WT/L/1076  
 
22 November 2019  
(19-7986) Page: 1/3 
General Council  
9-11 December 2019  Original: Spanish  
 
  
CUBA - ARTICLE XV:6 OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT  
ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 1994  
REPORT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA UNDER THE DECISION OF 12 DECEMBER 20161 
The following communication, dated 2 2 November  2019, is being circulated at the request of the 
delegation of Cuba . 
 
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1.1.  Pursuant to Article IX:4 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the Republic of Cuba hereby submits the third annual report on the waiver extension granted under 
the Decision of 1 2 December  2016 (WT/L/1003) . This waiver was granted to Cuba under the 
Decision of 1 4 October  1996 (WT/L/182) in relation to Article XV:6 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994 ). 
1.2.  The strict economic, commercial and financial blockade measures i mposed on Cuba by the 
Government of the United States remained in place throughout 2018 . These measures have 
intensified since the start of the Donald Trump administration , especially in the financial sector , with 
the ever -increasing targeting of Cuban bus iness activities and financial assets abroad . 
1.3.  The measures concerned include the targeting of transactions conducted between Cuba and 
multilateral cooperation agencies . In addition , the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of 
the United States Treasury Department has continued to i mpose multimillion dollar fines and 
sanctions on foreign banking institutions for dealing with Cuba, with the result that ties have been 
broken and/or Cuban transactions have had to be conducted in more d ifficult and onerous conditions . 
1.4.  The financial sector is affected not only by  the blockade and US pressure on Cuban banking 
activities , but by Cuba's high country -risk status , which is exacerbated by accumulated external 
payment arrears  and renegotiations . This all result s in higher financial costs that force the country 
to allocate  additional resources that could otherwise be used to enhance production capacity or 
ensure the  full use of existing capacity , and to develop priority social programme s. 
1.5.  The bloc kade increases the cost of financing, as a result of the need to set up the structures 
required to get around the restrictions as well as the high country -risk pinned on Cuban operations, 
given that the main risk assessment agencies at the global level are  partially or totally dominated 
by US capital . 
1.6.  In November  2018, as part of its repeated attempts to intensify the blockade and stifle Cuba 
economically , the US State Department decided to include 26 new entities on its list of 179 
"restricted Cuban entities " associated with the national defence and security sectors  – a list 
originally  issued in November  2017. This measure prohibits  direct transactions betw een Cuban 
entities and US citizens , while applications for licences to export US goods and services  to listed 
entities will be  rejected . To make matters worse, the list will be updated on a regular basis, in 
accordance with the National Security Presidenti al Memorandum of June 2017 on strengthening the 
policy of the United States toward Cuba . 
 
1 WT/L/1003.  WT/L/1076  
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  1.7.  This measure has resulted in the cancellation of bank transfers ordered by Cuban businesses 
unfairly included on the aforementioned list . This action indirectly affect s the operations of Cuban 
banking institutions, which have been forced to modify their usual banking channels, in themselves 
restricted, in order to make and receive payments, all of which generates additional difficulties and 
costs in commercial operation s. 
1.8.  Furthermore, in November  2018, the United States introduced new regulations that prohibit  
US citizens from visiting Cuba as tourists and that block financial transactions ( transfers of funds)  
where neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to US jurisdiction . 
1.9.  The genocidal policy against Cuba further intensified in May 2019, when , amongst other things,  
the US Government ended the moratorium on the implementation of Title III of the Helms -Burton 
Act and placed restrictions on f amily remittances to the country . 
1.10.   The main difficulties encountered by Cuban banking institutions in their operations in 2018  
are listed below . They are similar to those described in Cuba's  previous report : 
• The tightening of blockade measures relating to information techn ology  services . 
 
• The impossibility of using the US dollar in commercial and financial transactions abroad . 
 
• Cancellation of banking operations and signed correspondent agreements . 
 
• Account closure requests from foreign banking entities . 
 
• Refusal of foreign banks to transfer funds to or from Cuba and to provide other banking 
services, and the return of Cuban bank transfers . 
 
• Withholding of the funds of Cuban entities in foreign banks . 
 
• Refusal of foreign banks to notify and/or ha ndle letter of credit operations , to make 
amendments to this type of payment document , or to conduct other banking transactions . 
 
• Cancellation by foreign banks of SWIFT Relationship Management Application (RMA) 
codes, which serve as authorizations exchanged between correspondent banks, managing 
which messages can be received and the type of message that can be sent . 
 
• Requests to Cuban banks for additional documentation in order to conduct banking 
operations . 
 
• Problems sending and rece iving bank documents through international courier agencies . 
 
• Cuban entities are obliged to access external financing in extremely burdensome 
conditions as result of the country's risk classification rating (a key factor in the 
determination of the viabili ty and cost of financial operations), which has risen due to the 
current blockade . 
1.11.   For more than 25 years in a row, the international community has condemned this hostile 
policy of the United States towards Cuba . In 2019, the United Nations General Assembl y adopted a 
new resolution condemning the blockade , which, as in previous years, had the support of the 
overwhelming majority of members of that Organization, with 18 7 votes in favour to three  against  
(United States, Israel and Brazil)  and two abstentions  (Colombia and Ukraine) . 
1.12.   In spite of all these difficulties and restrictions, the Cuban economy grew at an annual rate 
of 2.2% at constant 1997 prices ; most noteworthy was the growth of services activities, which 
generated 83.1 % of the GDP . 
1.13.   In the midst of unfavourable conditions, the State budget , executed in line with the Plan for 
the Economy, recorded a deficit lower than that projected , and supported the measures taken to 
ensure the continued updating of the Cuban economic model . WT/L/1076  
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  1.14.   The monetary policy purs ued by the Central Bank of Cuba has been directed towards the use 
of financial instruments that regulate money supply . Exchange rate stability and savings growth are 
both signs of the public's confidence in the Cuban financial system.  
1.15.   Great efforts were made in 2018 to secure strategic development objectives without affecting 
the social programmes designed to raise the standard of living of the population . The most relevant 
social indicators of the year were the following:  
• For the second consecutive year, the infant mortality rate reached its lowest level in history 
of 4.0 per  thousand  live births ; this rate has remain ed below 5.0 for the last 11 years . 
 
• The maternal mortality rate fell from 41.9 per 100,000 live births in 2016 to 38.3 in 2017 . 
 
• Life expectancy at birth continued to be 78 years . 
 
• The country has one doctor per 118 inhabitants and one dentist per 595 inhabitants . 
 
• The unemployment rate remained at 1.7 %, as in 2017 . 
 
• A total of 386,787 students graduated from the education system : 22,344 from higher 
education institutions and 59,044 from technical and vocational courses . 
 
• Primary and secondary education for all has been guaranteed, as has school retention at 
primary and secondary level . 
1.16.   At international level , Cuba continued to exten d its social cooperation and support 
programmes in a considerable number of developing countries, primarily in the areas of health and 
education . 
1.17.   The Cuban economy was adversely affected by the passage of both sub-tropical storm 
"Alberto" and hurricane " Michael " in 2018 . Agricultural activity and the road, electrical, hydraulic 
and telecommunications infrastructure  were the hardest hit  by these events , with reported losses 
of 420.6  million  pesos . 
1.18.   Cuba confirms that the particular circumstances  preventing it from signing a special exchange 
agreement with WTO Members continue to exist, but that it remains committed to complying, where 
possible, with the principles laid down in the General Agreement . The application of the provisions 
of Article XV :6 of the GATT 1994 would involve serious legal and practical difficulties for Cuba . 
1.19.   It must be stressed that the measures taken during this period have to date not had any 
adverse effects on other WTO Members, which have not had any need to hold consultat ions in that 
connection . Cuba reaffirms its commitment to make use of the waiver without affecting the 
objectives of the GATT 1994 or harming or impairing the rights of the rest of the Membership . 
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