WT/DS552/R  
 
9 December 2022  
(22-9172) Page: 1/79 
  Original: English  
 
  
UNITED  STATES  – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM 
PRODUCTS  
REPORT  OF THE PANEL  
 
 WT/DS552/R  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  11 
1.1   Complaint by Norway  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..11 
1.2   Panel establishment and composition  ................................ ................................ ............ 11 
1.3   Panel proceedings  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......12 
1.3.1    General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 12 
1.3.2    Request for the substantive meetings of the Panel to be open to the public  ..................... 12 
1.3.3    Request for enhanced third -party rights  ................................ ................................ .....13 
1.3.4    Relationship with the other disputes where the same three persons act as panelists ......... 14 
1.3.5    Impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on the Panel proceedings  ................................ ........ 15 
1.3.5.1    Filing of written submissions ................................ ................................ ................... 15 
1.3.5.2    Scheduling of the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties  ................. 15 
1.3.5.3    Use of a virtual mee ting platform for the second substantive meeting of the Panel  
with the parties  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 16 
1.3.5.4    Impact on coordination with the othe r disputes where the same three persons act as 
panelists  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 17 
2   FACTUAL ASPECTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 18 
2.1   Section 232 and the United  States Department of Commerce reports on steel and  
aluminium  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 18 
2.1.1    Section  232 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 18 
2.1.2    The Steel Report  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......19 
2.1.2.1    Initiation and investigation process  ................................ ................................ ......... 20 
2.1.2.2    Product scope  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......20 
2.1.2.3    Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  .............................. 21 
2.1.3    The Aluminium Report  ................................ ................................ .............................. 23 
2.1.3.1    Initiation and investigation process  ................................ ................................ ......... 23 
2.1.3.2    Product scope  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......23 
2.1.3.3   Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  .............................. 24 
2.1.4    Presidential Proclamations  ................................ ................................ ........................ 26 
2.2   Measures at issue  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......27 
2.2.1    Import tariffs  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 29 
2.2.2    Import quotas  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 29 
2.2.3    Country -wide tariff exemptions ................................ ................................ .................. 30 
2.2.4    Product exclusions  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...31 
3   PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  ................................  32 
4   ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  ................................ ................................ ...................  33 
5   ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  ................................ ................................ ........  33 
6   INTERIM REVIEW  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 33 
6.1   Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards  ................................ ......33 
6.2   Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ................... 35 
6.3   Appendices  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 37 WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7   FINDINGS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  38 
7.1   Mandate under the DS U ................................ ................................ .............................. 38 
7.2   Order of analysis  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 40 
7.3   Article  II:1 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ....................... 41 
7.3.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 41 
7.3.2    Additional duties on steel and aluminium products  ................................ ....................... 42 
7.3.3    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 46 
7.4   Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ........................ 46 
7.4.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 46 
7.4.2    Country exemptions for steel and aluminium products  ................................ .................. 47 
7.4.3    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 48 
7.5   Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ...................... 49 
7.5.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 49 
7.5.2    Import quotas for steel and aluminium products  ................................ .......................... 49 
7.5.3    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 50 
7.6   Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ....................... 50 
7.7   Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards  ................................ ......50 
7.7.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 50 
7.7.2    Interpretation of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement o n Safeguards in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU  ................................ ................................ ................. 51 
7.7.3    Assessment of the measures at issue  ................................ ................................ ......... 58 
7.7.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 62 
7.8   Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ................... 63 
7.8.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 63 
7.8.2    Interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in accordance with Article  3.2 of  
the DSU  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 63 
7.8.3    Assessment of the measures at issue  ................................ ................................ ......... 72 
7.8.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 78 
8   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  ................................ ................................ ... 78 
 
 
  WT/DS552/R  
 
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LIST OF APPENDICES  
Contents  Page  
Appendix  A Materials submitted by the parties on Uruguay Round negotiations of the 
Agreement on Safeguards  4 
Appendix  B Materials submitted by the parties on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT 1994 12 
LIST OF ANNEXES  
ANNEX A  
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel  4 
Annex  A-2 Working Procedures of the Panel for Open Meeting  10 
Annex  A-3 Working Procedures of the Panel Revised on 19  July 2019 and 20  February  2020 11 
Annex  A-4 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Meetings with Remote 
Participation   17 
ANNEX B  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway  20 
Annex  B-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the United  States  of 
America  40 
ANNEX C  
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China  47 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European  Union  50 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Hong Kong, China  56 
Annex  C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India  59 
Annex  C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  62 
Annex  C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of New  Zealand  65 
Annex  C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian  Federation  68 
Annex  C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Singapore  74 
Annex  C-9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Switzerland  79 
Annex  C-10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Türkiye  84 
Annex  C-11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine  89 
 
 
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  CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT  
Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Argentina – Import 
Measures  Panel Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods , 
WT/DS438/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS444/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS445/R  and Add.1, 
adopted 26  January  2015, as modified (WT/DS438/R) and upheld (WT/DS444/R 
/ WT/DS445/R) by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/R 
/ WT/DS445/AB/R, DSR 2015:II, p. 783  
Argentina – Import 
Measures  Appellate  Body Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importa tion of 
Goods , WT/DS438/AB/R  / WT/DS444/AB/R  / WT/DS445/AB/R , adopted 
26 January  2015, DSR 2015:II, p. 579  
Argentina – Textiles and 
Apparel  Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, 
Textiles, Apparel and Other Items , WT/DS56/AB/R  and Corr.1, ado pted 
22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003  
Australia – Tobacco Plain 
Packaging  Panel  Report s, Australia – Certain Measures concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Requirements applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging , WT/DS435/R , Add.1 and Suppl.1 (Honduras)  
/ WT/DS441/R , Add.1 and Suppl.1 (Dominican  Republic ) / WT/DS458/R , Add.1 
and Suppl.1 (Cuba) / WT/DS467/R , Add.1 and Suppl.1 (Indonesia) , 
WT/DS458/R  and WT/DS467/R  adopted 27  August  2018, DSR 2018:VIII, p. 
3925, and WT/DS435/R  and WT/DS441/R  adopted 29  June 2020, as upheld by 
Appellate  Body Reports WT/DS435/AB/R / WT/DS441/AB/R, DSR 2018:VIII, p. 
3925 
Australia – Tobacco Plain 
Packaging  Appellate  Body Reports, Australia – Certain Measures concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Requirements applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging , WT/DS435/AB/R  and Add.1 (Honduras) / 
WT/DS441/AB/R  and Add.1 (Dominican  Republic ), adopted 29  June 2020 
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut  Appellate  Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut , 
WT/DS22/AB/R , adopted 20  March  1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167  
Canada – Autos  Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry , 
WT/DS139/R , WT/DS142/R , adopted 19  June 2000, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, DSR 2000:VII, p. 3043  
Canada – Autos  Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry , WT/DS139/AB/R , WT/DS142/AB/R , adopted 19  June 2000, DSR 
2000:VI, p. 2985  
Canada – Periodicals  Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals , 
WT/DS31/AB/R , adopted 30  July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 449  
Canada – Renewable E nergy 
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff 
Program  Appellate  Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed -in Tariff 
Program , WT/DS412/AB/R  / WT/DS426/AB/R , adopted 24  May 2013, DSR 
2013:I, p. 7  
Canada – Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports  Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of Imported Grain , WT/D S276/AB/R , adopted 27  September  2004, 
DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739  
Chile – Price Band System  Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to 
Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS207/R , adopted 23  October  2002, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/D S207AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3127  
Chile – Price Band System  Appellate  Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS207/AB/R , adopted 
23 October  2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473)  
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article  21.5 – Argentina)  Appellate  Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU 
by Argentina , WT/DS207/AB/RW , adopted 22  May 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 513  
China – Auto Parts  Appellate  Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile 
Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R  / WT/DS340/AB/R  / WT/DS342/AB/R , adopted 
12 January  2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3  
China – Rare Earths  Panel  Report s, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybden um, WT/DS431/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R  and Add.1 
/ WT/DS433/R  and Add.1, adopted 29  August  2014, upheld by Appellate  Body 
Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, DSR 2014:IV, 
p. 1127  
China – Raw Materials  Panel  Report s, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials , WT/DS394/R , Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R , Add.1 and Corr.1 / 
WT/DS398/R , Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22  February  2012, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, 
DSR 2012:VII, p. 3501  
Colombia – Ports of Entry  Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry , 
WT/DS366/R  and Corr.1, adopted 20  May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Colombia – Textiles  Appellate  Body Report, Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of 
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear , WT/DS461/AB/R  and Add.1, adopted 
22 June 2016, DSR 2016:III, p. 1131  
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Colombia) / 
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Panama)  Panel  Report , Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, 
Apparel and Footwear – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Colombia  / 
Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and 
Footwear – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Panama , WT/DS461/RW  and 
Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 5  October  2018 
Dominican  Republic  – 
Import and Sale of 
Cigarettes  Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes , WT/DS302/R , adopted 19  May 2005, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS302 /AB/R, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7425  
Dominican  Republic  – 
Safeguard Measures  Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric , WT/DS415/R , WT/DS416/R , 
WT/DS417/R , WT/DS418/R , and Add.1, adopted 22  February  2012, DSR 
2012:XIII, p. 6775  
EC and certain member 
States – Large Civil Aircraft  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities and Certain Member States – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft , WT/DS316/AB/R , adopted 
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p.  7 
EC – Bananas III  Panel Reports, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/R/ECU  (Ecuador)  / WT/DS27/R/GTM , 
WT/DS27/R/HND  (Guatemala and Honduras)  / WT/DS27/R/MEX  (Mexico)  / 
WT/DS27/R/USA  (US), adopted 25  September  1997, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R , DSR 1997:II, p.  695 to DSR 1997:III, p.  1085 
EC – Bananas III  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/AB/R , adopted 25  September  1997, 
DSR 1997:II, p. 591  
EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.5 – Ecuador  II) Panel Report, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the  DSU by 
Ecuador , WT/DS27/RW2/ECU , adopted 11  December  2008, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, DSR 2008:XVIII, p. 7329  
EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.5 – Ecuador II) / 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.5 – US) Appellate  Body Reports, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU 
by Ecuador , WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU , adopted 11  December  2008, and Corr.1 / 
European  Communities  – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by the United  States , 
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA  and Corr.1, adopted 22  December  2008, DSR 
2008:XVIII, p. 7165  
EC – Bed Linen (Article  21.5 
– India)  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton -Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the 
DSU by India , WT/DS141/AB/RW , adopted 24  April 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 965  
EC – Chicken Cuts  Panel  Report s, European  Communities – Customs Classification of F rozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts , WT/DS269/R  (Brazil)  / WT/DS286/R  (Thailand) , 
adopted 27  September  2005, as modified by Appellate  Body Report 
WT/DS269/AB/ R, WT/DS286/AB/R, DSR 2005:XIX , p. 9295 / DSR 2005:XX, 
p. 9721 
EC – Computer Equipment  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment , WT/DS62/AB/R , WT/DS67/AB/R , WT/DS68/AB/R , 
adopted 22  June 1998, DSR 1998:V, p.  1851 
EC – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar (Australia)  Panel  Report , European  Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint 
by Australia , WT/DS265/R , adopted 19  May 2005, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS265 /AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, 
DSR 2005:XIII, p.  6499 
EC – Fasteners (China) 
(Article  21.5 – China)  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Definitive Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse to 
Article  21.5 of the DSU by China , WT/DS397/AB/RW  and Add.1 , adopted 
12 February  2016, DSR 2016:I, p.  7 
EC – Hormones  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones) , WT/DS26/AB/R , WT/DS48/AB/R , adopted 
13 February  1998, DSR 1998:I, p.  135 
EC – IT Products  Panel  Report s, European  Communities and its member States – Tariff 
Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products , WT/DS375/R  / 
WT/DS376/R  / WT/DS377/R , adopted 21  September  2010, DSR 2010:III, 
p. 933 
EC – Poultry  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Certain Poultry Products , WT/DS69/AB/R , adopted 23  July 1998, 
DSR 1998:V, p.  2031 
EC – Seal Products  Panel Reports, European  Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS401/R  and WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Add.1, adopted 18  June 2014, as modified by Appellate Body Reports 
WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R, DSR 2014:II, p.  365 
EC – Seal Products  Appellate  Body Reports, European  Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/AB/R  / 
WT/DS401/AB/R , adopted 18  June 2014, DSR 2014:I, p.  7 
EEC – Import Restrictions  GATT Panel Report, EEC – Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain 
Products from Hong Kong, L/5511 , adopted 12 July 1983, BISD 30S/129  
India – Additional Import 
Duties  Appellate  Body Report, India – Additional and Extra -Additional Duties on 
Imports from the United  States , WT/DS360/AB/R , adopted 17  November  2008, 
DSR 2008:XX, p.  8223 
India – Patents (US)  Appellate  Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products , WT/DS50/AB/R , adopted 16  January  1998, DSR 
1998:I, p.  9 
India – Quantitative 
Restrictions  Panel  Report , India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, 
Textile and Industrial Products , WT/DS90/R , adopted 22  September  1999, 
upheld by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS90 /AB/R, DSR 1999:V, p.  1799 
India – Solar Cells  Panel  Report , India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules , WT/DS456/R  and Add.1, adopted 14  October  2016, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS456/AB/R, DSR 2016:IV, p.  1941 
Indonesia – Autos  Panel  Report , Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry , 
WT/DS54/R , WT/DS55/R , WT/DS59/R , WT/DS64/R , Corr.1 and Corr.2, adopted 
23 July 1998, and Corr.3 and Corr.4, DSR 1998:VI, p.  2201 
Indonesia – Iron or Steel 
Products  Panel  Report , Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products , 
WT/DS490/R , WT/DS496/R , and Add.1, adopted 27  August  2018, as modified  
by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS490/AB/R, WT/DS496/AB/R, DSR 2018:VII, 
p. 3707 
Indonesia – Iron or Steel 
Products  Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel 
Products , WT/DS490/AB/R , WT/DS496/AB/R , and Add.1, adopted 
27 August  2018, DSR 2018:VII, p.  3393 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages 
II Appellate  Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/AB/R , 
WT/DS10/AB/R , WT/DS11/AB/R , adopted 1  November  1996, DSR 1996:I, p.  97 
Peru – Agricultural Products  Panel  Report , Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products , WT/DS457/R  and Add.1, adopted 31  July 2015, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS457/AB/R, DSR 2015:VII, p.  3567 
Peru – Agricultural Products  Appellate  Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products , WT/DS457/AB/R  and Add.1, adopted 31  July 2015, DSR 
2015:VI, p.  3403 
Russia – Pigs (EU)  Panel  Report , Russian  Federation  – Measures on the Importation of Live Pigs, 
Pork and Other Pig Products from the European  Union , WT/DS475/R  and Add.1 , 
adopted 21  March  2017, as modified by Appellate  Body Report 
WT/DS475/AB/R, DSR 2017:II, p.  361 
Russia – Railway Equipment  Panel  Report , Russia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Railway 
Equipment and Parts Thereof , WT/DS499/R  and Add.1, adopted 5  March  2020, 
as modified by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS499/AB/R  
Russia – Tariff Treatment  Panel  Report , Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and 
Manufacturing Products , WT/DS485/R , Add.1, Corr.1, and Corr.2, adopted 
26 September  2016, DSR 2016 :IV, p.  1547 
Russia – Traffic in Transit  Panel  Report , Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit , WT/DS512/R  and 
Add.1, adopted 26  April 2019, DSR 2019:VIII, p. 4301  
Saudi Arabia – IPRs Panel  Report , Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights , WT/DS567/R  and Add.1, circulated to Members on 
16 June 2020, dispute termi nated while appeal pending  
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)  Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes 
from the Philippines , WT/DS371/AB/R , adopted 15  July 2011, DSR 2011:IV, 
p. 2203 
Ukraine – Ammonium 
Nitrate  Appellate  Body Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium 
Nitrate , WT/DS493/AB/R  and Add.1, adopted 30  September  2019, DSR 2019:X, 
p. 5227  
US – 1916 Act  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 , 
WT/DS136/AB/R , WT/DS162/AB/R , adopted 26  September  2000, DSR 2000:X, 
p. 4793 
US – Carbon Steel  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Corrosion -Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany , WT/DS213/AB/R  
and Corr.1, adopted 19  December  2002, DSR 2002:IX, p.  3779 
US – COOL  Appellate  Body Reports, United  States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements , WT/DS384/AB/R  / WT/DS386/AB/R , adopt ed 
23 July 2012, DSR 2012:V, p.  2449 
US – COOL (Article  21.5 – 
Canada and Mexico)  Appellate  Body Reports, United  States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Canada and WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Mexico , WT/DS384/AB/RW  / WT/DS386/AB/RW , adopted 29  May 2015, DSR 
2015:IV, p.  1725 
US – Customs Bond 
Directive  Panel  Report , United  States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject 
to Anti -Dumping/Countervailing Duties , WT/DS345/R , adopted 1  August  2008, 
as modified by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS343/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 
2008:VIII, p.  2925 
US – Gasoline  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R , adopted 20  May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p.  3 
US – Line Pipe  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea , 
WT/DS202/AB/R , adopted 8  March  2002, DSR 2002:IV, p.  1403 
US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment)  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000 , WT/DS217/AB/R , WT/DS234/AB/R , adopted 27  January  2003, DSR 
2003:I, p.  375 
US – Poultry (China)  Panel  Report , United  States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry 
from China , WT/DS392/R , adopted 25  October  2010, DSR 2010:V, p.  1909 
US – Section  301 Tra de Act  Panel  Report , United  States – Sections 301 -310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , 
WT/DS152/R , adopted 27  January  2000, DSR 2000:II, p.  815 
US – Shrimp  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products , WT/DS58/AB/R , adopted 6  November  1998, DSR 
1998:VII, p.  2755 
US – Softwood Lumber IV  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Final Countervailing Duty Determin ation 
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS257/AB/R , 
adopted 17  February  2004, DSR 2004:II, p.  571 
US – Stainless Steel 
(Mexico)  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Final Anti -Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/AB/R , adopted 20  May 2008, DSR 
2008:II, p.  513 
US – Steel Safegua rds Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Certain Steel Products , WT/DS248/AB/R , WT/DS249/AB/R , 
WT/DS251/AB/R , WT/DS252/AB/R , WT/DS253/AB/R , WT/DS254/AB/R , 
WT/DS258/AB/R , WT/DS259/AB/R , adopted 10  December  2003, DSR 2003:VII, 
p. 3117 
US – Upland Cotton  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , 
WT/DS267/AB/R , adopt ed 21  March  2005, DSR 2005:I, p.  3 
 
 WT/DS552/R  
 
- 9 - 
 
  EXHIBITS REFERRED TO IN THIS REPORT  
Panel 
Exhibit  Short title (if 
applicable)  Title 
NOR-1 and 
USA-7 Steel Report  US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of 
Technology Evaluation, The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National 
Security: An Investigation Conducted under Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended  (11 January  2018) 
NOR-2 and 
USA-8 Aluminium 
Report  US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of 
Technology Evaluation, The Effect of Imports of Aluminum  on the National 
Security, An Investigation Conducted under Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended  (17 January  2018)  
NOR-3 and 
USA-10 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9704 Proclamation 9704 of 8  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into 
the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  51 
(15 March  2018), p. 11619  
NOR-4 and 
USA-9 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9705 Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  51 
(15 March  2018), p. 11625  
NOR-6 and 
USA-12 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9710 Proclamation 9710 of 22  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into 
the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  60 
(28 March 2018), p. 13355   
NOR-7 and 
USA-11 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9711 Proclamation 9711 of 22  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  60 
(28 March  2018), p. 13361  
NOR-8 and 
USA-13 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9740 Proclamation 9740 of 30  April 2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  88 
(7 May 2018), p. 20683  
NOR-9 and 
USA-16 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9758 Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into 
the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  108 
(5 June 2018), p. 25849  
NOR-10 and 
USA-15 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9759 Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018, Adjusting I mports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  108 
(5 June 2018), p. 25857  
NOR-11 and 
USA-14 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9739 Proclamation 9739 of 30  April 2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into 
the United  States , United States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  88 
(7 May 2018), p. 20677  
NOR-12 and 
USA-1 Section  232 Trade Expansion Act, Public Law No.  87–794, 76 Stat. 877 (1962), 
United  States  Code, Title II, Section  232 
NOR-20 and 
USA-21 September 
Interim Final 
Rule Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to Submitted Requests 
for Steel and Aluminum, Interim Final Rule, United  States  Federal Register, 
Vol. 83, No.  176 (11 September  2018), p. 46026  
NOR-21 and 
USA-19 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9776 Proclamation  9776 of 29  August  2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into 
the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  171 
(4 September  2018), p. 45019  
NOR-22 and 
USA-18 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9777 Proclamation 9777 of 29  August  2018, Adjusting Im ports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  171 
(4 September  2018), p. 45025  
NOR-23 
(excerpt) 
and USA -84 
(full version)   Statements dated 29  October  2018, 21  November  2018, and 
4 December  2018 of the United  States , WTO Dispute Settlement Body  
NOR-76 and 
USA-20 March Interim 
Final Rule  Requirements for Submissions Requesting Exclusions From the Remedies 
Instituted in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States  and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United  States ; 
and the Filing of Objections to Submitted Exclusion Requests for Steel and 
Aluminum, Interim Final Rule, United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, 
No. 53 (19 March  2018), p. 12106  
NOR-5 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9772 Proclamation 9772 of 10  August  2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  158 
(15 August  2018), p. 40429  
NOR-15  Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United  States  (2019) Revision 2, 
Chapter 99  
NOR-69  United  States  Bound Tariffs  
NOR-125  Oxford English Dictionary, definition of "emergency", 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61130?redirectedFrom=emergency&print 
(accessed 4  February  2020)  
USA-2 Section  232 
regulations  United  States  Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Part 705  
USA-22  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993)  WT/DS552/R  
 
- 10 - 
 
  Panel 
Exhibit  Short title (if 
applicable)  Title 
USA-23  Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II  
USA-72  G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017)  
USA-80  Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 
10 November  2017, G/C/M/130  
USA-81  Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 23 and 
26 March  2018, G/C/M/131  
USA-82  Committee on Safeguards, Communication from the United  States , 
G/SG/168  
USA-83  Statement dated 8  May 2018 of the Deputy US Trade Representative and 
US Permanent Representative to the WTO, WTO General Council  
USA-85  Committee on Market Access, Notification Pursuant to the Decision on 
Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions (G/L/59/Rev.1), 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4  
USA-86  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993)  
USA-93  S. Greenbaum, English Grammar (Oxford University Press, 1996)  
USA-94  R. Flesch and A.H. Lass, The Classic Guide to Better Writing 
(HarperPerennial, 1996)  
USA-95  Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, 
Incorporated, 1995)  
USA-96  S. Benedict (ed.), Harper's English Grammar (Harper & Row, 1966)  
USA-222  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993)  
USA-226  W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and 
Bacon, 1999)  
USA-240  Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström, "Way ahead for the glob al 
steel industry", OECD High -Level Symposium on Steel  
USA-246  Statement of the Chair of the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting (2018)  
USA-247  Charlevoix G7 Summit Communiqué (9  June 2018)   
 
 
  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1.  This dispute concerns additional duties and related measures imposed by the United  States  on 
steel and aluminium products under Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. 
Norway challenges  the consistency of these measures with the United  States ' obligations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ( GATT  1994) and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
1.1  Complaint by Norway  
1.2.  On 12  June 2018, Norway requested consultations with the United  States  pursuant to Articles 
1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gover ning the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), 
Article  XXII:1 of the GATT  1994, and Article  14 of the Agreement on Safeguards with respect to the 
measures and claims set out below.1 
1.3.  Consultations were held on 19  July 2018 between Norway and the United  States . These 
consultations failed to resolve the dispute.2 
1.2  Panel establishment and composition  
1.4.  On 18  October  2018, Norway requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Articles 4.7 
and 6 of the DSU, Article  XXIII:2 of the GATT  1994, and Article  14 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
with standard terms of reference.3 At its meeting on 21  November  2018, the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the request of Norway in document WT/DS 552/10 , in 
accorda nce with Article  6 of the DSU.4 
1.5.  The Panel's terms of reference are the following:  
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by 
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by Norway in document 
WT/DS552/10 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendatio ns or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.5 
1.6.  On 7 January  2019, Norway requested the Director -General to determine the composition of 
the panel, pursuant to Article  8.7 of the DSU . On 25  January  2019, the Director -General accordingly 
composed the Panel as follows:  
Chairperson:  Mr Elbio Rosselli  
Members:   Mr Esteban B. Conejos, Jr  
   Mr Rodrigo Valenzuela  
1.7.  The Kingdom of Bahrain; Brazil; Canada; China; Colombia; Egypt; the European  Union ; 
Guatemala; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; India; Indones ia; Japan; Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Mexico; 
New Zealand ; Qatar; the Russian  Federation ; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Singapore; South  Africa ; 
Switzerland; Chinese  Taipei ; Thailand; Türkiye6; Ukraine; the United Arab Emirates7; and the 
Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela notified their interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as 
third parties.  
 
1 See Request for consultations by Norway, WT/DS552/1.  
2 See Request for the establishment of a panel by Norway, WT/DS552/10 (Norway's panel request).  
3 See Norway's panel request.  
4 See Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 21  November  2018, WT/DSB/M/421, para.  10.4. 
5 See Note by the Secretariat, Constitution of the Panel established at the request of Norway, 
WT/DS552/11.  
6 Member formerly known as Turkey.  
7 On 19  July 2019, the United Arab Emirates notified the DSB and the Panel of its interest in 
participating as a t hird party. (See WT/DS5 52/11/Rev.1 ). 
 WT/DS552/R  
 
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  1.3  Panel proceedings  
1.3.1   General  
1.8.  The Panel held an organizational meeting with the parties on 15  March  2019. 
1.9.  After consultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures8 and Timetable9 
on 5 April 2019. 
1.10.   The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 6 -7 November  2019.10 A session 
with the third parties took place on 18  November  2019. The Panel held a second substantive meeting 
with the parties on 14 and 28  January  2021. On 15  July 2021, the Panel issued the descriptive part 
of its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on 29 June 2022. The 
Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on 16 November  2022. 
1.3.2   Request for the substantive meetings of the Panel to be open to the public  
1.11.   On 5  March  2019, the Panel received a communication from the United  States  inquiring 
whether Norway was willing to open the substantive meetings in the dispute to public obser vation 
and make its submissions to the Panel available to the public.11 In the Panel's organizational meeting 
with the parties, Norway expressed its willingness to make the opening statements available for 
public viewing.12 
1.12.   The Panel transmitted its Workin g Procedures to the parties on 5  April 2019, which provided 
that the Panel "may open its meetings with the parties to the public, subject to appropriate 
procedures to be adopted by the Panel after consulting the parties".13 On 28  May 2019, the Panel 
circul ated draft additional working procedures on open meetings to the parties for comments. Based 
on the comments received from the parties on 14  June 2019 and 21  June 2019, the Panel adopted 
 
8 The Panel's Working Procedures were revised on 19  July 2019 and 20  February  2020. See the Panel's 
Working Procedures, adopted on 5  April 2019, as revised on 19  July 2019 and 20  February  2020, in Annex  A-1. 
9 The Timetable for the Panel proceedings was revised on 19  July 2019, 13  December  2019, and 
20 February  2020.  The Panel subsequently communicated with the parties directly regarding additional dates 
and deadlines in the Panel proceedings .  
10 On 14  October  2019, the Panel informed the parties that the Chairperson of the Panel would  not be 
able to travel to Geneva for the first substantive meeting  due to an accident.  In response to the Panel's 
invitation to provide views on the conduct of the meeting, the Uni ted States  expressed concern that 
participation by videoconference could make the meeting less effective and queried whether the Chairperson 
would be able to participate in person with a modest delay in the timetable.  After consulting the parties, the 
Panel decided  on 22  October  2019 to proceed with the participation of the Chairperson through 
videoconferencing. In its decision, the Panel noted that the prompt settlement of disputes is a key principle 
under Article  3 of the DSU and, under Article  12.2 of th e DSU, panel procedures should provide sufficient 
flexibility so as to ensure high -quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process. The Panel 
also informed the parties that several actions had been taken in order to guarantee an optimal quality of 
communication, including setting up multiple channels of communication between Geneva and Montevideo to 
maintain connectivity.  
11 United  States ' communication dated  5 March  2019.  
12 During the Panel's organizational meeting with the parties, the U nited States  alternatively requested 
the Panel to partially open its substantive meetings to the public given the complainants' views in the other 
disputes in which the same three persons were appointed as panelists (See section 1.3.4 below) . The 
United  States  argued in that context that providing for a partially open hearing would serve to facilitate the 
United  States ' right under Article  18.2 of the DSU to disclose statements of its own position. In its 
communication to the parties dated 5  April 2019, the Panel observed that nothing in the DSU provides that a 
party's right to disclose statements of its own positions to the public must be exercised through th e holding of 
fully or partly open hearings. The Panel noted that there are other ways in which Members can make 
statements of their own position public and that by declining a party's request to hold partially open hearings, 
the Panel would not be deprivin g a Member of its rights under Article  18.2 or under any other provisions of the 
DSU. Having considered the disagreement between the parties on the United  States ' proposal , as well as the 
parties' views on the scope of the obligation to protect confidentia l information in the context of a partially 
open hearing, the Panel exercised its discretion under Article  12.1 of the DSU to deny the United  States ' 
request for partially open meetings.  
13 Working Procedures of the Panel, para.  10. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  the Additional Working Procedures on open meetings on 19  July 2019, applicable to the first 
substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties.14 
1.3.3   Request for enhanced third -party rights  
1.13.   On 7  June 2019, the Panel received a communication from Türkiye  requesting enhanced 
third-party rights (a) to receive copies of all the parties' written submissions, oral statements, 
rebuttals and answers to questions from the Panel and each other, through all stages of the 
proceedings; (b) to be present for the entirety of all substantive meetings of the Panel with the 
parties; and (c) to  review the draft summary of their own arguments in the descriptive part of the 
Panel  Report .15 On 17  June 2019 and 26  June 2019, the Panel invited the parties to comment on 
this request as well as other similar requests received from China16; the European  Union17; 
Switzerland18; the Russian  Federation19; and Hong Kong, China.20 In response, the United  States  
opposed the requests for enhanced rights to third parties21, whereas Norway supported the 
requests.22  
1.14.   Having consulted the parties on th is matter and considering their due process interests, the 
Panel informed the parties and third parties on 19  July 2019 that it had decided to grant certain 
enhanced third -party rights to all third parties. The Panel implemented this decision in paragraph 
30(e) of the Revised Working Procedures of 19  July 2019, granting third parties access to the parties' 
submissions up to and including their responses to the questions posed by the Panel following the 
first substantive meeting, as well as final versions of  the oral statements made by the parties during 
the first substantive meeting. The Panel stated that it would address the requests for enhanced 
third-party rights in respect of further stages of the proceedings in due course.  
1.15.   After consultation with the pa rties, the Panel also granted enhanced third -party rights in 
respect of further stages of the proceedings. On 20  February  2020, the Panel amended its Working 
Procedures to provide third parties access to the parties' second written submissions, final versi ons 
of oral statements made by the parties during the second substantive meeting, their responses to 
the Panel's questions after the second substantive meeting, and comments on those responses.  
1.16.   In the interest of advancing the proceedings during the disru ptions associated with the 
COVID -19 pandemic23 and pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Panel's Working Procedures, the Panel 
sent additional questions to the parties on 26  August  2020. Based on consultations with the parties, 
the Panel decided on 8  September  2020 and 21  September  2020 that the parties' responses to the 
Panel's additional questions and comments on those responses should be made available to third 
parties.  
1.17.   Due to the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on the second substantive meeting24, the Panel 
decided, on 10  November  2020, to modify its decision of 20  February  2020 so that third parties 
would not receive further access to any statements, submissions, or exchanges from the parties, 
including statements made by the parties during the second substant ive meeting, their responses 
to the Panel's questions after the second substantive meeting, or comments on those responses.  
 
14 See the Panel's Additi onal Working Procedures on Open Meeting, adopted on 19  July 2019, in 
Annex  A-2. 
15 Türkiye's communication dated 7  June 2019, para.  11. 
16 China's communication dated 7  June 2019, para.  2. 
17 European  Union 's communication dated 7  June 2019, para.  11. 
18 Switz erland's communication dated 11  June 2019, para.  3. 
19 The Russian  Federation 's communication dated 14  June 2019, p. 3.  
20 Hong Kong, China's communication dated 25  June 2019, p. 1.  
21 United  States ' communications dated 24  June 2019, para.  2; United  States ' communication dated 
1 July 2019, para.  2.  
22 Norway's communication dated 24  June 2019; Norway's communication dated 1  July 2019, para.  8. 
23 See section 1.3.5.2  below.  
24 See section 1.3.5.4  below.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  1.3.4   Relationship with the other disputes where the same three persons act as panelists  
1.18.   At the organizational meeting and at various poi nts in the proceedings, the parties provided 
views regarding the relationship between this dispute and the other cases where the same three 
persons act as panelists.25 
1.19.   Norway considered that these complaints relate to the same matter and Article  9.3 of the  DSU 
was therefore applicable, noting that this was recognized in the Director -General's decision to 
appoint the same panelists to serve on all these panels. Accordingly, Norway argued that these 
proceedings required harmonized timetables and consolidated hearings , which could significantly 
reduce the risk of unnecessary repetition and achieve important efficiencies .26 For Norway, the 
notion of a "harmoni zed" timetable in Article  9.3 of the DSU implies "harmoni zed", or consolidated, 
substantive meetings.27 Norway argued that, in previous practice, single panels were established 
under Article  9.1 of the DSU despite the absence of a complete overlap of the claims raised  and that 
"[t]his logic applies a fortiori  under Article  9.3 of the DSU."28 
1.20.   The United  States  considered that a single panel had not been established in these disputes 
pursuant to Article  9.1 of the DSU, but rather, nine29 separate panels were established by the DSB 
to consider distinct matters. For the United  States , the matters are distinct because the claims and 
measures identified by each complainant are different from the other complainants. For this reason, 
the United  States  submitted that Article  9.3 of the DSU is not applicable and, even if it were, it would 
only be relevant to  the composition of the various panels and the timetables.30 In the context of 
Article  9.3 of the DSU, the United  States  argued that t o "harmonize" the timetables in these 
proceedings would mean to make them consistent or compatible and that harmonization does not 
suggest, much less require, that the Panel collapse the proceedings into a single, identical process. 
For the United  States , the disparate sets of claims and measures identified by the complainants are 
important to considerations of both efficienc y and procedural fairness.31 
1.21.   The Panel notes that, at its meeting on 21  November  2018, the DSB  established a panel 
pursuant to the request of Norway in document WT/DS552/10, in accordance with Article  6 of the 
DSU.32 While the same three persons that act as panelists in this dispute were also appointed as 
panelists in other related cases33, these proceedings are not substantively identical in all respects, 
for instance, in terms of the precise measures and claims at issue. The Panel was also mindful of 
the logistical complexities of coordinating multiple formally distinct disputes and, before  adopting its 
Timetable and Working Procedures, consulted the parties on multiple possible alternatives for the 
conduct and configuration of the proceedings.34 
 
25 The other disputes where  the same three persons are acting as panelists  include DS544 (China), 
DS547 (India), DS554 (the Ru ssian Federation ), DS556 (Switzerland), and DS564 (Türkiye). Mutually agreed 
solutions were notified in DS550 (Canada) and DS551 (Mexico), where the same three persons were appointed 
as panelists. See United  States  – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products (Canada) , Notification of 
a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS550/13, 27  May 2019 and United  States  – Certain Measures on Steel and 
Aluminium Products ( Mexico ), Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT /DS551/13, 3  June 2019. On 
17 January  2022, the United  States  and the European  Union  jointly notified  the DSB that they were terminating 
the dispute  in DS548 (European  Union ), where the same three persons were appointed as panelists. 
(WT/DS548/20 ). On 20  January  2022, that panel notified the DSB that it  was in receipt of a communication 
from the European  Union  notifying the withdrawal of its complaint, and accordingly, had ceased all work in 
those proceedings. ( WT/DS548/2 1). 
26 Norway's communication dated 2 2 February  2019.  
27 Norway's  communication dated  1 March  2019. 
28 Norway's  communication dated 1  March  2019.  
29 The Panel recalls that the disputes in DS548 (European  Union ), DS550 (Canada) and DS551 (Mexico) 
were active at the time of the Panel's organizational meeting and related consultations with the parties.  
30 United  States ' communication dated 22  February  2019.  
31 United  States ' communication dated 1  March  2019.  
32 Note by the Secretariat, Constitution of the Panel established at the request of  Norway, 
WT/DS552/11.  
33 DS544 (China), DS547 (India), DS554 (the Russian  Federation ), DS556 (Switzerland), and DS564 
(Türkiye).  
34 Panel communication to the parties dated 7  March  2019. During the Panel's organization al meeting 
and related consultations with the parties, the Panel specifically sought the parties' views on the optimal 
scheduling and configuration of the substantive meetings  in the disputes where the same three persons were 
appointed as panelists , particularly addressing three possible config urations for the substantive meetings: ( a) 
 WT/DS552/R  
 
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  1.22.   The Panel, nonetheless, made arrangements at each stage of the proceedings to maintain 
harmonize d timetables to the greatest extent possible in both the deadlines for written submissions 
and the dates for meetings across all disputes in which the same three persons act as panelists. In 
doing so, the Panel endeavoured to balance the efficient conduct of proceedings with the due process 
rights of the parties, taking into account the agreement of the parties, or lack thereof, on the 
different proposals on how to organize the proceedings. As elaborated in the next section,  the 
harmonization of timetables was, in some instances, affected by the divergent views of the 
complainants across the different disputes.35  
1.3.5   Impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on the Panel proceedings  
1.3.5.1   Filing of written submissions  
1.23.   On 17  March  2020, in response to the COVID -19 outbreak, the  Panel suspended the 
requirement to deliver paper copies of a document or submission to the other parties or the 
DS Registry until further notice. The Panel decided that receipt of the electronic version would be 
deemed to be full service for the purposes of the Working Procedures. After briefly reverting to 
service of hard copies of documents on 22  July 2020, the Panel informed the parties that as of 
28 October 2020, e -filing would be deemed full service again until further notice.36 
1.3.5.2   Scheduling of the seco nd substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties  
1.24.   According to the revised Timetable adopted on 20  February  2020 after consultation with the 
parties37, the Panel's second meeting with the parties was scheduled for 7 -8 July 2020.  
1.25.   On 27  May 2020, the Pa nel invited the parties to provide information on the travel restrictions 
that might impact the overall likelihood of holding the second meeting in person in July 2020. In 
addition, the Panel consulted the parties on possible alternative arrangements to me etings in person, 
including (a) holding the second substantive meeting through virtual participation in July 2020; (b) 
postponement of the meeting to a later date with a possibility for an exchange of written questions 
and responses in the interim; (c) ado ption of written procedures as a substitute for the second 
substantive meeting; or (d) any other possible arrangement, should it not be possible to hold the 
meeting in  person  in July 2020. The Panel further requested comments on the possibility of holding 
meetings open to the public given inter alia  the restrictions on social gatherings in force in 
Switzerland.  
1.26.   In response to the Panel's communication, both parties indicated their inability to travel to 
Geneva for the second substantive meeting in July 2020 .38 For Norway, both postponing the meeting 
to a later date and the adoption of written procedures as a substitute for the second substantive 
meeting were acceptable alternatives.39 The United  States  opposed holding the meeting in a virtual 
format, citing consequent limitations on interactions between the parties and the Panel, within  the 
parties' respective delegations, among the three panelists, and between the panelists and the 
Secretariat.40 The United  States  also opposed web -casting the meeting owing t o concerns of security 
and protection against manipulation of such webcasts.41 The United  States  further disagreed with 
 
combined substantive meetings with the parties in this dispute and the other eight disputes; ( b) a "two -stage" 
approach proposed by the United  States  with a first stage devoted solely to the United  States ' argumen ts 
under Article  XXI of the GATT  1994; and ( c) separate meetings for each of the disputes in which the same 
panelists  had been appointed.  
35 See section 1.3.5.4  below . 
36 Panel communication to the parties  dated 27  October  2020.  
37 Following its first substantive meeting with the parties, the Panel consulted the parties on various 
options for schedulin g the second substantive meeting between 22  June-31 July 2020 or 14  September -
16 October  2020, as well as an expedited timetable under which the second substantive meeting with the 
parties would be held in May 2020. While Norway favoured the earlier schedu ling of the meeting, the 
United  States  requested that the meeting be scheduled between 14  September  2020 and 16 October  2020, 
citing conflicting summer holiday schedules, US federal holidays, and the need for sufficient time to adequately 
prepare for the second substantive meeting. Based on these consultations, the Panel scheduled its second 
meeting with the parties on 7 and 8  July 2020.  
38 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, paras.  2-3; Norway's  communication  dated 
2 June 2020.  
39 Norway's communication dated 2  June 2020.  
40 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, paras.  9-10. 
41 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, para.  17. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Norway's suggestion that a written exchange could serve as an alternative to a second substantive 
meeting with contemporaneous oral exch ange.42 On this basis, the United  States  requested that the 
Panel reschedule the second substantive meeting for a later date.43 After reviewing the parties' 
comments, the Panel in its communication dated 12  June 2020 decided to postpone the meeting, 
indicating that it tentatively intended to schedule the meeting between 10  September  and 
20 October 2020.  
1.27.   Through multiple communications sent to the parties on 22  July 2020, 31 July 2020, 
26 August  2020, 21 September  2020, 13 October  2020, and 23  October  2020, the Panel regularly 
consulted the parties on the feasibility of in -person meetings in 2020 and possible alternative 
arrangements. Both parties identified numerous potential obstacles to holding in -person meetings 
in 2020, including evolving travel and quarantine restrictions due to the pandemic, and maintained 
their divergent views on alternative arrangements as a substitute for in -person meetings.44 In 
addition, Norway expressed that, in light of the pandemic and pro longed travel restrictions, it was 
willing to discuss alternative options, including the possibility of the second substantive meeting 
being conducted as a virtual hearing .45 
1.28.   After it became apparent that no in -person meeting would be possible in the fores eeable 
future due to the COVID -19 pandemic, the Panel issued a decision on 10  November  2020 on the 
way forward in the proceedings. The Panel began by noting the various restrictions imposed on 
gatherings and international travel in relation to the COVID -19 pandemic, including those instituted 
by Switzerland in November 2020, and that under these circumstances, holding the second 
substantive meeting in the manner originally envisaged in the Timetable was not feasible. The Panel 
indicated its consistent effor ts over the course of the dispute to maintain a balance between the 
efficient conduct of proceedings, the parties' due process rights, and the particular preferences 
expressed by each party, including the complainant's request to keep the timetables harmon ized 
across the disputes in which the same three persons act as panelists. Based on the parties' comments 
and in the interest of continuing to advance the Panel's work, the Panel decided to proceed by holding 
the second substantive meeting virtually. The P anel further indicated its intention to hold the second 
substantive meeting in closed session given inter alia the limited access to the WTO building and the 
logistical demands of holding virtual substantive meetings.  
1.3.5.3   Use of a virtual meeting platform for the second substantive meeting of the Panel 
with the parties  
1.29.   In its decision of 10  November  2020, the Panel noted its intention to conduct the second 
meeting through the Cisco Webex platform  and circulated draft additional working procedures 
requiring, among other things, that all remote participants follow the security rules contained in 
these additional working procedures as well as any additional security guidance that may be provided 
by the host.  The Panel also proposed to arrange advance testing sessions with the parties to ensure 
their remote participation and invit ed comments from the parties  on the draft additional working 
procedures .  
1.30.   In its comments on the draft additional working procedures, the United  States  requested that 
the Panel  (a) provide all questions to the parties at least two weeks in advance; (b) refrain from 
asking additional or follow -up questions during the session; and (c) prohibit parties from 
commenting on each other's responses to the Panel's questions during the se ssion. The 
United  States  reasoned that health concerns prevented its delegation from gathering in  person  to 
coordinate responses. The United  States  further cited technical considerations – "including the 
inability of USTR employees to participate in a meeting via Webex from telework locations" – in 
support of its request. Finally, the United  States  requested that the Panel enable the Webex dial -in 
 
42 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, para.  15; United  States ' communication dated 
5 June 2020, para.  3. 
43 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, para.  11; United  States ' communication dated 
5 June 2020, para.  1. 
44 Norway's communication dated 2 7 July 2020;  United  States ' communication dated 28  July 2020; 
Norway's communication dated 9  September  2020; United  States ' communication  dated 9  September  2020; 
Norway's communication dated 20  October  2020; United  States ' communication dated 20  October  2020; 
Norway's communication dated 4  November  2020; and United  States ' communication  dated 4  November  2020.  
45 Norway's communication dated 20  October  2020.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  feature to allow individuals from its delegation to connect by phone and reflect this adjustment in 
the proposed additional working procedures.46 
1.31.    Taking note of the parties' comments, the Panel declined the United  States ' request to (a) 
refrain from asking additional or follow -up questions during the session, and (b) prohibit parties 
from commenting on each other's responses to the Panel's questions during the session. The Panel 
observed that it had decided to divide the second substantive meeting into two f our-hour sessions 
with two weeks between the sessions. The Panel found that this arrangement would allow each party 
the time to confer within its delegation and respond to possible questions from the Panel or the other 
party throughout the course of the me eting. The Panel also noted that the parties would have the 
opportunity to provide further comments in writing in response to questions after the meeting.47  
1.32.   In the Additional Working Procedures for virtual meetings, the Panel indicated that the 
meeting wo uld be held in closed session, with remote access limited to registered participants. 
Accordingly, for security and confidentiality reasons, the Panel decided not to enable the dial -in 
feature on Webex.  
1.3.5.4   Impact on coordination with the other disputes where  the same three persons act 
as panelists  
1.33.   As discussed in section 1.3.4of this Report, the Panel made several arrangements at each 
stage of the proceedings to mainta in harmonized timetables in all disputes where the same three 
persons are acting as panelists. However, in its communications of 13  October  2020 and 23  October 
2020, the Panel noted that the complainants across the se disputes presented diverging views on t he 
way forward for the second substantive meeting in light of the COVID -19 pandemic. The Panel 
indicated to the parties that this divergence was difficult to reconcile with Norway's initial request to 
maintain harmonized timetables in all disputes. Accordi ngly, the Panel sought the parties' views on 
the feasibility of maintaining such harmonization going forward. The Panel also invited the parties' 
comments on the implications of the differences among the complainants in these disputes on 
enhanced third -party rights, and in particular on access to written submissions and responses to 
Panel questions, if the Panel determined that it was not viable to maintain harmonized timetables.  
1.34.   Norway requested that the timetables in the disputes where the same three pers ons act as 
panelists should be harmonized to the greatest extent possible.48 Norway further indicated that 
should this not be viable, it was willing to discuss appropriate alternative modalities with respect to 
due process concerns as well as third -party rights.49 
1.35.   The United  States  objected to proceeding differently across the disputes in which the same 
three persons serve as panelists, arguing that doing so would provide a strategic benefit to the 
complainants to the disadvantage of the United  States .50 Moreover, the United  States  observed that 
should the Panel move forward with different formats and different timetables across these disputes, 
the United  States  would no longer agree to open any of the proceedings to public viewing.51 The 
United  States  reaso ned that complainants participating in later meetings would have an opportunity 
to view the earlier open meetings and adjust their statements and arguments accordingly.52 For 
similar reasons, the United  States  also requested that the Panel rescind its deci sion on enhanced 
third-party rights in the event it acceded to the complainants' diverging requests, arguing that such 
enhanced rights would serve to unfairly advantage those third parties that are also parties in their 
own disputes.53  
1.36.   The Panel provided its decision on the second substantive meeting to the parties on 
10 November 2020, where it noted that Article  9.3 of the DSU provides for harmonizing timetables 
to the "greatest extent possible". The Panel observed that the compatibility of positions take n by 
parties across disputes, or lack thereof, was a significant factor in assessing the possibility of 
 
46 United  States ' communication dated 16  November  2020.  
47 Panel communication to the parties dated 1  December  2020.  
48 Norway's communication dated 20  October  2020.  
49 Norway's communication dated 4  November  2020.  
50 United  States ' communication dated 20  October  2020, para.  6. 
51 United  States ' communication dated 4  November  2020, para.  5. 
52 United  States ' communication dat ed 20  October  2020, para.  5. 
53 United  States ' communication dated 4  November  2020, para.  3. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  harmonizing timetables. In particular, the Panel considered that the harmonization of timetables 
would not compel the adoption of alternative meeting pr ocedures by virtual means even in those 
disputes where both the complainant and the respondent had expressed a preference to wait until 
in-person meetings were possible. In this light, the Panel concluded that if the divergent positions 
of the parties acro ss the disputes resulted in certain meetings being held at a later date, it would no 
longer be possible to harmonize the timetables across the disputes. The Panel further noted that if 
the timetables across the disputes were not harmonized, the rights of t hird parties for subsequent 
stages in the disputes would be as provided for in Article  10 of the DSU, and the Panel would not 
grant third parties further access to any statements, submissions, or exchanges from the parties in 
each dispute.  
1.37.   Based on the fo regoing, the Panel scheduled its second substantive meeting with the parties 
in this dispute for 14 and 28  January  2021. Rights of third parties for subsequent stages in the 
disputes were limited to those provided in Article  10 of the DSU.  
2  FACTUAL ASPECTS  
2.1  Section  232 and the United  States  Department of Commerce reports on steel and 
aluminium  
2.1.  This section provides the legislative and regulatory background of the measures at issue in this 
dispute and, in particular, of:  
a. Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended ( United  States  Code, Title 
19, Section  1862) (Section  232)54 and its  implementing regulation, United  States  Code of 
Federal Regulation s, Title 15, Part 70555; 
b. "The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted Under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended", United  States  Department 
of Commerce  Report , 11 January  2018 (Steel Report)56; and  
c. "The Effects of Impor ts of Aluminum on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted 
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended", United  States  
Department of Commerce  Report, 17  January  2018 (Aluminium Report ).57 
2.1.1   Section  232  
2.2.  Pursuant to Section  232, upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon 
application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the United  States  (US) Secretary of 
Commerce shall immediately initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the 
national security of imports of the article which is the subject of such request, application, or 
motion.58 The US Secretary of Commerce shall also immediately provide notice to the US Secretary 
of Defense of any such investigation, and shall consult with the  Secretary of Defense regarding the 
methodological and policy questions raised in such investigation.59 
2.3.  Section  232 further provides that no later than 270 days after an investigation is initiated with 
respect to any article, the US Secretary of Commerce s hall submit to the US President a report on 
the findings of the investigation with respect to the effect of the importation of such article in such 
quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security . Section  232 directs the 
US Secretary of C ommerce to make recommendations for action or inaction  based on such findings. 
If the US Secretary of Commerce finds that such article is being imported into the United  States  in 
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the nati onal security, the 
Secretary shall so advise the US President in such report.60 
 
54 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1). 
55 Section  232 regulations, ( Exhibit USA-2). 
56 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7). 
57 Aluminium Report, ( Exhibit NOR -2 and USA-8). 
58 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1), § 1862(b)(1)(A).  
59 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1), §§ 1862(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)(A).  
60 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1), § 1862(b)(3)(A) . WT/DS552/R  
 
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  2.4.  Within 90 days of receiving such report, the US President shall: (a) determine whether the 
President concurs with the finding of the Secretary; and (b) if the President concurs , determine the 
nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust 
imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair national 
security.61 If the US President determine s to take action to adjust imports of the article and its 
derivatives, the US President shall implement such action within 15 days.62 Further, the action taken 
by the US President may be the negotiation of an agreement which limits or restricts importation  
into, or exportation to, the United  States  of the article that threatens to impair US national security, 
or such other actions as the US President deems necessary to adjust the imports of the article so 
that the imports will not threaten to impair US nati onal security.63 
2.5.  Section  232 also sets out factors that should be analysed  when conducting an investigation to 
determine the effects of imports of a product  on the national security. In particular, it provides that 
the US Secretary of Commerce and the US P resident shall, in light of the requirements of national 
security and without excluding other relevant factors, give consideration to:   
a. domestic production needed for projected national defen ce requirements;  
b. the capacity of domestic industries to meet such  requirements;  
c. existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, products, raw materials, 
and other supplies and services essential to the national defen ce; 
d. the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services includin g the 
investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth; and  
e. the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as 
those affect such industries and the capacity of the United  States  to meet nati onal security 
requirements.64  
2.6.  In addition to these factors, Section  232 provides that in the administration of this section, the 
US Secretary of Commerce and the US President shall further recognize the close relation of the 
economic welfare of the United  States  to its national security, and shall take into consideration:  
a. the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic 
industries; and  
b. any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or 
investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic 
products by excessive imports.65 
2.7.  Additional regulations in the United  States  Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Part 705  set 
out the procedures according to which the  US Department of Commerce  shall commence and 
conduct its investigation to determine the effect on the national security of the imports of any article, 
as well as  issue the report and recommendation to the President of the United  States  for action or 
inaction regarding an adjustment of the imports of the article(s) in question.66 
2.1.2   The Steel Report  
2.8.  The Steel Report of 11  January  2018 summarizes the findings of an inv estigation conducted by 
the US Department of Commerce pursuant to Section  232 into the effect of imports of steel mill 
products on the national security of the United  States .67 
 
61 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA-1), § 1862(c)(1)(A).   
62 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1), § 1862(c)(1)(B).  
63 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1), § 1862(c)(3)(A).  
64 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1), § 1862(d).  
65 Section  232, (Exhibit NOR -12 and USA -1), § 1862(d).  
66 Section  232 regulations,  (Exhibit USA -2), §§ 705.1 -705.12.  
67 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7). WT/DS552/R  
 
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  2.1.2.1   Initiation and investigation process  
2.9.  On 19  April 2017, the US Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the 
effect of imported steel on national security under Section  232. The US Department of Commerce 
notified the US Department of Defense of the investigation in  a letter dated 19  April 2017.68 On 
20 April 2017, the US President  signed a Presidential Memorandum directing the US Secretary of 
Commerce to proceed expeditiously in conducting his investigation and submit a report on his 
findings to the President.69 On 21  April 2017, the US Department o f Commerce published in the 
Federal Register a notice about the initiation of the investigation. The notice also announced the 
opening of the public comment period as well as a public hearing to be held on 24  May 2017.70 
The US Department of Commerce held a public hearing to elicit further information concerning the 
investigation in Washington, D.C., on 24  May 2017.71 
2.10.   In addition to the notification provided by its 19  April 2017 letter to the US Department of 
Defense, the US Department of Commerce carried o ut consultations with the US Department of 
Defense regarding methodological and policy questions that arose during the investigation. 
According to the Steel Report, discussions were held with the US Army Materiel Command, the 
Defense Logistics Agency, the US Navy/Naval Air Systems Command, and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisitions & Logistics, Manufacturing , and Industrial Base Policy. Discussions were 
also held with "appropriate officers of the United States", including the US Department of State , 
Department of the Treasury, Department of the Interior/US Geological Survey, the Department of 
Homeland Security/US Customs and Border Protection, the International Trade Commission, and the 
Office of the United  States  Trade Representative.72 
2.1.2.2   Product sco pe 
2.11.   The Steel Report describes  its product coverage as steel mill products which are defined at 
the Harmonized System 6 -digit level as: 720610 through 721650, 721699 through 730110, 730210, 
730240 through 730290, and 730410 through 730690, including any sub sequent revisions to these 
HS codes.73 Generally, these products fall into five categories:  
a. Carbon and Alloy Flat Products (Flat Products): Steel products produced by rolling semi -
finished  steel through varying sets of rolls. This category includes sheets,  strips, and 
plates.74 
b. Carbon and Alloy Long Products (Long Products): Steel products that fall outside the flat 
products category. This category includes bars, rails, rods, and beams.75 
c. Carbon and Alloy Pipe and Tube Products (Pipe and Tube Products): Either seamless or 
welded pipe and tube products. Some of these products may include stainless as well as 
alloys other than stainless.76 
 
68 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 18.  
69 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 18.  
70 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA-7), p. 18.  
71 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 18.  
72 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), pp. 19 -20. 
73 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 21.  
74 Flat products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 720810, 720825, 720826, 720827, 
720836, 720837, 720838, 720839, 720840, 720851, 720852, 720853, 720854, 720890, 720915, 720916, 
720917, 720918, 720925, 720926, 720927, 720928, 720990, 721011,  721012, 721020, 721030, 721041, 
721049, 721050, 721061, 721069, 721070, 721090, 721113, 721114, 721119, 721123, 721129, 721190, 
721210, 721220, 721230, 721240, 721250, 721260, 722511, 722519, 722530, 722540, 722550, 722591, 
722592, 722599, 722611, 722619,  722691, 722692, 722693, 722694, 722699. ( Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 
and USA -7), p. 21).  
75 Long products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 721310, 721320, 721391, 721399, 
721410, 721420, 721430, 721491, 721499, 721510, 721550,721590, 7216 10, 721621, 721622, 721631, 
721632, 721633, 721640, 721650, 721699, 721710, 721720, 721730, 721790, 722520, 722620,722710, 
722720, 722790, 722810, 722820, 722830, 722840, 722850, 722860, 722870, 722880, 722910,722920, 
722990, 730110, 730210, 730240, 730290 . (Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), pp. 21 -22). 
76 Pipe and Tube products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 730410, 730419, 730421, 
730423, 730429, 730431, 730439, 730451, 730459, 730490, 730511, 730512, 730519, 730520, 730531, 
 WT/DS552/R  
 
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  d. Carbon and Alloy Semi -finished Products (Semi -finished Products): The initial, 
intermediate solid forms of m olten steel, to be re -heated and further forged, rolled, 
shaped, or otherwise worked into finished steel products. This category includes blooms, 
billets, slabs, ingots, and steel for castings.77 
e. Stainless Products: Steel products, in flat-rolled, long, pipe and tube, and semi -finished 
forms, containing at minimum 10.5% chromium and, by weight, 1.2% or less of carbon, 
offering better corrosion resistance than other steel.78 
2.1.2.3   Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  
2.12.   The Steel Report refers to the nonexclusive lists of factors in Section  232 and its implementing 
regulations that the US Department of Commerce must consider in evaluating the effect of imports 
on the national security.79 The Steel Report further refers to a determination by the US Department 
of Commerce in 2001 that (a) national defen ce includes both defen ce of the United  States  directly 
and its ability to project military capabilities globally, and (b) the term "national security" can be 
interpreted more b roadly to include the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond 
those necessary to satisfy national defen ce requirements that are critical to the minimum operations 
of the economy and government.80 
2.13.   In the Steel Report, the US Secretary of Commerce determined that the displacement of 
domestic steel by excessive imports and the consequent adverse impact of those quantities of steel 
imports on the economic welfare of the domestic steel industry, along with the circumstance of 
global excess cap acity in steel, were "weakening our internal economy" and therefore "threaten to 
impair" US national security as defined in Section  232.81 According to the Steel Report, the continued 
rising levels of imports of foreign steel threaten to impair the nationa l security by placing the US 
steel industry at substantial risk of displacing the basic oxygen furnace and other steelmaking 
capacity, and the related supply chain needed to produce steel for critical infrastructure and national 
defen ce.82 The Steel Report  refers to global excess steel capacity as a circumstance that contributes 
to the "weakening of [the US] internal economy" that "threaten[s] to impair" US national security 
as defined in Section  232.83  
2.14.   In arriving at this general conclusion, the Steel Rep ort relied on four main overarching 
findings, which in turn, comprise several  intermediate findings:  
a. Steel is important to US national security because84: (i) steel is needed for national 
defen ce requirements85; (ii) steel is required for US critical infrastructure86; (iii) domestic 
steel production is essential for national security87; (iv) domestic steel production depends 
 
73053 9, 730590, 730610, 730619, 730620, 730629, 730630, 730650, 730660, 730661, 730669, 730690. 
(Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 22).  
77 Semi-finished products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 720610, 720690, 720711, 
720712, 720719, 720720, 722410, 722490. ( Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 22).  
78 Stainless steel products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 721810, 721891, 721899, 
721911, 721912, 721913, 721914, 721921, 721922, 721923, 721924, 721931, 721932, 7 21933, 721934, 
721935, 721990, 722011, 722012, 722020, 722090, 722100, 7222 11, 722219, 722220, 722230, 722240, 
722300, 730411, 730422, 730424, 730441, 730449, 730611, 730621, 730640. ( Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 
and USA -7), p. 22) . 
79 Steel Report, (Exhibi t NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 13.  
80 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 13 (referring to Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Export Administration: The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi -Finished  Steel on the National Security, 
October 2001) . The Steel Report further clarifies that it uses the more recent 16 critical infrastructure sectors 
identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 instead of the 28  critical industry sectors used by the Bureau of 
Export Administration in the 2001 Report. (Ibid. p. 14). 
81 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 55.  
82 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 55.  
83 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 55.  
84 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 23.  
85 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 23.  
86 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), pp. 23 -24. 
87 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), pp. 24 -25. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  on a healthy and competitive US industry88; and (v)  steel is consumed in critical 
industries .89 
b. Imports in such quantiti es as are presently found adversely impact the economic welfare 
of the US steel industry due to90: (i) continued increase  in imports of steel products91; 
(ii) high import penetration92; (iii)  high import to export ratio93; (iv)  prevailing steel 
prices94; (v) steel mill closures95; (vi) declining employment trend since 199896; (vii) trade 
actions such as anti -dumping  and countervailing duties97; (viii) loss of domestic 
opportunities to bidders using imported steel98; (ix) financial distress99; and (x) limited 
capital expenditures arising from falling revenue and reduce d profits.100 
c. Displacement of domestic steel by excessive quantities of imports has the serious effect 
of weakening the US internal economy because101: (i) domestic steel production capacity 
is stagnant and concentrated102; (ii) production is well below demand103; (iii)  utilization 
rates are well below economically viable levels104; and (iv)  declining steel production 
facilities limits capacity available for a national emergen cy.105  
d. Global excess steel capacity is a circumstance that contributes to the weakening of the 
domestic economy because106: (i) free markets globally are adversely affected by 
substantial chronic global excess steel production led by China107; and (ii)  increasing global 
excess steel capacity will further weaken the internal economy as US steel producers will 
face increasing import competition.108 
2.15.   In the  Steel Report , the US Secretary of Commerce  recommends, due to the threat of steel 
imports to US national sec urity, that the US President take immediate action by adjusting the level 
of imports through quotas or tariffs on steel imported into the United  States , as well as direct 
additional actions to keep the US steel industry financially viable and able to meet US national 
security needs. The Steel Report states that the quota or tariff imposed should be sufficient, after 
accounting for any exclusions, to enable the US steel producers to be able to operate at about 80% 
or better of the industry's capacity utiliza tion rate based on available capacity in 2017.109 
2.16.   In particular, the Steel Report recommends the following two alternative courses of action:  
a. Global quota or tariff: The Steel Report recommends that this should be done by 
(i) imposing  a quota of 63% of the 2017 import level on all imported steel products, 
applied on a country and steel product basis ; or (ii) applying  a 24% tariff on all imported 
steel products, in addition to any anti -dumping  or countervailing duty collections applicable 
to any imported steel product.110 
 
88 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 25.  
89 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 25.  
90 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 27.  
91 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 27.  
92 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 29.  
93 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 30.  
94 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), pp. 31 -32. 
95 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 33. 
96 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 35.  
97 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 36.  
98 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 36.  
99 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 37.  
100 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 40.  
101 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 41.  
102 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 41.  
103 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 46.  
104 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 47.  
105 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 49.  
106 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 51.  
107 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 51.  
108 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 53.  
109 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 58.  
110 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), pp. 59 -60. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  b. Tariff on a subset of countries: The Steel Report alternatively recommends applying  a 53% 
tariff on all imported steel products from Brazil, the Republic of Korea , the 
Russian  Federation , Türkiye , India, Viet  Nam, China, Thailand, South  Africa , Egypt, 
Malaysia, and Costa Rica, in addition to any anti -dumping  or countervailing duty collections 
applicable to any steel products from th ese countries. All other countries would be lim ited 
to 100% of their 2017 import level.111 
2.17.   The Steel Report further states that, in selecting an alternative, the US President could 
determine that specific countries should be exempted from the proposed 63% quota or 24% tariff 
by granting those specific c ountries 100% of their prior imports in 2017, based on an overriding 
economic or security interest of the United  States .112 The Steel Report also recommends an appeal 
process by which affected US parties could seek an exclusion from the tariff or quota impo sed and 
notes that  the US Secretary of Commerce would grant such exclusions based on demonstrating (a) 
lack of sufficient US production capacity of comparable products or (b) specific national security 
based considerations.113 
2.1.3   The Aluminium Report  
2.18.   The Alumi nium Report  of 17  January  2018 summarizes the findings of an investigation 
conducted by the US Department of Commerce pursuant to Section  232 into the effect of imports of 
alumin ium products on the national security of the United  States .114 
2.1.3.1   Initiation and investigation process  
2.19.   On 26 April 2017, the US Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the 
effect of imported aluminium  on national security under Section  232.115 The US Department of 
Commerce notified the US Department of Defense  of the investigation  in a letter dated 
26 April 2017.116 On 27  April 2017, the US President signed a Presidential Memorandum directing 
the US Secretary of Commerce to proceed expeditiously  in conducting his investigation and submit 
a report on his findings to the President.117 On 3 May 2017, the US Department of Commerce invited 
interested parties to submit written comments, opinions, data, information, or advice.118 The US 
Department of Comm erce held a public hearing to elicit further information concerning this 
investigation in Washington, D.C. , on 22  June 2017.119 
2.20.   In addition to the notification to the US Department of Defense  on 26  April 2017, the US 
Department of Commerce consulted with th e US Department of Defense regarding methodological 
and policy questions that arose  during the investigation  and also consulted with other agencies of 
the US Government with expertise and information regarding the aluminium industry, including the 
US Geolo gical Survey of the Department of the Interior and the US International Trade 
Commission.120 
2.1.3.2   Product scope  
2.21.   The Aluminium Report  sets out its product scope in the following table:  
 
111 Steel R eport, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 60.  
112 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 60.  
113 Steel Report, (Exhibit NOR -1 and USA -7), p. 61.  
114 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8). 
115 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 18.  
116 Aluminium Re port, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 18.  
117 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 18.  
118 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 19.  
119 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 19.  
120 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 19. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Table  1: Harmonized Tariff Schedule for Aluminum Products121 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule for Aluminum Products  
HTS Code  Description  
7601 Unwrought aluminum  
7604 Aluminum bars, rods and profiles  
7605 Aluminum wire  
7606 Aluminum  plates, sheets, and strip, of a thickness exceeding 0.2  mm* 
7607 Aluminum  foil (whether or not printed, or backed with paper, 
paperboard, plastics or similar backing materials) of a thickness 
(excluding any backing) not exceeding 0.2  mm 
7608 Aluminum tubes and pipes  
7609 Aluminum tube and pipe fittings  
7616.99.51.60  Other articles of aluminum: castings  
7616.99.51.70  Other articles of aluminum: forgings  
*Note: This category includes can sheet for aluminum can packaging  
 
2.1.3.3   Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  
2.22.   The Aluminium Report  refers to the  nonexclusive lists of factors  in Section  232 and its 
implementing regulations  that the US Secretary of Commerce  must consider in evaluating the effect 
of imports on national security.122 The Aluminium Report  further refers to a determination by the 
US Department of Commerce in 2001 that (a) national defen ce includes both defen ce of the 
United  States  directly and its ability to project military capabilities globally, and (b) the term 
"national security" can be  interpreted more broadly to include the general security and welfare of 
certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defen ce requirements that are critical 
to the minimum operations of the economy and government .123 
2.23.   In the Aluminium Repor t, the US Secretary of Commerce determined  that the present 
quantities and circumstance of aluminium  imports were "weakening our internal economy" and 
"threaten to impair the national security as defined in Section  232".124 According to the Aluminium 
Report , the continued rise in levels of imports of foreign aluminium  threatens to impair US national 
security by placing the US aluminium  industry at substantial risk of losing the capacity to produce 
aluminium  and aluminium  products needed to support critical i nfrastructure and national defen ce.125 
The Aluminium Report  refers to excess production and capacity in China as a major factor 
contributing to the decline in US domestic aluminium  production and loss of domestic production 
capacity.126  
2.24.   In arriving at this general conclusion , the Aluminium Report  relies on findings  including : 
a. Aluminium  is essential to US national security because127: (i) aluminium  is required for US 
national defen ce128; and (ii)  aluminium  is required for US critical infrastructure .129 
 
121 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 20. 
122 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 12.  
123 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), pp. 12-13 (referring to Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Export Administration: The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi -Finished Steel on the National 
Security, October 2001) . The Aluminium Report  further clarifies that while it uses these interpretations of 
"national defense" and "national security", it refers to the more recent 16 critical inf rastructure sectors 
identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 instead of the 28 critical industry sectors used by the Bureau of 
Export Administration in the 2001 Report . (Ibid. p. 13) . 
124 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 104.  
125 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 104.  
126 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 104.  
127 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 23.  
128 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 24.  
129 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and U SA-8), p. 36.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  b. Domestic  production of aluminium  is essential to national security .130 
c. Domestic  aluminium  production capacity  is declining  because131: (i) the United  States  is a 
relatively high -cost producer132; and (ii)  aluminium  smelters are permanently shutting 
down.133 
d. Domestic  production is well below demand .134 
e. US imports of aluminium  are increasing  in aggregate135 and in particular, imports of 
(i) unwrought aluminium136; (ii) aluminium  bars, rods and profiles137; (iii)  aluminium  
plate, sheet and strip138; (iv) aluminium  foil139; (v) aluminium  pipes and tubes140; and (vi) 
aluminium  castings and forgings.141 
f. US aluminium  exports are declining.142 
g. The United  States ' import to export ratio  for the aluminium  product categories subject to 
this investigation is high.143 
h. Aluminium  imports are impacting  the welfare of the US aluminium  industry  because :144 
(i) employment  in the aluminium  industry is declining  as several smelters were either 
permanently shut down  or temporarily idled145; (ii) the financial status of the US 
aluminium  industry  is poor146; (iii) research and development expenditures are falling147; 
(iv) capital expenditures for the aluminium  industry are increasing148; and (v)  aluminium  
prices have dropped sharply.149 
2.25.   In the Aluminium Report , the US Secretary of Commerce recommends, due to the threat of 
aluminium imports to US national security, that the US President take immediate action by adjusting 
the level of these imports.150 The recommended  adjustments would be imposed on imports of: 
(i) unwrought aluminium  (Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Code 7601); (ii)  aluminium  castings 
and forgings (HTS Codes 7616.99.51.60 and 7616.99.51.70); (iii)  aluminium  plate, sheet, strip, and 
foil (flat -rolled  products) (HTS Codes 7606 and 7607); (iv)  aluminium  wire (HTS Code 7605); 
(v) aluminium  bars, rods and profiles (HTS Code 7604); (vi) aluminium  tubes and pipes (HTS Code 
7608); and (vii) aluminium  tube and pipe fittings (HTS Code 7609) based on 201 7 annualized 
imports in those categories. The Aluminium Report  states that the recommended quotas or tariffs 
would be designed, even after any exemptions (if granted), to enable US aluminium producers to 
utilize an average of 80% of their production capaci ty.151  
2.26.   In particular, the Aluminium Report  recommends the following two alternative courses of 
action:  
 
130 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 39.  
131 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 40.  
132 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 41.  
133 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 48.  
134 Aluminium Report, (Exhib it NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 59. 
135 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 63.  
136 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 70.  
137 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 71.  
138 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 72.  
139 Aluminium  Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 73.  
140 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 74.  
141 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 75.  
142 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 75.  
143 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 84. 
144 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 89.  
145 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 89.  
146 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 91.  
147 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 95.  
148 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 97.  
149 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 100.  
150 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 107.  
151 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 107.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  a. Global quota o r tariff:  The Aluminium Report  recommends that action should be taken by 
imposing on unwrought aluminium  and the other aluminium  product ca tegories  (i) a quota 
of 86.7% ; or (ii)  a tariff rate of 7.7 % in addition to any anti -dumping  or countervailing 
duty collections applicable to such product s.152 
b. Tariff on a subset of countries:  The Aluminium Report  alternatively recommends applying 
a 23.6% tariff on all imported aluminium products from China ; Hong Kong, China; the 
Russian  Federation ; Venezuela ; and Viet  Nam; in addition to anti -dumping  or 
countervailing duty collections applicable to aluminium  produc ts from these countries. All 
other countries would be limited to 100% of their 2017 import volumes .153  
2.27.   The Aluminium Report  further states that, in selecting an alternative, the US President could 
determine that specific countries should be exempted from t he proposed quota by granting those 
specific countries 100% of their prior imports in 2017 or exempting them entirely, based on an 
overriding economic or security interest of the United  States , which could include their willingness 
to work with the United  States  to address global excess capacity and other challenges facing the US 
aluminium  industry.154 The Aluminium Report  also recommends an appeal process by which affected 
US parties could seek an exclusion from the tariff or quota imposed and notes that the US Secretary 
of Commerce would grant exclusions based on demonstrating  (a) a lack of sufficient US production 
capacity of comparable products or ( b) specific national security based considerations.155 
2.1.4   Presidential Proclamations  
2.28.    The US Secretary of  Commerce transmitted the Steel Report and the Aluminium Report  to 
the US President on 11  January  2018 and 19  January  2018 respectively.156  
2.29.   On 8  March  2018, the US President issued two proclamations adjusting imports into the 
United  States : (a) Presidential Proclamation 9705 in relation to steel imports157 and (b) Presidential 
Proclamation 9704 in relation to aluminium imports.158 The US President concurred with the findings 
in the Steel and Aluminium Report s, and pursuant to the recommendations in  these reports, imposed 
additional import duties of 25% and 10% respectively on certain steel and aluminium imports from 
all countries, with exemption s for imports from Canada and Mexico.159 The US President welcomed 
any country with which the United  States  has a security relationship to discuss alternative ways to 
address the threatened impairment of US national security caused by imports from that country.160 
These proclamations also authori zed the US Secretary of Commerce to provide relief from the 
additio nal duties for any steel or any aluminium article determined not to be produced in the 
United  States  in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or in a satisfactory quality, or based 
upon specific national security considerations.161 
2.30.   Following Presiden tial Proclamations 9704 and 9705, the US President issued additional 
proclamations adjusting steel and aluminium imports into the United  States . As described in greater 
detail below, these proclamations removed the exemptions granted to Canada and Mexico162, 
granted various exemptions to certain WTO Members163, introduced import quotas on steel and 
aluminium imports from certain countries164, and increased the additional import duty applicable to 
 
152 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 108.  
153 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), pp. 108 -109. 
154 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 109.  
155 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 109.  
156 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11625; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, ( Exhibit NOR-3 and USA -10), p. 11619.  
157 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11625.  
158 Presidential Proclamation 9704, ( Exhibit NOR -3 and USA-10), p. 11619.  
159 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR-4 and USA -9), p. 11627; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, ( Exhibit NOR-3 and USA -10), p. 11621.  
160 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 1162 6; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, ( Exhibit NOR-3 and USA-10), p. 1162 0. 
161 Presidential Pr oclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11627; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, ( Exhibit NOR-3 and USA -10), p. 11621.  
162 See section 2.2.3 below.  
163 See section 2.2.3 below.  
164 See section 2.2.2 below.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  steel imports from Türkiye  to 50%.165 Subsequent proclamations also note the existence of 
agreements between the United  States  and countries exempted from the additional duties.  
2.2  Measures at issue  
2.31.   In its panel request, Norway notes the following166:  
a. In April 2017, the US Commerce Secretary ini tiated investigations into the effect of 
imported steel and aluminium on US national security, pursuant to Section  232. On 
11 January and 17  January  2018, the US Department of Commerce released the Steel and 
Aluminium Report s. 
b. On 8 March  2018, the Presiden t of the United  States  issued Presidential Proclamations 
9704 and 9705, under the authority conferred in Section  232.  These instruments took 
action pursuant to the Commerce Secretary's recommendations by imposing additional 
import duties of 25% and 10%, re spectively, on certain imported steel products and 
aluminium products from all countries, with a temporary exemption for imports from 
Canada and Mexico.  
c. Subsequent to the adoption of Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705, the President of 
the United  States issued additional Proclamations. In sum, these instruments increased 
the duty on steel imports from Türkiye  to 50%;  removed the exemptions granted to 
Canada and Mexico;  and granted various additional temporary and indefinite exemptions 
to certain other  WTO Members.  
d. Indefinite exemptions to the steel and aluminium tariffs at issue have been granted to 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil and the Republic of Korea , in exchange for agreement with 
these countries on a range of measures.  This range of measures inclu des, for Argentina, 
Brazil and the Republic of Korea , voluntary quantitative restrictions on exports of steel and 
aluminium products.  
e. Presidential Proclamations 9705 and 9704 provide for a product exclusion process. Both 
Proclamations authori ze the Commerc e Secretary to provide relief from the additional 
duties for any steel article, or any aluminium article, determined not to be produced in the 
United  States  in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or in a satisfactory quality, 
or based upon specifi c national security considerations.  Presidential Proclamations 9776 
and 9777 subsequently extended the product exclusions to steel and aluminium products 
imported from countries subject to quantitative limitations, in certain defined 
circumstances, including national security considerations.  
2.32.   Norway 's panel request  states that the measures at issue include, but are not limited to167: 
a. Presidential Proclamation 9704 of 8  March  2018;  
b. Presidential Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018;  
c. Preside ntial Proclamation 9710 of 22  March  2018;  
d. Presidential Proclamation 9711 of 22  March  2018; 
e. Presidential Proclamation 9739 of 30  April 2018; 
f. Presidential Proclamation 9740 of 30  April 2018; 
g. Presidential Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018; 
 
165 See section 2.2.1 below.  
166 Norway's panel request, p. 2.  
167 Norway's panel request, pp. 1 -4. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  h. Presidential Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018;  
i. Presidential Proclamation 9772 of 10  August  2018;  
j. Presidential Proclamation 9776 of 29  August  2018;  
k. Presidential Proclamation 9777 of 29  August  2018;  
l. Interim Final Rule regarding the Requirements for Submi ssions Requesting Exclusions 
From the Remedies Instituted in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States  and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into the United  States ; and the 
Filing of Objections to Submitted Exclusion Requests  for Steel and Aluminum, published 
on 19  March  2018;  
m. Interim Final Rule regarding Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to 
Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum, published on 11  September  2018;  
n. The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security, An Investigation Conducted Under 
Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended (19  U.S.C. 1862), US 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of industry and Security, Office of Technology 
Evaluation, 11  January  2018; and  
o. The Effect of  Imports of Aluminum on the National Security, An Investigation Conducted 
Under Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1972, as amended, US Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office of Technology Evaluation, 
17 January  2018.  
2.33.   Norwa y's panel request  specifies that it also covers any amendments, successor, replacement 
or implementing measures and any exemptions applied.168 
2.34.   In its first written submission, Norway describes the measures at issue as (a) the aluminium 
and steel tariffs at issue; (b) exemptions to the tariffs granted to certain WTO Members, and the 
quotas agreed, in place of duties, with certain of those Members; and (c) exclusions to the tariffs 
granted to certain aluminium and steel products.169 In response to questions fro m the Panel, Norway 
further argues that its panel request identifies four sets of measures: (a) the import tariffs; (b) the 
import quotas; (c) the country -wide tariff exemptions; and (d) the product exclusions, and that each 
measure is challenged on its ow n terms, and not as a component part of a single, broader 
measure .170 
2.35.   The following diagram depicts the Panel's understanding of Norway's presentation of the 
measures at issue at the time of the establishment of the Panel on 21  November  2018: 
 
168 Norway's panel re quest, p. 4.  
169 Norway's first written submission, para.  24.  
170 Norway's response to Panel's question No.  1. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Figure 1: Norway's presentation of measures at issue at the time of Panel establishment  
 
2.36.   The following sections describe the measures that Norway  challenges in this dispute . 
2.2.1   Import  tariffs  
2.37.   Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018, all imports of steel products as 
specified in the Proclamation  shall be subject to an additional 25% ad valorem  duty. According to 
this Proclamation, this rate of duty is in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions, and charges 
applicable to such imported steel articles.171 
2.38.   Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9704 of 8  March  2018, all imports of alumin ium art icles 
as specified in the Proclamation  shall be subject to an additional 10% ad valorem  duty. According 
to this Proclamation, this rate of duty is in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions, and charges 
applicable to such imported alumin ium articles.172  
2.39.   Subsequently, Presidential Proclamation 9772 of 10  August  2018 imposed a 50% ad valorem  
duty on steel articles imported from Türkiye , beginning on 13  August  2018.173 
2.2.2   Import quotas  
2.40.   Presidential Proclamation 9740 of 28  April 2018 describes how the United  States  and the 
Republic of Korea  agreed upon a quota on steel imports.174 Part A of the Annex to this Proclamation 
sets out the amendments to US Note 16 of subchapter III of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tariff 
 
171 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11627.  
172 Presidential Proclamation 9704, (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11621.  
173 Presidential Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit NOR -5), p. 40430.  
174 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13), p. 2068 3. 
WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Schedule of the Unite d States  (HTSUS ) that provide for this quota treatment175, and Part B of the 
Annex to the Proclamation details the annual aggregate limits for the applicable quotas.176  
2.41.   Presidential Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018 introduced quotas on steel products from 
Argentina and Brazil.177 The Annex to this Proclamation details the annual aggregate limits for the 
applicable quotas.178 
2.42.   Presidential Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018 introduced quotas for aluminium products 
from Ar gentina.179 The Annex to this Proclamation details the annual aggregate limits for the 
applicable quotas.180 
2.2.3   Country -wide tariff exemptions  
2.43.   With respect to steel products, Presidential Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018 sets out that 
the additional 25% ad val orem duty on imports of steel shall not be applied to imports from Canada 
and Mexico.181 
2.44.   Subsequently, Presidential Proclamation 9711 of 22  March  2018 amended Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 and introduced exemptions for Australia, Argentina, the Republic of  Korea , Brazil, 
and the member countries of the European  Union , in addition to those already granted to Canada 
and Mexico, until 1 May 2018.182  
2.45.   Presidential Proclamation 9740 of 30  April 2018 introduced further modifications by (a) 
extending the exemptions  granted to Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union  until 1  June 2018183; 
(b) extending the exemptions for Argentina, Australia, and Brazil until an unspecified date184; and 
(c) extending  the exemption to the Republic of Korea  until an unspecified date .185 
2.46.   Presidential Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018 further extended the  exemptions from the 
additional import duties granted to Argentina, Australia, and Brazil  until an unspecified date .186 This 
Proclamation  did not extend the exemptions for Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union . 
2.47.   With respect to aluminium products, Presidential Proclamation 9704 of 8  March  2018 sets out 
that the additional 10% ad valorem  duty on imports of aluminium shall not be applied to i mports 
from Canada and Mexico.187  
2.48.   Subsequently, Presidential Proclamation 9710 of 22  March  2018 amended Presidential 
Proclamation 9704 and introduced exemptions for Australia, Argentina, the Republic of Korea , Brazil, 
and the member countries of the Europe an Union , in addition to those already granted to Canada 
and Mexico, until 1 May 2018.188  
2.49.   Presidential Proclamation 9739 of 30  April 2018 introduced further modifications by (a) 
extending the exemptions granted to Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union  until 1  June 2018189; 
(b) extending the exemption for Argentina, Australia, and Brazil until an unspecified date 190; and 
(c) ending the exemp tion granted to the Republic of Korea .191 
 
175 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13), p. 20685.  
176 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhib it NOR -8 and USA -13), pp. 20697 -20705.  
177 Presidential Proclamation 9759, ( Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15), pp. 25857 -25858.  
178 Presidential Proclamation 9759, ( Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15), p. 25861. 
179 Presidential Proclamation 9758, ( Exhibit NOR -9 and USA-16), pp. 25850 -25851.  
180 Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16), pp. 25853-25855.  
181 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), pp. 11626 -11627 . 
182 Presidential Proclamation 9711, ( Exhibit NOR-7 and USA -11), pp. 13361 -13363.  
183 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13), p. 20685.  
184 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13), p. 20684.  
185 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13), p. 20684.  
186 Presidential Proclamation 9759, ( Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15), p. 25858.  
187 Presidential Proclamation 9704, (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), pp. 11620-11621 . 
188 Presidential Proclamation 9710,  (Exhibit NOR-6 and USA -12), p. 13357.  
189 Presidential Proclamation 9739, (Exhibit NOR -11 and USA -14), p. 20678.  
190 Presidential Proclamation 9739, (Exhibit NOR -11 and USA -14), pp. 20677 -20678.  
191 Presidential Proclamation 9739, (Exhibit NOR -11 and USA -14), pp. 20678 -20679.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  2.50.   Presidential Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018 further extended the  exemptions from the 
additional import duties  granted  to Argentina and Australia  until an unspecified date .192 This 
Proclamation  did not extend the ex emptions for Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union .193 
2.2.4   Product exclusions  
2.51.   Presidential Proclamations 9705 and 9704 of 8  March  2018 authorized the US Secretary of 
Commerce to provide relief from the additional duties set out therein for any steel or  alumin ium 
article determined not to be produced in the United  States  in a sufficient and reasonably available 
amount or of a satisfactory quality and also to provide such relief based on specific national security 
considerations.194 
2.52.   On 19  March  2018, the US Department of Commerce issued the requirements for submissions 
requesting exclusions from the remedies instituted in the Presidential Proclamations  adjusting 
imports of steel and alumin ium into the United  States  (March Interim Final Rule ).195 This document 
specifies the requirements and process by which parties in the Unit ed States  may submit requests 
for exclusions from the duties instituted by the US President, including how parties in the 
United  States  may submit objections to exclusion requests. It further identifies the relevant time 
periods for submitting such exclusi on requests and any objections to those requests, the method for 
submitting such requests, and the information that must be included in such requests and 
objections .196 
2.53.   On 11  September  2018, US Department of Commerce issued a document titled " Submissions 
of Exclusion Requests and Objections to Submitted Requests for Steel and Aluminum" (September 
Interim Final Rule ).197 This document introduces revisions to the requirements set out in the March 
Interim Final Rule  and "changes to the exclusion processes in thi s rule … informed by both the 
comments received in response to the March 19 rule and the Department's experience with 
managing the exclusion process".198 According to this document, the modifications were aimed at 
improving transparency, effectiveness , and fairness  of the product exclusion process , including by 
adding a rebuttal and surrebuttal process.199 
2.54.   Presidential Proclamations 9777 and 9776 of 29  August  2018 authorized the  US Secretary of 
Commerce to provide relief from quantitative limitations on steel and aluminium articles adopted 
pursuant to Section  232, including those set forth in Presidential Proclamations 9740, 9759, and 
9758, on the same basis as the Secretary is authorized to provide relief from the duties established 
in Pre sidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705.200  
 
192 Presidential Proclamation 9758, ( Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16), pp. 2584 9-25850.  
193 Presidential Proclamation 9758, ( Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16), p. 25850.  
194 Presidential Proclamation 9704, ( Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11621 and Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11627. Presidential Proclamation 9711 of 22  March  2018 amended 
Presidential Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018 by introducing the following language: " Such relief may be 
provided to directly affe cted parties on a party -by-party basis taking into account the regional availability  of 
particular articles, the ability to transport articles within the United  States , and any other factors as the 
Secretary deems appropriate ". (Presidential Proclamation 9 711, (Exhibit NOR-7 and USA -11), p. 13364 ). 
Presidential Proclamation 9710 of 22  March  2018 amended Presidential Proclamation 970 4 of 8 March  2018 by 
introducing the following language: " Such relief may be provided to directly affected  parties on a party -by-
party basis taking into account the regional availability  of particular articles, the ability to transport articles 
within the United  States , and any other factors as the Secretary deems appropriate ". (Presidential 
Proclamation 9710, (Exhibit NOR-6 and U SA-12), p. 13358).  
195 March Interim Final Rule, (Exhibit NOR-76 and USA -20), pp. 12106 -12112 . 
196 March Interim Final Rule , (Exhibit NOR-76 and USA -20), p. 12110.  
197 September Interim Final Rule,  (Exhibit NOR-20 and  USA-21), pp. 46026 -46065 . 
198 September Interim Final Rule, (Exhibit NOR-20 and  USA-21), p. 46027.  
199 September Interim Final Rule, (Exhibit NOR-20 and  USA-21), p. 46027.  
200 Presidential Proclamation 977 7, (Exhibit NOR -22 and USA-18), p. 45026  and Presidential 
Proclamation 977 6, (Exhibit NOR -21 and USA-19), p. 45020.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  3  PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
3.1.  In its panel request, Norway requests that the Panel find that the measures listed in its request 
are inconsistent  with the United  States ' obligations under the fo llowing provisions of the covered 
agreements201: 
a. Article  2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  applies safeguard 
measures to the products in question without first having determined, pursuant to other 
provisions of the Agreement on S afeguards, that such products are being imported into 
its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic 
industry that produces like or directly competitive products;  
b. Article  2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  does not apply the 
safeguard measures to imported products irrespective of their source;  
c. Article  5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  is applying 
safeguard measures beyond the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and 
to facilitate adjustment;  
d. Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards to the extent that the United  States  seeks 
or has sought any voluntary  export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, or any 
other similar measures on the export or the import side;  
e. Articles 12.1 and 12.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  has 
failed to comply with any of the notification and consu ltation obligations set out in these 
provisions;  
f. Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994, because, with respect to customs duties and charges of any 
kind imposed on or in connection with importation, and with respect to all rules and 
formalities in connection with im portation, the United  States  fails to accord any advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted by the United  States  to certain other countries 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in the territories of all other 
Members;  
g. Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  has imposed import 
duties on certain steel and aluminium products in excess of the duties set forth and 
provided in the United  States ' Schedule of Concessions and Commitments annexed to the 
GATT 1994, and has failed to exempt products of Norway subject to the measures at issue 
from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided in the 
United  States ' Schedule of Concessions and Commitments annexed to the GATT  1994 and 
from all other duties or charges in excess of those imposed on the date of the GATT  1994 
or those directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force 
in the United  States  on that date.;  
h. Article  X:3(a) of the GATT  1994, because the Uni ted States  has failed to administer its 
laws, regulations, decisions and rulings in relation to the measures at issue in a uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner;  
i. Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  has instituted restrictions other 
than duties, taxes or other charges, made effective through quotas, on the importation of 
products of the territory of other Members;  
j. Article  XIX:1(a) of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  has suspended tariff 
conce ssions without the products at issue being imported into the territory of the 
United  States  in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or to 
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in the United  States  of like or directly 
 
201 Norway's panel request, pp. 4 -5. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  comp etitive products, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the 
obligations incurred under the GATT  1994; and  
k. Article  XIX:2 of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  has failed to give notice in 
writing to the WTO as far in advance as m ay be practicable and has failed to afford the 
WTO and WTO Members having a substantial interest as exporters of the products 
concerned an opportunity to consult with it in respect of the proposed action.  
3.2.  The United  States  requests that the Panel find that  the United  States  has invoked its essential 
security interests under Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and so report to the DSB.202 
4  ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  
4.1.  The arguments  of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel 
in acc ordance with paragraph 23 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annex  B). 
5  ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
5.1.  The arguments of certain third parties  are reflected in their executive summaries, provided in 
accordance with paragraph  26 of the Workin g Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annex  C).  
6  INTERIM REVIEW  
6.1.  On 29  June 2022, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 3  August  2022, the 
parties submitted  written requests for review of the Interim Report. Neither party requested an 
interim review meeting. On 31  August  2022, the parties submitted comments on each other's 
requests for review of the Interim Report.  
6.2.  In accordance with Article  15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Report sets out the Panel's 
response to the requests made at the interim review stage, including certain requests by the parties 
discussed in greater detail below.  
6.3.  The Panel notes that the parties' requests for review of the Interim Report include requests to 
provide more detailed summaries of their arguments. Thro ughout the Report, the Panel has 
summarized the parties' arguments in order to facilitate understanding of the contested issues 
addressed in the Panel's reasoning and findings. The Panel has not comprehensively reproduced 
every aspect of the parties' argum ents, which are more fully reflected in the executive summaries 
annexed to this Report. Rather, the Panel has summarized the relevant arguments in the context of 
its own objective assessment of the matter before it, having regard for its mandate and discre tion 
to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or rulings provided for 
in the relevant covered agreements.  In this regard, it is generally within the discretion of a panel to 
decide which arguments or evidence it addresses or relies on in reaching its findings.203 Subject to 
the explanations and modifications described below, the Panel considers that the parties' arguments 
are adequately reflected and addressed in this Report, including the annexes thereto, to fulfil the 
requirements of the Panel's mandate under the DSU.204 
6.4.  In addition, the Panel has made typographical and other editorial modifications in the Report, 
including in response to the parties' requests. The discussion below refers to the numbering of 
sections, paragr aphs, and footnotes in the Final Report.  
6.1  Article  XIX of the GATT  1994  and the Agreement on Safeguards  
6.5.  The United  States  requests the Panel to include in paragraph 7. 65 "additional support" for its 
conclusions regarding the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. In 
particular, the United  States  argues that the Panel's conclusions in this paragraph are supported by 
the ordinary meaning of t he terms "sought, taken or maintained" in Article  11.1(c) . Norway 
 
202 United  States ' first written submission, para.  184. 
203 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, Ukraine – Ammonium Nitrate , para.  6.42; US – COOL , para.  299; 
EC – Poultry , para.  135; EC – Hormones , para.  135. 
204 See section 7.1 below.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  disagrees with the United  States ' request and considers that  the existing findings on Article  11.1(c) 
are sufficient  to resolve the question of whether the challenged measures are subject to  the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  Norway further notes that the  United  States ' proposed addition is a 
recitation of its argument and , if the change proposed by the United  States  is accepted , requests  
the inclusion of additional reasoning to address its argumen ts.   
6.6.  In section 7.7.2 of its Report, the Panel has examined the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) 
considering their ordinary meaning and having regard for the relevant context provided by terms 
used elsewhere in the Agreement on Safeguards, including  those that appear to convey a 
relationship of consistency with the requirements of another provision of the covered agreements. 
The Panel has further considered the use of terms in the three authentic language versions of the 
Agreement on Safeguards in ac cordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. The Panel has also found support for its conclusions in the object and purpose of 
the Agreement on Safeguards, as expressed in its preamble, and the negotiating history of 
Article 11.1(c). Accordingly, the Panel does not consider it necessary to additionally address the 
United  States ' arguments concerning the terms "sought, taken or maintained" in Article  11.1(c) to 
determine the meaning of "pursuant to" in that provision.  
6.7.  The Panel has taken note of the United  States ' arguments concerning the meaning of "sought" 
in Article  11.1(c), which are related to the United  States ' contention that formal notification of 
safeguard measures to the WTO is a "condition precedent" to the appl icability of safeguard 
disciplines. As part of its objective assessment of the legal characterization of the measures under 
Article  11.1(c), the Panel has taken into account the manner in which the measures at issue were 
notified to relevant WTO bodies or committees. Recalling the nature of the Panel's inquiry on the 
applicability of safeguard disciplines to the measures at issue, the Panel does not consider it 
necessary to address in further detail the United  States ' arguments on the meaning of "sought" in  
Article  11.1(c).  In this respect, the Panel additionally recalls its mandate and discretion to make 
such findings as will assist the DSB  in making the rulings and recommendations provided for in the 
relevant covered agreements.  
6.8.  The United  States  requests the Panel to revise paragraph 7.72  to accurately reflect its 
argument that "a key condition precedent to the exercise of [the right to ap ply a safeguard measure] 
is that the Member has invoked Article XIX as the legal basis for its measure by providing notice in 
writing and affording affected Members an opportunity to consult." According to the United  States , 
by suggesting "the United  State s' [contends] that, based on Article  XIX:2 of the GATT  1994, formal 
notification of safeguard measures to the WTO is a 'condition precedent' to the applicability of 
safeguard disciplines", the Panel misstates the United  States ' position.  Norway considers t hat the 
Panel's description of the United  States ' argument is accurate and correctly summari zed as meaning 
that notification is a condition precedent for the applicability of safeguards disciplines for the 
United  States .  
6.9.  The Panel notes that, in its submi ssions, the United  States  refers variously to "notice", 
"invocation", and "invocation through notice" under Article  XIX:2 of the GATT  1994 as a "condition 
precedent" for applicability of safeguard disciplines. The Panel has accordingly retained its summary  
of the United  States ' arguments in this respect and revised the corresponding footnote to clarify the 
various terms used by the United  States  in its submissions to the Panel . 
6.10.   Norway suggests revisions to paragraph 7.68  as it considers that this paragraph provides 
"an incomplete and confusing description" of Norway's argument regarding the terms "other than" 
in Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The United  States  does not object to expanding 
the summary of Norway's argument or rephrasing it to more closely reflect the terms Norway used 
in its submissions. The United  States  makes additional textual suggestions to Norway's proposed 
revision and requests a summary of its own arguments made in response to Norway.  
6.11.   The Panel states in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 7.68 that this sentence sets out 
the Panel's view of Norway's arguments. The Panel has added a footnote to this sentence referring 
to the relevant submissions by Norway on which the Panel bases its view. The Panel has similarly 
revise d the final sentence of paragraph 7.68 to indicate that this sentence reflects the Panel's 
understanding of Norway's arguments. In this light and recalling its approach to reflecting the 
parties' arguments on the issues raised in this dispute, the Panel do es not consider it necessary to 
further revise or expand the summaries of the parties' arguments in this paragraph.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  6.2  Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994  
6.12.   The United  States  requests an addition to paragraph 7.94 of certain arguments it puts 
forward on the interpr etation of Article  XXI(b), including its arguments on which phrase in 
Article  XXI(b) is modified by subparagraphs (i) and (ii) and the reconciliation of different language 
versions of Article  XXI(b). The United  States  also requests that paragraph 7.95  include a more 
complete description of the complainant's arguments on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b). Norway 
disagrees with the United  States ' requested additions on what is qualified by the subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI, which Norway considers are alread y captured in the Panel  Report . Norway comments 
that the United  States ' requested additions "gloss over and diminish the internal shifts and 
inconsistencies" in the United  States ' arguments on what is qualified by the subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI. Norway further contends that the United  States ' requests concern matters within the 
Panel's discretion that fall outside the scope of interim review. In addition, Norway considers that its 
own proposed interpretation of Article  XXI(b) is adequately summar ized and notes that citations to 
its interpretive arguments are contained throughout the Panel's reasoning on Article  XXI(b).  
6.13.   Recalling its approach to reflecting the parties' arguments on the issues raised in this dispute, 
the Panel declines to expand the  summaries of the parties' arguments in these paragraphs. In 
response to the United  States ' request, the Panel further notes that modification s to the Interim 
Report  discussed below include expanded reference to arguments that the United  States  requested 
to be reproduced in these paragraphs.   
6.14.   The United  States  requests that the Panel delete the footnote to paragraph 7.100  and 
instead address its substantive content in the body of the Report, particularly concerning the 
United  States ' arguments on the differ ences in the French and Spanish versions of Article  XXI(b) 
and the reconciliation of the three language versions of the text. In the United  States ' view, the 
Panel does not engage with these arguments and "misstates them in a footnote reference". The 
Unite d States  requests further engagement with these arguments and, specifically, that the Panel 
"explain why it is incorrect to read the sentence [in Article  XXI(b)] as consisting of three alternatives" 
for each subparagraph. Norway disagrees with the United  States' comment that the Panel misstates 
or fails to engage with the United  States ' arguments in this paragraph and footnote. Norway 
considers that the summary in the footnote accurately reflects the United  States ' submissions and 
that, contrary to the Unit ed States ' assertion, the Panel engages extensively with the United  States ' 
interpretive arguments under Article  XXI(b) regarding a "single relative clause" and the 
interpretation that best reconciles the three texts.  
6.15.   The Panel acknowledges the United  States' indication in its request for interim review that it 
"agrees (in the interpretation that best reconciles the three language versions) with the Panel that 
each of the paragraphs 'describe[s] the action referred to in Article  XXI(b)', but mediated throu gh 
the relative clause 'which it considers'." The Panel has accordingly retained the statement of its 
understanding that the parties agree that the subparagraphs qualify and relate to the "action" in 
Article  XXI(b), notwithstanding some disagreement as to the precise basis for this conclusion. The 
Panel has also expanded the summary of the United  States ' arguments regarding the reconciliation 
of texts in the three authentic language versions and its contention that, under this reconciled 
interpretation, the  terms of the provision still form a "single relative clause" that begins with the 
phrase "which it considers" and contains the entirety of each subparagraph.  
6.16.   Regarding the United  States ' request for further elaboration in the body of the Report, the 
Panel  briefly reviews certain points of its analysis of the United  States ' arguments to clarify the 
overall context in which the footnote appears in the Panel's reasoning regarding the interpretation 
of Article  XXI(b) in this dispute. In section 7.8.2, the Pane l focuses specifically on the United  States ' 
argument that "which it considers" qualifies the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) within a "single 
relative clause" that entirely reserves the subparagraphs to the judgment of the invoking Member. 
In accordance w ith Article  3.2 of the DSU, the Panel's textual analysis addresses the function and 
ordinary meaning of the subparagraphs as describing certain kinds of permitted "action", including 
reference to the structure and punctuation of Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. In this regard, the Panel 
concludes that the paragraphs and subparagraphs form alternative endings to a complete sentence 
under Article  XXI, and the opening terms of each of the subparagraphs ("relating to" and "taken") 
qualify the "action" in paragraph (b). Moreover, the subparagraphs are exhaustive in establishing 
the circumstances in which a Member may take the "action" under Article  XXI(b).  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  6.17.   Following these textual conclusions, the Panel addresses grammatical aspects of the parties' 
argument s as well as other aspects of textual interpretation and ordinary meaning, particularly the 
principle of effective treaty interpretation and the exhaustive types of "action" specified in the 
subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b). The Panel additionally addresses  relevant context in Articles XXII 
and XXIII of the GATT  1994 and the DSU, the object and purpose of maintaining the balance of 
rights and obligations under the covered agreements, and non -treaty materials submitted by the 
parties relating to the interpret ation of Article  XXI of the DSU. Based on the entirety of this analysis, 
the Panel concludes that the terms "which it considers" in Article  XXI(b) do not qualify the 
subparagraphs to render them "self -judging" or "non -justiciable" as argued by the United  States. 
6.18.   In this manner, the Panel has addressed multiple aspects of the interpretation of 
Article  XXI(b) with specific reference to the United  States ' argument regarding a "single relative 
clause" purportedly encompassing the subparagraphs of that provision . As one element of this 
analysis, the Panel has noted the concordance of plural and feminine terms in the French and Spanish 
versions of Article  XXI(b) to support the qualification of the term "action" by the subparagraphs. In 
other parts of its assessmen t, the Panel has also examined the ordinary meaning of actions "relating 
to" specified "materials" and "traffic" and to actions "taken in time of" specified circumstances. The 
Panel has further accounted for the structure of Article  XXI(b) and the textual separation of the 
subparagraphs into an enumerated list, which corresponds to the role of the subparagraphs as 
alternative sentence endings that collectively and exhaustively delimit the scope of Article  XXI(b).  
6.19.   The Panel recalls its mandate and discretio n to make such findings as will assist the DSB in 
making the recommendations or rulings provided for in the relevant covered agreements. In 
assessing the contested issues of interpretation regarding Article  XXI(b) and the review of its 
invocation by a Memb er in dispute settlement proceedings, the Panel did not find it necessary to 
address in greater detail the parties' arguments on the reconciliation of the three authentic texts  of 
the provision . In addition, the United  States  does not explain the relevance  of these arguments to 
the Panel's overall analysis and conclusions on whether a "single relative clause" beginning with the 
phrase "which it considers" renders Article  XXI(b) "self -judging" or "non -justiciable" in the sense 
argued by the United  States . To the extent the United  States ' request concerns the weight assigned 
to its arguments and the merits of the Panel's analysis, the Panel notes that interim review is not an 
appropriate stage for relitigating arguments already submitted by the parties and add ressed to the 
extent necessary in the Panel's findings.205 In these circumstances, the Panel has modified this 
footnote to expand the summary of the parties' arguments and to clarify that the Panel does not 
consider it necessary for the purposes of this dis pute to address in further detail the parties' 
arguments on the reconciliation of the three authentic texts in relation to the contested issues of 
interpretation under of Article  XXI(b) and its application to the measures at issue in this dispute . 
6.20.   The Unit ed States  requests that the Panel introduce certain modifications to paragraphs 
7.107 and 7.108  in order to more accurately reflect its arguments on English grammar rules in the 
context of the interpretation of Article  XXI(b). Norway considers that the Pan el accurately 
summarizes the United  States ' argument regarding the grammatical construction of Article  XXI(b). 
Norway further comments that the relevant paragraphs appear within the Panel's substantive 
reasoning and that it is inappropriate to inject long statements of the United  States ' arguments into 
the Panel's own reasoning. Finally, Norway requests similar elaborations on summaries of its own 
arguments should the Panel accept the United  States ' request, which Norway does not consider 
necessary for the Panel's reasoning.  
6.21.   The Panel has made the requested modification in paragraph 7.107 to clarify the context 
regarding subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Article  XXI(b) in which the United  States  referred to the rules 
of English grammar. The Panel declines the ad ditional suggested text in paragraph 7.108 in which 
the Panel is addressing grammatical considerations as part of its overall assessment of the contested 
issues of interpretation under Article  XXI(b) in this dispute. In particular, the Panel's analysis in 
these paragraphs notes the absence of a definitive rule of grammar supporting the United  States ' 
construction of the provision as containing a "single relative clause" that wholly reserves the 
conditions and circumstances of the subparagraphs to the judgme nt of the invoking Member. The 
Panel has modified these paragraphs to clarify that, with respect to the interpretation of 
Article  XXI(b), the qualification of the noun "action" in paragraph (b) by the subparagraphs is not 
 
205 See e.g. Panel  Report s, India – Solar Cells , para.  6.24; Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , Annex  A-
3, paras.  2.3-2.4; US – Poultry (China) , para.  6.32. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  solely determined by rigid applica tion of grammar but follows from the ordinary meaning of these 
terms, as elaborated in the remainder of the Panel's analysis.  
6.22.   Norway requests a modification to paragraph 7.116  to clarify that the Panel is referring to 
the position taken by the United  State s with respect to whether Article  XXI(b) contains a "single 
relative clause" that wholly reserves the conditions and circumstances of the subparagraphs to the 
judgment of the invoking Member. The United  States  objects to Norway's request and considers that  
the conclusion is clear as originally written.  
6.23.   The Panel declines to amend the language of this paragraph, which concerns the argument of 
the United  States  on a "single relative clause" in Article  XXI(b) that wholly reserves the conditions 
and circumstances of the subparagraphs to the judgment of the invoking Member.  
6.24.   The United  States  requests that the Panel expand the summary of arguments in paragraph 
7.121 on the interpretation of the terms "emergency in international relations" in Article  XXI(b)(iii), 
and that the Panel address these arguments in paragraph 7.125  setting out the Panel's 
interpretation of these terms. Norway does not agree with the United  States ' request and recalls 
that panels are not required to address each and every argument  raised by a party. Norway considers 
that the Panel's analysis resolves the parties' dispute as the Panel explains its interpretation of 
subparagraph (iii) and the application of the conditions therein. Norway comments that the 
United  States  does not expla in how the requested additions are necessary to resolve the dispute 
between the parties, also taking into account "the further additions that would be required to capture 
Norway's position on these points".  
6.25.   As noted, the Panel has not comprehensively repr oduced every aspect of the parties' 
arguments but rather has referred to the parties' arguments in order to facilitate understanding of 
the contested issues addressed in the Panel's reasoning and findings. In this connection, the Panel 
has focused on the g ravity or severity of an "emergency in international relations" within the 
meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii), particularly regarding the impact on international relations of 
situations falling under that provision. Moreover, the Panel has interpreted the term s "emergency in 
international relations" in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and its mandate to make such 
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements. In section 7.8.3, the Panel has  addressed the interpretation of Article  XXI(b)(iii) to the 
extent necessary to assess whether, based on the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties, 
the measures at issue were "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations". O n 
the basis of the foregoing, the Panel does not consider it necessary to further address the 
United  States ' arguments in this regard.  
6.3  Appendices  
6.26.   The United  States  requests that the Panel incorporate the analysis and conclusions contained 
in Appendices A a nd B into the main body of the Report. The United  States  considers the materials 
described in these appendices to be integral to the Panel's analysis and notes that they were a 
subject of disagreement and argument by the parties.  Norway suggests that the P anel could address 
the United  States ' request by stating in the Report that Appendices A and B are an integral part of 
its Report.  
6.27.   The Panel recalls its conclusion in Appendix  A that its review of the negotiating history of 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreemen t on Safeguards confirms its interpretation of that provision. The 
Panel has also concluded that the materials examined in Appendix  B support the general conclusion 
that the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 establish a right to take action for the protection 
of essential security interests in the conditions and circumstances described in the three 
subparagraphs. The appendices set out in greater detail the specific materials examined, the 
arguments advanced by the parties, and the bases for the Pane l's conclusions. The Panel therefore  
declines the United  States ' request,  and the Panel has modified the references to the appendices in 
the Report to specify which appendix is being referred to in the Panel's analysis . 
6.28.   Norway comments that a number of par agraphs, including paragraphs 2.11, 2.23, 2.31, 
3.2, 3.7, and 4.2 of Appendix  B, do not provide an accurate depiction its views and requests that 
the Panel's summary more fully reflect its arguments on the materials pertaining to the interpretation 
of Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. The United  States  does not comment on Norway's request.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  6.29.   The Panel has reviewed Norway's submissions and modified paragraphs 2.11, 2.23, 2.31, 3.2, 
3.7, and 4.2 of Appendix  B in order to better reflect Norway' s arguments relating to the 
interpretation of Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. 
6.30.   Norway requests that the Panel clarify its position in paragraphs 4.41 and 7.66 of 
Appendix  B with regard to the interpretive weight given, respectively, to internal documents of the 
US delegation at the ITO/GATT 1947 negotiations and comments made by delegations at a 
GATT  Council meeting addressing the invocation of Article  XXI by the United  States in relation to 
certain measures affecting Nicaragua. The United  States  does not object to Norway's request.  
6.31.   The Panel notes the following to clarify the context of the statements referred to by Norway. 
In section 4 of Appendix  B, the Panel has reviewed certain internal documents of the US delegation 
at the ITO/GATT 1947 negotiations. At the outset, the Panel makes a general observation that 
Article  32 of the Vienna  Convention  does not limit the scope of supplementary means of treaty 
interpretation to whi ch there may be recourse. Against that background, with certain limitations and 
caveats explained further in section 4.2, the Panel does not consider the internal documents of the 
US delegation at the ITO/GATT 1947 negotiations to be a priori  entirely irre levant. In the subsequent 
assessment of the content of these documents, the Panel reiterates the inherent limitations to these 
materials for the interpretive issues in this dispute and notes that the review of the materials 
submitted confirms, or at least does not undermine, the Panel's interpretation of Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994.   
6.32.   In section 7 of Appendix  B, the Panel has reviewed materials pertaining to the views expressed 
by GATT contracting parties in connection with prior invocations of Article  XXI of the GATT 1947. At 
the beginning of its analysis, the Panel notes that neither party in this dispute assigns any particular 
value to these "views" under either Articles 31 or 32 of the Vienna  Convention . The Panel further 
notes that the materials submit ted point to heterogeneous, conflicting views expressed by GATT 
contracting parties over time, and cannot thus provide any relevant guidance for the contested 
issues in this dispute.   
6.33.   As indicated in the summary provided above, the review of the documents  in question did not 
lead the Panel to modify its understanding of Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 under Article  31 of the 
Vienna  Convention . Accordingly, the Panel clarifies that Appendix  B should not be read as suggesting 
that greater interpretive value was  given to internal documents of the US delegation at the ITO/GATT 
1947 negotiations as compared to the views expressed by GATT contracting parties in relation to 
prior invocations of Article  XXI of the GATT 1947.  
7  FINDINGS  
7.1  Mandate under the DSU  
7.1.  The Panel wa s established  by the DSB in accordance with Article  6 of the DSU with standard 
terms of reference, as provided  in Article  7.1 of the DSU, "[t] o examine, in the light of the relevant 
provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the 
DSB" in the complainant's panel request and " to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making 
the recommendat ions or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements ". Pursuant to 
Article  7.2 of the DSU, the Panel is required to "address the relevant provisions in any covered 
agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute".  
7.2.  The matter referred to the DSB in the complainant's panel request comprises claims under the 
GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards with respect to the measures at issue.206 In response 
to these claims, the United  States  requests that the Panel find that the United  States  has invoked 
its essential security interests under Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and so report to the DSB.207 
Although the United  States  acknowledges that "the Panel has jurisdiction over this dispute, because 
the DSB has established the Panel to examine t he matter set out in the panel request "208, it argues 
that its " invocation of Article  XXI is a non -justiciable issue as Article  XXI makes its invocation 
 
206 See section 3 above.  
207 United  States ' first written submission, para. 184. 
208 United  States ' first written submission , para.  181. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  self-judging by the Member taking the security action ".209 In the United  States ' view, "[i] t follows 
that the Panel may not make findings on the complainant 's claims because they are not appropriate 
or suitable for adjudication by the Panel and may not make recommendations because no finding of 
WTO-inconsistency can be made. "210  
7.3.  In response to questions from the Panel, t he United  States  clarifies that "the United States is 
not requesting that the Panel refrain from applying the rules and procedures of the DSU " but rather 
submits that "[the United  States '] approach reflects an outcome consistent with a panel 's terms of 
reference from the DSB and function of a panel under the DSU, and a proper interpretation of 
Article  XXI(b) under the Vienna  Convention " on the Law of Treaties  (Vienna  Convention ).211 
According to the United  States , the Panel's "jurisdictio n" conferred by Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU 
is constrained by "the ordinary meaning of the terms in Article  XXI(b)", as interpreted in accordance 
with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.  The United  States  thus clarifies 
that its arguments on "justiciability" and the "political" nature of the questions involved rest on the 
interpretation of the terms of Article  XXI(b) in accordance with the interpretive principles of 
Article  3.2 of the DSU and the Panel's terms of reference.212 As addressed in greater detail below, 
the complainant also refers to these interpretive principles and the requirements of the Panel's terms 
of reference in contesting the United  States ' characterization of Article  XXI(b) as "non -justiciable".213   
7.4.  Based  on its terms of reference, the Panel's mandate under the DSU is to examine the matter 
raised by the complainant in its panel request and to address the United  States ' invocation of 
Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994. The purpose of this examination is to ena ble the Panel to make 
such findings as will assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the covered agreements. 
In fulfilling this mandate, the Panel is mindful of its function and duty under Article  11 of the DSU to 
make an objective assessme nt of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts 
of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements. The Panel 
is further guided by the role of WTO dispute settlement, as recognized in Article  3.2 of the DSU, to 
preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law .214  
7.5.  The Panel obser ves that the parties affirm these fundamental principles regarding the 
assessment of the complainant's claims and the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 under the rules and procedures of the DSU.215 However, the parties dispute the  
application of these principles to the matter before the Panel, particularly with respect to the 
applicability of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at 
issue, and the relationship between those disciplines and Art icle XXI(b) of the GATT  1994. Regarding 
the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b), the parties further dispute the extent to which the 
terms of this provision reserve discretion to the invoking Member taking action that it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests, as well as the applicability of this 
provision to the challenged measures based on the arguments and evidence submitted in these 
proceedings.  
 
209 United  States ' first written submission , para. 183. The United  States  submits that "'jurisdiction' can 
be defined as the extent of power of the Panel under the DSU to exercise its judicial authority or decide a 
particular case", while "'justiciability', by contrast, relates to whether a matter is appropriate or suitable for  
adjudication by a court, or in this context, whether an issue is subject to findings by the Panel under the DSU." 
(Ibid.  para. 181). 
210 United  States ' first written submission , para.  183. The United  States  further argues that "the self -
judging text include d in Article  XXI" reflects a recognition that "issues of essential security are inherently 
political in nature, and there are no legal criteria by which a Member's consideration of its essential security 
interests can be objectively determined". (Ibid.).  
211 United  States ' response to Panel question Nos. 26 -29.  
212 See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  54 (arguing that " it is not the political nature of 
the issues covered under Article  XXI(b) that lead to an interpretation that the provision is sel f-judging " but 
rather "[i]t is the text of Article  XXI(b) that establishes its self -judging nature"); see also United  States ' 
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  3-4 and 64.  
213 See section 7.8 below.   
214 See Appellate  Body Reports, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , para.  31; EC – Computer Equipment , 
para. 82; Panel  Report , US – Section  301 Trade Act , para.  7.75.  
215 See e.g. United  States ' response to Panel question No.  25 ("the Panel 's function is to objectively 
assess the matter before it by interpreting Article  XXI(b) in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation" ); Norway's response to Panel question N os. 26 and 27.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.6.  The Panel is required under the DSU to assess these disputed issues in an objective manner  
and to make findings on the basis of that assessment that will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or rulings prov ided for in the covered agreements. In furtherance of this mandate, 
the Panel will examine the matter within its terms of reference by assessing the a pplicability of and 
conformity with the relevant provisions of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguar ds, based 
on the interpretive principles of Article  3.2 of the DSU  and the arguments and evidence presented 
by the parties. As prescribed by Article  12.7 of the DSU, the Panel will set out its relevant findings 
of fact, the applicability of relevant provis ions, and the basic rationale behind any findings and 
recommendations that it makes.  
7.2  Order of analysis  
7.7.  In considering the appropriate order of analysis of the issues outlined above, the Panel has 
discretion to structure its analysis taking into account the  specific measures, claims, arguments , and 
relevant provisions  at issue.216 Having considered the arguments presented by the parties in this 
dispute217, the Panel will first address issues concerning its terms of reference and the identification 
of the measu res at issue. Following this determination of the measures within its terms of reference, 
the Panel will examine the complainant's claims that the measures are inconsistent with certain 
provisions of the covered agreements.  
7.8.  In principle, the obligations set forth in the WTO covered agreements apply cumulatively.218 In 
this dispute, t he parties disagree as to whether the WTO rules on safeguards set forth in Article  XIX 
of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards apply to the measures at iss ue, and the 
complainant raises other claims under the GATT  1994 which are independent of those contested 
issues of applicability . Taking these circumstances into account, along with the operation of the 
measures at issue  and the manner in which the parties  have presented their argument s, the Panel 
considers it appropriate to begin its assessment with the claims under Articles I:1, II:1, XI:1, and 
X:3 of the GATT  1994.  
7.9.  The Panel will first assess the consistency of the relevant measures with Article  II:1 of the 
GATT  1994 and the relevant commitments in the United  States ' Schedule of Concessions. The  Panel 
will then assess the claims under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 concerning most-favoured -nation 
treatment . The Panel will next address the claims under Arti cle XI:1 of the GATT  1994 concerning  
quantitative restrictions, followed by the claims under Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994 concerning the 
administration of measures. The Panel will then assess the remainder of the complainant's claims 
under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards , including the parties' 
disagreement as to the applicability of this provision and agreement to the measures at issue.  
7.10.   The Panel will next address the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 
in relation to any measures falling within the Panel's terms of reference found to be inconsistent 
with provisions of the covered agreements. The Panel will assess  the arguments and evidence 
submitted by the parties in relation to the measures at issue beginning with the parties' 
disagreement as to the meaning of the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 interpreted in 
 
216 See Appellate  Body Reports, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , para.  126; US – COOL 
(Article  21.5 – Canada and Mexico) , para.  5.229; Panel  Report s, India – Solar Cells , paras.  7.41-7.42; Russia – 
Pigs (EU), para.  7.30. In disputes involving security exceptions under Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and 
Article  73 of the TRIPS  Agreement , previous panels have exercised discretion regarding the order of analysis 
based on their consideration of the specific circumstances of the dispute, including arguments made by the 
parties and other relevant provisions at issue. (See Panel  Report s, Russia – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.20-7.26; 
Saudi  Arabia – IPRs, paras.  7.1-7.3). 
217 While not bound by the presentation of claims and arguments by the parties, the Panel notes that 
the parties have taken different views on the appropriate order of analysis of the issues in this dispute. The 
complainant considers that the Panel should commence with examination of the claims under the Agreement 
on Safeguards and Article  XIX of the GATT  1994, followed by other claims under the GATT  1994, before turning 
to the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b). The United  States  maintains that the Panel should begin by 
addressing Article  XXI(b) as the invocation of this provision means that there are no findings that would assist 
the DSB in making recommendations or giving rulings as to the complainant's claims. (United  States ' response 
to Panel question Nos. 21 -23). 
218 The Panel is also mindful that there may be circumstances in disputes where more than one covered 
agreement applies and it is appropriate to begin the analysis with p rovision s from an agreement that "deals 
specifica lly, and in detail" with the measures at issue. (See  Appellate  Body Report s, Brazil – Desiccated 
Coconut , pp. 12-13; Canada – Periodicals , p. 19; and EC – Bananas III , para.  204; Panel  Report s, Australia – 
Tobacco Plain Packaging , paras.  7.76-7.79; US – Customs Bond Directive , paras.  7.170 -7.171) . WT/DS552/R  
 
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  accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and t he customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. On the basis of this assessment, the Panel will provide its findings and 
recommendations in accordance with the DSU.  
7.3  Article  II:1 of the GATT  1994  
7.3.1   Introduction  
7.11.   Norway  argues that the alumin ium and steel tariffs violate Articles II:1(a) and II:1(b) of the 
GATT  1994.219 Norway considers that in terms of design and structure, the aluminium and steel 
tariffs are "ordinary customs duties" under Article  II:1(b).220 Norway contends that, for each and  
every tariff line for the relevant products, the aluminium and steel tariffs exceed the bound rates 
set out in the United  States ' Schedule, and as a result, violate Article  II:1(b) and also 
Article  II:1(a).221 Finally, even if the tariffs do not constitute  "ordinary customs duties" under the 
first sentence of Article  II:1(b), Norway considers that they constitute prohibited "other duties or 
charges".222 
7.12.   The United  States  has not advanced any arguments or evidence contesting the claims under 
Articles II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994.223  
7.13.   Article  II:1 of the GATT  1994 provides in relevant part:  
(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of th e 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.  
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, 
which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their 
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, 
conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs 
duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be 
exempt from all other dutie s or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those 
directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the 
importing territory on tha t date.  
7.14.   Additionally, the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 
provides in relevant part:  
Members hereby agree as follows:  
1. In order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and obligations deriving from 
paragraph 1(b) of Article  II, the nature and level of any "other duties or charges" levied 
on bound tariff items, as referred to in that provision, shall be recorded in the Schedules 
of concessions annexed to GATT  1994 against the tariff item to which they  apply. It is 
understood that such recording does not change the legal character of "other duties or 
charges".  
 
219 Norway's first written submission, paras.  16 and 426 -427; second written submission, para.  49; 
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  20; response to Panel question Nos. 1, para.  2, 
No. 21, para. 244, and No.  71, para.  657; responses to Panel's questions following the first meeting, Annex  I; 
and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  28. 
220 Norway's first written submission, paras.  432-433. 
221 Norway's first written submiss ion, paras.  434-436. 
222 Norway's first written submission, para.  437. 
223 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7 (indicating that the 
United  States  "has imposed duties on certain steel and aluminum products on a non -MFN basis and in excess 
of the levels set out in its WTO Goods Schedule").  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.15.   Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994 contains a general prohibition against according treatment 
less favourable to imports than that provided for in a Member's Schedule.224 The first sentence of 
Article  II:1(b) prohibits the imposition of ordinary customs duties on importation in excess of those 
rates set forth in a Member's Schedule.225 The second sentence of Article  II:1(b) prohibits the 
imposition of other duties or charges of any kind on or in connection with importation in excess of 
those imposed on the date of entry into force of the GATT  1994 (or those directly and mandatorily 
required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force on that date).226 According to the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article  II:1(b), the nature and level of any such "other duties 
or charges" must be recorded in a Member's Schedule.227  
7.16.   In this dispute, the complainant focuses its arguments on inconsistency with Article  II:1(b) 
and alleges a consequential violation of Article  II:1(a).228 Prior WTO adjudicators have considered 
that Article  II:1(b) prohibits "a specific kind of practice that will always be inconsistent with 
paragraph (a)" because a pplication of duties in excess of what is provided for in a Member's Schedule 
necessarily constitutes "less favourable" treatment within the meaning of Article  II:1(a).229 Given 
these considerations, the Panel will assess whether the challenged measures res ult in the imposition 
of duties in excess of what is provided for in the United  States ' Schedule under Article  II:1(b), and 
thus accord less favourable treatment than that provided for in the Schedule in violation of 
Article  II:1(a).  
7.17.   The Panel will begin by identifying the concessions and obligations for the relevant products 
in the United  States ' Schedule before turning to the treatment of those products under the additional 
duties.230  
7.3.2   Additional  duties on steel and aluminium products  
7.18.   In March 2018, the U nited States  imposed additional duties of 25% on steel products and 
10% on aluminium products.231 The following tables identify the steel and aluminium products 
covered by the additional duties and provide a comparative analysis of the United  States ' bound 
rates and its additional duty rates in relation to those products. The United  States ' Schedule does 
not record any "other duties or charges" with respect to the steel and aluminium products at issue.232 
 
224 See Appellate  Body Reports, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 45; Colombia – Textiles, 
para. 5.34. See also Panel  Report s, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 7.63; EC – IT Products , para. 7.99. 
225 See Appellate  Body Reports, India – Additional Import Duties, para. 150; Colombia – Textiles, 
para. 5.35. 
226 See Appellate  Body Report, India – Additional Import Duties, para. 151; Panel  Report , 
Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , para. 7.78. 
227 See Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , para.  7.78. See also Panel  Report , 
Dominican  Republic  – Import and Sale of Cigarettes , paras.  7.84-7.90. 
228 Norway's first written submission, para.  436. 
229 Appellate  Body Report, Argen tina – Textiles and Apparel , paras.  45-47. See also Panel  Report s, EC – 
Chicken Cuts , paras.  7.64-7.65; EC – IT Products , para.  7.747 . 
230 See Norway's first written submission, paras.  432-437. In a footnote as part of its Article  II:1 
analysis, Norway additionally referred to the United  States  having, as of 13  August  2018, imposed a duty of 
50% on steel products from Türkiye  through Presidential Proclamation 9772. (See Norway's first written 
submission, fn  414 to para.  432. See also ibid. para.  5 and Ta ble 2). In its responses to the Panel's questions, 
Norway also referred to Presidential Proclamation 9772 as having been linked to its claims under Articles 
II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994 in its panel request. (See Norway's response to Panel question Nos . 2 and 
85). However, Norway did not raise any arguments or specifically request findings under Articles II:1(a) and 
(b) of the GATT  1994 in respect of this duty. The Panel has therefore declined to make findings in respect of 
this duty, in the context of this dispute.  
231 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit NOR-4 and USA -9). See also section 2.2.1 for a detailed description.  
232 United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Table  2: Steel Products Subject to Additional Duties under Section  232 
Steel Products Subject to Additional Duties  
 
#  
HTS Code  Rates of customs duties  
Bound rates233 Additional duty  
1. 7206-7215 
0 +25%  2. 7216 (except 
certain 
subheadings)234 
3. 7217-7229 
4. 7301.10.00  
5. 7302.10  
6. 7302.40.00  
7. 7302.90.00  
8. 7304-7306 
Source : United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level; Presidential Proclamation 9705235 
 
Table  3: Aluminium Products Subject to Additional Duties under Section  232 
Aluminium Products Subject to Additional Duties  
 
#  
HTS Code  Rates of customs duties  
Bound rates236 Additional duty  
1. 7601 0-2.6%  
+10%  2. 7604 1.5-5% 
3. 7605 2.6-4.2%  
4. 7606 2.7-6.5%  
5. 7607 0-5.8%  
6. 7608 0-5.7%  
7. 7609 5.7%  
8. 7616.99.51  2.5%237 
Source : United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level; Presidential Proclamation 9704238 
 
233 Pursuant to Chapters 72 and 73 of the HTSUS, the generally applied rate for these products is also 
0% for all relevant subheadings.  
234 Exceptions for subheadings 7216.61.00, 7216.69.00, and 7216.91.00.  
235 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United  States  (2019) Revision 2, Chapter 99,  (Exhibit NOR -15), 
subchapter III, Notes 16(b) and 19(b) ; United  States  Bound Tariffs, (Exhibit NOR -69); and  Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9). The Panel additionally relied on data from the WTO's 
Consolidated Tariff Schedule (CTS) Database and online versions of the United  States ' harmonized tariff 
schedule, https://hts.usitc.gov/current  (accessed 22  June 2022) . 
236 Pursuant to Chapter 76 of the HTSUS, the generally applied rate for the relevant subheadings are as 
follows: for HTS Code 7601, 0 -2.6%; for HTS Code 7604, 1.5 -5%; for HTS Code 7605, 2.6-4.2%; for HTS 
Code 7606, 2.7 -6.5%; for HTS Code 7607, 0 -5.8%; for HTS Code 7608, 5.7%; for HTS Code 7609, 5.7%; and 
for HTS Code 7616.99.51, 2.5%. In respect of HTS Code 7608, tariff lines 7608.10.00 and 7608.20.000, as 
described in the United  States ' Schedule, are subdivided into two categories of (A) and (B). The former applies 
to products certified for use in civil aircraft, for which a bound rate of zero applies. The latter applies to all 
other products, for which a bound rate of 5.7% applies. The H TSUS does not draw a distinction between (A) 
and (B) by simply providing for a rate of 5.7%.  
237 In WTO document WT/Let/493, the heading is elaborated to 7616.99.50 ("Other"), for which the 
duty rate is listed as 2.5%. In the HTSUS, this heading is elaborate d to 7616.99.51 ("Other"), for which the 
duty rate is listed as 2.5%. Norway lists this figure as 0 -2.5%, which appears to be an error. (See Norway's 
first written submission, para.  434).  
238 See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United  States  (2019) Revisio n 2, Chapter 99,  
(Exhibit  NOR-15), subchapter III, Notes 16(b) and 19(b) ; United  States  Bound Tariffs, (Exhibit NOR -69); and 
 WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.19.   The Panel recalls that the first sentence of Article  II:1(b) prohibits the imposition of ordinary 
customs duties on importation in excess of those rates set forth in a Member's Schedule, whereas 
the second sentence  prohibits the imposition of all other duties or charges of any kind on or in 
connection with importation except as recorded in a Member's Schedule. To fall within the scope of 
Article  II:1(b), the additional d uties must therefore qualify as either "ordinary customs duties" under 
the first sentence, or "other duties or charges" under the second sentence.  
7.20.   The term "ordinary customs duties" is not defined in the GATT  1994.239 However, previous 
WTO panels and the Appellate  Body have highlighted several factors that are relevant to this 
characterization. First, the word "ordinary" has been defined as referring to duties "of the usual kind, 
not singular or exceptional"240 or "occu rring in regular custom or practice".241 Second, the "customs 
dut[y]" must be imposed "on [the product's] importation"; in other words, the obligation to pay 
must accrue at the moment of or by virtue of the product's importation into the Member's customs 
territory.242 Third, neither the form which the duty takes, nor the basis on which it is calculated, will 
necessarily be dispositive.243 Rather, panels have examined duties by their design and structure244 
and found certain duties and charges, based on their pa rticular features, not to constitute "ordinary 
customs duties" in the sense of Article  II:1(b).245 The term "all other duties or charges of any kind" 
has been interpreted broadly as a residual category, which covers all duties or charges on or in 
connection  with importation that are neither "ordinary customs duties" nor the duties or charges 
expressly provided for in Article  II:2 of the GATT  1994.246  
7.21.   In the present dispute, Norway argues that the additional duties of 25% on steel products 
and 10% on aluminiu m products constitute "ordinary customs duties" inconsistent with the first 
sentence of Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994. In particular, Norway highlights the following features:  
a. the chargeable event for the imposition of the tariffs is importation into the United  States  
of a steel or aluminium good, with duty liability arising because the products are imported;  
b. the tariffs are imposed at an ad valorem  rate of 25% (steel) and 10% (aluminium), with 
the customs value of the product serving  as the tax base;  
c. the tariffs are imposed as part of a single, cumulative fiscal charge together with other 
ordinary customs duties applied by the United  States  to the relevant products; and  
d. the tariffs are characterized as "ordinary customs duties" in th e HTSUS.247  
 
Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10). The Panel additionally relied on data from the 
WTO's CTS Database and online versions of the United  States ' harmonized tariff schedule, 
https://hts.usitc.gov/current  (accessed 22  June 2022).  
239 See Appellate  Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 265. 
240 See Panel  Report , Chile – Price Band System, para. 7.51. 
241 Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , para.  7.83.  
242 Appellate  Body Report, China – Auto Parts, para. 158. In Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , 
the panel thus noted that: "the expression 'ordinary customs duties' in Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 refers 
to duties collected at the border which constitute 'customs duties' in the strict sense of the term" and "this 
expression does not cover all possible extraordinary or exceptional duties collected in customs." (Panel  Report , 
Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.85).  
243 Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.84 (referring to Appellate  Body 
Report, Chile – Price Band System , paras.  216 and 271 -278). See also Appellate  Body Reports, China – Auto 
Parts, para.  162 (noti ng that "the time at which a charge is collected or paid is not decisive"); EC – Bananas III 
(Article 21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – US), para.  416 (noting in passing that "it is 
unusual that a tariff concession inscribed in a Member 's Schedule would be limited in time").  
244 See Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.85 (noting that to determine 
whether the duties are "ordinary customs duties", panels "must consider the design and structure of the 
measures conce rned"). See also Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 55; 
Panel  Report , Russia – Tariff Treatment, para. 7.92.  
245 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, Peru – Agricultural Products , paras.  5.70-5.76; Chile – Price Band 
System (Article  21.5 – Argentina) , paras.  167 and 171; Panel  Report s, Peru – Agricultural Products, 
paras.  7.373 -7.374; Dominican  Republic  – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.115.  
246 Panel  Report s, Dominican  Republic  – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.113; Dominican  Republic  
– Safeguard Measures , para.  7.79. See also Appellate  Body Report, India – Additional Import Duties , 
para. 157. 
247 Norway's first written submission, para.  432. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.22.   In the alternative, Norway argues that even if the tariffs do not constitute "ordinary customs 
duties", they constitute "other duties or charges" that are prohibited under the second sentence of 
Article  II:1(b).248  
7.23.   In the Panel's view, the addi tional duties at issue bear certain features which suggest that 
they may best be characterized as "ordinary customs duties" for the purposes of Article  II:1(b). In 
particular, the additional duties are: (a) levied on all imports of the covered steel and al uminium 
products; (b) calculated on an ad valorem basis; (c) described as "tariffs" and "ordinary customs 
dut[ies]" in the relevant Presidential Proclamations; and (d) operationalized as "ordinary customs 
dut[ies]" and inscribed in the "Rates of Duty – General" column of the United  States ' tariff 
schedule.249 These duties are also clearly applicable to products "on their importation into the 
territory" of the United  States  in the sense of Article  II:1(b). Moreover, the United  States  has not 
contested Norway' s characterization of the duties under Article  II:1(b), but rather accepts that it 
has imposed duties "in excess of the levels set out in its WTO Goods Schedule".250 Accordingly, the 
Panel considers that the additional duties are "ordinary customs duties" u nder the first sentence of 
Article  II:1(b).  
7.24.   However, the Panel is cognizant that the additional duties also bear other features which 
reflect the particular process under Section  232 through which they were imposed and maintained. 
First, the additional duties were not inscribed through an amendment or replacement of the existing 
MFN tariff, but rather through inscription in subchapter III of chapter 99 of the HTSUS, titled 
"Tempora ry Modifications Established Pursuant to Trade Legislation".251 As such, the duties expressly 
apply "in addition" to any pre -existing tariffs.252 Second, although the additional duties are generally 
applicable on an MFN basis, they are subject to a number of  country exemptions.253 Finally, while 
the additional duties are not expressly imposed for a temporary period, certain aspects of their 
implementation suggest that they may not be intended as permanent adjustments to the MFN tariff 
rate.  These include the a forementioned inscription in subchapter III of chapter 99, as well as the 
stipulated requirement in the relevant Presidential Proclamations that "[t]he Secretary shall continue 
to monitor" these duties.254 In the circumstances of this dispute and mindful of  these other features, 
the Panel will also consider whether the additional duties as "other duties or charges" would be 
inconsistent with the second sentence of Article  II:1(b).  
7.25.   As "ordinary customs duties" under Article  II:1(b), it is evident that the add itional duties of 
25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products exceed the United  States ' bound rates of 
0% and 0 -6.5% on steel and aluminium products respectively.255 These products are therefore not 
exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of t hose set forth in the United  States ' Schedule, in 
a manner inconsistent with the first sentence of Article  II:1(b). Moreover, the United  States ' 
Schedule does not record any "other duties or charges" with respect to the steel and aluminium 
products at issu e.256 Even if considered to be "other duties or charges", the additional duties would 
therefore exceed those imposed on the entry into force of the GATT  1994 or directly and mandatorily 
required to be imposed thereafter, in a manner inconsistent with the se cond sentence of 
Article  II:1(b).  
 
248 Norway's first written submission, para.  437. 
249 See Presidential Proclam ation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9). 
250 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7. 
251 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), Annex; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), Annex.  
252 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11621 ; Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11627  (stating t hat the duties apply " in addition to  any 
other duties, fees, exactions or charges applicable" to the imported articles). ( emphasis added)  
253 See section 2.2.3 for a de tailed description. See also Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 
and USA -10), p. 11620 ; Presidential Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11626 . See also 
Presidential Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit NOR -6 and USA -12); Presidential Procla mation 9711 , (Exhibit NOR -7 
and USA -11); Presidential Proclamation 9739 , (Exhibit NOR -11 and USA -14); Presidential Proclamation 9740 , 
(Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13); Presidential Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16); and Presidential 
Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15). These will be elaborated in more detail in the context of 
Norway's claim under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. 
254 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit NOR -4 and  USA-9). 
255 See para.  7.18 above.  
256 United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.26.   Accordingly, the Panel considers that the additional duties are inconsistent with the first 
sentence of Article  II:1(b) as "ordinary customs duties" exceeding the United  States ' bound rates 
for the relevant products. Even if the additional duties were considered "other duties or charges", 
the Panel considers that these duties would also be inconsistent with the second sentence of 
Article  II:1(b). On either basis, the additional duties on steel and aluminium products would 
therefore be inconsistent with Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994. As the additional duties are 
inconsistent with Article  II:1(b) by exceeding the levels in the United  States ' Schedule, the 
United  States  has necessarily accorded treatment less favourable than  that provided for in its 
Schedule. The Panel therefore concludes that the additional duties are also inconsistent with 
Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994.  
7.3.3   Conclusion  
7.27.   Regarding Norway's claims under Article  II of the GATT  1994, the Panel concludes that the  
additional duties of 25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products do not accord the 
treatment provided for in the United  States ' Schedule, contrary to Article  II:1(b) and Article  II:1(a) 
of the GATT  1994. 
7.4  Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994   
7.4.1   Introduction  
7.28.   Norway  argues that the aluminium and steel tariffs give rise to discriminatory restrictions that 
are inconsistent with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.257 Norway considers that the steel and aluminium 
tariffs are subject to Article  I:1 because the y constitute "ordinary customs duties" under 
Article  II:1(b).258 Norway further advances that it is rebuttably presumed that aluminium and steel 
products from exempted countries are "like" those from all other WTO Members.259 Furthermore, in 
Norway's view, the measures at issue confer an "advantage" on imports from Memb ers that qualify 
for a country exemption, by either exempting imports from the tariffs without the imposition of any 
import restrictions, or by, in effect, affording countries the opportunity to choose between its 
preferred import regime: either tariff or quota.260 Finally, Norway advances that this advantage is 
not extended "immediately and unconditionally" to like aluminium and steel products originating in 
other countries.261 
7.29.   The United  States  has not advanced any arguments or evidence contesting the compl ainant's 
claim under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.262  
7.30.   Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 provides:  
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection 
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of p ayments 
for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and 
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and  4 of 
Article  III,* any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
 
257 Norway's first written submission, paras.  438-440; response t o Panel's questions following the first 
meeting, Annex  I; response to Panel question Nos. 1, para.  2, and No.  21, para.  244; second written 
submission, para.  49 and fn  35 to para.  49; and opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, 
para. 28.  
258 Norway's first written submission, paras.  446-447. Norway further considers that the quotas granted 
to Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  constitute "rules and formalities in connection with importation". 
(Ibid).  
259 Norway's first written submissio n, paras.  448-449. 
260 Norway's first written submission, paras.  450-464. Norway recalls that the Presidential Proclamations 
provide that the United  States  is willing to discuss with any country with which it has a "security relationship", 
and "arrive at a satisfactory alternative means" of addressing the perceived impacts on imports. (Ibid. 
para. 451).  
261 Norway's first written submission, para.  466. 
262 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7 (the United  States  
accepting that it "has imposed duties on certain steel and aluminum products on a non -MFN basis and in 
excess of the levels set out in its WTO Goods Schedu le"). WT/DS552/R  
 
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  immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other [Members].  
7.31.   Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 prohibits, with respect to measures falling within its scope of 
application, discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries.263 
The obligation to accord most-favoured -nation treatment as set out in Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 
has been understood to require equality of competitive opportunities for like imported products from 
any Member.264 
7.32.   The Panel will proceed by examining the challenged measures under Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994, specifically concerning the country exemptions for steel and aluminium products.265 
7.4.2   Country exemptions for steel and aluminium products  
7.33.   As described in greater detail above266, in March 2018, the United  States  imposed addi tional 
import duties of 25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products.267 At that time, Australia, 
Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  were temporarily exempted from the additional duties 
on both steel and aluminium products.268 By May 2018, t he United  States  had agreed to various 
"satisfactory alternative means" with these countries, including: (a) exemptions for steel and 
aluminium products from Australia; and (b) exemptions for steel and aluminium products from 
Argentina, as well as steel pr oducts from Brazil and  the Republic of Korea , including through the 
alternative of import quotas.269 In Norway's view, through granting country exemptions to Australia, 
Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea , the United  States  affords an "advantage" t o products 
from these countries which has not been extended "immediately and unconditionally" to like 
aluminium and steel products originating in other countries.270 
7.34.   The Panel recalls that the exemptions in question relate to the additional duties on steel and 
aluminium products, which have been found under Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 to constitute 
"ordinary customs duties" applicable on importation into the territory of the United  States .271 As 
such, they also relate to "customs duties and charges" conn ected with importation falling within the 
scope of Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.272  
7.35.   By design, the country exemptions exclude steel and aluminium products of certain origins 
from the application of the additional duties, conferring differential treatment t o exempted products 
in comparison to those subject to the duties. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the additional duties 
apply to all qualifying products imported into the United  States  and that the relevant country 
exemptions apply to products from sele ct countries (i.e. Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic 
 
263 Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 84. 
264 See Appellate  Body Report, EC – Seal Products , paras.  5.86-5.87. Under Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994, a complainant must demonstrate that: (a) the measure at issue falls within the scope of 
Article  I:1; (b) the imported products at issue are "like"; (c) the measure confers an "advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity" on any product originating in the territory of any country; and (d) the advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted is not extend ed "immediately" and "unconditionally" to like products 
originating in the territory of all Members. (See Appellate  Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.86).  
265 See Norway's first written submission, paras.  438-466; response to Panel's questions followi ng the 
first meeting, Annex  I. 
266 See section 2.2 above.  
267 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9). 
268 See Presidential Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit NOR -6 and US A-12); Presidential Proclamation 9711 , 
(Exhibit NOR -7 and USA -11). 
269 See Presidential Proclamation 9739 , (Exhibit NOR -11 and USA -14); Presidential Proclamation 9740 , 
(Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13); Presidential Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16); and Presidential 
Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15). These exemptions were extended based on the 
United  States ' "security relationship" with these Members. (Ibid).  
270 Norway's first written submission, paras.  452-466. 
271 Moreover, even if not consi dered to qualify as "ordinary customs duties", the additional duties would 
in any event be inconsistent with th e second sentence of Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 as "other duties or 
charges". See section 7.3 above.  
272 Previous panels have found exemptions from import duties to fall within the scope of Article  I:1 of 
the GATT  1994. (See e.g. Panel  Report s, Canada – Autos, para. 10.16; Indonesia – Autos, paras.  7.3-7.5). WT/DS552/R  
 
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  of Korea ) solely on the basis of origin.273 The United  States  does not contest that the measures 
exempt certain products based exclusively on origin contrary to the obligation to accord most -
favoured -nation treatment under Article  I:1.274 Therefore, with respect to the imposition of customs 
duties, the country exemptions accord an "advantage"275 to steel and aluminium products from the 
exempted countries that is not accorded immediately and unco nditionally to "like products"276 
originating in non -exempted countries. The Panel thus concludes that, by granting country 
exemptions from the additional duties to Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea , the 
United  States  acted inconsistently with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.36.   In the context of its claim under Article  I:1, Norway also raised specific arguments concerning 
the import quotas for steel and aluminium products from Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of 
Korea , to the extent that these exempted countries wer e afforded a choice of import restriction (i.e. 
tariff or quota) .277 The Panel notes that such quotas relate solely to countries that are exempted 
from the additional duties, and the existence of such quotas does not negate the fact that the 
products to whi ch they apply are exempted from the additional duties.278 Given the foregoing finding 
on the advantage accorded by  the exemptions, the Panel does not consider it necessary for the 
purposes of this dispute to determine whether any particular alternative trea tment of exempted 
products from Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea , including under any import quota, would 
constitute a distinct violation of Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.4.3   Conclusion  
7.37.   Regarding Norway's claims under Article  I of the GATT  1994, the Panel concludes that the 
country exemptions for steel and aluminium products confer an advantage to products from 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  that has not been accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to like products from al l other Members, in a manner inconsistent with Article  I:1 of 
the GATT  1994. 
 
273 See section 2.2.3 above . The Panel notes that a "presumption of likeness" has been applied in prior 
disputes in situations where  the onl y distinguishing factor under the challenged measure was the origin of the 
products. These previous disputes suggest that, where a measure makes distinctions exclusively on the basis 
of origin, it will typically not be necessary to conduct a detail ed analysis of "likeness" of the relevant products. 
(See Panel  Report , Russia – Railway Equipment , paras.  7.897 -7.899 ; see also Panel  Report s, Colombia – Ports 
of Entry , paras.  7.355 -7.356; US – Poultry (China) , paras.  7.424 -7.432 ). 
274 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7 (accepting that it 
has imposed duties on certain steel and aluminium products "on a non -MFN basis").  
275 See Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 79; Panel  Report s, EC – Bananas III, para. 7.239; 
EC – Seal Products, para. 7.595. Previous panels have found country exemptions conferring duty free 
treatment to constitute an "advantage" under Article  I:1. (See Panel  Report , EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – 
Ecuador  II), paras.  7.152 -7.153. See a lso Appellate  Body Report,  EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – Ecuador II) / 
EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – US), para.  353).  
276 See fn  273 above. In the specific circumstances of this dispute, including the lack of any rebuttal by 
the United  States , the Panel considers  that the challenged measures apply to "like products" within the 
meaning of Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994, without the need to conduct a detailed "likeness" analysis.  
277 See Norway's first written submission, paras.  454-466. The Panel recalls that Norway identifies the 
country -wide tariff exemptions as a distinct meas ure with distinct legal consequences, and only challenges this 
measure under Article  I:1. (Norway's response to Panel question No.  2, paras.  3-9; response to Panel's 
questions following the first meeting, Annex  I). However, Norway considers that these exem ptions include 
where the United  States  either foregoes import restrictions altogether or applies a quota to imports. (See 
Norway's first written submission, paras.  438-440).  
278 The Panel further notes that all the "satisfactory alternative means", regardles s of their specific form, 
were extended by the United  States  on the basis of their "security relationship" with the exempted countries 
and based on the determination that "imports from these countries [would] no longer threaten to impair the 
national secur ity". (See Presidential Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit NOR -6 and USA -12); Presidential Proclamation 
9711, (Exhibit NOR -7 and  USA-11); Presidential Proclamation 9739 , (Exhibit NOR -11 and USA -14); Presidential 
Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13); Pres idential Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -
16); and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15)). WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.5  Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994  
7.5.1   Introduction  
7.38.   Norway  challenges the import quotas under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.279 Norway argues 
that the import quotas are, by definition, quan titative restrictions on imports of aluminium and steel 
to the United  States , which are prohibited under this provision.280 
7.39.   The United  States  has not advanced any arguments or evidence contesting the complainant's 
claim under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.281  
7.40.   Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994 provides that:  
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any Member on the importation of any product of the 
territory of any other Member or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other Member.  
7.41.   Article  XI:1 lays down a general obligation to eliminate quantitative restrictions by prohibiting 
Members from instituting or m aintaining prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other 
charges on the importation, exportation, or sale for export of any product of another Member or 
destined for another Member.282 Such prohibitions or restrictions are prohibited wheth er or not they 
are "made effective" through "quotas, import or export licen ses or other measures".283 
7.42.   The Panel will proceed by examining the challenged measures under Article  XI:1 of the 
GATT  1994, specifically concerning the import quotas for steel and al uminium products.284 
7.5.2   Import quotas for steel and aluminium products  
7.43.   By May 2018, the United  States  imposed import quotas as an alternative to the additional 
duties on steel and aluminium products for: (a) steel and aluminium products from Argentina; (b) 
steel products from Brazil; and (c) steel products from the Republic of Korea .285 Norway challenges 
these as quantitative restrictions that are prohibited under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.286 
7.44.   The challenged measures comprise import quotas for steel and alumi nium products from 
Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea . Such "quotas" are expressly listed in Article  XI:1 as a 
method by which prohibitions or restrictions on importation may not be made effective.287 The 
United  States  does not contest that the im port quotas prohibit or restrict importation of steel and 
aluminium products, contrary to the obligation to eliminate quantitative restrictions set forth in 
Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.288 Based on these considerations, the Panel concludes that the import 
 
279 Norway's response to Panel question No.  2(f). See also Norway's response to Panel's questions 
following the first meeting, Annex  I; opening statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  28; and 
response to Panel question No.  97. 
280 Norway's second written submission, para.  49.  
281 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7. 
282 Previous panels and the Appellate  Body have noted that the scope of Article  XI:1 is broad, capturing 
any measures through which a prohibition or restriction is produced or becomes operative. (See e.g. 
Appellate  Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures , paras.  5.216-5.219; Panel  Report , India - Quantitative 
Restrictions , para.  5.128).  
283 See e.g. Panel  Report , Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.5 – Colombia)  / Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Panama) , para.  7.160.  
284 See Norway's response to Panel question No.  2(f); second written submission, para.  49. 
285 See Presidential Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13); Presidential Proclamation 9758 , 
(Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16); and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15). 
286 Norway's second written submission, para.  49. 
287 WTO and GATT panels have previously found import and export quotas to constitute "restrictions" 
prohibited by Article  XI:1, as such quotas necessarily have a limiting effect. (See Panel  Report s, China – Raw 
Materials , paras.  7.207 -7.209 and 7.224; China – Rare Earths , para.  7.200; and GATT Panel  Report , EEC – 
Import Restrictions , paras.  9 and 31 -32). 
288 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  quotas for steel and aluminium products from Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  are 
inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.5.3   Conclusion  
7.45.   Regarding Norway's claims under A rticle XI of the GATT  1994, the Panel concludes that by 
imposing import quotas on steel and aluminium products from Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic 
of Korea , the United  States  has instituted prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or 
other charges on the importation of those products of the territory of those Members, inconsistently 
with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.6  Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994  
7.46.   Norway challenges the administration of the " two exceptions to the US aluminium and steel 
tariffs" , namely the country exemptions and the product exclusions, under Article  X:3(a) of the 
GATT  1994.289 Regarding the country exemptions, Norway focuses on two aspects: "(1) the absence 
of any administrative process that applicant countries should fol low in seeking an exemption; and 
(2) the use of inherently vague and undefined eligibility criteria." Norway considers both aspects to 
give rise to unreasonable administration that is inconsistent with Article  X:3(a).290  
7.47.   With respect to the product exclusi ons, Norway explains that in deciding whether to exclude 
a particular imported steel or aluminium product from the additional duties, the DOC gives US 
producers an opportunity to object to the admission of imported products subject to an exclusion 
request.  Norway argues that these US producers have an important commercial interest that is 
"adverse to admitting the imported product subject to the exclusion request" and by "affording US 
producers a formal opportunity to shield their own production from import  competition", the United 
administers the product exclusion process in a partial and unreasonable manner.291  
7.48.   The United  States  has not advanced any arguments or evidence contesting Norway's  claim s 
under Article  X:3(a) of the GATT  1994. 
7.49.   The Panel recalls it s findings of inconsistency in relation to the additional duties, country 
exemptions and import quotas on steel and aluminium under the GATT  1994. The Panel considers 
that the findings of inconsistency under other provisions of the GATT  1994 are sufficient , in the 
circumstances of the present dispute, to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving 
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements  as required under the DSU.292 In light of these 
findings, the Panel does not consider it necessary  to make findings on Norway's claims relating to 
the administration of the processes for excluding certain countries or products from measures that 
have already been found inconsistent with other obligations under the GATT  1994. The Panel thus 
declines to make findings  regarding the claims under Article  X:3(a) of the GATT  1994.   
7.7  Article  XIX of the GATT  1994  and the Agreement on Safeguards    
7.7.1   Introduction  
7.50.   Norway  claims that certain measures at issue are safeguard measures and are inconsistent 
with certain obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards. Norway also claims that certain 
measures at issue constitute "voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arra ngements or any 
other similar measures on the export or the import side" within the meaning of Article  11.1(b) of 
the Agreement on Safeguards. The United  States  disputes the applicability of Article  XIX of the 
GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards to t he measures at issue and additionally argues that 
 
289 Norway's first written submission, para.  467. 
290 Norway's first written submission, para s. 492-493. 
291 Norway's first written submission, para.  534. 
292 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program , 
paras . 5.189 -5.190 and 5.194; US – Upland Cotton , para.  732. The Panel further notes various instances in 
which previous panels have declined to make findings under Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994 based on other 
findings of inconsistency concerning the underlying me asure being administered, including duties in excess of 
the bound rates in a Member's Schedule of Concessions. (See Panel  Report s, Peru – Agricultural Products, 
para. 7.501; Argentina – Import Measures , para.  6.498; Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.152; and Russia – 
Railway Equipment, para. 7.939).  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 is a defence to the complainant's claims under the Agreement on 
Safeguards.  
7.51.   The Panel will first address the parties' disagreement as to the applicability of Article  XIX of 
the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at issue. In doing so, the Panel 
will address specific issues of interpretation contested by the parties in accordance with Article  3.2 
of the DSU and customary rules of interpretation of public int ernational law. The Panel will then 
assess the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties in relation to the relevant measures at 
issue in light of the conclusions reached regarding the interpretation of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 
and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
7.7.2   Interpretation  of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994  and the Agreement on Safeguards in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU  
7.52.   Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 is entitled "Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products" 
and provides in relevant p art:  
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations 
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any 
product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in s uch increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party 
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent a nd for such time as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in 
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.  
7.53.   Article  1 of the Agreement on Safeguards is a "General Provision" and provides:  
This Agreement est ablishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall 
be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article  XIX of GATT  1994. 
7.54.   Article  11 of the Agreement on Safeguards contains the following provisions on "Prohibition 
and Elimination of Certain Measures":  
1. (a) A Member shall not take or seek any emergency action on imports of particular 
products as set forth in Article  XIX of GATT  1994 unless such action conforms with the 
provisions of that Article  applied in accordance with this Agr eement.  
(b) Furthermore, a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export 
restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export 
or the import side.[3],[4] These include actions taken by a single Member as well  as 
actions under agreements, arrangements and understandings entered into by two or 
more Members. Any such measure in effect on the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement  shall be brought into conformity with this Agreement or phased out in 
accorda nce with paragraph 2.  
(c) This Agreement does not apply to measures sought, taken or maintained by a 
Member pursuant to provisions of GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX, and Multilateral 
Trade Agreements in Annex  1A other than this Agreement, or pursuant to protocols and 
agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework of GATT  1994. 
3 An import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant provisions of 
GATT  1994 and this Agreement may, by mutual agreement, be administered by the exporting 
Member. 
4 Examples of similar measures include export moderation, export -price or import -price 
monitoring systems, export or import surveillance, compulsory import cartels and d iscretionary 
export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford protection.  
 
7.55.   The Panel notes that a threshold question presented by the parties' arguments concerns the 
applicability of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards to th e measures at 
issue. Norway  emphasizes the characterization of the measures at issue as safeguards  or other 
prohibited measures under Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards  based on objective WT/DS552/R  
 
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  features of the measures at issue.293 The United  States  refers to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 and 
contends that the Agreement on Safeguards is inapplicable to the measures at issue by virtue of 
Article  11.1(c) as the measures were "sought, taken or maintained … pursuant to provisions of 
GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX".294  
7.56.   The Panel recalls that it is required under Article  11 of the DSU to make an objective 
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and 
the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements.295 Moreover, the Panel is 
required to address the parties' disagreement regarding the applicability of the relevant covered 
agreements in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and the customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.296 The rule of interpretation set out in Article  31(1) of the Vienna  Convention  
forms part of such "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" and provides that 
"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the 
terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."297 Regarding the interpretation of 
treaties authenticated in two or more languages, the customary rules in Article  33 of the 
Vienna  Convention  provide that "[t]he terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning 
in each authentic text" and that in case of a difference between authentic texts "which the application 
of articles 31 and 32 [of the Vienna  Convention ] does not remove, t he meaning which best reconciles 
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted".298 
7.57.   The Panel notes that the Agreement on Safeguards "establishes rules for the application of 
safeguard measures which shall be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX 
of GATT 1994".299 In this regard, Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that "[a] 
Member shall not take or seek any emergency action on imports of particular products as set forth 
in Artic le XIX of GATT 1994 unless such action conforms with the provisions of that Article applied 
in accordance with this Agreement." Article  11.1(a) is one of three paragraphs under Article  11.1 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards as part of provisions entitled "Pro hibition and Elimination of Certain 
Measures" under which Article  11.1(b) prohibits "voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing 
arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side". Article  11.1(c) refers 
to measures "sought, ta ken or maintained … pursuant to provisions of GATT  1994 other than 
Article  XIX", to which the Agreement on Safeguards "does not apply".  
7.58.   According to its express terms, Article  11.1(c) removes certain measures from the scope of 
application of the Agreement  on Safeguards, including the rules specified in Article  11.1(a) and the 
prohibition under Article  11.1(b).300 This is supported by the unambiguous reference in 
Article  11.1(c) to the inapplicability of the Agreement on Safeguards as a whole in respect of 
measures "sought, taken or maintained … pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than 
 
293 Norway's first written submission, paras.  90-156 and 392 -420. Norway  specifically argues that the 
measures at issue objectively present the constituent features of safeguard measures under Article  XIX of the 
GATT  1994. (See ibid. (referring to Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , para.  5.60)).  
294 United  States ' response to Panel question No s. 77 and 78; see also second written submission, 
section  II.A. 
295 The Panel further notes the principle affirmed in past disputes that panels under the DSU have 
independence in the structure of their analysis and the development of legal reasoning, as well as latitude in 
the evidence on the record relied upon to reach f indings that will assist the DSB. (See e.g. Appellate  Body 
Reports, EC – Hormones , para. 156; EC – Fasteners (China) (Article  21.5 – China) , para.  5.61;  Panel  Report s, 
India – Solar Cells , para.  7.41; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar  (Australia) , para.  7.121  and fn  437). 
296 See section 7.1 above.  
297 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, US – Gasoline , p. 17; India – Patents (US) , para.  46; Argentina – 
Textiles and Apparel , para.  42; US – Carbon Steel , para.  61. The Panel notes the parties' agreement that the 
Panel should be guided by the ordinary meaning of the terms of the Agreement on Safeguards in their context 
and in light of the object and purpose of the agreem ent. (See Norway's response to Panel question No.  20 and 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  20. See also Norway's second written submission, paras.  37-44; 
United  States ' second written submission, section IV.B).  
298 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports , US – Softwood Lumber IV , para. 59; EC – Bed Linen (Article  21.5 – 
India) , fn 153; US – Upland Cotton , para. 424; and US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) , fn 200.  
299 Article  1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
300 The French and Spanish versions of Article  11.1(c)  use the terms " ne s'applique pas " and " no es 
aplicable " respectively to denote that the Agreement on Safeguards is inapplicable to " mesures " or " medidas " 
described in that provision. The Panel understands that the parties agree that Article  11.1(c) exclud es certain 
measures from the scope of application of the Agreement on Safeguards, notwithstanding their disagreement 
as to when such measures may be considered to have been "sought, taken or maintained … pursuant to 
provisions of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX" within the meaning of Article  11.1(c). (See Norway 's 
response to Panel question No.  20; United  States ' response to Panel question No s. 20 and 22 ). WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Article  XIX". The Panel notes that the paragraphs of Article  11.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards do 
not contain any terms explicitly indicating the limitation or qualific ation of any paragraph in relation 
to another.301 In this respect, Article  11.1 does not subordinate any of the paragraphs in relation to 
one another concerning the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Panel thus considers 
that finding the meas ures at issue to fall within the scope of Article  11.1(c) would fully address the 
matter within the Panel's terms of reference under the Agreement on Safeguards as there would be 
no basis to assess claims of inconsistency under an agreement that "does not apply" to the measures 
at issue. The Panel is mindful in this connection of its mandate to make only such findings under the 
covered agreements as will assist the DSB in this dispute, taking into account the specific measures 
at issue, the evidence and arg uments submitted by the parties, and the Panel's overall conclusions 
reached with respect to the matter referred to the DSB.  
7.59.   In the circumstances of this dispute, the Panel therefore considers that it is appropriate to 
determine whether the measures at is sue can be characterized as having been "sought, taken or 
maintained … pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article XIX" within the meaning of 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Panel will focus its assessment on the terms of 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards, and particularly, the terms "pursuant to" and "other 
than", in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
7.60.   Regarding the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c), Norway  argues that this phrase refers 
to measures that are in conformity with or consistent with provisions of the GATT  1994. As a 
consequence, Norway  considers that the measures sought, taken or maintained by a Member must 
satisfy the conditions of "provisions of GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX" to be excluded from the 
scope of the Agreement on Safeguards.302 For the United  States , the expression "pursuant to" is 
different from the terms "in compliance with" or "consistent with", and serves the function of 
"direct[ing] the Panel to the other GATT  1994 provision pursuant to which the measure in question 
was attempted or tried".303  
7.61.   The Panel will assess the meaning of "pursuant to" as it is used in Article  11.1(c) having 
regard for relevant context and the use of t erms in the three authentic language versions of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. The expression "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) denotes the existence of a 
relationship betw een the measures of a Member and provisions of the GATT  1994 other than 
Article  XIX.304 The term "pursuant" when used with the preposition "to" may mean "under", "in 
accordance with", "in consequence of", or "as authori zed by".305 Taken in isolation, the ter ms 
"pursuant to" could potentially accommodate a range of meanings. Within this range of meanings, 
the terms "pursuant to" in the context of Article  11.1(c) could be understood as consistency with 
the requirements of a provision  of the GATT  1994 other than  Article  XIX, or a different relationship 
that does not require such consistency. For example, a measure could be characterized under 
Article  11.1(c) as being "pursuant to" a provision  in the sense of being sought, taken, or maintained 
under the purview of  that provision without necessarily meeting the requirements of the specific 
terms of such other provision.   
7.62.   The Panel finds instructive the contrast between "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) and terms 
used elsewhere in the Agreement on Safeguards that app ear to convey a relationship of consistency 
with the requirements of another provision of the covered agreements. This is particularly evident 
in the other paragraphs of Article  11.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards that provide immediate 
 
301 The paragraphs of Article  11.1 can be contrasted in this respect with other provis ions of the covered 
agreements that explicitly limit or qualify the scope of that provision by reference to another provision in the 
covered agreements, including within the same article. See e.g. Article  5.6 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
("Notwithstandin g the provisions of paragraph 5 …"); Article  3.3 of the SPS  Agreement  ("Notwithstanding the 
above …"); Article  X:6 of the WTO  Agreement  ("Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Article  …"); 
Article  3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture ("Subject to the  provisions of Article  6 …"); Article  XII:1 of the 
GATT  1994 ("… subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article"); Article  7.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards ("… provided that the pertinent provisions of Articles 8 and 12 are observe d").  
302 Norway's response to Panel question No.  20.b. 
303 United  States ' response to Panel question No s. 20 and 96.  
304 Similarly, in the French and Spanish versions of Article  11.1(c), the phrases " en vertu de " and " de 
conformidad con " respectively describe t he relationship between the measures (" aux mesures " and " las 
medidas ") and provisions of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX (" dispositions du GATT de 1994 autres que 
l'article XIX " and " disposiciones del GATT de 1994, aparte del artículo XIX ").  
305 Shorte r Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2411;  Garner's 
Dictionary of Legal Usage, 3rd Edition (Oxford University Press. 2011), p. 737.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  context to the term s of Article  11.1(c) and use the expressions "in accordance with" and "in 
conformity with" other provisions. The obligation for safeguard measures to meet the requirements 
of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards is expressed in Arti cle 11.1(a) by 
providing that Members' safeguard measures must " conform [] with the provisions of that 
Article  applied in accordance with  this Agreement".306 Similarly, the elimination of measures 
prohibited under Article  11.1(b) is expressed in the obligation that such measures "shall be brought 
into conformity with  this Agreement or phased out in accordance with " the mandatory timetables 
and requirements set  out in Article  11.2.307 These explicit references in Article  11.1 to "conformity" 
and actions "in accordance with" other provisions are comparable to other uses of these terms in 
the Agreement on Safeguards that similarly appear to denote consistency with the referenced 
requirements.308  
7.63.   The contrast in meaning between "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) and terms expressing a 
standard of consistency finds support in the French version of the provision referring to " mesures … 
en vertu de dispositions de GATT de 1994 autre que l'article XIX ". As in the English text, the 
Agreement on Safeguards uses the French terms " conformes " and " conformément " in Articles 
11.1(a) and 11.1(b) for "conforms" and "in accordance with", which similar ly appear to indicate 
consistency or conformity with the legal provisions specified in those paragraphs.309 In contrast, the 
French version of Article  11.1(c) for egoes  the term " conformément " in favour of " en vertu de ", whose 
dictionary meanings include " en conséquence de " (as a consequence of), " par l'effet de " (by the 
effect of), " par le pouvoir de " (by the power of), and " au nom de " (in the name of or on behalf of).310 
The Panel further notes that the use of the French term " conformément " in various provis ions of the 
Agreement on Safeguards corresponds to English references to "conformity" and actions being "in 
accordance with" other provisions.311 The terms of Article  11.1(c) in both English and French thus 
reflect a departure from terms used in other provi sions of the Agreement on Safeguards that appear 
to convey a requirement of conformity or consistency.  
7.64.   The Panel notes the terminology used in the Spanish version of the Agreement on Safeguards, 
which in Article  11.1(c) provides that the Agreement does not  apply to measures sought, taken or 
maintained " de conformidad con otras disposiciones del GATT de 1994 ". Dictionary meanings of the 
terms " de conformidad con " include " con arreglo a " or "a tenor de " (according to), " en proporción o 
correspondencia a " (in proportion or correspondence to), or " de la misma suerte o manera que " (in 
the same way or manner).312 The Spanish terms " de conformidad con " are also used in the provisions 
referred to above in which the English and French terms use variants of "conformity " or "conformité ", 
as well as "in accordance with" in English, and appear to indicate a requirement of conformity or 
consistency with the other referenced legal provisions. This is notably the case in Articles 11.1(a) 
and (b) where the Spanish text uses si milar terms (" conformes " and " de conformidad con ") as those 
used in English and French. The Spanish version of Article  11.1(c) refers to " conformidad con otras 
disposiciones del GATT de 1994 ", unlike the English and French terms in Article  11.1(c) that reflect 
 
306 Emphasis added.  
307 Emphasis added. See also footnote 3 to Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards ("[a]n 
import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with  the relevant provisions of GATT  1994 and this 
Agreement may, by mutual agreement, be administered b y the exporting Member") (emphasis added). The 
indication of consistency or conformity with certain requirements is further supported by the mandatory terms 
"shall" and "must" in Article  11.2 establishing the obligations with which a measure must be in con formity or 
accordance.  
308 See e.g. Article  4.1(b) ("'threat of serious injury' shall be understood to mean serious injury that is 
clearly imminent, in accordance with  the provisions of paragraph 2") (emphasis added); Article  4.2(c) ("The 
competent authoriti es shall publish promptly, in accordance with  the provisions of Article  3 …") (emphasis 
added); Article  7.2 ("[t]he period mentioned in paragraph 1  may be extended provided that the competent 
authorities of the importing Member have determined, in conformi ty with  the procedures set out in Articles 2, 
3, 4 and 5 …") (emphasis added). In prior disputes under the Agreement on Safeguards, the Appellate  Body 
has referred to other provisions in the Agreement on Safeguards establishing requirements with which 
safeguard measures must be in conformity, such as the conditions in Article  2.1 and the requirements of 
Articles 3 and 4. (See Appellate  Body Reports, US – Line Pipe , para.  84; US – Steel Safeguards , para.  264).  
309 See also footnote 3 to Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards (" Un contingent d'importation 
appliqué en tant que mesure de sauvegarde conformément  aux dispositions pertinentes du GATT de 1994 et du 
présent accord pourra, par accord mutuel, être administré par le Membre exportateur "). 
310 Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Fran çaise (2000), p. 2663.  
311 See e.g. Article  4.1(b) (" conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 "); Article  4.2(c) 
("conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 "); and Article  7.2 (" conformément aux procédures én oncées aux 
articles 2, 3, 4 et 5 "). 
312 Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), pp. 420 -421.   WT/DS552/R  
 
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  a clear departure from references to "conformity" or being "in accordance with" other legal 
provisions.313 
7.65.   On balance, these considerations indicate that the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) of 
the Agreement on Safeguards do not r equire consistency with provisions of the GATT  1994 other 
than Article  XIX for a measure to fall under that paragraph. The text of Article  11.1(c) does not make 
any explicit reference to a requirement of conformity with the provisions of GATT  1994 in Engli sh or 
French in contrast to other provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards, including those that provide 
immediate context for Article  11.1(c). The use of the French terms " en vertu de " in Article  11.1(c) 
is especially compelling in this regard in signall ing a contrast to the term " conformément " and 
indicates a different legal relationship than consistency or conformity with the requirements of a 
provision  of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX.  
7.66.   The comparison of terms in the different language versions is instructive but not in itself 
dispositive regarding the interpretation of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU.314 The terms of Article  11.1(c) must be interpreted in 
accordance with their ordinary mean ing in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the 
Agreement on Safeguards. Moreover, to the extent that the Spanish text "discloses a difference of 
meaning" when compared to the text of Article  11.1(c) in English and French, the Panel find s 
guidance in the rule of interpretation in Article  33(4) of the Vienna  Convention  that, if such difference 
cannot be removed by application of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna  Convention , the meaning which 
best reconciles the texts, having regard to the o bject and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.315  
7.67.   The Panel considers that interpreting the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) to refer to 
measures sought, taken, or maintained under the purview of another provision of the GATT  1994, 
without entail ing consistency with the requirements of such other provision, accords with the specific 
context in which those terms appear. The terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) form part of a 
provision  governing the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards rat her than the consistency of 
measures with the rules and requirements of that agreement.316 Accordingly, the nature of the 
relevant inquiry under Article  11.1(c) does not relate to another provision of the GATT  1994 as a 
legal exception or justification for inconsistencies with the Agreement on Safeguards.317 Rather, the 
 
313 The Spanish terms " de conformidad con " are also used in other provisions of the Agreement on 
Safeguards that appear to in dicate a standard of consistency across all language versions. (See e.g. 
Article  4.1(b) (" de conformidad con las disposiciones del párrafo 2 "); Article  4.2(c) (" de conformidad con las 
disposiciones del artículo 3 "); and Article  7.2 (" de conformidad con los procedimientos establecidos en los 
artículos 2, 3, 4 y 5 ")). The Panel further notes that the terms " de conformidad con " are translated with some 
variation in English, including provisions in which the corresponding term for " de conform idad con " in the 
English version is "under" within the specific context of the provision in question. (See Article  7.1 ("The period 
shall not exceed four years, unless it is extended under paragraph 2.") (emphasis added); Article  7.4 ("A 
measure extended under paragraph 2 …") (emphasis added)).  
314 The Panel notes that the terms "pursuant to" appear in various provisions of the Agreement on 
Safeguards for which the corresponding French and Spanish terms reflect the potential range of meanings of 
these terms a ccording to their specific context. For example, Article  2.1 provides that a safeguard measure 
may be applied "only if that Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below," various 
conditions for the application of safeguard measures. The context of mandatory conditionality in which 
"pursuant to" appears in Article  2.1 ("may apply a safeguard measure … only if") is reflected in the French and 
Spanish, respectively, as " conformément " and " con arreglo a ". As another example, Article  10 of the  
Agreement on Safeguards refers to "safeguard measures taken pursuant to Article  XIX of GATT 1947" where 
the corresponding French and Spanish terms (" au titre de " and " al amparo del " respectively) do not appear to 
indicate consistency or conformity.  
315 As noted above, this rule of interpretation forms part of the "customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law" referred to in Article  3.2 of the DSU. See para.  7.56 above.  
316 See Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , para.  5.57 (distinguishing "factors 
pertaining to the legal characterization of a measure for purposes of determining the applicability  of the WTO 
safeguard disciplines" from "the substantive conditions and procedural requirements that determine the WTO 
consistency  of a safeguard measure") (emphasis original).  
317 The Panel notes in this regard that Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeg uards serves a similar 
role to certain provisions in the Anti -Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures  (SCM  Agreement ), which allow Members to take measures "under" other provisions of the 
GATT  1994 but do not indicate a  requirement of conformity with such other provisions. Moreover, the French 
and Spanish versions of these provisions do not use terms such as " conformément " and " conformidad " but 
rather " au titre " and " al amparo " respectively. (See Article  18.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, footnote 24 
and Article  32.1 of the SCM  Agreement , footnote 56). At the same time, the Panel notes differences in the 
 WT/DS552/R  
 
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  relevant inquiry under Article  11.1(c) corresponds to the threshold issue of applicability and leaves 
as a separate inquiry whether a measure is consistent with the requirements of such other provision 
"pursuant to" which the measure was sought, taken, or maintained.  
7.68.   These considerations are also relevant for the interpretation of the terms "other than" in 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The parties dispute the meaning of these terms 
particularly in relation to their arguments on the characterization of measures as safeguards within 
the meaning of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and Article  1 of the Agreement on Safeguards. In this 
connection, Norway  contends that a measure may possess certain objective features of a safeguard 
measure and, if so, such measure would not be pursuant to a provision  "other than" Article  XIX in 
the sense of Article  11.1(c).318 In the Panel's view, Norway 's interpretation of  the terms "provisions 
… other than" amounts to meaning provisions that are exclusively other than Article  XIX of the 
GATT  1994. The Panel understands this interpretation to mean that  the Agreement on Safeguards 
could  still be applicable to a measure notwi thstanding its characterization as being pursuant to 
another provision of the GATT  1994.319  
7.69.   With respect to the ordinary meaning of the terms "other than", dictionary definitions include 
"besides", "except" or "apart from".320 The Panel notes that all three  language versions of 
Article  11.1(c) contain terms that are not qualified by any specification or limitation with respect to 
being "other than" Article  XIX of the GATT  1994. The ordinary meaning of these terms in their 
context encompasses measures that ar e pursuant to another provision  of the GATT  1994, and the 
Panel does not find in the text of Article  11.1(c) the imposition of an additional requirement or 
limitation of being exclusively pursuant to such other provision. This interpretation is consonant w ith 
the context of the paragraphs of Article  11.1 that together establish the conditions for the 
applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. The question of applicability is addressed under 
Article  11.1(c) by terms specifying a relationship between a mea sure and a provision of the 
GATT  1994 "other than" Article  XIX, namely that a measure is "pursuant to" such other relevant 
provision, and providing that the Agreement on Safeguards does not apply to such measure.321  
7.70.   The Panel finds support for these conclu sions in the object and purpose of the Agreement on 
Safeguards as expressed in its preamble recognizing "the need to clarify and reinforce the disciplines 
of GATT 1994, and specifically those of its Article XIX (Emergency Action on Imports of Particular 
Products), to re -establish multilateral control over safeguards and eliminate measures that escape 
such control". In this regard, the preamble further expresses recognition of the need for "a 
comprehensive agreement, applicable to all Members and based on th e basic principles of 
GATT  1994". An essential corollary of the "multilateral control over safeguards" and elimination of 
"measures that escape such control" under the Agreement on Safeguards is the explicit preservation 
under Article  11.1(c) of the right for Members to adopt measures under legal provisions of the 
GATT  1994 that are part of the "basic principles" affirmed and reinforced by the Agreement on 
Safeguards. The Panel considers significant in this regard the placement of Article  11.1(c) in the lis t 
of paragraphs under Article  11.1 as part of provisions entitled "Prohibition and Elimination of Certain 
 
terminology and structure of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards compared to these footnotes, 
which provide  that the particular terms of Article  18.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and Article  32.1 of the 
SCM Agreement  are "not intended to preclude actions under other relevant provisions of GATT  1994". By 
contrast, Article  11.1(c) is in the main text of the prov ision and expressly states conditions under which the 
agreement "does not apply". (See Appellate  Body Report, US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) , para.  262 
(referring to Appellate  Body Report, US – 1916 Act , para.  123) (describing the "accessory footnotes" a s 
"clarifications of the main provisions" on the "specific action" Members are permitted to take against dumping 
or subsidies)).  
318 Norway's response to Panel Question 20.b . 
319 See Norway's opening statement at the second meeting, para.  24 ("for a measure to  be subject to 
[Article  11.1(c)], the legal basis for the measure must be drawn from the universe of GATT 'provisions' besides  
Article  XIX. If the 'provisions' forming the legal base include  Article  XIX, they are not 'other than' Article  XIX") 
(emphasis original).  See also Norway's second written submission, para.  37. 
320 The terms of Article  11.1(c) in French and Spanish (" autres que " and " aparte del " respectively) 
similarly mean different from or with the omission of. See Le Petit Robert Diction naire de la Langue Francaise 
(2000), pp. 185 -186 and Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 
120. 
321 In the context of the objective assessment required under Article  11 of the DSU, the relevant 
provision under Art icle 11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards (i.e. the provision of the GATT  1994 "other 
than" Article  XIX) depends on the specific circumstances of the dispute, including the measures and claims at 
issue, legal provisions raised by the parties, as well as the relevant evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Measures". The imposition of obligations to "clarify and reinforce the disciplines of GATT  1994", as 
notably expressed in Articles 11.1(a) and (b), is  explicitly conditioned by the terms of Article  11.1(c) 
on the applicability of the agreement as a whole. The requirement under Article  11.1(c) for a 
measure to be "pursuant to" a provision  "other than" Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 thus serves the 
maintenance of a balance of rights and obligations that are in turn based on the terms of such other 
provision.  
7.71.   The relevant provision of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX in this dispute is Article  XXI 
entitled "Security Exceptions", which provides inter alia that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be 
construed … to prevent any [Member] from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests".322 In accordance with the requirements of A rticle 11 of 
the DSU, the Panel will assess the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at 
issue in light of the foregoing interpretive considerations on Article  11.1(c) as well as the evidence 
and arguments submitted by the parties in  this dispute. Taking into account the case -specific nature 
of the relevant inquiry on applicability rather than conformity, the Panel will identify relevant aspects 
of the design and application of the measures with specific reference to their legal chara cterization 
under Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Panel will give due consideration to all 
relevant evidence in this regard including the domestic law and procedures under which the 
measures were adopted as well as any relevant notifica tions or statements to the official bodies of 
the WTO.323  
7.72.   The Panel takes note of the United  States ' arguments in relation to the meaning of the term 
"sought" in Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards, which are related to the United  States ' 
conten tion that, based on Article  XIX:2 of the GATT  1994, formal notification of safeguard measures 
to the WTO is a "condition precedent" to the applicability of safeguard disciplines.324 As detailed 
below, the Panel considers the manner in which the measures wer e raised before the WTO, including 
notifications to relevant WTO bodies or committees, as part of the assessment of the evidence and 
arguments submitted on all relevant aspects of the measures at issue in this dispute. The Panel does 
not consider it necess ary for the purposes of this dispute to address in further detail the 
United  States ' arguments on WTO notification being a "condition precedent" for the applicability of 
safeguard disciplines.     
7.73.   Finally, the Panel notes that the parties have referred to certain aspects of the negotiating 
history of the Agreement on Safeguards in support of their respective positions. Under Article  32 of 
the Vienna  Convention , recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of a treaty, ma y be had either to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article  31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article  31 
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable. The Panel does not consider that the application of Article  31 of the Vienna  Convention  
to the interpretation of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards leaves the meaning of the 
provision ambiguous or obscure, nor does the Panel find that  it leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Panel has examined the negotiating history of the 
 
322 See section 7.8 below.  
323 The Panel notes that the Appellate  Body identified various relevant factors for the determination of 
whether measures constitute safeguard measures under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994. In this dispute, the 
relevant inquiry is directed by the terms of Artic le 11.1(c) to a provision  other than Article  XIX of the 
GATT  1994. Nevertheless, there is a broad parallel in both contexts of distinguishing questions of legal 
applicability from those concerning legal consistency and, for the former, making an objective examination of 
the specific measures at issue according to the relevant provision of the GATT  1994 upon which to determine 
the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. (See Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel 
Products , para.  5.60).  
324 United States ' second written submission, section s IV.B.1  ("Article  11.1(c) Supports That Invocation 
is a Condition Precedent for … a Member's exercise of its right to take action under Article  XIX and Application 
of Safeguards Rules") and IV.B.2 ("Other Provi sions of the Agreement on Safeguards Also Support that Notice 
is a Condition Precedent for Action Under Article  XIX"). For the various terms used by the United  States  to 
describe the "condition precedent" for the applicability of safeguard disciplines, see  United  States ' second 
written submission, para.  153 ("notice is a condition precedent to taking action under Article  XIX"); 
paras.  155-156 ("[t]he text of Article  XIX:2 explicitly sets out a requirement to invoke the provision through 
notice as a condition precedent to action under Article  XIX:1 … [w]ithout such notice, a Member is not seeking 
legal authority pursuant to Article  XIX"); para.  180 ("notice under Article  XIX:2 is a fundamental, condition 
precedent to a Member's exercise of its right t o take action under Article  XIX and the application of safeguards 
disciplines"); and para.  211 ("invocation through written notice is a condition precedent to a Member's exercise 
of its right to take action under Article  XIX and the application of safeguar ds rules to that action") . WT/DS552/R  
 
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  provision in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article  31 of the 
Vienna  Convention . As detail ed in Appendix  A to this Report , the Panel's review of the negotiating 
history of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards confirms the conclusions reached by the 
Panel regarding the interpretation of that provision.  
7.74.   Based on the foregoing, the Panel will assess the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards 
in this dispute according to whether the measures at issue were sought, taken, or maintained 
pursuant to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 within the meaning of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards.   
7.7.3   Assessment of the measures at issue  
7.75.   The United  States  adopted the measures at issue under Section  232 and the related 
procedures set out in Title 15, Part 705 of the Code of Federal Regulations.325 According to the terms 
of the domestic legislation, Section  232 concerns actions taken by the United  States  for 
"[s]afeguarding national security".326 Moreover, Section  232 authorizes the US Secretary of 
Commerce to investigate the effects of imports of an  article on US national security327, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officers of the United  States .328 If the Secretary 
of Commerce determines that an article is being imported into the United  States  in such quantities 
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, the US President may 
adjust the imports of that article into the United  States .329 In this respect, Section  232 directs the 
US Secretary of Commerce and the US President to give consid eration among other factors to the 
domestic production needed for projected national defen ce and the impact of foreign competition on 
the economic welfare of domestic industries essential to US national security .330  
7.76.   The US Secretary of Commerce commenced i nvestigations under Section  232 to determine 
the effects of imports of certain steel and aluminium products on US national security in April 
2017.331 The findings of these investigations were published in January 2018 in the Steel and 
Aluminium Reports, whe re the US Secretary of Commerce determined that present quantities of 
steel and aluminium imports were "weakening [the United States'] internal economy" and therefore 
"threaten to impair" its national security.332 According to these reports, rising levels o f imports of 
foreign steel and aluminium place at substantial risk the capacity of domestic industries to produce 
steel and aluminium for critical infrastructure and national defen ce333, especially in times of national 
emergencies.334 The reports recommend c orrective actions against imports in the form of tariffs and 
quotas with a view to improve domestic capacity utili zation  and stabili ze US production at the level 
required for its security needs.335 
 
325 See section 2.1 above.  
326 Section  232, ( Exhibit NOR-12 and USA -1), § 1862. Title 15, Part 705 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations sets ou t the procedures by which the US Department of Commerce commences and conducts an 
investigation "to determine the effect on the national security of the imports of any article". (See Section  232 
regulations, ( Exhibit US A-2), § 705.2 ). 
327 Section  232, ( Exhibit NOR-12 and USA -1), § 1862(b)(1)(A).  
328 Section  232, ( Exhibit NOR-12 and USA -1), §§ 1862(b)(2)(A)(i) and b(2)(A)(ii).  
329 Section  232, ( Exhibit NOR-12 and USA -1), § 1862(c)(1)(A).   
330 Section  232, ( Exhibit NOR-12 and USA -1), § 1862(d); Section  232 regul ations, ( Exhibit USA -2), § 
705.4.  
331 Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), p. 18; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR-2 and USA -8), p. 
18. See also sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 above.  
332 Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), p. 55; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR-2 and USA -8), p. 
104. 
333 Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), p. 55; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR-2 and USA -8), p. 
104.  
334 Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), pp. 55-56; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR-2 and USA -8), 
p. 105 (also noting that rising imports have placed at risk the capability of domestic industries to "quickly shift 
production capacity used for commercial products to defense and critical infrastructure production that 
provides the United  States  a surge capability that is vital to natio nal security, especially in an unexpected or 
extended conflict or national emergency").  
335 Aluminium Report, ( Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), pp. 104 -105. See also Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 
and USA -7), p. 58 (recommending quotas or tariffs on steel imported into the United  States  to increase 
domestic capacity utilization and to keep the domestic steel industry financially viable and able to meet US 
national security needs).  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.77.   The measures at issue in this dispute on imports of steel a nd aluminium into the United  States  
are based on the abovementioned findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of 
Commerce .336 The Presidential Proclamations  concurring with these findings and recommendations 
describe the measures as "necessary" and "appropriate" to address the threatened impairment of 
national security.337 Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 providing for additional duties on 
steel and al uminium imports state that "[t]his relief will … revive idled facilities, open closed 
[smelters and] mills, preserve necessary skills by hiring new [steel and alumin ium workers], and 
maintain or increase production", which in turn will "reduce [the United  States '] need to rely on 
foreign producers for [steel and alumin ium] and ensure that domestic producers can continue to 
supply all the [steel and alumin ium] necessary for critical industries and national defen se".338 These 
proclamations further describe the  additional duties as "an important first step in ensuring the 
economic viability" of the United  States ' domestic steel and alumin ium industry, without which "the 
industry will continue to decline, leaving the United  States  at risk of becoming reliant on f oreign 
producers … to meet [its] national security needs".339 These Presidential Proclamations  thus describe 
the national security objectives that the United  States  seeks to achieve by adopting measures 
against a "high level of imports".340  
7.78.   The national sec urity considerations expressed in the domestic legal instruments and acts 
underlying the measures at issue are also observable in the application of the additional duties on 
steel and aluminium imports, including their country and product scope. In this re gard, Presidential 
Proclamations 9704 and 9705 recogni ze that the United  States  may remove or modify the restriction 
on steel and alumin ium imports from a country if it determines that imports from the country no 
longer threaten to impair its national secu rity.341 The United  States  exempted various countries from 
the additional duties on steel and aluminium imports following such determinations342, based on its 
"important security relationships" and "security, defense, and intelligence partnership[s]" with th ese 
countries as well as their "shared concern about global excess capacity, a circumstance that is 
contributing to the threatened impairment of [US] national security".343 The Panel also notes that 
the additional duties are applied to products that are det ermined by the relevant domestic authorities 
of the United  States  to be important for its military systems and critical infrastructure.344  
7.79.   These considerations indicate that the measures at issue were designed and expected to 
operate in relation to the Uni ted States ' determination of a threat to its national security under the 
relevant domestic laws. In this regard, the Panel notes several other relevant aspects of the 
measures at issue and their application supporting this conclusion. For example, Presiden tial 
Proclamations 9740, 9758 and 9759 introduce quotas restricting steel and aluminium imports from 
certain countries to provide "effective, long -term alternative means" to address their contribution to 
 
336 See e.g. Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 116 19 and Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11626 noting that the US President concurs with the 
Secretary's findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports and has considered the recommendations in these 
reports.  
337 Presidential Procla mation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11626.  
338 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11 626. 
339 Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), pp. 11626 -11627.  
340 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11626.  
341 Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential  Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11626 (further noting that the United  States  may make corresponding 
adjustments to t he additional duties applicable to other countries as its national security interests require).  
342 See section 2.2.3 above for a list of the exempted countries.  
343 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11626; Presidential Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit NOR -6 and USA -12), pp. 
13355 -13356; Presidential Proclamation 9711 , (Exhibit NOR -7 and USA -11), pp. 1336 1-13362.  
344 Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), Appendix  H and Appen dix I; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit 
NOR-2 and USA -8), pp. 24 -39. See also Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), p. 11623 
(providing for additional duties on imports of unwrought aluminium; aluminium bars, rods and profiles; 
aluminium wi res; aluminium plates, sheets, strips and foil; aluminium tubes, pipes and tube or pipe fittings; 
and aluminium castings and forgings) and Presidential Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 
11629 (providing for additional duties on imports of fl at-rolled steel products; steel bars and rods; steel wire; 
steel sheet piling; steel rails; steel fish -plates and sole plates; steel tubes, pipes and hollow profiles; steel 
ingots; products of stainless steel; and other products of iron or steel). See also  Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 
and USA -7), pp. 21 -22; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit NOR-2 and USA -8), p. 20.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  the threat to national security as determined by the  United  States .345 These quotas are applied only 
in respect of countries with which the United  States  has identified "important security 
relationships".346 Presidential Proclamations 9704, 9705, 9776, and 9777 set out a product exclusion 
process to provide relief from the additional duties and import quotas based on "specific national 
security considerations".347 Moreover, the Presidential Proclamations  discussed above indicate that 
the measures at issue may be modified or removed based on monitoring by the US Secretary of 
Commerce and review of  "the status of [steel and aluminium] imports with respect to national 
security" .348 The Panel also  considers relevant the procedures under which the measures were 
adopted and applied, and in particular the consultations carried out with departments of government 
such as the US Department of Defense in relation to certain criteria for determining effect s of imports 
on national security.349 
7.80.   The Panel further notes that the national security considerations described above are reflected 
in notifications and statements made by the United  States  before various official bodies of the WTO 
both prior to and follo wing the adoption of the measures at issue. In a meeting of the WTO Council 
of Goods on 10  November  2017, before completing its Section  232 investigations into steel and 
aluminium imports, the United  States  noted that these investigations "were being condu cted by the 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), a Department of the US Commerce Agency". The 
United  States  further remarked that the purpose of these investigations was to "determine the effect 
of steel and aluminium imports on US national security, and  whether the global excess capacity 
problem in those industries was threatening the ability of the United  States  to meet its national 
security needs".350  
7.81.   In subsequent discussions at the WTO, the United  States  explicitly referred to Article  XXI of 
the GATT  1994 in connection with the measures on steel and aluminium under Section  232. Shortly 
after Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 introduced the additional duties discussed above, 
the United  States  provided information concerning these proclamations i n a meeting of the WTO 
Council for Trade in Goods. At this meeting, the United  States  referred to "the findings and 
recommendations in investigations concerning the impact of steel and aluminium imports on US 
national security" and indicated that it was pr oviding this information "pursuant to Section  232 of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and consistent with the Decision Concerning 
 
345 Presidential Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13), pp. 20683 -20684; Presidential 
Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16), p. 25850; and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit NOR -
10 and USA -15), pp. 25857 -25858. Moreover, these proclamations follow Presidential Proclamations 9710 and 
9711 discussing the appropriate means to ensure that exemptions from the additional duties do not undermine 
the national security objectives of the duties and noting that without "satisfactory alternative means addressing 
long-term solutions… the industry will continue to decline, leaving the United  States  at risk of becoming reliant 
on foreign pro ducers of [steel and aluminium] to meet [its] national security needs". (See Presidential 
Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit NOR -6 and USA -12), pp. 13356 -13357 and Presidential Proclamation  9711, 
(Exhibit NOR -7 and USA -11), pp. 13362 -13363 ). 
346 See Presidential Pr oclamation 9740 , (Exhibit NOR -8 and USA -13), p. 20683; Presidential 
Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16), p. 25849; and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit NOR -
10 and USA -15), p. 25857.  
347 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and US A-10), p. 11621; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11627; Presidential Proclamation 9776 , (Exhibit NOR -21 and USA -19), p. 
45020; and Presidential Proclamation 9777 , (Exhibit NOR -22 and USA -18), p. 45026. See also the March 
Interim Final Rule , (Exhibit NOR -76 and USA -20), p. 12111 and the September Interim Final Rule , (Exhibit 
NOR-20 and USA -21), p. 46058 (explaining that this criterion allows the US Department of Commerce, in 
consultation with other parts of the US Government as warranted, to consider impacts on US national security 
that may result from not approving an exclusion and that the demonstrated concern with US national security 
would need to be tangible, clearly explained and would be ultimately determined by the US Gov ernment).  
348 Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit NOR -3 and USA -10), pp. 11621 -11622; Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9), p. 11628. See also Presidential  Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit 
NOR-8 and USA -13), p. 20684; Presidential  Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16), p. 25850; and 
Presidential  Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15), p. 25858. The Panel notes that the measures 
applicable to imports from certain countries have been modified under this authority. (Se e e.g. Presidential 
Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit NOR -5)). 
349 See Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), pp. 18 -20 and Appendices E -G; Aluminium Report, 
(Exhibit NOR-2 and USA -8), pp. 18 -19 and Appendices A -B. See also Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhib it 
NOR-3 and USA -10); Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit NOR -4 and USA -9); Presidential Proclamation  
9758, (Exhibit NOR -9 and USA -16); and Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit NOR -10 and USA -15) 
(directing the US Secretary of Commerce to consider  adjustments to the additional duties and import quotas in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense).    
350 Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 10  November  2017, G/C/M/130, (Exhibit 
USA-80), pp. 26 -27. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Article  XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 30  November  1982".351 In a 
communication shortly thereafter to the Committee on Safeguards, the United  States  responded to 
a request for consultations under Article  12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards and referred to 
information it had provided to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods "consistent with the D ecision 
Concerning Article  XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 
30 November  1982".352  
7.82.   In a meeting of the WTO General Council on 8  May 2018, the United  States  referred to "the 
reasons underlying the United States' defense of critical n ational security interests" and recalled the 
Presidential Proclamations  under Section  232 "determining that tariffs are necessary to adjust 
imports of steel and aluminum articles that threaten to impair the national security of the 
United  States ". The Unit ed States  further referred at that meeting to having "previously informed 
Members about the proclamations issued by the President pursuant to Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended". The United  States  additionally referred to its "state ment at 
the Council for Trade in Goods meeting on March 23 – a statement we provided consistent with the 
Decision Concerning Article  XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 
30 November  1982".353 At a meeting of the DSB following the complainant's request for 
establishment of a panel in this dispute, the United  States  referred to the determination that 
"imports of steel and aluminum threaten to impair U.S. national security".354 
7.83.   On 28  September  2018, the United  States  notified import qu otas on steel products from the 
Republic of Korea , Argentina, and Brazil, and alumin ium products from Argentina to the WTO 
Committee on Market Access. In this notification, the United  States  listed Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 as the "WTO Justification and  Grounds for Restriction".355  
7.84.   Based on the foregoing evidence, the Panel considers that a central aspect of the design and 
application of the measures at issue is their relation to the United  States ' determination of a threat 
to its national security under  the relevant domestic laws. The national security considerations of the 
United  States  are manifest in the application, modification, and removal of the additional duties, 
quotas, and exemptions discussed above. Moreover, this aspect of the measures was em phasi zed 
and explicitly linked to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 by the United  States  in a series of notifications 
and statements to various official bodies of the WTO. The Panel considers significant the indications 
at both the domestic and multilateral lev els that the measures at issue related to the United  States ' 
determination of a threat to its national security and the explicit references to Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 as the legal basis under the covered agreements pursuant to which the measures were 
sought, taken, or maintained.356 While the domestic legal status or statements by a Member to 
official WTO bodies are not determinative of the legal characterization of measures under the covered 
agreements in dispute settlement, the Panel considers such ev idence to be relevant within the 
context of an objective assessment under Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. This is 
particularly so where there is evidence contemporaneous with the adoption of the measures that is 
 
351 Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 23 and 26  March  2018, G/C/M/131, 
(Exhibit USA -81), pp. 26 -27.  
352 Committee on Safeguards, Communication from the United  States , G/SG/168,  (Exhibit USA-82), pp. 
1-2 and fn  2. 
353 Statement dated 8  May 2018 of the Deputy US Trade Representative and US Permanent 
Representative to the WTO, WTO General Council,  (Exhibit USA-83), p. 3  (further noting that the United  States  
did not take action pursuant to Section  201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which is the law under which the 
United States  imposes safeguard measures).  
354 Statements dated 29  October  2018, 21  November  2018, and 4  December  2018 of the United  States , 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body , (Exhibit NOR-23 (excerpt) and USA -84 (full version) ). The United  States  further 
stated as fo llows at this meeting with respect to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 and the measures at issue:  
The United  States  has given detailed explanations that the measures at issue are justified under 
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. In particular, we have explained t hat these measures are 
necessary to address the threatened impairment that these imports of steel and aluminum 
articles pose to U.S. national security.  
355 Committee on Market Access, Notification Pursuant to the Decision on Notification Procedures for 
Quant itative Restrictions (G/L/59/Rev.1), G/MA/QR/N/USA/4, (Exhibit USA-85), p. 6 . 
356 Given the consistent indications both prior and subsequent to the adoption of the measures at issue, 
the Panel finds support for the measures being "sought, taken or maintained" within the meaning of 
Article  11.1(c).  The Panel notes in this regard the disjunctive nature of these requirements and does not 
consider it necessary in the circumstances of this dispute to make separate determinations as to which 
evidence refl ects the measures having been "sought", "taken", or "maintained" pursuant to a provision  of the 
GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  confirmed by other relevant evidence of the measures' design and application. In this dispute, the 
features of the measures outlined above indicate that the United  States ' determination of a threat 
to its national security under Section  232 is a central aspect of the measures with re spect to their 
legal characterization as being sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994.357 
7.85.   Regarding the applicability of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards,  
Norway  refers to the findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports pertaining to the adverse impact 
of imports on domestic steel and aluminium industries of the United  States . In particular, Norway  
highlights that the reports identify increased imports of steel and aluminium to the United  States , 
determine that there was injury to the domestic steel and aluminium industries due to increased 
imports, and examine such injury by reference to factors that are typically associated with a finding 
under Article  4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.358  
7.86.   The P anel notes that the findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports pertaining to the state 
of the United  States ' domestic steel and aluminium industries, including the decrease in domestic 
production, high import penetration, low -capacity utili zation  and declining employment, are made 
in the context of the determination by the US Secretary of Commerce that steel and aluminium are 
important to the United  States ' national defen ce requirements and critical infrastructure sectors. 
These reports discuss th e displacement of domestic steel and aluminium by imports in relation to 
the risk that the United  States ' domestic industries will be rendered incapable of meeting its national 
security needs, especially in times of national emergencies. The Steel and Alum inium Reports also 
recall the direction under Section  232 that the relationship between the weakening of the 
United  States ' internal economy and impairment of its national security shall be determined by 
reference to factors including "any substantial unem ployment, decrease in revenues of government, 
loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects".359 The reports recommend measures to 
increase  the capacity utili zation  of the United  States ' domestic industries with the specific objective 
of enabling t hem to meet projected national security needs .360  
7.87.   Viewed in their context, the findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports  confirm that the 
aspects of the measure s most central to their legal characterization under Article  11.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Safeg uards concern the national security considerations as reflected in Section  232 
and reiterated in the relevant domestic legal acts and instruments. The examination in the Steel and 
Aluminium Reports of the state of the domestic steel and aluminium industrie s is an element of the 
United  States ' determination of a threat to its national security under the relevant domestic laws. 
The Panel considers that it would be improper to assess such factors in isolation from the threat to 
national security that was deter mined to exist under Section  232 on the basis of those and other 
factors.  
7.7.4   Conclusion  
7.88.   In conclusion , the evidence before the Panel in relation to the design and application of the 
measures at issue indicates that the measures were sought, taken, or maintai ned pursuant to 
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. Accordingly, the measures were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant 
 
357 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, China – Auto Parts , para.  171; Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , 
para. 5.60. 
358 Norway 's first written submission, section VI.A.3 . 
359 Section  232, ( Exhibit NOR-12 and USA -1), § 1862(d); Section  232 regulations, ( Exhibit USA -2), § 
705.4.  
360 See Aluminium Report, ( Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 107 ("import restrictions could help address 
the threat to U.S. national security… [Q]uotas or tariffs would be designed, even after any exemptions (if 
granted), to enable U.S. aluminum producers to utilize an average of 80 percent of their production  capacity. 
The quotas and tariffs described below should be sufficient to enable U.S. aluminum producers to operate 
profitably under current market prices for aluminum and will allow them to reopen idled capacity") and 108 ("A 
worldwide quota …would help e nsure the viability of those U.S. producers to meet national security needs"). 
See also Steel Report, ( Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), p. 58 ("Due to the threat of steel imports to the national 
security, as defined in Section  232, the Secretary recommends that t he President take immediate action by 
adjusting the level of imports through quotas or tariffs on steel imported into the United  States , as well as 
direct additional actions to keep the U.S. steel industry financially viable and able to meet U.S. national 
security needs. The quota or tariff imposed should be sufficient, after accounting for any exclusions, to enable 
the U.S. steel producers to be able to operate at about an 80 percent or better of the industry 's capacity 
utilization rate based on available capacity in 2017").  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  to a provision  of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX within the meaning of Article  11.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  
7.89.   The Panel's ass essment of the measures being under the purview of Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 is without prejudice to the consistency of the measures with the specific terms and 
requirements of Article  XXI. The Panel recalls that its conclusions under Article  11.1(c) pe rtain solely 
to the issue of applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards rather than the consistency of the 
measures at issue with the requirements of the other provision, namely Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994, pursuant to which the measures were sought, ta ken, or maintained.  
7.8  Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994  
7.8.1   Introduction  
7.90.   The United  States  invokes Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in relation to the measures at issue 
as "action[s] which [the United States] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests". The Panel will address the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in 
relation t o whether the measures found to be inconsistent with Articles I:1, II:1, and XI:1 of the 
GATT  1994 are "actions" falling within the scope of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.  
7.91.   The Panel will first address the parties' interpretive disagreement on the extent  to which the 
terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 permit review of a Member's invocation of that provision 
in proceedings under the DSU. In doing so, the Panel will address specific issues of interpretation 
contested by the parties, including the Unit ed States ' arguments as to the "self -judging" nature and 
"non-justiciability" of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The Panel will then assess the ev idence 
and arguments submitted by the parties in relation to the measures found to be inconsistent with 
provisions of the GATT  1994 in light of the conclusions reached regarding the interpretation of 
Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.  
7.8.2   Interpretation of Arti cle XXI(b) of the GATT  1994  in accordance with Article  3.2 of 
the DSU  
7.92.   Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 is entitled "Security Exceptions" and provides:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed  
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information  the disclosure of which 
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action  which it considers  necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests  
(i) relating to fissionab le materials or the materials from which they are derived;  
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such 
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a milita ry establishment;  
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or  
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of internationa l peace 
and security.  
7.93.   The United  States  submits that the Panel should limit its findings in this dispute to recogni zing 
the invocation of Article  XXI(b) because "[t]he text of [the provision], in its context and in the light 
of the agreement's object and p urpose, establishes that the exception is self -judging."361 According 
to the United  States , "[t]he self -judging nature of … Article  XXI(b) is demonstrated by that 
 
361 United  States ' first written submission , para.  22. WT/DS552/R  
 
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  provision's reference to actions that the Member 'considers necessary' for the protection of its 
essential security interests."362 Consequently, "the only requirement for the Member invoking 
Article  XXI is for the Member to consider that a particular action is necessary to protect its essential 
security interests in any of the circums tances identified in Article  XXI(b)."363 The United  States  
maintains that this requirement is met "once the Member indicates, in the context of dispute 
settlement, that it has made such a determination" that it "consider[s] one or more of the 
circumstances set forth in Article  XXI(b) to be present".364  
7.94.   A premise of the United  States ' characterization of Article  XXI(b) as "self -judging" is that, 
based on "the text and grammatical structure" of the provision, "the phrase 'which it considers' 
qualifies all of t he terms in the single relative clause that follows the word 'action'".365 According to 
the United  States , this "single relative clause" in Article  XXI(b) "begins with 'which it considers 
necessary' and ends at the end of each subparagraph" and "describes t he situation which the 
Member 'considers' to be present when it takes such 'action'".366 The United  States  argues from this 
premise that, "[b]ecause the relative clause describing the action begins with 'which it considers', 
the other elements of this claus e are committed to the judgment of the Member taking the action."367 
The United  States  thus posits an "overall grammatical structure" of Article  XXI(b) according to which 
a panel may not "determine, for itself, whether a security interest is 'essential' to the Member in 
question, or whether the circumstances described in one of the subparagraphs exists".368  
7.95.   Norway  contests the interpretive and grammatical basis of the United  States ' argument and 
emphasi zes the objective review in dispute settlement proceedin gs of terms in Article  XXI(b) that 
are not qualified by the phrase "which it considers".369 Norway  thus disputes the characterization of 
Article  XXI(b) as "self -judging" and contends that the measures are not justified under this provision 
based on the argu ments and evidence before the Panel. In particular, Norway  argues that the 
United  States ' interpretation fails to give effective meaning to the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) 
and is incompatible with the requirements of the DSU concerning the independent review of matters 
raised under the covered agreements.370  
7.96.   The Panel recalls that it is required to address the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) 
of the GATT  1994 in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU  and the customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law.371 A threshold point of interpretive disagreement between the parties is 
the extent to which the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 permit review of a Member's 
invocation of that provision by a panel established under the DSU. While the parties refer to 
numerous aspects of treaty interpretation in relation to this question, both parties base their 
positions primarily on the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and the rule of i nterpretation set 
out in Article  31(1) of the Vienna  Convention  that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose."372 As noted above373, this rule of interpretation forms part of the "customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law" referred to in Article  3.2 of the DSU.374 Accordingly, the 
Panel will examine the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in their 
 
362 United  States ' first written submission , para.  24.  
363 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  33. 
364 United  States ' response to Panel question No. 52.a; see also response to Pa nel question Nos. 35 and 
38; second written submission, para.  34. 
365 United  States ' second written submission, paras.  7-8; see also ibid. para.  13 ("the ordinary meaning 
of the terms of Article  XXI(b) establishes that, contrary to the Norway's arguments, the word 'considers' 
qualifies all the terms in the chapeau and the subparagraph endings of Article  XXI(b)" ).  
366 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36. 
367 United  States ' second written submission, para.  33; see also response to Panel question Nos. 39 and 
40 ("The text reserves to the Member the judgment as to whether action is necessary in one or more of those 
circumstances for the protection of its essential security interests.").  
368 United States ' response to Panel question No.  37. 
369 See Norway 's response to Panel question Nos. 35 -37. 
370 See e.g. Norway 's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel ; Norway's response to Panel 
question No.  32. 
371 See section 7.1 above.  
372 See Norway's  response to Panel question No.  56; United  States ' response to Panel question No.  56. 
373 See para.  7.56 above.  See also Appellate  Body Reports, US – Gasoline , p. 17; India – Patents (US) , 
para. 46; Argentina – Textiles and Apparel , para.  42; US – Carbon Steel , para. 61. 
374 See e.g. Appellate  Body Report, US – Gasoline , p. 17.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose, focusing on the parties' disagreement as to 
whether the terms of the provision permit review of its invocation in proceedings under the DSU.  
7.97.   Pursuant to the security exceptions under Artic le XXI of the GATT  1994, "[n]othing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require" a Member "to furnish any information" described under 
paragraph (a) or "to prevent" a Member "from taking any action" described  under paragraphs (b) or 
(c) of that provisi on. The three paragraphs (a) to (c) are separated by semicolons followed by the 
word "or" and Article  XXI concludes in a full stop at the end of paragraph (c). Paragraph (b) of 
Article  XXI provides that the "action" that a Member is not prevented from taki ng is "any action 
which [the Member] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests", 
followed by three subparagraphs that are enumerated (i)  to (iii).375 These subparagraphs are 
separated by semicolons and the word "or" appears after the semicolons at the end of paragraph  (a) 
and subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b).376  
7.98.   In providing for "any action" that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed … to 
prevent", Article  XXI(b) establishes an exception to obligations under oth er provisions of the 
GATT  1994. The "action" covered by this provision is one that a Member "considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests". Dictionary definitions of the term "consider" include 
to "regard in a certain light or  aspect, look upon as" or "think or take to be".377 Under Article  XXI(b), 
a Member must consider that its action is "necessary for" a defined purpose, namely "the protection 
of its essential security interests". Dictionary definitions of "interest" include "the relation of being 
involved or concerned as regards potential detriment or (esp.) advantage".378 The relevant interests 
under Article  XXI(b) pertain to "security", which may be defined as "the condition of being protected 
from or not exposed to danger".379 The description of these security interests as "essential" indicates 
the heightened significance of the security interests that Members are not prevented from taking 
 
375 The parties have used different terminology to refer to the different parts of Article  XXI, including 
"chapeau ", "subparagraph", and "subparagraph ending". The Panel considers that  such terminology is not 
determinative of the proper interpretation so long as it is consistently applied in describing the provision.  
376 The French and Spanish texts are similarly struc tured with minor differences, including a colon at the 
end of paragraph (b) before the three subparagraphs. In addition, the Spanish text contains a colon after the 
opening terms of Article  XXI before paragraph (a), and in the French text the conjunction " ou" appears at the 
beginning of paragraphs (b) and (c).  
377 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 493. See also Le 
Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 921 (defining " estimer " as " [a]voir un e opinion sur " 
(to have an opinion on), " consid érer" (to consider), " croire " (to believe), " regarder " (to regard), or " penser " (to 
think)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 676 (defining 
"estimar " as " creer" (to believe) or "hacer aprecio y estimación de alguien o de algo " (make appreciation or 
estimation of someone or something)); and The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -22), p. 485 . 
378 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 1400 (also defining 
"interest" as "[a] thing that is of some importance to a person, company, state"). See also Le Petit Robert 
Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 13 40 (defining " intérêt " as " [c]e qui importe, ce qui convient 
(en quelque domaine que ce soit) " (what matters or what suits in any domain)); Diccionario de la Lengua 
Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 874 (defining " interés " as " [i]nclinación del ánimo 
hacia un objeto, una persona, una narración, etc. " (inclination of mind towards an object, a person, a 
narration, etc.)); and The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 
1993), ( Exhibit USA -22), p. 1393 .  
379 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2734. See also Le 
Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 2310 (defining " sécurité " as "[s]ituation, état 
tranquille qui résulte de l'abs ence réelle de danger" (tranquil situation, state which results from the real 
absence of danger)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 
1385 (defining " seguridad " as " [c]ualidad de seguro " and " seguro " as " [l]ibre y exento de todo peligro, daño o 
riesgo " (free and exempt from all danger, damage or risk )); and The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 
4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -22), p. 2754 . WT/DS552/R  
 
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  action to protect under Article  XXI(b).380 As indicated by the possessive pronou n "its", the relevant 
"security interests" are those of the Member taking action under Article  XXI(b).381 
7.99.   Interpreting the terms of Article  XXI(b) within the structure and context of the provision as a 
whole, the Panel notes the textual separation and inden tation under Article  XXI of the three 
paragraphs and a similar separation and indentation of the three subparagraphs under paragraph 
(b) of Article  XXI. The introductory terms of Article  XXI ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed") form the beginni ng of a sentence with three alternative endings to this sentence in each 
of the paragraphs (a) to (c). Under paragraph (b) of Article  XXI, the enumerated subparagraphs 
(i) to (iii) are alternative endings to the sentence following the terms "any action whi ch it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests". The punctuation and conjunctions 
linking these various parts of Article  XXI serve the function of listing the alternative endings to the 
provision. These considerations indi cate that Article  XXI(b) forms part of, and provides in its own 
subparagraphs, a list of alternative endings to form a sentence. Therefore, Article  XXI(b) is to be 
given meaning as a complete sentence with the enumerated subparagraphs (i)  to (iii) represen ting 
alternative endings to the sentence that begins "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed".  
7.100.   In continuation of the sentence formed under Article  XXI(b), subparagraphs (i)  and (ii) begin 
with the terms "relating to" and subparagraph (iii) begins wi th the terms "taken in time of". The 
terms "relating to" indicate a connection to the "materials" and "traffic" in subparagraphs (i)  and 
(ii), respectively, while the terms "taken in time of" indicate a temporal relationship to the 
circumstances in subpara graph (iii). The Panel understands these opening terms in each 
subparagraph to qualify and describe the "action" referred to in Article  XXI(b). This is confirmed in 
the French and Spanish versions of Article  XXI(b) in which the corresponding terms (" se rap portant " 
and " appliquées " in French and " relativas " and " aplicadas " in Spanish) qualify nouns that are 
feminine and plural translations of "any action" (" toutes mesures " in French and " todas las medidas " 
in Spanish).382 The relation of the opening terms of each subparagraph to the "action" in 
 
380 Dictionary definitions of "essenti al" include "[t]hat is such in the absolute or highest sense" and 
"[a]ffecting the essence of anything; significant, important". See also Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue 
Francaise (2000), p. 918 (defining " essentiel " as " [q]ui est absolument néce ssaire " (absolutely necessary) or  
"[l]e plus important " (the most important)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia 
Española, 2001), p. 655 (defining " esencial " as " [s]ustancial ", "principal ", or " notable "); and The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA-22), p. 852 . 
381 The French and Spanish language versions similarly use the possessive pronouns " sa" and " su" 
respectively. See Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 2365 and Diccionario de la 
Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española,  2001), p. 1424.  
382 The Panel understands that the parties agree that the subparagraphs qualify and relate to the 
"action" in Article  XXI(b), notwithstanding some disagreement as to the precise basis for this conclusion. The 
United  States  submits in this re gard that, under "[t]he most natural reading" of Article  XXI(b), subparagraphs 
(i) and (ii) relate to a Member's "essential security interests" whereas subparagraph (iii) modifies "action" that 
is "taken" by a Member. At the same time, the United  States  considers that "an interpretation that best 
reconciles the idiosyncratic Spanish text with the English and French texts" is one in which the "action" is 
modified by the terms following it and "all three subparagraph endings refer to 'any action which it cons iders'."  
(United  States ' response to Panel question Nos. 39 and 40; see also second written submission, para s. 29-31). 
Under this reading, the United States argues that the terms of the provision still form a "single relative clause" 
in which the phrase "w hich it considers" modifies the entirety of the subparagraphs. (United  States ' response 
to Panel question Nos. 41 -43; United  States ' second written submission, paras.  97-98; United  States ' opening 
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras.  8-9). Norway contests the grammatical basis of the 
United  States ' argument on a "single relative clause" in Article  XXI(b) and argues that the subparagraphs 
qualify the term "action". (See e.g. Norway's response to Panel question No s. 40 and 90 ).  
For the purposes of resolving the contested issues of interpretation under Article  XXI(b) in this dispute, 
the Panel considers that it is sufficient to conclude that the term "action" is qualified by the subparagraphs, as 
supported by the textual analysis in this section and the concordance of plural and feminine terms in the 
French and Spanish  versions of Article  XXI(b) . The Panel notes the United  States ' argument on the 
reconciliation of texts under Article  33 of the VCLT relates to its contentions regarding a "s ingle relative clause" 
in Article  XXI(b) and the "self -judging" nature of the provision, which the Panel addresses in this section in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and its mandate to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making 
the recommen dations or rulings provided for in the covered agreements. To the extent that the comparison of 
authentic texts discloses any difference in meaning under Article  33(4) of the VCLT, the Panel considers that 
the application of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT removes any such difference so as to resolve the contested 
issues of interpretation in this dispute. Accordingly , the Panel does not consider it necessary for the purposes 
of this dispute to address in further detail the parties' arguments on the reconcili ation of authentic texts in 
relation to the contested issues of interpretation under Article  XXI(b)  and its application to the measures at 
issue in this dispute . WT/DS552/R  
 
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  Article  XXI(b) is further supported by their parallel positioning in the text and their common function 
of linking the remaining terms of each subparagraph to those in paragraph (b).  
7.101.   As a result, Article  XXI(b) applies  to actions "relating to" the "materials" and "traffic" 
described in subparagraphs (i)  and (ii), respectively, and to actions "taken in time of" the 
circumstances referred to in subparagraph (iii). These subparagraphs provide alternative endings 
that are a n integral part of complete sentences formed under Article  XXI(b). Moreover, there is no 
textual indication that the sentence endings in the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) are merely 
illustrative or that Article  XXI(b) may apply to actions other than thos e described in the 
subparagraphs.383 These considerations indicate that the subparagraphs are exhaustive in 
establishing the circumstances in which a Member may take the "action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security inter ests" within the meaning of Article  XXI(b).384 
7.102.   Regarding the discretion of Members taking "action" under Article  XXI(b), the parties 
acknowledge the deference accorded to a Member's judgment for "any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests".385 The terms "which it considers" 
denote the consideration or judgment of the Member taking action under Arti cle XXI(b)386, which is 
further reinforced by providing that the Member shall not be prevented from taking "any" action 
within the terms of the provision.387 Regarding the extent of discretion accorded by the terms "which 
it considers", the parties disagree as to what precisely in Article  XXI(b) is qualified by these terms 
and the implications of such qualification for the review of a Member's invocation of Article  XXI(b) 
in dispute settlement proceedings. In particular, the parties dispute whether the three enumerated 
subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of Article  XXI(b) are qualified by the terms "which it considers" and, 
relatedly, how to interpret those subparagraphs in accordance with the requirements of the DSU. A 
specific question in this regard is whether, as a rgued by the United  States  and contested by 
Norway388, the clause beginning with the relative pronoun "which" constitutes a "single relative 
clause" that includes the terms in subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of Article  XXI(b).  
7.103.   The Panel notes that the United  States submits certain reference materials on English 
grammar in support of its contention that the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) form part of a "single 
relative clause" that is entirely reserved to the judgment of the Member taking action under the 
provis ion.389 Due to the grammatical dimension of the United  States ' arguments concerning the 
"single relative clause" in Article  XXI(b), the Panel examines the grammatical construction of the 
provision in relation to the contested issue of whether the subparagra phs of Article  XXI(b) are 
 
383 The subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 may be contrasted with other provisions of 
the covered agreements containing terms that explicitly indicate the illustrative nature of the provisions. (See 
e.g. Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement  ("such legitimate objectives are, inter alia , national securi ty 
requirements …" ); Article  3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement ("factors which may be relevant [for determining 
injury] include, inter alia , the volume and prices of imports …"); Article  1.1(a)(1) of the SCM  Agreement  ("a 
direct transfer of funds (e.g. gra nts, loans and equity infusion)"); and Annex  I to the SCM  Agreement  
("Illustrative List of Export Subsidies" )).  
384 The Panel notes the agreement of parties as to the exhaustive nature of subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI(b) , notwithstanding their disagreement o n the implications of this for review in by a panel 
established under the DSU. (See Norway 's response to Panel question No.  39; United  States ' response to Panel 
question No s. 39 and 40 ). For example, t he United  States  argues that the subparagraphs of Artic le XXI(b) 
"form an integral part of the provision in that they complete the sentence begun in the chapeau, establishing 
three exhaustive circumstances in which a Member may act". At the same time, the United  States  maintains 
that "[t] he fact that these cir cumstances are exhaustive, however, does not mean that the Member 's 
invocation of Article  XXI(b) is subject to review." (United  States ' response to Panel question Nos. 39 and 40).  
385 Norway 's response to Panel question No.  35; United  States ' response to Panel question No.  35.  
386 The French and Spanish language versions of Article  XXI(b) respectively  use the phrases " qu'elle 
estimera " and " que estime ", indicating the estimation or consideration of the Member taking action under that 
Article. See Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 824 and Diccionario de la Lengua 
Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 1270.  
387 The terms corresponding to "any action" in Article  XXI(b) in the French and Spanish versions  are 
"toutes mesures " and " todas las medidas ", which may be understood as all measures. See Le Petit Robert 
Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), pp. 2551 -2552; and Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd 
Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), pp. 1 485-1486.  
388 Norway 's response to Panel question No.  90. 
389 The Panel notes that the parties' arguments concerning the grammar of Article  XXI(b) focus on the 
English text of the provision, and the Panel accordingly focuses its assessment on the English text and the 
specific reference materials on English grammar submitted by the parties. The Panel does not make any 
determination as to the status or authority of such reference materials but rather refers to them as relevant to 
addressing the parti es' arguments and describing the grammatical construction of Article  XXI(b).  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  qualified by the terms "which it considers". The grammatical considerations raised by the parties 
reinforce the Panel's preceding textual analysis of Article  XXI(b) and are addressed insofar as they 
may inform the assessment of th e ordinary meaning of the terms in their context.  
7.104.   The grammatical analysis of Article  XXI(b) for the purposes of this dispute particularly 
concerns the relationship between various phrases and clauses within the overall sentence structure 
of the provision.390 As noted above, Article  XXI begins a sentence that is completed by the terms of 
paragraph (b) and the alternative endings in the subparagraphs thereunder. The opening terms of 
Article  XXI form a clause beginning with the terms "Nothing in this  Agreement" and ending with the 
terms "any action" in paragraph (b). This clause can be characterized as an independent clause in 
that it contains a subject ("Nothing") and predicate ("shall be construed to prevent any Member 
from taking any action") that can stand alone as a complete sentence.391  
7.105.   Following this independent clause, the relative pronoun "which" in Article  XXI(b) begins a 
relative clause that can be grammatically characterized as a dependent clause in the sense that it is 
a group of words wit h a subject and verb that, unlike an independent clause, cannot stand on its 
own as a complete sentence.392 This relative clause is grammatically subordinate to the independent 
clause at the beginning of Article  XXI that ends with the word "action" in parag raph (b), qualifying 
the noun "action" to describe the action that a Member may take notwithstanding the obligations 
under the GATT  1994.393 The pronoun "it" refers to the Member taking action under Article  XXI(b) 
and is the subject of this relative clause. The verb "considers" is followed by an immediate object 
("necessary") that is further modified by a prepositional phrase ("for the protection of") and noun 
phrase ("its essential security interests").394 
7.106.   Each of the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) b egins with a participle that forms the beginning 
of a participle phrase.395 Specifically, subparagraphs (i) and (ii) begin with the present participle 
"relating" and subparagraph (iii) begins with the past participle "taken". As these participles qualify 
the noun "action"396, the terms following each participle function as adjectives describing the "action" 
 
390 A "clause" in this context has been defined as "a group of words containing both a subject and a 
predicate" that "functions as an element of a compound or complex sentence". A " phrase", by contrast, is "a 
brief expression that consists of two or more grammatically related words but that does not constitute a 
clause" (i.e. does not contain a noun and a verb). ( Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  
(Merriam -Webster, Inco rporated, 1995), ( Exhibit USA -95), pp. 231 and 233 ). 
391 See W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit 
USA-226), pp. 91 and 93 (an "independent clause" is "[a] group of words with a subject and verb that c an 
stand alone as a sentence". A "predicate" refers to "[t]he verb and its related words in a clause or sentence" 
and "expresses what the subject does, experiences, or is"). According to the United  States , through the 
language in this independent clause, " Article  XXI(b) creates an exception to the obligations in the 
[GATT  1994]". (See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  90). 
392 S. Greenbaum, English Grammar (Oxford University Press, 1996), ( Exhibit USA -93), p. 631  (a 
"relative clause" is used to "postmodify nouns" and is "introduced by a relative item" such as the relative 
pronoun "which"); R. Flesch and A.H. Lass, The Classic Guide to Better Writing (HarperPerennial, 1996), 
(Exhibit USA-94), p. 69  ("[w]ho and which  are called relative pronouns  and introduce relative clauses" . Using 
these relative pronouns "[makes] an independent clause into a relative or dependent clause – a group of words 
that can't stand by itself" ) (emphasis omitted); and W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. W hite, The Elements of Style , 4th 
edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 91  (a "dependent clause" is "subordinate to an 
independent clause in a sentence" and begins with either a subordinating conjunction or a relative pronoun 
such as "which".) (emphasis omitted) . 
393 See e.g. S. Greenbaum, English Grammar (Oxford University Press, 1996), ( Exhibit USA -93), p. 631  
(a "relative clause" is used to "postmodify nouns" ); Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  
(Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 199 5), (Exhibit USA-95), p. 233  (a subordinate clause "cannot stand alone, 
and must be either preceded or followed by a main clause"); and  W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements 
of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 95  (a "subordinate clause" is a "clause 
dependant on the main clause in a sentence") . 
394 See Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), 
(Exhibit USA -95), p. 232  (a "noun phrase" consists of "a noun and its modifiers" w hereas a "prepositional 
phrase" consist of "a preposition and its object"); W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn 
(Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 93  (a prepositional phrase is "[a] group of words consisting of a 
prepos ition, its object, and any of the object's modifiers") . 
395 See Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), 
(Exhibit USA -95), p. 232  (a "participial phrase includes a participle and functions as an adjective"); W. Strunk 
Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 93  (a 
"participial phrase" is "[a] present or past participle with accompanying modifiers, objects, or complements").  
396 See para.  7.100  above.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  under Article  XXI(b) and thus can be characterized as participle or adjectival phrases qualifying that 
noun.397  
7.107.   The Panel does not consider that the gramm atical construction of Article  XXI(b) definitively 
resolves whether the subparagraphs are qualified by the phrase "which it considers" as part of a 
"single relative clause" in the manner contended by the United  States . The adjectival phrases in the 
subpara graphs of Article  XXI(b) could be regarded as continuations of the relative clause that begins 
with the relative pronoun "which" in the sense that they provide alternative endings to the sentence 
formed under the provision. However, this does not necessari ly compel the conclusion that the 
subparagraphs form part of a "single relative clause" in the sense argued by the United  States  that, 
"[b]ecause the relative clause describing the action begins 'which it considers', the other elements 
of this clause are c ommitted to the judgment of the Member taking the action."398 In support of its 
view that, under the ordinary meaning of the English text of Article  XXI(b), subparagraphs (i) and 
(ii) modify the phrase "essential security interests"399, the United  States  refers to rules of English 
grammar according to which "an adjectival phrase normally follows the word it modifies or is 
otherwise placed as closely to the word it modifies".400 According to this argument, the adjectival 
phrases in the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) would thus be part of the relative clause that begins 
with the word "which" and would modify the terms in that relative clause that appear closest to the 
subparagraphs.  
7.108.   The grammatical references cited by the United  States  do not indicate a categor ical rule 
according to which the relative clause in Article  XXI(b) that begins "which it considers" must contain 
and qualify any following adjectival phrase (i.e. those contained in the subparagraphs). Indeed, the 
United  States  acknowledges a deviation in Article  XXI(b) from the general rule it cites as "the 
drafters departed from typical English usage" in subparagraph (iii) by placing the adjectival phrase 
in that subparagraph next to "essential security interests", rather than next to the term modified by  
that adjectival phrase ("action").401 With respect to the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) , the 
qualification of the noun "action" in paragraph (b) by the participle phrases in the subparagraphs is 
not solely determined by rigid application of grammar but follows from the ordinary meaning of 
these terms, notwithstanding the existence of a relative clause in paragraph (b) between the noun 
"action" and textually discrete adjectival phrases qualifying that "action".  
7.109.   The foregoing considerations reflect the po tential limitations of a purely grammatical analysis 
of the terms of Article  XXI(b) and the significance of additional interpretive considerations in 
ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context. In addressing the parties' dispute 
as to the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, the Panel is mindful of the principle of 
effective treaty interpretation according to which all terms of a treaty are to be given meaning and 
effect. Relatedly, the terms used in a treaty must not be r educed to redundancy or inutility.402 The 
meaning and effect of the subparagraphs derives not only from considerations of grammatical 
qualification but also the specific terms used within the overall structure of the provision. 
Characterizing the subparagra phs as part of a "single relative clause", even if grammatically 
permissible, does not account for the ordinary meaning of actions "relating to" specified "materials" 
and "traffic" and to actions "taken in time of" specified circumstances. Nor does it acco unt for the 
structure of Article  XXI(b) and the textual separation of the subparagraphs into an enumerated list, 
which corresponds to the role of the subparagraphs as alternative sentence endings that collectively 
delimit the scope of Article  XXI(b).  
 
397 See Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), 
(Exhibit USA -95), pp. 232 -233 ("[a] participle phrase includes a participle and functions as an adjective". An 
"adjective clause modifies a noun or pronoun and normally follows the word it modifies") . 
398 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36. 
399 See fn 382 above.  
400 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  90 (referring to Exhibit USA -176, pp. 232 -233 ("[t]he 
adjective clause modifies a noun or pronoun and no rmally follows the word it modifies" and "[u]sage problems 
with phrases occur most often when a modifying phrase is not placed close enough to the word or words that it 
modifies") and S. Benedict (ed.), Harper's English Grammar (Harper & Row, 1966), (Exhib it USA-96), p. 186  
("adjectives and adverbial phrases, like adjectives and adverbs themselves should be placed as closely as 
possible to the words they modify") ). 
401 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  90. 
402 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, US – Gasoline , p. 23; Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , p. 12; India – 
Patents (US) , para.  45.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  7.110.   The Panel notes the United  States ' argument that Article  XXI(b) "should be read as a single 
clause and not as introducing separate conditions".403 Further, the United  States  cautions against an 
approach that would "atomize this single relative clause" because "[a]rtificially separating the words 
'which it considers necessary' from the language that immediately follows and continues the clause 
– for the protection of – would e rroneously interpret certain terms of Article  XXI(b) in isolation."404 
In the Panel's view, giving meaning and effect to the terms of the subparagraphs does not entail 
reading them in isolation from the other terms of Article  XXI(b) or "introducing separate  conditions" 
beyond what is reflected in the terms themselves.405 The terms of Article  XXI(b) grant discretion to 
Members for actions that they "consider necessary for the protection of their essential security 
interests" while also enumerating circumstance s and conditions under which that discretion may be 
exercised.406 The right to take action under Article  XXI(b) thus consists of an express provision of 
deference to a Member's consideration that is complemented by subparagraphs that must be given 
meaning a nd effect according to the ordinary meaning of their terms.407  
7.111.   The Panel finds relevant context for the interpretive issues raised in this dispute in the 
provisions of the GATT  1994 concerning consultation and potential recourse in cases of nullification 
or impairment, as well as the rules and procedures of the DSU, noting that these agreements are 
both "integral parts of [the WTO] Agreement, binding on all Members".408 Article  XXII of the 
GATT  1994 provides for consultation "with respect to any matter affec ting the operation of this 
Agreement" and Article  XXIII of the GATT  1994 addresses nullification or impairment of "any benefit 
accruing to [a Member] under this Agreement". The DSU elaborates upon these provisions409 and 
establishes the rules and procedures  applicable to disputes concerning the covered agreements in 
Appendix  1 of the DSU. Neither the relevant provisions of the GATT  1994 nor the DSU make any 
explicit reference to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 or the potential review of its invocation in disput e 
settlement proceedings.410 In the absence of any special or additional rule of dispute settlement 
concerning Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, any review of its invocation must be carried out in 
accordance with the DSU as a function of the terms of the provision interpreted in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.  
7.112.   The Panel finds further guidance in the  object and purpose as expressed in the preamble of 
the WTO  Agreement  "to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system 
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization 
efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations". In addition, 
the preambles of both the WTO  Agreement  and the GATT  1994 refer to the desire to contribute to 
the objectives of these agreements "by entering into reciprocal and  mutually advantageous 
 
403 United  States ' response to Panel question No. 40. 
404 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36; see also second written submission, para.  8. 
405 The United  States  draws the Panel's  attention to commentaries of the International Law Commission 
that, "[p]roperly limited and applied, the maxim [of effective treaty interpretation] does not call for an 
'extensive' or 'liberal' interpretation in the sense of an interpretation going beyond  what is expressed or 
necessarily to be implied in the terms of the treaty." ( United  States ' response to Panel question No.  47 citing 
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, 
Vol. II , (Exhibit USA-23), p. 219 ). The Panel agrees that the rule of effectiveness requires that treaty 
interpretation neither expand nor diminish the actual terms used. In the present case, the Panel does not 
consider its interpretation to require any addition to the terms of Article  XXI(b), as the effectiveness of the 
subparagraphs derives from their existing terms read within the overall structure of the provision. (See 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36, paras.  133-134 (arguing that the subparagrap hs would 
require additional terms at the beginning of the subparagraphs to establish their separation from the relative 
clause beginning with "which it considers")).   
406 The Panel notes that the scope of the circumstances set out in the subparagraphs does not detract 
from a Member's consideration that action within the scope of the subparagraphs is necessary "for" a specific 
purpose and that the Member's action pertain to "its" interest. (See United  States ' response to Panel question 
No. 36).  
407 In this sen se, the United  States ' view that "the subparagraphs guide a Member's exercise of its rights  
under this provision" is compatible with the delimiting function served by the subparagraphs to define the 
circumstances and conditions under which action may be ta ken, "while reserving to the Member the judgment 
whether particular action is necessary to protect its essential security interests".  (United  States ' first written 
submission, para.  33 (emphasis added); see also Response to Panel question No.  35). 
408 Article II:2 of the WTO  Agreement . 
409 Pursuant to Article  3.2 of the DSU, "Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the 
management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and 
procedures as further elabo rated and modified herein."  
410 Appendix  2 of the DSU does not provide any special or additional rules applying to disputes in which 
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 is invoked.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations".411 In furtherance of these 
objectives, the WTO  Agreement  establishes a legal framework of rights and obligations that includes 
the rules and procedures applicable to disputes concerning the covered agreements in the DSU. The 
DSU "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreement s"412 
and "[r]ecommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory 
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under [the DSU] and the 
covered agreements".413 The rules and procedures of the DSU are thus intended to maintain the 
balance between the rights and obligations of the Members414 as embodied in the covered 
agreements and the relevant provisions thereof raised by the parties to proceedings under the DSU.  
7.113.   The provision of relevance to this disp ute, Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, establishes a 
right to take action for the protection of a Member's essential security interests and explicitly 
enumerates conditions in the subparagraphs that are an integral part of that right. The absence of 
explicit provision or elaboration in Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 as to whether and how its 
invocation may be reviewed does not, in itself, preclude or otherwise determine the review of that 
provision in dispute settlement proceedings.415 Rather, the sco pe and nature of such review derives 
from the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and requirements of the DSU established under 
the WTO  Agreement , which acknowledges inter alia  the role of the WTO dispute settlement system 
in "providing security and p redictability to the multilateral trading system".416 If Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 is raised in dispute settlement proceedings, the DSU requires that it be addressed in 
accordance with the terms of the provision itself and within an objective assessme nt of the relevant 
measures and claims to make findings that will assist the DSB to make recommendations provided 
for in the covered agreements.  
7.114.   In addition to the relevant text, context, and object and purpose of the covered agreements, 
the parties have referred to various other materials regarding the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of 
the GATT  1994. These materials include: (a) negotiating history of Article  XXI of the GATT 1947 and 
preparatory works of the Havana Charter for the International Trade Or ganization (ITO); (b) internal 
documents of the US delegation to the negotiation of the ITO draft charter and GATT 1947; (c) GATT 
Council Decisions under the GATT 1947; (d) views expressed by GATT contracting parties prior to 
the creation of the WTO; and ( e) negotiating history of the Uruguay Round. Both parties contend 
that these materials provide support for their primary arguments on the terms of Article  XXI(b) of 
the GATT  1994 and the rule of interpretation in Article  31(1) of the Vienna  Convention .417 In 
Appendix  B to this Report, the Panel addresses the parties' arguments on the relevance of these 
materials to the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.  
7.115.   As detailed in Appendix  B, these materials do not provide clear guidance regarding the 
contested issues in this dispute, particularly concerning the scope and nature of the review of a 
Member's invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in proceedings under the DSU. In addition 
to questions on the precise legal status of these materials for  purposes of treaty interpretation, the 
Panel does not find any clear indication in these materials of the "self -judging nature" or "non -
justiciability" of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 as contended by the United  States .418 Rather, the 
Panel finds these m aterials to support the general conclusion that the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 establish a right to take action for the protection of essential security interests in the 
conditions and circumstances described in the three subparagraphs.      
7.116.   In conclusion, the entirety of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 is to be given meaning and 
effect in a manner that preserves the right and discretion of a Member to take action it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests un der the conditions and circumstances 
described in subparagraphs (i) to (iii). The Panel does not consider that Article  XXI(b) of the 
 
411 The preamble of the GATT  1994 refers to "international commerce" instead of "international trade 
relations".  
412 Article  3.2 of the DSU.  
413 Article  3.4 of the DSU.  
414 See Article  3.3 of the DSU.  
415 The Panel notes that the invocation of Article  XX of the GATT  1994 titled "General Exceptio ns" has 
been reviewed in WTO dispute settlement proceedings notwithstanding the absence of an explicit provision in 
Article  XX on whether and how its invocation may be reviewed.  
416 Article  3.2 of the DSU.  
417 Norway 's response to Panel question No.  56; United  States ' response to Panel question No.  56. 
418 See United  States ' first written submission , paras.  46, 55, and 105 . WT/DS552/R  
 
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  GATT  1994 is "self -judging" or "non -justiciable" in the sense argued by the United  States , nor that 
the provision contains a "single relative clause" that wholly reserves the conditions and 
circumstances of the subparagraphs to the judgment of the invoking Member. In light of this 
conclusion and in accordance with relevant requirements of the DSU, the Panel turns to assess the  
United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in relation to the measures at issue.  
7.8.3   Assessment of the measures at issue  
7.117.   The Panel will assess whether the measures found to be inconsistent with Articles I:1 , II:1, 
and XI:1  of the GATT  1994 were taken under the conditions and circumstances described in the 
subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.419  
7.118.   As an initial matter, the Panel notes the objections by the complainant to the manner and 
timeliness of the United  States' defence under Article  XXI(b)(iii), including concerns regarding due 
process and the Panel's independent assessment of the evidence and arguments on the record.420 
The Panel considers that the parties' due process rights have been fully maintained in th ese 
proceedings, during which the Panel has endeavoured to provide ample time and opportunity to 
address any evidence or arguments raised by the other party.421 Moreover, the Panel has engaged 
with such evidence and arguments in written questions and substa ntive meetings in order to fulfil 
its mandate under the DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter referred to the DSB and 
to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in the covere d agreements.422  
7.119.   The United  States  has presented its specific arguments on the challenged measures subject 
to its interpretive argument that Article  XXI(b) is entirely "self -judging" and imposes no requirement 
to explain or identify a relevant circumstance  in subparagraphs (i)  to (iii).423 Although the 
United  States  has focused its arguments on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) and the discretion 
accorded by its terms to Members, it has also submitted an extensive record of material relating to 
the measur es at issue. Of particular note in this context are the Steel and Aluminium Reports of the 
USDOC and Presidential Proclamations setting out the legal basis under Section  232 for taking action 
on steel and aluminium products. As described below, the United  States  has also elaborated its 
position throughout the course of the proceedings concerning the measures at issue and, in 
particular, the existence of an "emergency in international relations" within the meaning of 
Article  XXI(b)(iii) "in time of" which th e measures were taken.  
7.120.   The United  States ' first written submission focused on the argument that Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 is "self -judging" as a defence against WTO -inconsistencies and that its invocation by a 
Member is "non -justiciable" in WTO dispute  settlement proceedings. Following the first substantive 
meeting, the United  States  argued that "publicly available information" concerning its measures 
"could be understood to relate most naturally to the circumstance described in Article  XXI(b)(iii)".424 
At the same time, the United  States  maintained its interpretive view that it is not necessary under 
Article  XXI for any Member to provide details relating to its invocation of the exception, nor "to 
 
419 In light of the Panel's conclusion on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b)  and the arguments of the 
parties in this dispute , the Panel cons iders it appropriate to focus its assessment of the measures at issue on 
subparagraph (iii) and whether the measures were "taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations". The Panel notes that previous panels have assessed measures unde r Security Exceptions for "action 
which [a Member] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" beginning with the 
relevant subparagraph of the provision at issue. (See Panel  Report s, Russa – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.108 -
7.109; Saudi Arabia – IPRs; para.  7.242).  
420 See Norway's response to Panel question No.  71; comments after the second meeting  of the Panel . 
421 For example, at the closing of the second substantive meeting, the Panel indicated that the parties 
would have an opportunity to provide written comments on any issue raised during the meeting, including 
arguments on Article  XXI(b)(iii) made during closin g statements. The parties were accordingly invited to 
provide written comments following the second substantive meeting and given an opportunity to make any 
additional comments in response. The Panel considers the procedural arrangements in this dispute, i ncluding 
the overall time given to the parties for written submissions and comments, to have afforded the parties 
adequate opportunity to be heard and to respond to arguments made by the other party as required for the 
protection of their due process right s. (See Appellate  Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) , 
para. 147). 
422 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, US – Shrimp , para.  106; EC and certain member states – Large 
Civil Aircraft , para.  1317; Australia – Tobacco Plain Packaging , para.  6.244.  
423 See e.g. United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92. 
424 United  States ' second written submission , para. 35.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  identify the relevant subparagraph ending to that provisi on that an invoking Member may consider 
most relevant".425  
7.121.   The United  States  subsequently elaborated its arguments regarding the measures at issue 
based on its interpretation of an "other emergency in international relations" as meaning "a situation 
of dan ger or conflict, concerning political or economic contact occurring between nations, which 
arises unexpectedly and requires urgent attention".426 In particular, the United  States  argued that 
"the extensive findings in the steel and aluminum reports are consistent with the United  States  
considering the measures at issue to be taken 'in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations'."427 The United  States  cited various fi ndings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports and 
argued that "the findings cited above relating to the threatened impairment of national security by 
steel and aluminum imports, and the global crisis circumstances under which such importations were 
occurring, are consistent with the United  States  considering that an 'other emergency in 
international relations' exists – that is, a situation of danger or conflict, concerning political or 
economic contact occurring between nations, which arises unexpectedly and re quires urgent 
attention."428 
7.122.   In its closing statement at the second substantive meeting, the United  States  argued that, 
"even on the complainant's understanding of Article  XXI(b) as not self-judging, … [t]he record before 
the Panel demonstrates that the United  States  considers the measures at issue to be necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests and taken 'in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations'."429 The United  States  referred to findings in the Steel Report on "whether an 
emergency related to steel excess capacity exists" to comment that, "in 2017, it emerged that global 
efforts to address the crises would be insufficient. While the DOC steel report noted that the excess 
capacity crisis is a global problem that steel-producing nations have committed to 'work together on 
possible solutions,' the report observed the limits of the global efforts, including the work of the 
Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity."430 The United  States  argued that "what the DOC steel rep ort 
conveys is that the United  States  was at a crucial point [and] that without immediate action, the 
steel industry could suffer damages that may be difficult to reverse and reach a point where it cannot 
maintain or increase production to address national  emergencies."431 The United  States  additionally 
argued that "[a]n industry facing 'fundamental changes' brought on by a 'production revolution' can 
certainly lead to unexpected developments, particularly when that industry is facing an 'acute' 
situation of  global excess capacity that is the highest in the industry's history."432  
7.123.   The Panel notes that the United  States  has referred to appendices in the Steel and Aluminium 
Reports concerning global excess capacity in connection with the existence of an "emerge ncy in 
international relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii).433 In addition, the United  States  has referred to the 
 
425 United  States ' second written submission , para.  34. According to the United  States , its invocation of 
Article  XXI(b) indicated its consideration "that any or all of the three circumstances described in the 
subparagraphs are present", and whatever burden of proof attached to Article  XXI(b) "is discharged once the 
Member indicates, in the context of dispute settlement, that it has made such a determination" that it 
"consider[s] one or more of the circumstances set forth in Article  XXI(b) to be present". (United  States ' 
response to Panel question Nos. 50 and 52. See also United  States ' second written submission , para.  57. 
426 See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92.  
427 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  40. 
428 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  47. 
429 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  53. (emphasi s original)  
430 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, paras.  61-62. 
431 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  64. The United  States  also argue d that 
"the situation at issue did arise unexpectedly and remained an 'emergency in international relations' when the 
measures were taken. The confluence of events in 2017 made the emergency even more pressing to address 
for the United  States ." (United  States' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  61). 
432 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  65. The United  States  cited the 
following passages in G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), (Exhibit USA -
72): "The situation of excess steelmaking capacity 'has become particularly acute since 2015'; 'the steel 
industry will have to adjust in response to fundamental changes in economic activity brought on by the 'next 
production revolution.'" ( Ibid. p. 2); " In 2016, the global surplus in steelmaking capacity is estimated to have 
reached around 737  million  metric tonnes, the highest level seen in the history of the steel industry. If the 
announced capacity expansions until 2020 take place, this excess capacity  will further increase". ( Ibid. p. 4). 
433 See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  43 (referring to Steel Report , (Exhibit 
NOR-1 and USA -7), Appendix  L: "Global Excess Capacity in Steel Production" and its commentary on OECD 
analyses and the policy recommendations from the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity); United  States ' 
comments after the second meeting of the Panel, para.  11 (referring to Aluminium Report , (Exhibit NOR -2 and 
USA-8), Appendix  E "Global Excess Aluminum Production").  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  G20 Global Steel Forum Report of 2017 noting that excess capacity is a "global challenge" which 
risks "the viability of an industry that produce s a material which is vital for the functioning of 
economies and societies".434 The G20 Global Steel Forum Report of 2017 cited by the United  States  
also describes the situation of excess steelmaking capacity as "particularly acute since 2015" and 
addresses  the outlook of global steelmaking capacity.435 Further, the United  States  refers to remarks 
of the EU Commissioner for Trade at the OECD High -Level Symposium on Steel expressing concerns 
on steel overcapacity.436 The United  States  has also referred to a sta tement of the chairperson of 
the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting in 2018 that OECD members "share the view that severe excess 
capacity in key sectors such as steel and alumin ium are serious concerns for the proper functioning 
of international trade, the c reation of innovative technologies and the sustainable growth of the 
global economy" and "stress the urgent need to avoid excess capacity in … sectors such as aluminium 
and high technology."437 The United  States  additionally refers to the Charlevoix G7 Summ it 
Communiqué which "stressed the urgent need to avoid excess capacity" in the aluminium sector .438  
7.124.   The Panel will assess the evidence and arguments submitted in this dispute in accordance 
with the requirement under Article  11 of the DSU to make "an object ive assessment of the facts of 
the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements". In addition 
to the interpretive conclusions reached above439, the Panel's assessment will be based on an 
interpretation of the terms of subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b) in accordance with Article  3.2 of 
the DSU and customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Based on this 
interpretation as well as the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties, the Panel will as sess 
whether the "action[s] which [the United  States ] considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests" were taken under the circumstances described in the subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. 
7.125.   Under subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b), a Member may take action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests "in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations". Dictionary definitions of the term "emergency" include "[a ] situation, esp. 
of danger or conflict, that arises unexpectedly and requires urgent attention", "a condition requiring 
immediate treatment", or a "pressing need".440 The relevant emergency within the meaning of 
subparagraph (iii) must be "in international  relations". The term "relations" may be defined as "[t]he 
various ways by which a country, State, etc., maintains political or economic contact with 
another"441, while the term "international" may be defined as "[e]xisting, occurring, or carried on 
between  nations; pertaining to relations, communications, travel, etc., between nations ".442 The 
phrase "international relations" may thus be understood to mean interactions between nations or 
national governments.443 The terms of  Article  XXI(b)(iii) appear to dist inguish the relevant 
emergency under that subparagraph from an emergency in purely domestic or national affairs and 
 
434 United  States ' opening statement of the first meeting of the Panel, para.  54. 
435 See G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), ( Exhibit USA -72); 
United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  65. 
436 See Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström, "Way ahead for the global steel industry", OECD 
High-Level Symposium on Steel , (Exhibit USA -240); United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of 
the Panel , para.  66. 
437 United  States ' comments aft er the second meeting of the Panel, para.  14.  
438 United  States ' comments after the second meeting of the Panel, para. 14.  
439 See section 7.8.2 above.  
440 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 814. See also 
Norway's response to Panel question No.  51 (referring to Oxford English Dictionary, d efinition of "emergency", 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/61130?redirectedFrom=emergency&print (accessed 4  February  2020), 
(Exhibit NOR -125)); United  States ' response to Panel question No.  51 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -86), p. 806 ).  
441 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2520. See also 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th 
edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -222), p. 2534 ). 
442 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 1404. See also 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th 
edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -222), p. 1397 ).  
443 See also Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, March 2022) (defining 
"international relations" as " relations between nations, national governments, international organizations") and 
Black's Law Dictionary, 9th edn, B.A. Garner (ed.) (West Group 2009), p. 893 (defining "international relations" 
as "[g]lobal political interaction, primarily among sovereig n nations").  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  indicate the "international" character of the emergency in time of which Members are not prevented 
from taking action under Article  XXI(b).  
7.126.   The term "war" precedes the phrase "or other emergency in international relations" in 
subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b) and provides immediate context for its interpretation. Dictionary 
definitions of "war" include "[h]ostile contention by means of arm ed forces, carried on between 
nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state; the employment of armed 
forces against a foreign power, or against an opposing party in the state".444 Based on its ordinary 
meaning, "war" involves a state of conflict characteri zed by the use of force. This is further confirmed 
by the French and Spanish language versions of Article  XXI(b)(iii), where the terms " guerre " and 
"guerra " similarly signify armed struggles or outbreak of hostilities.445  
7.127.   The Pa nel finds that the reference to "war" informs the meaning of "emergency in 
international relations" as part of the circumstances "in time of" which a Member may act under 
Article  XXI(b) for the protection of its essential security interests. In particular,  the Panel considers 
that an  "emergency in international relations" within the meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii) must be, if 
not equally grave or severe, at least comparable in its gravity or severity to a "war" in terms of its 
impact on international relatio ns. This understanding is supported by the French and Spanish 
language versions of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, where the terms corresponding to 
"emergency in international relations" are " grave tension internationale " and " grave tensión 
internaci onal" respectively. The term " grave " in these languages may be understood as referring to 
international tensions that are of a critical or serious nature in terms of their impact on the conduct 
of international relations.  
7.128.   Further, under subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b), action for the protection of essential 
security interests must be "taken in time of" an emergency in international relations. As discussed 
above, the Panel understands these opening terms of subparagraph (iii) to qualify and describe the  
"action" referred to in Article  XXI(b). The phrase "taken in time of" in subparagraph (iii) describes 
the temporal link between the action taken by a Member under Article  XXI(b) and the "war  or other 
emergency in international relations" in subparagraph (iii) of that Article.  
7.129.   The Panel also considers relevant the context provided by the subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI(b) in conjunction with the terms used in paragraph (b) of Article  XXI, which concerns 
actions taken by a Member for the protecti on of its "essential security interests". As discussed above, 
the description of these security interests as "essential" indicates the heightened significance of the 
security interests that Members are not prevented from taking action to protect pursuant t o 
Article  XXI(b). Actions taken by a Member for the protection of its essential security interests may 
concern "fissionable materials" under subparagraph (i), "traffic" involving certain military interests 
under subparagraph (ii), and "war or other emergen cy in international relations" under subparagraph 
(iii). The Panel is guided by the delimiting function of the subparagraphs in construing subparagraph 
(iii) to refer to circumstances of a certain gravity or severity  in terms of their impact on the conduct  
of international relations, as part of the balance of rights and obligations reflected in the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of Article  XXI(b), interpreted in their context and in light of the object and 
purpose of the GATT  1994 and WTO  Agreement .446  
7.130.   With respect to the measures at issue, the Panel notes that the United  States  has referred 
in its arguments regarding  Article  XXI(b)(iii) to factors considered by the USDOC in the Steel and 
Aluminium Reports. These Reports reflect the domestic legislative basis and statutory terms of 
Section  232, particularly the factors to be considered in investigations by the USDOC and the 
reference to importation "in such quantities or under such circumstances" that the imports "threaten 
to impair the national security" .447 The Panel notes that various factors relied upon by US authorities 
 
444 Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, March 2022).  
445 See Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Fran çaise (2000), p. 1183 (defining " guerre " as " [l]utte 
armée entre groupes sociaux " (armed struggle between social grou ps) or " [l]es questions militaires " (military 
matters)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 795 (defining 
"guerra " as " [d]esavenencia y rompimiento de la paz entre dos o más potencias " (disagreement and breac h of 
peace between two or more powers) or " [l]ucha armada entre dos o más naciones o entre bandos de una 
misma nación " (armed struggle between two or more nations or between sides of the same nation)).  
446 See paras.  7.112  and 7.113  above.  
447 The USDOC noted the non -exhaustive list of fac tors to be considered in connection with "national 
security" under Section  232 and the list of factors for the US Secretary of Commerce to consider in determining 
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  are treated cumulatively  in support of the determination to act under Section  232. Specifically, the 
Steel and Aluminium Reports identify "three factors" as the basis for finding with r espect to steel 
and aluminium that "weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security", namely: 
(a) displacement of domestic steel/aluminium by excessive imports; (b) the consequent adverse 
impact on the economic welfare of the domestic st eel/aluminium industry; and (c) the global excess 
capacity in steel and aluminium.448 The Panel notes that the first two factors focus predominantly 
on developments relating to the domestic situation of steel and aluminium industries in the 
United  States449, while the third focuses on a global aspect of the situation .  
7.131.   The analysis and conclusions of the USDOC in the Steel and Aluminium Reports do not 
purport to identify or address the existence of an "emergency in international relations" within the 
meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. The determinations of US domestic authorities under 
Section  232 relate to a different legal standard and basis  under US municipal law  than the provisions 
of the covered agreements within the Panel's mandate under th e DSU. Accordingly, the factors relied 
upon by the USDOC and conclusions in the Steel and Aluminium Reports are distinct from, and 
cannot be directly transposed to, the terms of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994 and the objective 
assessment required und er Article  11 of the DSU. Therefore, the factors treated cumulatively by US 
domestic authorities under Section  232 may not be regarded as having commensurate relevance or 
weight in the Panel's objective assessment as to whether the measures were taken "in time of war 
or other emergency in international relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. The 
assessment of the Panel in this dispute concerns the United  States ' specific arguments in connection 
with the existence of an "emergency in internati onal relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii) and, in 
particular, its references to an international situation of global excess capacity in steel and 
aluminium.450  
7.132.   The Panel observes that, in its arguments under Article  XXI(b), the United  States  refers to 
this international situation – i.e. global excess capacity  in steel and aluminium – in connection with 
the impact of imports on domestic producers of steel and aluminium, as reflected in the conclusions 
of the USDOC in the Steel and Aluminium Re ports.451 The United  States  refers to factors addressed 
by the USDOC in the Steel and Aluminium Reports as evidence that it "considers" the measures at 
issue to have been "taken in time" of an "emergency in international relations" within the meaning 
of Art icle XXI(b)(iii). In this regard, the Panel notes the United  States ' argument that "the extensive 
findings in the steel and aluminum reports are consistent with the United  States  considering the 
measures at issue to be taken 'in time of war or other emerge ncy in international relations'."452 The 
United  States  additionally argues that "the Panel should find [that] the United  States  has provided 
information that it considers the measure necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests … [and] t hat the United  States  has provided information that it considers the measure 
'taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations', the circumstance in 
subparagraph ending (iii)".453 
7.133.   The Panel recalls its conclusion that the terms "which it c onsiders" in Article  XXI(b) do not 
qualify the subparagraphs to render them "self -judging" as argued by the United  States .454 While 
the United  States  contends that it has "provided information that it considers" the measures at issue 
to fall under Article  XXI(b)(iii), the review of such information in accordance with the DSU requires 
an objective ascertainment of factors relating to the relevant "emergency in international relations" 
under subparagraph (iii), as distinguished from factors pertaining to what is reserved to a Member's 
 
if imports "threaten to impair the national security". (See Steel Report , (Exhibit NOR-1 and USA-7), pp. 13 -15; 
Aluminium Report , (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), pp. 12 -14 (referring to Section  232(d))).  
448 Steel Report , (Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), p. 16; Alumin ium Report , (Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), p. 
15.  
449 See e.g. Steel Report , (Exhibit NOR-1 and US A-7), sections V.B.4 -10 and V.C; Alumin ium Report , 
(Exhibit NOR -2 and USA -8), sections VI.H and VI.C.  
450 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  43 (referring to Steel Report , (Exhibit NOR-1 
and USA -7), Appendix  L: "Global Excess Capacity in Steel Production" and its commentary on OECD analyses 
and the policy recommendations from the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity); United  States ' comments 
after the second meeting of the Panel, para.  11 (referring to Aluminium Report , (Exhib it NOR -2 and USA -8), 
Appendix  E "Global Excess Aluminum Production"); see also United  States ' closing statement at the second 
meeting, paras.  61-62. 
451 See Steel Report , (Exhibit NOR-1 and USA -7), section  VI; Aluminium Report , (Exhibit NOR -2 and 
USA-8), section VII. 
452 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  40. 
453 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  54. 
454 See para.  7.116  above.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  consideration under paragraph (b) of Article  XXI. The United  States  refers to factors that were 
cumulatively considered by domestic authorities in support of the determination to act under 
Section  232. As noted, these factors conc ern both the domestic situation of steel and aluminium 
industries as well as global excess capacity.  
7.134.   In the Panel's view, the factors  raised by the United  States  on the impact of imports on 
domestic producers of steel and aluminium , including the consider ation of US domestic authorities 
of "national security" under Section  232, pertain more to the "action which [the United  States ] 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" under paragraph (b) of 
Article  XXI.455 However, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, subparagraph (iii) 
requires a distinct inquiry as to whether the actions were taken in time of an "emergency in 
international relations" based on an objective assessment of relevant evidence and arguments.  
7.135.   In this connection, t he Panel notes the evidence submitted by the United  States  of 
international concerns regarding global exces s capacity in steel and aluminium, including the 
discussion of such concerns in the Steel and Aluminium Reports.  The statements at the international 
level referred to by the United  States  indicate that the issue of global excess capacity in steel and 
alumi nium has be en a topic of high -level discussion and expressions of concern in various 
international fora.456 As reflected in information provided by the United  States  in this dispute, the 
discussion of global excess capacity focuses on specific sectors and i s evidence of the fact that the 
issue has been raised as a matter of international attention within the conduct of international 
relations of various countries. Notwithstanding such evidence of international engagement, the Panel 
recalls that an "emergency  in international relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii) refers to situations of 
a certain gravity or severity and international tensions that are of a critical or serious nature in terms 
of their impact on the conduct of international relations.  
7.136.   Having  carefully reviewed the relevant evidence and arguments submitted in this dispute, 
and particularly those submitted by the United  States  in relation to global excess capacity, the Panel 
is not persuaded that the situation to which the United  States  refers rises to the gravity or severity 
of tensions on the international plane so as to constitute an "emergency in international relations"  
during which a Member may act under Article  XXI(b)(iii).457 For example, the G20 Global Steel Forum 
Report "focuses on the steel  sector and provides concrete policy solutions to reduce steel excess 
capacity".458 In referring to excess steelmaking capacity as "a global challenge that has become 
particularly acute since 2015", the report highlights various efforts within the Global St eel Forum in 
light of trends in the sector as part of "[g]lobal cooperation to find solutions to tackle excess capacity 
in the steel market".459 Such evidence submitted by the United  States  in this dispute reflects 
international concern expressed in the con text of cooperative efforts to address excess capacity in 
 
455 See e.g. United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  19 (stating that "the 
measures challenged were on steel and aluminum (key sources for military vehicles, weapons, and systems for 
critical national infrastructure) that the United  States  has taken for national security purposes"  and referring to 
"an industry that is vital to our national security and whose decline threatens to impair our national se curity") ; 
response to Panel question No.  92(a). See also paras.  7.71, 7.76-7.79, and 7.86-7.87 above.  
456 See e.g. G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), (Exhibit US A-72); 
Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström, "Way ahead for the global steel industry", OECD High-Level 
Symposium on Steel , (Exhibit US A-240); Charlevoix G7 Summit Communiqué (9  June 2018) , (Exhibit USA -
247).  
457 The Panel notes in this regard that previous panels have found situations to constitute an 
"emergency in international relations" under S ecurity Exceptions based on the particular evidence and 
circumstances at issue in those disputes. In a dispute under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, such evidence 
included international recognition of the degree of deterioration of relations between two Members and a 
situation involving armed conflict during a certain time period. (See Panel  Report , Russa – Traffic in Transit , 
paras.  7.122 -7.123). In another dispute under Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreement (the corresponding 
provision to Articl e XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994 in the TRIPS  Agreement ), such evidence included  the 
severance of all diplomatic, consular, and economic relations between two Members. (See Panel  Report , 
Saudi  Arabia – IPRs; paras.  7.257 -7.266).  
458 G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), ( Exhibit USA -72), p. 2.  
459 G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), ( Exhibit USA -72), pp. 2 -3. 
The report describes the formal establishment of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Ca pacity and notes that 
"the OECD acts as the facilitator to the Global Forum". (Ibid. para. 6). The report further describes efforts to 
develop an "information -sharing mechanism" in a "tangible process [that] contributes to the collective trust 
and confiden ce that are necessary to find collective solutions to the challenge of excess capacity". (Ibid. 
paras.  7-8). WT/DS552/R  
 
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  a specific sector.460 In the Panel's view, however, the gravity or severity of an "emergency in 
international relations" within the meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii), particularly regarding the impact o n 
international relations of situations falling under that provision, has not been established based on 
the evidence and arguments submitted in this dispute. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel is 
mindful of its mandate in this dispute461 as well as the balance of rights and obligations reflected in 
the terms of Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 interpreted in accordance with the DSU.  
7.8.4   Conclusion  
7.137.   In conclusion , the Panel does not find , based on the evidence and arguments submitted in 
this dispute, that the measures at issue were "taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations" within the meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. Therefore, the 
Panel finds that the inconsistencies of the measures at issue with Articles I:1 , II:1, and XI:1  of the 
GATT  1994 are not justified under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. 
8  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  
8.1.  For the reasons  set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:  
a. Regarding Norway's claims under Article  II of the GATT  1994, the additional duties of 25% 
on steel products and 10% on aluminium products do not accord the treatment provided 
for in the United  States' Schedule, contrary to Article  II:1(b) and Article  II:1(a) of the 
GATT  1994. 
b. Regarding Norway's claims  under Article  I of the GATT  1994, the country exemptions for 
steel and aluminium products confer an advantage to products from Australia, Argentina, 
Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  that has not been accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to like products from all other Members, in a manner inconsistent with 
Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.  
c. Regarding Norway's claims  under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, by imposing import 
quotas on steel and aluminium products from Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea , 
the United  States  has instituted prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or 
other charges on the importation of those products of the territory of those Members, 
inconsistently with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.  
d. Regarding Norway's  claims  under Article  X of the GATT  1994, the Panel does not consider 
it necessary to make findings on Norway's  claims relating to the administration of the 
process es for excluding certain countries or products from measures  that have already 
been found inconsistent with other oblig ations under the GATT  1994. The Panel therefore 
declines to make findings  regarding the claims under Article  X:3(a) of the GATT  1994.  
 
460 The United  States  refers to other evidence that similarly reflects expressions of concern in the 
context of specific international initiatives. For example, the United  States  refers to remarks by the EU 
Commissioner for Trade at the OECD High -Level Symposium on Steel expre ssing concerns on steel 
overcapacity while noting ongoing interventions as well as recommendations for international cooperation. 
(Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström, "Way ahead for the global steel industry", OECD High -Level 
Symposium on Steel , (Exhibit USA -240)). The statement of the chairperson  of the OECD Ministerial Council 
Meeting addressed multiple topics related to "[r]eshaping the foundations of multilateralism for more 
responsible, effective and inclusive outcomes", including a series of points reflecting the chairperson 's 
understanding of the views of OECD members on "[i]nternational trade an d investment for strong and inclusive 
growth". In this context, the chairperson  of the OECD Ministerial Council Meeting referred to "the view that 
severe excess capacity in key sectors such as steel and aluminium are serious concerns" and, "[t]o address 
this critical concern", indicated an agreement "to enhance cooperation in the WTO and in other fora, as 
appropriate". ( Statement of the Chair of the OE CD Ministerial Council Meeting (2018), ( Exhibit USA -246), p. 
5). The Charlevoix  G7 Summit Communiqué si milarly addresse s a number of topics of international 
engagement and international economic concerns, which includes G7 leaders "call[ing] on all members  of the 
Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity to fully and promptly implement its recommendations" while 
"stress[ing] the urgent need to avoid excess capacity in other sectors such as aluminium and high technology". 
(Charlevoix G7 Summit Communiqué (9  June 2018) , (Exhibit USA -247), p. 2).  
461 See section 7.1 above.  WT/DS552/R  
 
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  e. Regarding Norway's  claims under the Agreement on Safeguards,  the Panel finds that the 
relevant measures at issue were sou ght, taken, or maintained pursuant to a provision of 
the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX, namely  Article  XXI of the GATT  1994, within the 
meaning of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Panel therefore finds that 
the Agreement on Safeguards  does not apply to the measures at issue.  
f. Regarding Article  XXI of the GATT  1994, the Panel does not find that the measures at issue 
were "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations" within the 
meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. The Panel therefore finds that the 
inconsistencies of the measures at issue with Articles I:1 , II:1, and XI:1 of the GATT  1994 
are not justified under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994.  
8.2.  Under Article  3.8 of the DSU, in cas es where there is an infringement of the obligations 
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie  to constitute a case of 
nullification or impairment. The Panel concludes  that, to the extent that the measures at issue are 
inconsi stent with certain provisions of the GATT  1994, they have nullified or impaired benefits 
accruing to Norway  under that Agreement.  
8.3.  Pursuant to Article  19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommends that the United  States  bring its 
WTO-inconsistent measures into conf ormity with its obligations under the GATT  1994. 
 
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