G/C/W/803  
18 October  2021 
(21-7863) Page: 1/6 
Council for Trade in Goods  Original:  Spanish  
 
CUBA – ARTICLE XV:6  
REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF THE WAIVER CONCERNING ARTICLE XV:6  
OF THE G ATT 1994 CONTAINED IN THE DECISION OF 7 DECEM BER 2016 
(WT/L/ 1003) 
The following communication, dated 14 October 2021, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of the Republic of Cuba.  
 
_______________  
 
 
I have the honour to inform you, in your capacity as Chairman of the Council for Trade in Goods, 
that Cuba wishes to request the inclusion of an item regardi ng the extension of the waiver concerning 
Article XV:6 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 on the agenda of the next 
meeting of this Body.  
Pursuant to Article  IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World  Trade  Organization, th e 
Republic of Cuba requests an extension , until 3 1 December  2026, of the waiver of the provisions of 
Article XV:6 of the GATT, as is appropriate given that Cuba is not a member of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) . The current waiver is due to expire on 3 1 December  2021.1 The reason for 
this request for a further e xtension of the waiver is that the conditions reported in previous years 
not only continue to exist, but have intensified . 
 
1  PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND OF THE REQUEST  
1.1.  The Government of the Republic of Cuba requests a renewal of the extension granted on 
12 December  2016 (WT/L/1003) . This waiver providing relief from  the provisions of paragraph 6 of 
the above -mentioned  Article was granted to the Government of Cuba by the Decision of 
7 August  1964, as successively extended on 1 8 October  19962, 20 December  20013, 
15 December  20064, 14 December  20125 and 7 December  2016. 
1.2.  The request for a further extension of the waiver is based on the fact that the circumstances  
that justified the waiver extension granted in 201 6 not only remain virtually uncha nged, but have 
also worsened . This applies, in particular , to the economic, trade and financial blockade measures 
that the Government of the United States of America is continuing to impose on Cuba, which have 
been aggravated by the impact of the pandemic . 
1.3.  Following the rapprochement between the Governments of Cuba and the United  States of 
America on 17 December  2014, which set the stage for  the reopening of embassies and helped 
advance the conclusion of various cooperation agreements on issues of mutual interest, the 
subsequent Republican administration reversed this process, with an escalation of hostilities during 
 
1 WT/L/1003, Decision adopted in accordance with the Decision -Making Procedures under Articles  IX 
and XII of the WTO Agreement agreed by the General Council on 15  November  1995 (WT/L/93).  
2 WT/L/182.  
3 WT/L/440.  
4 WT/L/678.  
5 WT/L/850.  G/C/W/803  
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which a range of more than 240 measures were applied over the last two years , taking  the 
application of the blockade to extreme levels . 
1.4.  The new Democrat administration that entered the White House in January  2021 has, contrary 
to all predictions, continued to apply  the sanctions imposed by the previous administration , and has 
even reinforc ed them, thus aggravating the country's economic and social conditions, without in any 
way taking into account the efforts and sacrifice made by the Cuban  people to tackle COVID -19, 
including  the solidarity we have shown with the rest of the world . 
1.5.  The followin g set of existing measures ha ve been identified as forming the basic elements of 
the current escalation of hostilities:  
• On 17 April 2019, the Secretary of State issued a statement announcing the full 
activation of Title III of the Helms -Burton Act as of 2 May 2019. 
• On 4 June 2019, the Office of Foreign Assets Control  (OFAC ) announced a policy of 
refusing travel licences for passenger tra nsport (cruise ships ), recreational vessels and 
private aircraft . 
• On 9 October  2019, restrictions were imposed on remittances to natural persons  
(capping them at USD 1,000 in any three -month period) and "U -turn" banking 
transactions6 were banned , measur es contrary to those applied by the previous Barack 
Obama  administration . 
• On 26 February  2020, new regulations entered into force for the US company 
Western  Union, making it no longer possible to send remittances to Cuba from third 
countries . 
• On 10 March  2020, it was announced that charter flights to and from the United  States  
would be suspended throughout  the island, with the exception of Havana . This measure  
entered into force on  13 August  2020. 
• On 23 October  2020, OFAC banned persons under US jurisdiction from processing 
remittances to and from  Cuba that involve entities included on the Department of 
State's Cuba Restricted List , thereby  directly impacting remittances sent through  
Fincimex and AIS. 
• On 1 January  2021, the Department of State added the Banco Financiero Internacional 
to the Cuba Restricted List . 
• On 11 January  2021, Cuba was added to the State Sponso rs of Terrorism  list. 
1.6.  We wish to emphasize  that the policy of economic and financial persecution has intensified 
against third -country banks and firms, thus generating greater obstacles for the Cuban bank in its 
international operations . The central aspects of this situation are the considerable f ines imposed on 
major European Banks, the implementation of Title III of the Helms -Burton Act and Cuba's  inclusion , 
once again, on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list . This last measure, which is unquestionably 
illegal, has been widely criticized and reje cted by the international community, as reflected in the 
UN's o verwhelming vote against the blockade policy in June 2021. 
1.7.  The use of US currency  continues to be banned in the country's external commercial and 
financial operations, which generates substanti al losses on account of changes in the exchange rates 
between the US  dollar and the currencies  of third countries in which receipts and payments are 
executed, as well as other additional costs . Regarding this aspect, we should point out that the 
country was obliged to temporarily ban US dollar cash deposits in Cuban banking and financial 
institutions  because of the barriers imposed by the US blockade on the export of this currency when 
it has been collected in the country . 
 
6 Transfers of funds that pass through, but do not originate or terminate in, North American banks.  G/C/W/803  
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1.8.  Despite having been reincluded o n the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, our country continues 
to fulfil its obligations as part of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT) , where 
the results achieved show  that, to date, Cuba is among  the countries that have obtained  the best 
results at global level , reflecting  its context  and actual situation , and its aim to become fully 
integrated  into the international network of countries that combat  money laundering, the financing 
of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction  has thus been achieved . 
2  JUSTIFICATION  
2.1.  The rigid and hostile blockade policy against Cuba continues to be  the main impediment to the 
country's economic development , by hampering the performance of all sectors of its domestic 
economy, by sub stantially increasing financial costs and impeding access to external financial flows, 
and by obstructing essential imports, mainly  food, medicines and fuel , which is a serious obstacle to 
economic development.  
2.2.  Consequently, the country's efforts to integrate into the world  trading system are being made 
under particularly difficult conditions - the outcome of a policy that contradicts the principle of free 
trade.  
2.3.  The blockade legislation  also prohibit s loans to C uba by multilateral and regional financial 
organizations, thereby denying the country access to sources of long -term financing under 
favourable conditions and forcing it to resort to short -term loans with high interest rates and supplier 
financing on a muc h less flexible basis than credit from financial institutions and official sources.  
2.4.  The blockade is a blatant violation of international law and the principles of free trade and 
navigation enshrined in numerous international legal instruments, including th e rules of the 
World  Trade Organization (WTO) . It runs counter to the purposes and principles of the 
United  Nations  Charter and constitutes an infringement of a sovereign State's right to peace, 
development and security.  
2.5.  The main laws that allow the blockade to continue are the following:  
• The Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) : originally enacted as a wartime measure in 1917 
to restrict trade with nations that were considered hostile, it was on this law that the first 
regulations of the 1962 blockade a gainst Cuba were based . In September  2015, arguing 
foreign policy interests, President Obama renewed this Act, which constitutes the 
cornerstone of the laws and regulations governing the blockade, for one more  year.  
• The Foreign Assistance Act, enacted by t he United States Congress in September  1961, 
authorizing the President of the United States to establish and maintain "a total embargo 
on trade between the United States and Cuba" . It also prohibits the granting of any aid to 
the Government of Cuba.  
• The Ex port Administration Act (EAA), adopted in 1979, which empowers  the President to 
control, in general, exports and re -exports of goods and technology, in particular those 
that are considered detrimental to the national security of the United States.  
• The Cuba n Democracy Act (CDA), better known as the "Torricelli Act", signed by President 
Bush Senior in October  1992, reinforcing the economic measures against Cuba and 
providing a legal basis for the extraterritoriality of the blockade . Among other restrictions 
it prohibits subsidiaries of North American  companies in third countries from doing 
business with Cuba or Cuban nationals, and prohibits the entry into North  American  
territory for a period of 180 days of ships from third countries that have touched port in  
Cuba.  
• The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, commonly known as the 
"Helms -Burton Act", approved by President Clinton in March  1996. Its essential aim is to 
impede and discourage foreign investment and to internationalize the blockade against 
Cuba . It codifies the provisions of the blockade, limiting the President's prerogatives to 
suspend the policy and broadening its extraterritorial scope . It denies entry into the United 
States of directors of foreign companies (and their family memb ers) that invest in G/C/W/803  
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"confiscated" property in Cuba and provides for the possibility of filing legal action against 
them in the US courts.  
• The Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which regulate the exceptions to the Export 
Administration Act or those that are authorized under licences issued by the Bureau of 
Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce . They come under the Trading With 
the Enemy Act and the Export Administration Act . 
2.6.  This body of l egislation , applied over almost six decade s, has caused the Cuban nation severe  
economic damage estimated  at 147,853 million  dollars at current prices , and amounting to  
1,377,998,000 dollars by  the end of 20 20, taking into account the depreciation of the dollar  against 
the value of gold in the international  market.  
2.7.  Moreover, the economic, commercial and financial siege that has been kept in place unchanged 
by all of the US  administrations since 1961 imposes extraterritorial restrictions on Cuba that also 
affect other WTO Members.  
2.8.  The effects of the economic, commercial  and financial blockade are compounded by the adverse 
impact on  the Cuban economy of the continuing  global economic and financial crisis  and the 
pandemic . The host of difficulties mentioned above  prevent the  signing of a special exchange 
agreement with WTO  Members.  
2.9.  2020 was a very difficult and complex year for Cuba, one characterized by severe economic 
and financial tensions stemming from  the US blockade, monetary instability , price volatility in the 
international mar ket, and the effects of the global financial crisis . All this was compounded by the 
impact of the SARS CoV -2 (COVID -19) pandemic , which generated additional costs for the country 
because of  the need to implement lockdown and physical  distancing policies,  measures to shut down 
production activities and other actions related to the prevention and containment of the disease . 
2.10.  As a result of the foregoing, Cuba recorded a 10.9% drop in GDP for the second time in 
27 years, which was much higher than 0 .2% fall recorded in 2019. The production of goods fell by 
15.1% due to a decline in all economic activities  other than those related to mining and quarrying, 
while services fell by 10.1 %, amounting to 85.1 % of total GDP . 
2.11.  In the midst of this adverse scenario , it was necessary to adjust both the Plan for the Economy 
and the state budget, which required an increase in the fiscal deficit initially provided for in the State 
Budget Law, in order to support  the costs generated by COVID -19, as well as the rise in cos ts 
associated with the general reform of wages, pensions and social security benefits, as a step prior 
to the monetary and financial ordering process, the implementation of which began on 
1 January  2021. As a result, the fiscal deficit tripled in relation to that recorded in 2019 , amounting 
to 17.7% of GDP.  
2.12.  Economic measures were also taken to promote work in the non -state sphere, which involved 
1,549,000  people at the end of the year . This figure is expected to  continue to rise as activities 
included in the new forms of non -state management  expand . 
2.13.  Likewise, non -agricultural or services cooperatives continued to grow as a new form of 
economic management ; most of them operate in the areas of  trade, catering, tran sport and 
construction, which are expected to help raise the quality of services in the country . By the end of 
2020, 17,200 people were working in this type of non -state management, 3.0 % more than in the 
previous year.  G/C/W/803  
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2.14.  In spite of the economic decline, the  country made huge efforts to mitigate the impact of the 
blockade and the COVID -19 pandemic on the Cuban people and to prevent  the deterioration of social 
indicators, which reflect the gains made in this area . The most relevant indicators performed as 
follows: 
• The infant mortality rate fell from 5.0 per  thousand  live births in 2019 to 4.9 in 2020, 
while the under -five mortality rate fell from 6.6 to 6.2 per  thousand  live births , which 
is lower than the rate in South  American and Caribbean countries ; this rate has 
remained at or below 5.0 for the past 1 3 years . 
• Life expectancy at birth continues to be 78 years . 
• The country has one doctor per 108 inhabitants and one dentist per 544 inhabitants . 
• The unemployment rate rose slightly from 1.2% in 2019 to 1.4% in 2020 . The economic 
crisis brought on by the coronavirus pandemic had an impact on the labour market 
because of  the measures implemented to contain the spread of the virus . These 
measures provided for , inter alia , the temporary limitation of oper ations in non -essential 
economic activities  and restriction s on freedom of internal transit in the country . The 
same measures were accompanied by the introduction of support programmes for 
workers (teleworking and remote working) and mothers with children of school age , so 
as to prevent concentration s of people in the workplace  and to safeguard jobs . 
• A total of 345,764 students graduated from the education system at the end of the 
2019-20 academic year, of whom 35,739 from higher education institutions, which 
represents an increase of 56.7 % over the previous year . 
• Primary and secondary education for all has been guaranteed, as has school retention 
at primary and secondary level.  
• Total registration for the 2019 -20 academic year stood at m ore than 2,000,000  students 
at all levels (pre -school, primary and secondary education, special education, tertiary 
education, vocational and skills training and adult education), despite representing a 
drop of 14.9 % over the previous year.  
2.15.  At the internat ional level, Cuba continued to provide valuable support to developing countries . 
In 2020, with the arrival of the COVID -19 virus, the Cuban nation  began to send medical teams to 
countries that were request ing humanitarian aid . By the end of April 2021, more than 50 teams 
including specialized professionals from the Henry Reeve Brigade had been sent to treat coronavirus 
patients  in 40 countries . This medical brigade was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize  in 2021 for 
the extraordinary work and effort s of Cuban doctors and healthcare workers in countries 
experienc ing disasters and serious epidemics , in the 15 years since the brigade was founded.  
2.16.  The years 2020 and 2021 marked a milestone in the field of Cuban public health . Faced with 
the challenge of the COVID -19 pandemic, and in the midst of severe shortages and the unlawful 
escalation of the US blockade, our scientific community created three vaccines and two candidate 
vaccines, with satisfactory results, the aim being to  fully immuniz e all Cubans by  the end of 2021 . 
These biotech products are the result of a government policy aimed at enhancing not only 
technological infrastructure, but also  the capacity and talent of Cuban scientists, which throughout 
the years has required major investment efforts in the fields  of education, science, technology and 
innovation . 
_______________  
 
 G/C/W/803  
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ANNEX  
CUBA – ARTICLE XV:6  
DRAFT EXTENSION  OF WAIVER  
Decision of [...] 20 217 
 Noting  the request by the Government of Cuba for an extension of the waiver relieving it from 
the provisions of paragraph 6 of Article XV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  1994, 
which provide that any Contracting Party which ceases to be a member of the International  Monetary 
Fund shall enter into a special exchange agreement with the WTO;  
 Considering  once again that, owing to special circumstances, the application of the provisions 
of paragraph 6 of Article XV to Cuba would raise a number of legal a nd practical difficulties;  
 Noting  the assurances given by the Government of Cuba that it will use the waiver with the 
purpose of continuing to promote trade and investment with Members;  
 The Members, acting pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Art icle IX of the Agreement 
on the WTO,  
 Decide:  
1. Without derogation from any other provisions of Article XV and subject to the terms and 
conditions set out below, to extend the waiver granted to the Government of Cuba by Decision of 
7 August  1964, as exten ded on 1 8 October  1996, 2 0 December  2001, 15 December  2006, 
14 February  2012, and 1 2 December  2016, relieving it from the provisions of paragraph 6 of the 
said Article from 1 January  2022 to 31 December  2026. 
2. The extension shall be subject to the Government of Cuba satisfying the WTO that it has 
complied with its undertaking to make use of the waiver without thereby affecting the objectives of 
the General Agreement or harming or impairing the rights of the other contracting parties.  
3. The Government of Cuba will submit to the General Council an annual report on the 
implementation of this waiver with a view to facilitating the annual review provided for in paragraph 
4 of Article IX of the WTO Agreement.  
4. The Government of Cuba will, upon r equest, promptly enter into consultations with any 
interested Member with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise as a result of the 
implementation of this waiver, where a Member considers that any benefit accruing to it under the 
GATT 1994 may be or is being impaired unduly as a result of such implementation . Such consultation 
shall examine the possibility of action for a satisfactory adjustment of the matter . This decision does 
not affect Members' rights as set forth in the Understanding in Res pect of Waivers of Obligations 
under the G ATT 1994. 
__________  
 
7 Adopted in accordance with the Decision -Making Procedures under Articles IX and XII of the 
WTO Agreement agreed by the General Council on 15  November  1995 (WT/L/93).