WT/DS564/R  
 
9 December 2022  
(22-9171) Page: 1/89 
  Original: English  
 
  
UNITED  STATES  – CERTAIN MEASURES ON STEEL AND ALUMINIUM 
PRODUCTS  
REPORT  OF THE PANEL  
 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
1   INTRODUCTION  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........  13 
1.1   Complaint by Türkiye  ................................ ................................ ................................ ..13 
1.2   Panel establishment and composition  ................................ ................................ ............ 13 
1.3   Panel proceedings  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......14 
1.3.1    General  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................. 14 
1.3.2    Request for the substantive meetings of the Panel to be open to the public  ..................... 14 
1.3.3    Request for enhanced third -party rights  ................................ ................................ .....15 
1.3.4    Relationship with the other disputes where the same three persons act as panelists ......... 15 
1.3.5    Impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on the Panel proceedings  ................................ ........ 17 
1.3.5.1    Filing of written submissions ................................ ................................ ................... 17 
1.3.5.2    Scheduli ng of the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties  ................. 17 
1.3.5.3    Use of a virtual meeting platform for the second substantive meeting of the Panel  
with the parties  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 18 
1.3.5.4    Impact  on coordination with the other disputes where the same three persons act as 
panelists  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 19 
2   FACTUAL ASPECTS ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 20 
2.1   Section  232 and the United  States Department of Commerce reports on steel and  
aluminium  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 20 
2.1.1    Section  232 ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 20 
2.1.2    The Steel Report  ................................ ................................ ................................ ......21 
2.1.2.1    Initiation and investigation process  ................................ ................................ ......... 21 
2.1.2.2    Product scope  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......22 
2.1.2.3    Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  .............................. 23 
2.1.3    The Aluminium Report  ................................ ................................ .............................. 25 
2.1.3.1    Initiation and investigation process  ................................ ................................ ......... 25 
2.1.3.2    Product scope  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......25 
2.1.3.3    Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  .............................. 26 
2.1.4    Presidential Pro clamations  ................................ ................................ ........................ 28 
2.2   Measures at issue  ................................ ................................ ................................ .......29 
2.2.1    Additional duty of 25% ad valorem  on steel products  ................................ ................... 31 
2.2.2    Additional duty of 50% ad valorem  on steel products from Türkiye  ................................ 32 
2.2.3    Country -specific quantitative limitations on steel goods  ................................ ................ 32 
2.2.4    Additional  duty of 10% ad valorem  on aluminium articles  ................................ ............. 32 
2.2.5    Country -specific quantitative limitations on imports of aluminium goods  ......................... 33 
2.2.6    Various "unpublished voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements and 
similar measures"  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 33 
2.3   Measures amended, modified, or lapsed after the establishment of the Panel  ..................... 33 
3   PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  ................................  34 
4   ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  ................................ ................................ ...................  36 
5   ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  ................................ ................................ ........  36 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  6   INTERIM REVIEW  ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 36 
6.1   Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards  ................................ ......37 
6.2   Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ................... 38 
6.3   Appendices  ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 40 
7   FINDINGS  ................................ ................................ ................................ .................  40 
7.1   Mandate under the DS U ................................ ................................ .............................. 40 
7.2   Order of analysis  ................................ ................................ ................................ ........ 42 
7.3   Terms of reference and measures at issue  ................................ ................................ .....43 
7.3.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 43 
7.3.2    Additional duties on derivative steel and aluminium products and corresponding  
country exemptions  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 44 
7.3.3    Country exemptions granted to Canada and Mexico  ................................ ..................... 46 
7.3.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 47 
7.4   Article II:1 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ....................... 47 
7.4.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 47 
7.4.2    Additional duties on steel and aluminium products  ................................ ....................... 49 
7.4.3    Additional duty on steel products from Türkiye  ................................ ............................ 53 
7.4.4    Additional duties on derivative steel and aluminium products  ................................ ........ 54 
7.4.5    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 55 
7.5   Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ........................ 55 
7.5.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 55 
7.5.2    Country exemptions for steel and aluminium products  ................................ .................. 57 
7.5.2.1    Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  ................................ ............... 57 
7.5.2.2    Canada and Mexico  ................................ ................................ ............................... 58 
7.5.3    Additional duty on steel products from Türkiye  ................................ ............................ 59 
7.5.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 59 
7.6   Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ...................... 59 
7.6.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 59 
7.6.2    Import quotas for steel and aluminium products  ................................ .......................... 60 
7.6.3    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 61 
7.7   Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ....................... 61 
7.8   Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards  ................................ ......61 
7.8.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 61 
7.8.2    Interpretation of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU  ................................ ................................ ................. 62 
7.8.3    Assessment of the measures at issue  ................................ ................................ ......... 69 
7.8.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 73 
7.9   Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 ................................ ................................ ................... 74 
7.9.1    Introduction  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 74 
7.9.2    Interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in accordance with Article  3.2 of  
the DSU  ................................ ................................ ................................ ............................ 74 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  7.9.3    Assessment of the measures at issue  ................................ ................................ ......... 82 
7.9.4    Conclusion  ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 88 
8   CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  ................................ ................................ ... 88 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  LIST OF APPENDICES  
Contents  Page  
Appendix  A Materials submitted by the parties on Uruguay Round negotiations of the 
Agreement on Safeguards  4 
Appendix  B Materials submitted by the parties on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT 1994 11 
LIST OF ANNEXES  
ANNEX  A 
WORKING PROCEDURES OF THE PANEL  
Contents  Page  
Annex  A-1 Working Procedures of the Panel  4 
Annex  A-2 Working Procedures of the Panel Revised on 19  July 2019 and 20  February  2020 10 
Annex  A-3 Additional Working Procedures of the Panel Concerning Meetings with Remote 
Participation   16 
ANNEX B  
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  B-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Türkiye  19 
Annex  B-2 Integrated executive summary  of the arguments of the U nited States  of 
America  41 
ANNEX  C 
ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
Contents  Page  
Annex  C-1 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of China  48 
Annex  C-2 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the European  Union  51 
Annex  C-3 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Hong Kong, China  56 
Annex  C-4 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of India 59 
Annex  C-5 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Japan  62 
Annex  C-6 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of New Zealand  65 
Annex  C-7 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Norway  68 
Annex  C-8 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of the Russian  Federation  71 
Annex  C-9 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Singapore  77 
Annex  C-10 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Switzerland  82 
Annex  C-11 Integrated executive summary of the arguments of Ukraine  87 
 
 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  CASES CITED IN THIS REPORT  
Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Argentina – Import 
Measures  Panel Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods , 
WT/DS438/R  and Add .1 / WT/DS444/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS445/R  and Add.1, 
adopted 26  January  2015, as modified (WT/DS438/R) and upheld (WT/DS444/R 
/ WT/DS445/R) by Appellate Body Reports WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/R 
/ WT/DS445/AB/R, DSR 2015:II, p. 783  
Argentina – Import 
Measures  Appellate  Body Reports, Argentina – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Goods , WT/DS438/AB/R  / WT/DS444/AB/R  / WT/DS445/AB/R , adopted 
26 January  2015, DSR 2015:II, p. 579  
Argentina – Textiles and 
Apparel  Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, 
Textiles, Appa rel and Other Items , WT/DS56/AB/R  and Corr.1, adopted 
22 April 1998, DSR 1998:III, p. 1003  
Australia – Salmon 
(Article  21.5 – Canada)  Panel  Report , Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon – Recourse 
to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Canada , WT/DS18/RW , adopted 20  March  2000, 
DSR 2000:IV, p. 2031  
Australia – Tobacco Plain 
Packaging  Panel  Report s, Australia – Certain Measures concerning Tradem arks, 
Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Requirements applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging , WT/DS435/R , Add.1 and Suppl.1 (Honduras)  
/ WT/DS441/R , Add.1 and Suppl.1 (Dominican  Republic ) / WT/DS458/R , Add.1 
and Suppl.1 (Cuba) / WT/DS467/R , Add.1 and Suppl.1 (Indonesia) , 
WT/DS458/R  and WT/DS467/R  adopted 27  August  2018, DSR 2018:VIII, p. 
3925, and WT/DS435/R  and WT/DS441/R  adopted 29  June 2020, as upheld by 
Appellate  Body Reports WT/DS4 35/AB/R / WT/DS441/AB/R, DSR 2018:VIII, p. 
3925 
Australia – Tobacco Plain 
Packaging  Appellate  Body Reports, Australia – Certain Measures concerning Trademarks, 
Geographical Indications and other Plain Packaging Requirements applicable to 
Tobacco Products and Packaging , WT/DS435/AB/R  and Add.1 (Honduras) / 
WT/DS441/AB/R  and Add.1 (Dominican  Republic ), adopted 29  June 2020 
Brazil  – Desiccated Coconut  Appellate  Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut , 
WT/DS22/AB/R , adopted 20  March  1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 167  
Canada – Autos  Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry , 
WT/DS139/R , WT/DS142/R , adopted 19  June 2000, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, DSR 2000:VII, p. 3043  
Canada – Autos  Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Industry , WT/DS139/AB/R , WT/DS142/AB/R , adopted 19  June 2000, DSR 
2000:VI, p. 2985  
Canada – Periodicals  Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals , 
WT/DS31/AB/R , adopted 30  July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 449  
Canada – Renewable E nergy 
/ Canada – Feed-in Tariff 
Program  Appellate  Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed -in Tariff 
Program , WT/DS412/AB/R  / WT/DS426/AB/R , adopted 24  May 2013, DSR 
2013:I, p. 7  
Canada – Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports  Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of I mported Grain , WT/DS276/AB/R , adopted 27  September  2004, 
DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739 
Chile – Price Band System  Panel Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to 
Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS207/R , adopted 23  October  2002, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/D S207AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3127  
Chile – Price Band System  Appellate  Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products , WT/DS207/AB/R , adopted 
23 October  2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3045 (Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5473)  
Chile – Price Band System 
(Article  21.5 – Argentina)  Appellate  Body Report, Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU 
by Argentina , WT/DS207/AB/RW , adopted 22  May 2007, DSR 2007:II, p. 513  
China – Auto Parts  Appellate  Body Reports, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile 
Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R  / WT/DS340/AB/R  / WT/DS342/AB/R , adopted 
12 January  2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3  
China – Rare Earths  Panel  Report s, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten, and Molybden um, WT/DS431/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS432/R  and Add.1 
/ WT/DS433/R  and Add.1, adopted 29  August  2014, upheld by Appellate  Body 
Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R, DSR 2014:IV, 
p. 1127  
China – Raw Materials  Panel  Report s, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials , WT/DS394/R , Add.1 and Corr.1 / WT/DS395/R , Add.1 and Corr.1 / 
WT/DS398/R , Add.1 and Corr.1, adopted 22  February  2012,  as modified by 
Appellate  Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R, 
DSR 2012:VII, p. 3501  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Colombia – Ports of Entry  Panel  Report , Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry , 
WT/DS366/R  and Corr.1, adopted 20  May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535  
Colombia – Textiles  Appellate  Body Report, Colombia  – Measures Relating to the Importation of 
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear , WT/DS461/AB/R  and Add.1, adopted 
22 June 2016, DSR 2016:III, p. 1131  
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Colombia) / 
Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Panama)  Panel  Report , Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, 
Apparel and Footwear – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Colombia  / 
Colombia – Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and 
Footwear – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Panama , WT/DS461/RW  and 
Add.1, circulated to WTO Members 5  October  2018 
Dominican  Republic  – 
Import and Sale of 
Cigarettes  Panel  Report , Dominica n Republic  – Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes , WT/DS302/R , adopted 19  May 2005, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS302/AB/R, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7425  
Dominican  Republic  – 
Safeguard Measures  Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures on Imports of 
Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric , WT/DS415/R , WT/DS416/R , 
WT/DS417/R , WT/DS418/R , and Add.1, adopted 22  February  2012, DSR 
2012:XIII, p. 6775  
EC and certain member 
States – Large Civil Aircraft  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities and Certain Member S tates – 
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft , WT/DS316/AB/R , adopted 
1 June 2011, DSR 2011:I, p.  7 
EC – Bananas III  Panel Reports, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/R/ECU  (Ecuador)  / WT/DS27/R/GTM , 
WT/DS27/R/HND  (Guat emala and Honduras)  / WT/DS27/R/MEX  (Mexico)  / 
WT/DS27/R/USA  (US), adopted 25  September  1997, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS27/AB/R , DSR 1997:II, p.  695 to DS R 1997:III, p.  1085 
EC – Bananas III  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas , WT/DS27/AB/R , adopted 25  September  1997, 
DSR 1997:II, p. 591  
EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.5 – Ecuador  II) Panel Report, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Ecuador , WT/DS27/RW2/ECU , adopted 11  December  2008, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU, DSR 2008:XVIII, p. 7329  
EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.5 – Ecuador II) / 
EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.5 – US) Appellate  Body Reports, European  Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Second Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU 
by Ecuador , WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU , adopted 11  December  2008, and Corr.1 / 
European  Communities  – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by the United  States , 
WT/DS27/AB/RW/USA  and Corr.1, adopted 22  December  2008, DSR 
2008:XVIII, p. 7165  
EC – Bed Linen (Article  21.5 
– India)  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton -Type Bed Linen from India – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the 
DSU by India , WT/DS141/AB/RW , adopted 24  April 2003, DSR 2003:III, p. 965  
EC – Chicken Cuts  Panel  Report s, European  Communities – Customs Classification of Frozen 
Boneless Chicken Cuts , WT/DS269/R  (Brazil)  / WT/DS286/R  (Thailand) , 
adopted 27  September  2005, as modified by Appellate  Body Report 
WT/DS269/AB/R, WT/DS286/AB/R, DSR 2005:XIX , p. 9295 / DSR 2005:XX, 
p. 9721 
EC – Chicken Cuts  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Customs Classification of 
Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts , WT/DS269/AB/R , WT/DS286/AB/R , adopted 
27 September  2005, and Corr.1, DSR 2005:XIX, p. 9157  
EC – Computer Equipment  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment , WT/DS62/AB/R , WT/DS67/AB/R , WT/DS68/AB/R , 
adopted 22  June 1998, DSR 1998:V, p.  1851 
EC – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar (Australia)  Panel  Report , European  Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, Complaint 
by Australia , WT/DS265/R , adopted 19  May 2005, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, 
DSR 2005:XIII, p.  6499 
EC – Fasteners (China)  Panel  Report , European  Communities – Definitive Anti -Dumping Measures on 
Certain Iron or Steel F asteners from China , WT/DS397/R  and Corr.1, adopted 
28 July 2011, as modifi ed by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS397/AB/R, DSR 
2011:VIII, p.  4289 
EC – Fasteners (China) 
(Article  21.5 – China)  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Definitive Anti -Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China – Recourse to 
Article  21.5 of the DSU by China , WT/DS397/AB/RW  and Add.1 , adopted 
12 February  2016, DSR 2016:I, p.  7 
EC – Hormones  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones) , WT/DS26/AB/R , WT/DS48/AB/R , adopted 
13 February  1998, DSR 1998:I, p.  135 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
EC – IT Products  Panel  Report s, European  Communities and its member States – Tariff 
Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products , WT/DS375/R  / 
WT/DS376/R  / WT/DS377/R , adopted 21  September  2010, DSR 2010:III, 
p. 933 
EC – Poultry  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Certain Poultry Products , WT/DS69/AB/R , adopted 23  July 1998, 
DSR 1998:V, p.  2031 
EC – Seal Products  Panel Reports, European  Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation 
and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/R  and Add.1 / WT/DS401/R  and 
Add.1, adopted 18  June 2014, as modified by Appellate Body Reports 
WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R, DSR 2014:II, p.  365 
EC – Seal Products  Appellate  Body Reports, European  Communities – Measures Prohibiting the 
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products , WT/DS400/AB/R  / 
WT/DS401/AB/R , adopted 18  June 2014, DSR 2014:I, p.  7 
EC – Selected Customs 
Matters  Appellate  Body Report, European  Communities – Selected Customs Matters , 
WT/DS315/AB/R , adopted 11  December  2006, DSR 2006:IX, p.  3791 
EEC – Import Restrictions  GATT Panel Report, EEC – Quantitative Restrictions Against Imports of Certain 
Products from Hong Kong, L/5511 , adopted 12 July 1983, BISD 30S/129  
India – Additional Import 
Duties  Appellate  Body Report, India – Additional and Extra -Additional Duties on 
Imports from the United  States , WT/DS360/AB/R , adopted 17  November  2008, 
DSR 2008:XX, p.  8223 
India – Agricultural Products  Panel  Report , India – Measures Concerning the Importation of Certain 
Agricultural Products , WT/DS430/R  and Add.1, adopted 19  June 2015, as 
modified by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS430/AB/R, DSR 2015:V, p.  2663 
India – Patents (US)  Appellate  Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and 
Agricultural Chemical Products , WT/DS50/AB/R , adopted 16  January  1998, DSR 
1998:I, p.  9 
India – Quantitativ e 
Restrictions  Panel  Report , India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, 
Textile and Industrial Products , WT/DS90/R , adopted 22  September  1999, 
upheld by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:V, p.  1799 
India – Solar Cells  Panel  Report , India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules , WT/DS456/R  and Add.1, adopted 14  October  2016, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS456/AB/R, DSR 2016:IV, p.  1941 
Indonesia – Autos  Panel  Report , Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry , 
WT/DS54/R , WT/DS55/R , WT/DS59/R , WT/DS64/R , Corr.1 and Corr.2, adopted 
23 July 1998, and Corr.3 and Corr.4, DSR 1998:VI, p.  2201 
Indonesia – Chicken  Panel  Report , Indonesia – Measures Concerning the Importation of Chicken 
Meat and Chicken Products , WT/DS484/R  and Add.1, adopted 
22 November  2017, DSR 2017:VIII, p.  3769 
Indonesia – Iron or Steel 
Products  Panel  Report , Indonesia – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel Products , 
WT/DS490/R , WT/DS496/R , and Add.1, adopted 27  August  2018, as modified 
by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS490/AB/R, WT/DS496/AB/R, DSR 2018:VII, 
p. 3707 
Indonesia – Iron or Steel 
Products  Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia  – Safeguard on Certain Iron or Steel 
Products , WT/DS490/AB/R , WT/DS496/AB/R , and Add.1, adopted 
27 August  2018, DSR 2018:VII, p.  3393 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages 
II Appellate  Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages , WT/DS8/AB/R , 
WT/DS10/AB/R , WT/DS11/AB/R , adopted 1  November  1996, DSR 1996:I, p.  97 
Japan – Film Panel  Report , Japan – Measures Af fecting Consumer Photographic Film and 
Paper , WT/DS44/R , adopted 22  April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, p.  1179 
Peru – Agricultural Products  Panel  Report , Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural 
Products , WT/DS457/R  and Add.1, adopted 31  July 2015, as modified by 
Appellate  Body Report WT/DS457/AB/R, DSR 2015:VII, p.  3567 
Peru – Agricultural Products  Appellate  Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products , WT/DS457/AB /R and Add.1, adopted 31  July 2015, DSR 
2015:VI, p.  3403 
Russia – Pigs (EU)  Panel  Report , Russian  Federation  – Measures on the Importation of Live Pigs, 
Pork and Other Pig Products from the European  Union , WT/DS475/R  and Add.1, 
adopted 21  March  2017, as modified by Appellate  Body Report 
WT/DS475/AB/R, DSR 2017:II, p.  361 
Russia – Railway Equipment  Panel  Report , Russia – Measures Affecting the Importation of Railway 
Equipment and Parts Thereof , WT/DS499/R  and Add.1, adopted 5  March  2020, 
as modified by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS499/AB/R  
Russia – Tariff Treatment  Panel  Report , Russia – Tariff Treatment of Certain Agricultural and 
Manufacturing Products , WT/DS485/R , Add.1, Corr.1, and Corr.2, adopted 
26 September  2016, DSR 2016:IV, p.  1547 
Russia – Traffic in Transit  Panel  Report , Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit , WT/DS512/R  and 
Add.1, adopted 26  April 2019, DSR 2019:VIII, p. 4301  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
Saudi  Arabia – IPRs Panel  Report , Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual 
Property Rights , WT/DS567/R  and Add.1, circulated to Members on 
16 June 2020, dispute termi nated while appeal pending  
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)  Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes 
from the Philippines , WT/DS371/AB/R , adopted 15  July 2011, DSR 2011:IV, 
p. 2203 
Ukraine – Ammonium 
Nitrate  Appellate  Body Report, Ukraine – Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium 
Nitrate , WT/DS493/AB/R  and Add.1, adopted 30  September  2019, DSR 2019:X, 
p. 5227  
US – 1916 Act  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 , 
WT/DS136/AB/R , WT/DS162/AB/R , adopted 26  September  2000, DSR 2000:X,  
p. 4793 
US – Carbon Steel  Panel  Report , United  States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion -
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany , WT/DS213/R  and Corr.1, 
adopted 19  December  2002, as modified by Appellate  Body Report 
WT/DS213/AB/R, DSR 2002:IX, p.  3833 
US – Carbon Steel  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Corrosion -Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany , WT/DS213/AB/R  
and Corr.1, adopted 19  December  2002, DSR 2002:IX, p.  3779 
US – COOL  Appellate  Body Reports, United  States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements , WT/DS384/AB/R  / WT/DS386/AB/R , adopted 
23 July 2012, DSR 2012:V, p.  2449 
US – COOL (Article  21.5 – 
Canada and Mexico)  Appellate  Body Reports, United  States – Certain Country of Or igin Labelling 
(COOL) Requirements – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU by Canada and 
Mexico , WT/DS384/AB/RW  / WT/DS386/AB/RW , adopted 29  May 2015, DSR 
2015:IV, p.  1725 
US – Customs Bond 
Directive  Panel  Report , United  States – Customs Bond Directive for Merchandise Subject 
to Anti -Dumping/Countervailing Duties , WT/DS345/R , adopted 1  August  2008, 
as modified by Appellate  Body Report WT/DS3 43/AB/R / WT/DS345/AB/R, DSR 
2008:VIII, p.  2925 
US – Gasoline  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline , WT/DS2/AB/R , adopted 20  May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p.  3 
US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd 
complaint) (Article  21.5 – 
EU) Panel Report, United  States – Measures Affecting Trade in Lar ge Civil Aircraft 
(Second Complaint) – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the 
European  Union , WT/DS353/RW  and Add.1, adopted 11 April 2019, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS 353/AB/R W, DSR 2019:V, p. 2171  
US – Line Pipe  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea , 
WT/DS202/AB/R , adopt ed 8 March  2002, DSR 2002:IV, p.  1403 
US – Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment)  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset 
Act of 2000 , WT/DS217/AB/R , WT/DS234/AB/R , adopted 27  January  2003, DSR 
2003:I, p.  375 
US – Poultry (China)  Panel  Report , United  States – Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry 
from China , WT/DS392/R , adopted 25  October 2010, DSR 2010:V, p.  1909 
US – Ripe Olives from Spain  Panel  Report , United  States  – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe 
Olives from Spain , WT/DS577/R  and Add.1, adopted 20  December  2021 
US – Section  301 Trade Act  Panel  Report , United  States – Sections 301 -310 of the Trade Act of 1974 , 
WT/DS152/R , adopted 27  January  2000, DSR 2000:II, p.  815 
US – Shrimp  Appellat e Body Report, United  States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products , WT/DS58/AB/R , adopted 6  November  1998, DSR 
1998:VII, p.  2755 
US – Softwood Lumber IV  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada , WT/DS257/AB/R , 
adopted 17  February  2004, DSR 2004:II, p.  571 
US – Stainles s Steel 
(Mexico)  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Final Anti -Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico , WT/DS344/AB/R , adopted 20  May 2008, DSR 
2008:II, p.  513 
US – Steel Safeguards  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Certain Steel Products , WT/DS248/AB/R , WT/DS249/AB/R , 
WT/DS251/AB/R , WT/DS252/AB/R , WT/DS253/AB/R , WT/DS254/AB/R , 
WT/DS258/AB/R , WT/DS259/AB/R , adopted 10  December  2003, DSR 2003:VII, 
p. 3117 
US – Upland  Cotton  Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton , 
WT/DS267/AB/R , adopted 21  March  2005, DSR 2005:I, p.  3 
US – Washing Machines  Panel Report, United  States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on 
Large Residential Washers from Korea , WT/DS464/R  and Add.1, adopted 
26 September  2016, as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS464/AB/R, 
DSR 2016:V, p.  2505 WT/DS564/R  
 
- 10 - 
 
  Short Title  Full Case Title and Citation  
US – Zeroing (EC) 
(Article  21.5 – EC) Appellate  Body Report, United  States – Laws, Regulations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins ("Zeroing") – Recourse to Article  21.5 of the DSU 
by the European  Communities , WT/DS294/AB/RW  and Corr.1,  adopted 
11 June 2009, DSR 2009:VII, p.  2911 
US – Zeroing (Japan) 
(Article  21.5 – Japan)  Appellate Body Report, United  States – Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Japan , 
WT/DS322/AB/RW , adopted 31  August  2009, DSR 2009:VIII, p.  3441 
 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
- 11 - 
 
  EXHIBITS REFERRED TO IN THIS REPORT  
 
Panel Exhibit  Short title (if 
applicable)  Title 
TUR-1 and 
USA-1 Section  232 Trade Expansion Act, Public Law No.  87–794, 76 Stat. 877 (1962), 
United  States  Code, Title II, Section  232 
TUR-2 and 
USA-2 Section  232 
regulations  United  States  Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Part 705  
TUR-3 and 
USA-7 Steel Report  US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office 
of Technology Evaluation, The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National 
Security: An Investigation Conducted under Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended  (11 January  2018)  
TUR-4 and 
USA-8 Aluminium 
Report  US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Office 
of Technology Evaluation, The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the 
National Security, An Investigation Conducted under Section  232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended  (17 January  2018)  
TUR-6 and 
USA-9 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9705 Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Stee l Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  51 
(15 March  2018), p. 11625  
TUR-7 and 
USA-10 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9704 Proclamation 9704 of 8  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum 
Into the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  51 
(15 March  2018), p. 11619  
TUR-8 and 
USA-11 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9711 Proclamation 9711 of 22  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  60 
(28 March  2018), p. 13361  
TUR-9 and 
USA-12 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9710 Proclamation 9710 of 22  March  2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum 
Into the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  60 
(28 March  2018), p. 13355   
TUR-10 and 
USA-13 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9740 Proclamation 9740 of 30  April 2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  88 
(7 May 2018), p. 20683  
TUR-11 and 
USA-14 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9739 Proclamation 9739 of 30  April 2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum 
Into the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  88 
(7 May 2018), p. 20677  
TUR-12 and 
USA-15 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9759 Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018, Adjusting I mports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  108 
(5 June 2018), p. 25857  
TUR-13 and 
USA-16 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9758 Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum 
Into the United  States , Unite d States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  108 
(5 June 2018), p. 25849  
TUR-14 and 
USA-17 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9772 Proclamation 9772 of 10  August  2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  158 
(15 August  2018), p. 40429  
TUR-15 and 
USA-18 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9777 Proclamation 9777 of 29  August  2018, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into 
the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  171 
(4 September  2018), p. 45025  
TUR-16 and 
USA-19 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9776 Proclamation 9776 of 29  August  2018, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum 
Into the United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  171 
(4 September  2018), p. 45019  
TUR-23 and 
USA-20 March Interim 
Final Rule  Requirements for Submissions Requesting Exclusions From the 
Remedies Instituted in Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of 
Steel Into the United  States  and Adjusting Imports of Aluminum Into 
the United  States ; and the Filing of Objections to Submitted Exclusion 
Requests for Steel and Aluminum, Interim Final Rule, United  States  
Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  53 (19 March  2018), p. 12106  
TUR-42 and 
USA-224 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9886 Proclamation 9886 of 16  May 2019, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into th e 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 84, No.  98 
(21 May 2019), p. 23421  
TUR-48 and 
USA-225 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9980 Proclamation 9980 of 24  January  2020, Adjusting Imports of Derivative 
Aluminum  Articles and Derivative Steel Articles Into the United  States , 
United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 85, No.  19 (29 January  2020), p. 
5281 
TUR-43 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9893 Proclamation 9893 of 19  May 2019, Adjusting Imports of Aluminum 
Into the Unite d States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 84, No.  100 
(23 May 2019), p. 23983  
TUR-44 Presidential 
Proclamation 
9894 Proclamation 9894 of 19  May 2019, Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the 
United  States , United  States  Federal Register, Vol. 84, No.  100 
(23 May 2019), p. 23987  WT/DS564/R  
 
- 12 - 
 
  Panel Exhibit  Short title (if 
applicable)  Title 
USA-21 September 
Interim Final 
Rule Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to Submitted 
Requests for Steel and Aluminum, Interim Final Rule, United  States  
Federal Register, Vol. 83, No.  176 (11 September  2018), p. 46026  
USA-22  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993)  
USA-23  Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II  
USA-72  G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  
(30 November  2017)  
USA-80  Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 
10 November  2017, G/C/M/130  
USA-81  Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 23 and 
26 March  2018, G/C/M/131  
USA-82  Committee on Safeguards, Communication from the United  States , 
G/SG/168  
USA-83  Statement dated 8  May 2018 of the Deputy US Trade Representative 
and US Permanent Representative to the WTO, WTO General Council  
USA-84  Statements dated 29  October  2018, 21  November  2018, and 
4 December  2018 of the United  States , WTO Dispute Settlement Body  
USA-85  Committee on Market Access, Notification Pursuant to the Decision on 
Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions (G/L/59/Rev.1), 
G/MA/QR/N/USA/4  
USA-86  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993)  
USA-93  S. Greenbaum, English Grammar (Oxford University Press, 1996)  
USA-94  R. Flesch and A.H. Lass, The Classic Guide to Better Writing 
(HarperPerennial, 1996)  
USA-95  Merriam -Webster's Guid e to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, 
Incorporated, 1995)  
USA-96  S. Benedict (ed.), Harper's English Grammar (Harper & Row, 1966)  
USA-176  Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style (Merriam -Webster, 
Incorporated, 1995)  
USA-222  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993)  
USA-226  W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and 
Bacon, 1999)  
USA-240  Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström, "Way ahead for the 
global steel industry", OECD High -Level Symposium on Steel  
 
 
 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
- 13 - 
 
  1  INTRODUCTION  
This dispute concerns additional duties and related measures imposed by the United  States  on 
steel and aluminium products under Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended. 
Türkiye1 challenges the consistency of these measures with the United  States ' obligations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ( GATT  1994) and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
1.1  Complaint by Türkiye  
On 15 Augus t 2018, Türkiye  requested consultations with the United  States  pursuant to 
Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 
(DSU) , Article  XXII:1 of the GATT  1994, and Article  14 of the Agreement on Safeguards  with respect 
to the measures and claims set out below.2 
Consultations were held on 10 Octobe r 2018 between Türkiye  and the United  States . These 
consultations failed to resolve the disp ute.3 
1.2  Panel establishment and composition  
On 18 Octobe r 2018, Türkiye  requested the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article s 4.7 
and 6 of the DSU , Article  XXIII:2 of the GATT  1994, and Article  14 of the Agreement on Safeguards  
with standard terms of reference.4 At its meeting on 21 Novembe r 2018, the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) established a panel pursuant to the request of Türkiye  in document WT/DS 564/15, in 
accordance with Article  6 of the DSU.5 
The Panel's terms of reference are the following:  
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by 
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB by [Türkiye ] in document 
WT/DS 564/15 and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the  
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements.6 
On 7 Januar y 2019, Türkiye  requested the Director -General to determine the composition of 
the panel, pursuant to Article  8.7 of the DSU. On 25 Januar y 2019, the Director -General accordingly 
composed the Panel as follows:  
Chairperson:  Mr Elbio Rosselli  
Members:   Mr Esteban B. Conejos, Jr  
   Mr Rodrigo Valenzuela  
The Kingdom of Bahrain; Brazil; Canada; China; Colombia; Egypt;  the European  Union ; 
Guatemala; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; Malaysia; Mexico; 
New Zealand ; Norway; Qatar; the Russian  Federation ; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Singapore; 
South  Africa7; Switzerland; Chinese  Taipei ; Thailand; Ukraine; the Un ited Arab Emirates8; and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela notified their interest in participating in the Panel proceedings as 
third parties.  
 
1 Member formerly known as Turkey.  
2 See Request for consultations by T ürkiye , WT/DS564/1.  
3 See Request for the establishment of a panel by T ürkiye , WT/DS564/15 (T ürkiye 's panel request).  
4 See T ürkiye 's panel request.  
5 See Minutes of the DSB meeting held on 21  November  2018, WT/DSB/M/421, para.  16.4. 
6 See Note by the Secretariat, Constitution of t he Panel established at the request of T ürkiye , 
WT/DS564/16.  
7 On 16  July 2019, South  Africa  notified the DSB and the Panel of its interest to participate as a third 
party. (See WT/DS564/16/Rev.1 ). 
8 On 19  July 2019, the United Arab Emirates notified the DSB and the Panel of its interest to participate 
as a third party. (See WT/DS564/16/Rev.1 ). 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  1.3  Panel proceedings  
1.3.1   General  
The Panel held an organizational meeting with the parties on 19 March 2019.  
After c onsultation with the parties, the Panel adopted its Working Procedures9 and Timetable10 
on 5 April 2019. 
The Panel held a first substantive meeting with the parties on 14 and 15  November  2019.11 A 
session with the third parties took place on 18 November  2019. The Panel held a second substantive 
meeting with the parties on 15 and 29 Januar y 2021. On 15 July 2021, the Panel issued the 
descriptive part of its Report to the parties. The Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties on  
29 June 2022. The Panel issued its Final Report to the parties on  16 November  2022. 
1.3.2   Request for  the substantive meetings of the Panel to be open to the public  
On 5  March 2019, the Panel received a communication from the United  States  inquiring 
whether Türkiye  was willing to  open the substantive  meetings in the dispute to public observation  
and make its submissions to the Panel available to the public .12 In the Panel's organizational meeting 
with the parties, Türkiye  indicated its opposition to disclosing its statements or responses to 
questions to the public . Subsequently, T ürkiye  proposed an arrangement whereby the opening 
statement portion of the hearing could be divided into two  separate  time periods to accommodat e 
the parties' different preferences on opening their statements to the public.13 
The Panel transmitted its Working Procedures to the parties on 5  April 2019, which provided 
that the Panel "shall meet in closed session" .14 
 
9 The Panel's Working Procedures were revised on 19  July 2019 and 20  February  2020. See the Panel's 
Working Procedures,  adopted on 5  April 2019, as revised on 19  July 2019 and 20  February  2020, in Annex  A-1. 
10 The Timetable for the Panel proceedings was revised on 19  July 2019, 13  December  2019, and 
20 February  2020.  The Panel subsequently communicated with the parties directly regarding additional dates 
and deadlines in the Panel proceedings . 
11 On 14  October  2019, the Panel informed the parties that the Chairperson of the Panel would not be 
able to travel to Geneva for the first substantive meeting due to an acc ident.  In response to the Panel's 
invitation to provide views on the conduct of the meeting, the United  States  expressed concern that 
participation by videoconference could make the meeting less effective and queried whether the Chairperson 
would be able t o participate in person with a modest delay in the timetable.  After consulting the parties, the 
Panel decided on 22  October  2019 to proceed with the participation of the Chairperson through 
videoconferencing. In its decision, the Panel noted that the promp t settlement of disputes is a key principle 
under Article  3 of the DSU and, under Article  12.2 of the DSU, panel procedures should provide sufficient 
flexibility so as to ensure high -quality panel reports, while not unduly delaying the panel process. The Panel 
also informed the parties that several actions had been taken in order to guarantee a n optimal quality of 
communication, including setting up multiple channels of communication between Geneva and Montevideo to 
maintain connectivity.  
12 United  States ' communication dated 5  March 2019.  
13 Türkiye 's communication dated 22  March 2019.   
14 Working  Procedures of the Panel, para.  10. During the Panel's organizational meeting with the parties, 
the United  States  alternatively requested the Panel to partially open its substantive meetings to the public 
given the complainants' views in the other disputes  in which the same three persons were appointed as 
panelists (See section 1.3.4 below ). The United  States  argued in that context that providing for a partially open 
hearing would serve to facilitate the United  States ' right under Article  18.2 of the DSU to disclose statements of 
its own position. In its communication to the parties dated 5  April 2019, the Panel observed that nothing in the 
DSU provides that a party's r ight to disclose statements of its own positions to the public must be exercised 
through the holding of fully or partly open hearings. The Panel noted that there are other ways in which 
Members can make statements of their own position public and that by d eclining a party's request to hold 
partially open hearings, the Panel would not be depriving a Member of its rights under Article  18.2 or under 
any other provisions of the DSU. Having considered the disagreement between the parties on the 
United  States ' proposal, as well as the parties' views on the scope of the obligation to protect confidential 
information in the context of a partially open hearing, the Panel exercised its discretion under Article  12.1 of 
the DSU to deny the United  States ' request for par tially open meetings.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  1.3.3   Request for enhanced third -party rights  
On 7 June 2019, the Panel received a communication from the European  Union  requesting  
enhanced  third-party right s (a) to receive copies of all the parties' written submissions, oral 
statements, rebuttals and answers to questions from the Panel and each other, through all stages 
of the proceedings; (b) to be present for the entirety of all substantive meetings of the Panel with 
the parties; and (c) to review t he draft summary of their own arguments in the descriptive part of 
the Panel  Report .15 On 17  June 2019 and 26  June 2019, the Panel invited the parties  to comment 
on this request  as well as other similar requests received from China16, Norway17, Switzerland18, the 
Russia n Federation19, and Hong Kong, China .20 In response, the United  States  opposed the requests 
for enhanced rights to third parties21, whereas  Türkiye  supported the requests.22  
Having consulted the parties on this matter  and considering the ir due process interests, the 
Panel informed the parties and third parties on 19  July 2019 that it had decided to grant certain 
enhanced third -party rights to all  third parties. The Panel implement ed this decision in 
paragraph  30(e) of the Revised Working Procedures of 19  July 2019, granting third parties access 
to the parties' submissions up to and including their responses to the questions posed by the Panel 
following the first substantive meeting, as well as final versions of the oral  statements made by the 
parties during the first substantive meeting . The Panel stated that it would address the requests for 
enhanced third -party rights in respect of further stages of the proceedings  in due course . 
After consultation with the parties, t he Panel also granted enhanced third -party rights in 
respect of further stages of the proceedings . On 20  February  2020, the Panel amended its Working 
Procedures  to provide third parties access to the parties' second written submissions, final versions 
of oral statements made by the parties during the second substantive meeting, their responses to 
the Panel's questions after the second substantive meeting, and comments on those responses.  
In the interest of advancing the proceedings during the disruptions  associated  with the 
COVID -19 pandemic23 and pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Panel's Working Procedures, the Panel 
sent additional questions to the parties on 26  August  2020. Based on consultations with the parties, 
the Panel decided on 8 September  2020 and 21  September  2020 that the parties' responses to the 
Panel's  additional  questions and comments on those responses should be made available to  third 
parties.  
Due to the impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on  the second substantive meeting24, the Panel 
decided , on 10  November  2020, to modify its decision of 20 February  2020 so  that third parties 
would not receive further access to any statements, submissions, or exchanges from the partie s, 
including statements made by the parties during the second substantive mee ting, their responses 
to the Panel's questions after the second substantive meeting, or comments on those responses . 
1.3.4   Relationship with the other disputes where the same three persons act as panelists  
At the organizational meeting and  at various points in t he proceedings, the parties provided 
views regarding the relationship between this dispute and the other cases where the same three 
persons act as panelists.25 
 
15 European  Union 's communication dated 7  June 2019, para.  11. 
16 China's communication dated 7  June 2019, para.  2. 
17 Norway's communication dated 11  June 2019, para.  3. 
18 Switzerland's communication dated 11  June 2019, para.  3. 
19 Russia n Federation 's communication dated 14  June 2019, p. 3.  
20 Hong Kong, China's communication dated 25  June 2019, p. 1.  
21 United  States ' communications dated 24  June 2019, para.  2; United  States ' communication dated 
1 July 2019, para.  2.  
22 Türkiye 's communication dated 24  June 2019, p. 1; T ürkiye 's communication dated 1  July 2019, p. 1.  
23 See section 1.3.5.2  below.  
24 See section 1.3.5.4  below.  
25 The other disputes where  the same three persons are acting as panelists  include  DS544 (China), 
DS547 (India), DS552 (Norway),  DS554 (the Russian  Federation ), and DS556 (Switzerland). Mutually agreed 
solutions were notified in DS550 (Canada) and DS551 (Mexico), where the same three persons were appointed 
as panelists. See United  States  – Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Pr oducts (Canada) , Notification of 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
- 16 - 
 
  
Türkiye  considered that these complaints relate to the same matter and Article  9.3 of the DSU  
was therefore applicable , noting that this was recognized in the Director -General's decision to 
appoint the same panelists to serve on all these panels.  Accordingly, Türkiye  argued that these 
proceedings required harmonized timetables and consolidated hearings , which could significantly 
reduce the risk of unnecessary repetition and achieve important efficiencies.26 For Türkiye , the notion 
of a "harmoni zed" timetable in Articl e 9.3 of the DSU implies "harmoni zed", or consolidated, 
substantive meetings .27 Türkiye  argue d that, in previous practice , single panels were established 
under Article  9.1 of the DSU despite the absence of a complete overlap of the claims raised  and that 
"[t]his logic applies a fortiori  under Article  9.3 of the DSU."28 
The United  States  considered  that a single panel had not been established  in these disputes  
pursuant to Article  9.1 of the DSU, but ra ther, nine29 separate panels were established by the DSB 
to consider distinct matters. For the United  States , the matters are distinct because the claims and 
measures identified by each complainant are different from the other complainants . For this reason, 
the United  States  submitted that Article  9.3 of the DSU is not applicable and, even if it were, it would 
only be relevant to the composition of the various panels and the timetables.30 In the context of 
Article  9.3 of the DSU, the United  States  argued that t o "harmonize " the timetables in these 
proceedings would mean to make them consistent or compatible and that harmonization does not 
suggest, much less require, that the Panel collapse the proceedings into a single, identical process. 
For the United  States , the disparate sets of claims and measures identified by the complainants are 
important to considerations of both efficiency and procedural fairness.31 
The Panel notes that , at its meeting on 21  November  2018, the DSB established a panel 
pursuant to the reques t of Türkiye  in document WT/DS5 64/15, in accordance with Article  6 of the 
DSU.32 While the same three persons that act as panelists in this dispute were also appointed as 
panelists in other related cases33, these proceedings are not substantively identical  in all respects , 
for instance,  in terms of the precise measures and claims at issue . The Panel was also mindful of 
the logistical complexities of coordinating multiple formally distinct disputes and, before  adopting its 
Timetable  and Working Procedures, consulted the parties on multiple possible alternatives for the 
conduct and configuration of the proceedings .34 
The Panel, nonetheless, made arrangements at each stage of the proceedings to maintain 
harmonized timetables to the gre atest extent possible in both the deadlines for written submissions 
and the dates for meetings across all disputes  in which the same three persons act as panelists . In 
doing so, t he Panel endeavoured to balance the efficient conduct of proceedings with the  due process 
rights of the parties , taking into account  the agreement of the parties, or lack thereof, on the 
different proposals on how to organize the proceedings. As elaborated in the next section , the 
 
a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS550/13, 27  May 2019 and United  States  – Certain Measures on Steel and 
Aluminium Products (Mexico) , Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS551/13, 3  June 2019.  On 
17 Januar y 2022, the United  States  and the European  Union  jointly notified  the DSB that they were terminating 
the dispute  in DS548 ( European  Union ), where the same three persons were appointed as panelists. 
(WT/DS548/20 ). On 20  Januar y 2022, that panel notified the DSB that it  was in receipt of a communication 
from the European  Union  notifying the withdrawal of its complaint, and accordingly, had ceased all work in 
those proceedings. ( WT/DS548/2 1). 
26 Türkiye 's communication dated 22  Februar y 2019.  
27 Türkiye 's communicati on dated 1  March 2019.  
28 Türkiye 's communication dated 1  March 2019.  
29 The Panel recalls that the disputes in DS548 (European  Union ), DS550 (Canada) and DS551 (Mexico) 
were active at the time of the Panel's organizational meeting and related consultations with the parties.  
30 United  States ' communication dated 22  February  2019.  
31 United  States ' communication dated 1  March 2019.  
32 See Note by the Secretariat, Constitution of the Panel established at the request of T ürkiye , 
WT/DS564/16.  
33 DS544 (China), DS547 (India), DS552 (Norway), DS554 (the Russian  Federation ), and DS556 
(Switzerland).  
34 Panel communication to the parties dated 7 March 2019. During the Panel's organizational meeting 
and related consultations with the parties, the Panel specifically sought the parties' views on the optimal 
scheduling and configuration of the substantive meetings in the disputes where the same thre e persons were 
appointed as panelists, particularly addressing three possible configurations for the substantive meetings: (a) 
combined substantive meetings with the parties in this dispute and the other eight disputes; (b) a "two -stage" 
approach proposed by the United  States  with a first stage devoted solely to the United  States ' arguments 
under Article  XXI of the GATT  1994; and (c) separate meetings for each of the disputes in which the same 
panelists  had been appointed.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  harmonization of timetables was, in some instances,  affected by the divergent views of the 
complainants across the different disputes.35  
1.3.5   Impact of the COVID -19 pandemic on the Panel  proceedings  
1.3.5.1   Filing of written submissions  
On 17  March 2020, in response to the COVID -19 outbreak, the Panel suspended the 
requirement to deliver paper copies of a document or submission to the other parties or the DS 
Registry until further notice. The Panel decided that receipt of the electronic version would be 
deemed to be full service for the purposes of the Working Procedures. After briefly reverting to  
service of hard copies of documents on 22 July 2020, the Panel informed the parties that as of 
28 October  2020, e -filing would be deemed full service again unt il further notice.36 
1.3.5.2   Scheduling of the second  substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties  
According to the revised Timetable  adopted on 20  February  2020 after consultation with the 
parties37, the Panel's second meeting with the parties was scheduled  for 28-29 July 2020.  
On 27  May 2020, the Panel invited the parties to provide information on  the travel restrictions 
that might impact the overall likelihood of holding the second meeting in person in July  2020. In 
addition, the Panel consulted the parties on possible alternative arrangements to meetings in person, 
including (a) holding the second substantive meeting through virtual participation in July 2020; (b) 
postponement of the meeting to a later date with a possibility for an exchange of writt en questions 
and responses in the interim; (c) adoption of written procedures as a substitute for the second 
substantive meeting; or (d) any other possible arrangement, should it not be possible to hold the 
meeting in  person in July 2020.  
In response to th e Panel's communication, both parties indicated their inability to travel to 
Geneva for the second substantive meeting in July 2020.38 Türkiye  suggested that the Panel should 
postpone the second substantive meeting to  mid-September 2020 .39 Türkiye  noted th at should the 
circumstances at that time not permit a hearing in person, the Panel and the parties could discuss 
acceptable alternative arrangements to avoid further delays.40 In particular, T ürkiye  argued that the 
Panel should consider a written procedure  to replace in -person meetings.41 The United  States  
opposed holding the meeting in a virtual format, citing consequent limitations on interactions 
between the parties and the Panel, within the parties' respective delegations, among the three 
panelists, and  between the panelists and the Secretariat.42 The United  States  further argued that a 
written exchange could not serve as an alternative to a second substantive meeting with 
contemporaneous oral exchange.43 On this basis, the United  States  also requested t hat the Panel 
reschedule the second substantive meeting for a later date, indicating its support for T ürkiye 's 
proposal to schedule the meeting in mid -September 2020.44 After reviewing the parties' comments, 
 
35 See section  1.3.5.4  below . 
36 Panel communication to the parties dated 27  October  2020.  
37 Following its first substantive meeting with the parties, the Panel consulted the parties on various 
options for scheduling the second substantive meeting between 22  June-31 July 2020 or 14  September -
16 October  2020, as well as an expedited timetable unde r which the second substantive meeting with the 
parties would be held in May 2020. While T ürkiye  favoured the earlier scheduling of the meeting, the 
United  States  requested that the meeting be scheduled between 14  September 2020 and 16  October  2020, 
citing  conflicting summer holiday schedules, US federal holidays, and the need for sufficient time to adequately 
prepare for the second substantive meeting. Based on these consultations, the Panel scheduled its second 
meeting with the parties on 28 and 29  July 2020.  
38 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, paras.  2-3; Türkiye 's communication dated 
2 June 2020, p. 1.  
39 Türkiye 's communication dated 2  June 2020, p. 1.  
40 Türkiye 's communication dated 2  June 2020, p. 1.  
41 Türkiye 's communication dated 5  June 2020, p. 1.  
42 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, paras.  9-10. 
43 United  States ' communication dated 2  June 2020, para.  15. 
44 United  States ' communication dated 2 June 2020, para.  11; United  States ' communication dated 
5 June 2020, para.  3.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  the Panel in its communication dated 12  June 2020 decided to postpone the meeting, indicating that 
it tentatively intended to schedule the meeting between 10  September and 20  October  2020.  
Through multiple communications sent to the parties on 22  July 2020, 31  July 2020, 
26 August  2020, 21  September  2020, 13  October  2020, and 23  October  2020, the Panel regularly 
consulted the parties on the feasibility of in -person meetings in 2020 and possible alternative 
arrangements. Both parties identified numerous potential obstacles to holding in -person meetings  
in 2020, including evolving travel and quarantine restrictions due to the pandemic , and maintained 
their preference for in -person meetings .45 Türkiye  additionally considered that given the uncertainty 
as to when  in-person meetings could  resume, they  shoul d be replaced with written exchanges , 
virtual meetings  or hybrid meetings with both in -person and virtual participation to avoid undue 
delay.46  
After it became apparent that no in -person meeting would be possible in the foreseeable 
future  due to the COVID -19 pandemic , the Panel issued a decision on 10 November  2020 on the 
way forward  in the proceedings. The Panel  began by  noting the various restrictions imposed on 
gatherings and international travel in relation to the COVID -19 pandemic, including those instituted 
by Switzerland in November 2020 , and that under  these circumstances , holding the second 
substantive meeting in the man ner originally envisaged in the Timetable  was not feasible.  The Panel 
indicated its consistent efforts over the course of the dispute to maintain a balance between the 
efficient conduct of proceedings, the parties' due process rights, and the particular pr eferences 
expressed by each party, including the complainant's request to keep the timetables harmonized 
across the disputes in which the same three persons act as panelists. Based on the parties' comments 
and in the interest of continuing to advance the P anel's work, the Panel decided to proceed by holding 
the second substantive meeting virtually . 
1.3.5.3   Use of a virtual meeting platform for the second  substantive meeting of the Panel  
with the parties  
In its decision of 10 November  2020, the Panel noted its inte ntion to conduct the second 
meeting through the Cisco Web ex platform  and circulated draft additional working procedures 
requiring, among other things, that all remote participants follow the security rules contained in 
these additional working procedures as well as any additional security guidance that may be provided 
by the host . The Panel also proposed to arrange advance testing sessions with the parties to ensure 
their remote participation  and invited  comments from the parties  on the draft additional working 
procedures .  
In its comments on the draft additional working procedures, the United  States  requested that 
the Panel (a) provide all questions to the parties at least two weeks in advance; (b) refrain from 
asking additional or follow -up questions during the session; and (c) prohibit parties from 
commenting on each other 's responses to the Panel 's questions during the session. The 
United  States  reasoned that  health concerns preven ted its delegation from gathering in -person to 
coordinate  responses . The United  States  further cited  technical considerations – "including the 
inability of USTR employees to participate in a meeting via Webex from telework locations" – in 
support of its request. Finally, t he United  States  requested that the Panel enable the Webex dial -in 
feature to allow individuals from its delegation to connect by phone and reflect this adjustment in 
the proposed additional working procedures.47 
 Taking note of the parties' comments,  the Panel declined the United  States ' request to ( a) 
refrain from asking additional or follow -up questions during the session, and ( b) prohibit parties 
from commenting on each other's responses to the Panel's questions during the session. The Panel 
observed that it had decided to divide the second substantive meeting into two four -hour sessions 
with two weeks between the sessions. The Panel found  that this arrangement would allow each party 
the time to confer within its delegation and respond to possible questions from the Panel or the other 
 
45 United  States ' communication dated 28  July 2020, para.  9; United  States ' communication dated 
9 September  2020, para.  6; United  States ' communication dated 20  October  2020, para.  1; United  States ' 
communication d ated 4  November  2020, para.  2; Türkiye 's communication dated 28  July 2020; and Türkiye 's 
communication dated 9  September  2020.  
46 Türkiye 's communication dated 20  October  2020, p. 1; T ürkiye 's communication dated 
4 November  2020, p. 2.  
47 United States ' communication dated 16  November  2020.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  party throughout the course of the meeting. The Panel also noted that the parties would have the 
opportunity to provide further comments in writing in response to questions after the meeting.48  
In the Additional Working Procedures for virtual meetings, the Panel indicated that the 
meeting would be held in closed session, with remote ac cess limited to registered participants. 
Accordingly, for security and confidentiality reasons, the Panel decided not to enable the dial -in 
feature on Webex.  
1.3.5.4   Impact on coordination with the other disputes where the same three persons act 
as panelists  
As discussed in section  1.3.4 of this Report,  the Panel made several arrangements at each 
stage of the proceedings to maintain harmonized timetables in all disputes where  the same three 
persons are acting as panelists.  However, i n its communications of 13  October  2020 and 
23 October  2020, the Panel noted that the complainants across the se disputes presented diverging  
views on the way forward for  the second substantive meeting in light of the COVID -19 pandemic. 
The Panel indicated to the parties that this divergence was difficult to reconcile with Türkiye 's initial 
request to maintain harmoni zed timetables in all disputes. Accordingly, the Panel s ought the parties' 
views on the feasibility of maintaining such harmonization going forward.  The Panel also invited the 
parties ' comments  on the implications of the differences among  the complainants in the se disputes 
on enhanced third -party rights, and in  particular on access to written submissions and responses to 
Panel questions, if the Panel determined that it was not viable to maintain harmoni zed timetables.  
 Türkiye  argued the timetables in the seven disputes where the same three persons act as 
panelists should be harmonized to the greatest extent possible. T ürkiye  further argued that to avoid 
any due process concerns arising from different arrangements, the Panel sho uld preferably adopt 
the same types of alternative arrangements across all seven disputes. In T ürkiye 's view, to the 
extent that all seven disputes proceed along the same timetable, no concern s in respect of enhanced 
third-party rights would arise. T ürkiye  acknowledged that if one or more of the seven disputes were 
to proceed while the remaining were delayed, the time gap and resulting asymmetry could prejudice 
the due process rights of the United  States .49 In this regard, T ürkiye  noted that the Panel should not 
permit those complainants whose disputes are delayed to have access to the United  States ' written 
submissions in the parallel disputes in which the complainants enjoy enhanced third -party rights.50 
The United  States  objecte d to proceeding differently across the disputes in which the same 
three persons serve as panelists , arguing that doing so would  provide a strategic benefit to the 
complainants  to the disadvantage of the United  States .51 Moreover, t he United  States  observed  that 
should the Panel move forward with different formats and different timetables across the se disputes, 
the United  States  would no longer agree to open any of the proceedings to public viewing.52 
The United  States  reasoned that complainants participatin g in later meetings would have an 
opportunity to view the earlier open meeting s and adjust their statements and arguments 
accordingly.53 For similar reasons , the United  States  also requested that the Panel rescind its 
decision on enhanced third-party rights in the event it acceded to the complainants' diverging 
requests, arguing that such enhanced rights would serve to unfairly advantage those third parties 
that are also parties in their own disputes.54  
The Panel provided  its decision on t he second substantive meeting to the parties on 
10 November  2020, where it noted that Article  9.3 of the  DSU provides for harmonizing timetables 
to the "greatest extent possible" . The Panel observed  that the  compatibility of positions taken by 
parties acro ss disputes, or lack thereof, was a significant factor in assessing the possibility of 
harmonizing timetables.  In particular, the Panel considered that the harmonization of timetables 
would not compel the adoption of alternative meeting procedures by virtu al means even in those 
disputes where both the complainant and the respondent ha d expressed a preference to wait until 
in-person meetings were possible.  In this light, the Panel concluded that if the divergent positions 
 
48 Panel communication to the parties dated 1  December  2020.  
49 Türkiye 's communication dated 20  October  2020, p. 2 .  
50 Türkiye 's communication dated 4  November  2020, p. 1.  
51 United  States ' communication dated 20 October  2020, para.  6. 
52 United  States ' communication dated 4  November  2020, para.  6. 
53 United  States ' communication dated 20  October  2020, para.  5. 
54 United  States ' communication dated 4  November  2020, para.  6. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  of the parties across the disputes r esulted in certain meetings being held at a later date, it would no 
longer be possible to harmonize the timetables across the disputes. The Panel further noted that if 
the timetables across the disputes were not harmoni zed, the rights of third parties for subsequent 
stages in the disputes would be as provided for in Article  10 of the DSU, and the Panel would not 
grant third parties further access to any statements, submissions, or exchanges from the parties in 
each dispute.  
Based on the foregoi ng, the Panel scheduled  its second substantive meeting  with the parties 
in this dispute for 15 and 29 January  2021. Rights of third parties for subsequent stages in the 
disputes  were limited  to those  provided  in Article  10 of the DSU.  
2  FACTUAL ASPECTS  
2.1  Secti on 232 and the United  States  Department of Commerce reports on steel and 
aluminium  
2.1.  This section provides the legislative and regulatory background of the measures at issue in this 
dispute and, in particular, of:  
a. Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 19 62, as amended ( United  States  Code, Title 
19, Section  1862) (Section  232)55 and its implementing regulation, United  States  Code of 
Federal Regulation s, Title 15, Part 70556; 
b. "The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted Under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended", United  States  Department 
of Commerce  Report , 11 January  2018 (Steel Report)57; and  
c. "The Effects of Impor ts of Aluminum on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted 
Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, As Amended", United  States  
Department of Commerce  Report, 17  January  2018 ( Aluminium Report ).58 
2.1.1   Section  232  
Pursuant to Section  232, upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon 
application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the United  States  (US) Secretary of 
Commerce shall immediately initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the 
national security of imports of the article which is the subject of such request, application, or 
motion.59 The US Secretary of Commerce shall also immediately provide notice to the US Secretary 
of Defense of any such investigation, and shall consult with the Secretary of Defense regarding the 
methodological and policy questions raised in such investigation.60 
Section  232 further provides that no later than 270 days after an investigation is initiated with 
respect to any article, the US Secretary of Commerce sh all submit to the US President a report on 
the findings of the investigation with respect to the effect of the importation of such article in such 
quantities or under such circumstances upon the national security . Section  232 directs the 
US Secretary of Commerce to make recommendations for action or inaction  based on such findings. 
If the US Secretary of Commerce finds that such article is being imported into the United  States  in 
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to i mpair the national security, the 
Secretary shall so advise the US President in such report.61 
Within 90 days of receiving such report, the US President shall: (a) determine whether the 
President concurs with the finding of the Secretary; and (b) if the President concurs, determine the 
nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the P resident, must be taken to adjust 
imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair national 
 
55 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA-1). 
56 Section  232 regulations, (Exhibit TUR -2 and USA -2). 
57 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7). 
58 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8). 
59 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), § 1862(b)(1)(A).  
60 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), §§ 1862(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2)(A).  
61 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), § 1862(b)(3)(A) . WT/DS564/R  
 
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  security.62 If the US President determines to take action to adjust imports of the article and its 
derivatives, the US Pr esident shall implement such action within 15 days.63 Further, the action taken 
by the US President may be the negotiation of an agreement which limits or restricts importation 
into, or exportation to, the United  States  of the article that threatens to imp air US national security, 
or such other actions as the US President deems necessary to adjust the imports of the article so 
that the imports will not threaten to impair US national security.64 
Section  232 also sets out factors that should be analysed  when conducting an investigation to 
determine the effects of imports of a product  on the national security. In particular, it provides that 
the US Secretary of Commerce and the US President shall, in light of the requirements of national 
security and without ex cluding other relevant factors, give consideration to:   
a. domestic production needed for projected national defen ce requirements;  
b. the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements;  
c. existing and anticipated availabilities of the human resources, p roducts, raw materials, 
and other supplies and services essential to the national defen ce; 
d. the requirements of growth of such industries and such supplies and services including the 
investment, exploration, and development necessary to assure such growth; and 
e. the importation of goods in terms of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as 
those affect such industries and the capacity of the United  States  to meet national security 
requirements.65  
In addition to these factors, Section  232 provide s that in the administration of this section, the 
US Secretary of Commerce and the US President shall further recognize the close relation of the 
economic welfare of the United  States  to its national security, and shall take into consideration:  
a. the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic 
industries; and  
b. any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or 
investment, or other serious effects resulting from the displacement of any domestic 
products by excessive imports.66 
Additional regulations in the United  States  Code of Federal Regulation s, Title 15, Part 705  set 
out the procedures according to which the  US Department of Commerce  shall commence and 
conduct its investigation to determine the effect on the national security of the imports of any article, 
as well as issue the report and recommendation to the President of the United  States  for action or 
inaction regarding an adjustment of the imports of the article (s) in question.67 
2.1.2   The Steel Report  
The Steel Report of 11  January  2018 summarizes the findings of an investigation conducted by 
the US Department of Commerce pursuant to Section  232 into the effect of imports of steel mill 
products on the national security of the United  States. 
2.1.2.1   Initiation and investigation process  
On 19  April 2017, the US Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the 
effect of imported steel on national security under Section  232. The US Department of Commerce 
notified the US Department of Defense of the investigation in  a letter dated 19  April 2017.68 On 
 
62 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), § 1862(c)(1)(A).   
63 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), § 1862(c)(1)(B).  
64 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), § 1862(c)(3)(A).  
65 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), § 1862(d).  
66 Section  232, (Exhibit TUR -1 and USA -1), § 1862(d).  
67 Section  232 regulations, ( Exhibit TUR -2 and USA-2), §§ 705.1 -705.12.  
68 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 18. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  20 April 2017, the US President signed a Presidential Memorandum directing the US Secretary of 
Commerce to proceed expeditiously in conducting his investigation and submit a report on his 
findings to the President.69 On 21  April 2017, the US Department of Commerce published in the 
Federal Register a notice about the initiation of the investigation. The notice also announced the 
opening of the public comment period as well as a public he aring to be held on 24  May 2017.70 The 
US Department of Commerce held a public hearing to elicit further information concerning the 
investigation in Washington, D.C., on 24  May 2017.71 
In addition to the notification provided by its 19  April 2017 letter to  the US Department of 
Defense, the US Department of Commerce carried out consultations with the US Department of 
Defense regarding methodological and policy questions that arose during the investigation. 
According to the Steel Report, discussions were held  with the US Army Materiel Command, the 
Defense Logistics Agency, the US Navy/Naval Air Systems Command, and the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisitions & Logistics, Manufacturing , and Industrial Base Policy. Discussions were 
also held with "appropriat e officers of the United States", including the US Department of State, 
Department of the Treasury, Department of the Interior/US Geological Survey, the Department of 
Homeland Security/US Customs and Border Protection, the International Trade Commission, a nd the 
Office of the United  States  Trade Representative.72 
2.1.2.2   Product scope  
The Steel Report describes  its product coverage as steel mill products which are defined at 
the Harmonized System 6 -digit level as: 720610 through 721650, 721699 through 730110, 730210, 
730240 through 730290, and 730410 through 730690, including any subsequent revisions to these 
HS codes.73 Generally, these products fall into five categories:  
a. Carbon and Alloy Flat Products (Flat Products): Steel products produced by rolling semi -
finished  steel through varying sets of rolls. This category includes sheets, strips, and 
plates.74 
b. Carbon  and Alloy Long Products (Long Products): Steel products that fall outside the flat 
products category. This category includes bars, rails, rods, and beams.75 
c. Carbon and Alloy Pipe and Tube Products (Pipe and Tube Products): Either seamless or 
welded pipe a nd tube products. Some of these products may include stainless as well as 
alloys other than stainless.76 
d. Carbon and Alloy Semi -finished Products (Semi -finished Products): The initial, 
intermediate solid forms of molten steel, to be re -heated and further forged, rolled, 
 
69 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 18.  
70 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 18.  
71 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 18.  
72 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), pp. 19 -20. 
73 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 21.  
74 Flat pro ducts are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 720810, 720825, 720826, 720827, 
720836, 720837, 720838, 720839, 720840, 720851, 720852, 720853, 720854, 720890, 720915, 720916, 
720917, 720918, 720925, 720926, 720927, 720928, 720990, 721011, 721012, 721020, 721030, 721041, 
721049, 721050, 721061, 721069, 721070, 721090, 7 21113, 721114, 721119, 721123, 721129, 721190, 
721210, 721220, 721230, 721240, 721250, 721260, 722511, 722519, 722530, 722540, 722550, 722591, 
722592, 722599, 722611, 722619 , 722691, 722692, 722693, 722694, 722699. (Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 
and USA -7), p. 21 ). 
75 Long products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 721310, 721320, 721391, 721399, 
721410, 721420, 721430, 721491, 721499, 721510, 721550,721590, 721610, 72162 1, 721622, 721631, 
721632, 721633, 721640, 721650, 721699, 721710, 721720, 721730, 721790,  722520, 722620,722710, 
722720, 722790, 722810, 722820, 722830, 722840, 722850, 722860, 722870, 722880, 722910,722920, 
722990, 730110, 730210, 730240, 730290. (Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), pp. 21 -22). 
76 Pipe and Tube products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 730410, 730419, 730421, 
730423, 730429, 730431, 730439, 730451, 730459, 730490, 730511, 730512, 730519, 730520, 730531, 
730539, 730590 , 730610, 730619, 730620, 730629, 730630, 730650, 730660, 730661, 730669, 730690. 
(Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 22). WT/DS564/R  
 
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  shaped, or otherwise worked into finished steel products. This category includes blooms, 
billets, slabs, ingots, and steel for castings.77 
e. Stainless Products: Steel products, in flat -rolled, long, pipe and tube, and semi -finished 
forms, containing at minimum 10.5% chromium and, by weight, 1.2% or less of carbon, 
offering better corrosion resista nce than other steel.78 
2.1.2.3   Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  
The Steel Report refers to the nonexclusive lists of factors in Section  232 and its implementing 
regulations that the US Department of Commerce must consider in evaluatin g the effect of imports 
on the national security.79 The Steel Report further refers to a determination by the US Department 
of Commerce in 2001 that (a) national defen ce includes both defen ce of the United  States  directly 
and its ability to project militar y capabilities globally, and (b) the term "national security" can be 
interpreted more broadly to include the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond 
those necessary to satisfy national defen ce requirements that are critical to the minimu m operations 
of the economy and government.80 
In the Steel Report, the US Secretary of Commerce determined that the displacement of 
domestic steel by excessive imports and the consequent adverse impact of those quantities of steel 
imports on the economic w elfare of the domestic steel industry, along with the circumstance of 
global excess capacity in steel, were "weakening our internal economy" and therefore "threaten to 
impair" US national security as defined in Section  232.81 According to the Steel Report,  the continued 
rising levels of imports of foreign steel threaten to impair the national security by placing the US  steel 
industry at substantial risk of displacing the basic oxygen furnace and other steelmaking capacity, 
and the related supply chain neede d to produce steel for critical infrastructure and national 
defen ce.82 The Steel Report refers to global excess steel capacity as a circumstance that contributes 
to the "weakening of [the US] internal economy" that "threaten[s] to impair" US national secur ity 
as defined in Section  232.83  
In arriving at this general conclusion, the Steel Report relied on four main overarching 
findings, which in turn, comprise several  intermediate findings:  
a. Steel is important to US national security because84: (i) steel is n eeded for national 
defen ce requirements85; (ii) steel is required for US critical infrastructure86; (iii) domestic 
steel production is essential for national security87; (iv) domestic steel production depends 
on a healthy and competitive US industry88; and (v)  steel is consumed in critical 
industries .89 
 
77 Semi-finished products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 720610, 720690, 720711, 
720712, 720719, 720720, 7 22410, 722490. (Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 22 ). 
78 Stainless steel products are covered under the following 6 -digit HS codes: 721810, 721891, 721899, 
721911, 721912, 721913, 721914, 721921, 721922, 721923, 721924, 721931, 721932, 721933, 721934, 
721935, 721990, 722011, 722012, 722020, 722090, 722100, 7222 11, 722219, 7222 20, 722230, 722240, 
722300, 730411, 730422, 730424, 730441,  730449, 730611, 730621, 730640. (Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 
and USA -7), p. 22). 
79 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 13.  
80 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 13 (referring to Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Export Administration: The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi -Finished Steel on the National Security, 
October  2001).  The Steel Report further clarifies that it uses the more recent 16 critical infrastru cture sectors 
identified in Presidential Policy Directiv e 21 instead of the 28 critical industry sectors used by the Bureau of 
Export Administration in the 2001 Report. (Ibid. p. 14).  
81 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 55.  
82 Steel Report, (Exhib it TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 55.  
83 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 55.  
84 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 23. 
85 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 23.  
86 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), pp. 23 -24. 
87 Steel Report, (Exhibit  TUR-3 and USA -7), pp. 24 -25. 
88 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 25.  
89 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 25.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  b. Imports in such quantities as are presently found adversely impact the economic welfare 
of the US steel industry due to90: (i) continued increase  in imports of steel products91; 
(ii) high import penetration92; (iii)  high import to export ratio93; (iv)  prevailing steel 
prices94; (v) steel mill closures95; (vi) declining employment trend since 199896; (vii) trade 
actions such as anti -dumping  and countervailing duties97; (viii) loss of domestic 
opportunities to bidders using imported steel98; (ix) financial di stress99; and (x) limited 
capital expenditures arising from falling revenue and reduce d profits.100 
c. Displacement of domestic steel by excessive quantities of imports has the serious effect 
of weakening the US internal economy because101: (i) domestic steel production capacity 
is stagnant and concentrated102; (ii) production is well below demand103; (iii)  utilization 
rates are well below economically viable levels104; and (iv)  declining steel production 
facilities limits capacity available for a national e mergency.105  
d. Global excess steel capacity is a circumstance that contributes to the weakening of the 
domestic economy because106: (i) free markets globally are adversely affected by 
substantial chronic global excess steel production led by China107; and (ii)  increasing global 
excess steel capacity will further weaken the internal economy as US steel producers will 
face increasing import competition.108 
In the  Steel Report , the US Secretary of Commerce  recommends, due to the threat of steel 
imports to US nation al security, that the US President take immediate action by adjusting the level 
of imports through quotas or tariffs on steel imported into the United  States , as well as direct 
additional actions to keep the US steel industry financially viable and able to  meet US national 
security needs. The Steel Report states that the quota or tariff imposed should be sufficient, after 
accounting for any exclusions, to enable the US steel producers to be able to operate at about 80% 
or better of the industry's capacity u tilization rate based on available capacity in 2017.109 
In particular, the Steel Report recommends the following two alternative courses of action:  
a. Global quota or tariff: The Steel Report recommends that this should be done by 
(i) imposing  a quota of 63% o f the 2017 import level on all imported steel products, 
applied on a country and steel product basis, or (ii) applying  a 24% tariff on all imported 
steel products, in addition to any anti -dumping  or countervailing duty collections applicable 
to any imported steel product.110 
b. Tariff on a subset of countries: The Steel Report alternatively recommends applying  a 53% 
tariff on all imported steel products from Brazil, the Republic of Korea , the 
Russia n Federation , Türkiye , India, Viet  Nam, China, Thailand, South  Africa , Egypt, 
Malaysia, and Costa Rica, in addition to any anti -dumping  or countervailing duty collections 
 
90 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 27.  
91 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 27.  
92 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 29.  
93 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 30.  
94 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), pp. 31 -32. 
95 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 33.  
96 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 35.  
97 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 36.  
98 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 36.  
99 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 37.  
100 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 40.  
101 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 41.  
102 Steel Report , (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 41.  
103 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 46.  
104 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 47.  
105 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 49.  
106 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 51.  
107 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 51.  
108 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 53.  
109 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 58.  
110 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), pp. 59 -60. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  applicable to any steel products from th ese countries. All other countries would be limited 
to 100% of their 2017 import level.111 
The Steel Report further states that, in selecting an alternative, the US President could 
determine that specific countries sho uld be exempted from the proposed 63% quota or 24% tariff 
by granting those specific countries 100% of their prior imports in 2017, based on an overriding 
economic or security interest of the United  States .112 The Steel Report also recommends an appeal 
process by which affected US parties could seek an exclusion from the tariff or quota imposed and 
notes that  the US Secretary of Commerce would grant such exclusions based on demonstrating (a) 
lack of sufficient US production capacity of comparable products or  (b) specific national security 
based considerations.113 
2.1.3   The Aluminium Report  
The Aluminium Report  of 17  January  2018 summarizes the findings of an investigation 
conducted by the US Department of Commerce pursuant to Section  232 into the effect of imports o f 
alumin ium products on the national security of the United  States . 
2.1.3.1   Initiation and investigation process  
On 26 April 2017, the US Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the 
effect of imported alumin ium on national security under Section  232.114 The US Department of 
Commerce notified the US Department of Defense  of the investigation  in a letter dated  
26 April 2017.115 On 27  April 2017, the US President signed a Presidential Memorandum directing 
the US  Secretary of Commerce to proceed expeditiously in conducting his investigation and submit 
a report on his findings to the President.116 On 3 May 2017, the  US Department of Commerce invited 
interested parties to submit written comments, opinions, data, information, or advice.117 The 
US Department of Commerce held a public hearing to elicit further information concerning this 
investigation in Washington, D.C. , on 22  June 2017.118 
In addition to the notification to the US Department of Defense  on 26  April 2017, the 
US Department of Commerce consulted with the US Department of Defense regarding 
methodological and policy questions that arose  during the investigatio n and also consulted with other 
agencies of the US Government with expertise and information regarding the aluminium industry, 
including the US Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior and the US International Trade 
Commission.119 
2.1.3.2   Product scope  
The Aluminium Report  sets out its product scope in the following table:  
 
111 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 60.  
112 Steel Re port, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 60.  
113 Steel Report, (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 61.  
114 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 18.  
115 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 18.  
116 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 18.  
117 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 19.  
118 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 19.  
119 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 19.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Table  1: Harmonized Tariff Schedule for Aluminum Products120 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule for Aluminum Products  
HTS Code  Description  
7601 Unwrought aluminum  
7604 Aluminum bars, rods and profiles  
7605 Aluminum wire  
7606 Aluminum plates, sheets, and strip, of a thickness exceeding 
0.2 mm* 
7607 Aluminum  foil (whether or not printed, or backed with paper, 
paperboard, plastics or similar backing materials) of a thickness 
(excluding any backing) not exceeding 0.2  mm 
7608 Aluminum tubes and pipes  
7609 Aluminum tube and pipe fittings  
7616.99.51.60  Other articles of aluminum: castings  
7616.99.51.70  Other articles of aluminum: forgings  
*Note: This category includes can sheet for aluminum can packaging  
 
2.1.3.3   Findings and recommendations by the US Secretary of Commerce  
The Aluminium Report  refers to the  nonexclusive lists of factors  in Section  232 and its 
implementing regulations  that the US Secretary of Commerce  must consider in evaluating the effect 
of imports on national security.121 The Aluminium Report  further refers to a determination by the US 
Department of Commerce in 2001 that (a) national defen ce includes both defen ce of the 
United  States  directly and its ability to project military capabilities globally, and (b) the term 
"national security" can be interpreted more b roadly to include the general security and welfare of 
certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defen ce requirements that are critical 
to the minimum operations of the economy and government .122 
In the Aluminium Report , the US Secretary of Commerce determined  that the present 
quantities and circumstance of aluminium  imports were "weakening our internal economy" and 
"threaten to impair the national security as defined in Section  232".123 According to the Aluminium 
Report , the continued rise in levels of imports of foreign aluminium  threatens to impair US national 
security by placing the US aluminium  industry at substantial risk of losing the capacity to produce 
aluminium  and aluminium  products needed to support critical in frastructure and national defen ce.124 
The Aluminium Report  refers to excess production and capacity in China as a major factor 
contributing to the decline in US domestic aluminium  production and loss of domestic production 
capacity.125  
In arriving at this g eneral conclusion , the Aluminium Report  relies on findings  including : 
a. Alumin ium is essential to US national security because126: (i) aluminium  is required for US 
national defen ce127; and (ii)  aluminium  is required for US critical infrastructure .128 
 
120 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 20.  
121 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA-8), p. 12.  
122 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), pp. 12-13 (referring to Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Export Administration: The Effect of Imports of Iron Ore and Semi -Finished Steel on the National 
Security, October  2001). The Alumin ium Report further clarifies that while it uses these interpretations of 
"national defense" and "national security", it refers to the more recent 16 critical infrastructure sectors 
identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 instead of the 28 critical indus try sectors used by the Bureau of 
Export Administration in the 2001 Report.  (Ibid. p. 13).  
123 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 104.  
124 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 104.  
125 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 104. 
126 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 23.  
127 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 24.  
128 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 36.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  b. Domestic  production of aluminium  is essential to national security .129 
c. Domestic  aluminium  production capacity  is declining  because130: (i) the United  States  is a 
relatively high -cost producer131; and (ii)  alumini um smelters are permanently shutting 
down.132 
d. Domestic  production is well below demand .133 
e. US imports of aluminium  are increasing  in aggregate134 and in particular , imports  of 
(i) unwrought aluminium135; (ii) aluminium  bars, rods and profiles136; (iii)  aluminium  
plate, sheet and strip137; (iv) aluminium  foil138; (v) aluminium  pipes and tubes139; and (vi) 
aluminium  castings and forgings.140 
f. US aluminium  exports are declining.141 
g. The United  States ' import to export ratio  for the aluminium  product categories subject to 
this investigation is high.142 
h. Aluminium  imports are impacting  the welfare of the US aluminium  industry  because :143 
(i) employment  in the aluminium  industry is declining  as several smelters were either 
permane ntly shut down  or temporarily idled144; (ii) the financial status of the US 
aluminium  industry  is poor145; (iii) research and development expenditures are falling146; 
(iv) capital expenditures for the aluminium  industry are increasing147; and (v)  aluminium  
prices have dropped sharply.148 
In the Aluminium Report , the US Secretary of Commerce recommends, due to the threat of 
aluminium imports to US national security, that the US President take immediate action by adjusting 
the level of these imports.149 The recommended  adjustments would be imposed on imports of: 
(i) unwrought aluminium  (Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Code 7601); (ii)  aluminium  castings 
and forgings (HTS Codes 7616.99.51.60 and 7616.99.51.70); (iii)  aluminium  plate, sheet, strip, and 
foil (flat -rolled products) (HTS Codes 7606 and 7607); (iv)  aluminium  wire (HTS Code 7605); 
(v) aluminium  bars, rods and profiles (HTS Code 7604); (vi) aluminium  tubes and pipes (HTS Code 
7608); and (vii) aluminium  tube and pipe fittings (HTS Code 7609) based on 2017 annualized 
imports in those categories. The Aluminium Report  states that the recommended quotas or tariffs 
would be designed, even after any exemptions (if granted), to enable US aluminium producers to 
utilize an average of 80% of their production capacity.150  
In particular, the Aluminium Report  recommends the following two alternative courses of 
action:  
 
129 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 39.  
130 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 40.  
131 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 41.  
132 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 48.  
133 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 59. 
134 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 63.  
135 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 70.  
136 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 71.  
137 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 72.  
138 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 73.  
139 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 74.  
140 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 75.  
141 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 75.  
142 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 84.  
143 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 89.  
144 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TU R-4 and USA -8), p. 89.  
145 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 91.  
146 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 95.  
147 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 97.  
148 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 100.  
149 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 107.  
150 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 107.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  a. Global quota o r tariff:  The Aluminium Report  recommends that action  should be taken by 
imposing on unwrought alumin ium and the other alumin ium product categories  (i) a quota 
of 86.7% or (ii)  a tariff rate of 7.7 % in addition to any anti -dumping  or countervailing duty 
collections applicable to such product s.151 
b. Tariff on a subset of countries:  The Aluminium  Report  alternatively recommends applying 
a 23.6% tariff on all imported aluminium products from China ; Hong Kong,  China;  the 
Russia n Federation ; Venezuela ; and Viet  Nam; in addition to anti -dumping  or 
countervailing duty collections applicable to aluminium  products from these countries. All 
other countries would be limited to 100% of their 2017 import volumes .152  
The Aluminium Report  further states that, in selecting an alternative, the US President  could 
determine that specific countries should be exempted from the proposed quota by granting those 
specific countries 100% of their prior imports in 2017 or exempting them entirely, based on an 
overriding economic or security interest of the United  States, which could include their willingness 
to work with the United  States  to address global excess capacity and other challenges facing the US 
alumin ium industry.153 The Aluminium Report  also recommends an appeal process by which affected 
US parties could se ek an exclusion from the tariff or quota imposed and notes that  the US Secretary 
of Commerce would grant exclusions based on demonstrating  (a) a lack of sufficient US production 
capacity of comparable products or ( b) specific national security based considerations.154 
2.1.4   Presidential Proclamations  
 The US Secretary of Commerce transmitted the Steel Report and the Aluminium Report  to 
the US President on 11  January  2018 and 19  January  2018 respectively.155  
On 8  March 2018, the US President issued two procla mations adjusting imports into the 
United  States : (a) Presidential Proclamation 9705 in relation to steel imports156 and (b) Presidential 
Proclamation 9704 in relation to aluminium imports.157 The US President concurred with the findings 
in the Steel and Aluminium Report s, and pursuant to the recommendations in these reports, imposed 
additional import duties of 25% and 10% respectively on certain steel and aluminium imports from 
all countries, with exemption s for imports from Canada and Mexico.158 The US President welcomed  
any country with which the United  States  has a security relationship to discuss alternative ways to 
address the threatened impairment of US national security caused by imports from that country.159 
These proclamations also authori zed the US Secretary of Commerce to provide relief from the 
additional duties for any steel or any aluminium article determined not to be produced in the 
United  States  in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or in a satisfactory quality, or based 
upon specific national security considerations.160 
Following Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705, the US President issued additional 
proclamations adjusting steel a nd aluminium imports into the United  States . As described in greater 
detail below, these proclamations removed the exemptions granted to Canada and Mexico161, 
granted various exemptions to certain WTO Members162, introduced import quotas on steel and 
alumini um imports from certain countries163, and increased the additional import duty applicable to 
 
151 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 108.  
152 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), pp. 108 -109. 
153 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 109.  
154 Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 109.  
155 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11625; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11619.  
156 Presidential Proclamati on 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11625.  
157 Presidential Proclamation 9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11619.  
158 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11627; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 1162 1. 
159 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 1162 6; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 1162 0. 
160 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11627; Presidential Proclamation 
9704, (Exhibit TUR-7 and USA -10), p. 11621.  
161 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 below.  
162 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 below.  
163 See sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.5 below.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  steel imports from T ürkiye  to 50%.164 Subsequent proclamations also note the existence of 
agreements between the United  States  and countries exempted from the additi onal duties.165 
2.2  Measures at issue  
In its panel request, Türkiye  describes the measures it challenges as follows166: 
a. In two sets of Presidentia l Proclamations, dated 8 and 22  March 2018, the US President 
announced an additional import duty of 25% on certain s teel products and an additional 
import duty of 10% on certain aluminium products from all countries, with the exception 
of Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, the European  Union , the Republic of Korea , and 
Mexico.167  
b. On 30  April 2018, the US President issued two further Presidential  Proclamations 
exempting imports from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  from the 
additional duties on certain steel products, and exempting imports from Argentina, 
Australia and Br azil from the additional duties on certain aluminium products. The US 
President also extended the exemption from the additional import duties for Canada, the 
European  Union  and Mexico until 31  May 2018.  As of 1  June 2018, the additional duties 
on certain s teel products appear to apply to all countries of origin, except Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil and the Republic of Korea  and the additional duties on certain aluminium 
products appear to apply to all countries of origin except Argentina and Australia.168 
Quotas appear to have been introduced concerning steel imports from Argentina, Brazil , 
and the Republic of Korea , and concerning aluminium imports from Argentina. These 
exemptions appear to have been granted to these countries in exchange for certain 
measures  that, for at least some of these countries, appear to include voluntary 
quantitative restrictions on exports of steel and aluminium.169 
c. On 10  August  2018, the President of the United  States  amended the additional duties for 
certain steel products as applicable to T ürkiye , by increasing them from 25 to 50%, 
effective as of 13  August  2018. Moreover, on 10  August  2018, the US President 
announced that he would amend the additional duties for cer tain aluminium products as 
applicable to T ürkiye , by increasing them from 10 to 20%.170 
Türkiye 's panel request states  that the above -described import measures concerning certain 
steel products and certain aluminium products consist of, have been imposed by , are reflected and 
evidenced in, or are based on the following documents, whether considered alone and/or in any 
combination171: 
a. Presidential Proclamation 9705 of 8  March 2018;  
b. Presidential Proclamation 9704 of 8  March 2018; 
c. Presidential Proclamation 9711  of 22 March 2018;  
d. Presidential Proclamation 9710 of 22  March 2018;  
e. Presidential Proclamation 9740 of 30  April 2018; 
f. Presidential Proclamation 9739 of 30  April 2018; 
g. Presidential Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018; 
 
164 See section 2.2.2 below.  
165 See section  2.2.6 below.   
166 Türkiye 's panel request , pp. 1-3. 
167 Türkiye 's panel request , p. 1.  
168 Türkiye 's panel request , p. 1.  
169 Türkiye 's panel request , pp. 1 -2. 
170 Türkiye 's panel request , p. 2.  
171 Türkiye 's panel request , pp. 2 -3. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  h. Presidential Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018; 
i. Presidential Proclamation 9772 of 10  Augus t 2018; 
j. Presidential Proclamation 9777 of 29  Augus t 2018; 
k. Presidential Proclamation 9776 of 29  Augus t 2018; 
l. The Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security, An Investigation Conducted Under 
Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended (USDOC, 11  Januar y 2018) ; 
m. The Effect of Imports of Aluminum on the National Security, An Investigation Conducted 
Under Section  232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended (USDOC, 
17 January  2018) ; 
n. Section  232 of the United  States  Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended ; 
o. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Section  705, Effect of Imported Articles on the 
National Security ; 
p. Requirements for Submissions Requesting Exclusions From the Remedies Instituted in 
Presidential Proclamations Adjusting Imports of Steel Into the United  States  and Adjusting 
Imports of Aluminum Into the United  States ; and the Filing of Objections to Submitted 
Exclusion Requests for Steel and Aluminum (US Department of Comme rce); and  
q. Requirements for Submissions of Exclusion Requests and Objections to Submitted 
Requests for Steel and Aluminum (US Department of Commerce).  
Türkiye 's panel request states that  its request  also covers any additional measures that may 
amend, super sede, supplement, add to, update, extend, replace or implement the measures listed 
above, on their own or in any combination, as well as any exclusions or exemptions from those 
measures, including in particular any Presidential Proclamation or other legal instruments amending 
and/or increasing the additional duties on certain aluminium products as applicable to T ürkiye , as 
announced by the President of the United  States  on 10  August  2018.172 
In its first written submission, T ürkiye  categorizes and defines the measures at issue as 
follows:  (a) the additional duty of 25% ad valorem  that applies to steel products originating in all 
countries, except Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea ; (b) the additional duty of 
50% ad valorem  that applies to steel products originating in T ürkiye ; (c) country -specific 
quantitative limitations on steel goods that apply to Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea ; 
(d) the additional duty of 10% ad valorem  that applies to aluminium articles originating in all 
countries, except Argentina and Australia;  (e) country -specific quantitative limitations on imports of 
aluminium goods that apply to Argentina; and ( f) various unpublished voluntary export restraints, 
orderly marketing arrangeme nts and similar measures, such as export moderation and export price 
monitoring, agreed upon between the United  States  and certain other WTO Members, such as 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the Republic of Korea .173 Türkiye  further confirm s 
this in response to questions from the Panel.174  
The following diagram depicts the Panel's understanding of Türkiye 's presentation of the 
measures at issue at the time of the establishment of the Panel on 21  November  2018:  
 
172 Türkiye 's panel request , p. 3.  
173 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.6. 
174 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  1. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Figure 1: Türkiye 's presentation of measures at issue at the time of Panel establishment  
 
The following sections describe measures  (a) to (f)  that Türkiye  challenges  in this dispute . 
2.2.1   Additional duty of 25% ad valorem  on steel products  
Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018, all imports of steel products as 
specified in the Proclamation shall be subject to an additional 25% ad valorem  duty. According to 
this Proclamation, this rate of duty is in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions, and charges 
applicable to such imported steel articles.175 
Presidential Proclamation 9705 of 8  March  2018 also sets out that the additional 25% 
ad valorem  duty on imports of steel shall not be applied to imports from Canada and Mexico.176 
Subsequently, Presidential Proclamation 9711 of 22  March  2018 amended Presidential 
Proclam ation 9705 and introduced exemptions for Australia, Argentina, the Republic of Korea , Brazil, 
and the member countries of the European  Union , in addition to those already granted to Canada 
and Mexico, until 1 May 2018.177  
Presidential Proclamation 9740 of 30 April 2018 introduced further modifications by (a) 
extending the exemptions granted to Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union  until 1  June 2018178; 
(b) extending the exemption s for Argentina, Australia, and Brazil until an unspecified date179; and 
(c) extending the  exemption to the Republic of Korea  until an unspecified date .180 
Presidential Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018 further extended the  exemptions from the 
additional impor t duties granted to Argentina, Australia, and Brazil  until an unspecified date .181 This 
Proclamation did not extend the exemptions for Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union . 
 
175 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11627.  
176 Presidential Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), pp. 11626 -11627.  
177 Presidential Proclamation 9711, (Exhibit TUR -8 and USA -11), pp. 13361 -13363.  
178 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20685.  
179 Presidential Proclamatio n 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20684.  
180 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20684.  
181 Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), p. 25858.  
WT/DS564/R  
 
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  2.2.2   Additional duty of 50% ad valorem  on steel products from T ürkiye  
Presidential Proc lamation 9772 of 10  August  2018 imposed a 50% ad valorem  duty on steel 
articles imported from T ürkiye , beginning on 13  August  2018.182 
2.2.3   Country -specific quantitative limitations on steel goods  
Presidential Proclamation 9740 of 28  April 2018 describes how the United  States  and the 
Republic of Korea  agreed upon a quota on steel imports.183 Part A of the Annex to this Proclamation 
sets out the amendments to US Note 16 of subchapter III of chapter 99 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United  States  (HTSUS ) that provide for this quota treatment184, and Part B of the 
Annex to the Proclamation details the annual aggregate limits for the applicable quotas.185  
Presidential Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018 introduced quotas on steel products from 
Argentina and Brazil.186 The Annex to this Proclamation details the annual aggregate limits for the 
applicable quotas.187 
2.2.4   Additional duty of 10% ad valorem  on aluminium articles  
Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 9704 of 8  March  2018, all imports of alumin ium articles 
as specified in the Proclamation shall be subject to an additional 10% ad valorem  duty. According 
to this Proclamation, this rate of duty is in addition to any other duties, fees, exactions, and charges 
applicable to such imported alumin ium articles.188 
Presidential Proclamation 9704 of 8  March 2018 also sets out that the additional 10% ad 
valorem duty on imports of aluminium shall not be applied to imports from Canada and Mexico.189  
Subsequently, Presidential Proclamation 9710 of 22  March 2018 amended Presidential 
Proclamation 9704 and introduced exemptions for Australia, Argentina, the Republic of Korea , Brazil, 
and the member countries of the European  Union , in addition to those already granted to Canada 
and Mexico, until 1 May 2018.190  
Presidential Proclamation 9739 of 30  April 2018 introduced further modifications by (a) 
extending the exemptions granted to Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union  until 1  June 2018191; 
(b) extending the exemption for Argentina, Australia, and Brazil until an unspecified date 192; and 
(c) ending the exemption  granted  to the Republic of Korea .193 
Presidential Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018 further extended the  exemptions from the 
additio nal import duties  granted  to Argentina and Australia  until an unspecified date .194 This 
Proclamation did not extend the exemptions for Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the European  Union .195 
 
182 Presidential Proclamation 9772, (Exhibit TUR-14 and USA-17), p. 40430.  
183 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 2068 3. 
184 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20685.  
185 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), pp. 20697 -20705.  
186 President ial Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), pp. 25857-25858.  
187 Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), p. 258 61. 
188 Presidential Proclamation 9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11621.  
189 Presidential Proclamation 9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), pp. 11620-11621.   
190 Presidential Proclamation 9710, (Exhibit TUR -9 and USA -12), p. 13357.  
191 Presidential Proclamation 9739, (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14), p. 20678.  
192 Presidential Proclamation 9739, (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14), pp. 20677 -20678.  
193 Presidential Proclamation 9739, (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14), pp. 20678 -20679.  
194 Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), pp. 25849 -25850.  
195 Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), p. 25850.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  2.2.5   Country -specific quantitative limitations on imports of aluminium goods  
Presidential Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018 introduced quotas for aluminium products 
from Argentina.196 The Annex to this Proclamation details the annual aggregate limits for the 
applicable quotas.197 
2.2.6   Various "unpublished voluntary export restraints, order ly marketing arrangements 
and similar measures " 
Several of the Presidential  Proclamations  set out in the preceding sections  refer to the 
existence of certain agreements reached between the United  States  and some countries, including 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea . 
With respect to aluminium articles from Argentina, Australia, and Brazil, Presidential 
Proclamation 9739 of 30  April 2018 states  that: 
The United  States  has agreed in principle with Argentina, Australia, and Brazil on 
satisfactory alternative means to address the threatened impairment to our national 
security posed by aluminum articles importe d from these countries. I have determined 
that the necessary and appropriate means to address the threat to national security 
posed by imports of aluminum articles from Argentina, Australia, and Brazil is to extend 
the temporary exemption of these countrie s from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 
9704, in order to finalize the details of these satisfactory alternative means to address 
the threatened impairment to our national security posed by aluminum articles imported 
from these countries.198 
Presidenti al Proclamation 9758 of 31  May 2018 also states  that the United  States  agreed on 
a range of measures with Argentina and Australia, including measures to reduce excess alumin ium 
production and excess alumin ium capacity .199 
With regard to steel imports from the Republic of Korea , Presidential Proclamation 9740 of 
30 April 2018 states  that: 
The United  States  has successfully concluded discussions with South Korea on 
satisfactory alternative means to address the threatened impairment to our national 
security posed by steel articles imports from South Korea. The United  States  and South 
Korea have agreed on a ra nge of measures, including measures to reduce excess steel 
production and excess steel capacity, and measures that will contribute to increased 
capacity utilization in the United  States , including a quota that restricts the quantity of 
steel articles impor ted into the United  States  from South Korea.200 
With regard to Argentina, Australia, and Brazil, this same Proclamation states  that "[t]he 
United States has agreed in principle with Argentina, Australia, and Brazil on satisfactory alternative 
means to addre ss the threatened impairment to our national security posed by steel articles imported 
from these countries".201 Presidential Proclamation 9759 of 31  May 2018 further states  that "[t]he 
United  States  has agreed on a range of measures with these countries, i ncluding measures to reduce 
excess steel production and excess steel capacity, measures that will contribute to increased capacity 
utilization in the United  States , and measures to prevent the transshipment of steel articles and 
avoid import surges".202 
2.3  Measures amended, modified , or lapsed after the establishment of the Panel  
In its responses to questions from the Panel, Türkiye  refers to  certain factual and legal 
developments of the measures at issue that occurred after Türkiye 's request for the establishment 
 
196 Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), p. 25851.  
197 Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), pp. 25853 -25855.  
198 Presidential Proclamation 9739, (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14), pp. 20677 -20678.  
199 Presidential Proclamati on 9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), pp. 25849 -25850.  
200 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20683.  
201 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20684.  
202 Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA-15), pp. 25857 -25858 .  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  of the Panel .203 Türkiye  requests the Panel to consider  within its terms of reference  the following 
amended, modified, or lapsed measures204: 
a. Elimination of the 25 and 10% duties on steel and aluminium, respectively, for Canada 
and Mexico;  
b. Subsequently subjecting Canada and Mexico to voluntary export restrictions on both steel 
and aluminium ; 
c. Expansion of the 25 and 10% duties on steel and aluminium, respectively, to steel and 
aluminium derivative products; and  
d. The "extra -high" duty of 50% imposed on steel from T ürkiye , instead of the 25 % duties 
imposed on all other WTO Members.  
3  PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
3.1.  In its panel request, Türkiye  requests that the Panel find that the measures listed in its request 
are inconsistent with the United  States ' obligations under the following provisions of the covered 
agreeme nts205: 
a. Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  fails to accord immediately and 
unconditionally any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted to products 
originating in other countries, with respect to customs duties and charges and q uantitative 
import restrictions imposed on or in connection with importation and with respect to all 
rules and formalities in connection with importation, to like products originating in T ürkiye . 
The United  States  does so by applying selectively the additi onal import duties on certain 
steel and aluminium products originating in different Members, including by providing 
exemptions or applying alternative measures to certain countries. The United  States  
further does so by applying exclusively to T ürkiye  duties higher than those applied to any 
other WTO Member subject to these duties;   
b. Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  fails to accord to the 
commerce of most other WTO Members, including T ürkiye , treatment no less favourable 
than that p rovided for in the relevant part of the United  States ' Schedule of Concessions, 
and Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994, first and second sentence, because the United  States  
also fails to exempt products from most WTO Members, including T ürkiye , from ordinary  
customs duties in excess of those set forth and provided for in the United  States ' Schedule 
of Concessions and from all other duties or charges in excess of those imposed on the date 
of the GATT  1994 or those directly and mandatorily required to be impose d thereafter by 
legislation in force in the United  States  on that date;  
c. Article  X:3(a) of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  has failed and fails to 
administer its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings with respect to, and through, the 
measures at  issue in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner; and  
d. Articles XI:1 and XIII:1206 of the GATT  1994, because by imposing the above -mentioned 
measures, in particular the above -mentioned quotas, the United  States  has instituted 
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges on the importation of products of the 
territory of certain other Members and fails similarly to restrict the importation of the like 
product from all other Members.   
 
203 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  86. 
204 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  86. 
205 Türkiye 's panel request, pp. 3 -5. The Panel notes that in its first written submission, T ürkiye  
advanced  a claim of violation of Article  X:1 of the GATT  1994. (Türkiye 's first written submission, section  4.5.5 
and para.  5.2.xvi).  Subsequently, T ürkiye  clarified that it was no longer pursuing this claim . (See T ürkiye 's 
response to Panel question No.  2.i). 
206 In response to Panel question No.  2.h, Türkiye  clarified that it was no longer pursuing this claim.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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Türkiye  moreover co nsiders that the United  States ' measures constitute emergency safeguard 
measures within the meaning of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and of the Agreement on Safeguards. 
Türkiye  claim s that, as such, the United  States  acted inconsistently with:  
a. Article  XIX:1 (a) of the GATT  1994, because the United  States  has suspended tariff 
concessions and other obligations, without these products being imported into the territory 
of the United  States  in such increased quantities, in absolute terms or relative to domestic 
production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to 
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products, as a result of unforeseen 
developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred under the GATT  1994; 
b. Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  applies safeguard 
measures to the products at issue without first having determined that such products are 
being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relat ive to 
domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious 
injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products;  
c. Article  2.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  fails to a pply the 
safeguard measures at hand to imported products irrespective of their source;  
d. Article  3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards207, because the United  States  applies 
safeguard measures to the products in question without having conducted an investigation 
and without publishing a report that sets forth findings and reasoned conclusions on all 
pertinent issues of fact and law;  
e. Article  4.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  has not properly 
determined that there is serious injury, or threat thereof, to a domestic industry, within 
the meaning of that provision;  
f. Article  4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  has not properly 
evaluated all relevant factor s that have a bearing on the situation of the domestic industry. 
The United  States  has also not properly demonstrated that a causal link exists between 
increased imports and serious injury or the threat of serious injury. The United  States  has 
also failed to ensure that the injury caused by factors other than increased imports was 
not improperly attributed to increased imports. The United  States  has also failed to publish 
the requisite detailed analysis and demonstration of its conclusions.  
g. Article  5.1 of t he Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  is applying 
safeguard measures beyond the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and 
to facilitate adjustment;  
h. Article  7 of the Agreement on Safeguards208, because the United  States  is appl ying 
safeguard measures without providing for their application only for the period necessary 
to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment, without limitation to four 
years, and without making provision for progressive liberalization at  regular intervals;  
i. Article  8.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards209, because the United  States  has not 
endeavo ured to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other 
obligations to that existing under the GATT  1994 between the United  States  and the 
exporting Members affected by these measures, including T ürkiye ; 
j. Article  9.1 of the Agreement on Safeg uards210, because the United  States  applies its 
safeguard measures to products from developing country Members whose share of imports 
does not exceed 3 %, where developing country Members with less than 3 % import share 
collectively account for not more than 9% of total imports of the product;  
 
207 In response to Panel question No.  2.h, Türkiye  clarified that it was no longer pursuing this claim.  
208 In response to Panel question No.  2.h, Türkiye  clarified that it was no longer pursuing this claim.  
209 In response to Panel question No.  2.h, Türkiye  clarified that it was no longer pursuing this claim.  
210 In response to Panel question No.  2.h, Türkiye  clarified that it was no longer pursuing this claim.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  k. Article  11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, because the United  States  has taken 
emergency action on imports of particular products as set forth in Article  XIX of the 
GATT  1994, without this action being in conformity  with the provisions of Article  XIX 
applied in accordance with the Agreement on Safeguards;  
l. Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, to the extent that the United  States  seeks 
or has sought any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements, or any 
other similar measures on the export or the import side through the measures at issue; 
and 
m. Articles 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article  XIX:2 of the 
GATT  1994, because the United  States  has failed to comply with any of the notification 
and consultation obligations set out in these provisions.  
The United  States  requests that the Panel find that the United  States  has invoked its essential 
security interests under Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and so report to the DSB.211 
4  ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  
4.1.  The arguments of the parties are reflected in their executive summaries, provided to the Panel 
in accordance with paragraph 23 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annex  B). 
5  ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES  
5.1.  The arguments of certain third parties  are reflected in their executive summaries, provided in 
accordance with par agraph 26 of the Working Procedures adopted by the Panel (see Annex  C).  
6  INTERIM R EVIEW  
6.1.  On 29  June 2022, the Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. On 3  August  2022, the 
parties submitted written requests for review of the Interim Report. Neither party requested an 
interim review meeting. On 31  August  2022, the parties submitted comments on each other's 
requests for review of the Interim Report.  
6.2.  In accordance with Article  15.3 of the DSU, this section of the Report sets out the Panel's 
response to the requests made at the interim review stage, including certain requests by the parties 
discussed in greater detail below.  
6.3.  The Panel notes that the parties' requests for review  of the Interim Report include requests to 
provide more detailed summaries of their arguments. Throughout the Report, the Panel has 
summarized the parties' arguments in order to facilitate understanding of the contested issues 
addressed in the Panel's reas oning and findings. The Panel has not comprehensively reproduced 
every aspect of the parties' arguments, which are more fully reflected in the executive summaries 
annexed to this Report. Rather, the Panel has summarized the relevant arguments in the contex t of 
its own objective assessment of the matter before it, having regard for its mandate and discretion 
to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or rulings provided for 
in the relevant covered agreements.  In this regard, i t is generally within the discretion of a panel to 
decide which arguments or evidence it addresses or relies on in reaching its findings.212 Subject to 
the explanations and modifications described below, the Panel considers that the parties' arguments 
are a dequately reflected and addressed in this Report, including the annexes thereto, to fulfil the 
requirements of the Panel's mandate under the DSU.213 
6.4.  In addition, the Panel has made typographical and other editorial modifications in the Report, 
including in response to the parties' requests. The discussion below refers to the numbering of 
sections, paragraphs, and footnotes in the Final Report.  
 
211 United  States ' first written submission, para.  187. 
212 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, Ukraine – Ammonium Nitrate , para.  6.42; US – COOL , para.  299; 
EC – Poultry , para.  135; EC – Hormones , para.  135. 
213 See section 7.1 below.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  6.1  Article  XIX of the GATT  1994  and the Agreement on Safeguards  
6.5.  The United  States  requests the Panel to include in paragraph 7.93  "additional support" for its 
conclusions regarding the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. In 
particular, the United  States  argues that the Panel's conclusions in this paragraph are supported by 
the ordinary me aning of the terms "sought, taken or maintained" in Article  11.1(c) . Türkiye objects 
to the United  States ' request as it considers that the Panel has adequately and clearly set out its 
views on the issue at hand.  Türkiye also requests the Panel to explicit ly reject the United  States ' 
interpretation of the term "sought" in Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards to strengthen 
the Panel 's reasoning and thereby assist the parties in achieving a satisfactory settlement of this 
matter.  
6.6.  In section 7.8.2 o f its Report, the Panel has examined the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) 
considering their ordinary meaning and having regard for the relevant context provided by terms 
used elsewhere in the Agreement on Safeguards, including those that appear to co nvey a 
relationship of consistency with the requirements of another provision of the covered agreements. 
The Panel has further considered the use of terms in the three authentic language versions of the 
Agreement on Safeguards in accordance with the custom ary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. The Panel has also found support for its conclusions in the object and purpose of 
the Agreement on Safeguards, as expressed in its preamble, and the negotiating history of 
Article  11.1(c). Accordingl y, the Panel does not consider it necessary to additionally address the 
United  States ' arguments concerning the terms "sought, taken or maintained" in Article  11.1(c) to 
determine the meaning of "pursuant to" in that provision.  
6.7.  The Panel has taken note of the United  States ' arguments concerning the meaning of "sought" 
in Article  11.1(c), which are related to the United  States ' contention that formal notification of 
safeguard measures to the WTO is a "condition precedent" to the applicability of safe guard 
disciplines. As part of its objective assessment of the legal characterization of the measures under 
Article  11.1(c), the Panel has taken into account the manner in which the measures at issue were 
notified to relevant WTO bodies or committees. Recal ling the nature of the Panel's inquiry on the 
applicability of safeguard disciplines to the measures at issue, the Panel does not consider it 
necessary to address in further detail the United  States ' arguments on the meaning of "sought" in 
Article  11.1(c).  In this respect, the Panel additionally recalls its mandate and discretion to make 
such findings as will assist the DSB in making the rulings and recommendations provided for in the 
relevant covered agreements.  
6.8.  Türkiye requests a revision of paragraph s 7.96 and 7.97  regarding the reflection of Türkiye's 
arguments and additionally requests with reference to its submissions in this dispute that the Panel 
either clarify its reasoning or delete the content of these paragraphs. The United  States  does not 
object  to Türkiye's proposed revision in paragraph 7.96 or its request that the Panel clarify its 
reasoning in these paragraphs in light of Türkiye's comments and the arguments made in this 
dispute. However, the United  States  considers that these paragraphs are key to the Panel's 
conclusions that "the measures at issue were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to Article  XXI 
of the GATT  1994" and "the measures were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to a provision of 
the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX withi n the meaning of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards." Accordingly, the United  States  requests that the Panel reject Türkiye's request to delete 
the contents of these paragraphs.  
6.9.  The Panel has revised paragraph 7.96  to remove the references to T ürkiye's arguments, which 
are set out in the executive summary attached to this Report. The Panel has retained its conclusions 
regarding the interpretation of "other than" in Article  11.1(c) recalling that it is required to make an 
objective assessment of  the applicability of the relevant covered agreements in accordance with 
Article  3.2 of the DSU and the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.  
6.10.   The United  States  requests the Panel to revise paragraph 7. 99 to accurately reflect its 
argument that "a key condition precedent to the exercise of [the right to apply a safeguard measure] 
is that the Member has invoked Article XIX as the legal basis for its measure by providing notice in 
writing and affording affected Members an opportunity to  consult." According to the United  States , 
by suggesting "the United  States ' [contends] that, based on Article  XIX:2 of the GATT  1994, formal 
notification of safeguard measures to the WTO is a 'condition precedent' to the applicability of 
safeguard discipl ines", the Panel misstates the United  States ' position.  Türkiye objects to the 
United  States ' request as it considers that the Panel has accurately described the United  States ' WT/DS564/R  
 
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  argument to mean that notification is a "condition precedent" for a measure to qualify as a safeguard 
measure.  
6.11.   The Panel notes that, in its submissions, the United  States  refers variously to "notice", 
"invocation", and "invocation through notice" under Article  XIX:2 of the GATT  1994 as a "condition 
precedent" for applicability of sa feguard disciplines. The Panel has accordingly retained its summary 
of the United  States ' arguments in this respect and revised the corresponding footnote to clarify the 
various terms used by the United  States  in its submissions to the Panel . 
6.2  Article  XXI(b ) of the GATT  1994  
6.12.   The United  States  requests an addition to paragraph 7.12 1 of certain arguments it puts 
forward on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b), including its arguments on which phrase in 
Article  XXI(b) is modified by subparagraphs (i) and (ii) and the reconciliation of different language 
versions of Article  XXI(b). The United  States  also requests that paragraph 7.12 2 include a more 
complete description of the complainant's arguments on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b). In 
response to Tü rkiye's request for further reflection of its arguments, the United  States  additionally 
requests inclusion of its rebuttal to Türkiye's arguments on the grammar and phrasing of 
Article  XXI(b). Türkiye requests further reflection of its arguments in paragra ph 7.122 on the 
grammatical and syntactic structure of Article  XXI(b)(i) to (iii). In response to the United  States ' 
requests, while Türkiye does not oppose adding additional language, it considers the addition 
requested by the United  States  to be too long  and that it would be necessary to include its 
counterarguments on all of the issues on which the United  States  requests additional text. In 
addition, Türkiye considers that paragraph 7.122, together with the additional language that Türkiye 
requested, ade quately reflects Türkiye's arguments on the issue at hand.  
6.13.   Recalling its approach to reflecting the parties' arguments on the issues raised in this dispute, 
the Panel declines to expand the summaries of the parties' arguments in these paragraphs. In 
respon se to the United  States ' request, the Panel further notes that modification s to the Interim 
Report  discussed below include expanded reference to arguments that the United  States  requested 
to be reproduced in these paragraphs.   
6.14.   The United  States  requests th at the Panel delete the footnote to paragraph 7.127  and 
instead address its substantive content in the body of the Report, particularly concerning the 
United  States ' arguments on the differences in the French and Spanish versions of Article  XXI(b) 
and the reconciliation of the three language versions of the text. In the United  States ' view, the 
Panel does not engage with these arguments and "misstates them in a footnote reference". The 
United  States  requests further engagement with these arguments and, spec ifically, that the Panel 
"explain why it is incorrect to read the sentence [in Article  XXI(b)] as consisting of three alternatives" 
for each subparagraph. Türkiye does not believe that it is necessary for the Panel to change or 
expand on its reasoning in r esponse to the United  States ' requests. Türkiye considers that the 
United  States ' arguments are extensively described and discussed and that no further analysis of 
these arguments is required.  
6.15.   The Panel acknowledges the United  States ' indication in its req uest for interim review that it 
"agrees (in the interpretation that best reconciles the three language versions) with the Panel that 
each of the paragraphs 'describe[s] the action referred to in Article  XXI(b)', but mediated through 
the relative clause 'wh ich it considers'." The Panel has accordingly retained the statement of its 
understanding that the parties agree that the subparagraphs qualify and relate to the "action" in 
Article  XXI(b), notwithstanding some disagreement as to the precise basis for this  conclusion. The 
Panel has also expanded the summary of the United  States ' arguments regarding the reconciliation 
of texts in the three authentic language versions and its contention that, under this reconciled 
interpretation, the terms of the provision st ill form a "single relative clause" that begins with the 
phrase "which it considers" and contains the entirety of each subparagraph.  
6.16.   Regarding the United  States ' request for further elaboration in the body of the Report, the 
Panel briefly reviews certain p oints of its analysis of the United  States ' arguments to clarify the 
overall context in which the footnote appears in the Panel's reasoning regarding the interpretation 
of Article  XXI(b) in this dispute. In section 7.9.2, the Panel focuses specifically on the United  States ' 
argument that "which it considers" qualifies the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) within a "single 
relative clause" that entirely reserves the subparagraphs to the judgment of the invoking Member. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  In accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU , the Panel's textual analysis addresses the function and 
ordinary meaning of the subparagraphs as describing certain kinds of permitted "action", including 
reference to the structure and punctuation of Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. In this regard, the Panel 
concludes that the paragraphs and subparagraphs form alternative endings to a complete sentence 
under Article  XXI, and the opening terms of each of the subparagraphs ("relating to" and "taken") 
qualify the "action" in paragraph (b). Moreover, the sub paragraphs are exhaustive in establishing 
the circumstances in which a Member may take the "action" under Article  XXI(b).  
6.17.   Following these textual conclusions, the Panel addresses grammatical aspects of the parties' 
arguments as well as other aspects of te xtual interpretation and ordinary meaning, particularly the 
principle of effective treaty interpretation and the exhaustive types of "action" specified in the 
subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b). The Panel additionally addresses relevant context in Articles XX II 
and XXIII of the GATT  1994 and the DSU, the object and purpose of maintaining the balance of 
rights and obligations under the covered agreements, and non -treaty materials submitted by the 
parties relating to the interpretation of Article  XXI of the DSU.  Based on the entirety of this analysis, 
the Panel concludes that the terms "which it considers" in Article  XXI(b) do not qualify the 
subparagraphs to render them "self -judging" or "non -justiciable" as argued by the United  States . 
6.18.   In this manner, the Panel  has addressed multiple aspects of the interpretation of 
Article  XXI(b) with specific reference to the United  States ' argument regarding a "single relative 
clause" purportedly encompassing the subparagraphs of that provision. As one element of this 
analysi s, the Panel has noted the concordance of plural and feminine terms in the French and Spanish 
versions of Article  XXI(b) to support the qualification of the term "action" by the subparagraphs. In 
other parts of its assessment, the Panel has also examined t he ordinary meaning of actions "relating 
to" specified "materials" and "traffic" and to actions "taken in time of" specified circumstances. The 
Panel has further accounted for the structure of Article  XXI(b) and the textual separation of the 
subparagraphs into an enumerated list, which corresponds to the role of the subparagraphs as 
alternative sentence endings that collectively and exhaustively delimit the scope of Article  XXI(b).  
6.19.   The Panel recalls its mandate and discretion to make such findings as will assist the DSB in 
making the recommendations or rulings provided for in the relevant covered agreements. In 
assessing the contested issues of interpretation regarding Article  XXI(b) and the review of its 
invocation by a Member in dispute settlement proceed ings, the Panel did not find it necessary to 
address in greater detail the parties' arguments on the reconciliation of the three authentic texts  of 
the provision . In addition, the United  States  does not explain the relevance of these arguments to 
the Panel 's overall analysis and conclusions on whether a "single relative clause" beginning with the 
phrase "which it considers" renders Article  XXI(b) "self -judging" or "non -justiciable" in the sense 
argued by the United  States . To the extent the United  States ' request concerns the weight assigned 
to its arguments and the merits of the Panel's analysis, the Panel notes that interim review is not an 
appropriate stage for relitigating arguments already submitted by the parties and addressed to the 
extent necessary i n the Panel's findings.214 In these circumstances, the Panel has modified this 
footnote to expand the summary of the parties' arguments and to clarify that the Panel does not 
consider it necessary for the purposes of this dispute to address in further detai l the parties' 
arguments on the reconciliation of the three authentic texts in relation to the contested issues of 
interpretation under of Article  XXI(b) and its application to the measures at issue in this dispute . 
6.20.   The United  States  requests that the Pane l introduce certain modifications to paragraphs 
7.134 and 7.135  in order to more accurately reflect its arguments on English grammar rules in the 
context of the interpretation of Article  XXI(b). Türkiye does not object to the United  States ' request.  
6.21.   The Pa nel has made the requested modification in paragraph 7.134 to clarify the context 
regarding subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Article  XXI(b) in which the United  States  referred to the rules 
of English grammar. The Panel declines the additional suggested text i n paragraph 7.135 in which 
the Panel is addressing grammatical considerations as part of its overall assessment of the contested 
issues of interpretation under Article  XXI(b) in this dispute. In particular, the Panel's analysis in 
these paragraphs notes th e absence of a definitive rule of grammar supporting the United  States ' 
construction of the provision as containing a "single relative clause" that wholly reserves the 
conditions and circumstances of the subparagraphs to the judgment of the invoking Member . The 
Panel has modified these paragraphs to clarify that, with respect to the interpretation of 
 
214 See e.g. Panel  Report s, India – Solar Cells , para.  6.24; Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , Annex  A-
3, paras.  2.3-2.4; US – Poultry (China) , para.  6.32. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Article  XXI(b), the qualification of the noun "action" in paragraph (b) by the subparagraphs is not 
solely determined by rigid application of grammar but follo ws from the ordinary meaning of these 
terms, as elaborated in the remainder of the Panel's analysis.  
6.22.   The United  States  requests that the Panel expand the summary of arguments in paragraph 
7.148  on the interpretation of the terms "emergency in international  relations" in Article  XXI(b)(iii), 
and that the Panel address these arguments in paragraph 7.152  setting out the Panel's 
interpretation of these terms. Türkiye does not object to the added language requested by the 
United  States . However, Türkiye does not  consider it necessary that the Panel expand on its 
reasoning to assess additional arguments by the United  States . 
6.23.   As noted, the Panel has not comprehensively reproduced every aspect of the parties' 
arguments but rather has referred to the parties' argumen ts in order to facilitate understanding of 
the contested issues addressed in the Panel's reasoning and findings. In this connection, the Panel 
has focused on the gravity or severity of an "emergency in international relations" within the 
meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii), particularly regarding the impact on international relations of 
situations falling under that provision. Moreover, the Panel has interpreted the terms "emergency in 
international relations" in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU  and its mandate to make such 
findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or rulings provided for in the covered 
agreements. In section 7.9.3, the Panel has addressed the interpretation of Article  XXI(b)(iii) to the 
extent necessary to as sess whether, based on the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties, 
the measures at issue were "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations". On 
the basis of the foregoing, the Panel does not consider it necessary to further address the 
United  States ' arguments in this regard.  
6.3  Appendices  
6.24.   The United  States  requests that the Panel incorporate the analysis and conclusions contained 
in Appendices A and B  into the main body of the Report. The United  States  considers the materials 
described in these appendices to be integral to the Panel's analysis and notes that they were a 
subject of disagreement and argument by the parties.  Türkiye objects to the United  States ' request 
as it is sufficiently clear that the analysis and conclusions in both appendices are to be read as 
integral parts of the Report.  
6.25.   The Panel recalls its conclusion  in Appendix  A that its review of the negotiating history of 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards confirms its interpretation of that provision. T he 
Panel has also concluded that the materials examined in Appendix  B support the general conclusion 
that the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 establish a right to take action for the protection 
of essential security interests in the conditions and  circumstances described in the three 
subparagraphs. The appendices set out in greater detail the specific materials examined, the 
arguments advanced by the parties, and the bases for the Panel's conclusions. The Panel therefore  
declines the United  States ' request,  and the Panel has modified the references to the appendices in 
the Report to specify which appendix is being referred to in the Panel's analysis . 
In response to requests by  Türkiye  to amend paragraphs 8.35, 8.40, and 8.42 of 
Appendix  B to reflect  its arguments, the Panel has modified paragraph 8.42 and declines to amend 
the other paragraphs where Türkiye's submissions do not specifically refer to the materials reviewed 
in sections 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 of Appendix  B. 
7  FINDINGS  
7.1  Mandate  under the DSU  
7.1.  The Panel was established  by the DSB in accordance with Article  6 of the DSU with standard 
terms of reference, as provided in Article  7.1 of the DSU, "[t] o examine, in the light of the relevant 
provisions of the covered agreements cited by the parties to t he dispute, the matter referred to the 
DSB" in the complainant's panel request and " to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making 
the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements ". Pursuant to 
Article  7.2 of the DSU, t he Panel is required to "address the relevant provisions in any covered 
agreement or agreements cited by the parties to the dispute".  WT/DS564/R  
 
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The matter referred to the DSB in the complainant's panel request comprises claims under the 
GATT  1994 and the Agreement o n Safeguards with respect to the measures at issue.215 In response 
to these claims, the United  States  requests that the Panel find that the United  States  has invoked 
its essential security interests under Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and so report to the  DSB.216 
Although the United  States  acknowledges that "the Panel has jurisdiction over this dispute, because 
the DSB has established the Panel to examine the matter set out in the panel request "217, it argues 
that its " invocation of Article  XXI is a non -justiciable issue as Article  XXI makes its invocation 
self-judging by the Member taking the security action ".218 In the United  States ' view, "[i] t follows 
that the Panel may not make findings on the complainant 's claims because they are not appropriate 
or suita ble for adjudication by the Panel and may not make recommendations because no finding of 
WTO-inconsistency can be made. "219  
In response to questions from the Panel, t he United  States  clarifies that "the United States is 
not requesting that the Panel refrain from applying the rules and procedures of the DSU " but rather 
submits that "[the United  States '] approach reflects an outcome consistent with a panel 's terms of 
reference from the DSB and function of a panel under the DSU, and a proper interpretation of 
Article  XXI(b) under the Vienna  Convention " on the Law of Treaties  (Vienna  Convention ).220 
According to the United  States , the Panel's "jurisdiction" conferred by Articles 7.1 and 11 of the DSU 
is con strained by "the ordinary meaning of the terms in Article  XXI(b)", as interpreted in accordance 
with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law.  The United  States  thus clarifies 
that its arguments on "justiciability" and the "politic al" nature of the questions involved rest on the 
interpretation of the terms of Article  XXI(b) in accordance with the interpretive principles of 
Article  3.2 of the DSU and the Panel's terms of reference.221 As addressed in greater detail below, 
the complain ant also refers to these interpretive principles and the requirements of the Panel's terms 
of reference in contesting the United  States ' characterization of Article  XXI(b) as "non -justiciable".222  
Based on its terms of reference, the Panel's mandate under the DSU is to examine the matter 
raised by the complainant in its panel request and to address the United  States ' invocation of 
Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994. The purpose of this examination is to enable the Panel to make 
such findings as will assist the  DSB in discharging its responsibilities under the covered agreements. 
In fulfilling this mandate, the Panel is mindful of its function and duty under Article  11 of the DSU to 
make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective ass essment of the facts 
of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements. The Panel 
is further guided by the role of WTO dispute settlement, as recognized in Article  3.2 of the DSU, to 
preserve the rights and obligation s of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the 
existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law .223  
The Panel observes that the parties affirm these fundamental principl es regarding the 
assessment of the complainant's claims and the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the 
 
215 See section 3 above.   
216 United  States ' first written submission, para. 187. 
217 United  States ' first written submission , para.  184. 
218 United  States ' first written submission , para.  186. The United  States  submits that "'jurisdiction' can 
be defined as the extent of power of the Panel under the DSU to exercise its judicial authority or decide a 
particular case", while "'justiciability', by contrast, relates to whether a matter is appropriate or suitable for 
adjudication by a court, or in this context, whether an issue is subject to findings by the Panel under the DSU." 
(Ibid.  para. 184). 
219 United  States ' first written submission , para.  186. The United  States  further argues that "the self -
judging text included in Article  XXI" reflects a recognition that "issues of essential security are inherently 
political in nature, and there are no legal criteria by which a Member's consideration of its essential security 
interests can be objectively determined". (Ibid.).  
220 United  States ' response to Panel question Nos. 26 -29.  
221 See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  54 (arguing that " it is not the political nature of 
the issues covered under Article  XXI(b) that lead to an interpretation that the provision is self -judging " but 
rather "[i]t is the text of Article  XXI(b) that establishes its self -judging nature"); see also United  States ' 
opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, paras.  3-4 and 67.  
222 See section  7.9 below.  
223 See Appellate  Body Reports, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , para.  31; EC – Computer Equipment , 
para. 82; Panel  Report , US – Section  301 Trade Act , para.  7.75.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  GATT  1994 under the rules and procedures of the DSU.224 However, the parties dispute the 
application of these principles to the matter before the Panel, particularly with respect to the 
applicability of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at 
issue, and the relationship between those disciplines and Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994. Regarding 
the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b), the parties further dispute the extent to which the 
terms of this provision reserve discretion to the invoking Member taking action that it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security intere sts, as well as the applicability of this 
provision to the challenged measures based on the arguments and evidence submitted in these 
proceedings.  
The Panel is required under the DSU to assess these disputed issues in an objective manner  
and to make findi ngs on the basis of that assessment that will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or rulings provided for in the covered agreements. In furtherance of this mandate, 
the Panel will examine the matter within its terms of reference by assessing the a pplicability of and 
conformity with the relevant provisions of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards , based 
on the interpretive principles of Article  3.2 of the DSU  and the arguments and evidence presented 
by the parties. As prescribed by Article  12.7 of the DSU, the Panel will set out its relevant findings 
of fact, the applicability of relevant provisions, and the basic rationale behind any findings and 
recommendations that it makes.  
7.2  Order of analysis  
In considering the appropriate order of analysi s of the issues outlined above, the Panel has 
discretion to structure its analysis taking into account the specific measures, claims, arguments , and 
relevant provisions  at issue.225 Having considered the arguments presented by the parties in this 
dispute226, the Panel will first address issues concerning its terms of reference and the identification 
of the measures at issue. Following this determination of the measures within its terms of reference, 
the Panel will examine the complainant's claims that the mea sures are inconsistent with certain 
provisions of the covered agreements.  
In principle, the obligations set forth in the WTO covered agreements apply cumulatively.227 In 
this dispute, t he parties disagree as to whether the WTO rules on safeguards set forth in Article  XIX 
of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards apply to the measures at issue , and the 
complainant raises other claims under the GATT  1994 which are independent of those contested 
issues of applicability . Taking these circumstances into ac count, along with the operation of the 
measures at issue  and the manner in which the parties have presented their argument s, the Panel 
considers it appropriate to begin its assessment with the claims under Articles I:1, II:1,  XI:1, and 
X:3 of the GATT  1994.  
 
224 See e.g. United  States ' response to Panel question No.  25 ("the Panel 's function is to objectively 
assess the matter before it by interpreting Article  XXI(b) in accordance with the customary rules of 
interpretation" ); Türkiye 's response to Panel question Nos. 26 and 27.  
225 See Appellate  Body Reports, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports , para.  126; US – COOL 
(Article  21.5 – Canada and Mexico) , para.  5.229; Panel  Report s, India – Solar Cells , paras.  7.41-7.42; Russia – 
Pigs (EU), para.  7.30. In disputes involving security exceptions under Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and 
Article  73 of the TRIPS  Agreement , previous panels have exercised discretion regarding the order of analysis 
based on their consideration of the specific  circumstances of the dispute, including arguments made by the 
parties and other relevant provisions at issue. (See Panel  Report s, Russia – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.20-7.26; 
Saudi Arabia – IPRs, paras.  7.1-7.3). 
226 While not bound by the presentation of  claims and arguments by the parties, the Panel notes that 
the parties have taken different views on the appropriate order of analysis of the issues in this dispute. The 
complainant considers that the Panel should commence with examination of the claims un der the Agreement 
on Safeguards and Article  XIX of the GATT  1994, followed by other claims under the GATT  1994, before turning 
to the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b). The United  States  maintains that the Panel should begin by 
addressing Article  XXI(b) as the invocation of this provision means that there are no findings that would assist 
the DSB in making recommendations or giving rulings as to the complainant's claims. (United  States ' response 
to Panel question Nos. 21 -23). 
227 The Panel is also mindful that there may be circumstances in disputes where more than one covered 
agreement applies and it is appropriate to begin the analysis with p rovision s from an agreement that "deals 
specifically, and in detail" with the measures at  issue. (See  Appellate  Body Report s, Brazil – Desiccated 
Coconut , pp. 12-13; Canada – Periodicals , p. 19; and EC – Bananas III , para.  204; Panel  Report s, Australia – 
Tobacco Plain Packaging , paras.  7.76-7.79; US – Customs Bond Directive , paras.  7.170 -7.171 ). WT/DS564/R  
 
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The Panel will first assess the consistency of the relevant measures with Article  II:1 of the 
GATT  1994 and the relevant commitments in the United  States ' Schedule of Concessions. The  Panel 
will then assess the claims under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 concerning most-favoured -nation 
treatment . The Panel will next address the claims under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994 concerning  
quantitative restrictions , followed by the claims under Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994 concerning the 
administration of mea sures. The Panel will then assess the remainder of the complainant's claims 
under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards , including the parties' 
disagreement as to the applicability of this provision and agreement to the measures at i ssue.  
The Panel will next address the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 
in relation to any measures falling within the Panel's terms of reference found to be inconsistent 
with provisions of the covered agreements. The Panel will  assess the arguments and evidence 
submitted by the parties in relation to the measures at issue beginning with the parties' 
disagreement as to the meaning of the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 interpreted in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DS U and the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. On the basis of this assessment, the Panel will provide its findings and 
recommendations in accordance with the DSU.  
7.3  Terms of reference  and measures at issue  
7.3.1   Introduction  
In this section, t he Panel will  examine issues raised by the parties relating to Article  6.2 of 
the DSU, which provides in relevant part:  
The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate 
whether consultations were held, iden tify the specific measures at issue and provide a 
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem 
clearly.  
The parties have raised a number of issues relating to the requirements of Article  6.2 of the 
DSU and the Panel's  terms of reference.228 Specifically, T ürkiye  argues that the Panel's terms of 
reference include  (a) the additional import duties imposed on derivative steel and aluminium  
products  and the country exemptions  granted from those duties229; and (b) the country exemptions 
from the additional  duties granted to Canada and Mexico .230 The United  States  argues that 
subsequent measures, such as "amended " or "new" measures, that did not exist at the time of the 
panel request could not have been identified i n the panel request and therefore are not within the 
Panel 's terms of reference .231 
The Panel will accordingly examine whether  it can make findings and recommendations on 
the measures described  above.  
 
228 In addition to the issues discussed in this section, the parties also dispute whether T ürkiye 's panel 
request adequately identifies various unpublished measures agreed between the U nited States  and the 
countries exempted from the additional duties on steel and aluminium products. The Panel notes that T ürkiye  
challenges these measures under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 and Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards. In light of  the Panel's findings under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on 
Safeguards,  the Panel does not  find it necessary to further address whether these measures  are within its 
terms of reference. See sections 7.5 and 7.8 below.  
229 Türkiye 's second written submission, paras.  2.4 – 2.7; response to Panel question No.  86. 
230 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  86 (referring to Presidential Proclamation 9893 , (Exhibit 
TUR-43) and Presidential Proclamation 9894 , (Exhibit TUR -44)). Türkiye  also argues that through Presidential 
Proclamations 9893 and 9894, issued after the Panel was established, the United  States  agreed upon certain 
agreements with other Members with a view to revising, replacing, or adjusting the previously applicable 
import measures on steel and aluminium (See section 2.3 above; T ürkiye 's response to Panel question No.  86; 
second written submission, para.  2.3). T ürkiye  contends that this is an amendment to or modification of the 
various unpublished measures agreed between the United  States  and the countries exempted from the 
additional duties on steel and aluminium products, challenged under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 and 
Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards. (See T ürkiye 's response to Panel question No s. 2.c and 86). 
In light of the Panel's findings under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards, the Panel 
does not find it necessary to address  whether  these measures are within its terms of reference. See sections 
7.5 and 7.8 below . See also fn  228 above.  
231 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  87. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  7.3.2   Additional d uties on derivative steel and aluminium prod ucts and corresponding 
country exemptions  
On 24  January  2020, the US President  issued Presidential Proclamation 9980  under the 
authority granted by Section  232.232 Presidential Proclamation 9980 introduced  additional duties of 
25% on derivative steel products and 10%  on derivative aluminium products with effect from 
8 February  2020.233 This Presidential  Proclamation also exempted  from these duties: (a) derivative 
steel products from Australia, Argentina, Bra zil, the Republic of Korea , Canada, and Mexico; and (b) 
derivative aluminium produc ts from Australia, Argentina, Canada, and Mexico.234 
Türkiye  requests  the Panel to include the additional measures  imposed by Presidential  
Proclamation 9980 in its terms of r eference .235 According to Türkiye , these additional measures fall 
within the Panel 's jurisdiction  as they are  "closely related to" and do not change the "essence of the 
measure" at issue .236 Türkiye  argues  that g iven how closely linked the now -expanded measures are 
to the original measures, given that they take exactly the same form , and that they rely on the same  
underlying USDOC determinations and the same policy concerns, these  extensions  of the original 
measures in no way change the essence of the original measures .237 The United  States  notes that 
Presidential Proclamation 9980 was issued more than a year after the establishment of the Panel, 
and therefore, the duties on derivative products did not exist at the time of the Panel's establishment, 
were not and could not have been identified in Türkiye 's panel request, and fall outside the Panel's 
terms of reference .238  
The Panel begins by noting that  the measures within a panel's terms of reference are generally 
those in existence at the time of the establishment of the panel . This does not preclude a panel, in 
certain circumstances, from reviewing measures enacted  or modified  after its establishment , taking 
into account the specific terms used in a panel request and in light of the aim of the dispute 
settlement mechanism to provide a positive solution to the dispute .239 In assisting the DSB in making 
its recommendati ons, a panel may review measure s that come into existence after panel 
establishment that bear  a close relationship to  measure s described in the panel request.240 The Panel 
will thus assess the relationship between the measures identified in T ürkiye 's panel request and the 
additional duties on derivative products  imposed by Presidential Proclamation 9980 , including the 
corresponding exemptions set out therein .  
In its panel request, T ürkiye  challenges the "import measures concerning certain steel 
products and certain aluminium products ".241 These include the additional import duty of 25 % on 
certain steel products and the additional import duty of 10 % on certain alumi nium products from all 
countries , with exemptions  for Argentina, Australia, Brazil and the Republic of Korea  from the duties 
on steel products, and for Argentina  and Australia from the duties on aluminium products .242 
 
232 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), pp. 5281 and 5283.  
233 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5283.  
234 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5283.  
235 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  86, fn 36; second written submission, para.  2.5. From 
Türkiye 's response s to the Panel 's question s as well as its description of measures (a) and (d), the Panel 
understands T ürkiye 's request to also comprise the country exemptions from the additional duties on derivative 
steel and alumin ium products.  
236 Türkiye 's second written submission, para.  2.6. 
237 Türkiye 's second written submission, para.  2.7. 
238 United  States ' response  to Panel question No.  87. 
239 Articles 3.7 and 11 of the DSU. See also  Appellate  Body Reports, US – Zeroing  (Japan) (Article  21.5 
– Japan) , paras.  121 and 125; EC – Chicken  Cuts, paras.  156-159; and Chile – Price Band System , 
paras.  126-144; Panel  Report s, US – Ripe Olives  from Spain , para.  7.12; US – Washing  Machines , 
paras.  7.248 -7.249; EC – Fasteners (China) , para.  7.34; and Colombia – Ports of Entry, paras.  7.52-7.54. 
240 See Panel  Report s, US – Ripe Olives  from Spain , para.  7.14; Russia – Pigs (EU), para.  7.160; US – 
Carbon Steel , para.  8.11; India – Agricultural Products , para.  7.78-7.80;  EC – Fasteners (China) , para. 7.38; 
Australia – Salmon (Article  21.5 – Canada) , para.  7.10, subpara.  27; and Japan – Film, paras.  10.8-10.9. 
Similarly, previous panels and Appellate  Body reports have considered (a) whether the terms of the panel 
request are broad enough to cover amendments to the measures and (b) whether the measures remain in 
essence the same as  those identified in the panel request. Appellate  Body Report, Chile – Price Band System , 
paras.  135-139. See also Appellate  Body Reports, US – Zeroing  (EC) (Article  21.5 – EC), paras.  190-191 and 
383-384; EC – Selected Customs Matters , para.  184; EC – Chicken Cuts , paras.  156-161; Panel  Report s, US – 
Ripe Olives  from Spain , para.  7.14; Indonesia – Chicken , paras.  7.84-7.85; and US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd 
complaint) (Article  21.5 – EU), para.  7.524.  
241 Türkiye 's panel request, p. 2.  
242 Türkiye 's panel request, p. 1.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Türkiye 's panel request also states that these measures consist of, have been imposed by, are 
reflected and evidenced in, or are based on a number of legal instruments, including Presidential 
Proclamations 9704 and 9705 and the Steel and Aluminium Reports.243 Türkiye 's panel reque st 
further states that its request  covers any "additional measures that may amend, supersede, 
supplement, add to, update, extend, replace or implement the measures listed above, on their own 
or in any combination , as well as any exclusions or exemptions fr om those measures ".244 
The Panel  notes that Presidential Proclamation 9980 explicitly refers to the Steel and 
Aluminium  Reports  and earlier Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 on aluminium and steel, 
respectively, in setting out its legal basis and justification. In particular, Presidential Proclamation 
9980 refers to the direction in Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 to the US Secretary of 
Commerce to "inform [the US President] of any circums tances that in the Secretary's opinion might 
indicate the need for further action under section 232" .245 The US President decided to " adjust the 
tariffs imposed by previous proclamations to apply to the derivatives of aluminum articles and steel 
articles "246 specifically based on the Secretary's assessments that foreign producers of derivative 
steel and aluminium products "have increased shipments of such articles to the United  States  to 
circumvent the duties on steel and aluminum articles imposed in Preside ntial Proclamations 9704 
and 9705"247 and that " imports of these derivative articles threaten to undermine the actions taken 
to address the risk to the national security of the United  States  found in Presidential Proclamation s 
9704 and 9705 ".248 In this resp ect, the measures introduced by Presidential Proclamation 9980 have 
a close connection to the instruments  identified in T ürkiye 's panel request.249  
The legal basis for Presidential Proclamation 9980  is Section  232.250 Section  232 in turn 
authorizes the US P resident, if he concurs with the findings in the US Secretary of Commerce's 
reports, " to adjust the  imports of [an] article and its derivatives  so that such imports will not threaten 
to impair the national security ".251 In Presidential Proclamation 9980, th e US President notes the 
importance of stabilizing domestic capacity utilization in the steel and aluminium industries at the 
levels recommended by the US Secretary of Commerce in the Steel and Aluminium  Reports .252 The 
US President further relies on the Secretary's conclusion that "reducing imports of the derivative 
articles …  would reduce circumvention and facilitate the adjustment of imports that Proclamation 
9704 and Proclamation 9705, as amended, made to increas e domestic capacity utilization".253 This 
further demonstrates the connection between Presidential Proclamation 9980 on derivative products 
and the earlier Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705  stemming  from Section  232 and the Steel 
and Aluminium  Report s.  
The duties and exemptions  on derivative steel and aluminium products are also explicitly 
linked to the objectives of the earlier measures taken under Section  232 identified in T ürkiye 's panel 
request. Presidential Proclamation 9980  provides that import s of certain derivative  steel and  
alumin ium products have significantly increased since tariffs and quotas were imposed on certain 
steel and aluminium products, and that the net effect of this increase  has been to "undermine the 
purpose of the proclamation s adjusting imports of aluminum and steel articles to remove the 
threatened impairment of the national security" .254 This Proclamation states that the duties on 
derivative steel and aluminium products are "necessary and appropriate to address circumvention 
that is undermining the effectiveness of the adjustment of imports made in Proclamation 9704 and 
Proclamation 9705".255 This confirms that Presidential Proclamation 9980 supplements Presidential 
 
243 Türkiye 's panel request , pp. 2-3. See also section 2.2 above . 
244 Türkiye 's panel request , p. 3.  
245 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5281.  
246 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 528 3. 
247 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5282.  
248 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 528 2. 
249 The Panel also notes that Presidential Proclamation 9980 defines its product scope with reference to 
the steel and aluminium articles envisaged in Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705. (Presidential 
Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5282 ). 
250 Preside ntial Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5283 ("Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, authorizes the President to adjust the imports of an article and its 
derivatives  that are being imported into the United  States  in such quantities or under such circumstances as to 
threaten to impair the national security of the United  States " (emphasis added) ). 
251 Section  232, ( Exhibit TUR-1 and USA-1), § 1862(c)(1)(A) . 
252 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA-225), pp. 5281 -5282.  
253 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5282.  
254 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5282.  
255 Presidential Proclamation 9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225), p. 5283.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Proclamation s 9704 and 9705  in pursuit of the same objectives under Section  232 based on 
recommendations by the Secretary of Commerce in the Steel and Aluminium  Reports .  
For the foregoing reasons, the Panel concludes  that Presidential Proclamation 9980 and the 
actions set out therein, i.e.  the imposition of duties o n derivative steel and aluminium products and 
corresponding exemptions,  bear a close connection to the earlier measures on steel and aluminium 
that are identified in T ürkiye 's panel request. Moreover, T ürkiye 's panel request was formulated so 
as to encompass such supplements  or extensions  as well as exemptions from those  measures . The 
Panel therefore finds that these measures  are within its terms of reference.  
7.3.3   Country exemptions granted to Canada and Mexico  
Presidential Proclamation 9893 provides that the "United States has successfully concluded 
discussions with Canada and Mexico on satisfactory alternative means "256 and that as a 
consequence, the United  States  has "decided to exclude Canada and Mexico from the t ariff 
proclaimed in Proclamation 9704" on aluminium products.257 Similarly, Presidential Proclamation 
9894 states that the "United  States  has successfully concluded discussions with Canada and Mexico 
on satisfactory alternative means"258 and that as a conseq uence, the United  States  has "decided to 
exclude Canada and Mexico from the tariff proclaimed in Proclamation 9705" on steel products.259 
Türkiye  argues that the above -described amendments introduced by Presidential Proclamations 
9893 and 9894 to the duties  on steel and aluminium imports  are within the Panel's terms of 
referenc e.260 
The Panel recalls that b etween March and May 2018, the United  States  issued several 
Presidential  Proclamations exempting certain countries from the additional duties on steel and 
aluminium imports .261 These exemptions were granted based on the US President's determination 
in Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705  that " should the United  States  and any [country] arrive 
at a satisfactory alternative means to address the threat t o the national security … [the US President] 
may remove or modify the restriction on [steel and alumin ium] articles imports from that 
country".262 Türkiye 's panel request identifies Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 as well as 
subsequent proclamation s granting exemptions to countries including Australia, Argentina, Brazil 
and the Republic of Korea .263  
As discussed above264, a panel may review measure s that come into existence after panel 
establishment that bear  a close relationship to  measure s describe d in the panel request . In this 
regard, the Panel notes that  Presidential Proclamations 9893 and 9894 directly refer to Presidential 
Proclamations 9704 and 9705 in setting out their legal basis. In particular, they recall the US 
President's determination i n Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 on the circumstances under 
which exemptions from the additional duties could be granted .265 Presidential Proclamation s 9893 
and 9894 also refer to the authority of the US President under Section  232 and the findings of the 
US Secretary of Commerce in the Steel and Aluminium Reports, a feature shared by the Presidential  
Proclamations identified in T ürkiye 's panel request, including Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 
 
256 Presidenti al Proclamation 9893, ( Exhibit TUR -43), p. 23983.  
257 Presidential Proclamation 9893, ( Exhibit TUR -43), p. 23983.  
258 Presidential Proclamation 9894, ( Exhibit TUR -44), p. 23987.  
259 Presidential Proclamation 9894, ( Exhibit TUR -44), p. 23988.  
260 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  86. 
261 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 above.  
262 Presidential Proclamation 9739,  (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14), pp. 20677 -20678; Presidential 
Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), pp. 20683 -20684; Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit 
TUR-13 and USA -16), pp. 25849 -25850; Presidential Proclamat ion 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), pp. 
25857 -25858. See also Presidential Proclamation 9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential 
Proclamation 9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11626.  
263 Türkiye 's panel request, pp. 2 -3. Türkiye 's panel request also notes that "[a]s of 1  June 2018, the 
additional duties on certain steel products appear to apply to all countries of origin, except Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil and the Republic of Korea . The additional duties on certain aluminium products appear to apply to all 
countries of origin except Argentina and Australia". See ibid. p. 1.  
264 See para.  7.16 above. 
265 Presidential Proclamation 9893, (Exhibit TUR -43), p. 23983 ; Presidential Proclamation 9894, (Exhibit 
TUR-44), p. 2398 7 ("should the United  States  and any such country arrive at a satisfactory alternative means 
to address the threat to the national s ecurity such that … imports from that country no longer threaten to 
impair the national security, [the US President] may remove or modify the restriction on steel articles imports 
from that country ").  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  9705.266 For the Panel, this demonstrates the connection between Presidential Proclamations 9893 
and 9894 and the Presidential  Proclamations identified in T ürkiye's panel request relating to the 
country exemptions.  
In addition to the above, the Panel notes the similarities between the exemptions granted 
through Presidential Proclamations 9893 and 9894 and the exemptions identified in T ürkiye 's panel 
request. Eac h exemption is designed to exclude countries from the additional duties applicable to  an 
identical set of products , namely those  set out in  the annexes to Presidential Proclamation s 9704 
and 9705.267 The exemptions to Canada and Mexico were also granted und er the same circumstances 
as the exemptions identified in T ürkiye 's panel request, i.e. concluded discussions on "satisfactory 
alternative means to address the threatened impairment to [US] national security" posed by imports 
from the exempted country268 and the US President 's determination that imports from the exempted 
country "no longer threaten to impair the national security" .269 These similarities confirm the close 
connection between exemptions granted through Presidential Proclamations 9893 and 9894 an d 
those identified in Türkiye 's panel request.  
For these reasons and in light of the specific circumstances of this case, the Panel concludes  
that Presidential Proclamations 9893 and 9894 and the actions set out therein, i.e . the exemptions 
from the additional duties to imports from  Canada and Mexico , bear a close connection to  the earlier  
measures on steel and aluminium  products  identified in  Türkiye 's panel request . Moreover, T ürkiye 's 
panel request was formulated so as to encompass such ex tensions of exemptions.270 The Panel 
therefore  finds that these measures are within its terms of reference.  
7.3.4   Conclusion  
Based on the foregoing and in light of the specific circumstances of the present dispute, the 
Panel finds that the additional import dutie s imposed on derivative steel and aluminium products 
and the  corresponding  country exemptions , as well as the country exemptions  granted to Canada 
and Mexico after the Panel's establishment , are within its terms of reference.  
7.4  Article  II:1 of the GATT  1994  
7.4.1   Introduction  
Türkiye  argues that the additional duties on steel and aluminium products are inconsistent 
with Articles II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994.271 In Türkiye 's view, the additional duties are 
 
266 Presidential Proclamation 9893, (Exhibit TUR -43), p. 23983 ; Presidential Proclamation 9894, (Exhibit 
TUR-44), p. 2398 7. See also Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), pp. 60 -61; Aluminium Report,  (Exhibit 
TUR-4 and USA -8), p. 109.  
267 Presidential Proclamation 9739,  (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14), pp. 20677 -20678; Presidential 
Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20684; Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 
and USA -16), p. 25850; Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), p. 25858 ; Presidential 
Proclamation 9893 , (Exhibit TUR -43), p. 2398 3; and Presidential Proclamation 9894 , (Exhibit TUR -44), p. 
23988 . 
268 Presidential Proclamation 9739,  (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14), p. 20677; Presidential Proclamation 
9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), pp. 20683 -20684; Presidential Proclamation 9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and 
USA-16), p. 25849; Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), p. 25857; Presidential 
Proclamation 9893,  (Exhibit TUR -43), p. 2398 3; and Presidential Proclamation 9894 , (Exhibit TUR -44), p. 
23987. 
269 Presidential Proclamation 9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20684; Presidential Proclamation 
9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), p. 25850; Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), 
p. 25858; Presidential Proclamation 9893,  (Exhibit TUR-43), p. 2398 3; and Presidential Proclamation 9894 , 
(Exhibit TUR -44), p. 23988 . 
270 Türkiye 's panel request states that it "also covers any additional measures that may amend, 
supersede, supplement, add to, update, extend, replace or implement the measure s listed above, on their own 
or in any combination, as well as any exclusions or exemptions from those measures".  Türkiye 's panel request, 
p. 3. 
271 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  1.5, 1.10, 4.4, and 4.202; responses to Panel's questions 
followin g the first meeting, Annex  I. See also T ürkiye 's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, 
para. 6; closing statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  3; and second written submission, para.  6.1. 
More specifically, T ürkiye  challenges the  duty of 25% applied to steel articles from certain countries, the duty 
of 50% applied to steel articles from T ürkiye , and the duty of 10% applied to aluminium articles. (See 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  inconsistent with Article  II:1(b) independently of whethe r they are considered "ordinary customs 
duties" or "other duties or charges". Should the Panel find they are "ordinary customs duties", 
Türkiye  contends that the additional duties of 50% and 25% ad valorem  on steel products and 10% 
ad valorem on aluminium products exceed the United  States ' bound rates of 0% and at the highest 
5.8% respectively, thus resulting in inconsistency with the first sentence of Article  II:1(b).272 Türkiye  
further notes that, as these  "additional" duties are described as "ordinary customs dut[ies]" in the 
Presidential Proclamations and operationalized by modifying by "Rate of Duty – General" column in 
the HTSUS, they appear to be ordinary customs duties under United  States  law.273 Shoul d the Panel 
find that they are "other duties and charges", T ürkiye  considers that they would be inconsistent with 
the second sentence of Article  II:1(b), as the United  States  did not reserve any right to apply any 
other duties or charges on these products.274 Consequently, T ürkiye  considers that the United  States  
also acted inconsistently with Article  II:1(a).275 
The United  States  has not advanced any arguments or evidence contesting the claims under 
Articles II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994.276  
Article  II:1 of the GATT  1994 provides in relevant part:  
(a) Each contracting party shall accord to the commerce of the other contracting parties 
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part of the 
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agr eement.  
(b) The products described in Part I of the Schedule relating to any contracting party, 
which are the products of territories of other contracting parties, shall, on their 
importation into the territory to which the Schedule relates, and subject to  the terms, 
conditions or qualifications set forth in that Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs 
duties in excess of those set forth and provided therein. Such products shall also be 
exempt from all other duties or charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with 
the importation in excess of those imposed on the date of this Agreement or those 
directly and mandatorily required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force in the 
importing territory on that date.  
Additionally, the Understanding on  the Interpretation of Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 
provides in relevant part:  
Members hereby agree as follows:  
1. In order to ensure transparency of the legal rights and obligations deriving from 
paragraph 1(b) of Article  II, the nature and level of any "other duties or charges" levied 
on bound tariff items, as referred to in that provision, shall be recorded in the Schedules 
of concessions annexed to GATT  1994 against the tariff item to which they apply. It is 
understood that such recording does not change the legal character of "other duties or 
charges".  
Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994 contains a general prohibition against according treatment 
less favourable to imports than that provided for in a Member's Schedule.277 The first sentence of 
Article  II:1(b) prohibits the imposition of ordinary customs duties on importation in excess of th ose 
 
Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.202 (citing "measures a -b and d", def ined in ibid. para.  4.6); 
response to Panel question No.  82, paras.  1.9-1.10). T ürkiye  also identifies all its claims in respect of the 
additional duties as extending to the further duties on certain derivative steel and aluminium products.  (See 
Türkiye 's second written submission, paras.  2.4 and 2.7 ). 
272 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.208 -4.211.  
273 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.212.  
274 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.213. See also ibid. paras.  4.22-4.23. 
275 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.214.  
276 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7 (indicating that the 
United  States  "has imposed duties on certain steel and aluminum products on a non -MFN basis and in exces s 
of the levels set out in its WTO Goods Schedule").  
277 See Appellate  Body Reports, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel, para. 45; Colombia – Textiles, 
para. 5.34. See also Panel  Report s, EC – Chicken Cuts, para. 7.63; EC – IT Products , para.  7.99. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  rates set forth in a Member's Schedule.278 The second sentence of Article  II:1(b) prohibits the 
imposition of other duties or charges of any kind on or in connection with importation in excess of 
those imposed on the date of entry into force of the GATT  1994 (or those directly and mandatorily 
required to be imposed thereafter by legislation in force on that date).279 According to the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article  II:1(b), the nature and level of any such "other duties 
or charges" must be recorded in a Member's Schedule.280  
In this dispute, the complainant focuses its arguments on inconsistency with Article  II:1(b) 
and alleges a consequential violation of Article  II:1(a).281 Prior WTO adjudicators have considered 
that Article  II:1(b) proh ibits "a specific kind of practice that will always be inconsistent with 
paragraph (a)" because application of duties in excess of what is provided for in a Member's Schedule 
necessarily constitutes "less favourable" treatment within the meaning of Article  II:1(a).282 Given 
these considerations, the Panel will assess whether the challenged measures result in the imposition 
of duties in excess of what is provided for in the United  States ' Schedule  under Article  II:1(b), and 
thus accord less favourable treatme nt than that provided for in the Schedule in violation of 
Article  II:1(a).  
The Panel will begin by identifying the concessions and obligations for the relevant products 
in the United  States ' Schedule before turning to the treatment of those products under  the measures 
challenged by T ürkiye , specifically concerning:   
a. the additional duties of 25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products;  
b. the additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye ; and   
c. the additional duties of 25% on derivative steel p roducts and 10% on derivative aluminium 
products.283  
7.4.2   Additional duties on steel and aluminium products  
In March 2018, the United  States  imposed additional duties of 25% on steel products and 
10% on aluminium products .284 The following tables identify the steel and aluminium products 
covered by the additional duties and provide a comparative analysis of the United  States ' bound 
rates and its additional duty rates in relation to those products. The United  States ' Schedule does 
not record any "ot her duties or charges" with respect to the steel and aluminium products at issue.285 
 
278 See Appellate  Body Reports, India – Additional Import Duties, para. 150; Colombia – Textiles, 
para. 5.35. 
279 See Appellate  Body Report, India – Additional Import Duties,  para. 151; Panel  Report , 
Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , para.  7.78. 
280 See Pa nel Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , para.  7.78. See also Panel  Report , 
Dominican  Republic  – Import and Sale of Cigarettes , paras.  7.84-7.90. 
281 See T ürkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.214.  
282 Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Textiles and Apparel , paras.  45-47. See also  Panel  Report s, EC – 
Chicken Cuts , paras.  7.64-7.65; EC – IT Products , para.  7.747 . 
283 See T ürkiye 's first written submission, paras.  1.5, 1.10, 4.4, and 4.202 (citing "measures a -b and d", 
defined in ibid. para. 4.6); responses to Panel's questions following the first meeting, Annex  I; and response to 
Panel question No.  82, paras.  1.9-1.10. In its second written submission, T ürkiye  additionally referred to the 
United  States  having imposed, on 24  January  2020, further additional duties on imports of steel and aluminium 
derivatives. In T ürkiye 's view, these measures extended the product scope of the additional duties of 25% ad 
valorem on steel products and 10% ad valorem on aluminium products. Thus, T ürkiye  argue d that all of its 
claims relating to the measures it identified as measures (a) and (d) also applied to this recent tariff increase. 
(See T ürkiye 's second written submission, paras.  2.4 and 2.7). The Panel therefore understands T ürkiye 's 
claims under Artic les II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT  1994 to extend to the additional duties on derivative steel 
and aluminium products.  
284 See Presidential Proclamation  9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9). See also sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 for a detailed description . 
285 United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level . WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Table  2: Steel Products Subject to Additional Duties under Section  232 
Steel Products Subject to Additional Duties   
 
#  
HTS Code  Rates of customs duties  
Bound rates286 Additional duty  
1. 7206-7215 
0 +25%  2. 7216 (except 
certain 
subheadings)287 
3. 7217-7229 
4. 7301.10.00  
5. 7302.10  
6. 7302.40.00  
7. 7302.90.00  
8. 7304-7306 
Source : United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level; Presidential Proclamation 9705288 
Table  3: Aluminium Products Subject to Additional Duties under Section  232 
Aluminium Products Subject to Additional Duties  
 
#  
HTS Code  Rates of customs duties  
Bound rates289 Additional duty  
1. 7601 0-2.6%  
+10%  2. 7604 1.5-5% 
3. 7605 2.6-4.2%  
4. 7606 2.7-6.5%  
5. 7607 0-5.8%  
6. 7608 0-5.7%  
7. 7609 5.7%  
8. 7616.99.51  2.5%  
Source : United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level ; Presidential Proclamation 9704290 
 
The Panel recalls that the first sentence of Article  II:1(b) prohibits the imposition of ordinary 
customs duties on importation in excess of those rates set forth in a  Member's Schedule, whereas 
the second sentence prohibits the imposition of all other duties or charges of any kind on or in 
connection with importation except as recorded in a Member's Schedule. To fall within the scope of 
 
286 Pursuant to Chapters 72 and 73 of the HTSUS , the generally applied rate for these products is also 
0% for all relevant subheadings.  
287 Exceptions for subheadings 7216.61.00, 7216.69.00, and 7216.91.00 . 
288 See Presidential Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9). The  Panel additionally relied on data 
from the WTO's Consolidated Tariff Schedule (CTS) Database and online versions of the United  States ' 
harmonized tariff schedule, https://hts.usitc.gov/current  (accessed 22  June 2022).  
289 Pursuant to Chapter 76 of the HTSUS, the generally applied rate for the relevant subheadings are as 
follows: for HTS Code 7601, 0 -2.6%; for HTS Code 7604, 1.5 -5%; for HTS Code 7605, 2.6 -4.2%; for HTS 
Code 7606, 2.7-6.5% ; for HTS Code 7607, 0-5.8%; for HTS Code 7608, 5.7%; for HTS Code 7609, 5.7% ; and 
for HTS Code 7616.99.51 , 2.5%. In respect of HTS Code 7608, tariff lines 7608.10.00  and 7608.20.000,  as 
described in the United  States ' Schedule, are subdivided into two categories of (A) and (B). The former applies 
to products certified for use in civil aircraft, for which  a bound rate of zero applies. The latter applies to all 
other products, for which a bound rate of 5.7% applies. The HTSUS does not  draw a distinction between (A) 
and (B) by simply providing for a rate of 5.7% . 
290 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit  TUR-7 and USA-10). The Panel additionally relied on 
data from the WTO's CTS Database and online versions of the United  States ' harmonized tariff schedule, 
https://hts.usitc.gov/current  (accessed 22  June 2022).  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Article  II:1(b), the additional duties must therefore qualify as either "ordinary customs duties" under 
the first sentence, or "other duties or charges" under the second sentence.  
The term "ordinary customs duties" is not defined in the GATT  1994.291 However, previous 
WTO panels and the A ppellate  Body have highlighted several factors that are relevant to this 
characterization. First, the word "ordinary" has been defined as referring to duties "of the usual kind, 
not singular or exceptional"292 or "occurring in regular custom or practice".293 Second, the "customs 
dut[y]" must be imposed "on [the product's] importation"; in other words, the obligation to pay 
must accrue at the moment of or by virtue of the product's importation into the Member's customs 
territory.294 Third, neither the form whic h the duty takes, nor the basis on which it is calculated, will 
necessarily be dispositive.295 Rather, panels have examined duties by their design and structure296 
and found certain duties and charges , based on their particular features, not to constitute "o rdinary 
customs duties" in the sense of Article  II:1(b).297 
The term "all other duties or charges of any kind" has been interpreted broadly as a residual 
category, which covers all duties or charges on or in connection with importation that are neither 
"ordinary customs duties" nor the duties or charges expressly provided for in Article  II:2 of the 
GATT  1994.298  
In the present dispute, T ürkiye  argues that the additional duties of 25% on steel products 
and 10% on aluminium products are inconsistent with Artic le II:1(b) independently of whether the 
Panel considers them to be "ordinary customs duties" or "other duties and charges".299 Nonetheless, 
in Türkiye 's view, the additional duties are "ordinary customs duties" pursuant to US law. In 
particular, T ürkiye  highlights the following features:  
a. the relevant Presidential  Proclamations impose these duties by amending Chapter 99 of 
the HTSUS, on the basis of Section  604 of the Trade Act 1974;  
b. the relevant language describes the duties as "ordinary customs du[ties]" "applicable to 
all entries … from all countries"; and  
c. the amendments to Chapter 99 are operationalized by modifying the "Rate of Duty – 
General" column.300  
Nevertheless, should the Panel consider that the duties are best characterized as "other d uties 
and charges", T ürkiye  argues that such duties would also be inconsistent with this provision because, 
 
291 See Appellate  Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, para. 265. 
292 See Panel  Report , Chile – Price Band System, para. 7.51. 
293 Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , para.  7.83.  
294 Appellate  Body Report, China – Auto Parts, para. 158. In Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures , 
the panel thus noted that: "the expression 'ord inary customs duties' in Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 refers 
to duties collected at the border which constitute 'customs duties' in the strict sense of the term" and "this 
expression does not cover all possible extraordinary or exceptional duties colle cted in customs." (Panel  Report , 
Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.85).  
295 Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.84 (referring to Appellate  Body 
Report, Chile – Price Band System , paras.  216 and 271 -278). See also Appellate  Body Report s, China – Auto 
Parts, para.  162 (noting that " the time at which a charge is collected or paid is not decisive "); EC – Bananas III 
(Article  21.5 – Ecuador II) / EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – US), para.  416 (noting in passing that "it is 
unusual that a tariff concession inscribed in a Member's Schedule would be limited in time").  
296 See Panel  Report , Dominican  Republic  – Safeguard Measures, para. 7.85 (noting that to determine 
whether the duties are "ordinary  customs duties",  panels " must consider the design and structure of the 
measures concerned"). See also Appellate  Body Report, Argentina – Textiles  and Apparel, para. 55; 
Panel  Report , Russia – Tariff Treatment, para. 7.92.  
297 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, Peru – Agricultural Products , paras.  5.70-5.76; Chile – Price Band 
System (Article  21.5 – Argentina) , paras.  167 and 171; Panel  Report s, Peru – Agricultural Products, 
paras.  7.373 -7.374;  Dominican  Republic  – Import and Sal e of Cigarettes, para. 7.115.  
298 Panel  Report s, Dominican  Republic  – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.113;  Dominican  Republic  
– Safeguard Measures , para.  7.79. See also Appellate  Body Report, India – Additional Import Duties , 
para. 157. 
299 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.208.  
300 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.212.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  in column 6 of its Schedule, the United  States  did not reserve the right to apply any "other duties or 
charges" with respect to the steel and alumin ium articles at hand.301 
In the Panel's view, the additional duties at issue bear certain features which suggest that 
they may best be characterized as "ordinary customs duties" for the purposes of Article  II:1(b). In 
particular, the additional duties are: (a) levied on all imports of the covered steel and aluminium 
products; (b) calculated on an ad valorem basis; (c) described as "tariffs" and "ordinary customs 
dut[ies]" in the relevant Presidential Proclamations; and (d) operationalized as "ordinary custom s 
dut[ies]" and inscribed in the "Rates of Duty – General" column of the United  States ' tariff 
schedule.302 These duties are also clearly applicable to products "on their importation  into the 
territory" of the United  States  in the sense of Article  II:1(b). Moreover, the United  States  has not 
contested T ürkiye 's characterization of the duties under its domestic law , but rather accepts that it 
has imposed duties "in excess of the levels set out in its WTO Goods Schedule".303 Accordingly, the 
Panel considers tha t the additional duties are "ordinary customs duties" under the first sentence of 
Article  II:1(b).  
However, the Panel is cognizant that the additional duties also bear other features which 
reflect the particular process under Section  232 through which they  were imposed and maintained. 
First, the additional duties were not inscribed through an amendment or replacement of the existing 
MFN tariff, but rather through inscription in subchapter III of chapter 99 of the HTSUS, titled 
"Temporary Modifications Estab lished Pursuant to Trade Legislation".304 As such, the duties expressly 
apply "in addition" to any pre -existing tariffs.305 Second, although the additional duties are generally 
applicable on an MFN basis, they are subject to a number of country exemptions.306 Finally, while 
the additional duties are not expressly imposed for a temporary period, certain aspects of their 
implemen tation suggest that they may not be intended as permanent adjustment s to the MFN tariff 
rate.  These include the aforementioned inscription in subchapter III of chapter 99, as well as the 
stipulated requirement in the relevant Presidential Proclamations tha t "[t]he Secretary shall continue 
to monitor" these duties.307 In the circumstances of this dispute and mindful of these other features, 
the Panel will also consider whether the additional duties as "other duties or charges" would be 
inconsistent with the s econd sentence of Article  II:1(b).  
As "ordinary customs duties" under Article  II:1(b), it is evident that the additional duties of 
25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products exceed the United  States ' bound rates of 
0% and 0 -6.5% on steel and aluminium products respectively.308 These products are therefore not 
exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth in the United  States ' Schedule, in 
a manner inconsistent with the first sentence of Article  II:1(b).  Moreover, the United  States' 
Schedule does not record any "other duties or charges" with respect to the steel and aluminium 
products at issue.309 Even if considered to be "other duties or charges", the additional duties would 
therefore exceed those imposed on the entry into forc e of the GATT  1994 or directly and mandatorily 
required to be imposed thereafter, in a manner inconsistent with the second sentence of 
Article  II:1(b).  
 
301 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.213.  
302 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit  TUR-6 and  USA-9). 
303 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7. 
304 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10), Annex; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9), Annex.  
305 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10), p. 11621 ; Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9), p. 11627  (stating that the d uties apply " in addition to  any 
other duties, fees, exactions or charges applicable" to the im ported articles). ( emphasis added)  
306 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 for a detailed description.  See also Presidential Proclamation 9704 , 
(Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10), p. 11620 ; Presidential Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9), p. 11626 . 
See also Preside ntial Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit TUR -9 and  USA-12); Presidential Proclamation 9711 , (Exhibit 
TUR-8 and  USA-11); Presidential Proclamation 9739 , (Exhibit TUR -11 and  USA-14); Presidential Proclamation 
9740, (Exhibit TUR -10 and  USA-13); Presidential Proclama tion 9758 , (Exhibit TUR -13 and  USA-16); and 
Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -12 and  USA-15). These will be elaborated in more detail in the 
context of Türkiye 's claim under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. 
307 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9). 
308 See p ara. 7.35 above.  
309 United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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Accordingly, the Panel considers that the additional duties are inconsistent with the first 
sentence of Article  II:1(b) as "ordinary customs duties" exceeding the United  States ' bound rates 
for the relevant products. Even if the additional duties were considered "other duties or charges", 
the Panel considers that these duties would also be inconsistent with the second sentence of 
Article  II:1(b). On either basis, the additional duties on steel and aluminium products would 
therefore be inconsistent with Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994. As the additional duties are 
inconsistent with Article  II:1(b) by exceedin g the levels in the United  States ' Schedule, the 
United  States  has necessarily accorded treatment less favourable than that provided for in its 
Schedule. The Panel therefore concludes that the additional duties are also inconsistent with 
Article  II:1(a) of  the GATT  1994. 
7.4.3   Additional duty on steel products from T ürkiye  
In August 2018, an additional duty of 50% was imposed on steel products from T ürkiye .310 
As this duty is applicable to the same steel products  as listed in Table  2 above , the United  States ' 
bound rates in respect of th ose products have already been set out in that Table .311 
As previously noted, T ürkiye  argues that the additional duties are inconsistent with 
Article  II:1(b) independently of whether they are considered "ordinary customs duties" or "other 
duties and charges".312 These arguments include the additional duty of 50% on steel products from 
Türkiye .313 Türkiye  further argues that both the additional duties of 50% and 25% ad valorem on 
steel products exceed the bound rates of duty in the United  States ' Schedule of Concessions .314  
In the Panel's view, the additional duty on steel products from T ürkiye  raises similar issues in 
terms of its characterization as either an "ordinary customs dut[y]" or "other dut[y] or charge[]" 
under Arti cle II:1(b). For reasons similar to those outlined above315, the Panel considers that the 
additional duty is an "ordinary customs dut[y]" under the first sentence of Article  II:1(b). In 
particular, the additional duty is: (a) levied on all imports of the co vered steel products from T ürkiye ; 
(b) calculated on an ad valorem basis; (c) described as a "tariff" or "ordinary customs duty" in the 
relevant Presidential Proclamations; and (d) operationalized as an "ordinary customs duty" and 
inscribed in the "Rates o f Duty – General" column of the United  States ' tariff schedule.316  
As an "ordinary customs dut[y]", it is evident that the additional duty of 50% on steel products 
from Türkiye  exceeds the United States' bound rates for the steel products at issue (0%), in  a 
manner inconsistent with the first sentence of Article  II:1(b).  Moreover, even if considered to be 
"other duties or charges" under the second sentence317, the United  States ' Schedule does not record 
any "other duties or charges" with respect to the steel  products at issue.318 On either basis, the 
additional duty on steel products from T ürkiye  would therefore be inconsistent with Article  II:1(b) 
of the GATT  1994. As the additional duty on steel products from T ürkiye  exceeds the levels set out 
in the United  States ' Schedule, it follows that the United  States  has accorded treatment less 
favourable than that provided for in its Schedule. The Panel therefore concludes that the additional 
duty on steel products from T ürkiye is also inconsistent with Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994. 
 
310 See Presidential Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit TUR -14 and USA -17). The Panel notes that the 
additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye  was originally imposed in August 2018 and was 
amended in May 2019 to decrease the duty rate to 25%. (See Presidential Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit TUR -14 
and USA -17); Presidential Proclamation 9886 , (Exhibit TUR -42 and USA -224)). Presidential Proclamation 9886, 
which amends the duty rate to 25%, states that the United  States  has "remove[d] the higher tariff on steel 
imports from Turkey imposed by Proclamation 9772, and […] instead impose[d] a 25 percent ad valorem tariff 
on steel imports from Turkey, commen surate with the tariff imposed on such articles imported from most 
countries." (See Presidential Proclamation 9886 , (Exhibit TUR -42 and USA -224), p. 23422).  
311 See p ara. 7.35 above.  
312 See paras.  7.39 - 7.40 above.  
313 See Türkiye's first written submission, para.  4.208.  
314 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.209.  
315 See para.  7.41 above.  
316 See Presidential Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit TUR -14 and USA -17). 
317 These considerations may be relevant in light of other features of the additional duty on steel 
products from T ürkiye , such as: (a) being inscribed in subchapter III of chapter 99 of the HTSUS  titled 
"Temporary Modifications Established Pursuant to Trade Legislation "; (b) applying "in addition" to any 
pre-existing duties; and (c) solely appl ying to Türkiye . (See Presidential Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit TUR -14 
and USA -17)).  
318 United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level.   WT/DS564/R  
 
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  7.4.4   Additional duties on derivative steel and aluminium products  
In January 2020, the United  States  announced additional duties of 25% on derivative steel 
and 10% on derivative aluminium products .319 The following tables identify the derivative steel and 
aluminium products covered by these additional duties, and provide a comparative analysis of the 
United  States ' bound rates and its additional duty rates in relation to those products. As with the 
other steel and aluminium products, the United  States ' Schedule similarly does not record any "other 
duties or charges" with respect to these products.320 
Table  4: Derivative Steel Products Subject to Additional Duties under Section  232 
Derivative Steel Products Subject to Additional Duties  
 
#  
HTS Code  Rates of customs duties  
Bound rates321 Additional duty  
1. 7317.00.30  
0-2.5%  
+25%  2. 7317.00.5503  
3. 7317.00.5505  
4. 7317.00.5507  
5. 7317.00.5560  
6. 7317.00.5580  
7. 7317.00.6560  
8. 8708.10.30  
9. 8708.29.21   
Source : United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level; Presidential Proclamation 9980322 
Table  5: Derivative Aluminium Products Subject to Additional Duties under Section  232 
Derivative Aluminium Products Subject to Additional Duties  
 
#  
HTS Code  Rates of customs duties  
Bound rates323 Additional duty  
1. 7614.10.50  
2.5-5.7%  +10%  2. 7614.90.20  
3. 7614.90.40  
4. 7614.90.50  
5. 8708.10.30  
6. 8708.29.21  
Source : United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level ; Presidential Proclamation 9980324 
 
319 See Presid ential Proclamation 9980 , (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225). As noted above, T ürkiye  argues 
generally that the additional duties on steel and aluminium products are inconsistent with Article  II:1(b) 
independently of whether they are considered "ordinary customs  duties" or "other duties and charges", but did 
not raise specific arguments in respect of the additional duties on derivative products. (See paras.  7.39-7.40 
and fn  283 above).  
320 United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading lev el. 
321 Pursuant to Chapters 73 and 87 of the HTSUS, the generally applied rate for these products is also 
0-2.5% for all relevant subheadings.  
322 See Presidential Proclamation 9980 , (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225). The Panel additionally relied on 
data fro m the  WTO's CTS Database and online versions of the United  States ' harmonized tariff schedule, 
https://hts.usitc.gov/current  (accessed 22  June 2022).  
323 Pursuant to Chapters 76 and 87 of the HTSUS, the generally applied rate for these products is 0 -
5.7% for all relevant subheadings. In respect of HTS Code 8708.29.21, WTO document WT/Let/1098 lists this 
sub-heading 8708.29.21 at a bound duty rate of 2.5%. In the HTSUS, sub -headin g 8708.29.21 is duty free.  
324 See Presidential Proclamation 9980 , (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225). The Panel additionally relied on 
data from the WTO's CTS Database and online versions of the United  States ' harmonized tariff schedule, 
https://hts.usitc.gov/current  (accessed 22  June 2022).  WT/DS564/R  
 
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In the Panel's view, the additional duties on derivative steel and aluminium products raise 
similar issues in terms of their characterization as either "ordinary customs duties" or "other duties 
or charges" under Article  II:1(b). For reasons similar to those outlined above325, the Panel considers 
that the additional duties on derivative products are "ordinary custo ms duties" under the first 
sentence of Article  II:1(b). In particular, the additional duties are: (a) levied on all imports of the 
covered derivative steel and aluminium products; (b) calculated on an ad valorem basis; (c) 
described as "tariffs" or "ordina ry customs dut[ies]" in the relevant Presidential Proclamations; and 
(d) operationalized as "ordinary customs dut[ies]" and inscribed in the "Rates of Duty – General" 
column of the United  States ' tariff schedule. 326 
As "ordinary customs duties", it is evid ent that the additional duties of 25% on derivative 
steel products and 10% on derivative aluminium products exceed the United  States ' bound rates, 
which range from 0-2.5%  and 2.5 -5.7% for the derivative aluminium and steel products at issue 
respectively, in a manner inconsistent with the first sentence of Article  II:1(b).327 Moreover, ev en if 
considered to be "other duties or charges"  under the second sentence328, the United  States ' Schedule 
does not record any "other duties or charges" with re spect to the steel and aluminium products at 
issue.329 On either basis, the additional duties on derivative products would therefore be inconsistent 
with Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994. As the additional duties on derivative steel and aluminium 
products e xceed the levels set on in the United  States ' Schedule, it follows that the United  States  
has accorded treatment less favourable than that provided for in its Schedule. The Panel therefore 
concludes that the additional duties on derivative steel and alumin ium products are also inconsistent 
with Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994.  
7.4.5   Conclusion  
Regarding T ürkiye 's claims under Article  II of the GATT  1994, the Panel concludes that:  
a. the additional duties of 25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products do n ot 
accord the treatment provided for in the United  States ' Schedule, contrary to 
Article  II:1(b) and Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994; 
b. the additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye  does not accord the treatment 
provided for in the United  States ' Schedule, contrary to Article  II:1(b) and Article  II:1(a) 
of the GATT  1994; and  
c. the additional duties of 25% on derivative steel products and 10% on derivative aluminium 
products do not accord the treatment provided for in the United  States ' Schedule, co ntrary 
to Article  II:1(b) and Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994. 
7.5  Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994  
7.5.1   Introduction  
Türkiye  argues that the United  States  has chosen to treat differently the WTO Members from 
which it imports the steel and aluminium products at issue, in violation of Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994.330 In Türkiye 's view, the United  States ' diverse range of import measures fall squarely 
within th e scope of Article  I:1 as they are customs duties or rules imposed in connection with 
importation.331 Moreover, T ürkiye  considers that these measures create a competitive advantage for 
steel and aluminium articles originating in some Members which is not ex tended immediately and 
 
325 See para.  7.41 above.  
326 See Presidential Proclamation 9980 , (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225). 
327 See para.  7.49 above.  
328 These considerations may be relevant in light of other features of the additional duties on derivative 
steel and aluminium products, such as: (a) being inscribed in subchapter III of chapter 99 of the HTSUS  titled 
"Temporary Modifications Established Pursuant to Trade Legislation "; (b) applying "in addition" to any 
pre-existing duties; and (c) being subject to ex emptions for certain countries. (See Presidential Proclamation 
9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and USA -225)).  
329 United  States  Bound Concessions at the HS 6 -digit subheading level . 
330 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.220 -4.221. See also T ürkiye 's opening statement at the 
first meeting of the Panel, para.  6; response to Panel question No.  2; response to Panel's questions following 
the first meeting, Annex  I. 
331 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.227.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  unconditionally to like goods originating in all other Members, including T ürkiye .332 Finally, T ürkiye  
stresses that this differential treatment is based exclusively on the origin of the articles at issue, and 
therefore results in dis crimination between "like" products.333 For these reasons, T ürkiye  considers 
the United  States  to have acted inconsistently with Article  I of the GATT  1994.334 
The United  States  has not advanced any arguments or evidence contesting the complainant 's 
claim un der Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.335  
Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 provides:  
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection 
with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments 
for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and 
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article III,* any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other [Members].  
Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 prohibits, with respect to measures falling within its scope of 
application, discrimination among like products originating in or destined for different countries.336 
The obligation to accord most -favoure d-nation treatment as set out in Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994 
has been understood to require equality of competitive opportunities for like imported products from 
any Member.337  
The Panel will proceed by examining the challenged measures under Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994, specifically concerning  (a) the country exemptions for steel and aluminium products and  
(b) the additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye .338 
 
332 Türkiye 's first written submission, par as. 4.227 -4.229.  
333 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.230.  
334 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.231.  
335 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7 (the United  States  
accepting that it "has imposed duti es on certain steel and aluminum products on a non -MFN basis and in 
excess of the levels set out in its WTO Goods Schedule").  
336 Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 84. 
337 See Appellate  Body Report, EC – Seal Products , paras.  5.86-5.87. Under Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994, a complainant must demonstrate that: (a) the measure at issue falls within the scope of 
Article  I:1; (b) the imported products at issue are "like"; (c) the measure confers an "advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity" on any p roduct originating in the territory of any country; and (d) the advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity granted is not extended "immediately" and "unconditionally" to like products 
originating in the territory of all Members. (See Appellate  Body Report, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.86).  
338 See T ürkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.220 -4.221. Specifically, T ürkiye  refers to the 
following: (a) most countries are subject to a 25 % additional duty on steel and a 10 % additional duties on 
aluminium; (b) T ürkiye is subject to a 50 % additional duty on steel; (c) Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of 
Korea  are subject to quotas on steel and aluminium; (d) Australia is entirely exempt from any border 
restrictions, be they in the form of duties or quotas; and (e)  certain countries appear to be subject to certain 
treatment operationalized through the so -called "additional unpublished measures". (Ibid. para.  4.220. See 
also T ürkiye 's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  6; response to Panel que stion No.  2). 
In response to the Panel's questions, T ürkiye  further clarified that its challenge under Article  I:1 relates to: (a) 
additional import duties; (b) import quotas; and (c) certain measures agreed between the US and the 
countries exempted from t he additional duties. T ürkiye  does not consider the "country exemptions" to 
constitute a separate measure, but considers that Article  I:1 is relevant to these exemptions. (T ürkiye 's 
response to Panel's questions following the first meeting, Annex  I). WT/DS564/R  
 
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  7.5.2   Country exemptions for steel and aluminium products  
7.5.2.1   Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and  the Republic of Korea  
As described in greater detail above339, in March 2018, the United  States  imposed additional 
import duties of 25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products.340 At that time, Australia, 
Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  were temporarily exempted from the additional duties 
on both steel and aluminium products.341 By May 2018, the United  States  had agreed to various 
"satisfactory alternative means" with these countries , including : (a) exemptions  for steel and 
aluminium prod ucts from Australia; and (b) exemptions for steel and aluminium products from 
Argentina, as well as steel products from Brazil and the Republic of Korea , including through the 
alternative of import quotas.342 Türkiye  argues that the United  States ' differential treatment creates 
a competitive advantage for steel and aluminium articles originating in Members such as Australia, 
Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea , which is not extended immediately and unconditionally 
to like goods originatin g in all other Members, including T ürkiye .343 
The Panel recalls that the exemptions in question relate to the additional duties on steel and 
aluminium products, which have been found under Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 to constitute 
"ordinary customs dut ies" applicable on importation into the territory of the United  States .344 As 
such, they also relate to "customs duties and charges " connect ed with importation  falling within the 
scope of Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.345  
By design, the country exemptions  exclude steel and aluminium products of certain origins 
from the application of the additional duties, conferring differential treatment to exempted products 
in comparison to those subject to the duties . Furthermore, it is undisputed that the additional duti es 
apply to all  qualifying products imported into the United  States  and that the relevant country 
exemptions  apply to products from select countries (i.e. Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic 
of Korea ) solely on the basis of origin.346 The United  States  does not contest that the measures 
exempt certain products based exclusively on origin contrary to the obligation to accord 
most-favoured -nation treatment under Article  I:1.347 Therefore, with respect to the imposition of 
customs duties, the country exemptions accord an "advantage"348 to steel and aluminium products 
from the exempted countries that is not accorded immediately and unconditionally to "like 
products"349 originating in non -exempted countries. The Panel th us conclude s that, by gr anting 
 
339 See section 2.2 above.  
340 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9). 
341 See Presidential Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit TUR -9 and  USA-12); Presidential Proclamation 9711 , 
(Exhibit TUR -8 and  USA-11). 
342 See Presidential Proclamation 9739 , (Exhibit TUR -11 and  USA-14); Presidential Proclamation 9740 , 
(Exhibit TUR -10 and  USA-13); Presidential Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit TUR -13 and  USA-16); and Presidential 
Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -12 and  USA-15). These exemptions were extended based on the 
United  States ' "security relationship" with these Member s. (Ibid).  
343 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.229.  
344 Moreover, even if not considered to qualify as "ordinary customs duties", the additional duties would 
in any event be inconsistent with the second sentence of Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994 as "other duties or 
charges" . See section 7.4 above.  
345 Previous panels have found exemptions from import duties to fall within the scope of Article  I:1 of 
the GATT  1994. (See e.g. Panel  Report s, Canada – Autos, para. 10.16; Indonesia – Autos, paras.  7.3-7.5). 
346 See section s 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 above.  The Panel notes that a "presumption of likeness " has been 
applied in prior disputes in situations where the only distinguishing factor under the challenged measure was 
the origin of the  products.  These previous disputes  suggest that , where a measure makes distinctions 
exclusively on the basis of origin, it will typically not be necessary to conduct a detailed analysis of "likeness"  of 
the relevant products . (See Panel  Report , Russia – Railway Equipment , paras.  7.897 -7.899 ; see also 
Panel  Report s, Colombia – Ports of Entry , paras.  7.355 -7.356; US – Poultry (China) , paras.  7.424 -7.432 ). 
347 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7 (accepting that it 
has imposed duties on certain steel and aluminium products "on a non -MFN basis").  
348 See Appellate  Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 79; Panel  Report s, EC – Bananas III, para. 7.239; 
EC – Seal Products, para. 7.595 . Previous panels have found count ry exemptions conferring duty free 
treatment to constitute an "advantage" under Article  I:1. (See Panel  Report , EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – 
Ecuador  II), paras.  7.152 -7.153. See also  Appellate  Body Report,  EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – Ecuador II) / 
EC – Bananas III (Article  21.5 – US), para.  353). 
349 See fn  346 above. In the specific circumstances of this dispute, including the lack of any rebuttal by 
the United  States , the Panel considers  that the challenged  measures apply to "like products"  within the 
meaning of Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994, without the need to conduct a detailed "likeness" analysis.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  country exemptions from the additional duties to Australia, Argentina, Brazil , and the Republic of 
Korea , the United  States  acted inconsistently with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. 
In the context of its claim under Article  I:1, T ürkiye  also challenges the import quotas for 
steel and aluminium products from Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea , and any additional 
unpublished measures agreed between the US and the exempted countries  in relation to 
"satisfactory alternative means ".350 The Panel notes that such quotas and other agreed measures  
relate solely to countries that are exempted from the additional duties, and the existence of such 
quotas or agreed measures  does not negate the fact that the products to which they apply are 
exempted from the additional duties.351 Given the foregoing finding on the advantage accorded by 
the exemptions, the Panel does not consider  it necessary for the purposes of this dispute to 
determine whether any particular alternative treatment  of exempted pr oducts from certain 
countries , including under any import quota or other additional unpublished measure s, would 
constitute a distinct violation of Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.5.2.2   Canada and Mexico  
When the United  States  imposed additional import duties of 25 % on steel products and 10% 
on aluminium products in March 2018, it exempted steel and aluminium products from Canada and 
Mexico from those additional duties.352 After March 2018, the country exemptions for Canada and 
Mexico went through a number of iterati ons, as elaborated in further detail in earlier sections of this 
Report.353 Türkiye  further challenges any additional unpublished measures agreed with Canada and 
Mexico under Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.354 
The country exemptions for Canada and Mexico relate to the same "customs duties and 
charges" connected with importation in the sense of Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.355 It is also 
undisputed that these country exemptions apply to products from select countries (i.e. Canada and 
Mexico ) exclusively on t he basis of origin.356 Therefore, with respect to the imposition of customs 
duties, these country exemptions accord an "advantage" to steel and aluminium products from the 
exempted countries that is not accorded immediately and unconditionally to "like prod ucts" 
originating in non -exempted countries.357 The Panel thus concludes that, by granting country 
exemptions from the additional duties to Canada and Mexico, the United  States  acted inconsistently 
with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.  
Given this finding, the  Panel again does not consider it necessary to determine whether any 
particular alternative treatment of exempted products from Canada and Mexico, including under any 
 
350 Türkiye's first written submission, para.  4.220; response to Panel's questions following the first 
meeting, Annex  I. 
351 The Panel further notes  that all the "satisfactory alternative means", regardless of their specific form, 
were extended by the United  State s on the basis of their "security relationship" with the exempted countries 
and based on the determination that " imports from these countries [would]  no longer threaten to impair the 
national security ". (See Presidential Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit TUR -9 and USA -12); Presidential Proclamation 
9711, (Exhibit TUR -8 and USA -11); Presidential Proclamation 9739 , (Exhibit TUR -11 and USA -14); Presidential 
Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13); Presidential Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -
16); and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15)). 
352 See Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and  USA-10); Presidential Proclamation 9705 , 
(Exhibit TUR -6 and  USA-9). 
353 See section s 2.2 and 7.3 above.  See also Presidential Proclamation 9739 , (Exhibit TUR-11 and  USA-
14); Presidential Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit TUR -10 and  USA-13); Presidential Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit 
TUR-13 and  USA-16); Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -12 and  USA-15); Presidential Proclamation 
9893, (Exhibit TUR -43); and Presidential Proclamation 9894 , (Exhibit TUR -44). 
354 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.220 (challenging certain countries being subject to 
treatment operationalized through the so -called "additional unpublished measures" und er Article  I:1); response 
to Panel question No.  2(b) (identifying measure (f) as "various unpublished export restraints, orderly 
marketing arrangements and similar measures, such as export moderation and export price monitoring, agreed 
upon between the Uni ted States  and certain WTO Members, such as Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
Mexico, and South Korea"). See also T ürkiye 's response to Panel question No.  86. 
355 See para.  7.59 above. 
356 See para.  7.60 above . 
357 See fns 346 and 348 above.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  additional unpublished measures , would constitute a distinct violation of Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994.358 
7.5.3   Additional duty on steel products from T ürkiye  
In August 2018, an additional duty of 50% was imposed on steel products from T ürkiye .359 
Türkiye  argues that the United  States ' differential treatment includes its treatment of T ürkiye , which 
is subject to a 50% additional duty on steel and a 10% additional duty on alumin ium.360 Even within 
the universe of countries subject to the additional duties, T ürkiye  argues that there is differential 
treatment since T ürkiye  is subject to higher steel dutie s.361 Türkiye  therefore considers that the 
United  States  acts inconsistently with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994.362 
The Panel has previously found that the additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye  
qualifies as an "ordinary customs dut[y]" under Article  II:1(b) of the GATT  1994, and thus similarly 
considers that it qualifies as a "customs dut[y] and charge[] " in the sense of Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994.363 This additional duty confers differential treatment to Turk ish products in comparison 
to those from all other countries, which are either subject to a lower duty rate of 25% or are exempt 
from any additiona l duties. It is also undisputed that this duty applies to steel products from T ürkiye  
solely on the basis of origin.364 Therefore, with respect to the imposition of customs duties, steel 
products from all countries other than T ürkiye  have been granted an "a dvantage" which has not 
been accorded immediately and unconditionally to "like products" from T ürkiye .365 The Panel 
therefore concludes that, by imposing an additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye , the 
United  States  acted inconsistently with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.5.4   Conclusion  
Regarding T ürkiye 's claims under Article  I of the GATT  1994, the Panel concludes that:  
a. the country exemptions for steel and aluminium products confer an advantage to products 
from Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea  that has not been accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to like products from al l other Members, in a manner 
inconsistent with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994; 
b. the country exemptions for steel and aluminium products confer an advantage to products 
from Canada and Mexico that has not been accorded immediately and unconditionally to 
like p roducts from all other Members, in a manner inconsistent with Article  I:1 of the 
GATT  1994; and  
c. the additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye  confers an advantage to steel 
products from all other countries that has not been accorded immediately  and 
unconditionally to like products from T ürkiye , in a manner inconsistent with Article  I:1 of 
the GATT  1994. 
7.6  Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994  
7.6.1   Introduction  
Türkiye  argues that the United  States  has imposed quotas on imports from Argentina, Brazil, 
and the Republic of Korea  which are inconsistent with the United  States ' obligations under 
Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.366 Türkiye  argues that the import restrictions at issue are not "duties, 
 
358 See para.  7.61 above.  
359 See Presidential Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit TUR -14 and USA -17). See also fn  310 above.   
360 Türkiye 's first written submission , para.  4.220.  
361 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.228.  
362 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.231.  
363 See section s 7.4.3 and 7.4.5 above.  See also para. 7.59 above. 
364 See para. 7.60 above . 
365 See fns 346 and 348 above.  
366 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.215 -4.216. See also ibid. para.  4.25;  Türkiye 's opening 
statement at the first meeting of the Panel, para.  6; response to Panel's questions following the first meeting, 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  taxes o r other charges", and that by their design and intended operation, they have a limiting effect 
on the quantity or amount of product being imported. For example, T ürkiye  refers to Presidential 
Proclamation 9740 referring to the United  States  and the Republi c of Korea  agreeing to "a quota 
that restricts the quantity of steel articles  imported into the United  States ".367 Thus, by subjecting 
imports from the three countries to numerical quotas, T ürkiye  considers that the United  States  is 
plainly applying measure s that are inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.368 
The United  States  has not advanced any arguments or evidence contesting the complainant's 
claim under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.369  
Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994 provides that:  
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether 
made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be 
instituted or maintained by any Member on the importation of any product of the 
territory o f any other Member or on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other Member . 
Article  XI:1 lays down a general obligation to eliminate quantitative restrictions by prohibiting 
Members from instituting or maintai ning prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other 
charges on the importation, exportation, or sale for export of any product of another Member or 
destined for another Member.370 Such prohibitions or restrictions are prohibited whether or not they 
are "made effective" through "quotas, import or export licenses or other measures".371 
The Panel will proceed by examining the challenged measures under Article  XI:1 of the 
GATT  1994, specifically concerning the import quotas for steel and aluminiu m products.372 
7.6.2   Import quotas for steel and aluminium products  
By May 2018, the United  States  imposed import quotas as an alternative to the additional 
duties on steel and aluminium products for: (a) steel and aluminium products from Argentina; (b) 
steel pro ducts from Brazil; and (c) steel products from the Republic of Korea .373 Türkiye  challenges 
these as quantitative restrictions that are prohibited under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.374 
The challenged measures comprise import quotas for steel and aluminium products from 
Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of Korea . Such "quotas" are expressly listed in Article  XI:1 as a 
method by which prohibitions or restrictions on importation may not b e made effective.375 The 
United  States  does not contest that the import quotas prohibit or restrict importation of steel and 
aluminium products, contrary to the obligation to eliminate quantitative restrictions set forth in 
Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994.376 Based on these considerations , the Panel concludes that  the import 
 
Annex  I; second written submission, para.  3.3; and response to Panel question No s. 82, para.  1.10, and 
No. 89, para.  1.54. 
367 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.218. ( emphasis original)  
368 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.219.  
369 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  7. 
370 Previous panels and the Appellate  Body have noted that the scope of Article  XI:1 is broad, capturing 
any measures through which a prohibition or restriction is produced or becomes operative. (See e.g. 
Appellate  Body Report s, Argentina – Import Measures , paras. 5.216-5.219 ; Panel  Report , India - Quantitative 
Restrictions , para.  5.128 ). 
371 See e.g. Panel  Report , Colombia – Textiles (Article  21.5 – Colombia)/ Colombia – Textiles 
(Article  21.5 – Panama) , para.  7.160.  
372 See T ürkiye 's first written submission, pa ras. 4.215 -4.219; response to Panel questions following the 
first meeting, Annex  I. 
373 See Presidential Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA-13); Presidential Proclamation 9758 , 
(Exhibit TUR -13 and USA-16); and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA-15). 
374 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.215 -4.219.  
375 WTO and GATT panels have previously found import and export quotas to constitute "restrictions" 
prohibited by Article  XI:1, as such quotas necessarily have a limiting  effect. (See Panel  Report s, China – Raw 
Materials , paras.  7.207 -7.209 and 7.224; China – Rare Earths , para.  7.200; and GATT Panel  Report , EEC – 
Import Restrictions , paras.  9 and 31 -32). 
376 See United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the P anel, para.  7. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  quotas for steel and aluminium products from Argentina, Brazil , and the Republic of Korea  are 
inconsistent with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.6.3   Conclusion  
 Regarding T ürkiye 's claims under Article  XI of the GATT  1994, the Panel concludes that b y 
imposing import quotas on steel and aluminium products from  Argentina, Brazil , and the Republic 
of Korea , the United  States  has instituted prohibitions or restrictions other than duties , taxes or 
other charges on the importation of those products of the territory of those Members , inconsistently 
with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994. 
7.7  Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994  
Türkiye  argues that the United  States  fails to administer the measures at issue  in a reasonable 
and impartial manner. In particular, T ürkiye  contends that the process that leads to the exemption 
of certain countries from the additional duties on steel and aluminium as well as the criteria for these 
exemptions are undefined and repres ent non -reasonable administration.377 Türkiye  further claims 
that the  process and outcomes resulting from the product exclusion  system, through which the 
United  States  grants exclusions from the additional duties in respect of certain products , reflect 
administration that is neither reasonable nor impartial.378 In this regard, T ürkiye  argues that the 
United  States  accords preferential treatment to domestic producers that object to product exclusion 
requests .379 Türkiye  additionally  advances that the processing of product exclusion  requests has 
been non-transparent  and not in accordance with the applicable rules .380 The United  States  has not 
advanced any arguments or evidence contesting Türkiye 's claim s under Article  X:3(a) of the 
GATT 1994. 
The Panel recalls its findings of inconsistency in relation to the additional duties , country 
exemptions  and import quotas  on steel and aluminium under the GATT  1994. The Panel considers 
that the findings of inconsistency under other provisions of the GATT  1994 are sufficient, in the 
circumstances of the present dispute, to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving 
the rulings provided for in the covered agreements  as required under the DSU.381 In light of these 
findings, the Panel do es not consider it necessary to make findings on Türkiye 's claims relating to 
the administration of the process es for excluding  certain countries or  products from measures  that 
have already been found inconsistent with other obligations under the GATT  1994. The Panel thus 
declines to make findings  regarding the claims under Article  X:3(a) of the GATT  1994. 
7.8  Article  XIX of the GATT  1994  and the Agreement on Safeguards  
7.8.1   Introduction  
Türkiye  claims that certain measures at issue are safeguard measures and are inconsistent 
with certain obligations under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards. 
Türkiye also claims that certain measures at issue constitute "v oluntary export restraints, orderly 
marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side " within the 
meaning of Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The United  States  disputes the 
applicability of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at 
issue and additionally argues that Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 is a defence to the complainant's 
claims under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
 
377 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.250 -4.254.  
378 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.255 -4.256.  
379 Türkiye 's first written submission, para.  4.256.  
380 Türkiye 's first written submission, para . 4.256.  
381 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, Canada – Renewable Energy / Canada – Feed-in Tariff Program , 
paras . 5.189 -5.190 and 5.194; US – Upland Cotton , para.  732. The Panel further notes various instances in 
which previous panels have declined to make findings under Article  X:3 of the GATT  1994 based on other 
findings of inconsistency concerning the underlying measure being administered, including duties in excess of 
the bound rates in a Member's Schedule of Concessions. (See Panel  Report s, Peru – Agricultural Products, 
para. 7.501; Argentina – Import Measures , para.  6.498; Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.152; and Russia – 
Railway Equipment, para. 7.939).  WT/DS564/R  
 
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The Panel will first address the p arties' disagreement as to the applicability of Article  XIX of 
the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at issue. In doing so, the Panel 
will address specific issues of interpretation contested by the parties in accordance with Article  3.2 
of the DSU and customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The Panel will then 
assess the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties in relation to the relevant measures at 
issue in light of the conclusions reached regarding th e interpretation of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 
and the Agreement on Safeguards.  
7.8.2   Interpretation  of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994  and the Agreement on Safeguards in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU  
Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 is entitled "Emergency A ction on Imports of Particular Products" 
and provides in relevant part:  
1. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations 
incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any 
product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic 
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting p arty 
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be 
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in 
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.  
Article  1 of the Agreement on S afeguards is a "General Provision" and provides:  
This Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which shall 
be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article  XIX of GATT  1994. 
Article  11 of the Agreement on Safeguards  contains the following provisions on "Prohibition 
and Elimination of Certain Measures":  
1. (a) A Member shall not take or seek any emergency action on imports of particular 
products as set forth in Article  XIX of GATT  1994 unless such action conforms with  the 
provisions of that Article  applied in accordance with this Agreement.  
(b) Furthermore, a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export 
restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export 
or the import side.[3],[4] These include actions taken by a single Member as well as 
actions under agreements, arrangements and understandings entered into by two or 
more Members. Any such measure in effect on the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement  shall be brought into conformity with this Agreement or phased out in 
accordance with paragraph 2.  
(c) This Agreement does not apply to measures sought, taken or maintained by a 
Member pursuant to provisions of GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX, and Multilateral 
Trade Agreements in Annex  1A other than this Agreement, or pursuant to protocols and 
agreements or arrangements concluded within the framework of GATT  1994. 
3 An import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with the relevant p rovisions of 
GATT  1994 and this Agreement may, by mutual agreement, be administered by the exporting 
Member. 
4 Examples of similar measures include export moderation, export -price or import -price 
monitoring systems, export or import surveillance, compulsor y import cartels and discretionary 
export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford protection.  
 
The Panel notes that a threshold question presented by the parties' arguments concerns the 
applicability of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreeme nt on Safeguards to the measures at 
issue. Türkiye  emphasizes the characterization of the measures at issue as safeguards or other 
prohibited measures under Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards  based on objective WT/DS564/R  
 
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  features of the measures at issue .382 The United  States  refers to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 and 
contends that the Agreement on Safeguards is inapplicable to the measures at issue by virtue of 
Article  11.1(c) as the measures were "sought, taken or maintained … pursuant to provisions of 
GATT 1994 other than Article  XIX".383  
The Panel recalls that it is required under Article  11 of the DSU to make an objective 
assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and 
the applicability of and conformi ty with the relevant covered agreements.384 Moreover, the Panel is 
required to address the parties' disagreement regarding the applicability of the relevant covered 
agreements in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and the customary rules of interpretati on of 
public international law.385 The rule of interpretation set out in Article  31(1) of the Vienna  Convention  
forms part of such "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" and provides that 
"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good fai th in accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the 
terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."386 Regarding the interpretation of 
treaties authenticated in two or more languages, the customary rules in Article  33 of the 
Vienna  Convention  provide that "[t]he terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning 
in each authentic text" and that in case of a difference between authentic texts "which the application 
of articles 31 and 32 [of the Vienna  Convention ] does not remove , the meaning which best reconciles 
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted".387 
The Panel notes that the Agreement on Safeguards "establishes rules for the application of 
safeguard measures which shall be understo od to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX 
of GATT 1994".388 In this regard, Article 11.1(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that "[a] 
Member shall not take or seek any emergency action on imports of particular products as set forth 
in Article XIX of GATT 1994 unless such action conforms with the provisions of that Article applied 
in accordance with this Agreement." Article  11.1(a) is one of three paragraphs under Article  11.1 of 
the Agreement on Safeguards as part of provisions entitled " Prohibition and Elimination of Certain 
Measures" under which Article  11.1(b) prohibits "voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing 
arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side". Article  11.1(c) refers 
to measures "sought, taken or maintained … pursuant to provisions of GATT  1994 other than 
Article  XIX", to which the Agreement on Safeguards "does not apply".  
According to its express terms, Article  11.1(c) removes certain measures from the scope of 
application of th e Agreement on Safeguards, including the rules specified in Article  11.1(a) and the 
prohibition under Article  11.1(b).389 This is supported by the unambiguous reference in 
Article  11.1(c) to the inapplicability of the Agreement on Safeguards as a whole in r espect of 
measures "sought, taken or maintained … pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article 
 
382 Türkiye 's first written submission, paras.  4.10-4.63. Türkiye  specifically argues that the measures a t 
issue objectively present the constituent features of safeguard measures under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994. 
(See ibid. (referring to Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , para.  5.60)).  
383 United  States ' response to Panel question No s. 77 and 78; see also second written submission, 
section  II.A. 
384 The Panel further notes the principle affirmed in past disputes that panels under the DSU have 
independence in the structure of their analysis and the development of legal reasoning, as well as latitude in 
the evidence on the record relied upon to reach findings that will assist the DSB. (See e.g. Appellate  Body 
Reports, EC – Hormones , para. 156; EC – Fasteners (China) (Article  21.5 – China) , para.  5.61;  Panel  Report s, 
India – Solar Cells , para. 7.41; EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar  (Australia) , para.  7.121 and fn  437). 
385 See section 7.1 above.  
386 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, US – Gasoline , p. 17; India – Patents (US) , para.  46; Argentina – 
Textiles and Apparel , para.  42; US – Carbon Steel , para.  61. The Panel notes the parties' agreement that the 
Panel should be guided by the ordinary meaning of the terms of the Agreement on Safeguards in their context 
and in light of the object and purpose of the agreement. (See Türkiye 's response to Panel questi on No.  20 and 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  20. See also Türkiye 's second written submission, para . 5.19; 
United  States ' second written submission, section IV.B).  
387 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports , US – Softwood Lumber IV , para. 59; EC – Bed Linen (Article  21.5 – 
India) , fn 153; US – Upland Cotton , para. 424; and US – Stainless Steel (Mexico) , fn 200.  
388 Article  1 of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
389 The French and Spanish versions of Article  11.1(c) use the terms " ne s'applique pas " and " no es 
aplicable " respectively to denote that the Agreement on Safeguards is inapplicable to " mesures " or " medidas " 
described in that provision. The Panel understands that the parties agree that Article  11.1(c) excludes certain 
measures from the scope of applic ation of the Agreement on Safeguards, notwithstanding their disagreement 
as to when such measures may be considered to have been "sought, taken or maintained … pursuant to 
provisions of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX" within the meaning of Article  11.1(c). (See Türkiye's  
response to Panel question No.  22; United  States ' response to Panel question No s. 20 and 22 ). WT/DS564/R  
 
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  XIX". The Panel notes that the paragraphs of Article  11.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards do not 
contain any terms explicitly indicating the limitation or qualification of any paragraph in relation to 
another.390 In this respect, Article  11.1 does not subordinate any of the paragraphs in relation to 
one another concerning the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Panel thus considers 
that findi ng the measures at issue to fall within the scope of Article  11.1(c) would fully address the 
matter within the Panel's terms of reference under the Agreement on Safeguards as there would be 
no basis to assess claims of inconsistency under an agreement that  "does not apply" to the measures 
at issue. The Panel is mindful in this connection of its mandate to make only such findings under the 
covered agreements as will assist the DSB in this dispute, taking into account the specific measures 
at issue, the evide nce and arguments submitted by the parties, and the Panel's overall conclusions 
reached with respect to the matter referred to the DSB.391  
In the circumstances of this dispute, the Panel therefore considers that it is appropriate to 
determine whether the m easures at issue can be characterized as having been "sought, taken or 
maintained … pursuant to provisions of GATT 1994 other than Article XIX" within the meaning of 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Panel will focus its assessment on the  terms of 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards, and particularly, the terms "pursuant to" and "other 
than", in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement on Safeguards.  
Regarding the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1( c), Türkiye  argues that this phrase refers 
to measures that are in conformity with or consistent with provisions of the GATT  1994. As a 
consequence, Türkiye  considers that the measures sought, taken or maintained by a Member must 
satisfy the conditions of "provisions of GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX" to be excluded from the 
scope of the Agreement on Safeguards.392 For the United  States , the expression "pursuant to" is 
different from the terms "in compliance with" or "consistent with", and serves the funct ion of 
"direct[ing] the Panel to the other GATT  1994 provision pursuant to which the measure in question 
was attempted or tried".393  
The Panel will assess the meaning of "pursuant to" as it is used in Article  11.1(c) having 
regard for relevant context and the use of terms in the three authentic language versions of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. The expression "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) denotes the existence of a 
relationship between the measures of a Member and provisions of the GATT  1994 other than 
Article  XIX.394 The term "pursuant" when used with the preposition "to" may mean "under", "in 
accordance with", "in consequence of", or "as authori zed by".395 Taken in isolation, the terms 
"pursuant to" could potentially accommodate a range of meanings. Within this range of meanings, 
the terms "pursuant to" in the context of Article  11.1(c) could be understood as consistency with 
the requirements of a provision  of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX, or a different relationship 
that does not require such consistency. For example, a measure could be characterized under 
Article  11.1(c) as being "pursuant to" a provision  in the sense of being sought, taken, or mai ntained 
under the purview of that provision without necessarily meeting the requirements of the specific 
terms of such other provision.  
 
390 The paragraphs of Article  11.1 can be contrasted in this respect with other provisions of the covered 
agreements that explicitly limit or qualify the scope of that provision by reference to another provision in the 
covered agreements, including within the same article. See e.g.  Article 5.6 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
("Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 …"); Article  3.3 of the SPS  Agreement  ("Notwithstanding the 
above …"); Article  X:6 of the WTO  Agreement  ("Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Article  …"); 
Article  3.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture ("Subject to the provisions of Article  6 …"); Article  XII:1 of the 
GATT  1994 ("… subject to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article"); Article  7.1 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards ("… provided that the pertinent provisions of Articles 8 and 12 are observed").  
391 In the particular circumstances of this  dispute, if the Agreement on Safeguards were determined to 
be inapplicable to the measures at issue, the Panel does not consider that there would be anything additional 
under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 within the Panel's terms of reference on which it c ould make findings to 
assist the DSB in this matter.  
392 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No s. 20 and 98 . 
393 United  States ' response to Panel question No s. 20 and 96.  
394 Similarly, in the French and Spanish versions of Article  11.1(c), the phrases " en ver tu de" and " de 
conformidad con " respectively describe the relationship between the measures (" aux mesures " and " las 
medidas ") and provisions of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX (" dispositions du GATT de 1994 autres que 
l'article XIX " and " disposiciones  del GATT de 1994, aparte del artículo XIX ").  
395 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2411;  Garner's 
Dictionary of Legal Usage, 3rd Edition (Oxford University Press. 2011), p. 737.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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The Panel finds instructive the contrast between "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) and terms 
used elsewhere in the Agreement on Safeguards that appear to convey a relationship of consistency 
with the requirements of another provision of the covered agreements. This is particularly evident 
in the other paragraphs of Article  11.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards that provi de immediate 
context to the terms of Article  11.1(c) and use the expressions "in accordance with" and "in 
conformity with" other provisions. The obligation for safeguard measures to meet the requirements 
of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on  Safeguards is expressed in Article  11.1(a) by 
providing that Members' safeguard measures must " conform [] with the provisions of that 
Article  applied in accordance with  this Agreement".396 Similarly, the elimination of measures 
prohibited under Article  11.1(b) is expressed in the obligation that such measures "shall be brought 
into conformity with  this Agreement or phased out in accordance with " the mandatory timetables 
and requirements set out in Article  11.2.397 These explicit references in Article  11.1 to "conformity" 
and actions "in accordance with" other provisions are comparable to other uses of these terms in 
the Agreement on Safeguards that similarly appear to denote consistency with the referenced 
requirements.398  
The contrast in meaning between "purs uant to" in Article  11.1(c) and terms expressing a 
standard of consistency finds support in the French version of the provision referring to " mesures … 
en vertu de dispositions de GATT de 1994 autre que l'article XIX ". As in the English text, the 
Agreement  on Safeguards uses the French terms " conformes " and " conformément " in Articles 
11.1(a) and 11.1(b) for "conforms" and "in accordance with", which similarly appear to indicate 
consistency or conformity with the legal provisions specified in those paragraph s.399 In contrast, the 
French version of Article  11.1(c) for egoes the term " conformément " in favour of " en vertu de ", whose 
dictionary meanings include " en conséquence de " (as a consequence of), " par l'effet de " (by the 
effect of), " par le pouvoir de " (by t he power of), and " au nom de " (in the name of or on behalf of).400 
The Panel further notes that the use of the French term " conformément " in various provisions of the 
Agreement on Safeguards corresponds to English references to "conformity" and actions being "in 
accordance with" other provisions.401 The terms of Article  11.1(c) in both English and French thus 
reflect a departure from terms used in other provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards that appear 
to convey a requirement of conformity or consistency.  
The Panel notes the terminology used in the Spanish version of the Agreement on Safeguards, 
which in Article  11.1(c) provides that the Agreement does not apply to measures sought, taken or 
maintained " de conformidad con otras disposiciones del  GATT de 1994 ". Dictionary meanings of the 
terms " de conformidad con " include " con arreglo a " or "a tenor de " (according to), " en proporción o 
correspondencia a " (in proportion or correspondence to), or " de la misma suerte o manera que " (in 
the same way or  manner).402 The Spanish terms " de conformidad con " are also used in the provisions 
referred to above in which the English and French terms use variants of "conformity" or " conformité ", 
as well as "in accordance with" in English, and appear to indicate a re quirement of conformity or 
consistency with the other referenced legal provisions. This is notably the case in Articles 11.1(a) 
 
396 Emphasis added.  
397 Emphasis added. See also footnote 3 to Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards ("[a]n 
import quota applied as a safeguard measure in conformity with  the relevant provisions of GATT  1994 and this 
Agreement may, by mutual agreement,  be administered by the exporting Member") (emphasis added). The 
indication of consistency or conformity with certain requirements is further supported by the mandatory terms 
"shall" and "must" in Article  11.2 establishing the obligations with which a meas ure must be in conformity or 
accordance.  
398 See e.g. Article  4.1(b) ("'threat of serious injury' shall be understood to mean serious injury that is 
clearly imminent, in accordance with  the provisions of paragraph 2") (emphasis added); Article  4.2(c) ("The 
competent authorities shall publish promptly, in accordance with  the provisions of Article  3 …") (emphasis 
added); Article  7.2 ("[t]he period mentioned in paragraph 1  may be extended provided that the competent 
authorities of the importing Member have deter mined, in conformity with  the procedures set out in Articles 2, 
3, 4 and 5 …") (emphasis added). In prior disputes under the Agreement on Safeguards, the Appellate  Body 
has referred to other provisions in the Agreement on Safeguards establishing requiremen ts with which 
safeguard measures must be in conformity, such as the conditions in Article  2.1 and the requirements of 
Articles 3 and 4. (See Appellate  Body Reports, US – Line Pipe , para.  84; US – Steel Safeguards , para.  264).  
399 See also footnote 3 to Article  11.1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards (" Un contingent d'importation 
appliqué en tant que mesure de sauvegarde conformément  aux dispositions pertinentes du GATT de 1994 et du 
présent accord pourra, par accord mutuel, être ad ministré par le Membre exportateur "). 
400 Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Fran çaise (2000), p. 2663.  
401 See e.g. Article  4.1(b) (" conformément aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 "); Article  4.2(c) 
("conformément aux dispositions de l'article 3 "); and A rticle 7.2 (" conformément aux procédures énoncées aux 
articles 2, 3, 4 et 5 "). 
402 Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), pp. 420 -421. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  and (b) where the Spanish text uses similar terms (" conformes " and " de conformidad con ") as those 
used in English and French. Th e Spanish version of Article  11.1(c) refers to " conformidad con otras 
disposiciones del GATT de 1994 ", unlike the English and French terms in Article  11.1(c) that reflect 
a clear departure from references to "conformity" or being "in accordance with" other  legal 
provisions.403 
On balance, these considerations indicate that the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) of 
the Agreement on Safeguards do not require consistency with provisions of the GATT  1994 other 
than Article  XIX for a measure to fall under tha t paragraph. The text of Article  11.1(c) does not make 
any explicit reference to a requirement of conformity with the provisions of GATT  1994 in English or 
French in contrast to other provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards, including those that provide 
immediate context for Article  11.1(c). The use of the French terms " en vertu de " in Article  11.1(c) 
is especially compelling in this regard in signalling a contrast to the term " conformément " and 
indicates a different legal relationship than consistency or  conformity with the requirements of a 
provision  of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX.  
The comparison of terms in the different language versions is instructive but not in itself 
dispositive regarding the interpretation of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreem ent on Safeguards in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU.404 The terms of Article  11.1(c) must be interpreted in 
accordance with their ordinary meaning in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the 
Agreement on Safeguards. Moreover, to t he extent that the Spanish text "discloses a difference of 
meaning" when compared to the text of Article  11.1(c) in English and French, the Panel finds 
guidance in the rule of interpretation in Article  33(4) of the Vienna  Convention  that, if such differenc e 
cannot be removed by application of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna  Convention , the meaning which 
best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.405  
The Panel considers that interpreting the terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) to refer to 
measures sought, taken, or maintained under the purview of another provision of the GATT  1994, 
without entailing consistency with the requirements of such other provision, accords with the specific 
context in wh ich those terms appear. The terms "pursuant to" in Article  11.1(c) form part of a 
provision  governing the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards rather than the consistency of 
measures with the rules and requirements of that agreement.406 Accordingly,  the nature of the 
relevant inquiry under Article  11.1(c) does not relate to another provision of the GATT  1994 as a 
legal exception or justification for inconsistencies with the Agreement on Safeguards.407 Rather, the 
 
403 The Spanish terms " de conformidad con " are also used in other provisions of the Agreement on 
Safeguards that appear to indicate a standard of consistency across all language versions. (See e.g. 
Article  4.1(b) (" de conformidad con las disposiciones del párrafo 2 "); Article  4.2(c) (" de conformidad con las 
disposiciones del artículo 3 "); and Article  7.2 (" de conformidad con los procedimientos establecidos en los 
artículos 2, 3, 4 y 5 ")). The Panel further notes that the terms " de conformidad con " are translated with some 
variation in English, including provisions in which the  corresponding term for " de conformidad con " in the 
English version is "under" within the specific context of the provision in question. (See Article  7.1 ("The period 
shall not exceed four years, unless it is extended under paragraph 2.") (emphasis added);  Article  7.4 ("A 
measure extended under paragraph 2 …") (emphasis added)).  
404 The Panel notes that the terms "pursuant to" appear in various provisions of the Agreement on 
Safeguards for which the corresponding French and Spanish terms reflect the potential  range of meanings of 
these terms according to their specific context. For example, Article  2.1 provides that a safeguard measure 
may be applied "only if that Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below," various 
conditions for the appl ication of safeguard measures. The context of mandatory conditionality in which 
"pursuant to" appears in Article  2.1 ("may apply a safeguard measure … only if") is reflected in the French and 
Spanish, respectively, as " conformément " and " con arreglo a ". As another example, Article  10 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards refers to "safeguard measures taken pursuant to Article  XIX of GATT 1947" where 
the corresponding French and Spanish terms (" au titre de " and " al amparo del " respectively) do not appear to 
indicat e consistency or conformity.  
405 As noted above, this rule of interpretation forms part of the "customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law" referred to in Article  3.2 of the DSU. See para.  7.84 above.  
406 See Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , para.  5.57 (distinguishing "factors 
pertaining to the legal characterization of a measure for purposes of determining the applicability  of the WTO 
safeguard disciplines" from "the substantive conditions and procedural requirements that determine the WTO 
consiste ncy of a safeguard measure") (emphasis original).  
407 The Panel notes in this regard that Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards serves a similar 
role to certain provisions in the Anti -Dumping Agreement and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervaili ng 
Measures  (SCM  Agreement ), which allow Members to take measures "under" other provisions of the 
GATT  1994 but do not indicate a requirement of conformity with such other provisions. Moreover, the French 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  relevant inquiry under Article  11.1(c)  corresponds to the threshold issue of applicability and leaves 
as a separate inquiry whether a measure is consistent with the requirements of such other provision 
"pursuant to" which the measure was sought, taken, or maintained.  
These considerations are a lso relevant for the interpretation of the terms "other than" in 
Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards.  With respect to the ordinary meaning of the terms 
"other than", dictionary definitions include "besides", "except" or "apart from".408 The Panel  notes 
that all three language versions of Article  11.1(c) contain terms that are not qualified by any 
specification or limitation with respect to being "other than" Article  XIX of the GATT  1994. The 
ordinary meaning of these terms in their context encompa sses measures that are pursuant to 
another provision  of the GATT  1994, and the Panel does not find in the text of Article  11.1(c) the 
imposition of an additional requirement or limitation of being exclusively pursuant to such other 
provision. This interpre tation is consonant with the context of the paragraphs of Article  11.1 that 
together establish the conditions for the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. The question 
of applicability is addressed under Article  11.1(c) by terms specifying a relat ionship between a 
measure and a provision of the GATT  1994 "other than" Article  XIX, namely that a measure is 
"pursuant to" such other relevant provision, and providing that the Agreement on Safeguards does 
not apply to such measure.409  
The Panel finds sup port for these conclusions in the object and purpose of the Agreement on 
Safeguards as expressed in its preamble recognizing "the need to clarify and reinforce the disciplines 
of GATT 1994, and specifically those of its Article XIX (Emergency Action on Imp orts of Particular 
Products), to re -establish multilateral control over safeguards and eliminate measures that escape 
such control". In this regard, the preamble further expresses recognition of the need for "a 
comprehensive agreement, applicable to all Me mbers and based on the basic principles of 
GATT  1994". An essential corollary of the "multilateral control over safeguards" and elimination of 
"measures that escape such control" under the Agreement on Safeguards is the explicit preservation 
under Article  11.1(c) of the right for Members to adopt measures under legal provisions of the 
GATT  1994 that are part of the "basic principles" affirmed and reinforced by the Agreement on 
Safeguards. The Panel considers significant in this regard the placement of Artic le 11.1(c) in the list 
of paragraphs under Article  11.1 as part of provisions entitled "Prohibition and Elimination of Certain 
Measures". The imposition of obligations to "clarify and reinforce the disciplines of GATT  1994", as 
notably expressed in Article s 11.1(a) and (b), is explicitly conditioned by the terms of Article  11.1(c) 
on the applicability of the agreement as a whole. The requirement under Article  11.1(c) for a 
measure to be "pursuant to" a provision  "other than" Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 thus serves the 
maintenance of a balance of rights and obligations that are in turn based on the terms of such other 
provision.  
The relevant provision of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX in this dispute is Article  XXI 
entitled "Security Exceptions", whic h provides inter alia that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be 
construed … to prevent any [Member] from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests".410 In accordance with the requirements of Article  11 of 
 
and Spanish versions of these provisions do not use  terms such as " conformément " and " conformidad " but 
rather " au titre " and " al amparo " respectively. (See Article  18.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement, footnote 24 
and Article  32.1 of the SCM  Agreement , footnote 56). At the same time, the Panel notes differen ces in the 
terminology and structure of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards compared to these footnotes, 
which provide that the particular terms of Article  18.1 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement and Article  32.1 of the 
SCM Agreement  are "not intende d to preclude actions under other relevant provisions of GATT  1994". By 
contrast, Article  11.1(c) is in the main text of the provision and expressly states conditions under which the 
agreement "does not apply". (See Appellate  Body Report, US – Offset Act ( Byrd Amendment) , para.  262 
(referring to Appellate  Body Report, US – 1916 Act , para.  123) (describing the "accessory footnotes" as 
"clarifications of the main provisions" on the "specific action" Members are permitted to take against dumping 
or subsidies)) . 
408 The terms of Article  11.1(c) in French and Spanish (" autres que " and " aparte del " respectively) 
similarly mean different from or with the omission of. See Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise 
(2000), pp. 185 -186 and Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 
120. 
409 In the context of the objective assessment required under Article  11 of the DSU, the relevant 
provision under Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards (i.e. the  provision of the GATT  1994 "other 
than" Article  XIX) depends on the specific circumstances of the dispute, including the measures and claims at 
issue, legal provisions raised by the parties, as well as the relevant evidence and arguments submitted by the 
parties.  
410 See section 7.9 below.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  the DSU, the Panel will assess the applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards to the measures at 
issue in light of the foregoing interpretive considerations on Article  11.1(c) as well as the evidence 
and arguments submitted by the parties in this dispute. Taking into account the case -specific nature 
of the relevant inquiry on applicability rather than conformity, the Panel will identify relevant aspects 
of the design and application of the measures wit h specific reference to their legal characterization 
under Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. The Panel will give due consideration to all 
relevant evidence in this regard including the domestic law and procedures under which the 
measures were  adopted as well as any relevant notifications or statements to the official bodies of 
the WTO.411  
The Panel takes note of the United  States ' arguments in relation to the meaning of the term 
"sought" in Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards, which  are related to the United  States ' 
contention that, based on Article  XIX:2 of the GATT  1994, formal notification of safeguard measures 
to the WTO is a "condition precedent" to the applicability of safeguard disciplines.412 As detailed 
below, the Panel consi ders the manner in which the measures were raised before the WTO, including 
notifications to relevant WTO bodies or committees, as part of the assessment of the evidence and 
arguments submitted on all relevant aspects of the measures at issue in this dispu te. The Panel does 
not consider it necessary for the purposes of this dispute to address in further detail the 
United  States ' arguments on WTO notification being a "condition precedent" for the applicability of 
safeguard disciplines.  
Finally, the Panel not es that the parties have referred to certain aspects of the negotiating 
history of the Agreement on Safeguards in support of their respective positions. Under Article  32 of 
the Vienna  Convention , recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, including  the 
preparatory work of a treaty, may be had either to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article  31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article  31 
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a resu lt which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable. The Panel does not consider that the application of Article  31 of the Vienna  Convention  
to the interpretation of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards leaves the meaning of the 
provision ambiguous or obscure, nor does the Panel find that it leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Panel has examined the negotiating history of the 
provision in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article  31 of the 
Vienna  Convention . As detailed in Appendix  A to this Report , the Panel's review of the negotiating 
history of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards confirms the conclusions reached by the 
Panel regarding the interpretation of that provisi on. 
Based on the foregoing, the Panel will assess the applicability of the Agreement on 
Safeguards in this dispute according to whether the measures at issue were sought, taken, or 
maintained pursuant to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 within the meaning of Article  11.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.   
 
411 The Panel notes that the Appellate  Body identified various relevant factors for the determination of 
whether measures constitute  safeguard measures under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994. In this dispute, the 
relevant inquiry is directed by the terms of Article  11.1(c) to a provision  other than Article  XIX of the 
GATT  1994. Nevertheless, there is a broad parallel in both contexts of di stinguishing questions of legal 
applicability from those concerning legal consistency and, for the former, making an objective examination of 
the specific measures at issue according to the relevant provision of the GATT  1994 upon which to determine 
the ap plicability of the Agreement on Safeguards. (See Appellate  Body Report, Indonesia – Iron or Steel 
Products , para.  5.60).  
412 United  States ' second written submission, section s IV.B.1  ("Article  11.1(c) Supports That Invocation 
is a Condition Precedent for … a Member's exercise of its right to take action under Article  XIX and Application 
of Safeguards Rules") and IV.B.2 ("Other Provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards Also Support that Notice 
is a Condition Precedent for Action Under Article  XIX"). For the various terms used by the United  States  to 
describe the "condition precedent" for the applicability of safeguard disciplines, see  United  States ' second 
written submission,  para. 139 ("notice is a condition precedent to taking action under Ar ticle XIX");  
paras.  141-142 ("[t]he text of Article  XIX:2 explicitly sets out a requirement to invoke the provision through 
notice as a condition precedent to action under Article  XIX:1 … [w]ithout such notice, a Member is not seeking 
legal authority pursu ant to Article  XIX");  para. 166 ("notice under Article  XIX:2 is a fundamental, condition 
precedent to a Member's exercise of its right to take action under Article  XIX and the application of safeguards 
disciplines"); and para.  197 ("invocation through writ ten notice is a condition precedent to a Member's exercise 
of its right to take action under Article  XIX and the application of safeguards rules to that action") . WT/DS564/R  
 
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  7.8.3   Assessment of the measures at issue  
The United  States  adopted the measures at issue under Section  232 and the related 
procedures set out in Title 15, Part 705 of the Code of Federal Re gulations.413 According to the terms 
of the domestic legislation, Section  232 concerns actions taken by the United  States  for 
"[s]afeguarding national security".414 Moreover, Section  232 authorizes the US Secretary of 
Commerce to investigate the effects of i mports of an article on US national security415, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officers of the United  States .416 If the Secretary 
of Commerce determines that an article is being imported into the United  States  in such quantities 
or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, the US President may 
adjust the imports of that article into th e United  States .417 In this respect, Section  232 directs the 
US Secretary of Commerce and the US President to give consideration among other factors to the 
domestic production needed for projected national defen ce and the impact of foreign competition on 
the economic welfare of domestic industries essential to US national security .418  
The US Secretary of Commerce commenced investigations under Section  232 to determine 
the effects of imports of certain steel and aluminium products on US national security in 
April 2017.419 The findings of these investigations were published in January 2018 in the Steel and 
Aluminium Reports, where the US Secretary of Commerce determined that present quantities of 
steel and aluminium imports were "weakening [the United States'] i nternal economy" and therefore 
"threaten to impair" its national security.420 According to these reports, rising levels of imports of 
foreign steel and aluminium place at substantial risk the capacity of domestic industries to produce 
steel and aluminium fo r critical infrastructure and national defen ce421, especially in times of national 
emergencies.422 The reports recommend corrective actions against imports in the form of tariffs and 
quotas with a view to improve domestic capacity utili zation and stabili ze US production at the level 
required for its security needs.423 
The measures at issue in this dispute on imports of steel and aluminium into the 
United  States  are based on the above -mentioned  findings and recommendations by the US Secretary 
of Commerce .424 The Presidential  Proclamations concurring with these findings and 
recommendations describe the measures as "necessary" and "appropriate" to address the 
threatened impairment of national security.425 Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 providing 
for additional duties on steel and alumin ium imports state that "[t]his relief will … revive idled 
 
413 See section  2.1 above.  
414 Section  232, ( Exhibit TUR-1 and USA -1), § 1862. Title 15, Part 705 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations sets out the procedures by which the US Department of Commerce commences and conducts an 
investigation "to determine the effect on the national security of the imports of any article". (See Section 232 
regulations, ( Exhibit TUR-2 and USA-2), § 705.2 ). 
415 Section  232, ( Exhibit TUR-1 and USA -1), § 1862(b)(1)(A).  
416 Section  232, ( Exhibit TUR-1 and USA -1), §§ 1862(b)(2)(A)(i) and b(2)(A)(ii).  
417 Section  232, ( Exhibit TUR-1 and USA -1), § 1862(c)(1)(A).   
418 Section  232, ( Exhibit TUR-1 and USA -1), § 1862(d); Section  232 regulations, ( Exhibit TUR-2 and 
USA-2), § 705.4.  
419 Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 and USA -7), p. 18; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR-4 and USA -8), p. 
18. See also sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 above.  
420 Steel Report, ( Exhib it TUR-3 and USA -7), p. 55; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR-4 and USA -8), p. 
104. 
421 Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 and USA -7), p. 55; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR-4 and USA -8), p. 
104.  
422 Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 and USA -7), pp. 55-56; Aluminium Report,  (Exhibit TUR-4 and USA -8), 
p. 105 (also noting that rising imports have placed at risk the capability of domestic industries to "quickly shift 
production capacity used for commercial products to defen se and critical infrastructure production that 
provides the United  States  a surge capability that is vital to national security, especially in an unexpected or 
extended conflict or national emergency").  
423 Aluminium Report, ( Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), pp. 104-105. See also Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 
and USA -7), p. 58 (recommending quotas or tariffs on steel imported into the United  States  to increase 
domestic capacity utilization and to keep the domestic steel industry financially viable and able to meet US 
national security needs).  
424 See e.g. Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11619 and Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11626 noting that the US President concurs with the 
Secretary's findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports and  has considered the recommendations in these 
reports.  
425 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11626.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  facilities, open closed [smelters and] mills, preserve necessary skills by hiring new [steel and 
alumin ium workers], and maintain or increase production", which in turn will "reduce [the 
United  States '] need to rely on foreign producers for [steel and alumin ium] and ensure that domestic 
producers can continue to supply all the [steel and alumin ium] necessary for critical industries and 
national defense".426 These proclamations further describe the additional duties as "an important 
first step in ensuring the economic viability" of the United  States ' domestic steel and alumin ium 
industry, without which "the indu stry will continue to decline, leaving the United  States  at risk of 
becoming reliant on foreign producers … to meet [its] national security needs".427 These Presidential  
Proclamations thus describe the national security objectives that the United  States  seeks to achieve 
by adopting measures against a "high level of imports".428  
The national security considerations expressed in the domestic legal instruments and acts 
underlying the measures at issue are also observable in the application of the additional dut ies on 
steel and aluminium imports, including their country and product scope. In this regard, Presidential 
Proclamations 9704 and 9705 recogni ze that the United  States  may remove or modify the restriction 
on steel and alumin ium imports from a country if i t determines that imports from the country no 
longer threaten to impair its national security.429 The United  States  exempted various countries from 
the additional duties on steel and aluminium imports following such determinations430, based on its 
"important  security relationships" and "security, defense, and intelligence partnership[s]" with these 
countries as well as their "shared concern about global excess capacity, a circumstance that is 
contributing to the threatened impairment of [US] national security ".431 The Panel also notes that 
the additional duties are applied to products that are determined by the relevant domestic authorities 
of the United  States  to be important for its military systems and critical infrastructure.432  
These considerations indicat e that the measures at issue were designed and expected to 
operate in relation to the United  States ' determination of a threat to its national security under the 
relevant domestic laws. In this regard, the Panel notes several other relevant aspects of the 
measures at issue and their application supporting this conclusion. For example, Presidential 
Proclamations 9740, 9758 and 9759 introduce quotas restricting steel and aluminium imports from 
certain countries to provide "effective, long -term alternative mea ns" to address their contribution to 
the threat to national security as determined by the United  States .433 These quotas are applied only 
in respect of countries with which the United  States  has identified "important security 
 
426 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11626.  
427 Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), pp. 11626 -11627.  
428 Presidential Proclamation  9704, (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11626.  
429 Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential  Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11626 (further noting that the United  States  may make corresponding 
adjustments to the additional duties applicable to other countries as its national security interests require).  
430 See sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 above for a list of the exempted countries.  
431 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11620; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11626; Presidential Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit TUR -9 and USA -12), pp. 
13355 -13356; Presidential Proclamation 9711 , (Exhibit TUR -8 and USA -11), pp. 1336 1-13362.  
432 Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 and USA -7), Appendix  H and Appendix  I; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit 
TUR-4 and USA -8), pp. 24 -39. See also Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11623 
(providing for additional duties on imports of unwrought a luminium; aluminium bars, rods and profiles; 
aluminium wires; aluminium plates, sheets, strips and foil; aluminium tubes, pipes and tube or pipe fittings; 
and aluminium castings and forgings) and Presidential  Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 
11629 (providing for additional duties on imports of flat -rolled steel products; steel bars and rods; steel wire; 
steel sheet piling; steel rails; steel fish -plates and sole plates; steel tubes, pipes and hollow profiles; ste el 
ingots; products of stainless steel; and other products of iron or steel). See also Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 
and USA -7), pp. 21 -22; Aluminium Report, (Exhibit TUR-4 and USA -8), p. 20.  
433 Presidential Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), pp. 20683 -20684; Presidential 
Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), p. 25850; and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -
12 and USA -15), pp. 25857 -25858. Moreover, these proclamations follow Presidential Proclamations 9710 and 
9711 discussing  the appropriate means to ensure that exemptions from the additional duties do not undermine 
the national security objectives of the duties and noting that without "satisfactory alternative means addressing 
long-term solutions… the industry will continue t o decline, leaving the United  States  at risk of becoming reliant 
on foreign producers of [steel and aluminium] to meet [its] national security needs". (See Presidential 
Proclamation 9710 , (Exhibit TUR -9 and USA -12), pp. 13356 -13357 and Presidential Proclam ation 9711, 
(Exhibit TUR -8 and USA -11), pp. 13362 -13363 ). WT/DS564/R  
 
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  relationships".434 Presidential Proclamations 9704, 9705, 9776, and 9777 set out a product exclusion 
process to provide relief from the additional duties and import quotas based on "specific national 
security considerations".435 Moreover, the Presidential  Proclamations discu ssed above indicate that 
the measures at issue may be modified or removed based on monitoring by the US Secretary of 
Commerce and review of  "the status of [steel and aluminium] imports with respect to national 
security" .436 The Panel also considers relevant the procedures under which the measures were 
adopted and applied, and in particular the consultations carried out with departments of government 
such as the US Department of Defense in relation to certain criteria for det ermining effects of imports 
on national security.437 
The Panel further notes that the national security considerations described above are 
reflected in notifications and statements made by the United  States  before various official bodies of 
the WTO both pri or to and following the adoption of the measures at issue. In a meeting of the WTO 
Council of Goods on 10  November  2017, before completing its Section  232 investigations into steel 
and aluminium imports, the United  States  noted that these investigations "w ere being conducted by 
the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), a Department of the US Commerce Agency". The 
United  States  further remarked that the purpose of these investigations was to "determine the effect 
of steel and aluminium imports on US nationa l security, and whether the global excess capacity 
problem in those industries was threatening the ability of the United  States  to meet its national 
security needs".438  
In subsequent discussions at the WTO, the United  States  explicitly referred to Article  XXI of 
the GATT  1994 in connection with the measures on steel and aluminium under Section  232. Shortly 
after Presidential Proclamations 9704 and 9705 introduced the additional duties discussed above, 
the United  States  provided information concerning these proclamations in a meeting of the WTO 
Council for Trade in Goods. At this meeting, the United  States  referred to "the findings and 
recommendations in investigations concerning the impact of steel and aluminium imports on US 
national security" and indicated  that it was providing this information "pursuant to Section  232 of 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and consistent with the Decision Concerning 
Article  XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 30  November  1982".439 In a 
communi cation shortly thereafter to the Committee on Safeguards, the United  States  responded to 
a request for consultations under Article  12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards and referred to 
information it had provided to the WTO Council for Trade in Goods "consis tent with the Decision 
 
434 See Presidential Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit TUR -10 and USA -13), p. 20683; Presidential 
Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), p. 25849; and Presidential Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -
12 and USA -15), p. 25857.  
435 Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), p. 11621; Presidential Proclamation 
9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11627; Presidential Proclamation 9776 , (Exhibit TUR -16 and USA -19), p. 
45020; and Presidential Proclamation 9777 , (Exhibit TUR -15 and USA -18), p. 45026. See also the March 
Interim Final Rule , (Exhibit TUR -23 and USA -20), p. 12111 and the September Interim Final Rule , (Exhibit 
USA-21), p. 46058 (explaining that this criterion allows the US Department of Commerce, in consultation with 
other parts of the US Government as warranted, to consider impacts on US national security that may result 
from not approving an exclusion and that the demonstrated concern with US national security would nee d to be 
tangible, clearly explained and would be ultimately determined by the US Government).  
436 Presidential  Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit TUR -7 and USA -10), pp. 11621 -11622; Presidential 
Proclamation 9705 , (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9), p. 11628. See also Presidential  Proclamation 9740 , (Exhibit 
TUR-10 and USA -13), p. 20684; Presidential  Proclamation 9758 , (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16), p. 25850; and 
Presidential  Proclamation 9759 , (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15), p. 25858. The Panel notes that the measures  
applicable  to imports from certain countries have been modified under this authority . (See e.g. Presidential 
Proclamation 9772 , (Exhibit TUR -14 and USA -17); Presidential Proclamation  9893, (Exhibit TUR -43); 
Presidential Proclamation  9894, (Exhibit TUR -44); and Presidential Proclamation  9980, (Exhibit TUR -48 and 
USA-225)).  
437 See Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 and USA -7), pp. 18 -20 and Appendices E -G; Aluminium Report, 
(Exhibit TUR-4 and USA -8), pp. 18 -19 and Appendices A -B. See also Presidential Proclamation 9704 , (Exhibit 
TUR-7 and USA -10); Presidential Proclamation  9705, (Exhibit TUR -6 and USA -9); Presidential Proclamation  
9758, (Exhibit TUR -13 and USA -16); and Presidential Proclamation 9759, (Exhibit TUR -12 and USA -15) 
(directing the US Secretary of Commerce to consider adjustments to the additional duties and import quotas in 
consultation with the Secretary of Defense).  
438 Council for Trade in Goods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 10  November  2017, G/C/M/130, (Exhibit 
USA-80), pp. 26 -27. 
439 Council for Trade in Go ods, Minutes of the Meeting held on 23 and 26  March  2018, G/C/M/131, 
(Exhibit USA -81), pp. 26 -27.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Concerning Article  XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 
30 November  1982".440  
In a meeting of the WTO General Council on 8  May 2018, the United  States  referred to "the 
reasons underlying the United States' defens e of critical national security interests" and recalled the 
Presidential  Proclamations under Section  232 "determining that tariffs are necessary to adjust 
imports of steel and aluminum articles that threaten to impair the national security of the 
United  States". The United  States  further referred at that meeting to having "previously informed 
Members about the proclamations issued by the President pursuant to Section  232 of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended". The United  States  additionally referred to its "statement at 
the Council for Trade in Goods meeting on March 23 – a statement we provided consistent with the 
Decision Concerning Article  XXI of the General Agreement taken by the GATT Council on 
30 November  1982".441 At a mee ting of the DSB following the complainant's request for 
establishment of a panel in this dispute, the United  States  referred to the determination that 
"imports of steel and aluminum threaten to impair U.S. national security".442 
On 28  September  2018, the Un ited States  notified import quotas on steel products from the 
Republic of Korea , Argentina, and Brazil, and alumin ium products from Argentina to the WTO 
Committee on Market Access. In this notification, the United  States  listed Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 as the "WTO Justification and Grounds for Restriction".443  
Based on the foregoing evidence, the Panel considers that a central aspect of the design and 
application of the measures at issue is their relation to the United  States ' determination of a threat 
to its national security under the relevant domestic laws. The national security considerations of the 
United  States  are manifest in the application, modification, and removal of the additional duties, 
quotas, and exemptions discussed above. Moreover, this  aspect of the measures was emphasi zed 
and explicitly linked to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 by the United  States  in a series of notifications 
and statements to various official bodies of the WTO. The Panel considers significant the indications 
at both the  domestic and multilateral levels that the measures at issue related to the United  States ' 
determination of a threat to its national security and the explicit references to Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 as the legal basis under the covered agreements pursua nt to which the measures were 
sought, taken, or maintained.444 While the domestic legal status or statements by a Member to 
official WTO bodies are not determinative of the legal characterization of measures under the covered 
agreements in dispute settlemen t, the Panel considers such evidence to be relevant within the 
context of an objective assessment under Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. This is 
particularly so where there is evidence contemporaneous with the adoption of the measures that i s 
confirmed by other relevant evidence of the measures' design and application. In this dispute, the 
features of the measures outlined above indicate that the United  States ' determination of a threat 
to its national security under Section  232 is a central aspect of the measures with respect to their 
 
440 Committee on Safeguards, Communication from the United  States , G/SG/168, (Exhibit USA-82), pp. 
1-2 and fn  2. 
441 Utatement dated 8  May 2018 of the Deputy US Trade Representative and US Permanent 
Representative to the WTO, WTO General Council, (Exhibit USA-83), p. 3  (further noting that the United  States  
did not take action pursuant to Section  201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which is the law under which the 
United  States  imposes safeguard measures).  
442 Statements dated 29  October  2018, 21  November  2018, and 4  December  2018 of the United  States , 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body , (Exhibit USA -84). The United  States  further stated as follows at this meeting 
with resp ect to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 and the measures at issue:  
The United  States  has given detailed explanations that the measures at issue are justified under 
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. In particular, we have explained that these measures are 
necessar y to address the threatened impairment that these imports of steel and aluminum 
articles pose to U.S. national security.  
443 Committee on Market Access, Notification Pursuant to the Decision on Notification Procedures for 
Quantitative Restrictions (G/L/59/Re v.1), G/MA/QR/N/USA/4, (Exhibit USA-85), p. 6 . 
444 Given the consistent indications both prior and subsequent to the adoption of the measures at issue, 
the Panel finds support for the measures being "sought, taken or maintained" within the meaning of 
Article  11.1(c).  The Panel notes in this regard the disjunctive nature of these requirements and does not 
consider it necessary in the circumstances of this dispute to make separate determinations as to which 
evidence reflects the measures having been "sought", " taken", or "maintained" pursuant to a provision  of the 
GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  legal characterization as being sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994.445 
Regarding the applicability of Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on 
Safeguards,  Türkiye  refers to the findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports pertaining to the 
adverse impact of imports on domestic steel and aluminium industries of the United  States . In 
particular, Türkiye  highlights that the reports identify increased imports of steel and alu minium to 
the United  States , determine that there was injury to the domestic steel and aluminium industries 
due to increased imports, and examine such injury by reference to factors that are typically 
associated with a finding under Article  4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards.446  
The Panel notes that the findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports pertaining to the state 
of the United  States ' domestic steel and aluminium industries, including the decrease in domestic 
production, high import penetrati on, low -capacity utili zation and declining employment, are made 
in the context of the determination by the US Secretary of Commerce that steel and aluminium are 
important to the United  States ' national defen ce requirements and critical infrastructure secto rs. 
These reports discuss the displacement of domestic steel and aluminium by imports in relation to 
the risk that the United  States ' domestic industries will be rendered incapable of meeting its national 
security needs, especially in times of national eme rgencies. The Steel and Alumin ium Reports also 
recall the direction under Section  232 that the relationship between the weakening of the 
United  States ' internal economy and impairment of its national security shall be determined by 
reference to factors inc luding "any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, 
loss of skills or investment, or other serious effects".447 The reports recommend measures to 
increase  the capacity utili zation of the United  States ' domestic industries with the spec ific objective 
of enabling them to meet projected national security needs .448  
Viewed in their context, the findings in the Steel and Aluminium Reports confirm that the 
aspects of the measure s most central to their legal characterization under Article  11.1( c) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards concern the national security considerations as reflected in Section  232 
and reiterated in the relevant domestic legal acts and instruments. The examination in the Steel and 
Aluminium Reports of the state of the domestic s teel and aluminium industries is an element of the 
United  States ' determination of a threat to its national security under the relevant domestic laws. 
The Panel considers that it would be improper to assess such factors in isolation from the threat to 
national security that was determined to exist under Section  232 on the basis of those and other 
factors.  
7.8.4   Conclusion  
In conclusion , the evidence before the Panel in relation to the design and application of the 
measures at issue indicates that the measures we re sought, taken, or maintained pursuant to 
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994. Accordingly, the measures were sought, taken, or maintained pursuant 
to a provision  of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX within the meaning of Article  11.1(c) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.  
 
445 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, China – Auto Parts , para.  171; Indonesia – Iron or Steel Products , 
para. 5.60. 
446 Türkiye 's first written submission, section 4.4.2.2.2 . 
447 Section  232, ( Exhibit TUR-1 and USA -1), § 1862(d); Section  232 regulations, ( Exhibit TUR-2 and 
USA-2), § 705.4.  
448 See Aluminium Report, ( Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 107 ("import restrictions could help add ress 
the threat to U.S. national security… [Q]uotas or tariffs would be designed, even after any exemptions (if 
granted), to enable U.S. aluminum producers to utilize an average of 80 percent of their production capacity. 
The quotas and tariffs described b elow should be sufficient to enable U.S. aluminum producers to operate 
profitably under current market prices for aluminum and will allow them to reopen idled capacity") and 108 ("A 
worldwide quota …would help ensure the viability of those U.S. producers t o meet national security needs"). 
See also Steel Report, ( Exhibit TUR-3 and USA -7), p. 58 ("Due to the threat of steel imports to the national 
security, as defined in Section  232, the Secretary recommends that the President take immediate action by 
adjusti ng the level of imports through quotas or tariffs on steel imported into the United  States , as well as 
direct additional actions to keep the U.S. steel industry financially viable and able to meet U.S. national 
security needs. The quota or tariff imposed s hould be sufficient, after accounting for any exclusions, to enable 
the U.S. steel producers to be able to operate at about an 80 percent or better of the industry 's capacity 
utilization rate based on available capacity in 2017").  WT/DS564/R  
 
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The Panel's assessment of the measures being under the purview of Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 is without prejudice to the consistency of the measures with the specific terms and 
requirements of Article  XXI. The Panel recalls that its conclusi ons under Article  11.1(c) pertain solely 
to the issue of applicability of the Agreement on Safeguards rather than the consistency of the 
measures at issue with the requirements of the other provision, namely Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994, pursuant to which the measures were sought, taken, or maintained.  
7.9  Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994  
7.9.1   Introduction  
The United  States  invokes Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in relation to the measures at 
issue as "action[s] which [the United States] considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests". The Panel will address the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 in relation t o whether the measures found to be inconsistent with Articles I:1, II:1, and 
XI:1 of the GATT  1994 are "actions" falling within the scope of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.  
The Panel will first address the parties' interpretive disagreement on the extent  to which the 
terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 permit review of a Member's invocation of that provision 
in proceedings under the DSU. In doing so, the Panel will address specific issues of interpretation 
contested by the parties, including the Unit ed States ' arguments as to the "self -judging" nature and 
"non-justiciability" of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. The Panel will then assess the ev idence 
and arguments submitted by the parties in relation to the measures found to be inconsistent with 
provisions of the GATT  1994 in light of the conclusions reached regarding the interpretation of 
Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.  
7.9.2   Interpretation of Arti cle XXI(b) of the GATT  1994  in accordance with Article  3.2 of 
the DSU  
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 is entitled "Security Exceptions" and provides:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed  
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information  the disclosure of which 
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or  
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action  which it considers  necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests  
(i) relating to fissionab le materials or the materials from which they are derived;  
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such 
traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the 
purpose of supplying a milita ry establishment;  
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or  
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of internationa l peace 
and security.  
The United  States  submits that the Panel should limit its findings in this dispute to 
recogni zing the invocation of Article  XXI(b) because "[t]he text of [the provision], in its context and 
in the light of the agreement's object and purpose, establishes that the exception is self -judging."449 
According to the United  States , "[t]he self -judging nature of … Article  XXI(b) is demonstrated by 
that provision's reference to actions that the Member 'considers necessary' for the protection  of its 
essential security interests."450 Consequently, "the only requirement for the Member invoking 
 
449 United  States ' first wr itten submission , para.  23. 
450 United  States ' first written submission , para.  25.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Article  XXI is for the Member to consider that a particular action is necessary to protect its essential 
security interests in any of the circumstances ide ntified in Article  XXI(b)."451 The United  States  
maintains that this requirement is met "once the Member indicates, in the context of dispute 
settlement, that it has made such a determination" that it "consider[s] one or more of the 
circumstances set forth in Article  XXI(b) to be present".452  
A premise of the United  States ' characterization of Article  XXI(b) as "self -judging" is that, 
based on "the text and grammatical structure" of the provision, "the phrase 'which it considers' 
qualifies all of the terms i n the single relative clause that follows the word 'action'".453 According to 
the United  States , this "single relative clause" in Article  XXI(b) "begins with 'which it considers 
necessary' and ends at the end of each subparagraph" and "describes the situati on which the 
Member 'considers' to be present when it takes such 'action'".454 The United  States  argues from this 
premise that, "[b]ecause the relative clause describing the action begins with 'which it considers', 
the other elements of this clause are comm itted to the judgment of the Member taking the action."455 
The United  States  thus posits an "overall grammatical structure" of Article  XXI(b) according to which 
a panel may not "determine, for itself, whether a security interest is 'essential' to the Member  in 
question, or whether the circumstances described in one of the subparagraphs exists".456  
Türkiye  contests the interpretive and grammatical basis of the United  States ' argument and 
emphasi zes the objective review in dispute settlement proceedings of ter ms in Article  XXI(b) that 
are not qualified by the phrase "which it considers".457 Türkiye  thus disputes the characterization of 
Article  XXI(b) as "self -judging" and contends that the measures are not justified under this provision 
based on the arguments an d evidence before the Panel. In particular, Türkiye  argues that the 
United  States ' interpretation fails to give effective meaning to the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) 
and is incompatible with the requirements of the DSU concerning the independent review of matters 
raised under the covered agreements.458  
The Panel recalls that it is required to address the United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) 
of the GATT  1994 in accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and the customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law.459 A threshold point of interpretive disagreement between the parties is 
the extent to which the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 permit review of a Member's 
invocation of that provision by a panel established under the DSU. While the parties refer t o 
numerous aspects of treaty interpretation in relation to this question, both parties base their 
positions primarily on the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and the rule of interpretation set 
out in Article  31(1) of the Vienna  Convention  that "[a]  treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning given to the terms in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose."460 As noted above461, this rule of interpretation forms part of the "customary rules of 
interp retation of public international law" referred to in Article  3.2 of the DSU.462 Accordingly, the 
Panel will examine the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in their 
context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose, focusi ng on the parties' disagreement as to 
whether the terms of the provision permit review of its invocation in proceedings under the DSU.  
Pursuant to the security exceptions under Article  XXI of the GATT  1994, "[n]othing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to require" a Member "to furnish any information" described under 
paragraph (a) or "to prevent" a Member "from taking any action" described  under paragraphs (b) or 
 
451 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  33. 
452 United  States ' response to Panel question No. 52.a; see also response to Panel question Nos. 35 and 
38; second written submission, para.  25. 
453 United  States ' second written submission, paras.  7-8; see also ibid. para.  13 ("the ordinary meaning 
of the terms of Article  XXI(b) establishes that, contrary to t he complainant's arguments, the word 'considers' 
qualifies all the terms in the chapeau and the subparagraph endings of Article  XXI(b)" ).  
454 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36. 
455 United  States ' second written submission, para.  24; see also response to Panel question Nos. 39 and 
40 ("The text reserves to the Member the judgment as to whether action is necessary in one or more of those 
circumstances for the protection of its essential security interests.").  
456 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  37. 
457 See Türkiye 's response to Panel question Nos. 35 -37. 
458 See e.g. Türkiye 's opening statement at the first meeting of the Panel.  
459 See section 7.1 above.  
460 See Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  56; United  States ' response to Panel question No.  56. 
461 See para. 7.84 above . See also Appellate  Body Reports, US – Gasoline , p. 17; India – Patents (US) , 
para. 46; Argentina – Textiles and Apparel , para.  42; US – Carbon Steel , para.  61. 
462 See e.g. Appellate  Body Report, US – Gasoline , p. 17.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  (c) of that provision. The three paragraphs (a) to (c) are separated by semicolons followed by the 
word "or" and Article  XXI concludes in a full stop at the end of paragraph (c). Paragraph (b) of 
Article  XXI provides that the "action" that a Member is not prevented from taking is "any action 
which [the Member] considers necessary for the protecti on of its essential security interests", 
followed by three subparagraphs that are enumerated (i) to (iii).463 These subparagraphs are 
separated by semicolons and the word "or" appears after the semicolons at the end of paragraph 
(a) and subparagraph (iii) o f Article  XXI(b).464  
In providing for "any action" that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed … to 
prevent", Article  XXI(b) establishes an exception to obligations under other provisions of the 
GATT  1994. The "action" covered by this provision is  one that a Member "considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests". Dictionary definitions of the term "consider" include 
to "regard in a certain light or aspect, look upon as" or "think or take to be".465 Under Article  XXI(b), 
a Member must consider that its action is "necessary for" a defined purpose, namely "the protection 
of its essential security interests". Dictionary definitions of "interest" include "the relation of being 
involved or concerned as regards potential detrime nt or (esp.) advantage".466 The relevant interests 
under Article  XXI(b) pertain to "security", which may be defined as "the condition of being protected 
from or not exposed to danger".467 The description of these security interests as "essential" indicates 
the heightened significance of the security interests that Members are not prevented from taking 
action to protect under Article  XXI(b).468 As indicated by the possessive pronoun "its", t he relevant 
"security interests" are those of the Member taking action under Article  XXI(b).469 
Interpreting the terms of Article  XXI(b) within the structure and context of the provision as 
a whole, the Panel notes the textual separation and indentation und er Article  XXI of the three 
paragraphs and a similar separation and indentation of the three subparagraphs under paragraph 
(b) of Article  XXI. The introductory terms of Article  XXI ("Nothing in this Agreement shall be 
 
463 The parties have used different terminology to  refer to the different parts of Article  XXI, including 
"chapeau", "subparagraph", and "subparagraph ending". The Panel considers  that such terminology is not 
determinative of the proper interpretation so long as it is consistently applied in describing th e provision. ( See 
also Türkiye 's response  to Panel question No.  91; United  States ' response  to Panel question No.  91). 
464 The French and Spanish texts are similarly structured with minor differences, including a colon at the 
end of paragraph (b) before the three subparagraphs. In addition, the Spanish text contains a colon after the 
opening terms of Article  XXI before paragraph (a), and in the French text the conjunction " ou" appears at the 
beginning of paragraphs (b) and (c).  
465 Shorter Oxford English Dictio nary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 493. See also Le 
Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 921 (defining " estimer " as " [a]voir une opinion sur " 
(to have an opinion on), " consid érer" (to consider), " croire " (to believe), " regarder " (to regard), or " penser " (to 
think)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 676 (defining 
"estimar " as " creer" (to believe) or " hacer aprecio y estimación de alguien o de algo " (make appreci ation or 
estimation of someone or something)); and The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) 
(Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -22), p. 485 . 
466 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 14 00 (also defining 
"interest" as "[a] thing that is of some importance to a person, company, state"). See also Le Petit Robert 
Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 1340 (defining " intérêt " as " [c]e qui importe, ce qui convient 
(en quelque domaine que ce soit) " (what matters or what suits in any domain)); Diccionario de la Lengua 
Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 874 (defining " interés " as " [i]nclinación del ánimo 
hacia un objeto, una persona, una narración, etc. " (inclinatio n of mind towards an object, a person, a 
narration, etc.)); and The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 
1993), ( Exhibit USA -22), p. 1393 .  
467 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Pres s, 2003), p. 2734. See also Le 
Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 2310 (defining " sécurité " as " [s]ituation, état 
tranquille qui résulte de l'absence réelle de danger " (tranquil situation , state which results from the real 
absence of danger)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 
1385 (defining " seguridad " as " [c]ualidad de seguro " and " seguro " as " [l]ibre y exento de todo peligro, daño o 
riesgo " (free and exempt from all danger, damage or risk )); and The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 
4th edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -22), p. 2754 . 
468 Dictionary definitions of "essential" include "[t]hat is such in the absolute or highest sense" and 
"[a]ffecting the essence of anything; significant, important". See also Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue 
Francaise (2000), p. 918 (defining " essentiel " as " [q]ui est absolument nécessaire " (absolutely necessary) or  
"[l]e plus  important " (the most important)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia 
Española, 2001), p. 655 (defining " esencial " as " [s]ustancial ", "principal ", or " notable "); and The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary , 4th edn, L. Brown ( ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA-22), p. 852 . 
469 The French and Spanish language versions similarly use the possessive pronouns " sa" and " su" 
respectively. See Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 2365 and Diccionario de la 
Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 1424.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  construed") form the beginning of a se ntence with three alternative endings to this sentence in each 
of the paragraphs (a) to (c). Under paragraph (b) of Article  XXI, the enumerated subparagraphs (i) 
to (iii) are alternative endings to the sentence following the terms "any action which it cons iders 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests". The punctuation and conjunctions 
linking these various parts of Article  XXI serve the function of listing the alternative endings to the 
provision. These considerations indicate that Article  XXI(b) forms part of, and provides in its own 
subparagraphs, a list of alternative endings to form a sentence. Therefore, Article  XXI(b) is to be 
given meaning as a complete sentence with the enumerated subparagraphs (i)  to (iii) representing 
alternative endings to the sentence that begins "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed".  
In continuation of the sentence formed under Article  XXI(b), subparagraphs (i) and (ii) begin 
with the terms "relating to" and subparagraph (iii) begins with the ter ms "taken in time of". The 
terms "relating to" indicate a connection to the "materials" and "traffic" in subparagraphs (i) and 
(ii), respectively, while the terms "taken in time of" indicate a temporal relationship to the 
circumstances in subparagraph (iii ). The Panel understands these opening terms in each 
subparagraph to qualify and describe the "action" referred to in Article  XXI(b). This is confirmed in 
the French and Spanish versions of Article  XXI(b) in which the corresponding terms (" se rapportant " 
and "appliquées " in French and " relativas " and " aplicadas " in Spanish) qualify nouns that are 
feminine and plural translations of "any action" (" toutes mesures " in French and " todas las medidas " 
in Spanish).470 The relation of the opening terms of each subpa ragraph to the "action" in 
Article  XXI(b) is further supported by their parallel positioning in the text and their common function 
of linking the remaining terms of each subparagraph to those in paragraph (b).  
As a result, Article  XXI(b) applies to action s "relating to" the "materials" and "traffic" 
described in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), respectively, and to actions "taken in time of" the 
circumstances referred to in subparagraph (iii). These subparagraphs provide alternative endings 
that are an integral  part of complete sentences formed under Article  XXI(b). Moreover, there is no 
textual indication that the sentence endings in the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) are merely 
illustrative or that Article  XXI(b) may apply to actions other than those describe d in the 
subparagraphs.471 These considerations indicate that the subparagraphs are exhaustive in 
 
470 The Panel understands that the parties agree that the subparagraphs qualify and relate to the  
"action" in Article  XXI(b), notwithstanding some disagreement as to the precise basis for this conclusion. The 
United  States  submits in this regard that, under "[t]he most natural reading" of Article  XXI(b), subparagraphs 
(i) and (ii) relate to a Member's  "essential security interests" whereas subparagraph (iii) modifies "action" that 
is "taken" by a Member. At the same time, the United  States  considers that "an interpretation that best 
reconciles the idiosyncratic Spanish text with the English and French texts" is one in which the "action" is 
modified by the terms following it and "all three subparagraph endings refer to 'any action which it considers'."  
(United  States ' response to Panel question Nos. 39 and 40; see also second written submission, para s. 19-21). 
Under this reading, the United  States  argues that the terms of the provision still form a "single relative clause" 
in which the phrase "which it considers" modifies the entirety of the subparagraphs. (United  States ' response 
to Panel question Nos. 4 1-43; United  States ' second written submission, paras.  88-89; United  States ' opening 
statement at the second meeting of the Panel, paras.  8-9). Türkiye contests the grammatical basis of the 
United  States ' argument on a "single relative clause" in Article  XXI(b) and argues that the subparagraphs 
qualify the term "action". (See e.g. Türkiye 's response to Panel question No s. 40 and 90 ). 
For the purposes of resolving the contested issues of interpretation under Article XXI(b) in this dispute, 
the Panel considers that it is sufficient to conclude that the term "action" is qualified by the subparagraphs, as 
supported by the textual analysis in this section and the concordance of plural and feminine terms in the 
French and Spanish  versions of Article  XXI(b) . The Panel notes the United  States ' argument on the 
reconciliation of texts under Article  33 of the VCLT relates to its contentions regard ing a "single relative clause" 
in Article  XXI(b) and the "self -judging" nature of the provision, which the Panel addresses in this section in 
accordance with Article  3.2 of the DSU and its mandate to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making 
the recommendations or rulings provided for in the covered agreements. To the extent that the comparison of 
authentic texts discloses any difference in meaning under Article  33(4) of the VCLT, the Panel considers that 
the application of Articles 31 and 32 of t he VCLT removes any such difference so as to resolve the contested 
issues of interpretation in this dispute. Accordingly , the Panel does not consider it necessary for the purposes 
of this dispute to address in further detail the parties' arguments on the r econciliation of authentic texts in 
relation to the contested issues of interpretation under Article  XXI(b)  and its application to the measures at 
issue in this dispute . 
471 The subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 may be contrasted with other pr ovisions of 
the covered agreements containing terms that explicitly indicate the illustrative nature of the provisions. (See 
e.g. Article  2.2 of the TBT  Agreement  ("such legitimate objectives are, inter alia , national security 
requirements …" ); Article  3.5 of the Anti -Dumping Agreement ("factors which may be relevant [for determining 
injury] include, inter alia , the volume and prices of imports …"); Article  1.1(a)(1) of the SCM  Agreement  ("a 
direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans and equity infusion)" ); and Annex  I to the SCM  Agreement  
("Illustrative List of Export Subsidies") ).  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  establishing the circumstances in which a Member may take the "action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests" with in the meaning of Article  XXI(b).472 
Regarding the discretion of Members taking "action" under Article  XXI(b), the parties 
acknowledge the deference accorded to a Member's judgment for "any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essen tial security interests".473 The terms "which it considers" 
denote the consideration or judgment of the Member taking action under Article  XXI(b)474, which is 
further reinforced by providing that the Member shall not be prevented from taking "any" action 
within the terms of the provision.475 Regarding the extent of discretion accorded by the terms "which 
it considers", the parties disagree as to what precisely in Article  XXI(b) is qualified by these terms 
and the implications of such qualification fo r the review of a Member's invocation of Article  XXI(b) 
in dispute settlement proceedings. In particular, the parties dispute whether the three enumerated 
subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of Article  XXI(b) are qualified by the terms "which it considers" and, 
relatedly, how to interpret those subparagraphs in accordance with the requirements of the DSU. A 
specific question in this regard is whether, as argued by the United  States  and contested by 
Türkiye476, the clause beginning with the relative pronoun "which" co nstitutes a "single relative 
clause" that includes the terms in subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of Article  XXI(b).  
The Panel notes that the United  States  submits certain reference materials on English 
grammar in support of its contention that the subparagraphs  of Article  XXI(b) form part of a "single 
relative clause" that is entirely reserved to the judgment of the Member taking action under the 
provision.477 Due to the grammatical dimension of the United  States ' arguments concerning the 
"single relative clause"  in Article  XXI(b), the Panel examines the grammatical construction of the 
provision in relation to the contested issue of whether the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) are 
qualified by the terms "which it considers". The grammatical considerations raised by  the parties 
reinforce the Panel's preceding textual analysis of Article  XXI(b) and are addressed insofar as they 
may inform the assessment of the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context.  
The grammatical analysis of Article  XXI(b) for the purposes of this dispute particularly 
concerns the relationship between various phrases and clauses within the overall sentence structure 
of the provision.478 As noted above, Article  XXI begins a sentence that is completed by the terms of 
paragraph (b) and the alter native endings in the subparagraphs thereunder. The opening terms of 
Article  XXI form a clause beginning with the terms "Nothing in this Agreement" and ending with the 
terms "any action" in paragraph (b). This clause can be characterized as an independent clause in 
 
472 The Panel notes the agreement of parties as to the exhaustive nature of subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI(b) , notwithstanding their disagreement on the implications of this for review in by a panel 
established under the DSU. (See Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  39; United  States ' response to Panel 
question No s. 39 and 40). For example, t he United  States  argues that the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) 
"form an integral part of the provision in that they complete the sentence begun in the chapeau, establishing 
three exhaustive circumstances in which a Member may act". At the same time, the United  States  maintains 
that "[t] he fact that these circumstances are exhaustive, however, does not mean that the Member 's 
invocation of Article  XXI(b) is subject to review." (United  States ' response to Panel question Nos. 39 and 40).  
473 Türkiye 's response to Panel questio n No.  35; United  States ' response  to Panel question No.  35.  
474 The French and Spanish language versions of Article  XXI(b) respectively  use the phrases " qu'elle 
estimera " and " que estime ", indicating the estimation or consideration of the Member taking action under that 
Article. See Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), p. 824 and Diccionario de la Lengua 
Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 1270.  
475 The terms corresponding to " any action" in Article  XXI(b) in the French and Spanish versions are 
"toutes mesures " and " todas las medidas ", which may be understood as all measures. See Le Petit Robert 
Dictionnaire de la Langue Francaise (2000), pp. 2551 -2552; and Diccionario de la Len gua Española , 22nd 
Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), pp. 1485 -1486.  
476 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  90. 
477 The Panel notes that the parties' arguments concerning the grammar of Article  XXI(b) focus on the 
English text of the provision, and  the Panel accordingly focuses its assessment on the English text and the 
specific reference materials on English grammar submitted by the parties. The Panel does not make any 
determination as to the status or authority of such reference materials but rath er refers to them as relevant to 
addressing the parties' arguments and describing the grammatical construction of Article  XXI(b).  
478 A "clause" in this context has been defined as "a group of words containing both a subject and a 
predicate" that "functions as an element of a compound or complex sentence". A "phrase", by contrast, is "a 
brief expression that consists of two or more grammatically related words but that does not constitute a 
clause" (i.e. does not contain a noun and a verb). ( Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  
(Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), ( Exhibit USA -95), pp. 231 and 233 . WT/DS564/R  
 
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  that it contains a subject ("Nothing") and predicate ("shall be construed to prevent any Member 
from taking any action") that can stand alone as a complete sentence.479  
Following this independent clause, the relative pronoun "which" in Article  XXI(b) begins a 
relative clause that can be grammatically characterized as a dependent clause in the sense that it is 
a group of words with a subject and verb that, unlike an independent clause, cannot stand on its 
own as a complete sentence.480 This relative clause is grammatically subordinate to the independent 
clause at the beginning of Article  XXI that ends with the word "action" in paragraph (b), qualifying 
the noun "action" to describe the action that a Member may take notwithstanding the oblig ations 
under the GATT  1994.481 The pronoun "it" refers to the Member taking action under Article  XXI(b) 
and is the subject of this relative clause. The verb "considers" is followed by an immediate object 
("necessary") that is further modified by a prepositi onal phrase ("for the protection of") and noun 
phrase ("its essential security interests").482 
Each of the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) begins with a participle that forms the beginning 
of a participle phrase.483 Specifically, subparagraphs (i) and (ii) begin with the present participle 
"relating" and subparagraph (iii) begins with the past participle "taken". As these participles qualify 
the noun "action"484, the terms following each participle function as adjecti ves describing the "action" 
under Article  XXI(b) and thus can be characterized as participle or adjectival phrases qualifying that 
noun.485  
The Panel does not consider that the grammatical construction of Article  XXI(b) definitively 
resolves whether the su bparagraphs are qualified by the phrase "which it considers" as part of a 
"single relative clause" in the manner contended by the United  States . The adjectival phrases in the 
subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) could be regarded as continuations of the relativ e clause that begins 
with the relative pronoun "which" in the sense that they provide alternative endings to the sentence 
formed under the provision. However, this does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the 
subparagraphs form part of a "single rel ative clause" in the sense argued by the United  States  that, 
"[b]ecause the relative clause describing the action begins 'which it considers', the other elements 
of this clause are committed to the judgment of the Member taking the action."486 In support of  its 
 
479 See W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit 
USA-226), pp. 91 and 93  (an "independent clause" is "[a] group of words with a subject and verb that can 
stand alone as a sentence". A "predicate" refers to "[t]he verb and its related words in a clause or sentence" 
and "expresses what the subject does, experiences, or is"). Acc ording to the United  States , through the 
language in this independent clause, " Article  XXI(b) creates an exception to the obligations in the 
[GATT  1994]". (See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  90). 
480 S. Greenbaum, English Grammar (Oxford Unive rsity Press, 1996), ( Exhibit USA -93), p. 631  (a 
"relative clause" is used to "postmodify nouns" and is "introduced by a relative item" such as the relative 
pronoun "which"); R. Flesch and A.H. Lass, The Classic Guide to Better Writing (HarperPerennial, 199 6), 
(Exhibit USA-94), p. 69  ("[w]ho and which are called relative pronouns  and introduce relative clauses" . Using 
these relative pronouns "[makes] an independent clause into a relative or dependent clause – a group of words 
that can't stand by itself" ) (emphasis omitted); and W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th 
edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 91  (a "dependent clause" is "subordinate to an 
independent clause in a sentence" and begins with either a subordinating conj unction or a relative pronoun 
such as "which".) (emphasis omitted) . 
481 See e.g. S. Greenbaum, English Grammar (Oxford University Press, 1996), ( Exhibit USA -93), p. 631  
(a "relative clause" is used to "postmodify nouns" ); Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuati on and Style  
(Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), (Exhibit USA-95), p. 233  (a subordinate clause "cannot stand alone, 
and must be either preceded or followed by a main clause"); and  W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements 
of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 95  (a "subordinate clause" is a "clause 
dependant on the main clause in a sentence") . 
482 See Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), 
(Exhibit USA -95), p. 232  (a "noun phrase " consists of "a noun and its modifiers" whereas a "prepositional 
phrase" consist of "a preposition and its object"); W. Strunk Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn 
(Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 93  (a prepositional phrase is "[a] group of words consisting of a 
preposition, its object, and any of the object's modifiers") . 
483 See Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), 
(Exhibit USA -95), p. 232  (a "partici pial phrase includes a participle and functions as an adjective"); W. Strunk 
Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of Style , 4th edn (Allyn and Bacon, 1999), ( Exhibit USA-226), p. 93  (a 
"participial phrase" is "[a] present or past participle with accompanying m odifiers, objects, or complements").  
484 See para.  7.127  above.  
485 See Merriam -Webster's Guide to Punctuation and Style  (Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995), 
(Exhibit  USA-95), pp. 232 -233 ("[a] participle phrase includes a participle and functions as an adjective". An 
"adjective clause modifies a noun or pronoun and normally follows the word it modifies") . 
486 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36. WT/DS564/R  
 
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  view that, under the ordinary meaning of the English text of Article  XXI(b), subparagraphs (i) and 
(ii) modify the phrase "essential security interests"487, the United  States  refers to rules of English 
grammar according to which "an adjectival phrase n ormally follows the word it modifies or is 
otherwise placed as closely to the word it modifies".488 According to this argument, the adjectival 
phrases in the subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) would thus be part of the relative clause that begins 
with the word  "which" and would modify the terms in that relative clause that appear closest to the 
subparagraphs.  
The grammatical references cited by the United  States  do not indicate a categorical rule 
according to which the relative clause in Article  XXI(b) that be gins "which it considers" must contain 
and qualify any following adjectival phrase (i.e. those contained in the subparagraphs). Indeed, the 
United  States  acknowledges a deviation in Article  XXI(b) from the general rule it cites as "the 
drafters departed fr om typical English usage" in subparagraph (iii) by placing the adjectival phrase 
in that subparagraph next to "essential security interests", rather than next to the term modified by 
that adjectival phrase ("action").489 With respect to the interpretation o f Article  XXI(b) , the 
qualification of the noun "action" in paragraph (b) by the participle phrases in the subparagraphs is 
not solely determined by rigid application of grammar but follows from the ordinary meaning of 
these terms, notwithstanding the exis tence of a relative clause in paragraph (b) between the noun 
"action" and textually discrete adjectival phrases qualifying that "action".  
The foregoing considerations reflect the potential limitations of a purely grammatical analysis 
of the terms of Artic le XXI(b) and the significance of additional interpretive considerations in 
ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context. In addressing the parties' dispute 
as to the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, the Panel is mindfu l of the principle of 
effective treaty interpretation according to which all terms of a treaty are to be given meaning and 
effect. Relatedly, the terms used in a treaty must not be reduced to redundancy or inutility.490 The 
meaning and effect of the subpara graphs derives not only from considerations of grammatical 
qualification but also the specific terms used within the overall structure of the provision. 
Characterizing the subparagraphs as part of a "single relative clause", even if grammatically 
permissib le, does not account for the ordinary meaning of actions "relating to" specified "materials" 
and "traffic" and to actions "taken in time of" specified circumstances. Nor does it account for the 
structure of Article  XXI(b) and the textual separation of the subparagraphs into an enumerated list, 
which corresponds to the role of the subparagraphs as alternative sentence endings that collectively 
delimit the scope of Article  XXI(b).  
The Panel notes the United  States ' argument that Article  XXI(b) "should be rea d as a single 
clause and not as introducing separate conditions".491 Further, the United  States  cautions against an 
approach that would "atomize this single relative clause" because "[a]rtificially separating the words 
'which it considers necessary' from th e language that immediately follows and continues the clause 
– for the protection of – would erroneously interpret certain terms of Article  XXI(b) in isolation."492 
In the Panel's view, giving meaning and effect to the terms of the subparagraphs does not en tail 
reading them in isolation from the other terms of Article  XXI(b) or "introducing separate conditions" 
beyond what is reflected in the terms themselves.493 The terms of Article  XXI(b) grant discretion to 
 
487 See fn  470 above.  
488 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  90 (referring to Merriam -Webster's Guide to 
Punctuation and Style (Merriam -Webster, Incorporated, 1995),  (Exhibit USA -176), pp. 232 -233 ("[t]he 
adjective clause modifies a noun or pronoun and normally follows the word it modifies" and "[u]sage problems 
with phrases occur most often when a modifying phrase is not placed close enough to the word or words that it 
modifies") and S. Benedict (ed.), Harper's English Grammar (Harper & Row, 1966), ( Exhibit USA-96), p. 186  
("adjectives and adverbial phrases, like adjectives and adverbs themselves should be placed as closely as 
possible to the words they modify") ). 
489 United States ' response to Panel question No.  90. 
490 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, US – Gasoline , p. 23; Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II , p. 12; India – 
Patents (US) , para.  45.  
491 United  States ' response to Panel question No. 40. 
492 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36; see also second written submission, para.  8. 
493 The United  States  draws the Panel's attention to commentaries of the International Law Commission 
that, "[p]roperly limited and applied, the maxim [of effective treaty interp retation] does not call for an 
'extensive' or 'liberal' interpretation in the sense of an interpretation going beyond what is expressed or 
necessarily to be implied in the terms of the treaty." ( United  States ' response to Panel question No.  47 citing 
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, 
Vol. II , (Exhibit USA-23), p. 219) . The Panel agrees that the rule of effectiveness requires that treaty 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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  Members for actions that they "consider necessary for the protection of their essential security 
interests" while also enumerating circumstances and conditions under which that discretion may be 
exercised.494 The right to take action under Article  XXI(b) thus consists of an express provision of 
deference to a Member's consideration that is complemented by subparagraphs that must be given 
meaning and effect according to the ordinary meaning of their terms.495  
The Panel finds relevant context for the interpretive issues raised in this dispute in the  
provisions of the GATT  1994 concerning consultation and potential recourse in cases of nullification 
or impairment, as well as the rules and procedures of the DSU, noting that these agreements are 
both "integral parts of [the WTO] Agreement, binding on al l Members".496 Article  XXII of the 
GATT  1994 provides for consultation "with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this 
Agreement" and Article  XXIII of the GATT  1994 addresses nullification or impairment of "any benefit 
accruing to [a Member] und er this Agreement". The DSU elaborates upon these provisions497 and 
establishes the rules and procedures applicable to disputes concerning the covered agreements in 
Appendix  1 of the DSU. Neither the relevant provisions of the GATT  1994 nor the DSU make any  
explicit reference to Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 or the potential review of its invocation in dispute 
settlement proceedings.498 In the absence of any special or additional rule of dispute settlement 
concerning Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, any review  of its invocation must be carried out in 
accordance with the DSU as a function of the terms of the provision interpreted in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.  
The Panel finds further guidance in the object and purpose as expressed in the preamble of 
the WTO  Agreement  "to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system 
encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization 
efforts, and all of t he results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations". In addition, 
the preambles of both the WTO  Agreement  and the GATT  1994 refer to the desire to contribute to 
the objectives of these agreements "by entering into reciprocal and mutually ad vantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations".499 In furtherance of these 
objectives, the WTO  Agreement  establishes a legal framework of rights and obligations that includes 
the rules and procedures applicable to disputes concerning the covered agreements in the DSU. The 
DSU "serves to preserve the right s and obligations of Members under the covered agreements"500 
and "[r]ecommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory 
settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under [the DSU] and the 
covered  agreements".501 The rules and procedures of the DSU are thus intended to maintain the 
balance between the rights and obligations of the Members502 as embodied in the covered 
agreements and the relevant provisions thereof raised by the parties to proceedings  under the DSU.  
 
interpretation neither expand nor diminish the actual terms used. In the present case, the Panel does not 
consider its interpretation to require any addition to the terms of Article  XXI(b), as the effectiveness of the 
subparagraphs derives from their existing terms read within the overall structure of the provision. (See 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  36, paras.  133-134 (arguing that the subparagraphs would 
require additional terms at the beginning of the subparagraphs to establish their separation from the relative 
clause beginning with "which it considers")).  
494 The Panel notes that the scope of the circumstances set out in the subparagraphs does not detract 
from a Member's consideration that action within the scope of the subparagraphs is necessary "for" a specific 
purpose and that the M ember's action pertain to "its" interest. (See United  States ' response to Panel question 
No. 36).  
495 In this sense, the United  States ' view that "the subparagraphs guide a Member's exercise of its rights  
under this provision" is compatible with the delimiting function served by the subparagraphs to define the 
circumstances and conditions under which action may be taken, "while reserving to the Member the judgment 
whether particular action is necessary to protect its essential security interests".  (United  States ' first written 
submission, para.  34 (emphasis added); see also Response to Panel question No.  35). 
496 Article  II:2 of the WTO  Agreement . 
497 Pursuant to Article  3.2 of the DSU, "Members affirm their ad herence to the principles for the 
management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947, and the rules and 
procedures as further elaborated and modified herein."  
498 Appendix  2 of the DSU does not provide any special or additio nal rules applying to disputes in which 
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 is invoked.  
499 The preamble of the GATT  1994 refers to "international commerce" instead of "international trade 
relations".  
500 Article  3.2 of the DSU.  
501 Article  3.4 of the DSU.  
502 See Arti cle 3.3 of the DSU.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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The provision of relevance to this dispute, Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994, establishes a 
right to take action for the protection of a Member's essential security interests and explicitly 
enumerates conditions in the subparagraphs that ar e an integral part of that right. The absence of 
explicit provision or elaboration in Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 as to whether and how its 
invocation may be reviewed does not, in itself, preclude or otherwise determine the review of that 
provision in dispute settlement proceedings.503 Rather, the scope and nature of such review derives 
from the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 and requirements of the DSU established under 
the WTO  Agreement , which acknowledges inter alia  the role of the WTO dispute settlement system 
in "providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system".504 If Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 is raised in dispute settlement proceedings, the DSU requires that it be addressed in 
accorda nce with the terms of the provision itself and within an objective assessment of the relevant 
measures and claims to make findings that will assist the DSB to make recommendations provided 
for in the covered agreements.  
In addition to the relevant text, c ontext, and object and purpose of the covered agreements, 
the parties have referred to various other materials regarding the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of 
the GATT  1994. These materials include: (a) negotiating history of Article  XXI of the GATT 1947  and 
preparatory works of the Havana Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO); (b) internal 
documents of the US delegation to the negotiation of the ITO draft charter and GATT 1947; (c) GATT 
Council Decisions under the GATT 1947; (d) views ex pressed by GATT contracting parties prior to 
the creation of the WTO; and (e) negotiating history of the Uruguay Round. Both parties contend 
that these materials provide support for their primary arguments on the terms of Article  XXI(b) of 
the GATT  1994 and the rule of interpretation in Article  31(1) of the Vienna  Convention .505 In 
Appendix  B to this Report, the Panel addresses the parties' arguments on the relevance of these 
materials to the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.  
As detailed in  Appendix  B, these materials do not provide clear guidance regarding the 
contested issues in this dispute, particularly concerning the scope and nature of the review of a 
Member's invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in proceedings under the DSU. In addition 
to questions on the precise legal status of these materials for purposes of treaty interpretation, the 
Panel does not find any clear indication in these materials of the "self -judging nature" or "non -
justiciability" of Article  XXI(b) of the GAT T 1994 as contended by the United  States .506 Rather, the 
Panel finds these materials to support the general conclusion that the terms of Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 establish a right to take action for the protection of essential security interests in t he 
conditions and circumstances described in the three subparagraphs.  
In conclusion, the entirety of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 is to be given meaning and 
effect in a manner that preserves the right and discretion of a Member to take action it consid ers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests under the conditions and circumstances 
described in subparagraphs (i) to (iii). The Panel does not consider that Article  XXI(b) of the 
GATT  1994 is "self -judging" or "non -justiciable" in the sense argued by the United  States , nor that 
the provision contains a "single relative clause" that wholly reserves the conditions and 
circumstances of the subparagraphs to the judgment of the invoking Member. In light of this 
conclusion and in accordan ce with relevant requirements of the DSU, the Panel turns to assess the 
United  States ' invocation of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994 in relation to the measures at issue.  
7.9.3   Assessment of the measures at issue  
The Panel will assess whether the measures found to be inconsistent with Articles I:1 , II:1, 
and XI:1  of the GATT  1994 were taken under the conditions and circumstances described in the 
subparagraphs of Article  XXI(b) of the GATT  1994.507  
 
503 The Panel notes that the invocation of Article  XX of the GATT  1994 titled "General Exceptions" has 
been reviewed in WTO dispute settlement proceedings notwithstanding the absence of an explicit provision in 
Article  XX on whether and h ow its invocation may be reviewed.  
504 Article  3.2 of the DSU.  
505 Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  56; United  States ' response to Panel question No.  56. 
506 See United  States ' first written submission , paras.  47, 56, and 106 . 
507 In light of the Panel's conclusion on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b)  and the arguments of the 
parties in this dispute , the Panel considers it appropriate to focus its assessment of the measures at issue on 
subparagraph (iii) and whether the measures  were "taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
 WT/DS564/R  
 
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As an initial matter, the Panel notes the objections by the complainant to the manner and 
timeliness of the United  States ' defence under Article  XXI(b)(iii), including concerns regarding due 
process and the Panel's independent assessment of the evidence and arguments on the record.508 
The Panel considers that the pa rties' due process rights have been fully maintained in these 
proceedings, during which the Panel has endeavoured to provide ample time and opportunity to 
address any evidence or arguments raised by the other party.509 Moreover, the Panel has engaged 
with s uch evidence and arguments in written questions and substantive meetings in order to fulfil 
its mandate under the DSU to make an objective assessment of the matter referred to the DSB and 
to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommend ations or in giving the rulings 
provided for in the covered agreements.510  
The United  States  has presented its specific arguments on the challenged measures subject 
to its interpretive argument that Article  XXI(b) is entirely "self -judging" and imposes no requirement 
to explain or identify a relevant circumstance in subparagraphs (i)  to (iii).511 Although the 
United  States  has focused its arguments on the interpretation of Article  XXI(b) and the discretion 
accorded by its terms to Members, it has also submit ted an extensive record of material relating to 
the measures at issue. Of particular note in this context are the Steel and Aluminium Reports of the 
USDOC and Presidential Proclamations setting out the legal basis under Section  232 for taking action 
on ste el and aluminium products. As described below, the United  States  has also elaborated its 
position throughout the course of the proceedings concerning the measures at issue and, in 
particular, the existence of an "emergency in international relations" withi n the meaning of 
Article  XXI(b)(iii) "in time of" which the measures were taken.  
The United  States ' first written submission focused on the argument that Article  XXI of the 
GATT  1994 is "self -judging" as a defence against WTO -inconsistencies and that its invocation by a 
Member is "non -justiciable" in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Following the first substantive 
meeting, the United  States  argued that "publicly available information" concerning its measures 
"could be understood to relate most naturally  to the circumstance described in Article  XXI(b)(iii)".512 
At the same time, the United  States  maintained its interpretive view that it is not necessary under 
Article  XXI for any Member to provide details relating to its invocation of the exception, nor "to  
identify the relevant subparagraph ending to that provision that an invoking Member may consider 
most relevant".513  
The United  States  subsequently elaborated its arguments regarding the measures at issue 
based on its interpretation of an "other emergency in international relations" as meaning "a situation 
of danger or conflict, concerning political or economic contact occurring between nations, which 
arises unexpectedly and requires urgent attention".514 In particular, the United  States  argued that 
"the ext ensive findings in the steel and aluminum reports are consistent with the United  States  
considering the measures at issue to be taken 'in time of war or other emergency in international 
 
relations". The Panel notes that previous panels have assessed measures under Security Exceptions for "action 
which [a Member] considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" beginning with the 
relevant subparagraph of the provision at issue. (See Panel  Report s, Russa – Traffic in Transit , paras.  7.108 -
7.109; Saudi Arabia – IPRs; para.  7.242).  
508 See Türkiye 's response to Panel question No.  71; comments after  the second meeting  of the Panel . 
509 For example, at the closing of the second substantive meeting, the Panel indicated that the parties 
would have an opportunity to provide written comments on any issue raised during the meeting, including 
arguments on Article  XXI(b)(iii) made during closing statements. The parties were accordingly invited to 
provide written comments following the second substantive meeting and given an opportunity to make any 
additional comments in response. The Panel considers the procedural a rrangements in this dispute, including 
the overall time given to the parties for written submissions and comments, to have afforded the parties 
adequate opportunity to be heard and to respond to arguments made by the other party as required for the 
protect ion of their due process rights. (See Appellate  Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines) , 
para. 147). 
510 See e.g. Appellate  Body Reports, US – Shrimp , para.  106; EC and certain member states – Large 
Civil Aircraft , para.  1317; Australia – Tobacco Pl ain Packaging , para.  6.244.  
511 See e.g. United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92. 
512 United  States ' second written submission , para.  26.  
513 United  States ' second written submission , para.  25. According to the United  States , its invocation of 
Article  XXI(b) indicated its consideration "that any or all of the three circumstances described in the 
subparagraphs are present", and whatever burden of proof attached to Article  XXI(b) "is discharged once the 
Member indicates, in the context of dispute settlem ent, that it has made such a determination" that it 
"consider[s] one or more of the circumstances set forth in Article  XXI(b) to be present". (United  States ' 
response to Panel question Nos. 50 and 52. See also United  States ' second written submission, para s. 43-44). 
514 See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  relations'."515 The United  States  cited various findings in the Steel a nd Aluminium Reports and 
argued that "the findings cited above relating to the threatened impairment of national security by 
steel and aluminum imports, and the global crisis circumstances under which such importations were 
occurring, are consistent with t he United  States  considering that an 'other emergency in 
international relations' exists – that is, a situation of danger or conflict, concerning political or 
economic contact occurring between nations, which arises unexpectedly and requires urgent 
attenti on."516 
In its closing statement at the second substantive meeting, the United  States  argued that, 
"even on the complainant's understanding of Article  XXI(b) as not self-judging, … [t]he record before 
the Panel demonstrates that the United  States  considers the measures at issue to be necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests and taken 'in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations'."517 The United  States  referred to findings in the Steel Report on "whether an 
emergency related to steel excess capacity exists" to comment that, "in 2017, it emerged that global 
efforts to address the crises would be insufficient. While the DOC steel report  noted that the excess 
capacity crisis is a global problem that steel -producing nations have committed to 'work together on 
possible solutions,' the report observed the limits of the global efforts, including the work of the 
Global Forum on Steel Excess Ca pacity."518 The United  States  argued that "what the DOC steel report 
conveys is that the United  States  was at a crucial point [and] that without immediate action, the 
steel industry could suffer damages that may be difficult to reverse and reach a point whe re it cannot 
maintain or increase production to address national emergencies."519 The United  States  additionally 
argued that "[a]n industry facing 'fundamental changes' brought on by a 'production revolution' can 
certainly lead to unexpected developments, p articularly when that industry is facing an 'acute' 
situation of global excess capacity that is the highest in the industry's history."520  
The Panel notes that the United  States  has referred to the appendi x in the Steel Report 
concerning global excess capa city in connection with the existence of an "emergency in international 
relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii).521 In addition, the United  States  has referred to the G20 Global 
Steel Forum Report of 2017 noting that excess capacity is a "global challenge" whi ch risks "the 
viability of an industry that produces a material which is vital for the functioning of economies and 
societies".522 The G20 Global Steel Forum Report of 2017 cited by the United  States  also describes 
the situation of excess steelmaking capaci ty as "particularly acute since 2015" and addresses the 
outlook of global steelmaking capacity.523 Further, the United  States  refers to remarks of the EU 
Commissioner for Trade at the OECD High -Level Symposium on Steel expressing concerns on steel 
overcapac ity.524  
The Panel will assess the evidence and arguments submitted in this dispute in accordance 
with the requirement under Article  11 of the DSU to make "an objective assessment of the facts of 
the case and the applicability of and conformity with the rel evant covered agreements". In addition 
to the interpretive conclusions reached above525, the Panel's assessment will be based on an 
interpretation of the terms of subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b) in accordance with Article  3.2 of 
 
515 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  42. 
516 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  49. 
517 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  41. (emphasis original)  
518 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, paras.  49-50. 
519 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  52.  
520 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  53. The Uni ted States  cited the 
following passages in G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), (Exhibit USA -
72): "The situation of excess steelmaking capacity 'has become particularly acute since 2015'; 'the steel 
industry will have to ad just in response to fundamental changes in economic activity brought on by the 'next 
production revolution.'" ( Ibid. p. 2); "In 2016, the global surplus in steelmaking capacity is estimated to have 
reached around 737  million  metric tonnes, the highest leve l seen in the history of the steel industry. If the 
announced capacity expansions until 2020 take place, this excess capacity will further increase". ( Ibid. p. 4). 
521 See United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  45 (referring to Steel Report , (Exhibit 
TUR-3 and USA -7), Appendix  L: "Global Excess Capacity in Steel Production" and its commentary on OECD 
analyses and the policy recommendations from the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity) . 
522 United  States ' opening statement of the first meeting of the Panel, para.  57.  
523 See G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), ( Exhibit USA -72); 
United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of the Panel, para.  53. 
524 See Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström,  "Way ahead for the global steel industry", OECD 
High-Level Symposium on Steel , (Exhibit USA -240); United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting of 
the Panel , para.  54. 
525 See section 7.9.2 above.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  the DSU and customary r ules of interpretation of public international law. Based on this 
interpretation as well as the evidence and arguments submitted by the parties, the Panel will assess 
whether the "action[s] which [the United  States ] considers necessary for the protection o f its 
essential security interests" were taken under the circumstances described in the subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. 
Under subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b), a Member may take action which it considers 
necessary for the protect ion of its essential security interests "in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations". Dictionary definitions of the term "emergency" include "[a] situation, esp. 
of danger or conflict, that arises unexpectedly and requires urgent attentio n", "a condition requiring 
immediate treatment", or a "pressing need".526 The relevant emergency within the meaning of 
subparagraph (iii) must be "in international relations". The term "relations" may be defined as "[t]he 
various ways by which a country, St ate, etc., maintains political or economic contact with 
another"527, while the term "international" may be defined as "[e]xisting, occurring, or carried on 
between nations; pertaining to relations, communications, travel, etc., between nations" .528 The 
phras e "international relations" may thus be understood to mean interactions between nations or 
national governments.529 The terms of  Article  XXI(b)(iii) appear to distinguish the relevant 
emergency under that subparagraph from an emergency in purely domestic or national affairs and 
indicate the "international" character of the emergency in time of which Members are not prevented 
from taking action under Article  XXI(b).  
The term "war" precedes the phrase "or other emergency in international relations"  in 
subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b) and provides immediate context for its interpretation. Dictionary 
definitions of "war" include "[h]ostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between 
nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the  same nation or state; the employment of armed 
forces against a foreign power, or against an opposing party in the state".530 Based on its ordinary 
meaning, "war" involves a state of conflict characteri zed by the use of force. This is further confirmed 
by the French and Spanish language versions of Article  XXI(b)(iii), where the terms " guerre " and 
"guerra " similarly signify armed struggles or outbreak of hostilities.531  
The Panel finds that the reference to "war" informs the meaning of "emergency in 
internat ional relations" as part of the circumstances "in time of" which a Member may act under 
Article  XXI(b) for the protection of its essential security interests. In particular, the Panel considers 
that an  "emergency in international relations" within the mean ing of Article  XXI(b)(iii) must be, if 
not equally grave or severe, at least comparable in its gravity or severity to a "war" in terms of its 
impact on international relations. This understanding is supported by the French and Spanish 
language versions of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, where the terms corresponding to 
"emergency in international relations" are " grave tension internationale " and " grave tensión 
internacional " respectively. The term " grave " in these languages may be understood as referr ing to 
international tensions that are of a critical or serious nature in terms of their impact on the conduct 
of international relations.  
 
526 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 814. See also 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  51 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford  English Dictionary , 4th 
edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -86), p. 806 ).  
527 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 2520. See also 
United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92 (referrin g to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th 
edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -222), p. 2534 ). 
528 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th Edition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 1404. See also 
United  States ' response to Pan el question No.  92 (referring to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary , 4th 
edn, L. Brown (ed.) (Clarendon Press, 1993), ( Exhibit USA -222), p. 1397 ).  
529 See also Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, March 2022) (defining 
"international relations" as "relations between nations, national governments, international organizations") and 
Black's Law Dictionary, 9th edn, B.A. Garner (ed.) (West Group 2009), p. 893 (defining "international relations" 
as "[g]lobal political interac tion, primarily among sovereign nations").  
530 Oxford English Dictionary Online (Oxford University Press, March 2022).  
531 See Le Petit Robert Dictionnaire de la Langue Fran çaise (2000), p. 1183 (defining " guerre " as " [l]utte 
armée entre groupes sociaux " (arme d struggle between social groups) or " [l]es questions militaires " (military 
matters)); Diccionario de la Lengua Española , 22nd Edition  (Real Academia Española, 2001), p. 795 (defining 
"guerra " as " [d]esavenencia y rompimiento de la paz entre dos o más pote ncias" (disagreement and breach of 
peace between two or more powers) or " [l]ucha armada entre dos o más naciones o entre bandos de una 
misma nación " (armed struggle between two or more nations or between sides of the same nation)).  WT/DS564/R  
 
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Further, under subparagraph (iii) of Article  XXI(b), action for the protection of essential 
security interests must b e "taken in time of" an emergency in international relations. As discussed 
above, the Panel understands these opening terms of subparagraph (iii) to qualify and describe the 
"action" referred to in Article  XXI(b). The phrase "taken in time of" in subparagr aph (iii) describes 
the temporal link between the action taken by a Member under Article  XXI(b) and the "war  or other 
emergency in international relations" in subparagraph (iii) of that Article.  
The Panel also considers relevant the context provided by th e subparagraphs of 
Article  XXI(b) in conjunction with the terms used in paragraph (b) of Article  XXI, which concerns 
actions taken by a Member for the protection of its "essential security interests". As discussed above, 
the description of these security i nterests as "essential" indicates the heightened significance of the 
security interests that Members are not prevented from taking action to protect pursuant to 
Article  XXI(b). Actions taken by a Member for the protection of its essential security interest s may 
concern "fissionable materials" under subparagraph (i), "traffic" involving certain military interests 
under subparagraph (ii), and "war or other emergency in international relations" under subparagraph 
(iii). The Panel is guided by the delimiting function of the subparagraphs in construing subparagraph 
(iii) to refer to circumstances of a certain gravity or severity  in terms of their impact on the conduct 
of international relations, as part of the balance of rights and obligations reflected in the or dinary 
meaning of the terms of Article  XXI(b), interpreted in their context and in light of the object and 
purpose of the GATT  1994 and WTO  Agreement .532  
With respect to the measures at issue, the Panel notes that the United  States  has referred 
in its argu ments regarding  Article  XXI(b)(iii) to factors considered by the USDOC  in the Steel and 
Aluminium Reports. These Reports reflect the domestic legislative basis and statutory terms of 
Section  232, particularly the factors to be considered in investigations by the USDOC and the 
reference to importation "in such quantities or u nder such circumstances" that the imports "threaten 
to impair the national security".533 The Panel notes that various factors relied upon by US authorities 
are treated cumulatively  in support of the determination to act under Section  232. Specifically, the 
Steel and Aluminium Reports identify "three factors" as the basis for finding with respect to steel 
and aluminium that "weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security", namely: 
(a) displacement of domestic steel/aluminium by excessive i mports; (b) the consequent adverse 
impact on the economic welfare of the domestic steel/aluminium industry; and (c) the global excess 
capacity in steel and aluminium.534 The Panel notes that the first two factors focus predominantly 
on developments relating  to the domestic situation of steel and aluminium industries in the 
United  States535, while the third focuses on a global aspect of the situation .  
The analysis and conclusions of the USDOC  in the Steel and Aluminium Reports do not 
purport to identify or address the existence of an "emergency in international relations" within the 
meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. The determinations of US domestic authorities under 
Section  232 relate to a different legal standard and basis  under US municipal law  than the provisions 
of the covered agreements within the Panel's mandate under the DSU. Accordingly, the factors relied 
upon by the USDOC and conclusions in the Steel and Aluminium Repo rts are distinct from, and 
cannot be directly transposed to, the terms of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994 and the objective 
assessment required under Article  11 of the DSU. Therefore, the factors treated cumulatively by US 
domestic authorities under S ection  232 may not be regarded as having commensurate relevance or 
weight in the Panel's objective assessment as to whether the measures were taken "in time of war 
or other emergency in international relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. The 
assessment of the Panel in this dispute concerns the United  States ' specific arguments in connection 
with the existence of an "emergency in international relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii) and, in 
 
532 See paras.  7.139  and 7.140  above.  
533 The USDOC noted the non -exhaustive list of factors to be c onsidered in connection with "national 
security" under Section  232 and the list of factors for the US Secretary of Commerce to consider in determining 
if imports "threaten to impair the national security". (See Steel Report , (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), pp. 13-15; 
Aluminium Report , (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), pp. 12 -14 (referring to Section  232(d))).  
534 Steel Report , (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), p. 16; Alumin ium Report , (Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), p. 
15.  
535 See e.g. Steel Report , (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), sections V.B.4 -10 and V.C; Alumin ium Report , 
(Exhibit TUR -4 and USA -8), sections VI.H and VI.C.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  particular, its references to an international situati on of global excess capacity in steel and 
aluminium.536  
The Panel observes that, in its arguments under Article  XXI(b), the United  States  refers to 
this international situation – i.e. global excess capacity  in steel and aluminium – in connection with 
the impact of imports on domestic producers of steel and aluminium, as reflected in the conclusions 
of the USDOC in the Steel and Aluminium Reports.537 The United  States  refers to factors addressed 
by the USDOC in the Steel and Aluminium Reports as evidence that  it "considers" the measures at 
issue to have been "taken in time" of an "emergency in international relations" within the meaning 
of Article  XXI(b)(iii). In this regard, the Panel notes the United  States ' argument that "the extensive 
findings in the steel  and aluminum reports are consistent with the United  States  considering the 
measures at issue to be taken 'in time of war or other emergency in international relations'."538 The 
United  States  additionally argues that "the Panel should find [that] the United  States  has provided 
information that it considers the measure necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests … [and] that the United  States  has provided information that i t considers the measure 
'taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations', the circumstance in 
subparagraph ending (iii)".539 
The Panel recalls its conclusion that the terms "which it considers" in Article  XXI(b) do not 
qualify the subpar agraphs to render them "self -judging" as argued by the United  States .540 While 
the United  States  contends that it has "provided information that it considers" the measures at issue 
to fall under Article  XXI(b)(iii), the review of such information in accorda nce with the DSU requires 
an objective ascertainment of factors relating to the relevant "emergency in international relations" 
under subparagraph (iii), as distinguished from factors pertaining to what is reserved to a Member's 
consideration under paragra ph (b) of Article  XXI. The United  States  refers to factors that were 
cumulatively considered by domestic authorities in support of the determination to act under 
Section  232. As noted, these factors concern both the domestic situation of steel and aluminiu m 
industries as well as global excess capacity.  
In the Panel's view, the factors  raised by the United  States  on the impact of imports on 
domestic producers of steel and aluminium , including the consideration of US domestic authorities 
of "national securit y" under Section  232, pertain more to the "action which [the United  States ] 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests" under paragraph (b) of 
Article  XXI.541 However, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, subparagraph (iii) 
requires a distinct inquiry as to whether the actions were taken in time of an "emergency in 
international relations" based on an objective assessment of relevant evidence and arguments.  
In this connection, t he Panel notes the evidence subm itted by the United  States  of 
international concerns regarding global excess capacity in steel and aluminium, including the 
discussion of such concerns in the Steel and Aluminium Reports.  The statements at the international 
level referred to by the United  States  indicate that the issue of global excess capacity in steel and 
aluminium has be en a topic of high -level discussion and expressions of concern in various 
international fora.542 As reflected in information provided by the United  States  in this dispute, the 
discussion of global excess capacity focuses on specific sectors and is evidence of the fact that the 
issue has been raised as a matter of international attention within the co nduct of international 
relations of various countries. Notwithstanding such evidence of international engagement, the Panel 
 
536 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  45 (referring to Steel Report , (Exhibit TUR -3 
and USA -7), Appendix  L: "Global Excess Capacity in Steel Production" and its commentary on OECD analyses 
and the policy recommendations from the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity); see also United  States ' 
closing statement at the second meeting, paras.  49-50). 
537 See Steel Report , (Exhibit TUR -3 and USA -7), section  VI; Aluminium Report , (Exhibit TUR -4 and 
USA-8), section  VII. 
538 United  States ' response to Panel question No.  92, para.  42. 
539 United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  42. 
540 See para.  7.143  above.  
541 See e.g. United  States ' closing statement at the second meeting, para.  18. (stating that "the 
measures challenged were on steel and aluminum (key so urces for military vehicles, weapons, and systems for 
critical national infrastructure) that the United  States  has taken for national security purposes"  and referring to 
"an industry that is vital to our national security and whose decline threatens to imp air our national security") ; 
response to Panel question No.  92(a). See also paras.  7.98, 7.103 -7.106  and 7.113 -7.114  above . 
542 See e.g. G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), (Exhibit US A-72); 
Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström, "Way ahead for the global steel industry", OECD High -Level 
Symposium on Steel , (Exhibit US A-240).  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  recalls that an "emergency in international relations" under Article  XXI(b)(iii) refers to situations of 
a certain gravity or severi ty and international tensions that are of a critical or serious nature in terms 
of their impact on the conduct of international relations.  
Having  carefully reviewed the relevant evidence and arguments submitted in this dispute, 
and particularly those submi tted by the United  States  in relation to global excess capacity, the Panel 
is not persuaded that the situation to which the United  States  refers rises to the gravity or severity 
of tensions on the international plane so as to constitute an "emergency in in ternational relations"  
during which a Member may act under Article  XXI(b)(iii).543 For example, the G20 Global Steel Forum 
Report "focuses on the steel sector and provides concrete policy solutions to reduce steel excess 
capacity".544 In referring to excess steelmaking capacity as "a global challenge that has become 
particularly acute since 2015", the report highlights various efforts within the Global Steel Forum in 
light of trends in the sector as part of "[g]lobal cooperation to find solutions to tackle ex cess capacity 
in the steel market".545 Such evidence submitted by the United  States  in this dispute reflects 
international concern expressed in the context of cooperative efforts to address excess capacity in 
a specific sector.546 In the Panel's view, howeve r, the gravity or severity of an "emergency in 
international relations" within the meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii), particularly regarding the impact on 
international relations of situations falling under that provision, has not been established based on 
the evidence and arguments submitted in this dispute. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel is 
mindful of its mandate in this dispute547 as well as the balance of rights and obligations reflected in 
the terms of Article  XXI of the GATT  1994 interpreted in ac cordance with the DSU.  
7.9.4   Conclusion  
In conclusion, the Panel does not find , based on the evidence and arguments submitted in 
this dispute, that the measures at issue were "taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations" within the meanin g of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. Therefore, the 
Panel finds that the inconsistencies of the measures at issue with Articles I:1 , II:1, and XI:1  of the 
GATT  1994 are not justified under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. 
8  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION  
8.1.  For the reasons set forth in this Report, the Panel concludes as follows:  
a. Regarding T ürkiye 's claims under Article  II of the GATT  1994: 
i. the additional duties of 25% on steel products and 10% on aluminium products do not 
accord the treatment  provided for in the United  States ' Schedule, contrary to 
Article  II:1(b) and Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994; 
 
543 The Panel notes in this regard that previous panels have found situations to constitute an 
"emerg ency in international relations" under Security Exceptions based on the particular evidence and 
circumstances at issue in those disputes. In a dispute under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994, such evidence 
included international recognition of the degre e of deterioration of relations between two Members and a 
situation involving armed conflict during a certain time period. (See Panel  Report , Russa – Traffic in Transit , 
paras.  7.122 -7.123). In another dispute under Article  73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS  Agreemen t (the corresponding 
provision to Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994 in the TRIPS  Agreement ), such evidence included  the 
severance of all diplomatic, consular, and economic relations between two Members. (See Panel  Report , Saudi 
Arabia – IPRs; paras.  7.257 -7.266).  
544 G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), ( Exhibit USA -72), p. 2.  
545 G20, Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity Report  (30 November  2017), ( Exhibit USA -72), pp. 2 -3. 
The report describes the formal establishment of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity and notes that 
"the OECD acts as the facilitator to the Global Forum". ( Ibid. para. 6). The report further describes efforts to 
develop an "information -sharing mechanism" in a "tangible process [that] contributes to the collective trust 
and confidence that are necessary to find collective solutions to the challenge of excess capaci ty". (Ibid. 
paras.  7-8). 
546 The United  States  refers to other evidence that similarly reflects expressions of concern in the 
context of specific international initiatives. For example, the United  States  refers to remarks by the EU 
Commissioner for Trade at the OECD High -Level Symposium on Steel expre ssing concerns on steel 
overcapacity while noting ongoing interventions as well as recommendations for international cooperation. 
(Remarks dated 18  April 2016 of C. Malmström, "Way ahead for the global steel industry", OECD High -Level 
Symposium on Steel , (Exhibit USA -240)).  
547 See section 7.1 above.  WT/DS564/R  
 
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  ii. the additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye  does not accord the 
treatment provided for in the United  States ' Schedule, contrary to  Article  II:1(b) and 
Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994; and  
iii. the additional duties of 25% on derivative steel products and 10% on derivative 
aluminium products do not accord the treatment provided for in the United  States ' 
Schedule, contrary to Article  II:1(b) and Article  II:1(a) of the GATT  1994. 
b. Regarding T ürkiye 's claims under Article  I of the GATT  1994: 
i. the country exemptions for steel and aluminium products confer an advantage to 
products from Australia, Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic o f Korea  that has not been 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products from all other Members, in 
a manner inconsistent with Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994; 
ii. the country exemptions for steel and aluminium products confer an advantage to 
products from Canada and Mexico that has not been accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to like products from all other Members, in a manner inconsistent with 
Article  I:1 of the GATT  1994; and  
iii. the additional duty of 50% on steel products from T ürkiye  confers an advantage to 
steel products from all other countries that has not been accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to like products from T ürkiye , in a manner inconsistent with Article  I:1 
of the GATT  1994. 
c. Regarding T ürkiye 's claims under Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994, by imposing  import 
quotas on steel and aluminium products from  Argentina, Brazil , and the Republic of Korea , 
the United  States  has instituted prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or 
other charge s on the importation of those products of the territory of those Members , 
inconsistently with Article  XI:1 of the GATT  1994. 
d. Regarding T ürkiye 's claims under Article  X of the GATT  1994, the Panel does not consider 
it necessary to make findings on Türkiye 's claims relating to the administration of the 
process es for excluding certain countries or products from measures that have already 
been found inconsistent with other obligations under the GATT  1994. The Panel therefore 
declines to make findings regarding the claims under Article  X:3(a) of the GATT  1994.  
e. Regarding Türkiye 's claims under Article  XIX of the GATT  1994 and the Agreement on 
Safeguards,  the Panel finds that the relevant measures at issue were sought, taken, or 
maintained pursuant to a provision of the GATT  1994 other than Article  XIX, namely  
Article  XXI of the GATT  1994, within the meaning of Article  11.1(c) of the Agreement on 
Safeguards. The Panel therefore finds that the Agreement on Safeguards does not apply 
to the measures at issue . 
f. Regarding Article  XXI of the GATT  1994, the Panel does not find that the measures at issue 
were "taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations" within the 
meaning of Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994. The Panel  therefore  finds tha t the 
inconsistencies of the measures at issue with Articles I:1 , II:1, and XI:1 of the GATT  1994 
are not justified under Article  XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT  1994.  
Under Article  3.8 of the DSU , in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations 
assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie  to constitute a case of 
nullification or impairment. The Panel concludes  that, to the extent that the measures at issue are  
inconsistent with certain provisions of the GATT  1994, they have nullified or impaired benefits 
accruing to Türkiye  under that Agreement.  
Pursuant to Article  19.1 of the DSU, the Panel recommends that the United  States  bring its 
WTO-inconsistent measures into conformity with its obligations under the GATT  1994. 
__________