RESTRICTED  
  
G/C/M/135  
 
30 October 2019  
(19-7329) Page: 1/104 
Council for Trade in Goods    
 
MINUTES OF THE MEETI NG OF THE COUNCIL FO R TRADE IN GOODS  
8 AND 9  JULY  2019  
CHAIRPERSON: HE  MR JOSE LUIS CANCELA (UR UGUAY)  
The meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG, or the Council) was convened by 
Airgram  WTO/AIR/CTG/14; the proposed agenda for the meeting was circulated in 
document  G/C/W/766. The meeting proceeded on the basis of the following agenda:  
 
1   NOTIFICATION OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREE MENTS  ................................ ....................  3 
2   EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATI ON OF EU  TRQ COMMITM ENTS:  
SYSTEMIC CONCERNS – REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA, CANADA, CHINA, N EW ZEALAND,  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON, AND THE UNITED S TATES  ................................ ....................  4 
3   ENLARGEMENT OF T HE EUROPEAN UNION TO  INCLUDE CROATIA: NE GOTIATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6  OF THE GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON................................ ................................ ..............................  7 
4   CHILE, CHINA, IN DIA AND THAILAND – REQUEST FOR THE EXTEN SION OF  
THE WAIVER FOR PREFE RENTIAL TARIFF TREAT MENT FOR  
LEAST DEVELOPED COUN TRIES (G/C/W/764)  ................................ ................................ . 7 
5   UNITED STATES – REQUEST FOR A WAIVER  – CARIBBEAN BASIN ECO NOMIC  
RECOVERY ACT (CBERA AS AMENDED) (G/C/W/7 65) ................................ ....................  12 
6   SWITZERLAND –LIEC HTENSTEIN – NEGOTIAT IONS UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:5 OF 
GATT  1994 (G/L/1262/ ADD.1)  ................................ ................................ ......................  15 
7   MEASURES TO ALLO W GRADUATED LDCS, WI TH GNP BELOW USD  1,000, 
 BENEFITS PURSUANT T O ANNE X VII(B) OF THE AGRE EMENT ON SUBSIDIES A ND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASU RES – REQUEST FROM C HAD ON BEHALF OF THE  LDC GROUP 
(WT/GC/W/742 -G/C/W/7 52) ................................ ................................ .......................  15 
8   EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF N ON-TARIFF BARRIERS  
ON AGRICULTURAL PROD UCTS – REQUEST FROM ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA , BRAZIL, 
CANADA, COLOMBIA, CO STA RICA, CÔTE D'IVO IRE, DOMINICAN REPUB LIC, ECUADOR, 
GUATEMALA, HONDURAS,  MALAYSIA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PE RU,  
UNITED STATES, AND U RUGUAY  ................................ ................................ ....................  18 
9   KINGDOM OF SAUDI  ARABIA, KINGDOM OF BAHRAIN, THE UNITE D ARAB  
EMIRATES AND OMAN – SELECTIVE TAX ON CER TAIN IMPORTED PRODUC TS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, SWITZER LAND, AND THE UNITED  STATES  ...... 31 
10   INDONESIA'S IMP ORT AND EXPORT RESTR ICTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATE S ...................  33 
11   INDIA – CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON ICT  PRODU CTS – REQUEST FROM C ANADA,  
CHINA, NORWAY, CHINE SE TAIPEI, AND THE U NITED STATES  ................................ ...... 36 
12   TRANSPARENCY AN D NOTIFICATION REQUI REMENTS  ................................ ............  38 
12.1   Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Streng then Notification Requirements under 
WTO Agreements – Communication from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European 
Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and  
Matsu, and the United States (JOB/GC/20 4/Rev.2 -JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2)  ................................ .....38 G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.2   An Inclusive Approach to Transparency and Notification Requirements in the WTO – 
Communication fr om Cuba, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (JOB/GC/218, 
JOB/CTG/15, JOB/SERV/292, JOB/IP/33, JOB/DEV/58, JOB/AG/158) ................................ ........ 54 
13   EUROPEAN UNION — QUALITY SCHEMES FO R AGRICULTURAL PRODU CTS AND 
FOODSTUFFS - THE REG ISTRATION OF CERTAIN  TERMS OF CHEESE  
AS GEOGRAPHICAL INDI CATIONS – REQUEST FR OM ARGENTINA,  
THE UNITED STATES, A ND URUGUAY  ................................ ................................ .............  67 
14   EGYPT – MANUFAC TURER REGISTRATION S YSTEM – REQUEST FROM   
THE EUROPEAN UNION A ND THE RUSSIAN FEDER ATION  ................................ ...............  69 
15   MONGOLIA – QUAN TITATIVE RESTRICTION S AND PROHIBITIONS O N  
IMPORTATIONS OF CERT AIN AGRICULTURAL PRO DUCTS – REQUEST FROM   
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON................................ ................................ ............................  70 
16   VIET NAM – DECR EE ON THE REGULATION  ON CONDITIONS FOR A UTOMOBILES 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEM BLING, IMPORTING, AN D AUTOMOTIVE WARRANT Y AND 
MAINTENANCE  SERVICES – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FED ERATION AND  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 71 
17   CHINA – MEASURE S RESTRICTING THE IM PORT OF SCRAP MATERI ALS –  
REQUEST FROM THE UNI TED STATES  ................................ ................................ .............  72 
18   INDIA – QUANTIT ATIVE RESTRICTIONS O N IMPORTS OF CERTAIN  PULSES –  
REQUEST FROM AUSTRAL IA, CANADA, THE EURO PEAN UNION,  
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON, AND THE UNITED S TATES  ................................ ..................  75 
19   CHINA - CUSTOMS  DUTIES ON CERTAIN I NTEGRATED CIRCUITS –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND CHINESE TAIPEI  .........................  78 
20   EUROPEAN UNION - DRAFT IMPLEMENTING  REGULATIONS REGARDI NG  
PROTECTED DESIGNATIO NS OF ORIGIN AND GEO GRAPHICAL INDICATION S, 
TRADITIONAL TERMS, L ABELLING AND PRESENT ATION OF CERTAIN WIN E  
SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE UNITE D STATES  ................................ ...........  79 
21   CHINA – NEW EXP ORT CONTROL LAW IN D RAFT – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  .............  80 
22   UNITED STATES  – PROHIBITIVE PROPO SAL ON COMMUNICATION  EQUIPMENT  
OR SERVICES RELEASED  BY THE FCC – REQUES T FROM CHINA  ................................ ...... 81 
23   AUSTRALIA – DISCRIM INATORY MARKET ACCES S PROHIBITION ON  
5G EQUIPMENT – REQUE ST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 82 
24   UNITED STATES - MEASURES REGARDING MARKET ACCESS PROHIB ITION FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUE ST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ....... 83 
25   UNITED STATES – EXPORT CONTROL MEAS URES FOR ICT  PRODUCT S –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 83 
26   EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGUL ATION) –  
REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 84 
27   UNITED STATES – MEASURES ON AVIATIO N SECURITY EQUIPMENT  –  
REQUEST FROM CHINA  ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 85 
28   THE RUSSIAN FED ERATION – TRADE REST RICTING PRACTICES –  
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION  ................................ ................................ .........  86 
29   CROATIA – REGUL ATION OF IMPORT AND SALE OF CERTAIN OIL PRODUCTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  ................................ ................................ .. 90 
30   EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE DIRECTIVE 2009/28/EC , RENEWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM MALAYSIA  AND COLOMBIA  ................................  90 
31   EUROPEAN UNION – MEDICAL DEVICE REG ULATION AND IN VITRO  DIAGNOSTIC 
MEDICAL DEVICES REGU LATION – REQUEST FRO M THE UNITED STATES  .......................  94 
32   TUNISIA – IMPOR T RESTRICTION MEASUR ES – REQUEST FROM TH E EUROPEAN 
UNION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...........................  95 G/C/M/135  
 
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  33   ANGOLA – IMPORT  RESTRICTING PRACTIC ES - STATEMENT BY  
THE UNITED STATES  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 96 
34   BETTER FUNCTION ING OF THE COUNCIL F OR TRADE IN GOODS AN D  
SUBSIDIARY COMMITTEE S – STATEMENT BY HON G KONG, CHINA  ................................  97 
35   WORK PROGRAMME ON ELECTRONIC COMMER CE ................................ .................  101  
36   OTHER BUSINESS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 102  
36.1   Japan – Export Control Measures on Materials Essential for Semiconductors and Displays  102 
36.2   Optimization of the CTG Work in Line with the Practice of the General Council  ................  103 
36.3   Date of the Next Meeting  ................................ ................................ .........................  104 
 
 
Before the Agenda had been  adopted, the delegations of Argentina, C ôte d'Ivoire, the Dominican 
Republic,  and Nicaragua,  requested to be added as co -sponsors of Agenda Item 8 (European Union 
– Implementation of Non -Tariff Barriers on Agricultural Products) ; the delegation of Argenti na 
requested to be added as a co-sponsor of Agenda Item 13 (European Union – Quality Schemes for 
Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs) ; and the delegation of Colombia requested to be included as a 
co-sponsor of Agenda Item 30 (European Union – Amendments t o the Directive  2009/28/EC, 
Renewable Energy Directive) . The delegation of the Republic of Korea indicated that , under Agenda 
Item "Other Business ", it intended to raise the issue of Japan's export control measures on materials 
essential for semiconductors  and displays. The Chairperson  indicated that, under the same agenda 
item, he would raise the matter of the date of the Council's next meeting.  
 
The agenda was so agreed . 
 
1  NOTIFICATION OF REGI ONAL TRADE AGREEMENT S 
1.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, under the working procedures agreed by the Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) , and following the adoption by the General Council of the 
Transparency Mechanism, the CTG was to be kept informed of Members' notifications of new regi onal 
trade agreements (RTAs).1 He informed the CTG that the following two  RTAs had been notified to 
the CRTA, as followed:  
– Free Trade Agreement between the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and Israel 
(WT/REG398/N/1) ; and  
 
– Revised Treaty of the Economi c Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
(WT/REG399/N/1) . 
 
1.2.  The delegate of Nigeria  stated that , since ECOWAS had been notified as a Free Trade Area in 
2005 under the Enabling Clause, a number of developments had occurred. These developments 
furthered  the region 's objective of establishing an Economic Union of West Africa, in order to raise 
the living standards of its people, to maintain and enhance economic stability, to foster relations 
among member States , and to contribute to the progress and developm ent of the African continent. 
In 2009, the region had adopted a Common External Tariff (CET) of five  bands, namely 0%, 5%, 
10%, 20% and 35%, which had entered into effect on 1  January  2015, thereby transforming 
ECOWAS from a Free Trade Area (FTA) into a Cu stoms Union (CU). For transparency purposes and 
given the importance of the ECOWAS  Authority of Heads of States and Government decision, Nigeria, 
in its capacity as ECOWAS  Informal Group Coordinator, had notified the  establishment of the  
Customs Union unde r Article  XXIV of the GATT on behalf of ECOWAS  member States. He indicated 
that the ECOWAS  CU member States were mindful of the provisions of GATT  Article  XXIV:5(a) , and 
of the need for some members to modify their WTO  Tariff Schedule. Consequently, he inf ormed the 
Council that arrangements were being concluded for parties to the ECOWAS  Customs Union to 
commence renegotiations of tariff concessions pursuant to Article  XXVIII of the GATT , as a group, 
and in line with the provisions of GATT  Article  XXIV:6. The purpose of these renegotiations was to 
                                                
1 See documents  WT/REG /16, WT/L/671, and G/C/M/88.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  align the ECOWAS  CET with the WTO  bound tariffs of certain ECOWAS  member States that were 
currently in violation of their commitments as a result of the ECOWAS  CET. 
1.3.  The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the information provided and of the 
statement made.  
1.4.  The Council so agreed . 
2  EUROPEAN UNION – PROPOSED MODIFICATION O F EU TRQ COMMITMENTS: SYSTEMI C 
CONCERNS – REQUEST F ROM AUSTRALIA, CANAD A, CHINA, NEW ZEALAN D, THE RUS SIAN  
FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED STATES  
2.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 26  June 2019, the Russian 
Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda. In a communication 
dated 27  June 2019, the delega tions of Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand,  and the United 
States had also requested to include this issue on the agenda.  
2.2.  The delegate of Australia  remained concerned about the negative trade impact of the proposed 
modifications to the EU and UK 's WTO  tariff rate quotas. Both markets were important for Australia 's 
agricultural exporters of beef, sheep meat, dairy , and sugar. Australia continued to be concerned 
about the uncertainty surrounding the future UK -EU trading relationship post -Brexit , and reiterated 
the need for clarity , including with assurances that any agreement would not breach UK -
EU obligations to other Members or create disruptions in global agricultural markets. Australia 
recognized the legal rights of the EU and UK to modify their conces sions on goods provided that 
compensatory concessions were granted to Members  affected by such modifications . However, 
Australia could not accept the EU's assertion that no compensation was required because there had 
been no loss in the value of the concessions  granted . Nevertheless, Australia welcomed the EU 's 
commitment, undertaken at the Committee on Agriculture, to continue negotiations in an open and 
transparent manner under the terms of the GATT  Article  XXVIII process, and Australia looked 
forwa rd to working with both the EU and UK to resolve its concerns  in this regard . 
2.3.  The delegate of Chile shared Australia's systemic concerns on the issue of TRQ commitments 
under GATT  Article  XXVIII in the context of the UK's withdrawal from the EU, and Chile urged the 
EU to abide by its commitments and to find a satisfactory solution to the se concerns.  
2.4.  The delegate of Canada  continued to have significant concerns regarding the EU and UK 's 
approach to apportioning the EU -28's TRQs, which Canada had conveyed to the EU in this Council 
and in other WTO  Committees, as well as bilateral ly. Canada noted the EU 's willingness to engage 
with Members on these issues ; indeed, Canada  expected the EU to continue to make concrete efforts 
to address these longstanding concerns . Canada reminded the EU that an outcome on the current 
GATT  Article  XXVIII  negotiations depended on further clarity regarding the future EU -UK trade and 
economic relationship. Given the reduction in market access to the EU, Canada believed that the EU  
must offer meaningful compensation as part of this process. Canada looked forward to continuing 
bilateral discussions on this issue.  
2.5.  The delegate of New Zealand  noted that , after nearly two years , the concerns consistently 
expressed by New Zealand and others on this issue had remained unaddressed. As New Zealand 
had already made clear on previous  occasions , among its important specific concerns were  the 
following : (i) a significant loss of access i nto the EU  market, including complete elimination of a 
small number of current quotas and a large-scale reduction in many more; (ii)  the risk that much of 
what remained of the reduced MFN  TRQ access would be absorbed by the significant level of bilateral 
EU-UK trade; and (iii)  the loss of flexibility referred to above constraining the ability of both 
exporters and markets to respond appropriately to fluctuations in demand in the current uncertain 
environment. New Zealand again called upon the EU and the UK to use the time remaining under 
the Brexit extension to engage constructively with concerned Members to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable solution that did not leave partners at the WTO worse off relative to the EU's current 
bound access commitments. New Zea land stood ready to engage in further dialogue with the EU to 
achieve this objective.  
2.6.  The delegate of Uruguay  reiterated the concerns that it had expressed previously both in the 
Council and in other WTO fora and emphasized the importance for the multilate ral trading system G/C/M/135  
 
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  (MTS) that this matter be resolved through negotiation between the parties concerned, in accordance 
with the WTO  rules, and respecting WTO market access commitments and the balance of 
concessions that had previously been agreed.  
2.7.  The delegate of Indonesia  reiterated his delegation's concern over EU  unwillingness to accept 
data provided by Indonesia on the EU TRQ on manioc. Indonesia urged the EU to resolve this matter 
and to accept the validated data that it received from WTO  Membe rs. 
2.8.  The delegate of the United States  said that, as previously noted in this Council and other 
Committees, her delegation supported the UK establishing itself as an independent Member of the 
WTO. However, the United States rejected the EU -UK approach to TR Qs because it was prejudicial 
to its WTO  rights and trade interests ; in particular, the US considered that it was an approach that 
would reduce market access opportunities for US  exporters into both markets. Although the United 
States was engaging with the  EU and the UK on an overall solution, progress to date had only been 
procedural. In the US  view, prospects for a negotiated solution under GATT  Article  XXVIII were dim 
before a potential Brexit on 31  October  2019. The United States remained concerned abou t what 
would happen to the US  TRQs into both markets beginning as early as 1  November  2019, the day 
after a potential Brexit. The United States understood that the default position on 1 November  2019 
would be the original EU -UK proposal for apportion ing EU TRQs, which the United States had 
repeatedly rejected. The United States believed that the current approach to the negotiations was 
unacceptable . Nevertheless , the US stood ready to engage with the EU and the UK in productive 
negotiations to ensure that its trade interests were maintained.  
2.9.  The delegate of Brazil  shared the concerns of other Members about the way in which the EU 
was seeking to modify the TRQs in its Schedule. Brazil would continue to follow developments in the 
discussions on this topic and  expected the EU to engage in negotiations and consultations so as to 
prevent exporting countries, like Brazil, from being  worse off in terms of market access  post-Brexit . 
2.10.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  reiterated her delegation's deep concern over the EU 's 
approach to TRQ  negotiations in the context of Brexit. The Russian Federation believed that , while 
the Brexit process was complicated, complex , and broad in scope, within the WTO this process should 
be conducted in accordance with the Organizatio n's rules. Within the framework of the EU 's 
TRQ renegotiations, the reduction in market access opportunities for WTO  Members, as well as the 
WTO norms provided for in Article  XXVIII of the GATT , should not be disregarded or ignored. In her 
delegation's vie w, the TRQ  splitting methodology proposed by the EU would decrease Members ' 
current in-quota shares. It was an  approach that would result in declining terms of trade and 
mounting market access barriers in respect of both agricultural and NAMA  products. Indeed, the 
Russian Federation was convinced that it was an approach that was not WTO consistent without 
compensatory adjustment s; in this regard,  she noted that GATT  Article  XXVIII permitted Members 
to modify a concession , but also established an obligation to maintain a general level of reciprocal 
and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided prior to any 
renegotiations. The Russian Federation urged the EU to provide its compensatory  proposal.  
2.11.   The delegate of Costa Rica  indicated that Costa Rica was aware of the importance of a strong 
and effective MTS, as well as of the need to maintain and foster predictability in trading relations 
between WTO  Members. Costa Rica emphasized that the  UK and the EU should ensure that the 
process carried out under GATT  Article  XXVIII would be transparent, inclusive, and not prejudice 
Members' guarantees established under the WTO  Agreements; furthermore, they should ensure that 
any changes introduced were introduced in a way that would allow all Members effectively to assess 
their impact on international trade flows. On this topic, Costa Rica maintained , and would continue 
to maintain , a constructive dialogue with the EU and interested Members both bilate rally and in the 
framework of this Council and its subsidiary bodies.  
2.12.   The delegate of China  shared the concerns and views expressed by previous speakers. While 
China was willing to work with the EU to modify its TRQ  schedule , and with the UK to establish i ts 
own TRQ  schedule, China could not accept the proposed apportionment approach by the EU and the 
UK, which China believed would lead to a significant loss of market access opportunity and flexibility 
in future EU and UK  markets. Without wishing to repeat China's statements on this issue from 
previous CTG  meetings, she nevertheless confirmed that China's views, concerns , and requests , as 
expressed in previous meetings , remained the same.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  2.13.   The delegate of Switzerland  shared other Members' concerns over  the legal uncertainty 
regarding access to EU and UK  tariff quotas, specifically in the context of a hard Brexit. Switzerland 
also shared the view that the unbinding and reallocation of appropriate TRQ  quantities to the EU27 
and UK was highly relevant to m any Members and therefore of systemic importance to the WTO. 
Switzerland hoped that the necessary processes would be completed as quickly as possible and with 
the consensus of all Members.  
2.14.   The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  joined previous speakers in e xpressing the systemic 
concerns of his delegation regarding the proposed modification of EU  TRQ commitments. The 
uncertainty surrounding Brexit was giving rise to substantive concerns for bilateral and multilateral 
relations. Korea was keen for the negotia tions between the EU and other WTO  Members  to continue  
because, in its view , any modification in this regard would bring about significant consequences for 
the WTO  system.  
2.15.   The delegate of Japan  highlighted the importance of swiftly establishing the WTO  bound 
schedules that would be applicable to the EU and the UK following the UK 's departure from the EU. 
Japan also reiterated the importance of maintaining legal stability under the WTO  Agreement , and 
of ensuring clarity concerning the EU and the UK 's application of the MFN  rates to Members in 
accordance with their bound schedules. In this regard, Japan again  request ed the EU to ensure a 
high level of transparency as concerned the procedures for this process.  
2.16.   The delegate of Mexico  reiterated Mexico's s ystemic concerns already expressed in this 
Council, and in other fora, regarding  the methodology used for the modification of TRQs following 
Brexit. Mexico believed that any methodology used must maintain the balance between the rights 
and obligations nego tiated by Members.  
2.17.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  shared the concerns expressed by previous speakers, 
particularly regarding the uncertainty surrounding a possible disruption in trade. Chinese Taipei had 
registered its systematic concerns at previous CTG  meetings and had highlighted that its trade 
interests should be maintained and not be less favourable than those enjoyed prior to this 
notification. In addition, Chinese Taipei hoped that this issue would be resolved in a transparent 
way. 
2.18.   The delegate of India echoed the concerns that had been raised by other Members. India 
appreciated the efforts made by the EU in providing the revised data for erga omnes  TRQ re-
allocation and consultations under GATT  Article  XXVIII. India had already expressed its concerns  
both in writing and during the formal consultations with the EU  delegation and had made it clear to 
the EU that the present methodology and the threshold years taken into account for 
TRQ apportionment by the EU were affecting Members ' rights relative to the obligation previously 
undertaken by the EU on those specific tariff lines. India expected the EU to conduct these 
negotiations in full compliance with the WTO 's rules, and expected the EU to provide reasonable 
opportunities to all WTO  Membe rs, including India, to exercise their rights under the 
WTO Agreement. India looked forward to fruitful discussion s with the EU and the UK  on that basis . 
2.19.   The delegate of the European Union  acknowledged Members' concerns about the current 
uncertainty surrou nding the UK leaving the EU. The EU and the UK had engaged jointly as early as 
October  2017 with WTO  Members on the approach envisaged for apportion ing the bound WTO  TRQs. 
As already stated by the EU on many occasions, the key principle was to maintain the  existing level 
of market access between the EU27 and the UK. The EU was a supporter of the rules -based 
multilateral trading system , and it had followed all the relevant WTO  procedures when launching its 
Article  XXVIII negotiations and  would continue to do  so. The EU had engaged with relevant 
WTO partners on a regular basis even before launching the Article  XXVIII procedure and would 
continue to do so in good faith as part of those procedures. She informed the Council that the 
negotiations under GATT  Article XXVIII procedures were ongoing with those partners having 
recognized rights. The EU  welcomed Members' engagement in these formal negotiations, bearing in 
mind that the formal negotiations had begun only recently. The EU reiterated  its willingness to 
continue to engage in negotiations in an open and fair manner under GATT  Article  XXVIII regardless 
of the scenarios for the UK 's withdrawal. On EU-UK access to each other's MFN  TRQs, the EU had 
repeatedly stated its commitment to achieving an orderly withdrawal of the UK from the EU, including 
a comprehensive trade arrangement with the UK for the future. The EU continued to believe that 
continuing free trade between the UK and th e EU was the best way to ensure access to each other 's 
market without the need to use each other 's WTO  MFN TRQs in the future.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  2.20.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their statements and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
2.21.   The Council so agreed . 
3  ENLARGEMENT OF THE E UROPEAN UNION TO INC LUDE CROATIA: NEGOTI ATIONS 
UNDER ARTICLE  XXIV:6 OF THE GATT  1994 – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON 
3.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 26  June 2019, the 
delegation o f the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  
3.2.  The delegate of the Russian Federation  reiterated her delegation's deep concerns regarding the 
European Union 's negotiations under Article  XXIV:6 of the GATT in the framework of its enlargement 
to include Croatia. The Russian Federation had repeatedly raised this issue bilaterally, at the 
Committee on Market Access , and in the meetings of this Council. The Russian Federation's concerns 
had been communicated to the Eur opean Union in writing as well as circulated to WTO Members. 
Although  the Russia n Federation 's negotiating rights had been provided for in the EU 's notification, 
the EU had failed to engage in negotiations with Russia. She noted that , by refusing to negoti ate 
with the Russia n Federation , the EU was ignoring not only its own statistics, but also the indication 
of Members' negotiating rights in its own notification. She considered that to ignore the rights of the 
Russia n Federation  violated WTO rules. For these reasons, the Russian Federation concluded that 
the negotiations could not be considered to have  been completed , and she again called upon the EU 
to engage in compensatory adjustment negotiations with the Russia n Federation . 
3.3.  The delegate of the European Union  reminded Members of the EU's explanations that had been 
given to them at previous Council meetings. She clarified that the negotiations following Croatia 's 
accession to the EU were now closed. The EU had informed WTO  Members about the conclusi on of 
these negotiations one  year earlier , in document  G/SECRET/35/Add.2 , dated 26 July 2018, and that 
the outcome of the Article  XXIV:6 process would be reflected in the EU -28 Schedule , which was 
currently undergoing certification. The EU had extensively and repeatedly explained, orally and in 
writing, in the WTO and bilaterally, its reasons for not having accepted the compensation claims of 
the Russian Federation in the context of the EU's most recent enlargement. Once again, the EU 
underscored that the i ndication of a WTO  Member as principal supplier in a 
GATT  Article XXIV:6/XXVIII  notification was not an automatic recognition of a right for that 
WTO Member to obtain compensation.  
3.4.  The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council take 
note of the statements made.  
3.5.  The Council so agreed . 
4  CHILE, CHINA, INDIA AND THAILAND – REQUE ST FOR THE EXTENSION  OF THE WAIVER 
FOR PREFERENTIAL  TARIFF TREATMENT FO R LEAST DEVEL OPED COUNTRIES 
(G/C/W/764)  
4.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 13  June 2019, the 
delegations of Chile, China, India,  and Thailand had requested the Secretariat to circulate the request 
for the extension and the draft decision to  extend the validity of the waiver for the granting of 
preferential tariff treatment to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The request for extension was 
circulated to Members in document  G/C/W/764. In communications dated 4 and 5  July 2019, the 
delegations of Turkey and Brazil had requested the Secretariat to be added as co -sponsors to this 
document (G/C/W/764/Add .1 and G/C/W/764/Add.2 ). 
4.2.  The delegate of China  stated that her delegation had worked together with Brazil, Chile, India, 
Thailand,  and Turkey, and had submitted the request for the waiver extension on developing 
Members' preferential treatment to LDCs. China also thanked the Chair for his efforts and 
consultations on this issue. China believed that the integration of LDCs into the global trading syst em 
and the global economy required effort from all WTO  Members. While the Enabling Clause adopted 
in 1979 provided the legal basis for developed Members to accord non -reciprocal preferential 
treatment, developing Members also needed a legal instrument to g rant unilateral tariff preferences G/C/M/135  
 
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  to LDCs. Thus, a Decision granting a waiver to paragraph  1 of Article  I of the GATT  1994 had been 
initially adopted by the General Council in 1999 and then the waiver's validity was extended in 2009 
until 30  June 2019. Ch ina recognized that , under this waiver, some developing Members, although 
themselves facing capacity and resource constrain ts, were currently implementing preferential tariff 
access schemes for LDCs. For example, China had granted duty -free treatment to 97 % of tariff lines 
originating from all LDCs that enjoyed diplomatic relations with China. China believed that these 
preferential tariff access schemes provided by developing Members had promoted market access 
opportunities for LDCs and had also improved LDC  participation in global trade. According to 
UNCTAD  trade data, LDC  exports to most of the preference -granting developing Members had 
increased considerably. In general, developing Members ' share in total LDC  exports had increased 
from 35% in 1 999 to 55% in 2017. Meanwhile, LDCs still experienced vulnerability and special 
structural difficulties in the world economy. China believed that the exceptional circumstances that 
justified the initial granting of the LDC  waiver continued to exist; theref ore, it remained essential to 
extend the waiver as a legal instrument so that developing Members could continue to implement 
their preferential treatment, and more developing Members could also be encouraged to grant such 
treatment to LDCs. For these reaso ns, China, together with its co-sponsors, sought the extension of 
the LDC waiver for a further 10  years, from 1  July 2019 until 30  June 2029. China hoped that the 
CTG would approve this waiver extension request and then submit it to the General Council for  
adoption.  
4.3.  The delegate of Chile supported the statement made by China on the reasoning behind the co -
sponsorship of this document. For Chile, this was a highly important issue, looking to support the 
development of LDCs through their integration in to international trade. For this reason, Chile hoped 
that Members would agree on the extension of the waiver decision from 31  July 2019, as indicated 
in document  G/C/W/764.  
4.4.  The delegate of India supported the statement s made by previous speakers. India recalled t hat 
addressing the developmental concerns of LDCs through the grant ing of targeted preferential market 
access had been one of the underlying principles of the WTO , and that both the GATT and the 
Enabling Clause had always encouraged the granting of greater concessions to LDCs. In this regard, 
India acknowledged that the focus on this issue over two  decades , and the increasing efforts of the 
WTO Membership , had been noteworthy. The Ministerial Declaration on the Duty -Free Quota -Free 
(DFQF) Access for all LDCs was one such momentous decision , adopted by WTO  Members at the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Conference , in 2005. Over the last few years, developing countries had been 
increasingly finding the means within their own developmental imperatives to meet the requirements 
of the LDCs and to grant them meaningful concessions. India had announced its Duty -Free Tariff 
Preference Scheme for LDCs in April  2008, providing duty free and preferential treatment to LDCs 
on 98.4% of India's tariff lines. India believed that , given the constraints on several developing 
countries, this proposal was certainly a positive development. Given the right environment and 
enabling provisions, these developing countries, which were yet to provide tariff preferences to LDCs, 
could be encouraged to enhance their efforts  to do so . India noted that , to provide the enabling legal 
basis, developing country Members had been seeking an extension to this waive r every 10  years , 
since 1999 , to extend the Ministerial Decision granting a waiver under Article  IX of the 
WTO Agreement to developing countries providing preferential tariff access to LDCs. The most recent 
extension had been granted in 2009 and was valid until 30 June 2019. India believed that , through 
the proposed Decision to extend the waiver for a further period of 10  years, Members would be 
creating a stable and predictable legal basis on which developing countries could continue to 
implement their preferential tariff schemes for LDCs on a generalized, non -reciprocal , and 
non-discriminatory basis. For India, it was in this context  that the proposed waiver extension was 
important. India looked forward to Members giving their complete support and approval for the 
proposal so that it could be considered by the General Council at its meeting of 23  July 2019.  
4.5.  The delegate of  Thailand  said that his country highly valued the preferential tariff treatment 
for LDCs designed to promote and enable LDCs to integrate more fully into the multilateral trading 
system. Since 2015, Thailand had extended the Duty -Free Quota -Free Scheme to LDCs under the 
unilateral non -reciprocal tariff preference scheme for LDCs. Under the scheme, the preferential tariff 
treatment had been granted to all LDCs classified as such by the United Nations. Customs duties 
and quota s, covering both agricultural and  industrial products , were exempted for nearly 
7,000  products, accounting for approximately 73% of all Thailand's tariff lines. Thailand was in the 
process of reviewing its DFQF  scheme concerning the list of products under the preferential tariff 
treatment  and rule s of origin in order to facilitate and support LDCs to utilize the scheme as efficiently  G/C/M/135  
 
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  as possible . Thailand was pleased to see that all LDCs had benefited from this scheme and would 
continue co -sponsor  it. 
4.6.  The delegate of Turkey , as a co -sponso r of this document, noted that , for LDCs, trade was the 
most meaningful path to wards  integration in to the global economy and ending poverty. However, 
due to certain structural difficulties on their side, LDCs faced specific problems integrating in to the 
world economy and harvesting the benefits of free trade. Like previous speakers, Turkey believed 
that t he recognition of these specific problems and, as stated in the chapeau of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, the ensuing need for positive efforts , were vital to the economic development of LDCs. 
In this regard , Turkey considered that this document was one  such eff ort, which would ensure the 
continuation of the necessary WTO legal basis for the provision of preferential tariff access schemes 
for LDCs by developing country WTO  Members . Like others, Turkey also called upon the Membership 
to support this waiver extensi on request so that the waiver would remain valid until 30  June 2029.  
4.7.  The delegate of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, emphasized that the matter of preferential 
tariff treatment granted to LDCs was crucial insofar as LDCs were far behind and their market share 
in global trade represented barely 1%. Chad welcomed the waiver for preferential tariff treatment 
for LDCs proposed by developing countries since it helped further the common objective of better 
integrating LDCs into the multilateral trading system a nd contributed to achieving sustainable 
development as indicated by the Sustainable Development Goals and in the Agenda  2030. The 
LDC Group expressed its sincere appreciation to Chile, China, India, Thailand,  and Turkey for 
presenting this communication ai med at extending the waiver for preferential tariff treatment for 
LDCs until 2029 and also thanked the WTO  Secretariat and the Chair for their support. Chad noted 
that it was obvious that these preferences were beneficial; since they had been implemented , in 
1999, LDC  exports to developing countries had increased by about 420% between 1999 and 2016, 
according to data provided by the WTO  Secretariat. In 2000, total LDC  exports to developing 
countries stood at about USD  15 billion. In 2016, this volume grew t o close to USD  79 billion, 
representing an increase of approximately 420% between 2000 and 2016. To this day, despite the 
progress made, the LDC  Group underscored that the conditions that had prevailed when this waiver 
was put into place were still valid, and that the contribution from LDCs to world trade in terms of 
market share remained very small. Given that the waiver was due to expire on 30  June 2019, the 
LDC Group had held informal consultations since April with developing and developed countries alike 
and with the support of the WTO  Secretariat and the CTG  Chair. The LDC  Group had also requested 
that this waiver be adopted sufficiently early, at a special CTG  session, to be followed by an 
extraordinary session of the General Council. The  LDC Group reiterated this request on 24  June 2019 
during informal consultations with certain developed and developing countries, the WTO  Secretariat , 
and the CTG  Chair. The LDC  Group expressed its concern over the waiver's expiration on 
30 June 2019 and o n the potential unknown consequences on the ground for their exporters. The 
LDC Group thus called for extraordinary sessions of the CTG and the General  Council before 30  June 
2019, specifically to approve the request by Chile, China, India, Thailand,  and T urkey. However, he 
explained that  consultations led by the Chair had revealed that certain delegations had stated a need 
to await instructions from their Capitals . The LDC  Group recalled that any interruption of the waiver 
would constitute an additional ba rrier in the process of integrating LDCs in to the multilateral trading 
system and would prevent developing countries from granting preferences to goods originating from 
LDCs, while developed countries granted preferential treatment without delay within the  framework 
of the WTO. The  LDC Group expressed its concern over any further delay  in the current context of 
uncertainty at the WTO. The preferential treatment granted to LDCs was an essential engine of 
growth and was conducive to the formulation and implem entation of policies aimed at reducing 
poverty, generating employment, accessing markets, protecting livelihoods, and providing basic 
health care and infrastructure to help LDCs to advance. The LDC  Group reiterated that their exports 
had increased over the  past years since the waiver had first been put in place, which in turn had 
improved the DFQF  market access provided by developing countries such as China. It was the 
LDC Group's wish that the LDCs not be left in a situation of uncertainty and without WTO  support in 
the matter of preferential treatment by developing countries now that the waiver had expired since 
30 June 2019. A lack of support for the waiver's extension would send a very bitter message to the 
poorest and weakest Members of the WTO and the LDC Group hoped that this would not be the case. 
He recalled that the WTO's founding principles were balance, fairness, transparency , and consensus. 
The LDC  Group was favourable to a consensual approach to resolving any issue within the WTO and 
to obtainin g balanced outcomes.  
4.8.  The delegate of  the Republic of Korea  believed that preferential treatment for LDCs could 
provide improved market access opportunities by enabling LDCs to participate in and derive benefit G/C/M/135  
 
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  from the multilateral trading system. In her delegation's view, the extension of the waiver for 
preferential tariff treatment was therefore essential. This new Decision would allow developing 
country Members to grant unilateral tariff preferences to LDCs ; for t his reason , Korea strongly 
supported the extension. Currently,  Members were required to renew the decision every 10  years . 
In conclusion, Korea encouraged Members to seek ways to make the waiver permanent in order to 
stabilize this treatment for LDCs.  
4.9.  The delegate of Nepal  shared the views expressed by Chad in its capacity as LDC  Group 
Coordinator. Nepal was appreciative of the fact that Brazil, Chile, China, India, Thailand,  and Turkey 
had taken the initiative of circulating  a communication regarding this request for the extension of 
the waiver for the preferential tariff treatment for LDCs , contained in document  G/C/W/764. Nepal 
also thanked China, Chile, India, Thailand, Turkey, and the Republic of Korea for their statements, 
as well as the Chair for his consultation s with several Members from developed, developing , and 
least developed countries. Nepal recalled that the General Council decision adopted on 15  June 1999 
in this regard was a legal instrument that would allow developing country Members to gran t unilateral 
tariff preferences to least developed countries pursuant to a waiver under the provisions of 
Article  IX:3 of the WTO  Agreement. Nepal further noted that the 1999  waiver decision had been 
extended, as if automatically, until 2009 , and then again until 2019. Some developing country 
Members were currently implementing their preferential tariff schemes for LDCs under this waiver 
decision. Nepal emphasized the importance of noting that the economic and trade performance of 
most LDCs had not improved  and that the structural difficulty and vulnerability facing LDCs in the 
multilateral trading system had not changed. The integration of LDCs into the MTS required 
meaningful market access, and support for the diversification of the production and export base. 
Nepal recalled that the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the Declarations and Decisions that had 
been adopted at the Ministerial Conferences that had been held since then, had shown Members ' 
commitment to address ing the marginalization of LDCs in international trade and to improving their 
effective participation in the MTS. In conclusion , Nepal requested all WTO  Members to support the 
proposal for the extension of the LDC  waiver until 30  June 2029.  
4.10.   The delegate of Brazil  joined other Members in co -sponsoring this request to extend the 
waiver for preferential tariff treatment to LDCs, as Brazil had done when the waiver had last been 
extended. Brazil recognized that it was important that all Me mbers contributed to the trading system, 
especially regarding  those Members in greater need of support, namely the LDCs. Therefore, Brazil 
hoped that this request could count on the support of all Members and that Members could move 
forward expeditiously w ith the matter.  
4.11.   The delegate of Argentina  welcomed the waiver extension request. As pointed out by the 
proponents, the waiver in question provided a legal basis for the granting of preferential 
non-reciprocal tariff treatment to LDCs. Recognizing that Memb ers in this group faced particular 
realities and constraints, Argentina expressed its support for this initiative and conveyed its 
agreement for the extension of the waiver.  
4.12.   The delegate of Burkina Faso  thanked all the developing countries that had agreed to extend 
the waiver for preferential tariff treatment for LDCs. Burkina Faso hoped that all WTO  Members – 
both developing and developed countries – would strive to ensure that this provision be made 
effective at the meeting  itself. On the usefulness of th e waiver, Burkina Faso acknowledged that it 
demonstrate d the role played by international trade for LDCs, in that it allowed these countries to 
increase their exports and create wealth, which in turn allowed and would continue to allow 
thousands of people to find a route out of poverty. Burkina Faso requested that this waiver be 
renewed and even made permanent , and therefore predictable , so that, in the future, it might 
become an automatic procedure to wards  ensuring that LDCs could better integrate into the 
multilateral trading system.  
4.13.   The delegate of Uruguay , bearing in mind that LDCs faced particular vulnerabilities and 
structural difficulties, as had been recognized in previous Ministerial declarations and decisions, 
emphasized the importance of the waiver in meeting the needs of these Members and helping them 
to integrate more effectively into international trade, given that trade had been recogni zed as one 
of the pathways to development. Uruguay believed that, although the waiver was insufficient in 
itself, it had nevertheless proven to be an important instrument for enhancing LDC Member 
participation in international trade, in line with Sustainab le Development Goal  17.11 of the 
2030 Agenda. To that end, on the understanding that the conditions that gave rise to the waiver in 
2009 remain ed valid, Uruguay was in favour of extending it for an additional 10 -year period. Uruguay G/C/M/135  
 
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  emphasized that, beside s the need for compliance with each Member's internal procedures, it was 
also important to maintain the current conditions on the ground and to avoid potential trade 
disruptions. In this regard, Uruguay hoped that the formal aspects of the LDC  waiver renew al would 
be resolved without difficulty so that the necessary assurances could be given to enable those 
developing Members in a position to do so to continue applying their preferential treatment 
arrangements for LDCs on a continuous basis.  
4.14.   The delegate of  the European Union  considered it important that developing countries could 
grant preferential tariff treatment to products from LDCs. In her delegation's view, this was a useful 
contribution from developing countries in terms of the support for and econom ic development of 
LDCs, and it closed a gap in the Enabling Clause. Therefore, the European Union expressed its 
support for the extension of the waiver as of 1  July 2019, as mentioned in the proposed decision. 
However, she noted that the request for extens ion had been introduced fairly late , as it had been 
circulated only on 14  June 2019, and the  EU needed to complete its internal procedures before 
joining the consensus on the formal adoption of the relevant decision at the level of the General 
Council. For this reason , the EU therefore requested the CTG to forward the draft Decision once its 
internal procedures had been finalized.  
4.15.   The delegate of Canada  expressed his delegation's full support for this waiver extension 
request. At the same time, Canada reminded Members of the document that had been circulated by 
the LDC  Group five  years before on challenges faced by LDCs in complying with preferential rules of 
origin under unilateral preference schemes. In Canada's view, this document was a good reference 
point for Members as they proceeded to implement these preferences and operated these preference 
schemes for LDCs.  
4.16.   The delegate of Japan  joined other speakers in expressing its support for the waiver extension 
request. However, J apan pointed to the lack of legal basis for this waiver starting from 1  July 2019 
until the date on which the draft decision would be adopted. Japan requested the proponents to 
avoid repeating such a situation in the future.  
4.17.   The delegate of Chad, on behalf  of the LDC Group, reiterated its gratitude to all of the 
delegations that had taken the floor, particularly Brazil , which had spoken as a co -sponsor of this 
proposal, as well as the EU, Canada, Uruguay, Argentina, and all the other Members that had given 
their support to this request for an extension to the LDC waiver. The LDC  Group believed that this 
waiver was a key instrument for promoting  LDC integration into the MTS, bearing in mind the fact 
that these countries were marginalized. Therefore, for the L DCs, this was very important, and they 
were grateful to all those delegations that had expressed their support for this proposal.  
4.18.   The delegate of Mali addressed all Members that had supported this proposal and underscored 
the need for such support because if Members could help LDCs to integrate into international trade, 
and if LDCs in this way received help to sell their goods, then they could at the same time address 
such issues as migration , given that people migrated because they lacked jobs and their children 
lacked food. Mali believed that no Member was pleased to witness the current problem of migration. 
Similarly, Mali also believed that it was an obligation to help LDCs.  
4.19.   The Chairperson  thanked del egations for their interventions and indicated that , based on 
Members' statement s, he understood that no Member objected to approving the waiver extension 
request. However, the delegation of the European Union had indicated that , due to the waiver 
extensio n request's late submission , it required additional time to complete its internal procedures 
before the draft Decision annexed to the request contained in document  G/C/W/764 could be sent 
to the General Council for adoption. He therefore proposed that the Council take note of the 
statements made and approve the request contained in document  G/C/W/764. Likewise, he 
proposed that the Council agree to send the draft decision to the General Council for adoption once 
the European Union had informed the Council, through the Secretariat, of the completion of its 
internal procedures.2 
4.20.   The Council so agreed . 
                                                
2 Following a communication from the European Union, dated 3  October  2019, indicating that it had 
finalized its internal procedures, the draft waiver decision contained in document  G/C/W/764 was forwarded to 
the General Council for adoption at its meeting of 15  October  2019. G/C/M/135  
 
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  5  UNITED STATES – REQUEST FOR A WAIVE R – CARIBBEAN BASIN ECO NOMIC RECOVERY 
ACT (CBERA AS AMENDE D) (G/C/W/765)  
5.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communica tion dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda.  
5.2.  The delegate of the United States  recalled that the US  trade preferences programmes for the 
Central American and Caribbean region  were initially launched in 1983 by the Caribbean Basin 
Economic Recovery Act (CBERA). Since its implementation, CBERA had continued to generate 
important benefits for beneficiary countries and territories. The expansion of benefits through 
enactment of su bsequent legislation had represented an important affirmation of the ongoing 
US commitment to economic development in the Caribbean Basin, by expanding duty -free access to 
the US  market for eligible goods. At present, 17  countries and territories received benefits under the 
program, namely: Antigua and Barbuda ; Aruba ; Bahamas ; Barbados ; Belize ; British Virgin Islands ; 
Curaçao ; Dominica ; Grenada ; Guyana ; Haiti; Jamaica ; Montserrat ; St Kitts and Nevis ; St Lucia; 
St Vincent and the Grenadines ; and Trinidad and Tobago. In 2018, US  imports under 
CBERA  preferences had increased by 9.1% over 2017, to USD  1.7 billion ; of that amount, energy -
related products had accounted for 31%, textiles and apparel for 56%, and agricultural products 
and processed food for 7.9%. The US sought a new waiver so that it could continue to provide these 
preferences to the countries and territories of the Caribbean. The waiver request included a revised 
termination date of 30  September  2025, which was the date on which certain preferences were 
scheduled to expire. The US was committed to working in partnership with its neighbours in the 
Caribbean to expand their economic opportunities and believed that the CBERA made a vital 
contribution to the ir efforts in this partnership  by creating opportunities to expand trade between 
the US and the Caribbean, thus promoting economic opportunity and growth in the region.  
5.3.  The delegate of Trinidad and Tobago , on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Group, 
thanked the US  delegation for its submission. She said that Members of the CARICOM  Group and 
the US enjoyed cordial relations and looked forward to the continuation and expansion of their 
mutually beneficial commercial interactions. The CARICOM  Group recognized the US  commitment to 
Caribbean basin economies by providing duty -free access to the US  market for a wide range of 
goods. Economic programmes of this nature had been described as a vital element in US  economic 
relations with its neighbours in the Caribbean. The Ca ribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), 
allowed for the granting of duty -free treatment for imports of eligible articles from beneficiary 
countries. The CARICOM  Group applauded the US  commitment to working with its partners in the 
Caribbean to expand economic opportunities through greater economic integration. The Caribbean 
countries were among the most vulnerable nations in terms of natural disasters , and while 
comprehensive solutions were needed from the international community to treat the harmful e ffects 
of these phenomena on trade, they appreciated the efforts of the US in using CBERA to help stabilize 
the region's economies. In the Caribbean,  the 2017  hurricane season had ushered in a record 
number of six  consecutive hurricanes , which had accounte d for USD  229 billion in damage, resulting 
in significant economic losses across the region. The 2010  earthquake in Haiti was another example 
of how natural disasters could decimate economies and curtail years of development efforts. The 
CARICOM  Group high lighted that an examination of the Twelfth  Report to Congress on the Operation 
of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), which had been prepared by the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) on 29  December  2017, clearly reveale d that 
beneficiary countries were actively using the preference provisions. The CARICOM  Group applauded 
US efforts to facilitate the economic development and export diversification of Caribbean economies 
and thanked the US for its commitment to the Caribbe an. For these reasons, the CARICOM  Group 
unequivocally supported the US  request to extend this waiver.  
5.4.  The delegate Trinidad and Tobago , on behalf of her own country , expressed support for the 
US request for a waiver extending the CBERA because it supporte d Trinidad and Tobago 's goals for 
export growth and diversification, which in turn had a positive impact  on other development goals , 
including economic transformation and poverty and unemployment reduction. Since the waiver's 
previous review , in 2015, Trinidad and Tobago had been the largest exporter to the US among the 
CBERA  beneficiary countries as a result of exports of methanol and  petroleum oils. Trinidad and 
Tobago accounted for 57% of total US  imports under CBERA in 2018. In addition, since 2015, the 
US had been Trinidad and Tobago 's largest export market. As such, CBERA had been very useful in 
supporting the export growth and di versification goals of Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago, 
in its commitment to fully meet each aspect of the eligibility criteria for the programme, had been 
making efforts to address any enforcement deficiency in relation to intellectual property r ights with G/C/M/135  
 
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  the US. Trinidad and Tobago 's relationship with the US had proven to be a vital part of the country 's 
overall trade , in that the US remained Trinidad and Tobago 's number  one import and export market 
over the period 2015  to 2018. Indeed, during t he period from 2015 to 2018, an average of 26% of 
Trinidad and Tobago 's exports had gone to the US , while an average of 52% of Trinidad and Tobago 's 
imports had come from the US, thereby indicating that the US had traditionally been the main source 
and des tination of Trinidad and Tobago 's trade , and that Trinidad and Tobago greatly benefitted 
from the CBERA  programme. Trinidad and Tobago recorded surplus trade balances with the US for 
2015 to 2018 , with minor changes in the composition of exports. Five  products which had maintained 
their position in the top  ten exports from 2015 to 2018 , were the following : Anhydrous Ammonia; 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG); other Crude Petroleum; Methanol; and Urea. Furthermore, Trinidad 
and Tobago had benefitted from the prefe rences under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act 
(CBTPA) , with over 200  companies exporting duty -free to the US in 2018. Trinidad and Tobago had 
significantly utilized the preferences received under the CBERA and CBTPA. In 2018, the country 's 
exports to the US had amounted to TT$16.3  billion , while imports had amounted to TT$12.5  billion. 
Trinidad and Tobago had also been the top participant in these programmes. She emphasized that, 
for these reasons , the renewal of the CBERA and CBTPA, and t he preferences received under these 
programmes, were of critical importance to Trinidad and Tobago. In a period in which Trinidad and 
Tobago had been facing falling oil prices and a resultant recession, trade with the US had represented 
a positive light in  an otherwise negative period, helping the country to earn valuable foreign 
currency . Trinidad and Tobago's recent experience had served to reinforce the vulnerability of small 
states with open economies. In this period of discussion of WTO  reform, it rais ed the importance of 
features that should be maintained, for the benefit of smaller, vulnerable economies. According to 
Trinidad and Tobago, the renewal of the waiver for the CBERA would positively impact upon the 
competitiveness of local products in the U S market , which would in turn give positive results for 
employment, wages , and other economic factors. In this light, Trinidad and Tobago joined other 
CARICOM  delegations in underscoring  the importance of the preferential access provided under 
CBERA to the  trade and economic development of the Caribbean Region. In conclusion, Trinidad and 
Tobago reiterated its support for the continuation of the CBERA  arrangement until 
30 September  2025 and encouraged WTO  Member s to support the US ' request for the waiver's 
renewal.  
5.5.  The delegate of Jamaica  aligned his delegation with the statement made by Trinidad and 
Tobago on behalf of  the CARICOM  Group  and thanked the US  delegation for its submission contained 
in document  G/C/W/765, reporting on CBERA and outlining the specific circumstances justifying the 
measure, as well as calling for a renewal of the waiver permitting the Act until 2025. Jamaica, like 
other Caribbean countries, had been a beneficiary of the CBERA since the CBERA's inception and 
continued to attach high importance to it. Jamaica especially valued the market opportunities 
provided under the CBERA, especially at a time when achieving sustained and robust private sector -
led growth and broad and sustained job  creation were among its high priorities. Jamaica was seeking 
to leverage the value of its global brand , not only to penetrate new markets, but also to expand 
exports to existing markets, such as the US  market , and to further integrate its economy into glo bal 
value chains. Against this background, he noted that any interruption in Jamaica's trade flows with 
the US under the CBERA would have a negative impact up on Jamaica's economy, particularly in 
terms of Jamaica's thrust towards increased exports, employm ent, and an ability to create jobs. 
Over the past five  years, approximately 43% of Jamaica 's total exports had entered the United 
States,  80% of which had been granted duty -free access under the CBERA. In 2017 , exports to the 
US had stood at USD  535 millio n, representing an increase of 9% over the value of exports for 2016, 
which had stood at USD 487 million. Exports had increased further in 2018 , by 8% , to 
USD 582 million. Therefore, between 2016 and 2018 alone, Jamaica 's overall exports to the US had 
increased by around USD  94 million. This highlighted the significant role that preferential 
arrangements, such as the CBERA, played in facilitating improved market access for small and 
vulnerable economies like that of Jamai ca. Of particular significance was the fact that the scope of 
coverage of the Act had facilitated the vibrant flow of trade in agricultural and manufactured products 
and had assisted with the diversification of Jamaica's exports to include non -traditional products, 
such as alcoholic beverages (excluding rum), sauces, yams, mineral fuels (excluding ethanol) , and 
baked products. In 2017, non -traditional exports had accounted for approximately 69% of Jamaica 's 
total exports to the US. Jamaica reaffirmed its ap preciation for the US  Government for its 
maintenance of the CBERA as a strong demonstration of its commitment to a partnership for trade 
and development with its Caribbean neighbours , and Jamaica  looked forward to a continued positive 
engagement with the U S in order to deepen their bilateral trade relations  still further , and to advance 
the objectives of the Act . In conclusion , Jamaica trusted that the Council would endorse the request G/C/M/135  
 
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  for the renewal of the CBERA  waiver, so that the waiver extension reques t could then be transmitted 
to the General Council for final approval.  
5.6.  The delegate of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines , on behalf of the Members of the Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), associated her delegation with the statement delivered  by 
Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of the CARICOM  Group . She stated that international trade did 
produce some winners , but often those that were unable to compete were left behind. OECS  member 
States believed that the foundational tenets of the rules -based system existed to secure the interest s 
of weaker Members and to ensure that a rising tide lifted all boats. In this context, Members were 
reminded that the Marrakesh Agreement recognized that relations in the field of trade were to be 
conducted with a view to raising living standards, ensuring full employment, realizing a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand , and expanding trade in goods and 
services. More importantly, the Marrakesh Agreement demanded that international trade lead to the 
optimal use of the world's resources, in accordance with the aim of sustainable development, and in 
a manner consistent wit h the needs and concerns of countries at different levels of economic 
development. It was against this backdrop that the OECS  member States welcomed the request for 
an extension of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. They further supported the propo sed 
waiver be ing granted through 30  September  2025 in order to provide stability and predictability in 
trade relations. OECS  member States noted that the United States remained the principal market 
for many Caribbean countries; a nd that the US  market was o ne on which tens of thousands of jobs 
depended. The extension of the waiver would therefore support economic diversification and 
improved social and economic conditions for participating member States. In the case of the OECS, 
all seven  members of the prot ocol establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States' 
Economic Union would benefit under the waiver. For OECS  member States, this proposed extension 
was particularly timely given the recent disruptions to trade between the beneficiary countries a nd 
the United States because of  the passage of recent catastrophic hurricanes. International trade must 
therefore be driven by development concerns. For these reasons, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
thanked the United States for its continuing support of  their bilateral trade relations, as established 
under the 1979  Enabling Clause, and looked forward to this waiver extension request receiving 
Members' positive support.  
5.7.  The delegation of Barbados  joined the statement made by Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of 
the CARICOM  Group. He recalled that the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, also known as 
the CBERA, had been implemented on 1  January  1984, a product of the Caribbean Basin initiative, 
which had been launched the previous year. The CBERA provided pr eferential access for specific 
goods that were being exported to the US from specific countries of Central America and the 
Caribbean. This provision had then been amended and expanded through the United States -
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).  In this regard, Barbados underscored the critical 
role that trade had played in poverty alleviation and job creation, noting that  nobody disagree d that 
trade could be an engine for development and an important driver of sustained economic growth. 
The CBERA was instituted to assist the nations of the Caribbean, like Barbados, along the path to 
development by creating market opportunities for their goods and in turn expand ing their 
manufacturing sector. Barbados was a small open economy with limited prod uction capacity,  and 
statistics had shown that , during the period 2009 -2018, on average, 60% of Barbados' exports to 
the US had entered the US under this programme. According to his delegation, the preferential 
access accorded to Barbadian goods had increa sed the ir ability to compete in the US  market and at 
the same time had allowed the ir local industries to grow. Barbadian exports under the CBERA also 
accounted for 10% of Barbados ' total exports, which consisted of goods representing the major 
exported pro ducts to any market, including Barbados Rum, a significant source of export revenue. 
In conclusion, Barbados considered  that the CBERA continued to be economically beneficial . 
Barbados supported the request submitted by the US to extend the waiver of the CBERA through 
30 September  2025 and encouraged WTO  Members to provide their support.  
5.8.  The delegate of Haiti joined the statement made by Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of the 
CARICOM  Group . Haiti believed that this Act constituted one of the sources of export s and 
employment in Haiti as more than 80% of Haiti's exports in textiles went to the US  market. Haiti 
reiterated its recognition and gratitude to the US and supported this request ; it should be accepted.  
5.9.  The delegate of the European Union  supported the ex tension of this waiver. As mentioned in 
connection with the request for a waiver extension under the previous agenda item, due to its 
internal procedures, the EU requested the CTG to forward the draft Decision once the EU's internal 
procedures had been  finalized.  G/C/M/135  
 
- 15 - 
 
  5.10.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and indicated that , based on the 
statements that had been made by delegations , he had understood that there was no objection to 
the approval of the request for the extension of the wai ver. However, the delegation of the European 
Union had indicated that it required additional time to complete its internal procedures before the 
draft decision annexed to the request contained in document  G/C/W/765 could be sent to the 
General Council for adoption. He therefore proposed that the Council take note of the statements 
made and approve the request contained in document  G/C/W/765. Likewise, he proposed that the 
Council agree to send the draft decision to the General Council for adoption once the European Union 
had informed the Council, through the Secretariat, of the completion of its internal procedures.3 
5.11.   The Council so agreed . 
6  SWITZERLAND –LIECHTEN STEIN – NEGOTIATIONS  UNDER ARTICLE  XXVIII:5 OF 
GATT 1994 (G/L/1262/ADD.1 ) 
6.1.  The Chairperson  recalled t hat, at the Council's previous meeting, the delegation of Switzerland, 
on its own behalf and on behalf of Liechtenstein, had requested, under agenda item "Other 
Business", the circulation of document  G/L/1262/Add.1 , concerning the extension of the period f or 
Members' withdrawal of concessions in relation to the modification of the tariff line relating to "meat 
not further prepared than seasoned" in Schedule  LIX – Switzerland and Liechtenstein. In that 
document, Switzerland and Liechtenstein had indicated th at they would not assert that the 
WTO Members that had  submitted a claim under Article  XXVIII of the GATT  1994 were precluded 
from withdrawing substantially equivalent concessions under Article  XXVIII:3 because this 
withdrawal had occurred later than six  months after Switzerland and Liechtenstein's withdrawal of 
concessions ( namely, 4 April 2018), provided that the claiming WTO  Member withdrew concessions 
no later than 24  months after Switzerland and Liechtenstein's modification of those concessions 
(namely,  until 4  April 2020). In this regard, the Chairperson reminded Members that, at its meeting 
of 12 -13 November  2018, the Council had granted a similar extension to Switze rland and 
Liechtenstein.  
6.2.  The delegate of Switzerland  stated that, as mentioned at the Council's April 2019 meeting, 
negotiations and consultations pursuant to GATT  Article  XXVIII for simply seasoned meat had 
continued with the Members concerned. As the dea dline for the withdrawal of concessions had 
expired on 4  April 2019 and negotiations were still ongoing, Switzerland requested an extension of 
12 additional months, namely,  until 4  April 2020. Switzerland noted that significant progress had 
been made and h oped swiftly to conclude the negotiations and consultations under 
GATT  Article  XXVIII.  
6.3.  The Chairperson  suggested that the Council take note of the request made by Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein and agree to extend the deadline, as indicated in document  G/L/1262/Add.1, until 
4 April 2020.  
6.4.  The Council so agreed . 
7  MEASURES TO ALLOW GR ADUATED LDCS, WITH G NP BELOW USD  1,000, BENEFITS 
PURSUANT TO ANNEX  VII(B) OF THE AGREEM ENT ON SUBSIDIES AND  COUNTERVAILING 
MEASURES – REQUEST F ROM CHAD ON BEHALF O F THE LDC  GROUP (W T/GC/W/742 -
G/C/W/752)  
7.1.  The Chairperson  recalled that, at the Council's meetings of July and November  2018, and in 
April 2019, the delegations of the Central African Republic and Chad had introduced this matter on 
behalf of the LDCs. At those meetings, some delegations had requested additional information and 
clarification on certain aspects relating to this matter. Similarl y, at the Council's previous meeting, 
it had been agreed that this item would be discussed again at this meeting , if the LDCs so requested. 
In a communication dated 13  June 2019, the delegation of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, 
requested the Secretariat  again to include this item on the agenda.  
                                                
3 Following a communication from the European Union, dated 3  October  2019, indicating that it had 
finalized its internal procedures, the draft waiver decision contained in document  G/C/W/76 5 was forwarded to 
the General Council for adoption at its me eting of 15  October  2019.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  7.2.  The delegate of Chad, on behalf of the LDC  Group, recalled the essence and significance of this 
submission , which had been made in 2018 , and for which the LDC  Group sought a decision by the 
General Council. The LD C Group wished to ensure that the favourable treatment granted to 
developing countries within the framework of Annex  VII(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM  Agreement) applied also to graduating LDCs so long as their gross 
national product (GNP) per capita did not exceed USD  1,000 per year in 1990  USD. Furthermore, 
graduating LDCs should be able to benefit from the flexibilities contained in Article  27.2 of the 
above -mentioned Agreement so long as their GNP  per capita fell unde r USD  1,000 for 
three  consecutive years. The LDC  Group wished to ensure that the same conditions that applied to 
non-LDCs, as provided for in Article  10.4 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration on 
implementation -related issues and concerns, applied also to LD Cs that had graduated and been 
removed from the list under paragraph  (a) of Annex  VII. According to the LDC  Group, graduating 
LDCs should be listed under paragraph  (b) of Annex  VII, based on the above -mentioned criteria. He 
clarified that the sole purpose of this submission was to respond to a need expressed by their 
Ministers at the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference, and to enable a smooth economic transition for 
LDCs to their new status as developing countries . Therefore, the LDC  Group called upon 
WTO Members to adopt a decision along these lines at the next meeting of the General Council , in 
July 2019, and to thereby grant graduating LDCs the possibility of maintaining the existing 
flexibilities afforded to them under Annex  VII. 
7.3.  The delegate of the United States  reiterated that the specific need for this proposal remained 
unclear as there did not seem to be export subsidy program mes in place for which an extension 
might be needed. As such, the US continued to question the need to change the rules in this area.  
7.4.  The delegate of Nepal  associated her delegation with the statement delivered by Chad as the 
LDC Group Coordinator. Nepal reiterated that the LDC  proposal aimed to correct the missing 
information and technical error in the existing provision of Annex  VII(b) o f the SCM  Agreement. 
Nepal believed that if Members did not correct the missing information or technical oversight, they 
would be doing an injustice to graduating LDC  Members considering that several developing 
countries were evoking this flexibility time and again. Nepal emphasized that "graduation" itself was 
very challenging because graduating LDC  Members had to relinquish several international support 
mechanisms, including preferences and special treatments specific to LDCs. Nepal thanked those 
Members that had extended their support to the LDC  proposal and also recognized that certain 
Members had raised concerns in previous meetings about the list of beneficiary countries and the 
utilization of subsidies. Nepal noted that the list of beneficiaries depen ded upon their level of income 
and that the lists of such Members were updated by the WTO  Secretariat. If graduating countries 
had a GNP per capita of below USD 1000 in 1990  value, those graduating LDC s should be entitled 
to the flexibilities indicated under Annex  VII(b) of the SCM Agreement ; however, if  the income of a 
graduating LDC was higher than this threshold they were not entitled to use the se flexibilities. Nepal 
invited Members with further queries and concerns to share them with Nepal in written form.  
7.5.  The delegate of Turkey  thanked the LDC  Group for its proposal , which Turkey had already 
supported at previous Council meetings .4 Turkey encour aged Members to take the actions necessary 
to achieve the full integration of LDCs into the multilateral trading system , including assisting them 
to overcome any remaining challenges  in this regard . Turkey reiterated that graduated LDCs with a 
GNP below USD 1,000 should be granted the same rights as the developing countries listed in 
Annex  VII(b) of the SCM  Agreement.  
7.6.  The delegate of Bangladesh  associated his delegation with the statement made by Chad on 
behalf of the LDC  Group, Nepal,  and Turkey. According  to Bangladesh, the submission by the 
LDC Group  was self -explanatory and the LDC  coordinator had extensively narrated the context and 
background of the current proposal. Bangladesh also recalled that Members had previously discussed 
this issue on several f ormal and informal occasions, in Committee and at Council meetings. 
Bangladesh had always supported this proposal and reiterated its previous position. Article  27.2(a) 
of the SCM  Agreement, read with paragraph  10.1 of the Doha Ministerial Decision on 
Implementation -Related Issues  and Concerns , provided flexibilities to LDCs and countries with per 
capita of below USD 1,000 in constant 1990  dollar s listed in Annex  VII in providing export subsidies. 
In reading Anne x VII of the SCM  Agreement, Bangladesh did not clearly understand if a graduated 
LDC having per capita GNI below USD  1,000 in constant 1990  dollar terms would receive the same 
treatment available to developing country Members with GNI  per capita below USD  1,000 in 
                                                
4 Document  G/C/M/134, paragraph  8.17. G/C/M/135  
 
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  1990 US dollar terms under the same Annex  VII. Bangladesh reminded Members that when the 
SCM Agreement had been agreed upon, probably LDC  graduation had not been foreseen at all. 
However, there was now an aspiration among LDCs to meet the graduati on target and Bangladesh 
considered that it was the appropriate moment to address this missing element in Annex  VII through 
a decision by the General Council ; indeed, Bangladesh hoped that Members would realize the merit 
of the submission and work together  to address this missing element. Bangladesh clarified that the 
proposal did not envisage any new flexibility ; rather , it called for a decision to allow for the 
continuation of the same flexibilities as previously enjoyed if a graduated LDC fell within the criteria 
previously agreed upon by Members. This flexibility would not be extended to all graduated LDCs 
but only to those that fell within the agreed criteria at the time of graduation . Bangladesh further 
noted that it did not foresee that graduated LDCs, eligible for  this flexibility, would automatically use 
this exemption ; rather, they may resort to it only when necessary . Bangladesh believed that a 
positive recommendation by the CTG with a subsequent decision by the General Council would allow 
the Secretariat to calculate GNI  per capita for graduated LDCs for the year after their graduation 
during annual updates of the Annex  VII list. Bangladesh highlighted that this exercise could on ly be 
carried out after graduation as it was not possible to calculate GNI  per capita before graduation. 
Bangladesh had also noted that , at previous Council meetings, both formal and informal, many 
Members had acknowledged the logic and merit of this propo sal and had extended their unequivocal 
support to it, whereas only a few Members had sought further clarification regarding the impact of 
the proposal. Bangladesh therefore requested Members to reflect on the following three  points in 
order to take a decis ion going in the right direction: (i)  did Members agree that the proposed decision 
intended to address a missing element, which was not earlier  foreseen ; (ii) did Members agree that 
the proposed decision would not create any new flexibility for any Member; and (iii)  did Members 
agree that a graduated LDC deserved the same flexibility available to other developing countries 
with the same level of development. Bangladesh believed that , if the responses to the se questions 
were in the affirmative, then Members should accept the proposal positively. Bangladesh looked 
forward to working with Members  in this regard . 
7.7.  The delegate of India welcomed this agenda item from Chad,  on behalf of the LDC  Group , about 
deeming  newly graduated LDCs as Annex  VII(b) Member s until such time as they met the income 
criteria  for graduation from Annex  VII of  the WTO  SCM Agreement.  As stated at previous Council 
meetings, India reiterated its agreement with the principle that the Annex  VII income threshold for 
graduation should also be extended to newly graduated LDC  Members. India looked forward to 
extending its support to the finalization and adoption of the proposed decision.  
7.8.  The delegate of the European Union , as stated at the Council's previous meeting5, reiterated 
her delegat ion's support for constructive initiatives to better integrate LDCs into the multilateral 
trading system. The European Union encouraged discussion of this proposal – as any SDT  proposal 
– based on an analysis that showed where the specific problems were located . Members need ed to 
begin by assessing the actual use of export subsidies by LDCs in order to establish whether a 
transition period was needed that would allow graduated LDCs to continue using export subsidies. 
Unfortunately, Members had little knowledge of whether, or to what extent, LDCs used export or 
any other subsidies because many LDC  notifications under Article  25 of the SCM  Agreement were 
missing. The EU again encouraged the LDC  Group to work with the Secretariat to imp rove the 
situation on notifications and to tap into the possibilities of technical assistance that were available 
to this end. Reali zing that preparing first -time notifications could take time, the EU suggested that 
the LDC  Group help the debate by present ing anecdotal evidence of whether and how LDCs had 
made use of export subsidies and how that had helped their economic development. In addition, the 
EU suggested that the countries concerned also seek assistance for reshaping their export subsidies 
in orde r to make them WTO -compatible. The EU stood ready to engage in informal consultations 
with the LDC  Group in this regard . 
7.9.  The delegate of Canada  was mindful of the challenges faced by LDCs and of the need for 
flexibilities in the rules. Canada believed that  the agenda item relating to the extension of 
preferences from developing countries to LDCs was a good example of how WTO Members  had 
worked together to achieve that goal. Nonetheless, Canada emphasized that disciplines on export 
subsidies were core discip lines in the SCM  Agreement, and any additional flexibilities needed to be 
well-substantiated and needs -based. Canada recalled that the ultimate goal of the WTO was the 
elimination of such subsidies overall and that some of the questions raised by Canada an d others on 
this proposal remained unanswered  in this regard . For instance, clarification was required as 
                                                
5 Document  G/C/M/134, paragraph  8.15. G/C/M/135  
 
- 18 - 
 
  concerned which recently -graduated LDCs would benefit from this proposal ; clarification was  also 
required as to why this flexibility was needed. Canada was mindful that many LDC  Members had not 
notified any subsidy under Article 25 of the SCM  Agreement and considered that notifying existing 
subsidies would be an important step. Canada encouraged LDCs to engage with the Secretariat and 
other  Members with regard to technical assistance, if required. Canada also had questions concerning 
the proposal 's implementation . For example , Canada wondered how the absence of data on GNP per 
capita for certain LDC Members could be addressed. Canada was ava ilable to continue its 
engagement with the LDC  Group on these questions.  
7.10.   The delegate of Chad thanked those delegations that had expressed their support for the 
LDC request, as well as those that had indicated their objections to it. The LDC  Group had offe red 
explanations, had held bilateral consultations, had undertaken technical analyses, and had reached 
the conclusion that it had been a technical oversight. As explained by India, the threshold for 
graduating was provided in Annex  VII, whereas the list of  graduating LDCs was not. Therefore, 
according to the LDC  Group, what was at issue here was a matter just of justice, equity , and balance. 
He noted that Bangladesh and Nepal had underscored various relevant issues, and that these issues 
had been submitted to LDC  partners who, in turn, had said that the proposal had not been clear and 
who had questioned the need to modify the rules. Chad reaffirmed that the LDCs were not changing 
the rules; rather , they were simply recognizing that certain aspects were not currently covered by 
the rules. The LDC  Group emphasized that today's context had evolved as compared to the past and  
that, as a result, the current context needed to take into account things that had been overlooked 
in the past. The LDC  Group had examined  all the issues, had offered figures, and had offered 
technical analyses, to address these challenges ; it had also remained open and flexible. The 
LDC Group agreed to continue holding informal disc ussions with those delegations objecting to the 
proposal with the objective of reaching an understanding and encouraged Members with concerns 
or objections to clarify what exactly the y were and where the y were located . The LDC  Group believed 
that this was a matter of balance and equity , not of amending texts. In the LDC  Group, there were 
Members that were about to graduate from their LDC  status to become developing countries, such 
as Bangladesh, Vanuatu, Angola, and Nepal. The LDC  Group wished that, once these countries had 
graduated from LDC  status , they could still maintain a link with the developing countries listed under 
Annex  VII. The LDC  Group stood ready and willing to continue discussions with Members to this end 
but emphasized that this proposal was intended to be adopted by the General Council.  
7.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made, invited the 
LDCs to continue their discussions on this issue with other Members , and suggested that the Counci l 
revert to this issue at its next meeting , if the LDCs request ed it to do so . 
7.12.   The Council so agreed . 
8  EUROPEAN UNION – IMPLEMENTATION OF NON -TARIFF BARRIERS ON AG RICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM ARGENTINA, AUSTR ALIA, BRAZIL, CANADA , COLOMBIA, 
COSTA RICA,  CÔTE D 'IVOIRE, DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, GUATEMALA, 
HONDURAS, MALAYSIA, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, P ARAGUAY, PERU, UNITE D STATES, AND 
URUGUAY  
8.1.  The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of Australia, Brazil, Ca nada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Malaysia, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States,  and Uruguay had requested the Secretariat 
to include this issue on the agenda. After the agenda's circulation, and at the beginning of the 
meetin g, the delegations of Argentina, C ôte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua 
requested to be added to the list of proponents. Likewise, the Chairperson informed the Council that, 
on 4 July 2019, the proponents had requested the Secretariat to circ ulate a joint communication, 
which had been distributed to all Members in document  G/C/W/767  and its addendum . The unofficial 
translation of the communication in Spanish and French , as provided by the proponents , had also 
been distributed to all delegation s at their request.  
8.2.  The delegate of Colombia , on behalf of the co -sponsors, stated that , in order to face the 
challenge of producing more food in a safer and sustainable way, farmers must be able to access 
the full range of safe tools and technologies that  were available for agricultural production. Yet the 
farmers' choice of safe tools was increasingly undermined by regulatory barriers that were not 
founded on internationally agreed risk -analysis principles and did not take into account alternative 
approac hes to meeting regulatory objectives. The proponents believed that this was already having G/C/M/135  
 
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  a substantial negative impact on the production and trade of safe food and agricultural products, an 
impact that was likely to increase in the future. The proponents  raised concerns in the CTG because 
the EU had begun to implement measures that effectively prohibited the use of a number of 
substances that were required for safe and sustainable agricultural production and had been 
assessed and authorized for use by man y WTO  Members. The proponents stressed that the EU had 
moved forward with the implementation of its measures, which were first enacted in 2009, even 
though other Members had, over the years, repeatedly expressed concerns in the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary ( SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)  Committees regarding the overly 
restrictive impact of these measures on the trade in agricultural goods. The co -sponsors believed in 
protecting human health and facilitating trade, both goals recognized under the WTO  Agreements. 
To ensure a balanced approach, the international community had determined standards that follow ed 
the principle of evidence and science -based risk assessments, allowing WTO  Members to achieve an 
appropriate level of protection, while at  the same time ensuring that such measures were not more 
trade -restrictive than necessary. However, the proponents believed that the EU was diverging from 
those standards by incorporating a hazard -based approach to the approval and renewal of plant 
protect ion product authorizations for certain substances. In their view, this was creating a high 
degree of uncertainty with regard to how import tolerances would be considered and set for 
authorization in the EU. Despite repeated requests in the TBT and SPS  Comm ittees over the past 
four years, they considered that the EU had not identified either the level of protection being sought 
or the specific pathways of exposure or risks that it sought to mitigate, to justify the trade impact 
of these restrictions. In the proponents' view, the EU had not taken into consideration the comments 
of other WTO  Members on draft regulations and it had also ignored requests to complete science -
based risk assessments before the implementation of these measures , to take into account r isk 
assessment techniques developed by international organizations , and to articulate how risks would 
be assessed. In addition, the proponents believed that the EU had not clarified, despite multiple 
requests to do so, how it intended to consider applicati ons for import tolerances for those substances 
that were being assessed following hazard -based criteria. In implementing these measures, it 
appeared that the EU was unilaterally attempting to impose its own domestic regulatory approach 
onto its trading par tners. As a result, the proponents believed that the EU was effectively prohibiting 
the use of critical tools to manage pests and resistance, while damaging the livelihood of farmers 
beyond its borders, especially those in developing countries and LDCs. Ag ricultural production varied 
by region and what worked in Europe might not be appropriate in other climates and regions. The 
EU's insistence that farmers around the world would find alternatives rang hollow for many of the 
EU's trading partners who knew that, in most cases, viable alternatives simply did not exist or in 
fact might carry higher risks than the substances effectively banned by the EU. In addition, most 
Members that used these substances did not have the capacity to develop viable and economica lly 
feasible alternatives to use in their production systems. Even if those alternatives were to be 
developed elsewhere, the process for registration and approval would take more time than the grace 
period established by the EU. In addition, the EU had not  even considered Members' requests for 
additional transition periods in order to adapt to these regulations. The EU's implementation of these 
measures was already having an impact upon global agricultural production and trade in key 
products such as banana s, grapes, cereals , and tree nuts. The proponents stressed that this 
disruption threatened to escalate significantly in the coming years if the EU did not change its current 
approach. The EU's implementation of these measures would disproportionately affec t farmers in 
developing countries and LDCs, and the livelihood of millions of families whose income and 
sustenance depended on agriculture. This, in turn, would also affect Members' ability to achieve 
goals relating to food security and sustainable develop ment. Therefore, the proponents asked the 
EU to re -evaluate its hazard -based approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection product 
authorizations; to confirm that import tolerances would continue to be established based on 
internationally accept ed approaches for risk assessment; and to cease to implement those measures 
that unnecessarily and inappropriately restricted international trade. The proponents urged the EU 
to provide additional information on the process and timelines to set import tole rances for active 
substances that were not re -authorized in the EU, as well as applicable transition periods for 
Maximum Residue Levels ( MRLs). Additionally, the proponents strongly encouraged the EU to 
establish a transparent, predictable , and commerciall y viable import tolerance process for plant 
protection products that had not been re -approved that included a risk assessment, taking into 
account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international organizations. Finally, 
the proponents enc ouraged the EU to engage meaningfully with its trading partners on this issue.  
8.3.  The delegate of Colombia , on behalf of his own delegation , added some points of national 
interest. Colombia was the fifth  largest banana exporter in the world, reaching a produc tion of 
2 million ton nes of fruit in 2018 and exports worth USD  866 million in the same year, representing G/C/M/135  
 
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  the third  line of Colombia's agricultural exports, after coffee and flowers. 80% of these exports went 
to the European Union, mainly to Belgium, Germ any, Spain,  and the Netherlands. Banana producers 
were important generators of employment and development, especially benefiting remote areas of 
the Colombian geography where armed conflict had taken place. The sector generated approximately 
178 thousand j obs (39  thousand direct and 138  thousand indirect  jobs). For some time, and as 
Colombia had reported on different occasions at the WTO and bilaterally, Colombia had seen how 
bananas and other products , such as citrus fruits, mango, green banana, melons , and watermelons , 
were being affected by recent EU  measures relating to MRLs. To take only  bananas  as an example , 
the use of a series of necessary substances in the entire production chain was being banne d in 
practice, such as the buprofezin, chlorothalonil, and imazalil molecules. Without these substances, 
export of Colombian bananas into the European market would be practically impossible. This series 
of measures, in addition to those already described i n the joint declaration, undermined the 
multilateral trading system, leaving aside the principle of predictability. Through stability and 
predictability investments were encouraged, jobs were created, and consumers benefitted. However, 
thousands of small p roducers were in this case risking losing their livelihoods in a sector that had 
been characterized by its search for environmental sustainability and for complying with the highest 
international standards. Colombia hoped that the concerns of a significant  and representative 
number of WTO  Members would be addressed by the EU and that the EU would deepen its interaction 
with its business partners interested in this matter.  
8.4.  The delegate of Brazil  stated that his delegation and the other co -sponsors had decide d to bring 
this issue to the CTG because they believed that the EU decision to implement measures prohibiting 
the use of substances required for safe and sustainable agricultural production was to be regretted 
and avoided as it jeopardized the balance of r ights and obligations under the SPS  Agreement. Brazil 
believed in a balanced approach, one that protected human, animal and plant life or health and that, 
at the same time, facilitated trade, both goals recognized under the WTO  Agreements. In order to 
fulfil these objectives, Members should abide by Article  2.3 of the SPS  Agreement, which provided 
that the adoption of measures should  not be applied in a manner that constituted a disguised 
restriction on international trade. Members should also follow Articl e 2 of the SPS  Agreement, in 
which it was established that SPS  measures were to be applied only to the extent necessary to 
protect human, animal, plant life or health, and based on scientific principles. Brazil believed that 
WTO Members should not implemen t measures based on political decisions that did not observe and 
follow the standards based on the principle of evidence and science -based risk assessments 
established by the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, as well as othe r 
organizations recognized by the SPS  Agreement. He noted that the adoption of Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement as a rule rather than as an exception increased uncertainty in international trade 
and jeopardized trade flows. Even more seriously, this behavio ur could undermine the cornerstones 
of the agreed multilateral trading rules. Brazil believed that the EU  measures were already having a 
substantial negative impact upon the production of and trade in safe food and agricultural products, 
an impact t hat was likely to increase. Should the implementation of these policies continue, they 
would disproportionately affect farmers in developing countries and LDCs and the livelihood s of 
millions of families whose income and sustenance depended on agriculture.  In the case of Brazil, the 
sustainability of many production structures was under threat, such as  for soya beans, citric, coffee, 
wheat, banana, and papaya, which were important source s of income for large sectors of Brazil's 
population. Despite Brazil's repeated concerns in the TBT and SPS  Committees over the past 
four years, the EU had moved ahead with the implementation of such unilateral and discretionary 
measures at the expense of other WTO  Members. This situation could no longer continue. The paper 
that Brazil had co-sponsored with its trading partners underscored that this issue was not merely 
technical or legal. In Brazil's view, the EU 's current regulatory barriers posed concrete risks to the 
production of food in a safer and sustainable way in man y regions of the world, since it prohibited 
the use of critical state of the art technologies and tools to manage pests and resistance. 
Nevertheless, the Brazilian government was confident that the trade disciplines of the trade deal 
recently signed betwee n the EU and MERCOSUR would stimulate the European bloc to meet the 
commitments embodied in paragraph  8 of the Joint Declaration. Brazil encouraged the EU to 
establish and implement transparent and predictable policies regarding SPS that were in line with 
international ly agreed and recognized standards so as not to restrict international trade 
unnecessarily and inappropriately, and nor to affect WTO  Members' ability to achieve goals relating 
to food security and sustainable development.  
8.5.  The delegate of Panama thanked the co -sponsors for their interventions. Panama continued to 
follow with great concern the measures taken by the European Union that went beyond international 
guidelines, and which had been taken without investigation or substantiated justificat ion, as required G/C/M/135  
 
- 21 - 
 
  under the WTO  TBT and SPS  Agreements. From the beginning, Panama had raised its concerns in 
the SPS and TBT  Committees and it had also been a signatory to the 2017  Buenos Aires Ministerial 
Declaration on Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs) and t he more recent Antigua Declaration presented  
in Brussels. Panama believed that , while each WTO Member was free to take any precautions 
necessary for the safety of its citizens, such measures should not affect trade more than was 
necessary in order to achieve its permissible goals. For this reason, there were international 
standards , to which most Members adhered. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) Codex Alimentar ius and the World Health Organization (WHO) were recognized internationally  
by WTO  Members as setting the standards for world food security and the promotion of fair trade. 
Panama believed that any Member that wished  to apply more stringent practices to th ese standards 
must provide substantial justifications, alternatives to these measures, and due adaptation times. 
The EU's decision to remove products from the market or to limit the maximum levels of these 
agents to 0.01, which were essentially undetectabl e traces, amounted to prohibiting their use. 
Panama considered that measures taken with regard to the agents buprofezin, chlorothalonil, and 
picoxystrobin, among  others of national use, could disrupt trade with the EU and cause significant 
losses to sector s such as the banana  sector . At the same time , it would generate a negative impact 
on the well -being and work of thousands of families of the indigenous Ng äbe-Buglé people , who 
were the main workers in  the banana plantations of Changuinola and Puerto Armue lles. In 2017, 
agricultural exports from  Panama to the European Union were about USD  200 million dollars, with 
banana being the most important export. Panama applied the levels recommended by Codex 
Alimentarius  for these agents and these levels were also meticulously monitored by national 
authorities. Substances such as chlorothalonil were essential tools for fighting plant diseases such 
as black sigatoka that had proliferated because of global warming. Panama believe d that the a bsence 
of mechanisms to protect the challenges of the tropics could lead to significant losses in food 
production or require additional spaces to plant, putting tropical forests and global biodiversity at 
risk. As in previous interventions in other Committ ees, Panama called upon the EU to establish 
technical discussions with the affected Members. Panama also asked the EU to reconsider taking a 
risk analysis approach to adopt ing measures that did not go beyond international standards and 
scientific studies t hat supported and justified decisions, without forgetting the importance of 
adaptation times and supporting Members with possible substitutes for these products.  
8.6.  The delegate of Costa Rica  stated that his delegation was a co -sponsor of this agenda item and  
of the joint communication presented by Colombia. In addition to what had been indicated in that 
communication, Costa Rica believed that it was appropriate to highlight some specific issues 
surrounding its concerns. Costa Rica had brought this matter to t he attention of the CTG faced with 
the threat posed by EU  implementation of a set of phytosanitary measures that directly jeopardized 
the capacity of local agricultural producers and exporters to combat pests and diseases that affected 
crops in tropical cl imates. Costa Rica had expressed its concerns to the European Union on several 
occasions, both at the bilateral, regional , and multilateral levels, and in the context of the growing 
number of concerns raised in the SPS and TBT  Committees. However, to date Costa Rica had not 
received a satisfactory response from the European Union, which had decided to pursue its current 
approach regardless of its impact on food safety at the global level and on the most vulnerable 
populations in developing countries. In pas t years, Costa Rica had observed with concern the 
systematic reduction of MRLs by the European Union regarding a range of substances required for 
insect and pest control in tropical climates. These reductions often deviated from the tolerance  levels  
establ ished by the international community in the Codex Alimentarius, and thus ran counter to the 
objective of trade facilitation and harmonization that governed international trade commitments 
agreed at the multilateral level. Costa Rica believed that the imple mentation of these MRLs tended 
to be based on risks for which no conclusive results had been obtained and for which doubts existed 
as to the validity of toxicological studies and dietary dosage. In spite of these significant constraints, 
the European Union  had maintained the non -renewal of certain substances, clearly in pursuit of a 
hazard -based rather than risk -based approach . In addition to the doubts surrounding the scientific 
basis for these reductions, production realities also needed to be considered,  as well as the possibility 
for farmers to substitute their use of these substances with others that complied with national 
registers and were permitted for trade with the EU. Users of these substances were generally 
producers and exporters in developing c ountries , who did not necessarily have the technical capacity 
to develop new molecules or the institutional capacity to conduct their own scientific studies to 
establish across -the-board measures relating to MRLs. In Costa Rica's view, the non -renewal and 
the consequent reduction of MRLs for many of these substances would cause serious problems for 
the agricultural sector of tropical countries, including Costa Rica. There existed a limited supply of 
duly registered substances that would enable an appropriat e rotation for pest -control in fields, which 
was why the few that did exist were crucial for reducing the possibility of developing G/C/M/135  
 
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  cross-resistance, as was the case for the banana crop. The production of bananas in Costa Rica 
generated sales worth about U SD 1 billion annually, representing close to 2% of GDP and 38.6% of 
agricultural GDP. The sector generated 40,000  direct jobs and close to 100,000  indirect jobs, mostly 
in underdeveloped rural areas that were highly vulnerable to climate change. The main e xport 
destination was precisely the European Union, where over 50% of the crop was sent. Regrettably, 
Costa Rican producers were already starting to feel the effects of the change in EU  regulations as 
they were limited in the substances they could use for the control of pests, such as black sigatoka. 
At this time, it would be impossible for agricultural production to adapt to new requirements and 
tolerance in the time -frames provided by the EU, when only the registration of new molecules must 
undergo a comp lex evaluation lasting much longer than this time -limit. In this regard, on several 
occasions Costa Rica had urged the European Union to consider extending the deadline for 
compliance with the new tolerance for substances required for production in tropica l regions, and to 
begin a dialogue with countries that export ed agricultural products that were deeply affected by 
amendments to the MRLs. Regrettably, Costa Rica's requests had not been met with a favourable 
consideration. Nevertheless, Costa Rica once more urged the European Union: (i)  to apply the MRLs 
established in the Codex Alimentarius as the leading global reference for their standardization. In 
cases where conclusive scientific evidence existed that would indicate that tolerance for a given 
substance should be reduced, this process should take place within the  context of the Codex 
Alimentarius through the coordinated work of the international community, and to the benefit of 
trade harmonization and facilitation; (ii)  to conduct a risk assessment for each substance and specific 
product in accordance with the EU' s multilateral commitments, such that each amendment of the 
MRLs was based on conclusive scientific evidence and enabled the application of less trade -restrictive 
measures; and (iii)  to set transition periods for the application of new MRLs of at least 24  months 
with a view to ensuring that the agricultural sectors of exporting countries could conduct the 
necessary studies for identifying alternative substances that complied with the same level of 
protection, whose  use was permitted in the EU, and that coul d be duly registered in exporting 
countries with a sufficient time between harvests for their use.  
8.7.  The delegate of Nicaragua  shared the views of the other co-sponsors. In its national legislation, 
Nicaragua recognized the important technical role played by  international standardization 
organizations in the management of national food control system s, which had made it possible to 
achieve an appropriate level of protection, guaranteeing that Nicaragua's measures were not more 
trade -restricting than necessary , an essential condition for progress towards fairer and more 
transparent trade. Nicaragua noted with concern the MRLs policy implemented by the European 
Union for agricultural products, which affected Nicaragua's principal exports such as bananas, among 
others. In Nicaragua's  view, this would have a direct impact on the household and cooperative 
economy of Nicaraguan producers, affecting the livelihoods of  thousands of rural families whose 
income depended on agriculture. While Nicaragua shared the objectiv e of guaranteeing food safety, 
each Member, in accordance with its obligations, should ensure that this objective was aligned with 
the provisions of the Codex Alimentarius, as the international organization recognized by all Members 
for its work and its sc ientific rigour in the area of food safety. Considering the potential impact that 
this policy could have on the global flow of food trade and on interregional trade, Nicaragua urged 
the European Union: (i)  to reconsider its hazard -based approach and risk a ssessment so as to ensure 
that any modification of MRLs be based on scientific evidence; (ii)  to give consideration to longer 
transition periods for agricultural and export sectors; and (iii)  to base such efforts on the coordinated 
work of the internationa l community, through the Codex Alimentarius.  
8.8.  The delegate of Dominica n Republic  reiterated his delegation's interest in participating as a co -
sponsor under this item. For the Dominican Republic, the impact of these measures on trade in 
agricultural product s, particular ly in developing countries that had no alternatives, was a matter of 
the utmost concern. The Dominican Republic confirmed its interest in the adoption by the EU only 
of measures that were not trade -restricting and that were underpinned by scie ntific analysis and 
evaluation prior to their implementation.  
8.9.  The delegate of  Côte d'Ivoire  thanked those Members that had registered this important issue 
on the CTG 's agenda. Given the structure of Côte d'Ivoire's economy, largely dominated by 
agro-indust ry and agricultural products, Côte d'Ivoire expressed its support for the statement made 
by Colombia with regard to the implementation of non -tariff measures targeting agricultural products 
implemented by the European Union, of which Côte d'Ivoire was a co -sponsor. Côte d'Ivoire was 
deeply concerned by the implementation of these measures, especially  given that Côte d'Ivoire had 
been the largest producer and exporter of bananas in Africa to the European Union since 2016. In 
his delegation's view, the measures taken by the European Union would undoubtedly affect the G/C/M/135  
 
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  terms of trade between Côte d'Ivoire  and the European Union. For that reason, Cote d'Ivoire asked 
the European Union to respect the MRLs of pesticides fixed by the Codex Alimentarius. C ôte d'Ivoire 
indicated that it also endorsed the statement that would be made by Jamaica on behalf of the 
ACP Group.  
8.10.   The delegate of Canada  thanked the co -sponsors for bringing the statement on the 
implementation of non -tariff barriers by the EU on agricultural products to the attention of the 
Council. As a co -signatory, Canada strongly supported the concerns n oted within the statement. 
Canada had previously raised its concerns on the EU 's approach to the regulation of plant protection 
products in the WTO  SPS and TBT  Committees, and other international fora, on multiple occasions. 
The statement highlighted Membe rs' shared concerns regarding the lack of transparency and 
predictability in the EU 's approach to approval and renewal of plant protection product 
authorizations, and the impact that this was having on trade in food. Canada noted that multiple 
requests see king clarification, justification , and additional details from the EU had not been 
addressed to the satisfaction of Members. Canada recognized the right of Members to adopt 
measures to achieve legitimate objectives. However, such measures needed to be impl emented in 
a manner consistent with the principles and obligations of the WTO  Agreements. In Canada's view, 
the EU 's hazard -based approach to regulating certain plant protection products and the lack of clarity 
on how an import tolerance would be set for a n active substance falling under the cut -off criteria, 
was causing a high degree of uncertainty and risk for exporters wishing to maintain access to the 
EU, which prevented producers in Canada and around the world from using important plant 
protection tool s on commodities destined for the EU  market. Moreover, Canada maintained that it 
also unfairly stigmatized agriculture and food exports from Canada and other countries where food 
production was subject to rigorous oversight and the utmost consideration for  human, animal and 
plant health. Non -renewal decisions of plant protection products under the EU 's hazard -based 
approach were now translating into a real impact upon trade as MRLs for plant protection products 
were being revoked. Canada considered that it was troubling that a growing number of plant 
protection products were not being renewed in the EU, even though  many of them had been assessed 
and were registered for use in a large number of countries around the world. In Canada 's view, due 
consideration m ust be given to the mitigation measures that were expected to be put in place to 
reduce the potential risks of dietary exposure to an acceptable level. From a trade -facilitation 
perspective, this was particularly true of import tolerances. Canada urged the  EU to provide its 
trading partners with confirmation that import tolerances for plant protection products that fell under 
the hazard -based cut -off criteria would be established on the basis of an assessment of risks 
conducted in accordance with internatio nal guidelines, and provide detailed information to clarify the 
process the EU would follow. Until such a clear and predictable process was implemented, Canada 
requested that import tolerances in the EU  for active substances that fell under the EU 's hazard -
based cut -off criteria be maintained at existing levels to allow trade to continue. Canada hoped that 
elevating the concerns contained in this statement to the CTG served as a clear indication of the 
importance many WTO  Members attributed to this issue . At the same time, he emphasized the need 
for the EU to provide sufficient information to reassure Members that it would avoid unnecessary 
trade disruptions by meeting its WTO  obligations with regard to import tolerances for active 
substances that fell under  the EU 's hazard -based cut -off criteria.  
8.11.   The delegate of Honduras  noted that her delegation was a co -sponsor of the joint statement , 
as Honduras was also concerned by this issue, which was an issue of public interest. Honduras was 
concerned by the fact tha t, in recent years, the European Union had been reducing MRLs on a series 
of agricultural chemical products and other substances that were fundamental to agricultural 
production, particularly for pest management and rotation in tropical countries. These reductions 
often moved away from the tolerances established by the international community in Codex 
Alimentarius, which ran contrary to the objectives of tr ade facilitation and harmonization that 
governed multilaterally agreed upon international trade obligations. Given the budgetary and 
institutional limitations faced by Honduras for the generation of its own scientific studies, which 
would allow the establi shment of measures relating to MRLs in a generalized way, Honduras' trust 
was placed instead in cooperation with the international scientific community and the work being 
done in favour of harmonization under the Codex Alimentarius, of which the EU was an active 
member. However, the selection of safe measures by farmers in Honduras was increasingly affected 
by regulatory barriers that were not based on risk analysis principles agreed upon internationally 
and that did not take into account alternative approa ches to meet those regulatory objectives, which 
was a matter of great concern to Honduras. In Honduras, there was a limited supply of substances 
that were duly registered, and that would allow appropriate rotation for pest control in the field. The 
few tha t did exist were therefore of fundamental importance in reducing the possibility of developing G/C/M/135  
 
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  cross-resistance. In Honduras, agricultural production was one of the largest contributors to the 
economy, generating  significant social benefits , as demonstrate d by sustained growth over the 
previous three  years. The European market was one of the largest destination markets for Honduran 
products, representing more than USD  1 billion and generating more than 100,000  direct and 
indirect jobs. Honduras noted with d eep concern how its exports, such as bananas and other 
products in Honduras' export basket to the EU, such as coffee, cocoa, melons, and sweet potatoes, 
were being affected by the adoption of MRLs by the European Union ; indeed,  the trade impact on 
Honduras  in the near future  would be significant . Honduras emphasized that each decision that the 
EU took regarding the modification of SPS  conditions and technical regulations for imports had a 
huge impact on the economy, employment, and welfare of thousands of p eople in Honduras. For 
these reasons, Honduras joined other Members in expressing its concerns and in urging the EU to 
take such concerns into account in its decision -making process.  
8.12.   The delegate of Ecuador  expressed her delegation's support for the statem ents made by 
previous Members and was concerned by the situation of agricultural producers in Ecuador following 
the measures taken by the EU over recent years. Ecuador had witnessed an increase in the number 
of non -tariff barriers created by the EU , which could have a serious impact on many producers, 
whose exports represented a significant share of Ecuador's agriculture GDP. Ecuador was particularly 
concerned by the progressive prohibition of the use of SPS -protected measures, which were essential 
to guara ntee the absence of pests and the quality of food going through to the final consumer in 
EU markets. For these reasons, Ecuador had raised this issue before the TBT and SPS  Committees, 
as well as bilaterally in Brussels and in other appropriate fora. Ecuad or believed that the uncertainty 
generated by these measures was of great concern due to the consequences that it could have on 
production sectors upon which hundreds of thousands of families depended. This could have a 
negative impact on global production  and the safe and sustainable trade in food , particularly affecting 
small -scale producers from developing countries and LDCs, the majority of whom were farmers with 
few resources. Ecuador called upon the EU not to adopt excessively restrictive measures wit hout 
conclusive scientific evidence and without consideration of the social and economic impact that these 
measures could have in the short, mid, and long term. Ecuador also called upon the EU to respect 
globally recognized international standards for the protection of human, animal, and plant health,  
to grant sufficient transition periods of at least 36  months to make the necessary adjustments in 
producing regions, and to adhere to ob ligations established under the WTO Agreements, in particular 
the SPS  Agreement , framing all measures on a risk -based approach, minimizing trade -distorting 
effect, and avoiding that these measures become unnecessary barriers to trade.  
8.13.   The delegate of Guate mala joined the other co -sponsors and reiterated her delegation's 
concern over the recent measures on the reduction of MRLs by the European Union on a series of 
agrochemicals that were of fundamental importance in agricultural production and in the 
managem ent of pests of quarantine significance in tropical countries. Guatemala was concerned by 
the resulting lack of harmonization and the failure to take into consideration the tolerance levels 
established by the international community in the Codex Alimentari us. The main issue of concern 
for Guatemala was the negative impact that these measures would have on its exports of agricultural 
products. Guatemala shared the goal of ensuring the safety of food provided to consumers; at the 
same time, the exercise of th is right necessitated the conduct of risk -analysis so that new MRLs were 
established on the basis of scientific evidence and an appropriate identification of risk. Guatemala 
requested that the MRLs established in the Codex Alimentarius be applied as the fi rst global 
reference for the standardization of MRLs and that a risk -assessment be carried out for each specific 
substance and product, allowing application of the least trade -restrictive measure. Guatemala 
believed that the six -month transition period tha t had been accorded by the EU did not correspond 
to the actual situation in respect of production and the real possibilities available to farmers, in 
particular in developing countries, to replace the use of this substance with one that complied with 
national registrations and was permitted in trade with the EU. Guatemala requested that the EU 
grant a transition period of at least 24  months for the implementation of a new MRL to ensure that 
the agricultural sectors of the exporting countries could carry out  the necessary studies for the 
identification of alternative substances that met the same level of protection and whose use would 
be permitted in the EU. More importantly, Guatemala emphasized that farmers should have sufficient 
time available between harv ests for the switch between products and their new use. Therefore, 
Guatemala asked the EU to consider this request to ensure that trade was not obstructed.  
8.14.   The delegate of Malaysia  supported the concerns raised by other Members over the EU's 
implementation  of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products . Malaysia highlighted that it and other 
developing countries had made various efforts and taken various initiatives to move towards G/C/M/135  
 
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  sustainability. Additional efforts had been made, and resources spent, by t he developing countries 
and LDCs to comply with the various standards set by the international standard setting bodies, such 
as Codex Alimentarius and the International Plant Protection Convention. In particular, Malaysia had 
been continuously developing i ts agriculture policies, which included the transformation of the 
agriculture sector and agro -based industry into a modern, dynamic , and competitive sector, with a 
special focus on standard s, certification , and export quality. Malaysia had developed and 
implemented standards and programmes such as the Malaysian Good Agricultural Practices and 
various other sustainable certification standards, including the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil 
Certification Scheme, to ensure that its products could gain better rec ognition and acceptance in the 
local and international market. These standards prescribed a generic code of practice that defined 
essential elements for agricultural producers to follow for sustainable crop production that was 
legally compliant, environmen tally sound, socially acceptable , and economically viable , to ensure 
quality produce that was safe and suitable for consumption and/or utilization. As such, Malaysia 
urged the EU to support the efforts being made by the developing countries, and to work to gether 
towards further sustainable agriculture development, rather than putting up barriers that could 
discourage those efforts.  
8.15.   The delegate of Peru thanked the delegation of Colombia and, together with the delegations 
of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Can ada, Costa Rica, C ôte d'Ivoire, Dominica n Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Panama, United States, and Uruguay , reiterated his 
delegation's support for the trade concern presented in document  G/C/W/767 regarding the non -
tariff barriers to agricultural imports that the European Union had been implementing regarding the 
use of certain products in agriculture, and which had an excessively restrictive impact on trade in 
agricultural products. Peru reminded the European Union that any implemented  measures , in 
addition to addressing the legitimate interests of protecting consumers, must also observe the no 
less legitimate commitments assumed with other WTO  Members and , in this regard, they must be 
based on scientific principles and an appropriate risk assessment of the circumstances and not in a 
hazard assessment as decided by the European Union. Peru emphasized that such measures must 
be consistent with the provisions of the WTO  covered agreements , be based on the regulatory 
developments of international standardization and standardization bodies such as Codex 
Alimentarius , and be applied in a way that avoided them  constituting a disguised restriction on 
international trade.  
8.16.   The delegate of  the United States  joined Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, C ôte d'Ivoire, Dominica n Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Malaysia, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay,  to request this item on the Council's agenda. The United 
States had also joined Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, C ôte d'Ivoire, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
and Uruguay,  in a joint statement outlining its concerns on the E U's implementation of non -tariff 
barriers on agricultural products. The joint statement had been circulated in document  G/C/W/767. 
The US observed that , for over four  years, over 40  Members had taken the floor in the SPS and 
TBT Committees to ask the European Union to reconsider the unsound policies  at issue , the 
implementation of which would have a profound and adverse impact upon global agricultural 
production and trade, particularly in developing countries. In addition, the US reminded the Council 
that nearly a quarter of those WTO Members that had taken  the floor at the EU 's Trade Policy Review , 
on 5 July 2017, had raised these policies as an area of concern. Given the many concerns raised in 
the SPS and TBT  Committees, as well  as in the TPRB, by an unprecedented number of Members over 
the past several years, the United States was extremely troubled and disappointed that the EU: 
(i) had adopted criteria for banning the use of certain substances in agricultural production that we re 
far more stringent than those initially notified to the WTO, and which would likely lead to the banning 
of a greater number of substances than initially disclosed; (ii)  had removed and then failed to 
reintroduce the risk -based amendment to its derogatio n procedures, breaking the repeated 
assurances made to WTO  Members that critical substances used by agricultural producers around 
the world would be evaluated on the basis of risk; and (iii)  on 10  November  2018, had begun 
implementing its criteria to ident ify and subsequently ban certain substances, thus finalizing a 
regulation that codified a hazard -based approach to pesticide regulation. The United States believed 
that, under this approach, it remained uncertain how the EU intended to ensure that its acti ons were 
consistent with a central tenet of the SPS  Agreement that measures be based on an assessment of 
risk. The US observed that the concerns by a record number of Members in each of the SPS and 
TBT Committees, as well as concerns expressed in the TPRB over the past four  years , had gone 
entirely unheeded by the European Union. Implementation of the EU 's pesticide policies, as codified 
in EU  Regulations  1107/2009, 396/2005, and 2018/605, had begun in November  2018, and were G/C/M/135  
 
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  unnecessarily disrupting agricu ltural production and trade in cereals, tree nuts, bananas, 
cranberries, grapes, sweet potatoes, mangos, and other agricultural products. As the EU continued 
to move forward with additional pesticide bans, the US expected potentially severe impacts on 
agricultural production and trade. A study published in October  2017 had estimated that the lowering 
of pesticide residue tolerances (or MRLs) due to the EU 's hazard -based criteria had the potential to 
adversely affect agricultural trade flows valued at approx imately USD  86 billion annually worldwide, 
with a disproportionate impact upon growers in Central and South America and Sub -Saharan Africa. 
The United States emphasized its commitment to providing high levels of public health protection 
based on sound scie nce and internationally accepted risk analysis principles, and to supporting the 
efforts of other Members to do the same, including through collaboration in Codex to set international 
standards on pesticide MRLs that protected consumers and established the basis for fair trade. In 
the TBT and SPS  Committees, the US had repeatedly asked the EU why it continued to implement 
trade -restrictive measures when there was inconclusive or no scientific evidence of actual risk to 
human health or , worse yet, to implement measures that ran contrary to the scientific evidence. 
Furthermore, the US had asked the EU to explain why exemptions, grace periods , and transitional 
arrangements granted to domestic producers had not been extended to foreign prod ucers. The US 
stated that its questions remained unanswered. The US recognized that the continued 
implementation of the EU 's hazard -based approach would result in a continued ban of safe tools and 
technologies essential to feed a growing world population; it was thus an approach that carried the 
potential to undermine food security and sustainable development. The US brought this issue to the 
attention of the Council on Trade in Goods to defend the incomes and the livelihoods of farmers 
around the world and  welcomed the views of other Members on this critically important concern.  
8.17.   The delegate of Australia  as a co -sponsor of the paper shared the concerns raised in relation 
to the direction of the European Union 's agricultural chemical regulations and policy a nd the potential 
negative effect on farmers and trade. Australia had previously raised the concerns about the EU 's 
risk assessment and import tolerance setting policies in both the TBT and SPS  Committees. While 
Australia recognized the right of WTO  Members  to regulate agricultural and other chemicals in a 
manner that protected human, animal, and plant health and the environment, Members were also 
bound by WTO  obligations particularly in relation to undertaking science -based risk assessments and 
ensuring tha t measures were not more trade -restrictive than necessary. Australia questioned the 
EU's approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection product authorizations and import 
tolerance limits that relied primarily on hazard -based assessment. In Austra lia's view, it was unclear 
how the EU  hazards -based assessment was consistent with internationally agreed risk assessment 
standards for import tolerances. Australia sought clarification on how the EU determined hazards to 
consumers of treated produce and w ould welcome discussion on the risk assessments that 
underpinned EU  decisions on import tolerances. Australia also sought greater clarity on how the 
hazards of a substance were differentiated in terms of the substance use in a production system 
compared wi th presence in consumed produce. To support this, Australia would continue to share 
details with the EU on its regulatory approaches to these substances and the foundation for its 
assessments. Australia supported, wherever possible, alignment with internat ional scientific and 
regulatory standards to facilitate trade and provide greater certainty around the use of plant 
protection products. Where there were concerns about the scientific rigo ur or validity of international 
approaches, Australia encouraged an open discussion on this topic with a view to addressing trading 
partners ' concerns and to facilitate mutually beneficial trade.  
8.18.   The delegate of Uruguay  reiterated his delegation's long -standing trade and systemic 
concerns regarding the European Union's increasing use of a risk -based approach to its regulatory 
determinations relating to sanitary and phytosanitary issues. In this regard, Uruguay insisted that 
any determination, in particul ar when it departed from internationally accepted standards, must be 
based on a full scientific risk assessment underpinned by validated methodologies, in line with the 
provisions of the relevant Agreements, as this was essential for the maintenance of the  effective 
balance that must exist between the right of Members to pursue their legitimate objectives and the 
need to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to trade. Uruguay believed that it was the responsibility 
of WTO  Members to consider the effects that  their regulatory approaches might have on developing 
and LDC  Members  whose economies, and the household economies of their citizens, were largely 
based on the production and trade of agricultural and agro -industrial products. Uruguay invited 
Members not to overlook the enormous contribution made by those industries to the provision of 
adequate supplies of safe food for the growing world population, for the benefit of food security , and 
in line with the provisions of Sustainable Development Goal  2 of the 20 30 Agenda of the United 
Nations. Uruguay therefore called upon the European Union to reconsider its regulatory approach 
with a view to avoiding the unjustified proliferation of obstacles to international trade in agricultural G/C/M/135  
 
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  products and the serious socia l and economic consequences of such an approach on other Members, 
particular ly developing and LDC  Members , for which the European market was of key importance.  
8.19.   The delegate of Chile thanked Members for including this agenda item as it was an issue of 
interest to his country, as previously mentioned in the TBT and SPS  Committees. Chile had been 
consistent in supporting the risk -based approach in accordance with the SPS  Agreement. As a result, 
Chile was concerned about the hazard -based approach in addressing MRLs and pesticides  being used 
by the EU . Chile supported the recommendations issued by the Codex Alimentarius and endorsed 
the concerns raised by Members because in Chile's view the EU's approach would place the burden 
of proof on the importing country. Chile urged Members to resolve this issue.  
8.20.   The delegate of El Salvador  said that her authorities continued to follow the measures 
implemented by the European Union on the banning and reduction of the tolerance levels of certain 
substances required  for safe and sustainable agricultural production. El Salvador believed that the 
EU measures had been implemented despite concerns that had been repeatedly stated by several 
Members in the TBT and SPS  Committees. El Salvador pointed to the restrictive natu re of these 
barriers and their impact on agricultural trade, particularly in developing countries. In addition to 
concerns about the scientific basis underpinning these measures, El Salvador was concerned by the 
short deadlines given , which did not reflect  the reality of production and the needs of Salvadorian 
farmers to find alternatives for these banned substances given that the substances in question had 
previously been on national registers and allowed in trade with the EU. Having said that, El Salvador  
shared the systemic and trade concerns expressed by other Members and would continue to follow 
this issue closely.  
8.21.   The delegate of Paraguay  observed that the harmonization of regulations on the use of plant 
protection products and the setting of maximum r esidue limits, along with the recognition of the 
standards set by international organizations such as Codex, guaranteed food safety and protected 
the health of consumers, while avoiding disruptions to trade , and without placing unnecessary 
obstructions on trade. Paraguay believed that the use of substances considered safe, in accordance 
with internationally established criteria and standards, ensured their efficient production and the 
subsistence of  millions of producers around the world. This subsistence, together with food security, 
would be badly affected by the EU's measures because farmers would not necessarily have access 
to the technological resources needed to protect their crops from pests and diseases in various 
productive ecosystems. Substances su ch as chlorothalonil, picoxystrobin, glufo sinate, and 
diflubenzuron, although they were not the main active substances in integrated pest management,  
were used in the crop rotation process that ensured the sustainable production of soybeans, corn, 
wheat, s orghum, sunflower, sugar cane, peanuts , and other crops. Paraguay was a food -producing 
country, thanks to its high agricultural potential. In total, 35% of Paraguay's gross domestic product 
(GDP) came from agro -industrial production, with agricultural prod ucts constituting about 85% of 
Paraguay's exports. A significant share of the country's employment was in agriculture, either 
directly or in associated activities. Paraguay believed that decisions aimed at not renewing active 
substances and the subsequent amendment of the EU's maximum residue limits, disregarding 
international standards and without completing the risk analysis, taking into account only hazard 
criteria, placed the farmers in Paraguay at risk by failing to ensure import tolerance with a clear  and 
transparent methodology, or to put forward reasonable timelines that allow ed for the adaptation of 
production methods to these new requirements. Paraguay considered that the list of new active 
substances was not comprehensive . Similarly, the eliminati on of existing tools without the use of 
science -based criteria led to the distortion of agricultural production through the application of 
pressure for the integrated management of diseases and pests. Furthermore, the list of active 
substances awaiting ren ewal in the EU was extensive. Paraguay had systemic and economic interest s 
and concerns with regard to the trade -disrupting potential of these measures, which deviated from 
internationally established safety and security criteria, and risked generating  millions of dollars in 
losses in a sector that was key to the economic stability of Paraguay. Paraguay therefore urged the 
European Union to maintain a frank exchange with its trading partners on this issue in order to 
ensure that trade could continue without  disruption.  
8.22.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  joined others in expressing concerns over the EU 's implementation 
of such measures as they would effectively prohibit the use of a number of substances that were 
required for safe and sustainable agricultural production and had been assessed and authorized for 
use by many WTO  Members. Sri Lanka recognized that the EU had moved forward with the 
implementation of its measures, which were first enacted in 2009, even though other Members had, 
over the years, repeatedly expressed concerns in the SPS and TBT  Committees regarding the overly G/C/M/135  
 
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  restrictive impact of these measures on the trade of agricultural goods. As reflected in the 
communication, the EU  Regulation No.  1107/2009 provided that active substan ces used in crop 
protection products be assessed for potential hazard each time a substance was subject to an 
approval or renewal of approval at the EU  level. The irony was that, if deemed to belong to one of 
the cut -off categories, the EU  MRLs could be re voked and the substance withdrawn from the market. 
Therefore, Sri Lanka believed that the application of the criteria under regular EU  reviews created 
the potential for numerous plant protection products to be withdrawn from usage in EU  member 
states and t olerances for residues on imported goods to fall to the default level of 0.01  ppm. Sri 
Lanka had no doubt that revocation of MRLs would patently have an impact upon worldwide 
exporters of agricultural products to the European Union and that such trade flow  impacts could be 
substantial. A lack of predictability and transparency in application of the measures and defining 
very low MRLs by the EU in its subjected regulation against an array of pesticides commonly used 
by the farming community in developing cou ntries, which were presumed to pose no significant 
health risks at present, would act as a significant trade barrier to many developing and LDC Members  
in accessing the EU market. To ensure a balanced approach, the international community had 
determined st andards that followed the principle of evidence and science -based risk assessments, 
allowing WTO  Members to achieve an appropriate level of protection, while at the same time 
ensuring that such measures were not more trade -restrictive than necessary. Sri L anka 
acknowledged that the standards and applicable MRLs on the use of chemical substances, including 
plant protection products, established by the International Bodies, such as the IPPC and Codex, were 
the norms that needed to be adopted by WTO  Members while pursuing their legitimate objectives 
pertaining to protection of human, animal, and plant health . When such standards were not available 
at international level, such country specific standards should be applied while complying with the 
related provisio ns enshrined in the SPS  Agreement, which warranted the use of realistic and 
achievable compliance levels. Sri Lanka believed that , until the scientific evidence was gathered, and 
affirmative decisions had been taken on the permissible or tolerable levels, the flow of products 
presumed to be containing such chemical substances should not be halted. But, if MRLs of such 
chemical substances were defined at 0.01%, then such measures would actually displace other 
competitive exporting countries by giving undue a dvantages to EU  domestic producers over its 
competitors. Sri Lanka believed that the EU was diverging from the relevant standards by 
incorporating a hazard -based approach to the approval and renewal of plant protection product 
authorizations for certain su bstances. This was creating a high degree of uncertainty regarding  how 
import tolerances would be considered and set for authorization decisions in the EU. Such an 
approach would marginali ze the developing and least developed countries, as they did not have 
either capacity to comply with such standards or the ability to adopt to such new and highly 
sophisticated requirements. This in turn would increase the exiting disparities and have a drastic 
impact on their product ive capacities by closing the EU  market, which they had heavily relied upon 
for generating export income for their economic development. According to Sri Lanka, the export 
crops likely to be most impacted by this Regulation were tea, coconut, oil seeds, ve getables, rice, 
cocoa, and cinnamon, which constituted a significant proportion of Sri Lanka 's exports to the EU, 
amounting to 202  million euros. Sri Lanka was also concerned over the very short time periods 
granted in the EU  regulation for foreign supplie rs to comply with the requirements. Until those 
suppliers had been granted adequate time to find alternative means of achieving the same level of 
EU compliance and requiring their farming community to adapt to and introduce such changes, the 
EU should seri ously consider deferring the implementation of the measures in question . Sri Lanka 
also urged the EU to provide additional information on its process and timelines for setting import 
tolerances for active substances that were not re -authorized in the EU, a s well as applicable 
transition periods for MRLs. Additionally, Sri Lanka encouraged the EU to establish a transparent, 
predictable , and commercially viable import tolerance process for plant protection products , which 
had not been re -approved , and that in cluded a risk assessment, taking into account risk assessment 
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations, and to engage meaningfully with 
trading partners on this issue . 
8.23.   The delegate of Jamaica , on behalf of the ACP  Group, thanked the  co-sponsors of 
document  G/C/W/767 for bringing to the Council an issue that had grave systemic implications for 
WTO Members, especially developing countries and LDCs, whose populations and economies 
depended heavily on agricultural exports for their livelihood security. The ACP  Group believed that 
any arbitrary adoption of measures that negatively affected developing countries and LDCs went 
against the principle of facilitating development through trade. ACP  members relied heavily on many 
substances that w ere subject to these arbitrary measures, as these substances were often necessary 
for production and in post -harvest activities. Nevertheless, ACP members  acknowledged the right of 
WTO Members to exercise policy space to legitimately protect human, animal, and plant health  and G/C/M/135  
 
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  safety. At the same time, the ACP  members called upon Members adopting these measures to do so 
in line with the established rules and ethos of the WTO. In the case  of bananas, for example, the 
crop played an indispensable role in job creation, rural development , and livelihood security in a 
number of ACP  States. She further noted that the European Union had been a primary market for 
ACP banana exports. Therefore, lo wering MRLs for imazalil, a key post -harvest input, could have a 
severe and wide -ranging impact on the banana sectors in many ACP  countries. She stressed that in 
many instances there was no effective substitute among the available phytosanitary products wi th 
the efficacy of those affected by the lowering of MRLs, especially with regard to sporulation control. 
The ACP  concern was particularly centred on the arbitrary nature of the steps taken towards the 
implementation of these new measures, given that the a ssumed consumer risks were often premised 
on what the ACP believed to be insufficient data and inconsistency with the recommendations of 
international organi zations such as the Codex Alimentarius , the FAO, and the WHO. In the 
ACP members' view, this brough t into question whether the measure was more trade -restrictive 
than necessary to achieve the same  objective. She stated that concerns expressed during the 
consultations phase were too often disregarded and, in this context, the limited resource capacity of  
developing countries to seek redress through dispute settlement would bring into question the 
relevance of the WTO in the quest for development through trade. The ACP  Group called upon the 
European Union to use dialogue and diplomacy in its efforts to ado pt certain measures, especially 
measures in relation to which developing countries and LDCs had expressed serious concern. She 
reminded the Council that many Members had negotiated market access arrangements with the EU 
for products of export interest. The  outcomes of those good faith negotiations and the resulting 
agreements could be severely undermined if such NTBs were implemented without due concern for 
the deleterious impact of such trade restrictive measures. The ACP  Group thanked the co -sponsors 
for their initiative and indicate d their readiness to dialogue with the EU with a view to finding a 
mutually satisfactory approach to the adoption of non -tariff measures that diminish ed the benefits 
to be derived by ACP  Members from their membership in the WTO . 
8.24.   The delegate of Mexico  thanked the proponents for including this item on the agenda and for 
their statements. Mexico agreed with the positions stated by other Members regarding  the 
establishment of MRLs by the European Union. In Mexico's opinion, the Eur opean Union should 
adhere to a risk -based approach when determining MRLs and ensure that scientific evidence 
determined the conditions for establishing them, thereby avoid ing affecting global agricultural trade. 
Mexico considered that it was key to maintain science -based pro cedures when adopting 
SPS measures in conformity with the provisions of the SPS and TBT  Agreements. Mexico reiterated 
the importance of ensuring that transparency prevailed in measures to be implemented by the 
European Union. In particular, Mexico requeste d that Members be kept informed with regard to 
planned measures and that reasonable time periods be considered for the implementation of such 
measures so that Members could adapt to the m. More importantly, Mexico called upon the European 
Union to ensure th at a risk -based approach and scientific criteria were used for the adoption of such 
measures.  
8.25.   The delegate of New Zealand  reaffirmed her delegation's commitment to a rules -based trading 
system under the WTO  Agreement and was concerned when any Member adopt ed hazard rather 
than risk -based measures. New Zealand believed that the EU 's hazard -based approach to regulating 
substances identified as endocrine disruptors posed an unnecessary barrier to trade and would 
appreciate any update the EU had on its measure,  or an update on the derogation and plans to 
progress it.  
8.26.   The delegate of Thailand  thanked the co -sponsors of this agenda item and joined others in 
expressing his delegation's systemic and trade concerns regarding certain NTBs on agricultural 
products applied by the European Union, which unnecessarily restricted trade. Thailand had also 
raised its relevant concerns in past TBT  Committees , on numerous occasions , and had encouraged 
the EU to constructively engage with concerned Members, as well as ensuring th at these types of 
measures were considered on risk -based assessment in accordance with international standards in 
order to minimize the adverse impact on agricultural trade.  
8.27.   The delegate of India echoed the concerns raised in document  G/C/W/767 regarding t he 
implementation of non -tariff barriers on agricultural products by the EU. India stated that the 
WTO Agreements required Members to ensure that non -tariff measures were not applied in a manner 
that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable d iscrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail ed or were a disguised restriction on international trade. In particular, 
the SPS  Agreement stated that a Member may introduce measures that were not based on the G/C/M/135  
 
- 30 - 
 
  relevant international stand ards, guidelines , or recommendations, only if there was a scientific 
justification for them. Notwithstanding these obligations, in India's view , the EU had continued to 
impose measures that were more trade restrictive than necessary, without providing suff icient 
scientific evidence and/or undertaking a risk assessment. India reiterated its concerns regarding the 
EU measures , which had a significant trade impact , and requested the EU to consider other options , 
such as the risk -based assessment  approach  available within the WTO  SPS framework, rather than 
the hazard -based  approach.  
8.28.   The delegate of China  joined others in expressing its concerns over the EU's non -tariff 
measures on agriculture products, especially on the hazard -based approach and th e overly 
restrictive MRLs. China had for years also repeatedly raised its concerns in the SPS  Committee. While 
respecting the EU 's right to take measures to protect human beings, animals and plants, China 
believed that any measure should be based on risk a ssessment , with scientific evidence , and should 
be consistent with international standards. In this regard, China requested the EU to consider  the 
comments and concerns of Members and to make adjustments as soon as possible to the relevant 
measures in orde r to minimize their negative impact upon international trade.  
8.29.   The delegate of  the Plurinational State of Bolivia  thanked the delegations that had included 
this issue on the Council's agenda. Bolivia reaffirmed the importance of food regulations to the 
protection of human health. Nevertheless, Bolivia believed that these regulations must pursue 
legitimate goals and be based on scientific principles. Bolivia attached great importance to the work 
done by rural workers and to its agricultural production. For th at reason, Bolivia believed that the 
existence of regulatory barriers that did not comply with the WTO  Agreements was not justified. 
Bolivia supported the inclusion of this item on the agenda and reiterated that , when imposing trade 
barriers,  Members shoul d be very careful about focusing on a risk -based approach that was not 
supported by clear scientific evidence. The multilateral commitment of all Members should be 
towards maintaining the criteria established in Article  5 of the SPS  Agreement in order to g uarantee 
the balanced protection of human health, and the development and living conditions of agricultural 
workers.  
8.30.   The delegate of the Philippines  registered her delegation's interest in this agenda item as this 
measure could also affect Philippine's agr icultural exports. While her C apital was still looking into 
this matter, the Philippines was following this topic very closely and stood ready to engage with the 
EU and other concerned Members on this issue.  
8.31.   The delegate of Indonesia  shared the concerns ra ised by the proponents of this agenda item. 
Indonesia was fully aware that there was an increasing trend by the EU in setting up non -tariff 
barriers, especially for agricultural products. As stated by previous Members, the measures at issue 
could significa ntly affect global agricultural products, including from Indonesia. Products such as 
coffee, coconuts, and palm oil were among highly recorded agricultural products from Indonesia to 
the EU  markets. Indonesia believed that adopting hazard -based cut-off criteria for active substances 
used in crop protection products and the possible loss of pesticide MRLs would adversely affect its 
agricultural export s and threaten the livelihood of farmers and their families. Indonesia concurred 
that internationa l standards established by the international community provided the balance d 
approach to ensuring that the legitimate objectives of Members were not more trade restrictive than 
necessary. Indonesia therefore supported the proponents in urging the EU to pro vide additional 
information on this issue and to abide by international standards.  
8.32.   The delegate of Argentina  thanked the EU for the technical discussions that had proven useful 
in dispelling certain doubts. However, as pointed out by Colombia, Argentina re mained particularly 
concerned by the uncertainty surrounding the treatment of applications for import tolerances for 
active substances that had been affected by the hazard -based approach of Regulation  1107/2009. 
In Argentina's view, applications for import  tolerances were a palliative in the event of the possible 
non-renewal or rejection of the authorization of an active substance based on  mere hazard 
identification without a full risk assessment. Argentina urged the EU to take appropriate steps to 
avoid th e application of measures that constituted an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.  
8.33.   The delegate of the European Union  thanked the proponents for the circulation of their 
comments in writing. He assured Members that the EU 's SPS  regulatory system wa s fully 
transparent, and that the EU met all its WTO  obligations regarding notifications of measures and the 
consideration of and response to comments received. The EU had taken note of the statements 
made . However , it maintained that all EU  SPS measures w ere fully consistent with the G/C/M/135  
 
- 31 - 
 
  SPS Agreement in that they were based on science and the risk assessment necessary to achieve 
the EU  level of health protection , which applied equally to domestic production and imports. As 
concerned plant protection products,  the EU  explained that there existed a limited group of hazards 
for which the EU  level of health protection required no exposure from their use in the EU as any such 
exposure could indeed lead to risks that the EU considered unacceptable. However, the EU c onfirmed 
that, even for those substances, requests for import tolerances would be handled in a consistent and 
transparent manner through a process that included a full risk assessment. The EU had regularly 
provided detailed explanations in the SPS  Committe e of the rationale and necessity for its 
SPS measures , as well as on their implementation. The EU appreciated the concerns of Members 
and acknowledged the potential trade impact of certain EU measures. But the EU also insisted that 
its level of health protection could not be compromised. The EU also invested heavily in providing 
technical assistance to developing countries to assist them to meet EU and global SPS  standards.  
8.34.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
8.35.   The Council so agreed . 
9  KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARA BIA, KINGDOM OF BAHR AIN, THE UNITED ARAB  EMIRATES 
AND OMAN – SELECTIVE  TAX ON CERTAIN IMPO RTED PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, SWIT ZERLAND, AND THE UNI TED STATES  
9.1.  The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of the European Union,  Switzerland,  and the United States, respectively, had requested 
the Se cretariat to include this issue on the agenda of this meeting.  
9.2.  The delegate of Switzerland  recalled that this issue had already been on the CTG's agenda and 
welcomed the new developments that had taken place since April  2019 regarding the selective tax 
but indicated that , despite such developments, concerns continued to exist on the discriminatory 
impact of the selective tax on energy drinks that remained unaddressed. His delegation had pursued 
its efforts both in the WTO and in Capitals.  
9.3.  Switzerland had al so understood that , as of 15  June 2019, Oman had levied a selective tax on 
certain products; however, the implementing legislation had not yet been published. This 
contradicted GATT  Article  X, as the key elements of the selective tax had not been publicly available, 
and governments and traders therefore had no opportunity to become acquainted with it. He urged 
Oman to promptly publish the implementing legislation.  
9.4.  According to recent information, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the first GCC  member State 
to have implemented the first  step of the selective tax reform , on 1 July 2019, and consequently the 
tax base had been expanded to cover e -cigarettes and their products as well as fizzy drinks. 
Unfortunately, the discriminatory treatment between energy drink s and carbonated soft drinks 
remained.  
9.5.  The second  step of the reform, which would take place 12  months after the extension of the 
tax base, would be the replacement of the ad valorem  selective tax by a volume -based tax. In 
principle, this would take Switzerland's concerns  into consideration . He therefore asked the 
representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,  the Kingdom of Bahrain,  the United Arab Emirates , 
and Oman,  to confirm and  to provide more details regarding the reforms, especially on the expansion 
of the tax base and the modification of its nature.  
9.6.  Regarding sport drinks, there was a discrimination between different sport drinks brands, as 
some were subject to a 100% selecti ve tax , whereas other were not subject to any tax. This  
constituted a breach of the MFN  principle. In May  2019, the authorities had assured Switzerland that 
this had been a mistake and that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain,  and the 
Unite d Arab Emirates would remove the discrimination. He requested again that this removal occur 
without delay and to receive also an indication as to when the harmonization of the tax rate for sport 
drinks would be realized . 
9.7.  A note sent by the GCC  Secretariat in the name of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom 
of Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates , in March  2019, had emphasized the priority given by the G/C/M/135  
 
- 32 - 
 
  three  States to their WTO compliance. However, this note had not addressed the additional written 
questions that had been sent by Switzerland to Saudi Arabia,  Bahrain,  and the UAE , in 
September  2018, regarding the scientific basis justifying the imposition of different tax rates on 
energy drinks and carbonated soft drinks. His delegation was still looking forward to receiving an 
answer to those questions and encouraged the GCC  States to engage and to work closely with the 
industry in order to modify the selective tax, to apply it in a transparent and non -discriminatory 
manner , and to meet the legiti mate health policy objectives. Switzerland looked forward to receiving 
detailed information on a regular basis on the foreseen developments relating to the selective tax, 
as well as to be ing consulted on the changes foreseen.  
9.8.  The delegate of the European U nion reiterated its concerns in relation to the GCC  "Treaty on 
Excise Tax" of December  2016, as these had become significant barriers to trade. The EU called 
upon the GCC to engage in modifying the regulations with interested trading partners and private 
sector stakeholders in order to ensure that the regulations took into account scientific evidence for 
meeting specific health objectives, while minimizing any potential negative economic impact.  
9.9.  The EU understood that the measures in question were under con sideration by GCC  regulatory 
authorities and welcomed the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had already revised its 
regulation and published it on 15  May 2019. The EU had also noted that Saudi Arabia had included 
other sweetened beverages under the exc ise tax and thus no longer discriminated against soft drinks 
containing sugar. However, the EU was still concerned that Saudi Arabia had not decreased the tax 
for energy drinks from 100% to 50% in order to not discriminate between energy drinks and other 
sugary drinks.  
9.10.   The EU looked forward to receiving details about the proposed modifications or timelines for 
revisions from other GCC  countries to assess whether the proposed modifications would address the 
EU's concerns . In addition, the EU asked the GCC  countries to accelerate the modification of the tax 
base from retail price into ingredient/volume base, as indicated by the Kingdom of Bahrain at the 
last Market Access Committee meeting , on 28  May 2019. The EU thanked the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia for its reply to the recent EU  Ministerial letter and looked forward to receiving written replies 
from the other GCC  countries as well.  
9.11.   The delegate of the United States  reiterated her delegation's concerns over the excise tax on 
carbonated soft drinks, malt beverages, and energy and sports drinks currently implemented by the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,  the Kingdom of Bahrain,  the United Arab Emirates,  and Oman. The US 
had raised these concerns directly with the GCC  member States' governments, as well as in a 
number of previous WTO  meetings, along with representatives from the EU , Switzerland,  and Japan, 
but without yet receiving any detailed responses.  
9.12.   The current implementation of the excise tax on these products had had a discriminatory 
effect by singling out the particular types of beverages produced by multinational companies, while 
excluding non -carbonated sweetened beverages produced by domestic c ompanies in the GCC.  
9.13.   While the US supported domestic efforts to prevent and control non -communicable diseases, 
the report of the World Health Organization High -Level Commission on such diseases did not 
recommend the use of beverage taxes to advance public health outcomes. The US understood that 
multinational producers had publicly committed to working with GCC  member States through public -
private partnerships in a voluntary effort to address health concerns and strongly encouraged 
GCC member  States  to engag e private industry stakeholders to ensure that the excise tax was 
applied in a transparent and non -discriminatory manner, and to consult with industry stakeholders 
on possible suggestions for revising the implementation of the current tax.  
9.14.   The US had ackno wledged that GCC  member  States  had decided to revise certain aspects of 
the excise tax, including possibly widening the tax base to include non -carbonated beverages and 
possibly changing the tax base from ad valorem  to one based on ingredients, and that th is expansion 
might go into effect later in 2019. Therefore, the US requested the GCC  member States to provide 
detailed information on this issue and to arrange discussions with GCC  officials, including the 
Ministries of Finance, and private sector stakehol ders, for them to discuss directly the concerns 
raised as well as to arrange discussions with GCC  officials and representatives of the International 
Monetary Fund , which  would also be willing to provide guidance regarding excise taxation schemes 
if request ed to do so  by the GCC member States.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  9.15.   The delegate of  the Kingdom of Bahrain , on behalf of the Kingdom of Bahrain,  the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia,  the United Arab Emirates,  and the Sultanate of Oman,  thanked the US , the EU , and 
Switzerland for their interest in this matter, and referred to the statement that they had made at 
the most recent meeting of the Market Access Committee , on 28  May 2019. At the same time, he  
assured the delegations that had intervened that their comments would be reviewed and addressed 
at the GCC  level in due course . The GCC  member States remained open for bilateral discussions on 
this matter , in particular if there were new or specific concerns to be discussed.  
9.16.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and pr oposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
9.17.   The Council so agreed . 
10  INDONESIA'S IMPORT A ND EXPORT RESTRICTIN G POLICIES AND PRACT ICES – 
REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN UNION, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATE S 
10.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of the European Union,  Japan,  and the United States, had requested the Secretariat to 
include this issue on the agenda of this meeting.  
10.2.   The delegate of the European Union  said that , since this was a long -standing agenda item , 
she would not repeat the points the EU had previously raised and referred instead to the EU's 
statements made at earlier meetings, which remained valid to date.  
10.3.   The EU regretted to add that , since April  2019, imports of alcoholic beve rages of EU  origin 
into the Indonesian market had been de facto  denied without any formal notification or justification 
of a ban, and urged the Indonesian authorities to restore the situation and to allow again the entry 
of EU  alcoholic beverages.  
10.4.   Efforts had been made by Indonesia since the last meeting to lift the Avian Influenza import 
ban for poultry and poultry imports as concerned  a number of EU  member States. However, the ban 
had remained in place for a number of other EU  member States, despite the fact that these had 
been declared free from outbreaks according to OIE  rules.  
10.5.   At the Council's previous meeting, the EU had al so expressed concerns over the 
implementation of Halal Law  33/2014. Given that Government Regulation No.  31 of 2019 
implementing that Law had entered into force in May  2019, the EU called upon Indonesia to provide 
precise information on the scope, object , and timing of the measures, to notify them in accordance 
with WTO rules, to keep halal certification and halal labelling voluntary, as a less trade restrictive 
measure, and not to require haram products to be labelled as containing haram substances.  
10.6.   The EU  made a general call to Indonesia to eliminate its high number of trade barriers and to 
refrain from creating new trade barriers in line with its G20 commitments.  
10.7.   The delegate of Japan  said that at this Council, as well as in the TRIMs  Committee meeting, 
Japan, together with other Members, had expressed its concerns over the following Indonesian 
measures: the export restrictions imposed by the new Mining Law; the new laws on trade and 
industry; restrictions in the retail sector; and local content requiremen ts in the telecommunications 
sector, including for 4G  mobile phones. Japan regretted , however, that Indonesia had only replied 
that these measures were consistent with the WTO  Agreement , without providing any concrete 
answers.  
10.8.   Japan therefore requested Ind onesia to clarify : (i) how it could consider the measures to be 
introduced to be consistent with the WTO  Agreements; (ii) to provide specific details of the approach 
Indonesia was considering adopting  to promote reform; and (iii) to update Members on the l atest 
situation regarding all these measures.  
10.9.   The delegate of the United States  said that this Council was well aware of the breadth of 
concerns raised by her delegation with regard to Indonesia's trade and investment regime.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  10.10.   She recalled that in previous interventions in this body, her delegation had reviewed in detail 
the broad ran ge of its concerns , which included localization requirements, import licensing 
requirements, standards requirements, pre -shipment inspection requirements, and export 
restrictions, including taxes and prohibitions, among others. These types of restrictions affected a 
broad range of sectors.  
10.11.   As also mentioned at previous CTG  meetings, as well as in the CTG's subsidiary bodies, the 
US remained deeply concerned by Indonesia's use of localization requirements across a broad and 
expanding range of sectors, includ ing telecommunications, mobile technology, energy, agriculture, 
retail, and franchising. These local content requirements not only raised concerns about their 
consistency with Indonesia's trade obligations, but also acted as barriers to trade that potentia lly 
diverted investment from other developing countries.  
10.12.   The US appreciated the fact that Indonesia had taken some positive steps in the past year , 
including by amending its local purchase requirements for dairy products. However, the US remained 
deeply co ncerned that Indonesia was now considering expanding its local content requirements to 
the pharmaceutical and medical device sectors. Her delegation had submitted a second  set of 
questions (G/TRIMS/Q/IDN/5) on these potential new local content requirements  to the Committee 
on Trade -Related Investment Measures.  
10.13.   Concerns also existed regarding  developments in the digital trade space, including 
Indonesia's creation of tariff lines for electronically transmitted software and digital products. The 
US considered that any move to raise import duty rates on these tariff lines would raise serious 
questions regarding Indonesia's compliance with the moratorium on customs duties on electronic 
transmissions.  
10.14.   All these concerns had been raised on numerous occasions in the  CTG, bilaterally , and in 
other relevant WTO  Committees , not only by the United States but also by other Members.  
10.15.   Given President Jokowi's stated goal to improve the business and investment climate in 
Indonesia during his second  term, the United States hop ed that Indonesia would work to address 
US concerns and ensure a free and fair trade between the two  countries.  
10.16.   The delegate of New Zealand  echoed Members' previous concerns and recalled that, as had 
been indicated also in previous CTG meetings , New Zealan d believed that Indonesia's restrictions on 
agricultural imports undermined core WTO  principles and were inconsistent with key obligations in 
the WTO  Agreements. As stated also in previous DSB  meetings, New Zealand welcomed Indonesia's 
commitment to implem ent the WTO  decision and the steps that had been taken towards compliance 
to date.  However, New  Zealand was disappointed that full compliance had still not been achieved, 
particularly as concerned Indonesia's failure to meet the 22  June 2019 deadline to re move 
measure  18, which limited imports based on the sufficiency of domestic supply.  New Zealand would 
continue to encourage Indonesia to achieve commercially meaningful long -term compliance with the 
WTO decision.  
10.17.   Additionally, New Zealand continued to have  significant concerns over a number of 
Indonesia's import restrictions that affected trade across a range of agricultural products, and in 
particular regarding the two -month delay in issuing Import Approvals for New Zealand horticulture 
products, especially as Indonesian Ministry of Trade Regulation  64/2018 specified that these would 
be issued within two  working days. Other restrictions continued to be applied to New Zealand's 
horticultural and dairy products where progress had not been made by Ind onesia in removing its 
restrictive trade practices in accordance with the WTO  ruling.  
10.18.   Indonesia's restrictions hurt not only exporters but also Indonesian consumers, processors , 
and producers , as the measures in place had contributed to rises in food price s in Indonesia, 
including for basic foodstuffs and ingredients for the domestic manufacturing sector.  
10.19.   Like previous delegations, New Zealand hoped that Indonesia would implement its reform 
plans through WTO -consistent policies and looked forward to working  with Indonesia during this 
implementation process.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  10.20.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  joined previous delegations in expressing  its concern  on this 
issue, particularly regarding local content requirements for 4G  mobile phones and 
telecommunications.  
10.21.   Indonesia's Halal regulation of 2014, which mandated Halal certification for the circulation 
and trade in all products in Indonesia,  once impleme nted, would require all products on the 
Indonesian market to be identified with labels indicating whether the item was halal or non -halal. 
Given the Law's imminent implementation , on 17  October  2019, a number of Chinese Taipei's 
industries had requested he r authorities to seek clarification from Indonesia regarding the specific 
practices required. In this vein , she asked Indonesia to explain the requirement and procedure of 
mutual recognition between Indonesia's halal certification bureau, the BPJPH, and fo reign halal 
institutions.  
10.22.   She also called upon Indonesia to notify to the TBT  Committee its draft implementation rules 
so as to provide stakeholders with an opportunity to comment, and for the Indonesian government 
to take those comments into consideration . In addition, she asked Indonesia to ensure that a 
reasonable time period be provided from the date of announcement to the date of implementation 
of the rules and regulations so that foreign producers could make the relevant adjustments.  
10.23.   The delegate of t he Russian Federation  shared the concerns of other Members regarding 
Indonesia's trade restricting policies applied across a  broad range of products. The Russian 
Federation noted that Indonesia's import licensing requirements impeded market access and that  
the complex and burdensome measures it applied had resulted in a decrease in Indonesia's imports 
from the Russian Federation, as well as from other WTO  Members. The Russian Federation urged 
Indonesia to remove unnecessary obstacles to trade and to bring i ts measures in to conformity with 
WTO rules.  
10.24.   The delegate of Brazil  associate d his delegation with Members'  previous statements on this 
issue, expressing Brazil's concern over Indonesia's trade restrictive measures, in particular regarding 
undue delays in the process of inspection and approval of Brazilian meat exporters, which was clearly 
in breach of Article  8 and Annex  C of the SPS  Agreement. These measures, as Brazil had stated 
before on many occasions, had been harmful to Brazilian exports of  poultry and beef. He urged  the 
Indonesian Government , once again,  to engage with Brazil and other delegations in order to address 
this issue as soon as possible.  
10.25.   The delegate of Thailand  again registered Thailand's concern on this issue and referred to 
its statements made at previous CTG  meetings . Thailand called upon Indonesia to align its measures 
with its WTO  obligations . 
10.26.   The delegate of China  reiterated China's concerns over the pre -paid income tax on imported 
products under Article  22 of Indonesia's I ncome Tax Law. China had also noted that , unfortunately , 
Indonesia had further raised the pre -paid income tax rate on 1,174  products , in September  2018. 
China believed that such measures represented heavier tax burdens on imported products and thus 
constit uted discrimination against such products. She therefore urged Indonesia immediately to 
withdraw its trade restricting measures and to align its relevant measures with WTO  rules.  
10.27.   The delegate of Indonesia  thanked Members that had signalled their high level of interest in 
Indonesia's  market. His delegation would carefully consider the concerns raised regarding a number 
of Indonesia's policies or measures that had been alleged to be trade restrictive in nature. As 
Indonesia had mentioned in previous CTG  meetings, what certain Members perceived to be 
measures restrictive in nature may well be originating in Indonesia's efforts to cope with certain 
outstanding problems and the negative impact that Indonesia was confronting from opening its 
market to interna tional trade. However, this did not undermine Indonesia's commitment to the MTS. 
Indonesia had updated and would continue to update Members on these measures in the relevant 
Committees and remained open for further discussion with interested Members  on any  specific issue . 
10.28.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
10.29.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/135  
 
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  11  INDIA – CUSTOMS DUTI ES ON ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM CANADA , CHINA, 
NORWAY, CHINESE TAI PEI, AND THE UNITED STATES  
11.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of Canada,  China,  Norway,  Chinese Taipei , and the United  States, respectively, had 
requested the Secretariat to include this issue o n the agenda of this meeting . 
11.2.   The delegate of the United States  recalled that , from long ago , her delegation , as well as 
numerous other Members, had been discussing inconsistencies between India's WTO  commitments 
to provide duty -free access to certain info rmation and communication technology products, including 
commercially significant products from the United States, and the non -zero import duties that India 
was in fact charging those imported products. The US had repeatedly urged India, both bilaterally 
and in the relevant WTO  bodies, to address its actions and to abide by its commitments. However, 
tariff increases continued and the patience of the United States was running out. The US had also 
noted with interest the requests for consultations filed by the European  Union and Japan and called 
upon India to provide duty -free access for the ICT and telecommunications equipment products for 
which India had a WTO  commitment to do so.  
11.3.   The delegate of Norway , as one of the five  co-sponsors of this agenda item, indicated that 
Norway's concerns remained , and were both systemic and commercial.  
11.4.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei , as a co-sponsor of this agenda item , stated that Chinese 
Taipei remained deeply disturbed by India's continuous raising of its tariffs on at l east 
32 ICT products through its Union Budget and the publication of other government notifications since 
2014.  
11.5.   Given that her delegation had registered its concerns in previous CTG  meetings, she referred 
to the statements already delivered6 and urged Indi a to eliminate the tariffs at issue to ensure 
duty-free access where India had committed to provide it . Chinese Taipei would be monitoring this 
issue closely and would not rule -out the option of requesting formal consultations with India under 
the WTO  dispute settlement mechanism.  
11.6.   The delegate of Canada  regretted to be compelled once again to raise this issue in this Council . 
Canada's concerns had also been raised in the Committee on Market Access (CMA) and at the 
ITA Committee . However, Canada's concerns had still not been addressed. Canada's  concerns 
regarding India's application of tariffs on ICT  products in excess of its WTO  bound commitments 
were both systemic and commercial. He called upon India once again to immediately rescind its tariff 
increases and to refrain from pursuing any further tariff increases above its WTO  commitments.  
11.7.   Canada also regretted India's rejection of Canada's request to join the separate requests for 
consultations made by the EU and Japan,  as Canada considered it had  a substantial trade interest 
in the matter.  
11.8.   The delegate of China  reiterated the concerns of her delegation regarding India's tariff s on 
ICT products, especially those on mobile phones and their components , as these severely affected 
China's commercial in terests. China was of the view that these products were within the scope of 
ITA-1; therefore, India's current applied rates exceeded its WTO  bound rates. China urged India 
immediately to bring the customs duties on the relevant products back to their WTO bound rates.  
11.9.   With regard to the consultations requested by the EU and Japan under the DS B, China  
regretted India's refusal of China's requests to join the se consultations, particularly as China had 
significant interests , where there was a clear commercial i mpact on such products  from China . 
Nevertheless , China hoped that the issue , through consultations,  could be promptly resolved.  
11.10.   The delegate of Australia  reiterated Australia's continuing interest in this matter.  
                                                
6 Document  G/C/M/134, paragraph  12.7. G/C/M/135  
 
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  11.11.   The delegate of New Zealand  stated that his  delegation continued to share the concerns 
expressed by other Members, particularly in respect of the systemic importance of applied tariffs not 
exceeding bound commitments.  
11.12.   The delegate of Switzerland  reiterated his delegation's serious concerns regarding the 
customs treatment of certain ICT  products by India. Since 2014, India had progressively increased 
customs duties on several ICT  products , which constituted prima facie  violations of India's 
WTO commitments, particularly as the tariff lines in  question were subject to duty -free commitments 
in India's GATT  Schedule of Concessions.  
11.13.   The delegate of Thailand  again registered Thailand's continued systemic and commercial 
interests in this issue.  
11.14.   The delegate of Singapore  shared the concerns raised by  previous speakers on this issue. 
Singapore had both a systemic and commercial interest in this matter and believed that it was crucial 
for all WTO  Members to abide by their commitments. However, India had continued to impose tariffs 
on products that were covered under the ITA that affected Singapore's exports. As on previous 
occasions, Singapore once again urged India to bring its applied tariffs on ITC  products in to line with 
its ITA  Commitments. Singapore would continue to monitor this issue closely.  
11.15.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  shared the concerns previously raised by other 
Members regarding the inconsistency of the duties imposed by India with its WTO  commitments. 
Korea requested India to remove the tariffs on the ICT  products in question and t o resolve this issue 
promptly.  
11.16.   The delegate of Japan  stated that , for Japan,  it was clear that India's measures violated its 
tariff schedule. Japan had expressed its concerns on this issue repeatedly at the meetings of this 
Council and those of other relev ant Committee s. Since this issue had not been resolved, on 
10 May 2019, Japan had made a formal request to hold bilateral consultations  with India . 
11.17.   The delegate of India thanked previous speakers for their continued interest in India's 
customs duties on ce rtain telecommunications and other products. On the issue of duty imposed on 
certain products , which were listed as ITA -1 products by some Members , he recalled India's previous 
statements in various Committees, including the CMA, the ITA , and this Council.7 India had also 
offered bilateral meetings with Members on the technicalities of the rectification it had sought and  
fruitful and constructive discussions had taken place with a few Members, which had accepted 
bilateral discussions. Indi a referred to the statements made at previous CTG  meetings . For the sake 
of saving time , India reiterated that it was fully aware of its obligations and commitments under the 
ITA and had been abiding by the same.  
11.18.   India signed the ITA -1 in 1997 and presented its schedule of concessions, which was 
subsequently certified in document  WT/LET/181. India did not intend to commit what was there 
beyond the scope of its ITA -1 commitment inscribed in such document. India had also stated in 
previous meetings th at Members had the right to revisit any errors or mistakes committed in 
assigning bound tariffs while transposing their HS  Schedule and place the necessary rectification 
request before the concerned committee. Accordingly, India had filed its rectification  request aimed 
at correcting certain areas in its HS2007  Schedule. This was in accordance with the procedures for 
modification and rectification of the schedules of tariff concessions contained in the Decision of 
26 March  1980, under the category "other re ctifications".  
11.19.   India encouraged interested Members to discuss directly with India any of the ir views on the 
technical aspects of these products , as well as their classification.  
11.20.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
11.21.   The Council so agreed . 
                                                
7 Document  G/C/M/134, paragraph  12.15.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12  TRANSPARENCY AND NOT IFICATION REQUIREMEN TS 
12.1  Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements 
under WTO  Agreements – Communication from Argentina, Australia, Cana da, Costa Rica, 
the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and the United States 
(JOB/GC/204/Rev.2 -JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2)  
12.1.   The Chairperson  informed delegations that the Council had before it two  communications 
referring to the issue of transparency and notification requirements. The first was the second  revision 
of document  JOB/CTG/14 , being considered by this Council since November  2018, and with regard 
to which the proponents had held various co nsultations with interested delegations. The Council also 
had for its consideration document  JOB/CTG/15, dated 27  June 2019, which had been circulated by 
the Secretariat on the request of various delegations. He therefore proposed to the Council first to 
consider document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2, dated 27  June 2019, entitled "Procedures to Enhance 
Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO  Agreements – Communication 
from Argentina,  Australia,  Canada,  Costa Rica,  the European Union,  Japan,  New Zealand,  the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu , and the United States.  
12.2.   The representative of the United States  thanked the co -sponsors of the document for making 
the revised proposal what it was today. He recalled that the Unit ed States had initially tabled a 
proposal , at the November  2017 CTG  meeting,  to improve Member's compliance with the notification 
requirements of various WTO  Agreements.  
12.3.   The revised proposal circulated for today's meeting was a culmination of additional 
improvements based on the work of all the co -sponsors, the extremely helpful Member feedback the 
proponents had received during the four previous Council meetings, as well as countless bilateral 
and small group meetings.  
12.4.   The United States continued to see th is proposal as an effort to address deficiencies and gaps 
in notifications and transparency and to put the WTO on a path towards a more successful and 
sustainable future.  
12.5.   Members' compliance rate with notification obligations continued to be extremely low in many 
critical areas of the Organization's work. This lack of transparency was problematic for Members and 
traders and it undermined the proper functioning and operation of the WTO  Agreements.  
12.6.   Lack of compliance with basic notification obligations also u ndermined confidence in the 
system. If  Members could not comply with the ir most basic obligations, he questioned , then what 
certainty could there be that they were complying with those that were more substantive . 
12.7.   From a systemic perspective, it was also very difficult to develop, evaluate , and assess 
negotiating proposals to improve the operation of various WTO  Agreements without the information 
that Members should have provided under existing WTO  notification obligations.  
12.8.   To encourage better complia nce with notification obligations, this proposal included incentives 
to seek improved performance, such as the ability to request technical assistance , and the ability to 
compile information through the TPR  process, as well as modest administrative measure s 
acknowledging that sustained problems in compliance should have at least some consequences.  
12.9.   However, this proposal did not change the balance of Members' obligations, nor the 
notification obligations required of any Member under the WTO  Agreements. It me rely sought to 
encourage better compliance with existing obligations through various incentives and administrative 
measures.  
12.10.   In order to address the key revisions and improvements made since the previous version 
the US representative passed  the floor to hi s colleague.  
12.11.   The delegate of  the United States  thanked her representative for highlighting that , while the 
proposal might look significantly different from its previous  version, the revisions had in fact been G/C/M/135  
 
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  targeted on a few key areas. The provisions had  been re -ordered in such a way to create a better 
flow and clarity in the process by which administrative measures might be triggered.  
12.12.   Paragraphs  8, 9, and 10 in the previous version were now paragraphs  5, 6, and 7  in this 
version , namely the provisions that encouraged Members to provide an explanation as to the reason 
for any delay in submitting the ir notification, to seek Secretariat assistance if needed, and also the 
technical assistance provisions for developing country Members.  
12.13.   The earlier paragraph  7, on DS:1 notifications, was now paragraph  8. 
12.14.   The paragraph concerning "counter -notifications" , previous ly paragraph  5, had been shifted 
and was now paragraph  9, which, in turn, had been amended. This paragraph no longer refer red to 
"counter -notifications" , an issue on which she would elaborate  further later in her intervention . 
12.15.   She turned  to specific drafting revisions . 
12.16.   In the Preamble, the words "as follows" had been  added after the word "Decides" in order 
to account for the drafting structu re that followed throughout the text.  
12.17.   In paragraph  1, the word "including" had been added in order to ensure that this paragraph 
did not unintentionally limit the scope of the Decision to only "regular" notifications , meaning that 
this decision would apply  to all types of notifications, including ad hoc notifications.  
12.18.   In paragraph  3, the drafting of this provision had been cleaned -up in order to capture all 
relevant Handbooks that might need to be updated.  
12.19.   Throughout the text and , in particular , in the new paragraphs  5, 6, and 7, cross -references 
to old paragraph  6 and paragraph  7 had been deleted and pegged these provisions to the deadlines 
in the relevant Agreements and Understandings listed in paragraph  1. This change had been made 
in order to provide cer tainty as to the deadline for notifications , simply the current deadline , which 
had been indicated in the relevant agreement or understanding.  
12.20.   In paragraph  9, reference specifically to "counter -notifications" had been removed and this 
provision had more cl early been tied back to the obligations contained in the Agreements and 
Understandings listed in paragraph  1. Members continued to be encouraged to bring forward 
information they consider ed had not been notified by another Member, but the language here was 
now consistent with the language used in the relevant Agreements and Understandings, such as, for 
instance, the Agreement on Agriculture.  
12.21.   In the previous version of this proposal, old paragraph  6 was the original paragraph that 
teed up the administrative measures. The proponents had instead merged this language into the 
chapeau of the new paragraph  10 and had clearly spelled out the different treatment for different 
types of notifications. This was contained in subparagraphs  10(a), 10(b) and 10(c), which were, 
respectively, regular notifications going forward from the date of adoption of this decision, the 
DS:1 notifications, and the retrospective one -time notifications and relevant updates of such one -
time notifications.  
12.22.   Regarding paragraph  10(c), Members' concerns regarding the retrospective nature of this 
proposal had been considered and any retrospectivity had been limited to "one -time" notifications 
only. These one -time notifications tended to be information regarding a Member's laws, regulations , 
and other measures used to fulfil particular obligations of relevant agreements. As the expression 
"one-time" notifications was widely used and understood but not explicitly def ined, the proponents 
were open to stating clearly which notification requirements were meant in this context , and she 
wished also to be clear that what was being sought here was the most current information that 
should have been notified, not, for instance , information that should have been notified in 1995 , but 
which was now irrelevant. Therefore , this provision had been circumscribed even more to be that 
which is most current with respect to a one -time notification. Members would also have a year from 
the adoption of the decision to come into compliance with these notifications.  
12.23.   The administrative measures had also been separated into two  distinct paragraphs, 
paragraphs  10 and 11. Significantly, the proponents had listened to some of the concerns raised by  G/C/M/135  
 
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  Members regarding the administrative measures but continued to believe that there must be 
consequences for any lack of compliance with these pivotal obligations; however, the administrative 
measures had now been shifted within the two  sets in order to dem onstrate a more "progressive" 
nature. Moreover, what some would consider to be the more severe measures to the second  set 
contained in paragraph  11 had been moved , giving Members more time to come into compliance 
before these measures would kick in.  
12.24.   The pr oposal had also separated into its own provision, the new paragraph  12, the concept 
of deferring the administrative measures by an additional year for developing country Members that 
had requested assistance, if the Member concerned still failed to provide  the required notification.  
12.25.   The United States was appreciative of this opportunity to provide additional information on 
this notifications proposal, along with co -sponsors , who believed that improving transparency 
through existing WTO  notification requirements was a necessary institutional reform to facilitate 
future negotiations across negotiating topics, and a worthy and desirable outcome in the near term.  
12.26.   To advance this work, the United States and other proponents planned to continu e 
proponent -based discussions with all interested Members on improving this current proposed 
General Council Decision on Notifications and looked forward to hearing Members ' comments and 
engaging with Members in this regard in the days and weeks to come.  
12.27.   The representative of Japan  thanked the United States for introducing the revised proposal. 
Japan greatly appreciated the collective effort that had been made by all the co -sponsors to improve 
the proposal, as well as the various comments and feedback recei ved from all Members. In addition 
to the main changes and additional flexibilities already introduced, he highlighted the following 
three  points: (i)  the revised proposal did not create any new obligations . Its aim was to realize 
transparency, the most bas ic principle of the WTO, by ensuring that the existing notification 
requirements were fulfilled ; (ii) the administrative measures included in the proposal were 
consequences that the proponents hoped no Member would need to face, as the proposal provided 
a mechanism to help Members to complete their notifications through technical assistance. For this 
reason , developing Members were given an additional year before the administrative measures 
kicked in; and (iii)  increased transparency through notification wa s beneficial to a notifying country 
because transparency was an essential element of good governance.  
12.28.   During the conversations with developing Members, many had indicated the challenge s 
posed by capacity constraints, such as difficulties with internal coor dination with different 
government branches, or lack of human resources in preparing notifications. If the discussion in the 
WTO helped to raise awareness in Capitals concerning the importance of transparency, it would 
create a  momentum to improve internal  coordination and better mobilize domestic human resources 
so that Members would be in a position to better address their own capacity constraints.  
12.29.   Japan reiterated that enhancing transparency was the most important foundation for the 
effective functioning  of the WTO. Although this initiative might be a small step, Japan believed that 
it had a symbolic meaning given its importance as a litmus test for WTO  reform. If nothing was done 
in this area, the Organization would lose the trust of its external stakeho lders.  
12.30.   Japan remained committed to this matter and looked forward to further discussions with 
other Members.  
12.31.   The representative of Canada  thanked the United States for explaining the various 
improvements that Canada and the other co -sponsors had made to th is proposal since the previous 
CTG meeting. Based on Members' comments on that occasion , there was a recognition by all that 
the existing transparency obligations were important to the well -being of the WTO, and that failure 
to fulfil these existing obligations impaired the rights of all of Members, especially those with least 
capacity to obtain the relevant information on their own  behalf . 
12.32.   This explained why the United States had highlighted, and the co -sponsors had i ncluded  in 
the proposal , incentives to seek improved performance, such as the ability to request technical 
assistance and the ability to compile information through the TPR  process.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.33.   Undoubtedly, the provision of this technical assistance would be very help ful. Indeed, as 
noted by Guatemala at the November  2018 meeting, thanks to a national workshop organized by 
the Secretariat, Guatemala had been able to address a ten -year backlog of notifications, and to train 
a team set -up specifically to deal with its no tification obligations.  
12.34.   Moreover, the Global Trade -Related Technical Assistance Database showed that 118  national 
or regional workshops or seminars were given from 2010 to 2018 with "notifications" as the topic of 
learning. This number included 47 in the l ast three  years alone , and 31 of these 118  seminars and 
workshops had been specifically about agriculture notifications. The revision  26 of 
document  G/L/223 had shown improvements in the notification compliance rate of many developing 
Members from 2014 to 2017, particularly in respect of agriculture domestic support and export 
subsidy notifications. Therefore, with some assistance, transparency could be improved, and the 
proposal was aimed at providing such support.  
12.35.   The representative of Argentina  indicated  that his delegation would refer to the 
two communications announced by the Chairperson under this agenda item as they had common 
elements but also differences in dealing with the issue of transparency and the attention it deserved.  
12.36.   The changes introduced in the revised version of the proposal co -sponsored by Argentina 
had been explained in detail  by the delegation of the United States. In summary, this new revision 
reflected the continuous effort s of the co-sponsors , who had sought to incorporate into this  revision 
as many of the comments made by Members  as possible . 
12.37.   He highlighted the clarification  that that this proposal did not bring with it new notification 
requirements. What the proponents were seeking was to ensure that existing obligations were linked 
to consequences and that those consequences were assumed by the Members concerned. In other 
terms, a Member could currently fail to fulfil its obligations without its rights being affected ; however, 
such failure  undermine d the right of other Members to access the information that should have been 
provided in the relevant notifications. Thus, the proposal was addressing a situation that could itself 
be considered to be un fair or unacceptable.  
12.38.   In Argentina's opinion, whenever  there was deviation from WTO  rules, the rights of those 
Members with least capacity were always those most affected and undermined. Such Members did 
not have sophisticated market intelligence mechanisms  allowing them to self -generate information 
that othe r Members had committed themselves to provide.  
12.39.   The proposal consider ed the particular realities of certain developing countries. Argentina  
itself had experienced difficulties in updating its notifications in areas such as subsidies and 
countervailing measu res. Challenges still remained , as was clear from document  G/L/223/Rev.26. 
For this reason, Argentina considered that the proposal was not best served if judged simply from a 
developing country versus developed country binary standpoint.  
12.40.   In sum, Argentina considered that the two  communications had elements in common, 
including the aspiration to achieve an inclusive approach to transparency.  
12.41.   The representative of the European Union  welcomed the continued discussion of the revised 
and improved version of the transparency proposal. As noted by Argentina's Ambassador , the 
proponents considered that the proposal remained a work in progress and that the current version 
reflected how far co -sponsors had gone since the April  CTG meeting.  
12.42.   Since then, the proponents had continued their consultations with interested Members; these 
had provided valuable views and comments, including from the LDC  Group. The exchange of views 
would continue in the coming weeks and months in order to find ways of  alleviating Members' 
concerns while maintaining the essence of the proposal.  
12.43.   The Ambassador of the United States had already reiterated today that , based on the 
comments received, it was once again necessary to reassure Members that this proposal did not 
create new notification obligations. It merely promoted a collective effort to abide by obligations that 
all Members had already undertaken, and to do so in a timely manner.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.44.   Several Members were of the view that technical assistance and capacity -building w ere not 
by themselves enough to overcome the challenges that hampered some Members' ability to meet 
their transparency requirements, including the particular challenges faced by LDCs. Members had 
also indicated that the existing assistance was not sufficie ntly alleviating the challenges. The issue 
of whether or not the existing assistance was effective was indeed an important issue that Members 
needed to assess. The proponents were open to discuss this , as stated in the proposal's paragraph  2. 
The EU and other proponents looked forward to receiving Members' feedback at this meeting and to 
further working with all Members to advance the proposal.  
12.45.   The representative of New Zealand  stated that his delegation had long been an advocate for 
improving notification compliance and transparency. Transparency was fundamental to know ing 
whether or not Members were implementing their commitments, to understand ing the potential 
impact of notification non -compliance on the rights of other Members , and to inform ing continuin g 
negotiations.  
12.46.   All Members benefited from a transparent and rules -based system, and WTO oversight 
bodies , such as the CTG , would perform their monitoring function better when the full information 
about Members' policies was available in a timely manner.  
12.47.   Moreover, Members' notifications provided a valuable source of information for other 
Members and stakeholders. When combined with the work being done by the Secretariat, in 
partnership with other organi zations , such as the ITC, notifications provided valuab le information 
for SMEs, in both developing and developed Members.  
12.48.   New Zealand continued to engage actively in discussions with the other co -sponsors to 
improve the proposal, to address the concerns that Members had raised, and to ensure that the 
proposal would effectively fulfil its objective of enhancing notification performance.  New Zealand 
encouraged the wider WTO  Membership to participate constructively in the development of this 
proposal.  
12.49.   The delegate of Chinese  Taipei , associated her delegation with the statement made by the 
United States and emphasized how critical the issue of transparency was for the future work and 
sustainability of the WTO. All WTO  Members had signed up to the principle of a rules -based sys tem 
in the arena of global trade . All stakeholders expected to benefit from the system one way or 
another ; but similarly, they all had to make the same effort to ensure that it would work. Traders, 
businesses , and consumers benefited from the predictabilit y that a global rules -based system 
provided ; especially  for them , trust was the major factor . However , trust could only be built upon 
confidence and the fact that the WTO  system was based on transparency.  
12.50.   From the comments made both during the most recent CTG meeting , and in the 
consultations, there were concerns that this proposal would increase the burden of obligations on 
some Members, while others would prefer the incentives approach. She therefore reiterated that 
this revised proposal was still mainly focussed on re -committing to the existing obligations. What 
was being proposed was simply to improve the procedures in order to enhance transparency through 
clearer and stronger notification requirements. Some of the challenges and difficulties raised by 
Members had been addressed by suggestions in this proposal, and the proponents would continue 
to work with Members to identify and agree on possible ways forward.  
12.51.   As other proponents had just indicated, this revised proposal merely reflected the work-in-
progress so far , and Members' comments and feedback remained vital to the process of getting the 
necessary WTO  reforms under  way. Support for the proposal from additional Members would be 
greatly welcomed. Together with the other proponents, Chines e Taipei remained open to receiving 
any views and suggestions from Members in this regard . 
12.52.   The delegate of Costa Rica  expressed Costa Rica's satisfaction at being part of this joint 
proposal. For Costa Rica,  transparency was a core principle and a public good at the heart of the 
MTS. It was an individual responsibility and a collective obligation because without access to 
information , the e-monitoring and negotiation functions of the WTO would be weakened and  the risk 
of conflicts increased. The WTO performed a job of compiling information that would otherwise only 
be accessible to just a few Members , thus the importance of strengthening these mechanisms and 
ensuring compliance with them.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.53.   Costa Rica reiterated  that the proposal did not increase the existing notification obligations 
for any Members. Furthermore, the revised proposal offered additional incentives to address the 
difficulties that Members might have in meeting their notification obligations. Likewi se, Costa Rica 
believed that technical assistance provided by the Secretariat should help to boost national capacity 
in the area of notification s and level the playing field so that all Members could  meet their current 
notification obligations. Along these  lines, the proposal offered suitable incentives to improve the 
role and efficiency of resources for technical assistance, with support from the Secretariat.  
12.54.   Costa Rica recognized that preparing notifications often required institutional coordination, 
which was not always straightforward . Nevertheless, Costa Rica believed that this proposal offered 
additional incentives to encourage national notification system s to be given the necessary priority 
and relevant resources.  
12.55.   He thanked delegations for the ir comm ents and constructive contributions on this proposal 
given both in the context of recent consultations and here at this meeting. Costa Rica urged all 
Members to support the proposal and to contribute to improving it so that it could be come  an 
instrument th at would effectively strengthen the transparency pillar of the WTO.  
12.56.   The delegate of Australia  reiterated Australia's co -sponsorship of this proposal , the aim of 
which was to encourage better compliance with existing notification obligations. Australia cons idered 
Members' compliance with these obligations to be vital to the proper function ing of the WTO . 
Therefore, Australia welcomed the interest shown by other Members in this proposal. Australia was 
also pleased that , since the April  CTG meeting, discussions on the proposal had continued and , as a 
consequence, further changes had been made to clarify it. Among the recent changes, he highlighted 
the limiting of retrospectivity to "one -time" notifications only in paragraph  10(c). This ensured that , 
under this proposal, Members only had to provide recent and relevant information, and not, for 
example, information that should have been provided shortly after accession. Nothing in the proposal 
changed or added to any of the notification obligations requi red of any Member under the 
WTO Agreements. Indeed, the whole purpose of the proposal was to encourage and to assist 
Members in meeting their existing notification obligations. While acknowledging the capacity 
constraints of many developing Members, Austra lia noted that the WTO's notification obligations 
existed for a reason and played an important role in ensuring transparency and predictability in the 
international trading environment. In Australia's view, this proposal provided a pathway out of non -
compl iance and into compliance, including by offering technical assistance options.  
12.57.   Australia encouraged Members to view the notification system as a common resource that, 
when working as it should, would benefit everyone . In conclusion, he urged Members to co -sponsor, 
or at least to lend their support, to this proposal as a way of moving the issue forward towards a 
sustainable solution that would benefit the system and all its Members.  
12.58.   The delegate of Brazil  indicated that he would refer to the two  proposals to gether , which 
Brazil welcomed as ways to  enhance transparency and improve notification requirements in the 
WTO. Brazil understood some of the views expressed in document  JOB/CTG/15 and was aware that 
certain required notifications were indeed technical and  complex and might pose difficulties for many 
developing countries and LDCs that wished to meet their obligations in good faith. However, this 
was a matter that could be best addressed through technical cooperation and assistance , with which 
Members were r eady to collaborate. Notification and transparency were not options but obligations 
under the WTO. In this regard, Brazil concurred with the views expressed by the US and other co -
sponsors of the proposal in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 that WTO  Member s had c ommitted to 
submit notifications . Brazil's views also coincided with those of the proponents in terms of the need 
to develop a mechanism to ensure the effective presentation of timely and complete notifications.  
12.59.   Brazil also acknowledged and welcomed the revised version  of the proposal , which had 
resulted from an effort towards inclusiveness and consensus -building, as highlighted in the Council's 
previous meeting. Brazil agreed that transparency was essential to a well -functioning WTO. It also  
believed that there were no insurmountable hurdles in this area, and that Members should be able 
to work together to find feasible solutions to address this issue. Brazil stood ready to engage 
constructively with all Member s to find practical solutions and to develop a mechanism to encourage 
better notification compliance.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.60.   The delegate of Saint Lucia , on behalf of the ACP  Group , thanked the co -sponsors of 
document  JOB/C TG/14 for its latest revision. Notification and transparency remained critical to the 
good functioning of any governance system and the WTO was not an exception  to this rule . 
Transparency provided confirmation that Members were complying with their commitments; it also 
provided a mechanism through which Members could audit their own procedure s against best 
practice. More fundamentally, transparency ensured that WTO  Member s could report to the 
Membership on matters of common concern. Hence, the notification system provided an agreed 
procedural mechanism for achieving  the established aim of tran sparency.  
12.61.   The revised proposal aimed to tone  down the obligation on counter -notification and also 
bifurcated the administrative measures to be applied for non -compliance. The proposal further 
attempted to address the issue of capacity constraints by establ ishing a role for the Secretariat to 
support Members that required assistance as well as potentially submitting notification s on behalf of 
a requesting country.  
12.62.   The ACP  Group commended the proponents for their efforts but believed that , for countries 
already experiencing difficulties in implementing their existing obligations, establishing a new regime 
of sanctions or , as the proponents had euphemistically referred to  it, "administrative measures", 
would not serve to remedy non -compliance with transparency commitments. At best , these 
sanctions might further call into question the essential equity within the system and , at worst, they 
would erode the confidence of Members in assuming new binding rules.  
12.63.   At a time when the system was facing unprecedented and ex istential challenges, the 
Members that were most likely to be negatively affected by such punitive measures were the very 
Members that remained faithful  and steadfast in their support of  multilateralism and  the rules -based 
system.  
12.64.   The ACP  Group acknowledged that some Members were tardy in fulfilling notification 
obligations . However, this tardiness was a consequence of limited internal capacity that could not 
be addressed by short -term technical assistance interventions provided by the Secretaria t. For some 
Member s, ministries with responsibility for trade were staffed by a complement of three or 
sometimes four  officials who together were responsible for negotiations, both bilateral and 
multilateral , the implementation of regional commitments with in regional integration processes , the 
implementation of new commitments such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement and Economic 
Partnership Agreements , monitoring and responding to ongoing negotiations at the WTO such as the 
Fisheries Subsidies negotiations , and responsible, too, for the raft of plurilateral engagements under 
the self -styled joint statement initiatives. Coverage of these commitments , and more, left very little 
room for data collection and analysis as it related to transparency. In the face o f these daunting 
challenges, the ACP  Members had made every effort to meet their obligations. Their tardiness in 
meeting related commitments was in large measure a result of capacity constraints and not the 
result of proactive or strategic non -compliance.  
12.65.   The ACP  Member s were keen to find a solution to this issue but urged the proponents to 
seek more constructive and positive approaches to assist in bridging information and transparency 
gaps. Therefore, they urged the proponents to assess approaches based o n positive, trust building 
measures that could also aid Members in reaching a higher level of compliance with their notification 
obligations. Such an approach would not only address gaps in transparency but also strengthen trust 
in the system, particularly  at a time when Members were contemplating new notification obligations 
within the fisheries subsidies negotiations.  
12.66.   He again thanked the co -sponsors for their efforts and looked forward to further engagement 
that would lead to a positive and constructive result.  
12.67.   The representative of Singapore  indicated that he would refer to both the proposals under 
this agenda item. He thanked the proponents of the "Procedures to Enhance Transparency and 
Strengthen Notification Requirements Under WTO  Agreements" for havi ng consulted other Members, 
and also for having taken their comments into account to improve the revised draft. In particular, 
Singapore welcomed the clarification that the sanctions would not apply retroactively, and that a 
grace period would be provided for one -off notifications. Singapore also appreciated the re -arranged 
order for the application of administrative measures, with heavier measures imposed over time. 
These amendments went in the right direction. Nevertheless , Singapore continued to hold str ongly G/C/M/135  
 
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  the view that Members with genuine challenges in meeting their notification obligations due to 
capacity and other domestic constraints should not be penalized.  
12.68.   Singapore also firmly supported the broader aim of improving transparency and 
strengthenin g Members' compliance with notification requirements under the WTO  Agreements.  
12.69.   Indeed, there were gaps in the notification records of both developed and developing 
countries. Hence, it was the responsibility of all Members, both developed and developing, t o make 
their utmost efforts to fulfil their notification obligations in a timely and accurate manner. There was 
no excuse for continuing to maintain the status quo.  
12.70.   All Members would benefit from greater transparency regarding their respective trade 
policies. Notifications provided advance information of draft measures that might come into effect 
and of changes to existing measures. This allowed businesses to adapt to those measures and 
provided for predictability in the broader trading environment.  
12.71.   Singapo re also welcomed the ongoing dialogue aimed at improving the effectiveness of 
technical assistance provided to developing country Members to meet their notification obligations. 
The discussions on how best to help improve compliance among those Members that faced genuine 
capacity constraints should be intensified , including through the provision of more tailor -made 
technical assistance and capacity -building.  
12.72.   Singapore shared both proposals' urgency to improve notifications and transparency in 
WTO Committees, and looked forward to working with all Members to deliver concrete outcomes.  
12.73.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  thanked the proponents for their joint 
communication. Strengthening and improving the WTO's functioning, including its monitoring  
mechanism, was of utmost importance and was long overdue. The Russian Federation considered 
that enhancing transparency and improving the effectiveness of notification requirements was an 
integral part of WTO  reform . The Russian Federation stood ready to engage in further discussions 
on this issue in order to ensure the predictability and transparency of Members' trade regimes.  
12.74.   The delegate of South Africa  thanked the co -sponsors of the revised document and their 
explanation of changes made to the original  proposal. However, her delegation did not believe that 
the changes introduced to this revision addressed the concerns previously raised by other Members 
at this Council . South Africa considered that punitive approaches were not helpful and represented 
a disproportionate response to the inability of many developing countries to fulfil their notification 
obligations. The proponents also claimed that the issue of counter -notifications had been removed 
from the text ; however , a close reading confirmed that par agraph  9 still provided for this possibility. 
A fundamental difficulty that underlay the approach advocated under paragraph  9 was that it 
proposed to expand counter -notifications to all the Agreements and Understandings listed under 
paragraph  1. However, t his was done without following the amendment processes prescribed under 
the Marrakesh Agreement, thus severely affecting the rights and obligations of Members.  
12.75.   Clearly the same rational e applied to paragraph  4, where it had been proposed that 
Members' TPRs  further expand inquisitions on transparency and notification. South Africa noted 
clearly that paragraph  (a)(i) of Annex  3 of the TPRM recognized that that a Member's TPR was not 
intended to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations or t o impose new policy 
commitments on Members.  
12.76.   While the revised paper failed to address the capacity constraints of developing Members, it 
increased notification requirements on final bound rate Aggregate Measurement of Support 
(AMS) commitments for develope d Members to two  years. Furthermore, the assumption that more 
technical assistance would adequately address the notification deficits of developing countries 
missed the point. Broadly speaking , much of the capacity constraints faced by most developing 
countries stem med from chronic development constraints and the lack of infrastructure and human 
resources.  
12.77.   Additionally, the proposal only covered Agreements in Annex  1A, while some developed 
Members had chronic notification shortcomings in other covered agree ments. South Africa believed 
that selective approaches and cherry picking was not helpful; therefore, South Africa did not believe G/C/M/135  
 
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  that punitive approaches should drive transparency, and nor could it accept the increased burden of 
notification and transpar ency for which this proposal was advocating.  
12.78.   The delegate of Switzerland  supported the objective of the revised proposal, aimed at 
improving transparency and compliance with notification obligations. The monitoring function of the 
WTO could be carried out effectively if Members scrupulously respected their notification obligat ions. 
Switzerland appreciated that some of its own concerns had been addressed, in particular on the 
amended retroactivity clause.  
12.79.   Improving transparency was an important element in WTO reform. In this vein , Switzerland 
believed that solutions that signifi cantly improved the situation while considering the administrative 
constraints faced by some Members, particular ly LDCs, should be developed . In conclusion, her 
delegation looked forward to actively pursuing discussions with co -sponsors to work out and imp rove 
this proposal to strengthen the monitoring function of the WTO, which was in everyone's interest.  
12.80.   The delegate of Norway  welcomed both the Revision  2 of JOB/CTG/14 and JOB/CTG/15 from 
seven  developing Members. He welcomed the amendments made to Revision  1, which now gave the 
document a more logical and streamlined appearance. A substantive amendment was postponing 
the economic penalty stage  of one year for all Members.  
12.81.   However, a follow -up qu estion was whether the proposed economic penalty, at least for 
DS:1, domestic support in agriculture, was now almost redundant. According to Norway's 
understanding, the penalty for DS:1  notifications in agriculture would now kick in after 52  months 
for dev eloped Members and 64  months for developing Members.  
12.82.   With one notable exception, current performance in DS:1  notifications was already better 
than this  suggested . The  developed Member with the longest delay had notified DS:1 after 
41 months. The developing  Member with the second  longest delay had notified DS:1 after 
51 months. However, this proposal could still  have an impact on the 28  Members that had never 
submitted a DS:1  notification. More than half of these were LDCs, and Members could not expect 
them to be able to pay extra fees to the WTO. To conclude, the proposed economic penalty , at least 
for DS:1, seemed primarily to be politically motivated. It distracted attention from more important 
discussions in th e WTO.  
12.83.   Norway's second  main reservation against the proposal remained unchanged as Norway 
opposed the idea that the Secretariat could notify on behalf of Members. The Secretariat could not 
accept to do this either as it was obliged to preserve its neutral position.  
12.84.   Regarding JOB/CTG/15 , from seven  developing Members, Norway had taken due note of the 
capacity constraints of most developing Members, and also realized that lack of continuity in 
administration was a bigger problem for most developing Members th an for developed ones. Norway 
agreed that there was room for improvement in notification practices for all Members, including 
those Members with the best performance, and had similar views as the proponents regarding 
economic penalties and notifications by  the Secretariat. However, Norway could not subscribe to the 
idea of a reform pause in the WTO. Any new negotiated outcome would include new commitments 
and it was necessary to monitor these commitments based on notifications from Members. This was 
also re levant for the moderate Swiss proposal on non -preferential rules of origin, of which Norway 
was a co -sponsor.  
12.85.   If developing Members were to maintain that they could not do more reporting than they 
did currently , it would effectively put an end to implement ing new commitments and negotiated 
outcomes in the WTO. Measured by the number of recent proposals from developing Members, 
Norway did not think that this was the intention of developing Members.  
12.86.   The delegate of Ukraine  thanked all co -sponsors for the prop osals on strengthening 
transparency and notification requirements under the WTO  Agreements. Ukraine acknowledged the 
essential role of transparency in the implementation process of the WTO  Agreements and considered 
notifications to be a key instrument for assess ing Members' compliance with their substantive 
WTO commitments. Transparency and notifications were also tools to build and reaffirm trust 
between WTO  Members. Ukraine supported an open discussion of potential options that could further 
enhance trans parency and was willing to cooperate to achieve greater trust among Members.  G/C/M/135  
 
- 47 - 
 
  12.87.   The delegate of Uruguay  welcomed the revised version of the transparency proposal , 
incorporating modifications in response to Members' comments; it constituted an improvement with  
regard to the previous text. Nevertheless, Uruguay reiterated that the recommendations or 
proposals on the notifications indicated must adhere strictly to what was mandated in the 
WTO Agreements. The modifications made to the proposal had much merit,  but greater effort should 
be deployed to seek a solution to surmount the punitive approach. An approach  based on incentives 
for cooperation and technical assistance  would be preferable , while ensuring faithful compliance with 
the obligations underta ken. 
12.88.   Similarly, coherence in the approaches for dealing with the different Agreements, including 
in the case of DS:1  notifications in agriculture , should also be ensured.  
12.89.   The delegate of Nigeria  thanked the proponents for the revision of the proposed Decis ion on 
Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under 
WTO Agreements , contained in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2. However, Nigeria noted that there 
were no significant difference s between Revision  1 and the current Revision  2. One would have 
expected that Revision  2 would reflect the feedback and comments from developing Members on 
this issue, especially those that had been made at the previous CTG meeting , where the additional 
notification obligation of Revision  1 had been objected to, given inherent capacity constraints. But 
this had not been the case.  
12.90.   Nigeria noted that the proponents had expunged the paragraph on counter -notification from 
the proposal's Revision  2. However, the effect of paragraph  9 in Revision  2 was the sa me as 
paragraph  5 of Revision  1. Nigeria believed that there was no doubt as to the potential effect of this 
paragraph, especially as it would most certainly trigger the proliferation of counter -notifications to 
which developing Members would need to respond.  
12.91.   Paragraph  4, which effectively expanded Members' Trade Policy Review obligations, as well 
as paragraphs  5 and 7 , regarding six -month notice of explanations of delay , and information on 
delays in notification due to capacity constraint s, respective ly, would further stretch the already 
overstretched lean resources of developing counties.  
12.92.   At the Council's previous meeting , Nigeria had noted that a good number of developing 
countries lacked institutional capacity to comply with their respective notific ation obligations. These 
challenges included  the following : a shortage of adequate manpower in Government Ministries, 
Departments , and Agencies , with in -depth knowledge of WTO  Agreements and their applications , as 
well as weak inter -Agency channel s of comm unication. This was particularly problematic given that 
officials dealing with trade policy issues cut across several Ministries, Departments , and Agencies. 
Notification required the participation of several Ministries and Agencies that , in most cases , strived 
hard to preserve their respective mandate and that were not always willing to share information. 
These challenges were unlikely to be addressed by the capacity -building provisions of paragraph  7 
of Revision  2. In Nigeria's view, the punitive administr ative measures set out in paragraphs  10 and 
11 of Revision  2 amounted to punishing developing countries for being poor given that their ability 
to comply with notification obligation s was directly related to their level of economic development.  
12.93.   Nigeria believed that transparency and notifications were issues of critical and fundamental 
importance to the effective functioning of the MTS. Nigeria was therefore open to engaging in 
discuss ions on a careful and balanced approach to transparency that would ensure that Members, 
especially developing countries, were not punished unduly as a result of onerous notification 
obligations.  
12.94.   The delegate of Mexico  thanked the co -sponsors for their intr oduction to the revised 
proposal. Mexico considered that this revised proposal constituted a significant contribution to 
incentivising transparency and improving Members' compliance with their notification commitments.  
12.95.   Although Mexico welcomed the improvem ents that the co -proponents had explained to 
Members and  continued to consider that this revision went in the right direction, Mexico at the same 
time regretted that different treatment remained for DS:1  notifications in Agriculture, granting an 
additional  time-frame before a Member would be subject to administrative measures.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.96.   Therefore , Mexico believed that there was room for still further improvement and that, in 
order to meet Members' concerns, this paragraph should be subject to a precise date and not t o the 
eventual conclusion of a discussion.  
12.97.   Mexico was convinced that what the WTO require d were rules that were not permissive and 
that dealt with all topics in the same way.  
12.98.   Mexico indicated that  the document presented by Cuba,  India,  Nigeria,  South Afric a, Tunisia,  
Uganda,  and Zimbabwe,  was still under consideration in Capital, but by way of a preliminary 
observation , Mexico welcomed this contribution to the discussion.  
12.99.   Mexico was convinced that improving the notification and monitoring procedures for the 
commitments that Members had undertaken was of great importance; for this reason, Mexico 
reiterated its thanks to the proponents of both documents.  
12.100.   The delegate of Turkey  indicated that he would refer to both documents under this agenda 
item. As stated by his delegation since the very beginning of this discussion, Turkey strongly believed 
that transparency was the centrepiece of the whole functioning of the WTO and that proposals to 
enhance it were always welco med. Turkey had closely followed the constructive efforts of the 
proponents for the effective implementation of notification requirements and commended their 
intense  work in order to craft a new guide for strengthening transparency. Since the proposal was 
first introduced, Turkey had stated repeated ly that the proposed actions and disciplines should 
contribute towards solidifying Members' compliance with notifications but should not discourage 
them from fulfilling their obligations. Therefore, Turkey had duly raised its concerns on the proposed 
"administrative measures" and had underlined the need for Members to address the capacity 
constraints of developing countries. Based on this understanding, Turkey had carefully reviewed the 
latest revision of document  JOB/CTG/14 and had noted that the concept of administrative measures 
still remained and was unchanged, despite the recent , if slight , modifications with regard to this 
element.  
12.101.   Consequently , Turkey again emphasized its concern that the administrative meas ures 
against non-compliance could have the unintended effect of pushing Members even further away 
from the system. The approach of placing punitive measures at the centre  of any proposed reform  
could have a marginalizing effect, especially on developing WT O Members.  
12.102.   Turkey believed that developmental concerns should go hand  in hand in each facet of the 
WTO, and that all proposals, including the proposal in question , had to take Members' capacity 
constraints  fully into consideration . In this regard, Turkey shared the perspective and "inclusive 
approach" of document  JOB/CTG/15.  
12.103.   Turkey stood ready to work constructively with the Membership in order to reach a balance 
between the challenges of developing Members and the vital issue of e nhancement of transparency.  
12.104.   The delegate of India thanked the proponents for the revised proposal contained in 
document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 and reiterated that India strongly believed in transparency as one of 
the pillars of the rules -based MTS as it provided  information and clarity to Members on the laws and 
regulations, facts and figures, as well as measures impacting upon international trade that were 
being taken by other Members.  
12.105.   Many Members, including India, had significantly improved the ir notification compliance, 
despite the difficulties in collecting and collating information as per notification requirements. 
However, India was disappointed to see that no major substantive changes  had been made in the 
second  version of the proposal, despite the detaile d concerns expressed by Members at the Council's 
previous meeting , in April  2019. 
12.106.   Only minor changes seemed to have been made to the earlier version; the only noticeable 
changes related to the prospective application of the provisions of the discipline and  enabling 
language to open the doors for making counter -notifications against developing countries, including 
LDCs, at the drop of a hat.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.107.   No changes had been made to the major and substantive part  of the document , such as 
the proposed administrative measur es and the process of surveillance.  
12.108.   India reiterated that this proposal did not factor in the actual difficulties being faced by 
Members in the area of achieving compliance with the ir notification requirements. Several developing 
countries were facing cons traints in terms of human resources, institutional arrangements, database 
structures, infrastructure requirements , and financial resources. Given these facts, there would of 
course be difficulties, as well as delays, in collect ing, collating,  and preparing  notifications.  
12.109.   In addition, several notification requirements involved interpretational issues. Hence, India 
believed that technical assistance from the Secretariat  by itself, and  for a short  duration , would be 
insufficient  to overcome these challenges . Moreover, given the limited resources of the Secretariat 
vis-à-vis Members' requirements, it would not by itself be able to ensure adherence to the strict 
notification timelines.  
12.110.   The proposal as it currently stood would not only impact negatively upon the existing 
capacity constraints of developing countries, including LDCs , limiting their capacity to meet the ir 
notification  obligations, but would also even burden them with additio nal obligations. At the same 
time, the proposal was silent on a number of issues where there was a need for constant surveillance 
in terms of Members' compliance in meeting their obligations, particularly on the part of developed 
countries.  
12.111.   In summary , India would find it difficult to agree to any proposal that provided for penalties 
and administrative actions in case of default, rather than making an effort to understand the 
difficulties facing a large number of developing Members, given the breadth and le ngth of notification 
requirements under the various WTO  Agreements and Members' capacity constraints.  
12.112.   In India's view, what was required was not to assume wilful default, but rather to encourage 
those that had been able to update the ir notification s, despi te the great difficulty in doing so , and at 
the same time to excuse those that had not been able to notify for various reasons, including capacity 
constraints.  
12.113.   India considered that understanding and empathy, rather than sanctions eroding equity 
and trust , were what was needed at present. Therefore, India strongly advocated for appropriate 
support to notify , which  would encourage Members to improve upon their internal capacity to notify 
on time, instead of administrative actions . 
12.114.   The delegate of Israel  thanked the co -sponsors of the revised proposal and gladly noted 
that it had incorporated some of the comments and suggestions expressed by Members at the 
CTG's previous meeting. Israel welcomed this constructive approach. One of the positive by -products 
of the proposal had been to draw attention to the need for all Members to intensify their efforts 
regarding compliance with their notification obligations.  
12.115.   Some of the changes that Israel considered to be positive related to the clarification of the 
retroa ctive treatment of notifications , as well as moving back the financial administrative measures. 
Israel believed that there was still room for improvement regarding the incentive to continue 
notifying once a Member had fallen under an administrative measure  and was confident that 
Members were heading in the right direction. Israel looked forward to participating  in further 
discussions and consultations on this matter.  
12.116.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  appreciated the two  communications regarding 
transpar ency and notification, which were crucial elements for the WTO's functioning. Indeed, in 
order to make the WTO more relevant and useful, enhancing transparency and strengthening 
notification  compliance  were fundamental. Since the establishment of the WTO i n 1995, Members 
had made continued efforts to enhance transparency and notification. Yet this issue still remained a 
big challenge , despite its importance and Members' interest  in it. The severe imbalance in the level 
of notifications among Members called for a prompt and appropriate response.  
12.117.   At the CTG 's April  meeting, Korea had emphasized the need for a balanced approach , 
meaning  that the WTO  Membership needed to consider the necessity for notification s, as well as the 
challenges faced by some Members that lacked the capacity to fully implement their obligations. In G/C/M/135  
 
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  this regard, there were different perspectives between the two  communications as well as 
contrasting opinions among Members.  
12.118.    Korea appreciated the efforts made by the co -sponsors of document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 
to reflect the comments made by Members at the CTG 's previous  meeting , such as on amending the 
counter -notification part , for example . However, there still remained a need to further consider the 
feasibility of administrative measures. Korea was not yet fully convinced as to under what condition s 
any measures would be triggered.  
12.119.   Regarding the second  communication, document  JOB/CTG/15, Korea welcomed the work 
of highligh ting some developing Members'  reality by describing the ir lack of capacity. However, 
considering the necessity of transparency, Members had to focus more on how to strengthen 
Members' capacity through technical assistance from the Secretariat. If Members were to consider 
this matter seriously, they would see that it was time for all Members to take actions towards 
substantive progress, and not to step back and wait. Therefore, Korea suggest ed that Members 
could now channel this heightened interest in and at tention to the issue of transparency and 
notifications into a constructive dialogue and in-depth discussion. In short, Korea believed that it 
would be helpful to hold an informal meeting among interested Members , including co -sponsors , in 
a cooperative and  compromising spirit. To this end, Korea stood willing to participate actively and 
constructively in any further dialogue to facilitate this process.  
12.120.   The delegate of Chad, on behalf of the LDC Group , indicated that his Group did not question 
the good intentions behind this proposal. As a matter of principle, the LDCs considered that 
transparency was essential for the proper functioning of the MTS and of the WTO and favoured this 
idea insofar as it was  and insofar as it remained beneficial to all.  
12.121.   As to the substance of the proposal , and based on discussions held between the LDC  Group 
and certain co -sponsors, the LDCs continued to closely monitor the suggestions and efforts under 
way; they had also expressed their concerns  in this regard . In their view , the issue of reform 
remained  topical, and the LDCs wished to be involved in the debate in order to ensure a fair and 
equitable outcome for all its Members.  
12.122.   The LDCs were in a situation that did not yet allow them to fully and easily grasp the 
magnitude and accuracy of existing notification requirements. Therefore, they considered that new 
obligations, including sanctions, would impact heavily  upon them . In their view, what was important 
for the WTO was to do more to help LDCs  in the form , for example , of notification reminders, special 
assistance in identifying required notifications, and preparation and submission of notifications. The 
LDCs expressed concern over the proposal to set up a reminder mechanism  with sanctions once a 
notification deadline had been passed.  
12.123.   The LDCs were of the view that this new iteration of the proposal opened interesting 
perspectives for them but considered that it was by and large insufficient vis-à-vis the difficulties 
that they encountered and the challenges that they faced.  
12.124.   The LDC  Group favoured a positive approach to reform that would not paralyse them but 
that instead would strengthen inclusiveness and multilateralism in a context of transparency. The 
LDCs would pur sue discussions with a view to achieving an outcome that best addressed these 
needs.  
12.125.   The delegate of China  indicated that she would refer to both of the documents under this 
agenda item. Regarding  document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2, China appreciated the co -sponsor s' efforts in 
continuing discussion with other Members and was pleased to see some improvements in the revised 
text. However, punitive measures , which had been strongly opposed by other Members , still 
remained in the revised proposal. Additionally, the rev ised document did not refer to the notification 
obligations under the Services and TRIPS  Agreements. China believed that these obligations should 
also be an integral part of any discussion on enhancing transparency and strengthening notifications. 
In this vein, China requested further explanation on the new paragraph  9, including  the meaning of 
"in accordance with the Agreement and understandings listed in paragraph  1", because only a couple 
of Agreements and understandings contained counter -notification pr ovisions.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.126.   In addition, China believed that full account should be taken of the capacity constraints of 
developing Members, especially LDCs, as reflected in document  JOB/CTG/15. China considered that 
the concerns and proposals set out in document  JOB/CTG/15 deserved further discussion and full 
consideration. Therefore, further dialogue and consultations were needed so that the difficulties of 
developing Members could be better understood and addressed.  
12.127.   China also shared the concerns of other develo ping Members and , like others, it would do 
its utmost to fulfil the required notifications. Indeed, on 30  June 2019, China had submitted its 
industrial subsidies notifications , including with regard to its fisheries subsidies , within the relevant 
deadline.  The preparation of such notifications had been difficult , but China had prepared them 
nevertheless . 
12.128.   As indicated in document  JOB/CTG/15, developing Members might be failing to fully fulfil 
their notification obligations because of capacity constraints ; however, the document also showed 
that developed Members were not performing perfectly  either . The document contained a few 
examples of where developed Members had failed to fulfil their notification obligations. Therefore , 
to enhance transparency and streng then notifications in the WTO, it was crucial for developed 
Members to play a leading role , while developing Members should also endeavour to do their best.  
12.129.   The delegate of Paraguay  indicated that she would refer to both of the documents under 
this agenda item. With regard to the proposal on procedures to enhance transparency put forward 
by Argentina, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, Chinese 
Taipei , and the United States,  she said that her authorities were still analysing the revised version 
and that the comments that she would make therefore be only preliminary. Paraguay welcomed the 
developments introduced in the document's current version but remained concerned about the 
differentiate d treatment of domestic support notifications in agriculture, where backlogs  were at 
their worst . An issue of particular concern was the reference to an update of document  G/AG/2, for 
which a timeline had even been established, when the amendment or updati ng of this document 
was in fact still the subject of debate in the Committee on Agriculture, where consensus on this 
matter had not yet been reached.  
12.130.   In relation to the proposal entitled "An inclusive approach to transparency and notification 
requirements in the WTO" , submitted by Cuba, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda,  and Zimbabwe,  
she indicated that her authorities were also analysing  the proposal , but that , by way of preliminary 
comment, Paraguay was interested in working on tariff simplification , an element that, in its view, 
could contribute to enhancing the transparency and predictability of trade. Paraguay would provide 
further comments once her authorities had completed their review . 
12.131.   The delegate of Bangladesh  associated his delegation with the statement made by Chad on 
behalf of the LDC  Group and St Lucia on behalf of the ACP  Group. Bangladesh believed that 
transparency was an essential pillar of good governance ; however, it was not the only one. There 
were many ways to ensure transparency and t he objective of transparency would not be served by 
having just a few notification templates. Different agreements had diverse notification provisions , 
and LDCs' severe technical capacity constraints,  including their unique internal coordination 
challenges  and capability vacuum , would not be addressed, necessarily, by providing a few 
customized training program mes. While Bangladesh deeply appreciated the ongoing efforts of the 
WTO Secretariat to provide technical support, Bangladesh believed that LDC  capaci ty constraint s 
had to date not been improved to the expected level. Therefore, it was necessary first to investigate 
why the existing technical assistance program mes on notification enhancement had not been 
fulfilling Members' expectations.  
12.132.   Without practically addressing the notification gaps, administrative or punitive measures 
by themselves w ould not ensure the much -desired level playing field for all. Every Member had to 
take responsibility in this regard . Without collective and affirmativ e action, Members might not 
connect to the true spirit of multilateralism. Therefore, Bangladesh encouraged Members to review 
the existing difficulties in the area of notification s and, where required, to simplify the relevant 
templates and procedures. Ban gladesh looked forward to working with all Members  to this end . 
12.133.   The delegate of Egypt  shared the proponents' view of transparency being a cornerstone of 
the WTO and one of its main principles. However, Egypt believed that only a cooperative rather than 
a punitive approach could lead to a successful enhance ment of  transparency. Egypt also highlighted G/C/M/135  
 
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  that delay s encountered by Members in fulfilling their notification obligations could sometimes be 
attributed solely to resource constraints, which were not limited to constraints in terms of human 
expertise , but included also financial and technological constraints, and institutional inefficiencies 
and poor coordination between different governmental agencies , especially on the subnational level 
and with regard to the aggregation of data. Therefore, the solution to such problems could not be 
simply reduced to technical assistance.  
12.134.   Egypt was of the view that any constructive discussion in this regard should start by a 
comprehensive assessment of the current notifi cation obligations in all the WTO  Agreements by the 
respective Committees to ensure that they were not unnecessarily complex or burdensome and to 
examine whether such notifications could be simplified in a manner that would enable Members 
easily to keep up with their obligations, as well as an assessment of the existing technical assistance 
provisions to ensure that they met the actual needs of developing countries and at the same time  
incentivized countries that had not been in full compliance with their notification requirements to 
bring their notifications up to date.  
12.135.   Egypt believed that care should be taken not to deviate from what Ministers had recognized 
in Marrakesh regard ing "the need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, 
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in internati onal trade", 
and to avoid a situation where some Members were marginalized  even further . 
12.136.   The delegate of Chile welcomed the revised proposal on transparency and reiterated Chile's 
commitment to transparency and notification obligations. Chile had always co nsidered that the 
notification obligations in the various WTO  Agreements had been under taken by all Members at the 
establishment of the WTO. Notification obligation s had been assumed on a voluntary basis and were 
an expression and a reflection of Members' compromise and commitments in the WTO. Therefore, 
for Chile,  compliance was essential, and no one was questioning the low level of Members' 
compliance regarding notification obligation s. This was a major challenge for the Organization that 
must be resolved . Chile also believed that the circumstances of some Members needed to be 
considered as not all Members were able to meet their notification obligations. In this regard, Chile 
supported technical assistance activities for those Members facing specific diff iculties because of 
capacity  constraints.  
12.137.   Chile also thanked the proponents for having included Members' observations and 
comments. The proposal had been improved upon over time; nevertheless , Chile considered that 
the issues of agriculture  notifications and punitive measures needed to be revisited in a dialogue  
based on a new approach, some adjustments in the proposal, and much comprehension and 
understanding.  
12.138.   The delegate of Thailand  indicated that he would address both submissions under this 
agenda item and thanked the proponents. He welcomed the urgency created in trying to address 
the important issue of transparency and notification requirements and reiterated Thailand's 
continued support for all efforts at enhancing transparency and notification records , which were 
crucial to the WTO's work. He thanked the proponents of JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 for the ir constructive 
approach and improved submission , which had taken into account Members' c oncerns as expressed 
at previous meetings. Thailand believed that Members remained committed to fulfilling  their 
transparency obligations. However, as indicated by the proponents of document  JOB/CTG/15, many 
developing Members, especially LDCs, had legitim ate capacity constraints that prevented them from 
submit ting timely and complete notifications. Thailand therefore considered that further discussions 
were necessary in order to find ways to assess and properly address such constraints in addition to 
the technical assistance to be provided by the WTO  Secretariat. Thailand looked forward to further 
engaging with the proponents and all interested  Members on this issue.  
12.139.   The delegate of Indonesia  thanked the proponents of both documents for their submissions. 
Indonesia believed that transparency was an important pillar of the MTS. However, Indonesia 
continued to have serious concern s over the revised proposal to enhance transparency and 
strengthen notifications contained in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2. It seemed to Indonesia that the 
proponents had not taken into consideration Members' comments from previous meetings, but had 
instead introduced only semantic changes , without substance, as had previously been highlighted 
by South Africa. Moreover, the revised propo sal had still extended privileges for Members with AMS 
in Domestic Support equal to those that did not ; it was therefore flawed in suggesting a 
"one-size--fits-all" notification system. It would also place an additional burden on developing G/C/M/135  
 
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  Members beyond the obligations set out in the WTO Agreements, especially by suggesting 
administrative sanction s. The suggested proposal would only result in alienating developing Members 
since it failed to address the developmental challenges face d by many of them.  
12.140.   Indon esia concurred with the viewpoint expressed in document JOB/CTG/15, supported by 
a broad range of Members, that what was required was an inclusive approach to transparency and 
notification requirement s. This document highlighted many important aspects of the transparency 
issue that were lacking in the proposal set out in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2. In Indonesia's view, 
document  JOB/CTG/15 therefore deserved Members' further consideration . 
12.141.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  thank ed the proponents for their effo rts in preparing 
their submissions under this agenda item. During the discussion s Members had shared their 
respective concerns on the effective functioning of the WTO and had emphasized the crucial role in 
the MTS played by transparency.  
12.142.   On the first  proposal ( document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2), she referred to the previous 
comments and questions made by her delegation at the previous meeting.8 However, she indicated 
that the revised proposal seemed to address Members' concerns on non -compliance not caused by 
capacity constraints. In the revised version of the proposal , the co -proponents had elaborated on 
the assistance and capacity -building elements for Members with difficulties. To make such assistance 
and capacity -building meaningful to beneficiaries and to the system, the new paper from developing 
Members ( document  JOB/CTG/15) provided a clearer picture of some of the challenges that these 
Members encountered. Therefore, these documents established a good basis for discussion. The 
two documents also had comm on elements, including capacity -building, rationali zation of 
notification requirements, and the common goal of improving notification performance.  
12.143.   After almost two  years' consideration of the first  proposal, Hong Kong, China considered 
that it might be a g ood time to reflect on the process of the discussion s, particularly as many 
comments had been made at CTG  formal meetings and then the proponents had taken months to 
revise their proposal s for further comments at a subsequent CTG formal meeting. Hong Kong,  China 
questioned if this was the most fruitful approach.  
12.144.   Her delegation joined  the Republic of  Korea in encouraging the proponents of the 
two papers, as well as all interested Members , to engage quickly in informal discussions . She also 
suggested to Members that the CTG  Chair could consider holding informal consultations to encourage 
Members to discuss the details of the two  papers in an interactive and results -oriented way with a 
view to agree ing on concrete steps to be taken at the  Council's subsequent formal meeting.  
12.145.   With regard to the second  paper, her authorities were still studying the details. However, 
on a preliminary basis , Hong Kong, China noted that the introductory part of the paper had 
mentioned activities that seemed to "increase transparency obligations under the guise of efficient 
rationali zation of notification procedures and formats". One of the examples of such activities cited 
was Switzerland's proposal in the Committee on Rules of Origin  (CRO)  (document  G/RO/W/182) . 
Hong Kong, China, as a co -sponsor of the proposal on non -preferential rules of origin in question, 
considered that this might not be the case, particularly given that such a proposal, or the proposed 
template, was  intended as  a tool to facilitate the fulfilment of the existing notification requirement 
under the Agreement on Rules of Origin. Hong Kong, China looked forward to working with Members 
in the CRO to continue refining, understanding , and making the proposal work for all.  
12.146.   The delegate of Panama  thanked the co -proponents for this revised version of their 
document on transparency. Transparency was of vital importance to Panama and Panama was 
interested in continuing bilateral or informal discussions with the proponents. He also thanked the 
co-sponsor s of the new document for their hard work and indicated that his delegation would provide 
comments in due course . 
12.147.   The delegate of the European Union  thanked Members for their comments and highlighted 
the unanimous recognition that transparency was fundamen tal to the WTO and its Members, and 
that notifications were a key pillar of transparency.  
                                                
8 Document  G/C/M/134, paragraph  9.85. G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.148.   He recalled that this proposal was a work in progress. Together with the views already 
collected through the proponents' informal engagement with Members, the comment s received at 
this meeting were useful contributions that helped the proponents to better circumscribe what they 
particularly needed to further reflect upon in order for further progress to take place. The 
co-sponsors would consider these comments in their  further deliberations.  
12.149.   With regard to the challenges faced by a number of developing countries, and particularly 
LDCs, when dealing with notifications, he indicated that the proposal already placed a strong 
emphasis on technical assistance and capacity -building. The application of administrative measures 
would even be deferred a year for developing and LDCs that had submitted information on the 
assistance and capacity -building that the y required.  
12.150.   Some had indicated that technical assistance would not adequately meet the needs  of 
developing countries, and that technical assistance was already available. Therefore, the proponents 
would like to hear more from those Members that had already sought such assistance with a view 
to better understanding their e xperience , and whether , and how, in their view, such assistance could 
better contribute to improving notification compliance. Some developing country Members, including 
LDCs, for example, had insisted upon the institutional and capacity constraints that they 
encounter ed, and human capacity constraints  in particular . It was important to elaborate further on 
these issues. Situations were obviously diverse and varied from one Member to another. Situations 
might also evolve over  time. Based on the factual infor mation included in the Secretariat's report on 
notifications (G/L/223/Rev.26), there were areas where a large body of the Membership, including 
the LDCs, had notified ; for instance , in certain areas under agriculture. However, in other areas 
Members' performance was irregular. While the EU considered that the specificities of each Member 
needed to be taken into account, they also considered that there was a need to deepen the discussion 
to better understand what realities stood behind the facts, including what could be learned from 
such experience in terms of success stories and remaining challenges. Beyond the issue of shortage 
of resources, there was also a need to consider how resources were allocated and mobilized, and 
the extent to which notifications w ere prioriti zed. 
12.151.   The co -sponsors stood ready to examine and discuss these issues further and encouraged 
Members to pursue this conversation informally with them in the coming weeks.  
12.152.   The delegate of  Australia  thanked Members for their comments regarding the  allowance for 
DS1 agricultural notifications in the revised proposal. This included questions from Members on 
whether the allowance that had been made for DS1  notifications was too long, whether the 
DS1 notifications could be treated the same as other not ifications , as well as the reference to 
document  G/AG/2 on the current rules on agricultural notifications. The allowance that had been 
made for the proposal for DS1 was flexibility of an additional 2  year-period until administrative 
measures would apply. This flexibility would remain  until an update of the agricultural notifications 
provided in document  G/AG/2 could be achieved. These issues had been discussed as part of ongoing 
discussions of this proposal  between its co-sponsors , and represented a compromise. He recalled 
that Australia, as well as other co -sponsors, had previously expressed its interest in equal treatment ; 
however, it had also been pointed out that there were over 800  missing DS1  notificat ions and, by 
comparison, there were fewer than 100  missing notifications for each of the other required 
agricultural notifications. Australia would welcome any further views and input from Members on 
this issue as part of the ongoing discussions on this pr oposal.  
12.2  An Inclusive Approach to Transparency and Notification Requirements in the W TO – 
Communication from  Cuba, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe 
(JOB/GC/218, JOB/CTG/15, J OB/SERV/292, J OB/IP/33, J OB/DEV/58, J OB/AG/158)  
12.153.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of Cuba, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe,  had requested 
the Secretariat to circulate a submission on their behalf entitled "An Inclusi ve Approach to 
Transparency and Notification Requirements " (document  JOB/CTG/15) and to include this item on 
the meeting's agenda. After the Airgram had been circulated , the African Group had requested the G/C/M/135  
 
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  Secretariat to issue a revision of document  JOB/CT G/15 to include the African Group as a co -sponsor 
of the communication.9 
12.154.   The delegate of South Africa  thanked the delegations of Cuba, India, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe,  as co -sponsors together with South Africa  of the communicati on 
"An Inclusive Approach to Transparency and Notification Requirements in the WTO". She said that 
transparency was one of the pillars of the MTS and was important for the functioning of the WTO. 
While its importance, and that of compliance with obligation s, was understood, it was necessary to 
recognize that developing countries faced challenges in meeting their transparency obligations due 
to limited capacities and resources. For these reasons, a developmental and inclusive approach 
should be taken to tran sparency. The inability of many developing countries and LDCs to fulfil their 
notification obligations did not and should not equate to wilful neglect of their multilateral obligations. 
Rather, non -compliance could be attributed to other capacity factors , such as the database 
capabilities of Members being insufficient to gather complex data , including legislation and statistics, 
required for certain notifications. Notifications were also complex and required not only familiarity 
and training in respect of t he WTO  Agreements and obligations, but also the capacity to collect, 
validate, analyse , and present the information  required . Much of the issue related to a lack of proper 
infrastructure.  
12.155.   The co -sponsors of the paper believed that a more cooperative approach was called for , 
whereby Members were incentivized to comply with their obligations ; in this context, they found 
punitive approaches to be unhelpful. While there was a problem with notif ication non -compliance, a 
constructive and effective solution based on the nuancing of obligations in the context of a special 
and differential approach plus incentives was required. They also believed that such an approach 
would go a long way to building the trust that was so desperately needed in the Organization. The 
technical capacity and support provided by the WTO  Secretariat was very important and was 
welcomed. However, there should also be an understanding that countries with chronic lack of 
capacit y would still struggle to meet their multiple notification requirements and would require an 
improvement above all in institutional capacity . Punitive approaches to enforcing notification and 
transparency obligations were not acceptable. Any work in the notification area must support the 
ability of developing countries to address their difficulties through inclusive and mutually agreed 
approaches, such as through simplified notification formats. In some situations, consideration could 
also be given to prolo nged time -frames. Technical assistance and capacity -building must still remain 
central components; however, technical assistance and capacity -building alone would not completely 
resolve the human resource and institutional limitations facing many developin g countries. She 
emphasized that notifications could only be made by the concerned Member and that counter -
notifications would not be considered valid. Neither the Secretariat nor any other WTO  Member 
should have the right to notify information on behalf o f another Member unless that possibility had 
been provided for in existing agreements. The co -sponsors believed that transparency should 
permeate all aspects of the function of the WTO and not be limited to notifications  only. Their paper 
raised various is sues, including the following : (i) that transparency was not limited to notifications 
but should also include how an organization like the WTO was run; and (ii)  that it should underpin 
the day -to-day functions of the WTO , including its decision -making proc esses and the organi zation 
of various types of committee meetings , to ensure effective participation and an inclusive process.  
12.156.   Concerns had also been  raised regarding  the Ministerial Conference and how decisions were 
taken therein. Therefore, there was a n eed for a holistic approach to address all the limitations in 
the system. Transparency issues arose because some discussions took place in small committees, 
informal open -ended meetings , and Green Room meetings . Such practices limited the ability of 
develo ping country Members effectively to participate in important deliberations that affected their 
interest s. Furthermore, transparency was not a concern only for developing countries. Some 
developed country Members did not comply with their notification obligations  either , but for different 
reasons . For example, agriculture notification obligations in the context of final bound 
AMS commitments should be promptly  notified . Developing countries had a much better notification 
record than major d eveloped countries under GATS  Article  III.3. Concerns also remained around 
GATS  Mode  4. In addition, Article  66.2 of the TRIPS  Agreement was another area where more 
transparency could assist the promotion of technology transfer to LDC  Members. The 
TRIPS  Agreement had also established an obligation for Members to require patent applications to 
disclose the origin of biological resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, including Prior 
                                                
9 On 22  July 2019 a revised version of this document was issued to include Oman as a co -sponsor of the 
communication (see document  JOB/CTG/15/Rev.2).  G/C/M/135  
 
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  Informed Consent (PIC) and Access to Benefit Sharing (ABS). Howeve r, despite a long discussion in 
the TRIPS  Council in Special Session, no outcome had been produced on this issue. In this context, 
it was not in developing countries ' interests to expand their notification obligations beyond what 
already existed in the cur rent Agreement.  
12.157.   Treaty obligations relative  to the Marrakesh Agreement and its annexes must be performed 
in good faith. However, the obligation to comply could not be blind to the situation in which Members 
found themselves. If developing countries were unable to meet their current notification obligations, 
they could not be expected to meet even higher notification requirements in the future. The 
simplification of notification formats and longer time -frames to comply with notification periods could 
assist developing countries, and LDCs should not be subject to any notification except in areas where 
they might have an interest. Any work carried out on the issue should be focused on supporting and 
incentivizing developing countries to address their difficulti es. Suggested punitive approaches would 
not resolve such capacity constraints and would target Members already unable to comply and who 
remained under financial administrative measures. While technical assistance and capacity -building 
might assist developi ng countries to meet their notification obligations, it could not be seen as a 
panacea since the capacity of developing countries to comply with notification obligations was linked 
to their level of economic development and access to resources. Therefore, existing notification 
obligations should be rationalized so that they were commensurate with Members ' level of 
development. Developing countries and LDCs should not be expected to take on notification 
obligations that were beyond their capacities.  
12.158.   The dele gate of India said that the paper highlighted that , while transparency was 
important for the functioning of the WTO, LDCs and developing countries had genuine capacity 
constraints in the areas of institution al requirements and human resources when trying t o fulfil the ir 
notification obligations. Delays in notifying could not be attributed to wilful non -compliance. 
Therefore, instead of taking punitive measures the Organization needed instead to adopt an inclusive 
cooperative approach to incentivi ze LDCs and developing co untries to comply with their notification 
obligations. Transparency permeated all areas of the WTO's work, including the decision -making 
processes and the conduct of Ministerial Conferences. Transparency, therefore, should be applied to 
all WTO  work, inclu ding priorities and negotiations and deliberations in the various regular bodies. 
It was necessary to ensure transparent and inclusive processes that provided an opportunity for 
participation to all Members. Also, notification obligations could not be seen  as being relevant only 
to certain areas relating to goods ; instead, they  should be applied holistically to all WTO  Agreements. 
The paper highlighted that there were significant notification gaps in areas like agriculture, services , 
and TRIPS . Transparency  needed to be strengthened and the constructive approach should be to 
recognize the genuine capacity constraints faced by LDCs and developing countries and to adopt a 
cooperative and inclusive approach to address ing them. The necessary elements of such an approach 
included technical assistance, simplification of notification requirements , and reducing the 
administrative and technical burden for small delegations. Such an approach would help 
transparency without the additional cost of reducing trust and deep ening the divide among Members.  
12.159.   The delegate of Zimbabwe  said that the second  revision of document  JOB/CTG/14 had not 
taken into account the comments made by many developing countries regarding their resource and 
institutional constraints. Such challenges could not be adequately addressed through the usual 
capacity -building programmes. The revision talked about additional notification obligations for 
developing countries,  yet some developed countries had also failed to comply with their notification 
obligat ions. He questioned why notification obligations were being increased when Members were 
already failing to comply  with their current notification obligations . Additionally, the revised paper 
introduced punitive administrative measures on Members that failed to comply. These would mostly 
affect developing countries and would  therefore go beyond current WTO  rules and be a reversal of 
the WTO  principle of develop ment. Proposed counter -notifications would also represent an additional 
obligation on Members because the process proposed would allow any number of counter -
notifications from any Member, thus putting additional pressure on developing countries as a 
conseq uence of responding to questions regarding their trade policies. Finally, paragraph  4 of 
document  JOB/CTG/14 , regarding further questioning on issues relating to compliance during the 
Trade Policy Review , would likewise increase Members ' obligations.  
12.160.   His d elegation did not support document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 , which disadvantaged 
developing countries and went against the core principle of development. Indeed, the paper had 
prompted his delegation to co -sponsor communication JOB/CTG/15/Rev.2  instead , which did take 
into account the capacity and resource constraints facing developing countries when attempting to G/C/M/135  
 
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  meet their notification obligations . It also acknowledged that the nature of those challenges was 
linked to a Member's level of development. In 1996, the Working Group on Notification Obligations 
and Procedures had discussed the resource and capacity constraints of developing countries, their 
increasing work load, the small size of delegations, and the complexity and techn ical nature of 
notifications, among other issues , and had noted the need for some additional forms of special and 
differential treatment for developing countries. The work of the Working Group should be revisited 
and carried forward based on the "Inclusive  Approach to Transparency " paper. There were large 
gaps in terms of availability of resources, including human capital, between developed and 
developing countries, and developing countries needed special and differential treatment.  
12.161.   The current WTO  notifica tion requirements were complex, highly technical , and 
time-consuming. In certain cases, the data required was costly and difficult to collect and compile. 
Developing countries had previously raised their concerns over insufficient information and 
notificat ion non -compliance on the part of some developed countries regarding agricultural final 
bound AMS, GATS  Article  III, GATS  Mode  4, and Article  66.2 of TRIPS. This was empirical proof that 
all Members found it difficult to meet the ir transparency obligations  and, therefore, that Members 
should be finding amicable means by which to resolve the problem  of poor notification compliance . 
To the contrary, overly burdensome transparency requirements would only reduce current 
compliance levels  still further . Members should instead be working towards simplifying the 
notification requirements for developing countries and supporting and incentivi zing developing 
countries to address the ir challenges. In this regard , developing countries, LDCs , and Small and 
Vulnerable Economies ( SVEs) should not be expected to take up notification obligations beyond their 
capacities. Furthermore, they should not be penalized for non -compliance with their notification  
obligations  and their notification  obligations should be co mmensurate with the ir level of 
development . In conclusion, Zimbabwe reiterated that any proposals should uphold the core value 
of development in the WTO.  
12.162.   The delegate of Nigeria  said that it had co -sponsored document  JOB/CTG/15 because it 
was in line with Nigeria's desire for a balanced approach to the issue of transparency and 
notification s. It shed light on the capacity issues undermining the ability of developing countries to 
comply with their notification obligations and it also drew attention to other areas where a lack of 
transparency was often deliberately ignored or overlooked in the WTO, which undermined the gains 
of developing countries from the international trading system. Those issues included complying with 
GATS  Article  III:3 obligations and a lack of transparency in the day -to-day functioning of the WTO , 
particularly as concerned  the overlapping of meetings and the proliferation of informal negotiating 
meetings in which most developing countries were unable to participate because of resource 
constraints. There was also the issue of a lack of transparency in the conduct of Ministerial 
Conference negotiations.  
12.163.   In order to improve the overall benefits of the multilateral trading system for all, 
document  JOB/CTG/15 had proposed that some issues regarding transparency that were of critical 
importance to developing countries should be addressed. These included the following: the need to 
enhance Mode  4 GATS  Transparency; the need to concretize the implementation of paragraph  39 of 
the 18  December  2005 Ministerial Declaration that addressed the issue of disclosure of origin of 
biological resources and/or associated tra ditional knowledge in patent application; and the need to 
encourage annual notification of ad valorem  equivalent s of non -ad valorem  tariffs, or the conversion 
of non -ad valorem  tariffs to ad valorem  tariffs in order to enhance transparency. The 
recommendations contained in the paper would guarantee a win -win outcome for all Members 
regardless of their respective level of development. The proponents were open to further discussions 
on the issue and called upon all Members to reject any attempt to introduce measures that sought 
to unduly punish any Member, especially developing countries, as a result of non -compliance with 
their notification obligations.  
12.164.   The delegate of Mauritius  said that his country was pleas ed to co -sponsor 
document  JOB/CTG/15 . It also subscribed to the statement on transparency and notification that 
had been made on behalf of the ACP  Group. Mauritius fully understood the importance of 
transparency and notification for the good functioning of  any multilateral system, including the MTS. 
Mauritius had  tried to meet its notification obligations at the WTO and it thanked the Secretariat for 
providing technical assistance  to this end . However, this alone had not been enough as Mauritius 
continued t o face considerable resource constraints as a small island developing state with limited 
means and a lack of human and financial resources. In such circumstances, adding new obligations 
beyond existing ones , or imposing any form of punitive administrative measures , would only be G/C/M/135  
 
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  counter -productive. Instead, Members should be considering how to simplify notification and other 
procedures for Members with limited capacity, while also continuing to provide more and tailor -made 
technical assistance and designing  appropriate special and differential treatment ( SDT) for such  
Members. It was also a fact that the delegations of many developing countries, in particular small 
island developing states, were small , and composed often of only one or at most two  officials.  Thus, 
the continued concurrent scheduling of meetings was putting such delegations at a huge 
disadvantage and , in the process , it undermined important aspects of transparency and 
inclusiveness. In the view of Mauritius, this was a matter that should be given equal and serious 
consideration. He emphasized also that transparency was a matter of importance to all Members 
and was multi -dimensional, thus requiring a cooperative, balanced , and holistic approach , as 
proposed in document  JOB/CTG/15.  
12.165.   The delegate of Tunisia  endorsed the statements made by South Africa, India, Zimbabwe, 
Nigeria,  and Mauritius. His delegation was very pleased to be a co -proponent of 
document  JOB/CTG/15 . Tunisia believed that the issue of transparency and respect and compli ance 
with notification requirements was essential for the smooth  functioning of the WTO. For these 
reasons, Tunisia stood ready to work inclusively in a balanced and complementary way with other 
Members in order to enhance transparency, including in agricu lture, as well as to ensure 
inclusiveness within the WTO . Tunisia  remained open to further discussions and negotiations.  
12.166.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  welcomed the engagement of Cuba, India,  Nigeria, 
South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda,  and Zimbabwe,  in the ongoing discussion on the transparency issue. 
Transparency was one of the important elements for achieving a better functioning of the WTO as 
timely information played a key role in promoting Members' participation in global trade. Russia 
believed tha t enhancement of transparency in the most important areas of regulation , such as 
market access and rules of origin , would be beneficial to all Members regardless of their level of 
development . For this reason, Russia invited Members to work together in ord er to strike the right 
balance between their constraints and the improvement of the work of the WTO  bodies. Russia 
believed that close cooperation and constructive dialogue would help to dispel the existing concerns 
on transparency and allow Members to find a mutually acceptable solution  to this issue . 
12.167.   The delegate of Switzerland  thanked the proponents for their contribution on the 
discussions on transparency at the WTO. Their paper had highlighted various challenges, due to 
resource constraints, faced by developing countries and LDCs in complying with their notification 
obligations. Nevertheless, Switzerland considered that transparency was key to conduct ing an 
effective monitoring of the WTO  Agreements. Th e current situation suggested that there remained 
scope to improve transparency and compliance with notification obligations. However, there were 
also ways to improve transparency while considering Members' resource constraints and the 
complexity of certai n notification obligations. The paper directly addressed the ongoing transparency 
initiative in non -preferential rules of origin as an example of how this could be achieved, although it 
was quoted in document  JOB/CTG/15 as a source of concern. Switzerland considered it useful to 
recall and clarify certain points regarding the proposal put forward on rules of origin and indicated 
that, in developing its proposal, the proponents, together with other delegations, including from 
developing countries and LDCs, had taken into account the resource constraints and lack of capacity 
of some Members. As a result, the proposal had foreseen a notification template that kept the 
administrative burden to its minimum. In fact, Members having no non-preferential rules of ori gin 
in force , and related documentary requirements , would barely be required to tick three  boxes to 
complete the template and comply with the notification. Furthermore, the template offered a simple 
way to get back in line with transparency obligations pur suant to Article  5 of the Agreement on Rules 
of Origin. To date, approximately  30 countries had not submitted the respective notification.  
12.168.   Nevertheless, if developing country Members faced difficulties in completing the template, 
they could request and wou ld receive assistance from the Secretariat  to help them to do so . 
Discussions were ongoing to ensure that all Members were comfortable with the proposal, including 
on aspects such as S&D  treatment and technical assistance. Switzerland regretted that some 
Members saw the ROO only as a notification burden. The proposal addressed the information gaps 
that existed in the area of non -preferential rules of origin. In a world where rules of origin were 
becoming ever more important trade barriers, improving transpa rency would benefit all 
WTO Members. Small exporters in developing and least -developed countries wishing to integrate 
into global value chains would be the first  beneficiaries , for whom  simplified access to accurate and 
complete information was critical. S witzerland believed that Members should approach the Swiss 
proposal from a benefit -cost perspective and not only from a cost perspective. Members should G/C/M/135  
 
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  recognize the benefits of all of the notification requirements at the WTO because transparency 
constituted a public good  that was  indispensable for the good functioning of the multilateral trading 
system. Switzerland would continue to engage in the discussions with all Members with the aim of 
reaching common ground, preferably soon. 
12.169.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  said that Sri Lanka associated itself with the proposal presented 
by South Africa on behalf of a group of developing countries and supported the proposals contained 
in document  JOB/CTG/15. Issues of transparency and notification were  important to all Members. 
Developing countries, such as Sri Lanka, were complying to the best of their abilities, noting that 
compliance was not easy because of the level of technical detail and complexity involved in the 
presentation of the notifications . Data revealed that both developed and developing countries were 
behind in their notifications. No  WTO Member today was in full compliance with all their notification 
obligations. The proposal acknowledged that the issue of lack of capacity experienced by  developing 
countries could not be overstated.  
12.170.   Notifications required staff to be very familiar with the entire range of WTO  Agreements 
and to be confident dealing with highly technical aspects of those Agreements. They required 
institutional capacities th at were often absent in many developing countries. Since notifications 
required the participation of several Ministries, not just the Trade Ministry, Members should have 
sufficient human resources to work on WTO  matters. No amount of technical assistance w orkshops 
would solve the problem of notifications if there were simply too few persons assigned to oversee 
WTO matters. This issue of capacity had previously been highlighted by a working group on 
notification obligations and procedures. The latest proposa l had eluded to that report and had flagged 
that "many developing countries had difficulty understanding the frequently complex and highly 
technical information demanded, and therefore faced a prohibitive task in providing complete 
responses to the notific ation requirements and formats".  
12.171.   Sri Lanka could not support any transparency and notification measures that went beyond 
existing obligations , with which  Sri Lanka, like other developing countries, was already struggling. 
Instead, the notification issue sh ould be dealt with in a more positive manner, where support and 
incentives were accorded to assist developing countries to notify, and special and differential 
treatment measures were provided so that the notification demands on developing countries would 
be less demanding. The discussion of paragraph  54 of the Report of the Working Group on 
Notification Obligations and Procedures had made a significant reference therein , which suggested 
that "simplified formats might be developed for the developing countri es with more detailed 
information being provided to the Committees only when requested. In some situations, prolonged 
time-frames might be considered". Regarding  the proposal presented by the United States on behalf 
of other Members, Sri Lanka wished to re iterate its statement from the Council's April meeting.10 
She said that Sri Lanka had intended to comment on the latest revised proposal at the current 
meeting ; however, her delegation had seen no difference between the latest and the previous 
version  of the proposal . The revised proposal still contained major additional notification obligations 
and therefore Members ' rights and obligations in the Agreements were being altered . Sri Lanka found 
it difficult to support such positions and considered it unfortunate that the proponents had not taken 
into consideration the comments of many developing countries on its revised proposal made at the 
Council's previous meeting , which had highlighted the resource and institutional constraints of 
developing countrie s. 
12.172.   Sri Lanka considered that the approach of naming and shaming countries was highly 
problematic and had never before  been seen in international bodies. Also, the differences in the 
second  revision it considered to be cosmetic since both version s of the pr oposal contained two  sets 
of punitive measures ; indeed, only the order of these measures within the proposal had been 
changed in its second  revision. Sri Lanka underscored that, if the intention in this regard had been 
to make the punitive measures more ac ceptable to developing country Members, it certainly would 
not succeed in doing so . The paragraph on counter -notifications had been removed but a new 
paragraph had nevertheless been added using different connotations , although the kind of action 
that the p roposal aimed to develop  was the same . The proposal would lead to a proliferation in 
counter -notifications where counter -notifications had not been provided for and would also create 
an opportunity for others to bring forward information challenging developing countries. Sri Lanka 
questioned the meaning of " in accordance with the Agreements and understandings" and asked to 
what degree developed countries were questioning developing countries' practices in respect of that. 
                                                
10 Document  G/C/M/134, paragraph  9.91. G/C/M/135  
 
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  Sri Lanka conside red that the effect such a paragraph could be the same as the proposal's previous 
formulation on counter -notifications. In other words, developing countries would be subject to 
immense pressure and questioned in committees regarding their trade practices.  
12.173.   The US  proposal also increased notification obligations and particularly included the area 
of trade policy waiver s. It suggested that the Secretariat would be given the added responsibility to 
compile the content of missing notifications , beyond normal pra ctice and punitive administrative 
measures. The punitive measures would put a lot of developing countries in difficulty but would not 
be a mechanism that would trigger a reaction from developing countries. Her delegation also 
requested that the proponents clarify paragraph  2 of its revised proposal ; in particular, was the 
proposal seeking to incorporate all of the pertinent conclusions and recommendations given that the 
revised text had suggested that the Working Group meet regularly and make recommendation s to 
be presented to the CTG. Would the Working Group also be mandated to look at the comments and 
recommendations and conclusions already made in the past , in which the genuine difficulties and 
concerns of developing countries  had been recognized . For Sri  Lanka, this was a systemic concern.  
12.174.   The delegate of Costa Rica  thanked the sponsors for document  JOB/CTG/15 , which 
demonstrate d their interest in enhancing transparency in the work of the WTO. Transparency  was a 
fundamental principle of the WTO that required urgent attention  because  the current level of 
compliance was too low and varied depending on the issue at hand and the Member concerned. 
What did not change, however, was the duty of each Member to comp ly with the same notification 
requirements. In this regard, the practical implementation of transparency must be universal and 
unequivocal ; Members must all aspire to the same level of transparency and the greatest 
transparency possible. Also, Members must  have at their disposal mechanisms to build capacity and 
generate responsibilities for the fulfilment of such commitments. It seemed that establishing grades, 
levels , or rationalization measures according to a level of development , could well become a 
significant impediment for WTO  transparency. Costa Rica shared the sense of urgency that some 
Members felt regarding the need to enhance transparency in the regular work of the WTO. Without 
transparency , trust could not be built, and without trust, it would be  very difficult to advance the 
process of negotiating the relevant reforms that the multilateral trading system still needed.  
12.175.   Costa Rica also had a proposal to put forward that neither generated nor increased the 
existing notification requirements for any Member. It was normal that Members had different points 
of view on the balance that should be struck between transparency and the availability of the human 
and financial resources needed to achieve it. Costa Rica had always considered that investing in 
transparency, even for a small country, was the greatest contribution it could make to keeping the 
multilateral trading system alive. As a developing Member, Costa Rica believed in constructive 
dialogue and in recognizing the divergent opinions among all WTO  Members, especially among 
developing Member countries. This explained Costa Rica's perplexity over paragraph  2.7 of the 
document, where conclusions were being made about what developing Members could or could not 
accept in terms of transparency. Costa Rica  believed that the discussion should be held without 
prejudice to possible outcomes and agreed that a lack of information was not an concern exclusive 
to developing Members, as there was much room for improvement also in the area of agricultural 
notificati ons, as indicated in the document submitted by Norway, document  RD/AG/71 , of 
20 June 2019;  indeed, this was a work in progress for most Members. Costa Rica fully agreed with 
the importance of enhancing transparency in terms of tariffs because non-ad valorem  tariffs 
generated uncertainty and blocked access to markets. Indeed, Costa Rica had consistently defended 
that point in agricultural market access negotiations and , togethe r with other Members, had 
supported the work on tariff simplification. Costa Rica was therefore pleased to see a proposal along 
these lines in paragraph  3.18 of document  JOB/CTG/15 . 
12.176.   Costa Rica also stood ready to work with the sponsors of document  JOB/CTG/ 15 to enhance 
agricultural and market access notifications, especially with the largest players  who, independently 
of their level of development, possessed the greatest potential to distort agricultural trade at the 
global level . Similarly, Costa Rica agreed with paragraph  4.1.4 on the importance of avoiding 
scheduling conflicts with the Committees under the CTG, an issue raised by Hong Kong, China in its 
communication that would be examined in greater detail under agenda item  34. In addition, there 
were se veral forums and meeting configurations at the WTO , and it was not always necessary or 
practical to produce minutes for each one. Having said that, it was important to devise a mechanism 
for tracking progress in discussions. For example, in agriculture, th e Chairs of the negotiating group 
often presented written reports that were circulated under the JOB  document symbol at times when 
the negotiations so required. That was an example of a good practice that could be replicated in G/C/M/135  
 
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  other negotiating areas, if it was not already the case. These and other suggestions could be 
assessed during specific discussions within the Trade Negotiations Committee.  
12.177.   The delegate of New Zealand  thanked the proponents of document  JOB/CTG/15 and 
signalled his intention to confine his comments to issues under the purview of the CTG. His delegation 
welcomed the fact that more Members were now contributing to the discussion on transparency. 
New Zealand saw value in pragmatic constructive discussions in subsidiary committees , such as the 
Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO) and the Committee on Market Access (CMA) , on issues where 
scope for improvements had been identified. His delegation also echoed the comments made by 
Switzerland regarding the Rules o f Origin paper ( document  G/RO/W/182), which New Zealand had 
co-sponsored. Such discussions should consider  the challenges that developing Members confronted 
and the contribution s to the discussions of many Members, both developing and developed, had 
been v ery valuable. As New Zealand had said in the recent CMA, these discussions could be helpful 
for seeing if there was scope to develop the existing systems of Members. In this way, transparency 
could be improved while mitigating the challenges of providing i nformation. Sharing experiences 
could help and , in that context, his delegation had welcomed the recent TBT  thematic session on 
transparency.  
12.178.   The delegate of Chad, on behalf of the LDC Group, thanked South Africa and all the 
co-authors of the draft communi cation. He agreed that there was common ground between the 
two draft communications on the need to consolidate and strengthen transparency and notification 
requirements. However, their approaches were different , and WTO  Members needed to work to 
narrow those differences and achieve a consensual approach. This could be achieved collectively 
through mutual concessions. As underscored by South Africa, an approach based on collaboration 
and favouring incentives was not only necessary but was a lso useful for building mutual trust. It was 
clear that the communication had taken into account the question of transparency for the proper 
functioning of the WTO, as well as different dimensions of the issues dealt with at the WTO regarding 
notification requirements. Several LDCs already had to contend with administrative measures due 
to often difficult financial conditions, while trying to participate as best they could  in WTO activities 
and on most trade -related issues. The LDC  Group wished to ensure th at the reform that had begun 
at the WTO would be based on the principle of transparency and respect for the balance between 
rights and duties of Members, fully taking into consideration the specificities of LDCs, which were 
the most vulnerable of countries . The LDC  Group remained open to discussions and was ready to 
support any appropriate solutions.  
12.179.   The delegate of Egypt  thanked the co -sponsors of document  JOB/CTG/15 and welcomed 
their analysis , which had captured the essence of the challenges faced by dev eloping countries in 
fulfilling their transparency and notification obligations , which ranged across human, financial, 
technological , and institutional challenges , and which , to overcome them,  required more than just 
technical assistance. Egypt shared the co-sponsors ' view that punitive measures were not the answer 
to enhance compliance with notification obligations, and that transparency was broader than just 
notifications, and also agreed with the proponents that imposing additional transparency 
requireme nts on developing countries currently struggling to keep  up with the existing transparency 
requirements  would be excessively burdensome and very unlikely to lead to the desired outcome of 
transparency enhancement. Egypt stood ready to engage constructively  with all Members to build 
upon the ideas presented in the proposal with the final aim of enhancing all elements of transparency 
in the WTO's work.  
12.180.   The delegate of Ecuador  thanked the proponents for their document , which provided a good 
balance to the discussion on transparency. Given the lack of capacity and resources of LDCs, Ecuador 
agreed that any initiative imposing additional obligations or punitive measures in the context of 
notification obligations would be counter -productive. Likewise, Ecuador did not support the proposal 
on counter -notifications except where they were included in the existing Agreements.  
12.181.   The delegate of Uruguay  welcomed the document and thanked the sponsors  for introducing 
it. He emphasized  the apparent ly clear consensus among Members on the importance of improving 
the current situation relating to transparency. In that regard, Uruguay reiterated the importance of 
ensuring that any proposals put forward were effectively limited in scope to t he notification 
obligations that were already in place within the WTO, and emphasized the need to seek creative 
solutions in order to reach an outcome that ensured full compliance with the transparency obligations 
by all Members, allowing those that so nee ded it also to develop the necessary capacities for that 
purpose.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.182.   The delegate of the Philippines  welcomed the transparency proposals and papers on the 
table. The Philippines supported the statement delivered by Switzerland regarding the initiative to 
enhance transparency on non -preferential rules of origin and , as one of its co -sponsors, supported 
Members' efforts in increasing transparency in that area because doing so  would directly benefit 
exporters from developing countries, such as the Philippines, to  integrate into global value chains. 
Further more, as a developing country, the Philippines was of the view that Members should aim for 
a balance between ensuring substantial and timely compliance with notification obligations and 
awareness of the physical constraints that hindered such compliance, which in many cases could be 
alleviated by technical assistance and capacity -building. Her delegation saw value in sustaining a 
conversation on improving Members ' compliance with notification obligations under the  
WTO Agreements and stood ready to engage in constructive dialogue with all Members on this issue.  
12.183.   The delegate of the European Union  said that the debate on how to increase transparency 
in the WTO in general , and how to improve the transparency tool of no tifications in particular, was 
an important debate . The EU agreed that notifications were not the only transparency issue to be 
considered, and the EU had also looked at how meetings could be better organi zed with a view to 
enhancing transparency. The comm unication by South Africa and other Members had asserted that 
the proposal on notifications by the EU and others had proposed increased notification obligations. 
The EU had repeatedly clarified that its proposal did not do that. It proposed ways to improve 
compliance with existing obligations but did not suggest changing current obligations. Regarding 
previous references to counter -notifications, paragraph  9 of the EU  proposal simply said that the 
General Council could decide to encourage Members to raise the point if they considered that another 
Member had not met its notifications obligation. In the EU's view, this did not constitute a 
counter -notification. For example, Article  25 of the Subsidies Agreement set out all the obligations 
accruing to a Member that received a notification. The Member subject to the remark did not have 
to do anything in response and therefore there was no additional obligation.  Several regional 
agreements had more significant obligations regarding counter -notification. For  example, one stated 
that "each state party at the request of another state party, through the Secretariat , shall promptly 
provide information and respond to questions pertaining to an actual proposed measure in respect 
of whether or not the other state pa rty was previously notified of that measure  (Article  73 of the 
African Continental  FTA). This was an example of an actual obligation that followed a request. He 
wanted to be clear that the EU  proposal did not have any such additional notifications.  
12.184.   The EU was aware that making timely and complete notifications could be a challenge for 
countries with fewer administrative resources and capacity. This was why technical assistance and 
capacity -building played a central role in their proposal. The EU  proposal cl early recogni zed that 
capacity constraints could be the reason for non -compliance of developing countries. It encouraged 
developing countries to make use of existing assistance possibilities , such as  programmed trade -
related technical assistance and ad hoc assistance. Their proposal envisaged giving more time to 
developing countries that needed assistance to submit their outstanding notifications before 
administrative measures would be applied ; in other words, the EU had also considered "prolonged 
time-frames", as suggested in the past by South Africa and the other co -sponsors of the 
Communication by the Working Group. The proposal from the EU and co -sponsors asked the Working 
Group to assess, together with the ITTC, the contribution of WTO  trade -related technical assistance 
to improving notification compliance. In other words, the EU was open to analysing whether existing 
WTO assistance was effective. EU  exper ience had shown that preparing notifications could actually 
have a positive effect on capacity. The coordination required within and among various ministries 
and agencies contributed to better information -sharing and could increase policy coherence. 
Theref ore, it seemed to be in every Member's self -interest to dedicate resources to its notifications, 
in contrast to just perceiving them as a burden imposed upon them by the WTO Agreements.  
12.185.   The EU furthered that the scope of the proposal was the goods -related notification 
obligations overseen by the CTG. This was because there was a well-documented track record of 
compliance problems in the area of trade in goods -related notifications , which was not necessarily 
the case in Services; however, that did not imply that the EU was against deepening the discussions 
on notifications also in other WTO  relevant bodies, such as the Councils on Services and TRIP S. The 
EU looked forward to engaging with Members on these issues and, in particular, to examine why 
developing M embers seemed to perform better in Services notifications , which did not necessarily 
require a lesser degree of institutional inter -ministry organization. It would be beneficial for the 
proponents to look at how things worked and how they could make specif ic improvements . The EU 
wished to thank the proponents of document  JOB/CTG/15 and welcomed the opportunity to have a G/C/M/135  
 
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  debate on finding a solution to what Members considered to be a common problem. The EU looked 
forward to continuing discussions in the Coun cil and in other committees and groups.  
12.186.   The delegate of the United States  thanked South Africa and other co -sponsors for the paper 
on an "inclusive approach" to transparency and welcomed the engagement on the critical issue of 
improving Members' compliance with notification obligations.  
12.187.   It was clear that the United States,  by its co-sponsorship of the revised proposal previously 
discussed under this agenda item , strongly supported addressing deficiencies and gaps in 
notifications in order to put the WTO on a path towards a more successful and sustainable future.  
12.188.   Members' complia nce with notification obligations was poor at best, and frankly abysmal in 
many areas. This undermined the proper functioning of the WTO's work and created problems for 
traders and for other Members that relied on an understanding of one another's trading systems.  
12.189.   The new document noted that a deep understanding of WTO  Agreements was necessary 
for compliance with WTO  commitments, yet it was important to note that, in fact, transparency was 
a fundamental obligation for every Member. And being able to have a deep understanding of other 
Members' trading systems was also necessary for compliance with WTO  commitments. It also 
suggested that the transparency proposal submitted by the United States and various co -sponsors 
would place added obligations on developing  country Members. However, it was again important to 
note that the proposal from the US and others was simply calling for Members to fulfil their existing 
notification obligations, nothing more. It set no additional obligations on any Member. In fact, the 
proposal allowed more time for compliance before, for instance, the administrative measures might 
take effect, and also acknowledged differing Members' capacities. She also emphasized that there 
was more harm to other Members than to the country itself whe n it failed to meet notification 
requirements since the lack of information about a country's laws and regulations actual hindered 
trade.  
12.190.   The United States also noted that the proposal in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 in fact took 
the elements outlined in the South Africa paper and implemented them. For instance, opportunities 
for capacity -building, flexibility of time -frames, potential simplification of format of notifications , 
were all elements that had been taken up in document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 that would be put into 
practice.  
12.191.   In conclusion, the United States stood ready and committed to work with Members on 
improving their  capacity to implement notification obligations and believed that the proposal in 
document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 struck the necessary balan ce to do this. The US looked forward to 
working together with other Members to improve transparency and thereby also to improve the 
operation of the WTO.  
12.192.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  welcomed Members ' contributions to the issue of 
transparency and thanke d the co -sponsors of document  JOB/CTG/15  for their paper , which 
highlighted that there was broad agreement that transparency was indeed important for the 
Organization. Her delegation was also pleased to see ongoing discussion in subsidiary committees , 
such as in the Committee on Rules of Origin, to improve the issue of notifications. Her delegation 
saw value in the way that the paper helped to simplify the notification format , provided clear 
information , and Chinese Taipei added its voice to the statement m ade by Switzerland in that regard. 
Transparency was essential for the future work and sustainability of the WTO and Chinese Taipei 
also recognized some of the challenges and difficulties raised by Members. Chinese Taipei believed 
that more dialogue would h elp to find a way forward and hoped  to this end  that there would be 
continuous and constructive discussions among Members to improve notification compliance and 
enhance transparency.  
12.193.   The delegate of Australia  thanked Cuba, India, Nigeria, South Africa, Uga nda, and 
Zimbabwe for their communication on the important issue of transparency and notifications. The 
paper raised a range of key issues, including the capacity constraints being faced by some developing 
country Members. In this regard, Australia had pro vided support to a number of WTO  assistance 
mechanisms to ensure that Members were able to participate more effectively in the global trading 
system. The proposal from Australia and co -sponsors itself included assistance for Members to meet 
their WTO  Membership obligations and it also encouraged those Members needing assistance to take G/C/M/135  
 
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  advantage of existing mechanisms. It was also worth noting that the needs of developing Members 
had been taken into consideration in the flexibilities written into many A greements. Australia 
welcomed suggestions on ways in which it could support all Members, including developing Members , 
to improve compliance with notification obligations, while noting that this should not come at the 
cost of eroding Members ' commitments t o transparency on their trade policies. Having open access 
to information about other Members ' trade policies was an important common good which 
underpinned the functioning of the WTO and provided a transparent and predictable trading 
environment for busin ess. 
12.194.   The delegate of Canada  thanked the co -sponsors for their contribution s to the discussions 
on how Members could improve their compliance with their transparency obligations but raised 
concerns over the arguments that the proponents had made during thei r interventions. Regarding 
the arguments on counter -notifications, he noted that a significant proportion of the 
Annex  1A Agreements of the Marrakesh Agreement explicitly provided for such notifications. 
However, the sparse number of such notifications sin ce 1995 refuted the argument that they were 
made at the "drop of a hat ". Further more, Canada hoped that the proponents were not arguing that 
Members were not allowed to raise in Committees and Councils questions or issues of relevance to 
the implementation  of the relevant agreements. For instance, some speakers had previously said 
that LDCs should only be required to submit those "tedious " notifications in areas of interest. It was 
unclear whether or not this would help the rate of compliance, but such a co ncept should be of 
concern to all Members. Canada believed that Members did not make notifications for their own 
interest; they were made in the interest of all other Members. As Canada had stated at the CTG 's 
previous meeting, notifications were the lifeb lood of the work of Committees and Councils and helped 
all Members to learn from one another. By not providing information on their respective trade  
policies, Members were only hurting the ability of the Organization to oversee and manage 
international tra de. As had been noted by Hong Kong, China and Switzerland, some Members had 
seen the proposal on rules of origin mainly from a notification burden perspective , which was 
disappointing. The intention of the proposal was to facilitate trade through greater t ransparency, 
and Canada and other Members had worked hard to socialize the proposal and adapt it to take into 
account resource constraints and the lack of capacity of some Members. Canada would continue 
working with all Members to see the proposal adopted.  
12.195.   Canada was pleased that the co -sponsors had referenced the report of the Working Group 
on Notifications from 1996 , as this was a comprehensive and substantive report on the situation in 
the early days of the WTO. It also included reflections and recommend ations on what the Members 
and the Secretariat could do to support compliance with the different Agreement's notification 
obligations. In the section entitled "The Need of Some Developing Country Members for Assistance 
in Meeting their Notification Obligations ", to which the co -sponsors had made some reference, the 
report also recorded some helpful recommendations that had been pursued. For instance, "the Group 
had agreed that the technical cooperation programmes of the WTO were a sound vehicle for assisting 
developing countries in meeting their notification obligations ", and that the mentioned notification 
workshops and seminars should be "followed up and broadened. " A review of the trade -related 
technical assistance cooperation database  had revealed that the effort to support those developing 
countries needing notification assistance had indeed been followed -up and broadened.  
12.196.   Similarly, the report noted that , during the discussions of the Working Group, a formal 
proposal had been made by  Chile and Norway that a practical handbook or manual should be 
developed to guide Members through the information required to complete the ir submissions. Based 
on that proposal, the Group had expanded the concept further , leading to the development of a 
five-part draft document. The notification handbooks prepared for the Working Group had laid out 
in an easy to follow format the various notification requirements and had also provided references 
back to the texts of the Agreements for Members to understand  from where the obligation came. 
The opening paragraphs of the "Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification 
Requirements Under WTO  Agreements " clearly laid out that the Working Group would be asked to 
review and update those notification  handbooks. Furthermore, efforts would be undertaken to assess 
the contribution of WTO  trade -related technical assistance to improving notification compliance, and 
to consider both systemic and specific improvements that could help Members to improve their 
compliance with their notification obligations. Those were all important steps for Members to have 
taken as they worked to fulfil the obligations that they had all agreed to in respect of one another.  
Canada looked forward to continuing constructive discu ssions on finding ways to strengthen and 
modernize the Organizations' deliberative functions.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  12.197.   The delegate of Japan  thanked the proponents of document  JOB/CTG/15 for their 
communication raising  developing countries ' and LDCs ' concerns and problems. She reiterated that 
notification was a n obligation for Members under the WTO  Agreement. The communication consisted 
of four  elements: (i) consideration for developing countries , including the needs of capacity -building 
and flexibili ties; (ii) developed countries ' notification obligation s; (iii) notification and 
capacity -building under the GATS and TRIPS  Agreements; and (iv) scheduling of various committee 
meetings. Regarding  consideration for developing countries, the proposal on tra nsparency and 
notification requirements from Japan and others had already dealt with these issues by including 
references to capacity -building and additional flexibilities in the time -frame. Also, the simplification 
of the notification format would be an i mportant topic, and the proponents welcomed engagement 
and discussion from developing Members in the relevant Councils and Committees. The increased 
transparency of notification in the area of non-preferential rules of origin was a good example of the 
simplification of the format, without requiring any new obligation.  
12.198.   Regarding  administrative measures, Japan wished to emphasize that it was a last resort 
and should only be triggered when a Member persistently failed to comply with its obligation s under 
the W TO Agreement. Since the WTO's establishment, lots of opportunities for technical assistance 
and capacity -building had been provided to developing Members. But it was unfortunate that in 
some committees there had been no request for technical assistance on certain WTO Agreements 
for many years. The reason for this was unclear, but  document  JOB/CTG/15 emphasized the 
challenge of capacity constraints. Even so, clear answers were required from proponents as to why 
no requests had been made in certain committees. The transparency proposal set out in 
document  JOB/CTG/14 covered developed countries ' obligation s by providing stricter rules than did 
the communication in document  JOB/CTG /15. For example, developed country Members that failed 
to comply with their notification obligations would be subject to administrative measures 
immediately after the relevant deadlines had passed. Finally, the scheduling of committee meetings 
was also important and should be discussed separately. Japan believed that its transparency 
proposal tried to address many of the concerns and elements contained in the communication  in 
document  JOB/CTG/15 , and her delegation wished to further discuss  the question of  how Members 
could work together on improving transparency in a collaborative and constructive manner.  
12.199.   The delegate of Sri Lanka  said that technical assistance from the Secretariat would not 
resolve all the difficulties encountered by developing countries when attempting to comply with their 
notification  obligations . For example, there was a great deal of transfer of officers within various 
administrations and this itself resulted in a need for continual retraining ; in turn, this resulted in 
ministries and focal points struggling to get the necessary data as officers needed to be trained and 
educated on the type of information to be provided and on the necessity of providing it. With specific 
regard to the proposal on non -preferential rules of origin, Sri La nka was not questioning the provision 
itself but rather how to properly prepare a compilation of non -preferential rules. In Sri Lanka's case , 
these rules were adopted by different Chambers of Commerce and had to be collated into a national 
compilation, whi ch itself had become a mammoth task. Yet in the absence of a national compendium, 
dealing with more than 9,000  HS Codes, it would be impossible to notify these rules to the WTO. 
While the proponents might consider their proposal to be a less cumbersome app roach, from the 
developing countries' point of view it was a huge exercise that had to be carried out at a national 
level.  
12.200.   The delegate of India thanked all speakers for their constructive comments and 
contributions to the debate. The key motivation for th e submission was to highlight the need for an 
inclusive, cooperative , and developmental approach to transparency. Some Members seemed to 
suggest that notification gaps stemmed from wilful non -compliance and advocated punitive 
measures. The co -sponsors believed that such an approach would be counterproductive as it would 
ignore the reality of the developing world and further deepen divergence on the issue. All Members 
acknowledged the importance of transparency for the functioning of the WTO , but it was equally 
important to understand and recogni ze the capacity and resource constraints and inherent difficulties 
being faced by LDCs and developing countries in complying with burdensome notification 
requirements. The Working Group on Notification Ob ligations and Procedures , in its report of 1996 , 
clearly identified some of the inherent difficulties developing countries faced in fulfilling their 
notification obligations. Understanding  the frequently complex and highly technical information 
required un der a number of notifications  could itself be difficult, and there were also constraints in 
terms of institutional arrangements and resources. Accordingly, the Working Group had suggested 
a simplification of the notification format, to establish technical assistance, to prolong the 
time-frames for notification compliance , and to develop suitable notification systems and structures G/C/M/135  
 
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  in developing countries , including LDCs. India considered that it was now necessary to review and 
assess how much effort had bee n made in that direction over the years rather than suggesting 
punitive and administrative measures.  
12.201.   There had been a suggestion by some Members that the Secretariat should issue 
counter -notifications on behalf of other Members. This would go  against the s pirit of the Marrakesh 
Agreement and a Member -driven Organization like the WTO. The Secretariat provided technical 
assistance to Members but notifying on behalf of Members went beyond the mandate of the 
WTO Agreements. It was also important to understand t hat transparency was by no means only a 
developing country concern. Some developed countries were also  not comply ing with the ir 
notification obligations. For example, there were significant delays in notifying the final bound 
commitments under the Agreemen t on Agriculture or the record of notification under 
GATS  Article  33. For example, there was almost complete non -compliance with the requirements of 
Article  66.2 of the TRIPS  Agreement , and delays in considering disclosure requirements under the 
TRIPS. On the one hand, transparency was referred to as a public good and the life blood of the 
Organization, but on the other, GATS  Article  III:3 notifications were withheld while Members hid 
behind the language and interpretation of the word and phrases calling for these notifications. In 
addition, further transparency could not be limited to notifications alone , but should also include 
issues regarding the functioning of the WTO. Transparency should be reflected in the day -to-day 
functioning of the WTO and in its decision -making processes. Similarly, there was a need for a n 
holistic approach to address ing concerns relating to non -transparent, non -inclusive decision -making 
process es at Ministeria l Conferences. The paper from South Africa and others had explained the 
complexity of the issue in detail and address ed many of the issues that had been raised in the 
debate.  
12.202.   The WTO should focus on creating a suitable eco -system for strengthen ing Members'  
capacity and ability in this area. In the WTO, faith and trust were important to creating a cooperative 
atmosphere. In this regard, any proposal to improve notification obligations based on punitive 
measures , as had been suggested by some Members , would d efinitely be counterproductive and 
would serve only to deepen current divisions . Instead, Members needed to work sincerely on 
strengthening compliance through capacity -building and the simplification of notification formats. 
Members also needed to promote a true spirit of transparency by appropriately applying the intent ion 
and purpose of the WTO Agreements. The co -sponsors would continue to look into the solutions 
proposed by Members and would request additional info rmation on elements of the paper , as 
necessary ; they would also welcome further suggestions from Members and looked forward to future 
interactions bilaterally and in other formats.  
12.203.   The delegate of South Africa  thanked Members for their comments and suggest ions and for 
their engagement with the proposal contained in document  JOB/CTG/15. The paper emphasized the 
need for compliance and recogni zed the importance of transparency in notifications. However, it also 
emphasized the need to give due consideration to  the capacity constraints that were facing many 
Members. The co -sponsors also agreed that notifications and transparency were important in terms 
of achieving a clearer understanding of Members' implementation of the ir commitments in the WTO ; 
they were likewise important for predictability in global trade. However, the transparency and 
notification issue could not be looked at in isolation in view of the capacity constraints of developing 
Members that had also been raised in the paper. The co -sponsors reiter ated their view that a 
cooperative , development -oriented , and holistic approach would assist the WTO to address its 
current challenges more effectively than a punitive approach. The co-sponsors looked forward to 
further engagement with Members on the propo sal and already welcomed some of the suggestions 
that had been made by Hong Kong, China and Singapore on looking for  a way forward in terms of 
further informal consultations with the proponents of the other paper  under discussion under this 
agenda item . 
12.204.   The co -sponsors of document  JOB/CTG/15 had also noted that Members had identified 
points of commonality that existed between the two  papers. However, they also note d that there 
was a difference in approach , with document  JOB/CTG/15 proposing a more coopera tive, 
development -oriented , and inclusive approach , and document  JOB/CTG/14/Rev.2 proposing a more 
punitive approach. There was a need to further engage on some of the issues where there were 
differences and the co -sponsors welcomed further engagement in this regard to see if a way forward 
could be found . Their paper had emphasized that technical assistance made  a contribution but that 
technical assistance in capacity -building alone would not resolve the challenges of a number of 
systemic issues. Indeed, a number of developing countries had emphasized the challenges that G/C/M/135  
 
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  existed,  and it was important to look at those issues to see if there could be a strengthening of the 
assistance provided in order that such assistance dealt with the causes rather than only the 
symptoms of why Members were unable to comply  with their notification obligations . 
12.205.   The co -sponsors wished to emphasize that compliance with notification obligations was not 
just a matter of ticking the boxes. It involved collecting information, someti mes complex information, 
and also analysing it. Furthermore, it involved collecting data from a number of institutions and 
agencies within Government . In short, it was a complicated process that sometimes went beyond 
the capacities of Members. The Organiza tion needed to recognize this fact and to engage in the 
discussion with a view to find ing a constructive approach that would assist the Organization to 
function  more effectively . The co -sponsors wished to engage further with Members on these issues 
and would welcome any additional suggestions or comments from Members with a view to further 
enhancing and strengthen ing the paper.  
12.206.   The Chairperson  thanked all delegations for their interventions and proposed that the 
Council take note of the statements made.  
12.207.   The Council so agreed . 
13  EUROPEAN UNION — QUALITY SCHEMES FOR AGR ICULTURAL PRODUCTS A ND 
FOODSTUFFS - THE REG ISTRATION OF CERTAIN  TERMS OF CHEESE AS GEOGRAPHICAL 
INDICATIONS – REQUES T FROM ARGENTINA, THE UNIT ED STATES,  AND URUGUAY  
13.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of the United States and Uruguay, respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include 
this issue on the agenda.  He also recalled tha t, at the start of the meeting, Argentina  had requested 
to be added as a co -sponsor of this agenda item.  
13.2.   The delegate of Uruguay  indicated that his delegation regretted having to bring again this 
item back to the attention of the Goods Council in light of the difficulties encountered in reaching an 
understanding with the European Union with a view to resolving the issue. Uruguay reiterated that, 
following a process that was patently non -transparent, and despite the opposition of many 
WTO Members, the Europe an Union had decided to register the term "Danbo" as a protected 
geographical indication for Denmark. At the trade level, the creation of unnecessary obstacles to the 
marketing of this type of cheese in the European Union and its possible extension to thir d markets 
through trade agreements was a matter of great concern to Uruguay as a major producer and 
exporter of "Danbo" cheese worldwide. In addition, it should be noted that "Danbo" cheese had its 
own CODEX  standard that regulated its production and label ling: the CODEX  STAN  264 standard, 
approved in 1966 and updated several times, with the participation and acceptance of the European 
Union itself and its Member States, section  7 of which made it quite clear that "Danbo" was a generic 
term used to refer to  a type of cheese that could be produced in different locations, on condition 
that the requirements stipulated by that standard were met.  
13.3.   At the system ic level, it was worrying that an important Member of the WTO should choose 
not to take these standards into consideration, standards which were widely accepted among the 
Membership, calling into question the multilateral effort s made in CODEX to achieve reg ulatory 
harmonization at the international level. Uruguay reiterated that the name "Danbo" was a generic 
term which might not be appropriated and registered as a geographical indication, or had any 
limitations placed on its use. Accordingly, attempts to cl aim ownership of this term and to limit its 
use not only affected the trade in this product, but also set a dangerous precedent. Uruguay also 
rejected the EU  position that this was an intellectual property issue that should not be dealt with in 
this forum,  and pointed out that the rule under which these rights were granted was correctly notified 
by the European Union to the TBT  Committee on 18  November  2013, under the document symbol 
G/TBT/N/EU/139, including elements relating to labelling and relevant inte rnational standards.  
13.4.   In view of the foregoing, Uruguay once again urged the European Union  to provide appropriate 
responses to the concerns of Members and to reconsider its measure in order to avoid creating 
unnecessary restrictions on trade, taking due ac count of the substance of the international standards 
of CODEX. Uruguay also requested that it be kept informed of the status of the process under way 
for the registration of the term "Havarti" as a protected geographical indication for the benefit of 
Denm ark. Uruguay would be closely following developments in this area. G/C/M/135  
 
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  13.5.   The delegate of the United States  said that the United States was concerned about the EU's 
process of registering common cheese names, for which there were international standards, as 
protected geographical indications (PGI). The US had repeatedly expressed its concern with the 
registrati on of the name "Danbo " as a PGI, with a complete disregard for the international standard  
in Codex. Furthermore, the US felt that the application under consideration for the name "Havarti " 
also lacked transparency, particularly considering the existing Cod ex standard for Havarti. The US 
reiterated its view that the EU 's consultation process with regard to these registrations was 
unsatisfactory. Moreover, their interventions in this Council and in the TBT  Committee had not 
resulted in any additional clarity.  In particular, the US continued to seek to understand how the 
Commission considered the existing Codex standards for both "Danbo" and "Havarti", and was also 
concerned about many of the proposed amendments that the EU had made to the underlying 
regulation , which had been notified to the TBT  Committee in August  2018.  
13.6.   Those amendments exacerbate d rather than alleviate d existing US concerns. Shifting 
authority from the Commission to EU  member States and providing member States with greater 
flexibilities and c ontrol over GI  applications could have a negative impact on existing applications 
and on member States ' fulfilment of their WTO  commitments. The amendments would also sharply 
reduce the period granted for filing a reasoned basis in support of an opposition  to register a GI. The 
US said that , despite numerous attempts to obtain answers to their questions and concerns , 
including through written comments and questions in this Council and the TBT  Committee, the EU 
had repeatedly avoided providing answers. The U S wished to redouble its objection to the EU 
granting GI  protection for Havarti because there was an international Codex Alimentarius standard 
for Havarti, which Codex members , including the EU , had reconfirmed in 2007, 2008, and 2010.  
13.7.   The European Council 's own Decision on the EU 's accession to the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission affirmed that "Codex standards have acquired increased legal relevance by virtue of the 
reference made to Codex in the WTO  Agreements and the presumption of conformity which is 
conferred on national measures when they are based on such standards ". The EU and its member 
States had also supported and agreed to the Codex Committee for Milk and Milk Products ' Individual 
Cheese standards, which contained labelling provisions under section  7 that preserved the generic 
nature and use of the names of those cheeses. The US reminded the EU that no WTO  Agreement 
was superior to another and that the EU 's assertion that it was following procedures under other 
agreements did not mean that it could disregard TBT  commitments to uphold international 
standards.  
13.8.   The US asked if the Commission 's view of the legal relevance of Codex standards had changed 
since th e publication of the Council Decision. Any EU  decision to move forward in granting 
GI protection to Havarti would raise serious questions about the views of Denmark and the 
EU Commission regarding the relevance of Codex. The US encouraged Denmark to meet t heir 
respective WTO  TBT obligations by considering the international Codex standard for Havarti and 
taking comments into consideration prior to finalizing the Havarti measure. The US further 
encouraged the EU to consider withdrawing or amending the Havarti  GI application, for example by 
considering a less trade restrictive option to providing GI protection for Danish Havarti as a 
compound term while continuing to allow producers outside of Denmark to use Havarti for cheese 
produced in accordance with the Co dex standard. The US had understood from previous meetings 
that the EU would prefer to discuss the issue in a GI -focused forum. The US disagreed. It was a 
TBT matter, and therefore an absolutely relevant matter for discussion in the CTG. The EU had 
correct ly notified its quality schemes regulation under the TBT  Agreement precisely because there 
were TBT  implications, such as the labelling elements and relevant international standards.  
13.9.   The delegate of Argentina  reiterated that registration of the term "Danbo " as a protected 
geographical indication , demonstrated that the EU was not using Codex Standard  264 "as the basis" 
for Implementing Regulation  2017/1901. Argentina urged the EU once again to review the measure, 
not only in view of its impact on the specifi c trade in that type of cheese but also, and in particular, 
in view of its impact upon the international harmonization work under the Codex Alimentarius, which 
was work to which the EU itself was contributing.  
13.10.   The delegate of New Zealand  said that New Zeal and remained concerned that the European 
Commission had chosen to register the term "Danbo " despite having previously agreed to a Codex 
standard in which the European Commission and Denmark had both acknowledged 'the country of 
origin statement preserves i ts generic nature '. Such actions would negatively affect producers 
outside Denmark that had invested with the legitimate expectation that they could use the standard. G/C/M/135  
 
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  These actions showed disregard for the integrity of the standards setting system that pro moted 
reliability and consistency in international trade rules , which New Zealand would have expected the 
EU to support. Additionally, any suggestion that the term "Havarti " should be registered only 
amplified New Zealand' s concern by providing a further e xample of the integrity of the Codex 
standard being disregarded.  
13.11.   The delegate of Australia  noted that the Australian dairy industry was one of a number of 
international stakeholders that had objected to the protection of "Havarti" in the EU. Australia 
continued to have concerns about decisions to grant cheese GIs that were also a Codex standard for 
cheese. It was important to continue to support the integrity of international standards and to 
maintain access to common names when making decisions on GIs.  
13.12.   The delegate of the European Union  responded that the procedure for granting protection to 
the term "Danbo" as a Geographical Indication in the EU had been finali zed and that the Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU)2017/1901 of 18  October  2017 was publicly available. The 
Commission had always said that the fact that a name had a specific Codex Standard or that it was 
listed in Annex  B to the Stresa Convention did not imply that the said name had become generic. 
Generic status in the EU could only be  assessed based on the perception of consumers in the 
EU territory.  
13.13.   Regarding  the EU  internal procedures on the assessment of the application for granting 
protection to the term "Havarti" as a Geographical Indication, these had not yet been finali zed. 
Regulation (EU)1151/2012 on geographical indications, as well as subsequent delegated and 
implementing regulations, had been notified to the WTO under the TBT  Agreement because they 
contained provisions relevant for the purpose s of the TBT  Agreement and , in particular , provisions 
relating to technical standards, definitions , and labelling issues. However, even if intellectual 
property right s issues were part of the notification measures, they were not relevant for 
TBT purposes, particular ly those elements relating to the substantive protection of geographical 
indications. The EU considered that, concerning  TBT notifications of regulations that might include 
intellectual property issues, such as geographical indications, only those aspects relating to technical 
regulations, definitions , and labelling would be relevant for the purpose s of the TBT  Agreement and 
these should be discussed through TBT  channels.  
13.14.   The EU understood that some of the comments that had been made related to the generic 
character of the name a nd that this was typically part of the registration process of a geographical 
indication. The examination of a generic character was part of the "grounds for refusal " of a 
geographical indication , just like a "grounds for refusal " in the case of trademarks . Likewise, the US 
had made a number of comments about  how the geographical indication registration process worked 
in the EU. The EU stood ready to discuss all these matters, although the issue was very much about 
the registration process of a GI and these  were typically issues that pertained to the remit of the 
TRIPS Council. The refore,  the EU stood ready to engage in discussions in that context.  
13.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made on this issue.  
13.16.   The Council so agreed . 
14  EGYPT – MANUFACTURER  REGISTRATION SYSTEM  – REQUEST FROM THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE RUSSIA N FEDERATION  
14.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communicat ions dated 26 and 27  June 2019, 
the delegations of the Russian Federation and the European Union, respectively, had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda.  
14.2.   The delegate of the European Union  said that the EU was seriously concerned b y Egypt' s 
procedures on compulsory registration of foreign companies and pre -shipment inspections, as 
established by three  Egyptian Ministerial Decrees (No.  991/2015, No.  43/2016 , and No.  44/2019), 
as they created a considerable administrative and economic  burden. The EU was greatly concerned 
to learn about Egypt' s decision to extend the mandatory registration requirements to new product 
categories through Decree  No. 44/2019 of 15  January  2019. The EU maintained the serious 
concerns that it had expressed in  its written comments to Egypt as well as in previous meetings of 
the TBT  Committee and the CTG. The EU urged Egypt to suspend the application of the measures G/C/M/135  
 
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  and to review them in light of the principles and obligations laid down in WTO  law. The EU also 
invited Egypt to consider improvements to the implementation of the decrees, as suggested in 
previous exchanges. The EU would continue to engage with Egypt multilaterally and bilaterally in 
order to have this main trade barrier affecting EU  exporters abolis hed or modified in the near future.  
14.3.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  expressed the deep concerns of the Russian Federation 
over Egypt' s existing registration regime of manufacturers , which created unnecessary and 
discriminative obstacles for Russian exporters. It seemed that the requirements were applied in 
respect of exporters and exported products into the territory of Egypt only. In some cases, the 
Egyptian authorities had delayed the procedures without any feedback or explanation. Russian 
exporter s could not obtain permits for exports for two years. The Russian Federation understood the 
necessity of registration as a type of conformity assessment procedure. However, considering  the 
approaches applied by Egypt, they questioned the scope of the produ cts subject to registration as 
that scope was similar to the scope of products manufactured in Egypt itself . Moreover, Egyptian 
legislation did not lay down provisions regarding maximum periods for consideration of applications 
on registration of exporters . Such a situation created unpredictability and additional obstacles for 
exporters.  
14.4.   The Russian Federation also questioned the list of documents required for registration and did 
so for a number of reasons: some of the documents did not relate to product s afety; some were 
related to confidential information, such as the list of other countries to where the manufacturer 
exported the ir products; and information regarding trademarks, consumers , and so on . In this 
regard, the Russian Federation required Egypt to revise the legislation and to eliminate discriminative 
and burdensome approaches to imported products. They also requested Egypt to provide a copy of 
the legislation mentioned during their bilateral meetings , regulating the registration regime for 
national manufacturers and clarifying all the procedures.  
14.5.   The delegate of Brazil  shared the concerns raised under this item by other Members. The 
manufacturer registration system had severely affected many Brazilian  exporters, especially in the 
fields of ceramics, tableware, food , and cosmetics. The measures established by the Egyptian 
decrees not only represented unjustified hurdles to Brazil's bilateral trade with Egypt, they also failed 
to comply with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Brazil had repeatedly tried, both in Geneva and in 
Cairo, to engage with the Egyptian authorities in this regard . Unfortunately, their bilateral efforts to 
address the issue had not yielded any results. Thus, Brazil urged Egypt to eng age in discussions in 
good faith in order to find concrete solutions to this issue . 
14.6.   The delegate of Egypt  thanked the European Union and the Russian Federation for their 
interest in this issue and for their fruitful bilateral consultations. Egypt believed that such 
communications and exchanges were crucial to resolving any misunderstandings. She also extended 
her appreciation to the delegation of Brazil for its intervention. Egypt underscored , as it had done  at 
the most recent TBT Committee meeting, that a detailed analysis of Egypt's imports under the 
HS Chapters that contained tariff lines subject to Decree  No. 43 vividly demonstrated that the decree 
in fact did not restrict trade. Nevertheless , in line with their efforts to respond to the concerns 
express ed by a number of Egypt's trading partners, a new committee had been established in Egypt's 
Ministry of Trade and Industry with the mandate of reviewing all pending applications to accelerate 
the finalization of the registration process. In addition, the n ewly established committee would 
incorporate an appeal mechanism for companies whose registration applications had been rejected. 
Egypt renewed its call upon Members with specific problems or concerns to provide them with the 
details so that these could be  communicated to the new committee.  
14.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
14.8.   The Council so agreed . 
15  MONGOLIA – QUANTITAT IVE RESTRICTIONS AND  PROHIBITIONS ON IMP ORTATIONS 
OF CERTAIN AGRICULTU RAL PRODUCTS – REQUE ST FROM THE  RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
15.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 26  June 2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the 
agenda.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  15.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  recalled  that the Russian Federation had repeatedly 
raised the issue of Mongolia's application of quantitative restrictions and prohibitions on importation 
of certain agricultural products, including wheat flour and liquid milk, at different multilateral and 
bilateral fora. However, Mongolia had failed to provide a proper justification for its quantitative 
restrictions and prohibitions. In February  2019, Mongolia had claimed that quantitative restrictions 
on the importation of certain agricultural products, including wheat flour and liquid milk, had been 
established in preparation for the implementation of the Law on the Enrichment of Food Products. 
Mongolia had also explained that the Law had been adopted because food products needed to be 
enriched with iron, zinc, and vitamins  B and D. It had also said that monitoring through quota was 
a temporary measure until the end of 2019 (when the Law on the E nrichment of Food Products 
would enter into force). The Russian Federation was seeking further clarification on the rationale for 
using a quantitative quota regime to ensure that imported food products contained iron, zinc, and 
vitamins  B and D. The Russia n Federation also noted that the quota regime had been established in 
2013, whereas the Law on the Enrichment of Food Products had been adopted in 2018. Furthermore, 
the new explanation provided by Mongolia contradicted its previous statements explaining t he 
reasoning behind the measure at issue.  
15.3.   During the most recent meeting of the Committee on Agriculture , Mongolia had stated that 
the importation of liquid milk would not be allowed in 2019 due to the fact that in January  2018 
there had been no applicatio ns for quota shares from importers. Thereby, Mongolia had introduced 
a de facto prohibition on imports of liquid milk for the whole of year 2019. The Russian Federation 
was of the view that the lack of importers' applications for quota shares at one point in time could 
not in any way be considered a proper justification for the introduction of an import prohibition. The 
Russian Federation believed that Mongolia's measures were inconsistent with its obligations under 
the WTO  Agreements, Article  XI of the GAT T 1994 and Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture  
in particular , as well as Mongolia's accession commitments under paragraph  20 of the Working Party 
Report. The Russian Federation urged Mongolia promptly to take all necessary steps to bring its 
legislation and measures into conformity with the relevant WTO  provisions.  
15.4.   The delegate of Mongolia  said that , regarding wheat flour, the decision by the Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture , and Light Industry , to allocate quotas was publicly available. Regarding  liquid 
milk, although the invitation to apply for imports had been announced, no applications had been 
received , and Mongolia did not consider that such a situation amounted to  a prohibition. 
Furthermore, these circumstances  had been explained to the Russian F ederation during the meeting 
of the Bilateral Inter -Governmental Working Group on Agriculture on 28  May 2019. Mongolia had 
informed Members of the necessity for the measure in connection with the Law on Food Security as 
well as the Law on the Enrichment of  Food Products at previous meetings of the CTG and other 
Committees. Mongolia considered that the measure was fully justifiable under Article  XX(b) and 
Article  XI:2(b) of the GATT. The measure was not applied in an arbitrary manner and did not  
discriminate between suppliers ; in addition, both  domestically produced and imported products were 
monitored through the measure.  
15.5.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
15.6.   The Council so agreed . 
16  VIET NAM – DECREE ON  THE REGULATION ON C ONDITIONS FOR AUTOMO BILES 
MANUFACTURING, ASSEM BLING, IMPORTING, AN D AUTOMOTIVE WARRANT Y AND 
MAINTENANCE SERVICES  – REQUEST FROM THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION AND THE U NITED 
STATES  
16.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in communications dated 26 and 27  June 2019, 
the delegation s of the Russian Federation and the United States, respectively,  had requested the 
Secretariat to include this is sue on the agenda.  
16.2.   The representative of the United States  reiterated US  concerns about market access for motor 
vehicles resulting from Viet Nam's Decree  116 and Circular  3. The measures imposed burdensome 
certification and testing requirements, which were  continuing to disrupt auto trade with Viet  Nam. 
The US welcomed the Prime Minister 's announcement in October  2018 that he would be directing 
the Ministry of Transport to revise the onerous lot -by-lot testing requirements of Decree  116 and to 
revert instea d to testing a representative sample of each imported vehicle type.  Following his G/C/M/135  
 
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  directive, the US understood that the Ministry of Transport was conducting an assessment study of 
Decree  116 and Circular  3, including with respect to lot -by-lot testing requ irements. The US would 
appreciate any updates that Viet  Nam could provide about when the assessment would be 
completed, and when Viet  Nam planned to develop new regulations to revise lot -by-lot testing 
requirements, including a timeline and opportunities f or consultation with stakeholders.  
16.3.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  shared the concerns regarding Viet  Nam's registration 
of automobiles and thanked Viet  Nam for the detailed explanation of the measure and the trade 
statistics that they had provided bilaterally. The Russian Federation had taken into consideration 
that imports had increased compared to the period before entry into force of the measure, but that 
registration was conducted after customs clearance procedures; this created unnecessary obstacles 
for market access and generated high costs for manufacturers attempting to comply with all the 
requirements. The Russian Federation recommended that Viet  Nam revise the regulation because 
there were alternative measures to fulfil the legitimate objectives referred to by Viet  Nam under the 
TBT Agreement and under other commitments at the WTO.  
16.4.   The delegate of the European Union  shared the concerns expressed b y the US and the Russian 
Federation about Vietnamese Decree  116/2017 and again requested Viet  Nam to suspend the 
application of the Decree and to consider the comments made by WTO  Members in different fora. 
The EU also requested that any implementing measu re be notified to the WTO when still in draft 
form. The EU also requested that Viet  Nam involve all stakeholders, including importers of foreign 
cars, in all consultations that developed legislation further. The EU requested an update on how 
Viet Nam had c onsidered the concerns expressed by several WTO  Members on the measure.  
16.5.   The delegate of Mexico  said that Mexico was also closely following the matter.  
16.6.   The delegate of Viet Nam reiterated that the intention of Decree  116 was to ensure human 
safety, to impro ve compliance, to strengthen environmental protection, and to uphold consumers ' 
rights based on the principle of healthy competition. In that spirit, the requirements put forth by the 
measure, notably the lot -by-lot inspection and the Vehicle Type Approval , were for legitimate public 
policy purposes and were not discriminatory. Viet  Nam had recognized the difficulties for companies 
posed by the implementation of the Decree and had held many meetings and consultations at the 
highest levels of Government sinc e the Decree had entered into force with a view to facilitating trade 
while maintaining the objective of safeguarding public interests. Following lower than average 
year-on-year imports during the first  half of the year, car imports had picked up in the se cond half 
of 2018 and the upward trend was continuing. In the first half of 2019, automobile imports had 
reached a new record of 78  thousand units, surpassing 51  thousand units for the same period of 
2017, the year before Decree  116 had entered into force.  This marked a 53% growth. Consultations 
with importers had further helped to explain that it had just taken some time for them to get 
acquainted with Decree  116's requirements and to successfully adjust to them. The actual costs of 
compliance were not as high as the complaints had indicated. From the consumer 's perspective, the 
safety and quality of imported automobiles had been enhanced as the lot -by-lot testing had helped 
to expose a number of inferior shipments , which had failed to meet certain technical conditions, 
which might otherwise have been passed unchecked. Regarding the Russian Federation's concern 
over the registration of automobiles in Viet  Nam, his delegation would discuss this issue with them 
on a bilateral basis.  
16.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
16.8.   The Council so agreed . 
17  CHINA – MEASURES RES TRICTING THE IMPORT OF SCRAP MATERIALS – REQUEST 
FROM THE UNITED STAT ES 
17.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda of 
this meeting.  
17.2.   The delegate of the United States  reiterated US  concerns over China's measures banning or 
severely limiting the import of scrap materials. On 18  July 2017, China had notified to the 
TBT Committee its notifications CHN  1211 and 1212, banning the import of scrap post -consumer G/C/M/135  
 
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  plastics, mixed paper, and textiles , as well as setting new border inspection and identification rules 
for scrap materia ls that China qualified as 'waste'. China had implemented these measures on 
31 December  2017.  
17.3.   On 15  November  2017, China had notified CHN  1224 through CHN  1234, restricting the 
import of a variety of scrap materials through revised quality parameters. The commodities affected 
included industrial plastics, paper and paperboard, non -ferrous scrap and wire, ferrous scrap and 
wire, and metal and electrical appliance scrap, among others; these new barriers had entered into 
force on 1  March  2018. The US remained concerned that the broad scope of these compulsory new 
quality parameters might be excessively trade restrictive.  
17.4.   In April  2018, China had announced an expansion of its import ban to include most plastics 
and all wood, automotive, appliance, electric motor, and vessel scrap. In response to the US  inquiry , 
China had noted that it did not intend to notify these new measures to the TBT  Committee. 
Furthermore, in May  2018, China had announced , and implemented the following day , new border 
inspecti on rules requiring 100%  inspection and lab testing at the border for all scrap commodities. 
That same day, China had arbitrarily halted its pre -shipment inspection in the US for a period of 
30 days, leading to a complete halt in US  exports of recycled comm odities to China. On 
27 June 2018, China had issued a notice indicating that all scrap material imports would be restricted 
to a list of specified ports, effective January  2019. On 18  July 2018, China had issued the revised 
draft Law of the People's Republ ic of China on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution 
by Solid Wastes, which defined "solid waste" to include all scrap materials , and which expressly 
banned such imports. In totality, these measures outrightly banned or effectively banned i mports of 
scrap materials.  
17.5.   To be clear, scrap materials were firstly separated from the waste stream for recycling as a 
raw material and secondly were saleable items traded within a distinct global marketplace (meaning, 
they had an underlying economic valu e). These qualities made the classification of scrap materials 
as "waste" inaccurate.  
17.6.   Her delegation had observed that these barriers had entered into force without any reasonable 
interval for industry and recyclers to make the necessary adjustments to the ir supply chains or to 
develop new processing capacity.  
17.7.   China's vast share of the global secondary processing market , combined with its abrupt 
implementation of these measures , had forced recyclers in the US and elsewhere that could not 
locate alternative processing facilities to dispose of or incinerate otherwise valuable recyclable 
commodities. This artificial shortfall in global processing capacity, which could take several years to 
develop from the ground up, had caused the decline, and in many cases, c ollapse, of US municipal 
recycling program mes. As the world's largest processor of scrap materials, China's implementation 
of these measures had had an immediate, deleterious , and potentially lasting impact upon global 
recycling networks.  
17.8.   The United States  requested that China provide detail on how China had determined that its 
measures were necessary, particularly given how abruptly the measures had been implemented. 
Furthermore, these restrictions were detriment al to Members' shared environment. As a resu lt of 
China's measures, and consequently the additional pressure on capacity in smaller, less developed 
economies, an increased volume of scrap materials was at greater risk of going into landfills or other 
less desirable waste channels and becoming marine  litter.  
17.9.   While China had asserted that the solution to its import policies laid in affected countries 
adjusting their domestic recycling processes to meet China's import parameters, her delegation 
wished to underscore that for a vast number of materials ou tlined in China's ban and import control 
standards, China had no mandatory commensurate domestic standard or ban in place. The broadly 
trade -restrictive nature of the import control measures and the apparently fundamental differences 
between requirements f or foreign and domestic commodities were cause for concern.  
17.10.   Finally, China's continued refusal to notify its new technical measures consistent with its 
obligations under the TBT  Agreement, as well as its arbitrary and abrupt halt of pre -shipment 
inspection  in the US , had heightened US  concerns over the intent of these actions. The US requested 
China to immediately halt implementation of these measures and to revise them, in a manner G/C/M/135  
 
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  consistent with existing international standards for trade in scrap materia ls, which provided a global 
framework for transparent and environmentally sound trade in scrap materials.  
17.11.   The delegate of New Zealand  noted that her authorities acknowledged and supported the 
right of all WTO  Members to regulate in order to achieve legitim ate domestic health and 
environmental objectives. Furthermore, New Zealand applauded China's stated proactive policy 
objectives in relation to sustainable development and encouraged valid actions to limit harmful 
environmental impacts from contaminated was te inside China's border.  
17.12.   New Zealand in no way sought to question China's right to regulate to protect its 
environment. However, New Zealand continued to have an interest in this measure and a specific 
concern that vanadium slag was included in China's ca talogue of banned imports under this measure. 
New Zealand reiterated its view that vanadium slag was a purposefully produced co -product, with a 
purposeful end -use in the production of specific forms of steel. It was not a waste product and so 
should not fa ll under measures for solid waste. She recalled that China was the largest global 
producer of vanadium slag, with approximately 500, 000 tonnes of annual production generated as 
a co-product from steel mills.  
17.13.   New Zealand would appreciate receiving clarification from China on how it had ensured that 
the rules that applied to foreign products were no less favourable than those accorded to domestic 
products. Her delegation was also interested to hear a further explanation from China about how  it 
had ensured that the import ban on vanadium slag was not more trade restrictive than necessary to 
achieve China's environmental and health protection objectives.  
17.14.   The delegate of the Dominican Republic  shared the concerns raised by the US. It was 
import ant that Members observed the notification procedures early enough in order to strengthen 
the transparency of the multilateral trading system, particularly when those measures could have 
considerable trade impacts and bring systemic risks. The Dominican Re public did not question the 
right of Members to protect their environment. However, in doing  so, they had to respect the 
integrity of the rules, and especially those on non-discriminatory treatment between imported and 
domestic products.  
17.15.   The delegate of Australia  said that his authorities appreciated the importance of 
environmental protection and China's efforts to reduce pollution. However, Australia reiterated its 
concerns regarding China's implementation of a range of measures on waste and scrap imports,  
which appeared to be more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve China's desired objectives. 
Trade in secondary and recyclable materials was a key component to achieving global environmental 
outcomes. A range of materials impacted by China's measures  were valuable inputs to recycling 
supply chains rather than waste. Trade in these products allowed for the recovery of materials which 
might otherwise end up in landfill or in oceans.  
17.16.   Australia urged China to reconsider the measures and to engage with its  trading partners to 
improve and develop trade facilitative standards for trade in recyclables. This included standards 
which met policy objectives while also allowing for trade in recyclable materials, promotion of the 
recovery of resources , and global en vironmental outcomes.  
17.17.   The representative of Canada  noted that his delegation continued to share the concerns of 
the US and reiterated the comments on China's restrictions in respect of solid waste that it had made 
in earlier CTG and Committee meetings. Canada did not dispute China's goal of limiting the h armful 
environmental impact resulting from contaminated waste material. However, Canada noted that 
high quality scrap products were a valuable raw material for Chinese customers involved in various 
manufacturing sectors. Canada continued to encourage China  to ensure that any trade measure it 
took would be the least -trade restrictive possible while respecting its objective to limit harmful 
environmental impacts.  
17.18.   The delegate of the European Union  stated that , in the context of the regular EU -China 
Dialogues,  the EU had submitted questions to China on a number of issues , via a letter dated 
25 July 2018, including  detailed questions on the recent Chinese measures on waste. To date , China 
had not responded to the questions on waste or on any other issue. The EU once again asked China 
to respond to its questions as soon as possible. The EU looked forward to working with China on G/C/M/135  
 
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  addressing the issue of trade in waste in the most environmentally and economically efficient way  
possible , and in full transparency.  
17.19.   The delegate of China  stated that solid waste had inherent pollutant attributes, which 
differentiated it from other goods. China had suffered pollution from the solid waste imported from 
other countries for decades. China, as a developing country, faced great  challenges in addressing 
environmental pollution. It was imperative to implement measures to limit the negative effect s of 
solid waste.  
17.20.   From a worldwide perspective, the danger s of solid waste had been acknowledged by almost 
all countries. According to th e Basel Convention , and other internationally accepted principles, every 
Member was obliged to handle and to dispose properly of its domestically -produced solid waste. For 
a long time, China had suffered the consequences of imported solid waste while expor ting enterprises 
in other countries had enjoyed enormous economic benefits. China hoped that those exporting 
countries could now actively shoulder their international responsibilities, rather than expecting 
others to do it for them.  
17.21.   Regarding notification obligations, China had notified Quantitative Restrictions for the period 
2016 to 2018 and 2018 to 2020 to the Market Access Committee. China would further notify other 
measures as required by the WTO Agreements. Regarding  the EU's questions raised bilatera lly, 
Capital looked forward to continuing its discussions through the se bilateral channel s. 
17.22.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
17.23.   The Council so agreed . 
18  INDIA – QUANTITATIVE  RESTRICTIONS ON IMP ORTS OF CERTAIN PULSES – REQUEST 
FROM AUSTRALIA, CANA DA, THE EUROPEAN UNI ON, THE RUSSIAN  FEDERATION, AND THE 
UNITED STATES  
18.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in communications dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, the Russia n Federation,  and the United States, 
respectively, had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda of this meeting.  
18.2.   The delegate of Australia  noted that his delegation 's long -standing concerns regarding India's 
quantitative restrictions ( QRs) on certain pulses were well known. These concerns were held by a 
large group of developed and developing WTO  Members alike.  
18.3.   Australia had continued to engage with India on this issue bilaterally and in a number of 
different WTO  Committees. As noted by  his delegation at the most recent meeting of the Committee 
on Agriculture, it was difficult to know how to keep India engaged on this matter. Australia had 
asked India to identify the WTO  basis for its QRs and to explain how they were 'temporary' measures , 
noting that they had been in place for nearly two  years. India had failed to provide any substantive 
response on the WTO -consistency of its QRs. In response to previous questions on this issue, India 
had stated that its QRs on pulses were '  … temporary a nd extension or removal of these quantitative 
restrictions will be based on domestic demand -supply situations' . 
18.4.   Australia noted that recent Government of India estimates for pulse production in 2018 -2019 
were almost 10 % lower than last year , and were simil ar to levels in 2016 -2017, when India had 
introduced QRs. A reduction in production and lower buffer stocks had now placed upward pressure 
on the price s of some pulses, yet the QRs had remained.  
18.5.   Australia also reminded Members that their concerns were not solely regarding QRs. At the 
February  meeting of the Committee on Agriculture, Australia had co -sponsored a 
Canada -US counter -notification, which had demonstrated their broader concerns, particularly over 
India's Market Price Support (MPS) measures for pul ses. The counter -notification had clearly 
demonstrated how India was providing MPS well in excess of its de minimis  limits for a range of 
pulses. This WTO -inconsistent MPS, combined with QRs and high tariffs, were having a detrimental 
impact on the global pulses trade and on consumers in developing and developed countries.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  18.6.   Australia called upon India to provide the WTO -basis for these measures or , failing that, to 
remove the QRs immediately. His delegation also asked that India seriously consider the  impact of 
these measures on other Members, particularly developing Members , and the impact that these 
measures might have in the future when India would predictably become again a net -importer of 
pulses.  
18.7.   On the matter of transparency and advance notice, g iven the size and importance of India's 
pulse market to the global industry, and the importance of imported pulses to Indians in times of 
low production, India would benefit just as much as other Members by being as transparent as 
possible and by providing  prompt forewarning to Members as to when it was implementing or 
removing these types of measures. Australia suspected that India would also like the same courtesy 
extended to it from its trading partners in the same situation.  
18.8.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  once again expressed concerns over India's policy on 
the import of yellow peas. In November  2017, the Government of India had increased the import 
tariffs on yellow peas by up to 50%. In addition to these measures, on 25  April 2018, India had 
introduced quantitative restrictions on imports of yellow peas. This quota had been extended until 
30 September  2018. From September  2018 until March  2019, India had also applied restrictions of 
imports of dried peas. And in late March  2019, India had issued  a notification establishing a new 
quota of 1050  metric tonne s for the period from 2019 until March  2020.  
18.9.   The Russia n Federation  wished to highlight that , as a result of India's use of this measure by 
India, imports of yellow peas had dropped significantly  over the previous two years. The Russian 
Federation was of the view that quantitative restrictions as well as import prohibitions were not a 
trade policy instrument that could be applied by WTO  Members without proper justification. This was 
why the Russian Federation requested India to bring these measures into conformity with WTO  rules.  
18.10.   The Russian Federation also wished to raise the issue of the social welfare surcharge. This 
surcharge had been introduced in early 2018 as a means of fundraising for  educational purposes. 
The surcharge rate had been set at 10% on most imported products  and this surcharge only applied 
to imported products. According to its schedule of concessions, India was not allowed to apply any 
other duty or charge, and the Russian  Federation requested further clarification in this regard . In 
addition, they  wished to engage in further bilateral consultations with India on this issue . 
18.11.   The delegate of Canada  noted that Canada had been the Member most negatively affected 
by India's mea sures to limit the import of pulses over the previous two years. These measures went 
against the fundamental principles of both the GATT and the WTO  Agreement on Agriculture on the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions. Despite numerous requests at the CTG and in other 
WTO Committees, India had yet to provide the GATT or WTO  justification for these measures. 
Canada was very concerned over this lack of transparency and the imposition of these measures 
without explanation. Canada once again asked India to comply with its WTO  obligations and to repeal 
these restrictions.  
18.12.   The delegate of the European Union  shared the concerns expressed by other Members over 
India's pulse policy, in particular regarding the application of quantitative import restrictions and 
sudden increases in import duties. Her delegation was also concerned about the effect of these 
measures on the pulse crop markets. For further details, the EU referred to its interventions in the 
meetings of the Committee on Agriculture in 2018 and 2019.11 
18.13.   The representative of the United States  noted that her delegation remained concerned that 
India had undertaken a number of trade -distorting policies in relation to various pulses since 2017. 
These had included, but were not limited to, domestic support poli cies, multiple increases in tariff 
rates, and the application of quantitative import restrictions. Since August  2017, the Government of 
India had set annual import quotas for several types of pulses, including pigeon peas, mung beans, 
black gram lentils, a nd peas. These were products for which India's WTO  commitments prescribed 
a simple bound rate tariff with no allowance for a tariff -rate quota. Most recently, in March  2019, 
India's Ministry of Commerce and Industry had issued notifications restricting imp orts of mung 
beans, peas, black gram lentil , and pigeon peas in the Indian fiscal year 2019 -2020.  
                                                
11 See document  G/C/M/131, paragraph  8.5; document  G/C/M/132, paragrap h 22.13; 
document  G/C/M/133, paragraph  27.4; and document  G/C/M/134, paragraph  18.12.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  18.14.   In response to previous questions on this topic, India had stated that such quantitative 
restrictions were temporary , although restrictions on some of these products had been in effect for 
nearly two  years. Indian imports of pulses classified under HS  0713 had fallen from $4  billion in  
2016 to $1.1  billion in 2018, representing a 74 % decrease in only two  years. At the A pril 2019 
CTG meeting, India had explained that the decision to impose the quota had been based on the 
domestic supply and demand situation of pulses in India. The United States had requested more 
details from India on how the supply and demand situation w as assessed and how the decision was 
made to set the level of quantitative restriction for each pulse. What circumstance or conditions 
would result in India removing these restrictions?  
18.15.   Once again, the United States requested an explanation from India conc erning its use of 
quantitative restrictions for pulse imports and how these measures complied with India's 
WTO commitments.  
18.16.   The representative of Ukraine  echoed the concerns of Members regarding India's restrictive 
policy on certain pulses. These concerns had already been expressed by Ukraine on several 
occasions. It was important from a systemic point of view to develop a clear er understanding of the 
objectives of the multiple increases in tariff rates, the QRs, and the import limiting licensing 
arrangemen ts that India had imposed. Ukraine called upon India to comply with its transparency 
obligations and to bring its trade -distorting policies into conformity with WTO  rules.  
18.17.   The delegate of New Zealand  reiterated her delegation's concern with India's apparen t 
implementation of a QR in contravention of the rules set out in the WTO  Agreement. Like other 
Members, her delegation encouraged India to bring its measures into conformity with the 
WTO framework.  
18.18.   The delegate of India noted that the issues raised today had been raised in recent meetings 
of the Committee on Import Licensing, the Committee on Market Access , and in the previous meeting 
of the CTG. For the sake of an efficient utilization of time, his delegation would not repeat its 
comments on this issue delivered on previous occasions . 
18.19.   Briefly, India wished to inform Members that India was the largest producer as well as 
consumer of pulses. As had been mentioned on earlier occ asions, the decision to impose quotas was 
based on the domestic demand and supply situation of pulses in India. He reiterated that these 
measures were intended to alleviate  the distress caused to small and marginal farmers by the influx 
of cheap imported p ulses and the consequent impact on their food and livelihood security.  
18.20.   These measures were temporary and the extension or removal of these QRs would be based 
on the domestic demand and supply situations. India was constantly reviewing these measures. At 
previous meetings , India had informed Members of the changes in its wholesale price index ( WPI) 
on pulses.  
18.21.   On the issue of any additional quota for imports of peas during the financial year 2018 -2019, 
his delegation wished to inform Members that , despite the quota under the QR, substantial imports 
had been allowed on account of Court orders. Against the quota allocation of just 6  lakh metric 
tonnes for pulses in 2018 -2019, actual imports had been more than three  times that quota.  
18.22.   Further more, in t he present financial year, tariff quotas had been announced and the 
relevant procedure had also been laid down by the Directorate -General of Foreign Trade. The 
government had been regularly reviewing the market situation of pulses , owing to which the quota  
of pulses had been increased from 6,00,000  lakh metric tonnes in 2018 -2019 to 6,50,000  lakh 
metric tonnes for the financial year 2019 -2020. The quota for 2019 -2020 had been recently further 
increased by 2  lakh metric tonnes taking the total to 8.5  lakh me tric tonnes.  
18.23.   Certain additional issues had been raised by Members in the recent meeting of the 
Committee on Agriculture, and India had provided its responses to those queries. Regarding the 
query on the specific WTO  provisions under which India had imposed  its temporary measures, his 
delegation would revert back to the matter  at a later date . India would address any further query 
on this issue in the appropriate Committee and bilaterally.  
18.24.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  18.25.   The Council so agreed . 
19  CHINA - CUSTOMS DUTI ES ON CERTAIN INTEGR ATED CIRCUITS – REQU EST FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION, JAPA N, AND CHINESE TAIPE I 
19.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in communicati ons dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegations of the European Union, Japan,  and Chinese Taipei, respectively, had requested the 
Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  of this meeting . 
19.2.   The delegate of the European Union  thanked China for its engagement b oth bilaterally and in 
other contexts such as the GAMS  meeting. China had shared with other Members some technical 
information following the transposition towards tariff heading  8542 under the Harmonized 
System  2017 (HS2017) nomenclature. Unfortunately, th e information provided so far had not 
alleviated her delegation's concerns. These concerns had been raised in a variety of WTO  meetings.  
19.3.   Her delegation encouraged China to address these concerns as soon as possible , especially 
given the advanced stage of t ariff reductions on these products.  
19.4.   If China did not wish to modify its HS2017  classification at this stage, one  alternative could 
be to give a sign of its commitment to the ITA by accelerating the phasing -in of its tariff reductions 
on these products.  
19.5.   The delegate of Japan  thanked China for providing an explanation in response to Japan's 
questions. However, her delegation continued to have concerns, like other Members, regarding 
China's application of tariffs that were higher than the bound levels containe d in China's Schedule 
of Concessions. Regarding the IGBT -IPM (semi -conductor products), her delegation appreciated 
China's explanation but still found it unconvincing and requested that China swiftly withdraw the 
tariffs on the IGBT -IPM. Japan was also clo sely monitoring China's commitment to abolish customs 
duties in July  2021 on all relevant items in line with the staging commitments set out under the 
ITA-II. 
19.6.   The delegate of Chinese Taipei  shared the views of the other co -sponsors of this agenda item. 
Her delegation wished to thank China for its explanations. This had been a long -standing issue , as 
other co -sponsors had indicated. Since 1  January  2017, China had raised tariffs on four  tariff lines 
in its tariff schedule , which was in the HS2017  nomenclature. China had imposed tariffs on 
multi-component integrated circuit products at a rate that was higher than its current WTO  duty-free 
bound rate. Thus, this measure undermined the commercial interests of Chinese Taipei's industry. 
Therefore, Chinese Taipei urged China to immediately eliminate the tariffs on the MCO  products at 
issue.  
19.7.   The delegate of Switzerland  shared the concerns expressed by previous speakers. The 
HS transposition was a technical process, which should no t modify the concessions that had been 
granted. Switzerland invited China to remedy this situation promptly and to comply with its 
commitments.  
19.8.   The delegate of the United States  supported the statements and questions raised by previous 
speakers and reitera ted US  concerns over changes in China's applied duty rates for semiconductor 
products. This was an issue that the United States had previously raised in this Council as well as 
the Committee on Market Access and the ITA  Committee. In line with the General Council Decision 
on HS  transpositions, her delegation continued to assert that the scope of China's concessions had 
changed substantially, and the value of the concession had been impaired, in that these 
semiconductor products , which had been duty -free for  over a decade , were now facing duties.  
19.9.   The delegate of China  said that China had responded to similar comments on this item in 
previous meetings of this Council as well as the Market Access Committee and the ITA  Committee. 
Also, China had conducted a numb er of bilateral consultations with interested Members, and all the 
written questions that China had received had likewise been responded to in writing.  
19.10.   She wished to reiterate that the method China had used for the transposition was suggested 
by the WTO  documents, which was fully consistent with WTO  rules on HS2017  transposition. The 
ITA expansion negotiations had concluded through very hard and intensive work by all relevant G/C/M/135  
 
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  Members. In this process, China had made great contributions to the negotiation an d believed that 
a balanced outcome had been reached. China did not think that there were reasons at this moment 
to ask China to expedite its tariff reductions. China had always seriously undertaken its tariff 
reduction commitments. Since 1  July 2019, China  had implemented its fourth  tariff cut on 
ITA expansion products. The duty rates on MCO  products had been further reduced to 1.3%, 1.4% , 
and 3.3% , respectively. China would continue to fulfil its commitments and all duties on 
MCO products would be eliminat ed by July  2021, as scheduled.  
19.11.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
19.12.   The Council so agreed . 
20  EUROPEAN UNION - DRAFT IMPLEMENTING REGU LATIONS REGARDING PR OTECTED 
DESIGNATIONS OF ORIG IN AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS, TRADI TIONAL TERMS, 
LABELLING AND PRESEN TATION OF CERTAIN WI NE SECTOR PRODUCTS – REQUEST FROM 
THE UNITED STATES  
20.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda of 
this meeting.  
20.2.   The delegate of the United States  regretted that her delegation had to again raise concerns 
with the EU's policies on geographical indic ations and traditional terms for wine; and specifically, the 
pending applications of the United States for traditional terms. Her delegation had been raising 
concerns about these policies and the associated regulations for almost twenty  years. The EU's 
persistent failure to provide any information left her delegation with no choice but to raise these 
concerns once again.  
20.3.   At several recent TBT  Committee meetings, in this Council , and in the EU's recent response 
to US  comments, the EU had said that the pendin g applications for traditional terms were still under 
consideration, but that it could not provide a precise timeline for approval. The United States wished 
to know why the EU was unable to provide any estimate or to say where the US  applications were  
in the process . 
20.4.   The United States had been previously told that the cause for the delay was that the EU was 
working on revisions to the relevant regulations. Those revisions had now been adopted. And it was 
curious that , while the EU had had the opportunity du ring the review and revision of those measures 
to include timelines and greater transparency with regard to traditional terms, it had chosen not to 
do so even though it had seen fit to provide some timelines and transparency for geographical 
indications. W hy the difference? Why had the EU apparently made  no effort to ensure that delays 
on the approval of traditional terms would not continue? Her delegation also wished the EU to clarify 
whether and , if so, how, the processing of these applications would chan ge following the recent 
Parliamentary elections, including whether responsibility for processing applications would be 
transitioned to a new agency within the European Commission . 
20.5.   The US also wished  the EU to provide some transparency on the status of othe r applications, 
so that the US could evaluate how its own applications compared. Her delegation did not understand 
why the EU seemed unable or unwilling to provide transparency regarding the applications that had 
been lodged, or to provide greater predicta bility through timelines for traditional terms. Now that 
the new rules had entered into force, the United States once again requested the EU to move 
expeditiously to approve US  applications so that this longstanding item could be removed from the 
CTG's agenda. 
20.6.   The delegate of New Zealand  thanked the United States for placing this item on the agenda. 
New Zealand recognized that Members had the right to protect their consumers from deceptive 
practices in line with their obligations under the WTO. Nevertheless, New Zealand requested the 
European Union to take into consideration Members ' concerns about  the scope and application of its 
system for traditional terms, as well as transparency, process, and timelines relating to applications 
by third  count ries that wished to use traditional terms in the EU.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  20.7.   The delegate of Brazil  stated that her delegation echoed the concerns expressed by the United 
States under this agenda item.  
20.8.   The delegate of Argentina  stated that , rather than repeating the arguments that it had made  
at the CTG 's previous meeting, Argentina wished instead to express the hope that the recent 
agreement reached between Mercosur and the EU would lead to an early recognition of the traditional 
terms "Reserva" and "Gran Reserva", so that Europe an consumers could find these Argentine wines 
on the shelves of their local supplier.  
20.9.   The delegate of the European Union  said that the EU had undertaken a revision of its 
legislation on wine, including on traditional terms, which they had notified to the T BT Committee in 
document  G/TBT/N/EU/571. The revision had resulted in the adoption of Commission Implementing 
Regulation No.  2019/34, of 17  October  2018, which, among other elements, had established the 
rules regarding the procedures to be followed for the  registration of traditional terms. The EU had 
replied to TBT  comments received from the US, China, Australia, and Argentina on the relevant 
notification, and had also included clarifications regarding the definition of traditional terms. The 
pending appli cations were currently being processed and it was not yet possible to provide timelines.  
20.10.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
20.11.   The Council so agreed . 
21  CHINA – NEW EXPORT C ONTROL LAW IN DRAFT – REQUEST FROM JAPAN  
21.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of Japan had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  of this meeting . 
21.2.   The delegate of Japan  noted that, as mentioned at previous meetings  of this Council, her 
delegation believed that there was a possibility that this draft law included overly stringent export 
regulations that went beyond the scope of the international export management regime and were 
inconsistent with GATT  Article  XI on q uantitative restrictions. Also, regarding the National 
Development and Reform Commission 's export control mechanism, which would soon be released 
by the Chinese government, Japan wished to express its concern s over its scope, and about the 
details of the r estrictions and the relationship with the export control law that it would entail. In this 
regard, Japan requested China to provide concrete answers.  
21.3.   Japan welcomed China's explanation at the last meeting that the scope of the covered 
products and the meas ures were moderate, and that China had no intention of using such measures 
to restrict normal trade. At the same time, considering the importance of the kinds of detailed 
regulations the law brought into force , and how these would be administered, Japan wo uld continue 
to monitor the situation  closely . Also, as mentioned at the CTG's previous meeting12, Japan thought  
that the provisions on countermeasures constituted unilateral export control measures that did not 
have national security as their objective, and that, as a result , these measures should be withdrawn.  
21.4.   At the CTG's previous meeting, China had explained tha t the draft law was under legislative 
review and that there was no deadline on promulgation or implementation as yet. Also, the public 
comments would be incorporated into the draft law or considered in the further supporting 
regulations and rules. In this respect, Japan requested  China to provide updates on the situation, 
and to disclose the schedule  in a transparent manner , including with regard to detailed enforcement 
regulations, while ensuring that there would be a sufficient grace period for the law 's 
implementation.  
21.5.   The delegate of the Republic of Korea  was also of the view that the purpose and 
implementation of export control measures should be consistent with relevant WTO  rules, and in 
this regard, Korea voiced its concerns over the draft of the new export control law. For example, the 
purpose of the export control law , as stated in Article  1, remained vague because concepts such as 
development interests could imply a wide variety of meanings. Also, the scope of export controls 
                                                
12 Document  G/C/M/134, paragraphs  21.2-21.3. G/C/M/135  
 
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  prescribed in Article  2 seemed broad and uncertain. Korea was concerned that such ambiguity might 
open the door for unpredictable and excessive trade restrictions.  
21.6.   The delegate of the European Union  said that her delegation had submitted written comments 
during the consultation period in July  2017 and had been raising questions on China's draft export 
control law for over a year. While her delegation acknowledged that the draft law could consolidate 
China's export control system, it recalled that strategic export controls derived  from international 
obligations and commitments. Against this background, certain provisions of the draft law required 
further clarification as regarded their alignment with international security standards and their 
conformity with multilateral WTO  trade rules. The EU again requested China to provide the 
explanation that it had already requested at previous CTG  meetings , as well as an indication of when 
the draft law would be finali zed. 
21.7.   The delegate of China  noted that this issue had been on the CTG's agenda for quite some 
time, and that her delegation had given responses to all the questions raised in previous meetings 
in order to address the concerns of other Members. In the interest s of time, she would not  repeat 
all those responses, but instead would highlight some of the principles in China's export control draft 
law, as followed: (1)  China attached great importance to creating a non -discriminatory and 
transparent business environment; (2)  the measures Ch ina was proposing would be consistent with 
WTO rules; (3)  all market entities , including foreign companies , would be treated in a fair and 
equitable manner; and (4)  the purpose of the draft law was to fulfil international obligations and to 
safeguard natio nal security, and not to restrict normal trade.  
21.8.   Therefore , China sincerely hoped that other Members would not use their logic and practice 
to misjudge China's intention on the export control law. Regarding  the current state of play, on 
1 May 2019, the Stat e Council had listed an export control draft law to be submitted to the National 
Congress for review. The next steps depended on the outcome  of that review . 
21.9.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note  of the statements made.  
21.10.   The Council so agreed . 
22  UNITED STATES – PROH IBITIVE PROPOSAL ON COMMUNICATION EQUIPM ENT OR 
SERVICES RELEASED BY  THE FCC – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  
22.1.   The Chairperson  informed that Council that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda of this meeting.  
22.2.   The delegate of China  reiterated her delegation's concern s regarding the US  Federal 
Communication Commission (FCC) announcement , published on the Federal Reg ister of 2  May 2018, 
which was intended to prohibit the use of Universal Service Funds to purchase communication 
equipment and services identified as posing a national security risk to communications networks or 
the supply chain.  
22.3.   China noted that the deadl ine for solicitation on the proposed rule was July  2018 and that her 
delegation had been informed by the US  delegation at the previous CTG meeting that no further 
steps had been taken. Her delegation wished to know the current state of play.  
22.4.   China also bel ieved that the FCC's prohibitive proposal would limit the choice of commercial 
purchase on telephone, broadband , and medical care service providers. China requested the US to 
ensure that the whole process would be WTO  consistent, especially with regard to WTO  obligations 
on transparency and MFN  treatment. If the proposed rule constituted a nationality -based 
discrimi natory treatment in law or in practice, or if any security risk assessment had been made on 
the basis of assumptions without recourse to facts and evidence, it would definitely violate WTO rules 
and cause uncertainty and unpredictability for business es. 
22.5.   The delegate of the United States  noted that, as explained each time that China had placed 
this item on the CTG 's agenda, this issue was a matter of national security for the United States. 
Her delegation had provided an explanation of the FCC's fully transp arent rule -making process and G/C/M/135  
 
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  had also pointed Members to the FCC's website for further updates and information. Beyond this, 
she saw no scope for discussing the issue in this Council.  
22.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements m ade. 
22.7.   The Council so agreed . 
23  AUSTRALIA – DISCRIMI NATORY MARKET ACCESS  PROHIBITION ON 5G  EQUIPMENT – 
REQUEST FROM CHINA  
23.1.   The Chairperson  informed that Council that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, China 
had requested the Secretariat to include this iss ue on the agenda of this meeting.  
23.2.   The delegate of China  expressed serious concern over Australia's prohibition on China's 
equipment from Australian 5G  rollout and thanked Australia for its responses to China's questions. 
China had gone through the response s and was disappointed by their lack of substance. For example, 
the reply had given detailed information on Australia's Telecommunication Sector Security Reforms 
(the TSSR) , which had referred other  amend ments made  in 2017.  
23.3.   However, China's main concern wa s that Australia had never published any relevant official 
documents regarding any prohibition on China's enterprises. Unfortunately, there had been no reply 
on this point in the responses received from Australia. China had questioned the sequence of the 
TSSR, and Australia's prohibition on China's enterprises, but no reply had been provided by Australia. 
China had noted that the prohibition had come earlier than the implementation of the TSSR and had 
asked Australia about the criteria for prohibition and w hether there were any other Members' 
companies that had also been prohibited. There had come no reply to these questions either. China 
would carefully study further the responses from Australia,  which China had appreciated  even if their 
quality had been disappointing.  
23.4.   Therefore , China continued to have concerns on this issue . China believed that Australia's 
measures lacked clarity and sufficient evidence, and that there were no laws and regulations , thus 
violating  WTO rules on transparency and du e process. Meanwhile, Australia's measures also 
constituted a breach of WTO  rules by only targeting specific Chinese vendors and depriving Chinese 
equipment of access opportunities to the Australian market. The measures were  inconsistent with 
the WTO  MFN principle and the provisions regarding the elimination of quantitative restrictions.  
23.5.   Worse still, in 2019 the scope of Australia's restrictive measures had expanded beyond 5G. 
The Government of Australia had introduced additional unreasonable requirements for 
ICT equipment suppliers from China on maintaining and operating the existing 4G  network . It had 
also put pressure on Australia's operators in a manner that was neither transparent nor open. New 
restrictions included prohibiting existing 4G  networks oper ated by China's suppliers from transferring 
data sent by 5G  base stations , as well as preventing the maintenance staff of China's suppliers from 
entering into 4G and 5G  co-location base stations to maintain 4G  equipment. These measures 
seriously affected t he commercial interests of China's suppliers and also those of Australia's 
operators, such as Optus, VHA , and TPG.  
23.6.   This was an era of information technology where risks could not be limited by national borders. 
Isolation would never address the challenge o f risk. Certain of Australia's measures,  such as a 
country -specific approach and discriminatory measures , would instead serve only to block normal 
commercial activities and destroy the level playing field. China expressed its serious concerns over 
the measures taken by Australia and reserved its right to take all necessary legitimate actions.  
23.7.   The delegate of Australia  noted China's latest statement on this issue and also China's detailed 
set of written questions seeking further explanations and clarification regarding Australia's position 
on 5G  networks, which China had provided to Australia shortly before the CTG 's previous meeting. 
For its part, Australia had provided China with a substantive response to those questions. 
Nevert heless, Australia wished to reiterate that its position on 5G  networks was fully WTO  consistent 
and that it welcomed the opportunity to continue to engage constructively with China on this 
important issue for both countries.  
23.8.   The Chairperson  proposed that t he Council take note of the statements made.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  23.9.   The Council so agreed . 
24  UNITED STATES - MEAS URES REGARDING MARKE T ACCESS PROHIBITION  FOR 
ICT PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM CHINA  
24.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Committee that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  of this meeting . 
24.2.   The delegate of China  noted that , on 15  May 2019, the US had issued an Executive Order on 
Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Servi ces Supply Chain, which 
prohibited US  companies from buying or using telecommunications equipment and services provided 
by enterprises deemed to be national security threats. China wished to register its deep concern on 
this issue and noted that it opposed  the overgeneralization of the term "national security ". China 
firmly believed that national security should never be used as an excuse to adopt a policy of trade 
protectionism.  
24.3.   The measures mentioned above were targeting ICT  products and related service s upply 
chains. As Members were aware, ICT  relevant productions and services had the highest share in 
global trade, with the longest and most sophisticated global value chain. According to WTO  statistics, 
office and telecom products accounted for 15% of worl d exports of manufactured goods in 2017, 
and telecommunications, computer and information service s accounted for 10% of world service 
exports. The global value chain of ICT connected the whole world, driving technology innovation and 
promoting the developm ent of the digital economy. The consequence of any improper interference 
in any link in this global value chain would be amplified continuously on the whole chain through a 
butterfly effect. This in turn would cause uncertainty and a domino effect on the global economy and 
the security of the supply chain. And if that were to happen, no WTO  Member could avoid it, including 
the US. This was also the reason why governments and businesses all over the world were closely 
scrutinizing  the development of this US  proposed measure.  
24.4.   China also wished to emphasize the importance of information security.  At the same time, 
China opposed an overgeneralized approach and believed that security measures on the commercial 
use of ICT should be applied based on the following principles: (1)  technology should be treated in 
a non -discriminatory manner; (2)  measures  should not constitute unnecessary restrictions on 
commercial sale opportunities for foreign suppliers of ICT  products or services; and (3) if any 
measure had to be taken, it should be of limited scope and should strictly follow international norms 
and pri nciples  of non -discrimination . Furthermore, no conditions or restrictions should be set based 
on nationality for purchase, sale , or use of ICT  products or services. China wished to remind the 
US government of the importance of consistency with WTO  rules wh en formulating its rules and 
regulations, especially concerning WTO obligations on transparency, MFN  treatment, and elimination 
of Quantitative Restrictions.  
24.5.   The delegate of the United States  stated that her delegation did not believe that the WTO 's 
Counci l for Trade in Goods was the appropriate forum to discuss issues of national security.  
24.6.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
24.7.   The Council so agreed . 
25  UNITED STATES – EXPO RT CONTROL MEASURES FOR ICT  PRODUCTS – REQUEST F ROM 
CHINA  
25.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Committee that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to inc lude this issue on the agenda  of this meeting . 
25.2.   The delegate of China  noted that the United States had recently placed many  Chinese 
companies onto its export control "Entity List". China believed that this measure violated Article  I 
and Article  XI of the GATT. China wished to express its deep concern over this issue and its strong 
oppositi on to this abuse of export control  measures . G/C/M/135  
 
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  25.3.   At the press conference of the Osaka G20  Summit closing session, positive signals had been 
sent from the highest level of the US  Government to lift the export control measures on the Chinese 
company, Huawei. Chi na was expecting early follow -up concrete actions from the US in this regard . 
25.4.   In today's world , against the background of economic globalization, every link in the global 
supply chain interacted with every other  link, connecting seamlessly so as to operate  at high speed. 
High-tech was a field where countries shared many common interests and had broad prospects for 
cooperation. Therefore, while countries on the high -end of the global value chain enjoyed the 
greatest benefits , with their advantages, they also  bore the greatest responsibility for the overall 
stability of the global value chain. And if such a  country abused its dominant position in the global 
value chain, it would surely hurt all , including ultimately itself.  
25.5.   China hoped that the US would give s ubstantial answers  and responses to its questions and 
comments  because the concerns that it had raised on this and previous issues were all relevant to 
trade. The issue was one of fair competition and a level playing field , the importance of which the 
US had itself always emphasized.  
25.6.   The delegate of the United States  stated that her delegation did not believe that the WTO 's 
Council for Trade in Goods was the appropriate forum to discuss issues of national security.  
25.7.   The Chairp erson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
25.8.   The Council so agreed . 
26  EUROPEAN UNION – REGULATION EC NO.  1272/2008 (CLP  REGULATION) – REQUES T 
FROM THE RUSSIAN FED ERATION  
26.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated  26 June 2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda  of this meeting . 
26.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  reiterated her delegation's concerns , which had been  
previously expressed duri ng recent meetings of the Committee on TBT and the CTG and which had 
likewise been conveyed in document  G/TBT/GEN/263.  
26.3.   She noted that the EU's proposed classification of cobalt as a carcinogen category for all 
possible routes of exposure was not based on a ny scientific data. It had been recognized 
internationally by industry that scientific data supported the classification of cobalt metal as 
carcinogenic by inhalation only. In the TBT  Committee, the EU had mentioned that the European 
Chemical Agency (ECHA)  had received new information justifying the 'all possible routes of exposure ' 
proposal ; however, it had thus far been unable to substantiate this claim by demonstrating this new 
information. Her delegation noted that the opinion of the ECHA  Risk Assessmen t Committee (RAC) 
had not been based on science and could not be considered as conclusive.  
26.4.   The Russian Federation was also concerned about the discussion inside the global industry 
that EU  member States might request some product groups to be exempt from t his measure due to 
their critical importance. The Russian Federation wanted to point out that , if such an approach were 
in fact to be implemented, it would be inconsistent with the TBT  Agreement.  
26.5.   In addition , the Russia n Federation  was somewhat confused by the EU  statement made during 
the previous meeting of the TBT Committee , when it had said that the classification of cobalt metal 
would be applied with a generic concentration limit of 0.1% , rather than a specific concentration 
limit, despite the fact that the documents notified under G/TBT/N/EU/629 had laid down explicit 
provisions regarding interim application of the generic concentration limit only.  
26.6.   For this reason, the Russian Federation requested the EU to clarify the contradic tions between 
its previously made statements and the information laid down in the draft amendments to the EU's 
Regulations on Classification, Labelling , and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures 
(CLP Regulations) , on the one hand, and the statement made dur ing the previous meeting of the 
TBT Committee , on the other.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  26.7.   Moreover, the Russian Federation was confused by the lack of transparency pertaining to the 
adoption of this classification, because there was no information available regarding the results of 
the expert consultations that had taken place on 1  July 2019. For this reason, the Russian Federation 
requested the EU to provide documents, decisions, comments , and information concerning these 
consultations for its detailed consideration.  
26.8.   The delegate of Canada  noted the concerns raised by the Russian Federation over the EU's 
changes to its CLP Regulations. Canada again expressed its concern over the potential impact on 
trade in products that contained titanium dioxide or cobalt and the pro cess that the EU had followed 
to arrive at the proposed amendments to the CLP  Regulations. Changing the classification of titanium 
dioxide and cobalt under these Regulations could result in stricter requirements under other 
regulations, beyond simple label ling requirements, which could in turn have a significant impact on 
trade from Canada. Cobalt, for instance, was present in small amounts in nickel. Canada exported 
$1.1 billion in various types of nickel to the EU in 2017, representing 29% of Canada's tot al nickel 
exports. As a result, any fluctuations in the EU's demand for nickel or downstream products, such 
as stainless steel, would have very significant implications for Canada' s nickel industry.  
26.9.   Canada wished to receive  from the EU an explanation of th e next steps in its process to 
consider the proposed changes, including any relevant timelines . Canada also requested an 
explanation from the EU of how products that contained titanium dioxide or cobalt would be treated 
under the entire EU  regulatory framework as a result of this proposal. Furthermore, Canada 
suggested that the EU conduct a Better Regulation Impact Assessment in order to ascertain the full 
range of economic and health and safety impacts that might result from this proposal.  
26.10.   The delegate of the European Union  noted that her delegation had had a number of bilateral 
exchanges  with Members on this issue , including with the Russian Federation.  
26.11.   Titanium dioxide and cobalt had been included in the 2018  Adaptation to Technical and 
Scientific Progress (ATP) , amending the CLP  Regulation. Several discussions on the classification of 
cobalt and TiO2 and the classification of mixtures containing TiO2 had taken place in the relevant 
expert groups. The Commission would continue the discussio n (provisionally scheduled for 
July 2019) in the framework of the expert groups before deciding upon the adoption of a Commission 
Delegated Regulation.  
26.12.   The proposal to classify cobalt as carcinogen for all routes of exposure was based on the 
scientific opi nion of the RAC of the EC HA, as well as on the comments received from member States 
and stakeholders. This opinion was in line with the CLP  Regulation as well as the UN  Globally 
Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals. The opinion an d the background 
document containing all the relevant scientific information on which the opinion was based were 
publicly available on the website of the EC HA. The RAC of the EC HA had taken all available data  into 
account in its scientific assessment , incl uding the information submitted during the public 
consultation period. A review of a n RAC opinion was only possible if new scientific information 
became available.  
26.13.   The EU wished to reassure the CTG that all comments sent by WTO  Members in the context 
of the EU notification had been and would be duly taken into account by the Commission and member 
States in the decision -making process , in accordance with the TBT  Agreement . 
26.14.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
26.15.   The Counci l so agreed . 
27  UNITED STATES – MEAS URES ON AVIATION SEC URITY EQUIPMENT – REQUEST FROM 
CHINA  
27.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  of this meeting . 
27.2.   The delegate of China  expressed disappointment at having to continue to raise its concerns 
regarding the refusal by the US  Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of applications by 
Chinese enterprises for TSA  certification. Although China had repeatedly raised the matter in G/C/M/135  
 
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  different fora of the WTO , their concerns had still not been addressed and no convincing reply had 
been received to date . Instead, Chinese applicants had only received an informal email whic h had 
informed them that their application had been refused without at the same time providing them with 
any detailed reasons or explanations. In this regard, China was of the view that the TSA had failed 
to follow the principles of Article  5.2.2 of the TB T Agreement , which in this case required them  to 
inform Chinese companies of the certification results in a precise and complete manner, and to 
provide them with an opportunity  to make corrections.  
27.3.   Besides, China was of the understanding that the US had no t notified any WTO  body of its 
TSA Certification requirements,  including the TBT  Committee. At this present CTG  meeting , as at 
previous meetings , the United States, as a proponent of transparency and notifications, had 
emphasized how important it was that Members fulfilled their notification obligations. China urged 
the US to play a leading role  in this regard  by fulfilling  its own notification obligations. China added 
that, although TSA Certification might not be a technical regulation for market access, i t had already 
become a de facto  "must" for the market access of civil aviation security equipment , and an  arbitrary 
refusal to certify the products of this type from other Members would also create serious market 
access barriers for normal commercial products.  
27.4.   China's civil aviation security equipment had received TSA certification in the early years and 
had then sold well all over the world. And no client had ever raised any security concern. As the US 
had refused to accept China's applicat ion for further TSA  certification, China request ed the US to 
provide detailed explanations , as required under the TBT  Agreement, as to why it refused to accept 
China's certification applications. In short, China urged the US to treat enterprises and produc ts in 
an equal manner, observing national treatment and MFN  treatment principles, and eliminating 
technical barriers to trade as soon as possible to ensure fair competition and a level playing field.  
27.5.   She further emphasized that China's  issue raised here wa s one of fair competition, a level 
playing field, market access for commercial products , and non -discrimination as required by the 
WTO. At the same time, she urged the United States to meet the requirements of the 
TBT Agreement.  
27.6.   The representative of the United States  stated that her delegation did not believe that the 
CTG was the appropriate forum to discuss issues of national security.  
27.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
27.8.   The Council so agreed . 
28  THE RUSSIAN FEDERATI ON – TRADE RESTRICTING  PRACTICES – REQUEST  FROM THE 
EUROPEAN UNION  
28.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation  of the European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  
of this meeting . 
28.2.   The delegate of the European Union  said that her delegation's concerns remained because 
the Russian Federation persisted in its policy of import substitution and locali zation of production 
through measures whose intention appeared to be to disadvantage the access of foreign products 
to the Russian market, and which raised significant questions regard ing their consistency with 
WTO rules. The EU wished to enquire about the seven  issues to which they had already referred at 
previous Council meeting s, namely : 
(i) Since the introduction of the mandatory certification for cement in March  2016, 
EU exports had been practically blocked. In addition, a non -notified mandatory standard 
prescribing testing at the border had been introduc ed. The EU requested the Russia n 
Federation  to modify the technical regulation and standard so that they be based on 
proportionate, non -discriminatory requirements which would then allow for a 
resumption of the cement trade between the EU and Russia;  
 
(ii) the requirement of "good manufacturing practice " (GMP)  certificates for  
pharmaceuticals, which had not been notified to the WTO , remained an important G/C/M/135  
 
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  obstacle to pharmaceutical imports into the Russian Federation. The EU requested a 
general revision of G MP certification schemes to align them with best international 
practice and to set a level  playing field for locally produced and foreign medicines ; 
 
(iii) the EU remained concerned by the ban on fishery products from Estonia for alleged 
SPS reasons, which had been in place since June  2015. The ban was not properly 
justified. At the CTG 's previous meeting, the Russia n Federation  had referred to contacts 
with t he Estonian authorities aimed at resuming  trade. Indeed, the EU requested that 
this unjustified ban be lifted ; 
 
(iv) in the summer of 2018, the Russia n Federation  had passed a law putting in place an 
excise duty regime that was more onerous for imported than for domestic quality wines. 
The EU welcomed proposals from the Ministry of Finance on the modification of the 
excise taxes on wine, as submitted for discussion  to the Duma. Her delegation would 
be grateful for an update on when it was foreseen that the new rules would enter into 
force; 
 
(v) a series of measures had been in place since 2015 to restrict access by importing foreign 
companies to purchases of Russian  State -Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Her delegation 
was referring here to specific procedures only affecting SOE  purchases of foreign 
products in the context of large investment projects , such as : lists of goods that could 
not be bought abroad without the auth orization of the Commission on Import 
Substitution ; a 15%  price preference for domestic goods, services , or works in tenders 
organi zed by SOEs ; and a need for governmental approval for purchases and leasing of 
imported planes, vessels , and oil drilling pla tforms. This was a separate issue from 
government procurement, namely when governmental agencies , which might include 
SOEs, purchased products for governmental purposes. When SOEs acted in a 
commercial capacity, GATT and GATS  rules applied and the governme nt procurement 
exception did not. The EU  requested a comprehensive revision of the Russian 
Federation's measures affecting purchases by SOEs when acting in a commercial 
capacity so as to ensure that the WTO  rule of national treatment was complied with  
fully; 
 
(vi) the ban on the export of raw hides and skins , which had been extended on numerous 
occasions. In its latest notification of Quantitative Restrictions, Russia had referred to 
GATT  Article  XXI as a justification for the export ban  in question . The EU  had asked the 
Russian Federation the following: (a)  why hides and skins were critical for defence 
procurement; (b)  what was the volume of hides and skins necessary for defence 
procurement; and (c)  what was the volume of domestic production actually s ubject to 
the export ban ; and 
 
(vii) the Russian Government had introduced temporary quantitative restrictions on the 
export of birch logs from Russia outside of the Eurasian Economic Union until 
end-June 2019. The EU would welcome an update and strongly hoped that the measure 
had not been and would not be extended.  
 
28.3.   The delegate of Ukraine  shared the concerns raised by the EU and wished to draw Members' 
attention to the transit restrictions imposed by the Russian Federation. The Russian Government's 
Resolu tion No. 460-25 of 18  April 2019 had prohibited, inter alia , the importation into the Russian 
Federation of certain agricultural and industrial goods, if the country of origin of such goods was 
Ukrainian , or if such goods had been in transit through the territory of Ukraine. The list of banned 
products included paper, cardboard, clothing, wire, pipe products , and machinery. It was worth 
mentioning that the resolution had also introduced a ban on the export of goods to Ukraine for 
14 commodity items of fue l and energy products , as set out in Annex  2, and special permission 
requirements for 27  commodity items of fuel and energy products, as set out in Annex  3. 
28.4.   If one examined closely the 2018  statistical data, the exports of specified items by other 
countrie s to the Russian Federation via Ukraine was eleven  times greater than Ukrainian exports of 
these products to the Russian Federation. Therefore, these restrictions seemed primarily to target 
products originating in other WTO  Members. Therefore, Ukraine urge d the Russian Federation to 
fully comply with its WTO  commitments in order to ensure predictable conditions for trade and to 
remove unjustifiable bans and discriminatory barriers.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  28.5.   The delegate of the United States  said that her delegation continued to be concerned  about 
Russia's good manufacturing practice certificates for pharmaceuticals. At the April  CTG meeting, 
Russia had recognized the importance of the WTO's transparency and notification requirements and 
had described the m as an integral part of the W TO. 
28.6.   However,  despite repeated requests from Members, Russia had still not notified  to the WTO  
the changes to its GMP  rules, nor offered any explanation to Members of its failure to do so. Her 
delegation had heard from US  industry that there had been some i mprovements in the process. 
However, further changes were still necessary to ensure that imports had a level playing field and 
that Russian citizens had access to the full array of pharmaceutical products. Specifically , the United 
States urged Russia to do the following: (i)  to improve the Corrective and Preventative Actions 
process ; (ii) to use a risk -management approach to inspector assessments ; (iii) to rely on 
international standards ; and (iv) to harmonize inspection across the Eurasian Economic Union . 
28.7.   The United States also wished to follow up on an issue raised at the April  2019 meeting of the 
CTG, namely  Russia's discriminatory excise taxes on wine. In April, the delegate of the Russian 
Federation had explained that the Ministry of Finance was prepa ring amendments to the Tax Code 
to align the excise tax rates for imported and domestic wines. The United States requested the 
Russian Federation to provide an update on that process and to inform Members of any timeline 
established for introducing the ame ndments to the Tax Code in the Duma.  
28.8.   The United States also wished to bring to the attention of this Council a new issue that had 
been raising significant concerns among its companies , namely Russia's new labelling law, or "track 
and trace" as it was some times called. Based on information received by her authorities, the measure 
currently impacted a select number of industry sectors ; however, Russia planned for the system to 
cover virtually all spheres by 2024. Russia had asserted that the system was needed  primarily to 
combat counterfeiting and smuggling , both of which were laudable goals. However, her delegation's 
concerns focussed on the implementation of the system.  
28.9.   Other trading partners had raised their concern s over this new regime in other Committees , 
but the potential for the labelling regime to disrupt trade made it central to the work of this Council. 
Her delegation would provide Russia with questions in writing, but the US  concerns focussed on the 
lack of infrastructure and procedural information available to ensure an efficient and fair 
implementation of the new regime , and also about the risk of disclosure and/or misuse of the 
sensitive data collected under this new regime. The differential treatment of domestic manufacturers 
and importers could raise national treatment and trading rights concerns. Additionally, 
US stakeholders were concerned that the Government would use the system arbitrarily to halt sales 
of imports , which was  a concern based on real experience. Again, the United States did not  oppose 
the objective of combatting counterfeit and smuggled goods; however, it did ask that the 
Government provide a 2 -3 year transition period to ensure that the system worked properly and 
efficiently and that, during that time , the Government work with interested stakeholders to consider 
less trade restrictive alternatives  to such a system . 
28.10.   The United States, like the EU, had raised concerns about restrictions and obligations placed 
on Russia's SOEs ' purchasing decisions in this Council and in other WTO  Committees. Her delegation 
continued to review amendments to Federal Law No.  44 as well as its subsidiary legislation. In 
general, the United States remained very concerned that they were yet another example of Russia 
rejecting the open trading system of the WTO in favour of the discredited policies of import 
substitution. The United States looked forward to Russia's explanation.  
28.11.   The United States was also concerned by Russia's ban on exports of raw hides. Her 
delegation continued to seek an expl anation of how a measure that had been in place since 2014 
could be considered temporary. As noted before, by prohibiting exports, Russia had depressed 
domestic prices and encouraged consumption of the domestic product to the detriment of imports 
and the w orld trading system.  
28.12.   Finally, at the CTG 's previous  meeting, the United States had echoed concerns about the 
temporary ban on the export of birch logs. The measure was supposed to have been lifted on 
30 June 2019. She requested the delegate from the Russia n Federation to provide the Council with 
an update on the rules governing the export of birch logs . G/C/M/135  
 
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  28.13.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  noted that that GMP -certification was used in many 
WTO Members, including the EU. Rules and legislation for GMP -certification had been elaborated in 
a non -discriminative manner regarding  foreign producers of pharmaceutical products.  
28.14.   The State Institute of Pharmaceutical Products and Good Practices was constantly 
cooperating with the World Health Organization (WHO), Pharm aceutical Inspection Cooperation 
Scheme ( PIC/S ), Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency , and other international 
organizations. Her delegation emphasized that in 2016 the WHO had assessed the Russian national 
regulatory system with regard to the circulation of medicinal products. The results of the assessment 
relating to the Russian GMP -certification procedure was that it complied with the relevant 
international practices to ensure the quality of medicine and protection of Russian health and li fe as 
indicated in the WHO's guidelines. In addition, the State Institute and the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade had applied for pre -accession to PIC/S in August  2017. In September  2018, the Russian 
Federation had submitted a report on the regulatory system in the Russian Federation and the 
Eurasian Economic Union. The Russian Federation would apply for accession to PIC/S in July  2019.  
28.15.   The Russian Federation had  also conducted regula r work with the Association of European 
Business , which had also confirmed the absence of problems and discrimination in Russia's 
procedures. In this regard, her delegation wished to draw attention to the amendments that had 
been elaborated specifically at  the request of foreign manufacturers to facilitate the registration of 
medicinal products by allowing GMP  certification and registration to be conducted in parallel.  
28.16.   Regarding the SPS  ban on fish products from Estonia, the Russian Federation informed the 
Council that exports from one  Estonian establishment had been allowed as a result of the inspection , 
and that work was ongoing to assess the possibility of allowing exports from other Estonian 
establishments. The competent authorities from both countries w ere cooperating in order to 
determine the corrective measures that were necessary and to plan any further inspections , if 
required . 
28.17.   She confirmed, once again, the Russian Federation's  readiness to settle this issue and to 
resume fishery exports.  
28.18.   In respect  of wine taxation, she informed the Council that the Russian Federation expected 
to adopt legislation amending the Tax Code , which would align excise rates for wines , by end-2019. 
The EU had already been provided with the draft law.  
28.19.   As for the Russian Fede ration Government Resolution No.  925, her delegation drew the EU's 
attention to paragraph  8 of this Resolution, which clearly stated that priority should be given to 
Russian products only after full consideration had been given to the requirements of the G ATT. 
Therefore, in respect of procurement for commercial purposes, both Russian and foreign products 
were treated equally.  
28.20.   In respect of export restrictions on raw hides and skins, her delegation emphasized that this 
measure had been introduced with the pu rpose of assuring the implementation of State defence 
procurement. The export prohibition on raw skins and hides was to be suspended on 
1 September  2019.  
28.21.   As for quantity restrictions on the export of birch logs, the measure had been suspended on 
30 June 2019. Currently, birch logs were exported from the Russian territory without any restriction.  
28.22.   Regarding  Ukraine's  concern over transit restrictions, the Russian Federation did not believe 
that the Council was the appropriate forum to hold a discussion on security measures . 
28.23.   Regarding US concerns over labelling requirements, she referred to her delegation's 
statement delivered at the last TBT  Committee.  
28.24.   The Chairperson  proposed that t he Council take note of the statements made.  
28.25.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/135  
 
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  29  CROATIA – REGULATION  OF IMPORT AND SALE OF CERTAIN OIL PRODU CTS – 
REQUEST FROM THE RUS SIAN FEDERATION  
29.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that, in a communication dated 26  June 2019, the 
delegation of the Russian Federation had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the 
agenda  of this meeting . 
29.2.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  said that her delegation remained concerned about 
the trade regime applied by Croatia to certain oil products from the Russian Federation. During 
previous meetings of this Council, the EU  delegation had mentioned that a revision of the current 
legislation was ongoing. The Russian Federation deeply regretted that no legal act eliminating the 
discrimina tion in respect of oil products originating in Russia had been adopted or published since 
that statement. The Russian Federation requested the EU to provide information about the exact 
dates and state of play of the development or adoption of the relevant legislation , and also to provide 
the draft documents.  
29.3.   The delegate of the European Union  confirmed that the revision process of the measure was 
still ongoing. Her delegation expected that the next steps leading to a revised measure, which would 
be fully co nsistent with WTO  rules, would be made available shortly. The European Union would 
inform the CTG of these developments.  
29.4.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
29.5.   The Council so agreed . 
30  EUROPEAN UNION – AMENDMENTS TO THE D IRECTIVE 2009/28/EC,  RENEWABLE 
ENERGY DIRECTIVE – REQUEST FROM MALAYSIA  AND COLOMBIA  
30.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, Malaysia 
had requested the Secretariat to include this issue again on the agenda  of this meeting . The 
Chairperson also reminded delegations that , at the beginning of the meeting, Colombia had 
requested to be included as a co -sponsor of this agenda it em. 
30.2.   The delegate of Malaysia  expressed concerns regarding the publication of the Commission 
Delegated Regulation EU  2019/807 , of 13  March  2019, supplementing Directive EU  2018/2001 of 
the European Parliament and Council concerning the determination of high  indirect land -use change -
risk feedstock , for which a significant expansion of the production area into land with high carbon 
stock had been observed , and the certification of low indirect land -use change -risk biofuels, 
bioliquids , and biomass fuels. The d elegated regulation had been published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union on 21  May 2019 and had entered into force on the twentieth  day following the 
date of its publication. Malaysia had appreciated the European Union's willingness to engage i n open 
discussion and dialogue to exchange facts, information , and views. Her delegation had previously 
raised its concern relating to the delegated regulation in the TBT  Committee. However, Malaysia now 
considered that the continued bilateral engagement w ith the European Union with the aim of finding 
a mutually beneficial and mutually acceptable way forward had not resulted in a fair treatment for 
palm oil produced in Malaysia. In Malaysia's view, the delegated regulation was inconsistent with 
the MFN  provisions of GATT  Article  I and National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation of 
GATT  Article  III. Malaysia observed that the delegated regulation had singled out palm oil as a high 
indirect land -use change -risk feedstock, while the other major oil c rops, namely, rapeseed oil, 
soybean oil , and sunflower oil, had been categori zed as low indirect land -use change -risk feedstock. 
Malaysia also noted that high indirect land -use change ( ILUC) risk feedstock would not be taken into 
consideration for contributing towards the renewable energy targets of the European Union and 
would not be eligible for financial support under EU  Directive  2018/2001. Malaysia considered that 
the delegated regulation went against the principle of free trade by distorting t he pricing system , 
and also that the disguised restriction was an arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination which created 
unnecessary obstacles and was more trade restrictive and burdensome than necessary on 
international trade in palm oil and its product s. 
30.3.   Malaysia urged the European Union to provide an equitable treatment across all oil crop 
biofuels and bioliquids in line with the principle of non -discrimination , which stipulated that a Member 
shall not discriminate between "like" products from differen t trading partners. Malaysia recognized G/C/M/135  
 
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  the importance of protecting the environment and the conservation of biodiversity and  emphasized 
its commitment to combat climate change and global warming. Malaysia continued to maintain 
55.3% of its land area under  forest cover, which exceeded its commitment to retain at least 50% 
pledged at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, and which Malaysia believed was far higher than the forest 
cover in most large countries of the European Union,  including France, Germany, Italy,  and the 
United Kingdom.  
30.4.   She also reminded Members that, under the Paris Agreement, Malaysia had committed its 
ambitious Nationally Determined Commitment (NDC) to reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 45% 
by 2030 relative to the emission s intensity of GDP in 2005. Malaysia was pleased to share that it 
was on track to achieve its NDC by 2030. In March  2019, the Government of Malaysia had agreed 
with the new policy on ensuring that Malaysian palm oil was cultivated in a sustainable manner. The 
measures included the following: to cap the oil palm cultivated area to 6.5  million hectares; to put 
a stop on conversion of permanent forest reserved area; to halt planting of oil palm in the new 
peatland area and further strengthen regulations with regard to existing oil palm cultivated on peat; 
and to make available oil palm plantation maps for public access and to demonstrate further 
transparency in the supply chain. Malaysia emphasized that the national oil palm industry was 
committed to producing palm oil in accordance  with sustainable principles and criteria under the 
Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) certification scheme, which would be implemented on a 
mandatory basis by 31  December  2019. In this context, Malaysia urged the European Union to 
accept and recognize the MSPO  certification scheme as one of the voluntary schemes under the 
Directive for the certification of low indirect land -use change -risk biofuels and bioliquids. Malaysia 
remained open for discussion and to work together with the European Union for the  recognition of 
the MSPO  certification scheme under Directive EU  2018/2001. Malaysia remained fully committed to 
negotiating in a sincere and constructive manner to ensure non-discriminatory treatment for palm 
oil products and to prevent unnecessary barrie rs on the market access of palm oil products into the 
European Union.  Malaysia looked forward to a positive response from the European Union in this 
regard . 
30.5.   The delegate of Indonesia  thanked Malaysia for including this agenda item and echoed the 
sentiment s earlier expressed by Malaysia. Indonesia recalled its statements made at the CTG's 
previous meeting and reflected in document  G/TBT/W/641, where Indonesia had continued to 
express its serious concern s over the EU  amendment to Directive EU  2009/28 EC. Indonesia noted 
that the European Union had insisted that the issue was not within the purview of the 
TBT Committee, even though, in Indonesia's view, the shape and features of the measu re indicated 
otherwise. Indonesia believed that the EU  assertion that the measure did not create a ban or 
otherwise single out any specific biofuel did not mean that the measure could not be qualified as 
falling under the TBT  Agreement. The indirect land -use change -risk criteria as it had been regulated 
in the delegated act was unilateral and scientifically flawed . The calculations on emission number s 
and formulation s were inappropriate as they had never been communicated and verified. Moreover, 
the standar d content cut -off date of 2008 for land convention was unfair because the deforestation 
that had taken place for other vegetable oils had begun long before the development of palm oil 
plantations. Indonesia was of the view that the criteria released by the  European Union were more 
trade restrictive than necessary, created discrimination , and ultimately limited and banned market 
access for palm oil -based biofuels. Indonesia also believed that the measure undermined its ongoing 
efforts to meet the Sustainable  Development Goals (SDG) 2030. Indonesia's national commitment 
covered first and foremost the preservation of sustainable palm oil production and , in particular , its 
efforts towards poverty alleviation as guaranteed by the Marrakesh Agreement and the SDGs itself. 
Indonesia emphasized its strong opposition to the Renewable Energy Directive  II and its delegated 
act and urged the European Union to withdraw any measures that were not constructive to trade 
development and not supportive of Members'  efforts to ac hieve the ultimate objective of the 
sustainable development goals.  
30.6.   The delegate of Colombia  recalled that , at the beginning of the meeting , Colombia had 
requested to be included as a co -sponsor of this agenda item. Colombia appreciated the intention of 
the European Union to adopt a public policy aimed at protecting the environment through the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources . However, Colombia also expressed its 
concern that the implementation of the EU  environmental pol icy, and EU Directive  2018/2001 and 
its delegated implementing act  in particular , should be implemented in a non -discriminatory manner, 
not more trade restrictive than necessary , and that it not subsequently become an unnecessary 
obstacle and disguised bar rier to trade. Colombia recognized that EU  Directive  2018/2001 and its 
delegated act established that, from 2021, first  generation biofuels would count as renewable energy G/C/M/135  
 
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  in the transport sector only up to a quota of 7%, and that it further established th at first  generation 
biofuels with a high risk of causing ILUC shall have their contribution to the renewable energy quota  
gradually reduced to 0% by 2030. In Colombia's view, these provisions were inconsistent with the 
national treatment and MFN  obligation s set out in Article  III.4 and Article  I.1 of the GATT  1994.  
30.7.   Colombia considered that , although there were internationally validated methodologies for 
measuring the environmental impacts of productive activities, such as the Life Cycle Assessment 
(LCA) or the Carbon Footprint (CF), it was surprising that the EU had decided to use the  
ILUC methodology, which according to Colombia had no valid or internationally recognized scientific 
basis for the conduct of such analyses and assessments in their implementati on phase. With regard 
to the classification of certain biofuels as of high ILUC risk, Colombia also believed that the 
considerations were not technically appropriate, taking into account that the following : (i) that the 
deforestation associated with these products was not high in all producing countries; and (ii)  that 
there were countries, such as Colombia, that had land available to increase the cultivable agricultural 
area without deforestation. Furthermore, Colombia observed that products such as soy and  
rapeseed, shown by international studies to have a higher contribution to deforestation, were not 
considered as of high ILUC risk. In Colombia's view, this situation was not only discriminatory under 
Article  I and Article  III of the GATT  1994, but might e ven, in environmental terms,  benefit the 
producers of those goods that had already caused deforestation, owing to the fact that, under the 
methodology and baseline proposed by the EU in the delegated act, they would not register an 
excessive increase in their production.  
30.8.   Colombia believed that the delegated act may be considered as a technical regulation under 
the WTO's rules, since it established mandatory characteristics for biofuels relating to the raw 
materials used for their production. C olombia also noted that the European standard established 
certain risk criteria for each crop and  that, according to the sources used, it may be concluded that 
the cultivation of palm oil would be excluded from the very outset because of its excessive grow th, 
without the presentation of any indicators to ensure that the classification criteria were appropriate 
and applied in the same manner to other crops used in the production of biofuels. Even if Colombia 
recognized the legitimate objectives of the EU  directive, it considered that such a measure had also 
other objectives.  
30.9.   Concerning  the certification mechanism, Colombia understood that the delegated act stated 
that biofuels may only be certified as of low -risk if they met a number of criteria, including sc ale of 
production. For Colombia, the definition used for small -scale producers (smallholders) , who were 
defined as "farmers independently conducting an agricultural activity on a holding with an 
agricultural area of less than two  hectares for which they ho ld ownership or lease rights" , not only 
caused considerable concern but had no technical or scientific basis and substantially diverged from 
the standards used by international organizations such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(RSPO ) and the FAO . Colombia reiterated that this measure constituted de facto  discrimination  under  
the terms of Articles  I and III of the GATT  1994; it discriminated between like products of different 
origin by favouring EU  products and products of other origins to the det riment of palm oil derived 
products, such as those exported by Colombia. In this context, Colombia questioned the manner in 
which the Directive and the delegated act established that a raw material may be of high ILUC risk, 
on the basis of indicators, crit eria, and definitions that de facto  discriminated and that excluded 
prima facie  products such as soy or rapeseed. The European Union's  measures were currently 
affecting Colombia, a country which had zero  deforestation associated with the production of palm  
oil, and were also putting at risk 170,000  jobs and Colombia's third  largest export to the European 
Union. Colombia looked forward to the EU's responses.  
30.10.   The delegate of Honduras  shared the concern s raised by Malaysia and other Members 
regarding the EU  Directive on renewable energy. Honduras respected the legitimate right of 
WTO Members to adopt public measures aimed at the protection of the environment provided that 
such measures were compatible wit h the WTO  Agreements and did not restrict trade more than 
necessary. Honduras believed that the elimination of palm oil -based biofuels by 2030 would have a 
negative impact on its economy since, for Honduras, palm oil was an agro -industry of great 
importanc e, generating thousands of permanent jobs and supporting a large number of smallholder 
farmers. In Honduras, palm production was controlled and carried out under conditions that 
protected the tropical rainforests and the sector had grown considerably with minimal or marginal 
impact on the environment. In that regard, Honduras associated itself with the concerns expressed 
by Malaysia and other Members and urged the European Union to take those concerns into 
consideration in its decision -making process.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  30.11.   The d elegate of Ecuador  expressed her delegation's continuing interest in this topic. 
According to Ecuador, the directive established standards that were specific for biofuels, bioliquids , 
and biomass fuels produced by forest and food crops to mitigate emission s caused by ILUC. Ecuador 
believed that the methodology and criteria established for certification had been decided upon 
unilaterally because they had not been properly discussed , they had not been endorsed at the 
international level, and they had not been the subject of any agreement or multilateral negotiation, 
particularly with the Members that supplied these commodities. Furthermore, Ecuador believed that 
the criteria established directly affected palm oil and not fuels produced from other kinds of vege table 
oils, such as rapeseed and sunflower seed, which ran contrary to the obligations under Article  2.1 of 
the TBT  Agreement and Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. In her delegation's view, given that the 
proposed measures favoured vegetable oils produced in t he European Union, they also ran contrary 
to the obligations on national treatment prescribed in Article  2.1 of the TBT  Agreement and in 
Article  III:4 of the GATT  1994.  
30.12.   Ecuador also found that , although there was no specific prohibition on the import of fu els 
based on palm oil in the European Union, the directive disincentivized EU  Members from importing 
these products for their use as biofuels. Ecuador highlighted the progress that it had made in meeting 
its national targets for the mitigation of climate c hange, and that it was currently one of the world 
leaders in the implementation of policies, measures , and initiative s to reduce deforestation. 
Furthermore, Ecuador ranked second in the implementation of results -based payments in terms of 
deforestation and  forest damage and believed that these achievements under its international 
commitments should be considered whenever establishing any kind of restrictions. Finally, Ecuador 
pointed to the socioeconomic impact that these unilateral measures could have in t he palm sector 
in Ecuador, which was made up of 51% family -based and peasant farmers with less than 10  hectares 
of production. Ecuador recognized the European Union's legitimate climate targets ; however , it 
believed that any environmental measure should be  framed in terms that were compliant with the 
multilateral trading system so as  not to be arbitrarily discriminatory or unnecessarily restrictive to 
international trade. Ecuador called upon the European Union to reconsider its proposed measure 
with regard to ILUC because there already existed precepts that had been agreed upon 
internationall y with regard to deforestation, greenhouse gas emissions (GHGE) , and climate change.  
Ecuador reiterated that measures adopted by Members should not constitute unnecessary barriers 
to trade, particularly when there were binding targets agreed upon internati onally to measure the 
effectiveness of countries in terms of their protection of the environment.  
30.13.   The delegate of Guatemala  emphasized that, as a palm oil producer, Guatemala wished to 
associate itself with other Members' concerns over the negative repercu ssions of this measure, which 
discouraged the use of palm oil compared to other vegetable oils produced in the biofuel sector  in 
the European Union . Guatemala recognized the importance of sustainable production and believed 
that it was not possible to cond emn palm oil altogether in the global production of vegetable oils, 
thereby discriminating against it . The industry in Guatemala continued to work hard to maintain 
sustainable production and to comply with the SDGs.  
30.14.   The delegate of the European Union  expla ined that the revision of the Renewable Energy 
Directive (RED) had been discussed in various fora at the WTO, as well as in a number of bilateral 
meetings among experts. The EU was aware of the position expressed by Malaysia and the other 
Members that had taken the floor on the recast of the renewable energy directive and on the 
identification of biofuels at high -risk of contributing to ILUC. The EU recalled that the 
Second  Renewable Energy Directive did not aim at import restrictions, but rather at promoti ng 
sustainable renewable energies and at reducing the carbon footprint of the transport sector. She 
further noted that the Second  Renewable Energy Directive did not set a ban on any specific biofuel ; 
rather , it established rules on the calculations for the  achievement of the EU  renewable energy 
targets, including in the transport sector. She confirmed that the EU  market remained open to palm 
oil, in the biofuel sector as in other sectors ; indeed, EU imports of palm oil in 2018 had actually 
increased in volu me, and no specific restriction was in place. The EU remained available for 
discussions on this issue through the appropriate bilateral channels.  
30.15.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
30.16.   The Council so agreed . G/C/M/135  
 
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  31  EUROPEAN UN ION – MEDICAL DEVICE  REGULATION AND IN V ITRO DIAGNOSTIC 
MEDICAL DEVICES REGU LATION – REQUEST FRO M THE UNITED STATES  
31.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the United 
States had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  of this meeting . 
31.2.   The delegate of the United States  expressed her delegation's support for the development 
and enforcement of a well -defined medical device regulatory system which assured the safety and 
performance of all medical devices. However, the United States had serious concerns regarding the 
implementation of the EU's Medical Device Regulation (MDR) and the In Vitro Diagnostic Medical 
Devices Regulation (IVDR) and the US  industry was worried about  patient access to life saving and 
life improving medical technologies as well as their continued access to the EU's 125  billion medical 
device market, 20  billion of which were supplied by US  products.  
31.3.   The US noted that the implementation of these two  regulations was critically behind schedule 
and that US  national industry had two  particular concerns. First, there was an insufficient number 
of testing facilities, known as Notified Bodies  (NBs), to perform certification activities under the 
two regulations. And, second, the EU had drafted an insufficient number of the implementing acts 
needed to provide details about how industry could ensure that their products complied with the 
new product standards. The US appreciated that the Commission had previously ind icated that 
20 NBs might be designated by the end of 2019 and that these NBs had increased their capacity by 
25 to 50 %. In the US  view, this projection actually made their point that the complexity of the 
evaluations had also increased dramatically, the nu mber of files requiring re -certification was almost 
ten times the annual number, and each file required roughly six  months to evaluate. The US believed 
that the Commission's projected NBs by the end of 2019 would not have nearly enough capacity to 
meet dem and. In their view, the grace period of allowing products certified under the current MDR 
to be marketed was helpful. However, whole classes of products did not meet the regulation's criteria 
for eligibility and many companies could not find NBs to evaluat e their products under this previous 
regulation. The US reported that the NBs were already gearing up for the MDR and were turning 
away companies. Likewise, finalizing essential implementing acts by the end of the year was too 
late. 
31.4.   The US emphasized that companies must now know what they needed to do to comply with 
these regulations and that the Commission was not providing sufficient lead time for companies to 
prepare their documentation, let alone time for the NBs to evaluate those documents, by the 
May 2020 deadline for the MDR. Therefore, the US urged the EU to make important changes to allow 
the system to function. Nor was this  the view of the United States alone ; other trading partners , 
and even some EU  member States , had also expressed their concern s over the challenges in the 
implementation due to the lack of certification capacity and the absence of many implementing acts. 
Therefore , the US urged the EU to take the necessary steps to provide more time for the MDR to be 
fully implemented to enable patients to continue to receive the medical devices they needed.  
31.5.   The delegate of Canada  noted that, like the US, Canadian industry stakeholders had expressed 
concerns that the EU  MDR could pose a possible barrier to trade , especially because of the delays 
and uncertainty surrounding medical device regulation implementation. Canada asked the EU about 
any information available on next steps.  
31.6.   The delegate of  the Republic of  Korea  shared the concerns about the EU's MDR and IVDR that 
had been raised by th e United States. Korea believed that , despite the tightening of regulations , not 
enough information had been given on how the relevant evaluation procedures would be conducted. 
In Korea's view, this would make it difficult for companies to anticipate and p repare for the 
implementation of the EU's measures. The limited number of Notified Bodies designated to issue 
CE-Marking under MDR was especially concern ing to Korea, as companies worried that it would lead 
to delays and difficulties when obtaining CE  markings. Therefore, Korea requested the EU to address 
these concerns in a timely manner and also to provide more information on its measures.  
31.7.   The delegate of the European Union  replied that the new MDR and IVDR would enter into 
force in March  2020 and May  2022, respectively. These regulations aimed at ensuring the general 
safety and performance of medical devices and keeping up with technological progress. As indicated 
at the most recent meeting of the TBT Committee, the EU was aware that meeting the deadlines  of 
the regulations would be challenging for the stakeholders involved and that the timely availability of G/C/M/135  
 
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  an appropriate number of Notified Bodies was important. That said, the EU had informed Members 
that implementation was progressing well and that the regulations foresaw transition mechanisms, 
such as the possibility for manufacturers to continue to place products on the market under old 
Directive certificates until May  2024. The EU was therefore fully committed to introducing the new 
system without del ay in order to ensure a higher level of patient protection.  
31.8.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
31.9.   The Council so agreed . 
32  TUNISIA – IMPORT RES TRICTION MEASURES – REQUEST FROM THE EUR OPEAN 
UNION  
32.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
European Union had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  of this meeting . 
32.2.   The delegate of the European Union  provided detail s of the measures at stake as the item 
had been placed on the Council's agenda  for the first time . She stated that, on 29  November  2018, 
Tunisia had taken the decision to enforce new import restrictive measures on a wide number of 
products. The EU had noticed that Tunisia had de facto established a system of non -automatic import 
licences for many products  for consumption . The Tunisian importation regime was based on  
four categories : (i) free import; (ii)  import based on technical specifications, whereby the importer 
had to comply with certain provisions and get an authori zation for all future imports of the same 
product; (iii)  importation based on prior autho rization necessary for each consignment based on 
criteria that were not always transparent and depended on the nature of the goods and the Ministry 
involved; and (iv)  prohibited products.  
32.3.   The EU further noted that the decision of the Trade Ministry had extended the scope of 
products in category  (iii) while  technical specifications had apparently been in preparation. In the 
EU's view, import authori zations should in theory be guided by technical specifications but these had 
not yet been defined. In fact, the  Ministry of Trade in Tunisia evaluated and decided on importation 
requests literally on a case -by-case basis in the absence of objective criteria. Moreover, quantitative 
restrictions were also applied. Additionally, the list of products concerned included  many agricultural 
and agri -food products, textiles and clothing, cosmetics, leather products, shoes, toys, and electrical 
goods. The products affected represented roughly 4% of total EU  exports to Tunisia. The EU 
highlighted that these de facto non -automa tic import licen ces had not been notified to the WTO and 
appeared to run contrary to WTO  provisions and , in particular , Article  XI:1 of the GATT and 
Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, where appropriate.  
32.4.   Regarding the way the measure was administe red, the EU considered that the provisions of 
the WTO  Import Licensing Agreement would apply and had raised the matter in the last Import 
Licensing Committee meeting  accordingly . Regarding the potential informal conditions to be imposed 
on importers for ob taining an import licence, for example by reducing the quantity imported, the EU 
considered that these would not only be incompatible with GATT  Article  XI and the Import Licensing 
Agreement, but also in violation of Article  X:1 and X:2 of the GATT regardin g the publication of 
measures of general application. The EU therefore urged Tunisia to repeal these measures as rapidly 
as possible.  
32.5.   The delegate of China  thanked the EU for raising this issue and shared the same concerns. 
According to China, the measures that had been published by the Department of Commerce of 
Tunisia in November  2018 had covered a large number of products exported from China to Tunisia. 
China hoped that the mentioned measures would not increase burdens on business, nor create 
barriers to Chinese exports to the Tunisian market. China was still assessing the impact of the 
measures and might revert  to this issue in future meetings.  
32.6.   The delega te of Tunisia  thanked the EU and China for placing this item on the agenda. Tunisia 
informed Members that , eight months since the measures had entered  into force, the Tunisian 
authorities had assessed these measures and were currently studying the idea of repealing them. 
Tunisia would inform WTO  Members in due course of the exact date when these measures would be 
repealed.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  32.7.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
32.8.   The Council so agreed . 
33  ANGOLA – IMPORT REST RICTING PRACTICES  - STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES  
33.1.   The Chairperson  informed the Council that , in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of the United States had requested the Secretariat to include this item on the agenda  of 
this meeting . 
33.2.   The delegate of the United States  raised her delegation's concern s over Angola' s Presidential 
Decree No. 23/19, issued on 14  January  2019. It was the understanding of the US that the decree 
had been intended to restrict Angola’s imports with the goal of increasing its domestic economic 
development. The decree had specifically targeted 54  products, mainly agricultural goods, and could 
potentially target more in the future. Currently, there were reports of import b ans in place on pork, 
maize flour, and diapers , using Decree  No. 23/19 as justification. Import bans were prohibited under 
GATT  Article  XXI. The US was concerned that these actions could discourage overseas companies 
from doing business in Angola and could  also compromise Angola' s relationships with key trade 
partners. The US asked Angola' s officials to please explain how they planned to bring the decree and 
its implementation into accordance with WTO  rules. They also urged the Angolan government to 
request  technical assistance  from the WTO  Secretariat , if necessary, in notifying any trade measures 
taken under Presidential Decree No. 23/19. The US would continue to raise this issue in the CTG and 
other standing Committees , as necessary , until Angola' s import  bans had been lifted and its national 
treatment obligations were once again being respected.  
33.3.   The delegate of the European Union  said that the EU was supportive of Angola' s intention to 
diversify its economy and to develop its domestic industry. Neverthele ss, the EU also shared the 
concerns expressed by the United States . Decree  No. 23/19 seemed to protect domestic industries 
in a manner that was not compatible with WTO  rules and that could prove detrimental to foreign 
investments in Angola. The EU urged An gola to review the relevant measures in order to ensure 
compliance with WTO  rules.  
33.4.   The delegate of Brazil  shared the concerns of the US over Angola' s Presidential Decree 
No. 23/19.  The decree had specifically targeted 54  products, affecting important Brazi lian 
agricultural exports of goods, such as maize, poultry , and pork. Brazil had been following  the 
implementation of Angola's policy of import substitution with great concern. Indeed, since mid-2008, 
Brazilian exporters had been facing significant trade losses due to the restrictions that had been 
imposed by the Angolan government. Brazil had expressed its concerns to Angola's  representatives 
in a bilateral meeting in June  2019, explaining  that t he import bans were not in accordance with 
Articles  1.2 and 3.2 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Article  4 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture , and Articles  IX and XXI of GATT. Brazil encouraged the Angolan government to revise 
the measures as soon as possible.  
33.5.   The delegate of Canada  said that Canadian agriculture stakeholders had raised questions 
about Angola' s Presidential Decree No. 23/19, more specifically on its potential inconsistencies with 
Angola' s international trade obligations. Canada  shared some of the concerns raised by the US and 
encouraged Angola to ensure that the measure was consistent with its WTO  obligations, in particular 
the elimination of quantitative import restrictions and import prohibitions, as well as national 
treatment . Canada also encouraged Angola to comply with its WTO  notification requirements and 
notify the decree , as well as any measures taken under the decree , to the appropriate 
WTO Committees, including to clarify the scope of the measure and the HS  codes of the  products 
covered.  
33.6.   The delegate of the Russian Federation  shared the US  concerns regarding Angola's trade 
restrictive measures. The Russian Federation noted that the import bans that had been applied by 
Angola were inconsistent with Article  XI of the GATT.  The Russian Federation urged Angola to bring 
these measures into conformity with the WTO  Agreement and to lift the import bans on agricultural 
products.  
33.7.   The delegate of Angola  said that the decree had not impose d any restrictions on the 
importation of products, notwithstanding that Angola had operated according to WTO  rules regarding G/C/M/135  
 
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  the mechanism of non -automatic licensing in the import of selected products. Firstly, the Decree 
disciplined the rules of the commer cial chain of goods, meaning that  it defined the various  producer s, 
wholesaler s, retailer s, and consumer s, having the right to import , since in the past the retailer and 
the consumer were part of the chain of importers which Angola considered was not corre ct. Second ly, 
the Decree determined that priority should be given to the purchase of products of national origin, 
when those products were intended for public institutions . And third ly, Angola anticipated applying 
the temporary measure of effective quantitative restriction only in 2022, and that , before applying 
the measure, there would be an investigative study process and other procedures carried out as per 
the WTO  rules. Economic diversification was important in order to increase economi c resilience as 
well as to enable LDCs to participate meaningfully in global value chains and in the international 
trading system. Angola was preparing the notification of Decree No. 23/19 and it reaffirmed that 
imports were proceeding in the normal way. Angola warned of the need for proper structural 
transformation so that LDCs could positively reduce import dependence and mitigate their impact 
on the Balance of Payments, thereby reducing the gap between developed and least developed 
countries. Angola had already sent the matter to Capital and they had proposed to continue bilateral 
consultations with the United States . 
33.8.   The Chairperson  proposed that the Council take note of the statements made.  
33.9.   The Council so agreed . 
34  BETTER FUNCTIONING O F THE COUNCIL FOR TR ADE IN GOODS AND SUB SIDIARY 
COMMITTEES – STATEME NT BY HONG KONG, CHI NA 
34.1.   The Chairperson  informed Members that, in a communication dated 27  June 2019, the 
delegation of Hong Kong, China had requested the Secretariat to include this issue on the agenda  of 
this meeting . Likewise, Hong Kong, China had requested the Secretariat to distribute a Room 
Document, which had been made available to Members electronically by the Secretariat.13 The 
Chairperson also reminded Members that, on 18  June 2019, informal consultati ons had been held 
on how to improve the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. During those consultations, 
delegations had shared interesting and important ideas, including those reflected in the Room 
Document of Hong Kong, China. Similarly, during  the informal consultations, the delegation of 
Singapore had distributed its own Room Document14 on best practices followed in other Committees , 
inviting the Council to reflect upon which of these practices could eventually be implemented in its 
subsidiary bodies. The Chairperson clarified that , since delegations would surely make reference to 
these ideas and suggestions in their interventions under this agenda item, he did not consider it 
necessary to make a more detailed summary of the informal consultatio ns. 
34.2.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  recalled that , at the Council's previous meeting, her 
delegation had added this item as a platform to focus attention on small steps to improve the 
functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. She clarified that th is was not a proposal of Hong 
Kong, China but rather a collection of ideas from Members having  an interest in exploring the 
potential for improvement under the existing framework. Hong Kong, China recognized that , thanks 
to the Chair's informal consultations in early June  2019, Members had already engaged in very 
constructive exchanges. While some ideas would need further discussion, others could be adopted 
quickly to facilitate Members' participation at meetings.  
34.3.   The room document that Hong Kong, China had circulated under this item contained two  ideas 
for the consideration of Members , namely , the annotated agenda and the year plan of meetings. 
Hong Kong, China noted that both practices had already been tested  in certain committees and 
believed that wider adoption of these practices by the CTG and its subsidiary bodies would benefit 
Members even more. She explained that, with regard to the annotated agenda, and as elaborated 
in the room document, it would help Membe rs to understand new items and do the necessary 
research in preparation for a meeting. For reoccurring items, especially for those discussed in other 
committees, an annotated agenda could enable Members to be updated on how  issues had developed 
since the C ouncil's previous meeting. In her delegation's view, this would be particularly helpful to 
small delegations that might not be able to cover the meetings of all committees. As for timing, she 
suggested that the circulation of the annotated agenda two  weeks  prior to the Council's meeting 
would be useful to many delegations, although it was for Members to decide  their view on this . As 
                                                
13 Document  RD/CTG/9.  
14 Document  RD/CTG/8.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  for the yearly plan of meetings, Hong Kong, China observed that some WTO  Committees had been 
issuing tentative meeting dates for the year ahead to facilitate planning for participation  by 
delegations and Capitals . A more comprehensive year plan could also enable the Secretariat to avoid 
meeting clashes and to explore coordination between related meetings and workshops in order to  
facilitate the participation of Capital -based experts. Hong Kong, China suggested that , if Members 
had no objection, the Secretariat could start working on these ideas after the summer break, and in 
this regard , she also invited Members to share other ide as relevant to the functioning of the CTG 
and its subsidiary bodies.  
34.4.   The delegate of Singapore  thanked Hong Kong, China for introducing this agenda item, and 
also for highlighting some of the ideas that had been raised at the CTG's informal meeting of 
18 June 2019. Singapore was supportive of having a more detailed annotated agenda and for having 
an annual calendar of meetings. Singapore was also open to discussing additional ideas on how to 
improve the functioning of the CTG and its  committees. It was precisely to aid such discussions that 
Singapore had tabled a discussion paper on Good Practices in the TBT  Committee 
(document  RD/CTG/8) for discussion at the 18  June informal CTG  meeting. The intention of 
Singapore's paper had been to  encourage a discussion on whether the practices and tools used in 
the TBT  Committee might also be useful for other CTG  subsidiary bodies as well. She explained that 
the TBT  Committee fixed its calendar of meetings for the year well in advance , and also us ed an 
annotated agenda , which highlighted whether a trade concern was being raised for the first  time or 
whether it was a recurring agenda item. Singapore welcomed Members' preliminary views on the 
paper and looked forward to further discussion at the CTG's next informal meeting. Singapore had 
also co -sponsored the EU's proposal on Procedural Guidelines for WTO  Councils and Committees 
Addressing Trade Concerns and believed that the proposal contained pragmatic suggestions that 
would allow delegations to par ticipate in WTO  meetings more effectively.  
34.5.   The delegate of the European Union  thanked the Chair and Hong Kong, China for keeping 
Members focussed on the task of improving the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. 
The EU also thanked the delegat ion of Singapore for the useful paper on TBT  good practices. As had 
been indicated in the informal consultations organi zed by the Chair, the EU welcomed practical 
suggestions on how to facilitate work in the regular bodies of the WTO, such as the ideas set  out in 
the communication of Hong Kong, China. According to the EU, annotated agendas were an existing 
practice in several committees and could be very useful for preparing meetings, particularly where 
Members faced  resource constraints. An annual calendar  of meetings was also a straightforward 
good practice that the EU would encourage for all regular WTO  bodies. As indicated under this 
agenda item at the Council's previous meeting, and as previously mentioned by Singapore, the EU 
had been working with nume rous interested Members on a proposal for guidelines applicable to 
WTO bodies deal ing with trade concerns, such as the CTG and most of its subsidiary bodies. The EU 
observed that the two  long days of discussions at this meeting had once again illustrated that , while 
Members put a lot of effort into raising and responding to trade concerns, progress in resolving them 
remained rather slow. The proposal contained several improvements on how Members prepared for 
and organi zed meetings in general, a s well as guidelines on how to consider trade concerns more 
effectively. The EU informed Members that the proposal, co -sponsored by ten Members, had been 
circulated to Members on 5  July 2019 and would be on the agenda of the General Council on 
23 July 2019.15 The EU looked forward to a discussion of the proposal in that context.  
34.6.   The delegate of New Zealand  thanked Hong Kong, China and Singapore for their efforts to 
stimulate this useful discussion and for the ideas that they had generated. New Zealand confir med 
its co-sponsorship of the paper "Procedural Guidelines for WTO  Councils and Committees Addressing 
Trade Concerns", which had been explained by the EU. New Zealand saw this proposal as setting 
out tangible, practical , and pragmatic improvements to commi ttee functioning and looked forward 
to engaging with Members on this matter.  
34.7.   The delegate of Switzerland  thanked Hong Kong, China for sharing its thoughts and ideas. 
Switzerland believed that the ideas that had been presented in the paper deserved careful 
consideration, particularly in light of the increasing number and duration of meetings and the 
resource constraints of many delegations. Accordingly, Switzerland could support the ideas 
presented in the paper, namely: the circulation of an annotated agenda  prior to each CTG  meeting, 
and an annual plan of meetings for the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. Switzerland believed that 
these were simple, effective , and cost -free measures. He also highlighted that Switzerland was a 
                                                
15 Document  WT/GC/W/777.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  co-sponsor of the EU  paper on speci fic trade concerns that had been mentioned by other delegations. 
Furthermore, and in a similar spirit of unburden ing the agenda and meetings of the CTG , as well as 
other WTO  bodies, and to complement other proposals , such as that of the EU, Switzerland, to gether 
with a group of interested Members, was itself working on an opportunity to establish a new tool at 
the WTO to support Members in finding mutually agreeable solutions to their trade concerns, in 
particular those trade concerns that had been raised repeatedly in the committees.  
34.8.   The delegate of Norway  thanked Hong Kong, China for its room document on a better 
functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. Norway supported the idea of an annotated agenda 
for the CTG and an annual plan of meetings for the CTG and its subsidiary bodies. Norway looked 
forward to discussing these and other constructive ide as for improving  the functioning of the WTO. 
In addition, Norway expressed its support for the EU's ideas regarding how to deal with specific trade 
concerns , as reflected in a recent proposal to the General Council, and Norway was also among the 
co-sponsor s of this proposal.  
34.9.   The delegate of South Africa  took note of the room document circulated by Hong Kong, China 
and said that South Africa saw value in taking small steps to improve specific functions of the CTG, 
like the agenda and the plan of meetings , as mentioned in the discussion paper. However, South 
Africa did not see how the CTG could discuss the better functioning of the work of its subsidiary 
bodies given that they had mandates and rules of procedures that had been negotiated together 
with the func tioning of the WTO  system. In South Africa's view, the CTG could not agree on an open -
ended mandate to alter these procedures. Each committee would have to establish a need, then 
enter into negotiations to alter its rules of procedure based on its mandate and the provisions of the 
relevant Agreements. South Africa noted that Hong Kong, China's document was only a discussion 
document calling for more views and suggestions. South Africa was open to informal discussions 
with Hong Kong, China. However, South Af rica noted that it would be helpful if Hong Kong, China 
could give them a sense of the outcome of these discussions that they envisaged. South Africa was 
of the view that any proposal on improvement s in the functioning of the CTG should be specific and 
should not be made in an open -ended manner that would alter the rights and obligations of Members. 
South Africa emphasized that it had to be made clear to Members , in writing , what the CTG would 
take on board and implement in September , as Hong Kong, China ha d suggested.  
34.10.   The delegate of Panama  thanked the Chairman and Hong Kong, China for their initiative for 
taking steps to improve the functioning of the CTG. As mentioned by previous speakers, Panama 
confirmed its co -sponsorship to the EU  document , aimed at r esolving trade concerns, as a 
contribution to the better functioning of the multilateral trading system . Panama stated that the 
document would be submitted to the General Council . Nevertheless , Panama stood ready to discuss 
the document with any interested  Members also before the General Council meeting.  
34.11.   The delegate of Australia  appreciated the need to work together so that the CTG remained 
a relevant, constructive , and focused forum for the multilateral trading system. In Australia's view, 
the two  suggest ions put forward proposing an annotated agenda for the CTG and an annual plan of 
meetings were concrete ideas that could enhance the functioning of the CTG. Australia looked 
forward to further discussions  of this issue . 
34.12.   The delegate of Paraguay  thanked the  delegation of Hong Kong, China for its statement. 
Paraguay believed that improving the functioning of the various WTO  Committees was a task that 
Members must undertake, and that the adoption of annotated agendas was a good first  step towards 
ensuring a better follow -up to meetings, in particular those dealing with specific trade concerns. 
However, Paraguay drew Members' attention to the proliferation of different initiatives with the same 
objective s in different areas. To avoid a duplication of effort, Paraguay believed that it would make 
sense to discuss how and where these discussions could be centralized.  
34.13.   The delegate of Japan  welcomed Hong Kong, China's initiative. As stated at the Council's 
previous informal meeting, Japan believed that the earlier circulation of an annotated agenda before 
a CTG  meeting was useful to facilitate discussions at the meetings and it should be utilized swiftly 
based on the existing practices of some subsidiary bodies. Japan believed that, in practice, if an 
agenda  item was also discussed at another relevant body, it was desirable that the reference 
document number of the other body be included in the annotation. Also, the timing of circulation 
needed to be sufficiently early to allow for close consideration. Japan also shared Hong Kong, China's 
view that the preparation of an annual plan was helpful and was a possible change that could improve 
the work of the CTG and its subsidiary committees. Japan believed that it would be desirable for the G/C/M/135  
 
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  annual plan to be first prepared for CTG  meetings and then included in other Council meetings, such 
as the Council for Trade in Services, the Council for TRIPs, and the DSB  meetings.  
34.14.   The delegate of  the United States  requested that any ideas regarding any changes in the 
operatio n of the CTG be put forward formally and in writing so that the y could be sent back to Capital 
for consideration.  
34.15.   The delegate of Argentina  considered that the two  suggestions put forward by Hong Kong, 
China were a good beginning from which to improve the functioning of the CTG and its subsidiary 
bodies. Argentina fully agreed with Hong Kong, China that an annual plan of meetings should be 
tentative and should not curtail any flexibilities required by circumstances.  
34.16.   The delegate of Canada  recognized from Me mbers' discussions that there was a lot of 
trepidation around introducing changes to the system. In his delegation's view, one  aspect that had 
to be considered , or at least kept in mind , was that Members were looking for improvements or ways 
to make the sy stem and the Committees work more efficiently and more substantive ly, to allow for 
more substantive exchanges between Members in the CTG, and to allow for more transparency and 
more exchanges on trade policies. With respect to the two  specific items that h ad been identified in 
Hong Kong, China's paper, particularly on the annual plan of meetings, Canada did not consider that 
Members needed a decision on this particular aspect, as it was up to the Secretariat. He did not 
recall the TBT  Committee or the SPS Committee, or any other committees, making any specific 
decision in that regard. It was rather the Secretariat on its own volition that had decided that it was 
a good idea and a good practice to set out an indicative list of timing. In his view, this w as part of 
the proposal that the EU had made and did not require a specific decision from Members to do this. 
In terms of the annotated agenda, Canada believed that there might be a need to discuss this issue  
further , but again he did not see the need for a decision. In Canada's view, if Members felt that they 
needed to explain the issues  that they were raising, then why not. For example, there was one  issue 
on the meeting's agenda concerning oil, which the Russia n Federation  had raised with the European 
Union, and he did not know what it was about. Therefore, in the event of a new item, to have some 
background information up -front could be useful, especially for Members' preparations for meetings . 
In respect of the comment made by South Africa, Canada share d the view that the procedures that 
the committees themselves implemented were discussed within the committees ; however , he 
recognized that it was the CTG that had the mandate over those committees, and it was also the 
CTG that approved the rules of proced ures for them. Therefore, Canada reminded Members that 
they had a role to play in the CTG with regard to at least providing some advice to the CTG's 
subsidiary committees.  
34.17.   The delegate of India agreed with Canada that these were broader issues. On the annu al 
plan for the subsidiary committees, he agreed that it was up to the Secretariat to provide such a 
plan if it was comfortable with this idea , and that probably no separate decision was required. As far 
as the annotated agenda was concerned, India suggest ed looking into the genesis of the issues that 
were coming to the CTG. Most of these issues had already been addressed in the various committees, 
whether it be the Committee on Market Access , or the TBT Committee,  or the SPS Committee, and 
some of those is sues were then flowing into the CTG. Whether there was a need for an annotated 
agenda in case s where these issues had already been discussed in those committees, India believed 
that this had to be seen in a broader perspective to understand the need for such an effort and again 
directing it to the various different committees because different committees operated in different 
situations and had  different mandates. India agreed that the CTG could direct the different 
committees, but with care because the  portfolios of the various committee s were distinct . India 
therefore called for more discussion on these points and waited for feedback from its Capital.  
34.18.   The delegate of Hong Kong, China  thanked Members for their comments and clarified that 
the proposal was not about asking Members to agree on something. Regarding the year plan, the 
proposal was just administrative if the Secretariat could do somet hing to facilitate this without 
requiring a decision by Members. Regarding the annotated agenda, she explained that the room 
document had only referred to the annotated agenda for the CTG and not for its subsidiary bodies. 
She said that , if the CTG found i t useful, then it could encourage subsidiary bodies to consider the 
same practice. As mentioned by Singapore, where there were good practices in one committee, 
Members could just encourage other committees to consider adopting the same practice. She 
conclu ded that Members did not need to take any decisions.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  34.19.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and especially for the interest 
shown in the better functioning of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. He highlighted that the 
exercise that  had taken place confirmed the trust that Members placed in the multilateral trading 
system and in the role of the different bodies of the WTO as fora for understanding the trade policies 
of other Members and for presenting the various trade concerns relat ing to the implementation of 
the WTO  Agreements, in particular those relating to trade in goods. He recognized that, as set out 
by several delegations, there was an interest in continuing to discuss this matter further, and he 
expressed his willingness to do so informally. He was also pleased to note that the working 
methodology used by Members was one in which they moved forward on elements of agreement 
while leaving for further discussion those issues where divergent views persisted. In his view, this 
was the best way to build consensus. He proposed that the Council take note of the statements 
made and that, if delegations requested  him to do so , he would call for further informal consultations 
on this matter after the summer break.  
34.20.   The Council so agreed . 
35  WORK PROGRAMME ON EL ECTRONIC COMMERCE  
35.1.   The Chairperson  recalled that a Ministerial Decision had been adopted at MC11 in Buenos 
Aires in which Ministers had agreed to maintain the existing Work Programme on E -Commerce, and 
to endeavour to reinvigorate the WT O's work on E -Commerce. The Ministerial Decision had also 
instructed the General Council to hold periodic reviews in its sessions of July and December  2018, 
and July  2019, based on the reports submitted by the relevant bodies, among them the Goods 
Council;  and to maintain the current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic 
transmissions. Therefore, this Council was again tasked to discuss the E -Commerce aspects relating 
to trade in goods and , in order to fulfil its mandate, the E -Commerce issu e was a standalone agenda 
item. The Chairperson invited delegations to continue expressing their opinions and to make 
suggestions as to how to work on the preparation of the periodic review to be held in the General 
Council at its session of July  2019.  
35.2.   The Chairperson also recalled that at the last meeting, the delegate of Chad, as Coordinator 
of the LDC  Group, had invited the four  WTO bodies, including this Council, to look into the costs and 
benefits of electronic commerce for LDCs when evaluating the Min isterial Decision at the end of the 
year. In that regard, the delegate of Chad had expressed the interest of LDCs in evaluating the 
opportunities offered by electronic commerce for companies, consumers , and their economies. Based 
on the technological diffi culties identified by the LDCs, but at the same time recognizing the potential 
of electronic commerce, the LDC  Group had announced that it intended to hold a workshop on the 
subject.  
35.3.   Finally, the Chairperson reminded Members that, in accordance with the ma ndate contained 
in the aforementioned Ministerial Decision, the last report of the CTG to the General Council before 
the next Ministerial Conference must be presented during the next meeting of the CTG at the end of 
July 2019. For this purpose, the Chairpe rson would submit a factual report to the General Council 
under his own responsibility. However, since the MC12  Ministerial Meeting would no longer take 
place in December of 2019 , but in June  2020, he asked for Members' opinion about whether this 
Council s hould also inform the General Council about its work at its meeting of December  2019.  
35.4.   The delegate of China , pursuant to the mandate of the Work Programme on Electronic 
Commerce , shared some examples on E-Commerce which demonstrated how E-Commerce was 
helping to promote industrial development and international trade in goods contributing to inclusive 
and sustainable growth, rural development , and poverty reduction. China informed Members that 
these cases had  also been shared at the CTS  meeting on 27  June. Considering the time restraints, 
she requested the Secretariat to refer to China's statements made at the June  2019 CTS meeting.16 
35.5.   The delegate of Mali indicated that a lot of internal discussions had taken p lace on this issue 
in the African and LDC  Groups. Mali indicated that no one challenged the benefits of electronic 
commerce and Members were all aware of what needed to be done and what benefits electronic 
commerce  could  bring to LDCs and in terms of their integration in to world trade. She indicated that, 
despite the various Ministerial Decisions on this issue that had mandated Members to examine this 
issue based on the reports made by the Chairs of the various Councils, several meetings had been 
                                                
16 Document  S/C/M/139, paragraphs  3.2-3.9 and 3.38 -3.43. G/C/M/135  
 
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  held and n o specific outcome had yet been achieved. Reference was also made to the report by the 
Ambassador of Singapore in which it had been highlighted that there had been no progress due to 
a lack of consensus. She considered that the same conclusion would be mad e at the next General 
Council meeting in July , which would provide another opportunity to state that there was no mandate 
for electronic commerce. Mali was therefore surprised that an issue like E-Commerce, for which 
there was no mandate, was making so muc h progress in the context of the discussions that were 
taking place among some Members , while at the same time the Doha Development Agenda was not 
being applied, the Hong Kong Ministerial Decision was not being implemented, and a lot of other 
decisions were likewise not moving forward. In addition, the precondition for E-Commerce, which 
was the transfer of technology, had not yet been realized . Mali recognized that everybody should 
integrate E-Commerce and reported that, with the support of UNCTAD, it had b egun a preliminary 
phase of evaluating what steps Mali should take to integrate E-Commerce. However, it was 
premature for Mali to enter into negotiations when a proper diagnosis of the situation had not yet 
been carried out. Mali believed that Members were skipping certain steps and that they needed to 
go slowly . Mali also emphasized that developed countries needed to fulfil their own obligations in 
terms of trans fer of technology and technical assistance, as these were prerequisites for the 
1998 Work Programme ; however, no one was applying these . Mali recogni zed that Members would 
like to make progress but that they needed to integrate all these elements first.  
35.6.   The delegate of New Zealand  thanked China for sharing their experiences both in this Council 
and in the CTS and reiterated its strong desire to continue discussions within the WTO on 
E-Commerce. New Zealand believed that it had never been more important to d emonstrate that the 
WTO could respond to contemporary trading realities, including through discussing E -Commerce in 
various forums throughout the Organization. Being a small and isolated economy at the far end of 
the world, New Zealand knew the difference that it could make to have this connection to help 
sustainable and inclusive growth.  
35.7.   The Chairperson  recognized that this was an important matter for all Members. He therefore 
encouraged delegations to keep -up their interest in this matter and to continue their discussions on 
E-Commerce. Likewise, he reiterated his willingness to support any delegation in any action that 
they might consider useful. He thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the 
Council take note of the statements made.  He also reminded Members that he would prepare a 
factual report, under his own responsibility, to the General Council at its next meeting , as well as at 
its meeting in December , before the next Ministerial Conference.  
35.8.   The Council so agreed . 
36  OTHER BUSINESS  
36.1  Japan – Export Control Measures on Materials Essential for Semiconductors and 
Displays  
36.1.   The representative of the Republic of Korea  raised the issue of Japan's export control 
measures on materials essential to the production of semiconductors and displays towards Korea. 
She stated that , on 1 July 2019, Japan had announced its plans to tighten export controls on 
three  Japanese materials which Korean semiconductor companies heavily depended upon, namely: 
fluorinated polyimides ; resists ; and hydrogen fluoride.  According to Korea, Japan had only cited a 
'damage of trust' as the reason behind its actions, without elaborating on the basis of the measure 
vis-à-vis WTO  norms. Korea reported that, beginning 4  July 2018, Japanese exporters of such 
materials had been required to apply for export licen ces each time that they shipped these materials 
to Korea. Korea was the sole target of these export control measures, and Japan was also reviewing 
whether it should change Korea's white list status under Japan's expor t control law, which could 
result in an even greater tightening of regulations on exports to Korea.  
36.2.   Korea emphasized that there were no provisions in the WTO  Agreements that allowed a 
Member to take export control measures against another Member due to a ' damage of trust' between 
the countries  concerned . Korea worried that Japan's motivation behind its trade restrictive measures 
might end up jeopardizing the spirit of free and fair trade that the WTO  Members endeavoured to 
protect. In Korea's view, if a Mem ber planned to take trade restrictive measures it should offer a 
detailed explanation of the reason and necessity for such measures, and such explanation should be 
made in a transparent and predictable manner. Korea recognized that Japan itself had acted a s a G/C/M/135  
 
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  strong advocate of such transparency and predictability at the G20  Summit in Osaka in June  2019. 
Japan, as the G20  Chair, had taken a leading role in the adopt ion of  the Osaka Declaration , at the 
level of G20 leaders , which called for a "free, fair, no n-discriminatory, predictable, and stable trade 
environment". Therefore, Korea was taken by surprise when, two  days later, Japan had unexpectedly 
announced its plans for stricter export control measures, and when these measures had been 
directed at a singl e country. Korea could not help but point out that , while Japan had repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of "free, fair, non -discriminatory, predictable , and stable trade", Japan's 
actual actions introduced measures that were unpredictable and unstable, no t to mention falling 
short of free, fair, and non -discriminatory. Korea also emphasized that Japan's actions were not only 
damaging to Korean industries but would also disrupt the stability of the global value chain and have 
negative effects on Japanese co mpanies as well. The materials on which Japan had imposed export 
control measures were vital for semiconductors and displays, which were major industries in Korea. 
Semiconductors and displays from Korea were also used worldwide for the production of variou s 
electronic products. Korea emphasized that Japan's measures would impede a critical link in this 
global system and would have negative ripple effects throughout the entire world economy. Korea 
found it surprising that Japan would resort to such a measure where the whole world, including the 
companies of both countries , might suffer the consequences. Korea believed that the Japanese 
measures would have negative effects on the multilateral trading system that all Members cherished, 
in contradiction o f Japan's prior claims of being an avid supporter of free and fair trade, and 
detrimental to the growth and development not only of Korean firms, but of enterprises all around 
the world, including the companies of Japan itself. For these reasons, Korea str ongly requested that 
Japan withdraw its measures.  
36.3.   The representative of Japan  responded that the measure referred to by Korea was not a trade 
embargo but an operational review necessary for the proper implementation of Japan's export 
control system based o n national security concerns , and he explained that a review of export control s 
was conducted by every country, including Korea. Thus, Japan considered it irrelevant to say that 
such a review went against free trade or the principles adopted at the G20  Summit in Osaka. 
Furthermore, in his delegation's view, the measure taken by Japan simply reverted to the existing 
simplified procedures applied to Korea to the usual procedures. Japan observed that the three  items 
in question were already subject to the Inte rnational Regulatory Framework; therefore, they were 
fully consistent with the WTO  Agreement.  
36.4.   The delegate of  the Republic of  Korea , rather than making a long counter -argument,  
reiterated the principle and spirit of free and fair trade. Korea could not ign ore the fact that Japan's 
measures would have negative effects on the multilateral trading system. In her delegation's view, 
Japan's measures would impair not only Korean industries but also global value chains as a whole , 
including Japanese companies. Kor ea again requested Japan to reconsider and withdraw its trade 
distorting measures.  
36.5.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made.  
36.6.   The Council so agreed . 
36.2  Optimization of the CTG Work in Line with the Practice of the General Council  
36.7.   The Chairperson  asked Members whether in their opinion it was appropriate, with a view to 
optimizing the work of the Council and the use of its time, that the Council adopt the practice of the 
General Cou ncil to limit speakers ' interventions to a maximum of five  minutes per delegation, and 
seven  minutes when the speaker took the floor on behalf of a group of Members.  
36.8.   The delegate of India asked the Chairperson to clarify whether the proposed time -limit of 
five minutes would also apply when Members discuss ed a new proposal, such as the transparency 
proposal, or only when they discussed specific trade concerns.  
36.9.   The delegate of South Africa , in addition to India's question, noted that it would be important 
to make a distinction between those trade concerns that were raised for the first  time in the Council, 
and those that were repeated for a number of times when considering how much time to allow for 
discussions.  G/C/M/135  
 
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  36.10.   The delegate of the United States  thanked the Chairperson for the suggestion and said that 
she would submit it to her Capital for reaction.  
36.11.   The Chairperson  thanked delegations for their interventions and proposed that the Council 
take note of the statements made. He also indicated that, if Members so requested, he would conduct 
informal consultations on this issue ahead of the Council's next formal meeting.  
36.12.   The Council took note  of the statements made.  
36.3  Date of the Next Meeting  
36.13.   The Chairperson  informed delegations that the next meeting of the Council was scheduled 
to take place on 14 and 15  November  2019. The agenda would close on 1  November  2019, at 
4.30 pm. 
36.14.   Regarding closure of the agenda, he reminded delegations that, according to the Rules of 
Procedure, meetings of WTO  bodies were convened by a meeting notice issued not less than 
ten calendar days prior to the date set for the meeting. Therefore, the agenda closed one  working 
day prior to the circulation of the meeting notice; that is,  11 calendar days before the date set for 
the meeting (or, if the date fell on a weekend, the previous Friday).  
36.15.   The Council so agreed . 
36.16.   The meeting was closed . 
__________