost all of the Memb ers concerned 
had previously reported the time limits and nature of the planned termination of their export subsidy 
programmes. New Zealand requested to keep this item on the agenda for the fall meeting.  
83. The Chair  noted that the Committee would revert to t hat issue at the next meeting.  
                                                
4 RD/SCM/36/Rev.3.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  84. The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
7  IMPROVING THE TIMELI NESS AND COMPLETENES S OF NOTIFICATIONS A ND OTHER 
INFORMATION FLOWS ON  TRADE MEASURES UNDE R THE SCM AGREEMENT  
85. The Chair  recalled that since the request of the Chairman of the Trade Policy Review Body in 
spring 2009, the Committee had been discussing, at formal and informal meetings, "ways to improve 
the timeliness and completeness of notifications and other information flo ws on trade measures". 
The substance of those discussions was reflected in the minutes of the previous meetings.  
86. The Chair recalled that at Committee's October 2018 meeting a number of Members had 
indicated their willingness to continue discussions on ways  to improve timeliness and completeness 
of notification obligations under the SCM Agreement, with the notification of subsidies being the 
most fundamental. In this regard, there were two topics to cover under this agenda item, (i) the 
status of Members' no tifications of subsidies and (ii) the US proposal regarding a written process for 
questions and answers under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 of the SCM Agreement.  
87. Regarding the status of subsidy notifications, the Chair noted that the Secretariat had 
prepared and updated a background note at the request of Members, providing a snapshot of the 
level of compliance with the various notification obligations under the SCM Agreement since 1995, 
the most recent of which had been circulated in document G/SCM/W/546/Rev.10.  
88. Since the October 2018 meeting of the Committee, only Montenegro had submitted its 2017 
new and full notification. In addition, India had provided an additional notification to its previously 
submitted notification.  
89. The Chair also noted that he had sent in dividual reminder letters to those delegations with 
pending notification obligations and invited them to provide their subsidy notifications as soon as 
possible.  
90. Unfortunately, compliance with the obligation to notify subsidies remained low. 77  Members 
had not made their 2017 new and full subsidy notifications for which the deadline had been 
30 June 2017. Sixty -two Members still had not made their 2015 new and full subsidy notification, 
although the deadline had been almost four years earlier. Further, fift y-five Members still had not 
made their 2013 notifications, which had been due six years earlier. Many of these Members either 
had never notified or had done so only in the distant past. The chronic low compliance with this 
fundamental transparency obligat ion constituted a serious problem in the proper functioning of the 
Agreement.  
91. The Chair invited the Members that had not yet submitted their 2017 notifications to provide 
an update to the Committee on their progress in preparing those notifications. No suc h delegation 
took the floor.  
92. The Chair urged Members that had not yet submitted their notifications to do so and recalled 
that the Secretariat continued to be available for enquiries about compliance with notification 
obligations. The Secretariat had assis ted many Members in the past and Members finding themselves 
unable to comply with their obligations were encouraged to consult the Secretariat. There was a 
range of resources that delegations could draw upon in working to rectify the situation, including t he 
Secretariat Handbook on Notification Requirements for the SCM  Agreement and the two 
Geneva -based Internship Programmes coordinated by the Secretariat. The Secretariat had recently 
modified the handbook as well as the mock examples for the notifications to be submitted which 
could be found on the WTO webpage.  
93. In addition, the Secretariat had launched a series of regional technical assistance activities 
with a specific focus on the notification of subsidies. The first of such events had been organized in 
July 2018 in Singapore for developing Members in the Asia -Pacific region. Three additional activities 
had been scheduled in 2019 for Latin American countries as well as French and English -speaking 
African countries.  
94. Morocco  indicated that it was working wit h different departments and agencies in order to 
gather information on subsidies and it would provide its notification. Recalling the Ministerial Decision G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  taken in Buenos Aires on fisheries subsidies, Morocco reminded that its notification on fisheries 
programmes had already been circulated.  
95. New Zealand  expressed concerns with the low levels of compliance with WTO notification 
obligations. Without those notifications it would be difficult to assess what programmes were in place 
which might be affecting the  trade interests of other Members. New  Zealand appreciated the 
opportunity to ask questions of other Members particularly regarding their notified fisheries subsidies 
programmes and the timely responses to those questions. New  Zealand had also provided res ponses 
to Members' questions in previous meetings regarding changes in New  Zealand's domestic 
countervailing duty legislation. Those questions had given New Zealand an opportunity to get 
external perspectives on its legislation. New Zealand also noted that  many Members had not 
submitted a nil notification although they did not have any subsidy programmes in place. 
New Zealand encouraged those Members who had not submitted their notifications to do so as soon 
as possible. Those facing difficulties should see k assistance from the Secretariat.  
96. The European Union  stressed that the notification of subsidies was a key element to the work 
of this Committee and an essential part of the SCM Agreement. It was imperative that Members 
made their best effort to notify al l their subsidies granted in their territories. Referring to a previous 
discussion on completeness of notifications, the European Union reiterated that all Members were 
required to provide full notifications of all those subsidies that were specific. Membe rs could not wait 
for the WTO to determine whether or not the subsides were specific; rather they should ma ke this 
judgement by themselves. It was of great concern that the level of compliance between 2015 
and 2017 had dropped. Only 45% and 41% of Members had notified in 2015 and 2017, respectively 
despite the very extensive efforts made by the Secretariat to hold technical assistance and to update 
the Handbook.  
97. Chinese Taipei  expressed its concerns regarding the low level of compliance with the 
notificatio n obligations and urged those Members which had not yet provided their notifications to 
do so in a timely manner.  
98. Canada  shared the concern of the Chair and other Members with respect to the low level of 
compliance with notification requirements. Canada ag reed that the subsidy notification process was 
a resource intensive but fundamentally important transparency exercise and encouraged Members 
to take best efforts to fulfil their requirements and seek assistance from the Secretariat, if necessary.  
99. Australia  echoed the concerns raised by previous speakers noting that the statistics were 
worsening rather than improving. It reiterated that the transparency obligation was a core provision 
of the Agreement. Without notifications it would be very difficult for exp orters and producers to know 
what was going on in other markets. Australia urged those Members who were in the process of 
compiling the notifications to do so as soon as possible. It also appreciated the support provided by 
the Secretariat.  
100.  The United Stat es associated itself with the previous speakers and expressed its concern over 
declining number of notifications that had been provided. The United States applauded the work of 
the Secretariat in providing technical assistance and particularly, the regiona l seminars on 
notification obligations. The United States also asked to keep that item on the agenda.  
101.  China  echoed the previous  statements noting that transparency and notification requirements 
constituted fundamental elements of many WTO Agreements and c ompliance with the existing 
notification requirements had been chronically low. All Members should make their efforts to improve 
the performance of notification requirements. Developed Members, having adequate technical 
capacities and administrative resour ces, should take the lead role in performing the transparency 
obligations. Developing Members should also fulfil their obligations within their abilities. In addition, 
the Secretariat should play a vital role in the process of improving transparency. The l ack of capacity 
had always been a challenge for developing Members to fulfil their notification obligations, especially 
for those facing practical limitations in terms of administrative resources and technical conditions.  
102.  Japan  echoed the statements made b y the previous speakers and noted that transparency 
through the notification obligation was one of the most important foundations to make the WTO 
system work more effectively. All Members should make their notifications within the specified 
deadlines.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
- 13 - 
 
  103.  The Russian Federation  thanked the Secretariat for the surveillance of subsidy notifications 
noting that notification of subsidies was a fundamental obligation.  
104.  Pakistan  indicated that notifying subsidies in a timely and complete manner was very 
important to a ddress issues of distortion in the global market. If Members were not following the 
obligations, it would create inefficiency in the performance of the Agreement. The support from the 
Secretariat was very important for Members who needed technical assistan ce to meet this obligation.  
105.  Norway  emphasized the importance of transparency sharing the concerns expressed by 
previous speakers. Notification obligations had to be completed within the deadlines and Norway 
stood ready to engage in efforts in addressing the situation.  
106.  Tajikistan  informed t he Committee that it was in the process of completing its notification 
working with the Secretariat. The notification would be submitted soon.  
107.  Referring to the statement made by China, the European Union  noted that all Members were 
facing similar resource limitations and lack of capacity in dealing with that issue. Members had to 
make better efforts to meet with their obligations. There were more complexities for certain 
Members. The European Union had to coordinate, not only on subsidies granted at EU leve l, but also 
granted at 28 Member States level. Some of the Member States then, in turn, had further complex 
federal structures  – all of which had to be coordinated. Nevertheless, the European Union still 
managed to get its notification done in time every s econd year despite tight resource limitations. 
The European Union suggested those members who had not made yet to make a nil notification.  
108.  With respect to the second topic under this agenda item, the Chair recalled that at the 
Committee's October 2018 regu lar meeting, a number of Members had indicated their willingness to 
continue discussions on the proposal from the US regarding procedures for questions and answers 
under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 of the SCM  Agreement.5 
109.  The United States  recalled that previous ly it had introduced its formal proposal that written 
answers to initial questions under Article 25.8 be provided within sixty days and that follow -up 
questions be answered in thirty days. Although the mandatory deadlines for written answers to 
questions u nder Article 25.8 were necessary for the proper functioning of the provision, it recognized 
the concerns raised by some developing countries. Since no consensus had been reached on 
mandatory deadlines previously, the United States proposed an alternative u nder which Members 
would agree to non -mandatory deadlines for responses to Article 25.8 questions.  
110.  Under that proposal, Members would only agree to make their best efforts to submit written 
responses to Article 25.8 questions within sixty days and written responses to follow -up questions 
within thirty days. According to the United States, such guidelines would signal that Members of the 
Committee were committed to making the important transparency provisions contained in the 
SCM Agreement function properly.  While that was a less ambitious outcome it would be an 
important, initial step to enhance a critical transparency tool.  
111.  Although it had been reluctant to reconsider its position, the United States had heard certain 
Members' comments and modified its posit ion to take into account those concerns. Where written 
responses to questions posed under Article 25.8 are not provided in a timely manner, or not at all, 
that important tool would be rendered ineffective and thus undermine transparency and the proper 
functioning of the SCM Agreement. The idea of Members committing to providing written responses 
to Article 25.8 questions within a specified time was not a radical one and was in fact rooted in the 
accepted practices of the Committee.  
112.  According to the United States, there was nothing extraordinary about the proposal because 
it mirrored the existing practice of providing answers to questions on regular notifications and 
reflected the practice most Members had followed when answering Article 25.8 questions. The 
United  States would ask that the proposal be adopted in the same manner as the procedures for 
review of regular notifications and expected that the new proposal would overcome Members' 
                                                
5 G/SCM/W/557/Rev. 3. G/SCM/M/109  
 
- 14 - 
 
  concerns. The United States indicated that it remained open -minded noti ng that it had made very 
significant modifications to the proposal to reach agreement.  
113.  The United States reminded that this provision was used infrequently – less than once a year 
on average  – which suggested it was not being abused. It was, however, an important transparency 
tool and the new proposal would advance its proper functioning. Finding ways to enhance 
transparency was a goal that all Members should embrace, considering the outcome at the Ministerial 
Conference in Buenos Aires, where Ministers had re -committed to the implementation of existing 
notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the Agreement.  
114.  The United States remained flexible in finding a pragmatic solution that would sat isfy the 
underlying objective of enhancing the exchange of information.  
115.  Japan  supported the new proposal noting that the title of the proposal had changed from 
procedure to guideline meaning that it was not mandatory. Members should respect and follow the 
proposal as a best effort base. That guideline would be a good practice for transparency. Different 
from measures such as laws and regulations it was not easy for other Members to access subsidy 
information. Therefore, the transparency of subsidy was very important for the implementation of 
the Agreement.  
116.  Canada  agreed that the subsidy notification process was a fundamentally important 
transparency exercise and expected that Members would make every effort to provide their 
notification and respond to questi ons from Members in a timely and complete manner. Canada 
further noted that the information request process contemplated under Articles 25.8 and 25.9 of the 
SCM Agreement were important pillars for achieving the transparency objectives of the Agreement 
and supported the proposal.  
117.  The European Union  supported the US proposal indicating that the revisions should fully 
address the concerns that had been made by certain Members. The question and answer process 
under Article 25.8 and 25.9 was an imperative compl ementary aspect to the notification of subsidies. 
The European Union invited other Members to fully support the proposal.  
118.  Australia  supported the proposal and the revisions made which indicated that Members were 
listening to each other. It appreciated the US' flexibility in looking at ways to accommodate the 
concerns raised by some Members. This was a very important part of Article 25 and it was  within 
the gift of the Committee to agree on the guidelines being used.  
119.  Korea  expressed its support for the revis ed proposal of the US which could serve as a useful 
guideline in operating Article 25.8 of the Agreement.  
120.  China  recalled its position at the previous meetings noting that Articles 25.8 and 25.9 did not 
dictate that Members should submit written replies, no r did it specify that the deadline for submitting 
answers. The requirement for making written answers would impose new substantive obligations on 
Members. China recalled that many questions raised by the Members pursuant to Article 25.8 had 
been incorporat ed into the normal questions upon subsidies notifications. Therefore, the proposal 
would not only cause difficulties to the LDC Members but would also pose challenges to many 
developing Members  by increasing their workload and distracting their focus on pr eparing their 
notifications. China reiterated the importance of transparency expected that the relevant discussions 
could be conducted in a pragmatic manner.  
121.  Brazil  supported the proposal and thanked the United States for its flexibility. It had become 
a balanced proposal which would be helpful to improve transparency. The revised proposal would 
provide more predictability to the process established in Articles 25.8 and 25.9 ensuring the 
necessary flexibility in terms of deadlines that might be needed for Members to submit written 
answers to questions posed on their programmes.  
122.  India thanked the United States for the revised proposal and appreciated its efforts to bring 
in new elements in the revised proposal taking into account the discussions and concerns  raised by 
Members. The US proposal, in various forms, had been under discussion in the Committee for some 
time, and Members had raised certain basic and fundamental concerns with the proposal. The US in 
its revised proposal had tried to bring in the conce rns of Members by linking the timelines with the G/SCM/M/109  
 
- 15 - 
 
  best endeavour clause. India agreed that transparency was an important component of the 
SCM Agreement and was essential for the smooth functioning of the multilateral trading system. 
However, the strict time lines for notifications imposed certain burdens for developing Members. 
Thus, pragmatism was needed in imposing such enhanced obligations. Developing and LDC Members 
had capacity constraints and challenges in meeting those enhanced obligations. First of al l, the 
proposed time limits for the submission of replies to the questions under Article 25.8 needed to be 
examined from the point of view of practicality and pragmatism. Most developing and LDC Members 
had capacity constraints in compiling information fro m different central or sub -central agencies. One 
of the Members stated that the information collection from the sub -federal level, particularly the 
state governments or the Member states was not an easy job. Therefore, India was not completely 
convinced wi th this strict time frames, even though it was the best endeavour clause which could 
yield effective results. Noting that the proposal used the phrase "appropriately answered", India was 
not sure who would determine whether the question has been "appropria tely answered". India also 
indicated that it would look forward to bilateral discussions with the United States on the revised 
proposal.  
123.  Chinese Taipei  thanked the United States for the proposal which was necessary and essential 
for transparency and expect ed to work together with Members on the proposal in the future.  
124.  The Russian Federation  reiterated its welcome for the efforts to increase timely responsiveness 
of Members but recalled the concerns raised by some Members at previous meetings. It also 
reiter ated that the interests  of Members with complex state structure should be taken into account. 
For those Members it might be a challenge to collect and process the relevant information from 
regional authorities.  
125.  The United States  noted the comments raised b y India and the Russian Federation and 
indicated that it would discuss those issues with them bilaterally.  
126.  The Chair stated that it appeared that Members wished to continue discussions on those issues 
at the next regular meeting of the Committee.  
127.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
8  CONSTANT DOLLAR METH ODOLOGY FOR GRADUATI ON FROM SCM ANNEX VI I(B) 
128.  The Chair recalled that, pursuant to the Doha Ministerial Decision on Implementation -Related 
Issues and Concerns (document WT/MIN (01)/17, para graph 10.1), Annex VII (b) to the 
SCM Agreement listed Members until their GNP per capita reached US$1,000 in constant 1990 dollars 
for three consecutive years. As of 1 January 2003, the methodology set forth in G/SCM/38, 
Appendix  2 had applied for making those calculations. In accordance with that Decision, since then 
the Secretariat had circulated annual notes in document series G/SCM/110 updating the GNP per 
capita figures for the Members listed in Annex VII (b) based on that methodology. The most recent  
version, Addendum 15, had been circulated in 2018 and the Secretariat would circulate the updated 
calculations as soon as the necessary World Bank data became available.6 
129.  No Member took the floor and the Committee took note  of the Chair's statement.  
9  IMPLE MENTATION OF PARAGRA PH 2 OF THE MINISTER IAL DECISION ON FISH ERIES 
SUBSIDIES (WT/MIN(17 )/64; 13 DECEMBER 20 17) – ITEM REQUESTED  BY ARGENTINA, 
AUSTRALIA, CANADA, C OSTA RICA, THE EUROP EAN UNION, ICELAND, JAPAN, THE 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, N EW ZEALAND, NORWAY, CHIN ESE TAIPEI AND THE U NITED 
STATES  
130.  The United States  recalled the Ministers' recommitment at the Ministerial  Conference in 
Buenos Aires in 2017 to the implementation of existing notification obligations under Article 25.3 of 
the Subsidies Agreement, with a v iew toward strengthening transparency with respect to fisheries 
subsidies. It noted that Members ' record in meeting their subsidy notification obligation under 
                                                
6 Document G/SCM/110 /Add.16 was circulated on 14 May 2019.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
- 16 - 
 
  Article  25.3 was abysmal and seemed to be getting worse. Almost half of all Members had not 
submitted their subsidy notification in 2017.  
131.  For example, one of the largest fisheries producers had not provided a notification since 1996. 
Even when some Members had provided a notification, not all of their fisheries subsidies were 
reported. The United  States called on Members to correct course and submit their complete subsidy 
notifications, including their fisheries subsidies information, by the 30 June deadline. In light of the 
Ministerial directive from Buenos Aires, all Members had to seriously re -commit to meet their existing 
notification obligations – or risk missing the first important deadline set at MC11. This was an 
opportunity to demonstrate that Members could carry out one of the most basic transparency 
obligations that they had in the WTO.  
132.  According to the United States, Members also had to ensure that their notifications provided 
greater transparency, where needed, that was unique to fisheries subsidies programs, and allowed 
a better understanding of the operation of notified programs. At f isheries subsidies negotiations in 
the Rules Negotiating Group, discussions had all too often devolved into abstract debates on 
definitions, fisheries management regimes, and jurisdictional issues. The subsidy notifications called 
for by Ministers were str aightforward and served as an important reality check on those discussions. 
Meeting the ministerial mandate with full and comprehensive notifications of fisheries subsidies could 
provide important context and benchmarks for finding ways to break longstandi ng stalemates.  
133.  The previous year, the United States had asked what practical impediments might be in 
submitting timely and comprehensive notifications of fishery subsidies. Several Members had 
indicated the difficulties in meeting their notification requir ements in a timely manner, and that in 
some instances this could be attributed to capacity, internal coordination challenges, and resource 
constraints. For those Members, the United States suggested alerting the Secretariat, to help 
expedite submission of a "nil" notification. For those facing practical challenges, the WTO Secretariat 
was in a position to help, and was immediately available to help provide advice concerning the 
gathering and notification of fisheries subsidies information.  
134.  The United States  also noted that it was willing to share experiences and prepared to help to 
ensure capitals were well informed of the need to meet the deadline. It was open to any further 
ideas that would help to ensure that all Members comply with the Ministerial direct ive from 
Buenos  Aires to provide fisheries subsidies notifications under Article 25.3 by June 30th.  
135.  New Zealand  reiterated the directions from Ministers at MC11 reaffirming existing obligations 
to notify fisheries subsidies under the Agreement by 30 June 2 019. Unfortunately, Members were 
not fulfilling their obligations to notify. The lack of comprehensive implementation of this obligation 
was unfortunate and Members did not have a transparent picture of distorting subsidies which 
created substantive and sy stemic problems, not only for Members' work and engagement in the 
Committee, but also for the ongoing fisheries subsidies negotiations. If Members fail to achieve a 
critical mass of notifications and meet this time -frame, Members need to ask themselves, wh at signal 
does this send to the stakeholders who are watching the fisheries subsidies process so closely. If 
Members fail on this fundamental restatement of their existing obligations, what does it say about 
going to the next step and remove harmful fisher ies subsidies. New Zealand is aware of the 
legitimate and genuine challenges facing some Members in preparing notifications and encourages 
them to be open about these challenges and engage with the Secretariat and other Members.  
136.  Chinese Taipei  echoed the s tatement made by New Zealand and recalled Ministers' 
recommitment to the implementation of existing notification obligations under Article 25.3 of the 
Agreement. This was not a new but rather an existing obligation. For the difficulties of Members, in 
preparing fisheries subsidy notifications, Chinese Taipei welcomed the suggestion made in the 
previous meeting that Members could ask technical assistance from the Secretariat. In addition, 
Members could share expertise in the Committee. Chinese Taipei urged M embers who had not 
submitted the relevant information on fisheries subsidies to do so.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
- 17 - 
 
  137.  Argentina  recalling the decision by Ministers in Buenos Aires noted that in particular when 
there was a lot of turbulence in the multilateral system – better efforts in notifications would be a 
real opportunity to improve visibility of the Organisation and to enhance its internal work. Argentina 
fully agreed with what had been said by Canada in October 2018 that complete and precise 
information on existing programmes of f isheries subsidies were necessary, so that Members could 
properly deal with the challenges relating to the illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing as well 
as overfishing. They could also meet the Sustainable Development Goal 14.6. Argentina invited 
Members to double their efforts to meet their transparency obligations and noted that Members 
could exchange ideas which would be useful for those Members that were finding it difficult to achieve 
this. 
138.  Canada  emphasised the importance of fisheries subsides r ecalling Ministers' decision at MC11. 
Many Members, however, had not notified any fisheries subsidies. In anticipation of the upcoming 
June deadline for subsidy notifications, Canada urged all Members to comply with their obligations 
and provide informatio n on their fisheries subsidies programmes. Having a clear picture of the 
fisheries subsidies maintained by Members was a necessary first step, if Members were truly 
committed to delivering on our commitment to deliver new rules addressing harmful fisheries  
subsidies. Members had discussed previously, both in the Committee and on the Negotiation Group 
on Rules, possible ways to facilitate compliance by Members with their notification requirements. 
Canada was prepared to engage constructively on any new sugge stions to that end and expected all 
Members would strive to fully notify their fisheries subsidies and comply with the Ministerial Decision.  
139.  The European Union  noted that transparency with regard to all subsides, including those 
relating to fisheries, was of utmost importance to the EU. The EU has provided comprehensive 
information about its subsidy programmes at both the EU and national levels, as shown in all of its 
subsidy notifications, including the last one in 2017. The Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017 
provided that Members recommitted to implementation of existing notification obligations under 
Article 25.3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, thus strengthening 
transparency with respect to fisheries subsidies. However, w hen looking at the factual paper 
provided by the Secretariat in document RD/TN/RL/49/Rev.3 the situation looked somewhat 
different. In fact, it looked downright dismal. The Secretariat had analysed notifications from the 
two cycles in 2015 and 2017 and it turned out that a mere 25 % of Members had notified any fisheries 
subsidies; and only Morocco had provided its notification on fisheries subsidies after the Secretariat's 
factual paper. The EU was concerned that a significant number of Members had failed to  observe 
fundamental rules that the WTO was based on. The EU called on those Members to heed to the 
commitment taken at the MC11 and implement existing notification obligations in the field of 
fisheries subsidies.  
140.  Japan  attached great importance to improvi ng Members' compliance with the notification 
obligations in the area of fisheries subsidies. Improving the implementation of existing notification 
obligations through paragraph 2 would significantly contribute to the proper functioning and 
operationalizati on of fisheries subsidies disciplines.  
141.  Norway  referred to the Ministerial Decision made in Buenos Aires in 2017 and recalled the 
discussions on that issue at the last meeting of the Committee. Members ' record in meeting their 
subsidy notification obligatio n under Article 25.3 was dismal.  Some Members that had provided a 
notification had not notified all of their fisheries subsidies which had been indicated by various Trade 
Policy Reviews.  
142.  According to Norway, transparency  was not only an obligation in itsel f but also essential as 
the basis for building good rules. In light of the Ministerial directive from Buenos Aires, and since 
the Membership was soon entering the final stage of the negotiations on fisheries subsidies, Members 
should deliver on their exist ing notification obligations by 30 June 2019. Given how far the fisheries 
subsidies negotiations had come, Norway presumed that most Members now had in depth knowledge 
about their subsidies.  
143.  Norway urged those Members who had indicated difficulties in meeting their notification 
requirements in a timely manner to ask technical assistance from the Secretariat. Norway 's ultimate 
goal was to ensure that notifications provide greater transparency, where needed of Members' 
fisheries subsidies programs, and that the notifications allow a better understanding of the operation 
of the programs.  Norway 's first, immediate step would be to adhere to the Ministerial Decision from 
MC11 and to submit complete and timely notifications of its fisheries sub sidies by June 2019.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  144.  China  attached great importance to the protection and sustainable development of the marine 
fisheries resources and supported carrying out the decision of the MC11 to complete the fisheries 
subsidies negotiations as scheduled and impro ve the transparency concerns. China expected that 
the transparency concerns would not place excessive burdens on developing and especially, least 
developed Members.  
145.  Korea  emphasised the importance of the implementation of Paragraph 2 of the Ministerial 
Decision and urged all Members to implement the existing notification obligations under Article 25.3 
of the SCM Agreement, thus strengthening transparency with respect to fi sheries subsidies.  
146.  Australia  reiterated the importance of the transparency obligations particularly with regard to 
fisheries subsidies which was more important given the recommitment made by Ministers at the 
MC11. Those notifications were necessary for the  negotiations on developing disciplines on fisheries 
subsidies. Australia would normally be submitting its notification around September or October due 
to its financial year. Recognizing the importance of meeting the 30 June 2019 deadline for fisheries 
subsidies, however, it would submit a separate fisheries subsidies notification by 30 June. Australia 
urged other Members with similar circumstances to follow a similar approach.  
147.  Pakistan , referring to the Ministerial Decision at the MC11, endorsed the views expressed by 
Members and noted that the notification obligation under the Agreement as well as the pursuance 
of the Ministerial Decision was very important for all Members.  
148.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
10  ARTICLE 25.8 QUESTIO NS TO CHINA ON POTENTIAL STEEL SUBS IDIES – ITEM 
REQUESTED BY THE EUR OPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES  
149.  The United States  recalled that it had been concerned with the lack of transparency of China's 
industrial subsidy regime since 2001. To prompt a more fulsome disclosure of China's subsidy 
programmes, it had raised questions to China under the old Transitional Review Mechanism, 
pursuant to Article 25.8 of the Agreement, under the normal Committee procedures and also 
counter -notified subsidy measures under Article 25.10.  
150.  As steel was a vital sector in the US, it had raised questions and counter -notified numerous 
possible steel subsidy measures in China. Notwithstanding its claim to the contrary at prior meetings, 
however, China had not notified the vast majority of its steel  subsidy programmes over the last 
eighteen years of its WTO Membership.  
151.  The growth of the steel industry in China had been remarkable since China had become a WTO 
Member. Its steel capacity had grown over 500 % since 2001 and it accounted for half of the gl obal 
steel production. The growth of capacity in China had outpaced the growth in demand. Its steel 
capacity exceeded domestic demand by approximately 300 million tons.  
152.  In a market economy, when capacity outpaced demand, the owners of that capacity were 
threatened by financial loses which forced them to reduce capacity or exit from the market. In a 
market economy, when there was excess capacity in an industry it would be difficult to obtain 
commercial financing for even more capacity investments. However, t hose market dynamics did not 
appear to apply in China.  
153.  The financial crisis in 2008 had led to a severe drop in global demand for steel. In China, 
however, the financial crisis had not affected the increase in capacity. Steel capacity in China had 
increase d by 500 million tons or by 78 % between 2008 and 2015 while its internal demand for steel 
had increased by only half of that amount.  
154.  Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China and many market analysts agreed 
that China's steel demand had peak ed, and it had been declining since 2013.  
155.  China's excess production had spilled over to export markets while there was insufficient 
domestic demand. China's exports had grown from less than 7 million tons to 70 million tons between 
2001 and 2017 which had led to a rise in trade remedy cases in both developed and developing 
countries against Chinese steel products.  G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  156.  According to China, the growth in capacity and exports – in both good and bad times  – had 
been accomplished with little or no government subsidy support, even for those companies owned 
by the government, while a superficial examination of the annual reports of several of the largest 
steel companies in China indicated otherwise. In those reports, under the title of "government 
subsidies" or "governm ent grants", many of China's top steel companies listed dozens of 
government -funded projects through the provision of grants.  
157.  The Article 25.8 questions co -submitted by the European Union and the US enquired  about 
160 government subsidies or government gra nts listed in the annual reports of six of the largest 
steel companies in China. More recent annual reports indicat e the same general level of government 
subsidies. All of the listed government subsidies or government grants might not be subject to the 
notification requirements of Article 25 of the SCM Agreement; however, there were  certainly  more 
than the three non -specific programmes  China had claimed to be the exclusive instances of 
government intervention in the steel industry or the few other programme s that China claimed it 
had notified under different names or had not been specific.  It had taken China sixteen years to 
submit its first sub -central subsidy notification however it was clear how deficient the notification 
was. 
158.  According to steel company a nnual reports, several of China's steel companies had received 
relatively large government equity investments which were not surprising given that most of the 
largest steel companies in China were government -owned. The US and the EU had asked China to 
explain whether those government investments could be commercially justified; however no 
response had been provided by China, even orally at previous meetings.  
159.  The European Union  noted that it fully associated with the US statement. It also thanked China 
for some of the clarifications that had been provided at previous Committee meetings. According to 
the EU, while some of the schemes referred to in the questions might already have been notified, 
that was not clear. The EU remained very concerned that the most recent notification of China in 
July 2018 did not mention any steel -specific subsidies, even though  both the US and EU had 
identified specific steel subsidies granted to steel companies in China. Submission of a complete or 
full notification on subsidies w as an essential part of the Agreement therefore the EU urged China 
to note that their next notification should include steel subsidies and asked China to provide written 
answers to those questions in the interests of transparency.  
160.  China  had noticed the sus tained concern of the US and the EU about its steel industry policies 
which China would like to clarify. China also indicated that its efforts in improving the transparency 
of the steel subsidy policies should not be ignored or underestimated. In its lates t subsidy notification 
for the period of 2015 -2016, China had incorporated subsidies involving the steel sector. Although 
those policies were not specific to steel industry China had included them in the notification for the 
purpose of improving transparen cy. 
161.  For example, at the central governmental level there were preferential tax treatment for 
environmental protection, water and energy conservation, clean development mechanism, fund for 
energy conservation and emission reduction, fund for air pollution p revention and control, R&D super 
deduction for enterprises, and reward and support fund for the structural adjustment of industrial 
enterprises.  
162.  At the local governmental level, there were;  
 i. Fund for environmental protection, Jiaozuo city of the Henan Province.  
 ii. Fund for prevention and control of air pollution, Jiaozuo and Xinxiang city of the Henan 
Province.  
 iii. Fund for environmental protection, Hu nan province.  
 iv. Fund for energy conservation, Tianjin Municipality.  
 v. Reward and suppor t fund for dissolving overcapacity, Yunan province.  
 vi. Fund for prevention and control of air pollution, He Bei Province  
 vii. Fund for energy conservation, emission reduction and ecological protection, Jilin Province  
 viii. Fund for pollution prevention  and control and environmental monitoring and supervision, 
Jilin Province  G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  163.  China had sent the annual report of the six steel enterprises mentioned in the documents to 
the competent local governments for further verifications. In the meantime, the 2017 -2018 local 
subsidy notification were in the process of drafting. If the related steel subsidy policies fell within 
the scope of notification based on China's understanding, it would include those in the coming 
subsidy notification.  
164.  With regard to the programs i ndicated in the annual report, China noted that the annual report 
was formulated upon supporting programs, while its notification was based on policies. Therefore, 
different programs sometimes might come from the same policy and there was no one -to-one 
correlation between those two. Even with the same program, there could be duplication of statistics 
among different subsidiaries. According to the SCM Agreement, however, not every program 
released in the annual report shall be notified. As a result, not ever y program disclosed in the 
enterprises ' annual reports corresponded to one of China's submitted subsidy notifications. For this 
reason, it was pointless to compare the number of subsidy policies notified with the programs 
disclosed in the annual reports.  
165.  With respect to the issue of overcapacity , China noted that over -capacity of steel was a global 
problem which required joint efforts to cope with. With the rapid economic development and the 
organisation in China, the production of steel had increased quick ly. The increased capacity was 
attributable to  domestic development as China's exports of steel in 2018 only accounted for six per 
cent of the total steel production . In contrast, the export production of some EU members had been 
as high as 60 %, while Japa n's production  had been higher than 30 %. 
166.  China also indicated that the economic development of developing Members definitely needed 
an increased production of steel which had been proven evidently by the rapid increase of steel 
productivity in such Members . Therefore, it was outrageous that China should take the major 
responsibility for over -capacity. In the meantime, China had taken positive efforts to fulfil the 
commitments of G20 summit according to which the outdated  capacity would be eliminated in a wa y 
to improve the environmental protection standards as well as safety and quality standards. From 
2016 to 2018, China had eliminated 150 million tonnes of outdated capacity , resettled 270,000 
laid-off workers and made a significant contribution to sustaina ble development of steel industry.  
167.  The Chinese Government pushed structural reform of the supply side in depth. In 
November  2008, eleven departments including the National Development and Reform Commission 
and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology had jointly published a Circular forbidding 
the preserving of some enterprises through financial subsidies by the government.  
168.  Japan  stated that , in the interest of  transparency, Members should  continue the discussion on 
this issue in  the Committee.  
169.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
11  PERMANENT GROUP OF E XPERTS  
170.  The Chair recalled that the terms of Mr Welber Barral and Mr Chris Parlin  as members of the 
Permanent Group of Experts (PGE) expired in April 2017 and April 2018, respectively. The previous 
Chairperson of the Committee had held consultations with a view to fill those vacancies and she had 
informed the Membership that Rabih Nass er of Brazil had received the greatest number of 
expressions of support, followed by Mr Jaemin Lee of Korea. Due to some issues raised following the 
consultations, however, the Committee had not been able not finalize the election process at its 
previous m eetings.  
171.  Following the Chair's conducts, those Members, which had previously raised concerns, agreed 
to join the consensus to fill those vacancies. Accordingly, in document G/SCM/153, the Chair 
informed the Committee and proposed that the Committee elect M r Rabih Nasser and Mr Jaemin Lee 
to fill the vacancies on the PGE created by the expiry of the term of office of Mr Chris Parlin and 
Mr Welber Barral, respectively. Since no Member raised any reactions to that proposal the election 
process was finalized as  explained in document G/SCM/154.  
172.  The Chair also recalled that the term of office of Mr Subash Pillai as a member of the 
Permanent Group of Experts was expiring and the Committee should elect a new member to replace G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  him. The Secretariat received only one n omination, Ms Marina Foltea from Moldova and no objection 
was raised against her nomination during the Chair's consultations. The Chair recalled that he had 
explained the procedures he had followed and shared the results of the consultations with the 
Membe rship in a transparency session held on 18  April 2019. On that date, he had circulated an 
email to Members summarizing the process and the outcome of his consultations. In that fax, he 
had asked any Member that had not been able to join a consensus around Ms Marina Foltea to so 
inform him in writing via the Secretariat by 25 April 2019. He also had noted that Members not 
expressing any view would be considered to agree to join the proposed consensus.  
173.  Since no objection had been raised, it appeared that ther e was a consensus to elect Ms Marina 
Foltea to the PGE. The Chair thus proposed that the Committee elect Ms Marina Foltea to the 
Permanent Group of Experts, for a term of office to expire in spring 2024.  
174.  The Committee elected  Ms Marina Foltea to the Perman ent Group of Experts.  
12  OTHER BUSINESS  
175.  Mexico  expressed its concern over the recent anti -dumping and anti -subsidy investigations 
carried out by the United States against the imports of steel structures.  
176.  As also pointed out during the investigation, Mexico wa s concerned about the lack of clarity 
of the information used to initiate the investigation. Mexico referred to the deficiencies in the 
application, deficiencies in the determinations made by both the Department of Commerce and the 
International Trade Comm ission, and the deficiencies in the preliminary determination of the 
Commission.  
177.  In particular, it was not clear which products were investigated. Mexico had indicated during 
the investigation that the customs information used by the US included products t hat did not meet 
the description of the products subject to investigation, so it was not clear whether they were subject 
to investigation or not. Obviously, this caused serious doubts about the compatibility of other aspects 
involved in the investigation w ith the applicable provisions of the WTO Agreements. According to 
Mexico, these deficiencies should be sufficient to reconsider the initiation of the present 
investigation.  
178.  No explanation was provided as to the type of analysis that was carried out to make  a 
determination on whether imported and US products were like . 
179.  Before the initiation of the investigation, the applicant could not prove that it was representing 
the domestic industry, and once the investigation had been initiated, it tried to remedy this  defect 
by simply changing the name of the case. The applicant did not prove that it represented the 
domestic industry, thus allowing it to submit an application on its behalf. Mexico reiterated that no 
investigation could be initiated if the applicant's r epresentativeness was not clear.  
180.  Despite those deficiencies, on 25 March 2019, the US International Trade Commission issued 
its preliminary determination where it indicated that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that 
the investigated imports caused  damage to the US industry producing like products. On the same 
day the Commission issued its preliminary determination, noting that the deadline for interested 
parties to submit comments to the Department of Commerce to determine which products should 
be considered as investigated had been concluded. On 11 April 2019, after a preliminary 
determination regarding injury, the applicant submitted additional comments on what should be 
considered as investigated products.  
181.  Thus, while the Department of Commerce w as still analysing wh at products were under 
investigation , the International Trade Commission had already determined that the importation of 
these unknown products had caused injury  to the US domestic industry . Mexico indicated that given 
the situation, it  was clear that the interested parties ' right of defence  were negatively affected.  
182.  The United States  noted that the proceedings were at a very early stage and the investigation 
had been initiated in February 2019. The notice of initiation provided a descri ption of the products 
subject to investigation and explained the process to submit any comments about the scope of the 
investigation. Numerous scope -related comments had been submitted by the deadline and the G/SCM/M/109  
 
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  Department of Commerce had extended the deadlin e to submit comments. The Department of 
Commerce would consider all the comments received and had conducted all the necessary 
consultations prior to the initiation. The United States would remain open for bilateral consultations.  
183.  The Chair raised the issue of the deadline for requesting items to be placed on the final agenda. 
The Chair reminded Members that the deadline for requesting items to be placed on the final agenda 
is indicated at the end of the annotated draft agenda which is made available se veral weeks prior to 
the meeting. The Chair urged Members to observe the specified deadlines.  
184.  The Committee took note  of the statements made.  
13  DATE OF NEXT REGULAR  MEETING  
185.  The Chair recalled that the proposed date for the autumn meeting was the week of 
21 October  2019. At the SCM Committee meeting held in May 1995, it was agreed that the 
Committee meetings will be held twice a year in the last weeks of April and October of each year. 
However, during this spring's meeting of the Safeguards Committee on 29 Apr il, Members had 
agreed ad referendum to hold the Safeguard Committee's meeting in the week of 4 November  2019, 
pending approvals from capitals. The Chair therefore proposed to schedule ad referendum the next 
regular meeting of the Committee for the week of  4 November  2019. 
186.  The Committee so decided .7 
14  ELECTION OF OFFICERS  
187.  The Chair explained that the election of the new Chair and Vice -Chair for the Committee cannot 
take place at this meeting, as discussions were still underway in the CTG. The Chair noted that  the 
Secretariat would send a communication to Members once the CTG has completed its work, 
indicating the name of the new Chair appointed by the CTG. The new Chair would be deemed to be 
elected by the Committee absent any objection. The Chair proposed to postpone the election of the 
Vice-Chairperson until the new Chair is appointed.  
188.  The Committee so decided . 
 
 
__________  
                                                
7 On 9 May 2019 , the outgoing chairs of the Committee on Anti -Dumping Practices, the Committee on 
Safeguards, and the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures jointly sent a fax to all Members 
confirming that no objection was received. Subsequently on 15 July 2019, the newly -appointed chairs of the 
three Committees jointly sent another fax to  all Members informing that due to a conflict with the meetings of 
the Negotiation Group on Rules (fisheries negotiation) they propose that the meetings of the three Committees 
be held during the week of 18  November  2019. No objection was received.